

INQUIRY

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE

REORGANIZATION

OF THE

ARMIES OF INDIA.

REPLIES

WITH REFERENCE TO THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER FROM THE


Honorable the Court of Directors to the Government of India,

No. 235—25th November 1857,

AS ALSO ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT,

WITH

PRECIS AND RETURNS ATTACHED.



INQUIRY ON THE SUBJECT
OF THE
RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY
IN
INDIA.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT,

No. 235 of 1857.

Our Governor General of India in Council.

WE trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, shall have ended your efforts to put down the mutiny of the Native Army of your Presidency, and to re-establish the authority of the Government in the disturbed districts, you will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select Officers of ability and experience to assist you, by investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming wise conclusions on the most important subject which must soon press for decision, namely, the proper organization of our Army in India.

2. To this end, we authorize you to appoint, as soon as circumstances will permit, a Commission composed of Military Officers of the Armies of the three Presidencies (to whom should be associated Officers of the Queen's Army who have had experience in Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely, together with one or more Civil Servants, whom you may consider to be specially qualified to discharge such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general administrative experience.

3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this Commission, we are desirous that the following heads of enquiry should be specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to deserve their attention:—

1st.—Should Corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and be local only?

2nd.—Should Corps be composed of Troops or Companies, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the Regiment?

3rd.—Should a Company or Companies of Europeans form a component part of the Regiments?

4th.—What alterations should be made in your recruiting Regulations relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future composition of the Native Army?

5th.—Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate Regiments, or in Companies, or otherwise?

6th.—Whether, in Native Infantry Regiments, the discontinuance of the grades of Native Commissioned Officers, and the substitution of an European Serjeant and Corporal to each Company is advisable, and if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish graduated scales of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service?

7th.—Whether the system of promotion, generally, by seniority, to the grade of native Commissioned Officers, (if these are retained,) should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at Madras and Bombay?

8th.—If separate Corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for each branch respectively?

9th.—Have the powers of Commanding Officers of Native Corps, and the powers of Officers in charge of Companies, been diminished? What consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for the improvement of discipline?

10th.—Should Cadets be trained and drilled in European Regiments before they are posted to Native Regiments? or what would be the best mode of drilling and training Cadets before they are posted to Native Regiments?

11th.—Should the special rules regulating punishment in the Native Army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British Army, or ought there to be any, and what changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

12th.—How can the demands for European Officers for Staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of Regiments?

4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the Commission, and the opinions to be offered by them, are to have reference to the several branches of the Native Army, Infantry, regular and irregular; Cavalry, regular and irregular; Artillery, and Sappers and Miners; and with respect to the Artillery and Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed, as heretofore, of Europeans and Natives, or be entirely European.

5. To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the Native portion of the Army in India generally, and at each Presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call on the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the Members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough development of the important questions at issue, you will refer the views of the Commission for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, and will then furnish us with the result of your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures, which should, in your judgment, be taken for the organization and maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.

7. The Commission itself may be instructed to make to the Governor General in Council any suggestions or recommendations which occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified heads of inquiry.

We are, &c.,
 (Signed) R. D. MANGLES.
 „ F. CURRIE.
 &c. &c.

LONDON ;
 The 25th November 1857. }

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 No.

FROM

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special Duty with the Governor General.

TO

Allahabad, the 21st May 1858.

SIR,

UNDER instructions from the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, I have the honor to forward a printed copy of Letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.

2. Circumstances having rendered it hitherto impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our Troops in the Field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the authority of Government in the disturbed districts, to constitute such a Commission as the Honorable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing from eminent and experienced Public Servants, Civil and Military, their opinions on the several heads of the inquiry, the conduct of which would otherwise have been inapplicable to the Commission.

questions have

sive than in respect to the order in which these heads shall be taken up, His Lordship's will, however, be that, the main features of the revolt of the Native Army in Bengal, and the necessary financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entail, are sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Government must first be directed ; that point being the strength and the composition of the European Army which must be permanently maintained in India, as the basis of our power and security.

4. This being so, the fifth paragraph of the Honorable Court's Despatch becomes the one of primary importance, and indeed a decision on the point above noticed, as well as on the question raised in that paragraph, viz., the proportion which the European should bear to the Native portion of the Army in India generally, and at each Presidency separately, will go far to simplify enquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which will then be brought clearly into view.

5. Impressed with the necessity for a speedy, though a well-considered settlement of these fundamental data, the Governor General has directed me to forward, for your attentive consideration, the appended series of questions, and to request that replies may be returned with as little delay as the weighty nature of the points referred for your opinion may render practicable.

6. This series of questions will be followed by other series upon the various heads to which the Court's Despatch calls attention; therefore, in replying to those which I am now directed to place before you, there will be no necessity for touching upon the many important particulars to which the Letter of the Hon'ble Court adverts, but which are foreign to the main question raised in the fifth paragraph.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. M. DURAND, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
On special Duty with the Governor General.

FROM

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special Duty with the Governor General, Allahabad.

TO

Dated Allahabad, the 15th June 1858

SIR,

MY Letter No. of the 21st May last, will have prepared you for the receipt of other series of questions upon the various heads to which Letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Honorable the Court of Directors, had called attention.

2. By direction of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, be the honor to forward a series of questions connected with the re-organization of the Infantry branch of the Service.

3. The questions now forwarded, are upon the recruiting and ^{the} ~~of~~ the ^{ch} ~~of~~ Corps. The questions upon the second, third, and fourth heads of the ^{on} ~~of~~ g ^{an} ~~of~~ cation, will follow as soon as they are received from the Press, and will ^{the} ~~of~~ without any accompanying letter.

4. Such of the questions as are not applicable, will, of course, require no other reply than a statement to that effect. The questions having to be framed for wide and general circulation, entailed the necessity of their being comprehensive, and precluded their limitation, otherwise than by marginal manuscript direction, to the special circumstances of the several Civil and Military Authorities to be addressed.

5. I have only to repeat that the Governor General is desirous, that replies be furnished with as little delay as the nature and complexity of the points referred for your opinion, may render practicable.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. M. DURAND, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
On special Duty with the Governor General.

No.

FROM

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special Duty with the Governor General, Allahabad.

TO

Allahabad, the 15th June 1858.

SIR,

UNDER instructions from the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, I have the honor to forward the copy of letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, and with reference to the various heads to which the Court's Despatch calls attention, I am directed to enclose, for your consideration, the accompanying series of questions connected with the re-organization of the Native Infantry of the

2. The questions upon the second, third and fourth heads of the general classification, will shortly be transmitted to you.

3. Upon these different series of questions, His Lordship's desire is, that replies be given with the least practicable delay.

4. You will do me the favor to bear in mind that those questions which are inapplicable to yourself require no reply other than a statement to that effect. As the questions had to be printed for wide and general circulation, they are more comprehensive than if they had been framed to suit each special reference. The marginal directions will, however, instruct you as to the general questions to which it does not seem necessary to give you the trouble of turning your attention.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. M. DURAND, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
On Special Duty with the Governor General.

QUESTIONS

Having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857. Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

- 1.** What is the number of European Troops of each arm now serving and what is their distribution ?
- 2.** What is the number of European Troops of each arm you deem necessary for and what should be their ordinary distribution ?
- 3.** What is the number of Native Troops of each arm now serving in and what is their distribution ?
- 4.** What is the number of Native Troops you deem necessary for and what should be their ordinary distribution ?
- 5.** What proportion of Native Troops now serving in _____ are Regulars, Irregulars and Police Corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur ?
- 6.** What proportion of your proposed Establishment of Native Troops should be Regulars, Irregulars and Police ?
- 7.** What proportion should the European bear to the Native Troops in _____ and state the ratios both inclusive and exclusive of Police Corps ?
- 8.** What proportion should the European bear to the Native Troops in India generally, and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of Native Police Corps ?
- 9.** Is there adequate Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now serving in _____ and state its amount ?
- 10.** Would additional Barrack accommodation have to be provided in _____ for the strength of European Troops you deem necessary, and to what extent ?
- 11.** What proportion of the European Force should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, and what portion should be composed of Troops raised for service in India ?

12. Under the supposition that additional Corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them ?

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of Corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army, will this accession of seniority promotion Corps create any greater embarrassment in juxta-position with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Marines, and the three Indian Armies in all which Corps and Armies seniority promotion is the system ?

14. The feasibility of raising Corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to Native and Foreign mercenary Troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8, if so, to what extent ?

No. 121.

FROM

MAJOR-GENERAL W. R. MANSFIELD,
Chief of the Staff,

TO

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DURAND, C. B.

Dated 4th September 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to send you the answers to certain series of questions respecting the future organization of the Bengal Army, in obedience to the commands of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General.

In order more fully to explain my meaning than appeared to me to be possible by adhering solely to my answers to the questions, I have ventured to add a Minute containing my views at length on the solution of the matter proposed for consideration.

/ I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, *Major-General,*
Chief of the Staff.

ALLAHABAD, }
The 4th September 1858. }

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Allahabad, 13th July 1858.

I VENTURE, with considerable diffidence, to add a Minute to my series of answers to the questions proposed for consideration, under the orders of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General.

It has appeared to me that by the adoption of this course, I may be able more thoroughly to elucidate my thoughts on the great subject of these questions than by presenting them only in a form which, to a certain degree, interferes with their connection, and therefore with close argument.

Perhaps it may be well to say, *in limine*, that my views are not merely of yesterday, since the great outbreak and rebellion of last year; but that they were the results of thought many years ago, when owing to my position of Command of one of Her Majesty's Regiments, I was thrown much into contact with the Native Army of Bengal.

These views have been greatly strengthened by late occurrences.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH NATIVE ARMIES SHOULD BE FORMED.

Without attempting to indicate the original causes of the mutinies of the Bengal Army, we may admit that the loyalty of the Corps which remained true to their Colors, has been an affair of circumstances.

This remark applies as much to the Native Corps in the Armies of Madras and Bombay, as to the few and isolated faithful Regiments of Bengal.

In the two former the disease of mutiny did at times make its appearance, but the favorable circumstances were too strong to permit of its spreading; and taken as a whole, the two Armies have passed through a very terrible ordeal in a manner almost incredible.

To attribute this wonderful result to one of the circumstances, *viz.*, a better system of discipline as compared with the system and discipline of the Army of Bengal, would be indeed an error.

We are not surprised to find the Officers of the Madras and Bombay Armies assume that a great superiority distinguishes them in this respect.

Perhaps this may be the case owing to their smaller numbers, although it is denied by many not incompetent judges.

Admitting it to be true, we must regard the fact as only one of the circumstances which conduced towards that result of which the Officers of the two Southern Armies are so justly proud.

If we look a little further, we shall find another circumstance from which a most important lesson may be learnt, containing, perhaps, the vital principle to be followed in the reconstruction of the Army of Bengal.

The Armies of Bombay and Madras being quite separate and apart from that of Bengal, having different interests, different system, and different services to show, are animated by an "*esprit-de-corps*" of their own, and it may be presumed, entertain much jealousy of the larger body to which a certain pre-eminence has been awarded on account of its vastly superior numbers, and of the constant wars in which it has of late been engaged.

In this term of "*esprit-de-corps*" is included the feeling of separate nationality and race, which is always apparent in Troops raised in different parts of a large Empire.

If we may judge of the feelings of the Soldiery by those of the Officers, of which the latter make no secret, from the Generals down to the Ensigns, we shall be hardly liable to error in ascribing a strong antipathy in the Southern Armies towards the great one of the North.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate what is so much known to every one—the constitution of the late Bengal Army.

Suffice it to say that that Army, owing to the manner in which it was recruited, formed an immense quasi-masonic brotherhood from Peshawur to Calcutta, and from the Himalaya to the Nerbudda. With that river the agency of the brotherhood stopped, and other Military bodies were beyond, which refused to acknowledge its signs, or to obey its behests.

The unwise tendency of the Bombay Government of late years to give a preference to the Poorbeas of Oude, on account of the comeliness of such recruits, had nearly caused its Army to be affiliated to the brotherhood of Bengal. Fortunately the mischief had not gone far enough to complete the process, when the outbreak of last year took place.

To this only may the safety of the Bombay Army under Providence be now attributed.

We have sufficient evidence to show on what a precipice it was for some time standing on the account stated, and the Cavalry of Madras, in which the same error was committed, gives testimony of a like nature respecting the Army of that Presidency, though in a far less degree, as the men enlisted in the Northern Provinces were few in number as compared with the Poorbeas in the service of Bombay.

The manner in which the warlike population of the Punjab has been employed in crushing the mutiny of the Army, and the general insurrection in the Presidency of Bengal, is another instance differing in kind, but not in idea, of the sentiment which has so largely conduced to the safety of Southern India.

It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindostan, and hated the Bengal Army, that the Seikhs have flocked to our standards, instead of seizing the opportunity to strike again for their freedom.

They wanted to revenge themselves, and to gain riches by the plunder of the Hindoostanee cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay. It was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder, and of stamping on the heads of their enemies.

In short, we have turned to profit the *esprit-de-corps* of the old Khalsa Army of Runjeet Singh, in a manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Seikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last.

What then is the lesson to be learnt from the great instances which have been cited ?

That we should avoid creating any grand centralized Army like the one lately dissolved, and substitute in its place several local Armies, which should remain distinct and separate from one another, and in each of which an *esprit de corps* peculiar to itself should be fostered by all the means incidental to distinct services, and countries differing in climate, latitude and race.

Independent of the safety of the Empire in not being again exposed to the secret plots of a mighty brotherhood, all of which obey the same impulses, we should recognise the fact that the Native Army of India is not wanted for Foreign War.

We have attained the natural limits of the Indian Empire.

What we require is such an organization as may provide for the Military defence, and the maintenance of the peace, in every part of the country, in the manner most agreeable to the Troops and to the people, without sacrificing efficiency.

Perhaps the first severe shock given to the fidelity of the Sepoy, was in the passage of the Indus and in the early expeditions to China.

If we admit that we have passed the acquisitive phase of our Indian policy, and that we are bent for the future on consolidation of the Empire only, we may arrive at the conclusion that several Local Armies for certain large provinces, partaking somewhat of the character of our Militia at home, but liable to police duty, are more adapted to our object on the ground of general policy, than one large homogeneous body which is an Army for purely Military, and for the most part, aggressive purposes. Our North-West Trans-Indus Frontier would naturally fall to the share of the Army of the Punjab.

Its employment thus is suited to the warlike genius of the Seikh.

It is necessary on grounds of policy that he should be constantly opposed to the Affghan, and sufficiently practised in war to meet the irruptions either of savage, or civilized enemies from the West.

In other parts of the Empire the Native Armies would really be but a better sort of Police in ordinary times, and to duties of such a form, would they in fact come to be limited, upon which they should be employed without remorse, instead of remaining in ease, idleness, and uselessness, in large Cantonments, as has been the case in time of

peace hitherto. But they would be liable as one Militia to service any where in case of danger to the Empire. Each Chief Commissionership is a mighty Kingdom. It may be said that Imperial safety requires the characteristics of each Kingdom to be preserved ; and that no advantage can follow, whereas great danger might ensue, on abolishing the old landmarks, or on obliterating old differences between provinces, religions and races.

By the maintenance of a Local Force for each Kingdom or Commissionership, which should generally be moved only within the precincts of the country to which it belongs, and in which it was raised, the idea of a large confederacy of States under an Imperial Government would be maintained, instead of the dead levelling process of centralization pursued during our later years, the latter having been carried through by an Army which we fondly hoped, and perhaps almost believed, was so thoroughly mercenary as to have abjured every affection excepting that for Pay and Pension.

Such speculations on Indian policy may appear foreign to the subject of this Minute.

In truth, however, they are not, but form the very essence of it. We cannot separate the policy of British India from the constitution of its Army. The great Sepoy Mutiny has been but one form of general insurrection, whether it was a cause or a consequence is now of little importance. An Army of 1,20,000 men could not mutiny without dragging a large part of the country with it, in which it was raised, and *vice versa*,—if wide Provinces strike for freedom the Soldiers who spring from them are sure not to forget the claims of race, religion and brotherhood.

It appears to me, therefore, that on the largest political considerations, as well as on account of the great Military question, the various Provinces or Chief Commissionerships of this immense Presidency should be treated as a confederacy of States, each having its own local force, the binding string of the forces of States being the British Army proper of the Queen and of the Hon'ble Company, reinforced slightly by bodies of Light Troops which should be gathered from every district and corner of India, and should be closely incorporated with the British Battalions.

In one of my answers I have said that as regards the service of the State, the Native Troops and trained Police may be taken as convertible terms.

There can be no essential difference between the two bodies, recruited as they are from the same classes, and trained as they are in the same manner.

If the idea of local forces were adopted, we should find it inexpedient to allow any difference whatever to exist between them, and there should be no distinct appellation.

It matters not that in theory the idea of a Police Force differs from that of a Military one. In practice we find the training required for the latter is the best preparation for the former.

The trained Police of Ireland is probably the most efficient body of Troops in the whole world, and the so-called Police Battalions of Scinde and the Punjab are in no

respect inferior to the Native Battalions of this Army. In point of fact there is no difference between them. They do the same duty, carry the same arms, and have a like training.

Here then it seems we have the secret of keeping the Troops constantly employed.

When not assembled for the purpose of Military instruction, or for Military duty proper, they should be dispersed, not on furlough as according to the old practice, but on duty in the discharge of ordinary Police functions under their European Officers, as the disciplined auxiliaries of the Magistrate—a *Corps d'Élite* on which the latter might depend when greater firmness is required than can be expected from his ordinary attendants and Chuprassees. If this were admitted, it would be for the Commander of the Local Army to institute a certain system of relief, under which a given number of his Regiments would be kept together, and proceed with their Military training, while the remainder should be employed in the Districts with the Magistrates, each Corps having its own tour at stated intervals of both duties under its European Officers.

The European Officers who, under the old system, had no chance of becoming acquainted with the people or the country, would thus each in his turn be thrown into contact with all classes of the population.

The extraordinary segregation of the British Officers from the people could not but cease, and perhaps it might not be seen again that a wide-spread conspiracy should take place without the cognizance of a single white man throughout the Presidency. It would come to pass that every Officer employed with the native Troops would have worked at some time or other during his career, and probably for a great portion of it, immediately with the Civil Magistrate, and would thereby be qualified to be a Magistrate himself, while at the same time his efficiency as a Military Officer would not be impaired.

The Local Forces would have no Artillery of their own; it being decreed that in future all Artillery shall be European, it would of necessity belong to the Regular Army which is apart from the Local Forces, although portions of the former, including Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, would be of necessity distributed throughout each State as the general binding medium of the Empire.

During the season of Camps and drill the Local Forces might meet the Regular Army for exercise, but only then. At all other seasons the former should be dispersed over the various districts, some in the active performance of Police work, others in Cantonments as Military bodies.

The wives and families should live in the Cantonments with the men.

Long furloughs, so much abused formerly, (*vide* General Sleeman's journey through Oude) would no longer be necessary, as the men would be in their own country, and would have their wives with them.

The system of long furloughs then should be altogether abolished.

They should cease to be a matter of right, and it should be left to Commanding Officers to determine whether they should be granted or not according to the conduct of the applicants.

It will have been remarked that the object of the system proposed is to obtain real work from the Sepoys at all times, and not to maintain large bodies of armed men in a state of ease and even luxury, and of the most profound idleness during peace.

Many years ago I ventured the remark which has been in the mouths of many of our best authorities, that the only condition of safety with respect to the Bengal Army, was its constant employment in war. It was impossible to observe the state of ease in which they lived in time of peace, and the surly conduct of the sepoy, when called on to do what did not exactly suit their fancy, without appreciating the dangers which would arise at some time or other from such pampered soldiery. Their Officers steadily resisted their employment under the Magistrates, and in too many instances pandered to their prejudices and idleness.

Reasoning on great Military principles, but forgetting perhaps the natures and characters of the men he had to deal with, their tendency to combine for unlawful purposes, and mistaking perhaps the present wants of the Empire, Sir Charles Napier earnestly recommended the concentration of great divisions of Troops, thus alienating them still more from what may be called Civil duty by way of distinction, although in most parts of India it has generally borne a Military character and will always have to do so.

The old mutinies of India and the terrible one of last year, demonstrate the inexpediency of such concentrations of Native Troops at immense stations, except where they may be wanted for Garrisons, as at Peshawur. The necessity of advocating a principle of dispersion to preserve the peace of the country after the fashion of Military Police, rather than that of assembling for the purpose of imposing Military display therefore becomes obvious.

I believe the true principle to be adopted may be stated in a very few words.

As centralization is necessary to meet a Foreign Enemy, so dispersion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied. It sounds almost like a truism ; but the repetition of it cannot be avoided, and it must be pressed home, owing to the great and venerated authority under which an opposite view has been advocated.

One more point occurs to me in the general question of the Sepoy before I pass to another part of the subject. It appears to me that in our anxiety to propitiate him, we have allowed him to gain an exaggerated opinion of his own value, and that we have not been at sufficient pains to cause it to be understood that admission to and retention in our Service are great privileges.

The importance of this omission on our part can hardly be over-estimated. I will propose to repair the fault by abolishing the system of unlimited service, and to substitute in its place an enlistment for ten (10) years.

When the time of enlistment had expired, re-enlistment should be matter of the greatest favor to be granted, exceptionally only.

A second enlistment should not exceed five years, after the expiry of which term the soldier might be re-enlisted a third time. At every subsequent period of five years the bond should be again renewed.

As in the Army of the Queen, the Soldier should not be allowed to take his discharge while he may be engaged in active service.

The advantages to be gained would be as follows. The men would cease to look on their Regimental positions as vested rights, and when once accustomed to a soldier's life, would have the strongest incentive to merit the favor of re-enlistment.

The worthless and inefficient men would be got rid of without trouble.

The question of seniority promotion would be settled as inefficient. Non-Commissioned Officers and even Commissioned Officers would have to abide by the law of their enlistment.

Pensions would not be paid except to the favored few who had earned them by good service after a series of re-enlistments.

Then would pensions really be the reward of merit and good service.

On such terms, I am of opinion that a pension list should still be allowed to exist, but only on such terms.

Such then are the general principles which I would advocate in the reconstitution of the Native Army.

1. Local Army for each Commissionership or Government.
2. To employ the Troops actively in the performance of Police duties without sacrificing their Military efficiency.
3. Enlistment for limited service, re-enlistment being held to be a great boon and not a right.
4. Pensions—a reward for good conduct and long service only.
5. A limited Native auxiliary force to be attached to the British Cavalry Regiments and Infantry Battalions.

EXTRACT from a journey through the Kingdom of Oude by Major-General Sir W. H. Sleeman, K. C. B., Resident at the Court of Lucknow.

This privilege which the Native Officers and Sipahs of an Indian Army enjoy, for petitioning for redress of grievances through the Resident, has now been extended to all the Regular, Irregular and Local Corps of the three Presidencies, that is, to all Corps paid

by the British Government, and to all Native Officers and Sipahes of Contingent Corps employed in and paid by Natives States, who were drafted into them from the Regular Corps of our Army, up to a certain time, and the number cannot be less than 50 or 60,000. But European Civil and Political Functionaries in our own Provinces and other Native States, have almost all some men from Oude in their Offices or Establishments, whose claims and complaints they send for adjustment to the Resident, and it is difficult for him to satisfy them that he is not bound to take them up in the same manner as he takes up those of the Native Officers and Sipahes of our Native Army, and he is often induced to yield to their importunity and thereby to furnish grounds for further applications of the same sort. This privilege is not recognised or named in any treaty or other engagement with the Sovereign of Oude; nor does any one know its origin, for it cannot be found in any document recorded in the Resident's Office.

If the Resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing, man, he will often frighten the Durbar and its Courts or local Officers into a hasty decision by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the Native Officers and Sipahes, and if he be at the same time an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the Sipahes shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity or that of his Commanding Officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the ground on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are unhappily too many instances recorded in the Resident's Office. This privilege is in the hands of a Resident, an instrument of *torture*, which it is his duty to apply every day to the Oude Durbar. He may put on a *screw more* or a *screw less* according to his temper or his views, or the importunities of Officers Commanding Corps or Companies, and Native Officers and Sipahes in person, which never cease to oppress him more or less.

The most numerous class of complaints and the most troublesome is that against the Government of Oude, or its Officers, and landholders, for enhanced demands of rent, and whenever these Officers or landholders are made to reduce these demands in favor of the privileged Sipahes, they invariably distribute the burden in an increased rate upon their neighbours.

Officers who have to pass through Oude in their travels, or sporting excursions have of late years generally complained that they receive less civility from villages in which our Invalid or Furlough Sipahes are located than from any others, and that if they are any where treated with actual disrespect such Sipahes are generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators.

This complaint is not, I fear, altogether unfounded, and may arise from the diminished attachment felt by the Sipahes for their European Officers in our Army, and partly from the privilege of urging their claims through the Resident enjoyed by Native Officers and Sipahes now ceasing on their being transferred to the Invalid Establishment.

But the privilege itself is calculated to create feelings of dissatisfaction with their European Officers among the honest and hard-working part of our Native Army. Such petition only when they have just cause, and not one in five of them can obtain what they demand, and believe to be their just right, under an administration like that of ~~✓~~, whatever efforts the Resident may make to obtain it for them; and where one is satisfied, four become discontented, while the

dishonest and idle portion of their brother Soldiers, who have no real wrongs to complain of, and feign them only to get leave of absence, throw all the burden of their duties upon them. Others again by fraud and collusion with those whose influence they require to urge their claims, often obtain more than they have a right to, and their unmerited success tends to increase the dissatisfaction felt by the honest and more scrupulous portion of the Native Officers and Sipahes who have failed to obtain any thing.

Government will not do away with the privilege without first ascertaining the views and wishes of the Military Authorities. They are not favorable to the abolition, for though the honest and hard-working Sipahes may say that it is of no use to them, the idle and unscrupulous, who consider it as a lottery in which they may sometimes draw a prize, or a means of getting leave of absence when they are not entitled to it, will tell them that the *fidelity* of the whole Native Army depends upon its being maintained and extended. I am of opinion, after much consideration and a good deal of experience in the political working of the system, that the abolition of the privilege would be of great advantage to the Native Army, and it would certainly relieve the European Officers from much importunity and annoyance which they now suffer from its enforcement. It is not uncommon for a Sipahes of a Regiment in Bombay to obtain leave of absence for several times over, for ten months at a time, on the pretence of having a case pending in Oude. When his leave is about to expire, he presents a petition to the Resident, who obtains for him from the Court an order for the local authorities to settle his claims. This order is sent to the Officer Commanding his Regiment. The man then makes up a piteous story of his having spent the whole ten months in prosecuting his claim in vain, when in reality he has been enjoying himself at home, and had no claim whatever to settle. The next year, or the year after, he gets another ten months leave for the same purpose, and when it is about to expire he presents himself to the Resident and declares that the Local authorities have been changed and the new Officers pay no regard to the King's orders. New orders are then got for the new Officers and sent to his Regiment, and the *same game is played over again*.

CHAPTER II.

CASTE AS REGARDS CONSTITUTION OF REGIMENTS.

With regard to the Hindoo castes it may be expedient to adopt into the Army, we can hardly be too liberal.

The old spirit of exclusiveness in favor of the high and cleanly castes which operated on the Officers to the full, as much as it did on the Sepoys themselves, created the *imperum in imperio*, which is ever the certain forerunner of mutinies in all Armies.

The Sepoys believing we could not do without them—an opinion they were at no pains to disguise—naturally thought that whenever it might suit them, declare our rule at an end, our ruin would in fact be accomplished.

The subserviency of the Officers generally to the feelings of high caste, which gave them handsome and intelligent men, was, I believe, appreciated in all its strength

by the Sepoys, who actually played with the fears of their Brahminized Colonels, and insisted, in many instances, on the observance of certain customs even in the presence of an enemy, to which we know they are perfectly indifferent under really intelligent and energetic Command.

Thus was the germ of resistance to authority and discipline fostered, and it but too often happens that Commanding Officers openly admitted the presence of a power superior to their own discipline, succumbed to it themselves, and induced superior authority to give countenance to it also. The jealousy on the part of the Sepoys of interference with what they held to be a vested right to fill the Bengal ranks was manifested almost with violence when the direction was given to admit a certain portion of Seikhs to the Corps in the Punjab, shortly after the annexation of that country.

Exclusiveness in the choice of recruits must, therefore, be cut away, root and branch, and while we admit low caste, we must not shut out high caste.

Let all castes, and let the Mussulman share, and share alike in the Regiments of the local Armies.

There may be low caste Corps, high caste Corps, and Mussulman Corps.

Other Regiments may be formed of Companies of different castes, and in all, there should probably be a Company or two of Mussulmans.

Uniformity in these respects is neither desirable nor advisable.

The more diversity that can be introduced into the constitution of the different Corps the better, so that in case of any future attempt at combination, the heterogeneous character of the various Regiments may present an effective bar to it, and be the means of information to the Commanding Officers.

One test, however, should be applied to all.

To a certain extent this has been carried out in the Punjab Regiments

The experiment has been tried in certain Hindoo low caste Corps, which have been raised in 1858, but without success.

On the urgent representation of the Officers Commanding some of these Corps, the Commander-in-Chief has deemed it advisable not to persevere in it.

His Excellency, among other things, was told that just now there was so much fear in the native mind about tampering with their faith and religious observances that danger of serious nature might arise, which in ordinary times would not be the case.

It should be a *sine quâ non* that all the individual Sepoys forming a Company should mess together. Any man objecting to conform to this Regulation should be immediately discharged.

In war it is necessary to efficiency, and in peace it is required, as a test of discipline in the face of caste and Hindooism.

I am strongly of opinion that Mussulmans should not be in the same Company or Troop with Hindoos or Seikhs, and that the two latter should not be mingled together. I would maintain even in the same Regiment all differences of faith with the greatest care. There might be rivalry or even hate between two Companies or Troops.

The discipline of a Native Regiment instead of being impaired, would gain by it as regards the great question of the obedience of the whole to the Commanding Officer.

The motto of the Regimental Commander, and therefore of the Commander-in-Chief, must be for the future *Divide et Imperio*.

CHAPTER III.

THE REGULAR ARMY OF BENGAL.

While the idea of local Native Armies for the confederacy of States has been entertained, it will not have escaped recollection that the binding medium of the whole to ensure general allegiance throughout the Empire, and the fidelity of the Native Soldiery must be a large European Force, to which should be permanently attached special Native Corps.

The presence of Native Troops with the British Corps is necessary both in field and in quarters. The idea of the local or Police Army being admitted, it therefore becomes indispensable to render the British Corps quite independent of the former, which, except in extraordinary circumstances, are not intended to move beyond the precincts of their own Provinces.

Many reasons combine to show how imperatively the authorities of India are bound to limit the demands on England for Regiments and Recruits. The former affects the War Department, and the foreign policy of England; the latter touches the questions of British industry, population, and the rates of wages very nearly.

We cannot therefore do without a regular Native Army, which shall act like the European Force as a counterpoise of the local forces, while from circumstances, association, and paucity of numbers, it will be thoroughly identified with the British Regiments proper, and be considered, both by itself and the British Regiments, as a mere auxiliary of the latter.

The British Corps proper should be numerically stronger than the Native ones; but if such a plan be too expensive, it is necessary that the latter should, on no account, exceed the former in numbers.

I would prefer the following proportions:—

A Native Battalion six hundred strong to be attached to every Battalion of British Infantry, whether the latter belong to the Queen's or Company's Service.

In the Cavalry, the Native Squadrons might be equal in strength to the British.

The Officers of the Native Battalions should be taken from among the British Regiments to which they are attached, the Battalions and Squadrons being respectively under the Supreme Command of the Commanding Officer of the British Corps, there being a Commandant of the Native Battalion or Cavalry Squadrons, according to the practice of the Irregular system.

If possible he should be one of the Majors of the European Regiments; but if circumstances did not admit of such an arrangement, he should be chosen for his fitness from among the Captains or from another Corps.

This arrangement is not meant to interfere with the detached employment of the Native, whether Cavalry or Infantry, or to diminish the power of the Commandant of the Native Battalion or Regiment.

The latter would be to the British Battalion as a second Regiment in a Brigade to be commanded for general purposes, its own internal economy and Regimental Command being unimpaired and maintained in all its integrity according to the well-known practice of our Service.

The relief of a Queen's Corps serving in India need not form any bar to such an arrangement.

If the foregoing designs were entertained, it would become necessary to add largely to the Establishment of Officers in each Regiment. The Officers so employed could at their option be transferred to a relieving Corps coming from England under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, according to the practice which has always obtained at the Horse Guards in disposing of the supernumerary Officers reduced to half-pay from the relieved Regiments.

A Regiment of two Battalions—one British and one Native—would thus be formed, and they should never be separated from one another except for temporary and detached purposes. In the Regiments of the Company's Service, the bond would last for ever, and as regards those of Her Majesty's, it would endure till their departure for England.

There would be no difficulty, however, when one of Her Majesty's Regiments should in its turn be ordered home. The Native Battalion attached to it, would await in some convenient station the arrival of the relieving Corps, with which it should be connected without delay.

It seems to be generally admitted that the Presidency of Bengal will not be able to subsist in future with an European Garrison of less than (50,000) Fifty thousand men, and this exclusive of the Force necessary for Gwalior and Rajpootana.

N. B.—This will require an Establishment of about 64,000.

I am myself of opinion that, in the course of time, when the rebellion of this last year shall have become a matter of History, and cease to be a means of excitement with the popular mind,—when the province of Oude shall have been thoroughly reduced, and order again properly established in Central India and Bundelcund, that a less number may be found to suffice, and that we shall not be required to maintain a European Force of above (35,000) Thirty-five thousand men, for this Presidency. But for the present and for some years to come, probably ten at least, the larger number, *viz.*, (50,000) Fifty thousand must be maintained.

N. B.—Requiring an Establishment of 44,000.

Assuming that number to be indispensable, an assumption few would be found to deny, I would at once take measures to associate with them (30,000) Thirty thousand Natives, to be distributed rateably between the Cavalry and Infantry.

The Head Quarters of each European Regiment should be made the scene of a new Levy.

It should be distinctly understood that in such new Levies the future regular Army was to be, and that to them it was to be restricted with some exceptions to be stated hereafter.

All Corps and Levies made under the orders of the Government, the Commander-in-Chief, the various Chief Commissioners, &c., &c., should, to the local Armies, or Police Forces of their respective Provinces, be augmented or decreased accordingly, as may be demanded by the general policy of the Empire; of that of each Province under existing circumstances, and with regard to present emergencies.

Thus for the present we are compelled, by a bitter necessity, to admit an immense Punjabee and Seikh Force, and to employ of them probably (60,000) Sixty thousand men of all Arms, and to the exclusion of the other races and sects of Hindoostan.

Whilst the excitement of war, plunder and success over their natural enemies lasts, we may believe this Seikh Army may not give us trouble; but we can hardly doubt that when the excitement has passed away, we shall have to exhibit great prudence and judgment in dissolving the large Punjabee Force we have scattered abroad, cast over the Empire, and that we must provide in time a Native as well as a European counterpoise.

Therefore, I repeat, no time should be lost in initiating the scheme which alone contains in my belief the principle of safety with regard to the regular Army of India, and that each Battalion of India and formed Regiment of Cavalry in the Presidency of Bengal, not quartered in the Punjab, should be permitted to raise a Native Corps for general service.

This duty should not be extended for the present to the British Corps stationed in the Punjab.

When a few of the second or Native Battalions have been roughly formed, they should march with the British Regiment to which they belong to the Punjab, and relieve the Corps there stationed.

For some time to come we must resolutely abstain from enlisting more Seikhs or Punjabees, excepting to fill vacancies in Corps we may wish to continue, namely, until the equilibrium has been restored in our ranks between these races and the others of Hindoostan.

When that shall have been compassed, there will be no greater objection to Seikh Companies in the Regular Army than to any other men in India; on the contrary we know them to be most admirable Soldiers, and were it advisable on political consideration, would desire no other recruits.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EUROPEAN FORCES FOR THE ARMY OF BENGAL.

The question has been put "what proportion of the European Force should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, and what proportion should be composed of Troops raised for service in India?"

In answering this question we are obliged to consider that the days of the Company's Service, properly so called, are numbered, and that the distinction as at present existing between the Army of Her Majesty and of that of the Hon'ble Company cannot but soon come to an end. But it would appear that although that distinction is about to cease, another one will spring into life, *i. e.*, that there will be a local Queen's Army for India, as distinguished from the regular moveable Army of the Crown.

Although there are no official data on which to ground this assumption, it seems there can be but little doubt about it, in consequence of the late permission given to the Company to raise many additional Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry.

I therefore take liberty to assume the above question to be settled.

I am the more strengthened in this course owing to the absolute and palpably evident necessity of having a body of English Gentlemen trained to the knowledge of India, which shall not be estranged from its service, excepting under certain conditions.

Much may be said on the moral question of relieving Regiments from time to time ; but if the Crown takes possession of all the Armies of India, that must in great measure be laid aside, and the source must be in all its integrity from which the numerous functionaries proceed for the administration of the Indian Empire.

Assuming then that a local Army will be entertained for the Presidency of Bengal under the Crown, I would submit that this body should consist of an Artillery Regiment having about the same strength as the present one, English Companies* being substituted for the old Native Companies of ten Regiments of Cavalry consisting of (400) four hundred sabres each, and of (30) thirty Battalions of Infantry consisting of (12) twelve Companies each. Of the twelve Companies forming a Battalion, two should remain in England as a Depôt, in accordance with the system now adopted for Her Majesty's Army under the late orders of Government.

Each Battalion should possess in India the same strength as that now allowed to Her Majesty's Regiments, *viz.* :—

12	{	10 Companies abroad.
	{	2 Ditto at Depôt.
		1 Colonel Commandant.
		2 Lieutenant-Colonels.
		2 Majors.
		12 Captains.
		14 Lieutenants.
		10 Ensigns.
		1 Pay Master.
		1 Surgeon.
		3 Assistant Surgeons.
		1 Sergeant Major.
		1 Quarter Master Sergeant.
		1 Pay Master Sergeant.
		1 Armourer Sergeant.
		School Master appointed by the Secretary of State for War.
		1 Hospital Sergeant.
		1 Orderly Room Clerk.
		12 Color Sergeants.
		48 Sergeants.
		1 Drum Major.
		24 Drummers and Fifers.
		60 Corporals.
		1140 Privates.

* 1339 Total Numbers.

* This number includes the Depôt Companies which it is proposed to retain in England.

Whilst, however, this large local Force should be called into being for service in India, without relief, it is absolutely necessary for the great purposes of example, discipline and salutary emulation, that a certain number of the moveable Regiments of the Crown should periodically come to India and be relieved in due course according to the practice which has obtained heretofore.

I have the most entire and absolute conviction that this practice is required for the discipline of the local Regiment. It cannot have escaped the most careless observer, that although Regiments which have been long in India fight as well as highly disciplined Corps just arrived from England, and that although the men of the former are for a time more efficient than the latter, as understanding the climate better, and being more able to take care of themselves, nevertheless there is by no means the same healthy tone of discipline running through the body in the one as the other. It is by no means uncommon to see extraordinary sloth and debauchery in such old Regiments, and that the Officers have become so enervated by climate or other causes that they are unable to check the one and do away with the other. But again it is observed that the quartering of such a Corps in the neighbourhood of the well-disciplined one excites a new emulation when the importation of another Commanding Officer will go far to reassert discipline, effect the necessary reform, and finally restore absolute efficiency. I wish to draw no invidious comparisons between the two services, but will simply record that what has been here asserted has come under my observation in both.

I would, therefore, propose that the Establishment coming from the moveable column of the Crown should be on about the same footing as that preserved in the time antecedent to the great mutiny; but I would add some Artillery to it and some Royal Engineers.

The Establishment would then stand thus :—

- 12 Troops and Field Batteries of Artillery.
- 4 Companies Royal Engineers.
- 2 Regiments of Dragoons.
- 15 Battalions of Infantry.

Much has been said in England respecting the great difficulty of obtaining recruits to meet the new and permanent demands of the Army occasioned by the late Military revolution in India.

In order to meet this difficulty, I would submit that as the British Soldier in India is never required to carry a greater weight than his arms, ammunition and great coat, it is unnecessary to seek for large and bulky men in the ranks of India, consequently there should be one invariable standard of Infantry and Cavalry recruiting for India. Whether aught be the regulation of the authorities at home for Regiments serving elsewhere, the Indian standard should be 5 feet 3 inches for grown men, and 5 feet 2½ inches for growing lads. For the Artillery no man under 5 feet 6 inches in height should be admitted, excepting the Drivers, who would be men of 5 feet 3 inches. As a rule no man should be enlisted who has not completed his 20 years.

It would soon come to be understood amidst the classes from which the recruits are drawn that the rivalry between the recruiting Sergeants as now existing between those

belonging to H. M.'s Service and those of the Hon'ble Company had ceased, the short men would go at once to the Service disposed to admit them without question.

Such broadly stated is the system I would adopt as regards the component parts of the future Army of Bengal, and I do not see that there need be any difficulty in developing it in practice.

The Cavalry and Artillery already exist, as also it may be said six Battalions of Infantry. It remains then to form 24 Battalions in addition.

The system hitherto adopted, and which seems to be agreeable to the Bengal Army, is to take two Battalions of the old Native Infantry, and to fuse them into one of the new European Regiments.

This system is understood by the Officers of the Army, and although fraught with some inconvenience in respect of producing rapid efficiency in a new Battalion, perhaps militates less than any other which could be devised against the rights which every Officer possesses according to the Commission he holds under the Hon'ble Company.

Let us now, therefore, examine how the plan proposed would work with regard to the Officers.

Including the three European Infantry Regiments lately ordered, 54 Regiments of the old Bengal Establishment will be absorbed in completing the European Local Infantry to 30 Battalions. There would then be left the Officers of 20 Regiments, who should be distributed according to their seniority in the 30 European Corps. The establishment of each Corps being thus permanently increased, as the only means of meeting the constant draughts on Regiments made by the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief, to fill the numerous Offices of the Civil and Military administration of India including the Commandants and other Officers for the Native Forces, Regular and Local.

It will be found eventually that the Establishments of the European Regiments, even with the addition proposed will not be sufficient for the proper discharge of the service, unless another great alteration be introduced, and that is the institution of an unattached list on which the names of all Officers should be placed holding situations of certain position either in the Civil Government or on the Staff of the Army.

I would instance as such situations, Assistant Commissioners of 1st and 2nd Class, and all Officers in Civil employ of position superior to that rank.

2ndly. Officers connected with the Secretariat of Government.

3rdly. Officers Commanding Police Corps.

On the Staff of the Army Officers having the rank of Deputy Assistant Adjutant General and all superior grades.

Officers having the command of Irregular Corps or Corps of the Local Forces proposed in the first Chapter.

In order to atone for the want of Regimental promotion thus entailed upon an Officer accepting Staff employment, he should receive a step in effective rank for every

five years passed in Staff employ according to the custom obtaining in Her Majesty's Service with regard to Majors so situated. Thus the appointment of an Officer to permanent Staff employ would give a step of Regimental promotion. If such a system of unattached Commissions be not introduced into the Army of Bengal, it will be quite impossible to officer the European Regiments in a manner sufficient for discipline, and at the same time to meet the calls of Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

An English Regiment requires many experienced Officers, and it also requires tolerably permanent command. If an English Regiment be left to chance, if it be divested of all its best Officers, if elderly gentlemen should be sent to command it who are ignorant of Regimental duty, as was formerly so often the case with the Native Infantry Regiments of Bengal, the new Local Army will be a disgrace in quarters, and in all probability will misbehave in the Field.

The Government of India, however constituted at home and in the country itself, must now take the greatest precautions in this respect. They cannot succeed without, in some measure, separating the Civil and Military Staff from the Regiments, and incurring a larger expense in the matter of Officers than that to which they have hitherto been accustomed.

It must also be borne in mind that the Officers for the Native portion of the Regular Army, whether the latter be attached to the European Corps, as proposed by me, or not, must be drawn from the bodies of Officers of which the European Corps are composed. It will not do hereafter to have one set of men belonging to the European local Corps and another to the Native Corps. They must originally belong all to the European Corps, be trained there and nominated by appointment to serve with the Native Corps according to the present Irregular system.

Every man for the future nominated to do duty with a Native Corps must be a selected man, and his position should be enhanced by the receipt of larger allowances than those falling to the lot of his comrades who remain in the ordinary performance of duty in the European Regiment.

In short, every appointment to a Native Regiment should be held to be a Staff appointment, as is now the case with the Irregular Corps.

We now approach the question of the local Army of India, and that of the moveable Army of England. It has been assumed that the local Army will be a Royal Army.

We must recollect the great prestige and honor belonging to the Army of the Hon'ble Company, and we must take care that those great and first-rate qualities of an Army are not lost sight of. The local Army of India must be placed on a footing of absolute equality with that of the moveable Army of England. This can only be obtained in one manner, *viz.*, by allowing exchanges between the Officers of the two Armies.

The precedent for such an arrangement is found in all the local Corps raised for special services in the various Colonies. An Officer serving in a West India Regiment may go to the Guards, or an Officer in the Ceylon Rifles to the Blues.

This principle then on every account of justice to the Officers of the Local Army, and of harmony between the two services of the Crown, should be admitted under certain limitations; such limitations are necessary, the welfare of the State will not admit of wholesale exchanges, or of the too frequent departure of Officers who have already acquired knowledge and experience of the Country of their original choice.

I would venture to advocate, therefore, that no exchange should be permitted till an Officer had completed ten years' service in India; that tolerable parity of years, without too much strictness in that respect should be exacted from two men demanding to exchange; and that no Officer should be able to transfer his staff appointment to the individual with whom he proposed to make an arrangement; such exchanges would depend upon the fiat of the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the confirmation of the Crown, after the consent of the local Government of India should have been obtained. Previous misconduct in either party should be an absolute bar, and no man who had blemished his character in the one from whatever cause, should be allowed to transfer himself to the other.

Officers in the unattached list of all ranks from that of General downwards should be available for service anywhere under the orders of the Crown. We should never again listen to a distinction between services of Englishmen being a bar to the employment of a large class of experienced and intelligent Officers.

The local British Army of India including Officers and men should be subject to the same Mutiny Act and Articles of War as the other Forces of the Crown.

For the Officers of the Local Army, the same rules of Furlough should remain as those now existing, excepting that no Furlough should exceed two years in duration.

The old Furlough of three years was originally calculated with regard to the twelve months sacrificed in the home and outward passages round the Cape.

I am not aware that any essential points have been omitted in which the interests of the State, or of the relations of the Officers towards it are concerned. But there is one immediately affecting the Officers in their private capacity which may cause much difficulty whenever the attempt is made to amalgamate the service of the Crown and the Company. I allude to the Funds to which all the Officers of the latter have subscribed and are subscribing.

Under the Regulations and therefore the action of these Funds, the Officers of the Company's Army form a Joint Stock Association.

It will be for the Actuary to determine hereafter how an individual Officer may be compensated who might determine or wish to exchange to the Regular Army of the Crown, if such exchange be admitted to be, as it undoubtedly is, a necessity of State on account of reasons which have been already alluded to.

In any case the solution of the question will be most delicate and difficult, to determine which, without the consent of the individual affected, any Government would be most averse. The advantage to be gained in dissolving an association which establishes an interest in a body of Officers apart from their Military profession and not possessing a Military character cannot escape us.

CHAPTER V.

THE COMMAND OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

The Hon'ble Court has directed that the power of Commanding Officers of Native Infantry Regiments shall be increased, and it has also been ruled that the claims of seniority shall be so far set aside that incompetent Lieutenant-Colonels may be shelved under the orders of the Government.

These concessions to the opinions of those who are conversant with the Native character are well considered and right, though it may be doubted whether they go far enough.

In the so-called Irregular system, every Commandant of a Native Regiment is a selected man. This should be the rule throughout the Service, and for the future no man should be allowed to command a Native Regiment who has not been specially chosen for it. It is difficult to guard against jobbery and personal predilection; but on the whole, on so important a matter it is better to risk the inconveniences which may spring from such causes, than again to trust to the blind chances of a seniority system as regards the command of Native Soldiery.

It is bad enough in the case of a British Regiment, fenced as the latter is by all the compensating circumstances of a mutiny act, the free spirit of the men, the prevalent sense of duty, and the individual knowledge of what is due to them as soldiers; in short, the perception of legality and freedom common to all British born men, which annihilates much of the personal influence of a Commander, and causes the commanded to look far more to the laws they live under, than to the man who exceeded them.

But with Asiatics the presence of an incompetent Commander is absolutely fatal. With them the immediate Commander should be a second providence, and stand instead of Articles of War and every thing else. From him there should be no apparent appeal. He should rule them not only as one of our Regulation Commanders, but as a King; but then he must be a King according to the old meaning of the term. The Officers who in former years, and in our own time have had the most success in dealing with the Native Soldiery, are exactly those who, from circumstances, or owing to their own strength of character, have escaped interference from higher authority.

The Commandants of Native Corps must, therefore, be chosen men, and when appointed much confidence must be reposed in them.

Certain simple rules should be laid down for the guidance of the Commandant which should stand in lieu of Articles of War.

The power of dismissal from the Service, of inflicting corporal punishment, should be vested in him, records of his proceedings being carefully preserved for submission to the Commander-in-Chief.

It has been shown very fully in the last year of war that for service in the field the present Irregular system does not give sufficient Officers either to the Cavalry or the Infantry.

While in the Field every Regiment should have at least one European Officer per Troop or Company. Whether that be useful, possible or not in time of peace, it should always be looked to and enforced when a Regiment is engaged in war.

If the plan proposed in a previous Chapter be adopted, this may be ensured without leaving a Regiment uselessly with Officers when it is not actively employed. I say uselessly, as the ordinary business of interior economy cannot but be performed by Native Officers as in the Irregular Regiments of the present day.

In the Local or Police Armies, I would have a Commandant assisted by a Second in Command and Adjutant. I consider the Punjab Police arrangement, which only allows one Officer to a Corps, faulty in this respect, and that there should never be less than three English Officers to any Corps, however constituted or whatever may be its denomination.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE QUESTIONS HAVING REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF DESPATCH No. 235, OF 25TH NOVEMBER 1857, MILITARY DEPARTMENT, COURT OF DIRECTORS.

Many of the questions proposed in the paper having reference to Para. 5 of Despatch No. 235, have been answered in the foregoing Chapters of this Minute; and others will obtain their replies from the Departments of the Adjutant General and the Secretariat.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1 and 3.

Return marked *A. in answer to No. 1, B. in answer to No. 3, are answered.

2 and 4.

Questions 2 and 4 have been treated in the foregoing Chapters of this Minute.

5 to 8.

With respect to those questions in which it is required to state certain ratios, I would submit the impossibility of making even a proximate calculation until the plans of Government shall have been decided on respecting organization and European Establishments. I therefore refrain from committing myself to any arbitrary assertion on these matters beyond what has been generally stated in this paper.

It appears from these Returns that the present proportion, including Military Police and levies of every kind, is about three to one of Natives to Europeans.

It is probable, as time wears on, and the Country subsides into a state of peace, that we shall be able to manage with a proportion of 4 to 1.

In former times in the Presidency of Bengal it was, I believe, as much as 15 to 1.

13.

With respect to question 13, I would say in reply, I do not think when we are legislating on the future organization of the Indian Army, that the question of purchase or non-purchase should be entertained.

As explained in the fourth Chapter of this Minute, I would admit the privilege of exchange between the Officers of the Regular Army under certain conditions.

* Marked C. to complete answer of question No. 5, part of which is found in Return marked B.

Purchase, though winked at by authorities in India, has never been legalized or regulated in the Indian Armies as it has unfortunately been in that of Her Majesty's.

Although it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, utterly to abolish purchase in the latter, no step should be taken to authorize it in the local Army.

Let there be no interference with the Officers of the local Army; but as at present, let those who like to pay discharge themselves of their superfluous money, and let there be no illegality nor shame in receiving it on the part of the Officers leaving the Service.

This will not materially affect exchanges or the status of either Service; and I do not see that any embarrassment can occur.

The men who pay largely for promotion in Her Majesty's Army, are content, with rare exceptions, to enjoy life in England, and do not seek to improve their position by service in India, except in exciting times. This is well known to all Regimental Officers.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF THE REGULAR FORCES IN THE PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL IN TIMES OF TRANQUILLITY.

The proposed British Establishment for the ensuing ten years is estimated at—

- 44 Troops and Batteries of Artillery.
- 30 Reserve Companies of Artillery.
- 12 Regiments of Cavalry.
- 4 Companies of Engineers.
- 45 Battalions of Infantry.

Until peace is thoroughly established we cannot do well without at least (50) fifty Battalions of Infantry. The question before us, however, is the distribution of the Forces for the maintenance of peace after it shall have been restored.

I would propose for that purpose the following distribution as per annexed Return—

	Reserve Companies Artillery.	Artillery Troops or Companies.	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Battalions.	
Presidency Division ...	3	2	0	2	{ Besides the Battalion there will be Recruit Depôts at Dum-Dum and Chinsurah for Her Majesty's Regiments, and at Barrackpore, and eventually at Berhampore for those of the Honorable Company: at Dum-Dum are the Head Quarters of the Royal Artillery.
Dinapore	1	1	0	2	
Benares and Ghazeepore } Buxar and Azimghur .. }	1	2	1	3	{ It is asserted that Goruckpore is very unhealthy in the Autumn; owing to necessity a Regiment is quartered there for this year, hereafter it may turn out advisable to bring it to the right bank of the Gogra.
Goruckpore	0	1	0	1	
Carried over ...	5	6	1	8	

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Continued.)

	Reserve Companies Artillery.	Artillery Troops or Companies.	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Battalions.	
Brought forward ...	5	6	1	8	
Allahabad	2	1	1	2	} The Force stated here is the minimum owing to the great importance of the Fort as a Magazine, and the Establishments Civil and Military which are growing daily.
Banda	0	1	0	1	
Saugor	1	1	1	2	} The dependencies of Saugor include Shahghur, Dumoh, Jubbulpore, and the intervening tract of country which is prone to rebellion.
Jhansie	0	1	0	1	
Cawnpore	1	2	1	2	} The Force stated here will only suffice for quiet times, it being necessary at present to occupy from Jhansie Chunderie on one side, Mote and Koonch on the other, while there is a Garrison at Calpee. When the country is thoroughly tranquil, it will be sufficient to have one Battalion at Jhansie which shall detach two Companies to Calpee.
Futtehgurh and Mynpoory	0	1	0	1	
Oudh { Lucknow ... } { Fyzabad ... } { Bureach ... } { Seetapore ... }	4	6	2	8	} Supports Oudh on the one side, and Bundelcund on the other.
Gwalior and Dependencies	1	3	1	2	
Meerut	1	2	1	1	} When the country shall have been disarmed, it will be possible to deduct two Regiments from Oudh but not before.
Delhie	1	1	0	2	
Agra	2	2	0	1	} This is a minimum, and may require reinforcements at any time.
Muttra	0	0	1	0	
Bareilly	1	1	0	1	} One Reserve Company of Artillery and one Infantry Regiment may be deducted from the strength of this Garrison when the Arsenal is removed and the fortifications destroyed.
Mooradabad	0	1	0	0½	
Shahjehanpore	1	1	0	0½	} The strength of Artillery here stated is required on account of the Arsenal and its proximity to Gwalior.
Kumaon	1	0	0	0	
Umballah	0	2	1	1	} With regard to the feeling in the Cis-Sutledge States, it might be advisable to quarter two Infantry Regiments at this station.
Ferozepore	1	1	0	1	
Jullundur Phillour	1	1	0	1	} Phillour has a Magazine.
Umritsur	1	0	0	1	
Lahore	2	2	1	2	} This is a minimum.
Mooltan	1	1	0	1	
Sealkote	0	1	0	1	} The presence of an Infantry Battalion should never be dispensed with at Mooltan.
Rawulpindee	3	6	1	4	
Attock					
Nowshera					
Peshawur					
Total	30	44	12	45	} It is possible that the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab might prefer to send the Regiment quartered at Sealkote to Jhelum.
					} The Troops at Rawul Pindee and other Stations mentioned here are the outposts of the Empire.

The Head Quarters Royal Engineers should be at Roorkee, and the Companies distributed according to the wants of the country.

Note.—The Stations of the Artillery, as stated in the Return, would be considerably affected if my scheme for the organization of Artillery were to be adopted.

It will be observed that the above distribution makes no allusion to Burmah or Rajpootana.

This has been done advisedly, on the assumption that, according to the practice which has prevailed for some years, the former, Burmah, will continue to be held by the Army of Madras, and the latter, Rajpootana, by that of Bombay. In the same manner I would propose that Goonah and Mhow may be provided for by a detachment from the Rajpootana Force, and so be comprehended within that Command.

If every Corps comprised in the above Distribution Return were at its full strength, we should find a total of about 62,000 Rank and File, without taking into account the Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

In practice it is discovered that when the establishment of a Battalion in India stands at 1,000 Rank and File, we never in fact find in the ranks more than 750. This is accounted for by the averages of the sick and convalescent lists, the death vacancies to fill up, which is the process of a twelvemonth, as well as the other numerous vacancies caused by invaliding, discharges, &c.

This number of 62,000 must, therefore, by no means be accepted as being absolute. On the contrary it must be taken as the paper or establishment number, as distinguished from the number ready for active purposes, and we should make a reduction of fully one-fourth from it or of (250) two hundred and fifty men per thousand, even if the Regiments be kept complete on paper by the yearly drafts. Thus the 62,000 will be reduced to 46,500, the latter number forming the European Garrison of the Bengal Presidency ready for effective duty, although the larger one would figure in the Government Returns.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARMY OF BENGAL.

The calculation on which the Distribution Return is based, depends altogether on the association of a limited Native Army, whether in Camp or quarters, with the European Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry.

If the British line proper be not so extended by a body of Native Soldiery attached to and dependent on it, the said Native organization being apart from all others in the country, the necessity of adding largely to the numbers of the European Corps will quickly make itself visible.

In former times the European Force was the auxiliary of the Sepoy Army. Now the conditions must be exactly reversed, and the Sepoy must be admitted only as the auxiliary of the European. The latter cannot do altogether without the former on his own personal account, and as said before, England has not men to furnish an English Army of (100,000) one hundred thousand men for the Presidency of Bengal. Consequently wherever an European Corps is quartered, it must have for a neighbour a weak Sepoy Battalion, the latter being either on a separate Establishment as formerly or attached to the European Corps, as I have ventured to recommend.

I conceive it to be very important that there should be no mistake in this matter. In it is involved the great consideration of economizing our demands on England, and of providing the counterpoise for the Local or Police Armies.

There are besides certain Native Corps which I would preserve in their integrity without interference with their present organization, consisting of Goorkhas, *viz.* :—

Nusseeree.
Kumaon.
Sirmour.
66th Native Infantry.
73rd Native Infantry.

These Battalions being kept quite apart should, as heretofore, be cantoned generally in the hills, and come down for any service for which they might be required. The cantonment of each Regiment might be a Goorkha Colony.

A few Regiments and remnants of Regiments have remained faithful. It might be well to retain and recruit them as a separate Brigade, their Officers being named by special appointment, as has been the case with the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.

These Regiments are the 31st Native Infantry, Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, and Lucknow Regiment.

Three Regiments to be formed out of the faithful remnants of mutinous Corps.
Total Six.

Thus besides the Native Force to be attached to the European Corps, we should have an addition of (11) eleven Battalions, which would swell what may be called the moving Native Army, as distinguished from the Local or Police Armies, to rather more than (40,000) forty thousand men, to be constituted as follows :—

4,800 Cavalry,	12 Regiments	@ 400 men each.
27,000 Infantry,	45 Battalions	@ 600 ditto.
4,000 Goorkhas,	5 Regiments	@ 800 ditto.
4,800 Six other N. I Regiments	@ 800	ditto.
<hr/>		
40,600		

To this add proposed European Establishment of all arms :—

62,000 excluding Officers and Serjeants.

1,02,600 Total.

This total, therefore, represents the Army by which the Presidency of Bengal might, in my opinion be held, if, at the same time, each large Government be provided with a Local or Police Army, including Irregular Cavalry and Infantry, which may be available either for Military or Civil purposes.

Let us recollect that the latter bodies have either been called into existence or are in the course of being so in all parts of this Presidency under the pressure of circumstances.

In point of fact it is only required to develop and complete what has been roughly shaped out.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE FINANCIAL RESULT TO BE ANTICIPATED AS CONSEQUENT ON THE SCHEME SUBMITTED.

On the 1st January 1857, the number of Native Soldiers in the Army of Bengal, including Irregular of all descriptions, Drivers and Gun Lascars, amounted to 1,70,000 men; at that time the European Force consisted of 15,750.

It has been ruled that in point of expense one European Soldier is equal to two Sepoys.

Deduct from the proposed European Establishment ...	62,000
The old Establishment	15,750
	46,250
Multiply by 2 to give the equivalent Sepoys	2
	92,500
Add the proposed Sepoy Establishment for the Moveable Army	40,600
	Total 1,33,100
If this sum be deducted from the Native Establishment on the 1st January 1858, <i>viz.</i>	1,70,000
we shall find the difference of cost between the proposed Moveable Army and the old Regular Anglo-Indian Army of Bengal, irrespective of the Pension list	1,33,100
	Difference ... 36,900

It has been proposed in the foregoing scheme to abolish the Pension List, excepting in certain cases.

What the saving under that head may be, I cannot say, there being no published data of the receipts of Government in this respect. It is presumed, however, that it would be very large.

In such case it would seem that if we allow the Local or Police Armies to swell to (80,000) eighty thousand men, the cost to the State on account of Military expenditure would not exceed what it was in the commencement of 1857, while we might expect a not inconsiderable diminution in the outlay of the Civil Magistrate on account of Burkundauze or non-Military Police.

It is not assumed that the latter can be dispensed with altogether; but I think we may fairly look to a considerable economy in this respect, when the Military Police has been fairly organized over the whole Country. On this point, however, I am not competent to give an opinion.

(COPY.)

A.

RETURN of European Troops serving in the Bengal Presidency on 1st July 1858.

CORPS.	European Officers	European Non-Com- missioned Officers and Rank and File.	Total.
QUEEN'S.			
ROYAL ARTILLERY.			
E. Troop Horse Artillery	7	181	188
F. Troop Horse Artillery	6	184	190
8th Company 2nd Battalion Foot Artillery	6	102	108
5th do. 3rd do. do. do.	5	177	182
1st do. 6th do. do. do.	7	186	193
6th do. 7th do. do. do.	6	178	184
3rd do. 8th do. do. do.	7	176	183
3rd do. 9th do. do. do.	7	181	188
6th do. 11th do. do. do.	5	96	101
5th do. 12th do. do. do.	6	162	168
5th do. 13th do. do. do.	4	201	205
6th do. 13th do. do. do.	7	191	198
3rd do. 14th do. do. do.	6	202	208
4th do. 14th do. do. do.	7	168	175
7th do. 14th do. do. do.	6	209	215
Total	92	2,594	2,686
ROYAL ENGINEERS.			
4th Company	6	110	116
23rd do.	4	80	84
Total	10	190	200
CAVALRY.			
Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoon Guards	19	518	537
Do. do. 6th do. do. (Carabineers)	23	614	637
Do. do. 7th do. do.	32	495	527
Do. do. 7th Light Dragoons... ..	27	439	466
Do. do. 9th Lancers	16	541	557
Do. do. 2nd Battalion Military Train	10	228	238
Total	127	2,835	2,962
Carried over	229	5,619	5,848

A.—(Continued.)

CORPS.		European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Total.
Brought forward		229	5,619	5,848
QUEEN'S.—(Continued.)				
INFANTRY.				
Her Majesty's	5th Fusiliers	24	713	737
Do. do.	6th Foot (1st Battalion)	16	639	655
Do. do.	7th do. (do. do.)	41	1,225	1,266
Do. do.	8th do. (do. do.)	19	799	818
Do. do.	10th do. (do. do.)	22	776	798
Do. do.	13th L. I. (do. do.)	30	859	889
Do. do.	19th Foot	33	1,042	1,075
Do. do.	20th do.	31	796	827
Do. do.	23rd do.	34	926	960
Do. do.	24th do.	26	942	968
Do. do.	27th do.	26	986	1,012
Do. do.	29th do.	25	907	932
Do. do.	32nd Light Infantry	15	463	478
Do. do.	34th Foot	28	728	756
Do. do.	35th do.	35	858	893
Do. do.	37th do.	37	669	706
Do. do.	38th do.	38	951	989
Do. do.	42nd do.	31	828	859
Do. do.	52nd Light Infantry	25	978	1,003
Do. do.	53rd Foot	21	902	923
Do. do.	54th do.	33	797	830
Do. do.	60th Rifles (1st Battalion)	20	710	730
Do. do.	60th do. (2nd do.)	16	392	408
Do. do.	61st Foot	15	770	785
Do. do.	64th do.	27	801	828
Do. do.	70th do.	17	979	996
Do. do.	73rd do.	24	792	816
Do. do.	75th do.	20	780	800
Do. do.	77th do.	32	574	606
Do. do.	78th Highlanders	23	748	771
Do. do.	79th do.	32	896	928
Do. do.	80th Foot	21	720	741
Do. do.	81st do.	29	1,041	1,070
Do. do.	82nd do.	39	929	968
Do. do.	84th do.	22	755	777
Do. do.	87th Fusiliers	23	1,066	1,089
Total		950	29,737	30,687
Carried over		229	5,619	5,848

A.—(Continued.)

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Com- missioned Officers and Rank and File.	Total.
Brought forward	229	5,619	5,848
QUEEN'S.—(Concluded.)			
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)			
	950	29,737	30,687
Her Majesty's 88th Foot	40	877	917
Do. do. 90th do.	32	803	835
Do. do. 93rd Highlanders	32	891	923
Do. do. 94th do.	41	854	895
Do. do. 97th do.	36	848	884
Do. do. 98th do.	37	769	806
Do. do. 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade	28	930	958
Do. do. 3rd do. do. do.	32	951	983
Total	1,228	36,660	37,888
HON'BLE COMPANY'S.			
ARTILLERY.			
Staff 1st Brigade Horse Artillery... ..	}	No returns.	
1st Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery			
2nd do. 1st do. do. do.			
3rd do. 1st do. do. do.	}	No returns.	
Staff 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery			
1st Troop 2nd do. do. do.			
2nd do. 2nd do. do. do.	}	No returns.	
3rd do. 2nd do. do. do.			
Staff 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery			
1st Troop 3rd do. do. do.	}	No returns.	
2nd do. 3rd do. do. do.			
3rd do. 3rd do. do. do.			
4th do. 3rd do. do. do.	}	No returns.	
Staff 1st Battalion Foot Artillery			
1st Company 1st Battalion Foot Artillery... ..			
2nd do. 1st do. do. do.	}	No returns.	
3rd do. 1st do. do. do.			
4th do. 1st do. do. do.			
Total	55	956	1,011
Carried over	1,512	43,235	44,747

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non Com- missioned Officers and Rank and File.	Total
Brought forward	1,512	43,235	44,747
HONORABLE COMPANYS.—(Continued.)			
ARTILLERY.—(Continued.)			
	55	956	1,011
Staff 2nd Battalion Foot Artillery	5	6	11
1st Company 2nd Battalion Foot Artillery	6	84	90
2nd do. 2nd do. do. do.	3	68	71
3rd do. 2nd do. do. do.	4	33	37
4th do. 2nd do. do. do. with European } Drivers attached	6	140	146
Staff 3rd Battalion Foot Artillery	4	6	10
1st Company 3rd Battalion Foot Artillery	1	64	65
2nd do. 3rd do. do. do.	7	85	92
3rd do. 3rd do. do. do.	4	79	83
4th do. 3rd do. do. do.	4	60	64
Staff 4th Battalion Foot Artillery	5	6	11
1st Company 4th Battalion Foot Artillery	5	59	64
2nd do. 4th do. do. do.	5	58	63
3rd do. 4th do. do. do.	3	71	74
4th do. 4th do. do. do.	4	72	76
Staff 5th Battalion Foot Artillery	2	5	7
1st Company 5th Battalion Foot Artillery	0	43	43
2nd do. 5th do. do. do.	2	33	35
3rd do. 5th do. do. do.	1	40	41
4th do. 5th do. do. do.	0	21	21
Staff 6th Battalion Foot Artillery	4	6	10
1st Company 6th Battalion Foot Artillery	3	8	11
2nd do. 6th do. do. do.	4	89	93
3rd do. 6th do. do. do.	3	95	98
4th do. 6th do. do. do.	5	65	70
Total	145	2,252	2,397
CAVALRY.			
1st European Regiment Light Cavalry	16	245	261
2nd do. do. do. do.	13	256	269
3rd do. do. do. do.	18	235	253
4th do. do. do. do.	No return.		
Total	47	736	783
Carried over	1,704	46,223	47,927

A.—(Concluded.)

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Total.
Brought forward ...	1,704	46,223	47,927
HON'BLE COMPANY'S.—(Concluded.)			
INFANTRY.			
1st European Bengal Fusiliers	49	853	902
2nd • Ditto ditto	47	780	827
3rd European Regiment... ..	47	876	923
Total	143	2,509	2,652
Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry	26	222	248
Lahore Light Horse	7	134	141
Peshawur Light Horse	7	179	186
Total	40	535	575
European Invalid Battalion	74	176	250
European Veteran Company	0	28	28
Total	74	204	278
Grand Total... ..	1,961	49,471	51,432

(Signed) W. MAYHEW, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Adjutant General of the Army.

ALLAHABAD ;
Adj. Genl's. Office, Head Quarters,
The 4th August 1858.

B.

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
				European.	Native.
ARTILLERY.					
4th Troop 2nd Brigade H. A., and Gun Lascars 1st 2nd and 3rd Troops ... }	6	3	189	9	189
Gun Lascars 3rd Brigade H. A. ...	0	0	92	0	92
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 2nd Battalion Foot Artillery ... }	0	0	188	0	188
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 3rd Battalion Foot Artillery ... }	0	0	214	0	214
Gun Lascars 4th Battalion Foot Artillery ...	0	0	113	0	113
7th Battalion Foot Artillery ...	No Return.				
Staff 8th Battalion Foot Artillery	4	2	3	6	3
1st Company 8th ...	Mutinied.				
2nd Ditto ...	3	0	100	3	100
3rd Ditto ...	Disbanded.				
4th Ditto ...	5	0	39	5	39
5th Ditto ...	3	0	120	3	120
6th Ditto ...	Mutinied.				
9th Battalion Foot Artillery ...	No Return.				
Total ...	21	5	1,058	26	1,058
CAVALRY.					
4th Regiment Light Cavalry ...	No Return.				
5th Ditto ...	No Return.				
6th Ditto ...	7	0	442	7	442
8th Ditto ...	8	0	17	8	17
9th Ditto ...	8	0	354	8	354
10th Ditto ...	7	0	169	7	169
Total ...	0	0	129	0	129
Total ...	30	0	1,111	30	1,111
Sappers and Miners ...	No Return.				
INFANTRY.					
2nd Regiment Native Infantry ...	5	1	660	6	660
3rd Ditto ditto ...	8	2	103	10	103
4th Ditto ditto ...	14	2	528	16	528
13th Ditto ditto ...	7	1	876	8	876
16th Ditto ditto ...	7	0	779	7	779
21st Ditto ditto ...	11	2	902	13	902
24th Ditto ditto ...	8	0	819	8	819
25th Ditto ditto ...	11	0	776	11	776
26th Ditto ditto ...	2	0	143	2	143
27th Ditto ditto ...	7	0	725	7	725
Total ...	80	8	6,311	88	6,311
Carried over ...	131	13	8,480	144	8,480

B.—(Continued.)

CORPS.				European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
							European.	Native.
Brought forward ...				131	13	8,480	144	8,480
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)				80	8	6,311	88	6,311
31st	Regiment	Native Infantry	...	} No Return.				
32nd	Ditto	ditto	...	4	2	848	6	848
33rd	Ditto	ditto	...	6	1	755	7	755
36th	Ditto	ditto	...	4	1	122	5	122
37th	Ditto	ditto	...	6	1	131	7	131
39th	Ditto	ditto	...	7	0	753	7	753
40th	Ditto	ditto	...	2	0	103	2	103
42nd	Ditto	ditto	...	} No Return.				
43rd	Ditto	ditto	...	} No Return.				
47th	Ditto	ditto	...	} No Return.				
49th	Ditto	ditto	...	6	1	657	7	657
50th	Ditto	ditto	...	8	1	395	9	395
58th	Ditto	ditto	...	10	0	775	10	775
59th	Ditto	ditto	...	7	1	795	8	795
61st	Ditto	ditto	...	8	1	124	9	124
62nd	Ditto	ditto	...	6	0	578	6	578
63rd	Ditto	ditto	...	} No Return.				
64th	Ditto	ditto	...	6	2	860	8	860
65th	Ditto	ditto	...	12	2	880	14	880
66th	Ditto	ditto	...	16	1	1,089	17	1,089
69th	Ditto	ditto	...	11	1	803	12	803
70th	Ditto	ditto	...	} No Return.				
73rd	Ditto	ditto	...	7	0	1,211	7	1,211
Lucknow	Regiment	0	2	138	2	138
Poorbeeah	5	4	292	9	292
Total ...				131	21	11,309	152	11,309
LOCAL CORPS.								
Kelat-i-Gilzie	Regiment	5	2	1,107	7	1,107
Regiment of Ferozepore	3	2	771	5	771
Ditto	of Loodianah	3	0	415	3	415
Seikh Volunteers	} No Return.				
Kumaon Battalion	5	1	692	6	692
Sirmoor	Ditto	} No Return.				
Nusseree	Ditto	7	1	829	8	829
1st Extra Goorkah	Regiment	5	1	475	6	475
Landour Hill	Rangers	6	1	518	7	518
1st Assam Light Infantry	Battalion	4	2	1,025	6	1,025
2nd Ditto	ditto ditto ditto	3	1	1,133	4	1,133
Mhairwarra	Battalion	4	2	738	6	738
Mhair	Regiment	3	2	622	5	622
Total ...				48	15	8,325	63	8,325
Carried over ...				310	49	28,114	359	28,114

B.—(Continued.)

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
				European.	Native.
Brought forward ...	310	49	28,114	359	28,114
LOCAL CORPS.—(Continued.)	48	15	8,325	63	8,325
Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion ...	6	2	962	8	962
Arracan Battalion ...	6	2	723	8	723
Shekhawattee Battalion ...	3	2	743	5	743
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion ...	No Return.				
Munneepoor Regiment ...	2	2	503	4	503
Kamroop Ditto ...	4	2	915	6	915
Mynpoory Infantry Levy ...	0	0	590	0	590
Futtehgurh Ditto ...	0	0	539	0	539
Cawnpore Ditto ...	5	0	825	5	825
Allahabad Ditto ...	4	0	613	4	613
Allygurh Ditto ...	2	1	307	3	307
Bareilly Ditto ...	0	0	322	0	322
Sebundy Sappers and Miners ...	1	2	211	3	211
Resident's Escort ...					
Local Company of Artillery ...					
Nimar Police Corps ...					
Malwah Bheel Corps ...					
Meywar Ditto ...	4	2	1,030	6	1,030
Meena Battalion ...	4	0	579	4	579
Calcutta Native Militia ...	3	1	963	4	963
Hill Rangers ...	3	2	616	5	616
Jodhpore Legion ...	4	2	703	6	703
1st Sikh Infantry ...	4	0	986	4	986
2nd Ditto ditto ...	4	1	948	5	948
3rd Ditto ditto ...	3	0	940	3	940
4th Ditto ditto ...	6	0	259	6	259
Total ...	68	21	14,277	89	14,277
IRREGULAR CAVALRY.					
1st Irregular Cavalry ...	2	0	536	2	536
2nd Ditto ditto ...	4	0	405	4	405
4th Ditto ditto ...	2	0	238	2	238
5th Ditto ditto ...	1	0	64	1	64
6th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	581	4	581
7th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	575	4	575
8th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	472	4	472
11th Ditto ditto ...	No Return.				
16th Ditto ditto ...	2	0	416	2	416
17th Ditto ditto ...	6	0	482	6	482
18th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	589	4	589
Ramgurh ...	1	0	190	1	190
Benares Horse ...	2	0	164	2	164
Total ...	36	0	4,712	36	4,712
Carried over ...	414	70	47,103	484	47,103

B.—(Continued.)

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
				European.	Native.
Brought forward ...	414	70	47,103	484	47,103
IRREGULAR CAVALRY.—(Continued.)	36	0	4,712	36	4,712
Beatson's Horse ...	No Return.				
Meade's Horse ...	6	1	453	7	453
Behar Horse ...	No Return.				
Rohilcund Horse ...	No Return.				
Peshawur Light Horse ...	0	0	148	0	148
1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry ...	No Return.				
2nd Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	0	617	6	617
3rd Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	766	4	766
4th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	524	4	524
1st Punjab ditto ditto ...	5	0	568	5	568
2nd Ditto ditto ditto ...	8	0	713	8	713
3rd Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	0	536	6	536
4th Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	0	546	6	546
5th Ditto ditto ditto ...	5	0	582	5	582
Jodhpore Sikh Horse ...	1	0	453	1	453
Mooltanee Cavalry ...	No Return.				
Towanna Horse ...	No Return.				
Total ...	51	1	5,906	52	5,906
PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.					
1st Punjab Light Field Battery ...	1	2	143	3	143
2nd Ditto ditto ditto ditto ...	2	1	141	2	141
3rd Ditto ditto ditto ditto ...	1	2	141	3	141
No 4 Garrison Company of Artillery ...	2	0	151	3	151
Hazara Mountain Train Battery ...	1	0	80	1	80
Corps of Guides ...	4	0	1,137	4	1,137
Total ...	11	5	1,793	16	1,793
INFANTRY.					
1st Punjab Irregular Infantry ...	4	0	924	4	924
2nd Ditto ditto ditto ...	5	0	900	5	900
3rd Ditto ditto ditto ...	3	1	954	4	954
4th Ditto ditto ditto ...	10	0	845	10	845
5th Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	0	1,022	6	1,022
6th Ditto ditto ditto ...	3	0	917	3	917
7th Ditto ditto ditto ...	7	0	820	7	820
8th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	918	4	918
9th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	919	4	919
10th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	925	4	925
11th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	958	4	958
Total ...	54	1	10,102	55	10,102
Carried over ...	530	77	64,904	607	64,904

B.—(Concluded.)

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	
				European.	Native.
Brought forward ...	530	77	64,904	607	64,904
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)	54	1	10,102	55	10,102
12th Punjaub Irregular Infantry...	4	0	941	4	941
13th Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	2	948	8	948
14th Ditto ditto ditto ...	5	0	955	5	955
15th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	959	4	959
16th Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	1	922	7	922
17th Ditto ditto ditto ...	3	2	1,007	5	1,007
18th Ditto ditto ditto ...	3	0	959	3	959
19th Ditto ditto ditto ...	3	0	913	3	913
20th Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	961	4	961
21st Ditto ditto ditto ...	7	0	930	7	930
22nd Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	0	1,002	4	1,002
23rd Ditto ditto ditto ...	4	2	896	6	896
24th Ditto ditto ditto ...	6	20	846	26	846
Hazara Goorkha Battalion ...	3	0	793	3	793
Total ...	62	27	13,032	89	13,032
Grand Total	592	104	77,936	696	77,936

(Signed) W. MAYHEW, *Lieut.-Col.*,*Adj. Genl. of the Army.*

ALLAHABAD ;

*Adj. Genl's Office, Head Quarters,**The 4th August 1858.*

C.
SUPPLEMENT.

DISPOSITION RETURN of Temporary Levies, organized Police Contingents, &c., in the Bengal Presidency on the 1st July 1858.

Quarter Master General's Office ; Head Quarters,

Allahabad, 29th July 1858.

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	CORPS.	Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	REMARKS.	
PRESI- DENCY.	Raneegunge... ..	Sonthal Police	231	0		
	Cachar	Kashie Levy	214	0		
	Purneah	Purneah Police Battalion	634	0		
	Dorundah	Cole and Sonthal Levy	488	0	150 of these at Chyebassa.	
	Doodnugger	Bengal Police Battalion	363	0		
	Patna and Dinapore	Do. do. do.	35	0		
	Bastee	Do. do. do.	55	0		
	Chupra	Do. do. do.	41	0		
	Arrah... ..	Do. do. do.	161	0		
	Dehree	Do. do. do.	39	0		
DINAPORE.	Rohatas	Do. do. do.	296	4		
	Sasseram	Sebundy Levy	242	0	35 of these are Cavalry.	
	Behar District	Behar Irregular Cavalry	176	0		
		Do. Station Guards	757	0		
		Do. Mounted Police	25	0	Europeans.	
	Ghazeepore	Sewan Levy	231	0		
		Police Levies	131	0		
		Benares	Do. Do.	710	0	62 mounted ; includes 337 of Catania's Levy of which station.
		Jounpore	Do. Do.	288	0	89 do. <i>Note.</i> —Of these Police Levies the Horse are partially armed.
		Mirzapore	Do. Do.	207	0	
Azimghur		Do. Do.	200	0	50 Do. Infantry entirely unarmed.	

SAUGOR	Allahabad	Seikh Police Corps	1,114	0	Since moved to Bitlour between Cawnpore and Meerut.
	Banda	Allahabad Levy	525	0	
	Calpee Road	Bundelcund Auxiliary Levies	978	0	
OUDH.	Bunnee	Towana Horse	308	0	Detachments at Chinthul, Mullahabad and Futtehpore.
		Kuppoortalah Rajah's Contingent Artillery	83	0	
		Ditto ditto ditto Cavalry	146	0	
		Ditto ditto ditto Infantry	1,110	0	
	Oonao	Ditto ditto ditto ditto	186	0	
		Pathan Horse	110	0	
	Lucknow	2 Regiments Oudh Police Cavalry	811	0	
		4 ditto ditto ditto Infantry	2,218	0	
		Seikh Levies from Umballah	711	0	
	Mullahabad	Allahabad Mounted Police	322	0	
1st Regiment Oudh Police Infantry		879	0		
Remains of Oudh Irregular Cavalry Corps		125	0		
CAWNPORE.	Cawnpore	Cawnpore Levy	798	0	3 Companies detached to Meerun-ka-Seraie.
	Etawah	Auxiliary Levy Artillery	30	5	
		Ditto ditto Cavalry	213	0	
		Ditto ditto Infantry	375	0	
	Mynpoory	Mynpoory Irregular Cavalry	414	0	
		Ditto Police Levy	303	0	
	Futtehgurh	Futtehgurh Levy	578	0	
Furruckabad Police Infantry		240	0		
RODILCUND.	Shahjehanpore	Ditto ditto Cavalry	136	0	200 men detached to Etawah.
		Mooltanee Horse	638	0	
	Powaeen near Shahjehanpore	Rohilcund Auxiliary Police Cavalry	321	0	
		Ditto ditto ditto Infantry	220	0	
	Bareilly	Kumaon Hill Levy	737	0	
		Mooltanee Horse	356	0	
	Mooradabad	Pathan	101	0	
		Cavalry attached to 1st Punjab Infantry	70	0	
		Gowan's Infantry	539	0	
	Bijnour	District Police Cavalry	219	0	
Police Cavalry		102	0		
Ally Ghur	Ditto Infantry	210	0		
	Allyghur Levy	277	0		
Agra	Police Battalion	895	0		
	Ditto Infantry	186	0		
MUTTRA.	Artillery General Van Cortlandt's Levy	51	4	} Have returned to Goorgaon.	
	Towana Horse	149	0		
	Goorgaon Mounted Police	192	0		
Carried over			23,500	13	

C.—(Continued.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	CORPS.	Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	REMARKS.
		Brought forward	23,500	13	
MEERUT.	Boolundshahur	Goorgaon Pathan Horse Stokes	226	0	En route to Allahabad.
		Police Cavalry	540	0	
		Ditto Infantry	455	0	
	Moozuffernuggur	Ditto Cavalry	107	0	
		Ditto Infantry	222	0	
	Meerut	Ditto Cavalry	405	0	
		Ditto Infantry	822	0	
	Delhec... ..	8th and 9th Punjab Police Battalions	1,500	0	And in the Division } Do. do. do. } Approximate.—No return.
		Mounted Police	300	0	
	Jhujjur	Jhujjur Mounted Police	210	0	
		Esakhel Cavalry	107	0	
		Putteeala Rajah's Artillery	66	0	
		Ditto ditto Cavalry	387	0	
	Rohtuck	Ditto ditto Infantry	1,167	0	Now at Goorgaon.
		Towana Horse	320	0	
		Police Cavalry... ..	222	0	
		Ditto Infantry	91	0	
		Rajah of Jheend's Troops. Cavalry	59	0	
Ditto ditto ditto Infantry . . .		164	0		
Scharunpore	Police Cavalry	105	0		
	Ditto Infantry	430	0		
Dehra Dhoon	Police	174	0	26 of these are mounted.	
	Ditto Mounted	145	0		
Umballah	4th Punjab Police Battalion	575	0		
	Horse Levy	74	0		
Hooshearpore	Foot	349	0		
	Putteeala Rajah's Contingent	39	0		
Loodianah	Nabba Ditto Ditto	247	0		
	Soony Mookhec Police Battalion	76	0		
	Mooltanee Infantry	26	0		
	General Service Levy... ..	172	0		
HIND.					

SIR	Hissar	{	Rajah Jowhir Singh's Contingent	696	0	
			Mounted Police	332	0	
			Detachment Lieutenant Walcott's Battery	39	4	
			Artillery	16	4	3 4-Pounder. 1 3½-Pounder.
			Police Cavalry	288	0	
			Ditto Infantry	304	0	
Lahore	Lahore	{	Putteeala Rajah's Infantry	62	0	
			Lahore Mounted Police	103	0	
			Punjab ditto ditto	843	0	And in the Division.
			1st ditto Police Battalion	893	0	
			Mooltan Mounted Police	350	0	And in the Division. Approximate. No return.
			3rd Punjab Police Battalion	476	0	
Lahore	Mooltan	{	Googaira Horse Levy ✓	108	0	
			Ditto Foot ditto	200	0	
			Detachment 3rd Punjab Police Battalion	103	0	
			Sealkote Foot Levy	353	0	
			Mooltanee Horse	104	0	
			Ditto Infantry	44	0	No return.
Lahore	Googaira	{	7th Punjab Police Battalion	
			3rd Troop Punjab Mounted Police	36	0	
			Goordaspoor Foot Levy	183	0	
			Detachment 2nd Punjab Police Battalion	168	0	
			Ditto ditto ditto ditto	368	0	
Lahore	Sealkote	{	Irregular Mounted Levy	306	0	
			Ditto Foot Levy	364	0	
			6th Punjab Police Battalion Detachment	39	0	
			Irregular Mounted Levy	385	0	
			Ditto Foot Levy	571	0	
			6th Punjab Police Battalion	722	0	
Lahore	Umritsur	{	Irregular Mounted Levy	31	0	From Return of 1st June.
			Ditto Foot Levy	341	0	
			Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	93	0	
			Irregular Mounted Levy	103	0	
			Ditto Foot Levy	110	0	
			Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	43	0	
Lahore	Goordaspoor	{	Jhelum Levy	271	0	
Lahore	Noorpore	{	Carried over	42,730	21	
Lahore	Kangra	{				
Lahore	Bunnoo	{				
Lahore	Dera Ismail Khan	{				
Lahore	Goojerat	{				
Lahore	Goojranwalla	{				
Lahore	Leia	{				
Lahore	Mithun Kote	{				
Lahore	Tak	{				
Lahore	Jhelum	{				

C.—(Concluded.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	CORPS.	Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	REMARKS.	
		Brought forward	42,730	21		
PESHAWUR.	{	Rawul Pindee	Mounted Police	350	0	And in the Division. Approximate. No return.
			5th Punjab Police Battalion	380	0	
		Campbellpoor	Khuttuck Levy	162	0	
		Attock	Mooltanee Horse Levy	49	0	
			Ditto Foot	76	0	
		Nowshera	Mooltanee Horse	105	0	
Peshawur	Mounted Police	500	0	Approximate. No return.		
		GRAND TOTAL	44,352	21		

This Statement is necessarily *incorrect* in many instances, in consequence of Returns not having been duly furnished.

(Signed) W. MACPHERSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Offy. Quarter Master General of the Army.

(A true copy)

(Signed) H. H. CREALOCK,
D. A. A. General to Chief of the Staff.

Note.—This number is constantly swelling, as the Magistrates under the orders of Government succeed in addition to the Ranks of the Military Police.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, *Major-General*,
Chief of the Staff.

W. R. MANSFIELD, Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

REGIMENT		OFFICERS AND COMPANY, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.					Horses.	Strength of each Regiment, &c.	Total strength of each Arm.	Grand Total strength of all Arms.
ESTABLISHMENT	REGIMENT	Sergents.	Corporals and Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers	Privates, &c.				
		0	10	1	12	160	200	203	609	ABSTRACT OF THE EUROPEAN FORCE. Officers 2,818 Non-Commissioned Officers, Trumpeters and Artificers 5,890 Rank and File 61,308 <hr/> Total 70,016
		0	10	2	11	150	130	192	1,728	
		2	32	9	10	606	703	746	1,492	
		6	18	2	0	92	0	123	492	
		0	50	20	0	950	0	1,119	16,785	
ESTABLISHMENT	8	120	34	33	1,958	1,033	2,383	21,106	21,106	
REGIMENT		OFFICERS AND COMPANY, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.					Horses.	Strength of each Regiment, &c.	Total strength of each Arm.	Grand Total strength of all Arms.
ESTABLISHMENT	REGIMENT	Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers.	Natives.	Privates, &c.				
		10	2	1	23	171	200	225	2,025	* NOTE 1. No Statement of Officers on account of the Native Regiment has been given, as they will be deducted from the Establishments of other Regiments on the so-called Irregular system, vide text of minute. The Establishment stated in the Return for the Local European Regiments has merely been copied from the present Royal Establishments, which will probably require large augmentations to compensate for the extraordinary demands of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief for Civil and Military administration; and to admit all the Officers of the present Army, it must ever be remembered that one season of the year being taken with another, the effective strength of the European Forces in India is reckoned on the whole as less by one fourth than the regulated Establishments. The figures in this Return represent the proposed regulated Establishment. * NOTE 2. The 70,016 as European Establishment includes 736 Artificers, Natives, on the strength of the Artillery Troops and Battalions.
		10	2	1	23	161	170	215	4,915	
		10	1	0	0	92	0	116	3,480	
		18	6	6	0	384	450	477	4,770	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		50	20	0	0	950	0	1,123	33,690	
ESTABLISHMENT	68	61	8	16	1,758	860	2,156	48,910	48,910	
REGIMENT		Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.		Horses.	Strength of each Regiment.	Total strength of each Arm.				
ESTABLISHMENT	REGIMENT									
			400	0	400	4,800				
			600	0	600	27,000				
			800	0	800	4,000				
			800	0	800	4,800				
ESTABLISHMENT			2,600	0	2,600	40,600				
						*70,016				
						40,600				
						1,10,616				

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major-General.

No. 804 OF 1858.

FROM

LIEUT.-COLONEL CUTHBERT DAVIDSON,
Resident at Hyderabad.

To

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General,

ALLAHABAD.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch No. 29, under date the 21st May 1858, giving cover to a printed copy of a letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, and appending a series of questions to which my replies are requested.

2. These questions have been replied to *seriatim* in the accompanying enclosures, and I now proceed to offer some general observations upon the subject of the fifth Para. of the Hon'ble Court's Despatch.

3. I cannot but question the policy of entertaining low caste men; they are not more submissive or amenable to authority than the high caste, although they would not be able to plead caste for some peculiar acts of disobedience—yet all are alike disinclined to go on board ship or proceed on foreign service.

4. No secret combinations to resist authority and to refuse Government employment have been so active and so determinedly carried out as those entered into conjointly by low castes, such as artizans, sweepers, washermen, peadas and watchmen of Villages and similar low classes. I would not refuse these men a place in our ranks; but I doubt whether enlisting them in large bodies to supply the place of the Brahmin and Rajpoots, Hindoostan Sepoys, will suppress that tendency to mutiny which seems inherent in all classes of the Natives of India (Seikhs not excepted) when once enlisted in Government employ, nor will such a measure altogether meet the difficulty Government has to contend with in

Note.—The Seikhs have lately been largely employed by the Minister here, and openly give out that their day is coming and that they will yet govern Hindoostan.

re-organizing the Indian Army.

5. I would propose to enlist in the Hyderabad Contingent, in place of two of the present Infantry Regiments of Sepoys, two African Corps taken indiscriminately from the races inhabiting that great Continent—Hottentots, Caffres, Negroes, &c. &c., refusing no race physically suited for a Soldier in a tropical climate, and apply this principle throughout the Armies of India, that is out of every eight Regiments embodied, two should be foreigners, capable of serving in a tropical climate. These must be in addition to the European Army in India.

6. Some political difficulties have, I perceive, been anticipated in regard to the enlistment of African Corps; but the arguments adduced in support of these opinions do not seem to me to carry much weight with them.

7. The Native Governments have long since given us a practical lesson as to their opinion of the loyalty and fidelity of the Sepoy Soldiery of India. It will be found that their most trusted Troops are always foreign mercenaries. The Nizam has, at this

present moment, in his employ 18,000 Arabs and about 5,000 Rohillas (Affghans), and many more of the latter tribe are in his Territory seeking employment. Not a petty Rajah in Guzerat but has, or endeavours to have his Arab, or foreign guard, however small it may be numerically for the protection of his person and Treasury, alleging they find the foreign mercenaries faithful, while their own immediate subjects cannot be trusted. So far as the difference of circumstances admits, we might do well to imitate the Roman policy which jealously excluded the employment in their conquered Provinces, of Troops Native to the place, and substituted for them men having no local sympathies of country and kindred.

8. If we do not have Troops of this description, I must advocate the location of a European Regiment, in addition to those I have specified, somewhere near Lingsoogoor or Moodgul, whichever is found the more favorable in point of climate, and another at Ellichpore, with a sanitary Station near the latter Cantonment at Chickuttah. This will be a more expensive arrangement than the enrolment of African Corps, and considered, with reference to tropical service, probably not so efficient. In both cases Barrack accommodation M. M. in addition to what I have noted in answer to the questions put, will be required.

9. If the strict letter of Treaties be adhered to, we might not be able to place any European Infantry in the Subsidiary Force excepting a few Artillerymen. *Vide* Article 3 of Treaties of 1798 and 1800 respectively.

Article 3rd of 1798.

The proposed reinforcement of the subsidiary Troops shall be in the pay of this State from the day of their crossing the boundaries; satisfactory and effectual provision shall be made for the regular payment of this Force which, including the present Detachment, is to amount to six thousand Sepoys with firelocks, with a due proportion of field pieces manned by Europeans.

Article 3rd of 1800.

With a view to fulfil this Treaty of general defence and protection, His Highness the Nabob Asophjah agrees that two Battalions of Sepoys and one Regiment of Cavalry, with their due proportion of Guns and Artillerymen, shall be added in perpetuity to the present permanent subsidiary Force of six Battalions of Sepoys of one thousand firelocks each and one Regiment of Cavalry, five hundred strong (with their proportion of Guns and Artillerymen) so that the whole subsidiary Force furnished by the Hon'ble East India Company to His Highness, shall henceforward consist of eight Battalions of Sepoys (or eight thousand firelocks) and two Regiments of Cavalry (or one thousand horse) with their requisite complement of Guns, European Artillerymen, Lascars and Pioneers, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition, which Force is to be stationed in perpetuity in His Highness' Territories.

Article 3rd of 1853.

The Hon'ble East India Company further agrees, that in lieu of His Highness' present Contingent, it shall maintain for His Highness, his heirs and successors, an auxiliary Force, which shall be styled the Hyderabad Contingent, according to the provisions for the maintenance of that Force which are described in the 6th Article of this Treaty.

It shall consist of not less than five thousand Cavalry, with four Field Batteries of Artillery. It shall be commanded by British Officers fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government through its representative the Resident at Hyderabad.

tion of the Artillery is also European. The preservation of peace and tranquillity in his dominions has always been the chief consideration of the Nizam and his Minister, and if

10. By the Treaty, however, of 1853, the Hyderabad Contingent, which are now British Troops, might be all Europeans, as we are only bound by it to keep up 5,000 Infantry, 2,000 Cavalry and four Batteries of Artillery. The discipline of these Troops is not specified, whereas in the Treaties in which the Subsidiary Force is alluded to, eight Regiments of Sepoys, two Regiments of Cavalry (these might be Europeans) are mentioned. We have hitherto, in keeping up the Subsidiary Force, considered one European Soldier numerically as two Natives, and it is clear the specification of Sepoy Battalions in the Treaties had reference to the expense we were bound to incur for the support of the Subsidiary Force, not to the exclusion of European Troops if we judged their employment expedient.

11. The Nizam has never, so far as my means of information extends, objected to the introduction of European Troops for the protection of his Territory, and for many years a European Regiment has been stationed at Secundrabad, while the larger portion

LIEUT.-COL. C. DAVIDSON, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Questions and Answers having reference to Para. 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

1.

The European Force ordinarily stationed within the Nizam's Territory, consisted only of one Regiment of European Infantry and two Companies of Artillery; but under recent circumstances, it has been increased to the extent shown in the following Tabular Statement:—

STATION.	CORPS.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeons & Assistant Ditto.	Veterinary Surgeons.	Troop Quarter Mas- ters.	Riding Masters.	Apothecaries or As- sistant Ditto.	Sergeants.	Trumpeters, Drum- mers and Buglers.	Farrriers.	Rank and File.	Regimental Horses.	Bullocks.	Natives attached.	Total exclusive of the three last Columns.
		Vide Return of H. S. Force, of 1st May 1858. Secunderabad. Head Quarters H. S. Force.	"B" Troop Horse Artillery ..	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	5	2	3	93	153	0
12th Royal Lancers at Trumulgerry	2		3	11	1	1	0	1	2	30	8	4	357	339	0	664	420
Royal Artillery at Trumulgerry ..	0		2	3	1	0	0	0	1	7	1	0	94	0	0	4	109
4th Battalion Artillery ..	1		0	4	1	0	0	0	2	9	8	1	78	103	125	130	99
1st Battalion Royals ..	4		6	30	3	0	0	0	3	53	20	0	1,039	0	0	24	1,153
Total ..	7		12	50	7	1	1	1	8	104	34	8	1,661	595	125	983	1,894

Jaulnah. { 1 Squadron Dragoons.
2 Co's. European Infantry.
Half Battalion European Artillery. } Under Orders from Bombay to Jaulnah, not joined.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

2.

One Regiment of European Cavalry 700 Rank and File.
Two Troops of European Horse Artillery.

Three Regiments of European Infantry, 1000 each.

Six Horse Batteries, of which two to belong to the Subsidiary Force, and four to the Hyderabad Contingent.

The ordinary distribution of these Troops should be as follows:—

At Secunderabad.

One Regiment European Cavalry.
Two Regiments European Infantry.
Two Troops European Horse Artillery.
Two Horse Batteries.

At Aurungabad.

One Regiment European Infantry.
One Horse Battery (Hyderabad Contingent).

In Raichore Doab.

At Lingsoogoor (or elsewhere).
One Horse Battery (Hyderabad Contingent).

At Hingolee.

One Horse Battery (Hyderabad Contingent).

At Ellichpoor.

One Horse Battery (Hyderabad Contingent).

A Sketch Map is enclosed showing the distribution of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and Hyderabad Contingent.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

3.

The Native portion of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force is stationed at Secunderabad, with the exception of a half Troop of Horse Artillery and one Regiment of Native Infantry detached for temporary employment in the Raichore Doab. The following is a Return of the Force as it stood on the 1st May 1858 :—

NUMBER of Troops now serving in the Nizam's Territories and Assigned Districts.

HYDERABAD SUBSIDIARY FORCE AT SECUNDERABAD.

CORPS.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Veterinary Surgeons.	Troop Quarter Masters.	Riding Masters.	Apothecaries and Assistant Ditto.	Native Commissioned Officers.	Sergeants and Havildars.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farrriers.	Rank and File.	Regimental Horses.	Bullocks.	Total exclusive of the two last Columns.
	<i>Vide Return of H. S. Force for April 1858.</i>																
"E" Troop Horse Artillery	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	1	1	40	87	0	50
Detachment 2nd Light Cavalry	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	15	2	4	138	124	0	168
Ditto 7th Ditto	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	11	1	3	115	112	0	138
Sappers and Miners	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	45	0	0	49
7th Regiment Native Infantry ..	1	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	10	32	17	0	474	0	0	541
9th Ditto Ditto	1	2	9	0	1	0	0	0	1	17	54	18	0	618	0	0	721
10th Ditto Ditto	1	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	1	6	35	10	0	385	0	0	443
42nd Ditto Ditto	2	2	10	0	1	0	0	0	1	18	55	19	0	699	0	0	807
49th Ditto Ditto	1	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	2	19	48	15	0	544	0	0	641
Total	7	10	42	0	4	1	0	0	8	80	258	84	8	3,056	323	0	3,558

N. B.—Of the foregoing one Regiment Native Infantry and half a Troop of Native Horse Artillery are temporarily detached on Field Service in the Raichore Doab.

NUMERICAL Strength of the Hyderabad Contingent according to authorized Establishment.

STATIONS.	CORPS.	Native Officers	Rank & File.
BOLARUM... ..	1 Company of Artillery	2	177
	1 Regiment of Cavalry	18	537
	2 Ditto Infantry	34	1,804
AURUNGABAD	1 Company of Artillery	3	193
	1 Regiment of Cavalry	19	559
	1 Ditto Infantry	17	902
ELlichPOOR	1 Company of Artillery	3	193
	1 Wing of Cavalry	10	280
	1 Regiment Infantry	17	902
HINGOLEE	1 Company of Artillery	3	193
	1 Wing of Cavalry	9	279
	1 Regiment Infantry	17	902
LINGSOOGOR	1 Detachment Company Artillery	1	116
	1 Detachment Cavalry	1	22
	1 Regiment Infantry	17	902
MOMINABAD	1 Regiment of Cavalry	19	559
	Total	190	8,520

N. B.—Of the foregoing, all available Troops from those stationed at Bolaram and temporarily detached on Field Service in the Raichore Doab, are 300 Infantry and 150 Horse.

Of the Troops above exhibited as serving in the Nizam's Territory and Assigned District, the following portion of the Hyderabad Contingent is now on Field Service in Central India :—

From Bolarum.	From Aurungabad.	From Ellichpoor.	From Hingolee.	From Mominabad.
Head Quarters and Squadron. 2nd Cavalry, with General Whitlock's Column.	2nd Infantry. 4 Guns. 3rd Cavalry.	Wing 5th Infantry. 4 Guns. Left Wing 4th Cavalry.	Right Wing 4th Cavalry. 4 Guns. Wing 3rd Infantry.	1st Cavalry. Leaving 1 Troop for protection of the Station.

At Shorapoor.

2 Guns 3rd Company Artillery, and 2 Companies 4th Infantry under a European Officer.

QUESTIONS.

4.

The Troops of Native Horse Artillery Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and the four Companies of Artillery Hyderabad Contingent being abolished, on the organization of the six European Horse Batteries, I would return the present establishment and distribution of the remaining portion of the Native Force as at present constituted, viz. :—

ANSWERS.

Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

At Secunderabad { 1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
5 Ditto Infantry.

Hyderabad Contingent.

At Bolarum..... { 1 Regiment Cavalry (less 1 Detachment).
2 Ditto Infantry (less 2 Companies).

At Aurungabad { 1 Regiment of Cavalry.
1 Ditto Infantry.

At Ellichpoor... { 1 Wing of Cavalry.
1 Regiment of Infantry.

At Hingolee ... { 1 Wing of Cavalry.
1 Regiment of Infantry.

At Lingsoogoor { 2 Detachments of Cavalry.
1 Regiment of Infantry.

At Mominabad... 1 Regiment of Cavalry (less 1 Detachment).

At Wurrungul ... 2 Companies of Infantry.

I would replace 2,000 of the 5,000 Infantry, which by the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1853, we are bound to keep up in the Hyderabad Contingent, by two Regiments of 1,000 each, composed of Africans, Caffres, Hottentots and other men of the Cape.

5.

The only Irregular Troops, of those which I have enumerated, are the four Regiments of Cavalry in the Hyderabad Contingent.—Police Corps are not included in the foregoing Statements.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

The Police Corps in the Hyderabad Assigned Territories may be stated as follows :—

DISTRICTS.	Officers superior to Privates or Peons.	Privates or Peons.
North Berar	80	464
South Berar	72	492
Dharaseo District	34	198
Raichore Doab	55	349
Hill Rangers	19	162
Frontier Chowkies	21	238
Total ...	281	1,903

The Native Cavalry and Horse Artillery of the Subsidiary Force are composed principally of Mussulmans and Mahrattas, —descendants from and connected with the ancient Military retainers of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, and the Rajahs of Tanjore and Mysore. The Infantry are recruited principally from the Districts of the Northern Circars, Arcot, Vellore, Coimbatore and Trinopoly.

The following Tabular Statements show the races of which the Subsidiary Force and Hyderabad Contingent are composed and the proportion in which they occur :—

Subsidiary Force.

	Hin- doos.	Mussul- mans.	In- ferior Castes.	Chris- tians.	Percentage.			
					All Ranks.	All Ranks.	All Ranks.	All Ranks.
Cavalry	52	247	0	9	16.883	80.175	0	2.922
Artillery				None present.				
Infantry	1,811	1,155	128	182	55.281	35.256	3.907	5.556
Total ...	1,863	1,402	128	191	51.981	39.118	3.571	5.327

Hyderabad Contingent.

	Hindoos.		Mussulmans.		Inferior Castes.		Christians.		Percentage.			
	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Hindoos.	Mussulmans.	Inferior Castes.	Christians.
Cavalry	8	308	73	1,925	0	13	0	19	13,470	85,166	555	809
Artillery	10	309	2	209	0	99	0	0	50,716	33,545	15,739	0
Infantry	70	2,072	30	1,879	0	1,441	0	31	38,783	34,565	25,091	561
Total	88	2,689	105	4,013	0	1,553	0	50				
Grand Total ...	2,777		4,118		1,553		50		32,678	48,459	18,275	588

It would inconveniently delay this Report to obtain the same minute information regarding the Police of the Districts, and it may be sufficient to state that in Berar and the Dharaseo District, the District Police comprises Mahrattas of all castes and Mussulmans. In Northern Berar the Mussalman predominate. In South Berar they are about equal. In the Dharaseo District Hindoos greatly outnumber the Mussulmans, while in the Raichore Doab there is no great preponderance on either side. The Hindoo portion consisting of Coombees, Rajpoots and Bedurs and a small portion of Dhers. In the district, as a general rule, the village watch is kept by Mahars and Maugs.

QUESTIONS.

6.

I do not propose to disturb the present portion of Regular, Irregular and Police Corps; but the last I consider under their present organization an utterly inefficient body of men. There is an entire absence of uniformity and discipline; these I would introduce and strictly enforce, and with this view would recommend a European Superintendent to be placed over the whole, and an Assistant over each Police District.

7.

The Troops which I have proposed to be employed in these Territories, may be summed up as follows:—

European.

1 Regiment of European Cavalry	700
3 Ditto ditto Infantry	3,000
2 Troops of European Horse Artillery	200
6 Horse Batteries	600
Total Europeans				4,500

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Native Subsidiary Force.

1 Regiment of Native Cavalry	350	
5 Ditto Ditto Infantry	4000	
			4,350

Hyderabad Contingent.

4 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry	2,336	
6 Ditto Native Infantry	5,412	
			7,748

Police.

District	1,744	
Hill Rangers and Frontier Chowkeys	..	441	
			2,185

Total Native Troops 12,098

Total Police 2,185

Total Natives ... 14,283

Proportion of European to Native Troops.

Exclusive of Police 1 European to 268 Natives.

Inclusive of Police 1 Ditto to 317 Ditto.

The substitution of 2000 Africans for 2000 of the Infantry Contingent would leave the Natives of India in proportion to the remainder of the Forces as 1·88 to 1, or something less than two-thirds of the former to one-third of the latter.

8.

I am of opinion that throughout India generally there should be a proportion of one-third of Europeans to two-thirds of Natives of India, inclusive of Sepoys and Police.

9.

There is ample accommodation for European Troops now serving in the Nizam's Territory and Assigned Districts, as the Barracks now available would hold conveniently about 3000 men.

10.

In the event of the European Force being increased to the extent herein proposed by me at Secunderabad, four new ranges of Barracks, with four ranges of buildings for married men, would be required, with auxiliary buildings, and the addition of family quarters to the old Infantry Barracks; Plans and Estimates for which latter buildings have been already called for by the Madras Government. At Aurungabad Barrack accommodation for 1000 men would require to be built, and for a Horse Battery at Bolarum, Hingoollee and Ellichpoor.

(Signed) CUTHBERT DAVIDSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Resident.

SIR R. HAMILTON, BT., AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDIA.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

It is difficult to state the exact number of European Troops in Malion on this date; but I believe the following is nearly correct.

<i>At Mhow</i> ...	{	Left Wing 71st Highland Light Infantry, 92nd Wing Highlanders. 1 Squadron 17th Lancers. 1 Company Royal Artillery. 2 6 Bengal Artillery No. Light Battery.
<i>At Gwalior</i> ...	{	Right Wing 71st Highland Light Infantry. 86th Royal Infantry. 95th Foot. 3 Squadrons 14th Dragoons. Royal Artillery. 1 Bombay Horse Battery. Royal Engineers.
<i>At Jhansee</i> ...	{	3rd Bombay European Regiment. 1 Squadron of 14th Dragoons. 1 Bombay Troop Horse Artillery.
<i>At Calpee</i> ...	{	43rd H. M.'s. 19th M. N. I. Company Foot Artillery.
<i>At Seepree</i> ...	{	Wing 8th Hussars. 1½ Troop Horse Artillery Bombay.
<i>At Banda</i> ...	{	3rd Madras Europeans. 12th Lancers Wing. 1st Madras N. I. 2nd Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent. 300 Seikhs. Troop Horse Artillery. Siege Train.
<i>At Asserghur.</i>	{	1 Company 18th Royal Irish. Regiment of Foot.

2.

There should be 2 European Regiments—

<i>At Mhow</i> ...	{	One Wing of which detached to Lahore. 1 Regiment of Cavalry. 1 Troop Horse Artillery. 1 Horse Battery. Company 2nd or 3rd Class Siege Train. 1 Company Royal Engineers.
<i>At Gwalior</i> ...	{	2 Regiments of Infantry. 1 Wing detached to Jhansee. 1 Regiment Cavalry. 2 Squadrons at Jhansee. 1 Troop Horse Artillery. 1 Field Battery. 2 Guns at Jhansee. A 3rd Class Siege Train.
<i>At Calpee</i> ...	{	A Wing of European Infantry. Half a Battery.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

The Fort of Calpee to be the Arsenal for Gwalior and Bundelcund, and being on the Jumna gives it the advantage of river approach.

At Banda { A wing of European Infantry.
 { A Horse Battery.

At Nowgong { A Regiment of Cavalry.
 { There are Barracks and fodder.

The whole of these Troops should be formed annually into one or two Camps of Exercise, and kept in Camp from 1st December to 1st March. Mhow and Gwalior could assemble at Goonah. The Bundelcund at Kutch.

3.

The Native Troops in Central India are :—

24th at Jhansee	} All Bombay.
25th at Gwalior	
4th Rifles Ditto	
9th at Mhow	
19th Ditto	
10th at Seepree	

Madras Infantry at Banda.

3rd Bombay Cavalry at Jhansee and Mhow.

Wing 1st Bombay Lancers at Seepree.

Madras Cavalry at Banda.

Hydrabad Contingent Cavalry at Banda.

Native Infantry Asserghur Bombay.

The remains of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry are employed in Shahghur, but that is in the Saugor Division.

The remains of the Malwa Bheel Corps are employed on the Bombay and Agra road about Scindwah and in the valley of the Nerbudda.

4.

Native Troops must be employed with European Troops to do the sun work and ordinary station duties.

2	Regiments of Infantry at	Gwalior.
1	do. do.	Jhansee.
1	do. do.	Calpee.
1	do. do.	Banda.
3	do. do.	Mhow.
	One Wing at	Sehore.

The number of Escorts called for at Mhow for Stores or Treasure from Malligaum and Poona to Neemuch and Rajpootana towards Agra and Saugor makes the duty heavy. A wing or two full Companies at least at Asserghur might, as heretofore, be furnished from Malligaum.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

5.

All the Native Troops in Central India are Regulars except the Hyderabad Cavalry at Banda and the Malwah Bheel Corps. The Bombay and Madras Infantry Regiments are mixed races, the Cavalry chiefly Mahomedans.

6.

All the Native Infantry employed with European Regiments should be Regular, that is fighting men drilled and disciplined as Europeans. The Native Cavalry should be Irregulars, in reality not the Regular Cavalry that has just destroyed itself, but Irregular Horsemen fit for rough and ready work, foraging, escorts, pursuing plunderers, and duties on which European Cavalry cannot be sent out. Their description should be enough to ensure Military subordination, and their drill such as to enable to form up and act in a body but not so extensive as to make strong reviews. The more they shine on parade the less useful they will ever be as Irregular Horse.

The Malwah Bheel Corps should be strictly Police and Civil Corps, and such another Corps should supply the place of the Infantry of the Malwah Contingent. These Police Corps should have each a squadron of Cavalry, one to be stationed at Rugwas, and the other to have its Head Quarters at Dhar.

7.

There should be one European Regiment to every three Native Corps, supposing the European to be 1000 and the Native Corps 800 each; but in Central India this proportion can hardly be maintained, owing to the force being merely Contingent, and the Territory in which they will be employed Native States.

8.

Three Native to one European Regiment may be assumed as a fair proportion. 10,000 European Troops would be more than a match for 30,000 Natives, yet all things considered, and the fact that the population is not European, so that in the case of a rebellion, its tendency would be to side against the foreigner, three to one may be viewed as a large proportion. An armed Police Corps at all trained would, in times of revolt or disturbance, be nearly as bad as a mutinous Regular Corps, and I would not alter the proportion of 3 to 1.

9.

There is not adequate Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now serving in Malwah.

10.

Additional Barrack accommodation would have to be provided, because, except at Mhow, European Troops have not hitherto been stationed at Gwalior, Jhansee, Calpee or in Bundelcund.

(Signed) R. HAMILTON,
Agent Governor General for Central India.

No. 99.

FROM

CAPTAIN HENRY HOPKINSON,
Offg. Commissioner Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces,

To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special Duty with the Governor General,

ALLAHABAD.

Dated Maulmain, the 1st July 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 21st of May last, with the enclosures as noted in the margin, and to transmit herewith answers to the questions put therein. The questions having been confined to Tenasserim, I thought it would be better to include Martaban.

Printed despatch of Hon'ble Court of Directors Military Department No. 235, of the 25th November 1857. Printed list of questions having reference to Para. 5th of the above despatch.

I have availed myself largely of the experience, judgment and information of Colonel Stevenson, the Officer Commanding at Maulmain, in the consideration of the questions, and have been further assisted by Captain F. Beauchamp P. Seymour, H. M. S. *Pelorus*, and Senior Naval Officer with H. M.'s Vessels on this Coast.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

I refer to Statement A., which gives the answer in detail. At Maulmain a Company of European Artillery (Reserve), at Shoay Gyeen $\frac{2}{3}$ Company Madras Artillery, 2 Companies of European Infantry. There is no European Force at Tavoy and Mergui.

2.

To the present number and distribution of European Troops in Tenasserim and Martaban no material objection can, I think, be made. The number certainly would not bear reduction, and I am not satisfied that it stands in need of increase; but the Companies, Artillery and Infantry, should be kept up to their full regulated strength, for instance, instead of 44 Artillerymen only at Maulmain, there should be 60.

2. Colonel Stevenson observes, although I cannot say that any addition to the present regulated Force is absolutely necessary for the security of the Tenasserim Provinces, there can be no doubt that the presence of two or three hundred European Infantry would tend to make assurance doubly sure, and prove highly satisfactory to the Mercantile Community. I concur. I think Sepoys should always find themselves in the presence of European Soldiers, supposing a Regiment of European Infantry to be always maintained at Rangoon.

3. But both Colonel Stevenson and myself assume the invariable presence of a Vessel of War on the Coast and to be ordinarily stationed at Maulmain. The Steam Gun Vessels now in India, one of which, H. M. S. *Sparrowhawk*, is here at present, are well fitted for the duty. Tavoy and Mergui should never remain long unvisited by an armed vessel.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

4. In the event of an European war, Colonel Stevenson would locate two or three hundred European Infantry at Natmoo, on the right bank of the Maulmain river, six miles below Maulmain. Captain Seymour thinks that a good work there would be useful against shipping ; but a ship could range close in shore in a position the most favorable for her Artillery. I do not feel myself competent to give an opinion on the point ; but my impression is that to protect Maulmain in the case of a war with any Western Power it would be necessary to establish the superiority of our Naval Force.

5. Insurrection is possible rather than probable at Mergui and Tavoy, and I think the possibility is too remote to require to be guarded against by the constant presence of European Troops. But the small detachment of Sepoys stationed at either Tavoy or Mergui would be quite insufficient to meet any serious outbreak, and to prevent any thing of the kind being meditated, and to check it if it were attempted, would be one of the chief uses of a Gun Vessel on the Coast.

6. Major Berdmore has shown by his success against Menglounng Yoonzabry that the existing Military Force in the Province of Martaban is ample to quell any local disturbance.

7. In Province Amherst beyond the town of Maulmain I can scarcely imagine an occasion arising which would call into requisition the services of European Troops.

8. Maulmain, a city now containing 45,000 inhabitants might, if all were united in one common impulse, give trouble ; but though the most unexpected combinations have been met with in the progress of late events, I do not know what would combine so heterogeneous a mixture as the population of Maulmain in armed resistance to our authority.

9. Colonel Stevenson truly remarks "that the greatest source of anxiety to the Maulmain Community is the presence of the Trans-marine Convicts." He thinks it unfounded, and relying on his experience of them at Singapore (he was, I believe, Captain Mann's predecessor there) believes that a just and considerate treatment would range the great majority on the side of order. I do not at all agree in this. I would not be unjust to Bengal Convicts, but I doubt their being more reliable than Bengal Sepoys, and I regard them as the chief source of danger to Maulmain, but not a danger to be feared while we have a Gun Vessel in the river.

10. The steady fidelity of which the Madras Army has given such abundant proof will, I trust, never require any thing like co-action. I have not, therefore, taken into account the presence of Europeans in that sense, but here also a Vessel of War would prove the best representative of our power in the concrete.

I would observe, however, that the spirit and discipline of Madras Troops will be always much improved by a companionship with Europeans. Between the Bengal Sepoy and his Euro-

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

pean comrade, there never was the slightest approach to confusion, but I have always fancied that I could detect in the Madras Sepoy a capability of assimilation, the means of encouraging which should never, if possible, be absent.

It used to be an old joke against the Madras Presidency that if you asked a Native there what his caste was, the chances were he would answer "Master's caste." We are thankful now to have found some truth in the jest, while we see its inapplicability in Bengal.

11. I would wish it to be understood that I calculate on the presence of a Vessel of War at Maulmain in addition to and independently of a Coast Steamer, such as the *Pluto*, for transport, mail circuit and general service.

3.

Statement B. shows the number of each arm now serving in the Tenasserim Provinces and their distribution.

The Force is wholly Infantry, a Regiment of Regulars at Shoay-Gyeen and two at Maulmain, furnishing three Companies to Sittang, one to Tavoy, and one to Mergui. In the Tenasserim Provinces but a small body of armed Police, 143 Rank and File, is maintained and some River Police, 115 men.

In Martaban the land Police amounts to 150 Rank and File with the Karen Levy, 168 strong, and River Police, 111 men.

4.

I do not see any objection to the present number and distribution of Native Troops in these Provinces; but Colonel Stevenson suggests, and I agree in his suggestion, that the Sittang Detachment of three Companies might be furnished by the Rangoon Force, so as to leave the same number of Companies available at need for the Upper Salween, where the progress of events with reference to the anarchical state of the Karennee country may make it desirable that our presence should be felt. The Detachments at Tavoy and Mergui should also be increased to the strength of at least from 80 to 100 men at each station.

5.

Regular Troops from the Madras Presidency comprise seven-tenths of the entire force; Chittagongees in the River Police, one-tenth; the remainder interior Police, consisting of 461 Rarongs, Talings, Burmans, and other Burman races, with here and there a Madrassie or a Malay, make up the other two-tenths.

6.

And in answer to No. 6, I beg to say that I do not see any particular necessity for altering the above proportions.

7.

With Native Regular Troops of the Madras Army as now recruited, I think a proportion of one European Soldier or Sailor to five Sepoys would be amply sufficient. Inclusive of Police Corps the proportion might be as one European to seven or eight

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Natives. I answer this question, understanding the object to be, not so much to employ Europeans and Natives in the cheapest possible proportion, as to obtain a minimum of Europeans without reference to other considerations than those consistent with security and efficiency.

In the Tenasserim Provinces, where the European stands the climate better on the whole perhaps than the Native of India, even when equally exposed, the more Europeans in a Force the better, and a body of 3,000 men, consisting of 500 Europeans and 2,500 Natives, may cost more than one consisting of 1,000 Europeans and 1,500 or even 1,000 Europeans and 1,000 Natives, and not be more efficient; but on the other hand I apprehend that the State would be glad, although at a greater cost, to give two or even three Sepoys for every European Soldier, who could safely be dispensed with from these Provinces.

8.

Not to be answered.

9.

There are 11 ranges of Barracks planked buildings each measuring 160×25 with outer verandah 10 feet wide all round, and Serjeant's quarters at the angles. They have been condemned and were to have been pulled down, and a brick Barrack erected in their place had the European Regiment formerly stationed at Maulmain not been withdrawn; but they would answer very well for any temporary purpose, and there is ample space in them for one Regiment.

12. The Artillery are lodged in a well-built brick building 186×24 ; there are also three ranges of lascar sheds with tiled roofs and brick pillars, planked sides and flooring, which might easily be converted into temporary quarters for European Troops to the number of about 200 men.

10.

No.

11. 12. 13. 14. Not to be answered.

13. I have put down the Ship's Company of a Gun Vessel at 110 men. They would be more useful with their Ship than three times their number ashore. I beg to submit a brief note from Captain Seymour on the Naval Force to be maintained in these waters, which may be read with interest.

I have &c.,

(Signed) HENRY HOPKINSON,

Offg. Commissioner T. & M. Provinces.

MAULMAIN ;
Commissioner's Office,
The 1st July 1858. }

Porus Amherst, 1st July 1858.

MY DEAR HOPKINSON,

BEING about to leave for Trincomalee, I consider it right to let you know what in my opinion should constitute the Naval Force in these waters so long as the disturbances in India continue.

You ought always to have one Vessel on the Rangoon station, with orders to visit Dalhousie and Bassein occasionally; a second should be stationed at Maulmain where at present the force of English Soldiers amounts to 46 Artillerymen only, and her duty should be to take a trip now and then to Tavoy and Mergui, whence during the N. E. Monsoon she could run down the coast in shore as far as Junk Ceylon to prevent piracy in that neighbourhood, while a third should extend her cruising ground from the Ports on the Eastern Coast, *namely*, Chittagong, Akyab, &c., to the Andamans, the Government of India having expressed a wish to that effect.

The Steam Gun Vessels now in India are well fitted for these duties, and the occasional presence of the larger Vessels would suffice to maintain tranquillity in the several Ports of the Arracan, Tenasserim and Pegu Provinces, where even at the present day the sight of a large man-of-war is a novelty.

Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR.

(A true copy)

(Signed) HENRY HOPKINSON,

Offg. Commissioner T. & M. Provinces.

A.

RETURN of European Troops serving in the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces.

REGULAR CORPS.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Native Officers.	Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Havildars.	Buglers and Drummers.	Naiques.	Gunners.	Privates.	GUN LASCARS.			QUARTER MASTER'S DEPARTMENT.			MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.			
																	Native Officers.	Havildars.	Lascars.	Bheesties.	Lascars.	Artificers.	Assistant Apothecary.	Second Dresser.		
<i>Tenasserim Provinces.</i>																										
Company of European Artillery.	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	0	3	0	44	0	1	2	27	5	0	8	0	1	Total of Europeans, Gunners and Privates 186 Estimated strength of Europeans in H. M.'s Gun Vessel ... 110 Proportion of Europeans in the Coast Steamer 20	
Reserve present at Maulmain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	6	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0			
Absent in India	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Total	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	11	0	3	0	50	0	1	2	29	5	0	8	0	1		
Wanting to complete	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
Establishment	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	7	12	0	4	0	60	0	1	2	30	5	0	7	0	0		
Supernumeraries	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		
<i>Martaban Provinces.</i>																										
Company of European Artillery at Shoay Gyeen ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	32	0	1	0	10	1	0	1	0	0		
H. M.'s 69th Regiment 2 Companies	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	0	7	3	0	0	0	0	110	0	0	0	6	9	0	0	0		
Total	0	0	2	4	1	0	1	0	0	8	6	0	1	0	32	110	1	0	10	7	9	1	0	0		
Total effective strength T. and M. Provinces ...	0	0	3	5	1	0	1	0	0	10	6	0	4	0	76	110	2	2	37	12	9	9	0	1		

MAULMAIN;
Commissioner's Office, T. & M. Provinces,
The July 1858.

(Signed) HENRY HOPKINSON,
Offg. Commr., T. & M. Provinces.

B.

RETURN of Native Troops serving in the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces.

REGULAR CORPS.	Lieutenant-Colonels	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants	Ensigns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Native Officers.	Staff Sergeants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Havildars.	Buglers and Drummers.	Naiques.	Gunners.	Privates.	GUN LASCARS.			QUARTER MASTER'S DEPARTMENT.			MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.		REMARKS.	
																	Native Officers	Havildars.	Lascars.	Bheesties.	Lascars.	Artificers.	Assistant Apothecary.	Second Dresser.		
<i>Tenasserim Provinces.</i>																										
13th Regiment N. I. at Maulmain	1	1	2	4	3	0	1	12	2	0	0	36	15	36	0	409	0	0	0	13	10	4	0	1		
Absent in India	0	0	4	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	11	1	5	0	88	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0		
Total	1	1	6	9	3	0	1	13	2	0	0	47	16	41	0	497	0	0	0	15	11	4	1	1		
Wanting to complete	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	352	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Establishment	1	1	7	11	5	1	1	20	2	0	0	61	20	60	0	1000	0	0	0	20	13	4	1	1		
<i>48th Regiment N. I. at Maulmain</i>																										
48th Regiment N. I. at Maulmain	1	0	2	6	2	0	0	12	2	0	0	42	13	45	0	379	0	0	0	16	10	2	1	1		
Detachment 48th Regiment N. I. at Mergui	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	1	6	0	46	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0		
Ditto Ditto at Tavoy	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	7	2	4	0	54	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0		
Absent in India	0	1	5	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	8	3	5	0	95	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		
Total	1	1	7	11	2	0	0	20	2	0	0	60	19	60	0	574	0	0	0	20	13	2	1	1		
Wanting to complete	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	426	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0		
Establishment	1	1	7	11	5	1	1	20	2	0	0	60	20	60	0	1000	0	0	0	20	13	4	1	1		
<i>Martaban Province.</i>																										
37th Regiment Grenadiers at Shoay Gyeen	0	1	1	5	2	1	0	12	3	0	0	30	11	30	0	369	0	0	0	12	23	4	2	2		
Detachment 13th Regiment N. I. at Sittang	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	14	3	19	0	51	0	0	0	5	2	0	0	0		
Total	0	1	2	7	2	1	0	18	3	0	0	44	14	49	0	520	0	0	0	17	25	4	2	2		
Total effective strength T. and M. Provinces...	2	2	6	19	7	1	1	46	7	0	0	132	45	140	0	1408	0	0	0	50	47	10	3	4		

MAULMAIN;
Commissioner's Office, T. & M. Provinces,
The July 1858.

(Signed) HENRY HOPKINSON,
Offg. Commissioner, T. & M. Provinces.

C.

RETURN of Police Corps, Land and River, serving in the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces.

TOWN AND INTERIOR ARMED POLICE.							TOWN AND INTERIOR ARMED RIVER POLICE.									REMARKS.
POLICE CORPS.	Subadars.	Jemudars.	Havildars.	Naiques.	Buglers.	Privates.	POLICE CORPS.	Superintendent.	Assistant Superintendent.	Constables.	Sygangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Carpenters.	Caulkers.	
<i>Tenasserim Provinces.</i>																
Town Police	1	3	5	8	0	73	Town River Police	0	0	1	0	4	36	0	0	
Interior Ditto	0	0	5	5	0	70	Interior Ditto	1	1	0	2	8	79	1	1	
Total	1	3	10	13	0	143	Total	1	1	1	2	12	115	1	1	
<i>Martaban Provinces.</i>																
Interior Police	1	3	10	10	0	150	Interior Police	1	2	0	3	11	111	1	1	
Karen Levy	2	2	12	12	4	168										
Total... ..	3	5	22	22	4	318	Total	1	2	0	3	11	111	1	1	
Grand Total	4	8	32	35	4	461	Grand Total	2	3	1	5	23	206	2	2	

MAULMAIN;
 Commissioner's Office, T. & M. Provinces,
 The July 1858.

(Signed) HENRY HOPKINSON,
 Offy. Commissioner, T. & M. Provinces.

FROM

MAJOR GENERAL JAS. BELL,
Commanding Pegu Division.

To

LIEUT.-COL. H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

SIR,

I HAVE been favored by Major Phayre, Commissioner and Agent Governor General Pegu, with a copy of his letter No. 17, of 27th July 1858, to your address, by which I observe that, he has noted an omission on my part in replies to the questions which he referred to me. I therefore now make good that omission, by adding my proposals for the Maulmain Garrison. I would however observe, that the Commissioner only asked for my opinion with regard to *Pegu*, and I was besides aware from correspondence I had had with the Officer Commanding Maulmain, who was consulted by Captain Hopkinson, Commissioner of the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces, that you had called for his opinion on the subject of the Garrisons for those Stations, within the districts confided to his charge.

The advantages of the position and climate of Maulmain for an European Regiment are great, but in consequence of the enormous expense of provisioning Europeans in Burmah, I question the wisdom of sanctioning European Barracks without giving this part of the subject due consideration. I believe that a reserve European Regiment could be kept on the opposite coast for less than half the expense* of Maulmain, and with the Telegraph wire to Calcutta, a Steamer could, in the event of an emergency arising in this country, land the Corps in Burmah in a very few days.

I consider one Regiment of Regular Native Infantry, and one Native Police Corps, ample for all duties at Maulmain, as well as for the outposts of Tavoy, Mergui, Sittang and Beeling as at present; but as experience has shown the wisdom of having an European element in the strength of such a Garrison, I could well spare two Companies from the Regiment at Rangoon, and these with the Company of Artillery located in a fortified Barrack (on a site on the angle of the river approved by our Chief Engineer,) would be all that Maulmain in my opinion actually requires, and with a Gun Boat on the river there would be nothing left to desire, and the great expense of maintaining an additional European Regiment in Burmah would be avoided.

You will observe that I have recommended one Regiment and a wing of Native Infantry, and eight Companies of Europeans at Tounghoo; I am satisfied that a body of 200 resolute armed Rebels could at any time cut off the communication in its present state,

* The cost of European rations at Rangoon for one month is Rupees 12-7-0 per man. In India, assuming the ration to cost 3 annas 4 pie (the allowance given by Government, it does not cost so much at all Stations) the amount per man per month is Rupees 6-5-4. The cost of Rations in Rangoon:—

1000 men for one year	1,49,250	0	0
India.....	76,000	0	0

Excess for Rations alone, Rupees 73,250 0 0

between any of our posts and Tounghoo, and that it would require a very considerable Force to clear and keep it open. I am on that account anxious to see that frontier post strong, and also the Native Troops in a better proportion to the amount of work they have to perform, than has hitherto been generally the case in the Division; but I have no fear that the Natives of this and the adjoining countries will ever attack the Natives of India with impunity; indeed, it was only in March last, that 200 armed Rebels attacked a Subadar and

* Letter No. 77, of 29th April, Foreign Department. 30 Sepoys of the 13th Regiment Native Infantry, at Ky-ka-to, an open Village; the result* was reported to the Supreme Government by the Commissioner of Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces, the Rebel Chief was slain, and the whole clan broken up, and has remained dispersed. From my experience in the first Burmese War, and what we have seen since, I am quite satisfied on this score, but I do attach great importance to the necessity of giving a Garrison in proportion to the work to be done, which I have already slightly touched on, and given my reasons for it in the papers which accompanied my letter No. 181 of 2nd August, to your address.

I trust you will consider the importance of the subject, and the accidental omission of Maulmain in my original list of replies, a sufficient excuse for my troubling you with this communication.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed) JAMES BELL, *Major General,*

HEAD QUARTERS PEGU DIVISION;
Rangoon,
6th August 1858.

Commanding Pegu Division.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

European Infantry 3 Regiments, or 2168 men ... } Including Non-Commis-
European Artillery 5 Companies or 351 men ... } sioned, Rank and File.

Their distribution is as follows:--

Men.

1.	Rangoon	{	Infantry	811 or one Regiment.
				Artillery	109 or two Companies.
	Thyet-myo	{	Infantry	688 Head Qrs. and 8 Cos. of one Regiment.
				Artillery	66 One Company.
	Tounghoo	{	Infantry	401 Head Qrs., and 5 Cos. of one Regiment.
				Artillery	110 Two Companies.
	Shoay-Gyeen	{	Infantry	110 Two Companies.
				Artillery	38 Half a Company.
	Meaday	{	Infantry	158 Two Companies of a Regiment.
				Artillery	28 One-third Company.
	Bassein	{	Infantry	158 Two Companies of a Regiment.
				Artillery	28 One-third Company.

2.

{ No additional number to the above, but the Battery at present serving in Bengal, though not urgently required, should be sent to its original destination, Thyet-myo, as soon as its services can be dispensed with.

{ Their ordinary distribution should be as at present.

3.

Eleven Regiments Native Infantry, 1 Company of Golundauz, and 4 Companies of Sappers and Miners, making 7,550 men of Native Infantry, 53 Golundauz, and 4 Companies or 361 men, Sappers and Miners distributed thus :—

- 4 Regiments at Rangoon, giving 2 Companies for Bassein, 1 Company of Sappers and Miners at Rangoon.
- 3 Regiments at Thayet-myo.
- 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners at Thayet-myo.
- 1 Regiment at Meeaday, giving 4 Companies for Prome.
- 2 Regiments at Tounghoo, giving 5 Companies to Shoay Gyeen and 1 to Kyo-kie.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners at Tounghoo.
- 1 Regiment at Henzadah, giving 4 Companies to Menghee.
- 1 Company of Golundauz at Meeaday.

4.

At present the number of Native Regiments serving in Burmah is 11, their strength averaging about 600 Privates, and this number of Regiments could not now be reduced, but when each Corps is augmented to its full complement of 1,000 Privates, I consider that two Regiments might be safely withdrawn, that is, one from Rangoon, one from Thayet-myo, and if a Police Corps could be given (1,000 strong) with the Head Quarters at Henzadah, it might provide for the Posts of Menghee and Prome. These changes would admit of the withdrawal of two additional Regular Corps, viz., the Regiment at Henzadah, and the Regiment at Thayet-myo (Head Quarters now at Meeaday) which supplies Prome.

I am of opinion that, there should be one Cavalry Corps in the Division, which might be stationed by Squadrons at Thayet-myo, Tounghoo and Rangoon.

Those, under Military authority, are all Regulars.

To save time I give in the following table the average of the Regiments at Rangoon, which may be taken as a fair relative average for the Division.

STATEMENT showing the number of each caste composing the different Native Corps at Rangoon, and the relative proportion of each.

5.

	Europeans.	Indo-Britons.	Native Christians.	Mussulmen.	Brahmins and Rajpoots.	Maharattias.	Teloogoos.	Tamil.	Other Castes.	Total.
6th Regiment N. I. ...	0	25	41	231	46	4	373	74	36	830
12th " " ...	0	16	42	362	21	9	303	40	6	793
23rd " L. I. ...	4	19	38	260	82	13	228	106	36	786
41st " N. I. ...	2	17	24	214	46	0	536	5	25	869
Total ...	6	77	145	1,067	195	26	1,440	225	103	3,278
Average per centage..	0·18	2·17	4·42	32·55	59·5	0·80	45·93	6·86	3·14	10·01

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

6.

I consider that there should be three Native Infantry Corps of the augmented strength at Rangoon, which should give three Companies to Bassein and two for Pegu. Tounghoo and Thyet-myo should have two Native Corps each, Tounghoo supplying four Companies for Shoay Gyeen and one to Kya-Kie, and Thyet-myo three Companies for Meeaday.

I think it will be well to postpone the consideration of the number of Police Corps until we obtain the one promised, and see how it works.

7.

The proportion which my recommendation in Para. 6 if carried out would give, viz. :—

European Soldiers to Sepoys (Regulars) 3 to 7

European Soldiers to Policemen 3 to 1

European Soldiers to Sepoys and Police 3 to 8.

(Signed) JAMES BELL, *Major General,*

Commanding Pegu Division.

(True Copy)

(Signed) — TRAVERS, *Captain,*

Assistant Adjutant General, Pegu Division.

FROM

MAJOR A. P. PHAYRE,

Comr. of Pegu and Agent to the Govr. Genl.,

To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,

On special duty with the Governor General,

ALLAHABAD.

MILITARY.

Dated Rangoon, 27th July 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated the 18th May last, and No. 34, dated 21st Idem, forwarding copy of letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors with questions upon Para. 5 of that Despatch, and desiring me to afford replies thereto. Before giving specific answers to those questions, I beg to make a few remarks on the composition and strength of the Military Force, European and Asiatic, in the Province of Pegu, with reference to the defence against insurrection or attack from without.

In considering the question of defence against internal commotion, it is necessary to consider—

- 1st.—The races of which the Force, Regular and Irregular, is composed.
- 2nd.—The races inhabiting the Province.
- 3rd.—The races we may have to oppose beyond our Frontier.

The Military Force is at present composed of—

- 3 Regiments of European Infantry.
- 13 Regiments Madras Native Infantry.
- 5 Companies of European Artillery.
- 4 Companies Madras Sappers (Native.)

Besides these there is the Pegu Light Infantry, consisting of 800 Privates armed and disciplined like other Irregular Corps, but having, in addition to a Commandant, Second in Command and Adjutant, four European Officers to command the eight Companies of which the Battalion consists.

There are also three Police Battalions, consisting in the aggregate of 1600 Privates, and having a portion of Officers answering to Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. These Battalions have each two European Non-Commissioned Officers attached to them. They are commanded by the Deputy Commissioner of the District they belong to.

It will not be necessary to do more than refer to the number of European Regiments in the Province. With reference to the races of the men composing the Madras Regiments, I beg to refer to the accompanying paper with which I have been favored by Major General Bell, Commanding the Division. From the return of four Madras Native Regiments at Rangoon, it appears that Telagoos form 43 per cent and Mahomedans 32 per cent; the remainder being made up in small proportions of six other races.

The men of the Pegu Light Infantry are composed about 20 per cent. of Malays (Mahomedans in religion) and the remainder of Burmese and Talaings. A fourth Police Battalion for the District of Tounghoo, to be composed of Karens, has been sanctioned, but no progress has been made in forming it. The races forming the Province are in the mass Burmese, Talaings and Karens. There are in the Towns, especially the sea-ports, a number of Foreigners from various parts of the Madras Presidency, from Bengal and from Surat. There are also several wealthy Merchants from the Persian Gulf, all the foreigners may be classed as Traders and shop-keepers; they are wealthy and industrious, but cannot be considered as politically influential or dangerous.

The great mass of the inhabitants of the country being Burmese, Talaings, and Karens of Indo-Chinese race, having no sympathy with the people of India, differing from them in race, in language and religion, the Indian Troops here may generally be considered as trust-worthy to act against them without reserve in case of need.

The Pegu Light Infantry and the Police Battalions have hitherto shown praise-worthy alacrity when required to act in the field against their countrymen. For a Regi-

ment like the Pegu Light Infantry, a larger number of Malays would be very desirable, but it has been found impossible to enlist more men at the present rate of pay (Rupees 10 per mensem) even with bounty money and other advantages held out to them.

Practically therefore we must consider the Pegu Light Infantry and the Police Battalion as composed of the indigenous races of Pegu.

The inhabitants of the country may generally be considered content with the change of Government, still considerable numbers of those Burmese races might be expected to welcome a move from the Ava Territories. The Karens are generally quiet and tractable, but they are subject to extraordinary delusions from a belief in the destiny of their race, long repressed, to rise triumphant over all others not excepting the British.

With reference to defence against attack, from without, that is, from the Burmese, the European force is what must almost be entirely depended on.

A Burmese Army would not hesitate to attack a force of Natives of India with anything like equality of numbers, even though the latter were led by European Officers.

I may here mention that another class of Troops differing from any of those mentioned above, is now being raised in the Madras Presidency as "Pegu Police Corps." These Corps will, I understand, be composed of the same races generally as the Madras Regiments of the line, but probably of a description of men less excellent than those now in the ranks. The privates are to receive 12 Rupees a month, which is somewhat less than what the Madras Soldier receives in Pegu, and they are not to get Pensions. It seems to be doubtful yet how these men are to be employed, and it is a point which is desirable should be decided. They will not be of much use as Police in the strict sense of the term. Being Foreigners, they would be quite helpless in the interior of the country; knowing neither the language, the manners of the people, nor the country, they could scarcely be useful as Police. They would require guides, interpreters and Commissariat, which the Burmese Police do not want. They might certainly be employed as Jail or Treasury guard, and by being mixed in a portion at the large Stations with the Regular Troops effect, by taking ordinary Station duties, what is, I presume, urgently required, that is, a permanent reduction of the number of Regular Native Troops in Pegu. I may mention that I think the men of these Police Corps should be enlisted to perform, in addition to all the ordinary duties of Soldiers, the duties of Sappers whether in Camp or Quarters. They might receive daily extra pay when so employed in any work not essential for Military defence. Indeed, I think all Native Troops, Regular or Irregular, ought to be enlisted on those terms.

As there are now 13 Native Regiments in Pegu and Tenasserim, and the Madras Army consists of 52 Regiments of the line, it is evident that the turn of each Regiment for Foreign service would come round in four reliefs, or about nine years after leaving the Province, if each Regiment were to remain three years. It is not for me to say whether this is desirable or not, but in case it should not be so, I think one-half of the Indian Force, *i. e.* the Military force in Pegu, composed of Natives of India, might consist of these Police Corps, and the remainder of Native Regiments of the line. I now come to reply to the separate questions proposed. The document containing General Bell's replies to the same questions is appended to this letter.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

European Infantry.

1. 3 Regiments or } Including Non-Commissioned Rank and
2,168 men. } File.

European Artillery.

- 5 Companies or } Including Non-Commissioned Rank and
351 Men. } File.

DISTRIBUTION.

STATION.	Arm.	Number of Men.	
RANGOON ...	Infantry ...	811	One Regiment.
	Artillery ...	109	Two Companies.
THAYETMYO ...	Infantry ...	688	Head Quarters and 8 Companies of a Regiment.
	Artillery ...	66	One Company.
TOUNGHOO ...	Infantry ...	491	Head Quarters and 5 Companies of a Regiment.
	Artillery ...	110	Two Companies.
MEEADAY ...	Infantry ...	158	Two Companies of a Regiment.
BASSIEN ...	Artillery ...	28	One-third of a Company.
SHOAY GYEEN. }	Infantry ...	110	Two Companies.
	Artillery ...	38	Half a Company.

2.

General Bell, in his reply to this question, has apparently restricted his answer to Pegu Proper. As however I consider the Military Force of the Tenasserim Provinces, (Head Quarters at Maulmain,) and of Martaban, must, with that of Pegu, be viewed as a whole, whether with reference to internal or external affairs, I shall consider this question as applying to the whole of the British possessions in this quarter. I consider then that an additional Regiment of European Infantry might with great advantage be stationed at Maulmain. It will be of great service with reference to the display of a Force towards the Burmese Territory; it would be readily available if required at Calcutta or Madras; and Maulmain is a healthy place; with the above exception the present number and distribution of European Troops in Pegu appears to me all that can be desired. This European Regiment would furnish the Detachment of European Troops at Shoay Gyeen instead of the Detachment being drawn as now, from Frontier Station of Tounghoo.

3.

The following is the number and distribution as given by Major General Bell:—

11 Regiments of Native Infantry.

1 Company of Native Artillery.

4 Companies of Sappers.

Making—7550 Men Native Infantry.

53 Men Native Artillery.

361 Men Sappers.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Distributed thus.

STATION.	Arm.	No. of Men or Corps.	DETACHMENTS.
RANGOON	Infantry	4 Regiments..	{ 2 Companies to Pegu and 3 Companies to Bassein.
"	Sappers	1 Company.	
THAYETMYO	Infantry	3 Regiments.	4 Companies to Promé.
"	Sappers	2 Companies.	
MEEADAY	Infantry	1 Regiment ..	5 Companies to Shoay Gye. 1 Company to Kyo-kie.
"	Artillery	1 Company.	
TOUNGHOO.....	Infantry	2 Regiments..	4 Companies to Menghee.
"	Sappers	1 Company.	
HENZADA	Infantry	1 Regiment ..	

N. B.—Besides the above there are two Regiments of Native Infantry at Maulmain, and European and Native Artillery.

4.

As I think that in the case of an European Regiment being once more stationed at Maulmain, the Native Regular Troops in the Province of Pegu might be diminished, the number and distribution I propose would differ somewhat from that proposed by General Bell. In the distribution I propose, I assume that the Madras Native Infantry Regiments, are made up to their full strength as now authorized, namely, one thousand Privates.

The distribution would, including Maulmain, be as follows :—

STATION.	Arm.	No. of Men or Corps.	DETACHMENTS, &c.
MAULMAIN.....	Infantry ..	2 Regiments ..	To send Detachments to Sittang and Shoay Gyeen, instead of those being furnished as now from Tounghoo.
"	Artillery ..	as at present.	
RANGOON	Infantry ..	3 Regiments..	Two Companies to Pegu, 3 Companies to Bassein. <i>N. B.</i> —From the increased size of the Company three might now suffice for both places.
"	Sappers ..	1 Company.	
THAYETMYO	Infantry ..	2 Regiments..	The Regiments of the Line do not now furnish Detachments along the frontier, but this may again become necessary. Meeaday will before long, be merely an out-post from Thayet-myo, and not require more than 2 Companies of Native Infantry, perhaps not more than once. This will result from all Ordnance and Commissariat Stores being removed and placed in the Redoubt at Thayetmyo, Meeaday therefore hitherto the frontier place of strength will be simply an out-post.
"	Sappers ..	2 Companies.	
TOUNGHOO.....	Infantry ..	1 Regiment ..	To be kept intact and furnish no Detachments.
"	Sappers ..	1 Company.	
HENZADA	Infantry ..	1 Regiment ..	Two Companies to Menghee. Two Companies to Promé.

It is with much diffidence that I venture to differ from Major General Bell in the number and distribution of the Native Troops

proposed for the Division. I beg to offer the following explanations :—

The present number of Native Infantry Regiments in Pegu and Tenasserim is 13. General Bell, leaving the two Maulmain Regiments as at present, would reduce the 11 Native Regiments of Infantry in Pegu to 9. But with the augmentation from 70 men a Company, to 100, this would be an actual increase of 1500 Native Infantry Soldiers into Pegu.

The alterations I venture to propose are as follows :—

For all Pegu and Tenasserim nine Native Infantry Regiments, instead of 13, to be distributed as above, this will leave the actual number of Native Troops just as it is. The difference of distribution I propose is, that the Tounghoo Native Infantry Regiment is to be kept complete. The Detachments required at the Stations on the Sittang river in rear of it, being furnished from Maulmain instead of from Tounghoo. The advantage of this is, that the actual number of Native Troops at Tounghoo, will not then be decreased from the present strength, while the disadvantage of increasing the Native Force there will be avoided. This advantage consists in the greater expense of conveying all stores, &c., to that remote Station, and the necessity there will be for providing additional Barrack accommodation, if the Native Force there is increased beyond its present strength.

The Regiments at Maulmain would, in addition to their present Detachments, have to take the Stations on the Sittang river (Shoay Gyeen, &c.), but I believe the strength of these Detachments may be reduced. My proposed distribution does not in other respects differ from that of General Bell.

5.

The proportion now is of Infantry—

13	Regiments	Regulars.
1	„	Irregular.
3	„	Police.

From General Bell's reply the proportion of Races in the Regular Native Force appears to be as follows :—

Europeans	0·18
Indo	2·17
Native Christians	4·62
Mahomedans	32·55
Brahmins and Rajpoots	5·95
Teloogoos	43·93
Tamils	6·86
Other Races	3·14

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

In the Irregulars the Pegu Light Infantry consists of:—

Malays about	20
Talaings and Burmese	80

				Total	100

The three Police Corps consists of Talaings and Burmese in about equal proportion, but it is not easy to distinguish these two races in Pegu.

6.

In the answer to question 4 I stated the number of Native Regular Troops which I consider necessary for Pegu and Tenasserim, that is, nine Regiments. Of these I would observe four might be the Police Corps now raising under the orders of the Madras Government for service in Pegu; they might be stationed thus:—

Maulmain	1
Rangoon	1
Henzada	1
Thayet-myo	1

				Total	4

Of course these Corps would be entirely under the orders of the Major General Commanding the Division.

The proportion of the different description of Asiatic Troops would be as follows:—

Regulars.

- 5 Regiments Madras Native Infantry.
- 4 Companies Sappers.

Police.

- 4 Regiments Natives of Madras Presidency.

Irregular.

- 1 Regiment Pegu Light Infantry, Malays, Burmese, and Talaings.

Police.

- 3 Regiments Burmese and Talaings.

Note.—The Police Regiment for Tounghoo not included as not yet raised.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

7.

The actual number proposed as above is—

European Infantry and Artillery	5,400*
Native Regular Infantry	5,000
Native (Indian) Police	4,000
Irregular (Burmese) Pegu Light Infantry ...	800
Burmese Police	1,600
Native Sappers.	575
	Total
	17,375

9.

There is ample Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now serving in Pegu, excepting for one Company which may be required at Bassein. I have consulted with Colonel Cunningham, the Chief Engineer, on this subject, as also the Barrack accommodation for the Native Troops, as the Natives here are quartered in Barracks.

The actual amount of Barrack accommodation in Pegu is as follows:—

Rangoon	9 Companies.
Thayet-myo	9 Companies.
Meeaday	1 Company.
Toungoo	10 Companies.
Shoay Gyeen	2 Companies.

For Maulmain as the present European Barracks are old and uncomfortable, new will be required.

At Rangoon, Barrack for one more Company, will eventually be required, and one at Thayet-myo when the arsenal is withdrawn from Meeaday.

10.

New masonry Barracks were sanctioned both by the Supreme Government and the Home authorities to be built at Maulmain, as however it was supposed a Regiment would not be required there the work has not been proceeded with; a complete set of Barracks for a Regiment of Foot would be necessary at Maulmain in case the Regiment is stationed there as proposed; the additional Barrack required at Rangoon and Thayet-myo for two Companies is dependant on the distribution of the present force as before contemplated, and not in any addition now proposed.

I have &c.,

(Signed) A. P. PHAYRE,

Comr. of Pegu, and Agent to the Govr. Genl.

RANGOON,

The 27th July 1858. }

* I am not certain what the strength of Europeans belonging to a Horse Battery will be when the Native riders are dispensed with.

OUDE COMMITTEE.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS having reference to Para. 5 of Court of Director's Despatch, No. 235, dated 25th November 1857.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

OUDE POLICE.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

No reply.

7.

1 to 2.

8. 9. 10. 11.

No reply.

12.

Use up the whole of the Officers of the late Army, and add one-third more from the Queen's.

13.

No reply.

14.

Certainly not, modify.

(Signed)

G. HUTCHINSON, *Captain,**Mily. Secy. to Chief Commissioner.*

OUDE COMMITTEE.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS having reference to Para. 5 of Court of Director's Despatch, No. 235, dated 25th November 1857.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

BENGAL REGULAR ARMY.

1.9,858, *vide* list appended.**2.**

For the secure occupation of Oudh, at least 10,000 Europeans of all Arms, with a larger proportion of Artillery than is usual.

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>	REMARKS.
Fyzabad ...	2,000	500	2,500	12	Including North of Gogra to be watched by this Force, but not to be cantoned there.
Seetapore ..	1,200	250	1,450	12	
Roy Bareilly ...	1,200	250	1,450	12	
Lucknow ...	4,000	500	4,500	12	

The above to consist of a proportion of Cavalry and Artillery.

3.

20,000, including Military Police, which body amounts to 12,000. This will leave 8,000 men pertaining to the Native Army, to be cantoned with the Europeans. The Native portion of the Army to be cantoned only where there is a European

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Force. The Military Police to carry on the duties of all other Stations as also the Civil duties, where European Troops are quartered.

The distribution of the regular Native Troops belonging to the Army to be as follows :—

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Fyzabad	1,500	500	2,000
Seetapore	1,000	500	1,500
Roy Bareilly	1,000	500	1,500
Lucknow	2,000	1,000	3,000

Memo.—Since this was written the Military Police are recruiting up to 12,000 instead of 9,000, therefore 5,000 Regulars from the Native Army will only be required.

4.

This has been answered already, *viz.*, 12,000 Military Police, and 8,000 Regulars.

5.

The European and Regular Force to be equal in Oudh, or for all India, in the proportion of 1 European to 1½ of the Regular Native Army.

6.

The proportion of one European to two Natives.

7.

There is Barrack accommodation for 6,000 men at Lucknow, such as it is. Native Palaces have been converted into tolerable Barracks. There is no other Barrack accommodation in Oudh.

8.

Barrack accommodation will be required for 5,500 Europeans.

9.

The proportion of one European to two Natives of the Regulars and Military Police together.

(Signed) G. HUTCHINSON, *Captain,*
Mily. Secy. to Chief Commissioner.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

*NUMERICAL RETURN of the Brigade comprising the
Oudh Force.*

STATION.	Regiment.	Strength of each Regiment.	Strength of each Brigade.	REMARKS	
In the Garrison at Lucknow ..	{	No. 3-8 Bl. Arty.	156	2,768	
		No. 6-11 do.	104		
		No. 6-13 do.	145		
		Royal Engineers	96		
		H. M.'s 32nd Regt.	926		
		H. M.'s 38th do.	754		
		H. M.'s 97th do.	587		
At the old Can- tonments	{	2-3 Bl. B. Arty.	202	2,295	Detachment
		H. M.'s 2nd Dra. Gds.	240		
		H. M.'s 38th Regt.	207		
		3rd Bn. B. B.	839		
		H. M.'s 88th Regt.	807		
At Nawabgunge Fyzabad Road	{	2-3 Bde. B. H. A.	109	1,741	
		200 2nd Dra. Gds.	200		
		90th Light Infantry	755		
		1st E. B. F.	677		
On the march to Fyzabad	{	F. Troop R. H. A.	149	1,507	
		Q. Battery R. A.	157		
		5-13 Bn. R. A.	86		
		H. M.'s 7th Hussars	389		
		2nd Bn. R. Bde.	726		
At Nawabgunge Cawnpore Road	{	1-1 Bde. B. H. A.	116	1,547	
		H. M.'s 20th Regt.	603		
		H. M.'s 53rd Regt.	828		
Total	9,858		
This Return includes <i>all</i> Ranks.					

(Signed) R. BIDDULPH, *Captain,*

Offy. Dy. A. A. General.

Note.—The strength of an European Regiment of Infantry in India is as follows :—

In India 10 Companies 100 men each.
At Depôt at Home ... 4 ditto 100 do. do.

(Signed) R. B.

(True copy)

(Signed) G. HUTCHINSON, *Captain,*

Mily. Secy. to Chief Commissioner.

MAJOR GENL. R. J. H. BIRCH, C. B., SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MILY. DEPT.
 QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to paragraph 5, of Despatch No.
 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

Grand total of European Troops	61,556
Deduct Naval Force	983
Ditto Madras European Troops ...	3,172
Ditto Bombay European Troops	7,308
	11,463
Balance	50,093

of the Bengal Presidency only.

Royal Troops.

Horse Artillery	2 Troops.
Foot Artillery	{ 14 Companies with 8 Field Batteries.
Engineers	2 Companies.
Dragoons	6 Regiments.
Infantry	44 Regiments.

Local or Company's Troops.

Horse Artillery	9 Troops.
Foot Artillery	{ 24 Companies with 12 Field Batteries.
Cavalry	4 Regiments incomplete.
Cavalry raised during the Mutinies	{ 4 Corps.
Infantry	3 Regiments.
Ditto	{ 3 Regiments ordered but not formed.
Grand Total .. Horse Artillery	11 Troops.
Foot Artillery	{ 38 Companies and 20 Field Batteries.
Engineers	2 Companies.
Dragoons	14 Regiments.
Infantry	50 Regiments.
Cavalry raised during the Mutiny	{ 4 Small Corps.

Distribution (Bengal Troops).

		Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Royal Troops	Bengal	None.	0	2
	Punjaub	{ Foot Artillery .. 2 Field Batteries .. 2 }	1	6
	Field	{ Engineers 2 Companies Horse Artillery .. 2 Foot Artillery .. 2 Field Batteries .. 6 }	5	34
	Pegu		0	1
Local or Company's Troops	Bengal	{ Foot Artillery .. 1 Field Batteries .. 3 Horse Artillery .. 5* }	0	0
	Punjaub	{ Foot Artillery .. 10 Field Batteries .. 4 Horse Artillery .. 6 }	1	1
	Field	{ Foot Artillery .. 13 Field Batteries .. 7 }	3	3

Note.—Four Regiments of Light Cavalry are incomplete; and three Regiments of Infantry have been ordered but are not yet formed.

* Two of these are old Native Horse Artillery Troops manned now by Europeans.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

2.

	<i>Artillery.</i>		<i>Cavalry. Infantry.</i>	
Bengal	{ 10 Companies	}	None.	10
	{ 8½ Field Batteries.			
N. W. P. from Benares to the Sutlej, and the Jullundur Doab and Rohilcund...	{ 6 Troops	}	9	25
	{ 27 Companies			
	{ 22 Field Batteries			
Central India, from the Jumna to the Nerbuldah	{ 11 Troops	}	1	8
	{ 10 Companies			
	{ 10 Field Batteries	}	5	16
Punjaub	{ 3 Troops			
	{ 20 Companies	}	4	6
	{ 14½ Field Batteries			
Oude	{ 2 Troops	}	2	3
	{ 7 Companies			
	{ 6 Field Batteries			
Gwalior	{ 1 Troop	}	2	3
	{ 5 Companies			
	{ 4 Field Batteries			

Grand Total.

Horse Artillery ...	12 Troops.
Foot Artillery ...	80 Companies with 65 Field Batteries.
Engineers	3 Companies.
Dragoons	21 Regiments.
Infantry... ..	68 Regiments.

See Tabular Statement for the proposed distribution of these Troops.

This estimate may perhaps appear large, but circumstances have forced upon us the necessity of having more Regiments of Infantry than would have been required, had the Native Artillery continued faithful. It is now indispensably requisite that European be substituted for Native Artillery, and wherever there are Guns there must needs be protection provided for them by European Infantry or Cavalry. Heretofore we have had Post Guns at various small Stations, manned by Detachments of Native Artillery; some of these Guns must now be withdrawn, and those which remain must be manned by European Artillerymen.

In making the preceding calculations, I have estimated the Cavalry Regiments other than such Royal Dragoons Regiments as may be kept in or sent to India, at a greatly reduced scale.

In my opinion a Cavalry Regiment should not exceed 350 in Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. Regiments of this description are much more easily handled on parade, and in the field more easily found with quarters, more readily moved on service, they require fewer followers, they never need be divided, and in every point of view they are more serviceable than Regiments of such

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

strength as the four Regiments of European Cavalry lately introduced into the Bengal Army. The effect of small bodies of European Cavalry, much less numerous than the reduced Regiments which I advocate, has been conspicuous in all our Indian Wars ; and recently, the conflicts occasioned by the Mutiny of the Native Army have in every instance shown that European Cavalry, even in handfuls of men, have carried dread into the ranks of the rebel Infantry, and have dispersed and overthrown large bodies of rebel Native Cavalry.

If the proposition lately made by Government, to form ten Regiments of Cavalry of 384 privates in the place of the four Regiments of more than double that strength already ordered, and in lieu also of the only two remaining Regiments of Native Light Cavalry, the 5th and 8th, which it is proposed to disband, we shall have, with the 6th Royal Dragoon Regiments now serving in Bengal, 16 Corps of Cavalry ; my estimate of our requirements amounts to five additional Regiments, in all 21. I would propose to have only three of the present Royal Dragoon Regiments in Bengal, and to substitute for the other three, three Regiments on the reduced scale, having on the Indian establishment 18 Regiments of Cavalry.

As regards the Infantry, I am persuaded that Regiments of 1140 Privates, which is the present complement of Her Majesty's Regiments serving in India, are much larger than are really required. The work to be done is in fact done by a far less number of men. I would propose to have Regiments of 800 Rank and File at most, and it is on that calculation that I have estimated the number of Corps of Infantry required for the defence of this Presidency. The old establishment of Regiments of Royal Infantry was 15 for Bengal, and even then, circumstances occurred in Europe which made it necessary to withdraw one Regiment from this Presidency (and one also from Madras) without re-placing them. But it is not for Europe only that we have been called on for Troops in time of War. The War in Persia took away for a time both Infantry and Dragoon Regiments of the Royal Army. After all that we have recently gone through in Bengal, from the unexpected Mutiny of the Native Army, it would be unwise to subject the defence of this extensive Presidency, to the hazard of being rendered too great a task for us, by keeping up a European Force, composed so largely as is that we now have, of Regiments of the Royal Service, liable in a greater or less degree to be called away to other fields of action at a time when their places could not be supplied at all. I am very decidedly of opinion that a permanent Local Force is on this account of paramount necessity, and I think that not less than 50 Regiments out of the 68 which I would propose to maintain, should belong to the Indian establishment. This will still leave us three more Infantry Regiments of the British Army than we have

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

had before, *viz.*, 18, but in a total of 68 Regiments, two or three Corps might be temporarily spared from India on an emergency. I would reduce the six Regiments now in the Company's Service to 800 Rank and File at the utmost, and would constitute 44 other Regiments for the Indian Service on that scale. Fewer Officers will be required for them, instead of the present plan of transferring to them the Officers of two Native Corps to one European Regiment, as will be shown in my reply to another question. I believe it will be found practicable, and not very long hence, to reduce the number of Corps assigned for the present defence of this Presidency, and as the Railroads come to be completed, we shall be able to dispense with more of them. The standard height of the men might well be lowered, both in the Infantry and in the Cavalry Regiments on the Indian establishment.

Respecting the Artillery, the want of additional Force of this Arm has long been felt. It is the most important Arm of all, and only by maintaining a very powerful Artillery can we hope to overawe those who oppose themselves to us.

The Artillery on the Bengal establishment before the Mutinies, consisted of (Regular Artillery)—

Horse Artillery	{	European 9.
		Native 4, total 52 Companies in 3 Brigades.
Foot Artillery	{	European 24.
		Native 18, total 52 Companies in 9 Battalions.
Field Batteries		21.

Of this number, we have lost by the Mutinies one Native Troop and 8 Companies with 5 Field Batteries, and 3 Companies have been disarmed. But it has been determined by authority that no part of the Artillery shall henceforward consist of Natives; and it is now to be considered whether the Artillery in Bengal shall consist in whole or in part of an Indian establishment. One precaution must and will naturally be observed, that European Artillery shall never be used with only Native Cavalry or Infantry. It is indispensable, when our Gunners are Europeans, that they shall be escorted by Europeans of the other Arms. But I conceive that it will be necessary to keep up Native Drivers on the old footing. They will be required to do work that the Europeans cannot stand in this climate, and I think they would be powerless for mischief in the presence of European Gunners.

It was understood when the Royal Artillery reinforcement was sent out, that it was only to be temporarily employed in India. It was not publicly so announced, but that it was so understood, I know on very good authority. The relative rank of

Artillery Officers from the peculiar constitution of the Royal Artillery is a source of considerable inconvenience from the supersession it involves of the Officers of the Indian Service, our Artillery not being similarly constituted.*

It involves too this inconvenience, that the Commanders in the Royal Artillery are more numerous and therefore more expensive than in ours, and that the pay of the men of the Indian Artillery has to be increased to put them on a par with the men of the Royal Artillery.

It has been said and with much truth, that the example of the Royal Infantry and Cavalry is needed in this country to give a tone to the European Regiments in the Indian Service, great good has undoubtedly been derived from the presence of the Royal Troops, and whatever is of superior quality in the Indian Service is based on emulation of the excellencies which distinguish our own British Army.

But this sort of leading is not required in the Artillery; without venturing to offer any opinion of my own, I would refer with confidence to the repeatedly expressed opinions of able Officers of the highest rank, who have declared the Artillery of the Company's Service second to none in the world, not even to that of our Royal Army. It is much more important that the Artillery force in India should not be liable to diminution by sudden calls for service elsewhere, than either the Cavalry or the Infantry.

On these considerations and on others which might be mentioned, it appears highly desirable that the whole of the Artillery should be of the Indian Establishment.

The Artillery of the Punjaub Irregular Force and the Peshawur and Hazara Mountain Train Batteries, might still be Natives. The whole of the Punjaub Irregular Force consists of Natives, and unless European Troops should be added to them, European Artillery alone could not be of any use, and would be in great peril. If the power of Artillery which I have proposed to distribute throughout this Presidency be established, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from reconstituting the Batteries of the smaller contingents, such as the Bhopal, the Malwah, the Kota Contingents, and the Joudpore Legion with Native Artillerymen. For this purpose, the few Companies of Foot Artillery and the two Troops of Horse Artillery which have not joined in the Mutinies, might be made use of; the latter on reduced pay. The Peshawur and Hazara Mountain Train Batteries might also be retained.

* *Note.*—This inconvenience has to a great extent been rectified by the orders recently received to assimilate the Artillery of the three Presidencies with that of the Royal Army in regard to the Officers.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

With regard to the Artillery employed in Arracan, there is a difficulty. There has been a Detachment there hitherto furnished from the Native Battalion at Dum Dum, and it will be necessary to keep up the guns, two in number. To man these guns with Europeans is not practicable. I conceive the detail might be taken from the remaining portion of the Bengal Native Artillery which has not mutinied. The increased pay given in Arracan might reconcile to permanent Service in that Province.

Scarcely had I written the preceding remark regarding the Punjaub Batteries, when intelligence was received of a mutinous plot among some men, Malwa Sikhs, from the Cis-Sutlej States, of the 10th Punjaub Infantry Regiment at Dera Ishmael Khan, in which some portion also of the Native Battery there is said to be implicated. With this warning given to us, it appears to me to be highly necessary to do away with the Punjaub Batteries, and that, as soon as possible; and this measure if carried out necessarily involves the substitution of European Regiments for some part of the Punjaub Irregular Infantry also, for, as has been observed, European Artillery cannot be left alone with Native Cavalry and Infantry under any circumstances.

There is one important consideration which has induced me to propose so large an amount of Force, European and Native, for the defence of this Presidency; the necessity for organising moveable Columns from the larger Stations which should be held in readiness to proceed at very short notice, in whatever direction circumstances may require. For these moveable Columns carriage must of course be kept constantly provided. It appears to me that ponies and bullocks might be largely substituted for Camels, and that the whole of the Carriage for all movements of Troops should be kept up by Government. We might do away with the Batta given to Troops marching, and while Troops in the Field must of course be restricted to a very small amount of baggage, Troops marching for ordinary reliefs, or on escort duties of any kind, should likewise be made to move much less encumbered than has heretofore been the case.

Another reason for my proposing so large a European Force is, that to the European Troops only would I entrust the charge of Magazines and of Treasuries, and the interior defence of Jails.

It appears to me an excellent suggestion that all European Soldiers should be taught to ride on Camels, and that a certain number of these animals should be always kept up at large Stations and at important posts, so as to admit of a detachment being rapidly conveyed to any point where their services may be emergently required. I would propose that all moveable Columns should invariably have the means of mounting on Camels, a Detachment equal to the Wing of a Regiment of Infantry.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Grand Total of Native Troops.

3.

Regiments Regular and Irregular (armed)	75,859
Deduct Madras Troops	5,010
Ditto Bombay ditto... ..	6,557
	<u>11,567</u>
Balance	64,292

Note.—In the deductions are included 179 men of the Hyderabad Contingent and in the balance are included the —

Nagpore Irregular Force	3,425
Mewar Bheel Corps	1,004
Joudpore Legion	1,118
Mhair Regiment	550
Mhairwarra Battalion	712
Meena Battalion	577
	<u>7,386</u>
Regiments disarmed	17,776
Temporary Levies, organized Police, &c., serving in the Bengal Presidency	44,371
	<u>1,26,439</u>

Horse Artillery ... 3	Troops.
Foot Artillery ... 6	Companies with some Remounts with 2 Field Batteries.
Sappers and Miners 1	{ At Roorkee ... 528 men. ,, Attock ... 89 ,, ,, Peshawur ... 82 ,,
Body Guard... .. 1	(2 Cos., Half armed and half dis- armed.)
Light Cavalry ... 2	(Disarmed).
Infantry Regular 7	(Armed).
„ „ 19	(Disarmed).
„ Irregular 16	(Armed).
„ „ 1	(Disarmed).
Cavalry „ 16	(Armed).
„ „ 1	(Disarmed).
Artillery „ 3	{ With 3 Batteries and one Mountain Train Battery.
Punjaub and Sikh Infantry	29
„ „ Cavalry	10
„ Irregular Artillery 8	{ With 4 Batteries and one Mountain Train.

New Levies and organized Police are not included in this, neither are “Towanna Horse” “Mooltan Horse” and such Corps,

* Three of these Regiments are in China.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Distribution.

Native Troops.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	REMARKS.	
Bengal ...	{ Foot Artillery ... 2 } { Field Batteries ... 2 } * One Co. Sappers ...	4	3½	15	* Sebundee Sappers at Das jeeling.
Punjaub ...	{ Horse Artillery 2 } { Foot Artillery ... 8 } { Field Batteries ... +5 } 3 Cos. S. and M. ...	15	5	33	+ 2 Mountain Train Batteries
Field ...	{ Horse Artillery 1 } { Foot Artillery ... 7 } { Field Batteries ... 2 } ‡ 1 Sappers and Miners ...	10	11½	21	‡ Also some Punjaub Sappers.

Note.—The Nagpore Irregular Force, Mewar Bheel Corps, Joudhpore Legion, Mhair Regiment, Mhairwarra Battalion and Meena Battalion are not included, if they should be, the following should be added to the "Field." 1 F. A., 1 Battery, 2 Cavalry, and 7 Infantry.

Of these Regiments, 2 Troops of Horse Artillery, 3 Companies F. A., 3½ Cavalry Regiments, and 20 Infantry, are disarmed.

4.

The Native Troops will, I presume, consist as heretofore of Regular and Irregular Regiments, but with this important difference, that we shall henceforward have no Regular Native Artillery and no Regular Native Cavalry.

With regard to the Native Infantry, there remain of the old Bengal Army the following Regiments :

Regular Regiments, entire armed, unaffected by the Mutinies.	{ The 21st... .. } { " 31st } { " 66th } { " 73rd }	4
Portions remaining faithful when their comrades mutinied.	{ 42 portions of other Regiments estimated in all at about 2,000 men, }	3
With their arms restored and now on service in China.	{ 47th } { 65th } { 70th }	3
Regiments which are likely to have their arms restored.	{ In the Punjaub ... } { In Bengal ... }	4 2
	Total	16
Irregular Regiments on the same footing as the Line but officered as Irregulars.	{ Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Sirmoor. Nusseree. Kemaon. Ferozepore. Loodianah.	

Of these Corps it appears that 14 of the Regular Regiments are likely to remain embodied in the Bengal Army. (In calculating the whole at 16, I reckoned the 2,000 men composed of remnants of Corps at two Regiments as on the old complement.) It is probable now that they will be made into small Irregular Regiments. But the 14 Corps are all probably considerably reduced by the operation of men on leave not having returned, by invaliding and by discharges. I think it would be unadvisable to complete them to the old standard, and as many Irregular Regiments must remain embodied for the Regular Regiments of Native Infantry, I would propose 640 privates as a proper and sufficient complement. This was the strength of our Regular Regiments in 1831. I would propose also, that they should be maintained in the form of Regular Regiments; Irregular Infantry Corps have certainly not heretofore formed the *elite* of the Native Army, however otherwise the case may have been with the Irregular Cavalry, and it is to be remembered that, the whole of the Contingents have mutinied, *viz.*, the Oude, the Gwalior, the Bhopal, the Kotah, all consisting of Corps on the Irregular system. We have not one Irregular Regiment (I do not allude to merely Local Corps at all) which has stood against the mutiny, excepting those which, though with only the complement of European Officers which Irregular Corps have, are yet in point of organization and pay on the footing of Native Corps of the Line, *viz.*, the Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the Ferozepore and the Goorkha Regiments. I would now bring into the Line the six Regiments above enumerated, of which the men are now on the same footing as Line Regiments. This would make a total of 20 Regiments of Regular Native Infantry already embodied, and to these I would propose to add 10 more, giving on the whole, 30 Regiments of Regular Native Infantry on the Establishment.

For the duties of the larger Stations, I think Regular Infantry Regiments should in preference be employed, the number of European Officers attached to them giving them an advantage for such localities over the Irregular Regiments.

I think none of the Regular Regiments should be kept up unless they now consent to serve beyond Sea, or wherever they may be ordered. Those which have been disarmed should have this undertaking imposed upon them as a condition of the restoration of their arms: and in the case of those which have remained armed all along, their refusal to undertake general service beyond Sea should lead to their not being recruited so that they die out, and even to their discharge with suitable gratuities. I do not anticipate much difficulty in gaining the consent of the whole to take general service, considering the power we have acquired over them by the experience of the late time of disturbance.

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It is an additional argument in favor of Regular Regiments over Irregulars, that they proceed on foreign service with their own Officers, whereas the Irregulars require additional Officers to be posted to them for the occasion, as was done when the 4th Sikh Local Regiment went to Burmah in the late war, a system which can but rarely work well, as on service it is more essential than any where else, that the men should know their Officers.

With regard to re-arming Regiments which have once been disarmed, I know that there is a strong opinion held by Officers of ability and experience that such a measure would be highly impolitic and objectionable, for they feel convinced that men once subjected to such an indignity can never be trusted again. I have ventured to hold a different opinion and I do so still; some of the Native Regular Regiments were disarmed as a precaution, and they knew this, and were thankful for the measure.

This sentiment has been expressed to me by Native Officers who are among the best we have in the Service. The alacrity with which some of them gave up their arms, and the cheerfulness with which they have since done duty, are corroborations of the fact as in the Right Wing of the 4th Native Infantry for example, and in the 32nd Native Infantry and others. The Right Wing of the 4th Native Infantry is a striking instance. These men have been occasionally trusted with arms, and employed in the interval, since they were disarmed, and they have repeatedly returned their arms into store when such occasional employment was completed. They show no symptom whatever of consciousness of disgrace by having been required to give up their arms, but quite the contrary feeling; and in a very decided manner. I see no reason to doubt that this will prove the case also with other Regiments to whom their arms may be restored.

The best men in the Corps (and these formed, I am convinced, the majority in every Regiment) felt inexpressible relief on seeing the means of mischief taken away from the bad and violently-disposed minority, the men of worst character in their Corps, and I see no reason to doubt, that if the Regiments to be re-armed are well selected, and if they be first weeded by the discharge of any man in them of bad character, we shall have a body of men in the remainder to whom arms may be safely restored, and who will not only not feel a disposition to resent as an indignity their temporary privation of their arms, but will feel and respond to the compliment of being again entrusted with them. Besides this, these men have before them the fruits of this causeless Mutiny; they see plainly exhibited ruin brought down upon their own heads by their comrades who have risen in arms against the Government, the distress of families by the stoppage of remittances, the desolation of their homes by the march of war over the land, the loss of pensions, the

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ANSWERS.

fall of men in battle who, had they died in the service of Government, instead of in rebellion, would have left some provision to their heirs. These examples will surely not be thrown away; and for my own part I do feel firmly convinced that there exist—spread in greater or less degree throughout every Regiment that we may again entrust with their arms, the elements of such fidelity and heroism as have distinguished the already very large numbers of Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers and Sepoys who have earned by their loyalty extraordinary rewards at the hands of Government. I would not re-enlist an individual of those who have taken their discharge; not a man who has been borne on the Rolls of any Regiment; but I have no fear as to the result of restoring arms to such of the disarmed Regiments as after the process of discharging the bad characters among them may be selected for that honor.

Of the Irregular or Local Infantry Regiments (not including Contingents of course, but the old single Irregular Corps) heretofore existing before the Mutinies, I think not one can be dispensed with, except it be the Calcutta Native Militia; that Corps is doing such duty as a Corps disarmed can do. I would not restore arms to it but convert it into Police.

How far the several Levies raised, and about to be raised in the North Western Provinces, may answer their object is yet an experiment, of which the result has to be ascertained in the course of time. For local duties at the larger Stations where they are raised, they may possibly do very well, but I am not sanguine as to their usefulness elsewhere should they be sent from their proper Stations.

For the number and distribution of the Native Troops, which I would propose to have, I beg to refer to the Tabular Statement.

5.

Regulars	{	Armed	6,947	
		Disarmed*	16,575	
				23,522
Irregular	{	Armed	72,260	
		Disarmed	1,199	
				73,459
				96,981
		Grand Total		
Police	{	Horse	7,115	
		Foot	17,972	
				25,087
		Grand Total of Regulars, Irregulars and Police		1,22,068

Note.—Besides the above there are Troops belonging to the Rajah of Puttialla, and other Native Princes, numbering in all 4,412 men.

* In these are included 507 Military Prisoners.

Corps are composed of Affghans, Punjabees and the Derajat Goorkhas, Hindoostanees, Arracanese, Assamees and Sonthals, &c. &c.

The Castes are Mussulmans, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Gwalas, Kayuts, Koormees, Goosains, Bhats, Gurrercas, Burrais, and numerous other Castes of Hindoos. I am not able to state the proportion of the different races.

6.

So far as relates to Regular and Irregular Native Regiments this question has been already answered in my reply to the 4th question, (See Tabular Statement.)

As to the Police I have not the means of forming any very accurate opinion, I think the placing of *fire-arms* in the hands of the Native Police and drilling them as Regiments, to be matters of very questionable policy, constituted as they must needs be of very much the same descriptions of men of which the Native Army, Regular and Irregular, is composed, it is only multiplying trained opposition to our rule against some future day of difficulty to establish Police Regiments on any thing approaching the footing of the Native Army. To protect the Territories under our power against such internal disturbances as do legitimately call for the aid of the military Force properly so designated, and for their defence against external aggression, I consider the army, European and Native, which I have proposed to maintain to be sufficient; but if it is to be an object to overawe not the Regular and Irregular Forces only, but an armed and drilled Native Police also, it will be necessary to increase *considerably* our European Force. If proper measures are taken to disarm the population of our provinces, I conceive to place *fire-arms* in the hands of our Police when those whom they have to keep in order are not so armed, and if to resist Dacoits and other such disturbers of the peace, and to apprehend offenders individually or in gangs, be the true duties of the Police, I see no reason why they should have *fire-arms*, and much less why they should be drilled to act together as Soldiers; any such opposition as would require a force to be drawn out in array to put it down seems rather a case for calling out the Military than for using the Police force. There is a well known race of Policemen often entertained for their own protection or for aggression on their neighbour's property by Native Zemindars, the Lattials (Burkundaz) who take their designation from the weapon (the bludgeon) which they use. Of their entire effectiveness there is no doubt.

In connection with the subject of arming and employing the Police, I would take occasion to mention that, for escort for Treasure or Army Stores, excepting Tents, I would not employ the Police but the Irregular Troops, but as string of carts laden with Wines and Stores such as the Commissariat has to supply to the Troops, sent by merchants to their constituents, may be seen now on the road from Calcutta to the principal part of this Doab, and were constantly seen before the mutinies traversing the whole country, even to

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Peshawur, with no protection but a few Chuprassees; so might most Commissariat Stores now be forwarded from station to station with an escort of Burkundaz armed with bludgeons or at the most with swords.

The defence of Jails should be entrusted to the Military chiefly: the internal guard should be European Soldiers, the external might be either Native Irregular Soldiers or Police.

Every Magazine should be defended by small fortifications which should give defence to the Treasuries, the Commissariat supplies, and a small garrison of European Soldiers, in addition to providing a place of refuge to the families of the Officers and men when the bulk of the Troops at the station went on service.

7.

The proportion I have assigned in the Tabular Statement appears to me to be sufficient, if the Police is not to be armed with fire-arms and not regimentally drilled, but if the Police is to be so armed and drilled, I think we shall require at least one half more of European Troops.

8.

If the Police is to be what Police ordinarily is, I think the proportion of the European to the Native Troops should be as one to four, but if the Police is to have fire-arms and to be regimentally drilled, the proportion should in my opinion be as one to three.

9.

Of a permanent nature there is not; but accommodation either permanent or temporary, and of the last kind some exceedingly good, there is enough available. The comparatively few Troops now in the field are of course not included in this Statement; what the amount of accommodation may be will best be ascertained in the Department of Public Works.

10.

Additional accommodation will be necessary, but to what extent, I cannot here accurately state. But wherever it may be determined to place European Troops under my scheme or any other, the provision of Barrack accommodation is so purely a matter of absolute necessity, that there seems to be little occasion to calculate its amount or extent before hand. Just as at Barrackpore and at Allahabad on its being determined to locate European Troops at those Stations which had not been done before, Barrack accommodation was necessarily provided for them, so at any other place the expediency of having European Troops there located is the main consideration, and that question once determined in the affirmative, the provision of Barrack accommodation follows of course.

11.

I have stated this above, but to recapitulate I would propose that—

The Artillery should be wholly composed of Troops raised for Service in India and consist of 92 Troops and Companies; that—

The Cavalry should consist of three Royal Dragoon Regiments and of 18 Regiments on the reduced scale, composed of Troops raised for Service in India ; and that—

The Infantry should consist of 18 Royal Regiments of Foot, and of 50 Regiments on the reduced scale of Troops entertained for the Indian Service.

12.

The ten Regiments of European Cavalry already proposed by Government, are to be officered from the lists of the Bengal Light Cavalry, with a proposed addition of three Lieutenants and two Cornets to each. These ten Regiments, if so constituted will more than absorb the Officers of Cavalry now on the establishment, and if the additional Regiments be constituted, they will have to be officered by new appointments of Officers from England. But to supply Officers of *standing*, down to the rank of Captain inclusive, it will be necessary to allow of transfers from Her Majesty's Service, and these should be so arranged as to afford to the Cavalry Officers, now on the Indian Establishment, a fair share of the higher grades in the new Regiments. I am not advocating *amalgamation*, for it appears to me that that is surrounded with insuperable difficulties, and could not be brought into operation without great injustice in one way or another ; but what I would propose is actual *bonâ fide* transfers of Officers from Her Majesty's Service to the Indian Establishment ; with every reasonable advantage secured to them of previous service for pension, but with restriction in all necessary respects to the system prevailing in the Indian Service ; and once transferred they should thenceforward take their place on the gradation list of the Indian Establishment. Officers for the lower grades might be supplied by the nomination of Cadets as heretofore.

The usual system of forming new Regiments of European Infantry has the immediate effect of making supernumerary as many Colonels as there are Regiments formed.

Each body of Officers of the old Native Infantry has its Colonel ; but the junction of two such Corps of Officers causes the loss of one Officer of that rank. The promotion in the line is by this means most injuriously interfered with, and not only in Bengal, but in Madras and Bombay also, the Officers of the three Presidencies being included in one list down to the Captains inclusive.

Again, the tone of the Bengal Army is lowered by losing its Colonels. Its Officers by every such step that they lose, are less and less able to compete for those Commands and distinctions which the service in India presents to the just ambition of Officers. Further, the loss of the rank of Colonel regimentally cruelly deprives us of that privilege which after all falls to the lot of com-

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paratively very few among us, of enjoying rest and a competent income in our own Country in the down hill of life, a privilege which ordinarily is not attained in less than 40 years' service; again every diminution of the grade of regimental Colonel is a diminution of the funds of those invaluable Institutions on which our Widows and Orphans depend for their subsistence, and for every step in that rank lost to us, the subscriptions of all the other ranks of Officers must be enhanced, a process which would soon press beyond endurance on the means of Officers of all grades, especially of the lowest.

Lastly, any great diminution of the number of regimental Colonels, would sink Bengal into a third rate Presidency; a very anomalous state of matters, considering the extent of territory embraced within it, the very large amount of force European and Native, required for its defence, and the fact of its being the seat of the Supreme Government of India.

In any arrangement that may be made in reorganizing the Bengal Army, the maintenance of a fair proportion of regimental Colonels should be an object of special care.

The system of doubling up the Officers of two Corps into one new Regiment, gives the latter more Officers than are required for it. For instance:—

Two Lieutenant-Colonels and two Majors, one of each grade is amply sufficient. In Her Majesty's Regiments serving in India, one of the two Lieutenant-Colonels is generally away from the Regiment, either as a Brigadier or on staff employ, or on leave, and it frequently happens that one of the two Majors is away on staff employ or otherwise. There is actually no occasion for two Officers of these grades with any Regiment. I think also that the Captains and Subalterns might without inconvenience be less numerous. Her Majesty's Infantry Regiments serving in India have 12 Captains, 14 Lieutenants and 10 Ensigns. The local European Regiments have 14 Captains, 22 Lieutenants and 10 Ensigns.

It certainly cannot be necessary to have an establishment of Officers more numerous than suffices for Her Majesty's Regiments, which are of greater strength than one Indian Corps. On this ground two Captains and eight Lieutenants might at once be struck off from the complement of each of the European Corps on the Indian Establishment. But I am persuaded that 12 Captains, 12 Lieutenants, and 6 Ensigns, would be a proper and sufficient complement for each Regiment of European Infantry.

I have estimated the requirements of the Bengal Presidency at 50 Regiments of European, and 30 Regiments of Native Infantry, to form the permanent Indian Establishment here, to officer these

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according to the scale I have proposed for European and for Native Regular Regiments, we shall require :—

For the European Regiments...	{	50	Colonels.
		50	Lieut.-Colonels.
		50	Majors.
		600	Captains.
		600	Lieutenants.
	{	300	Ensigns.
For the Native Regiments ...	{	30	Colonels.
		30	Lieut.-Colonels.
		30	Majors.
		180	Captains.
		180	Lieutenants
	{	120	Ensigns.
Total	{	80	Colonels.
		80	Lieut.-Colonels.
		80	Majors.
		780	Captains.
		780	Lieutenants.
	{	420	Ensigns.

The present establishment of Officers of all Ranks in the Bengal Infantry is :—

78 Colonels.
80 Lieutenant Colonels.
80 Majors.
560 Captains.
880 Lieutenants.
400 Ensigns.

Therefore, to make up the required complement of Officers on the new scales, we are deficient of :—

2 Colonels.
220 Captains.
20 Ensigns.

and we have a surplus of 100 Lieutenants.

Considering then that the first two hundred and twenty Lieutenants of Infantry in the list are Officers of from 14 to 18 year standing from 1843 to 1850, with very few of so late a season as 1849 and 1850 it would not be unreasonable to promote them to the rank of Captain. If this be done, the measure will absorb 220 Ensigns to be promoted to Lieutenants in their room.

The effect of what I have proposed will be on the whole the promotion of—

2 Lieutenant Colonels to be Colonels.
2 Majors to be Lieutenant-Colonels.
2 Captains to be Majors.
222 Lieutenants to be Captains.
122 Ensigns to be Lieutenants.

and the same number of Cadets, 122, will have to be supplied to England to complete the establishment. This would be no great dan

I believe several projects of a different nature have occurred to others, and among them, one is to consider all the Officers of Infantry as forming one general list, irrespective of the Regiments to which they belong, and then to select from the whole such of the Officers as may be considered best adapted for serving with European Regiments. This plan would be highly injurious, to a great many Officers, without any adequate good to the Service.

In the first place to select, from among a host of Officers who have never served in a European Regiment, such as may be best fitted for such service, can only be a speculative and uncertain procedure. It can only be conjectured, that, owing to their known or supposed possession of certain qualities, certain Officers are better adapted than others for commanding European Soldiers; and in many cases the selection will assuredly prove erroneous.

Again, the position of the selected Officers in the Corps to which they are sent will not admit of adjustment in any conceivable form which would not militate against the first principles of a seniority service such as ours; and the force of this suggestion is increased when it is remembered, that the Armies of Madras and Bombay are so mixed up with that of Bengal, that a radical alteration in the old system of promotion, cannot affect one of the three Armies, without affecting the other two likewise.

But selection in order to form many European Regiments, is a hopeless task. What occasion there can be for doubting the efficiency of Officers of the Indian Service, and their capacity to command European Soldiers, is not apparent; we have had European Regiments for many years in all the Presidencies, and though the first and the oldest Regiment in each Presidency is now, in regard to the mode in which it was formed, beyond the memory of any one, the other six Regiments, two in each Presidency, have been formed within a comparatively recent period, and they were formed by the chance assemblage together of Officers from the line, not selected, but posted to them according to their standing in the Regiments generally. With these Corps there has been no lack of able Officers, and the efficiency of these Regiments is unquestionable; it has been amply proved both in peace and war, and it may be prognosticated most reasonably that the new Regiments will become as efficient as the old ones. If there be any sort of failure, it will be at first only; and every day's experience, and the constant flow of casualty and change, will speedily correct any deficiency.

There is another and very strong objection to this sort of selection for the European Regiments from the general list. The claims of the European Regiments are not a whit more emergent

TABULAR STATEMENT of European and Native Troops to constitute the Indian Service in Bengal, showing the proportions relatively of each, and their Distribution. (Local Corps in Assam, Sylhet, Arracan, and elsewhere, not included.)—(Continued.)

STATIONS.	Horse Artillery.	Foot Artillery.	Field Batteries.	European Cavalry.	Irregular Cavalry.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Irregular Infantry.	MOVEABLE COLUMN
	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	
Brought over... ..	5	35	28	7	19	31½	16	9	
Jhansi	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	
Nowgong	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	
Saugor	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	
Mhow	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	{ B. C. D. E. F. 1 1 1 1 1
Neemuch	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	
Nusseerabad	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	
Nagode	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Jubbulpore... ..	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Lucknow	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	0	{ A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fyzabad	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Sultanpore	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	
Other places in Oude...	0	3	3	2	2	2	2	0	
Bareilly	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	{ B. C. D. E. F. 1 1 1 1 1
Shajehanpore	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	
Mooradabad	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	
Almorah	0	½	½	0	0	½	0	1	
Nyneetal... ..	0	½	½	0	0	½	0	0	
Gwalior	1	3	2	2	2	2	0	2	{ A. B. C. D. E. F. H. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Augur	0	1	1	0	1	½	0	0	
Seepree	0	1	1	0	0	½	0	1	
Ferozepore	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Lahore... ..	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	0	{ A. B. C. D. E. H. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Umritsir	0	1	1	0	0	¾	0	1	
Govinghur	0	1	0	0	0	¾	0	0	
Sealkote	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Noorpore	0	½	0	0	0	½	½	0	
Kangra	0	½	0	0	0	½	½	0	
Mooltan	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	
Dera Ishmael Khan ...	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Bunnoo	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	{ With Infantry of the Punjaub Irregular Force.
Kohat	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	
Jhelum	0	1	1	0	1	½	0	0	
Rawulpindee	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	1	
Attock	0	1	½	0	0	½	0	1	
Shumsabad	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Nowshera	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	
Peshawur	2	4	3	2	2	2	0	2	
Grand Total	11	80	64½	20	43	67½	31	27	

INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT.

PROPOSED STRENGTH OF REGIMENTS (EXCLUSIVE OF ARTILLERY).

<i>European Cavalry.</i>	<i>Irregular Native Cavalry.</i>
1 Colonel.	1 Commandant.
1 Lieut.-Colonel.	1 2nd in Command.
1 Major.	1 Adjutant.
6 Captains.	400 Privates.
12 Lieutenants.	
6 Cornets.	
384 Privates.	
<i>European Infantry.</i>	
1 Colonel.	
1 Lieut.-Colonel.	
1 Major.	
12 Captains.	
12 Lieutenants.	
6 Ensigns.	
800 Privates.	
<i>Regular Native Infantry.</i>	<i>Irregular Native Infantry.</i>
1 Colonel.	1 Commandant.
1 Lieut.-Colonel.	1 2nd in Command.
1 Major.	1 Adjutant.
6 Captains.	400 Privates.
6 Lieutenants.	But it is not proposed to reduce
4 Ensigns.	below 800 Privates the local
640 Privates.	Regiments, such as the Assam
	Regiments, &c., which are now
	above that strength.

No 1283.

FROM

H. E. LIEUT.-GENL. SIR H. SOMERSET, K. C. B. AND K. H.,
Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army.

TO

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. DURAND, C. B.,
On Special duty.

Head Quarters, Poona, 22nd July 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to communicate to you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, my views regarding Para. 5 of the Honorable Court's Despatch No. 235, as well as replies to the questions which accompanied your Circular Letter No. 14 of 21st May.

2. Should it be resolved to enlist Natives of other tropical countries for Service in India, I would certainly recommend their being formed into separate Regiments, but after due consideration, I am led to doubt the expediency of such enlistments at all.

3. I think that in the long run Regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans do without possessing their general efficiency.

4. But it is chiefly on political grounds that I deprecate such enlistments, and I will therefore submit for His Lordship's consideration a few of the reasons that strike me as militating against them.

5. The history of India for the past century has shown, I think, that our rule has rested more upon moral influence and the natural ascendancy of our race over the Asiatic, than on the numerical strength of the British Troops maintained in the country, and it seems to me that though it is our plain duty to augment the latter, yet that we must still look to moral influence as the distinguishing characteristic of our rule; and here I will not stop to analyse on what this influence is based, its chief outward cause is undoubtedly the European element, Civil and Military in the country, but besides that there are other points of no small importance, such as the superior vigor, moral, physical and intellectual of the Anglo-Saxon, not the least of the collaterals I refer to is the salutary impression on the Native mind of our unbounded resources. Hyder Ali is not the only native who has felt what he undoubtedly expressed that "in regard to our power he was not afraid so much of what he saw as of what he did not see."

6. I gather from the results of a year's severe test, that the truth of this principle has been fully established, for though in the course of many years, the undue reduction of our European forces, too indulgent a rule and many other powerful causes had so weakened its effect in a portion of our Empire as to pave the way for mutiny and rebellion, still the main body of the people of India remains passive under its influence, and thus allowed time for the full restoration of its supremacy by means of an accession of European force and the successive victories that followed.

7. If a section of our subjects, carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance and fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength and underrate ours, to forget that the substantial privileges which they enjoy depends solely on their connection with us, and *not* on the soundness of their own constitution, moral or social, we may conclude that having now had ocular demonstration that the European force in this country can be trebled, and having learnt such severe lessons through its instrumentality, they will as a body abandon such fallacies, and readily believe that our supremacy, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a practical as well as a moral truth.

8. If I am right then in supposing that the ascendancy of our prestige and moral power constitute the main spring of our rule, I think that before introducing any foreign elements into our system, we should satisfy ourselves that they will strengthen, or at all events, not weaken it.

9. I must confess that I am far from thinking that the enlistment of foreign native mercenaries into our ranks will have a beneficial effect ; they would not in the first place command the respect that Europeans do, nor could they for reasons of policy as well as duty, be introduced in sufficiently large numbers to render us independent of the Sepoys, who numerically speaking, must always preponderate, nor do I consider that should a moral epidemic recur, like that from which we are now emerging, they would be one whit more trustworthy than the natives of this country themselves are.

10. Finally, they might occasion jealousy and distrust between us and the whole Native Army, and their presence be very probably attributed to inability on our part to maintain an adequate European force in the country, and if such were the case, the consequences might be more serious and embarrassing than we can now trace.

11. After viewing the subject therefore in every possible light, I think that if we maintain a fixed European Force *en evidence* in the country, and steadily persevere in our attempts to free its people from the moral thralldom in which they are held by their Brahminical heads, we should be independent of native foreign mercenaries, and always command the respect, as well as the support of a section of our subjects ; indeed even now it is not so much the people in this Presidency as the Brahmins who are disaffected, and it is clear that our influence must either transcend theirs or in time yield to it.

12. I shall now have the honor to reply to the questions which accompanied your letter under reply.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS,

1 and 3.

13. The number of European and Native Troops now serving in the Bombay Presidency and their distribution is given in the annexed Sketch Map marked A.

14. The Rajpootana Field Force, though at present under the orders of the Government of India, properly belongs to the Bombay Presidency and has been included as serving therein.

15. *Mhow* at present held by Bombay Troops has also been included.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

16. Return showing these details also accompanying the Sketch.

2 and 4.

17. I beg to submit both a return and Sketch Map B, showing the number of European and Native Troops I propose for this Presidency, as at present defined, and their distribution.

5.

18. In the accompanying return marked C, I give as near a computation as possible of the strength of the Regulars, Irregulars and Police to which this Presidency will soon be completed ; for the information regarding the races of the men I must refer you to other sources.

19. There are two extra Battalions of Infantry upwards of 1100 strong each that are now being formed by drafts from Regular Regiments ; these Battalions are really Regulars, but at present officered as Irregulars, and for reasons which I will explain in treating the next question No. 6, I deprecate the proportion of Irregulars being augmented beyond what it now is, *viz.*, about 10,000 men.

20. There is one other point which I desire especially to urge upon his Lordship's notice, which is, that whatever Irregular Troops we have, may be kept free from serving as Police under Civil Officers as at present practised. I shall hope further on to show how utterly impossible it is for any body of Troops to be efficient as Police and Soldiers too, but independently of this it often happens that the sudden withdrawal of Irregulars from Police duties for Field Service, hazards the tranquillity of the districts affected by it, there being generally no force available to replace them. I would suggest that if it be indispensably necessary that Irregulars should be so employed, more than half the Regiment may not be on detached duty at once, the other half being at Head Quarters for instruction in Drill, &c. &c.

6.

21. The question as to what proportion of our Native Establishment should be Regulars, Irregulars and Police, involves I think some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad whose practical adoption would lead I fear to great evils and fresh complications.

22. I allude in the first place to the hypothesis that the Native Army should from henceforth be required to perform the combined duties of Police and Soldiers, and secondly, that for financial reasons its present Establishment of * 35 European Officers per Regiment should be reduced to four (inclusive of the Surgeon) according to the model of Irregular Corps.

* This excludes 1 Colonel and 2 Medical Officers, but includes Regimental Staff.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

23. I cannot but regard the first of these projects as simply impracticable, chiefly because the population of this part of India is sub-divided into a variety of races, many of them aboriginal and predatory, whose employment by Government is not only a matter of policy but of duty, and who, though ready and willing to enter Police Corps, are resolutely averse to leaving their own districts, and to the course of discipline necessary for a Soldier.

24. But besides this there is the natural diverseness between the duties required of Policemen and Soldiers, which renders their unfettered performance on a large scale by one and the same body, impossible.

25. For instance in a Policeman a *local* knowledge of the country and people is the principal qualification, whereas in a Soldier a perfect freedom from *all localities*, sympathies or incumbrances, a readiness to move any where on any duty at a moment's warning, and a strict discipline, are required.

26. If therefore the raw material as well as the mode of its preparation for the two branches are so radically different, I cannot see how the combination contemplated by such a theory could be even attempted with any hope of success.

27. With regard to the reconstruction of the Native Army on the Irregular model, I quite agree that the reduction of the Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File of the former in each Regiment so as to correspond with the latter more closely than at present, is a measure that would be productive of economy and good order, but I cannot agree that the number of European Officers to Non-Commissioned Rank and File should be reduced below its present proportion.

28. The present established strength of a Native Regiment is as follows :—

		<i>Pay in Garrison.</i>	
1	Colonel... ..	1,295	5 0
1	Lieutenant-Colonel	827	14 0
1	Major... ..	640	14 6
7	Captains	2,618	7 0
11	Lieutenants... ..	2,483	4 0
5	Ensigns	910	9 7
1	Surgeon	674	1 0
1	Assistant Surgeon	255	12 0
Total 28		Rupees	9,706 3 1

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

European Non-Commissioned Officers.

1 Sergeant... ..	50	13	2
1 Quarter Master Sergeant... ..	44	13	2
<hr/>			
Total 2	Rupees	95	10 4

*Native Commissioned Non-Commissioned Rank and File.**Average Garrison Pay as per classes.*

12 Subadars	624
12 Jemadars	294
12 Color Havildars	192
48 Havildars... ..	672
60 Naiques... ..	720
24 Drummers and Fifers	192
12 Bhisties... ..	90
1000 Privates	8,000
<hr/>	
Total 1180	Rupees 10,784

29. Thus the 29 Native Infantry Regiments of this Presidency are established to contain 34,220 Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File, and their Garrison pay monthly, inclusive of European Officers, amounts to about Rupees 6,00,000.

30. This strength having been found totally inadequate to the positive duties which had to be performed, Government sanctioned, as a temporary measure, the enrolment of about 2,000 Pensioners and two extra Battalions 1180 strong each, so that over and above the 34,220 men specified, we have about 4360 to meet present emergencies, but of this extra number, the 2000 enrolled Pensioners being an expensive body, and too old and infirm to perform other than light Camp duties, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged for.

31. I have just shewn that we already have upwards of 4000 Regular Native Infantry over and above our established strength, but it is unorganized and unofficered at present, and therefore of very little use. Though the Army is so hard-worked that unless augmented or reorganized, it cannot continue to perform its present rate of duty for long, without great loss, yet I am led, after the most careful consideration, to believe that instead of increasing its Rank and File, the most efficient and politic mode of relieving it and strengthening our system will be by a reorganization calculated alike to increase our moral hold upon it and render it fitter for detailed and detached work than it is at present.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

32. About 39,000 Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File would, I think, meet all our requirements if organized on either of the following plans :—

33. The first, which is the one that I would most strongly recommend, involves the abolition of the rank of Native Commissioned Officers altogether, and the increase of the European Officers so as to make up for that reduction.

34. I have found that we have at present too many Companies and too many Non-Commissioned Rank and File for the purposes of general economy, and I would therefore propose that each Regiment should consist of ten Companies and the following ranks :—

<i>European.</i>	<i>Native.</i>
1 Colonel.	10 Color Havildars.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel.	40 Havildars.
1 Major or 2nd Lieutenant-Col.	50 Naiques.
10 Captains.	20 Drummers and Fifers.
12 Lieutenants including 1 Adjutant and 1 Quarter Master.	10 Bhisties.
	850 Privates.
10 Ensigns.	—
1 Surgeon.	980
1 Assistant Surgeon.	—
<u>37 Officers.</u>	

- 1 Sergeant-Major (European.)
- 1 Quarter-Master Sergeant (European.)

35. But if the plan of excluding the Native Officers be objected to on political grounds, I trust that at least the present number of European Officers per Regiment may be continued, and that the following may be the strength of Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File per ten Companies, *viz.* :—

	<i>Garrison Pay.</i>
10 Subadars	Rs. 520
10 Jemadars	" 245
10 Color Havildars	" 160
40 Havildars	" 560
50 Naiques	" 600
20 Drummers and Fifers	" 160
10 Bhisties	" 75
850 Privates... ..	" 6,800
<u>1000 Total.</u>	<u>Rupees ... 9,120</u>

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

36. I would propose that our Army, which now consists of 29 Regiments of Native Infantry, should be reconstructed into 39 of 1000 each, which at the comparatively trifling cost of about a lac and a half per mensem, in excess of our present expenditure on this head, would give us a force more in hand, better disciplined and better adapted to both Military and Political purposes than the present Army is.

<i>Abstract Cost.</i>		<i>Rs.</i>
28 Officers		9,706
1 Serjeant Major and Quarter Master Serjeant .. .		95
1000 Native Comd. Non-Comd. Rank and File ..		9,120
		<hr/>
		18,921
		39
		<hr/>
		1,70,289
		56,763
		<hr/>
Total ..		7,37,919

37. In estimating the number of Officers for a Native Infantry Regiment, the number on an average required from each for Military and Civil Staff appointments must never be lost sight of. In the present day it has amounted to about three per Regiment for Military and for Civil.

38. While I quite agree that three European Officers are sufficient for each Police Corps, I cannot believe that that degree of discipline, which is the life and soul of the Regular Army, can ever be either established or maintained by that number of European Officers per Regiment in a Native Indian Army.

39. Whatever Soldier-like qualities the Soldier may hitherto have shown, he owes their development solely to his European Officers, under whose directing influence his natural prejudices and apathy have been overcome to an extent that can be best estimated by comparing the present state of the Native Army of this Presidency with what it was thirty years ago.

40. A well-officered Native Cavalry or Native Infantry Regiment is not only as a rule a better disciplined and more efficient body in the field than an Irregular one, but it has greater weight in the country in time of peace. Its European Officers often exercise a beneficial influence beyond the limits of their Regiment, and I have observed that Political Officers and Magistrates in certain circumstances estimate the Native Regulars at a very different standard from other Native Troops.

41. That the reduction of European Officers in the Native Army would involve a loss of its discipline and general efficiency, there can be no doubt, but there is a still more serious evil inseparable from it, and that is *the undue power that it would throw into the hands of the Native Officers*, for Officer there must be of one kind or the other.

42. Now if there is one lesson which the history of the past year has taught us more prominently than another, it is, I think, the

imperative necessity of so arranging the constituent elements of our system, Civil and Military, as to place the reins of all branches of importance in European hands.

43. We have learnt that our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element, but more I think upon its judicious fusion amongst the mass to be governed by it than upon its bare physical strength ; and I firmly believe that no addition of European strength that we are able to make to this Presidency would ever compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European Officers would occasion to the Native Army, and through it to the State.

44. No Native will progress towards the European standard of improvement except by constant and well regulated association with Europeans, and I cannot but regard any measure that tends to lessen that association in the Army as clearing the way for a host of villains who, by dint of superstition and fanaticism, would endeavour to mould that Army to their purpose ; an example of this occurred last year in the case of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, half of which was composed of Hindoostanees, but whose lines, in the midst of Mutiny and rebellion in Malwah, were comparatively inaccessible to seditious agents, not only on account of the vigilance of the European and Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, but the good feeling and mutual regard that existed between them and their men.

45. It may be relied upon, that the effect of isolating the Native Army either externally from their comrades, the European Soldiers, or depriving them internally of their European Officers, would sooner or later be productive of an inflated spirit of pride that would ultimately lead to their entire alienation from us.

46. Some of our most distinguished and *practical* Generals (Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier amongst the number) have

It must always be borne in mind how large a proportion of the European Officers of Native Regiments are withdrawn for staff duties.

earnestly represented to Government the *want* of more European Officers with Native Regiments, but no Officer of experience in the field has yet come forward to declare that we have got *too many*. When I reflect that out of the three Officers proposed for each Regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders for every difficult occasion have to be supplied, casualties filled, the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together the wavering, or rallying the broken mass ; I feel utterly at a loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under notice, involving, as I before remarked, undue power being thrown into the hands of the Native Officers, and even placing them in Command of Regiments on field Service.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

47. The real calibre of the native of India must always be borne in mind, when judging of matters so important as these are. Sepoys led by an European Officer are different men from those not so; more especially against a foreign enemy in a strange country.

48. I would mention here as bearing closely on the point under discussion, that out of the three Native Cavalry Regiments serving with Sir James Outram in Persia, the 3rd Light Cavalry (a Regular Corps) was held in highest esteem in the army as always ready, always efficient, and certainly, if we recal to mind their dashing conduct at Khooshab, the prominent position they held, was well earned and well deserved.

49. I will not dwell further on the subject than to observe that, if a European Regiment requires some sixty Officers to maintain its discipline, and lead it in the field much more a native one some five and twenty. In no point of view therefore can I see the reasonableness of the theory, that would reduce that five and twenty to three.

50. My own impression is, after the most careful consideration, that the Police must be a perfectly distinct force, and that (including local corps) it should not exceed about half the numerical amount of the Regulars and Irregulars put together, although its existing proportion is a little in excess of that, yet, as there are Pensioners and Veterans and City Police included in the total, it may be taken as equivalent to half, and is I conclude considered sufficient by the Government to meet the wants of this Presidency according to its present limits.

<i>Present Established Strength.</i>			
Regulars	42,614		
Irregulars ...	10,135		
Police	23,738		
Total	81,487		

51. I think also that the Irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one-fourth the Regulars. These proportions are also existing ones (or very nearly so) the result of practical trials, and I would strongly and respectfully urge on His Lordship's notice, that they have of late years, and especially during the one that is past, stood a test that affords the best guarantee we could desire for their general adaptation to Foreign and Home Service.

7 and 8.

52. The proportion of European Troops to the whole Native force of the Bombay Presidency, Police Regulars and Irregulars, should never I think be less than one-fourth,* and excluding the Police they should bear a proportion of about the Regulars and Irregulars put together.

53. It will be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to Native Troops than one-fourth, but it is politic to maintain that if possible.

* This proportion would admit of one-third being temporarily sent on service.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

9 and 10.

54. The Barrack accommodation for Troops in the Bombay Presidency as well as that required for the strength I consider necessary, are stated in the accompanying Return marked D.

11.

55. The proportion of European force to be drawn from Her Majesty's Army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that army in the time of war. I am strongly of opinion that it will never answer in the event of a European war to denude India to the extent already done. I submit this view as accordant with past experience, and I think that two-thirds of the European Force required for the permanent occupation of India should be composed of Troops raised exclusively for that service.

12.

56. I would officer those Troops as at present on the seniority promotion system, and if requisite absorb the unemployed Officers of the Bengal Army in their organization and the re-construction of the Native Army.

13.

57. With regard to the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxta-position of the seniority and purchase promotion systems, it would I think be very great, unless some remedy similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's Engineers and Artillery be granted to the Company's Cavalry and Infantry; also the Officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of Major in the Artillery and Engineers gives the Officers of those arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority promotion system. I am not quite clear as to the actual course that would afford the desired relief, but would suggest for consideration that each Native Cavalry and Infantry Regiment should have a 2nd Lieutenant-Colonel, who would only receive pay of a Major until he attained a certain position on the general list of Lieutenant-Colonels, after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank. Whilst thus expressing myself, however, I must say that I do not speak at all confidently on the subject.

14.

58. I do not think it would be safe to reduce our established European strength below one-fourth of the whole of the Troops in India, be the remaining three-fourths composed of whatever countries they may; indeed if foreign mercenaries were introduced, I should be rather inclined to increase than diminish the proportion, as I think the effect they would have on the country generally would be of an existing character; if any measure would admit of our reducing the European force below this, it would be the augmentation of the European Officers of the Native Army, not their reduction as I have heard advocated.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-General,*
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

A.

LIST of Her Majesty's European, and the Hon'ble Company's European and Native Troops of each Arm now borne on the Rolls of the Bombay Presidency, showing their present strength and distribution.

Those marked in italics are beyond the limits of the Presidency, and their strength is given as per the last Returns received; since their date however, many casualties have occurred.

Head Quarters, Poona, 23rd July 1858.

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.		COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED RANK AND FILE.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans	Natives.
SERVING IN THE PRESIDENCY.	1st Troop Horse Artillery ...	5	0	212	73
	3 Companies Siege Train Artillery	15	0	277	12
	2 Light Field Batteries ...	10	0	331	29
	1 Company of Engineers ...	4	0	112	0
	2½ Regiments Cavalry ...	81	0	1,436	0
	9½ Regiments Infantry ...	360	0	8,618	0
Total... ..		475	0	10,986	114
SERVING BEYOND THE PRESIDENCY.	1 <i>Light Field Battery</i> ...	5	0	185	29
	1 <i>Company Engineers</i> ...	4	0	117	0
	1½ <i>Regiment Cavalry</i> ...	49	0	903	0
	5 <i>Regiments and 2 Cos. Infantry.</i>	145	0	4,094	0
Total... ..		203	0	5,299	29
Grand Total... ..		678	0	16,285	143

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ABOVE.

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
D Troop Horse Artillery	Poona.
8th Company 1st Battalion Light Field Battery..	Baroda.

A.—(Continued.)

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.—(Continued.)	
5th Co. 14th Battalion Light Field Battery ...	Central India Field Force.
8th Co. 14th Battalion Light Field Battery ...	Kulladghee, Dharwar and Nurgoond.
3rd Co. 4th Battalion Siege Train	Neemuch.
2nd Co. 11th Battalion Siege Train	Surat.
7th Co. 11th Battalion Siege Train	Mhow.
ENGINEERS.	
11th Company	Neemuch.
21st Company	Central India Field Force.
CAVALRY..	
3rd Dragoon Guards	Kirkee.
1 Squadron	Ahmednugger.
1 Ditto	Sattara.
8th Hussars (Head Quarters Wing)	Central India Field Force.
Left Wing	Nusseerabad.
14th Light Dragoons	Central India Field Force.
Depôt	Kirkee.
17th Lancers	Kirkee.
1 Squadron	Sholapoor.
1 Ditto	Mhow.
INFANTRY.	
4th King's Own (Wing)	Ahmedabad. Temporarily.
18th Royal Irish (Head Quarters and 5 Co.'s) ...	Poona.
2 Companies	Ahmednugger.
1 Company	Asseerghur.
2 Companies	Jaulna.
33rd Regiment (Head Quarters)	Poona.
2 Companies	Sattara.
1 Company	Sholapoor.
1 Company	Ahmednugger.
51st Light Infantry (Head Quarters)	Kurrachee.
1 Company	Baroda.
2 Companies	Hyderabad.
1 Company	Shikapoor.
56th Regiment	Belgaum.
1 Company	Sawunt Warree.
57th Regiment (Head Quarters and Wing) ...	Bombay.
Wing	Aden.
64th Regiment	Bengal Presidency.
Depôt	Belgaum.
71st Highlanders	Central India Field Force.
72nd Highlanders	Neemuch.
74th Highlanders (Detachment from Bellary. } Temporarily) }	Dharwar Fort.
78th Highlanders	Bengal Presidency.
Depôt	Poona.
83rd Regiment	Nusseerabad.
Depôt	Deesa.

A.—(Continued.)

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.		STATIONS.			
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)					
86th Regiment		<i>Central India Field Force.</i>			
Depôt		Poona.			
Detachment... ..		Mhow.			
89th Regiment		Deesa.			
1 Company		Ahmedabad.			
1 Company		Mount Aboo.			
92nd Highlanders		Mhow.			
1 Company		Bombay.			
92nd Highlanders 1 Company		Nassick.			
1 Company		Malligaum.			
95th Regiment		<i>Central India Field Force.</i>			
Depôt		Deesa.			
Details of Recruits of Her Majesty's Regiments ..		Baroda and Broach.			
HON'BLE COMPANY'S EUROPEAN TROOPS.		COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED RANK AND FILE.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
SERVING IN THE PRESIDENCY.	2 Troops Horse Artillery	10	0	273	49
	6 Companies Foot Artillery with Light Field Batteries	14	5	474	325
	1 Company without Battery	4	1	79	30
	3 Companies Reserve Artillery with Light Field Batteries	7	2	293	138
	1 Regiment Infantry	32	0	982	0
	Total... ..	67	8	2,101	542
SERVING BEYOND THE PRESIDENCY.	2 Troops Horse Artillery	11	0	292	49
	1 Company Foot Artillery with Light Field Battery	2	1	97	73
	1 Company Reserve Artillery with Light Field Battery	1	0	52	46
	2 Regiments Infantry	52	0	1,801	0
	Total... ..	66	1	2,242	168
Grand Total		133	9	4,343	710

A.—(Continued.)

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ABOVE.

HON'BLE COMPANY'S EUROPEAN TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
<i>Horse Brigade.</i>	
Head Quarters	Poona.
1st Troop	Central India Field Force.
2nd Troop	Nusseerabad.
3rd Troop	Central India Field Force.
4th Troop	Poona.
 <i>1st Battalion.</i>	
Head Quarters	Ahmednugger.
1st Company with Light Field Battery	Ahmedabad.
2nd Company without Battery	Aden.
3rd Company with Light Field Battery	Belgaum.
4th Company with ditto	Hyderabad (Scinde.)
 <i>2nd Battalion.</i>	
Head Quarters	Bombay.
1st Company with Light Field Battery	Neemuch.
2nd Company with ditto	Sattara.
3rd Company with ditto	Sholapoor.
4th Company with ditto	Central India Field Force.
 <i>Reserve.</i>	
1st Company	Shikarpoor.
2nd Company	Central India Field Force.
Detachment	Jaulna.
3rd Company	Kollapoor.
4th Company	Kurrachee.
 <i>Infantry.</i>	
1st Regiment Fusiliers	Bengal Presidency.
Depôt	Kurrachee.
2nd Regiment Light Infantry	Belgaum.
Detachment	Kollapoor.
Ditto	Kulladghee.
Ditto	Rutnagherry.
3rd Regiment	Central India Field Force.
Depôt	Ahmednugger.

A.—(Continued.)

HONORABLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.		COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED RANK AND FILE.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
SERVING IN THE PRE- SIDENCY.	5 Companies Foot Artillery with Light Field Batteries .. . }	5	21	6	671
	5 Companies without Batteries ..	11	22	2	487
	Head Quarters and 3½ Companies } Sappers and Miners... .. }	6	7	20	427
	2 Regiments Light Cavalry.. ..	33	33	3	959
	5 Regiments Irregular Cavalry ...	20	125	0	3,686
	26 Regiments Native Infantry ..	339	614	17	26,469
	1 Marine Battalion	4	24	0	1,130
	1 Native Veteran Battalion... ..	14	16	0	822
	Enrolled Pensioners	5	55	2	1,661
	Total... ..	437	917	50	36,312
SERVING BEYOND THE PRESIDEN- CY.	1½ Company Sappers and Miners	5	3	13	130
	2 Regiments Light Cavalry... ..	31	31	2	846
	Detachment of Irregular Cavalry	0	1	0	26
	3 Regiments Native Infantry ...	39	69	1	2,630
	2 Belooch Battalions	15	4	0	2,041
Total... ..	90	108	16	5,673	
Grand Total		527	1,025	66	41,985

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ABOVE.

HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
1st Company 3rd Battalion Artillery	Detachments, Rajkote and Godra.
2nd Company 3rd Battn. with Light Field Batty.	Godra.
3rd Company 3rd Battn. with Ditto	Deesa.
4th Company 3rd Battn. with Ditto	Nusseerabad.
5th Company 3rd Battn.	Ahmednugger.
6th Company 3rd Battn.	Aden.
1st Company 4th Battn. with Light Field Batty.	Head Quarters, Ahmednugger.
Detachment	Neemuch.
2nd Company 4th Battn. with Light Field Batty.	Ahmednugger.
3rd Company 4th Battn.*	
4th Company 4th Battn.	Ahmednugger.
5th Company 4th Battn.*	
6th Company 4th Battn	Ahmednugger.

These Companies do not at present exist, the men who composed them having been distributed among the other Companies of the Battalion.

A.—(Continued).

HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	STATIONS.
SAPPERS AND MINERS.	
Sappers and Miners (Head Quarters and 1½ Company)	Poonah Detachment, Southern Mahratta Country.
1 Company	Aden.
1 Company	Neemuch.
1½ Company	Central India Field Force.
CAVALRY.	
1st Lancers (Head Quarters)	Central India Field Force.
Detachments... ..	Nusseerabad and Bombay.
2nd Native Light Cavalry (Head Quarters) ..	Neemuch.
Detachment	Deesa.
3rd Native Light Cavalry	Central India Field Force.
2nd Madras Light Cavalry	Sholapoor.
3rd Scind Irregular Horse	Jacobabad.
Detachment	Secundrabad.
Poona Irregular Horse	Seroor.
Detachments	{ Kandeish, Poona, Ahmednugger and Thulghaut.
1st Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad.
Detachments	{ Hoosenkegherry, Tungwannee, Khundkote and Koomree.
Detachments	Rojun.
3rd Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad.
Detachment	Gundava.
Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Head Quarters, Kulladghee.
Detachments	{ Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara and Kolapoor.
INFANTRY.	
1st Grenadier Regiment Native Infantry ...	Bombay.
2nd Grenadier Regiment Native Infantry ...	Ahmednugger (Guzerat.)
Depôt	Ahmedabad.
3rd Regiment Native Infantry	Sholapoor.
Detachment... ..	Beejapoor.
4th Regiment Native Infantry Rifles	Mhow.
5th Regiment Native Light Infantry	Ahmednugger.
Detachments	Field Service in the District.
6th Regiment Native Infantry	Poona.
7th Regiment Native Infantry	Bombay.
8th Regiment Native Infantry	Baroda.
Detachments... ..	Jambooseer and Dohud.
9th Regiment Native Infantry	Mhow.
10th Regiment Native Infantry	Central India Field Force.
11th Regiment Native Infantry	Ahmedabad.
Detachments	Gogo.
12th Regiment Native Infantry	Nusseerabad.
Detachment	Neemuch.
13th Regiment Native Infantry	Neemuch.
Detachment	Nusseerabad.
Depôt..... ..	Hyderabad.
14th Regiment Native Infantry	Kurrachee.
Detachment	Ahmedabad.

A.—(Concluded.)

HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	STATIONS.
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)	
15th Regiment Native Infantry	Kolapoor.
Detachments	Rutnagherry, Vingorla and Kalladgi
16th Regiment Native Infantry	Surat.
Detachment	Broach.
17th Regiment Native Infantry	Rajkote.
Wing	Deesa.
18th Regiment Native Infantry	Belgaum.
18th Regiment Native Infantry, Detachment ...	North Canara Frontier.
19th Regiment Native Infantry	Mhow.
20th Regiment Native Infantry	Belgaum.
Detachments	Ramghaut and Baitsee.
22nd Regiment Native Infantry	Sattara.
Left Wing	Tasgaum.
Detachments	Ashta, Beejapoor, and Bunderpoor
23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry	Khandeish.
Detachment	Asseerghur.
24th Regiment Native Infantry	Central India Field Force.
Depôt	Mhow.
25th Regiment Native Infantry	Central India Field Force.
Depôt	Poona.
26th Regiment Native Infantry	Dhoolia.
Detachments	Nugger Districts.
28th Regiment Native Infantry	Dharwar.
Detachments	Field Service, Southern Districts.
29th Regiment Native Infantry	Aden.
30th Regiment Native Infantry	Maligaum.
Detachment	Kurrachee.
31st Regiment Native Infantry	En route to Deesa.
IRREGULAR INFANTRY.	
Marine Battalion	Bombay.
Detachments	Scinde, Bushire, &c.
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie.
Detachments	Bhewndy and other parts of Kokan.
Enrolled Pensioners	{ Tanna, Poona, Ahmednugger, Dapoolie, Malwan and Ahmedabad.
1st Belooch Battalion	Bengal Presidency.
2nd Belooch Battalion	Dera Ghazee Khon.
Detachments..	Mungrota and Meetunkote.

N. B.—No Returns of the 3rd Belooch Battalion and the two Scinde Rifle Regiments, being Civil, have been received, they are not consequently included in the above.

(Signed) H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-General,*
Commander-in-Chief.

PROPOSED PERMANENT Establishment of Regular Troops for the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution.

Head Quarters, Poona, 22nd July 1858.

STATIONS.	EUROPEANS.							NATIVES.		REMARKS.	
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Light Field Battery for Garrison duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.		
Bombay Garrison	1	1 Regt.	2 Regts. ...	Exclusive of the Marine Battalion.	
Surat	1	Det. 1 Co.	{ 1 Regt. Hd. Qr. Wing..		The Detachment of European Infantry to be furnished from the Presidency or Ahmedabad, as found convenient, and the whole of the European Troops to be quartered in the Castle.
NORTHERN DIVISION.	Broach	1/2 Regt.	If European Troops were not required at Baroda for political reasons, the whole of this force might be concentrated at Divisional Head Quarters, Ahmedabad.	
	Baroda	1	1 Regt. ...		
	Ahmedabad	1 Company...	1	Detachment...	1 Regt.		2 Regts.
	Rajkote	1	Detachment...		1 Regt.
	Deesa	1 Company..	1 Troop	.. .	1	Detachment...	1 Regt. ...	Wing ...		2 Regts.
Mhow	1 Company..	1	1 Sqdn..	Detachment...	1 Regt. ...	1 Regt. ...	4 Regts.		

B.—(Continued.)

STATIONS.	EUROPEANS.						NATIVES.		REMARKS.		
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Light Field Battery for Garrison duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.		Infantry.	
RAJPOOTANA FIELD FORCE.	Nusseerabad	1	1	1 Sqdn..	Detachment ..	1 Regt. ...	Hd. Qr. Wing	3 Regts. ...	{ It has been proposed to dismantle Ajmere, and establish our Arsenal, &c., in a Field fortification at <i>Nusseerabad</i> . { Should be the Head Quarters of Rajpootana Field Force. A Field fortification is in contemplation.
	Neemuch	1 Company ..	1 Troop.	1	{ Hd. Qrs and 2 Sqdns. }	Detachment...	1 Regt. ...	1 Regt. ...	2 Regts. ...	
SCINDE DIVISION.	Kurrachee	2 Companies..	1 Troop.	2	Detachment...	2 Regts.	3 Regts. ...	{ When the Frontier Brigade sanctioned for Jacobabad is properly organized, the European Artillery and Infantry now at Shikarpoor would be brought to Hyderabad. In addition to the Regular Native Infantry at Kurrachee, Hyderabad and Shikarpoor, there is a Beelooch Battalion for each Station.
	Hydrabad	2	Detachment..	Wing	1 Regt. ...	
	Shikarpoor...	
Aden	1 Company	1	Wing	1 Regt.	
SOUTHERN DIVISION.	Belgaum	1 Company	1	1	{ Hd. Qr. of a Divn. }	1½ Regts.	3 Regts. ...	{ 1 Company of Siege Artillery for Fort.
	Dharwar	1	Det. 2 Cos.	1 Regt. ...	The Europeans inside the Fort.
	Kulladghee	1	Detachment .	Det. 3 Cos.	1 Regt. ...	{ At present the Head Quarters of the Southern Mahratta Horse.
Kolapoor	1	Detachment...	Wing	1 Regt.	

Sholapoor	1 Troop.	Wing ..	Detachment...	Wing	2 Regts. ...	{ The 2nd Regiment of Mahratta Horse should be at Sholapoor.
Poona and Kirkee	{ Hd. Qrs. } { & 2 Cos. }	2 Troops	1	1 Regt .	{ H. Qrs. of } { the Corps }	2 Regts.	3 Regts.	
Sattara	1	{ H. Qrs. } Wing.	Detachment...	1 Regt.	
Ahmednuggur	3	1	Detachment...	Wing	1 Regt.	
Malligaum	1	Detachment...	Wing	2 Regts.	
Doohlia	1 Regt.	
Asseerghur	{ Det. from Nuggur }	Detachment...	Detachment.	
Total	1 Regt.*	6 Troops	9 Cos.†	18 Lt. Fd. Btts.	3 Regts.	A Corps of 4 Divisions.‡	15 Regts. ...	3 Regts. ...	39 Regts.	

* If a Corps of Sappers and Miners, composed entirely of Europeans, be objected to on the score of expense, that arm of the Service ought at least to be composed of half Europeans and half Natives. Our present strength of Native Sappers is five Companies, far below the requisite proportion for this Army. Were an European Battalion of five Companies added to this, I consider we should have enough. It is certainly questionable whether we should be entirely dependent upon Natives as Sappers and Miners any more than as Artillerymen. Were a Foreign Enemy to appear in India and be joined by our Native Sappers, we should, without Europeans of that arm, be in an awkward predicament.

† Siege Artillery required as a Reserve and for Garrison purposes in Forts, &c. At present we cripple our Light Field Batteries to man Siege Trains and too often detach the latter inefficiently equipped.

‡ Every one has felt the imperative necessity of bringing the Carriage of Armies under Military control and organization, of keeping up, in time of peace, a certain proportion of Animals and Equipments, Drivers, &c., with each Division of the Army, such proportion not to be less than one-third the quantity of Carriage required to move the Force at the Station; thus we should have a nucleus on which to base an augmentation in time of war, with some hope of rendering the mass in some degree manageable through the medium of the trained Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Drivers accustomed to the work. If this Corps cannot, for reasons of economy, be entirely European, it should, at all events be partly so, for the same reasons that we would put our Artillery in sure hands, for without its Baggage and Commissariat, an Army soon becomes a rabble. If an Enemy strong in Cavalry knew how to use it, he might, in most instances, destroy all the Baggage of an Indian division simply owing to its unmanageable character, being composed of heterogeneous mass of men, cattle and vehicles, chiefly pressed into the service for the occasion. The delay in starting Troops for want of Carriage, the check to Agriculture and Trade caused by its seizure from the people of the Country, the enormous outlay with which the present system is attended, the infinite sources of fraud that it contains, and other evils too numerous to detail, are reasons which will be found to counterbalance any arguments resting on Financial grounds that can be brought against it; but, even on those grounds I am satisfied that it will be found a saving in the long run.

B.—(Continued.)

DETAIL.	ESTABLISHED STRENGTH.				REMARKS.
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned Rank and File.		
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	
2 Battalions of Sappers and Miners	30	10	500	570	{ The Europeans should be all Artificers. Two more Troops of Horse Artillery are urgently required.
6 Troops of Horse Artillery	30	0	900	150	
9 Companies of Reserve Artillery	45	0	945	288	
18 Light Field Batteries	90	0	*2,682	576	
3 Regiments of European Cavalry	129	0	2,244	0	
Military Train	26	0	800	0	
15 European Regiments	750	0	16,155	0	
3 Regiments Native Light Cavalry	78	48	6	1,950	
39 Regiments Native Infantry	1,092	780	78	38,220	
Total	2,270	838	24,310	41,754	

N. B.—The proposed Establishment of Regular Native Troops will be 42,592, including Native Officers.

(Signed) H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-Genl.*,

C.

RETURN of the whole of the Native Troops, Regulars, Irregulars, and Police, borne on the Returns of the Bombay Presidency, including some under organization.

Head Quarters, Poona, 22nd July 1858.

HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS,	ESTABLISHED STRENGTH.				REMARKS.
	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED RANK AND FILE.		
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	
<i>Regular Troops.</i>					
5 Companies of Foot Artillery, with Light Field Batteries,	20	15	5	720	4 European Officers to each Company; the Native Artillery to be gradually absorbed.
5 Companies without Batteries.	20	15	0	500	
5 Companies of Sappers and Miners	10	10	32	570	2 European Officers to each Company.
3 Regiments of Light Cavalry	78	48	6	1,950	
29 Regiments of Native Infantry	812	696	58	33,176	26 European Officers to each Regiment. 28 European Officers to each Regiment.
2 Extra Battalions of Infantry	8	48	4	2,288	
Enrolled Pensioners	5	67	2	1,933	Ordered to be raised with an Establishment of 4 Officers, including the Surgeon. They are composed of Sepoys transferred from Regular Regiments, and should be fully officered as Regulars.
Total	953	899	107	41,137	
<i>Irregular Troops.</i>					
Scinde Frontier Brigade, including 3 Regiments of Horse and 2 of Foot .. .	22	129	3,873	Under organization.
3 Belooch Battalions	12	60	3,363	
Poona Horse	4	30	922	One under organization.
2 Regiments of Southern Mahratta Horse... .. .	8	58	1,750	
Total	46	277	9,908	A 2nd Regiment is now being raised.
<i>Police and Local Corps serving as Police.</i>					
Marine Battalion	4	24	2	1,144	Head Quarters, Bombay.
Main body of Police of the Presidency, under the Commissioner of Police...	16,000	
Horse and Foot, Scinde Police	4	88	4,251	Civil.
Police of the Island of Bombay	1,093	
Kolapoor Infantry Local Corps	2	20	900	Civil.
Sawunt Warree Local Corps	4	12	988	
Kutch Legion Local Corps	2	10	700	Computed Civil.
Sattara Local Corps	1	8	595	
Kattiawar Horse Local	1	1	900	Civil.
Guzerat Horse Local	4	33	1,059	
1 Native Veteran Battalion	27	16	896	Civil.
Troops kept up by a few Native States are not included.					
Total	49	212	2	28,526	
Grand Total	1,048	1,388	109	79,571	

Total Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned.
 Rank and File Regulars 42,036 } As at present
 Ditto ,, ,, Irregulars 10,185 } established.
 Ditto ,, ,, Police and Local Corps 28,738 }
Grand Total **80,959**

These numbers are substantially correct, and show what, according to the present intention of Government, will shortly be the strength of the three branches.

The following proposed Establishment of Regular Native Troops was given in Return B. :-

- 1 Battalion Sappers, Natives 580.
- 3 Regiments Light Cavalry.
- 39 Regiments Native Infantry.

(Signed) H. SOMERSET, Lieut.-Genl.,
 Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

D.

STATEMENT showing the existing Barrack Accommodation for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency, as well as that required for the Strength considered necessary.

STATION.	TROOPS.	EXISTING BARRACK ACCOMMODATION.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	REMARKS.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Bombay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Reserve Artillery... 1 Regiment of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> { For a Battalion in Fort George. { For 286 men in the Town Barracks and for a Wing at Colaba ... } 	1 Regiment of Infantry ...	{ The present Infantry Barracks are condemned, new ones are required.
Surat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Reserve Artillery .. 1 Company of Infantry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery .. 1 Company of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Reserve Artillery ... 1 Company of Infantry ... 	{ The Detachments of Artillery and Infantry occupy buildings in the Castle.
Baroda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Reserve Artillery .. 1 Company of Infantry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery with Battery 2 Companies of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Arty. with Battery. 1 Company of Infantry. 	
Ahmedabad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Company of Arty. with Battery 1 Regiment of Infantry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery with Battery Wing of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company Sappers and Miners. 1 Company of Arty. with Battery. 1 Detachment Military Train. 1 Regiment of Infantry. 	
Rajkote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Arty. with Battery 2 Companies of Infantry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Arty. with Battery. 2 Companies of Infantry. 	
Deesa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Troop of Horse Artillery .. 1 Company of Arty. with Battery Detachment Military Train .. 1 Regiment of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Troop of Horse Artillery. 1 Regiment of Infantry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners. 1 Company of Arty with Battery. Detachment Military Train. 	

Mhow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Company of Arty. with Battery 1 Squadron of Cavalry Detachment Military Train 1 Regiment of Infantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Cos. of Arty. with Batty. 	The European Troops at present are sheltered in the Artillery Barracks, Hospitals and other Public Buildings.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company Sappers and Miners. 1 Squadron of Cavalry. Detachment Military Train. 1 Regiment of Infantry. 	The Company of Sappers, or Detachment Military Train, can be accommodated in one of the Artillery Barracks.
Nusseerabad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Reserve Artillery .. 1 Company of Arty. with Battery 1 Squadron of Cavalry Detachment Military Train 1 Regiment of Infantry 	1 Co. of Arty. with Batty.	Major General Roberts, Commanding Rajpootana Field Force, was invested with full authority to take whatever measures he deemed proper to ensure shelter for the Troops at Nusseerabad and Neemuch for the hot season and rains.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company Reserve Artillery. 1 Squadron of Cavalry. Detachment of Military Train. 1 Regiment of Infantry. 	
Neemuch	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Troop of Horse Artillery 1 Company of Reserve Artillery Hd. Qrs. and 2 Squadrons of Cavalry. Detachment Military Train 1 Regiment of Infantry 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Co. Sappers and Miners. 1 Troop of Horse Artillery. 1 Co. Reserve Artillery. Hd. Qrs. & 2 Squadrons of Cavalry. Detachment Military Train. 1 Regiment of Infantry. 	
Kurrachee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners 1 Troop of Horse Artillery 2 Cos. of Arty with Batteries Detachment Military Train 2 Regiments of Infantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Troop of Horse Artillery. 1 Regiment of Infantry .. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery 1 Regiment of Infantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Cos. of Sappers and Miners. 2 Cos. of Artillery with Batteries... Detachment Military Train. 1 Regt. of Infantry. 	For one Co. already sanctioned.
Hydrabad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Cos. of Arty. with Batteries Detachment Military Train Wing of Infantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Regiment of Infantry .. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As only a Wing of Infantry is proposed to be stationed at Hydrabad, accommodation for the Co. of Artillery and Detachment Military Train can be provided for in the Infantry Barracks with some addition and alteration. 	
Aden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Company of Reserve Artillery Wing of Infantry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery. Wing of Infantry. 		1 Company of Sappers & Miners.	
Belgaum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Sappers and Miners 1 Company of Reserve Artillery 1 Company of Artillery with Batty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company of Artillery .. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Company Sappers & Miners. 1 Co. of Artillery with Battery. 	The present Artillery Barracks in the Fort for the Reserve Co.

D.—(Continued.)

STATIONS.	TROOPS.	EXISTING BARRACK ACCOMMODATION.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	REMARKS.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Belgaum (Contd.)...	{ Hd. Qrs. of a Divn. of Mily. Train 1½ Regiment of Infantry ...	1 Regiment of Infantry..	Wing of Infantry ..	Hd. Qrs. of a Divn. of Mily. Train. ½ Regiment of Infantry.	
Dharwar ..	{ 1 Company of Arty. with Battery 2 Companies of Infantry	1 Co. of Artillery with Battery 2 Cos. of Infantry. ...	1 Co. of Artillery with Battery. 2 Cos. of Infantry.	
Kulladghee ..	{ 1 Company of Arty. with Battery Detachment Military Train ... 3 Companies of Infantry	1 Company of Artillery with Battery 1 Company of Infantry ..	1 Co. of Arty. with Battery. Detachment Military Train. 3 Cos. of Infantry.	
Kolapoor ...	{ 1 Company of Arty. with Battery Detachment Military Train ... Wing of Infantry	1 Company of Artillery with Battery 3 Companies of Infantry ...	1 Co. of Artillery with Battery. Detachment Military Train. Wing of Infantry.	
Sholapoor ..	{ 1 Troop of Horse Artillery Wing of Cavalry Detachment Military Train Wing of Infantry	1 Co. of Arty. condemned Wing of Cavalry 1 Company of Infantry	1 Troop Horse Artillery. Wing of Cavalry. Detachment Military Train. Wing of Infantry.	
Poona ..	{ Head Quarters and 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners } 2 Troops of Horse Artillery ... 1 Company of Arty. with Battery. Head Qrs. of the Military Train .. 2 Regiments of Infantry { Two Troops of Horse } Artillery condemned } 2 Regiments of Infantry..	{ Head Quarters and 2 Companies } Sappers and Miners. Head Quarters Military Train.	{ Plans and Estimates for Barracks } for two Troops of Horse Artil- lery, and 1 Company of Artillery with Battery under preparation.
Kirkee ...	{ 1 Regiment of Cavalry	{ 1 Regiment of Caval- } ry condemned .. }	{ Plans and Estimates for new } Barracks before Government.

FROM

LIEUT.-GENL. SIR P. GRANT, K. C. B.,
Commander-in-Chief at Madras.

TO

LIEUT.-COL. H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On special duty with the Governor General of India.

Ootacamund, 16th June 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 15, of the 21st of May, received here on the 10th Instant, and to make the following replies to the Series of "Questions" therein enclosed:—

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1 and 2.

My letter to Major General Sir Wm. Mansfield, Chief of the Staff, dated 1st January 1858, with Enclosures, contains full information on the points adverted to. Copy accompanies. (A.)

3.

The number of Native Troops of each arm now on the Establishment of the Madras Presidency is as follows:—

Two Troops of Horse Artillery, 168 Gunners, one Battalion of Golundauze of 8 Companies, including two Supplemental Companies. The strength of the Battalion is 552 Privates, with the usual proportion of Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.

One Corps of Sappers and Miners, consisting of 12 Subadars, 12 Jemadars, 50 Havildars, 100 Naicks, and 1,350 Privates formed into 12 Companies.

Seven Regiments of Light Cavalry, (the Eighth has been broken up) each Regiment consists of 367 Sabres of all grades, being a total of 2,569 Light Cavalry Sabres.

Fifty-two Regiments of Native Infantry of the line, and three "extra" Regiments, total 55 Regiments of Native Infantry, amounting in all to 61,600 Bayonets, two Veteran Battalions numbering together 2,320 Bayonets.

The distribution of the Native Troops is shown in enclosure B.

4.

I conceive the existing numbers of Native Troops to be quite necessary for the Madras Presidency at present, and until our European force is increased to the extent proposed—till a local force for Pegu is organized, and an efficient Police is formed,—when those arrangements shall have been carried out, all Native Artil-

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

lery may be and ought to be dispensed with. The Light Cavalry may be reduced from eight to four Regiments of six hundred Privates each, formed into eight Troops. I would hope that a considerable reduction may be likewise effected in the strength of the Native Infantry; but to what precise extent I cannot now say.

When a Police is organized and in working order, the distribution I would propose to make of the Native Troops (Infantry) is as follows :—

Madras	3 Regiments.
Vellore	1 „
Trichinopoly	3 „
Palamcottah	1 „
Quilon	1 „
Cannanore	3 „
Mercara	1 „
Mysore	1 „
Mangalore	2 „
Bangalore	3 „
Huraghur	1 „
Cuddapah	1 „
Bellary	3 „
Kurnaul	1 „
Secunderabad	5 „
Nagpore Territory	6 „
Jaulnah	2 „
Masulipatam	1 „
Vizianagram	3 „
Russelcondah	1 „
Cuttack	1 „
Rangoon	3 „
Thayet-myo	2 „
Tounggoo	2 „
Maulmain	2 „
Straits	2 „
<hr/>	
Total Regiments of Native Infantry ...	55

5.

The proportion of Regulars is given in the replies to Question 3.

The Irregulars and Police Corps, *viz.*, the Hyderabad Contingent, the Nagpore Irregular Force, the Nair Brigade, the Kurnaul Irregular Horse, the Mysore Silladar Horse, the Orissa Paik Companies, the Ganjam Sebundies, the Malabar Police Corps

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

are not under Military authority, and I am unable to give any information with respect to their composition, but the enclosed Return (C) shows the distribution and number of these Forces.

6.

The proportions of the different races now ordered to be observed in the composition of the Regulars, are specified in the enclosed General Order, dated the 3rd December 1857, No. 74 (C. 1.).

As regards Regulars this question is answered in the reply to Question 4.

With respect to the proportion of Irregulars and Police, I am not able at present to form an opinion, except as regards Pegu, for which, in my report dated 2nd February 1857, forwarded to the Government of India by the Madras Government on the 9th Idem, I recommended the following local Force—

Two Companies of Artillery.

Two Companies of Sappers.

One Regiment of Cavalry.

Four Regiments of Infantry.

inclusive of the present Pegu Light Infantry.

7 and 8.

In the Madras Presidency, and in India generally, I consider that the European Force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the Native Troops of the Line. I would not allow Police Corps to affect the calculation either way.

9.

The Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now borne on the Establishment of the Madras Presidency is shewn in enclosure D. ; it will be observed that it is inadequate.

10.

The extent of additional Barrack accommodation required for the European Force, I deem to be necessary for the Madras Presidency, is specified in enclosure D.

11.

On this point I recorded my opinion, and it is still the same, in my memorandum placed in the hands of the Governor General, on the 29th June 1857, extract enclosed E.

12.

I would officer additional Corps of Europeans raised for India in the mode specified in my memorandum submitted to the Governor General on the 11th August 1857, and for the reasons therein given. (Copy enclosure F.)

13.

An increase to the number of Corps raised for service in India and officered from the Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army, ought not, I think, to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

14.

I consider that foreign mercenaries of the races specified in this question are almost as little to be trusted in the long run as are the Native Troops of India.

I am of opinion that there is in the heart of every black man, an inherent dislike of the white man, which will always lead him to sympathize with those of his own colour, however they may differ in race, creed or country.

To provide effectually for the safety of our Indian Empire, never let us have less than the proportion of our own countrymen indicated in my replies to Questions 7 and 8.

As instructed in para. 6 of your letter under acknowledgment, I have, on the present occasion, confined my replies to the points specified in the series of "Questions."

I however take leave to add, that I have, already, in various minutes, memoranda and letters submitted to the higher authorities, recorded my sentiments on almost every point adverted to in the letter from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, No. 235, of the 25th November 1857, and in the despatch from the Secret Committee No. 1930, dated the 9th March 1858.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut.-General*,

Commander-in-Chief.

Note.—In my reply to Questions 7 and 8 I have stated that the European Force in India never should be below the proportion of one-third of the Native Troops of the Line, and the strength respectively of Europeans and Natives which I have specified as being required for the Madras Presidency is as nearly as possible in that ratio. Thus:—

<i>Europeans.</i>	<i>Natives.</i>
43 Companies of Artillery, each averaging 121 of all ranks ... 5,208	4 Regiments of Cavalry, each 703 Sabres 2,812
3 Regiments of Dragoons each, 703 Sabres 2,109	55 Regiments of Infantry and 2 Battalions of Veterans, amounting in all to Bayonets ... 63,920
13 Regiments Infantry, each 1152 Bayonets 14,976	—————
Total European ... 22,288	Total Natives .. 66,732

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut.-General*

A.

To

MAJOR-GENERAL MANSFIELD,
Chief of the Staff,
 HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP CAWNPORE.

Madras, 1st January 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 12th ultimo, communicating to me the desire of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to be furnished with a statement of all the European Corps belonging to both Services now stationed in, or expected at the Presidency of Madras, together with the Stations held by the respective Corps.

On these points I hope that the enclosed return* will be found to afford full and explicit information to His Excellency.

The Commander-in-Chief in India also requires to be made acquainted with my opinion on the strength of the European Forces which I may consider necessary as the permanent British Garrison of the various British Provinces, including Burmah, over which my Command extends.

On this most important question I have already some months since communicated my views to the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, as well as to the Right Honorable the Governor of Madras, and I now proceed to submit my opinions in like manner to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of India.

I consider that for the thorough protection and military occupation of the Madras Presidency, within its present defined limits, and Burmah, we require a British force of—

Artillery.

156 Field Guns requiring to be manned by Troops or Companies	...	26
Reserve Companies	17
Total Troops or Companies...	43

Cavalry.

Regiments	3
-----------	--------	---

Infantry.

Regiments	13
-----------	--------	----

and of this force I would propose the following "disposition" :—

SOUTHERN DIVISION.

Head Quarters at Trichinopoly.

12 Guns, one Reserve Company of Artillery, and two Regiments of Infantry.†

* Dated 31st ultimo, prepared by the Quarter Master General of the army.

† One at Trichinopoly, and one at Jackatalla (Nielgherry Hills.)

CENTRE DIVISION.

Head Quarters at Madras.

Twelve Field Guns, three Reserve Companies of Artillery, one of which should always be quartered in Fort St. George, and one Regiment of Infantry.

MYSORE DIVISION.

Head Quarters at Bangalore.

Eighteen Field Guns, one Reserve Company of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons, and one Regiment of Infantry.

MALABAR AND CANARA DISTRICT.

District Head Quarters Cannanore.

Six Field Guns, one Reserve Company of Artillery, and one Regiment of Infantry.

CEDED DISTRICT.

Head Quarters at Bellary.

Twelve Field Guns, one Reserve Company of Artillery, and one Regiment of Infantry.

NORTHERN DIVISION.

Head Quarters at Vizianagram.

Twelve Field Guns, two Reserve Companies of Artillery, and one Regiment of Infantry.

SECUNDERABAD FIELD FORCE.

Head Quarters at Hyderabad.

Twenty-four Field Guns, one Reserve Company of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons, and two Regiments of Infantry, one of which and six Field Guns to be placed at Jaulnah.

NAGPORE FIELD FORCE.

Head Quarters at Kamptee.

Eighteen Field Guns, two Reserve Companies of Artillery (one always to be in the Fort of Seetabuldee, in which is situated the arsenal of the entire Force), one Regiment of Dragoons, and one Regiment of Infantry.

BURMAH.

Head Quarters Rangoon.

Forty-two Field Guns,* three Reserve Companies of Artillery,† and three Regiments of Infantry.‡

STRAITS.

Head Quarters, Singapore.

Two Reserve Companies of Artillery, one for Singapore, the other for Penang.

* Rangoon ..	12	† Rangoon ..	1	‡ Rangoon ..	1
Thayet-myo ..	12	Thayet-myo ..	1	Thayet-myo ..	1
Tounggoo ..	12	• Meeaday ..	1	Tounggoo ..	1
Maulmain ..	6				
	<hr/> 42		<hr/> 3		<hr/> 3

RECAPITULATION.

	ARTILLERY.				
	No. of Field Guns.	Troop and Companies for Field Guns.	Reserve Companies.	Regiments of Dragoons.	Regiments of Infantry.
Southern Division	12	2	1	0	2
Centre Division... ..	12	2	3	0	1
Mysore Division	18	3	1	1	1
Malabar and Canara	6	1	1	0	1
Ceded Districts	12	2	1	0	1
Northern Division	12	2	2	0	1
Secunderabad and Jaulnah Field Force	24	4	1	1	2
Nagpore Field Force	18	3	2	1	1
Burmah	42	7	3	0	3
Straits	0	0	2	0	0
Total Field Guns and European Force of all Arms	156	26	17	3	13
			43		

To meet these requirements we have available and in prospect—

Field Guns	150
Troops and Companies to man these Guns and for Reserve Companies 1 Troop, 2 Companies Royal Artillery, Troops and 16 Companies Madras Artillery. Total Troops and Companies	23
Regiments of Dragoons	2*
Regiments of European Infantry	11†

Thus our means in hand and in prospect fall short of our necessities to the extent of six Field Guns, twenty Companies of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons, and two Regiments of Infantry, and if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor Territory North of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras Presidency, I consider that we shall require a further accession of European Force of not less than 18 Field Guns, manned by three Companies of Artillery, two Reserve Companies of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons, and one Regiment of Infantry. The Establishments of Troops of Horse Artillery and Companies of Foot Artillery in this Presidency are, in my judgment much below the strength which a due regard to efficiency in this all important arm of the Service demands.

Present Establishment of a Troop of Madras Horse Artillery.

6 Serjeants.
6 Corporals.
12 Bombrs.
84 Gunners.

Present Establishment of a Company of Foot Artillery.

6 Serjeants.
6 Corporals.
6 Bombrs.
60 Gunners.

Present Establishment of a Regiment of European Infantry.

50 Serjeants.
50 Corporals.
800 Privates.

* 1st King's Dragoon Guards, 12th Royal Lancers.

† Her Majesty's 1st, 43d, 44th, 3rd Battalion 60th Rifles, 66th, 68th, 69th, and 74th, East India Company's 1st Fusiliers, 2nd Light Infantry, and 3rd Regiment.

I consider that a Troop of Horse Artillery should consist of at least 100 Gunners, with a corresponding number of Serjeants, Corporals, and Bombardiers; and I am of opinion that Companies of Foot Artillery should be augmented to a strength of 80 Gunners each, with additional Non-Commissioned Officers in proportion.

I also think that the Establishment of Regiments of European Infantry of the Company's Service should be fixed at 1,000 Privates each, with a proportionate number of Non-Commissioned Officers.

I have &c.,

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut-General,*
Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

A.

STATEMENT of all European Corps belonging to Her Majesty's and Hon'ble Company's Services, and the Stations at which they are now serving or immediately about to be quartered at, in the Madras Presidency (including Burmah.)

TROOPS.	Company.	Regiments.	Strength in India according to last return.	Where Serving.	REMARKS.
			Rank and File.		
H.	...	Royal Horse Artillery	214	Saint Thomas' Mount.	
A.	...	Horse Artillery	510	General Whitlock's Force.	
B.	...	Ditto		Secunderabad.	
C.	...	Ditto		Bangalore.	
D.	...	Ditto		Kamptee.	
		1st Royal Dragoon Guards	505	Bangalore.	
		12th Royal Lancers	648	Wing at Secunderabad.	
Horse Battery	1	Royal Artillery	159	Wing with General Whitlock's Force.	
	1	Ditto	153	Ordered from Bellary to Bangalore.	
	1	Ditto	214	General Whitlock's Force.	
	1	Ditto	126	Ordered to Tounghoo.	
	A.	1st Battalion Artillery	384	Secunderabad.	Reserve Company.
	B.	Ditto		Straits	Ditto Ditto.
Ditto.	C.	Ditto		Burmah	
Ditto.	D.	Ditto		Bellary.	Horses withdrawn to Bengal.
Ditto.	A.	2nd Battalion Artillery	395	Burmah	Reserve Company.
Ditto.	B.	Ditto		Trichinopoly.	Ditto Ditto.
Ditto.	C.	Ditto		Burmah	Ditto Ditto.
Ditto.	D.	Ditto		Saint Thomas' Mount	
	A.	3rd Battalion Artillery	373	Kamptee	
	B.	Ditto		Bengal.	
	C.	Ditto		Burmah.	
	D.	Ditto		Ditto,	
	A.	4th Battalion Artillery	395	General Whitlock's Force.	
	B.	Ditto		Ditto.	
	C.	Ditto		Ditto	Reserve Company.
Ditto.	D.	Ditto		Secunderabad.	
	A.	Ditto		Burmah	Ditto Ditto.

A B S T R A C T .

	1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery	214	<i>Total Strength of each Arm, Rank and File.</i>			
	4 Troops Hon'ble Company's Horse Artillery	510				
	2 Regiments Her Majesty's Dragoons	1,148				
	4 Companies Royal Artillery	652	Artillery Royal and Hon'ble Company's			2,926
	16 Companies Hon'ble Company's Artillery	1,550	Her Majesty's Dragoons			1,148
	8 Regiments Her Majesty's Infantry	7,012	Her Majesty's and Hon'ble Company's Infantry			9,562
	3 Regiments Hon'ble Company's Infantry	2,550				
					
		13,636	Total, of all Arms			13,636

2 M

B.

DISTRIBUTION RETURN of the Native Troops of each Arm now on the Establishment of the Madras Presidency.

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head Quarters of Corps.	REMARKS.
Horse Artillery ...	E. Troop ...	{ ½ F. S. in Bengal, ½ Secun- derabad.	
Ditto ...	F. Ditto ...	F. S. General Whitlock.	
Light Cavalry ...	1st Regiment ...	Trichinopoly.	
Ditto ...	2nd Ditto ...	Sholapore.	
Ditto ...	3rd Ditto ...	Bangalore.	
Ditto ...	4th Ditto ...	F. S. Bengal.	
Ditto ...	5th Ditto ...	Bellary.	
Ditto ...	6th Ditto ...	F. S. Bengal.	
Ditto ...	7th Ditto ...	Kamptee.	
Golundauze ...	5th Battalion ...	Saint Thomas' Mount.	
Ditto ...	2 Companies ...	Straits.	
Ditto ...	1 Company ...	F. S. in Bengal.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	Cannanore.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	Sumbulpore.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	Burmah.	
Ditto ...	Supplemental Co. ...	Mount.	
Ditto ...	Ditto ...	Vizianagram.	
Sappers and Miners ...	Head Quarters ...	Dowlaishweram.	
Ditto ...	4 Companies ...	Ditto.	
Ditto ...	1 Company ...	F. S. Sir H. Rose's Force.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	F. S. General Whitlock.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	F. S. Bengal.	
Ditto ...	1 Ditto ...	Secunderabad.	
Ditto ...	4 Companies ...	Burmah.	
Native Infantry ...	1st Regiment ...	F. S. General Whitlock.	
Ditto ...	2nd Ditto ...	Quilon.	
Ditto ...	3rd Ditto ...	Cannanore.	
Ditto ...	4th Ditto ...	Burmah.	
Ditto ...	5th Ditto ...	{ Berhampore and Sumbul- pore.	
Ditto ...	6th Ditto ...	Burmah, Rangoon.	
Ditto ...	7th Ditto ...	Secunderabad.	
Ditto ...	8th Ditto ...	Burmah, Tounghoo.	
Ditto ...	9th Ditto ...	Secunderabad.	
Ditto ...	10th Ditto ...	Ditto.	
Ditto ...	11th Ditto ...	Cannanore.	
Ditto ...	12th Ditto ...	Burmah, Rangoon.	4 Cos. in China.
Ditto ...	13th Ditto ...	Ditto, Moulmein.	
Ditto ...	14th Ditto ...	Straits, Singapore.	
Ditto ...	15th Ditto ...	Burmah, Thayet-myo.	
Ditto ...	16th Ditto ...	Mangalore.	
Ditto ...	17th Ditto ...	F. S. in Bengal.	
Ditto ...	18th Ditto ...	Vellore.	
Ditto ...	19th Ditto ...	F. S. General Whitlock.	
Ditto ...	20th Ditto ...	Bangalore.	
Ditto ...	21st Ditto ...	Trichinopoly.	
Ditto ...	22nd Ditto ...	Straits, Penang.	
Ditto ...	23rd Ditto ...	Burmah, Rangoon.	
Ditto ...	24th Ditto ...	Ditto, Henzadah.	
Ditto ...	25th Ditto ...	Madras.	
Ditto ...	26th Ditto ...	Kamptee.	
Ditto ...	27th Ditto ...	F. S. in Bengal.	
Ditto ...	28th Ditto ...	Hooshingabad.	
Ditto ...	29th Ditto ...	Masulipatam.	
Ditto ...	30th Ditto ...	Bellary.	

B.—(Continued.)

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head Quarters of Corps.	REMARKS.
Native Infantry ..	31st Regiment ...	Vizianagram.	
Ditto ...	32nd Ditto ...	Kamptee.	
Ditto ...	33rd Ditto ...	Ditto.	
Ditto ...	34th Ditto ...	Trichinopoly.	
Ditto ...	35th Ditto ...	Hurryhur.	
Ditto ...	36th Ditto ...	Kurnool.	
Ditto ..	37th Ditto ...	Burmah, Shoay-Gyeen.	
Ditto ..	38th Ditto ...	Vizagapatam.	
Ditto ..	39th Ditto ...	Burmah, Thayet-myo.	
Ditto ..	40th Ditto ...	Cuttack.	
Ditto ..	41st Ditto ...	Burmah, Rangoon.	
Ditto ..	42nd Ditto ...	Secunderabad.	
Ditto ..	43rd Ditto ...	Russellcondah.	
Ditto ..	44th Ditto ...	Burmah, Thayet-myo.	
Ditto ..	45th Ditto ...	Madras.	
Ditto ..	46th Ditto ...	Vizianagram.	
Ditto ..	47th Ditto ...	Bellary.	
Ditto ..	48th Ditto ...	Burmah, Maulmain.	
Ditto ..	49th Ditto ...	Secunderabad.	
Ditto ..	50th Ditto ...	F. S. General Whitlock.	
Ditto ..	51st Ditto ...	Palamcottah.	
Ditto ..	52nd Ditto ...	Mercara.	
Madras Rifles ..	8 Companies ...	F. S. Bengal.	Rifle Companies of 1st, 5th, 16th, 36th and 49th N. I., and 2 Cos. of the 34th N. I.
Native Infantry ..	1st Extra ...	Samulcottah.	
Ditto ..	2nd Ditto ...	Trichinopoly.	
Ditto ..	3rd Ditto ...	Cuddapah.	

Besides the above there are :—

- 2 Native Veteran Battalion, Head Quarters at Madras and Arcot respectively
- 1 Madras Sappers Militia at Madras.

Strength of Madras Army.

2 Troops Native Horse Artillery	@ 90	180 Rank and File.
1 Regiment Golundauze	600 Ditto.
1 Ditto Sappers and Miners	1,450 Ditto.
7 Ditto Light Cavalry	@ 324	2,268 Ditto.
52 Ditto Native Infantry	@ 1060	55,120 Ditto.
3 Extra Regiments	@ 1060	3,180 Ditto.

Total 62,798 Rank and File.

Strength of Veterans and Sapper Militia.

2 Veteran Corps @ 1,110	2,220 Rank and File.
1 Madras Sapper Militia	1,024 Ditto.

Total 3,244 Rank and File.

C.

ABSTRACT of Local and Irregular Forces serving in the Madras Presidency.

DESCRIPTION OF TERRITORIES.	Horse Battery.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.
Mysore Territory	2,784	2,784
Travancore Country	29	1,608	1,637
Malabar Police...	177	177
Kurnool Country	337	337
Nizam's Dominions	2,231	742	5,283	8,256
Nagpore Territory	114	495	2,657	3,266
Ganjam Country	472	472
Total	114	5,847	771	10,197	16,929

C. 1.

EXTRACT from General Orders by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated Head Quarters, 3rd December 1857, No. 74.

7. "The following caste proportions are to be maintained in recruiting under this order :—

One-quarter Tamulians of various castes, inhabitants of the Carnatic and Ceded Districts.

One-quarter Telingas and other Hindoo castes from Northern Circars.

One-quarter Mussulmans from various parts.

One-quarter Natives of lower castes or without recognized caste.

8. "Until further orders the foregoing para. 7 will also apply to the recruiting of the Army generally."

(True Extract)

(Signed) W. G. WOODS, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Adjutant General of the Army.

D.

DETAIL of Barrack accommodation for European Troops in the Madras Presidency.

Divisions.	Stations.	Nature of Barrack.	Capable of contain- ing Rank and File.	TOTAL ACCOMMODATION FOR			REMARKS.
				Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Presidency.	Fort St. George	Infantry Barracks	1245	1 Regiment	{ Has been condemned as a Barrack for Europeans, and will not contain more than 700. The Artillery Barrack will only contain 100.
	Ditto	Artillery Do.	400	
	Saint Thomas' Mount	Horse Artillery Barracks	104	1 Troop Horse.	{ Good Barrack, but will not contain more than 300 each. Depot H. M.'s Troops. Occupied, but of the worst description. Infantry Depot Co.'s Europeans.
	Ditto	Ditto	104	Do.	
	Ditto	Foot Artillery Barracks	400	4. Cos. or 1 Bn.	
	Ditto	Ditto	400	Do.	
Centre Divi- sion.	Poonamallee	Infantry Barracks	600	{
	Arcot	Ditto	640	
Nagpore Force.	Seetabuldee	Artillery Barracks	133	1 Company.	{
	Kamptee	Ditto	100	1 Do.	
	Ditto	Ditto	100	1 Do.	
Ceded Dis- tricts.	Ditto	Horse Artillery Barracks	100	1 Troop Horse.	{
	Ditto	Infantry Barracks	1000	1 Regiment.	
	Bellary	Artillery Barracks	70	1 Company	
Mysore Divi- sion.	Ditto	Infantry Ditto.	1260	1 Regiment	{ Old Infantry Barrack at Bellary long since condemned and out of use. New Barracks. Artillery Barrack condemned. Infantry Barracks long since condemned, holds not more than 800.
	Bangalore	Infantry Barracks	1000	1 Regiment	
	Ditto	Horse Artillery Barracks	116	1 Troop Horse.	
	Ditto	Cavalry Barracks	700	1 Regiment.	
	Ditto	Artillery Ditto	80	
	Mercara	Ditto Ditto	26	
	Malliapooram	Infantry Barracks	150	2 Companies.	
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.	Cananore	Ditto Ditto	1000	1 Regiment.	{
	Secunderabad	Infantry Ditto	700	1 Do.	
	Ditto	Artillery Ditto	170	2 Companies.	
	Jaulnah	Horse Arty. Ditto	100	1 Troop	
	Trinullgherry	Infantry Ditto	1000	1 Regiment	
Southern Divi- sion	Trichinopoly	Infantry Ditto	413	A Wing	{
	Ditto	Artillery Ditto	103	1 Company.	
	Jackatalla	Infantry Ditto	1000	1 Regiment	

N. B.—New Cavalry Barracks at Bangalore to accommodate 700 men not yet completed, and not included; most of these Barracks are quite incapable of holding now the number they were originally intended for, on the improved system of quartering; certainly not more than two-thirds of the number originally mentioned can be quartered in any of them.

HEAD QUARTERS;
Ootacamund;
The 24th June 1858.

The exact extent of quartering for European Troops in Burmah is not known, The public Buildings not being under this Presidency. There are however, quarters for a Regiment of European Infantry at each of the Stations of Rangoon, Maulmain, Thayet-myo, Tounghoo, and for Detachments at Bassein and Shoay-Gyeen, quarters for Artillery at Rangoon, Maulmain, Thayet-myo, Tounghoo and for smaller parties at Shoay-Gheen and Bassein. These quarters were however of a very inferior description in January 1857, as fully reported in His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's Minute of the 2nd February of that year.

Nothing is correctly known of the means of quartering in the Straits, but the following is the extent of additional Barrack accommodation deemed necessary for the European Forces in the Madras Presidency—

Fort Saint George	One Regiment of Infantry.
Presidency	Two European Infantry Depôts.
Vellore	Half Company of Arty., and 2 Companies Infy.
Mysore Division	Two Companies of Artillery.
Malabar and Canara	Two Companies of Artillery.
Ceded Districts	Three Companies of Artillery.
Northern Division	One Regiment Infy., and 4 Companies of Arty.
Secunderabad	One Regiment Infy., and 2 Companies of Arty.
Jaulnah	One Regiment of Infantry.
Kamptee	One Company of Artillery.

E.

EXTRACT from Memorandum, dated Calcutta 29th June 1857.

“I think that the Officers appointed to these European Corps should be sent home to raise and organize their Regiments, and until they are formed and fit for duty, it is obviously necessary, that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's Troops, a portion of which should always be in this country. There are no better Troops in the world than the European Regiments of the Company's Service, but associating them with Troops of the Royal Army, creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. The system of interior economy of Regiments of Her Majesty's Service is, I believe, superior to that of any Army in the world, and it should be strictly followed in all European Regiments of the Company's Service. The Troops should be cantoned in considerable bodies in the most eligible position, and in the proportion of one European to three Native Soldiers.

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut.-General,*
Acting Commander-in-Chief, Bengal.

F.

MEMORANDUM.

Calcutta, 11th August 1857.

IN continuation of my Memorandum of the 29th of June, I beg to recommend, if additional European Regiments for the Company's Service are sanctioned, that the following mode of officering them may be adopted. I propose that the existing Establishment

of Officers of Native Regiments of each branch, Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on as at present regimentally. That the Officers to serve with the European Corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole Army, and in the proportions obtaining in Her Majesty's Service.

That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the Staff duties of the Army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with Native Corps.

When, from any cause, an Officer proves unfit for the thoroughly efficient discharge of the duties of a European Regiment, it shall be competent to the Commander-in-Chief to remand him to the Native Corps to which he belongs, and to supply his place by selection as before.

I anticipate the most favorable results from this mode of Officering additional European Corps.

It will secure the presence with each Corps of the number of officers necessary to maintain discipline and perfect efficiency.

The principle of selection will admit of none but efficient Officers being attached to European Regiments, a point of the highest importance, the value of which cannot be over-estimated; and belonging to different Regiments, and having distinct and separate interests, the Officers attached to European Corps will have little or no inducement to purchase the retirement from the service of their brother Officers with whom they are for the time serving, and thus jealousy and bad feeling and frequent changes will be, in a great measure, obviated.

I need scarcely draw attention to the evils of the present system under which Officers are appointed to Regiments solely with reference to their standing on the gradation list, and the command of Corps falls into incompetent hands, merely because rank and seniority are considered to have claims which cannot be set aside, save in cases of notorious and proved unfitness and incapacity, such as hardly ever occur or can be established.

I think the home establishment of Officers of Her Majesty's Service would quite suffice for Company's European Regiments in India, *viz.* :—

Cavalry.

- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
- 1 Major.
- 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Cornet per Troop.
- 1 Lieutenant or Cornet for Adjutant.
- Interpreter and Quarter Master.

Infantry.

- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
- 2 Majors.
- 1 Captain, one Lieutenant or Ensign per Company, and two additional Subalterns for Adjutant, and Quarter Master and Interpreter.

Artillery.

- 1 Captain and three Subalterns per Troop or Company with Battery attached.
- 1 Captain and 1 Subaltern will suffice for a Reserve Company.

The Establishment of a Regiment of Light Cavalry in Bengal is—

1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
1 Major.
7 Captains.
9 Lieutenants.
4 Cornets.

And thus two Regiments of Light Cavalry could supply the complement of Officers I have indicated for a Regiment of European Dragoons, and leave available for employment with Native Troops, Staff, or other duty :—

1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
1 Major.
6 Captains.
9 Lieutenants.

Making a total of 17 Officers, from which deduct three for each Native Corps (which I consider quite a sufficient number, as I should now wish to see the Native Regiment constituted, whether of Cavalry or Infantry), and eleven Officers for every two Regiments of Light Cavalry are left surplus.

In like manner every two Regiments of Native Infantry can supply the regulated Establishment of Officers for one Regiment of European Infantry, and there would still remain eleven Officers of those two Regiments available for detached employment, &c., &c., and from the twenty-four Regiments of Native Infantry composing the Bengal Army, the Officers would stand thus, supposing twenty European Infantry Regiments were to be formed. The total number of European Officers of all Ranks below Regimental Colonels borne on the establishment of 74 Regiments of Native Infantry—

Amounts to	1,850
Deduct Establishment proposed for 20 Regiments of European Infantry	700
34 Regiments of Natives	102
	802
Leaves	1,048

European Officers of Infantry available for any purpose, after fully providing, as I think, for maintaining a full complement with Regiments.

I have said in my Memorandum of the 29th June, that Guns ought never again to be manned by Natives, I will now add that neither ought Natives to be employed as Syce Drivers. A Corps of European Artillery Drivers should be formed.

Nearly the whole Native Army is now either in open revolt or disarmed on well-founded suspicion of unfaithfulness, there can therefore be no breach of faith in reorganizing Regiments and making any change the Government may consider expedient in the constitution and terms of enlistment of the native portion of the Bengal Army. If when the present disturbances shall have ceased, there should be any Regiments who have throughout conspicuously maintained their loyalty, an exception in their favor can be easily made.

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut-General,*
Acting Commander-in-Chief, Bengal.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. HOPE GRANT, K. C. B., COMMANDING OUDE FORCE.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to Paragraph 5, of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

Lucknow	Artillery	483	
					Royal Engineers	103	
					Cavalry	45	
					Infantry	3,177	
							3,808
Garrison Column					Artillery	215	
Cantonments	...				Cavalry	419	
					Infantry	1,568	
							2,202
Nowabgunge, Cawn-					Artillery	87	
pore Road	...				Infantry	1,563	
							1,650
Brigadier Horsford's					Artillery... .. .	256	
Column, Nowab-					R. Engineers	15	
gunge Fyzabad					Cavalry	388	
Road					Infantry... .. .	1,038	
							1,697

2.

15,000, but when the country is settled, this number might be considerably reduced.

Troops to be posted at Huttoora, Seetapoor, Ramnugurh near the Gogra, Fyzabad, Pertabgurh, and Roy Bareilly.

3.

Lucknow	Pioneers	288	
					Cavalry	250	
					Infantry	790	
							1,328
Garrison Column					Artillery	105	
Cantonments	...				Cavalry	521	
							626
Nowabgunge,					Artillery	13	
Cawnpore Road					Cavalry	396	
							409
Nowabgunge, Fyza-					Cavalry	390	
bad Road... .. .					Infantry	803	
							1,193
Oonoo	Cavalry	111	
							111

4.

15,000, but when the country is settled, I would recommend all Regular and Irregular Native Troops to be removed from Oude, and hold the country with European Troops and Police.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Ramnugurh near the "Gogra," Fyzabad, Purtabgurh, 1 Bareilly, Huttoora, and Seetapoor.

<i>Regulars.</i>	<i>Race.</i>
Artillery, Drivers and Lascars	118 Hind

Irregulars.

Cavalry	1,668	} 3,549
Infantry	1,593	
Pioneers	288	
Police..	5,248	

Races.

5.

Seikhs	1,962	} Irregulars.
Pathans	400	
Punjab Mahomedans... ..	625	
Ditto Hindoos	42	
Hindustanee Mahomedans	9	
Ditto Hindoos	16	
Mooltanees... ..	13	
Muzbees	288	
Dogras	190	
Rajpoots... ..	2	
Brahmins	2	
Total	3,549	} Police.
Punjaubees... ..	3,299	
N. W. Provinces and Oude	1,949	
Total	5,248	

6.

All Police after the country is settled ; at present the Police are all new levies.

7.

Two-thirds Native to one European.

The Cavalry to be all Irregular, and armed and equipped according to the Native system.

9.

The only Barrack I know of is in Lucknow, and it is made to hold about a Regiment.

10.

Yes.

FROM

C. B. THORNHILL, Esq., C. S.,

COLONEL DURAND, C. B.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 33, of the 21st Instant, forwarding certain questions relative to the organization of the Army in the North-Western Provinces.

2. The subject is one which I approach with diffidence, and have therefore endeavoured to explain in each case the grounds on which my replies have been based.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1 to 4.

3. The annexed Tabular Statement contains in one view the answers to Questions 1 to 4, namely, the strength and disposition of the European and Native Army before the mutiny, and the arrangement which I would venture to suggest for the future.

4. I have found it more convenient to adhere to the Civil Division of the country into the seven circles of Commissioner's jurisdiction, because this has formed the basis of the organization of the new Police Battalions, which force will, in a great measure, I imagine, supply the place of the old Native Army as mere local guards.

5. Commencing at the Eastern limit of this Presidency, the first Division is Benares, containing the six Districts of Ghazeepore, Benares, Mirzapore, Juanpore, Azimgurh and Goruckpore.

6. The capital Benares would require the constant presence of a European Force to overawe the populous city. In cases of emergency, Detachments could be sent with facility to the adjacent river Stations of Mirzapore and Ghazeepore, it is therefore doubtful whether it might be necessary to have any European Detachment at Ghazeepore; the argument in favor of that arrangement being the valuable Government property in the stud at that Station.

7. Assuming that a force would be stationed at Fyzabad on the Gogra, the cantonment of a Regiment of European Infantry at Azimgurh would be sufficient for the protection of that and the adjoining District of Goruckpore, which latter, it is feared, might prove unhealthy as a permanent location for European Soldiers.

8. The Fort of Chunar being held in sufficient strength would protect the South of the Mirzapore District.

9. The remaining Districts would apparently be sufficiently guarded by the Police Battalions without any other Native Troops than a Corps of Irregular Cavalry at Benares or Sultanpore.

10. The Allahabad Division under the old arrangement comprised five Districts, Allahabad, Futtehpore, Banda, Humeerpoor and Cawnpore.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

11. The presence of the large force which would remain at the seat of Government, and the cantonment of one European Regiment at Cawnpore, would amply command the Southern Dooab. For some time to come, it might be necessary to place a Wing of one European Infantry at Banda, but as that Station has a reputation for unhealthiness, it might hereafter be sufficient to maintain a full Regiment at Nowgong, leaving Banda to be held by Native Troops or the Police Battalion only.

12. Futtehpore being on the Grand Trunk Road between Allahabad and Cawnpore, at both which Stations a strong force would be placed, and being in Railway communication with both, would require nothing beyond the Police Battalion.

13. Humeerpore is also protected by Cawnpore and Jhansie, so that here also the Police Battalion would be sufficient, without any European Troops.

14. Cawnpore would continue as heretofore a post for European Soldiers.

15. Agra, Futtehgurh and Allyghur Forts being garrisoned by Europeans, the Police Corps would hold Muttra, Mynpoorie and Etawah. The latter would also derive protection from the Garrison at Calpee. The facilities for procuring forage might perhaps lead to the cantonment of any Cavalry attached to the Agra Brigade at Muttra.

16. The Garrison in the Fort of Allyghur and the force at Meerut, would render it unnecessary to place European Troops at Boolundshuhur.

17. Roorkee and Meerut would protect Mozuffernugger, Shaharunpoor and Deyrah.

18. Bijnore lying between Roorkee and Moradabad, and Badoon being within 30 miles of Barielly, it might be sufficient to have only three Stations for European Troops in Rohilcund, *viz.*, Barielly, Shajehanpoor and Moradabad.

19. The Delhi Division having been transferred to the Punjab Government, would fall within the arrangement made for that Presidency.

20. In the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories, the Stations of Jhansie and Nowgong, Mhow, Saugor and Jubbulpore being garrisoned by European Troops, would afford sufficient protection to the smaller Stations, which might be adequately held by the Police Battalion.

21. In anticipating the efficiency of the Police Battalions to undertake so largely the duties heretofore performed by the Native Army, it is necessary to state that each Divisional Battalion will

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

consist of an average of about 3,000 Foot and 500 Horse, but the numbers will necessarily be adjusted in accordance with the requirements of the several Districts comprised in each Division. Round numbers the organized Police for the six Divisions of the North-Western Provinces may be taken at 20,000 Foot and 3,500 Horse.

6.

22. The suggested strength of Europeans would be five Regiments Cavalry, and about 17 of Infantry, besides Artillery, and this suggests the reply to your 6th question, namely, that the European arm should not be less than one-third of the total strength of armed and disciplined Natives of all kinds, and that recourse should be had chiefly to a system of organized Police for the performance of all guard, escort and interior detachment duties, which formerly were discharged by the Native Army. The employment of a Native Army being limited, for the future, to the discharge of those Military duties in the field, which the climate of this country renders prejudicial to the health of European Soldiers.

23. The large number of armed and disciplined Natives of the Punjab recently sent down into these Provinces, renders it a question of importance how this preponderance of men, having a bond of union from being fellow-countrymen, may be best counterbalanced by arming and disciplining men from other parts of Hindoostan. The consideration of this question however falls under your subsequent queries on enlistment.

9 and 10.

24. The question of Barrack accommodation is one which must be replied to by the Public Works Department, but the European Army which I have suggested would doubtless require very extensive accommodation in excess of that which already exists.

25. It may, I think, be assumed from recent experience, that no formidable insurrection can be organized among the population of the Districts under our rule, so long as the possession of Artillery is strictly limited to European Troops, and the concentration of treasure within Fortresses garrisoned by Europeans, carefully enforced.

26. Hereafter the general disarming of the whole population will probably render it practicable to reduce the strength of our European Army to some extent, more especially if the training of the Natives who may be entrusted with arms be limited to mere instruction in their use so as to prevent their attaining that degree of discipline which would render them capable of combining a hostile Army.

27. The bearing of the question of enlistment upon this subject will be noticed in the replies to your further questions, which I hope soon to have the honor of submitting in continuation of this letter.

LAHABAD ;
rd June 1858. }

I have &c.,
(Signed) C. B. THORNHILL.

FORMER FORCE.

STATION.	EUROPEAN.			NATIVE.	
	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.
Ghazepore
Mirzapore
Chunar	2 Companies Invalids	2 Cos. Invalids, 2 ditto
Benares	1 Regt. Irregular
Sultanpore	N. Dett. Foot, 2 Guns
Azimghurh	ditto
Jaunpore	ditto	Detailed from Bn
Goruckpore
Total in the Benares Division	2 Companies Invalids	2 Cos. Invalids & 22 Veterans.	6 Guns with N. Detachment.	1 Irregular
Allahabad	2 Companies N. A.
Futtehpore
Humeerpore
Banda
Cawnpore	3 Companies	1 Regt. Bn
Total in Allahabad	5 Companies	1 Regt. Bn
Agra	1 Company	1 Regiment
Muttra
Etawah
Mynpoorie
Futtygurh	Detail Foot
Total in Agra	1 Company	1 Regiment	Detail Foot
Meerut	1 Troop and 1 Company ..	1 Regiment	1 Regiment	1 Regiment
Allygurh
Beolundshuhur
Mozuffernuggur
Seharunpore
Roorkee
Jeyra
andour	Convalescents
Total	1 Troop and 1 Company—	1 Regiment	1 Regt. and Convalescents	1 Regiment
Barielly	1 Company	1 Regiment
Moradabad	Detail
Bijnore
Budaon
Shajehanpoor	Detail
Almorah	1 Company
Total	2 Companies & Foot Guns ...	1 Regiment
Delhi	1 Company
Boorgaon
Hansie
Nirsa	1 Regiment
Sar
htuck
urnaul
Total	1 Company	1 Regt. Bn
augor	1 Company
ibbulpore	1 Regiment
how	1 Company	1 Regiment
agode
umoh
hansie	1 Company	1 Regiment
owgong
Total	1 Company	2 Companies	1 Regiment
Grand Total	6 Companies and 1 Troop..	1 Regiment	1 Regt., 4 Cos. Invlids., & Convt's	10 Cos. and 4 outposts	8 Regt.

NATIVE.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	under
.....	Wing N. I.	½ Battery
.....	1 Regt. N. I.	Invalids
.....	Wing N. I.	1 Battery or Troop
.....	3 Regts. N. I.
Det. Foot, 2 Guns ..	1 Regt. Irregular Cavalry ...	1 Regiment
ditto	Wing N. I.
ditto	Detailed from Segowlee ...	Wing N. I.
Guns with N. Detachment.	½ Irregular	5 Regiments
Companies N. A.	1 Regiment	2 Troops or Companies	..
.....	Detail
.....	Ditto
Companies ..	1 Regt. Regular	1 Regiment	½ Battery	.. e Presi-
.....	3 Regiments	1 Troop or Company	..
Companies ..	1 Regt. Regular	5 Regiments
.....	2 Regiments	½ Troop or Company	.. ent, be-
.....	Detail	½ Ditto	.. is state
.....	1 Regiment ons for
Detail Foot	1 Regiment
Detail Foot	4 Regiments
.....	1 Regiment	2 Regiments	2 Troops or Companies	.. Bombay
.....	1 Ditto	½ Battery	.. 00 men,
.....	Detail beyond
.....	Ditto
.....	Ditto
.....	1,000 Sappers
.....	1 Regiment
.....
.....	1 Regiment	5 Regiments European
..... factorily,
1 Company	1 Regiment Irregular.	2 Regiments.	1 Troop.	.. constitu-
Detail	1 Ditto	½ Battery.	.. ably be
.....
.....	Detail
Detail	1 Regiment.	½ Battery	.. Troops,
1 Company	Ditto	1 Company Nynceetal.	.. e or less
2 Companies 4 Foot Guns ...	1 Regiment Irregular.	5 Regiments. Bombay
..... he Pro-
.....	3 Regiments	1 Battery	.. be deter-
.....	1 Regiment Irregular number
.....	1 Regiment idency :
.....
.....
1 Company	1 Regt. Irregular	4 Regiments of the
.....
.....	1 Regiment	2 Regiments	1 Battery	..
.....	1 Ditto
1 Company	1 Regiment	1 Ditto	1 Battery	..
.....	Detail
.....	Detail
1 Company	1 Regiment	1 Regiment	1 Battery	..
.....
.....
2 Companies	3 Regiments	5 Regiments
10 Cos. and 4 outposts	8 Regiments	33 Regiments

have no not borne

PROPOSED FORCE.

EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.	
Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
..... 1 Regiment ..	½ Regiment .. 1 Veterans .. 1 Regiment 1 Regiment	Police Battalion. Ditto. Detachment P. Battalion. Police Battalion. Detachment P. Battalion. } Police Battalion.
.....
1 Regiment	2 Regiments ½ Regiment .. 1 Regt. Dett. at Calpee ...	1 Regiment 1 Regiment ..	Police Battn. and 1 Regt. Native. Police Battalion. Ditto. Ditto. 1 N. Regt. and Police Battalion.
.....
1 Regiment	½ Regiment } 1 Regiment ..	1 Regiment	1 N. Regt. and Police Battalion. Police Battalion. } Ditto. } Ditto.
.....
1 Regiment	2 Regiments .. Wing 1 Regiment .. Invalids.	1 Regiment Native. Police Battalion. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Goorkha Regiment.
.....
1 Regiment.	1 Regiment. Wing. 1 Regiment. Ditto.	1 Regiment N. and P. Battalion. Police Battalion. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Goorkha.
.....
.....	1 Regiment } 1 Regiment	Police Battalion. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto.
.....
.....	1 Regiment .. 1 Ditto .. 1 Wing } Wing 1 Regiment ..	Police Battalion. Ditto. Native Infantry. Police Battalion. Ditto. Ditto.
.....
5 Regiments	6 Regts. Irrgr.

(Signed) C. B. THORNHILL, C. S.,
Inspector General of Prisons.

COLONEL P. M. MELVILL, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1

There are at present 18,500 European Troops serving under the Bombay Presidency, *viz.* :—

Artillery	2,900
Cavalry	2,300
Infantry	13,300
	<hr/>
Total	18,500
	<hr/> <hr/>

These are distributed throughout the Territories of the Presidency, and in Rajpootana and Central India.

2.

This question cannot be answered satisfactorily at present, because it is impossible to deduce from the existing anomalous state of the country, and of the Native Army, any safe conclusions for the future.

3.

The total number of Native Troops serving under the Bombay Presidency by the returns of the 1st May 1858 was 38,000 men, distributed throughout the Territories of the Presidency, and beyond the frontier in Rajpootana and Central India.

4.

For the same reason as assigned in the case of European Troops, it is not practicable to answer this question satisfactorily, or with any confidence. There is to be a change in the constitution of the Native Army throughout India; there will probably be a change also in the duty to be performed by the Native Troops, their subjection to the European branch may be made more or less immediate and direct; the Stations to be garrisoned by the Bombay Army may or may not extend into Rajpootana and over the Province of Malwa. These are some of the points that must be determined before any sure calculation can be ventured of the number of Native Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency: and of the manner in which they should be distributed.

5.

The total number of Irregular Troops on the returns of the Bombay Army, is—

Cavalry	3,850
Infantry	2,000
	<hr/>
Total	5,850
	<hr/> <hr/>

Of the Police Corps, which are entirely Civil, I have no direct knowledge, they form no part of the Army, and are not borne on its returns.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

The composition of the Regular Regiments of the Bombay Native Army according to castes is exhibited below, *viz.* :—

Christians	410
Jews	370
Mussulmans	3,200
Hindoos	25,120
Various low castes	4,865

The following is the classification according to countries :—

From Afghanistan	20
Bombay	30
The Concan	16,130
Candeish	160
Carnatic	180
Canara	12
Deccan	3,070
Guzerat	300
Hindoostan	13,150
Madras	400
Malabar	280
Punjab	155
Rajpootana	4
Scinde	75

Thus, out of every hundred men in round numbers, 75 are Hindoos, 12 are of the lower castes, and 10 are Mahomedans, the remaining 3 may be Christians or Jews.

Again of the entire Army, 47 per cent. are from the Concan, and 38 per cent. from Hindoostan.

6.

I cannot venture to define the establishment of Native Troops until the constitution to be given to the Native Army has been determined, and of course I am equally unable to divide the establishment between any proposed strength of Regulars or Irregulars.

7.

Speaking very generally, I consider that the proportion of the European element to the Native in the Indian Army should not be more than one or two or less than one to three, and that it must vary according to circumstances.

8.

The proportion of the European element fixed for India generally should rule that for Bombay.

9.

The Barrack accommodation in the Bombay Presidency is generally inferior both in kind and extent. There was accommodation before the present year for barely eight Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry. More has been provided lately, but generally of only a temporary nature.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

10.

Answered by the preceding.

11.

I conceive this to be immaterial, and may be allowed to fluctuate according to circumstances.

12.

The additional Corps should be officered from the present Establishment of the Indian Army, on the same principle as when augmentations were made in former times.

13.

The Purchase Promotion System of Her Majesty's Army produces no embarrassment in juxtaposition with the Seniority Promotion System of the Indian Army, nor can any augmentation in the number of Corps on the one side or the other, cause any embarrassment ; so long as the two systems stand divided from each other, any attempt to amalgamate them would produce the utmost confusion.

14.

The advocates for the raising Corps of Foreign Mercenaries must say whether they are to be regarded as taking the place of European, or of Native Troops ; in my opinion the presence of such Mercenaries would not enable the Government to dispense with any portion of the English Troops in India.

LIEUT.-GENL. SIR M. CUBBON, COMMISSIONER OF MYSORE AND COORG.

The whole of these questions, from 1 to 13 inclusive, will have been answered by the Head Quarters of the Madras Army, but I can say positively that the introduction of the foreign mercenaries indicated in paragraph 14, would be received with great distaste, not only by the existing Madras Army, but by the population in general.

(Signed) M. CUBBON, *Lieut-Genl.*,
Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

At Bangalore there are at present 79 men of the Madras Horse Artillery, 119 men of Foot Artillery, of the 1st Dragoon Guards 433 men, 500 men of the 60th Rifles. Total at Bangalore 1,172 Rank and File. At Mysore 92 men of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Rifles, and at Hurryhur 94 men of the 60th Rifles, both Detachments temporarily.

2.

Not fewer than one complete European Regiment of Infantry, at least 1,000 strong, or still better 1,200, one complete Regiment of European Dragoons, at least 700 strong, and 300

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

European Artillery, Horse and Foot, I conceive should always be stationed at Bangalore.

3.

At Bangalore about 124 of the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry and 585 of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry; at the French Rocks the Left Wing of the 52nd Regiment Native Infantry 217; at Mysore 76, and at Hoonsoor 49. At Hurrayhur the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, 339 men.

4.

At Mercara in Coorg the right wing of the 52nd N. I. I consider one entire Native Regiment necessary to be stationed at Mercara in Coorg, together with one Brigade of European Artillery for special reasons. One entire Native Regiment at Hurrayhur on the Northern boundary of Mysore, and one Native Regiment at the French Rocks, or at a new station proposed by the Commander-in-Chief between Seringapatam and Mysore. At Bangalore such a number as the Military authorities may deem necessary to carry on the duties usually assigned to natives and not more; perhaps about two Regiments of Native Infantry. I am not aware that any necessity exists for stationing a Regiment of Native Cavalry at Bangalore.

5.

The Troops alluded to in answer to the previous questions are all Regulars. Besides these there are four Battalions of Mysore Irregular Infantry, consisting in all of about 2,200 men, and seven Regiments of Mysore Irregular Horse, consisting of about 2,500 Privates. Both these are distributed throughout the Country as Revenue and Judicial Guards, as escort for Treasure, and generally for Police purposes, the Silladars being always available for service when called for by the Madras Government; and at this very moment 1000 of them are serving under the orders of the Madras Government beyond the frontier of Mysore.

The accompanying Statements will show of what races the Mysore Troops are composed, and in what proportions the races occur.

6.

I am not aware that any alteration is necessary in this report.

7.

The number of Europeans proposed is in the proportion of 2 to 5 of the Regular Native Troops, and 2 to between 9 and 10 of the Regular and Irregular Troops.

9.

When the new Dragoon Barracks in course of construction are finished, there will be abundant accommodation for the European Troops proposed to be stationed at Bangalore.

10.

None.

ABSTRACT Strength of Four Battalions of Barr as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

BATTALIONS.	Commandants.	Rissaldars.	Subadars.	Adjutants.	Jemadars.	Havildar Majors.	Havildars.	Drummers.	Fifers.	Sepoys.	Vakeels.	Writers.	Hakeems.	Jackumbunds.	Puckalies.	Washermen.	Orderlies.	Armourers.	Smiths.	Carpenters.	Chucklers.	Lascars.	Total.	Total Pay of each Battalion.		
																								Rs.	A.	P.
1. Syed Eshock	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	7	10	478	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	626	4,800	8	0
2. Syed Abdool Rahimon	1	1	9	1	10	1	70	10	9	510	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	659	4,993	8	0
3. Meer Ameenodeen	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	10	10	540	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	691	4,472	0	0
4. Butcha Row	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	10	10	540	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	691	4,472	0	0
Total	4	4	39	4	40	4	280	37	39	2068	4	20	4	4	40	40	4	4	4	4	4	16	2667	18,738	0	0
Wanting to complete	1	3	1	92	97	658	0	0
Establishment	4	4	40	4	40	4	280	40	40	2160	4	20	4	4	40	40	4	4	4	4	4	16	2764	19,396	0	0

(True Copy)
 (Signed) M. CUBBON,
Commissioner of Mysore.

(Signed) E. B. RAMSAY,
Offy. Military Assistant.

MILITARY ASSISTANT'S OFFICE;
 BANGALORE,
The 15th July 1858.

STATEMENT showing the present strength of Barr, specifying the different Castes in each Rank, the rate and the amount of Pay to the 1st and 2nd Class Battalions, as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

RANK.	Moosulmen.	Brahmins.	Mahrattas.	Rajpoots.	Koonbees.	Allaymons.	Ranchaywur.	Punchal.	Chucklers.	Total.	FIRST CLASS.					SECOND CLASS.					REMARKS.				
											Number.	Pay of each Rank.			Total.	Number.	Pay of each Rank.			Total.					
Commandants	3	1	4	2	120	0	0	240	0	0	2	100	0	0	200	0	0	
Rissaldars	4	4	2	80	0	0	160	0	0	2	70	0	0	140	0	0	
Subadars	29	1	1	4	2	2	39	19	30	0	0	570	0	0	20	25	0	0	500	0	0	
Adjutants	4	4	2	25	0	0	50	0	0	2	20	0	0	40	0	0	
Jemadars	34	2	2	2	40	20	16	0	0	320	0	0	20	14	0	0	280	0	0	
Havildar Majors	3	1	4	2	15	0	0	30	0	0	2	12	0	0	24	0	0	
Havildars	210	1	14	20	16	17	2	280	140	9	0	0	1260	0	0	140	8	0	0	1120	0	0	
Drummers	1	36	37	17	7	8	0	127	8	0	20	6	8	0	130	0	0	
Fifers	2	37	39	19	7	8	0	142	8	0	20	6	8	0	130	0	0	
Sepoys	1458	8	173	82	151	189	7	2068	988	6	8	0	6422	0	0	1080	5	8	0	5940	0	0	
Vakeels	4	4	2	16	0	0	32	0	0	2	16	0	0	32	0	0	
Writers	1	19	20	10	8	0	0	80	0	0	10	8	0	0	80	0	0	
Hakeems	2	2	4	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	
Jackumbuds	4	4	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	
Puckallies	40	40	20	6	0	0	120	0	0	20	5	0	0	100	0	0	
Washermen	20	19	1	40	20	5	0	0	100	0	0	20	4	8	0	90	0	0	
Orderlies	1	..	1	..	2	4	2	6	0	0	12	0	0	2	6	0	0	12	0	0	
Armourers	3	1	..	4	2	9	8	0	19	0	0	2	9	8	0	19	0	0	
Smiths	1	2	1	..	4	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	
Carpenters	4	..	4	2	9	0	0	18	0	0	2	8	0	0	16	0	0	
Chucklers	4	..	4	2	3	8	0	7	0	0	2	3	8	0	7	0	0	
Lascars	2	..	1	..	7	6	16	8	4	8	0	36	0	0	8	4	8	0	36	0	0	
Total	1802	36	190	131	199	284	9	6	10	2667	1285	0	0	0	9794	0	0	1382	0	0	0	8944	0	0	

MILITARY ASSISTANT'S OFFICE;
BANGALORE,
The 15th July 1858.

(True Copy)
(Signed) M. CUBBON,
Commi

(Signed) E. B. RAMSAY,
Offg. Military Assistant.

ABSTRACT Strength of Seven Regiments of Silladars as it stood

REGIMENTS.	Regimentdars.	Ressaldars.	Surzufferdars.	Zufferdars.	Jemadars.	Trumpeters.	Dhunka Navaz.	Nishanburdars.	Silladars.	Surpaishcars.	Paishcars.	Nakeeb.	Mounted Mahaldars.	Pydal Mahaldars.	Jhandawallahs.	Elephants.	Horses.	Total Pay of each Regiment.		
																		Rs.	As.	P.
1. Syed Fuckrodeen	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	365	1	6	1	6	1	4	...	426	9744	0	0
2. Kristna Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	360	1	6	1	6	1	4	...	422	9768	0	0
3. Termul Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	344	1	6	1	6	1	8	...	406	9443	0	0
4. Hunmunt Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	339	1	6	1	6	1	4	1	401	9386	0	0
5. Mahomed Abass	2	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	366	1	6	1	6	1	4	...	429	10114	0	0
6. Bahoo Row Mannay	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	358	1	6	1	6	1	4	...	419	9584	0	0
7. Lutchman Row	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	391	1	6	1	6	1	4	...	452	10247	0	0
Total	8	39	7	42	210	14	7	7	2523	7	42	7	42	7	32	1	2955	68286	0	0
Wanting to Complete	3	3	360	0	0
Establishment	7	42	7	42	210	14	7	7	2523	7	42	7	42	7	32	1	2958	68646	0	0
Supernumerary	1	1	250	0	0

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(161)

MILITARY ASSISTANT'S OFFICE ;
BANGALORE,
The 15th July 1858. }

(True Copy)
(Signed) M. CUBBON,
Commissioner of Mysore.

(Signed) E. B. RAMSAY,
Offg. Military Assistant.

STATEMENT showing the Present Strength of Silladars, specifying the different Castes in each Rank, and the rate of Pay as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

RANK.	Musulmans including Pindarees.	Mahrattas.	Brahmins.	Urses.	Rajpoots.	Seikhs.	Naidoos.	Koonbees.	Allaymons.	Christians.	Chucklers.	Stallions.	Total Strength.	PAY.			REMARKS.			
														Rate of each Rank.	Total.					
Regimentdars	2	2	4	8	250	0	0	2000	0	0	} 1 at 140 Rupees. 38 at 120 Rs. each.
Ressaldars	12	6	15	2	2	1	1	39	120	0	0	4700	0	0	
Surzufferdars	5	2	7	60	0	0	420	0	0	
Zufferdars	20	15	3	1	3	42	25	0	0	1050	0	0	} 2 at 45 Rs. each. 2 at 33 Ditto. 206 at 30 Ditto.
Jemadars	108	16	12	2	13	1	..	4	210	30	0	0	6336	0	0	
Trumpeters	14	14	20	0	0	280	0	0	
Dhunka Navaz	6	1	7	20	0	0	140	0	0	} 2 at 30 Rs. each. 1 at 24 Rupees. 1 at 22 Ditto. 2519 at 20 Rs. each.
Nishanburdars	5	2	7	22	0	0	154	0	0	
Silladars	1302	884	139	7	129	16	1	11	3	1	..	30	2523	20	0	0	50486	0	0	
Surpaishcars	7	7	35	0	0	245	0	0	} 2519 at 20 Rs. each.
Paishcars	42	42	30	0	0	1260	0	0	
Nakeeb	7	7	24	0	0	168	0	0	
Mounted Mahaldars	42	42	20	0	0	840	0	0	
Pydal Ditto	7	7	6	0	0	42	0	0	
Jhanda Duffadars	1	6	..	7	5	0	0	35	0	0	
Jhandawallas	1	1	23	..	25	4	0	0	100	0	0	
Elephant	1	0	0	0	30	0	0	
Total	1517	929	222	12	147	18	2	16	17	1	29	30	2995	0	0	0	68286	0	0	

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MILITARY ASSISTANT'S OFFICE;
BANGALORE,
The 15th July 1858.

(True Copy)
(Signed) M. CUBBON,
Commissioner of Mysore.

(Signed) E. B. RAMSAY,
Offg. Military Assistant.

LIEUT.-COL. W. MAYHEW, ADJT. GENL. OF THE ARMY.

QUESTIONS and **ANSWERS** having reference to the 5th Para. of letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General of India in Council, No. 235 of 1857.

QUESTIONS.**ANSWERS.****1.**

Vide return enclosed.

2.

For many years to come, a European Force of not less than sixty thousand men, of all arms, will be required for the restoration of order, and to awe the rebellious spirit which is abroad throughout India, but has so far particularly developed itself in the Bengal Presidency. The Troops should be in the proportion of Artillery 10,000, Cavalry 8,000 and Infantry 40,000, without taking into account the Sappers, which need only be a Corps of Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. The distribution of this Force may be left very much as it is at present, making Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Lahore and Jhelum, large entrepots for European Troops, on which all their out-posts might be assembled, whether for offensive or defensive operations, and where large stores of every kind should be always in a state of preparation for service.

3.

Vide return enclosed.

4.

The Native Troops of the Line have so signally failed in responding to the fidelity which we deemed we had purchased by the many advantages and privileges accorded to them from time to time by the Government, that it appears to me they have one and all forfeited every claim to consideration, and should be disbanded at once. To such portion as has shown *active* loyalty to the State, enhanced benefits might be granted as a *reward*; but every man should be given distinctly to understand that all *claim* has ceased under old regulations. Numerically they might be retained in equal proportions with Europeans for Cavalry, Infantry and Sappers, and be distributed in like manner and always associated as much as possible.

5.

Vide Return enclosed, which is very imperfect as to Police Corps, of which little is known, nor can the races of which the

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Native Army is composed be ascertained with any accuracy, so innumerable are the tribes of Rajpoots and others. Oude and Behar contribute the majority of our Infantry, and Rohilcund and Hurriannah of our Cavalry, the Doab from Mynpooree downwards also furnishes many Soldiers of all arms.

6.

I am of opinion that the whole Native Infantry should be formed on the same footing as the Loodianah, Ferozepore and Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiments, and that all the Cavalry be Irregular, by which arrangement a large margin will be given for the selection of Officers for the various staff duties, all of whom might be borne on the strength of such Corps, though not necessary for their discipline. The proportion of Police Corps required to carry on the civil duties is a question I cannot answer, and which will depend very much on the state of security in which our Civil Treasuries and Jails are placed.

7.

I have already stated that the Native Troops, exclusive of Police Corps, should be numerically equal to the European.

8.

A proportion of one to three, exclusive of Police Corps, would, in my opinion, be the safest for India generally, for many years to come.

9.

Barrack accommodation is very deficient, but the question is one to be disposed of in the Quarter Master General's Department.

10.

Yes, very largely, I apprehend.

11.

The majority of the European army of India should be raised for exclusive service in the country, in the proportion of three to one to Her Majesty's Regular Troops. Economy, acclimation, and aptitude for the peculiar nature of the service, and knowledge of the country and its people, make it very desirable that Officers and men should devote their lives to the service; one-third of Royal Troops would suffice to control this body if necessary, and to infuse the leaven of modern improvement that may be required to maintain the Indian Institutions on a level with those of Europe.

12.

The permanent European Corps cannot be more readily commanded than by the British Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Native Army, forming the complement for one European Regiment out of two Native ones, as is being done at present with the new Cavalry and Infantry Corps.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

13.

I apprehend not, but I do not clearly understand the scope of this enquiry.

14.

In the event of another rise against British dominion in India, no Troops are safely to be trusted but European ones, and the ratio of one to three is the safe one.

DISTRIBUTION RETURN of the Troops, European and Native, serving on the Bengal Establishment on the 1st of May 1858.

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.	
PRESIDENCY.	Fort William	Her Majesty's 73rd Foot ...	24	763	0		
	Allipore	Calcutta Native Militia ...	3	2	995		
	Ballygunge	Governor General's Body	3	1	134		
		Guard	...				
	Calcutta	5th Company 3rd Battalion	7	179	0		
		Royal Artillery	...				
		Her Majesty's 2nd Battalion 60th Foot	22	817	0		
	Barrackpore	Her Majesty's 19th Foot	38	1,052	0		
		2nd Native Infantry Grenadiers	5	2	730		
		32nd Native Infantry	12	1	643		
		34th Ditto ditto	12	1	302		
		43rd Ditto ditto	11	1	731		
	Dum-Dum	3rd Company 9th Battalion Royal Artillery	7	187	0		
		Head Quarters 5th Battalion Artillery	2	7	0		
	Berhampore	4th Company Her Majesty's 35th Foot	11	249	0		
		63rd Native Infantry	12	2	809		
	Akyab	11th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	341		
		Arracan Battalion	5	2	737		
	EASTERN FRONTIER.	Jelpigoree	73rd Native Infantry	9	1	1,135	
		Cherra Poonjee	Sylhet Light Infantry Btn.	6	2	940	
			Munneepore Regiment	4	0	568	§ Raised since the Mutiny.
Debrooghur		1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion	5	2	1,021		
		A Company of Assam Local Artillery	1	1	107		
Gowahatty		2nd Assam Light Infantry Battalion	4	1	1,113		
	Kamroop Regiment	4	1	917	§ Raised since the Mutiny.		
	Total	...	211	3,274	11,223		
DINAPORE.	Dinapore	4th Company 5th Battalion Artillery	5	76	48		
		Her Majesty's 35th Foot	27	576	0		
		7th Native Infantry	3	0	60		
		8th Ditto ditto	4	0	34		
	Bhaugulpore	40th Ditto ditto	2	0	105		
		Hill Rangers	3	2	620		
	Darjeeling	5th Irregular Cavalry	2	0	64		
		Sebundy Sappers and Miners	1	2	206		
	Dorundah	Ramgurh Irregular Cavalry	1	0	183		
	Chyebassa	Seikh Volunteers	4	0	197	§ Raised since the Mutiny.	
	Sasseram	Her Majesty's 6th Foot	22	728	0		
	Sumbulpore	Sheikhawatee Battalion	3	0	748		
	Nepaul	Resident's Escort	1	0	84		
Arrah	3rd Seikh Cavalry	4	0	284			
	Carried over	...	82	1,384	2,633		

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Continued.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
DINAPORE.—(Continued.)		Brought forward ..	82	1,384	2,633	
	Benares	Left Wing 25th N. I. ...	5	0	461	
		37th Native Infantry ...	5	1	139	
		50th Ditto ditto ...	13	2	208	
		Regiment of Loodianah ...	3	0	409	
	Azimgurh	8th Company 2nd Battalion Royal Artillery ...	6	105	0	
		Her Majesty's 34th Foot ...	32	762	0	
		6 Companies of Her Majesty's 37th Foot ...	16	290	0	
	Ghazcepure	Her Majesty's 37th Foot ...	22	406	0	
		5 Companies of Her Majesty's 54th Foot ...	14	295	0	
	Chunar	European Invalid Battalion ...	77	184	0	
		European Veteran Compy. ...	0	30	0	
	Doojunpore	2nd Battn. Military Train ...	12	238	0	
	Singah	Her Majesty's 10th Foot ...	24	787	0	
		Her Majesty's 84th Foot ...	33	792	0	
	Total ...	344	5,276	3,850		
CAWNPORE.	Cawnpore	3rd Compy. 5th Battn. Arty. ...	3	75	34	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		The Benares Horse ...	2	0	220	
		Cawnpore Levy ...	4	0	754	
	Futtehgurh	3rd and 7th Companies 14th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	12	295	0	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		Her Majesty's 80th Foot ...	21	495	0	
		Futtehgurh Levy ...	4	0	502	
	Ukberpore	7th Punjaub Infantry ...	9	0	819	
		3rd Company 1st Battalion Artillery ...	3	79	82	
	Etawah	Her Majesty's 88th Foot ...	44	901	0	
		3rd European Regiment ...	24	904	0	
	Kantah	Her Majesty's 7th Hussars ...	30	504	0	
		2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade ...	32	971	0	
	Mohun	Her Majesty's 38th Foot ...	40	1,014	0	
		Head Quarters and 3rd Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery ...	8	116	24	
	Bunterra	2nd Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery ...	4	110	18	
		F Troop Royal Horse Artillery ...	8	195	0	
	Lucknow...	3rd Company 8th Battalion, Royal Artillery ...	5	165	0	
		6th Company 11th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	5	105	0	
		5th Company 12th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	6	183	0	
		5th and 6th Companies 13th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	11	242	0	
1st Troop 1st Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery ...		5	103	19		
2nd Company 3rd Battalion Bengal Artillery ...		6	93	76		
2nd Company 8th Battalion Bengal Artillery ...		0	0	100		
3rd Battn. Rifle Brigade ...		40	925	0		
	Carried over ...	326	7,475	2,648		

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Continued.)

Divisions.	Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
CAWNPORE.—(Continued.)	Lucknow Fyzabad Alum Bagh Bundie Moosa Bagh Allahabad Futtehpore	Brought over ...	326	7,475	2,648	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		Her Majesty's 20th Foot ...	38	824	0	
		Her Majesty's 23rd Fusiliers ...	44	979	0	
		Her Majesty's 53rd Foot ...	24	939	0	
		Her Majesty's 97th Foot ...	39	837	0	
		1st European Bengal Fusiliers ...	24	875	0	
		Ferozepore Regiment ...	4	2	784	
		Lahore Light Horse ...	8	131	5	
		1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry ...	4	0	589	
		Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoons ...	21	530	0	
		2nd Punjaub Infantry ...	9	0	1091	
		5th Ditto ditto ...	6	0	1011	
		2nd Troop 1st Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery ...	4	107	21	
		E. Troop Royal Horse Artillery ...	8	184	0	
		4th Company 14th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	7	151	0	
		Her Majesty's 32nd Foot ...	15	491	0	
		Her Majesty's 54th Foot ...	23	563	0	
Allahabad Levy ...	4	0	477			
3½ Companies of Her Majesty's 80th Foot ...	10	305	0			
	Total ...	618	14,393	6,626		
SAUGOR DISTRICT.	Saugor Marowa Malthone	1st Company 3rd Battalion Bengal Artillery ...	3	63	28	
		52nd Native Infantry ...	16	2	151	
		3rd Irregular Cavalry ...	2	0	135	
		31st Native Infantry ...	8	2	889	
		42nd Ditto ditto ...	11	1	226	
	Total ...	40	68	1,429		
MEERUT.	Meerut Bijnour Roorkee	Head Quarters and 3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery ...	9	114	20	
		Head Qrs. 3rd Btt. Arty. ...	2	6	0	
		3rd Light Cavalry ...	7	2	79	
		Her Majesty's 75th Foot ...	24	790	0	
		Nusseeree Battalion ...	8	2	831	
		Meerut Light Horse European ...	9	121	0	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		5th Troop 1st Brigd. H. Arty. ...	2	2	90	
		4th Company 4th Battalion Bengal Artillery ...	2	75	27	
		1st Punjaub Cavalry ...	4	0	480	
		1st Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	924	
17th Ditto ...	5	1	1,040	} Raised since the Mutiny.		
1st Sikh Infantry ...	5	0	948			
	Carried over ...	81	1,113	4,439		

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Continued)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned. Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
MEERUT.—(Continued.)		Brought forward ...	81	1,113	4,439	
	Delhie	2nd Troop 2nd Brigade / Horse Artillery ... }	4	106	30	
		1st Co. 4th Battn. Arty. ...	3	56	26	
		Head Quarters 8th Batta- / lion Artillery ... }	2	2	3	
		H. M.'s 61st Foot ...	17	789	0	
		2nd European Bengal Frs....	20	804	0	
		4th Irregular Cavalry ...	3	0	232	
	Landour	2nd Sikh Cavalry ...	7	0	634	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		Landour Regiment ...	6	1	486	
	Agra	2nd Company 5th Battalion / Bengal Artillery ... }	4	75	16	
		Her Majesty's 8th Foot ...	17	808	0	
	Goorgaon	Meade's Horse ...	3	0	404	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		Kemaon Battalion ...	5	2	692	
	Moradabad	1st Company 1st Bttn. Arty.	3	88	91	
		H. M.'s 60th Foot (1st Battn.)	18	785	0	
	Shajehanpore	4th Co. 1st Battn. Artillery	3	44	6	
		1st Co. 5th Battn. Artillery	2	61	21	
		H. M.'s 9th Lancers ...	17	527	0	
		H. M.'s 42nd Highlanders	37	882	0	
		H. M.'s 78th Highlanders	22	759	0	
		H. M.'s Highlanders ...	34	931	0	
		H. M.'s 93rd Highlanders	39	964	0	
		2nd Punjaub Cavalry ...	8	0	720	
		4th Punjaub Infantry ...	6	0	855	
		24th Ditto ditto ...	6	20	846	} Raised since the Mutiny.
	66th Native Infantry ...	16	1	1,096		
	Huldwanee	1st Extra Goorkha Regiment	5	0	408	} Raised since the Mutiny.
	Nynee Tal	H. M.'s 6th Dragoon Guards	27	620	0	
Buksena	22nd Punjaub Infantry ..	4	0	1,011	} Raised since the Mutiny.	
Gungeree	23rd Ditto ditto ...	4	2	892		
Kanound	2nd Co. 4th Battn. Artillery	1	60	29		
Subawar	Mhairwarra Battalion ...	4	2	729		
Bewar	Mhair Regiment ...	3	2	565		
Ajmere						
		Total ...	431	9,504	14,231	
SIRHIND.	Umballah	4th Light Cavalry Lancers	1	1	38	
		Her Majesty's 27th Foot ...	31	902	0	
		5th Native Infantry ...	2	0	19	
	Jullundur	13th Punjaub Infantry ...	7	2	939	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		1st Troop 3rd Brigade / Horse Artillery ... }	3	16	28	
		Head Quarters 1st Batta- / lion Artillery ... }	2	5	0	
		6th Light Cavalry ...	6	0	17	
		Her Majesty's 87th Fusiliers	25	1,008	0	
		33rd Native Infantry ...	8	2	863	
		36th Ditto ...	6	2	126	
		61st Ditto ...	9	1	126	
		4th Sikh Infantry ...	5	0	385	
16th Punjaub Infantry ...	5	1	874	} Raised since the Mutiny.		
Carried over ...	110	2,030	3,415			

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Continued.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
SIRHIND.—(Contd.)		Brought forward ...	110	2,030	3,115	
	Phillour ...	2nd Co. 2nd Battn. Artillery ...	1	69	35	
	Hosheypore ...	3rd Native Infantry ...	7	2	104	
		Left Wing 4th Native Infy.	5	0	346	
	Total ...	123	2,101	3,900		
LAHORE.	Lahore ...	Head Quarters and 1st Troop 2nd Brigd. Horse Artillery ...	6	107	26	
		3rd Co. 3rd Battn. Arty. ...	4	84	88	
		Head Quarters and 3rd Compy. 4th Battn Arty. }	4	77	31	
		8th Light Cavalry ...	4	1	359	
		9th Ditto ditto ...	3	0	170	
		Her Majesty's 7th Fusiliers	44	1114	0	
		16th Native Infantry ...	0	0	784	
		26th Ditto ditto ...	2	0	144	
		49th Ditto ditto ...	6	1	666	
		4th Seikh Irr. Cavalry ...	1	0	38	
	Googaira ...	21st Punjaub Infantry ...	6	0	923	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		16th Irregular Cavalry ...	2	0	416	
		15th Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	958	
	Umritsur ...	2nd Co. 1st Battn. Arty. ...	2	73	31	
		5th Co. 8th Battn. Arty. ...	1	0	120	
		35th Native Infantry ...	6	1	762	
	Ferozepore ...	59th ditto ditto ...	8	1	800	
		10th Light Cavalry ...	6	1	129	
		Her Majesty's 24th Foot ...	26	941	0	
	Kana ...	20th Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	945	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		Head Quarters and 1st Co. 2nd Battn. Arty. ...	5	89	92	
	Goordaspore ...	2nd Irr. Cavalry ...	4	0	403	
		4th Troop 3d Brigade Horse Artillery ...	3	2	96	
	Mooltan ...	4th Co. 3rd Battn. Arty. ...	2	78	27	
		1st Co. 6th Battn. Royal Artillery ...	7	186	0	
		62nd Native Infantry ...	8	0	580	
		69th Ditto ditto ...	10	1	805	
Sealkote ...	11th Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	198	} Raised since the Mutiny.	
	H. M.'s 2nd Dragoons ...	29	466	0		
Mogul-ke-Serai ...	H. M.'s 52nd Lt. Infantry.	23	846	0		
	1st Irregular Cavalry ...	3	0	545		
Reisan ...	2nd Punjaub Light Field Battery ...	2	0	140		
	Noorpore ...	4th Native Infantry ...	8	0	427	
Dera Ishmael Khan.	39th Native Infantry ...	7	0	762		
	No. 4 Garrison Co. of Arty.	2	0	131		
	1st Punjaub Lt. Field Btty.	1	2	142		
Dera Ghazee Khan... Asuce ...	10th Punjaub Infantry ..	3	0	939	} Raised since the Mutiny.	
	3rd Punjaub Cavalry ...	8	0	538		
	4th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	537		
	Total ...	272	4,073	13,752		

DISTRIBUTION RETURN — (Continued.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	Native Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
PESHAWUR.	Peshawur	3rd Co. 2nd Battn. Arty. ...	1	35	36	
		6th Co. 7th Battalion Royal Artillery ...	6	185	0	
		H. M.'s 70th Foot ...	25	969	0	
		24th Native Infantry ...	6	0	830	
		27th Ditto ditto ...	7	1	733	
		7th Irregular Cavalry ...	4	0	586	
		18th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	588	
		9th Punjaub Infantry ...	5	0	930	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		14th Ditto ditto ...	5	0	931	
	18th Ditto ditto ...	4	0	918		
	Attock	4th Co. 8th Battn. Arty. ...	0	0	39	
		4th Co. 2nd Battn. Arty. (with European Drivers attached) ...	3	144	31	
	Selim Khan	Her Majesty's 81st Foot ...	33	1,041	0	} 7 Cos. at Peshawur and Nowshera.
		Peshawur Mountain Train Battery ...	5	1	186	
	Shabkuddur	8th Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	923	} Raised since the Mutiny.
		21st Native Infantry ...	10	2	924	
	Nowshera	5th Light Cavalry ...	5	0	445	
		H. M.'s 98th Foot ...	38	800	0	
		64th Native Infantry ...	9	2	869	
	Rawul Pindee	4th Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery ...	5	2	93	
		Her Majesty's 9th Foot ...	42	893	0	
		58th Native Infantry ...	9	2	775	
		17th Irregular Cavalry ...	6	0	586	
Kohat	19th Punjaub Infantry ...	3	0	904	} Raised since the Mutiny.	
	3rd Punjaub Infantry ...	4	0	957		
	6th Ditto ...	3	0	920		
	Carried over ...	246	4,077	13,204		

DISTRIBUTION RETURN.—(Concluded.)

DIVISIONS.	STATIONS.	Corps.	European Commissioned	European Non-Commis-	Native Commissioned,	REMARKS.
			Officers.	sioned and Rank and File.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	
PESHAWUR.—(Continued.)		Brought forward ...	246	4,070	13,204	
	Campbellpore ...	Peshawur Light Horse (European and Native) ...	10	189	98	Raised since the Mutiny.
	Abbottabad ...	Hazara Mountain Train Batty	1	0	81	
		2nd Seikh Infantry ..	3	1	923	
	Koolachee ...	5th Punjaub Cavalry ...	5	0	584	Raised since the Mutiny.
	Hurreepore ...	12th Punjaub Infantry ...	5	0	940	
	Murdan ...	Corps of Guides Infantry and Cavalry ...	6	0	1,047	
	Bunnoo ...	3rd Punjaub Light Field Battery ...	1	2	142	
		3rd Seikh Infantry ...	3	0	860	
		9th Irregular Cavalry ..	3	0	240	
	Ukora ...	3rd T. 2nd Brigd. H. Arty.	3	98	30	
	Euzufzye ...	Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment ...	6	0	1,137	
		Total ..	292	4,367	19,286	
	Rangoon ...	Right Wing 25th N. I. ...	6	1	397	
	China ...	47th Native Infantry ...	15	1	498	
	65th Ditto ditto ..	9	2	888		
	70th Ditto ditto ...	13	2	886		
	Total ...	37	5	2,272		
Kussmore in Scinde...	6th Irregular Cavalry ...	4	0	584		

N. B.—No returns having been received from the following Corps they have been omitted:—

EUROPEAN.

6th Battalion Bengal Artillery.
 Royal Engineers 4th and 23rd Companies.
 Her Majesty's 5th Fusiliers.
 Ditto 13th Light Infantry.
 Ditto 29th Foot.
 Ditto 64th Ditto.
 Ditto 82nd Ditto.
 Ditto 90th Ditto.

NATIVE.

7th Battalion Foot Artillery.
 9th Ditto.
 Sirmoor Battalion.
 Beatson's Horse.
 Behar Horse.
 Rohilcund Horse.
 Jodhpore Seikh Horse.
 Mooltanee Regt. of Cavalry.
 Towanna Horse.
 Mynpoorie Levy.

Raised since the Mutiny.

A B S T R A C T.

CORPS.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
QUEEN'S.				
Royal Artillery (2 Troops and 13 Companies) ..	95	2,362	0	
6 Regiments of Cavalry ..	136	2,885	0	
37 Regiments of Infantry ..	1,150	31,983	0	
Total ...	1,381	37,230	0	
HONORABLE COMPANY'S EUROPEANS.				
3 Brigades of Horse Artillery (9 Troops) ...	46	967	0	
5 Battalions Foot Artillery 20 Companies ...	66	1,512	0	
3 Regiments of Infantry ...	68	2,583	0	
European Invalid Battalion ..	77	214	0	
3 Regiments of Light Horse ..	27	441	0	Raised since the Mutiny.
Total ...	284	5,717	0	
NATIVES.				
3 Troops Horse Artillery ...	10	6	279	
1 Battalion Foot Artillery (3 Companies) ...	3	2	262	
Gun Lascars attached to the European Horse } and Foot Artillery ... }	0	0	1,071	
Governor General's Body Guard, and 7 Regi- } ments of Light Cavalry ... }	35	6	1,371	
38 Regiments of Native Infantry ..	320	43	21,833	
24 Regiments of Local and Irregular Infantry .	98	23	15,714	{ Including 9 Regiments raised since the Mutiny.
15 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry ..	47	0	5,527	{ Including 2 Regiments of Horse raised since the Mutiny.
1 Company Assam Local Artillery ...	1	1	107	
2 Companies Sebundy Sappers and Miners ..	1	2	206	
Total ...	515	83	46,370	
PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.				
Batteries ...	10	5	691	{ Including the Peshawur Mountain Train Battery.
4 Garrison Company of Artillery ...	2	0	131	
Regiments of Cavalry ...	45	0	4,404	{ Including 4 Seikh Regiments raised since the Mutiny.
Troop Peshawur Light Horse ...	0	0	103	Raised since the Mutiny.
18 Regiments of Infantry ..	135	27	24,804	{ Including 18 Regiments raised since the Mutiny.
Corps of Guides ..	6	0	1,047	
Total ...	198	32	31,180	

(Signed) W. MAYHEW, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Adjutant General of the Army.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
The 6th July 1858. }

No. 293 of 1858.

FROM

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C. B.,
Commandant-in-Chief, Scinde Irregular Horse.

TO

COLONEL DURAND, C. B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General of India.

Dated Jacobabad, 7th June 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt this day of your printed letter No. 19, of the 21st May 1858, to my address, with accompaniment, and with reference to their subject, to state that with respect to the questions regarding the numbers, distribution and accommodation of Troops in the Bombay Presidency generally, I am not in possession of the information necessary to enable me to reply to these queries with precision; and as you will of course receive replies from those Officers who have the necessary records to refer to, regarding such matters, it seems best that I should not trouble you with approximations only to exact information.

2. With respect to the other questions on the list, bearing reference to the Presidency of Bombay or to India generally, I beg leave to observe that it appears to me to be wholly erroneous to suppose that the numbers of European Troops to be stationed in that Presidency or in India, should bear any particular proportion to the numbers of Native Troops employed.

3. It cannot, it appears to me, be wise to attempt to regulate the numbers of Europeans to be employed in the service, by any such considerations as the proportions which these numbers may bear to the Native Troops, but it seems that such numbers must depend on totally different circumstances, such as the nature of the duties to be performed, the climate, local position, &c.

4. For instance on this frontier, Europeans would be totally useless; they could not live in this climate, and in one year Regiments would probably be reduced to Companies, however well the men might be sheltered, while if they had to take the Field in the summer time, one day might suffice to destroy the whole Force. Kurrachee, on the contrary, is probably the best place in all India at which permanently to mass a large European Force for imperial purposes, and totally irrespective of merely provincial requirements.

5. I would also remark that it seems to me to be absolutely certain that we cannot hold India by an Army chiefly, or in large proportions, composed of English Soldiers, and that to attempt to do so must be attended with speedy and utter ruin.

6. In the first place, England could not supply the numbers of Soldiers, supposed on the most moderate estimate to be required for the purpose of maintaining such an Army in the East.

7. And again, it is clear to me that if we could command even such a host of Europeans as the grand Army with which Napoleon invaded Russia, the attempt to coerce India by such forces would only end in more complete and hopeless failure.

8. The mere brute force of hundreds of thousands of men becomes powerless before that of hundreds of millions of such people as the Natives of India. The whole force of the Mogul Empire was never able to subdue even one of these nations—the Rajpoot.

9. To attempt to govern India by the force of numbers of English Soldiers must, it seems to me, alienate from us, all of the best of the inhabitants of the country, who are now assuredly inclined to favor and to support our power, while those inclined to be dissatisfied with our rule, who have hitherto been effectually restrained by the knowledge that the feelings of the great body of the people were with us, would then be free to display their hostility.

10. Whatever the numbers of European Soldiers employed, if we found ourselves placed in opposition to the whole people of India, composing all the classes above referred to, the result could not long be doubtful.

11. We should, I conceive, speedily find ourselves in the position of a waggoner, who, finding his horses unruly and troublesome, and perhaps getting a kick from one of the animals, should dispense with the services of the team, and place himself, with one or two of his friends, between the shafts. It is certain, that though the men might break their hearts with their exertions, they would not move the load one inch. But let the driver, instead of finding fault with the poor horses, improve his own guiding power a little, let him handle his team more skilfully, and he would soon find all working together with irresistible power, quietly, steadily and well.

12. Thus, I am convinced that this great Empire also cannot be controlled by English bone and muscle, by numbers of English bodies, but it can be held in perfect safety and security by English mind, by English moral power—by the influence of a moderate number of cultivated English gentlemen, rather than by a multitude of rude Soldiers.

13. It is certain that the Natives of India, even of Hindoostan Proper, habitually under proper treatment, and commanded as *men* in accordance with living principles and natural laws, can be made as good, true and faithful Soldiers, as any Europeans whatever.

14. This has been long known to me, but its truth has been placed beyond a doubt by the facts which have occurred while I was absent in Persia. During the last year in Upper Scinde, where a body of Native Officers and Hindoostanee Sepoys, mostly from the most disturbed districts around Delhi, standing alone amidst the rebellious inhabitants of the country, and the disaffected Sepoys of other Corps in the Government Service, when tried and tempted, as none of their brethren have been tried or tempted elsewhere, not only remained themselves perfectly faithful and true, but without an European Soldier within hundreds of miles of them, controlled and repressed every attempt, however insidious, or however formidable, by whomsoever made, whether by secret persuasion or open force at Mutiny and Rebellion around them—and thus saved the lives of all the Europeans in this Province, and prevented a violent open rebellion throughout Scinde and Beloochistan, while, in some instances, they knew their sons and relations,

though probably as true even as themselves, were being executed as traitors by British Officers in Hindoostan.

15. I beg leave to suggest that, the correspondence relating to the conduct of the Troops, the proceedings on this Frontier, and the treatment of men detached from hence on recruiting Service in Hindoostan during the past year, be called for from the Commissioner in Scinde, or from the Government of Bombay. This correspondence would, I think, with reference to the subject now treated of, be found most significant and interesting.

16. Previously to the receipt of your letter under reply, I had been requested by the Commissioner in Scinde to answer questions with respect to this Province, similar to those which I have now been favored with from yourself, wherefore it seems to me that, I cannot do better than forward herewith a duplicate of my reply to Mr. Frere, which I have accordingly the honor to do.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
(Signed) JOHN JACOB, *Brigadier General,*
Commandant-in-Chief, Scinde Irregular Force.

COMMANDANT'S OFFICE ;
 Jacobabad,
The 7th June 1858. }

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN JACOB.

QUESTIONS referred by the Commissioner in Scinde to Brigadier General Jacob, with his replies thereto.

Jacobabad, 5th June 1858.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

I AM not informed on this head.

2.

It seems to me that this question cannot be answered wisely ; if the occupation of Scinde be considered as a provincial matter only, Scinde being the most exposed portion of the Frontier of India, the Military occupation of this province can only be properly discussed with reference to Imperial interests.

For local purposes, for the mere occupation, no European Troops are actually necessary, except two Companies of Artillery, but with a view to Imperial interests and necessities, Kurrachee seems to me to be in every respect the best position in all India at which permanently to station a large body of European Troops.

The climate is most favorable, as good perhaps as any in the world, while the Troops there Stationed would be in the best possible position as a reserve force for service in the Punjab,

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

or any where on our N. W. Frontiers; the means of transport by land and water are continually improving, and if placed on a proper footing, a force of ten thousand men might reach the Punjab from Kurrachee in the space of one month. On the other hand, being massed at a seaport Town, the Troops could readily be transported by sea to any other part of the Empire.

The presence of a large force of European Troops at Kurrachee would, in my opinion, tend more than any other measure to keep all quiet throughout and beyond our N. W. Provinces, while, if the Regiments had their permanent Head Quarters established at Kurrachee, they would always be able to move anywhere on Service, leaving sick weakly Recruits, and unfits, as well as the wives and families of the members of the Corps, in safety and comfort at their homes, to which the men would return on the conclusion of the duty on which they might be commanded, and this seems to me to be an arrangement which conduces in a most powerful manner to the efficiency of Soldiers in the field.

I should recommend then that a force be permanently stationed at Kurrachee, consisting of two Troops of Horse Artillery and four field Batteries fully horsed and manned, ready at all times for field service with a grand Arsenal and Ordnance Depôt, and four reserve Companies of European Sappers and ten Regiments of European Infantry. There should be no other European Troops anywhere in the Province.

3.

I have no means of supplying the information required in the first part of this question; with respect to the latter part, the only Native Troops required for Scinde are those composing the Frontier Field Force. The Frontier Field Force might consist of three Regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse, with three Troops of Salidar Horse Artillery and three Regiments of Salidar Infantry as detailed in former correspondence with the Commissioner in Scinde and with Government. The permanent Head Quarters of these Corps should be established at Jacobabad. No troops are in my opinion required at other Stations or any where in the interior of Scinde, a proper organized Police force should be maintained for internal duties, such as Jail Guards, &c., 1500 Mounted and 4,500 Foot Police might suffice for Scinde exclusive of the Frontier, but on this matter I am not fully informed, and am doubtful as to exact number, without having the records to refer to.

5.

This question is answered above, but it would be highly advisable to attach a full Company of Gun Lascars of the old strength of 120 men to each Troop and Company of European Artillery, and of European Sappers.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

6.

It appears to me that the number of Europeans to be employed should be determined on without any reference to the proportion they may bear to other Troops, but on consideration depending on totally different questions and principles.

7.

There is accommodation for a Troop of Horse Artillery and two Regiments of Infantry at Kurrachee, and for one Regiment at Hydrabad.

8.

Good Barracks must be provided at Kurrachee for a Troop of Horse Artillery and eight Companies of Foot Artillery, two Companies of Sappers, and for eight Regiments of Infantry.

9.

The idea of any such proportions appearing to me to be wholly erroneous.

Forty thousand European Infantry would be ample for all India ; of these I should advise that ten thousand be quartered at Kurrachee, five thousand at other convenient Stations in the Bombay Presidency, five thousand in the Madras Presidency, two thousand in the Bengal Presidency, and the remaining ten thousand in reserve at Scinde.

The whole of the Artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few Troops and Companies formed for special service in particular localities where Europeans could not live.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, *Brigr.-General,*
Political Superintendent, and Commandant
on the Frontier of N. Scinde.

EXTRACT of a letter from Sir John Lawrence, G. C. B., Chief Commissioner Punjab, to Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Durand, C. B., on special duty with the Governor General, Allahabad, dated Murree, 25th June 1858.

“ I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 7, of the 27th ultimo, with its enclosures, regarding the reorganization of the Bengal Army. So far as concerns the Territories under my control, the annexed memo. contains full and complete replies to your queries.

“ It will be seen that this document is signed by Brigadier General Chamberlain, C. B., and Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes, C. B. By associating these two able and experienced Officers in its preparation, I am able to furnish Government with more satisfactory information than had I drawn up the paper by myself. On all the various and important subjects which have come under consideration, it will be seen also that our opinions are unanimous.”

PUNJAUB COMMITTEE.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to Para. 5 of Court's Despatch No. 235, of the 25th November 1857.

PUNJAUB.

QUESTIONS.

1.

ANSWERS.

The abstract numbers are as follow :—

Artillery	1,691
Cavalry	707
Infantry	11,157
Total	13,555

Their detail and distribution is shown in the accompanying Statement No. 1.

2.

The abstract numbers recommended are as follow :—

Arms.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of men.
Sappers and Miners	0	2	200
Artillery	0	29	2,900
Cavalry	5	0	2,500
Infantry	17	0	17,000
Total	22,600

For detail and distribution see Statement No. 2.

3.

The armed Troops are as follow :—

Native Regulars	1,000
Ditto Irregulars	6,990
Punjaub Ditto	20,860
Police	13,050
Depôts	2,450
Levies	7,076
Total	51,426

For detail see the accompanying Statement No. 3.

The unarmed Troops are of course not shown here ; but in round numbers they are about 12,000 men.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

4.

The abstract numbers recommended are as follow :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of men.
Pioneers	0	2	200
Artillery	0	8½	840
Irregular Cavalry	15	0	7,400
Police Horse... ..	0	54	5,400
Infantry	31	0	27,624
Police Battalion	12	1	10,900
Total	52,364

For detail and distribution see Statement No. 4.

5.

The first clause of this question is answered in answer No 3.

The proportion of castes in the Native Troops in these Territories stands thus :—

Mussulmans	30,188
Seikhs	14,692
Hindoos of mixed Castes... ..	6,546
Total	<u>51,426</u>

The following is the detail :—

Arm.	Mussulmans.	Seikhs.	Hindoo mixed.	Total.
Hindoostanee Regulars ...	166	0	834	1,000
Ditto Irregulars ...	6,939	0	51	6,990
Punjaabee Ditto	10,837	6,460	3,563	20,860
Police Horse	3,033	1,517	0	4,550
Ditto Foot	3,400	3,300	1,800	8,500
Depots... ..	1,096	1,056	298	2,450
Levies	4,717	2,359	0	7,076
Total	30,188	14,692	6,546	51,426

6.

Regulars	None.
Irregulars	36,064
Police	16,300
Total	<u>52,364</u>

For details see answer No 4.

7.

By the foregoing proposals the ratio of European to Native Troops inclusive of Police is as 3 to 7.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

The ratio of European to Natives exclusive of Police is as 5 to 8 ; as a rule the *minimum* of Europeans should be 3 Natives, and the *maximum* 1 to 2. Assuming this principle to be expedient, to 22,600 Europeans we might have 67,800 Natives. The actual proposition now submitted is 52,364 Natives, or a mean between the two ratios ; the larger the proportion of Police the lower may be the ratio of the Europeans. As a mere question of security, a large European Force is essential, but to administer the country a still larger number of Native is indispensable. The country can neither be held nor worked by Europeans alone. If at first sight the ratio of Natives in the present proposal be deemed too great for safety, it must be borne in mind that on the side of the Europeans are ranged 102 Field pieces of Artillery, against 22 on the side of the Native. Or if it be thought that less Natives would suffice for the administration, the answer will be found in a careful inspection of the details and distribution. At every point the Natives have been reduced to the lowest practicable number.

8.

Not required.

9.

The total accommodation is more than sufficient for the European Troops.

We have at present 13,655 European Soldiers, and accommodation (permanent or temporary) for 20,000. We are also constructing temporary Barracks at Campbellpore, and permanent ones at Umritsur and Mooltan. New Barracks have been sanctioned at Ferozepore. No difficulty has been experienced this year in sheltering the European Troops.

10.

Additional accommodation would be required for 12,131 men as shown in Statement No. 5, because some of the present Barracks are of a temporary nature, and others are not in the places where they are wanted. In no place however will really good Barracks be thrown away by the proposed arrangements, except at Peshawur, where it is necessary to save life. Until new Barracks were erected at all the required points, the distribution of the European Force would be modified so far as to fill all existing Barracks at whatever Station.

 PUNJAUB COMMITTEE.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. Having now replied categorically to the questions propounded by the Governor General, we proceed to offer some general observations.

2. It will be seen that the Military occupation of the Country is placed upon very stable foundations. The European Force is nearly doubled. The Native Troops are largely diminished in numbers, and changed from what is called the Regular to the Irregular system.

The organized Police is greatly enlarged. The mass of the Artillery is transferred from the hands of the Natives to those of Europeans. For the old Regular Native Cavalry, a new force of European Cavalry is substituted.

3. It is anticipated that these radical changes will be effected without any financial sacrifice ; we have not the means or time to exhibit the exact difference of expenditure, but from a rough calculation believe that there will be little if any. By the statement No. 6, the rates of Pay of the Troops remaining the same, there would be a saving of nearly five lakhs of Rupees per annum. But the pay of the Troopers of the Punjaub Cavalry has been lately raised from 20 Rupees to 25 Rupees a month, and a strong recommendation has been submitted to Government for a similar increase in the Hindoostanee Cavalry ; making allowance for this increase and for a corresponding one in the pay of Native Cavalry Officers, it is anticipated that there will be neither saving nor loss.

The increase and decrease of the several arms may be conveniently shown below :—

ARM.	Former Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Increase.	Decrease.
Europeans	12,050	22,600	9,550
Native Regular and Irregular	58,717	36,064	22,653
Police	9,000	16,300	7,300
Total	79,767	74,964	16,850	22,653

RESULT.—Actual Decrease of 5,803.

4. The details of the column headed “ Former Strength ” will be found in the accompanying Statement No. VII., but it should be explained that the Regiments of Europeans are there calculated at only 850 men, being the average strength to which they had unhappily sunk for want of recruits previous to the rebellion, while each Regiment in the scheme for the future is assumed to be 1000 men, the strength at which they should be invariably and carefully maintained by regular annual reinforcements. If the Regiments in both cases were assumed to be 1000 strong, the increased establishment of Europeans would be only 7,900 men.

5. Another feature of the proposed changes is, that the whole decrease is effected in those classes of the Native Soldiery who are entitled to pensions, while any increase of Natives is confined to the Police, to whom pensions are only given in special cases. This is a great prospective advantage.

6. On the whole then, it will be seen that in drawing up the present proposal, while on the one hand due weight has been given to considerations of finance, and on the other, a full share of employment has been provided for the military classes of our subjects, the whole system of military occupation in the Punjaub has been so remodelled as to place that important Frontier Province of our Indian Empire thoroughly within the grasp of our own countrymen ; at the same time it should never be forgotten, that no system, however carefully elaborated, however theoretically complete, can ever work efficiently and securely unless it be placed under the guidance and control of Officers thoroughly competent to discharge the duties entrusted to them.

* * * * *
* * * * *

On a former occasion, Brigadier General Chamberlain and Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes had advocated the withdrawal of all European Troops from the Peshawur Valley, while Sir John Lawrence thought such a measure would be unsafe, and that Peshawur must be held by Europeans or not at all.

But the new Station of Nowshera is admitted to have never yet been fully tried by European Troops, and is known to be at all events much healthier than Peshawur. As yet too the long desired bridge over the Indus at Attock (which was a *sine quâ non* in the proposed withdrawal of the Europeans) has not been constructed or begun. For the present, therefore, we would unanimously recommend that Nowshera be a Station for Europeans, and that as soon as the Grand Trunk Road through the Punjaub be completed, the construction of the Attock bridge be commenced without delay, so that before its completion, a definite judgment may be formed as to the possibility of cantoning European Troops at all in the Peshawur Valley.

9. The result of the arrangement now proposed would be to place about 2,000 European Soldiers in the whole valley instead of 2,500. But the great change is in transposing the men by locating at Peshawur only 300 instead of 2,000, and 1,650 at Nowshera instead of a third of that number.

10. Little expense for Barracks is involved in the transposition, for already there are Barracks at Nowshera for a Regiment of 1,000 men, quite capable of holding 1,200, and it is believed that the remaining 450 may be housed in the Barracks which were erected as a sanatorium for Invalids from Peshawur.

11. The reasons for withdrawing the European Troops from Peshawur are not only sanatory, but Military, to remove the embarrassment of an unwieldy cantonment from what would be the field of action in any great crisis on the frontier.

But if Nowshera prove healthy, there would be no Military objection to locating there the Military Force. On the contrary, it is a good military point, affording a proper base to the Irregular Force at Peshawur, an useful link with Attock, and a convenient support to Murdan. It also commands the passage of the Cabul river ; when to these reasons it is added that excellent stone Barracks have been built there at great expense, it seems unreasonable to abandon Nowshera, till like Peshawur it proves decidedly unhealthy for the Troops.

12. If, on the other hand, Government should desire not to withdraw the masses of European Troops from the cantonment of Peshawur, then the following distribution of Frontier Garrisons is recommended :—

STATIONS.	ARTILLERY.		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.
	Troops.	Reserved Companies.			
Peshawur	2	1	*350	1,000	1,650
Nowshera	1	0	150	1,000	1,250
Attock	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	150	200
Campellpore... ..	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	500	1,850	2,600
Total	4 or 400 men.	3 or 300 men	1,000	4,000	5,700

13. By either of the above proposals nearly 8,000 European Soldiers are placed within 100 miles of Peshawur, 7,000 of whom in an emergency could be concentrated in a week on any point.

14. Whether the Peshawur Cantonment be in future occupied by European or Native Troops, it will be equally necessary to have a new Fort there, and that it should be garrisoned by European Soldiers. A Fort is indispensably necessary to contain an Ordnance Depôt, the Civil Treasury, a Granary, and (in addition to the accommodation for the regular Garrison) a Barrack to receive the families of all Europeans, residents at Peshawur, in case of emergency. The old Fort at Peshawur, was designed solely to overawe the town, and is too far from the British Cantonment to answer our purposes.

It is moreover greatly dilapidated, and to repair and adapt it would be almost as expensive as to build a suitable position. A fortification on European principles is not required ; but a strong enclosure with a curtain wall high enough for protection against direct fire, flanked by solid bastions for heavy guns and surrounded by a ditch. The best site for all purposes would be the high ground on which stand the houses of the late Colonel Mackeson and Colonel Phillips. A Fort planted here would command the Cantonment with its fire, and sufficiently control the city. The old Fort (on the completion of the new one) might be converted into a Godown or Seraie.

15. The Peshawur Depôt Magazine should be merely one of issue, and on as small a scale as possible. Stores should not be manufactured there. It is an evil accumulating Military material unnecessarily. Trans-Indus Peshawur should be regarded as an outpost, and kept as free as possible from embarrassment.

16. If our proposal to place only a Native Irregular Brigade at Peshawur be adopted, the Irregulars should occupy the Barracks formerly built for the European Soldiers, by which present expense in housing the Natives would be saved, and the Barracks be kept in repair so as to be available at any time for a European Force.

* NOTE.—Head Quarters of Cavalry Regiment here for sake of existing Barracks.

17. All old Native lines and superfluous bungalows not required by the Irregular Brigade should be levelled.

18. Passing now from the Peshawur Valley, a few words are necessary regarding other Military positions in the Territory.

19. Campbellpore, the new Cis-Indus Cantonments selected by Sir Sidney Cotton is only on trial, but it is expected to prove a healthy place ; at present its only apparent defect is, that it is off the line of the high road. This is however a very serious one, and as the buildings as yet are only temporary, it is strongly recommended that the country be again carefully searched for a suitable site on the high road. Campbellpore is said to be the only site capable of cantoning 7,000 men, but a site fit for 5,000 men is all that we require.

20. Rawul Pindee is in every respect a first rate position for European Troops ; its strategic importance is great ; it covers Murree, supports Peshawur, and is well placed for Kohat and the Derajat. Lastly, it combines the salubrity of the hills with the comfort and convenience of the plains.

21. Sealkote was not well chosen for general purposes. It is in a corner, and designed chiefly to observe Jummoo, but it has proved salubrious, and Government has laid out enormous sums there in buildings. Instead however of placing two European Corps of Infantry at this place, it is strongly recommended to canton one at Jhelum, a point of which the importance was shown throughout the events of 1857. It is the midway link between the upper and lower Punjaub. Its occupation would become immediately necessary in the event of disturbance in the Cashmere Territories. Its situation on the highly navigable river from which it takes its name, points it out at once as a future emporium of commerce, and as the site of a Military Magazine, which cannot be left without European Troops. Its salubrity too is second only to that of Sealkote. A Fort should be erected to command the passage of the River, of the same description as recommended for Peshawur. Nature has provided an admirable site on a mound about 400 yards from the river bank commanding the bridge, the road, the town and the cantonment. A small fortified Magazine already exists about 1000 yards in rear, but it is only adapted for stores, is in low ground, and commands nothing.

22. Lahore, Delhi and Ferozepore must be held in strength, and also have sufficient force to take the field in an emergency. Ferozepore contains the grand arsenal of the Punjaub, and is so well placed to aid in controlling the Cis-Sutlej States. Lahore and Delhi are political capitals, and their importance does not rest on the fading prestige of former dynasties, but on the natural causes and advantages which have ever made them the seats of empire. Much has lately been said in anger about abandoning Delhi, but it is believed that those who advocate the measure would fail to find an equal site on the banks of the Jumna.

23. Mooltan is a warning against neglecting these land marks of nature, at the debouche of the Ravee Chenab and Jhelum rivers, the key of communication between the Punjaub and the Sea, from time immemorial there had been a fortress to secure it. The last Affghan Governor died in defending it. The conquering Seikhs rebuilt, enlarged and strengthened it, till it became the first Fortress in the Punjaub. We took it with infinite pains in the war of 1848-49, and then allowed an Officer of Engineers to

declare it useless. At his bidding we dismantled it, and in 1857 when the first storm arose to try the strength of our grasp upon the Country, we at once betook ourselves to the ancient stronghold, and hastily repaired its breaches.

24. If indeed the late struggle has shown any thing, it is the folly of the English prejudice against Forts, and we would strongly urge that there should be no Station in India without a "keep" of some kind to which non-combatants could retreat upon emergency ;* we must really learn to remember that we are on a foreign soil, and cease to despise the commonest Military precautions. The simplest plan (in old Stations) will now be to select one or two Barracks or other suitable buildings in the Cantonment, and designating them "the keep," connect them in such a way by walls and towers as to be a secure post in case of need. Within the post should be a Granary, in which a month's supply should be kept for the numbers liable to take refuge. By buying in and selling out the grain at certain seasons of the year, fresh stores would be kept up and the expense covered. At many Stations the Church from its height, solidity, tower, &c., is well adapted for defence. What sad loss of European life might have been saved by the precaution of such a "keep" at Cawnpore !

25. It will be seen that it is no part of the present scheme to canton European Troops in the Simla Hills. Both Military and Sanatory reasons are against it. Late events have shown that every effective European Soldier should be in the plains, ready to act at a moment's warning. In the Hills they are entirely dependent on carriage, and may be unable to move, in a crisis of the least importance. Their presence in the plains is an essential element in our occupation of India. Remove them to the Hills, and their moral influence over the disloyal is lost. Natives believe little that they do not see. Again our object is to use the Hills as Sanatoria, and this is defeated by sending up the sick and the healthy indiscriminately. Indeed, there are sick men whom the Hills make worse, and healthy men whom they make sick. Instead therefore of marching two or three whole Regiments up the Hills, let the selected sick and weakly of every European Regiment within reach be sent there to recover. The Stations of Murree, Dhurmsala, Dugshae, Kussowlee and Subathoo would afford accommodation for all the European invalids of the Punjaub and Delhie Territory. By this arrangement, the European Artillery and Cavalry would share with the Infantry the advantages of the Hill Stations which they have not hitherto done, and it may be added that the healthy Europeans are far happier in the open plains, and would never go to the Hill Stations if allowed a choice.

26. Profiting by the experience of the past year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the Artillery from the hands of Native to those of European Gunners. The value of Artillery is perhaps greater in Asia than in any other part of the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the Natives of India, and for that reason become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian Gunner. A small European Force with a powerful Artillery should be irresistible, and no mutiny of a Native Army without Guns could hope to be successful. Many Officers

* The Stations in the Punjaub where keeps will be required are :—

Nowshera.
Campbellpore.
Rawul Pindee.
Sealkote.

Mean Meer.
Mooltan Cantonments.
Jullundur.
Umballa—wherever, in fact, there is not a Fort.

would, for these reasons, object to any Artillery at all being left in the hands of the Natives, but in practice it is not expedient to go to this extreme. The frontier must be excepted. Here in the first place a Mountain Train is necessary, and a European Mountain Train in India is an anomaly. The men are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved, and they require an amount of carriage and supplies which render prompt or rapid movement impossible. The Peshawur Mountain Train was originally manned by Europeans, but Natives were substituted after the very first expedition in which they were engaged. Again, for similar reasons, the defence of the Frontier requires Native Irregular Cavalry and Infantry, and it would be as unwise to brigade European Artillery with Native Troops only, as to tell a Frontier Force that it could not be trusted with Guns. Throughout the crisis of 1857, there were 18 Field Guns manned by Native Irregulars upon the line of the Indus, and their conduct was so good that to disband them would be unjust. Moreover, if Native Artillery be not allowed, European Artillerymen must be located in the Derajat, which is as unhealthy as Peshawur, and European Infantry be employed to guard them. For these reasons it will be observed that, in the present schéme, the Native Infantry of the frontier has been maintained, and so long as the mass of our Artillery in India is manned by Europeans, we need not fear to have a few native Guns upon the border.

27. It is recommended however to reduce the size of each Punjaub Light Field Battery from six to four Guns, a number which it is believed will suffice at Kohat, Bunnoo and Derah Ishmael Khan. This reduction in the three existing Batteries would give six out of the eight Guns required for Peshawur, leaving two to be proved.* Two more are required at Derah Ghazee Khan, and then there will be twenty-two Native Field pieces on the Frontier, instead of 18 as heretofore. The details of the former and proposed arrangement are shown in the subjoined comparison :—

Field Guns on the Frontier.

BEFORE.				PROPOSED.			
STATIONS.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.	STATIONS.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Campbellpore		Campbellpore... ..	12	...	
Nowshera		Nowshera	12	...	
Peshawur	24	...		Peshawar	8	
Kohat	6		Kohat	4	
Bunnoo	6		Bunnoo	4	
Derah Ishmael Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan ... }	...	6		Dera Ishmael Khan	...	4	
				Derah Ghazee Khan	...	2	
Total	24	18	42	Total	24	22	46

Total increase—4 Guns Native.

* That is supposing Government to approve the withdrawal of the European Troops from Peshawur to Nowshera.

The Mountain Trains of Peshawur and Hazara remain as before, and are not included in this Statement of Field Artillery.

28. The only inconvenience that arises from this proposal is, that there is no Battery from which to take the two Guns from Derah Ghazee Khan. They need never be moved, and might be a separate Subaltern Command.

29. Before quitting the subject of Artillery, attention should be drawn to the great saving in expense which would result from retaining Native Drivers and Gun Lascars, with all the European Artillery of the local Army. If the Gunners and Cavalry escort are Europeans, there can be no fear of the Drivers. This was strongly shown at Delhi, where their conduct was admirable. Drivers are not of the Sepoy class, but of the Syce class, and it is an incidental advantage to give an opening to the Artillery Syces for promotion. The Royal Artillery of the Line would have European Drivers as usual.

30. And here we would add that it is desirable always to have some Artillery from the Line serving in India, not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the Artillery of the Local Army.

31. We cannot conclude this report without adverting to the urgent necessity of completing the main line of communication from Kurnaul to Attock. Large sums have already been expended on this road, but half a million of money is still required to complete it, until this has been effected, the Military communication must remain at the mercy of the elements. The road from Lahore to Mooltan is still worse. From the nature of the soil and the line which has been adopted, large sums would be required to improve it. This however is of little consequence, if the Railroad be pushed forward to completion.

32. Lastly, we would urge the imperious necessity of having good Steamers on the Punjaub rivers. Boats of light draught and great steam power are wanted in considerable numbers. Those now plying on the Indus are few in number, and quite unfitted for the navigation of these rivers. It is only by great exertion and immense cost that during the late crisis we have been enabled to transport stores from Kurrachee to the Punjaub, and the delay might have been fatal. A country fertilized by rivers, and broken by ravines and Hills, like the Punjaub, can neither be strongly held nor wisely managed without a system of roads and bridges and river navigation.

STATEMENT No. I.

WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION 1.

STATEMENT of European Troops of all Arms now serving in the Punjaub and Delhi Territoics.

STATIONS.	Artillery.	Strength.	Cavalry.	Strength.	Infantry.	Strength.	REMARKS.
PESHAWUR DIVISION.	Peshawur	$\frac{3}{2}$ Horse $\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{4}{2}$ and $\frac{3}{6}$ Foot ...	374	Peshawur Lt. Horse	180	H. M.'s 70th, 81st, and Eurasian Company ..	1390
	Nowshera...	Wing, Her Majesty's 81st	568
	Campbellpoor	Her Majesty's 98th ..	882
	Rawal Pindee	C. Batty. Royal & $\frac{1}{2}$ Horse	274	Her Majesty's 94th ..	880
LAHORE DIVISION.	Meean Meer	$\frac{1}{2}$ & $\frac{1}{3}$ Horse Dett. & $\frac{3}{4}$ Foot	233	H. M.'s 7th Fusrs. and Dett. of other Corps ..	1443* * H. M.'s 7th Fusrs. is 999 strong.
	Ferozepore... ..	$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{2}{2}$ $\frac{6}{6}$ Foot ...	104	Her Majesty's 24th Foot..	941
	Mooltan	V. Batty. Rl. $\frac{4}{3}$ Foot ..	307	Wing 1st Bombay Fusiliers	386† † The Arty. and Infantry were included together, not separately shown.
	Sealkote	7th Dragoons	466	H. M's 52nd Foot ...	827
	Umritsur	$\frac{2}{1}$ Foot $\frac{5}{8}$ Foot ..	78	Wing 1st Bombay Fusrs. ...	358
	Delhie	186	H. M's. 61st Foot, and 2nd European Regiment .	1525

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STATEMENT No. I.—(Continued.)

STATIONS.	Artillery.	Strength.	Cavalry.	Strength.	Infantry.	Strength.	REMARKS.
UMBALLA DIVISION.	Umballa	9th Lancers ...	61	H. M.'s 27th Foot, and Convalescents ..	766	
	Jullundhur	$\frac{1}{3}$ Horse ..	102	..	H. M.'s 87th Foot ..	759	
	Dugshaie	Detachment of various Re- giments ..	278	
	Kussowlee	Ditto ..	19	
	Subathoo	Ditto ..	59	
	Phillour	$\frac{13}{4}$ Foot ..	38	Detachment 87th ..	76
	Total of Artillery ...	1,691	Total of Cavalry ..	707	Total of Infantry ..	11,157	

Prepared from Returns dated June 1st.

ABSTRACT.

Artillery	1,691	}
Cavalry	707	
Infantry	11,157	
Total	13,555	

The sickness in Lahore and Umballa Division, is about 11 per cent.

(Signed) R. C. LAWRENCE,
Officiating Military Secretary.

STATEMENT No. II.

WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION 2.

PROPOSED distribution of European Troops in the Punjaub and Delhi Territories.

No.	STATIONS.	Engineers.	ARTILLERY.		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	REMARKS.
			Troops or Batteries.	Foot Reserve Companies.				
1	Peshawur	1	...	200	300	<p>The Reserve Company of Artillery and the 200 Infantry are to garrison the proposed Fort.</p> <p>* For convenience in this return, each Troop, Battery or Company is counted as 100 men.</p> <p>† If the New Cavalry Regiments are to be 500 strong as recommended, then two Regiments should be at Campbellpore, furnishing a detachment to Nowshera. But if the strength of Regiments is to be 800, then one must suffice. The half Reserve Company at Campbellpore in time of disturbance would move up to Attock. If any reduction in the proposed number of Artillery be necessary, it should be effected at Campbellpore rather than Pindee. It is desirable to place as many Head Quarters of Corps as possible at Campbellpore, and so free the Peshawur Valley.</p> <p>The other half detached to Umritsur to be periodically relieved.</p> <p>The Reserve Company is required for the Magazine and Fort at each of these Stations.</p> <p>‡ A Company of Infantry and detail of Foot Artillery will be detached to garrison the Fort of Phillour.</p> <p>It is recommended that entire Infantry Regiments should not as formerly be sent to these Sanataria, but convalescents from all Regiments and all branches, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry. In any accidental absence of convalescents, a garrison of one Company should be at Kussowlee as a refuge for the other Stations.</p> <p>Delhi requires an European Garrison, but it is not healthy for them. It is recommended therefore that one Regiment be located in the Palace, which is the most healthy part, and that the adjoining Station of Meerut be kept always strong with special reference to reinforcing Delhi. Meerut is remarkably healthy. The distance is 40 miles. If there be no Railroad there should be a transport train. There should also be a Sapper Company and Reserve Company of Artillery at Meerut available for Delhi.</p>
2	Nowshera	2*	...	150	1300	1650	
3	Fort of Attock	150	200	
4	Campbellpore	2	1 ^{1/2} †	850†	2350	3550	
5	Rawulpindee ... }	1 Co. Sappers.	2	2000	2300	
6	Jhelum			1	1	...	1000	
7	Sealkote	1	...	500	1000	1600	
8	Lahore	1 ^{1/2}	1	500	2000	2750	
9	Mooltan	1	1	...	1000	1200	
10	Dehra Ishmael Khan.	1	100	
11	Umritsur	1	...	1000	1150	
12	{ Jullundhur and } { Kangra ... }	...	1	1†	...	1000†	1200	
13	Ferozepore	1	2	...	2000	2300	
14	Umballa	1	2	...	500	1000	1800	
15	Kussowlee	
	Dugshaie	
	Subathoo	
	Delhi	2	1	...	1000	1300	
16	Total	2	17	12	2500	17000	22600	

STATEMENT No. III,

WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION No. 3.

STATEMENT of the Number of Native Troops of each Arm, now serving in the Punjab and the Delhi Territory.

STATIONS.	NATIVE REGULARS.					NATIVE IRREGULARS.					PUNJAB IRREGULARS.				POLICE.			DEPOTS.			LEVIES.			GRAND TOTAL.	REMARKS.	
	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.			
Peshawur	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	120	1,000	0	1,000	2,120	0	0	2,700	2,700	200	0	200	0	0	0	1,089	605	1,694	7,714	{ The Levies are divided between Derah Ishmael Khan and Bunnoo, and are distributed along the Border. { This is the 2nd Belooch Battalion.	
Rawul Pindie	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	0	300	700	0	0	900	900	100	900	1,000	0	0	0	4	0	4	2,604		
Kohat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	120	0	1,800	1,920	50	0	50	0	0	0	201	290	491	2,461		
Jhelum.. ..	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	900	900	100	0	100	0	300	300	13	0	13	1,313		
Dera Ishmael Khan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	120	400	900	1,420	200	900	1,100	0	0	0	792	*1,016	1,808	4,328		
Bunnoo.. ..	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	200	120	0	900	1,020	200	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1,420
Murdan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	800	1,200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1,200
Derah Ghazee Khan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	900	900	0	500	0	500	300	0	300	0	0	0	210	233	443	2,143		
Asnee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		500
Hazara	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	0	1,800	1,860	150	100	250	0	0	0	48	155	203	2,313		
Leia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	0	150	0	0	0	12	192	204	354			
Lahore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	900	900	150	900	1,050	0	500	500	0	0	0	2,450		
Goojranwallah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	0	150	0	300	300	15	0	15	465			
Umritsur & Govindghur.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	900	1,050	0	0	0	106	0	106	1,156			
Googaira	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	500	0	0	900	900	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,500		
Ferozepore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	900	900	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	900		
Goordaspore	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	500	0	0	0	150	0	150	0	300	300	0	0	0	0	950		
Mooltan	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	500	0	0	900	900	100	900	1,000	0	0	0	89	0	89	2,489		

STATEMENT No. IV.

WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION No. 4.

PROPOSED Distribution of Native Troops in the Punjab and Delhi Territories.

No.	STATION.	ARTILLERY.		CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		TOTAL.	REMARKS.
		Troop or Battery.	Foot.	Irregular.	Police Horse.	Punjab Regiment.	Police Battalion.		
1	Peshawur	2	850 ^a	600 ^b	2,250 ^c	900	4,900	One Troop to be Horse Artillery of 6-Pounders and 1 Battery of 9-Pounders, each to consist of 4 pieces and 100 men. { ^a Head Quarters of two Regiments, furnishing Detachments to Nowshera, each Regiment 500 Sabres. ^b Though entered here, perhaps never more than one Ressallah would be in the lines, the other five being detached at Out-posts and on Roads. ^c In this Return a Police and Irregular Infantry Regiment is counted as 900 Bayonets.
2	Nowshera	{ 120 Mountain } Train 8 Guns }	150	..	450	..	720	
3	Fort of Western Borders	1,800	..	1,800	
4	Yousufzye and Hushnuggur	400 Guides.	..	824	..	1,224	
5	Fort of Attock	160 ^d	..	160	
6	Campbellpore	150 ^e	..	740	..	890	
7	Hazara	{ 70 ^f Mountain } Train .. }	..	150	1,800 ^g	100 ^h	2,120	
8	Rawulpindee	350	400 ⁱ	900	900 ⁱ	2,550	
9	Jhelum	900	..	900	
10	Kohat	1	500	200 ^j	300	1,800	900	3,450	
11	Bunnoo	1	25	300	300	1,800	..	2,525	
12	Derah Ishmael Khan	1	25	500	200 ^k	900	900 ^l	2,625	
13	Dehra Ghazee Khan	1 ^m	500	800 ⁿ	900	..	1,750	
14	Anee	500	500	
15	Leiah	150	150	
16	Mooltan	500	400 ^o	900	900	2,700	
17	Googaira	900	..	900	
18	Lahore	500	700 ^p	1,800	900	3,900	
19	Sealkote	900	..	900	
20	Umritsur	500 ^q	..	900	900	2,300	
21	Jullundhur	500	100	900	..	1,500	
22	Hooahyarpoor	100	..	900 ^r	1,000	

23	Kangra & Noorpoor	900 ^w	..	900 ^e	* Two Companies at Noorpoor, and the Head Quarters at Kangra.
24	Phillour	900	..	900	
25	Ferozepore	500	..	900	..	1,400	
26	Umballah	500	400 ^t	900	900 ^t	2,700	† For Civil duties generally.
27	Simlah	700 ^u	..	700	‡ This is the strength of the Nusseerae Goorkha Battalion.
28	Delhi	500	500 ^v	1,800	900 ^w	8,700	§ Detail as follows:— Delhi District 2 Troops. Goorgaon Ditto 2 Ditto. Pauiput Ditto 1 Ditto.
29	Goorgaon	900 ^x	900 [.]	For Civil duties generally.
30	Hansi and Hissar..	800 ^y	..	900 ^z	1,700	¶ For Civil duties generally.
										§ Detail as follows:— Sirea 2 Troops. Hissar 2 Ditto. Rhotuck 2 Ditto. Jhujjur 2 Ditto.
	Total	26 Co.s ..	5½	290	7,400	5,400	27,624	10,900	52,364	‡ For Civil duties generally.

(Signed) R. C. LAWRENCE,

Offg. Military Secretary.

STATEMENT No. V.
WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION No. 10.
Barrack Accommodation.

No.	Stations.	Accommodation in December 1857,	Additional Accommodation on 30th April 1858.	Total.	Proposed No. of Europeans.	Accommodation wanting.	REMARKS.
1	Peshawur	3,200	550	3,750	300	..	
2	Nowshera	768	288	1,056	1,650	600	{ There is already accommodation for one European Regiment, besides this there is the Convalescent Depôt building, so that with due notice, the 1,650 men could be covered in by the next hot weather.
3	Attock	300	..	300	200.	..	{ There is temporary accommodation for these Troops, which will suffice until regular Barracks are built.
4	Campbellpore	3,550	3,550	{ Barracks for a Wing are now ready, and by next hot weather, with timely notice, accommodation for 2,550 might be got ready, the 2nd European Regiment of Infantry might in the interim be placed in the Simla Hills.
5	Rawul Pindee	1,230	..	1,230	2,300	1,070	{ The extra accommodation of a temporary character might be made ready by next hot weather.
6	Sealkote	1,200	..	1,200	1,600	400	The extra accommodation might readily be furnished.

7	Mooltan	108	144	252	1,200	918	} Barracks for a European Regiment have been ordered, and until ready, by using the Iron frames received from England, a whole Regiment can be covered by next hot weather.
8	Meean Meer	1,528	115	1,643	2,750	1,107	
9	Umritsur	100	...	100	1,150	1,050	Accommodation will be ready by next hot weather.
10	Ferozepore	1,036	...	1,036	2,300	806	Accommodation can be given in the arsenal, and by using the Iron Frames.
11	Jullundur	1,231	...	1,231	1,200	..	
12	Umballa	424	1,500	1,924	1,800	..	
13	Kussowlie.. .. .	934	..	934	
14	Subathoo	596	300	896	
15	Dugshaie	960	..	960	
16	Delhie	1,300	1,300	If orders are issued in time, accommodation can speedily be provided.
17	Jhelum	1,200	1,200	Temporary accommodation could be arranged for by hiring Bangalows, &c.
18	Dera Ishmael Khan..	100	100	} An effort might be made to provide accommodation, but if not ready before the hot weather commenced, the men might be kept at Mooltan.
	Total	16,512	22,600	12,131	

(Signed) **R. C. LAWRENCE,**
Offg. Military Secretary.

STATEMENT No. VI.

REFERRED TO IN THE GENERAL REMARKS.

*STATEMENT approximated of expences of Troops in the Punjaub and Delhi Territories before the Mutinies.**Regulars—Natives.*

Artillery	1,330	say 13 Troops or Companies at	3,200	41,600
Cavalry	3,000	say 6 Regiments at	25,000	1,50,000
Infantry	34,700	or 30 Regiments at	15,000	4,50,000
Total Regular Infantry						<u>6,41,600</u>

Irregulars.

Artillery	120	at	3,200	3,200
Cavalry	5,000	10 Regiments at	16,000	1,60,000
Infantry	1,620	3 Regiments	10,000	30,000
Total Irregulars						<u>1,93,200</u>

Punjabees—Irregulars.

Artillery	630	5 Companies at	5,000	15,000
Cavalry	3,055	6 Companies at	16,000	96,000
Infantry	9,550	11 Regiments at... ..	10,000	1,10,000
Total Punjabees						<u>2,21,000</u>

Europeans.

Artillery	2,000	say 20 Companies at	10,000	2,00,000
Cavalry	700	1 Regiment at	40,000	40,000
Infantry	9,350	11 Regiments at	30,000	3,30,000
Total Europeans						<u>5,70,000</u>

ABSTRACT OF FOREGOING.

Regulars, Native	<i>Per Mensem.</i>	6,41,600
Irregulars, Ditto	1,93,200
Punjaubees	2,21,000
Europeans	5,70,000
Total per Mensem								<u>16,25,800</u>

Add for Punjaub Police.

7 Battalions at	8,500	59,500	
27 Ressallas at	2,460	67,420	
					<u>1,26,920</u>
Grand Total per Mensem					<u>7,52,720</u>
or per Annum					<u>2,10,32,640</u>
Add for Trans-Indus batta given to Troops at Peshawur, &c					<u>6,00,000</u>
Total					<u>2,16,32,640</u>

STATEMENT approximate of Expense of Troops proposed for the Punjaub and Delhi Territories.

Natives.

Artillery 5½ Troops 3 Companies or 8½	... at	3,200	27,000
Cavalry 7,400 15 Regiments at	16,000	2,40,000
Cavalry Police 54,000 or 54 Ressallas	... at	2,400	1,29,600
Infantry Irregulars 27,624 or 31 Regiments	at	10,000	3,10,000
Infantry (Police) 10,900 or 12 Battalions	at	8,500	1,02,000
Sappers 2 Companies at	1,500	3,000
				8,11,800
				8,11,800

Europeans.

Artillery ... 17 Troops 12 Companies or 29 Cos.	at 10,000	2,90,000
Cavalry... .. 2,500 or 5 Regiments	at 30,000	1,50,000
Infantry..... 17,000 or 17 Regiments	at 30,000	5,10,000
			9,50,000
			9,50,000

ABSTRACT.

Natives	8,11,800
Europeans	9,50,000
		17,61,800
		2,11,41,600

Comparison.

Cost of Troops before Mutiny per annum	2,16,32,640
Cost of Ditto as per proposed Statement ditto ditto	2,11,41,600
Decreased Expenditure per annum	4,91,040

Deduct from above.

DECREASE.

Amount of additional pay granted to 5½ Regiments of Punjaub Cavalry at 2,500 per Regiment, being per mensem Rs. 14,166 or per annum	1,69,992
		3,21,048
		3,21,048
Also amount of proposed increase to remaining 9½ Regiments at 2,500 per Regiment being Rs. 23,333 per mensem or per annum	2,79,996
		41,052
		41,052

(Signed) R. C. LAWRENCE,
Offg. Military Secretary.

STATEMENT No. VII.

REFERRED TO IN THE GENERAL REMARKS.

MEMO. shewing the number of Troops of all Branches, European and Native, serving in the Punjaub and the Delhi Territory, previous to the Rebellion of 1857.

Murree, June 1858.

STATIONS.	EUROPEANS.				NATIVE REGULARS.				NATIVE IRREGULARS.					PUNJAUB IRREGULARS.				Grand Total.	REMARKS.	
	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.			Total.
Peshawur	628	1700	2328	100	500	102	5600	6302	1000	1000	9632	*A Corps of Irr. Cavly. is shewn at Jhelum, as the 6th Irr. Cavly. was only lent to Sindh during the Persian War.
Attock	100	100	100	
Shumshabad	500	500	500	
Shubkudar	1120	1120	1120	
Nowshera	850	850	1120	1120	120	500	620	2590	
Rawul Pindee	850	850	210	1120	1330	500	720	1220	3300	
Jhelum	100	2240	2340	*500	500	2840	
LAHORE DIVISION.																				
Lahore	540	850	1390	500	3360	3860	5250	
Umritsur and Gobindghur	80	80	100	1120	1220	1300	
Ferozepore	160	850	1010	500	2240	2740	3750	
Goordaspore	500	500	500	
Mooltan	80	80	210	2240	2450	500	500	3030	
Sealkote	190	850	1040	500	2240	2740	3780	
Noorpore and Kangra	100	1120	1220	1220	

SIRHIND DIVISION.															
Umballa	220	700	920	500	2240	2740									3660
Jutogh Simla .. .										720	720				720
Dugshaie .. .			850	850											850
Kussowlie.. .			850	850											850
Subathoo .. .			850	850											850
Jullunder .. .	110		850	960	500	2240	2740								3700
Phillour .. .						1120	1120								1120
Hooshyarpore .. .				210		1120	1330	500			500				1830
Delhie .. .				200		3360	3560								3560
Hansi .. .								500		900	1400				1400
PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.															
Kohat .. .												138	550	2700	3388
Bunnoo .. .												138	550	1800	2488
Derah Ghazee Khan .. .													550	1800	2350
Asnee .. .													550	550
Derah Ishmael Khan .. .												284	550	900	1734
Kote Murdan .. .													285	550	835
Hazara .. .												70	1800	1870
Grand Total .. .												630	3035	9550	13215

Organized Police in the Punjaub.
 Mounted Police 27 Troops 2700
 Police Battalions 7 6300

9000

N. B.—The strength of European Regiments is assumed to be 850 Bayonets.
 Ditto Native Infantry Regt. ditto 1120 do.
 Ditto Punjaub Irregular Regt. ditto 900 do.

(Sd.) R. C. LAWRENCE,
 Officiating Military Secretary.

PUNJAUB COMMITTEE.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to Para. 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

BENGAL PRESIDENCY.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

We have no correct data from which to answer this.

2.

To speak confidently on this point requires a more detailed knowledge of many parts of the Presidency than we possess, but the subjoined Table has been drawn up to the best of our judgment and amounts to 5,46,000 men.

No.	Civil Government.	DISTRIBUTION.			TOTAL.		
		Division of the Army.	Station.	Number.	Of each Division.	Of each Govern-ment.	
1	Bengal	Presidency ..	Calcutta ..	2000	5000		
			Dum Dum ..	1000			
			Dacca ..	1000			
			Arracan ..	1000			
		Pegu ..	2000	2000			
		Dinapore..	Dinapore ..	2000	3000		
			1000				
2	North-Western Provinces	Benares ..	Benares ..	2000	5000		
			Saugor ..	1000			
			Jubbulpore ..	1000			
			Ghazee-pore ..	1000			
			Cawnpore ..	2000			
			Allahabad ..	2000			
		Bundlecund ..	1000	5000	7000	17,000	
		Meerut ..	Agra ..	2000			
			Rohilcund ..	2000			
			Meerut ..	3000			
3	Supreme Government ..	Central India ..	Neemuch ..	5000	5000	5000	
			Mhow ..				
			Ajmere ..				
4	Punjab	Sirhind ..	Lahore ..	Peshawur ..	Details given in answer to former question.	22,000	
Grand Total ..					5,46,000		

In distributing the European Troops we are decidedly of opinion that they should not be frittered away in Detachments, but centralized, firstly with reference to political acquirements, and secondly to the healthiest places within those political circles. We have not gone into a detail of the different arms, as that seems to be a mere question of proportion.

3.

No correct data available, but we subjoin a Statement, No. VIII., showing, to the best of our ability, all the Troops serving in the Presidency in January 1857 before the Mutiny, amounting to—

Europeans	19,670
Natives... .. .	1,76,834
(For details See No. VIII.) Total	<u>1,96,504</u>

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

4.

Having decided (in answer 2) the number of European Soldiers indispensable for holding the country, we could lay down the principle that Native Soldiers should be as five to two, and we would endeavour to keep as nearly as practicable to the following proportions :—

European Soldiers	2
Native Infantry	3
Police...	2
Total ...						7

The result would be as follows :—

Governments.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal	10,000	25,000	35,000
North Western Provinces	17,000	42,500	59,500
Central India	5,000	12,500	17,500
Punjaub	22,600	56,500	79,100
Bengal Presidency	54,600	1,36,500	1,91,100

On the subject of proportioning Natives to Europeans it should be remembered of how many races the population of India is made up ; that some are much more warlike and robust than others, and that the European check ought to vary with the Native powers. Thus, in the Punjaub and Upper India less than one European to two Sikhs or Pathans or Goorkhas would not be safe, whereas with the Hindoostanees, it might be one to three, and with the Southern races one to four. Statement No VIII. shows that before the Mutiny European Soldiers were only one to nine.

5.

No correct data available.

6.

No. Regulars, Irregulars and Police in the proportion stated in answer 4, but the farther South, and the easier the country the more the Police may be increased.

7.

Answered in No. 4.

8.

The proportion laid down in answer 4 for Bengal should pervade the whole of India, at least we know of no element of security which could render it safe to increase the proportion of Native except that of Christianity.

9 and 10.

No correct data available.

11.

The proportions which for all considerations seems best are as follows :—

BRANCH.	LINE.	LOCALS.
Artillery.. .. .	1	3
Cavalry.. .. .	1	3
Infantry.. .. .	1	3
Sappers and Miners	none.	all.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

It is very desirable to keep up emulation and improvement by having fresh Regiments from home periodically, but the attendant evils are expense of transport and strangeness to the Country and climate, and the amount of Line Troops should be limited accordingly. The Artillery is the great strength of the Army; and it should be chiefly local, as little liable as possible to call from England for general service. The Cavalry for India should be of a totally different kind from that which is in vogue in the British Line. What are called "Light Dragoons" are too heavy for Indian horses, climate and warfare. Every possible ounce of steel and brass should be got rid of, and accoutrements brought down as nearly as practicable to the standard of a cross country sportsman. It is not probable that so plain and simple a Cavalry would be admitted into the Line, and therefore this branch of the Indian Army must needs be chiefly local. The Infantry may be half and half; for the necessity of making the dress of the marching Soldier as light, easy and simple as possible has lately been recognized in the Line to a very great extent, though leather stocks are still seen. The Engineer branch would be of little use if not thoroughly acquainted with the country. This seems a proper place to urge that on Line Regiments going home all Soldiers should be allowed to volunteer to remain in India.

12.

The new Regiments of Europeans should, we think, be officered from the Officers of the old Native Army. The temporary disadvantages inseparable from their inexperience of European Soldiers would be compensated by their knowledge of the country and language. The State too must find employment for these Officers, whose devoted services as a body during the late crisis have established claims which cannot be overlooked, and there seems no other opening for them. The circumstances of the late crisis have however been so exceptional, and caused in the Bengal Presidency such a great derangement of promotion, that justice to the Officers as well as the Service, seems to demand that the whole of the Officers of the Cavalry and Infantry of that Presidency should be thrown into two general lists of the two branches, and replaced according to seniority from their status on the 10th May 1857; as it is, the surviving Officers of the worst Corps have benefitted by the Mutiny, and have superseded not only their contemporaries of the best Native Regiments, but also those of the European Regiments who have been putting down the Mutineers. A very general dissatisfaction prevails upon this head, and it is very easy to remedy it now before beginning a new system. Having thrown all the Officers into a general Cavalry and general Infantry List, the Adjutant General's Department of the Army and the Generals of Divisions should be called on to report those Officers whose inefficiency for the public service is notorious, and such

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Officers should be struck off the Rolls of the Army ; and allowed to retire on the pension of their rank, or on a bonus commensurate with their services, or in some cases both.

The really efficient Officers should then be posted to the new army according to seniority.

13.

We do not see why it should create any greater embarrassment, but should it do so, we have no hesitation in recommending that the present purchase promotion system be no further extended, as it is based on the vicious principle that money is the test of fitness for superior rank, and consequently deprives the State of the just average of ability inherent in its poor and wealthy Officers as a body. There is a very legitimate and very useful way of giving money, its influence in quickening promotion, *viz.*, the system which is recognized in the Indian Armies of all the juniors who can afford it (a point on which public opinion keeps a wholesome check) joining in buying out their senior, and benefitting by the promotion according to seniority. It will not be questioned that the Officers of the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery and Royal Marines are at least as efficient as the Officers of the Line.

14.

Should corps of Foreign Mercenaries (Coloured races) be raised, we do not think that the proportion of European Troops could be modified to any sensible degree. But we would offer the strongest objection to such a system. Military Service is one of the most powerful means of conciliation which the British Indian Government has at its disposal, but after we have given all the service that is available, it is still one of the popular complaints that we give so little. It is a necessity of our position in India, that we must spend a large proportion of the revenues of the country on European Soldiers, but no such necessity exists for bringing in Mahomedans, Hindoo and Buddhist, foreigners from other tropical countries. Such a policy would be felt to be oppressive, and would be departing from the benevolent desire we have ever had to rule India for the benefit of the Indians. Moreover, with the memories of 1857 still fresh, we doubt much whether the Natives of India are not the most docile of coloured Military races. Again every foreign coloured Soldier that you bring in to India displaces an Indian Soldier—a Soldier too by caste and profession who will take to no other livelihood. What would the advocates of foreign mercenaries propose to do with these displaced Military class ? No Statesman can ignore them. The wise policy is to feed, use, and control them.

STATEMENT No. VIII.

STATEMENT showing the Number and Distribution of all Troops, European and Native, serving in the Bengal Presidency, in January 1858.

STATIONS.	EUROPEANS.					NATIVES.																		REMARKS.					
	Queen's.		Company's.			Regular.				Irregular.			Punjab Irregular.			Hyderabad Contingent.			Nagpore Force.			Gwalior Contingent.			Oude Irregular.				
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.		Infy.	Sappers.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.		Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
			Troops.	Companies.																									Regiments.
Fort William ...	0	1	0	a 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	{ a. With No. 3 Battery. b. With No. 13 Battery. c. Govr. Genl's Body Guard.
Barrackpore ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Dum Dum ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5 Arracan ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	{ * The † entered here is the Koke Levy. No. 9 and 11 Battery. d. Ramghur (Cavalry) Battalion.
Eastern Frontier...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Dinapore ...	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Soorie (Santhal District) ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	e. No. 18 Battery. No. 12 Battery. f. g. These are Invalids.
10 Benares ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Saugor ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Jubbulpore ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	h. No. 4 Battery.
15 Cawnpore ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Allahabad ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Mhow ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	i. No. 6 Battery. k. No. 8 Battery.
Nagode ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lucknow ...	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
20 Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Meerut ...	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	No. 2 Battery. { The 2 Infantry Regiments are 17th and 41st. No. 14 Battery.
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Delhio ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
25 Agra ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	No. 5 Battery. No. 20 Battery. No. 15 Battery.
Bareilly ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Gwalior ...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Out-Stations ...	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
30 Umballa ...	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD HARRIS, GOVERNOR OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

*Questions and Answers having reference to the 5th para. of Court's Despatch,
No. 235, of the 25th November 1857.*

QUESTIONS.					ANSWERS.
1.	See Statement	No. 1
2.	See Statement	No. 2
3.	See Statement	No. 3
4.	See opinion marked	X
5.	See Statement	No. 4
6.	See opinion marked	X 2
7.	See ditto ditto	X 3
8.	Answered by reply to question 7.				
9.	See opinion marked	X 4
	And Statement	No. 5
10.	See opinion marked	X 5
11.	See ditto ditto	X 6
12.	See ditto ditto	X 7

X.

4.

When the Police of the Madras Presidency is re-organized, this force will relieve the Troops of some of the duties on which they are employed, and consider that the Army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided tht six Local Corps for Pegu are raised.

It might however be advisable to diminish the number of Native Cavalry Regiments, and replace them by Europeans.

This however is a subject requiring serious consideration, and upon which I should require further information before giving a deliberate opinion. It has already been determined to do away with the Native Artillery.

I should be disposed to retain the present distribution of the forces, at all events, until it is proved to be defective.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

X 2.

6.

It is difficult to give a very definite answer to this question.

Return number 3 gives the numbers and distribution of the Regular Army of Madras, and of the few local Corps strictly under the orders of this Government, but it will be observed it also includes as part of the forces within the Military area of the Presidency, the Irregulars belonging to Nagpore, the Nizam and Travancore, and as these two first named large and important Territories are in no way under the supervision of the Madras Government, I cannot pretend to give any opinion concerning them. I however suppose them to be efficient and loyal, and that the number of our Regular Troops usually stationed amongst them has been generally found sufficient.

I have stated above that the Police of this Presidency is about to be re-organized.

At present with the exception of a few Sebundy Corps, and the Kurnool Horse, it is not a disciplined force, and it is even difficult to ascertain its numbers.

When re-organized, the Police will include the small Irregular Corps above mentioned, and should amount to above 22,000 men.

There would then be no Irregulars strictly within the Presidency.

The Regular Army would amount to about 60,000.

X 3.

7.

I have already given a return of the number and description of European Troops I consider necessary for the Military area of this Presidency.

The object I have in view in recommending this force, and its location, is to insure the moral effect produced by the presence of Europeans, and to secure the speedy formation of small forces capable of acting within certain areas with rapidity and effect.

If this course be adopted, and if at the same time the Native Corps be formed with discretion, in the selection of materials as regards race, caste, &c., and disciplined with vigor, I am inclined to think that proportions of mere numbers are of little importance, and cannot very well be taken as any significant test for ensuring safety and predominance.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

✕ 4.

9.

There is not adequate Barrack accommodation.

The Barracks in Fort St. George require to be enlarged.

Those at Trichinopoly and Masulipatam should be improved

A Barrack for a Wing of a Regiment should be built at Waltaie.

The Barracks in Pegu I believe require improvement.

✕ 5.

10.

Additional Barrack accommodation would be required for—

One Regiment of Cavalry at Secunderabad.

Or possibly for Wings at these places, and also at Mhow and Saugor.	}	Ditto	ditto	Rajpore.
		Ditto	ditto	Jaulnah.

One Wing at Mercara.

There would also probably be additional accommodation for Artillery required at some stations.

✕ 6.

11.

I should be disposed to have three-fourths of the Infantry and Cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's Regular Army. I would recommend that the Regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present.

The Artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

✕ 7.

12.

They must, I suppose, through the regular course of the Hon'ble Company's Service.

This would apparently be the simplest course, though other plans might be suggested.

✕ 8.

13.

I must confess I do not fully comprehend this question.

✕ 9.

14.

I consider the proportion could not be altered.

STATEMENT No. 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 1.

EUROPEAN Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to established strength.

							Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.	
Dragoons and Lancers	1,416	
Artillery, Royal	933	
„ Company's	1,845	
„ Veterans	125	
Infantry, Her Majesty's	8,629	
„ Company's	2,841	
„ Veterans	115	
„ European Sappers	75	
Total established strength							...	15,979

STATEMENT No. 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 1.—(Continued.)

DISTRIBUTION of European Troops, Madras Presidency, according to effective strength.

				Regiments.	Troop or Companies.	Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.
NAGPORE FORCE ...	Kamptee	Artillery	Hd. Qrs. and 1 Co. ...	227
HYDERABAD SUBSIDIARY FORCE ...	Secunderabad	Lancers	...	Hd. Qrs. H. M.'s 12th Lancers.	397
	"	Infantry	...	H. M.'s 1st Royal	1110
NORTHERN DIVISION ...	"	Artillery	Hd. Qrs. and 1 Co. ...	223
	Vizagapatam	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 69th Regiment ...	3 Companies	197
	"	{ Infy. Veteran } Co. ... }	1 Company	110
CEDED DISTRICTS ...	Masulipatam	Artillery	Detail	17
	Bellary	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders	1 Company	484
	"	Artillery	1 Company	79
	Shorapore	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders	1 Company	95
FORT ST. GEORGE ...	Dharwar	3 Companies	283
	Ramandroog	1 Company	101
	Fort St. George	Artillery	Detail	91
CENTRE DIVISION ...	"	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 44th Foot	921
	Mount	Artillery	...	{ Head Quarters, Madras Roy- } { al Artillery ... }	698
	Vellore	{ Artillery } terans ... }	Ve- ... }	Detail	21
MYSORE DIVISION ...	Palaveram	Ditto	1 Company	71
	Bangalore	Dragoons	...	Her Majesty's 1st Dragoons	520
	"	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	998
	"	Artillery	{ Hd. Qrs. 1 Troop } { Horse & 16 Foot. }	295
MALABAR & CANARA ...	Mysore	Infantry	...	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles ...	1 Company	98
	Hurryhur	Ditto	...	Ditto ditto ...	1 Ditto	100
	Cannanore	Ditto	...	Hd. Qrs. H. M.'s 60th Regt.	463
	Mangalore	Ditto	...	Her Majesty's 60th Regiment ...	1 Company	106
	Maleapooram	Ditto	...	Ditto ditto ...	½ Ditto	134
SOUTHERN DIVISION ...	Calicut	Ditto	...	Ditto ditto ...	1 Ditto	105
	Sirsy	Ditto	...	Ditto ditto ...	1 Ditto	106
	Trichinopoly	Hd. Qrs. 2nd European L. I.	719
	"	Artillery	1 Ditto	72
	Tanjore	Infantry	...	2d European Light Infantry ...	2/3 Ditto	58
	Maulmain	Artillery	1 Ditto	59
PEGU DIVISION ...	Rangoon	Infantry	...	{ Head Quarters Her Majesty's } { 68th Foot ... }	813
	"	Artillery	Hd. Qrs. and ½ Co. ...	116
	Toung-hoo	Infantry	...	{ Head Quarters Her Majes- } { ty's 69th Foot ... }	496
	"	Artillery	1½ Company	117
	Bassein	Ditto	½ Company	25
STRAITS ...	Shoay Gyeen	Ditto	½ Company	36
	Thayet-myo	Ditto	1 Company	66
	Ponang and Malacca	{ Ditto }	1 Company	61
	Saugor	Lancers	...	12th Lancers	...	237
GENL. WHITLOCK'S OR SAUGOR FIELD DIVISION.	Banda	Artillery	1 Troop and 4 Cos. ...	415
	Saugor	Infantry	...	{ 3rd Madras European Regi- } { ment ... }	198
	Banda	Ditto	...	{ Head Quarters 3rd Euro- } { pean Regiment ... }	474
	Hinnotah	Ditto	...	{ Head Quarters Her Majes- } { ty's 43rd Foot ... }	1035
	Dumoh	Ditto	...	{ 3rd Madras European Regi- } { ment ... }	2 Companies	185
	Jubbulpore	Ditto	...	Ditto ditto ...	Detail	49
BENGAL FIELD FORCE	Lucknow	Ditto	...	1st Madras Fusiliers	561
	Benares	Artillery	1 Company	103
Total Real Strength				13,950

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
Depty. Adjutant General of the Army

STATEMENT No. 2 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 2.

EUROPEAN Troops of each Arm deemed necessary for the Madras Presidency.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	COMPANIES OF ARTILLERY.		
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve.
Kamptee .. { These two Stations to supply Saugor and Mhow with } Jaulnah .. { Detachments.. }	1	1	1	2	1
Secundrabad	2	1	1	2	1
Northern Division	1	1	..
Bellary	1	1	1
Bangalore	1	1	1	2	1
Mercara to provide Malabar	1	1	..
Jackatalla to provide Trichinopoly	1
Trichinopoly	1	1	..
Fort St. George	1	1
St. Thomas' Mount	1	2	2
Penang	1	..
Singapore*	1	1	1
Thayet-myo	1	1	1
Toung-hoo	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
Rangoon	1	1	..
Maulmain	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	..
Total	14	4	6	19	10

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The question of a Station for European Infantry being formed at the Straits is left for the decision of the Government of India, but is here thrown out as a suggestion.

STATEMENT No. 3 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 3.

NATIVE Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to effective established Strength.

							Havildars, Naiques and Privates.	
Cavalry...	2,754	
Artillery	849	
Sappers and Miners	1,505	
Infantry	...	{ Including 3rd Extra Re- giment and Madras Sap- per Militia. }			62,722	
Veterans	2,324	67,830 variable at will.
<i>Increase in proportion to increase of Army.</i>								
<i>Hyderabad Contingent.</i>								
							2,192	
							388	
							5,280	7,860
<i>Irregulars.</i>								
							332	
							2,809	
							1,563	
							423	
							174	
							400	
							138	
							2,688	8,527
Total of all Classes							...	85,117

STATEMENT No. 3 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 3.—(Continued.)
 DISTRIBUTION of Native Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency according to
 Strength.

DIVISIONS.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops and Companies.	Havildars, Natives and Privates.	Total.
Nagpore Force ..	Kamptee ...	1 Cavalry	258	3646
	Seonie ..	3 Infantry ..	1 Detachment ..	1930	
	Hosingabad	3 Companies ..	78	
	Seetabuldee ..	1 Infantry ..	4 Ditto ..	621	
	Nursingpore	5 Ditto ..	408	
Hyderabad Force	Secundrabad ...	1½ Cavalry	512	4497
	Ditto	5 Infantry	3895	
	Ditto	{ Detachment Sappers and Miners .. }	46	
	Ditto	Ditto Artillery..	44	
Northern Division .	Cuttack ...	1 Infantry	550	7329
	Ditto	Detachment Arty.	41	
	Sumbulpore	Ditto ditto..	28	
	Ditto	Ditto Infantry..	697	
	Vizianagram	Ditto Artillery..	38	
	Ditto	2 Infantry	1322	
	Ditto	Detail ..	31	
	Masulipatam	Detachment Arty.	14	
	Ditto	1 Infantry	884	
	Vizagapatam ..	1 Ditto	1053	
	Berhampore	Detachment ..	248	
	Russulcondah ..	1 Infantry	545	
	Samalcottah ...	1 Ditto	912	
Dowlaishweram .	Sappers & Miners	358		
Ditto	8 minor Out-posts	608		
Ceded Districts ...	Bellary ..	1 Cavalry	390	3917
	Ditto ..	2 Infantry	1720	
	Cuddapah ..	1 Ditto	931	
	Cumbum	{ 1 Company In- fantry ... }	82	
	Kurnool ..	1 Infantry	794	
Fort St. George ...	Madras ..	Body Guard	113	3464
	Ditto ..	2 Infantry	1523	
	Ditto ..	1 Sapper Militia	877	
	Ditto ..	1 Native Veteran Battalion ..	{ .. }	951	
Centre Division ...	St. Thomas' Mount	{ Head Quarters 5th Battalion Artillery .. }	93	2551
	Vellore ..	1 Infantry	788	
	Ditto	{ 2nd Native Ve- teran Battalion }	209	
Ditto	8 minor Out-posts	1461		

STATEMENT No. 3 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 3.—(Concluded.)
 DISTRIBUTION of Native Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to
 Strength.—(Continued.)

DIVISION.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Havildars, Na- ques, and Pri- vates.	Total.
Mysore Division ..	Bangalore ..	1 Cavalry	383	2935
	Ditto ...	1 Infantry	755	
	Hurryhur ...	1 Ditto	477	
	North Canara	3 Companies In- fantry ...	396	
	Mercara ..	1 Infantry	48	
	Ditto	4 minor Out-posts.	441	
Malabar & Canara...	Cannanore	Detachment Arty.	48	2615
	Ditto ..	2 Infantry	1346	
	Mangalore	25	
	Ditto ..	1 Infantry	568	
	Ditto	7 minor Out-posts.	628	
Southern Division ..	Trichinopoly ...	1 Cavalry	378	4760
	Ditto ..	3 Infantry	1730	
	Quilon ..	1 Infantry	639	
	Palamecottah ..	1 Ditto	720	
	Ditto	14 minor Out-posts	1293	
Pegu Division ...	Rangoon ..	5 Infantry	2883	9851
	Ditto	1 Company Sap- pers and Miners	99	
	Thayet-myo ..	4 Infantry	2614	
	Ditto	1 Company Sap- pers and Miners	88	
	Toungheo ...	1½ Infantry	1212	
	Ditto	1 Company Sap- pers and Miners	92	
	Shoay Gyeen ...	½ Infantry	461	
	Maulmain ..	2 Ditto	1054	
Ditto	9 minor Out-posts	1348		
Straits ..	Singapore	Detachment Arty	77	1855
	Ditto ..	1 Infantry	651	
	Penang	Detachment Arty.	32	
	Ditto ..	1 Infantry	720	
	Ditto	5 minor Out-posts	375	
China	Hong Kong	Detachment In- fantry ...	229	229
Service ..	Saugor Field	3 Infantry ..	1 Company In- fantry ...	1996	2086
	Ditto	1 Troop Horse Artillery ...	90	
Service ..	Bengal ...	2 Cavalry	663	3124
	Ditto	Detachmt. Sap- pers and Miners	112	
	Ditto ..	3 Infantry	2225	
	Ditto	Detachment Arty. 1 Company Arty.	44 80	
					52859

STATEMENT No. 4 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION N

NATIVE Troops, Madras Presidency, as consisting of Regulars, Irregulars and Police, of what races composed.

REGULARS.	Havildars, Naiques, Privates.	CASTES.						
		Christians.	Mussul- mans.	Telingas or Gentoos.	Tamul.	Other Castes.	Indo-Britons.	Hindoostanee Oudh, &c.
Madras Army	52,859*	2,137	19,783	17,238	5,426	2,769	282	2,972
Hyderabad Contingent... ..	7,860	Chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
<i>Irregular.</i>								
Kurnool Horse	332	Mussulmans.		
Mysore Horse	2,809	Mussulmans and Hindoos.		
Nair Brigade	1,563	Hindoos.		
Ganjam Sebundeas	423	Hindoos.		
Nagpore Force	3,226	Mussulmans and Hindoos, chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
<i>Police.</i>								
Malabar Police	174	Nairs, Moplas and Mussulmans.		

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* *Memo.*—The Castes in the 3rd Extra Regiment N. I., and of the Recruits recently transferred from recruiting Depôts to Corps, are not given in the Returns.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE; }
 FORT ST. GEORGE, }
 The 22nd June 1858. }

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
 Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD ELPHINSTONE, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to para. 5, of Court of Directors Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

Return marked A. shows the number of European Troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution.

2.

Return marked B. shows the number of European Troops of each arm deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution.

In replying to this question, I have taken into consideration the present limits only of this Presidency. Bombay Troops however now occupy Garrisons in Rajpootana and Central India, at the Stations of Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Mhow, Seepree, Jhansie, Gwalior, and in the Nizam's Territories at Jaulna.

The Agent to the Governor General in Rajpootana and Central India, and the Resident at Hyderabad, will, I conclude, be called upon to consider what Garrison will be required for these Stations.

3.

Return marked A. shows the number of Native Troops now, serving in the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution.

4.

Return marked B. shows the number of Native Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution.

5.

The proportions of Native Troops now serving within the limits of the Bombay Presidency are—

Regulars	26,668
Irregulars	8,588
Police, disciplined and armed (exclusive of the				
Police of Bombay and of Scinde) viz.,	9,871
Bombay Town Police	1,162
Scinde Police	5,075

In the accompanying Return marked C., the races of which the Regular Troops are composed are shown, with the proportion per cent. The total number of Regulars in this Return varies from that above given, as the Return includes the whole of the Regular Bombay Army, the Troops serving without as well as within the Presidency.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

The Irregulars number 8,588, the proportion per cent. of races to the whole being—

Deccanees	37·9
Hindoostanees	24·4
Madrasees	05·8
Concanees	10·0
Guzratees	8·8
Kutchees	3·9
Bheels	0·9

The proportion per cent. of races in the Bombay Police to the whole is as follows :—

Mahomedans	18·6
Kolees	8·2
Poorbheas	3·1
Rajpoots	30·5
Mahrattas	25·7
Bheels	13·0
Christians	0·3
Hindoo Castes	27·4

The proportion per cent. of races in the Scinde Police to the whole is as follows :—

Mahrattas	4·3
Purdasses	13·8
Mussulmans	44·5
Punjabees	5·0
Beeloochees	6·5
Sindees	24·0

6.

To meet the requirements of the Bombay Presidency only, I should propose that the Regular Force should consist of 25 Regiments of Infantry.

The Irregular Force of nine Regiments of cavalry and 13 Regiments of Infantry including the Marine Battalion.

I would have no Regular Cavalry except the European Regiments.

The Police Force should consist as at present of about 18,000 men, 700 of these mounted for the Bombay Provinces, not including Scinde, and 1,500 mounted for Scinde.

7.

I have proposed that the European Force for the Bombay Presidency should consist of two Regiments of Cavalry, four Troops

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

of Horse Artillery, twenty Companies of Foot Artillery, one Company of Sappers, and nine Regiments of Infantry.

According to the present established strength these would give in numbers:—

Cavalry	1,492
Horse Artillery	764
Foot Artillery	3,600
Sappers	120
Infantry	9,630
					15,886

The Native Troops deemed necessary, are—

- 3 Companies African Artillery.
- 5 Companies of Sappers.
- 25 Regiments of Regular Infantry.
- 9 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry and—
- 13 Regiments of Irregular Infantry, including Marine Battalion. These would give in number according to present established strength—

African Artillery	300
Sappers	620
Regular Infantry	28,600
Irregular Cavalry	6,930
Irregular Infantry	11,000
					47,450

The proportion therefore of Europeans to the Regular and Irregular Troops would be a third of the whole, and inclusive of Police would be about one-fourth.

8.

I have no means of judging what proportion the Regular and Irregular Native Troops and Police should bear to each other in Bengal and in the Punjab, my impression is that the proportion of Europeans to Natives of every description should not be less than 20 per cent., and for the next few years 25 per cent.

9.

Return marked D. shews the amount of present Barrack accommodation for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency.

10.

Returns marked E. and F. show the additional Barrack accommodation required in the Bombay Presidency for the strength of European Troops deemed necessary for it.

11.

I think the whole of the European Force should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

When the East India Company had an Army of its own, distinct from that of the Crown, I can conceive a difference of opinion existing upon this subject, but now that the whole Army of India is to be a Royal Army, there seems to be no good reason for maintaining a distinction between one part of the European Force and the remainder.

It is no valid argument to say that the Regiments of Her Majesty's Regular Army are liable to be withdrawn from India in the event of a European War, for unless the whole of the European Troops in India were raised for local service, only that portion of them which belonged to the Queen's Regular Army would always be liable to be thus withdrawn, and even if the whole were raised as Local Troops means would be found, in the event of any great emergency, to make them available for general service; neither do I consider that it is a sound reason for raising European Regiments for Indian service only, to say that such Regiments will be more entirely at the disposal of the Government of India.

If there is one thing which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed from in our Military arrangements in India, it is the entire subordination of the Army, both European and Native to the Government of India. The Troops of the Queen's Regular Army, while serving in India, must be wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's Government in India. Regimental promotion indeed may be left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage of every Staff appointment in India should be vested, as with very few exceptions it now is, entirely in the hands of the Supreme and Local Governments, and of the Supreme and Local Commanders-in-Chief.

Having gone into the arguments commonly used in favor of the measure of raising European Regiments for Indian service only, I will briefly add those which seem to me to tell conclusively against it.

1st.—It will perpetuate the distinction which has hitherto existed between the Queen's and the Company's Service; a distinction which has occasioned much jealousy and heart-burning, and which ought now, I think, to be done away with for ever.

2nd.—It is impossible that any Local Troops can be *really* equal to the British Line; they must always be conscious of a species of inferiority, they do not fight the battles of England on the battle-fields of Europe, even if the enemy whom they may have to encounter upon the plains of India were of a different stamp, the fact that he is not a European enemy would take away half the glory of defeating him. But the fact is that henceforward our European

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Force will have no regular Armies in India to conquer, for I presume that the organization of the Native Army will in future be such that no general revolt will be possible. I need hardly say that this is no reason for being satisfied with any but the best description of European Force in India. English Troops cannot be supplied in great numbers, and even if England could furnish them, India could not afford to pay for them. We must pay the best price for those that we have, and we ought to have the best article.

But a European Force raised for India, and constantly stationed there, will be physically as well as morally inferior to the Queen's Regular Army; instead of keeping men in this climate until their health is ruined, I am convinced that true policy demands that we should have more frequent reliefs of our European Regiments. No Regiment ought, under any circumstances, to remain in India more than ten years, and except under a great exigency, no man should be allowed to come out who is not willing to enlist for the whole of this period, and whose health and constitution do not at least permit the hope that he will live to return. One great cause of expense is the sending out men who are wholly unsuited for the climate; not only the poor fellow who dies or is invalided, but the man who is sickly and passes half his time in hospital, is a direct loss to the State.

I would add the Company's European Artillery and the nine Regiments of European Infantry to the Queen's Regular Army; the best way of doing so would be to incorporate the Artillery of the three Presidencies with the Royal Artillery, retaining them as separate Battalions, and allowing every Officer and man the option of remaining in India, and drawing his full Indian pay and allowances, or of serving in other parts of the world upon the same pay and allowances as are now drawn by the Royal Artillery. In any case both Officers and men should retain their right to retire from the service on the Indian rates of Pension.

Probably, the Company's Infantry Regiments might be at once transferred to the Royal Army, as 2nd Battalion to the nine oldest Regiments in the line which have not second Battalions already; by doing this both the Officers and men who are accustomed to India, and wish to remain here, might always have the opportunity of remaining. One Battalion of each of the nine Regiments might be kept in India as long as there are any Officers or men belonging to the Company's Regiments remaining. Officers and men not wishing to return to Europe might always be kept in this Battalion, and all would be entitled to the Indian rates of Pension on their retirement or discharge.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

12.

The answer which I give to this question may be inferred from my reply to the last.

I believe that it would be a great mistake to raise any additional Corps of Europeans *for service in India* only. I think that the whole European Force should form a part of the Queen's Regular Army, consequently the Officers must belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army.

It may be objected to this that the members of the Council of India, like the Court of Directors, are to be partly remunerated by the patronage of the Indian Armies, and that if all the Officers of the European Force in India are to belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, they will lose a portion of their patronage, and if the Native Corps are in future officered in the way which I am going to suggest, they will be deprived of the whole of it. But I do not see why this should be the case; the privilege of recommending Officers for their first Commissions is already exercised by the Colonels of the household Regiments, and virtually by the Commander-in-Chief, the Board of Admiralty (for the Marines) and (formerly at least) by the Master General of the Ordnance (for the Artillery and Engineers). If in lieu of their present patronage, the Members of the Council of India were allowed to recommend to Her Majesty a certain number of qualified young gentlemen for Commissions in the Army, this objection might be got over, at any rate it ought not to stand in the way of a measure which would place all the Queen's Officers upon an equal footing, and thereby remove a source of jealousy and heart-burning which will otherwise continue to exist as heretofore.

Another objection of a different kind is, that if all the Queen's Officers in India are appointed by the Crown, the patronage of the Crown (or of the Horse Guards) will be too much increased; but this may be met either by allowing the Members of the Council of India to exercise a portion of that patronage in the way I have suggested, or what would be much better, by allowing them to nominate a certain number of Cadets to the Royal Military College, of which all who qualified themselves for the Army should receive Commissions from the Queen.

I may here remark that one of the most effectual means of promoting a good feeling and Military spirit among all the Officers of the Army, and of uprooting every remnant of jealousy and separation between the different services, would be to educate all young Gentlemen destined for the Army at the same Military College. I am convinced that nothing would have a better effect upon the *morale* of the Army than the amalgamation of the so

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

called College at Sandhurst with the Academies of Woolwich and Addiscombe.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the efficiency of the Professorial staff would be trebled, while greater scope and opportunity of improvement would be afforded to talents of every Cadet.

13.

From what I have already written, it will be seen that I do not recommend that any European Corps should be raised for service in India only.

With regard to the Officers of the Bengal Army whose Regiments have mutinied, I think that they might be provided for in the following manner.

1st. All Officers at present employed on the Staff or in Command of Irregular or Police Corps, or on other detached duty, to be placed on a general Staff or detached List ; such arrangements being made for the promotion of Officers upon this list as may give them as nearly as possible the same average prospect of promotion which they would have enjoyed Regimentally.

I would make the appointment of Officers to all Native Regiments by selection from the General Staff List upon the same principle, and in the same proportion, that Officers are now selected from the Line for the Irregular Corps. Of the Regimental Officers now unemployed, a limited number (say 10 or 15 per cent.) in excess of the number at present on the Staff, or on detached employment, or required for Native Regiments under the system proposed in the preceding paragraph, might be allowed the option of being included in the General Staff List with a view to filling vacancies.

The supernumeraries, while unemployed, might receive the net pay of their rank, and an unattached allowance, which would make up their income to that which they would have drawn as Regimental Officers at a half Batta station. No Officer to be eligible for the Staff List, who is not qualified for Staff employment according to the present standard.

When the Officers now placed upon the Staff List retire or die out, I would provide for the performance of their duties by Officers taken from the Queen's Regiments, who have passed the required test, which will, of course, include an examination in the Native Languages.

When Officers are placed on the General Staff List, their places in their Regiments to be filled up. Thus the inconvenience

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

of taking Officers from their Regiments ; and of again remanding them, when these are ordered on service, often to the neglect and injury of the important duties for which they were selected, would be obviated.

A further limited number of Officers belonging to the mutinied Regiments of the Bengal Army might be allowed the option of entering Her Majesty's Service. It has been found that the practice of attaching a Company's Officer to each Queen's Regiment as Interpreter has been very useful. I believe that if one Captain and two Subalterns were to be attached to each as supernumeraries, to be absorbed as vacancies occur, that the same object would be gained, very many useful Officers might find employment. Officers thus transferred to European Regiments might further have the option of remaining in India until they had served their time, or of going home with the Regiment in which they were serving ; and in the event of their remaining in India they should be entitled to pension according to length of service, and upon the Indian scale as at present.

My impression is, that after establishing the General Staff or detached List, which I have proposed, and after allowing for the absorption of three Officers into each European Regiment in India, there would remain but few Officers unprovided for. But to all Officers not included in the General Staff and detached List, and not absorbed into European Regiments in India, I would pay a fair equivalent for their loss of service, either in the shape of a pension chargeable upon the Indian Revenue, or of purchase money for their commissions. These Officers if pensioned to be relieved from all liability to serve, if purchased out they would of course be free from any liability of the kind.

The question refers to the Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army only, but it will be perceived that my answer is of a wider application, and embraces the whole of the Company's Officers. I would recommend the establishment of a separate General Staff List in each Presidency.

14.

In calculating, in reply to questions 7 and 8, the proportion of European to Native Troops of all sorts, I have assumed that the Native Army will be so constituted as to render the danger of general mutiny as small as possible. It appears to me, if proper precautions are used, (I shall have another opportunity of explaining those which I advocate, and in the mean time I beg to refer to my minute of the 14th and 22nd May last), I am persuaded there would be as little to apprehend from Native Troops as from foreign mercenaries, and I do not think that the employment of the latter would enable us to reduce the number of European Troops.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

There are however two exceptional cases in which foreign Troops might be advantageously employed. One of these is in the Artillery. I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any natives of India to the use of Guns. They make excellent Artillery-men, and they attach great value and importance to Guns ; but these very circumstances make it dangerous to place them in their hands. There are some stations however, such as Shikarpore and Aden, in this Presidency, in which European Troops suffer severely, and where it is nevertheless necessary to have Artillery. I would suggest that a few Companies of African Artillery-men might be formed for those hot Stations.

Another exceptional case is, when a whole Province is disaffected or hostile to us, like Oude or the Delhi Division. In such a case, it would be dangerous to raise Troops on the spot, and it is not desirable to keep a body of Native Troops from a different part of the Country in such a Province. They would be liable to be tampered with, perhaps they might carry the spirit of disaffection to their homes. In this case, it would be safer to depend wholly upon Europeans and foreign Troops. I do not see why we might not at once secure the services of the Gold Coast Artillery Corps, of the three West India Regiments, and of the Ceylon Rifle Corps (Malays), their places being taken by Native (Indian) Artillery and by Sepoy Regiments ; the difference of pay ought not to prevent this measure from being carried out. The Indian Government would pay the difference between the Colonial allowances and Indian Allowances ; and it would gain six Companies of African Artillery and four excellent Regiments, while six Companies of Gollundaz, and four or five of the Sepoy Regiments now disarmed and utterly useless or worse than useless, would be not only got rid of but turned to good account.

MINUTE BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

The Secret Committee's Despatch to the Government of India of the 9th of March (No. 1930) has been sent to us only that we may obtain and submit the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as to the future probable demand for Troops, and their distribution within this Presidency. Upon these points a Military opinion is of course indispensable, but it seems to me that the subject of the Despatch includes the composition as well as the distribution and strength of the Native Army ; and holding as I do that this was the radical error to which the greatest disasters which we have experienced were chiefly to be attributed, I hope that I shall not be considered officious if I take this opportunity of bringing my views upon this matter under the notice of

the Government of India and the Secret Committee. They are not new to my Colleagues, for I have already entered fully into them upon more than one occasion.

I cannot explain the system of Recruitment which I advocate, better than by transcribing a part of my Minute of the 21st of September last. "I have a very strong of opinion upon this subject. I believe that for a long time past we have too much lost sight of our true policy with respect to the Native Army, and when I find that the views which I have long entertained, and which were formed from reading the Minutes of Sir Thomas Munro, and from conversing with General Cubbon, the late Sir John Doveton, and other Officers of great experience in the Madras Army, are so nearly the same as those which are now expressed by Brigadier General Jacob, I am strongly impressed with the conviction that they are sound." I beg to append to this Minute copy of one by Sir Thomas Munro, dated December 29, 1820. It will, I am sure, be read with interest at the present moment.

"Our Native Troops," says Sir Thomas Munro "unite the character of a standing Army with that of a Militia." It is to be observed that this is, or at least, was the case with all the best Native Armies that have ever existed. The Mahrattas, the Khalsa of Lahore, and to this day the Goorkhas of Nepaul, are exactly described by these words of Sir Thomas Munro. The effect of losing sight of this normal condition of the Native Army is, to use Sir Thomas Munro's words "to convert it into a body of mere mercenaries, finding homes and families wherever they may go, and ready to join in any disturbance dangerous to the State."

But it may be said that there is equal or even greater danger in forming our Regiments exclusively from men belonging to the same part of the Country, and that our safety consists in forming our Regiments of the most discordant materials. I know that this is the prevailing opinion at the present moment, an opinion however which is founded upon a state of things totally different from that which I advocate. I hope therefore, that I may be allowed to show in what this difference consists.

As I have before remarked the system advocated by Sir Thomas Munro is the nearest approach to that of the best constituted Armies under Native Governments. It may be regarded in fact as the *natural* system of an indigenous Army; according to it the Troops, though liable to serve in foreign Countries, and in distant parts of India, are essentially local Troops. The Regiments are raised in the same districts in which they are habitually quartered. The men, though belonging to the same part of the Country, are not necessarily of the same cast. It is however probable that a large proportion of them are, and that there are, as Sir Thomas Munro expresses it, "many families related to each other serving in the same Corps."

That experienced Officer, and far-sighted Statesman, did not however anticipate danger from this cause. He knew that the two things that possess the greatest influence for good over the mind of the Native are his family and his village, and he sought to enlist this influence with the Sepoy into the service of Government. He considered that the more a Regiment was localized, the more this influence would be felt, the more the thoughts and aspirations of the Sepoy would be concentrated in his Regiment, and the less community of feeling would exist between him and the Sepoy of a different Regiment, raised in a different district and seldom brought into contact with him except when on actual service.

The Bengal Army was the very opposite of this, though 100,000 men were raised from the same province, and exclusively from the highest Castes, and though they refused to serve beyond sea, they certainly could not be considered a local force in the same sense of the term in which it was used by Sir Thomas Munro ; but a very small proportion of that great Army was ever quartered in the district from which it was almost exclusively raised.

The Regiment was never considered by the Sepoy as his home, in the Regiment the influence of the family and the village was wholly wanting ; indeed, this influence, instead of leading him to concentrate all his thoughts in his own Regiment, as it would have done under the system recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, had a directly opposite tendency, for the Bengal Sepoy had his relations and his correspondents in half the Regiments in the Army, any attack real or fancied upon the susceptibilities of one Regiment was thus felt by the whole, and when one mutinied the rest followed, as if impelled by some unseen but irresistible impulse, as if an electric shock had been felt by them all.

General Jacob's plan differs in some important particulars from Sir Thomas Munro's. He localizes the Head Quarters of the Regiment even more completely than Sir Thomas Munro, who merely contemplated the periodical and frequent return of each Corps to the Station which it regarded as its home, the place from whence it was chiefly raised ; but General Jacob does not advocate the location of his regimental home in the district where the Regiment is principally recruited ; the tie which he seeks to create is a purely Regimental one. In this respect his plan seems to me inferior to Sir Thomas Munro's. It has this further disadvantage, that it has no tendency to isolate the Regiments from each other, an object which I think we should seek to promote by every means in our power.

If the plan which I advocate be adopted, each Regiment will have its own special recruiting district, from which no other Corps will be permitted to enlist recruits ; the complete isolation of Regiments will be effected, for it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep up that close correspondence, and to create that community and identity of feeling in Regiments thus composed which existed in the late Bengal Army ; on the other hand the home associations, the only healthy moral influence which we can bring to bear upon the native mind will be encouraged, and it is not too much to say, will be arrayed on the side of Government.

It is not necessary in order to carry out this plan that Regiments shall be raised in every district, or even in every province. I am quite aware that there are parts of the Country in which it would be impossible to raise a Regiment ; there are other parts where at present at all events it would be highly inexpedient to do so. The area of recruiting districts must be in proportion to their capacity to furnish recruits. This does not depend so much upon the density of the population, as upon the character of the people, but as a general rule, I would endeavour to raise Regiments in every part of the Country, excepting only those provinces where the spirit of disaffection prevails ; even in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, which are probably the most unwarlike in India, some races will be found, like the Santhals, who may probably be turned into good Soldiers.

This radical change in the system of recruiting should be the basis of our future policy with regard to the Native Army. It may be useful also to divide the Army into different classes, such as Troops of the Line, Irregular Levies, and Police Corps, and to separate these classes as much as possible by artificial means, each class having its own terms of enlistment, rates of pay, arms and uniform.

It seems to me that it is worthy of the consideration of the Government of India whether the Army of the Punjaub shall not be entirely separated from the Army of Bengal; for many years we have been endeavouring to assimilate, to centralize, to do away as much as possible with the difference and peculiarities which used to distinguish the armies of the different Presidencies. I think that it must now be admitted that it is just as well that we had not altogether succeeded in effecting this object. If we had thoroughly amalgamated the three Armies, and had incorporated Seikhs and Goorkhas into the mass, where should we have been now?

But it may be urged that if we had done this, the Mutiny of last year would not have taken place, that it was in its origin a caste movement; and that the intermixture of other castes and races would have prevented it. I am not prepared to admit this; but even admitting it for the sake of argument, I cannot allow that Mutinies can only be caused by caste questions. I believe that more Mutinies have arisen from questions of pay and allowances than from any other cause.

But suppose the whole Native Troops to be formed into one grand Army, the component parts of each Regiment being as heterogeneous as possible, and suppose some cause of discontent to arise which affects all castes alike, the danger would be undoubtedly far greater than that which overtook us last year. I have long considered this subject, and I am convinced that the exact converse of this policy of assimilation is our only safe Military policy in India. *Divide et Impera* was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours. The safety of the great iron Steamers which are adding so much to our Military power, and which are probably destined to add still more to our commercial superiority, is greatly increased by building them in compartments. I would ensure the security of our Indian Empire by constructing our Native Army upon the same principle for this purpose. I would avail myself of those diversities of race and language which we find ready at our hands. I might perhaps hesitate to express my conviction so decidedly, if I were not able to show that my views upon this subject are entirely in accordance with those of the Duke of Wellington. The following extract from a letter of his Grace to Mr. Wynne, the President of the India Board, dated Strathfieldsaye, August 7th 1826, are so much to the point that I cannot forbear to copy it.—“ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have read that part of Malcolm’s “book which relates to the Military establishments in the East Indies, and I see that he “recommends the amalgamation of the Armies, the equalization of their pay, and indeed “the formation of the whole into one. He attacks the opinion which I entertain of the “security which is derived from the division of the Establishment. But Malcolm passes “over unnoticed two or three little events not much to the credit of Indian Armies “as Armies, but which ought to have a great influence in the decision of these questions. “*First.* The Mutiny of the European Officers of the Bengal Army in 1795-96. “*2nd.* “The Mutiny of the Sepoys of the Army of Fort Saint George, and “*3rd.* the Mutiny “of the Officers of the Army of Fort Saint George. Some others might be quoted, “such as the arrest of Lord Pigot, &c., but I refer only to those of modern times as

'bearing more immediately upon the question. It is true that this country can always 'rely upon the King's Troops in India, that is to say, if the Native Army is kept in the 'hands of the Company, but I declare I believe that if upon any one of those occasions 'the Armies had been amalgamated, and had formed but one, the dependancy upon this 'Country would have been lost.

" With these events before us, and seeing what Armies have done in different Coun- 'tries of Europe, and are capable of attempting, I cannot but think it fortunate that they 'are three separate and distinct Armies, and not an Army consisting of 2,50,000 men.

" But there is one point peculiarly Indian which Malcolm has not brought forward 'in discussing this question, however much it deserves consideration, and notwithstanding 'that it has not escaped him in considering other parts of this subject, and that is the 'different classes and nations of people of whom these Armies (proposed to be made 'one Army) are composed. He says very truly in another part of his book, that the 'natives of the Countries about Cape Comorin are as unlike those of Hindostan, or of 'the Provinces of Bengal, as a native of Spain or of Italy is to a native of Sweden, 'or of the North of Germany, or of Russia, and their languages differ as much as their 'appearance. The exclusive merit of these Officers of the Company's Army is their 'understanding the language, manners and customs of the natives of India placed 'under their Command. But how is a man belonging to a Corps raised and stationed 'on the Coast of Coromandel or Malabar, or in the Ceded Districts or the Deccan, to 'go and command a Battalion raised and stationed in Hindostan. He knows no more 'of them than (not so much probably as) the Commanding Officer of one of the King's 'Regiments who may have done duty in Hindoostan. The fact is, that all these Armies 'differ in their discipline, appearance, mode of doing duty, &c., not only because they 'are separate Armies, and paid at different rates, but because they are composed of people 'of different nations. This can never be altered, let us leave the rest as it is.

" If you have not read it, pray read the account of the Mutiny of the Officers of the 'Army of Fort Saint George, which was in fact fomented by the Commander-in-Chief, 'General MacDowall. Pray likewise read the account of the late conspiracies in the 'Russian Armies, which are not unworthy of attention in considering the question of 'forming the Indian Armies into one."

These Extracts show that the Duke of Wellington considered the separation of the Native Armies of the three Presidencies as our greatest safe guard against the danger of Mutiny. I need not point out the striking corroboration which the events of the last year have afforded to his opinion, my object is simply to suggest the adop- tion of the principle of separation and isolation which he advocated to the fullest extent which may be found compatible with perfect efficiency and convenience.

The 14th May

(Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

MINUTE BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

HAVING read my Honorable Colleagues' Minutes, I hope that I may be permitted to add a very few words on the subject of the enlistment and composition of the Native Army.

I am aware that this is a subject upon which a difference of opinion is almost sure to exist. In fact, it is impossible to propose any plan which is not open to some objection. I admit at once that there may be danger in drawing the Native Troops exclusively from the population of the Country in which they are to be generally and habitually quartered ; but I believe this danger to be infinitely less than that which arises from the opposite system. I would point out that under a system either of promiscuous, or of partially foreign* enlistment, the complete isolation of Regiments and even of Armies becomes impossible ; correspondence will be kept up between men in different Regiments and in different Armies ; the community of feeling and interest between the different Regiments and the different Armies, and the consciousness of strength which this inspires, will not be destroyed. But if the principle of isolation be adopted, if the Native Army be completely and thoroughly localized, this great and constant source of danger would cease to exist.

There might still be disaffection, and there might still be Mutiny, but it would be local not general.

In this Presidency, the Police, which are purely local, have never shewn any sympathy for local Insurgents or Rebels ; and I need not say that I entirely concur with both my Honorable Colleagues that the existing system in this Presidency should not be disturbed ; at this moment we have two Bheel Battalions in Candeish acting against their own clansmen and Chiefs. In Ireland, the Constabulary and the Military Force, almost equally recruited from the Irish population, have never hesitated to act against their own countrymen whether ribbon-men or orange-men, even supposing that a Regiment or the Troops at one Station were gained over, that they refused to act, or even joined the disaffected. Their disaffection would not immediately spread into other Regiments or Stations, and the whole European Force in the Division, and probably a portion at least of the Native Troops where different races and languages exist in the same Division (they would be found in every Indian Army) would be available to suppress it.

There are two other points in my Honorable Colleagues' Minutes on which I wish to explain myself more clearly than I appear to have done. Mr. Malet observes that this Presidency is divided into four great Military districts, and that only two of them would furnish sufficient recruits for their Military occupation. But though I would *localize* each Regiment, and give it a home or permanent Head Quarters, I do not recommend that Regiments should never be moved from this home. If Guzerat or the Southern Mahratta country will give us no recruits, they must be garrisoned by Regiments raised in other parts of the Presidency, those Regiments being however frequently relieved, and never kept for more than three or four years away from their permanent Head Quarters. I believe, however, that recruits would be much more readily found in those parts of the country which do not now furnish any, if the local system of enlistment were adopted. I can easily understand a man whose language is Guzrattee or Cavarese disliking to enter a Regiment of Mahrattas and Hindoostanees, who are to him almost foreigners. A hundred years ago not many Highlanders would have enlisted in an English Regiment.

The other point is one upon which Mr. Reeves lays much stress, and which I readily admit deserves the greatest consideration. My Honorable Colleagues think, that

* *i. e.*, from other parts of India.

Regiments should be composed of different castes and classes, and that great care should be taken that neither Brahmins nor Mussulmans, nor indeed any class of Natives, should be allowed an undue numerical superiority ; but attention to this precaution is not, it appears to me, incompatible with the principle of isolation ; indeed, I have great doubts whether any Brahmins should be enlisted. They appear to exercise an influence over the men of other castes which is inconsistent with discipline. I have heard of a low caste Officer falling at the feet of a Brahmin private, and beseeching his blessing.

This seems utterly subversive of all correct Military feeling and discipline, and if there is any truth in such stories, the only remedy would appear to be the exclusion of men possessing such influence from the ranks. With reference to other castes and classes, I agree with my Honorable Colleague, that it is desirable that men of different castes should be encouraged to enlist, and that if possible no one caste should predominate. (I except of course Regiments composed of a particular tribe or race like Bheels or Koteis.) Knowing however that Mutinies and disaffection proceed from other causes besides caste, I think that all precautions upon this point will be ineffectual to prevent them, if our Native Regiments are still linked together by a system of enlistment which fosters those feelings of common interest and mutual reliance upon each other, and that consciousness of power, without which no Mutiny of an Army *en masse* could ever be brought about.

(Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

The 22nd May.

A.

RETURN showing the Troops, European and Native, of all Arms, serving within the limits of the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution.

	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED AND RANK AND FILE.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery	5	0	212	73
2 Light Field Batteries	10	0	531	29
1 $\frac{3}{4}$ Regiments Cavalry	63	0	1,076	0
6 $\frac{1}{2}$ Regiments Infantry	245	0	5,377	0
Total	323	0	6,996	102
HON'BLE COMPANY'S EUROPEAN TROOPS.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery	5	0	118	25
5 Companies Foot Artillery with Light Field Batteries	12	4	398	260
1 Company without Battery	4	1	79	30
3 Companies Reserve Artillery with Light Field Batteries	7	2	293	138
0 Regiment Infantry	32	0	982	0
Total	60	7	1,870	453
HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.				
4 Companies Foot Artillery with Light Field Batteries	3	19	5	470
5 Companies without Batteries	11	21	2	441
Head Quarters and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Companies Sappers and Miners	4	5	17	319
1 Regiment Light Cavalry	15	14	2	395
5 Regiments Irregular Cavalry	20	125	0	3,686
21 Regiments of Infantry	279	495	14	21,357
1 Marine Battalion	4	24	0	1,130
1 Native Veteran Battalion	14	16	0	822
Enrolled Pensioners	5	55	2	1,661
Total	355	774	42	30,281
Grand Total... ..	738	781	8,908	30,636

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ABOVE.

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
D Troop Horse Artillery ..	Poona.
1st Battalion 8th Company Light Field Battery...	Baroda.
14th Ditto ditto ditto ...	Kulladghee, Dharwar and Nurgood.
CAVALRY.	
3rd Dragoon Guards (Head Quarters Wing) ...	Kirkee.
Detachment ...	Sattara.
Detachment ...	Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
Depot 14th Light Dragoons ...	Kirkee.
17th Light Dragoons (Lancers) ...	Kirkee.
1 Squadron ...	Sholapore.

A.—(Continued).

HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS.	STATIONS.
INFANTRY.	
4th King's Own (wing)	... Ahmedabad, temporarily transferred from Mauritius.
18th Royal Irish (Head Quarters)	... Poona.
2 Companies	... Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
1 Company	... Asseerghur.
33rd Regiment (Head Quarters)	... Poona.
2 Companies	... Sattara.
1 Company	... Sholapore.
1 Company	... Ahmednuggur.
51st Light Infantry	... Kurrachee.
1 Company	... Ahmedabad.
2 Companies	... Hyderabad.
1 Company	... Shikarpore.
56th Regiment (Head Quarters)	... Belgaum.
1 Company	... Sawunt Waree.
57th Regiment (Head Quarters)	... Bombay.
Wing	... Aden.
Depot 64th Regiment	... Belgaum.
74th Detachment from Bellary (temporarily)	... Dharwar Fort.
Depot 78th Highlanders	... Poona.
Depot 83rd Regiment	... Deesa.
Depot 86th Regiment	... Poona.
89th Regiment	... Deesa.
92nd Highlanders (1 Company)	... Bombay.
1 Company	... Nassick.
1 Company	... Malligaum.
Depot 95th Regiment	... Deesa.
Details of Recruits of Her Majesty's Regiments	... Baroda and Broach.
HON'BLE COMPANY'S EUROPEAN TROOPS.	
STATIONS.	
ARTILLERY.	
<i>Horse Brigade.</i>	
Head Quarters	... Poona.
4 Troops	... Poona.
<i>1st Battalion.</i>	
Head Quarters	... Ahmednuggur.
1st Company with Light Field Battery	... Ahmedabad.
2nd Company without Battery	... Aden.
3rd Company with Light Field Battery	... Belgaum.
4th Company with Light Field Battery	... Hydrabad (Scinde).
<i>2nd Battalion.</i>	
Head Quarters	... Bombay.
2nd Company with Light Field Battery	... Sattara.
3rd Company with Light Field Battery	... Sholapore.
<i>Reserve.</i>	
No. 1 Company	... Shikarpore.
No. 3 Company	... Kolapore.
No. 4 Company	... Kurrachee.
<i>Infantry.</i>	
Depot 1st Regiment Fusiliers	... Kurrachee.
2nd Regiment Light Infantry	... Belgaum.
Detachment	... Kolapore.
Detachment	... Kulladghee.
Detachment	... Rutnagherry.
Depot 3rd Regiment	... Ahmednuggur.

HONORABLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
1st Company 3rd Battalion Artillery ...	Detachments Rajcote and Surat.
2nd Company 3rd Battalion with Light Field Batty.	Ahmedabad.
3rd Company 3rd Battalion with Light Field Batty.	Deesa.
5th Company 3rd Battalion ...	Ahmednuggur.
6th Company 3rd Battalion ...	Aden.
1st Company 4th Battalion with Light Field Batty.	Head Quarters Ahmednuggur.
2nd Company 4th Battalion with Light Field Batty.	Ahmednuggur.
4th Company 4th Battalion ...	Ahmednuggur.
6th Company 4th Battalion ...	Ahmednuggur.
SAPPERS.	
1½ Company ...	Poona, Detachment Southern Mahratta Country.
1 Company ...	Aden.
CAVALRY.	
1st Lancers (Detachment) ...	Bombay.
2nd Light Cavalry (Detachment) ...	Deesa and Bombay.
2nd Madras Light Cavalry ...	Sholapore.
Poona Irregular Horse (Head Quarters) ...	Secroor.
Detachments ...	Khandeish, Poona, Nuggur and Shallghaut.
1 Scinde Horse Irregular ...	Jacobabad.
Detachments ...	Hoosenkagherry, Tungwanee, Khundkote & Koomrie.
2nd Scinde Irregular Horse ...	Jacobabad.
Detachment ...	Rojun.
3rd Scinde Irregular Horse ...	Jacobabad.
Southern Mahratta Horse ...	Head Quarters Kulladghee.
Detachments ...	Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara and Kolapore.
INFANTRY.	
1st Grenadier Regiment Native Infantry ..	Bombay.
2nd Grenadier ditto ditto ..	Russoolpore.
Depôt ...	Ahmedabad.
3rd Regiment Native Infantry ..	Sholapore.
Detachment ...	Beejapore.
5th Regiment Native Light Infantry ..	Ahmednuggur.
Detachment ...	Field Service in the Districts.
6th Regiment Native Infantry ..	Poona.
7th Regiment Native Infantry ...	Bombay.
8th Regiment Native Infantry ...	Baroda.
Detachment ..	Jumboseer and Dohnd.

A.—(Concluded.)

HON'BLE COMPANY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	STATIONS.
INFANTRY.—(Continued.)	
11th Regiment Native Infantry	.. Ahmedabad.
Detachment	.. Gogo.
Depôt 13th Regiment Native Infantry	... Hyderabad.
14th Regiment Native Infantry	... Kurrachee.
Detachment	.. Ahmedabad.
15th Regiment Native Infantry	... Kolapore.
Detachments	.. Rutnagherry, Vingorla and Kulladghee.
16th Regiment Native Infantry	.. Surat.
Detachment	... Broach.
17th Regiment Native Infantry	... Deesa, under orders for Rajcote.
Wing	... Rajcote.
18th Regiment Native Infantry	... Belgaum.
Detachment	... North Canara Frontier.
20th Regiment Native Infantry	... Belgaum.
Detachments	... Ramghat and Betsee.
22nd Regiment Native Infantry	... Sattara.
Left Wing	... Tasgaum.
Detachments	.. Asta, Beejapore and Punderpoor.
23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry	... Malligaum.
Detachment	... Asseerghur.
Depôt 25th Regiment Native Infantry	... Poona.
26th Regiment Native Infantry	... Dhoolia.
Detachments	... Nuggur districts.
28th Regiment Native Infantry	... Dharwar.
Detachments	... Field Service Southern Districts.
29th Regiment Native Infantry	... Aden.
30th Regiment Native Infantry	... Malligaum.
Detachment	... Kurrachee.
31st Regiment Native Infantry	... Deesa.
IRREGULAR INFANTRY.	
Marine Battalion	... Bombay.
Detachments	... Scinde, Bushire, &c.
Native Veteran Battalion	... Dapoolee
Detachments	.. Bhewady and other parts of the Concan.
Enrolled Pensioners	.. Tanna, Poona, Ahmednuggur, Dapoolee, Malivan, and Ahmedabad.

N. B.—No returns of the 3rd Belooch Battalion and the two Scinde Rifle Regiments have been received. They are not consequently included in the above.

QUARTER MASTER GENL'S. OFFICE ;
 POONA,
 The 1st July 1858.

(Signed) R. PHAYRE, *Lieut-Colonel,*
Quarter Master General.

B.

PROPOSED distribution of Troops in the Bombay Presidency.

STATIONS.	CAVALRY.		ARTILLERY.			SAPPERS AND MINERS.		EUROPEAN INFANTRY.		NATIVE IRREGULAR CAVALRY.		NATIVE INFANTRY.				Barrack accommodation required.
	Regiments.	Troops.	European.		African.	European.	Native.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Troops.	Regular.		Irregular.		
			Troops.	Companies.	Companies.							Companies.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	
POONA DIVISION.																
Poona	1	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	
Sattara	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Abmednuggur .. .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Malligaum	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Nassick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Asseerghur .. .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	
Dhoolia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	
Dhurrumpoor .. .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Total	1	0	2	6	1	1	2	1	10	2	0	5	10	3	0	
GUZERAT DIVISION.																
Surat	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Broach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	
Baroda	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	
Ahmedabad .. .	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	
Deesa	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Rajcote	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Dohud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Total	0	0	1	5	0	0	1	2	0	3	0	6	10	2	0	
SOUTHERN DIVISION.																
Bolgaum	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Dharwar	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Kulladghee .. .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Sawunt Warree ..	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Kolapore	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	
Sholapore .. .	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Total	1	0	1	4	0	0	0	1	10	1	0	6	0	2	0	
SCINDE DIVISION.																
Kurrachee .. .	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	
Hydrabad .. .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	
Shikarpore .. .	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Jacobabad .. .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	
Total	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	3	0	5	0	
Aden	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	
Bombay	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	
Grand Total ..	2	0	4	20	2	1	5	7	20	9	1	20	20	13	0	

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RETURN of Races in the Bombay Army,—1st January 1858.

CORPS.							Hindoostanees.	Concan.	Deccan.	Guzerat.	Madras.	Malabar.	Punjaub.	Scinde.	TOTAL.
Artillery	909	195	152	9	8	2	0	0	1,275
Engineers	226	115	225	0	8	0	0	0	574
Cavalry	1,001	175	127	41	41	0	0	0	1,385
Infantry	11,011	15,684	2,723	256	534	279	153	74	30,714
Total	13,147	16,169	3,227	306	591	281	153	74	33,948

Proportion per Cent. of each Race to the whole Army.

This Return does not include Beelooch Battalions or Irregular Cavalry.

	<i>Per Cent.</i>						
Hindoostanees	38.75
Concanees	47.6
Deccanees	9.5
Guzerat	0.90
Madras	1.71
Malabar	0.82
Punjaub	0.45
Scinde	0.01

D.

RETURN of existing and sanctioned Barrack accommodation for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency including Aden, calculated at 1,200 cubic feet per man.

STATIONS.	PERMANENT EXISTING.	TEMPORARY EXISTING.								REMARKS.
	Number of men.	Wing.	Companies.	Regiment.	Wing.	Troop.	Companies.	Wing.	Companies.	
<i>Artillery.</i>										
Bombay	For 264 men	In Fort St. George Barracks. For One Company Artillery recom- mended.
Poona	For 164 men	For Two Troops		
Sattara	For One Company ...		} Poona Division.
Nuggur	For 381 men	For One Company ...		
Malligaum	For half ditto ...		
Asseerghur		
Belgaum	For 60 men	For One Company.		} Southern Division. These Barracks condemned.
Dharwar	For One Company ...		
Kulladghee	Ditto ...		
Kolapore		
Sholapore	For 88 men	For One Company ...		} Northern Division.
Ahmedabad	Ditto ...		
Baroda	} Old Pendants space in the Castle for about 100 men. }		} Scinde Division.
Surat	For One Company ..		
Deesa	For 116 men	} Scinde Division.
Kurrachee	For 162 men	For One Company ..		
Shikarpore		
Aden	For one Company	For One Company		
Total Artillery ...	1,235 men.	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	8½	
<i>Cavalry.</i>										
Sholapore	For One Wing.		} Scinde Division.
Kirkee	For 453 men	For a Wing			
Sattara	For One Wing.		
Total Cavalry	453 men.	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	

Infantry.

Bombay	For 778 men	640 in Town Barracks, and 318 at Colaba in the Gorporee Barracks. New wawanee Barracks in course of completion.	
.....	For 831 men	For One Wing	For one Regiment		Poona Division.
Assenghur	For Two Companies		
Belgaum	For 645 men	For One Wing		Southern Division.
Dharwar	For Two Companies		
Kulladghee	For One Company		
Kolapore	For Three Companies		
Mholapore	For One Company		Northern Division.
Ahmedabad	For One Wing		
Baroda	For Two Companies...		
Bombay	For 200 men	For 100 men additional...		
Deesa	For 683 men	Scinde Division.	
Kurrachee	For 1,618 men		
Hyderabad	For 1,392 men		
.....	At Kurrachee there are in addition Pendants of an old temporary construction for about 1,600 men.	
Total Infantry ...	5,947 men.	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	12		

E.

ADDITIONAL accommodation required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present permanent accommodation only.

STATIONS.	CAVALRY.			ARTILLERY.			SAPPERS AND MINERS.		INFANTRY.			REMARKS.
	Regiments.	Troops.	Number of men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of men.	Companies.	Number of men.	Regiments.	Companies.	Number of men.	
POONA DIVISION.												
Poona	1	118	1	120
Sattara	1	118	5	500	..
Ahmednuggur	2½	250	..
Malligaum	1	118
Asseerghur	1	118
Total	4	472	1	120	..	7½	750	..
NORTHERN DIVISION.												
Surat	50
Baroda	1	118
Ahmedabad	1	118	1	..	1,070	..
Deesa	1	..	191	3½	350	..
Rajkote	1	118
Total	1	3	595	1	3½	1,420	..
SOUTHERN DIVISION.												
Belgaum	½	89	3½	350	..
Dharwar	2	200	..
Kolapore	1	118	5	500	..
Sholapore	1	1	{ 191 118 }	3	300	..
Total	746	1	2½	516	13½	1,350	..
SCINDE DIVISION.												
Kurrachee	¾	74
Grand Total	746	2	10¾	1,657	1	120	1	24½	3,520	{ That is, for one Regiment of Cavalry ; 2 Troops of Horse Artillery ; 10½ Companies of Artillery ; one Company of Sappers and Miners ; and 3½ Regiments of Infantry.

The number of men for each Regiment, Troop and Company, is taken from the present established strength for the different branches of the Army.

ADDITIONAL Barrack accommodation required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present accommodation both permanent and temporary.

STATIONS.	CAVALRY.			ARTILLERY.			SAPPERS AND MINERS.		INFANTRY.			REMARKS.	
	Regiments.	Wing.	Number of men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of men.	Companies.	Number of men.	Regiments.	Companies.	Number of men.		
POONA DIVISION.													
Poona	1	120		
Ahmednuggur	3	300		
Malligaum		
Asseerghur	59		
Total	59	1	120	..	3	300		
GUZERAT DIVISION.													
Surat	59		
Ahmedabad	5	500		
Deesa	1	..	191	3	300		
Rajcote	1	118		
Total	1	1½	368	8	800		
SOUTHERN DIVISION.													
Belgaum	89		
Kolapore	2	200		
Sholapore...	1	373	1	1	309	2	200		
Total	1	373	1	1½	398	4	400		
SCINDE DIVISION.													
Kurrachee	1	118		
Grand Total	1	373	2	4½	943	1	120	..	15	1,500		

{ Equal to 1½ Regiments of Infantry; 1 Wing of Cavalry; 1 Company of Sappers and Miners; 2 Troops of Horse Artillery; 4½ Companies of Artillery.

No. 205.

FROM

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR COTTON, K. C. B.,
Commanding Peshawur Division.

TO

LIEUT.-COLONEL DURAND, C. B.,
On special duty with the Governor General.

Dated Peshawur, the 21st June 1858.

SIR,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your printed Circular No. 37, under date 21st May 1858, with its accompaniments, *viz.*, the printed Despatch No. 235 of 1857 addressed by the Court of Directors to the Governor General of India in Council, and the printed questions submitted by yourself having reference to paragraph 5 of the said Despatch of the Honorable Court, I have the honor to state, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, that I had, previous to the receipt of your letter now under acknowledgment, prepared for the consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and of Government, a despatch containing my views in full on the subject of the "Re-organization of the Army," which I have now the honor to send direct to you (the Despatch not having at the time of receiving your letter No. 75, been sent to its destination.)

2. In looking carefully over the printed questions, and in endeavouring to reply to them *seriatim* in compliance with your directions, I observe that I could not give satisfactory replies to each, without entering in the answers required, an explanation in each case of my views on the general project.

3. The accompanying despatch addressed to the Chief of the Staff with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief however, answers in full all your questions, and in a manner which, when laid before His Lordship will, I trust, be so explanatory of my views as to place them more clearly, and in a more convenient manner, before him, than could be done by any other means.

4. It must, I am sure, be apparent to the Right Honorable the Governor General, that the Natives generally of India, owing to recent lamentable events, have had their eyes opened to the fact that the Troops of this country possess a power in themselves so great and so formidable as to enable them at any time, unless organized under the most strict and necessary regulations, to rise upon the British Government, and shake its empire to the very foundation.

They cannot have failed, I am sure, to observe, that nothing but a want of well arranged and well organized plans under competent Chiefs has saved our Government in this fearful crisis.

5. The Army has in this instance taken the lead, and every where that mutiny prevailed did the inhabitants of the country await with intense anxiety the issue of the contest between the British Government and its Soldiery, being prepared, it is my firm belief, to rid themselves of our Government, should the tide of events in the struggle have turned against us. On the Peshawur Frontier, this is openly, I believe, avowed; indeed the people of this country would not assist the British Government until the Regular Troops had been deprived of the power to act against us.

6. With these preliminary remarks I assure the Government that its own position (placed heretofore as has been proved by unfortunate circumstances on a foundation the most insecure and most dangerous that could well be imagined) will become even more dangerous than ever, if the power to rise and rebel be ever again at the disposal of the Native Troops.

7. It is true that the Sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies did not in a body, by the blessing of Divine Providence, rise simultaneously against the British rule, at a critical moment, but they must have been observers of passing events, and cannot be supposed to have noticed the providential escape of every living European throughout the country.

8. The Madras Troops, it must be remembered, have mutinied before now, and are capable of making great combinations to effect their ends. They might therefore mutiny and combine to mutiny *en masse* at any time, and I sincerely hope that the Government of India will never place implicit confidence in them any more than in others.

9. In order then to place the Native Troops of whatever creed or caste they may be composed, (whether of Bengal, Madras or Bombay) in a position to do us no mischief, and at the same time to give us the benefit of their services, which cannot be avoided in such climates as those of India, there must be an entire and complete change in the Military occupation of the country. The object of my despatch then is to submit for consideration my humble opinion of systems hitherto prevailing which have so eminently failed, and at the same time to propose certain systems, which I think must be substituted with a view to the future security of the British Government in India.

10. The general principles it will be found which I advocate are these, *viz.* :—

1stly.—To incorporate in the Battalions and Regiments of *the Line* the European and Native Soldiers; the former having never as yet acted, and never can act for any length of time without the aid of Native Troops, owing to the heat of the climate, and the exposure, and thus by bringing the two together Regimentally, in the proportion of two Europeans to one Native, their end would be obtained without risk.

2ndly.—That the Government of India should be so essentially Military that Commanders might be enabled to act with promptitude. All embarrassment by departmental rules should be at once removed, and the powers of Commanders of large bodies of Troops should be vastly increased.

3rdly.—The Troops should be kept together in much larger bodies than heretofore. They should be told off in Brigades with an efficient staff as if in the field, being at all times and in all respects ready for field service.

These bodies of Troops to be designated "*Corps de Armee.*" Every Soldier in India should be on the rolls of some *Corps de Armee*, whether detached from necessity in small numbers or otherwise.

4thly.—That the Police force of the country (not armed and trained like Soldiers as heretofore) should be increased, so as to do away with the necessity of employing the

Troops in detached or escort duty in every possible case, and not in fact to allow armed and regular Soldiers to stray from their Regiments.

5thly.—It should be a capital offence for any Native of the country, excepting such as are specially sanctioned by Government, to have arms in possession or the implements of making them, or to have or to make warlike instruments of any sort.

11. My despatch, it will be found, refers to all these subjects, bringing them under one view ; together with others which I have felt it my duty to bring under notice, my object being to induce Government to make a radical reform in all existing Military Regulations.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
(Signed) SYDNEY COTTON, *Major General,*
Commanding Peshawur Division.

To
MAJOR GENERAL SIR W. R. MANSFIELD, K. C. B.,
Chief of the Staff.
ARMY HEAD QUARTERS.

Division Head Quarters, Peshawur, 11th June 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to request that this despatch may be laid before His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at your convenience, the subject of which I am well aware is of the highest importance to the interest of Government and of the Army, which unhappily has fallen into a state of unprecedented anarchy, by the general Mutiny of the Native Troops.

Introductory address.

I trust it may not be considered presumption in me to offer remarks and suggestions on the reorganization of the Army, in which I am permitted to hold so important a command, seeing that a measure of such vital importance must shortly come under the consideration of Government.

Impressed then with the belief that the suggestions of experienced Officers at such a moment will not be unacceptable to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to the Government, I hesitate not to record my sentiments however valueless they may prove to be. Having been connected with the Armies of India in all its Presidencies, with but little intermission for nearly forty-eight years, commencing as Cornet in 1810, in a Regiment of Light Dragoon, and passing through all the grades of the service to that of Major General, and having been employed on the Staff as Military Secretary in Bengal, Deputy Adjutant General Queen's Troops both in Bombay and Madras, for Officers in Her Majesty's Service have ever had such an opportunity of observing the working of systems prevailing generally throughout India. On these grounds I venture to ground my claims to the title of an experienced Officer.

2. The recent mutiny in the Bengal, and partially in the Bombay and Madras Presi-

Consequent on the Mu-
tiny, Military authority
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India, and European
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ed mainly in the occupa-
tion of the country.

dencies, has opened our eyes at least to the fact that we must not rely with any confidence on the Native Troops of any creed or caste as a body. The people of the vast empire of India now under British rule having been conquered by the sword, must by that weapon be held in subjection, and the sword must be firmly grasped for the

future by the hand of the European Soldier, throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Government in India must henceforward be more essentially military, but no one I think, could reasonably expect, that Great Britain would be able to furnish exclusively Troops in sufficient numbers for the Military occupation of such a country.

The climate is much too hot for the European in many situations where Military duties have to be performed, and the expenditure of Troops would be vastly too great if the European alone endeavoured to take those duties. The Natives of the country must therefore be called in to assist us, and a certain limited number must be armed and trained as Soldiers, but by no means in the same numbers as heretofore. In fact the Native Troops must be used as auxiliaries and nothing more, and they must be placed in such positions as to be powerless to do mischief ; and here I would earnestly implore of the Government to take warning by the past. It is true that some Native Troops have during the great crisis of the rebellion remained faithful to the British Government, but the fidelity of these few is to be attributed more to local circumstances, and to peculiar positions, rendering it difficult for them to act against us, than to any real attachment to the British Government. The Mutiny may be considered as a great national movement, in which the whole Army has taken the lead, and in which all are in heart concerned, the object being to expel from the country or to destroy the Christian conquerors, who are hated as such universally and indeed naturally, and despised and looked down upon as enemies to their religion.

3. The newly raised Troops of Peshawur and Mooltan Frontier, and of the adjacent

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hereafter placed by the
British Government in
the Native Troops of In-
dia exclusively.

countries in and bordering on our Territory, who have so well served us in our difficulties, and by adhering to, or espousing our cause, saved us at a most critical moment, are no more to be depended on than any others. I verily believe that these Troops

derived from much more energetic and intelligent races would become still more formidable than the Hindoostanees, if by a sudden change in their sentiments towards us, arising out of a fanatical cry to which they are quite capable of responding, they might choose to desert our cause. Already do they feel their importance (as the saviours of our tottering Government) already do they feel the power which we have placed in their hands, and they have before their eyes the baneful example of rebellion which has been shewn them by their Hindoostanee neighbours, tending to prove that our Government has hitherto been placed on an insecure foundation.

This very feeling will in after times, deter many who had formerly considered us invincible, to ponder well ere they commit themselves by entering the service of so uncertain and insecure a Government.

4. Having adverted therefore to the fact that the Hindoostanee Troops can never

The early disbandment
of the whole Native
Army as originally con-
stituted, recommended.

again be trusted as a body, and having endeavoured to shew that no native of the country is deserving at our hands of implicit confidence, I would suggest as a preliminary step towards reorga-

nization, that the whole of the Native Regular Cavalry and Infantry of the Bengal Army, remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed, whether apparently loyal or otherwise, be indiscriminately discharged from the service of the British Government. This act would be eminently just on our part. The Troops as a body having proved themselves to be, *as at present constituted*, not only unworthy of our confidence, but dangerous to us in the extreme.

5. With regard to the newly organized Levies, they should be kept embodied and

The newly raised Troops to be kept embodied, but their organization to be changed. When once the terms are finally settled, no concessions are to be made to any extent whatever at their own seeking.

treated with liberality, but at the same time so grafted on and amalgamated with European Troops, that they would be powerless to do harm.

Their organization must be changed as will be suggested hereinafter, and should it be deemed expedient, which no doubt it might be, to re-enlist in our service any portion of the old Army of the country, the men should be hired on terms better suited than those of previous times to our welfare and security, terms of such rigid discipline as would ensure ready and willing obedience to all such orders of superiors as are commonly issued to Soldiers of all Armies, without affording them the means of concealing their transactions as heretofore, and of combining to mutiny against their employers; and whilst enforcing discipline with such Troops, let our treatment of them be liberal, we must begrudge them nothing that is right to give them, but that once settled and determined on, let no concessions whatever be henceforward made when urged and solicited by themselves. Concede nothing to Native Troops at their own requiring, they are incapable in such concessions of imputing to their employers aught but weakness.

6. Of all the changes required in the great Army of British India, there is none

Powers of Military Commanders to be greatly increased. One Commander in Chief of all the Indian Armies recommended, with four Commanders of forces placed in convenient localities.

so much needed, so imperatively called for, as the power to act on sudden emergencies by Officers holding commands. It is most necessary that they should have the means nearer at hand to obtain instructions from the Supreme Military authorities, and the sanction of proposed measures without delay. The great machinery of Military affairs is by much too complicated for such a country as India, I would therefore suggest that Commanders of the Forces with vastly increased powers to act on their own responsibility may be so located, and within the reach of the Troops, as to remove all possibility of delay in carrying out measures of public utility.

In my humble opinion there should be but one Commander-in-Chief of all the Armies of India, whose motto should be *ubique*, and he, as supreme Military authority, should be vested with powers *in ordinary matters* to act without referring to the Supreme Government of the country. It is impossible adequately to express or explain the embarrassment caused, and the evils to which the Soldiers are liable, by the difficulty and delay which occur in obtaining authority for carrying out the most trifling measures of necessity.

I would have Commanders of the forces, but not Commanders-in-Chief at the subordinate Presidencies, *viz.*, there should be one in Bengal, one at Madras, one at Bombay, and one in the Punjab, and adjacent Provinces, all four reporting to the Chief of the Staff for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The whole of the Armies of India should be under one system, and under the same code of Regulations, so that they might be transferred from one Presidency to another without difficulty or inconvenience.

7. The rigid Departmental Rules at present in force, which deprives the Executive Officer of the power of acting under or by the orders of the Military authorities on the spot, except in the most paltry cases are injurious to the Soldiers, the Departmental superiors to whom most matters must be referred, having no real interest on questions submitted for their consideration, and not being exactly aware of the nature of the exigencies of the Troops, put aside matters of immediate necessity in the ordinary course of business, and by the delay which takes place the object is frequently lost. Indeed, so long is the process, and so hopeless the prospect of obtaining what is required, that wants are often endured because the season must pass away ere authority for works can be obtained.

Commanders of the forces to be empowered to order Military Works to be undertaken and completed on a more extended and liberal scale than at present.

8. The amalgamation of the Services is another measure of expediency as well as of necessity, which should be at once resorted to, and the present is the most convenient opportunity of accomplishing it.

The abolition of all distinctions between Officers and Soldiers of the Armies of India strongly advocated and recommended as a measure of imperative necessity, and highly advantageous to the interests of the Governments of England and India.

The Crown of Great Britain has erected under the names of Queen's and Company's Services a barrier, which is a stumbling block to all improvement, and causes embarrassment in carrying out measures of great public utility. In the re-organization of the Indian Army these services should be blended. The very feelings of jealousy which now exist even between brothers and relations—as well as countrymen engaged in the same duties, arising from this unnecessary and stupid distinction, is prejudicial to the interests in a thousand ways of the Government under which we are all serving. It is scarcely to be understood how it has happened that the Crown of England should so long have permitted the existence of such a barrier, which, to the nation at large, is so highly prejudicial.

India is or ought to be the great nursery or School of Officers (Commanders and Staff) for the service of the Crown.

The great field for the exercise of Military talent and ingenuity in Officers and Soldiers is alone to be found in Her Majesty's Indian possessions, and to India mainly the Crown should look for Officers of Military experience in her European wars.

It is too late to train and make Officers when war breaks out in Europe, and can Officers be formed and made efficient within the limits of Great Britain and her smaller Colonies, where the three arms of the service rarely or never in time of peace come together in the field? Certainly not. Hence then I maintain as regards European services "that the interests of the Crown are not consulted by the barrier which at present exists in regard to Indian Officers," and that as regards "Indian services" it is necessary that all European Officers serving in the same Army should be placed on the same footing, and thereby made available in common for all duties with the Troops.

raised Corps of the country. The steadiness of these Troops on the duties of the Station is now perfectly wonderful. At first it was supposed that the Native Troops might not relish being brought so closely in contact with the European Soldiers, but not only do they like it, but they are proud of their position, and strive to the utmost of their ability to bring themselves to the same perfection as Europeans, and the Serjeants of guards and even the European Soldiers generally take a pleasure in drilling and instructing their native comrades.

The Europeans too feel their value as helpmates in such a climate, and are kind to them. I have raised a Corps of Cavalry which is one of the most valuable Corps that I have seen in India, modelled on the same principle. I have had the "Peshawar Light Horse" constantly under canvas since August last, and the Corps is perfect in itself for field service. The Corps consists of two Troops of Europeans (80 Privates each) and one of natives of the same strength. On service in the district the cattle of the Army must be protected by the Cavalry whilst grazing, and if baggage breaks down or strays by accident, it is the Native Soldier only who can be detached on escort to bring it up; he alone can bear the exposure in such a climate. Foraging parties too in the heat of the day must be sent out, and hence the European so saved for services of different and greater importance. All power to rebel and do mischief is thus taken from the Native Soldier, and he has become a most-valuable and necessary auxiliary, and I do not hesitate here to assert, because I know it to be a fact, that the white and black races so associated would work together in the field with one common rivalry for the public good, and I verily believe that the three Troops of Cavalry, constituted as is the "Peshawur Light Horse," are fully as valuable to the State, and would be fully as powerful when in contact with the enemy in India, as the same number of Dragoons exclusively European.

The two fraternize in the most extraordinary manner. When serving with the Madras Cavalry, which I did for many years in a Regiment of Dragoons, I observed the same thing. The European and Native Troopers being continually on terms of good fellowship and friendly towards each other, and when I advocate the measure of associating Europeans and Natives, I do not hesitate to give it as my opinion, that 20,000 Native Soldiers embodied and placed as part and parcel of the same Corps with Europeans would be in full as valuable to Government as were 40,000 of the same before kept in Battalions, distinct from each other. The Native Companies of the Regular Forces should be classified, they should be enlisted for not less than seven years, and should be composed of Hindoos, Mussulmen, Goorkhas, Seikhs, in fact all sorts, but they must be in separate Companies. They should be completely officered like the European Companies with European Officers. The grade of Native Officers in such Battalions should be for ever abolished. In each Troop or Company there should be an European Serjeant Major or European Color Serjeant, the Native Non-Commissioned Officers of Companies should be termed "Havildars" and "Naicks" as heretofore. The Native Non-Commissioned Officers should be selected and rise by merit and not by seniority, and to no higher grade than that should they ever rise in the Regular Army, and in order to encourage the well behaved and deserving Non-Commissioned Officers they might for special services, and general good conduct be promoted into the Irregular Corps, where being a perfect drill their services would be acceptable, or they might be removed into the civil branches of the service. Those Natives who would choose to serve the Government on such terms should be enlisted and none other. They should be hired to serve

nization, that the whole of the Native Regular Cavalry and Infantry of the Bengal Army, remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed, whether apparently loyal or otherwise, be indiscriminately discharged from the service of the British Government. This act would be eminently just on our part. The Troops as a body having proved themselves to be, *as at present constituted*, not only unworthy of our confidence, but dangerous to us in the extreme.

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treated with liberality, but at the same time so grafted on and amalgamated with European Troops, that they would be powerless to do harm.

Their organization must be changed as will be suggested hereinafter, and should it be deemed expedient, which no doubt it might be, to re-enlist in our service any portion of the old Army of the country, the men should be hired on terms better suited than those of previous times to our welfare and security, terms of such rigid discipline as would ensure ready and willing obedience to all such orders of superiors as are commonly issued to Soldiers of all Armies, without affording them the means of concealing their transactions as heretofore, and of combining to mutiny against their employers; and whilst enforcing discipline with such Troops, let our treatment of them be liberal, we must begrudge them nothing that is right to give them, but that once settled and determined on, let no concessions whatever be henceforward made when urged and solicited by themselves. Concede nothing to Native Troops at their own requiring, they are incapable in such concessions of imputing to their employers aught but weakness.

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so much needed, so imperatively called for, as the power to act on sudden emergencies by Officers holding commands. It is most necessary that they should have the means nearer at hand to obtain instructions from the Supreme Military authorities, and the sanction of proposed measures without delay. The great machinery of Military affairs is by much too complicated for such a country as

India, I would therefore suggest that Commanders of the Forces with vastly increased powers to act on their own responsibility may be so located, and within the reach of the Troops, as to remove all possibility of delay in carrying out measures of public utility.

In my humble opinion there should be but one Commander-in-Chief of all the Armies of India, whose motto should be *ubique*, and he, as supreme Military authority, should be vested with powers *in ordinary matters* to act without referring to the Supreme Government of the country. It is impossible adequately to express or explain the embarrassment caused, and the evils to which the Soldiers are liable, by the difficulty and delay which occur in obtaining authority for carrying out the most trifling measures of necessity.

I would have Commanders of the forces, but not Commanders-in-Chief at the subordinate Presidencies, *viz.*, there should be one in Bengal, one at Madras, one at Bombay, and one in the Punjaub, and adjacent Provinces, all four reporting to the Chief of the Staff for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The whole of the Armies of India should be under one system, and under the same code of Regulations, so that they might be transferred from one Presidency to another without difficulty or inconvenience.

7. The rigid Departmental Rules at present in force, which deprives the Executive Officer of the power of acting under or by the orders of the Military authorities on the spot, except in the most paltry cases are injurious to the Soldiers, the Departmental superiors to whom most matters must be referred, having no real interest on questions submitted for their consideration, and not being exactly aware of the nature of the exigencies of the Troops, put aside matters of immediate necessity in the ordinary course of business, and by the delay which takes place the object is frequently lost. Indeed, so long is the process, and so hopeless the prospect of obtaining what is required, that wants are often endured because the season must pass away ere authority for works can be obtained.

Commanders of the forces to be empowered to order Military Works to be undertaken and completed on a more extended and liberal scale than at present.

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The Crown of Great Britain has erected under the names of Queen's and Company's Services a barrier, which is a stumbling block to all improvement, and causes embarrassment in carrying out measures of great public utility. In the re-organization of the Indian Army these services should be blended. The very feelings of jealousy which now exist even between brothers and relations—as well as countrymen engaged in the same duties, arising from this unnecessary and stupid distinction, is prejudicial to the interests in a thousand ways of the Government under which we are all serving. It is scarcely to be understood how it has happened that the Crown of England should so long have permitted the existence of such a barrier, which, to the nation at large, is so highly prejudicial.

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The great field for the exercise of Military talent and ingenuity in Officers and Soldiers is alone to be found in Her Majesty's Indian possessions, and to India mainly the Crown should look for Officers of Military experience in her European wars.

It is too late to train and make Officers when war breaks out in Europe, and can Officers be formed and made efficient within the limits of Great Britain and her smaller Colonies, where the three arms of the service rarely or never in time of peace come together in the field? Certainly not. Hence then I maintain as regards European services "that the interests of the Crown are not consulted by the barrier which at present exists in regard to Indian Officers," and that as regards "Indian services" it is necessary that all European Officers serving in the same Army should be placed on the same footing, and thereby made available in common for all duties with the Troops.

9. The Europeans and Natives must, in my opinion, be henceforward associated and placed in more immediate contact than heretofore for the public safety.

Organization of the Regular Troops of India by a combination of Europeans and Natives in all Regular Corps of Horse and Foot recommended. British Artillery never again to be trusted to Natives.

The Regular Native Army of Bengal, such as its Regular Cavalry and Infantry, I consider as gone for ever, and the Army must be remodelled on principles totally different from those of former times, which have proved to be so thoroughly faulty.

It is scarcely necessary to make any allusion to the Artillery branch of the Service, which requires perhaps no re-organization, excepting that in no way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted with British Artillery, nor should any Native of India be instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons.

The Native drivers are good horsemen, and the gunners most excellent, but they cannot be trusted; they have a religious veneration for their guns, and in proportion as they are most valuable to the Government they serve, so are they more formidable when they choose to be rebellious. Considering that in times of peace the Regular Native Army of the State has hitherto been chiefly employed in Police duties, such as escorting public and private property about the country, I would recommend that the Army be reduced in numbers, whilst the Police of the country be increased, and that the regular Native Soldiers be never permitted to travel and be scattered over the country as heretofore in small parties. I would combine the Regular Native Horse and Foot altogether with the European Corps, in proportion of two Europeans to one Native. To the forty thousand European Infantry, which I would fix as the least amount of force required for the Bengal Presidency, I would attach twenty thousand Natives, trained, armed and disciplined precisely in the same manner, and being incorporated with the Europeans, they should be subject to the same rules and regulations of Barrack discipline. With every due consideration for their religious prejudices, and respect for their peculiar habits, I would keep them quite distinct in their quarters from the European Soldiers, but the Bugle which sounds the "assembly" for Parade, should bring together by companies (only so far distinct) the Europeans and Natives of the Corps.

These Corps would consist then of 1500 men. A thousand Europeans Rank and File, and 500 natives. On parade each Corps should be formed up in two Battalions, each Battalion having the due proportion of two Europeans to one Native. The natives should take their fair proportion of all Regimental duties. On the Regimental guards the two should in general be associated. The natives being placed on sentry on posts of exposure to heat for which the European is not calculated. I advocate this measure as one of vast utility, so found by experience throughout my command during the past twelve months of extraordinary difficulty.

In Peshawur the newly raised troops have universally been associated in this manner; they were first combined together from necessity, owing to the paucity of European Troops who had by night and day to guard against the insurrection for ever expected of the faithless Hindoostanee troops in garrison. This system was first proposed to me by Brigadier Galloway, and it has succeeded admirably. To this measure I mainly attribute the rapid progress towards efficiency which has been made in Peshawur by the newly

raised Corps of the country. The steadiness of these Troops on the duties of the Station is now perfectly wonderful. At first it was supposed that the Native Troops might not relish being brought so closely in contact with the European Soldiers, but not only do they like it, but they are proud of their position, and strive to the utmost of their ability to bring themselves to the same perfection as Europeans, and the Serjeants of guards and even the European Soldiers generally take a pleasure in drilling and instructing their native comrades.

The Europeans too feel their value as helpmates in such a climate, and are kind to them. I have raised a Corps of Cavalry which is one of the most valuable Corps that I have seen in India, modelled on the same principle. I have had the "Peshawar Light Horse" constantly under canvas since August last, and the Corps is perfect in itself for field service. The Corps consists of two Troops of Europeans (80 Privates each) and one of natives of the same strength. On service in the district the cattle of the Army must be protected by the Cavalry whilst grazing, and if baggage breaks down or strays by accident, it is the Native Soldier only who can be detached on escort to bring it up; he alone can bear the exposure in such a climate. Forageing parties too in the heat of the day must be sent out, and hence the European so saved for services of different and greater importance. All power to rebel and do mischief is thus taken from the Native Soldier, and he has become a most valuable and necessary auxiliary, and I do not hesitate here to assert, because I know it to be a fact, that the white and black races so associated would work together in the field with one common rivalry for the public good, and I verily believe that the three Troops of Cavalry, constituted as is the "Peshawur Light Horse," are fully as valuable to the State, and would be fully as powerful when in contact with the enemy in India, as the same number of Dragoons exclusively European.

The two fraternize in the most extraordinary manner. When serving with the Madras Cavalry, which I did for many years in a Regiment of Dragoons, I observed the same thing. The European and Native Troopers being continually on terms of good fellowship and friendly towards each other, and when I advocate the measure of associating Europeans and Natives, I do not hesitate to give it as my opinion, that 20,000 Native Soldiers embodied and placed as part and parcel of the same Corps with Europeans would be in full as valuable to Government as were 40,000 of the same before kept in Battalions, distinct from each other. The Native Companies of the Regular Forces should be classified, they should be enlisted for not less than seven years, and should be composed of Hindoos, Mussulmen, Goorkhas, Seikhs, in fact all sorts, but they must be in separate Companies. They should be completely officered like the European Companies with European Officers. The grade of Native Officers in such Battalions should be for ever abolished. In each Troop or Company there should be an European Serjeant Major or European Color Serjeant, the Native Non-Commissioned Officers of Companies should be termed "Havildars" and "Naicks" as heretofore. The Native Non-Commissioned Officers should be selected and rise by merit and not by seniority, and to no higher grade than that should they ever rise in the Regular Army, and in order to encourage the well behaved and deserving Non-Commissioned Officers they might for special services, and general good conduct be promoted into the Irregular Corps, where being a perfect drill their services would be acceptable, or they might be removed into the civil branches of the service. Those Natives who would choose to serve the Government on such terms should be enlisted and none other. They should be hired to serve

every where, and to work as the Soldiers of all nations work, with the spade and the pick-axe. It has been urged by some that the Natives when embodied with Europeans might lose respect for them, owing to their dissipated habits. This is a mistake arising from a want of knowledge of European Troops ; unfortunately in isolated positions, when the European Soldiers are not properly looked after, some drunkenness prevails, but in well regulated Corps, as all should be, and generally are, a drunken Soldier is never seen in a Barrack square. Drunkenness is not now a prevailing crime as it used to be in the Army. I can safely assert that during the five or six years that I have been in the Peshawur Cantonments I have not seen half a dozen drunken Soldiers about the station, so vigilant are the Police Authorities, and so strict the regulations relative to drunkenness.

10. The Native Irregular Cavalry and Infantry must next come under consideration. I am of opinion that about 40,000 men of the latter would suffice for the service of the Bengal Presidency. They should be armed with Firelocks and two-grooved Rifles, but the Enfield Rifle should never be trusted to them, and as I would congregate Troops very much more than heretofore in great Military Cantonments, and would keep them under strict rigid discipline as in our Military Colonies, the Irregular Forces should be chiefly therein contained and distributed in due proportions to the other Arms of the Service. For instance—Trans Jhelum, I would have an Army of 25,000 men, and these should garrison the whole of the posts and stations in the Sind Saugor District, and on the Peshawur, Kohat and Hazara frontiers. This force should be composed of the three Arms and all services. It should be placed in the Sind Saugor District (as the great frontier Force in India), which has been found to be most healthy, and I would place the greater part of this body as near to the Indus as possible, say on the plains at Campbellpore (if these plains are found on experience to be healthy.) Campbellpore is admirably situated as a support to the frontier posts of Kohat, Peshawur, and Hazara, being nearly equi-distant from these posts respectively, and I would keep only such Troops at these advanced frontier posts as are politically required to preserve order, looking to the great frontier force in the Sind Saugor District as the base of all operations on the border, and available for service at a moment's notice in any direction at all seasons of the year, furnishing Detachments for all these posts of the frontier *viz.*, Kohat, Peshawur and Hazara and the minor Stations attached to them.

Proper arrangements should be made at once for the transport of these Troops, sheds should be erected on all the great roads at convenient distances, and the river Indus should be bridged at Attock. Of the constitution of the Native Irregular Cavalry and Infantry Corps as I think, and it is admitted by every one, that they have not at present nearly sufficient European Officers, I would alter the present organization in that respect. It is proposed by many well acquainted with the subject, and I am inclined to consider that opinion as founded on wisdom, that instead of increasing very much the number of European Officers as at present established, it would be far better to reduce the effective strength of Corps in numbers of men, and to increase the number of European Officers slightly, so that Corps of Cavalry should not exceed 300 men, two Squadrons of three Troops, and Corps of Infantry should not exceed 400 Rank and File in four Companies, thirty to each Corps of Irregular Cavalry, I would post a Commandant and 2nd in Command, with two Officers doing duty besides the Adjutant.

Organization of the Irregular Native Cavalry and Infantry recommended.

To each Corps of Irregular Infantry a Commandant and 2nd Command, and three European Officers doing duty, each Company thereby with a 2nd in Command having its own European Commander besides the Adjutant. I would not deprive these Irregular Regiments of their Native Officers, they should remain as at present constituted in that respect, but the Commanders of Regiments should have increased powers, and Native Officers as well as men should be subject at his hand to instant dismissal for breaches of discipline.

It should not be necessary to raise these Native Officers from the ranks; on the contrary the respectable natives of the Country of the upper grades being desirous of serving the British Government might be hired as Native Officers, bringing with them clansmen on whom they could depend, and over whom personally they might have some moral influence and control.

As regards classes and castes in these Irregular Corps, I am inclined to think that as their numerical strength regimentally would be so small, and as I would keep the Army cantoned generally in larger bodies than heretofore, that it might be best that each Corps should be composed of one class or caste, so that the counterpoise might be by Regiments and not by Troops and Companies as was suggested with Regiments of their original strength.

11. In selecting the European Officers for these duties, the greatest care should be taken. They should be well paid, and discouraged in every possible way from changing from one branch of the Service to another.

Selection of Officers for appointments to Irregular Corps.

12. I do not think it ever would be necessary, if my proposal were carried out in full, to bring foreigners of color into the Indian Service. I think they would become a very great burden to the State when worn out, and perhaps very troublesome. Look at the Arabs in the Decan in the service of Nizam, and if I mistake not, the Corps composed of Malays, Caffres and Sepoys in the British service, in the Ceylon Regiments in former days were not found to answer, neither do I think that the Natives of this country, situated as I have recommended, could ever combine together in general rebellion against the British Government.

The introduction of foreigners of color as Soldiers in the British Service disapproved of.

13. I would divide the Army into Corps, each Corps to consist of at least 20,000 men, and be numbered and kept entirely on Field Establishments. These *Corps d' Armee* as they should be termed, should be under command of a Major General, with the *personnel* of Military Secretary and two Aides-de-Camp with a general Staff of Assistant Adjutant General, Assistant Quarter Master General and Deputies, so competent to the duties of the command, and so complete, that business could meet with no hindrance. These *Corps d' Armee* should have their own Commissariat, Ordnance Commissariat, and Barrack Departments, and be divided into Brigades fully officered with staff as on field service. Camp Equipage and carriage should always be kept up so that the Troops might move at a moment's notice, and every *Corps d' Armee* should take the field for exercise two months in every year. The present system of placing 12,000 men of the three arms (sometimes more and sometimes less) under one Brigadier with a single Brigade Major should be at once discontinued. The Honorable

The Armies of India to be divided into *Corps d' Armee* told off into Brigades with Staff complete, as for field service. These *Corps d' Armee* should take the field for exercise for two months in each year.

the Court of Directors of the East India Company, who have established this system, probably looking to small expenditure (and that only), do not appear to have been aware or mindful of the necessities of armies. These old arrangements may cause a small draft on the Treasury for Commanders and Staff, but they are not economical, because practically (under such circumstances) Troops cannot be efficient for immediate service. Every Soldier to whatever Arm he may belong should be kept on the roll of a *Corps d' Armee*, where rigid and strict discipline being maintained, and all the Military exercises being practised, none would be deteriorated by being temporarily on detached duties. It must be necessary of course sometimes to detach Troops from these large bodies but Detachments should be relieved very frequently, and hence very little evil would happen to them.

The great Forts, such as "Fort William" might or might not be an exception to this rule. It is impossible for any Officer to enter into a detailed statement pointing out all the necessary localities for these *Corps d' Armee* in a political point of view, and therefore in writing on the subject, I can only recommend for the consideration of Government the general principles on which I would reorganize the Army. The whole of my suggestions are intended to point very distinctly to the great principles on which such a country as India should henceforward be ruled with a view to its future security, the general re-organization being essentially military.

14. And now with regard to the General Police of the country, which I would augment

Soldiers not to be employed on Police duties, or escorting prisoners. The Police of the country to be increased in numbers, but not to be drilled and armed as Soldiers except in certain localities.

so as to discontinue altogether the practice of employing Soldiers of the Army in Police duties, or such duties as would cause them to stray or straggle all over the country. In the first place, I would on no account arm and discipline Police like Soldiers, because by that measure the Government are training the Police to be just as formidable as Native Soldiers of the Regular Army have been.

The Peshawur and Frontier Districts must be exempted from this; the Police must be armed in these places: concluding that the British Government will never for the future allow the population of this country to be armed, it is wholly unnecessary to think of training Policemen with arms and to drill them as Soldiers.

When the country becomes settled therefore, and the people deprived of their arms as they must be, and having settled down to peaceful occupations, it will be unnecessary to give the Police of the country generally any other weapon than the Tulwar; indeed, even that might not be necessary. A few fire arms at the Police posts under the Constables or Chiefs of Police would suffice to keep order in the country. I will leave to others to determine the amount of Police Force required, so as to avoid in all ordinary cases, calling for the service of the Troops, as treasure escorts, &c., by the Civil authorities, as has been the practice heretofore.

15. I think that if the European Officers serving on the staff and other detached

A General list instead of Regimental lists recommended for Officers serving on the staff and other detached duties in India, and in Irregular Corps.

duties, and in Irregular Corps in India, were placed on one General list as in the Artillery, it would be far better to have them so than on Regimental lists, because from those General lists selections being made for the Regimental and Staff duties, the Officers best suited for the various occupations would find their way into their

proper places. Officers might be regularly appointed in the *Regular service* and rise accordingly.

16. The system at present prevailing of raising Officers rapidly from the lower to the higher grades to meet the emergencies of services according to their qualification, will, I hope and trust speedily remove from the service that exceedingly objectionable arrangement by which large bodies of Troops are kept under the control and management exclusively of the Civil Officers of Government, and entirely removed from the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

I have heard but two reasons given for the prevalence of such an extraordinary system, and which in times of war and difficulty could not possibly be sustained, which are—

Firstly.—It enables the local Governments to place in authority over such Troops younger and more efficient Officers, and—

Secondly.—Being under the immediate control of the Local Civil Government, which is vested with powers at once to meet the wants and demands of the Troops; the usual embarrassments which are experienced by the Troops of the Army are never felt. Does not this speak volumes as to the defects of the system under which the Regular Army suffers when it is actually found necessary to organize and keep up Forces separate and distinct from the Regular Army for Frontier Services, the Army embarrassments rendering it unserviceable in such positions? Indeed, the Army must and should be under one authority, and the Army embarrassments must and should be removed. The present machinery of Military matters are indeed, as before stated, much too complicated. During the greater part of the recent rebellion, fortunately for the Troops of the Peshawur Frontier, the ordinary channels of communication with the far distant Government were closed, and the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, ever ready and prompt to meet the exigencies of the times, acted entirely on his own responsibility, and the most useful and necessary measures were sanctioned without a moment's delay. No sooner however were the roads thrown open than the Military machinery became again clogged, and matters were restored to their pristine embarrassment.

I offer these remarks solely for the public good, not intending to reflect on any acts of my superiors, but simply to prove how much the present Military administration needs reform.

17. I would urgently recommend also to the Government to abolish a system by which some of its best and most valuable Military Officers are excluded from the power to do good in their own profession by being locked up in Kutcheries and Commissariat Offices, and employed in the various Civil services of the Country.

Recommending that Officers of the Army should not be taken from Military duties and employed in the Civil Service of the Country.

If the Government thinks that these Officers, of whose valuable services the Army is deprived, are or ever can be with all their talent, courage and devotion qualified to command Troops as they should be commanded, when brought out on a sudden emergency to serve with, or lead them in the field, I, as an old Soldier, can solemnly assure it that they cannot be so. To have the entire confidence of the Troops, and that moral influence so essential to Military Government, Officers must be identified with their men, and must be associated with them in peace as well as in war. They must know well their wants, and enter warmly into their feelings, and so maintain discipline by

paternal and friendly intercourse, rather than by perpetually turning to the clauses of Mutiny Act. There is much more required of an Officer than courage in battle, and a clear head to discern. The admiration of the Soldiers towards any man who is daring in battle will be gained, it is true, for the moment, but their general confidence in him must still be wanting if he be a stranger to the Troops.

Let the Army then have its own, and let the Civil Services of the Country be otherwise provided for.

18. The unsettled state at present of the Officers of the Army in India under the existing system is enough to ruin the finest Army in the world. Regimental Officers being, from the commencement of their career, taught, as it were by contagion, to look for pecuniary advantages, whether in Civil or Military life, have no *esprit-de-corps* and escape from their men the first moment they can get the opportunity.

Esprit de-Corps of Officers taken from them by various objectionable rules.

There is another vast evil prevailing, principally in the Bengal Presidency, to which I cannot help adverting, as tending in like manner to unsettle the minds of Officers, and to take from them all interest in and affection for the Soldier of the service to which they belong, and that is the indiscriminate leave of absence which is given to Officers to visit the Hills and Cashmere for six months in every year. Of all the inventions that could be hit upon to ruin and injure the younger Officers in particular of the Army, and to take away from them all feelings of affection towards the Soldiers with whom they are enrolled, and ought to be continually associated, none could be more effectual than this. Besides large bodies of young Officers congregating and away from Military control, and leading a life of continued idleness for so long a period, resort to every description of immorality, and debauchery, and are, in fact, utterly ruined, and thereby rendered unfit to a very considerable extent, for the duties of their profession when they return to them.

Medical Officers are indeed too incautious in granting Medical Certificates, and Officers reported incapable of doing their Military duties are to be seen in droves who are gaming and drinking all night in the Hill Stations full of health and vigour, unblushingly laughing amongst themselves as to their adroitness in misleading the Doctor.

This is by no means an incorrect picture of Military life generally prevailing in the Upper Provinces of Bengal.

19. I would here take leave to refer to several matters which bear very much on the question of re-organization :—

To save Troops the improvements of Roads and Bridges recommended, the introduction of Sapper (European) recommended, and also the discontinuance of the system of employing Officers and Soldiers of the Line as overseers of Public works.

1st.—The necessary strength of the Army depends very much on the state of the Roads and Bridges and the means of transporting Troops.

Government has expended vast sums of money in the construction of roads in the Punjaub which have remained unfinished for the last two or three years.

The want of proper overseers and trustworthy men in the Public Works has caused a vast waste of public money.

I would recommend that a most efficient Corps of Sappers, European and Native, be kept up with each *Corps d' Armee* ready at all times to carry on, under the Executive Engineer, the great Military works in progress, the former should be employed as Overseers and Chief artisans, and the latter as tradesmen.

The system heretofore prevailing of employing Officers and Soldiers of the line, as overseers on the lines of roads, is most objectionable. The former (young Officers) are sent to overlook the construction of great works of which they are entirely ignorant, and naturally idle, as many young Officers are, they become more and more so when away from the duties of their profession and the control of their Commanding Officers.

In many cases they are worse than useless to Government, and become totally ruined as Officers by the bad habits they contract. The latter (the common Soldiers) cannot be trusted with money, frequently turn out dishonest, rob the Government, and return to their Corps with lost character.

The Soldiers, generally European and Native, should, when available, be employed as labourers in the public works and the great Military gardens which should be cultivated near to but not in the stations of the Army, receiving for their services working money.

The labor of Soldiers in cool weather is most valuable to Government, much more so than that of coolies for the same money, and the system is in every way useful to the Soldiers themselves; it assists them very much in providing for their families, prepares them by practice for throwing up field works in time of war, and affords them healthy recreation.

20. Sheds should be erected, as before hinted at, along all the great Military Roads for the shelter of Troops in the heat of the day, and the Land Transport Trains for the conveyance of Troops in hot weather, recently introduced, from necessity, in various parts of the country, should be vastly increased and improved, and they should be kept up until the Railway is introduced, and the River Steam Navigation improved throughout India. I would never move Troops in the ordinary course of relief in tents; they should march from shed to shed in the ordinary routes, and the marches might be much longer with the same fatigue to the men.

Sheds for Troops recommended on the Military roads, and that the Land Transport Trains should be improved and vastly increased.

21. A system of espionage so essential to good government in a conquered country should be established and freely paid, and all breaches of Regulations (such as being found with Arms in possession &c.) should be considered as capital offences, and summarily dealt with by order of Military Commanders. One of the greatest wants of an Army quartered, as it were, in an enemy's country (for so we must view India more or less for a long time to come) is a good and efficient "Intelligence Department."

Intelligence Depts. recommended as most necessary on the re-organization of the Army.

The Commanders of all the great bodies should have a well organized establishment of this nature, with ample funds at their disposal to pay for secret intelligence. A strict surveillance may be kept, and in such times as these, are kept over the Post Office receipts and issues, and letters of a seditious nature may be often so intercepted, but the Natives generally are much too cunning to expose their mutinous designs to such a risk of discovery. They have other modes of communicating which requires the most shrewd and practised hands to trace and discover.

Infantry Soldiers have been taught by us to be gunners, and the people of the country have been taught to prepare weapons, and thus it appears by incautious systems, we have been training the inhabitants to rise up in rebellion well prepared for our destruction.

26. There are not at present nearly sufficient European Officers in India, or on its establishment for the ordinary services of the country. I consider the ordinary pay and allowances of the lower grades of Regimental European Officers to be wholly insufficient; many Officers are in consequence in such bad circumstances as materially to interfere with their efficiency.

More European Officers required in India, and the pay of lower grades recommended to be increased.

If the Government be pleased to build quarters for Officers near to and adjoining the Soldiers' Barracks as I have recommended, it would be a great and necessary boon conferred on them if the Officers were allowed to occupy them as in Europe, without charge for rent, and I recommend very strongly that the pay and allowances of all Officers may be consolidated.

27. I do not recommend that European Troops should be located and quartered in the Hills, except such as are specially recommended by experienced Medical Officers for change of air and recovery of health. There are many diseases, particularly those of an organic nature, which are not improved by the Hills, and to the patients suffering under such diseases, the Hills often are fatal.

Hills not recommended for large bodies of European Troops.

The climates of the mountains are in fact more or less unnatural. We ascend mountains gradually until human life becomes extinct. The damp and rain of the Himalayas are very injurious; in some cases particularly with old Soldiers suffering from chronic dysentery, the result of being long in tropical climates, and leading a hard life. In heart complaints too, the Hills are injurious.

When bodies of Troops, such as Regiments, are placed in the Hills, of course every description of disease will be found amongst them, to which the human frame is liable. To many the climate is fatal, whilst to others of course the cool atmosphere is beneficial. I would therefore recommend the Hills for Troops only when the proper selections are made. The Soldiers dislike the Hills exceedingly. The confinement is bad for them in every way. I recommend that the best selections may be made on the most advantageous and healthy ground in the plains for the great cantonments.

28. I feel confident that, with armies constituted and organized throughout India, as I have suggested, the public safety would be maintained, and with Forces infinitely less in numerical strength than those heretofore in the service of Government.

Conclusion.

Very much more might be written on this most important subject. I am quite unable now to enter into detailed particulars relative to the services of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, nor into the amount of Artillery and Cavalry required for Bengal. My despatch, already perhaps too lengthy, contains however my views as to the general principles of re-organization of the whole of the Armies of India, subject to local modifications. My object in thus addressing my superiors, at such a moment, on such a subject, has it appears to me, been sufficiently attained without entering into more minute particulars.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
(Signed) SYDNEY COTTON, *Major General,*
Commanding Peshawar Division.

COLONEL E. GREEN, C. B., ADJUTANT GENERAL, BOMBAY ARMY.

BOMBAY ARMY.

QUESTIONS and ANSWERS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235 of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.

1.

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Total.
Royal	2,287	1,045	240	10,515	14,087
Bombay	0	1,836	33	2,757	4,626
	2,287	2,881	273	13,272	18,713

The distribution of the European Troops is as follows:—

DIVISION OR FIELD FORCE.	Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
SOUTHERN DIVISION.	Bombay	Head Quarters 2nd Battalion	{ Wing 57th Regiment Foot Company 79th Highlanders.
	Belgaum	{ 3rd Compy. 1st Battn. and No. 17 Light Field Battery Bombay Ar- tillery	{ 56th Regiment Foot 2nd Bom- bay European Regiment.
	Dharwar	{ Head Quarters 8th Company 14th Battalion with 2 Guns Royal	{ Company 56th Regiment Foot Company 74th Highlanders.
	Nurgoond	{ 2 Guns 8th Compy. 14th Battn. Royal	2 Companies 74th Highlanders.
	Kulludghee	{ 2 Guns 8th Compy. 14th Battn. Royal	1 Company 56th Regiment Foot.
	Sholapora	{ 3rd Compy. 2nd Battn. and No 14 L. F. B. Bombay	{ Squadron 17th Lan- cers.	{ 1 Company 33rd Duke of Wel- lington's Regiment.
	Kolapoor	{ 3rd Company Reserve and No. 15 L. F. B. Bombay	{ 3 Companies 2nd Bombay European Regiment.
	Rutnagberry	{ Company 2nd Bombay European Regiment.
Sawuntwarree	Company 56th Regiment Foot.	
POONA DIVISION.	Poona	D Troop Royal, 4th Troop Bombay	{ Head Quarters Sappers and Miners	{ 18th Royal Irish Regiment 33rd Regiment of Foot.
	Kirkee	{ Head Quarters 3rd Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers	{ 2 Companies 33rd Regiment Foot.
	Sattara	{ 2nd Company 2nd Battalion Bombay and No. 16 L. F. B.	{ Squadron 3rd Dra- goon Guards.	{ Company 33rd Regiment Foot 2 Companies 18th Royal Irish Regiment.
	Ahmednuggur	{ Head Quarters 1st Battalion. Head Quarters Reserve Bombay and No. 10 Light Field Battery	{ Squadron 3rd Dra- goon Guards.	{ Company 18th Royal Irish Regiment.
	Asseerghur	Company 92nd Highlanders.
	Nassick	Company 92nd Highlanders.
Malligaum	{ 2 Guns 7th Company 11th Batta- lion Royal	Company 92nd Highlanders.	
NORTHERN DIVISION.	Ahmedabad	{ 1 Company 1st Battalion Bom- bay, and No. 3 L. F. B.	{ Wing 4th Foot. Company 89th Foot.
	Baroda	{ 8th Company 1st Battalion and Battery Royal.	Company 51st Foot.
	Surat	2nd Company 11th Battn Royal	{ 1 Company European Re- cruits.
	Deesa	89th Regiment Foot.
RESERVE DIVISION.	Kurrachee	{ 4th Company Reserve and No. 7 L. F. B. Bombay	51st Regiment Foot.
	Hyderabad	{ 4th Company 1st Battalion and No. 5 L. F. B. Bombay.	{ 2 Companies 51st Regiment Foot.
	Shikarpoor	{ 1 Company Reserve and No. 9 L. F. B. Bombay.	Company 51st Regiment Foot.

DIVISION OR FIELD FORCE.	Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
RAJPOOTANA FIELD FORCE.	Nusseerabad ..	2nd Troop Bombay Horse	...	Squadron 8th Hussars	83rd Regiment Foot.
	Neemuch ..	3rd Company 4th Battalion Royal and Siege Train. 1st Company 2nd Battn. Bombay and No. 2 L. F. B.	11th Company Royal	72nd Highlanders.
	Ajmere	Company 83rd Regiment Foot.
CENTRAL INDIAN FIELD FORCE.	Between Gwalior, Jhansi and Seepree ..	1st and 3rd Troops Bombay Horse	21st Company Royal ..	8th Hussars ..	Wing 72nd Highlanders 86th Regiment Foot.
		5th Company 14th Battalion Royal and No. 6 L. F. B.	14th Dragoons ..	95th Regiment Foot.
		4th Company 2nd Battalion Bombay and No. 4 L. F. B.	3rd European Regiment Bombay.
		2 Guns 2nd Company Reserve Bombay and No. 18 L. F. B.		
	Mhow ..	7th Company 11th Battn. Royal 2nd Company 6th Battalion Bombay and No. 8 L. F. B.	Squadron 17th Lancers ..	Wing 71st Highlanders, 92nd Highlanders.
	Jaulnah ..	3 Guns, 2nd Company Reserve Bombay	2nd Company 18th Royal Irish.
	Aden ..	2nd Company 1st Battalion Bombay	Wing 57th Regiment Foot 64th Regiment Foot.
	Bengal Presidency	78th Highlanders 1st European Fusiliers Bombay.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

2.

I have embodied in the accompanying Return the information which will reply to this question and also No. 4. My reasons for recommending this distribution are therein given, and I trust it may be remembered that in framing it and the remarks, I have not overlooked the subject of expense that would be incurred by the alterations, while keeping in view that we are considering the important requirements of an Empire.

3.

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Artillery Drivers.	Gun Lascars.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Total.
Regular...	1,417	933	492	613	567	30,956	34,978
Irregular ..	3,837	1,969	5,806
	5,254	933	492	613	567	32,925	40,784

The distribution of the Native Troops is as follows :—

DIVISION. OR FIELD FORCE.	Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
SOUTHERN DIVISION.	Belgaum	{ Detach. Southern Mahratta Horse.	{ 18th Regiment. 20th Regiment.
	Dharwar	Head Quarters 28th Regiment.
	Nurgoond	Company 28th Regiment.
	Kulladghee	{ Head Qr. Southern Mahratta Horse.	{ Wing 15th Regiment.
	Sholapoor	{ 2nd Madras Cavalry Aden Troop	{ 3rd Regiment.
	Kolapoor	{ Detach. Southern Mahratta Horse.	{ Head Quarters 15th Regt.
	Rutnagherry	Company 15th Regiment.
	Vingorla	2 Companies 15th Regiment.
	Ram Ghaut	Company 20th Regiment.
	Baitsee	Company 20th Regiment.
	Tullawarree	Company 28th Regiment.
Paldy	Company 28th Regiment.	
Beeres	Company 28th Regiment.	

DIVISION OR FIELD FORCE.	Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
NORTHERN DIVISION.	Ahmedabad ..	{ 2nd Company 3rd Battalion and No. 12 L. F. B. Head Quarters 3rd Battalion .. } { 2 Guns 1st Company 3rd Battalion and No. 17 L. F. B. .. }	{ Guzerat Irregular Horse	{ 2nd Gr. Regiment. Head Quarters 11th Regiment. 8th Regiment. Head Quarters 16th Regiment. Wing 16th Regiment. Company 8th Regiment. Company 8th Regiment. Company 11th Regiment. Company 14th Regiment. Company 11th Regiment. Company 31st Regiment.	
	Baroda
	Surat
	Broach
	Nandode
	Jumbooseer
	Gogo
	Dohud
	Sadra
	Pallunpoor
SCINDIA DIVISION. FRONTIER OF UPPER SCINDIA.	Kurrachee	14th Regiment.	
	Kotree	Company Marine Battalion.	
	Jacobabad	{ 1st 2nd and 3rd Regiments Scinde Horse.		
	Rogan	Det 2nd Ditto.		
	Gundava	Ditto.		
	Hussan ka Ghury	Ditto.		
	Kund Kote	Ditto.		
	Kooruree	Ditto.		
	Kusmore	Det. 3rd Ditto.		
	RAJPOOTANA FIELD FORCE.	Nusseerabad ..	{ 4th Company 3rd Battalion and No. 8 L. F. B. .. }	Squadron 1st Lancers	12th Regiment.
Neemuch ..		{ Detachment 1st Company 4th Battalion .. }	{ 3rd Company Sappers and Miners .. }	{ Head Quarters 2nd Regiment .. }	{ 13th Regiment.	
Between Gwalior, Jhansi and Sepree	{ B Coy. Madras Sappers .. } { Det. 2nd & 5th Companies .. } { Bombay Sappers .. }	{ Head Quarters 1st Lancers .. } { Head Quarters 3rd Regiment .. }	{ 10th Regiment. 24th Regiment. 25th Regiment.	
BOMBAY FIELD FORCE.	Bombay	{ Detachment 1st Lancers (Body Guard) .. }	{ 1st Gr. Regiment. 7th Regiment. Marine Battalion. 4th Regiment. 9th Regiment. 19th Regiment. Company 6th Regiment.	
	Mhow	Wing 3rd Regiment	2nd Belooch Regiment.	
	Jaulna	Company Ditto	
	Dheera Ghazee Khan	29th Regiment.	
	Muttiakote	1st Belooch Regiment.	
	Aden ..	6th Company 3rd Battalion.	1 Coy. Sappers.	
	Bengal	

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

4.

Replied to by the answer to query No. 2.

5.

The Native Troops serving in the Bombay Presidency are composed of proportions as follows :—

Regulars	33,564
Irregulars	7,168
Police	15,627
					<u>56,359</u>

The races are as follows :—

		Regulars.	Irregulars.
TROOPS, EXCLUSIVE OF POLICE.	Mussulmans ..	3,034	4,872
	Chuttees ..	2,289	205
	Brahmins ..	3,123	111
	Mahrattas ..	12,371	675
	Purwarrees ..	3,761	840
	Other castes ..	8,562	448
	Christians ..	424	17

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

6.

I have shown this in the distribution statement. I do not venture to give an opinion as to the number of Police that will be required, as so much must depend upon the internal state of the Country.

7.

The European Force should never be less than one-half of the Native Troops, Regular and Irregular. This would leave a margin for the Police, the ratio being probably one-third European to two-thirds Native, Regular, Irregular, and Police.

8.

The answer to No. 7 will apply much to this question, as to the proportion the European Troops should bear to the Native, Regular, Irregular, and Police; but the little knowledge I possess of the other Presidencies does not permit me to state the proportions in a satisfactory manner.

9.

No; there is not. There is permanent accommodation for four Troops of Horse Artillery, eight Companies of Foot Artillery, one Regiment of Cavalry, and seven Regiments of Infantry; also temporary accommodation for nine Companies of Foot Artillery, one Regiment of Cavalry, and three Regiments of Infantry, Rajpootana and Central India not included.

10.

Certainly; for one Troop of Horse Artillery, nineteen Companies of Foot Artillery, three Regiments of Cavalry, and nine Regiments of Infantry, besides accommodation for Sappers

11.

It must depend upon the state of affairs in Europe as to what proportion of the European Force for India should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, and what proportion should be composed of Troops raised for service in India; but by having a large addition to the Bombay European Force, India would be placed above the contingency of a Continental War, which might force the necessity of the withdrawal of the Royal Troops at a most inconvenient time. Two-thirds of the European Force of all arms for the Bombay Presidency should, therefore, be composed of Troops raised for service in India.

12.

I do not see how we can depart from the established custom adopted when an augmentation takes place, *viz.*, by giving the senior of each grade throughout the arm to be augmented, advancement in the new Regiment.

The system of seniority could hardly be departed from now without causing serious and natural discontent, though there can be no doubt that by thus placing the most unfortunate, and therefore the oldest Officers in the Army, in the new Corps, the interests of Government suffer severely.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

13.

This question appears to embrace the probability of certain Officers of the mutinied Bengal Regiments being appointed to European Corps "raised for service in India." The juxtaposition may be embarrassing if these new European Corps are to be Royal, because the Officers entered the Army under the seniority promotion system as opposed to that of purchase promotion, to which they would now be brought in contact.

14.

Whatever may be the feasibility of raising foreign mercenaries, the proportion of European to Native or foreign mercenary Troops should not be less than one in three.

 MEMORANDUM.

1. The mutinous and uneasy feeling among the Native Troops lately prevailing, have made it a matter of deep consideration, if it be not expedient to amend the system of our Cantonments in *India*; but I wish to confine these remarks to the Bombay Presidency, where many alterations must take place in consequence of the number of Regiments expected from England.

2. There can be no doubt that the system of triangulation is based upon sound Military practice, as affording mutual support to the several Stations thus arranged, with the power of concentration at any particular point which may be threatened; and if this be conceded, it appears, according to reason, that the Troops should be massed as much as possible, and small isolated detached Stations avoided.

3. The massing of Troops has many advantages; it affords a moral force which must have great weight with the people of the Country; better discipline is maintained, and our Native Troops learn much from being brought into contact with Regiments fresh from home; the movements of large bodies in the field become habitual, and there is always a force ready to act in any direction.

4. Small Stations possess none of these advantages; the Troops cantoned in them are sufficient only for the duty of the Garrison, and in time of commotion they are liable to be besieged.

5. If small Cantonments are to be deprecated, how much more so should be avoided the scattering the Troops in detached bodies among them.

6. To divide a Regiment into Wings, or sub-divide it into Detachments, has always, and most justly, been looked upon as a great evil; it ruins the discipline of a Corps and weakens the force which the united body possesses more by moral than any actual physical power that may be due to actual numbers.

7. The moral power attached to British Soldiers has been strikingly shown lately in the Southern Mahratta Country, in Scinde, and also in Bombay, where the presence of a few hundred Europeans has overawed the turbulent, and in a great measure restored tranquillity and confidence in the permanency of our hold upon India.

It is to be hoped that the arrival of reinforcements will prevent an outbreak which might demonstrate the physical weakness so unhappily shown in Rajpootana by our failures at "Awah," "Neembeera" and "Jeerun."

Failures of this kind where European Soldiers have been present are always calamities in India; how much then must they be lamented at present, and how strictly should they be avoided in future, when our prestige has been so rudely shaken.

8. Detachments of a few hundred Europeans located throughout our different Stations would not long retain their moral effect, and in the case of any serious disturbance, the physical power of the Soldiers would be lost by the necessity of keeping the Detachment as a protection to the Cantonment, or of detaching so small a portion of it as to endanger the success of an offensive movement.

9. We should never strike a slight blow in India, and we must hereafter be careful that the effect of an aggressive movement be short, sharp, and decisive, crushing in its effects, in order that the example be permanent, otherwise we may expect a constant repetition of small wars, as dangerous as they are expensive.

10. The awkward position in which our European Regiments are now placed has been forced upon us by circumstances, and could not have been avoided. To have withheld the assistance of the Detachments now so widely scattered, would probably have lost Provinces, and in great emergencies general rules must be departed from. Skill will be required to reunite the divided Regiments, and no time should be lost in carrying this into effect, risking some thing for so desirable an end.

11. The practice of cantoning our Regiments in the neighbourhood of Cities and Towns belonging to independent Chiefs is very objectionable, not only frequently causing unpleasant collisions, but the risk of sedition among the Native portion by contact with the disorderly Soldiers invariably to be found at Native Courts.

12. I would propose the entire abandonment of the Cantonments at Baroda, Kolapore and Bhoj, the Troops in Garrison there being disposed of as hereinafter mentioned. The Guikwar, Rajah of Kolapore and Rao of Cutch should be permitted to keep a quota of Troops sufficiently numerous for their personal protection, and to support their State, with which, except their actual number, the British Government should be in no way concerned. Under the judicious guidance of the Residents at the Courts, these should be sufficient for all purposes of Police, the Government only lending their aid when the Princes were unable to act against any refractory subjects.

13. The time has now arrived when our Cantonments require a complete reorganization, and that accommodation be provided for a defensive position in which can be placed the Magazines and Treasure. No Cantonment should be without a "fortified square:" the advantage of which has been shown at Mhow and Neemuch. Before these can be determined on, and the sites for the new Barracks fixed, the situation of the Cantonments should be reviewed, when I think it will be found that many, if not most of them, are not advantageously placed, with respect to their Military positions, and the great requisite of a good supply of water. As regards this last essential provision, nothing can be worse than the situation of the Poona Cantonment, where almost every year the Artillery Horses have to be sent in the hot season to the bank of the Mota Moollas, and there kept till the rains set in.

14. A Select Committee would point out many evils existing in the location of our several Cantonments, which have been built on the spot, where probably the Force encamped on our taking possession of the Country.

15. The number of Troops to be located in each Cantonment will depend upon the European Force to be maintained under this Presidency for the future ; but we should have strong European Brigades at Poona, Sholapore, Belgaum, in the Nassick District, at Mhow, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Deesa, Ahmedabad, Surat or Broach, Rajkote, and Kurrachee, requiring about sixteen English Regiments, while at Poona, Belgaum, and Kurrachee two Regiments should be cantoned, and a complete (or more) Regiment at the Presidency.

16. The Cavalry Regiment at Kirkee should be removed to Poona, the Poona Horse from Seroor to Sattara, the Southern Mahratta Horse from Kulladghee to Belgaum. Baroda, Kolapore, Bhooj, and Dharwar should be abolished as Military Stations, the Fort at the latter being entirely dismantled.

17. An English Cavalry Regiment should be quartered at Mhow, one at Nusseerabad or Neemuch, with another divided between Sattara and Sholapore. The Light Cavalry should be disposed, one in Rajpootana, a second at Deesa, and a third in the Deccan.

18. Malligaum is an unsuitable Cantonment ; at times there is a scarcity of water, and the heat is intense. Nassick or Chandore would be a better location ; it would domineer over the Bheels, and be in better communication with the Presidency, Poona, and Ahmednuggur. Sattara should be formed into a Brigade Command, for being the Head Quarters of the Mahratta families, a strong Force should be stationed there at all times.

19. I take it for granted that the Artillery will be all Europeans, and that a Battery will be the component part of the Garrison for each Cantonment.

20. European Troops cannot be stationed in Upper Scinde, and Hyderabad is nearly as objectionable. The health of the Soldiers suffer, and they become disorganized. The protection of all that part of Scinde should be left to the arrangement of the Commissioner and the Commandant on the Frontier. The building of the Barracks at Hyderabad was a grave error, and our experience of the Country requires no further experiments.

21. Thus massed, we should overawe the entire population. As before said, scattered Detachments are weak in themselves, and unable to strike a heavy blow. I calculate that at least thirteen British Regiments will be required independent of our three European Corps ; and till we discover the cause of the present rising of our Native Soldiers, India will never be safe without an ample number of English Soldiers.

22. No time should be lost in building "fortified squares," in which all of value should be stored ; but as before stated, previous to undertaking such expensive works and the building of Barracks, we must consider the locality of our Cantonments, for without judicious location and an ample supply of water, such buildings would be useless, and we know that at several of our Stations water is lamentably deficient in the hot season.

23. It is to be hoped that the Government will see the necessity of building suitable pendalls for the Native Troops. Nothing can be worse than the present system of hutting. The first outlay for well-built Native Lines will, in a few years, be a great saving

to Government in putting money and compensation for losses sustained by fires, which are of constant occurrence.

24. Above all, let it be our aim to keep the Troops together, and to avoid cantoning them anywhere near Towns and Cities belonging to Native Princes.

25. These should be made to take care of themselves, and in case of any opposition to the wishes of Government, we can throw such a body of Troops into the Country as to render opposition futile.

26. By the adoption of some such plan as is herein set forth, I think no great additional expense will be entailed upon Government. The Scinde Division will be abolished ; but Mhow, Neemuch and Nusseerabad should be formed into one.

The first class Commands at Nusseerabad and Hyderabad will lapse,—the latter altogether, and the former becoming a second class.

The Kandeish Brigade Command would fall to Sattara, the Baroda Command be transferred to Surat or Broach, the smaller Command merging into a Brigade at Chandore or Nassick, and Brigadiers will be required for Mhow, Sholapore and Neemuch ; but the advantage will be in the perfect security of the State, and thus these remarks may not be thought unworthy of consideration.

I mention Surat or Broach as a Station because between it and Ahmedabad, Baroda is checked. Broach appears to be a fine situation, Surat being considered unhealthy.

DISTRIBUTION of the Bombay Army, as proposed by the Adjutant General.

CORPS.	Artillery.			Cavalry.			Sappers.	Infantry.		REMARKS.
	Horse Artillery.	Field Battery.	Reserve Companies.	European.	Native Regular.	Irregular.	European Companies.	Native Companies.	English.	
Poona	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	4	12	2
Belgaum	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	2
Sattara	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ahmednuggur	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Chandore or Nassick	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Bombay	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4
Sholapore	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Surat or Broach	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Ahmedabad	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2
Deesa	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Nusseerabad	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2
Neemuch	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Mhow	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	2
Asseerghur	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Rajkote	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Kurrachee	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	2
Aden	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1
Total	5	18	9	4	3	3	4	12	16	30

N. B.—This distribution refers only to Stations within the limits of the Bombay Presidency.

H. B. E. FRERE, ESQUIRE, COMMISSIONER IN SCINDE.

BOMBAY ARMY.

QUESTIONS a ANSWERS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1.

The replies from the Military Authorities at Bombay will give this information more accurately than I can in detail.

The present numbers are, of course, exceptional. The ordinary establishment has, of late years, been—

European Infantry (Her Majesty's)...	...	4 Regiments.
„ „ (Company's)	3 Regiments.
„ Cavalry (Her Majesty's)...	...	1 Regiment.
„ Artillery (Company's)	1,600 Men.

They have heretofore, in time of peace, been usually distributed between—

Bombay	Mhow (occasionally).
Belgaum	Deesa.
Poona } Kirkee }	(European Cavalry) ...	{ Kurrachee } { Hyderabad }	Scinde.
Ahmednugger (Head Quarters Arty.)			Aden.

They are now much dispersed in Detachments all over the Presidency, few large Stations being without a Detachment of Europeans.

2.

As regards numbers, this can hardly be answered without reference to question 7, *q. v.*

It seems to me principally, if not wholly, a question of finance.

Our income is limited and capable of little rapid extension ; large portions of it are very precarious. We cannot long go on borrowing. It is necessary to our existence that we should bring our expenses, of which the Military charges are the heaviest portion, within our income. Even in a Military point of view, the value of a surplus income, good credit and a contented Native population, which needs no large Force to keep it from rising, is greater to us in India than that of a powerful and well-prepared Army. Give us the former and *time*, and we must, with our Naval superiority and vast mechanical resources, always be a fair match for any enemy,

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

whether internal or external, that can assail us ; but if we have a deficient income, low credit, and discontented classes among our own subjects, the largest and best appointed Army will only precipitate our downfall ; *time* will then befriend our enemies, who will have only to force us to keep our Army up to a War standard in time of peace in order to ensure our ultimately ruining ourselves by costly victories.

This is not the place to dwell on the political and social questions affecting the feelings of our subjects towards our Government, further than to note that no Army we could possibly maintain if our pecuniary resources were double that they are, could enable us long to hold the Country, if any large classes once become convinced that there are other Governments possible which would be preferable to ours, and to introduce which it is worth their while to make some present sacrifice.

Hence it is necessary, in answering the present question, always to bear in mind that we *must* bring our expenses within our income, and that the vital question is not what do we want to ensure our perfect safety ; but what can we afford to spend for defence ; and how can we lay it out to the best advantage ?

The form, therefore, in which I would put this question is—
 “ What Army can you afford to hold that part of India for which
 “ Bombay is the natural base of operations ; what proportion of
 “ that Army should be Europeans ; and how should they be
 “ distributed ? ”

The most obvious divisions of India for Military purposes would be one which gave the valley of the Ganges and its tributaries to one Army with its base at Calcutta ; the valley of the Indus with its tributaries, to another Army with its base at Kurrachee ; the Western Coast from the Gulf of Cutch to Mangalore, including Rajpootana, Malwa, the Deccan, Bedur and Berar, to a third Army with its base at Bombay ; southern India and the Coromandel Coast, to a fourth Army having its Head Quarters at Madras ; Ceylon, Burmah and the Straits Settlements, to a fifth Army with its Head Quarters at Rangoon or Point de Galle.

But according to existing divisions, the Bombay Presidency Proper, including Scinde with Rajpootana and Malwa, fall to the lot of the Bombay Army, and considering the necessity which exists for a considerable disposable Force on this frontier and seaboard, its duties may still be taken at about a fourth of the whole Military duties of India.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Supposing then that the finances of India allowed an Army of 200,000 men, 50,000 would be assigned to Bombay, of whom 12,500 (*vide* the answer to question 7) would be Europeans.

Artillery	3,500
Cavalry	500
Infantry	8,500
Total				12,500

Who might be thus distributed (the numbers given are merely roughly proportionate approximations)—

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bombay	1,000	500	3,000
Poona			
Kirkee			
Ahmednugger			
Belgaum	500	...	1,000
Sholapoor	100
Maligaum	100
Mhow	300	...	1,000
Neemuch	100
Nusseerabad	100
Deesa	500	...	1,000
Ahmedabad			
Baroda	100
Kurrachee	500	...	2,000
Aden	200	...	500
Total	3,500	500	8,500

The same proportions would hold good, whatever the size of the Army we could afford, whether 100,000 or 200,000.

If we had the money to pay them, I should not consider India sufficiently provided till we could assemble 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior, at two months' notice, and 60,000 within three months', and at half that notice at any spot on the frontier or sea-board, without denuding any single Station of Troops. But this is, in a great measure, a question of facilities for movement rather than of numbers, and requires the

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

completion of a good system of Rail and Steam Communication and Telegraph.

I have classed Bombay, Poona, Kirkee and Ahmednuggur together, because it is impossible to consider their wants separately.

An adequate European Garrison must always be at hand to protect Bombay, but it is a very bad place for European Soldiers; and with a Station like Poona within 100 miles, situated on the healthy highland of the Deccan, and connected by Railway with Bombay, it is advisable to keep the Europeans as much as possible up there, sending down to Bombay only such men as are absolutely required for current Garrison duties.

Kirkee is the best Station for European Cavalry, who have long been quartered there, and may be considered a part of Poona.

I have only proposed to have 500 European Cavalry, which is less than the ordinary Indian strength of one Regiment. My reason for proposing so small a Force is, that there can be no question that for ordinary Indian service, European Cavalry is less efficient in proportion to its expenses than Artillery and Infantry, and if you have money to spare, it is advisable rather to increase your European Force in those arms than in Cavalry; of course when you have amply sufficient European Infantry and Artillery, there is no reason why you should not have as many more European Cavalry as you can conveniently pay for; but not till then.

Ahmednuggur, probably from its being such a good climate and having a Fort, has been made the principal Artillery Station, and there must always be a considerable reserve of Artillery within easy reach of Bombay.

Accidental circumstances led to the division of the Troops among these four Stations—Bombay, Poona, Kirkee and Ahmednuggur, and a great amount of capital, public and private, has been invested in providing quarters for them. It is impossible entirely to disregard such considerations, especially at a time of financial pressure like the present; but if we were now arranging for the first time, it would probably be best to have but two European Stations—Bombay on the Coast and one in the Deccan above the Ghauts.

The other Stations of European Infantry have been chosen—Belgaum as the key of the Southern Mahratta Country; Mhow as Commanding Malwa, Candeish, and the Trunk Road to Agra; Deesa as Commanding Guzerat and Rajpootana; Aden as Com-

manding the Red Sea ; Kurrachee as the key of the valley of the Indus ; and the Punjab as an advance post to the West, superior even to Bombay in position and very salubrious. It is one of the most valuable Military positions in India ; but for all local and provincial duties, a very small Garrison would suffice.

Deesa and Ahmedabad have been coupled together, because the objects aimed at in having Europeans at the two Stations are nearly identical. Deesa is more advanced and has a better climate, while the Arsenal of the Division is at Ahmedabad. It would, of course, be better not to separate the Arsenal from the principal post in the Division, and better still to concentrate both at a spot near Aboo, where Europeans could be kept in better health than in the Plains.

At the other Stations there would be no more Europeans than are necessary for the Artillery, which would be stationed there.

This distribution is made on the supposition that our Army will be more massed than it has heretofore been, that no regular Troops, European or Native, will be stationed at places like Shikarpore, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Bhooj, Rajcote, Broach, Surat, Dhooliah, Sattara, Kolapore, and Dharwar, and that all the duties at these and other minor Stations will be performed by Local Corps and Police.

3.

As in the case of Europeans, this information will be more accurately given in detail by the Military Authorities at Bombay, and the present state of things is quite exceptional. Before the mutiny the numbers were—

29 Regiments of the Line.

1 Battalion of Veterans.

1 Marine Battalion.

2 Belooch Battalions.

33 Regiments of Infantry not Local.

3 Regiments of Light Cavalry.

2 Ditto Scinde Horse.

1 Ditto Poona Horse.

6 Regiments of Cavalry.

About 1,000 Artillerymen, with about an equal number of Lascars and Drivers.

500 Sappers and Miners.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

And they were commonly distributed at the following Stations :—

		Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
SCINDIAN DIVISION.	Jacobabad	2 Regts. S. H.	..
	Shikarpore	Artillery.	2 Regts.
	Hyderabad	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
	Kurrachee*	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
NORTHERN DIVISION.	Bhooj	Ditto.	1 Ditto.
	Rajkote	Ditto.	1 Regt. L. C.	1 Ditto.
	Ahmedabad	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
	Deesa*	Ditto.	1 Regt. L. C.	1 Ditto.
	Baroda	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
	Broach	A Det.
	Surat	Artillery.	1 Regt.
Tanna	Det.	
POONA DIVISION.	Bombay Garrison ..	Artillery.	3 Regts.
	Poona*	Ditto.	HeadQuarters Sappers and Miners.	Poona Horse at Seroor.	3 Ditto.
	Ahmednugger	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
	Maligaum	Ditto.	1 Ditto.
	Sattara	Ditto.	1 Ditto.
Dapolce	Veterans.	
SOUTHERN DIVISION.	Belgaum*	Artillery.	2 Regts.
	Sholapoor	Ditto.	1 Regt. L. C.	2 Ditto.
	Dharwar	1 Ditto.
	Kolapoor	Artillery.	1 Ditto.
	Aden	Ditto.	2 Ditto.
				6 Regts.	33 Regts.

Besides which Nusseerabad, Neemuch and Mhow were occasionally garrisoned by the Bombay Troops, when the above distribution would be altered.

The Artillery at Stations marked* were often exclusively Europeans.

4.

Vide answers to questions 2 and 7.

As in the case of Europeans, I would regulate the number of the Army according to the finances, and I should consider that we had as large an Army as was desirable in India, when from the peace establishment we could assemble 30,000 men in equal proportions, Natives and Europeans, at two months' notice, and 60,000 in three months', at any given point of the interior, and at half that notice at any spot on the coast or frontier.

I would assign a fourth of the whole Army to Bombay, and three-fourths of the Bombay Army should be Natives. If we could pay an Army of 200,000 men in India, 50,000 would be

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

the proportion for Bombay, of whom 37,500 would be Natives in the following proportions—

Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.
700	500	7,500*	28,800†	37,500

* Say 10 Regiments of 750 each. } These are merely proportionate approximations.
 † Say 36 Regiments of 800 each. }

Who might be thus distributed in time of peace—

	Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.		Infantry.	
			Men.	Regts.	Men.	Regts.
Bombay*	200	250	750	1	6,400	8
Poona (Seroor for the Cavalry)*			750	1	1,600	2
Nuggur*	100	500	750	1	1,600	2
Belgaum (Kuladgee for the Cavalry)*			750	1	1,600	2
Sholapoor*	100	500	750	1	1,600	2
Maligaum*			750	1	1,600	2
Asseerghur	100	500	750	1	1,600	2
Mhow*			750	1	1,600	2
Neemuch*	100	500	750	1	1,600	2
Nusseerabad			750	1	1,600	2
Deesa*	100	500	1,500	2	3,200	4
Ahmedabad*			1,500	2	3,200	4
Baroda*	100	500	750	1	1,600	2
Kurrachee*			750	1	1,600	2
Jacobabad*	100	500	2,250	3	1,600	2
Aden*			2,250	3	1,600	2
	700	500	7,500	10	28,800	36

The Stations marked* are those which I should consider Depôts, whence, in time of war, a force of six Regiments of Cavalry and sixteen of Infantry could be drawn.

Whatever the number of men, the number and dispositions of the Battalions and Regiments should, I think, be about what is shown above. If the finances will not bear the expense of so many men, reduce each Regiment to 600 bayonets or sabres, and even still less if necessary.

5.

Of the Troops shown in answer to question 3, all the Artillery and Sappers and Miners were Regulars, and were generally Hindoostan men, nearly the same in composition as the corresponding arms in the Bengal Army, with the mixture of some Mahrattas.

Of the thirty-three Regiments of Infantry, twenty-nine were of the Line—Regulars in the fullest sense of the word. Probably about half of the men before

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

particular Districts of the Mahratta Country. The extent to which this original intention was adhered to varied much according to the individual views or prejudices of the Commanding Officer, and sometimes considerable numbers of men foreign to the District were introduced. I have seen some of them, especially the Bheel Corps in Candeleish, when they contained very few but Bheels, and were in equipment and in parade discipline equal to any Light Infantry Regiments of the Line.

In the Scinde Rural Police it has always been an object to have a considerable admixture of foreigners, principally Hindoostani men and Mahrattas, and they still preponderate. It was a part of Sir Charles Napier's policy regarding his excellent Police, that a majority of the *Protective Police*, in a newly-conquered Country should not be Natives of the Country.

Of the Cavalry shown in answer 3, the three Regiments of Light Cavalry were Regulars, composed of very much the same material as the Bengal Regular Cavalry, with the same comparative physical inferiority and from the same cause as above stated in speaking of the Infantry. The admixture peculiar to the Bombay Cavalry consisted of Deccan Mahrattas and Mahomedans, but not generally in large numbers. The Poona Irregular Horse and the two Regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse were Irregulars,* *i. e.*, Silladars, and exempt from the ordinary Regulations of the Army, but directly subordinate to the Military Authorities. As a body they are composed of very much the same materials as the old Irregular Cavalry of Bengal (Skinner's Horse, &c.) and of His Highness the Nizam; the admixture of Deccan Mahomedans and Mahrattas being greatest in the Poona Horse.

The same description applies, I believe, to the Southern Mahratta Horse; but when I knew them eight years ago, there was a large proportion of Mahrattas in them.

The Civil Corps are —

1.—The Guzerat Horse, Head Quarters at Ahmedabad, composed of much the same material as the Poona Horse, with a large mixture of inhabitants of Guzerat, Cutch, Rajpootana and Kattywar

2.—The Cutch Horse, a small Local Corps, principally composed of Natives of Cutch, with a few Hindoostanees and Deccanees

* It always struck me that at least as regarded the Scinde Horse the term "Irregular" was misapplied, as in all the essentials of Military discipline they were as regular and orderly as Troops could be. The term "Silladar Regiments" would much more nearly describe their real peculiarities.

3.—In Scinde the Mounted Police are—

	Drilled.	Undrilled and Camel Sowars.	Total.
Shikarpoor	300	130	430
Hyderabad	300	50	350
Kurrachee	300	25	325
Total	900	205	1,105

They are generally Beloochees or Patans, Natives of Scinde or the Punjab, with a few Afghans, Hindoostanees and Deccanees.

6.

The establishments proposed in my answer to question 4 were intended to be all Troops of the Regular Army, and I think it would be a great mistake to attempt to lay down or to maintain any fixed proportion between them and the Police.

It seems to me to have been one of the capital errors of our system of late years to confound the functions of the Army and the Police, and to keep up an Army which was in many respects used merely as a Local Police Force, and to raise Corps of Police which discharged hardly any duty of real Police, and which, except in exemption from many Military Regulations and from the control of the Commander-in-Chief, differed in no function that they performed from the Army.

I much fear that this fundamental error, as it appears to me, will be perpetuated and extended, by the accidental circumstance that during the late crisis the existence of a large Military Force, nominally Police, but really a separate Army independent of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and under the exclusive orders of the Chief Civil Authority, contributed greatly to the salvation of more than one Province of the Empire.

There can, however, in my opinion, be little doubt that the principle of maintaining such a double Army is wrong both in a Financial and Military point of view, and that the only sound system is one which keeps up an Army for purely Military purposes, under Military Chiefs, and restricts the Police to their strictly Police and Civil duties, under the authority of the Civil Magistrate.

If this be done, the respective strength of each branch will depend on considerations generally independent of each other, and the Army and Police Corps will bear no permanent proportion to each other.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

A sufficient Police should be maintained to perform all Police and Civil duties. It should be divided into Detective and Protective Police;—the latter being sufficiently strong to take Civil Guards and Escorts, including Jail Guards, Treasury Guards and the like. Whatever strength it has beyond what is necessary for such purposes, is not only superfluous but positively mischievous.

The Police should, however, be sufficiently strong to keep order all troublesome tribes and populations within our own border, without having recourse to the Troops of the Regular Army.

The latter should never be called on for active service, except against a foreign enemy, or in case of actual organized rebellion and internal war.

There can be no doubt that if these limitations were carefully observed, the defence of the Country might be effected with a very much smaller number of men and at less expense than at present, and it must be borne in mind that the strength of the Police as well as of the Army must, in the long run, be a pure question of finance.

It is not what we want, but what we can pay for, that we ought to consider, and if we give due attention to this momentous question we should find it much more easy to satisfy our real wants than it is at present.

But effectually to carry out such a system, it is absolutely necessary that both the Army and Police should be under one local head with power to vary the expenditure either on the Army or the Police, and to increase or decrease salaries and establishments within a fixed limit, restricting the total expenditure per annum.

It is for want of this power and responsibility that we are rapidly drifting to financial ruin, and that whilst our expenditure is far higher than it need be, and greater than our income can afford, there is hardly a Department in the State which is in a thoroughly efficient condition.

This inefficiency, easily demonstrable and often admitted, places it in the power of almost any public Officer of energy and ability to increase the State expenditure by impressing on the Supreme Authority the urgent necessity for an increase of some particular branch of his Department, while there is hardly a man, from the Governor General downward, who has power, without reference to England, entirely to remodel the expenditure of any single Department, still less of any dozen Departments, so as to bring the total expenditure within a given limit.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

It is only by granting such power to the Governors of our great Provinces that we can possibly make both ends meet, and ascertain the necessary strength, either of our Army or our Police or indeed of any Department in the State.

With regard to the proportions between Regular and Irregular Troops, I would entirely abolish the distinction. There should be no Troops in the Army, but such as were subject to the control of the Commander-in-Chief; and with regard to Native Troops, I would entirely discard those Regulations, the observance or non-observance of which constitutes the present difference between Regulars and Irregulars.

The essential difference between the two bodies is not the being subject to or exempt from rule generally. Both are subject to rules of their own, and the difference is in the nature of the rule, which is often stricter and more imperative in the Irregular than in the Regular Corps; but the unwritten rules of common sense, applied according to the judgment of a single selected Officer, to which the so-called Irregular is subject, appear to me much better adapted for the government of Native Troops, than the written rules intended to ensure uniformity of system and conformity to the English Army, which have lately governed the Regular Indian Army. Therefore I would advocate the general adoption of the former system.

In speaking of Irregular Troops, it must be borne in mind that many of our so-called Irregular Corps have been mere disorderly copies of Regular Troops, the Officers Commanding them having as little real command over their men as in a Regular Corps. No argument can be drawn from the failure of such Corps.

7.

I think it a great mistake to attempt to fix any proportion between European and Native Troops, except on combined considerations of efficiency and finance.

You require an Army to hold the Country, and your finances are limited.

The great question is what is the composition of the Army which will give you the nearest approach to the Force you require, at an expense within your financial means?

There are five propositions which seem to me so self-evident that I will not unbidden offer argument in proof of them.

First.—That it is impossible to hold India with a purely European or Foreign Army.

Secondly.—That it is equally impossible to hold it with an entirely Native Army.

Thirdly.—That there is nothing but our own mismanagement to prevent Natives of India being as good Soldiers, and as loyal to us, their foreign masters, as they have ever been.

Fourthly.—That Native Soldiers are, man for man, far less costly than Europeans.

Fifthly.—That a mixed Force of Natives and Europeans combined is absolutely more efficient, taking all seasons and descriptions of Military service together, than any purely European Force which you could maintain at the same expense.

The problem to be solved is then, after employing as many Native Soldiers as are absolutely necessary to the efficiency of a European Force in hot weather, and for services which are better performed by Natives than by Europeans, what further proportion of the cheaper and more accessible Native element may you add to your Army, without impairing its efficiency for general Military service?

Judging from late experience, it is difficult to provide efficiently for all the duties of a large Army in the field during a protracted campaign in India, without nearly as many Native as European Troops. One-half may, therefore, be taken as the minimum proportion which Native Troops should bear to Europeans, and which it would be desirable to have, even if the difference and difficulty of providing Europeans were not greater than that of providing Natives.

In some of our best campaigns, where there has been least reason to desire any alteration in the composition of the Force, the proportion has been about one European to three Native fighting men, and I have heard Sir Charles Napier argue that a Force mixed in such proportions, and led by European Officers, was superior in Asia to an equal number of any European Troops, except French and English. He was doubtful regarding the Russians, whom he had never seen in action, but he affirmed that any General, with three-fourth Natives such as the Troops he had himself Commanded in Scinde, and one-fourth Englishmen, ought, in a pitched battle, all other things being equal, to beat an equal number of Austrians, Prussians or Spaniards. This was a deliberate opinion, which he repeated in writing, and was not hastily formed or given.

Three to one, then, is about the ratio which I should consider Natives should bear to Europeans in order to give us the most efficient Army which could be kept up for any given sum.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

A larger proportion of Europeans would give more than you require of the most costly element in your Army ; a smaller one might reduce too low the element which is most formidable in a general action.

But the proportion would vary in the different arms. In the Artillery, the back-bone of the Army, the advantage of having Europeans is, from the paramount value and importance of the arm, the great utility of individual muscular power, and many other reasons, comparatively greater, and the drawbacks fewer than in other arms, and therefore, in the Artillery, Europeans should so far preponderate that there should always be at least sufficient to work every Gun, save in very rare exceptional cases, where (as on the Scinde Frontier) it is altogether impossible to keep Europeans permanently stationed. In the Cavalry the advantages of employing Europeans are at a minimum, and a very small proportion of Europeans will suffice ; one of the principal reasons being that European Dragoons can never in this Country dispense with their Grass-cutters and other Followers, who are necessarily on foot, and thus Europeans as Cavalry lose much of the superior celerity and independence, and other natural advantages of Cavalry, as compared with Infantry ; and the advantage of employing the more costly European for such service is much lessened.

I do not think the ratio should be affected by the number of men it may be found necessary to employ as Police. It seems to me essential to a sound Military system to keep the standing Army and the Police more distinct than we have done heretofore. In former days our Army did much Police work. Now our Police does, in many parts of India, much of the Military duty. I think the latter is, if any thing, the more dangerous mistake of the two, and I think it very essential to economy and efficiency in both branches of the Service, that our Army should be regulated by our really Military wants, and that our Police should be restricted to what is needed for its Civil duties—to repress ordinary crime, and to preserve internal peace. It is only when a Police grows beyond what is sufficient for its legitimate duties that its number can have any bearing on our Military wants.

8.

The last answer is applicable to this question also.

9.

I am not able accurately to state the total amount of Barrack accommodation in the Bombay Presidency ; but it is notorious that it is quite inadequate to the wants of even the comparatively small body of Europeans serving in the Presidency before the mutiny.

I would draw a wide distinction between shelter suitable for the temporary accommodation of Europeans, and Barracks in which

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

European Soldiers can live for long periods without getting sick and demoralized.

The quarters of European Troops generally throughout the Presidency are of the former description.

Of the latter description there was not, previous to Sir Charles Napier's time, a single Barrack in existence. Since then excellent Barracks have been built—

At Hyderabad, Scinde, for one Regiment, 700 men.

At Kurrachee, for one Regiment, 1,100 men and a Troop of Horse Artillery.

And I believe at Poona, for two Regiments (not completed).

The Barracks at Sukkur (unused), at Deesa and at Poona, as I believe, not so inferior in convenience or so unhealthy as others, but with the exception of the new Barracks on Sir Charles Napier's plan above specified, there are none which ought not, on economical grounds, to be condemned and rebuilt, if required as permanent quarters for Europeans.

10.

There would, at present, be only temporary shelter for the European Troops I deem necessary. Barracks as permanent quarters would have to be built every where ; even at Kurrachee and Poona additional Barracks would be required.

But the necessity for new Barracks would exist even if no more than the old Force of Europeans were kept in the Country. There can be no doubt that even in an economical point of view the present style of Barracks was most objectionable. I do not think even the latest built by any means perfect, and I think even better Barracks than any we have, might be built at not greater cost than those of the latest style.

11.

As far as I am able to judge, the European Troops, like every other branch of the Army in India, should be a portion of H. M.'s Army, and the European portion should be available for service in every part of the British Empire.

Every Regiment in the Army should have permanent Head Quarters either in the United Kingdom, in India, or the Colonies. The ordinary European Garrison of India should all have the permanent Head Quarters of the Corps composing it in India, and should not leave India except on extraordinary emergencies, and in like emergencies in India Regiments of the Army whose permanent Head Quarters were in the United Kingdom or Colonies, might temporarily reinforce the Garrisons of India.

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ANSWERS.

12.

Many good Officers for European Regiments might, no doubt, be found among the Officers of the Native Army ; but, as a general rule, Officers who have served long with our Regular Native Regiments, do not make good Officers for European. The system of treating the two races of Soldiers and the peculiar habits of Command acquired are very different. A man who has served long in Command of Natives is, on that account, less respected as a Regimental Officer by the lower class of European Soldiers, unless they find he has unusual claims to their respect. Even then he will take longer to establish his position than if he came among them an unknown man. I should say that if efficiency alone were looked to, it would be best to Officer any new European Regiments, as much as possible, with Officers who have not served long enough with Regular Native Regiments, to get their habits of life fixed.

13.

I do not see how it could.

14.

I think any plan for enlisting any large number of foreign mercenaries, would render it necessary to have a larger proportion of European Troops than if the mercenaries were Natives of India. Some tribes of Negroes have, I believe, a sort of dog-like fidelity ; but they have peculiarities of their own very dangerous to their employer, and as far as I can judge of races, of whom my personal knowledge is very limited, Tartars, Chinese, or Malays, with whom your only bond of union must be the mercenary one of pay, would require an overpowering Force of Europeans to ensure their fidelity.

SCINDE ARMY.

1.

Station.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.
Shikarpoor ...	None.	1 Company ...	1 Light Field Battery.
Hyderabad ...		2 Companies ...	1 Light Field Battery.
Kurrachee ...		{ 6 Companies and Head Quarters of Her Ma- jesty's 51st ... }	} 1 Light Field Battery.
Total in Scinde...	None.	9 Companies.	3 Light Field Batteries.

This is exclusive of the Depôt at Kurrachee for Recruits and Invalids belonging to Regiments in the Punjab, the strength of which is, of course, very variable.

In ordinary times of peace it has been usual to keep two complete Regiments of European Infantry in Scinde, divided between Hyderabad and Kurrachee, a Troop of Horse Artillery at

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

Kurrachee, and sometimes a Light Field Battery of European Artillery; but till the present year, the Batteries at Hyderabad and Shikarpoor have been usually Native Golundauze.

2.

For service in the Province, no European Troops whatever, nor any portion of the Regular Army would be required, the Police being ample for all provincial requirements.

As a part of the general defence of India, the duty to be performed by the Troops in Scinde would consist of—

Garrisoning Kurrachee, which is the key of the Indus, and a seaport of remarkable salubrity, where Troops can be embarked and disembarked at all times of the year, and where they are admirably placed for movement up the Indus, and in any direction by Sea. It must be in a few years one of our principal Arsenals and greatest Military Stations in India.

2ndly.—Keeping open the communication up the line of the Indus with Mooltan and the Punjab.

3rdly.—Observing the Bolan Pass, one of the two great highways from the West into India.

It is only the first of these duties which should be assigned to Europeans as an ordinary part of our system. Owing to the extreme heat in Central and Upper Scinde, I think it would usually be found convenient to keep at least one-fifth of the whole force of European Infantry and Artillery of the Bombay Army at Kurrachee, and if our finances allowed of our keeping more than 10,000 Europeans in the Bombay Army, the excess could not be better posted than at Kurrachee.

At present the high price of forage at and near Kurrachee renders it unadvisable to post any European Cavalry there, and none could exist and remain efficient during the hot weather in Upper Scinde.

3.

The ordinary distribution of Native Troops has been in time of peace—

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Jacobabad ...	} 2 Regts. Irregular Cavalry Scinde Horse.
Shikarpoor ...		Light Field Battery ...	2 Regiments.
Hyderabad ...		Light Field Battery ...	2 Regiments.
Kurrachee	2 Regiments.

At present the only Native Troops are the two Regiments of Scinde Horse at Jacobabad, a single Regular Regiment of Native Infantry at Kurrachee, and an extra Police Battalion lately raised at Hyderabad.

The Civil duties every where are taken by the Police. Orders have been lately issued to raise a third Regiment of Scinde Horse and two Silladar Rifle Regiments at Jacobabad, where they are now in process of formation.

4.

No portion whatever of the Regular Native Army is required for provincial purposes in Scinde, the Police being ample for every local duty. As a part of the general defence of the Country, the Frontier Field Force, as recommended by Brigadier-General Jacob, and (with the exception of the Artillery) already sanctioned by Government, should be maintained, and posted where they will command the Bolan Pass.

3 Regiments Irregular Cavalry.	2 Regiments Silladar Rifles.	2 Troops Horse Artillery.	
			they will command the Bolan Pass.

I think that when we have completed the Railway, now in course of construction, from Kurrachee to the Indus opposite Hyderabad, and with such a Flotilla belonging to Government and private Companies as will in a few months be on the Indus, no Troops need be permanently posted at Hyderabad, nor at Shikarpore, nor anywhere else in Scinde, except at Jacobabad and Kurrachee.

5.

As regards the Regulars and Irregulars, *vide supra* answer to question 3. The information regarding the races of which they are composed will be found in the answer to this question relating to the Bombay Army generally.

The Scinde Police was the first body of the kind organized in India, on a system devised by Sir Charles Napier, under the orders of Lord Ellenborough. They are divided into—

1st.—“Rural Police.”—A body of drilled Infantry, whose functions are purely protective. They guard Prisoners, Jails and Treasuries, and wherever permanent Guards are required.

They were originally entirely Hindoostan and Deccan men, Sir Charles Napier holding that, in a newly conquered Country, a large proportion of the protective Police should be foreigners. It was also found at first difficult to get Scindees and Beloochees to submit to the uniform and drill, but of late years many of them have been enlisted.

2nd.—“Mounted Police.”—A body of Police Horse, some of them armed and equipped like the Irregular Cavalry.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

There are many Hindoostan men in the ranks, but the majority are Natives of Scinde, Beloochistan, and Affghanistan. Their functions are partly protective and partly detective.

A portion of the Mounted Police in each Collectorate are Beloochees of various frontier tribes, dressed in their national costume, and riding Belooch mares, and a few of them, who are employed in the sandy portions of the Desert, ride camels.

3rd.—“ City Police.”—A small proportion of these men ordinary Nujeebs and Burkundauze for protective Police purp in towns, but most of them are trackers and detectives, and, v very few exceptions, Natives of Scinde.

6.

Vide answer to question 4. I do not think it would possible to fix any proportion.

The strength of the Police should be regulated by purely local and provincial wants, the state of crime, &c., to which the number of Troops of the Regular Army quartered in Scinde would have no reference whatever, the latter being dependent on purely general considerations connected with the defence of the whole Presidency, and totally irrespective of local wants.

7.

Vide answer to the same question relating to the Bombay Presidency.

9.

Observing the distinction between Barracks sufficient for temporary accommodation and such as are fit for permanent quarters, I should say, that of the former class there is ample accommodation for a Regiment at Sukker. No European Troops are ever likely to be stationed there permanently, but the Barracks are occasionally used by Troops passing, and should be kept up in a serviceable state.

There are very fine Barracks, with ample accommodation, for one Regiment (700 men) begun by Sir Charles Napier at Hyderabad. It is not a place where I would recommend Europeans being permanently stationed; but the Barracks will always be of use for the temporary accommodation of Troops when Kurrachee is overcrowded, or for Regiments going up the River, and they also should be kept in good repair.

At Kurrachee there are excellent Barracks for a Regiment of Infantry (1,100 men) and a Troop of Horse Artillery, and inferior shelter for about 2,000 more Europeans. The latter is only fit for temporary use, and it would be an economical measure to pull them down and re-build them on a better plan.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

10.

Good Barracks for at least 3,000 men should be provided at Kurrachee in addition to the good Barracks now there, and in substitution for some of the old temporary buildings.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

No. 2119 OF 1858.

FROM

H. B. E. FRERE, ESQUIRE,
Commissioner in Scinde,

TO

COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On special duty with the Governor General.

Dated 6th November 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to forward replies to the questions received with your letters noted on the margin, and to express my regret that a constant press of current business has occasioned so much delay.

No. 11 of 21st May 1858.
No. 52 of 15th June 1858.

The answers to the remaining questions are now in the copyists' hands, and will be forwarded, I hope, in the course of a few days.

2. I have answered all the questions to the best of my knowledge, believing that though I can speak with official or professional authority on comparatively few points, the opinions of a non-Military person, who has lived more with the Military than with any other class of his Countrymen in India, would not be without their value on most of the questions which engage your attention.

3. And as you have done me the honor to consult me, I feel assured that when interests of such magnitude are at stake, you will pardon my expressing, in a more condensed form, my general views on the subject of the enquiry which you have in hand, referring for details to the answers to your questions.

4. Throughout the discussion which has taken place regarding the re-organization of the Army, it strikes me, we have very generally forgotten that the main question is one of finance. We are now, with no external war on our hands, living far beyond our income, which is at best limited, not capable of rapid extension, and in some important items very precarious. The vital question is not "What Army would we think desirable"? but "What Army can we afford"? This applies not only to the numerical strength of our Army, but to the relative proportions of Natives and Europeans, and to all the most important points touched on in the Honorable Court's Despatch.

5. It seems to me that in the strictest Military point of view, the restoration of our finances and credit is the first thing to be thought of; that a surplus income, good credit, and a contented Native population, which needs no large Force to keep it from

rising, are as important to the Commander-in-Chief as a powerful and well-appointed Army, and that the Command, to whomever is entrusted with the task of re-organizing the Army, must be "not to make the Army all you desire or consider sufficient," but "do the best you can to raise the most efficient Army possible at a given annual charge."

6. The most sceptical must now be convinced that, admitting the reconquest of India over and over again to be within the power of England, no Army which it can be worth our while to maintain could hold India, unless we can revert to our old normal condition, when our subjects generally acquiesced passively in our rule, and when we were rarely reminded that it was necessary to use our Army except against independent or semi-independent States. It seems to me utterly impossible that our present system of holding the country with European Detachments scattered over it, can be persevered in, without the destruction of all discipline, and an aggravation of the feeling of general distrust which makes Englishmen, as well as Natives, suppose that a Detachment of Europeans is necessary at almost every Station.

7. The material power of England was no doubt ample, if properly directed, to have crushed the United States in the war of independence. We retired from the contest and gave up our Colonies, not because we felt we were the weaker party, but because we felt we could not retain them without an expenditure of blood and treasure so vast, and the creation of feelings so bitter, as to render the price of retention greater than the value of the possession to be retained.

8. If we would avoid the necessity which obliged England to cast off her American Colonies, we *must* continue to govern our own Indian Provinces hereafter, as we have generally done heretofore, through the respect and with the consent of the Natives, and to trust for the general maintenance of internal peace to our Police. A conviction of our superior Military power is one necessary element of real respect; but such respect derives its greatest strength from a belief in our superior wisdom, justice, and moderation, and is something very different from the simple conviction of our superior brute force, on which it is now so much the fashion to recommend reliance.

9. Sooner or later the language of the Government of India to the ruler of every subordinate Province must be—"We can afford you no more than so many millions per annum for your Army; you must do your best with that, and preserve internal peace at home, and be prepared to resist in repelling attacks from abroad. What you cannot effect by force of arms, you *must* secure by sound policy and good government, and no Government can be good depending solely on a Military superiority which requires to be constantly exerted and exhibited in order to check the spirit of rebellion."

10. But for the task which this Command would, at the present moment, impose upon the Governments of three-fifths of India, powers the most dictatorial are necessary. We have always hitherto been, and are still, in the condition of an insolvent Irish Landholder, before the encumbered Estates Act was passed; empowered still further to pledge and waste an income already insufficient to meet the current charges, but without any power to revise the expenditure as a whole, that is, to reduce charges which it is mathematically impossible to meet in full, and to apply the saving to purposes either necessary to the existence of the Estate, or calculated to improve its income.

11. One of the most potent causes of this dilemma appears to me to be our false system of centralization. Of true centralization of power in India, I at once admit the absolute necessity. Nothing can be more thoroughly centralized than a vigorous oriental despotism where all the centralization is by persons,—where from the sovereign down to the headman of the village, there is a continual personal chain of subordination, and where anything like concurrent powers or jurisdiction in the same locality is utterly unknown.

12. But our attempts at centralization during the last twenty-five years have been the reverse of all this; they have been all by Departments instead of by persons. I know of no successful instance of the kind in history, and it appears to me to be the true, almost the only source of a general decay of vital power ominously coincident with a dropsical increase in the extent of the body throughout which the vigorous action of that power is necessary to continued existence.

13. In every natural despotism, in every vigorous despotism of which we have any record, each subordinate, from the sovereign downwards, is one of several functionaries who represent, in a more limited area, the grade above them. The delegation of independent power for special purposes, or in a particular Department direct from the sovereign, and independent of his local representative, has always been an exceptional measure to meet some temporary exigency, and generally, a sure symptom of decay and weakness.

14. But of late years, in India, our Government has presented to the people the spectacle of a number of Departments with independent or concurrent powers, sometimes pulling together by virtue of national habits of order and subordination, but oftener unconsciously and unavoidably thwarting and impeding each other to an extent quite subversive of good Government. Nowhere in India is it now possible to find any functionary of a grade higher than the village headman, who can say that he represents Government in all its Departments, that he has himself undivided authority within the territorial bounds of his charge, and that he is responsible only to one superior representative of Government.

15. From the Governor in Council with very imperfect legal authority over a great portion of the Army, and some weight but no authority whatever in matters of legislation; with Post Offices, Telegraphs and accounts under entirely independent control, with but little power to sanction expenditure, and still less to re-adjust both income and charges, this infinite sub-division of power and responsibility is continued in an increasing ratio down to the subordinate Civil Magistrates, within whose territorial charge, as large as one of the smaller kingdoms in Europe, are a dozen distinct Departments—Military, Judicial, Medical, Ecclesiastical, Police, Postal, Educational—for enquiries into tenures, surveys, and many others, all independent of local authority and subordinate to some Chief, often so distant that his powers of control for any useful purpose are absolutely nullified. To our Native subjects nothing is more bewildering than this infinite sub-division of authority.

16. We cannot defend our departure from the orthodox pattern of despotic Governments by saying that our system has worked well in practice. In the first day of serious trial, the machinery, moved by such slender threads from so many and such distant

sources of power, became utterly disordered and refused to move, and the action of Government in its distant Provinces was only continued where an irregular assumption of power and responsibility saved the State by acts of happy and patriotic illegality.

17. Nor does our system of pseudo-centralization in any way conduce to economy in the finances. Even the Governor General at the head of the Supreme Council, if he creates a new office or adds to the salary of an old one, is unable to read just the expenditure of a single Province without risk of his revision being disallowed by the Home Government ; and I have known this power very lately exercised on a large scale, and with the most mischievous results to our finances ; lacs of Rupees being annually wasted and lost for want of the Establishments which every authority in India who had anything to say to the subject, admitted to be absolutely necessary to the collection of the Government dues ; yet the same authority, so powerless in one respect, can make peace and war, and incur millions of debt. Similar anomalies are found in all branches of our administration. There are few of the superior servants of Government, with a sphere of authority so limited, that they cannot do much to increase the charges of the State by neglect and a pathetic adherence to forms, if not by their own act or influence ; fewer still who might not, if they had the power, readjust the expenditure of their Departments so as to secure greater efficiency, if not an absolute saving of expense.

18. The late alteration in the constitution of India may confer on the Governor General the autocratic power he requires ; but I respectfully contend that a similar process must be continued lower down in the scale, and we must centralize by persons and not by Departments, and that in place of numerous independent Departments, undivided power must be delegated to the administrators of all our larger Provinces, if we would avoid general bankruptcy and ruin.

19. Most of all is this necessary in the Army, where the very essence of the institution is despotic power joined to individual responsibility, and where any division of authority has invariably, in any season of trial, proved fatal.

20. How little our own Armies have conformed to this rule, I need not now point out. Even in Europe our almost invariable want of success at the commencement of a war, and the enormous losses by which final success is preceded, have become proverbial. As we know no nation of which the people are individually at once so bellicose, so full of resources moral and material, and so subordinate to legal authority, none of the current explanations of this phenomenon seem to me sufficient. It may be that our usual national habits of managing affairs by the counsel and consent of many rather than by the absolute will of one, form an obstacle to that Military organization for which the nation is in many other respects so well-adapted, and that we do not succeed till that habit has been for the time laid aside. Be that as it may, we find as matter of fact that our most successful Generals and Expeditions have been either beyond the reach of post, or have succeeded only when imminent danger or exasperation at repeated failures, led the nation to a tacit concession of dictatorial powers.

21. These may be truisms ; but they point at what seems to me a radical and incurable defect in the means we are now adopting to re-organize our Indian Army.

22. A Commission well-selected, and faithful to its charge, may expose abuses and trace the causes of disasters ; but I submit it must be essentially powerless and useless

to create or reform an Army, unless it acts at the bidding, and in the confidence, of one man prepared and empowered to carry out at once such of its views as may commend themselves to his judgment.

23. In all great operations the Army must be the creation of the General. A Commission can no more supply him with an Army than with hands or teeth. No one can imagine Wellington or Napoleon fighting with an Army organized by an independent Commission, nor can we separate the idea of our Indian Army from the Clives, Cootes, Lawrences and Wellesleys who formed it. It is true that a good Army will ever produce good Generals, but they will always be men of the second order, growing up with, and in the Army. They may, however, generally be relied on as sufficient for the ordinary wants of an Empire, for everything except the crisis which calls for and creates the natural, general or great conqueror.

24. Such a crisis is the reformation of an Army which has become *effete*. No Army or Military system can be stereotyped. A continued career of conquests like that of the Romans, may for generations and centuries, while continually operating on fresh fields of action, maintain the vitality of a Military system, but even then the organization of the Army alters as its bulk increases. The legions which defended Rome in the first Punic War were nearly as different from those which fought under Titus, as either were from the Macedonian phalanx. Commonly a single generation of profound peace is sufficient to cause such serious change in any Military organization, as to render necessary a thorough reformation of the Army. It is vain to expect a General, merely system made, to reform the system which produced himself, still more hopeless is the task, if entrusted to a Commission of Officers of inferior rank but still system made. The only hope is in the man, rare in every Army, but always to be found among a Military nation, who, comprehending the great principles of Military Science, can apply them to circumstances different from those under which he learnt them. But he must have power to apply them without reference to precedent or usage.

25. Such a crisis is now upon us, and I submit that it is equally hopeless to attempt re-organization, either by Commissions of many men trained according to the *effete* system, or by any one man, however able, who is empowered to enquire and form an opinion, but not to act on it.

26. For enquiry and report as to the causes of such a disaster, no individual can possibly supply the place of a Commission. His opinion must always be more or less liable to the imputation of partiality, and such enquiry is precisely one of those judicial acts to which the consent of several good judges is necessary in order to give it weight in public estimation.

27. Still less can we hope for any successful re-organization as a result of the enquiries of an individual whose duties are limited to enquiry and report, without the powers of a General Commanding-in-Chief, to act on his convictions and to carry them into practice. The soundest conclusions he can draw may be set aside as individual crotchets, unless they happen to be supported by a certain number of opinions from the more experienced, but possibly less judicious individuals he has consulted. Even if adopted, how small is their chance of success when the task of carrying out his views is entrusted to persons indifferent, it may be, or even bitterly hostile, and unconsciously anxious to see the best considered plans of the reformer justify their own prophecies of failure.

28. I would, therefore, respectfully, but very earnestly state my opinion that the duties of any Commission should be limited to enquiry into the causes of disasters and the defects of the system which has broken down, if there is supposed to be any doubt or room for further enquiry on these heads, leaving the re-organization of the Army to individual Officers empowered at once to give effect to the reforms which they may find necessary, either as Commander-in-Chief if the required man be found in the higher ranks of the Army, or as a Minister of War should he not happen to be a Military man of rank sufficient to give him the supreme command.

29. It seems to me that we have very unnecessarily increased our difficulties by enlarging the sphere of our enquiries beyond what was absolutely called for. About half of our Native Army has failed us. We shall, as we proceed, find much to reform in the other half. But there can be no present reason why we should increase our difficulties by undertaking the reform of that which appears at all events to answer its present purpose. The Madras Army may not be perfect, but its imperfections are, at all events, not identical with those of the late Bengal Army. When we consider the large number of Officers present with each Regiment and devoted to its duty, with no temptation to leave it, the excellent system of recruiting, and promotion in the Native ranks, and the admirable standing orders which leave so much discretion to authority, but lay down such sound principles for exercising that discretion—we must see that the Madras Army has not been exposed to some of the most active causes which destroyed the Army of Bengal.

30. Similarly it has been shown that a considerable portion of the Bombay Army is free from the taint of disaffection. There is much, no doubt, in both Armies which must speedily be altered, but not for the same reasons or in the same way as the Bengal Army, to the reconstruction of which our attention should now, I think, be first devoted.

31. The rage for assimilation to certain favorite patterns has already done infinite mischief. Is there no danger that abandoning the attempt to assimilate to standards of proved excellence we may attempt assimilation to ideal standards of whose practical value we have absolutely no proof whatever?

32. We have further unnecessarily added to our task by including in it the reformation of the Police. No doubt the necessary strength of the Army depends much on the state of the Police, but not more than it depends on the general state of feeling of the people, and for both the loyalty of the people and the efficiency of the Police, we ought to look solely to the Civil Government.

33. It seems to me to have been one of our capital errors during late years to confound the functions of the Army and the Police. The employment of our Regular Troops on Police duties was not a greater mistake than the maintenance of a Police larger than is required to prevent crime, and the entrusting to it duties which rightly belong to the Army. Nothing can be more distinct than the duties of the two bodies, and the waste of our financial resources, which is caused by our present tendency to maintain, under the name of Police, an Army independent of the Military Authorities, and opposed to every sound Military principle, is the least of the many evils entailed by the system. In some of our Provinces there is said to be no Police worthy of the name, and there, of course, it is the first duty of the Civil Government to create an efficient Police; but in other Provinces the Police is redundant, and is, in fact, a Civil Army, and there

the first duty of the Civil Government is to reduce the Police to what is really necessary, and to transfer the surplus to the Regular Army. Under the present system of divided duties and responsibilities, it is as vain to hope for the means of supplying the defect as to expect the self-sacrifice which shall confess and cut off the superfluity.

34. I will now briefly describe the plan which I would recommend for the re-organization of that portion of the Army which has failed. It will be unnecessary for me to point out how much I am indebted to what Brigadier-General J. Jacob, C. B., has written on this subject. But in expressing once for all my general obligations to his writings and concurrence with his views, I would state that my opinion is founded on no hasty assent to a speculative theory, but on a close personal observation, during many years, of the practical effect of his system, on both Natives and Europeans.

35. There can be no doubt that the Armies of Madras and Bengal, as lately organized, were far too large and scattered for a single Command. To wield either effectually in time of war was an Herculean task, to keep either in real efficiency in dull times of peace was scarcely less difficult, while the re-construction of the larger of the two, at a period when absolute dictatorial powers are not readily conceded, would far overtask the powers of any one man.

36. We may, therefore, safely assume that the number of separate bodies into which the whole Army of India is divided, must be increased.

37. There are five grand natural Military Divisions of our Indian Empire,—1, the valley of the Ganges; 2, the valley of the Indus; 3, the West Coast; 4, the East Coast; 5, Burmah and the Straits (to which might, perhaps, be added Ceylon.) Each of these Divisions has its separate natural lines of operations, on the first four of which it is hardly necessary to specify Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Kurrachee as the natural basis.

38. It might be possible to adjust five such Armies to the existing distribution of Governments in India; but there is an immense advantage in making each Military division correspond with the area of a separate Civil Government, and I cannot believe that with all the apparatus of a complete Government at Bombay, the anomaly of governing from Calcutta, Provinces in the Deccan and Guzerat, which are within 200 or 300 miles of Bombay, and the language and races of which are identical with those of the Bombay Presidency, can be long maintained again. Instead of extending the authority of the Punjab Government Eastwards towards Delhi, the more natural course would be to extend it down the Indus to the Sea, which must ever be the natural base of all operations in that valley and beyond its Western frontier.

39. A recasting of the limits of the Civil Governments into which British India is divided seems, therefore, to me a necessary accompaniment to any reorganization of our Armies, so as to make the jurisdiction of each of the subordinate Civil Governments correspond with the natural division of the Country to be occupied and defended by each Army.

40. In the mean time, while such a measure is being matured, there is no necessity to suspend action with regard to the Army, but it is an additional reason why our first efforts at reconstruction should be confined to those forces which occupy the valleys of the

Ganges and Indus, and which may be taken at about half of the whole Army required for India.

41. Such restriction in the task of re-organization would still leave to the Governments and Armies of Madras and Bombay no light task.

42. To each would be assigned a certain portion of the Peninsula, to be occupied and defended by the Army of the East or West Coast, as the case might be, with power to the Commander-in-Chief acting under the authority and with the consent of the Government of his Presidency, to modify the Stations to be occupied by his Army, as he might think best in a Military point of view.

43. The sole restriction imposed on the subordinate Governments should be a limit to the total Military expenditure. The ordinary charges must be brought within the limits of ordinary income, extraordinary charges arising from the present condition of the Country and necessarily met by Loans, being separately submitted for periodic revision and sanction to the Supreme Government.

44. The Madras Army would probably extend the ordinary limits of the territory garrisons by occupying the Country it now holds in Berar and the Saugor and Nerbudda Territory, while the Bombay Army might retain the Stations it has lately occupied in Rajpootana, Central India and the Deccan.

45. The Civil Government of each Presidency would have—

1st. So to rule as to keep the Country in order with no other aid than the Police.

2nd. To organize, where it does not exist, such a Police Force as should suffice not only to detect and prevent crime, but to provide against any disturbance within our own Provinces short of actual rebellion, in fact, for all Police and really Civil duties, setting the Army free for purely Military duties.

3rd. It would also have to consider, in conjunction with the local Commander-in-Chief, all the great and important questions affecting the organization of the Army, with a view to avoid such errors as have ruined the Army of Bengal, *e. g.*, it would have to decide on the number and size of Battalions and Regiments in the Native Army, the number and rank of European Officers, by what device of a Staff Corps, half pay list, or otherwise, the evil effects of drawing away for Staff employment the Officers best recommended, may be avoided; what can be done by any change in the system of enlistment or promotion of Native Officers to maintain their efficiency and fidelity, &c. &c.

46. In these and in all other details, the utmost latitude of discretion should be allowed to a local Commander-in-Chief whose views are supported by the Government of his Presidency, provided that certain limits of total Military expenditure be observed, that the Government be not pledged to any prospective expenditure by alterations of rates of pay or pension without the sanction of the Governor General in Council, and that a certain amount of force of each arm be kept available within certain geographical limits for such general service as the Government of India may require.

47. The Commander-in-Chief in India would exercise supreme Command, absolved from all charge of the details of any single Army, and so relieved, the Government

India would find in him an efficient coadjutor in estimating the value of each Army, and in disposing of the great Military questions which alone would come before it from subordinate Governments.

48. The relations of the Commander-in-Chief of each Army to the Civil Government of the Territory garrisoned by that Army, and of both Civil Government and Commander-in-Chief to the Governor General of India, would much resemble what in practice they were, in one of the subordinate Presidencies, fifty years ago, when, whatever theory may have been, distance and the difficulty of communication rendered each Presidency practically independent on all questions save those of really imperial moment.

49. It could hardly be a difficult task for the Supreme Government, if relieved from the necessity for continued interference in petty details which the present system entails, to fix accurately the proportion which the necessary Military expenditure of each Army should bear to the total Military expenditure of India. Every thing beyond this it would, for the present, be put down as an extraordinary charge, and would come forward periodically for consideration and revision.

50. But the amount to be so allowed, either as fixed or extraordinary charge, should on no account depend on the revenue of the Presidency to which the Army belonged. The Army of India should be considered as a whole, maintained and available for the general defence, and the expenditure should be regulated by the means in the general Exchequer and by the duty to be done, not by the revenues of the Presidency at which the Head Quarters of each separate portion of the Army might be situated.

51. But it would be otherwise with the Police, whose number and pay should bear the proportion to the amount which the persons and property they protect, contribute to the State Exchequer. It must, however, be borne in mind that the District in which Police is maintained is often not that which contains the persons or property to be protected.

52. Judging from what is done by the Police as organized by Sir Charles Napier, under Lord Ellenborough's order, in Scinde, and as copied more or less imperfectly in every body of Police which has since been raised, though in some places it has been rather travestied, I have no doubt that a thoroughly efficient Police would prove a measure of economy in the general expenditure, while it would give the Government a grasp on the Country such as it has never yet had.

53. I will not enter here into details because I hold the subject to be quite distinct from Army organization. But one thing is indispensable in both reforms. The whole subject must be entrusted to one head in each Province with full power to carry out his views, and not merely to enquire and report.

54. In the organization of the Armies which are to occupy the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus, the first principle to lay down is the same as that already stated with regard to the Armies of Madras and Bombay, *viz.*, that each Commander-in-Chief acting under the orders and with the sanction of the local Government should have power to remodel the Army under his Command, subject to the obligation of confining the total expenditure within definite financial limits to be fixed by the Supreme Government.

55. It is absolutely necessary to the success of this or of any other plan of re-organizing the Army that no Officer should be appointed either to the Command-in-Chief or to any Command above that of a Company, unless he has been selected for the duty, and the selection in all the higher grades should be such as to ensure the appointment of none but men of proved efficiency. I need not dwell on this subject, for the known incapacity of a great number of our superior Officers—the inevitable consequence of our seniority system—is, I believe, the least disputed of all causes of the wide-spread evil done by the mutiny.

56. But I speak advisedly and on careful consideration when I say, that in the Bombay Army, where the Officers Commanding Brigades and Divisions are generally younger men than in the other Presidencies, about half of the whole number has been, as a general rule, for as long as I can remember, either notoriously incapable, or past active work, and that of the other half, the majority is so much past the prime of life, as to be unfit to bear severe field service. On looking at the lists I find that the proportion of Officers in actual Command of Divisions and Brigades, who were really both professionally competent and physically fit for active service, has, of late years, been rarely as great as one-fourth of the whole number, and the Government who appointed them has been, as a general rule, practically powerless to pass them over.

57. I see no difficulty whatever in arranging that every Officer filling such a situation should be really efficient. Veterans of unimpeached character, but unfit for active service, who, under the present system, get Brigades and Divisions, might be provided with good service pensions of sufficient amount to compensate for foregoing the position and emoluments of an active Command. The total expense of such an arrangement would be a mere trifle compared to the increased efficiency which it would place within the reach of Government.

58. As regards the details of re-organization in the Armies of the Indus and Ganges, I have little to add to what has been already placed on record by Brigadier-General John Jacob.

59. The number of men now paid for purely Military services under various denominations in the tract to be occupied, is, I believe, far beyond what would be required for the general peace establishment, and the duty of each Commander-in-Chief of an Army would be to weed out what was useless, and to reduce the rest to such order as to enable him to work with them as one body, rather than to create an Army *de novo*.

60. His first task would be, in conjunction with the Civil Government, to fix accurately the limits of duty and responsibility between the Military and Police, and to take the whole of the Military under his immediate and effective control.

61. In organizing into an Army the very heterogeneous mass of Troops which he would find thus placed under his Command, two modes of action present themselves,—one, to prescribe a model and enforce conformity to it; the other, to adopt any thoroughly sound body as a germ or nucleus, and to add to or permit it to grow, till it has attained the required dimensions.

62. To the former course there is this insuperable object that all our most cherished models have been broken or fallen to pieces, from Peshawur to Bengal; all that for

generations past we have been told to imitate, has failed us, and this system of assimilation to patterns prescribed by distant Authorities, who can never see the results of their orders, is everywhere execrated, by the best informed men, as one of the main causes of our misfortunes.

63. But we are not without thoroughly sound examples of Troops who have stood the shock, and who prove that the art of making perfectly good and loyal Soldiers, even of the Natives of the most rebellious Provinces, has not been lost from among us. We hear of such bodies in other Provinces, and I can testify to their existence here, under more than one form of organization. Getting rid of what is doubtful and insecure, let us make such bodies the nuclei of our future Army.

64. Should we then take the best of them and prescribe them as models to the rest ?

65. Certainly not. But having selected the best living man (or men if they are to be found) who had shown capacity to form such Soldiers as we require, I would give him full power as a General of Division to extend the sphere of his operations till he could fill up the existing gaps in our lines of defence.

66. There are many races which contribute the raw material to our Army, and they require very different treatment in detail, though there are a few grand simple general rules which apply to all our dealings with them.

67. That Native Soldiers should be treated as men with feelings, passions and prejudices capable of being developed and worked on for good or for evil, not as mere machines or animals obeying some invariable instinct of caste or race, still less as incarnate demons incurably prone to every form of evil, that after various fashions and with various forms of external difference; they will conform themselves to whatever their European Officers are themselves, and wish their men to be, whether brave, zealous, or loyal Soldiers, or careless, idle, mercenary and discontented drones, that they obey the man who represents the Government, and wields its power, and not the system or abstraction embodied in rules. All these may seem truisms; but we have too often forgotten them in our dealings with our Native Soldiers, and obedience to the laws they embody will be found more or less at the root of all successful attempts to command Asiatics, whether in former or more recent days.

68. But it may be asked, granting the existence of sound germs or stocks which may be safely allowed to grow, and that we have discovered and re-organized them, what is to be done while a Native Army is in process of growing from such germs as may exist ?

69. We have already in the Country the European Force which, under any circumstances, must form the back-bone of the Army. It will hardly be questioned that a total absence of Native Troops would be a safer condition than the presence of large bodies of men disarmed or distrusted, and requiring to be watched, so that, in many parts of the Country, a general disbandment of the remaining Native Army would actually add to our strength.

70. We must first of all then get rid of what is incurable, bad and dangerous. Race alone, to which we are now trusting, will be a most fallacious guide. Not only shall

we dismiss many good and useful Soldiers and retain many bad and traitorous ones ; but we shall perpetuate a most false and dangerous principle.

71. It is certain that we shall be miserably deceived if we entrust the expulsion of the bad and corrupt portion of our Army to any distant authority. A good General personally inspecting a Corps under his own Command, will soon find out whether the Regiment is really to be depended on, whether the Officers and Men mutually trust each other, as is absolutely necessary, if the body is ever to be better than a broken reed. But it is vain to expect the generality of even good Officers to report that they distrust their men. There are, I believe, hundreds of Officers whom no consideration of personal humiliation and ruin would keep silent, but who would be deterred from speaking out their distrust by a mistaken feeling of what is called *esprit de corps*, and who are confirmed in their fatal mistake by a sense of the imminent personal dangers they incur by their silence, which gives to the risks they run, an unreal halo resembling that of an act of duty.

72. No amount of writing or returns to an office at a distance, nor of formal inspections of the old regulation pattern, would elicit the truth in such cases ; but a few with such a Corps would show the real feeling to a good General, armed with the power of a Commander in the field, and able at once to weed the Army of Men and Officers whose value as Soldiers he had good reasons to doubt.

73. But I believe the more frequent result of such close intercourse between a good General and his Troops would be to restore confidence where it has not existed for months and years, and to render trustworthy that which at present is really not so. Those who have never witnessed the effect on disorganized and demoralized Troops, of the arrival of a General in whom they have confidence, could never believe how much he may effect without apparently doing any thing, and I am convinced that the mere presence on the spot of a Commander who could and would at once reward and punish, without previous report, or waiting for instructions, would alone go far to make trustworthy Soldiers of many Corps whose own Officers now mistrust them.

74. But even if the only effect of his presence were to effect a great reduction in the numbers of the Native Soldiers now in our pay, I believe the remainder would be more than adequate to our wants.

75. Let it be borne in mind that the Army is to be absolved from the ordinary Police duties, and it will be evident that the events of the past year, if properly interpreted, have shown us how to do in time of peace with a smaller Native Army than has heretofore been deemed necessary.

76. We may lay it down as a proved fact that no force of Europeans in the field for a long campaign, is thoroughly efficient, without at least an equal number of Native auxiliaries to take duties for which Europeans are unsuited. A Native Army equal in number to the Europeans may then be taken as the minimum proportion necessary to efficiency within the regions of tropical heat.

77. We may raise the proportion of the less costly and more easily replaced material as high as four Natives to one European fighting man, and still in the opinion of our ablest Generals, the efficient fighting power of the aggregate body will be superior, on

their own ground, to that of any Army which can be brought against them. This then may be taken as a safe maximum proportion of Natives to European fighting men in our Army for Indian service.

78. Between the two extremes, one to one, and one to four, therefore, we may regulate the proportion according to what we can get in the shape of European recruits, and what we can pay for, both of Europeans and Natives.

79. The sufferings of the past year have been of little service, if they have not taught us how to manage with fewer Troops than formerly, and how to make those few more efficient.

First.—They must be more massed than at present, and the number of distinct permanent Stations must be fewer.

80. The great obstacle to this now is the prevailing want of confidence which creates a panic wherever there is not a force of Europeans. To remove this and inspire confidence is the part of the Civil Government. It can, and it must be done, otherwise life will be, to all Europeans, intolerable, and the tenure of the Country on any terms which can make it worth holding, will be impossible.

81. It needs but little knowledge of Military affairs to know that unless for a temporary purpose, the system of holding the Country by Detachments, each so small as to render the preservation of discipline impossible, is a great waste of strength, and that a Country can be held by a numerically smaller body of men when they are concentrated into bodies, each capable of independent action, than when they are dispersed in Detachments, which may be frequently compelled to remain inactive, and on the defensive.

82. Even in our present condition as to the means of locomotion and fortified defence, there are many permanent Stations which, I think, might with advantage be abandoned. In the enumeration, I confine myself to parts of the Country with which I am personally acquainted.

Shikarpoor.
Hyderabad, Scinde.
Bhooj.
Rajcote.
Broach.
Dhooliah.
Sattara.
Kolapoor.
Dharwar.

83. *Secondly.*—Our strength might be further economized if every thing in the shape of an arsenal were made easily defensible by a small body, against any thing short of a siege, and our larger Military Depôts on the frontier or sea-board should be fortified, so as to stand a regular siege.

84. In all our foreign expeditions it has been a standing difficulty to collect any large body of men without denuding any Station of Troops. The number of men so locked up, and taking no duties but the Station Guards of our scattered, ill-arranged, and unprotected Cantonments, has been in itself a considerable Army.

85. The expence of providing, at each of our permanent Stations, defensible posts where a very small body of men could protect the families and non-combatants belonging to the Army, its reserve ammunition and baggage, and the more valuable public property, need not be large and could be distributed over a long period.

86. But in this, as in every thing else, nothing useful can be done unless we trust to local and individual power and responsibility. Let the General Commanding, and the Chief Civil Authorities of the Province know that they can lay out a certain sum, and no more, in the year, on any object of the kind indicated, regarding which they may agree, and something effectual may in time be done for the money. But if the duty and responsibility is to be divided among half a dozen different Departments, all practically independent of each other, and of the General, and if the result is to be merely a recommendation to a power a thousand miles off, the present state of things will continue while we remain in India; the same money will be spent, but to little or no purpose.

87. Any moral effect produced by many of our small Stations would be far better secured by the habitual formation of Camps of Exercise, when the Troops might be annually marched to a certain rendezvous for instruction in field and out-post duty, as well as in manœuvring in large masses. This kind of exercise will become more than ever necessary as railways and steamers supersede daily marching, and the ordinary annual reliefs cease to become, as they now are, a very useful school for field service.

88. *Thirdly.*—Better arms and superior organization in the Natives retained in our service, would still further aid us to reduce the numbers who must be kept on foot. It is as much as a man's reputation for sanity is worth, to urge this truth at a time when it seems an almost universal opinion that Natives are never to be trusted with any but inferior weapons, yet I think it would not be difficult to show the unsoundness of this prevalent belief not merely because the argument, if good for anything, would require us to restrict our Sepoys to bows and arrows or staves, but by the plain reason that if there is a certain work to be done, and it is desirable to employ no more men than are really wanted to do it, it is obviously the wisest plan to give them the best tools they can use. If there are, as all admit, duties for which the Native Soldier is more useful to his European comrade than another European would be, why employ two Sepoys with flint muskets, or three with clubs, when one man with a good rifle could do the work better? The expense in direct pay as well as in carriage, Commissariat and all accidental expenses, is greater for the larger and less efficient body, and there are three men to be taught and kept to their duty instead of one. If the Native Soldier be as some (most unjustly and untruly I believe) assert, incurably untrustworthy, why employ three traitors, each of whom has a certain amount of physical force independent of you, and which you cannot take away from him, when one traitor with good tools will do the work equally well and be more manageable.

89. In a financial point of view the difference is enormous. I once calculated that fully three-fourths of a million might at once have been saved in the arm of Native Cavalry alone, by adopting the best equipment and organization we know, while the efficiency of the arm would be fully doubled. It would not be necessary to give expensive or very formidable arms to the Police, whose power ought not to rest in their superior physical force. If the population generally are prohibited from carrying arms, all you require is that the Policeman should be somewhat more than a match for a ruffian he has to apprehend, and swords and ordinary light fusils or carbines are as effectual and efficient, and better weapons. When the Police require Enfield Rifles and Artillery, it is time they should stand aside and make way for a Regular Army.

90. *Fourthly.*—A much smaller number of Troops would suffice, if the facilities for moving them were greater.

91. As regard Natives, I am convinced that one of the readiest and most economical means of increasing their mobility would be to adopt General Jacob's plan of extending to the Infantry the Silladar principle, which has been found so efficacious as applied to Cavalry.

92. In the latter arm, the value of the principle is now recognized, and Silladar Cavalry are generally admitted to be fully equal in efficiency, while in facility of movement they are infinitely superior to Cavalry organized on what is called the Regular system.

93. But as applied to Infantry the Silladar mode of organization has been less known, and the first fair trial on a large scale is now being made by General John Jacob in the Rifle Regiments of his Frontier Field Force. I will, therefore, at present only express my conviction that the principle will be found as valuable for the other arms as for Cavalry, and that, while effecting an important saving of expense, it will render the Troops we entertain much more moveable than at present by the ordinary means of field transport, and consequently render a smaller number of men able to do the work of larger bodies under the old system.

94. *Fifthly.*—With respect to extraordinary means of transport, it is fortunate that our great lines of Military communication correspond exactly with our Commercial lines, and that no line of real Military importance can be projected which is not worth construction on Commercial grounds. This coincidence is, perhaps, less marked with regard to lines of communication parallel with the Sea Coast; but the law still holds good, and taking into account all Military advantages, Government may, I believe, safely guarantee the usual rate of interest on any line which a respectable Company can be found to undertake. In every point of view I know no line of more importance than that which would connect Kurrachee with Mooltan, and the latter City with Peshawur and Lahore, running parallel to the only frontier the invasion of which is something more than a remote possibility. I feel convinced that no expense which the finances of India can bear, should be spared to render this line by both river steamer and rail, running parallel to each other, as perfect as possible. The effect, however, cannot be very immediate, and I will, therefore, refer for details to a separate memorandum on the subject as applied to the portion of India with which alone I am personally acquainted.

95. For the formation of the common roads much greater latitude should be given than is at present allowed to Local Authorities. Every head of a Province should have a certain sum allowed to him yearly for this purpose, and he should be desired to do his best with it towards improving the communications within his charge, beginning with the trunk lines. Sums unspent in one District might be transferred, at the end of the year, to another which could spend more. I am convinced no other system will, for centuries to come, give to India the roads we require for Military or Commercial purposes.

96. *Sixthly.*—In estimating the strength of the Army required for India, we must take into account that the events of the last year have, to a very considerable extent, relieved us from all apprehension of active hostility on the part of subordinate Native States within our border. The Force required at any Native capital is now clearly necessary

rather for the defence of our Ally than to coerce him, and I cannot but believe that the declaration of a more liberal policy in cases of succession, guaranteeing all Native Chiefs who are not, according to Native custom, heirless, against annexation of their estates, except in case of proved disloyalty, would do much to reduce still further the chance of our ever having to use our Indian Army against the Chief of an Indian State. No such guarantee need, of course, extend to what are really attributes of sovereignty. It would merely assure Chiefs against all fear of their estates and property being confiscated, under color of an extinction of the line to which the rights of sovereignty may appertain.

97. *Seventhly.*—The system of permanent Head Quarters for Regiments recommended by General J. Jacob might, I believe, be made the means of greatly promoting both economy and efficiency in our Native Army. It would then be possible to allow men who had served past the prime of life in the active ranks of the Army, to retire with a provision for their maintenance which would secure to the State their services during a portion of each year for exercise, and for permanent Garrison Duty on full pay when required. This arrangement might be made far less costly and less liable to abuse than the Pension List, to which it would be a valuable auxiliary and often an excellent substitute, in securing efficient men for the active ranks of the Army.

98. There can also be no doubt that the system of permanent Head Quarters would greatly facilitate recruiting.

99. The combined effect would be, that it would be possible, on emergency, to move out for active service every formed Soldier capable of enduring a campaign, leaving, at the same time, a sufficient Garrison of veterans, convalescents and recruits to afford protection to the Station, and to the Regimental families and property, the disposal of which is now so frequently a source of serious inconvenience.

100. It would also be possible with safety to reduce, much more extensively and rapidly from a war to a peace establishment, and to consult immediate economy without the risk of reducing too far the available strength of the Army.

101. It does not appear to me at all impossible, by the system I have described, in the course of two years to bring our Military expenditure within the limits of our present income, and still if we steadily persevere in it for the few years required, to extend our railway system, to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior of India, with two months' notice, and 60,000 at three months' notice, and similar numbers, with half that notice, on the frontier or sea-board.

102. With less than this I cannot think that our Indian Army is equal to our requirements; but I must again repeat that the first of our necessities seems to me to bring our ordinary Military expenditure in time of peace within our ordinary income, and to be able to trust to our Police for the preservation of internal peace.

103. I believe the principles above stated are applicable more or less to the whole of India; but I will not attempt to show how they should be applied beyond the valley of the Indus, of which alone I have some personal knowledge.

104. It has always appeared to me one of the capital errors of the existing organization of India, that the sea base of all Military operations in the Punjab should be

laid on the banks of the Hooghly, and that the Civil and Military administration should be but a branch of that of Bengal.

105. Nor is it possible to be blind to the inconveniences of a division which makes the Southern portion of the valley and its Army a dependency on Bombay, while the Northern looks to Calcutta for orders.

106. Believing that the jealousy of local self-government, and the disposition to meddle in affairs which can only be properly settled by Local Authority, which we mistake for centralization, is one of the most potent causes of our misfortunes, and that it is certain if persevered in, to ensure our ruin, I would increase rather than diminish the powers of local administration which already exist here in Scinde; but it seems to me absolutely necessary that the Army and Civil Service of the whole valley of the Indus should be as distinct as those of the other great divisions of India.

107. By making the Army of the Indus a body as separate as those of Madras and Bombay, one step would be gained towards equalizing the present great disparity in size between the three Armies, which is productive of many practical inconveniences.

108. But I look on the measure principally as rendering it possible for one General Officer to make himself master of the whole position his Army has to defend, and really to Command that Army, during his tenure of office, which is clearly impossible now.

109. He would find himself charged with the task of occupying and defending, with a given number of men, a given territory, able, within a year, to become personally acquainted with all the important parts of his Command, and armed with power to make any changes in which he could secure the concurrence of the Civil Government of the Province, provided the Military charges were kept within certain given limits.

110. Such charges would be divided under two heads,—*first*, a fixed share of the total ordinary Military charges of India, proportioned to the ordinary extent and requirements of his Command, and *secondly*, extra expenditure, chargeable to the present condition of India.

111. The latter would probably be in the form of so many extra Corps or extra men temporarily added to the ordinary strength of each Corps of his Army, and to the possibility of reducing such extra expenditure, his attention would be perpetually drawn by the necessity for proving periodically to the Local as well as to the Supreme Governments, the necessity for its continuance.

112. He would find his Army composed of—

1st.—European Troops.

2nd.—Sepoy Regiments on the old footing.

3rd.—Irregular Regiments, some as they existed before the mutiny, others raised since, very various in character and organization, but all armed and disciplined more or less, as far as parade movements go, according to the Regular pattern.

4th.—Irregular Police Regiments and Levies of various kinds made over to him by the Civil Government, after retaining as Police, under Civil control, only so many as were wanted for purely Police and Civil purposes.

113. His attention would probably be first directed to his European Troops, and he would find that at the two extremities of the line of his operations, he had a good sea coast climate at Kurrachee, and good mountain stations in the Himalayan and Sub-Himalayan ranges.

114. His first object would be to secure permanent Head Quarters for his European Troops in these comparatively healthy regions, where the families of Invalids and Convalescents might live always, and the effective men, when not on active field service, might be quartered in climates more congenial to an European constitution than the generality of Indian Stations.

115. To render such Stations easily defensible and accessible, so that the largest possible portion of his efficient European Force might be always available at the shortest possible notice, whenever wanted for distant Field Service, to provide good Barracks, and the appliances necessary to keep his men and their families and followers in health and efficiency, would alone, when more pressing wants had been provided for, furnish ample occupation for years to a succession of most active-minded General Officers.

116. There are few subjects of greater importance than the condition and management of the European Soldiers in India; but space allows me only here to state my firm belief, grounded on much and careful observation, that in a Cantonment situated as I have described, and furnished as it would have been by Sir Charles Napier, with really good Barracks (and the best that can be built are the most economical), with good respectable and comfortable quarters for the married men, gardens, play-grounds for their children, with amusements for the idle, work-shops for the industrious, and reading rooms for the studious, the European Soldier might last in efficiency double the number of years he does now, rear children to be useful in many ways to the State instead of seeing them die prematurely as four-fifths of them now do, and he might add in many ways not only to our physical security, but to our moral strength.

117. None of these are Utopian dreams. I have seen separately, in different Stations and Regiments, all the appliances I would desire, and have witnessed their good effects, and I feel convinced that all that the most sanguine in such matters ever expected, might be attained, and a great saving in our total Military expenditure be at the same time effected, if the General Officer on the spot had the power, in conjunction with the Local Civil Government of the Province, to carry out all the improvements he desired, within certain limits as to expense. It is the necessity for applying for sanction for every trifle to distant Authorities who know through reports but little, and can themselves see and hear nothing whatever of local wants; that is the great obstacle to improvement of every kind.

118. A powerful and readily moveable European Force at each extremity of his frontier line would greatly lessen the necessity for scattering the European Troops over the Country; still stations would remain like Mooltan very unfavorable to the European constitution, which must nevertheless, on account of their great strategical importance,

be garrisoned by European Troops. These might be held by Detachments of men selected as being ripe and seasoned Soldiers, who by frequent reliefs might be kept in fair health and efficiency.

119. If we can keep our European Force in India always recruited up to its present strength in time of European war as well as European peace, the General would have to consider merely how to preserve the efficiency and make the most of what he has got, without attempting to do with less.

120. But the possibility of keeping up such a supply of European recruits is a point which ought to be very carefully weighed, for it is obviously impolitic to habituate ourselves to rely exclusively on a species of Force, our supply of which may be diminished just at the moment when we shall need it most.

121. With regard to his Native Troops, the General's first care would be to obtain a good body of European Officers, and before he can do this, it will be absolutely necessary to decide on the course to be adopted with regard to Officers in Civil employ, and to put some check on the system which at present drains the Army of many of its best Officers.

122. As regards the territories on the Indus, there seem to be peculiar facilities for disposing of a question which elsewhere is beset with some difficulty. There is no local Civil Service, and the Members of the Civil Service of Bengal and Bombay who serve there are but a small minority of the whole body of European Civil Officers.

123. Two courses suggest themselves whereby the many anomalies and inconveniences of the present want of system may be remedied.

124. One is an enlargement of the existing Civil Service of the Western Presidency to such an extent as may enable it to provide for all Civil duties in Scinde and the Punjab, as well as in Bombay, and thus to form, for the whole of India, three nearly equal bodies;—one for the Civil duties of Bengal and North-Western Provinces, a second for Madras and the whole South of the Peninsula, and a third for Bombay and the Indus Territories.

125. The alternative measure is the creation of a separate fourth Civil Service for the territories on the Indus. If this measure were adopted, Members of the existing Civil Service now serving in Scinde or the Punjab might have the option of being transferred to the new Service, ranking as at present, and retaining all their existing rights and liabilities to Pension, Civil Fund, &c., in their own Service, abandoning merely their claims on the appointments in their old Presidency, which are usually reserved to the Civil Service of that Presidency.

126. Whichever plan were adopted, Military Officers who had been in Civil employ for more than two years, and whose qualifications were certified by their immediate Official superior, by the head of their Department and by the Provincial Government, to be satisfactory, might have the option of being transferred, by order of the Home Government only, to the new Civil Service. They would in that case become exempt from liability to be ordered to join their Regiments, and they would cease to have any further concern with the Army, save that until Regulations could be matured for a gene-

ral scheme of pensions, &c., they might retain their Army rank and all the claim it gave them to pension for length of service.

127. I would make an exception in the case of Officers in the Police Force. They would rarely, if ever, leave their Police Corps or duties to claim Regimental Command; but they would be eligible in turn for all Brigade and superior Commands for which their Police duties, placing them early in Command of large bodies of men, would form an excellent training.

128. Really diplomatic service might be open to Military Officers as at present, without interfering with their Military rank or prospects.

129. Military Officers transferred to the new Civil Service might rank in it with Civilians, according to the length of time they had actually served in a Civil capacity.

130. Young Officers might still, as at present, be taken from the Army and employed in Civil duties, and at the end of a definite period, say two years, the Local Government might decide whether such as wished to be transferred were qualified to be recommended to the Home Government for permanent transfer.

131. Some similar process should be adopted with regard to the Civil Staff of the Army, including the Commissariat and Pay Departments, the Judge Advocate General's Department, Superintendents of Bazars, &c. There are many good reasons why such appointments should always be held by Military Men, and Officers who have been selected for such duties should rise in their several Departments as long as they are efficient; but when once so diverted from Military duty, their path in life should be quite distinct from that of the Regimental Officer, and they ought never, on any account, to be allowed to interfere with Officers doing Regimental duty, still less to supersede them.

132. Whether this can best be done by one Staff Corps or by several, one Corps for each separate Department or by any other device, is a matter of detail. Numerous plans have been and many more might be devised, none free from some objections, but such objections are generally of very trivial moment compared with the object in view.

133. For it may be set down as a truth hardly disputable, and of cardinal importance, that there can be no reasonable hope of ever keeping an useful Native Army as long as we persevere in our present system of making Staff appointments away from the Regiments, an object of ambition to Regimental Officers, and a better provision for a young man, in position and emoluments, than the Command of Native Soldiers.

134. Some Native Soldiers, whether few or many, we must have. They must ever be an essential and preponderating element in any permanent Indian Army, and if they are to be ever any thing but a source of anxiety to the General, they must be Commanded by men who serve with them from choice, who have a pride in their duty, whose whole hearts are in their work, and who feel they can make themselves obeyed.

135. This can be easily effected by making such service a matter of selection and a prize, as it is now with most of what are called Irregular Corps, where a man's hopes

limited to his Corps, which he has no temptation to leave till he becomes qualified for Brigade or higher Command.

136. The purely Military Staff of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General's Departments, and the personal Staff of General Officers, would, of course, be selected, as at present, from the best qualified Officers of the Army without any restriction, and should always be objects of ambition to a Soldier who is fond of his profession. Not only are the duties purely Military, but the appointments are so few in number that the prospect of getting one would not exercise any disturbing influence on the minds of Regimental Officers generally, or prevent their entire devotion to their Regimental duty.

137. Deducting Officers transferred to the Civil Service, to the Civil Staff of the Army, selected for service with Native Regiments, and for the Military Staff of the Army, together with the necessarily large number absorbed by the additional European Regiments, few Officers would remain unprovided with duty, even of the large body whose Regiments have disappeared ; but if any such remain for whom no place could be found in so many and such various lines of employment, it will be the soundest economy to provide for them by a pension or half pay list, for nothing is more pernicious to the efficiency of a Native Corps than an European Officer serving with it unwillingly, or even listlessly or without responsible or influential duties.

138. For the future, every Cadet will join an European Regiment, and do duty there for two years after his arrival in the Country, and none, it is to be hoped, will ever be transferred to a Native Regiment, except as a privilege, and with something more than their own free-will.

139. Of the Sepoy Regiments which remain on the old footing, nothing need be altered beyond what is obviously and unmistakeably necessary for greater efficiency, such as giving efficient powers of Command to the nominal Commanding Officer, and getting rid of Officers who nominally belong to it, but whose liability to serve does not increase the effective strength of the Regiment, while it interferes with the prospects of those who do, and greatly increase the apparent cost of the Native Army.

140. The differences in organization in different branches of the same Army, which the retention of these Corps will involve, are not greater than it is probably desirable to have in every large Army, but which in an Indian Army may be considered the inevitable consequences of a healthy system, and the necessary signs of that true vitality which alone can resist a contagion such as lately infected a whole Army.

141. The Commander-in-Chief, to whom Irregular Regiments and Police Corps are made over as a portion of his Army, will, for the same, be cautious in enforcing uniformity to any really approved model. A reduction may no doubt be effected, to a great extent, of what is either superfluous in numbers or vicious in organization ; but mere peculiarity, if not obviously objectionable, is preferable to that external uniformity which has afforded such fatal facilities for combination, and has so aided the contagion of evil example.

142. Above all, it must be borne in mind that the whole Army of the Indus is essentially a Frontier Army, facing in close proximity warlike and aggressive nations, who

have twice successfully invaded India since we first gained territorial footing on the Continent, and who boast themselves prepared to repeat the attempt whenever it suits them, while they are daily becoming more subject to those Military and Political influences which affect the great family of European nations. Whatever we may think of its possibility or of its chance of success, an invasion of India is a common topic of conversation in every assemblage of Chiefs between Tabriz and Peshawur, the day-dream of more than one Sovereign Prince, and a subject of more or less thought and reflection to every one who aspires to be a successful Soldier. There can be no doubt of the grave results which must follow any advance of our Armies beyond our present frontier; but if we would avoid inviting aggression, or combinations which may force us to advance in self-defence, we must be better prepared than we have been during the last ten years, and our Frontier Army must not only be in numbers sufficient to render attack hopeless, but it must always be ready for the field. If we would preserve peace, every Corps and every Station West of the Indus should be permanently on a footing prepared for immediate war.

143. The above remarks may appear vague and general, but the main point to be insisted on is, that all particulars and details must be left to local arrangement, that there must be no attempt to dictate on such points from a distance, and that no one system, however well devised, is or can be, of universal application.

144. It is, I believe, a fashionable theory that railways, electric telegraphs, and similar appliances render it easier for a Central Government to control its distant subordinates, and safer to exercise that power. So far from this being the case, they seem to me to render it necessary to concede formally greater powers, because the facilities of reference hold out a temptation to refer, instead of acting, as a man was compelled to do before such facilities existed. On the other hand, the facilities of communication greatly diminish the danger of entrusting despotic powers to men at a distance, owing to the greater publicity they ensure, and increased facilities they afford to aggrieved parties, to seek redress at the hands of the Central Government.

145. I will now, as briefly as possible, recapitulate the points on which I have dilated at, I fear, inconvenient length.

1. The question of organizing the Army is essentially a financial question, and the first question must be—not what Army we could desire; but, what is the best Army we can afford?

2. Re-organization of an Army is not a work which can be executed by a Commission. The labors of any Commission should be confined to inquiry and report on defects and causes of disaster.

3. The task of re-organizing the Army must be entrusted to individual Officers acting with Local Governments, each independent in its sphere of territory, and within certain limits as to total expenditure, and only generally accountable to the Supreme Government.

4. A system of centralization by persons, each despotic in his own sphere, must be substituted for our present system of centralization by separate and independent Departments.

5. The present task of re-organization should be more immediately confined to re-placing that portion of the Army which has fallen away.

6. The re-organization of the Army must be kept quite distinct from that of the Police.

7. The Civil Government endowed with more autocratic powers, and stricter responsibilities than at present, must undertake so to govern as to require no further aid or protection, in ordinary times, against internal disaffection or rebellion, than can be furnished by the Police, and must itself undertake the reform of that Police where necessary.

8. The Army of India should be divided into five distinct bodies, each under a separate Commander-in-Chief, viz.—

1st. The Army of the valley of the Ganges, with its base at Calcutta.

2nd. The Army of the valley of the Indus, with its base at Kurrachee.

3rd. The Army of the West Coast, with its base at Bombay.

4th. The Army of the East Coast, with its base at Madras.

5th. The Army of Burmah, the Straits and Ceylon. The whole under a Commander-in-Chief in India.

9. The boundaries of the Civil Governments to be re-adjusted so as to correspond with the divisions, each of which is occupied by a separate Army.

10. For the present we may restrict any attempt at entire re-organization, to the Armies occupying the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus.

11. The Governments of Bombay and Madras will be charged with the duty of garrisoning definite portions of the Peninsula, with full power to modify the stations and constitutions of their Armies, under the general control of the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief in India, within certain limits of annual expense for regular charges, and with the obligation to seek periodical sanction for extraordinary war charges, and to keep a certain Force always available for general duty beyond the limit of the Presidency.

12. These Governments should also be empowered to reform their Police, on the principles first adopted by Sir Charles Napier in Scinde, so as to relieve the Army of all Civil duties, and to provide against all contingencies, save external aggression or organized rebellion.

13. The Commander-in-Chief in India to be absolved from all detailed Command of any one Army, and to aid the Governor General in exercising an efficient general control over the whole Military strength of India.

14. The relation of the Local Governments and the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor General to be the same as in practice fifty years ago.

15. The total Military expenditure to be considered as a whole, and divided to each Army according to the work to be done, without any reference to the Revenue of the Presidency to the occupation of which the Army is allotted.

16. The Police to be a Local charge, and its strength to have some reference to what is paid by the persons and property protected.

17. Succession to active Command by seniority to cease on reaching the rank of Field Officer. Veterans of unimpeached character, who may be passed over on account of age and physical incapacity, consequent on length of service, to succeed by seniority to higher rates of good service pensions.

18. In the territories on the Indus and the Ganges, the Local Commander-in-Chief, in conjunction with the Civil Government, having discriminated accurately between what is required for Military and what for Police duties, should take over, under his own Command, all the bodies employed on the former class of duties.

19. These he must then weed and organize, not by enforcing conformity to any one model, but by letting any one body of proved excellence, grow and expand till it has filled up the gaps which defection may have left in our line of defence.

20. To do this, the best men who have shown they can make good Soldiers of Natives should be selected as Generals of Division and entrusted with the task of reformation.

21. We must first get rid of what is incurably bad and dangerous ; but we must not, in judging of this, trust to race as a guide.

22. Still less must the task of weeding be entrusted to distant authority. It must be left to a General, seeing, hearing, and deciding for himself on the men he Commands as they come personally before him.

23. In the time of peace, we shall not require so large a Native Army as heretofore.

24. The proportion of Natives to European fighting men may vary according to our means, from that of one Native to one European up to four Natives to one European.

25. In order to make smaller numbers more efficient—

1st.—Our Troops must be more massed than they are at present.

2nd.—All Arsenals should be made defensible, and Entrenched Lines should be provided for baggage and non-combatants in every large permanent Cantonment, which occupies an important strategical position ; but all other stations, and all stations on the frontier, should be held as camps of a Force in the field.

3rd.—The best arms procurable should be given to all Soldiers, Natives as well as Europeans. The Police will not require them.

4th.—The facilities for moving Troops should be improved, and with this view the Silladar principle should be extended to all Native Troops.

5th.—Railways, roads, and steamers should be extended as much as possible.

6th.—We must abandon a policy calculated to alienate Native Princes, and enable them to take care of themselves, and keep their own subjects in order, reducing Contingents, &c.

7th.—Permanent Head Quarters should be established for Regiments serving at the same time as Recruit and Invalid Depôts.

26. By these means, in the course of a few years, we ought to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior, at two months' notice, 60,000 at three months' notice, and within half those periods on the frontier sea-board. With less than this, we cannot be secure in India.

27. In applying these principles to the valley of the Indus, we should begin by giving it an Army and Civil Service as distinct from those of the rest of India as in the other Presidencies.

28. The Commander-in-Chief of such an Army would have—

First.—To provide proper quarters for his European Regiments at Kurrachee as the sea base of his operations, and in salubrious regions of the Sub-Himalayan Ranges.

Second.—In order to get a really efficient body of European Officers for the Native Force, arrangements should be made for transferring all Officers in Civil employ to a Local Civil Service, and all in Civil Departments of the Military Service to a Staff Corps, leaving with the Native Corps none but Officers who serve in them from choice and as their permanent profession.

Third.—In reorganizing the Native Army, variety of organization is not *per se* to be regarded as a reason for change, and no attempt should be made at assimilation for the mere sake of uniformity.

29. The whole of the Indus or Frontier Army should be kept permanently on a War Establishment.

FROM

W. MUIR, ESQUIRE,

Member Sudder Board of Revenue, and

Secretary to Government N. W. P.,

TO

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,

On Special Duty with the Governor General.

Dated Allahabad, 13th September 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to subjoin some observations, for the consideration of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, on the Indian Army, as required by your Circular Letters Nos. 32 and 72, dated 21st May and 16th June.

2. My ignorance of professional details renders it unnecessary to follow your questions *seriatim*; but they will form a guide for the order of my remarks.

3. The extremely limited number of European Troops for many years cantoned in these Provinces, has, without doubt, been a leading cause of the growing self-importance exhibited by the Sepoy Army. One of the honestest of themselves told Mr. Colvin, when endeavoring to elicit the causes of dissatisfaction—"It is *we* who have conquered India for you from Ceylon to Peshawur." The idea once entertained was confirmed by all that the Sepoys saw around them. From Meerut to Calcutta the European Regiments were scattered singly at distances of three and four hundred miles. Seeing this absence of European Force, the Sepoys were not unnaturally puffed up with the notion that they were *essential* to our existence, and that the fabric of our Empire rested almost solely on one pillar—the Sepoy Army.

Number of European Troops for the North-Western Provinces.

Must be sufficient to crush the idea of successful opposition by the Native Army.

4. This is a notion the growth of which must never again be possible, if we are to govern the Country with security and advantage.

5. No doubt the new form in which our Native Army is to be re-produced, may of itself, to a great extent, present or limit the grounds for such a notion. In proportion to the degree in which the Native Army is broken up into Provincial Battalions and Local Forces, it will lose its sense of unity, independence and concentrated power; and there will not be the same danger of the attempt, even in imagination, at measuring itself with the British in India.

But may be rendered less numerous by breaking up the Native Army into unconnected parts.

6. On the other hand, the fact of the Sepoy Army having once combined, and kept as long at bay, however in the end unsuccessfully, will not be forgotten, and the idea will, *cæteris paribus*, occur in future more naturally and certainly than in past times. To be sure of repressing the thought of independence and of combination, the standing European Force available for the Field, must be of a strength palpably and beyond all question in the mind of the Native Army, to overawe and render hopeless any combination amongst them.

But the late General Mutiny will make the idea of opposition more easy of suggestion than it was before.

7. Happily the two centres of warlike races in Northern India have no sympathy with each other. The Punjab (with due precautions on our part) is not likely to fraternise with the N. W. Provinces. The lowest possible limit, therefore, of European Troops, consistent with the maintenance of a secure footing in the Country, is that European Force which would at any moment afford moveable Troops sufficient to crush *either* the Punjabee or the Hindoostanee Army. This would be the minimum, to secure our continuance in India against the chances of disaffection and mutiny. We must be able at any hour to cope with either class of Soldiers.

Lowest scale of Troops in these parts, that which could cope either with the Punjabee or Hindoostanee Troops.

8. But for the successful Government of India it is necessary to provide for something further. The very *idea* of independence must be checked in the Native Troops, and for this purpose the European Forces must be of sufficient amount, *and so*

Necessity for large Brigades at a few prominent positions throughout the Country.

distributed, as in all parts of the land to show that a Force could be rapidly brought into the Field able to overpower any classes of Native Troops that chose to combine. The power of throwing into the field a Moveable Column must be seen and felt *everywhere*. This will be best secured by posting Brigades of such strength as to be able to furnish a Moveable Column of European Troops at convenient, and not very distant, posts throughout the Country. Such an arrangement would, I conceive, afford more palpable evidence of our power than the same amount of European Troops distributed in small bodies at various posts, from which they could not be brought together, so as to form a powerful moveable body, without delay, and without the appearance of denuding out-posts.

9. For the North-Western Provinces Proper, I think two such first class posts would be needed, *viz.*, Allahabad and Meerut. As Oude is properly a portion of these Provinces, I mention as a third Brigade Station, Lucknow. These points would command—Meerut the Western Districts, Allahabad the Eastern, and Lucknow the Trans-Ganges Provinces, including Rohilcund.

10. I do not propose any such Brigade at Agra, as I presume there will be a powerful European armament at Gwalior in place of the late Contingent, which would effectually secure that Frontier.

11. For Rajpootana there should be two other European Brigades, at Nusseerabad and Mhow, the cost of which would be properly debitable to Rajpootana and Bundelkund, for the security and protection of which they would be mainly required.

12. I conclude that European Brigades will likewise be provided for Nagpore, Calcutta and Dinapore.

13. Full Brigades should be stationed at three commanding positions in the Punjab.

14. With Northern and Eastern India thus protected, the European Forces required for Madras and Bombay need not be of corresponding strength.

15. Each Brigade Station should have three, and the less important two, Regiments of European Infantry, a Regiment of European Cavalry, two European Batteries and a Reserve Artillery Company. The Chief Brigade Stations would thus have available for the Field two European Infantry and one Cavalry Regiments with two Batteries, leaving behind an Infantry Regiment and the Reserve Company of Artillery to guard the Cantonment, with its Magazine and Treasury.

16. Such Brigades, distributed in the manner I have ventured to suggest, would not only secure our footing in this Country against any possible rising or combination of Native Troops, but would render the very idea of combination so hopeless that it would never be contemplated. This would be a Peace and not a War Establishment; but still in concert with the Native Army, thus obliged to maintain its faithfulness, the European Field Force would be always ready to repel foreign attack. An Army of 18 to 20,000 European Troops could be brought together on an emergency (the Brigade Stations being still held) in something of the following manner.

CIRCLE.	BRIGADE STATIONS.	AVAILABLE FIELD FORCE.			TOTAL.		
		Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery Troops or Battalions.	Infantry Regiments.	Cavalry Regiments.	Artillery Troops or Battalions.
N. W. Provinces	Meerut	2	1	2	6	3	6
	Allahabad	2	1	2			
	Lucknow	2	1	2			
Rajpootana and Central India	Gwalior	2	1	2	6	3	6
	Nusseerabad	2	1	2			
	Mhow	2	1	2			
Punjab Three similar Stations	6	3	6
Bengal	Calcutta	1	0	1	3	2	3
	Dinapore	1	1	1			
	Nagpore	1	1	1			
Madras Two Brigade Stations	2	1	2	2	1	2
Bombay Two Brigade Stations	2	1	2	2	1	2

17. This would require, for the supposed sixteen Brigade Stations throughout India, the following Force,—a European Regiment being estimated at 1,000 men, a Cavalry Corps at 400, and a Battery, Troop or Company, at 100.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
For Moveable Columns	25,000	5,200	2,500	32,700
To garrison 16 Brigade Stations	16,000	...	1,600	17,600
Total	41,000	5,200	4,100	50,300

18. But besides these main Military posts there are other important central points which must be guarded by European Troops. I refer chiefly to the Divisional Head Quarters of Civil administration. In case of frontier war, our hold must be firmly retained upon our own Districts in order to the successful maintenance of the Government, the provision of Supplies, and the collection of Revenue. Our central Treasuries will also be at these Stations, and late events have shown that Treasure to any large extent cannot, with security, be left to the guardianship of Native Troops. The Divisional Stations must accordingly be held by bodies of European Troops sufficient to guard against any chances of surprise or treason. The Divisional Stations should have Forts or Entrenchments, where the Magazine and

bulk of the Treasure would be safe under a permanent European Garrison ; besides which the Force should be of sufficient strength to admit of a small Detachment of Europeans taking the Field when necessary.

19. The following would be the Divisional Stations—1 Bareilly, 2 Agra, 3 Benares, 4 Goruckpore, 5 Saugor, 6 Jubbulpore, 7 Jhansie, each Enumerated. should have half a European Regiment, a Squadron of Cavalry, a Battery or Troop of Artillery (for some of the Stations a half Battery might suffice) and a reserve Company or half Company for the Fortress or Entrenchments. Saugor might have a full Corps, or half a Corps might be posted at Nagode, debitable to the Bundelkund States. In all probability four Infantry Regiments, three or four Cavalry Regiments, six or seven Batteries, and three or four Reserve Companies, would be required.

20. There would still remain about twenty-nine or thirty Stations, the Head Quarters of District Civil administration, to be provided for. They are as follows :—

<i>Division.</i>	<i>District.</i>	
Meerut	Dehra	} Will be protected by the European Depôt or Sanatarium at Mussoorie.
	Seharunpore.	
	Moozuffernugger.	
	Boolundshuhur.	
	Allygurh.	
Rohilkund	Bijnour.	
	Moradabad.	
	Budaon.	
	Shajehanpore.	
Agra	Muttra.	
	Etawah.	
	Mynpoorie.	
	Etah.	
	Furruckabad.	
Allahabad	Cawnpore.	
	Futtehpore.	
	Banda.	
Benares	Jaunpore.	
	Mirzapore.	
	Ghazeepore.	
	Azimgurh.	
Goruckpore	...	} A second District will probably be formed out of this enormous tract, and will add to this list.
Jhansi	Humeerpore.	
	Jaloun (Calpee).	
	Chundeyree (Scindia's District).	
Jubbulpore	Mundlah	} These four are minor Districts.
	Seonee	
	Dumoh	
	Baitool	
	Nursingpore.	
	Hoshungabad.	

<i>Division.</i>	<i>District.</i>
Kumaon	... Almorah.
	Gurhwal { This will not require European Troops.
Jawud	... Jawud Neemuch (Rajpootana).
Nimar	... Nimar (Central India).
Ajmere	... Mhairwarra.

21. Jawud Neemuch, being in Rajpootana, hardly falls within this scheme; but I have noted it as belonging to the North-Western Provinces. Certain Districts belonging to the N. W. P. omitted. It would probably occupy the place of a second Class or Divisional Station, if indeed political reasons do not justify the location of an entire European Corps there.

22. Mhairwarra will be provided from Nusseerabad, and Nimar from Mhow. Some of the smaller Districts as Deyrah, Etah, the minor Some minor Districts may be left out of account. Saugor and Nerbudda Districts, and Ghurwal may also be left out of account. There remain some twenty-five to be considered.

23. These are all centres of administration, having each a distinct Treasury, several European Officers with their Establishments, and in many cases large Cities close by.

24. Some of them are already provided with strong Forts of old standing, as Allygurh, Almorah, Furruckabad; while at others,* since the outbreak, measures have been taken for the construction of Fortifications or Entrenchments of greater or less strength.

Fortresses or Entrenchments.	Futtehpore.
*Shujehanpore.	Mirzapore.
Etawah.	Azimghur.
Mynpoorie.	
Cawnpore.	

25. It is important that Forts or Entrenchments of this kind should exist at all the chief District Head Quarters, as places of refuge, in case of any unexpected danger, and a receptacle for the Treasure, which must, to some extent,* accumulate between each despatch to the central Treasury. They should all have at least two or three pieces of Light Artillery. The larger Forts, as Allygurh, Cawnpore, and Furruckabad would, I presume, be armed with heavy ordnance.

Should exist at all chief District Head Quarters.

*Say from £ 20,000 to 30,000 at some periods when the Revenue instalments fall due.

26. It is equally important that all such Forts should have permanently a Garrison of European Troops trained to Artillery practice, of greater or smaller numbers (say from 200 to 300 men), according to the extent and Military requirements of each.

And be permanently garrisoned by Europeans.

27. Some might possibly be provided for by Detachments from neighbouring Stations; but the Forces at the Brigade posts ought not, I conceive, to be frittered away on such work.

28. I would submit that this want might best be met by the formation of a Garrison Corps, to be raised from amongst the Invalids and Pensioners, and Soldiers who may prove constitutionally unfit for active employment in the Field. The Head Quarters might be at Chunar, from which Garrisons would be furnished. Probably 1,200 men would supply all that is required in these Provinces, or with a Reserve at Head Quarters of 1,500 men.

A Garrison Corps would provide for this want.

Reserve of Artillerymen for these posts.

*Cawnpore.	†Seharunpore.
Furruckabad.	Moradabad.
Almorah.	Shajehanpore.
Allygurh, and perhaps Calpee.	Muttra.
	Banda.

29. Several of the larger Forts* and more important Cities† would also require some Regular Artillerymen, say from half to quarter of a Company. Perhaps from 3 to 400 Artillerymen would suffice for this object.

Native Army.

30. I proceed to offer some observations on the number and composition of our future Native Army.

31. In estimating the amount of Native Troops that will be required for these Provinces, it is first necessary to consider how far the duties of the late Sepoy Army will be henceforward performed by the Military Police. Its strength dependent on decision as to Police Battalions.

32. In respect of the constitution of Police Battalions, I beg to annex, as expressive of my views, a Memorandum prepared for the Chief Commissioner, Agra, in October 1857. A Memorandum annexed on Police Battalions.

33. It is hardly necessary now to enlarge on the advantages of having a portion of our Troops under this semi-military organization. Detached from the general Army, and composed of local and isolated Corps, the Police Battalions will have no sympathy, and no concern in common with the Regular Regiments. The latter will not recognise them as a part of their own body, and the same gigantic union of purpose and corporate action which pervaded the entire Bengal Army, will then be scarcely possible. Advantage of them.

34. The Army Proper will, by the formation of these Corps, be employed upon its own proper duties. It may be immensely reduced in numbers, and yet be really more valuable for the purposes of war, because more efficient in discipline, and (now that it is not frittered away on small Detachments) more immediately and readily available for its duty in the field.

35. As to the constitution of the Military Police, I need not repeat here what I have said in the Memorandum above referred to. I will only add, that I think it of importance that the pay should be somewhat lower than in the Line Corps. All future enlistments should be at Rupees 6 for the Infantry and Rupees 22 or Rupees 23 for the Cavalry, and say a fourth or fifth part of each Battalion might be reserved at the present higher rates, after long approved service. This would afford a sufficient distinction between the two services, or, allowing the proposed reduced rates to hold good universally, they might be increased to the rates of the Regular Army whenever a Police Detachment is called out of its Division for Field Service. Pay of Police Corps should be lower than of Line Corps.

<i>Present rates.</i>	
Infantry	Rs. 7
Cavalry	„ 25

36. Further, although it is absolutely necessary that the discipline of the Corps should be exclusively in the hands of the Military Officers Commanding, yet as the Police Troops are to be, for the most part, employed in the direct aid of the Civil administration, there is a danger of their usefulness being impaired by want of co-operation, arising out of jealousies or misunderstanding between the Police Military District Commandants and Adjutants should be made Assistants to the District Civil Officer.

Officer and the Magistrate and Collector. I am assured that in some quarters this difficulty already begins to show itself. It would, to a considerable degree, be removed, if the District Military Officers were appointed *Ex-officio* Assistants to the Magistrate and Collector in the Civil Department. They should be encouraged to rise to the exercise of special Assistant's powers, and to those of Joint Magistrate and Deputy Collector, on passing the prescribed examinations, by the grant of an additional monthly allowance, say Rupees 50 for the former, and Rupees 100 or Rupees 150 for the latter. This would prove a stimulus to study, and the acquisition of a knowledge of the language and habits of the people, and prove an excellent school for the raising of Political and Civil Officers from the Army. It would be a material aid to the Civil administration; it would, at the same time, make the Police Force more useful by making its Officers more amenable to the Magistrate; and while it thus made the Commandant in one respect subordinate to the Civil Authority, it would leave him free in matters of Military discipline. It is probable that an arrangement of this sort would sensibly diminish the chances of jarring and opposition, and add to the usefulness of the Military Police.

37. According to the scheme now being introduced, the following will be the Estimate of Military Police. Police Force for these Provinces, including the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories, but excluding Azimgurh, Mhairwara, Jawud Neemuch and Nimar (and of course Oude also).

	EACH STATION.		TOTAL.	
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
7 Divisional (Head Quarters) Stations	800	250	5,600	1,750
Add Gorruckpore	800	250
31 District Stations	400	100	12,400	3,100
Total	18,800	5,100

38. Some of the Districts, as before explained, are of inferior size and importance, and may not require the full standard number. I think it likely that on tranquillity being restored, the amount of Military Police will be susceptible of some reduction from that and other sources; but

MILITARY POLICE AS IT STOOD ON 31ST AUGUST 1858.								
Horse.				Infantry.				GRAND TOTAL.
Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Troopers.	Total.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Privates.	Total.	
124	349	4,205	4,678	167	1,128	14,254	15,549	20,227

for a time this will not be possible. Indeed there are now some auxiliary Levies which swell the numbers above the standard. Although two or three Divisions are as yet very imperfectly supplied, the Infantry, by the last Return, numbered above 15,500, and the Cavalry 4,618, or in all, above 20,000 men. The present

wants of these Provinces will not be supplied under 18,000 Foot and 5,000 Horse. Hereafter, perhaps, it might be reduced to 15,000 Foot and 3,000 Horse.

39. As regards the classes from which the Military Police should be recruited, I adhere to the rule advocated in my Memorandum—" Enlist
Classes from which it should be recruited. " from none exclusively ; from all indiscriminately ; choosing
 " the most active, able-bodied men, of good general character
 " and repute." I see no objection to the supply being drawn from the immediate neighbourhood of the Division in which the men are to serve, provided they be not too much of one caste, or one social connection. I am not in favor of low-caste Police Corps. It is more objectionable here than in the Regular Army, as the men come more in contact with the people, and are more connected with the Civil administration. It is not wise to exercise our Government in a way to breed contempt, if not disgust. At the same time, I have no objection to the entertainment, occasionally, of Companies of low-caste men of the more respectable classes. I would vary the composition of the Police as much as possible. The same or similar castes should be generally arranged by Companies, so that they may work the more readily together.

Duties. 40. The District Police thus formed would undertake all the *ordinary* duties of protection, guards, &c.

Two remarks of some importance remain.

41. *First.*—Recruiting the Regular Army from the Police ranks should be jealously avoided. It would break down the wall of partition which
Regular Army not to be recruited from Police. should be carefully maintained between the two bodies. It would tend to make the materials homogeneous, and introduce in the Army that sympathy and fellow-feeling with the Police Corps which it is essential to guard against.

42. *Second.*—The name might be altered from " Police Corps" to " Local Battalions."
Should be styled " Local Battalions," not " Police Corps." It may seem an insufficient cause, but the name may render the service unpopular for Military Officers. It is natural they should feel a Corps termed Police to be something inferior, and we may lose something of the *esprit de corps* which even in these Local and semi-military bodies it is important to maintain. The Vernacular names would correspond,—“ Moolkee Pultun” for Local Battalion, “ Jungee Pultun” for Line Battalion.

43. It remains to consider what amount of Regular Troops, beyond these Local
Regular Native Army. Battalions, will be required. Before proceeding to the Brigade and Divisional Stations, I would notice, first, several separate Stations where isolated Native Corps will probably be needed. There are some
Isolated Regiments. large Cities which, either from their own importance, or the distance of European Troops, should have the benefit of a Native Force independently of the Local Battalions. The following are of this character—

Allyghur, Moradabad, Furruckabad and Banda. At Moradabad and Banda there should be some Native Cavalry, say a Regiment or a Squadron. There would be besides a Hill Corps always at Almorah and another at Deyrah. In all, this would give six isolated Regiments.

44. At each of the first class or Brigade Stations, there should be posted two Native Corps of Infantry and one of Cavalry. The whole could be spared for field duty when a Moveable Force is required, (the local duty being taken by the Military Police) so that the European Field Army would receive an accession of Native Soldiers equal in number to itself.

Native Force required at the
Brigade Stations.

45. At each of the second class or Central Stations, there should be a Native Infantry Corps for fatigue and field duty, and sometimes a Native Cavalry Regiment or Squadron.

At the Central Stations.

46. I would have no Native Artillery of any description. At Agra we had none during the disturbances, and no inconvenience was felt from its absence. The Europeans were always ready to go out at any time of the year—summer and rains—on the frequent expeditions undertaken in the neighbourhood; and I believe the exposure did them no harm. With the Artillery in our own hands exclusively, the Native Troops will hardly dream of combination against us, even if our weakness in other respects were to tempt the idea. This arm requires comparatively few Soldiers, and I see no reason why we should not depend solely on our own Country for them.

No Native Artillery.

47. I think further that, if possible, Native States should be limited both in the number of Artillerymen they entertain, and in the calibre of their Guns, if this can be done without transgressing treaties or giving great offence. No Native Government needs heavier ordnance than a Mountain Train or 3-Pounders, for all purposes of State, or for the repression of petty *emeutes*. For all more serious work, they should trust to our Artillery. When threatened by invasion or domestic rebellion, the Native States (as Dholepore, Kotah, Gwalior) have always abandoned their Guns to the enemy. Our enemies should not be allowed such opportunities of providing themselves with dangerous Artillery.

Artillery of Native States
should be placed under limi-
tations.

48. One exception, but an extremely limited one, might be allowed in favor of Native Artillery—I mean a Christian Company. In the present state of feeling this would be quite trust-worthy for loyalty: and they would be useful in a Fort or Entrenchment. But as Christianity spreads, so as to include (as in Mysore) whole Districts, the dependence of the Native Christians upon our Government will become weaker, and the character of individuals less easily ascertainable. When these days come, I would not recommend any extensive enlistment of Christians into the Artillery Service; they might be accessible to influence from Native States; meanwhile there is no danger of having too many Native Christians as Gunners.

Christian Artillery.

Abstract of European and Native Regular Army.

49. The following is an abstract of the European and Native Army according to the above suggestions—

Abstract of Peace Force required for the North-Western Provinces of the Bengal Presidency.

STATIONS.	EUROPEAN TROOPS.				NATIVE TROOPS.			
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Total.
I. Brigade Stations.								
Meerut	1 Regiment.	3 Regiments	{ 2 Batteries and Reserve Company	3700	1 Regiment	2 Regiments	2500
Allahabad	1 Regiment.	3 Regiments	{ 2 Batteries and Reserve Company	3700	1 Regiment	2 Regiments	2500
II. Central Stations.								
Barreilly	Squadron	Wing	{ 1 Troop and Company	850	1 Regiment	1 Regiment	1500
Agra	Ditto	{ Ditto	650	Ditto	1000
Benares	Ditto	{ Ditto	650	Squadron	Ditto	1000
Goruckpore	Ditto	{ Ditto	650	Ditto	1000
Saugor	Squadron	1 Regiment.	{ Ditto	1550	1 Regiment	Ditto	1500
Jubbulpore	Wing	{ 1 Troop and Company	600	Ditto	1000
Jhansi	Ditto	{ 1 Troop and Company	650	Squadron	Ditto	1250
III. Garrison Corps.								
Chunar	1 Regiment.	1500
Reserve Artillery Company	4 Companies	400
IV. Native Infantry Stations.								
Allyghur	Forts would be garrisoned by Chunar Corps & Reserve Artillery Corps	1 Regiment	1000
Moradabad	Ditto	1000
Furruckabad	Ditto	1000
Banda		Squadron	Ditto	1250
Deyrah	Ditto	1000
Almorah	Ditto	1000
V. Native Christian Artillery.								
....	100	100
Total	3 Regts.	11 Regts.	10½ Batteries or Troops 9½ Companies	14,700	5 Regts.	17 Regts.	100	19600

50. Thus the European Force for these Provinces (exclusive of Nusserebad, Ratio of European Troops to Native Regular Troops. Neemuch and Nimar) would consist of 11 Regiments of Infantry, 3 of Cavalry, 10½ Batteries or Troops, with 9½ Companies of Artillery; in all 14,700 men. Against this there would be 17 Regiments Native Infantry, 5 Regiments Native Cavalry, and 1 Company Christian Artillery; in all 19,600 men, or in the proportion of 1½ Native Regular Soldiers to the European Soldier.

51. The permanent Military Police throughout the same tract will probably be about equal in its numbers to the Regular Army, so that Ratio of Regular and Police Native Troops combined. there will be one European Soldier to 2½ Natives of the combined Police and Regular Forces. The present standard of the Military Police would make the proportion about 1 to 3, a safe enough ratio when we have the whole Artillery in our hands.

52. I should remark that the proposed arrangements go upon the presumption that the Province of Oude will be at least equally strongly provided for, as the Districts in the North-Western Provinces.

53. I must also add that the proposed Army is that which appears to me proper for a *peace* establishment. For some little time yet even if our cold weather campaign be as successful as we hope it will be, many Stations, as Moradabad, Shajehanpore, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, Calpee, Jhansi, Banda, Jubbulpore, Ghazee-pore, Azingurh will require a far larger European Force than I have contemplated in the above remarks. But when the Country has once thoroughly quieted down, the scale I have ventured to suggest may be adopted, I think, without any risk.

54. It is also to be looked for that in a few years the advance of our Railways, and perhaps increased facilities of River transport, will have greatly consolidated our power, and rendered our European Forces incomparably more able than ever they could have been before, instantaneously to quell revolt or mutiny.

General remarks. 55. I will now offer a few general observations connected with the Army.

Classes to be enlisted. 56. And first, *on the classes best fitted for enlistment.*

57. The chief fault in the former system was that we confined ourselves almost exclusively to two or three leading castes ; that we recruited from a limited area ; and that, from a combination of these causes, a clanship, a family or social interconnection grew up within the ranks.

58. The men composing the late Bengal Army were in themselves unexceptionable ; of respectable character, and a bold Military disposition ; they made good Soldiers and were peculiariy amenable to discipline.

59. I would by no means exclude Brahmins, Rajpoots and Mussulmans from our new Army, but would confine their numbers within comparatively limited proportions. A percentage throughout the Army should be fixed for each main caste or cluster of castes, and any sensible variation from the prescribed ratio jealously checked.

60. A scale something of the kind indicated below would answer for the North-Western Provinces Army—

	<i>Per cent.</i>
Mussulmans from the Punjab	5
Ditto Doab and Western Districts	5
Ditto Benares and Eastern Districts	5
Brahmins from Doab and Western Districts	6
Ditto Benares and Eastern Districts	6
Rajpoots from Doab and Western Districts	8
Ditto Benares and Eastern Districts	6
Aheers	8
Jats	8
Seikhs	10
Goorkhas	8
Low-castes	10
Miscellaneous Castes... ..	15
	100

61. It would not be necessary rigidly to adhere to this or to any other numerical scale ; but there ought to be a *maximum*, say 15 per cent, beyond which none of the three grand castes—Brahmin, Rajpoot, Mussulman—should, on any account whatever, be permitted to go.

Maximum should be fixed for chief castes, not on any account to be exceeded.

62. I am not an advocate for a large proportion of low-caste Soldiers. I would not exclude low-castes ; on the contrary, I would encourage a part of the Regular Army being always drawn from them, because variety of class is itself a benefit ; but I do not expect any greater degree of faithfulness from them than from the high castes. At times when disaffection is abroad, they are even more under the influence of Brahmins and under caste bondage than the higher castes. The low-caste drivers generally went over, *en masse*, to the insurgents, while the most frequent, and most marked instances of devotion and fidelity have been among the Brahmins. The Syuds also, in some places, behaved well.

Low-castes to be entertained in moderate numbers.

63. It is not enough to vary the castes ; the growth of a common bond among the men must be avoided. This will be accomplished partly by extending the area and partly by altering the system of recruiting. Enlistment should be encouraged in *every* District, where the people show a readiness to enter the ranks. This will break *local* associations throughout the Army.

Further precautions.

64. Recruiting should take place *solely* through Officers deputed to the several Districts. The old plan of allowing men to bring their brothers, cousins, and friends as candidates should be stopped. It helped on the growth of the great brotherhood of the Army. The Recruiting Officer should visit each Tehseeldaree Station in his Recruiting District, and choose the best-looking men he can get, according to proportions of caste, prescribed for his guidance by some central watching authority. I do not think any reference is ordinarily needed to the local Civil Officer ; but if there be doubt as to respectability, feigning of caste, residence or name, enquiry should be made to the Tehseeldar or Magistrate.

Recruiting only through Officers deputed to Districts.

Disposition of the Native Army.

65. It is not only necessary to avoid a homogeneous material in the composition of the new Army ; we must adopt every possible means to guard against the growth of association, sympathy and combination throughout the whole. I doubt whether this will be at all effectually prevented unless the mass of the Army is broken up, for all ordinary duties, into local and entirely separate bodies. So long as the great Army of Bengal (including the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces) forms, in its discipline and tour of duty, a single and united body, there will always be the danger of a community of feeling and interest pervading the whole, and of the consciousness of a power of combined and independent action growing up.

There should be a Local Army for each Local Government.

66. It is true that the existence of Police Corps—Local Battalions with their separate sphere and organization—will prove, to some considerable extent, a safe-guard against this. The Regular Army will see and feel that there is another element of power present everywhere and perfectly distinct from itself ; but the danger will still not be

So long as there is one vast Army, combination will be possible.

entirely removed so long as the Regiments of the Bengal Army circulate, on their periodical reliefs, from Peshawur, along the Punjab and the Gangetic valley to Burmah, and back again through all this vast tract to Peshawur. They will feel that they are one body, the grand imperial force of India; they will be able to watch, as they lately did, the gradual withdrawal of European Troops when they chance to be needed elsewhere. Spying out thus what they vainly imagine to be the nakedness of the land, they may again become puffed up, arrogant, ambitious, and impatient of discipline, and break off to rapine, outrage, and intestine war.

67. To my apprehensions, the best security against such a contingency would be to frame a Local Army for each Local Government,—an Army for Bengal Proper, an Army for the North-Western Provinces (including Oude), and a Punjab Army; and to keep the tour of duty for each Army, by ordinary relief, within the limits of its own administration. Every thing should, I conceive, be done to segregate the local forces. As the regular reliefs of the Police Corps would be within each Commissionership, so the regular reliefs of the Line Corps would be within the limits of each Local Government. They would always be prepared, at emergencies, to march anywhere for foreign service; but this would be exceptional. Their regular and recurring duties should be so confined to their own territory, that sympathy and community of interest, the interchange of thought and speculation would not be possible. No Regiment from one Local Army should take its regular tour of duty within another Government. It was the 72nd Native Infantry from Agra that poisoned Nusseerabad: from Nusseerabad the flame spread to Neemuch, and gradually the whole Gwalior Contingent was compromised. It is impossible to say how far this Contingent might not have kept aloof from the mutinous Army had the 72nd and 23rd Native Infantry not been in their way. It certainly, for some considerable time, refused to join, and eventually maintained a perfectly distinct course of its own.

68. I think, further, that the major part of each Local Army should be composed of local materials. The Seikhs and Punjabees should, to my apprehension, be kept mainly to their Country. By being long cantoned in very large numbers in the Southern Province, they may become used to the people, and in case of need might not be available as a *foreign* element, that which has of late proved the great value in Hindoostan. Many hundreds of Seikhs employed with the Poorbeea Sepoys threw in their lot with them in the mutiny. A separate organization, it is true, might have gone some way to prevent this, still it shows that by contact with other races they can lose their distinctive character so far as it is practically of value to us. Every thing should be done to keep up the separate and independent nationality of each Army; then when any necessity requires their services elsewhere, they can be employed with the less dread of their sympathizing with any class of insurgents out of their own Country.

69. So far as the Seikhs specially are concerned, this arrangement would have another advantage. The North-Western Frontier is the most exposed post; the hardest fighting is required there; and there lies the greatest fear of foreign aggression. It is well to have the best material in that line. I believe also that the Punjabee population with the frontier Affghans form an excellent counterpoise to the Seikhs; so that there would be little fear of the Seikh force having it all their own way in the Punjab.

70. While thus advocating that each Local Army should have its *main* portion composed of local elements, I see advantage in having a small portion, both of the Police and Regular Armies, formed of men from a distance. It is a wholesome check on the rest; but the foreign material should be kept separate and with a distinct organization to prevent its mingling with, and taking the color of, the Local Levies.

Limited portions of each Local Force might be of foreign element.

71. I am hardly competent to offer an opinion on the internal arrangement of a Regiment. If there be no Military inconvenience, a Corps composed of Companies, each of a separate caste, would seem to have some advantages; but I see no objection to some Regiments being each wholly composed of a single caste. The more that Regiments are raised each from a given District, or limited area, the better; each has thus its own individual separate interests; it will less tend to sympathy with the rest of the Army.

Internal composition of Corps.

72. Neither am I competent to speak of Military discipline, excepting in this general way, that I would abolish Native Courts Martial as an injurious farce. Commanding Officers should be selected for intelligence and judgment, and the Government may then well place the reins, to a great extent, in their hands. Ordinary punishments, dismissal, &c., should rest with them.

Increase of Commanding Officers' power.

73. I would not do away with pensions; they should be given after terms of faithful service. It is not sound reasoning to say that as *they* did not prevent the Sepoy Army from mutinying, therefore they were of no use, and should be done away with. The pension has undoubtedly had a most beneficial effect in the long series of services rendered by the Native Army. It failed before a still stronger motive, the pseudo-patriotism which called on them to transfer their allegiance to a Native dynasty, and the lust of power and plunder. But whenever it may fall to our lot again to encounter a foreign foe, either on our borders or without them, I am persuaded that the tie connecting the Native Soldier with our Government, and nerving him to fight for it, will be greatly strengthened by the privilege of pension, and I earnestly hope it will not be discontinued.

Opinion in favor of pensions.

74. Short terms of enlistment have been advocated by some; but there is one evil from this system which must not be overlooked. By constantly and rapidly changing the material of the Army, we shall scatter over the land great numbers of trained Soldiers. It is better that the Sepoy should continue to hold on by his profession, when once he has been well-drilled, than that he should retire from the Service to form a possible element of future trouble to us, should events tempt him to join our adversaries' ranks. It might be well to enlist with no period for discharge but the pleasure of the Commanding Officer. The effect would be to increase the power and influence of the Commandant.

Opinion against short terms of enlistment.

75. The precautions I have sought to press may seem to be unnecessary, with the prospect of a powerful English Brigade in every Province; and, no doubt, so long as English Troops on the scale contemplated are maintained throughout the Country, disaffection will not be able to rear its head, and, the Country being disarmed, there will be no risk of any rising.

76. But it is to be feared that our present vigilance, and our jealousy of resting on any purely Native body will not always last. When the danger has passed away, and become dimmed by distance, a sense of security will again creep over us. The Government may be tempted to withdraw its Brigades for foreign service, or for economy's sake to retrench their numbers. Necessity or parsimony may thus hereafter urge a dangerous diminution of our European Force ; so much the more prudent is it now to anticipate that danger, and by a radical change in the constitution of the Army, which shall, by maintaining its elements and parts distinct and independent, prevent the chances of mutinous combination.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. MUIR,

Member Sudder Board of Revenue and

Secy. to Govt. N. W. P.

P. S.—I ought to have mentioned that the cost of the Police Battalions will be, to some extent, met by retrenchments from the Police and Revenue Establishments, the previous duties of which they will in part perform. This subject should have early consideration on the return of tranquillity.

Expence of Military Police in some degree to be met by retrenchment in Civil Establishments.

I trust that the European Troops will be freely sent to the Hill sanatoria. At least one Regiment from each Brigade Station should, in ordinary times, be marched up into the Himalayas during the hot weather. There should be at least three Hill Stations for these Provinces, including Oude, *viz.*, Mussoorie, Nynsee Tal and Almorah. The latter is perhaps hardly cold enough, and it would be better if a fourth Station could be provided.

Hill sanatoria should be encouraged.

On reading over my paper, I find that I have not said any thing upon the question whether there should be any Native Army. This is simply because I regard it as axiomatic that there must be a Native Army, if we are to do more than simply garrison several points throughout the Country. Those who advocate a purely and exclusively European Army are evidently unacquainted with the practical working of the administration of a vast Empire like ours in India. We must have Native Troops, and that too in large numbers, for duties our English Soldiers are not adapted to perform, and we must have them likewise to work with our European Army, relieve it from unnecessary exposure and fatigue, and render its movements effectual. I have endeavored in my estimate to limit the number so far as appeared compatible with secure and efficient Government.

W. MUIR.

MEMORANDUM on the Re-organization of the Police, and on the construction of a system of Police Battalions or Military Corps, dated Agra Fort, the 28th October 1857, by William Muir, Esquire, Officiating Member Sudder Board.

The question of how the Police shall be reorganized depends materially upon another question—how is the Native Army to be reorganized ?

If, as seems likely, there will not again be a Bengal Army of the magnitude and unity of construction of the former, then the present opportunity may be seized for effecting an improvement in our Police long desiderated.

The Sepoy and Native Cavalry Regiments performed the duty not only of guarding the Country from foreign aggression, but also of putting down riots or local opposition, however petty. The guarding of fairs and festivals, escorting treasure, &c., and all other matters of internal administration were committed to them. These duties were often vexatious and affected discipline for strictly Military operations.

A very general consent seems now to prevail that these duties can be more appropriately performed by Local Police Battalions.

The Army, as such, would thus be left free for its proper Military duties, and there would be this further political advantage in the scheme, that the Battalions being local and having their own interests distinct and separate from all other armed bodies, there would be less room, if any, for a general combination between the Corps, among themselves, or with the Regular Army, than has hitherto existed. Without some bond such as would be here dispensed with, discontent and insolence want a common material to work upon.

I do not say that if we had had Police Battalions in supercession, to a considerable extent, of the Sepoy Army, they would not have failed us in the late hour of our need. *After* the example of defection had been shown, and *after* mutiny had attained to an imperial seat, by its masterly dash on Delhi, and *after* our power thus seemed to the Native eye in the extremest peril, if not actually levelled with the ground, I do not doubt that such Battalions would have gone very much as all our other Establishments—Customs, Police, &c.—went. But *in the steps which led to the mutiny* there would have been an important difference. The Native Army would not have felt itself in the same degree an integral body that could move with concentrated strength and unity. It would not have had, permeating all its parts, that *esprit de corps* which gave it an independent life for evil action. It would have had less temptation to regard itself, as no doubt it did in overweening vanity and insolence regard itself, the one pillar on which our Indian Empire was reared, and on which alone both the internal and the external defences of our power rested.

To break up into distinct Forces the Native Army with which we govern India, is then in itself an essential advantage. It is a weighty argument in favor of Police Battalions.

It is also a measure which will relieve the Army Proper from a number of duties not proper to the Army, which used to harass both Men and Officers, affect Military discipline, and fritter away the strength of our forces in matters more naturally connected with the Civil administration.

In 1843, Lord Ellenborough introduced Police Battalions into some of the Districts of these Provinces. His model Battalion was that for Bundelkund. Its constitution will be found explained in Mr. Thomason's Minute on Police Battalions, No. 251, dated 22nd May 1845, Paragraphs 32 to 34. The entire Police duties were entrusted to this

Vol. I. of "Thomason's Despatches," p. 164.

Force ; the guarding of the Jails, Treasuries, Tehseeldarees, &c. Detachments were posted at the Thannahs, and the Officers of those Detachments were *ex-officio* Police Officers ; only a Mohurir was retained, for, the Men and Officers being chosen for the qualities which constitute a good Soldier, few, if any, were found competent even to write a deposition or submit a Statement.

It was this error which made the system utterly break down. A Force which, had it been confined to preventive duties, would have answered its purpose admirably, was utterly out of its place when put also to the discharge of detective and Magisterial duties.

I remember being very glad to get 80 to 100 of the Battalion Cavalry to help me to overawe the outlaw Duryao Sing at Bhadurpore Khaga, in the Futtehpore District. This was a suitable duty, and in such duties they performed valuable service ; but to expect that a Battalion Officer, because he is a good Soldier, shall also make a good *Police Officer*, was preposterous. You choose a Sepoy or Military Nujeeb not because of his aptitude for tracking thieves, or searching out the successive steps in a case of murder, but because "he is a young stout active man who can be easily taught to handle a musket, and move well on the parade ground," and promotions to command in a Battalion are made necessarily on very similar grounds.

Minute quoted above, Para. 23.

It resulted that the men to whom the responsible duties of the detective and Magisterial Police in Bundelkund were committed, were utterly unqualified for their discharge.

"Scarcely one of them," writes Mr. Thomason, can "read or write or understand the duties of a Police Officer ; and the whole work is, therefore, thrown into the hands of the Mohurir or mere Writer on 7 Rupees a month." Mr. Thomason, therefore, earnestly recommended the return "to the old system ; to revive the office of Thannahdars and replace the old Police." As a looker-on from the adjacent District of Futtehpore, of which I was then in charge, I can speak to the utter incompatibility of the system for the duties required of it. It broke down because two separate and incongruous duties were required of the same men.

Minute quoted above, Para. 36.

Any system to be successful must discriminate and provide separately for the wants and requirements of two distinct departments—the detective and Police proper on the one hand, the preventive and protective on the other.

One body of men must be employed to trace offenders and follow them up to justice, to watch bad characters, and conduct initiative Magisterial proceedings ; another and distinct body of men, to repress violence, oppose armed opposition, disperse riotous assemblies, and generally to overawe the Country.

The former, the detective and Magisterial Police, should be solely and exclusively under the Magistrate.

It should consist, as at present, of a Thannahdar or Darogah, a Jemadar, a Mohurir, and Burkundazes. But the existence of a Battalion will render it possible greatly to dimi-

nish the number of Burkundazes. As they will be employed almost exclusively in detective duties, they will require very careful selection, and I agree with Major Williams that they must be better paid. There might be three grades receiving say, 5, 7, and 9 Rupees each.

The Tehseeldars should, as at present, have the powers of Officers of Police, and where they possess superior qualifications and tried experience, they may, with great advantage, be invested with the powers of Assistant Magistrates, under the Act proposed last year.

This is in accordance with Mr. Thomason's views. See Item V. Para 40 of the above quoted Minute.

So much for the detective Police.

The Police Battalions will require a Military organization, for they are required to supply the place of a Military body, and they must be prepared, at times of emergency, to act, to some extent, in a concentrated and combined form. I agree, however, with Major Williams that they need not be perfected in all the mysteries of the profession. They need be drilled only in those simple movements which are required in the ordinary manœuvres of practical action.

I think the Corps unit should be regulated by Divisions; an integral Corps for each Revenue and Police Division.

The strength will be proportioned by the number of Districts, the number of Tehseeldares in each, the population and area, and by the character of the people, whether peaceful or turbulent.

Guards will be required—(1) for the Jails, (2) for the District Treasuries, (3) for the Tehseeldares, (4) personal for the Magistrate, &c.

The strength of the Jail Guard will depend, of course, entirely on the size of the Jail.

The District Treasuries will need, say, half a Company (40 men or so) each. The Head Quarters (Divisional) Treasury will, I conclude, have a European Guard. There should be no accumulation of Treasure in the District Treasuries, but the surplus over them inimum required for the ordinary wants of the District should be regularly and frequently transmitted to the central Treasury.

At each Tehseeldaree there should be a Guard, say of 25 or 35 Nujeebs and 6 or 8 Sowars, more or less according to the area of the Tehseelee, number of Thannahs, character of the people, remoteness of populous Towns, &c. A constant Guard will be supplied from the Nujeebs over the Tehseelee Treasury. The remainder will be available for general preventive and protective purposes, suppression of disturbances, apprehension of violent out-laws, &c. This will admit of a considerable reduction of the Tehseelee Chuprassees.

Note.—This is very much in accordance with Mr. Thomason's proposal. Item V., Para, 40 of Minute above quoted.

The personal Guards should be on a moderate scale; but they will be specially required for all Officers moving in the District for some time to come at any rate. I

calculate that a District will require for the purposes from 300 to 500 Infantry and 80 to 150 Cavalry.

There should also be a reserve of say 2 or 300 Infantry, and 100 to 150 Cavalry at the Head Quarters directly under the Officer Commanding. This will admit of periodical transfers of portions of the Force from District to District, so that no portion shall remain at a time longer than say one or two years in a District, and all will, from time to time, come under the discipline of the Divisional Commandant. This will maintain an uniform degree of drill and discipline.

Similarly in Districts, the Tehseeldaree and other Guards should be regularly shifted, and a reserve be constantly under the direct personal drill and discipline of the District Commandant.

It is important that these Battalions, as they are in great part to supersede (on the supposed principle) the former Native Army for purposes of internal administration, should be capable of being, to a certain extent and under certain limitations, massed together for local action.

It should be understood that they will never be expected to go on foreign service (*i. e.*, out of India) or to any great distance from their own Presidency. Ordinarily they will not be required out of their own Division. Their proper sphere of action lies within it; but in case, for example, of a foreign war requiring us to denude the Doab of Military Force to a great extent, and there were a disturbance or rising in Shajehanpore or at Jhansi, it would be a most valuable assistance if portions of the Battalions from the adjoining Divisions could be detached to aid in putting it down. This, it is true, would be *exceptional* service, still the discipline of the Corps should be such that it may always be *possible* service.

For this end, it is absolutely necessary that there should be a fair and efficient degree of acquaintance with Military tactics and a perfect power of executing all ordinary movements, and thus of combining with other Military bodies under a common command.

A Military character and discipline is essentially necessary for this end, and to secure it the management of the Corps must be solely in the hands of the Military Commandants. The Civil Officers of Districts cannot be allowed any power of interference without affecting the Military *morale* and *esprit de corps* of the Battalions.

Recruiting, discipline, punishments, promotions, must then be exclusively in the hands of the Officer Commanding under the orders (with prescribed limitations) of the Divisional Commandant and the Superintendent. Punishment should be by the orders of the Commandant. Certain sentences requiring confirmation of the Superintendent, and an appeal, as proposed by Major Williams, to the Lieutenant-Governor. Heinous offences, involving the punishment of death, and say, of any punishment above three years' imprisonment, might be cognizable by the ordinary Courts of Justice.

Similarly, promotions above the rank of Jemadar to be subject to the Superintendent's confirmation; those of Subadar to that of the Lieutenant-Governor.

There should be a general appeal from all orders of the Commandant to the Lieutenant-Governor. I should have recommended an appeal to the Commissioner of the Division if there had been no General Superintendent. I do not see how the Superintendent's authority can be maintained if a local appeal to the Civil power is allowed.

The Superintendent should receive say Rupees 1,500 a month (rising to Rupees 2,000); the Divisional Commandant say 1,000; the District Commandant, 800; the Adjutant 500; other *attaches*, 300 to 350; all hands to have additional allowances on being reported qualified for Civil work; say 50 Rupees additional for Assistants' powers, and 150 for Joint Magistrate's.

In the Magisterial position, every Officer would, of course, be strictly subordinate to the Magistrate; but *quoad* his Military duty quite independent, I do not see that the double functions would clash one with the other.

As to classes of people to be enlisted, I certainly agree with Major Williams. Enlist from none exclusively; from *all* indiscriminately, choosing the most active, able-bodied men, of good general character and repute. The pay would be on a somewhat lower scale than for the Regular Army.

In fine, the Force would be an embodied Militia, in the ordinary sense of the word for local administrative purposes.

W., MUIR.

P. S.—The Artillery ~~arm~~ will, in future, I conclude, be reserved for *Europeans* only. I have not, therefore, contemplated the necessity of attaching Guns to the Battalions.



Extract of a letter No. 55 of 1857, from Colonel Sir R. Shakespear, Kt, Resident at Baroda, to G. F. Edmonstone, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India, Baroda Residency, the 3rd August 1857.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

3. WITH reference to paragraph 3 of your letter now under reply, I have the honor to state, that by a letter from the Secretary to Government of Bombay to my address, No. 758 of 4th July, it appears that prior to that date the Bombay Government had placed both Civil and Political jurisdiction in Guzerat under the supervision of Major General Roberts in so far as regards the adoption of measures for maintaining the tranquillity of that province.

4. I beg to say that General Roberts has also been empowered to increase the Police of Northern Guzerat.

5. The Bombay Government has ordered an increase of two Companies and two Troops for each Native Regiment of the Army of that Presidency, this increase may perhaps be sufficient for the purpose mentioned in paragraph 5 of your letter, *i. e.* "to give it strength and secure its fidelity;" but the favorable manner in which my proposition has been received, induces me to venture upon making propositions by no means strictly within my province. I do so with much hesitation, and I entreat His Lordship to believe solely for the good of the State.

6. The deplorable circumstances which have occurred, appear to have rendered it utterly impossible that the Supreme Government can again employ any of the members of the Army which has so thoroughly disgraced itself in Bengal, at the same time it is very alarming to contemplate the necessity of being obliged to entertain an Army of entire foreigners; again supposing foreigners alone are to be selected, is it to be contemplated that we are to begin without any nucleus, without any men disciplined as Soldiers, any Non-Commissioned Officers. The obvious risk and difficulty of such a measure may very probably have forced upon the notice of the Government the propriety of the proposition I am about to make, but it is also just possible that in the multiplicity of emergent measures now forced upon the attention of Government this proposition may have escaped its notice, and I would rather run the risk of being thought officious than allow a proposition so pregnant with public good to escape the notice of the Government.

7. In the Bombay Army there are numbers of men whose homes are in the North-Western Provinces and Oude. They are not such men as would, when the Bengal Army was in its pride, have been sought for as recruits for its ranks, but they are able-bodied, highly disciplined faithful Soldiers. The very fact of their not being of the very highest caste is, surely, after what has occurred, a very great recommendation; and above all they are natives of the country for which we have now to organize an Army. Their homes and families are (chiefly) in the North-Western Provinces. Not only would they hail with delight any employment there, but the devastation they have heard of must have so worked upon their feelings that, unless removed to that part of the country, a vast number would, with difficulty be retained in the Bombay Presidency.

8. I am in the Artillery, and have served chiefly with Europeans, but I have seen both Native Armies and as far as my opportunities have admitted, have studied both. I am by no means prepared to endorse the assertions of certain writers to the prejudice of the Bengal Army ; but I readily admit that on the question of discipline, the superiority does lie with the Bombay Army, and that there are certain points of internal Regimental management, Orderly room, &c., which it would be decidedly beneficial to introduce into the new Army for Bengal.

Here again is another argument in favor of this proposition.

9. I know nothing whatever regarding the constitution of the Madras Army, but if in its ranks there are also men from the North-Western Provinces, the great problem which must now be pressing on the thoughts of the Government of India will in a great measure have been solved, that is, we shall have found material wherewith to lay the foundation of a new Army for Bengal from a body of men who are

(1st). Natives of the country.

(2nd). Highly disciplined, and

(3rd). Untainted by mutiny.

10. It may be urged that to withdraw the North-Western men from the Bombay and Madras Armies, might tend to weaken them, inasmuch as their withdrawal would leave only men of one class, and thereby we should fall into, at these two Presidencies, all those evils which have ended so disastrously in Bengal ; but in the Bombay Army this would not be the case, as in its ranks are Mahrattas, Jews, all varieties of Hindoos, of the lowest castes, and Mahomedans, and the Native Officers of all grades are taken without any respect to religion or caste.

11. However this is a question that affects the Bombay Government, and as I shall forward this letter under a flying seal to that Government to be sent on with such remarks as the Right Honorable the Governor may deem necessary, no possible harm can result from my having made the suggestion.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed) R. C. SHAKESPEAR,

Resident.

From H. L. Anderson, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Bombay, to G. F. Edmonstone, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 634, dated 11th September 1857.

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

SIR,

SIR Richmond Shakespear, the Resident at Baroda, in his letter to your address, No. 55, dated the 3rd August last, submitted for the consideration of the Right

Honorable the Governor General of India in Council, a scheme for forming a new Bengal Army out of the Hindoostanee Sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Armies.

2. As Sir R. Shakespear forwarded this letter through this Government, in order

The Right Honorable the Governor,
dated 8th instant.

The Honorable A. Malet, dated
the 8th Instant.

The Honorable H. W. Reeves,
dated 9th instant.

The Right Honorable the Governor,
dated the 10th instant.

that it might offer such remarks upon the scheme as it might deem necessary, I am desired to enclose for submission to the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, copies of four Minutes by the Right Honorable the Governor and Civil Members of the Board, recorded under the dates noted in the margin.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed) H. L. ANDERSON,

Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Minute by the Right Honorable the Governor, dated the 8th September 1857.

SIR RICHMOND SHAKESPEAR has submitted to the Supreme Government a scheme for forming a new Bengal Army out of the Hindoostanee Sepoys in the Bombay and Madras Armies, and he has sent this proposal through this Government, in order that we may make such remarks upon it as we may deem necessary.

2. If I were to confine myself to the effect of the proposed measure upon the interests of this Presidency, my remarks would be very brief. The fact that the Hindoostanics constitute fully one-half of the Bombay Army, appears at first sight to tell very much against the proposed transfer, but I am compelled to state my conviction, that what we should lose in numbers we should more than gain in the superior trustworthiness and serviceableness of the remainder. As far therefore as the Bombay Army is concerned, I have no objection to offer to Sir Richmond Shakespear's suggestion, but I cannot take so narrow a view of the subject.

3. It is true that one-half of our Army are Natives of the Bengal Presidency, that they are in a high state of discipline, and that with some few exceptions they have hitherto behaved with exemplary fidelity. It would lead me too far if I were to go into all the causes which have, in my opinion, conduced to the good behaviour of the Hindoostani Sepoys in the Bombay Army, which contrasts so favorably with that of their brethren in Bengal. The chief of these, however, I believe to be a stricter discipline and a different system of promotion.

4. Something no doubt is to be attributed to the greater mixture of castes, but I believe that undue stress has been laid upon this point. The Mussulmans are quite as much concerned in the mutiny of the Bengal Army as the Hindoos; moreover, if you allow any Brahmins to enter your Army as we do, they will always exercise an influence which it is difficult to counteract, and even to understand, over the lower castes. The only remedy for this is to treat all alike, and to uphold discipline, in a word to teach the private Sepoy, even if he is a Brahmin, that he must look up to his Subadar even if he is a Pariah.

5. The European Officers in Bengal believed that this was impossible, the consequence was that caste became a recognized institution in the Army, and discipline was subordinated to it. The relaxation of discipline has produced its natural result.

6. The Bombay Army has hitherto been kept together, mainly, I believe, by the adoption of the opposite system, namely, the subordination of caste to discipline, but the contagion of mutiny is abroad, and I cannot venture to predict that we shall escape it; indeed we have had one or two sporadic cases of the disease in our Regiments already. The part of our Army which is the most susceptible of infection is undoubtedly the Poorbeah or Hindoostani part. If this part were transferred to their own Presidency, I believe that the Mahrattas and other indigenious elements would certainly resist the prevailing epidemic; but I do not believe that the Hindoostanies could be transferred to their own Presidency with impunity. Even now their correspondence with the mutineers, and their knowledge of what has happened in their own country are sources of dangers, but if they were transplanted to the immediate neighbourhood of the insurrection, it is impossible to suppose that they would not be drawn into the vortex.

7. I may notice here that Sir R. Shakespear is in error in believing that the Bombay Sepoys are simply a lower caste of Hindoostanies. There are many men of the highest caste in our ranks, and many, I believe I may say most of our Sepoys have brothers or other relations in what must now be called the Rebel Army.

8. Under these circumstances, though I believe that we should be better without them, I cannot think that it would be advisable to transfer our 13 or 14,000 Hindoostanies to form a nucleus for the new Bengal Army, I think on the contrary, that it will be better not to run the risk of sending any of our Regular Troops into the disturbed districts.

9. How then it may be asked is the place of the Bengal Army to be supplied?

10. I should say certainly not by forming a new Army *at present* from the same materials as the old. I would let the classes that composed that Army feel the consequences of their misconduct. I would substitute for them an Army of Seikhs, Goorkhas and Siddies or Africans. I would not mix up these different races in the same Regiments. I think this would be a capital error, but I would keep them distinct as checks upon each other. I have never been an advocate of what is called the policy of assimilation. The old Roman principle of "divide et Impera" seems to me the only one upon which it is possible either to acquire or to maintain the dominion of a distant country over a subject Province. I cannot admit that future mutinies will always be caused by caste questions. The last two great mutinies in India (those of the Khalsa Army in 1845, and of the Madras Army, or perhaps I should say of the Madras Officers instigated by their Commander-in-Chief in 1809) were on the subject of pay, and what I contend is that if ever a mutiny should occur when the whole of the Native Troops are thoroughly *assimilated*, our empire is at an end. I would therefore carefully maintain such natural differences as actually exist, and it would be my policy rather to create others artificially than to destroy these, for this reason I would keep up the distinction between Troops of the Line and Irregulars, and I would always have a number of Police Battalions. These should all be paid at different rates (the aggregate of their allowances should be nearly the same, but they should receive it under different heads)

they should neither be armed nor dressed alike. The Troops of the Line in Bengal would be composed of Punjabies, Goorkhas, and Africans. The Irregulars might perhaps include a few Hindoostanee Regiments, Sonthals, and other Hill-men, perhaps Burmese, and Taliens. The Police would be recruited from indigenous sources.

11. But I have got far beyond the limits which I proposed to myself when I began this Minute. The want of Native Troops in Bengal will undoubtedly be much felt, and I do not believe that it can be supplied in the manner proposed by Sir Richmond Shakespear; we might possibly raise a body of Somalis or other Africans at Aden, and I propose to write to Brigadier Coghlan upon this point. But with the exception of the Belooch Battalion, and perhaps the Bheels, I do not think it would be prudent to send any part of our Army into the Bengal Presidency.

(Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

Minute by the Honorable Mr. Malet, dated 8th September 1857.

I CONCUR so much in the Right Honorable the President's remarks on Sir Richmond Shakespear's proposition, that I might almost content myself with simply noting my concurrence, especially as I do not anticipate that the proposal will be adopted; there is however a point which appears to me of some consequence, and as I think it in a considerable degree affects our Army, I do not like to let it pass unnoticed.

It seems to me that the Regular Army of each Presidency, and I hope to see the Presidencies in some degree multiplied so that no one may very greatly predominate in numbers over any other, should be composed as few as may be of men differing from the armed Police and from the Irregular Troops, and as our Presidency is not so thickly peopled as to supply us with any super-abundance of men for these services, I do not object to a portion of Hindoostanees in the Regular Regiments, though I would exclude the higher castes, the members of which appear to me to obtain more influence among their comrades than is consistent with strict discipline. I am led to this opinion chiefly, because I think that except in a revolt such as that under which we are now suffering, the element is useful as a counterpoise to local causes for discontent, and that it is also an element of strength when we may be engaged in war beyond our own frontiers. On such an occasion as the present, I should be glad were there not a Hindoostanee in our ranks, but we have them and must make the best of them, and when this revolt is subdued it appears to me that they will not have either the power or the inclination to be dangerous.

(Signed) A. MALET.

Minute by the Honorable Mr. Reeves, dated the 9th September 1857.

I VENTURE a few remarks on this grave and delicate question.

The proposal is to transfer to the Bengal Presidency for the formation of a new Army, the Hindoostanee Sepoys of Bombay and Madras, who are,

1st.—Natives of the country.

2nd.—Highly disciplined.

3rd.—Untainted by mutiny.

The Right Honorable President has shewn that they are not, so far as Bombay is concerned, possessed of the 3rd qualification, and it is my firm conviction that the Bombay Sepoys of *all castes* merely want opportunity to follow the example of the Bengallees. The Mahrattas and low caste men would mutiny at once if they were not held in check by our European Troops, and the news of our recent success. Discipline and distance from the focus of revolt have fortunately for us kept them long from corruption, but they are now, I believe, all alike untrustworthy, and had it not been for the arrival of Her Majesty's 33rd Regiment from the Mauritius, which though directly due to the wisdom of this Government, I cannot help regarding as most Providential, I consider it most probable that this Presidency would have been in flames.

It is my opinion that the time has now arrived when the Empire of Britain in India must at all hazards be upheld by British Soldiers, for I cannot allow that want of discipline alone has been the cause of our disaster *that* led the Bengal Army to think of mutiny first, and to commence the work of destroying us; the grand, the real cause was the insignificantly small amount of the British Army. This altable weakness was at once assailed by the Bengallee Sepoys, but I consider that even if they had had the discipline of our own Sepoys, the evil consequences would all the same have appeared; it was in fact a *mere question of time*, as it is, the Bengal Army began single handed under different circumstances there would have been a simultaneous rise in the three great Presidencies.

The British forces should therefore as I think, be augmented to such an extent as to enable the Government every where to shew that it relies on them alone for the maintenance of its power. This effected, the question of the Native Army becomes a comparative simple matter. I see no reason why a nucleus should not be formed for such a new Bengal Army as may hereafter be found necessary from the Bombay and Madras Armies, both of which require more European Troops, and can easily spare Natives to make room for them. We could let any necessary number of Hindoostanees go, for we can get as many recruits as we choose; but I certainly agree with the Right Honorable President, that Government will not profit by present severe experience if Hindoostanees or indeed any one caste or castes be allowed to obtain an undue predominance in the Native force. On this principle I advocate the question of caste never could become very serious, but it might be troublesome, and therefore should be guarded against. I question the propriety of raising Regiments of particular caste, this would operate as a direct encouragement to *caste*, and I think the Right Honorable President does not intend it; in other respects his idea of the composition of the Native Army appears to me entirely correct. Races of men such as Seikhs, Siddies, Goorkhas would be well formed into separate Corps, but men of the different castes enlisted in the Bombay Army, should continue to be brought together into the same Corps, according to a particular proportion which should be laid down by Government.

I concur in the opinion of His Lordship, that it would be unwise to send any of our Native Troops into the disturbed Districts.


(Signed) H. W. REEVES.

Further Minute by the Right Honorable the Governor, dated 19th May 1857.

MY Honorable Colleague has correctly interpreted my meaning, though it might have been better expressed. I certainly never for an instant contemplated the formation of Regiments of one caste ; when I said Seikhs, I should have said Punjabees, for I meant simply the Natives of the Punjab. I believe that the Goorkhas are all of one caste, but they are in fact a race not a caste, and it was as a race and not as a caste that I considered them.

(Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

The 10th September 1857.



STATEMENT showing the Armed Troops in the Presidency of Bengal, calculated at the full established Strength.

	EUROPEAN TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.	
	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File.	European Commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.
Before the Out-break on the 1st April 1857.				
EUROPEAN TROOPS.				
2 Regiments Her Majesty's Dragoons	88	1,414	0	0
16 Regiments Her Majesty's Infantry	752	17,104	0	0
Horse Artillery, 9 Troops in 3 Brigades	76	1,040	0	0
Foot Artillery, 24 Companies in 6 Battalions	162	2,058	0	0
Engineers, Sappers and Miners	125	96	0	0
Hon'ble Company's Infantry, 3 Regiments	159	2,937	0	0
Officers of the Invalid Establishment, and the European Invalid Battalion and Veteran Company	80	236	Actual strength.	
Medical Officers & Veterinary Surgeons not attached to Corps	253	0	0	0
Total	1,695	24,885	0	0
NATIVE TROOPS—REGULARS.				
4 Troops Horse Artillery	0	0	8	462
3 Battalions Foot Artillery, 18 Companies with 8 Light Field Batteries	0	27	81	2,409
Gun Lascars with European Horse Artillery	0	0	0	351
Ditto ditto Foot	0	0	0	783
Gun Drivers of 12 Light Field Batteries	0	0	0	759
Corps of Sappers and Miners, 12 Companies	0	0	*17	1,394
10 Regiments Light Cavalry	0	30	260	5,063
73 Regiments Native Infantry, (19th Native Infantry disbanded, but Officers included)	0	148	1,998	84,837
IRREGULARS.				
Peshawur Mountain Train	0	2	*4	144
Assam Local Artillery	0	2	*1	124
Sebundy Sappers and Miners	0	4	*1	207
18 Regiments Irregular Cavalry	0	0	*73	10,749
19 Regiments of Local Infantry	0	38	*73	18,029
OUDEH IRREGULAR FORCE.				
3 Horse Field Batteries and 1 Reserve Company	0	6	*8	535
3 Regiments of Cavalry	0	0	*12	1,764
10 Regiments of Infantry	0	20	*40	9,400
GWALIOR CONTINGENT.				
4 Companies of Artillery and 1 Reserve Company	0	4	*4	744
2 Regiments of Cavalry	0	0	*8	1,163
7 Regiments of Infantry	0	14	*28	6,412
LEGIONS AND CONTINGENTS.				
Artillery	0	5	*19	269
Cavalry	0	0		
Infantry	0	4		
Grand Total	1,695	25,189	2,347	1,50,304
PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.				
Artillery, 3 Light Field Batteries, 1 Garrison Company, 1 Mountain Train	0	6	*9	661
Cavalry, 5 Regiments and 3 Troops Guide Corps	0	0	*26	3,234
Infantry, 6 Regiments Punjab Infantry, 4 Regiments Seikh Infantry, 1 Guide Corps	0	0	*54	9,806
Total	0	6	*89	13,701

* Officers attached to Local and Irregular Corps, marked thus,* not included in the Total, as they have already been returned with their own Corps, whether Artillery, Cavalry, or Infantry.

Medical Officers and Veterinary Surgeons attached to Corps, whether Artillery, Cavalry, or Infantry, Regular or Irregular, are included in the number of Officers with those Corps.

STATEMENT showing the Armed Troops in the Presidency of Bengal, calculated at the full established Strength.—(Continued.)

	EUROPEAN TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.	
	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers, Rank and File.	European Commissioned Officers.	Native-Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File.
After the Out-break on the 1st April 1858.				
EUROPEAN TROOPS.				
2 Troops Royal Horse Artillery ...	16	364	0	0
13 Companies Ditto Foot Ditto ...	83	2,118	0	0
2 Companies Royal Engineers ...	14	200	0	0
6 Regiments Her Majesty's Dragoons ...	240	3,797	0	0
41 Regiments Her Majesty's Infantry ...	1,927	43,747	0	0
3 Brigades Horse Artillery, 9 Troops, 2 Troops manned from other Corps, not included ...	73	1,026	0	0
6 Battalions Artillery, 24 Companies, and Officers of the mutineer Companies ...	228	2,110	0	0
3 Regiments Honourable Company's Infantry ...	159	2,931	0	0
1 Regiment Honour Light Horse ...	*8	185	0	0
Officers of the Invalid Establishments, and the European Invalid Battalion and Veteran Companies ...	74	213	0	0
Medical Officers and Veterinary Surgeons not attached to Corps ...	251	0	0	0
Total ...	3,065	56,691	0	0
NATIVE TROOPS—REGULARS.				
5th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery ...	0	2	2	91
2nd, 4th and 5th Companies 8th Battalion Artillery ...	0	0	6	324
Gun Drivers of Light Field Batteries ...	0	0	0	671
Gun Lasers of European Companies of Artillery ...	0	0	0	881
Peshawar Mountain Train ...	0	1	4	191
3 Companies Sikh Artillery ...	0	0	4	318
Native Infantry, the 21st, 31st, 47th, 65th, 66th, 70th and 73rd Regiments, in their established proportions ...	0	14	189	8,134
IRREGULARS.				
Assam Local Artillery ...	0	1	1	122
Irregular Cavalry, including the newly raised Horse Corps ...	0	0	*38	5,412
Irregular Infantry, 18 Regiments ...	0	25	*84	14,358
Sebandy Sappers and Minors ...	0	2	*1	209
4 Infantry Levies ...	0	8	*16	3,723
Grand Total ..	3,065	56,744	206	34,439
PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.				
3 Light Field Batteries ...	0	4	3	421
1 Garrison Company of Artillery and 1 Mountain Train ...	0	0	2	264
4 Regiments Sikh Cavalry and 5 Regiments Punjab Cavalry ...	0	0	*47	4,619
Peshawar Light Horse and Cavalry of the Guide Corps ...	0	0	*1	498
4 Regiments Sikh Infantry, 24th Punjab Infantry, and Guide Corps ...	0	2	*146	26,670
Total ...	0	6	*199	32,472
DISARMED AND PORTIONS OF MUTINIED CORPS.				
Head Quarters and 1st, 2nd and 3rd and 5th Companies, 9th Battalion Artillery ...	0	2	3	274
Light Cavalry 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Regiments, and all the Officers of the Light Cavalry ...	0	3	260	1,259
Native Infantry, all the Regiments, save the 21st, 31st, 47th, 65th, 66th, 70th and 73rd ...	0	36	1,809	15,818
Irregular Cavalry, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 11th Regiments and Governor General's Body Guard ...	0	0	18	1,128
Irregular Infantry, Calcutta Native Militia ...	0	4	5	1,425
Total ...	0	45	2,095	19,904

European Commissioned Officers given at the full established strength. European and Native Non-Commissioned Officers and men in their actual proportions.

* Officers attached to Local and Irregular Corps, marked thus,* not included in the total, as they have already been returned with their own Corps.

Medical Officers and Veterinary Surgeons attached to Corps, whether Artillery, Cavalry or Infantry, Regular or Irregular, are included in the number of Officers with those Corps.

RETURN showing the number of Troops in the Presidency of Bengal before the Out-break on the 1st of April 1857, reckoning each Corps at its full Strength.

CORPS.	European Commission- ed Officers.	European Non-Com- missioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commis- sioned Officers, and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
QUEEN'S.				
2 Regiments of Dragoons	88	1,414	0	Including H. M.'s 84th Foot from Ran- goon.
16 Regiments of Infantry	752	17,104	0	
Total	840	18,518	0	
HONORABLE COMPANY'S.				
<i>Europeans.</i>				
3 Brigades of Horse Artillery (9 Troops) ...	84	1,040	0	
6 Battalions of Foot Artillery (24 Companies) ...	162	2,058	0	
3 Regiments of Infantry	159	2,937	0	
Total	405	6,035	0	
<i>Natives (Regulars).</i>				
4 Troops of Horse Artillery	0	0	462	The 19th N. I., dis- banded 27th March 1857, not included.
3 Battalions of Foot Artillery (18 Companies) with 8 Light Field Batteries attached	81	27	2,409	
Gun Lascars attached to the European Horse Artillery	0	0	351	
Gun Lascars attached to the European Foot Artillery	0	0	783	
Gun Drivers of the 12 Light Field Batteries attached to the European Foot Artillery	0	0	759	
Corps of Sappers and Miners (12 Companies) ...	18	96	1,394	
10 Regiments of Light Cavalry	260	30	5,063	
73 Regiments of Infantry	1,971	146	84,837	
Total	2,330	299	96,058	
<i>Natives (Irregulars).</i>				
Peshawur Mountain Train Battery	4	2	144	Includes Cavalry attached to Ramgurh Light Infantry Batta- lion.
Assam Local Artillery (1 Company)	1	2	124	
Benbundy Sappers and Miners (2 Companies) ...	1	4	207	
8 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry	73	0	10,749	
9 Regiments of Local Infantry	73	38	18,029	
Total	152	46	29,253	
<i>Punjaub Irregular Force and Seikh Corps.</i>				
3 Punjaub Light Field Batteries	6	6	435	
No. 4, c Garrison Company of Artillery	2	0	118	
Hazarah Mountain Train Battery	1	0	108	
5 Regiments of Punjaub Cavalry	25	0	2,940	
6 Regiments of Punjaub Infantry	30	0	5,580	
4 Regiments of Seikh Infantry	20	0	3,648	
Corps of Guides { Infantry	4	0	578	
{ Cavalry	1	0	294	
Total	89	6	13,701	

RETURN showing the number of Troops in the Presidency of Bengal before the Out-break on the 1st of April 1857, reckoning each Corps at its full Strength.—(Concluded.)

COBPS.	European Commission- ed Officers.	European Non-Com- missioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commis- sioned Officers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
<i>Oude Irregular Force.</i>				
3 Horse Field Batteries	6	6	422	
Reserve Company of Artillery	2	0	113	
3 Regiments of Cavalry	12	0	1,764	
10 Regiments of Infantry	40	20	9,400	
Total	60	26	11,699	
<i>Gwalior Contingent.</i>				
4 Companies of Artillery	4	4	672	
Reserve Company of Artillery	0	0	72	
2 Regiments of Cavalry	8	0	1,163	
7 Regiments of Infantry	28	14	6,412	
Total	40	18	8,319	
<i>Joudpore Legion.</i>				
Artillery	} 4 {	2	31	
Cavalry		0	250	
Infantry		2	959	
Total	4	4	1,240	
<i>United Malwah Contingent.</i>				
Artillery	} 7 {	1	108	
Cavalry		0	758	
Infantry		2	738	
Total	7	3	1,604	
<i>Bhopal Contingent.</i>				
Artillery	} 4 {	0	72	
Cavalry		0	255	
Infantry		0	712	
Total	4	0	1,039	
<i>Kotah Contingent.</i>				
Artillery	} 4 {	2	58	
Cavalry		0	283	
Infantry		0	751	
Total	4	2	1,092	
<i>Abstract.</i>				
Total, Europeans (Queen's)	840	18,518	0	
Europeans (Hon'ble Company's) Artillery and Infantry	405	6,035	0	
Natives { Regular	2,330	299	96,058	
{ Irregular	360	105	67,947	
Grand Total	3,935	24,957	1,64,005	Including Contingents, &c.

RETURN of the European Troops on the Bengal Establishment, on the 1st of April 1858, reckoning each Corps at its full Strength.

Divisions and Stations.		Corps.	Commissioned Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.
PRESIDENCY DIVISION.	Fort William ..	H. M.'s 6th Foot	47	1,067	
	Calcutta ..	5th Co. 3rd Bn. Royal Artillery	7	136	
	Dum-Dum ..	3rd Co. 9th Bn. Royal Artillery	9	206	
		(T. Field Battery)	5	7	
	Barrackpore ..	Head Quarters 5th Bn. Arty ..	47	1,067	
		Total	115	2,483	
DINAPORE DIVISION.	Dinapore ..	4th Co. 5th Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 11 Light Field Battery attached.
		H. M.'s 35th Foot	47	1,067	
	Benares ..	8th Co. 2nd Bn. Royal Arty. ..	6	136	
		H. M.'s 13th Lt. Infy.	47	1,067	
	Ghazee pore ..	H. M.'s 37th Foot	47	1,067	
	Azimgurh Field Force ..	2nd Bn. Royal Mily. Train ..	15	262	
		H. M.'s 10th Foot	47	1,067	
		H. M.'s 34th Foot	47	1,067	
		H. M.'s 84th Foot	47	1,067	
		Total	308	6,883	
CAWNPORE DIVISION.	Allahabad ..	4th Co. 14th Bn. Royal Arty. ..	7	136	
		H. M.'s 54th Foot	47	1,067	
		Eun. Troop Royal Horse Arty. ..	7	182	
	Cawnpore ..	3rd Co. 14th Bn. Royal Arty. ..	6	136	
		3rd Co. 5th Bn. Arty.	5	83	
		H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers	47	1,067	
		H. M.'s 32nd Lt. Infy.	47	1,067	
		H. M.'s 78th Highlanders ..	47	1,067	
	Futtehgurh ..	H. M.'s 80th Foot	47	1,067	
		7th Co. 14th Bn. Royal Arty.			
		(Field Battery)	6	206	
		H. M.'s 82nd Foot	47	1,067	
		F. Troop Royal Horse Arty. ...	9	182	
		1st Troop 1st Bde. Horse Arty.	5	111	
		3rd Co. 8th Bn. Royal Arty. ..	5	136	
		6th Co. 11th Bn. Royal Arty. ..	6	136	
	Lucknow ..	5th Co. 12th Bn. Royal Arty.			
		(Q. Field Battery)	6	206	
		4th Co. 1st Bn. Arty.	5	83	
		2nd Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	5	83	
1st Co. 5th Bn. Arty.		5	83		
4th Co. Royal Engineers ...		7	100		
H. M.'s 2nd Dragoon Guards ...		40	707		
Lahore Light Horse		0	185		
H. M.'s 20th Foot		47	1,067		
H. M.'s 23rd Fusiliers		47	1,067		
H. M.'s 38th Foot	47	1,067			
H. M.'s 53rd Foot	47	1,067			
H. M.'s 90th Light Infantry ..	47	1,067			
H. M.'s 97th Foot	47	1,067			
1st Bengal European Fusiliers..	53	977			
		Carried over	741	16,536	

RETURN of the European Troops on the Bengal Establishment, on the 1st of April 1858, reckoning each Corps at its full Strength.—(Continued.)

Divisions and Stations.	Corps.	Commissioned Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.		
	Brought over ..	741	16,536			
CAWNPORE DIVISION.—(Concluded.)	Brigadier General Walpole's Field Force at Lucknow ...	2nd Troop 1st Bde Horse Arty.	5	111		
		Hd. Quarters and 2nd and 3rd Troops 3rd Bde. Horse Arty.	16	231		
		5th Co. 13th Bn. Royal Arty. ...	5	136		
		6th Co. 13th Bn. Royal Arty. (Field Battery) ...	7	206		
		23rd Co. Royal Engineers ...	7	100		
		H. M.'s 7th Hussars ...	40	707		
		H. M.'s 9th Lancers ...	40	707		
		H. M.'s 42nd Highlanders ...	47	1,067		
		H. M.'s 79th Highlanders ...	47	1,067		
		H. M.'s 93rd Highlanders ...	47	1,067		
		H. M.'s 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade... ..	47	1,067		
		H. M.'s 3rd Bn. Rifle Brigade... ..	47	1,067		
		Ukbarpore ..	3rd Co 1st Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 17 Light Field Battery attached.
			H. M.'s 88th Foot	47	1,067	
		Moveable Column Suhawur	3rd Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 14 Light Field Battery attached.
2nd Co. 4th Bn. Arty.	5		83			
H. M.'s 6th Dragoon Guards	40		707			
H. M.'s 64th Foot	47		1,067			
	Total	1,245	27,059			
MEERUT DIVISION.	Meerut ..	Hd. Quarters and 3rd Troop 1st Bde. Horse Artillery	11	120		
		Hd. Quarters 3rd Bn. Arty.	5	7		
		H. M.'s 1st Bn. 60th Rifles	47	1,067	Left Wing at Roorkee.	
		75th Foot	47	1,067		
		Camp Etawah ..	3rd European Regiment	53	977	
		Mozuffernuggur District ..	Meerut Light Horse	0	0	Manned from other Corps.
		Camp Roorkee	1st Co. 1st Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 7 Light Field Battery attached.
			4th Co. 4th Bn. Arty.	5	83	
		Agra ..	2nd Co. 5th Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 21 Light Field Battery attached.
			H. M.'s 8th Foot	47	1,067	
		Delhie ..	2nd Troop 2nd Bde. Horse Arty.	5	111	
			1st Co. 4th Bn. Arty.	5	83	
			Hd. Quarters and 4th Co. 6th Bn. Arty.	10	90	
H. M.'s 61st Foot	47		1,067			
	2nd Bengal European Fusiliers... ..	53	977			
	Total	345	6,882			
SAUGOR DISTRICT.	Saugor (Mhow) ..	1st Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	5	83		
		2nd Co. 6th Bn. Arty.	5	83	No. 8 Light Field Battery attached.	
		Total	10	166		
SIRHIND DIVISION.	Umballah ..	H. M.'s 27th Foot	47	1,067		
		H. M.'s 87th Fusiliers	47	1,067		
		Jullunder ..	1st Troop 3rd Bde. Horse Arty.	5	111	
			Hd. Quarters 1st Bn. Arty.	5	7	
			H. M.'s 52nd Light Infantry	47	1,067	
	Total	151	3,319			

RETURN of the European Troops on the Bengal Establishment, on the 1st of April 1858, reckoning each Corps at its full strength.—(Concluded.)

Divisions and Stations.	Corps.	Commissioned Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.		
LAHORE DIVISION.	Lahore..	Hd. Quarters and 3rd Troop 2nd Bde. Horse Arty. ...	11	120	No. 10 Light Field Battery attached.	
		1st and 2nd Cos. 2nd Bn. Arty.	10	166		
	Umritsur	Ferozepore	Hd. Quarters and 3rd Co. 4th Bn. Arty. ...	10	90	Left Wing en route to Rawul Pindee.
			H. M.'s 7th Fusiliers ...	47	1,067	
		H. M.'s 94th Foot ...	47	1,067		
		2nd Co. 1st Bn. Arty. ...	5	83		
	Mooltan	Sealkote	3rd Co. 6th Bn. Arty. ...	5	83	No. 19 Light Field Battery attached.
			H. M.'s 24th Foot ...	47	1,067	
		6th Co. 7th Bn. Royal Arty. (Field Battery) ...	6	206		
			4th Troop 3rd Bde. Horse Arty.	5	0	Manned from other Corps.
		4th Co. 3rd Bn. Arty. ...	5	83		
		H. M.'s 7th Dragoon Guards ...	40	707		
		Total ...	238	4,739		
PESHAWUR DIVISION.	Peshawur	1st Troop 2nd Bde. Horse Arty.	5	111		
		Hd. Quarters and 3rd Co. 2nd Bn. Arty. ...	10	90		
	Campbellpore	Rawul Pindee	4th Co. 2nd Bn. Arty. and the new Peshawur Light Field Battery attached ...	5	0	Manned from other Corps.
			H. M.'s 70th Foot ...	47	1,067	
		Peshawur Light Horse ...	0	0	Manned from other Corps.	
	Nowshera		4th Troop 2nd Bde. Horse Arty.	5	0	Ditto ditto.
			H. M.'s 81st Foot ...	47	1,067	Left Wing at Peshawur.
		H. M.'s 98th Foot ...	47	1,067		
		Total ...	166	3,462		
Baroda	8th Co. 1st Bn. Royal Arty. ...	7	136			
Thayet-myo (Pegu)	H. M.'s 29th Foot ...	47	1,067			
Corps.	Commissioned Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.			
ABSTRACT.						
<i>Queen's Troops.</i>						
2 Troops of Horse Artillery ..	16	364				
13 Companies of Foot Artillery ..	83	2,118				
2 Companies of Engineers ..	14	200				
6 Regiments of Cavalry ..	240	3,797				
41 Regiments of Infantry ..	1,927	43,747				
Total ..	2,280	50,226				
<i>Hon'ble Company's Troops.</i>						
3 Brigades of Horse Artillery (9 Troops) ..	73	1,026	2 Troops manned from other Corps, not included.			
6 Battalions of Foot Artillery (24 Companies) ..	156	2,110				
3 Regiments of Infantry ..	159	2,931				
1 Regiment of Light Horse ..	0	185				
Total ..	388	6,252				
Grand Total ...	2,668	56,478				

N. B.—The Gun Lascars attached to the European Horse and Foot Artillery, and the Gun Drivers belonging to Light Field Batteries attached to the European Foot Artillery, are included in the return of the Native portion of the Army.

*DISPOSITION RETURN of the Native Troops on the Bengal Establishment
on the 1st of April 1858.*

Divisions and Stations.		Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commis- sioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Offi- cers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.	
PRESIDENCY DIVISION.	Allypore	Calcutta Native Militia	3	2	1,007	Disarmed.	
		Head Quarters and 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Companies 9th Battalion Ar- tillery	3	2	274	Ditto.	
	Dum-Dum	Gun Drivers No. 3 Light Field Bat- tery	0	0	53	Ditto.	
		Gun Lascars, 3rd Company 5th Bat- talion European Foot Artillery	6	0	34	The Company is at Cawnpore.	
	Barrackpore	2nd Native Infantry (Grenadiers)	8	2	742	Disarmed.	
		32nd Native Infantry	9	2	650	Disarmed, 4 Cos. mutinied in the Sonthal District.	
		34th Native Infantry	11	1	303	7 Cos. disbanded at Barrackpore, and 3 Cos. mutinied at Chittagong.	
	Berhampore	43rd Light Infantry	10	1	740	Disarmed.	
		63rd Native Infantry	12	2	812	Ditto.	
		11th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	346	Disarmed, 2 Troops mutinied at Jul- pigooree and Madargunge.	
	Akyab	Arracan Battalion	4	2	752		
	EASTERN FRONTIER.	Jelpigooree	73rd Native Infantry	8	1	1,105	2 Cos. mutinied at Dacca.
		Cheera Poon- jee	Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion	7	2	924	
			Munneepore Regiment	4	0	624	Raised since the mutinies.
		Debroogurh	1st Assam Light Infantry Batta- lion	5	2	1,030	
Assam Local Artillery (1 Com- pany)			1	1	122		
Gowahatty	2nd Assam Light Infantry Batta- lion	3	1	1,113			
	Kamroop Regiment	4	1	887	Raised since the mutinies.		
Total... ..			96	22	11,518		
DINAPORE DIVISION.	Dinapore	Gun Lascars 4th Company, 5th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	32		
		Gun Drivers No. 11 Light Field Bat- tery	0	0	73	Attached to the 4th Co. 5th Bn. Arty	
		7th Native Infantry	2	0	61	Mutinied.	
		8th Native Infantry	2	1	34	Ditto.	
	Bhaugulpore	40th Native Infantry	2	0	105	Ditto.	
		Hill Rangers	3	2	621		
	Darjeeling	5th Irregular Cavalry	2	0	64	Mutinied.	
		Sebundy Sappers and Miners (2 Companies)	1	2	209		
	Dorundah	Ramgurh Cavalry	1	0	180		
	Chyebassa	Seikh Volunteers	3	0	198	Raised since the mutinies.	
	Sumbulpore	Shekawattee Battalion	3	0	752		
	Benares	37th Native Infantry	3	1	144	Mutinied.	
50th Native Infantry		1	1	208	Ditto.		
Azimgurh Field Force	Regiment of Loodianah	2	2	418	Partially mutinied.		
	3rd Seikh Cavalry	5	0	509	Raised since the mutinies.		
Total.. ..			30	9	3,608		
CAWNPORE DIVISION.	Cawnpore	Cawnpore Infantry Levy	3	0	492	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Mynpoorie Infantry Levy	4	2	800	Ditto.	
	Futtehgurh	Gun Drivers, No. 20 Light Field Battery	0	0	62	Doing duty with Royal Arty.	
		7th Punjab Infantry	10	0	824	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Gun Lascars, 1st Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	19		
	Lucknow	Gun Lascars, 2nd Company, 3rd Bat- talion, European Foot Artillery	0	0	28		
		Gun Drivers, No. 4 Light Field Bat- tery	0	0	48	Attached to the 2nd Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	
		Regiment of Ferozepore	5	2	811		
		2nd Punjab Infantry	9	0	1,093		
		5th Punjab Infantry	6	0	1,011		
Futtehgurh	Futtehgurh Infantry Levy	4	0	421	Raised since the mutinies.		
	Benares Horse	1	0	221	Ditto.		
	1st Seikh Cavalry	9	0	591	Ditto.		
Carried over			51	4	6421		

DISPOSITION RETURN of the Native Troops on the Bengal Establishment
on the 1st of April 1858.—(Continued.)

Divisions and Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commis- sioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Offi- cers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.		
	Brought over	51	4	6,421			
CAWNPORE DIVISION.—(Concluded.)	Brigadier General Walpole's Field Force, Lucknow	Gun Lascars, 2nd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	21		
		Gun Lascars, 2nd Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	18		
		Gun Lascars, 3rd Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	24		
		Gun Lascars, 4th Company, 1st Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	6		
		Gun Lascars, 1st Company, 5th Bat- talion European Foot Artillery	0	0	21		
		2nd Company 8th Battalion Artillery	0	0	167	No. 2 Light Field Battery attached.	
		4th Punjab Infantry	10	0	872		
		24th Punjab Infantry	5	0	846	Pioneers, raised since the mutinies.	
		2nd Punjab Cavalry	7	0	723		
		Gun Lascars, 3rd Company, 1st Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	24		
	Ukbarpore	Gun Drivers, No. 17 Light Field Battery	0	0	60	Attached to 3rd Co. 1st Bn. Arty.	
		Gun Lascars, 3rd Company, 3rd Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	22		
	Moveable Column, Suhawur	Gun Lascars, 2nd Company, 4th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	29		
		Gun Drivers, No. 14 Light Field Battery	0	0	66	Attached to 3rd Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	
	Allahabad	Allahabad Infantry Levy	4	0	349	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Total... ..	77	4	9,669		
	MEERUT DIVISION.	Meerut	Gun Lascars, 3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	20	Mutinied.
			3rd Light Cavalry	6	1	79	
Nusseree Battalion			8	2	840		
5th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery			2	2	91		
Roorkee		Gun Lascars, 1st Company, 1st Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	25		
		Gun Lascars, 4th Company 4th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	27		
		Gun Drivers, No. 7 Light Field Batta- ry	0	0	67	Attached to the 1st Co. 1st Bn. Arty.	
		1st Seikh Infantry	5	0	948		
Kemaon Nynee Tal Landour Gungaree Goorgaon Kanound		1st Punjab Infantry	4	0	924		
		17th Punjab Infantry	5	0	1,041	Raised since the mutinies.	
		66th or Goorkha Regiment	15	2	1,101	At Camp Huldwanee.	
		1st Extra Goorkha Regiment	4	0	373	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Landour Rangers	7	1	452	Ditto.	
		22nd Punjab Infantry	3	0	1,011	Ditto.	
		Kemaon Battalion	5	2	689		
		23rd Punjab Infantry	5	0	886	Raised since the mutinies.	
Agra		Gun Lascars, 2nd Company, 5th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	16		
		Meade's Horse	3	0	376	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Gun Lascars, 2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	30		
Del		Gun Lascars, 1st Company, 4th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	26		
	Gun Lascars, 4th Company, 6th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery	0	0	32			
	Sirmoor Battalion	6	2	1,000			
	4th Seikh Infantry	6	0	811			
	4th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	239			
2nd Seikh Cavalry	7	0	637	Raised since the mutinies.			
	Total	99	12	12,223			

*DISPOSITION RETURN of the Native Troops on the Bengal Establishment
on the 1st of April 1858.—(Continued.)*

Divisions and Stations.		Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commis- sioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Offi- cers and Rank and File.	REMARKS.	
SAUGOR DISTRICT.	Saugor	Gun Lascars, 1st Company, 3rd Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	28		
		Gun Drivers, No. 12 Light Field Battery ..	0	0	62	Attached to 1st Co. 3rd Bn. Arty.	
		31st Native Infantry ..	8	2	901	At Camp Shahgurbh.	
		42nd Light Infantry ..	8	1	229	Partially mutinied at Camp Mal- thone.	
		52nd Native Infantry ..	7	2	152	Mutinied.	
	Mhow	3rd Irregular Cavalry ..	2	0	137	At Camp Shahgurbh.	
		Gun Lascars, 2nd Company 6th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	27		
		Gun Drivers, No. 8 Light Field Bat- tery ..	0	0	16	Attached to 2nd Co. 6th Bn. Arty	
		Total	25	5	1,552		
		Total	25	5	1,552		
SIRIND DIVISION.	Umballah	4th Light Cavalry ..	2	1	50	Mutinied.	
		13th Punjab Infantry ..	6	0	939	Raised since the mutinies.	
	Phillour	3rd Native Infantry ..	5	2	105	Mutinied.	
		Gun Lascars, 1st Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	0	0	28		
	Jullundur	33rd Native Infantry ..	6	2	865	Disarmed.	
		36th Native Infantry ..	4	2	128	Mutinied.	
		61st Native Infantry ..	8	2	127	Ditto.	
		6th Light Cavalry ..	5	0	19	Ditto.	
		16th Punjab Infantry ..	5	0	871	Raised since the mutinies.	
	Total	41	9	3,132			
LAHORE DIVISION.	Lahore	Gun Lascars, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	0	0	30		
		Gun Lascars, 1st Company, 2nd Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	27		
		Gun Lascars, 2nd Company, 2nd Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	35		
		Gun Lascars, 3rd Company, 4th Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	31		
		Gun Drivers, No. 10 Light Field Battery ..	0	0	64	Attached to 1st Co. 2nd Bn. Arty.	
		8th Light Cavalry ..	2	1	362	Disarmed.	
		9th Light Cavalry ..	3	0	170	Mutinied.	
		16th Native Infantry (Grenadiers) ..	4	0	786	Disarmed.	
		26th Light Infantry ..	3	0	144	Mutinied.	
		49th Native Infantry ..	4	1	666	Disarmed.	
		21st Punjab Infantry ..	6	0	925	Raised since the mutinies.	
		4th Seikh Cavalry ..	1	0	38	Under formation.	
		Umritsir	Gun Lascars, 2nd Company 1st Batta- lion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	31	
			5th Company, 8th Battalion Artillery.	1	0	118	No. 16 Light Field Battery attached.
			35th Light Infantry ..	4	2	763	Disarmed.
	59th Native Infantry ..		6	1	804	Ditto.	
	Gun Lascars 3rd Company 6th Batta- lion European Foot Artillery ..		0	0	26		
	Ferozepore	Gun Drivers, No. 19 Light Field Battery ..	0	0	37	Attached to 3rd Co. 6th Bn. Arty.	
		10th Light Cavalry ..	5	0	132	Mutinied.	
		20th Punjab Infantry ..	4	0	946	Raised since the mutinies.	
		Gun Lascars, 4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery ..	0	0	24		
		Gun Lascars, 4th Company 3rd Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	26		
	Mooltan	Gun Drivers, 4th Company 3rd Bat- talion European Foot Artillery ..	0	0	63		
		62nd Native Infantry ..	5	1	580	Disarmed.	
		69th Native Infantry ..	6	1	807	Ditto.	
		11th Punjab Infantry ..	5	0	924	Raised since the mutinie...	
		1st Irregular Cavalry ..	4	0	559		
	Noorpore	4th Native Infantry ..	11	2	783	Disarmed, left Wing at Kangra.	
	Googaira	16th Irregular Cavalry ..	2	0	405		
		15th Punjab Infantry ..	4	0	959	Raised since the mutinies.	
	Goordaspore	2nd Irregular Cavalry ..	4	0	405		
	Total	84	9	11,670			

*DISPOSITION RETURN of the Native Troops on the Bengal Establishment
on the 1st of April 1858.—(Concluded.)*

Divisions and Stations.	Corps.	REMARKS.				
		European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.		
PESHAWUR DIVISION.	Gun Lascars, 1st Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	26		
	Gun Lascars, 3rd Company 2nd Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	35		
	Gun Lascars, 4th Company 2nd Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	31		
	Peshawur	24th Native Infantry	6	0	836	Disarmed.
		27th Native Infantry	5	1	739	Ditto.
		Regiment of Kilat-i-Ghilzie	3	0	1080	
		9th Punjab Infantry	5	0	931	} Raised since the mutinies.
		14th Punjab Infantry	5	0	932	
		18th Punjab Infantry	4	0	929	
		7th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	776	
		18th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	590	
	Campbellpore	Native Troop Peshawur Light Horse	0	0	99	Raised since the mutinies.
	Attock	4th Company 8th Battalion Artillery	0	0	39	
	Shubkuddur	21st Native Infantry	8	2	926	
	Rawul Pindee	Gun Lascars, 4th Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	22	
		58th Native Infantry	7	2	777	Disarmed.
		19th Punjab Infantry	3	0	906	Raised since the mutinies.
	Murree	17th Irregular Cavalry	5	0	460	
		Peshawur Mountain Train Battery	4	1	191	
	Nowshera	5th Light Cavalry	3	0	447	Disarmed.
		64th Native Infantry	6	2	877	Ditto.
		8th Punjab Infantry	4	0	866	Raised since the mutinies.
	Dera Ishmael Khan	39th Native Infantry	6	0	765	Disarmed.
		No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	2	141	
	Abbottabad	No. 4 or Garrison Company of Artillery	1	0	132	
		10th Punjab Infantry	3	0	939	Raised since the mutinies.
		2nd Seikh Infantry	3	1	923	
	Bunnoo	Hazarah Mountain Train Battery	1	0	132	
		9th Irregular Cavalry	2	0	242	
		3rd Seikh Infantry	4	0	960	
Murdan	No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	2	141		
	Corps of Guides	5	0	656	Infantry.	
Kohat		1	0	399	Cavalry.	
	No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	0	139	At Camp Reisah.	
	3rd Punjab Infantry	4	1	944	At Camp Togh.	
Hurreepore	6th Punjab Infantry	3	0	922		
	12th Punjab Infantry	5	0	940	Raised since the mutinies.	
Dera Ghazee Khan	3rd Punjab Cavalry	5	0	519		
Asnee	4th Punjab Infantry	4	0	537		
Kolachee	5th Punjab Cavalry	5	0	583		
Total ..		131	14	22,520		
Bewar	Mhairwarrah Battalion	3	2	686		
Ajmere	Mhair Regiment	3	2	492	Raised since the mutinies.	
Khorwarrah	Meywar Bheel Corps	4	2	1034		
Sirdarpore	Malwah Bheel Corps	3	0	656		
Kusmore	6th Irregular Cavalry	4	0	586		
Rangoon	25th Native Infantry	10	0	886	Left Wing (disarmed) is at Benares.	
China	47th Native Infantry	11	1	498	Under orders for China.	
	65th Native Infantry	7	2	890	Ditto.	
	70th Native Infantry	10	2	889	At Canton.	

ABSTRACT.

Artillery	...	6	4	2,241
Light Cavalry	...	26	3	1,259
Infantry	...	252	49	29,928
Infantry (Irregular)	...	246	31	43,715
Cavalry (Irregular)	...	94	0	10,703
Artillery (Irregular)	...	10	6	998
Subsidiary Sappers and Miners	...	1	2	209
Total ...		635	95	81,853

RETURN showing the Races of which the Native Army was composed on the 1st April 1858.

CORPS.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	NUMBER OF EACH RACE OR CASTE.																	REMARKS.			
				Christians.	Mussulmen.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Hindoos of inferior description.	Seikhs.	Punjabees.	Hindoostances.	Cis-Sutledge.	Trans-Indus.	Hill States of Nepal.	Hazarah Tribes.	Affghans.	Goorkas.	Hillmen.	Mhairs.	Mhairats.		Bheels.	Moogeahs, Grasscutts and other predatory Tribes.	Total.
<i>Artillery Horse and Foot.</i>																								
5th Troop, 1st Brigade and Gun Lascars, attached to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Troops	2	2	151	0	51	40	25	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	151	The 4th Troop mutinied.	
Gun Lascars, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	108	0	78	4	23	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	108		
Gun Lascars, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery	0	0	94	0	42	9	7	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	94		
Gun Lascars, and Gun Drivers, 1st Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	213	0	88	7	2	116	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	213		
Gun Lascars, and Gun Drivers, 2nd Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	192	0	112	2	4	68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	192		
Gun Lascars, and Gun Drivers, 3rd Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	243	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Return does not show the castes.
Gun Lascars, 4th Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	113	0	56	5	6	46	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	113		
Gun Lascars, and Gun Drivers, 5th Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	291	0	125	4	21	141	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	291		
Gun Lascars, and Gun Drivers, 6th Battalion European Foot Artillery	0	0	138	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		The Return does not show the castes. No Return received from this Battalion.
7th Battalion Native Foot Artillery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
8th Battalion Native Foot Artillery (1st and 6th Companies mutinied, 3rd Company disbanded)	1	0	324	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Returns do not show the castes.	
9th Battalion Native Foot Artillery (4th and 6th Companies mutinied) disarmed	3	2	274	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total	6	4	2241	0	552	77	88	445	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,162		
<i>Light Cavalry.</i>																								
3rd Regiment (mutinied)	6	1	79	7	39	17	13	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	79		
4th Ditto (ditto)	2	1	50	0	30	14	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50		
5th Ditto (disarmed)	3	0	447	2	688	130	111	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	447		
6th Ditto (mutinied)	5	0	19	2	7	7	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19		
8th Ditto (disarmed)	2	1	362	0	177	115	60	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	362		
9th Ditto (mutinied)	3	0	170	9	102	26	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	170		
10th Ditto (ditto)	5	0	132	5	81	35	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	132		
Total	26	3	1259	25	624	344	231	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,259		
<i>Infantry.</i>																								
2nd Regiment (disarmed)	8	2	742	21	149	241	208	123	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	742		
3rd Ditto (mutinied)	5	2	105	5	20	30	40	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	105		
4th Ditto (disarmed)	11	2	788	10	110	197	140	101	7	147	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	788		

RETURN showing the Races of which the Native Army was composed on the 1st April 1858.—(Concluded.)

CORPS.	NUMBER OF EACH RACE OR CASTE.																			REMARKS.						
	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Christians.	Musulmen.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Hindoos of inferior description.	Saikhs.	Punjaubees.	Hindoostanees.	Cis-Sutledge.	Trans-Indus.	Hill States of Nepal.	Hazarah Tribes.	Affghans.	Goorkas.	Hillmen.	Mhairs.		Mhairsats.	Rheels.	Alongeeahs, Giraseeans and other predatory Tribes.	Total.		
Brought over ..	71	24	12238	14	1166	1048	2636	2081	1231	154	0	0	0	0	0	0	271	1895	566	915	227	10	12238			
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	No Return.
Munneepore Regiment	4	0	624	0	122	426	76	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	624	Raised since the mutinies.	
Kamroop Regiment	4	1	887	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ditto No Return.
Mynpoorie Infantry Levy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Futtehgurh Infantry Levy	4	0	421	2	11	9	1	407	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	421	
Cawnpore Infantry Levy	3	0	492	1	33	1	47	410	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	492	
Allahabad Levy	4	0	349	0	3	0	2	341	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	349	
Malwah Bheel Corps	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	No Return.
Meywar Bheel Corps	4	2	1034	0	49	57	36	103	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	576	213	1034			
1st Sikh Infantry	5	0	948	0	0	0	0	0	0	658	65	97	78	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	948	
2nd Ditto	3	1	923	0	0	0	0	0	0	506	76	14	47	257	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	923	
3rd Ditto	4	0	960	0	0	0	0	0	0	285	6	390	177	0	0	0	0	152	0	0	0	0	0	0	960	
4th Ditto	6	0	811	0	0	0	0	140	504	99	45	0	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	811	
Corps of Guides	5	0	656	0	0	0	0	0	0	323	0	28	204	101	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	656	
1st Punjaub Infantry	4	0	924	0	0	0	0	0	0	415	29	65	415	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	924	
2nd Ditto	9	0	1093	0	0	0	0	0	0	909	49	24	111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1093	
3rd Ditto	4	1	944	0	0	0	0	0	0	686	26	24	208	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	944	
4th Ditto	10	0	872	1	469	0	113	83	206	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	872	
5th Ditto	6	0	1011	0	0	0	0	0	0	660	32	54	265	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1011	
6th Ditto	3	0	922	0	0	0	0	0	0	378	172	73	299	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	922	
7th Ditto	10	0	824	0	0	0	0	0	0	570	10	73	80	0	0	0	0	91	0	0	0	0	0	0	824	
8th Ditto	4	0	866	0	0	0	0	0	0	653	12	28	173	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	866	
9th Ditto	5	0	931	0	0	0	0	0	0	625	62	28	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	931	
10th Ditto	9	0	939	1	0	0	0	0	0	537	50	130	111	0	0	0	0	110	0	0	0	0	0	0	939	
11th Ditto	5	0	924	0	0	0	0	0	0	671	76	59	9	0	0	0	0	109	0	0	0	0	0	0	924	
12th Ditto	5	0	940	0	0	0	0	0	0	644	42	20	83	0	0	0	0	151	0	0	0	0	0	0	940	
13th Ditto	6	0	939	0	0	0	0	0	0	649	31	67	23	0	0	0	0	169	0	0	0	0	0	0	939	
14th Ditto	5	0	932	0	0	0	0	0	0	714	43	82	87	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	932	
15th Ditto	4	0	959	0	0	0	0	0	0	814	14	131	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	959	
16th Ditto	5	0	871	0	0	0	0	0	0	614	2	51	106	0	0	0	0	98	0	0	0	0	0	0	871	
17th Ditto	5	0	1041	0	0	0	0	0	0	809	10	49	13	0	0	0	0	180	0	0	0	0	0	0	1041	
18th Ditto	4	0	920	0	0	0	0	0	0	494	26	44	218	0	0	0	0	138	0	0	0	0	0	0	920	
19th Ditto	3	0	906	0	0	0	0	229	312	365	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	906	
20th Ditto	4	0	946	0	0	0	0	0	0	683	2	87	7	0	0	0	0	167	0	0	0	0	0	0	946	
21st Ditto	6	0	925	0	0	0	0	0	405	392	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	128	0	0	0	0	0	0	925	
22nd Ditto	3	0	1011	0	0	0	0	0	0	684	1	167	12	0	0	0	0	147	0	0	0	0	0	0	1011	
23rd Ditto	5	0	886	1	0	0	0	0	0	284	15	485	0	0	0	0	0	101	0	0	0	0	0	0	886	
24th Ditto	5	0	846	0	0	0	0	0	846	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	846	
Total	240	24	42715	20	1853	1532	2911	3821	3504	15286	896	2270	2367	358	23	32	271	3077	566	915	803	223	41828			

A B S T R A C T.

CORPS.	NUMBER OF EACH RACE OR CASTE.																						REMARKS.	
	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Christians.	Mussulmen.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Hindooes of inferior description.	Sikhs.	Punjaubees.	Hindoostances.	Cis Sutledge.	Trans-Indus.	Hill States of Nepal.	Hazarah Tribes.	Afghans.	Goorkas.	Hillmen.	Mhairs.	Mhairata.	Bheels.	Moogeahs, Grasscoars and other predatory Tribes.		Total.
Artillery ..	6	4	2341	0	552	77	88	445	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1162	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="font-size: 3em; margin-right: 5px;">}</div> <div> <p>* 430 Rakhines + 227 Muunee- poories + 10 Burmeso</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">} Inclusive of Arracan Battalion.</p> </div> </div>
Light Cavalry ..	26	3	1259	25	624	344	231	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1259	
Infantry ..	248	47	21928	486	3590	6205	6404	4326	135	192	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	21,925	
Infantry (Irregular) ..	240	29	42715	20	1853	1532	2911	3821	3504	15288	896	2270	2867	358	23	32	271	3677	566	915	1803	1223	41828	
Cavalry (Irregular) ..	94	0	10703	41	3831	350	549	181	833	2401	1219	167	467	19	0	105	29	2	0	0	0	0	10194	
Artillery (Irregular) ..	10	6	998	0	0	0	0	0	0	495	38	15	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	553	
Sebundy Sappers and Miners ..	1	2	209	0	2	18	179	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	209	
Total ..	625	91	80053	572	10452	8526	10362	8818	4472	1837	2153	2452	3339	377	23	137	890	3679	566	915	803	223	77133	
<i>Total of Corps, the races of which are not shown here.</i>																								
Artillery ..																						1079		
Irregular Infantry ..																						887		
Irregular Cavalry ..																						509		
Irregular Artillery ..																						445		
Total ..																						80,053		

ACCOMMODATION for European Troops existing and in preparation.

				Cavalry Corps.	Infantry Corps.	Artillery Troops or Companies.	REMARKS.
LOWER PROVINCES.							
1	Fort William and Calcutta (say)	0	1	1	Three Regiments may easily be quartered in Calcutta and the Fort, by end of the season.
2	Barrackpore	0	1	1	
3	Chinsurah	0	1	0	
4	Dum Dum	0	1	1	Besides the depôt families in the old barracks.
5	Haneegunge	0	1	0	
6	Darjeeling	0	1	0	
7	Hazareebaugh	0	1	0	
8	Berhampoor	0	1	1	
9	Patna and Dinapore	0	2	2	Including existing barracks.
Total, Lower Provinces				0	10	6	
NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.							
1	Agra	0	2	2	
2	Muttra	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	1	
3	Meerut	1	$2\frac{1}{3}$	4	
4	Roorkee	0	1	0	
5	Futtehgurh	0	1	1	
6	Nynee Tall	0	1	0	
7	Allygurh ... }	0	2	3	
8	Delhi ... }	0	2	3	
9	Mynpooree	0	1	0	{ Uncertain. It was proposed to place a Regiment in the Jail there, but no report has been received.
10	Ghazeepoor	0	1	0	
11	Benares	0	2	2	
12	Mirzapoor	0	1	0	Will not be ready before the rains for more than a Wing.
13	Allahabad	1	3	4	
14	Cawnpoor	1	2	2	
15	Saugor	0	1	1	No report received yet.
16	Jubbulpoor	0	1	0	Ditto ditto.
17	Jhansi (when recovered)	0	1	1	
18	Mhow	1	1	2	Cover for 1,700 Europeans expected to be ready by middle of March.
Total, North Western Provinces				$4\frac{1}{2}$	$23\frac{1}{2}$	23	

ACCOMMODATION for European Troops existing and in preparation.— (Concluded.)

								Infantry Men.	Artillery Men.	REMARKS.
PUNJAB.										
1	Peshawur	3,658	1,050	Provision was ordered to be made in the Punjab for 2 Regiments of Cavalry, 18 Infantry and 14 Troops or Companies Artillery. It will be fully equal to this, even though a smaller Force be assigned to the Peshawur Valley than is entered here. New temporary barracks are being made at Mooltan, at Campbellpore near Attock and at Umritsur (Govindgurh). The rest of the accommodation is got from existing buildings, restorations and adaptations.	
2	Nowshera	1,498	0		
3	Attock	300	0		
4	Campbellpore	500	0		
5	Rawul Pindee	1,710	0		
6	Sealkote	1,500	263		
7	Mooltan	564	120		
8	Mecan Meer	1,750	810		
9	Lahore Citadel	600	210		
10	Anarkullee	450	0		
11	Umritsur, Cantonment and Fort	308	150		
12	Ferozepore	2,320	220		
13	Loodianah	200	0		
14	Jullundur	1,515	340		
15	Hoshearapore	75	0		
16	Umballa	1,500	650		
17	Kussowlee	1,000	0		
18	Subathoo	896	0		
19	Dugshai	1,000	0		
Total Punjab...								21,344	3,813	The Cavalry barracks at Umballa do not appear to be included; they will hold a Regiment and a half.
Total, Artillery and Infantry									25,157	

(18)

TABULAR STATEMENT of Barrack Accommodation for European Troops in the Presidency of Bengal.

PROVINCE.	Stations.	Nature of Buildings.	Numbers and Detail of Troops.	REMARKS.
PEGU AND TENASSERIM.	Moulmein ...	Temporary ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	These barracks have been condemned, new permanent Barracks proposed, but not sanctioned. Well-built commodious barracks, but styled "temporary" because constructed of timber. Remarks as above.
	Rangoon ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot Artillery 1 Company ...	
	Thayet-Myo ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Fonghoo ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot.	
BENGAL.	Fort William ...	Permanent ...	1 Regiment of Foot and other Detachments ...	When the Fort barracks are completed they will afford full accommodation for one Regiment, with room for 200 or 300 Recruits, Invalids, &c., &c.; by the end of July it is expected that the buildings in the Fort will be in a condition to accommodate 1,300 men, and about 400 may be accommodated in Government buildings outside. Part of the accommodation is at present occupied by families of Soldiers who have proceeded up-country. At present there is not full accommodation for one Regiment without crowding, but additions have been sanctioned. According to the present allowance of space for the men, the Infantry and Artillery Barracks together do not afford sufficient space for one Regiment of Infantry, but Estimates for improving and extending the accommodation have been called for, and are under preparation.
	Dum-Dum ...	Ditto ...	½ Regiment Foot, 2 Companies of Artillery ...	
	Chinsurah ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Dinapore ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot, 1 Company of Artillery.	
	Berhampore ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Darjeeling	Sanatarium.	
NORTH WESTERN PROVINCES.	Benares ...	Permanent ...	2 Companies Foot Artillery.	There is room also for the Ordnance Establishment. The old barracks have been condemned, but are not uninhabitable; the new double-storied barracks are in progress; the lower story is supposed to be nearly ready to receive the roof. Some quarters are provided in existing Native buildings, others completing; the accommodation for 600 men were sanctioned and put in progress, but probably have been destroyed. The old barracks have been condemned, but are still partially habitable and occupied; the new barracks well advanced. One set of Infantry barracks has been partly, if not entirely, given up to the Artillery Head Quarters or School of Instruction.
	Chunar ...	Ditto.		
	Allahabad ...	Ditto ...	½ Regiment of Foot ...	
	Cawnpore ...	Temporary ...	1 Regiment of Foot, 4 Companies Artillery ...	
	Lucknow ...	Ditto ...	½ Regiment Foot ...	
	Agra ...	Permanent ..	1 Regiment of Foot, 2 Companies of Artillery, 2 Regiments of Foot ...	
	Meerut ...	Ditto ...	1 Ditto Dragoons 4 H. and Companies Artillery ...	
	Roorkee ...	Ditto ...	Sappers and Miners, 30 men.	
Landour ...	Ditto ...	Sanatarium.		

TABULAR STATEMENT of Barrack Accommodation for European Troops in the Presidency of Bengal.—(Concluded.)

PROVINCE.	Stations.	Nature of Buildings.	Numbers and Detail of Troops.	REMARKS.
PUNJAB.	Umballa ...	Permanent ...	1 Regiment Dragoons ...	Infantry barracks condemned, but an Estimate for making them habitable was lately submitted.
		Temporary ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
		Permanent ...	3 Companies Artillery ...	
	Kussowlee ...	Temporary ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	The temporary barracks are condemned, and are being gradually replaced by more permanent buildings; the existing accommodation is barely sufficient for one Regiment.
		Permanent ...	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Dugshai ...	Permanent ...	1 Regiment of Foot.	The temporary barracks are condemned, but not uninhabitable. Estimates for the new permanent barracks have not been sanctioned.
	Subathoo ...	Temporary ..	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Jullundur ...	Ditto ..	1 Regiment of Foot, 2 Companies and F. Artillery ...	
	Govindghur ...	Permanent ..	1 Company Artillery ...	No remark.
	Mecan Meer ...	Ditto ...	1 Regiment of Foot, 6 Companies and F. Artillery ...	Ditto.
	Ferozepore ...	Temporary ..	1 Regiment of Foot, 2 Companies Artillery ...	These barracks were condemned, and an Estimate for new ones has been sanctioned, but certain improvements have lately been made to the old barracks by which they have been made serviceable for several years.
	Mooltan ...		1 Company of Artillery ...	
	Sealkote ...	Permanent	1 Regiment of Foot, 2 Companies and F. Artillery.	No remark.
	Rawul Pindie ...	Ditto	1 Regiment of Foot ...	
	Wuzeerabad ...	Temporary	
Nowshera ...	Permanent	1 Regiment of Foot	The barracks are not quite completed.	
Peshawur ...	Ditto ...	2 Regiments of Foot of F. and Companies Artillery ...	Accommodation not completed. The Troops are partly occupying temporary buildings.	
Murree ...	Sanatarium	200 European Soldiers.		

DISPOSITION RETURN of the Punjaub and Seikh Corps before the outbreak reckoning each Regiment at its full Strength.

Stations.	Corps.	European Com- missioned Officers.	European Non-Com- missioned and Rank and File.	Natives.	Remarks.
Kohat	No. 2, Punjaub Horse Light } Field Battery ... }	2	2	145	
	2nd Punjaub Cavalry ...	5	0	588	
	3rd Punjaub Infantry ...	5	0	930	
	5th Ditto ...	5	0	930	
	6th Ditto ...	5	0	930	
Bunnoo	No. 3, Punjaub Horse Light } Field Battery ... }	2	2	145	
	3rd Punjaub Cavalry ...	5	0	588	
	5th Ditto ...	5	0	588	
	1st Punjaub Infantry ...	5	0	930	
Dera Ishmael Khan ...	4th Ditto ...	5	0	930	
	No. 1, Punjaub Horse Light } Field Battery ... }	2	2	145	
	No. 4 or Garrison Company of } Artillery ... }	2	0	118	
	4th Punjaub Cavalry ...	5	0	588	
Dera Ghazee Khan ...	3rd Seikh Infantry ...	5	0	912	
	2nd Punjaub Infantry ...	5	0	930	
Asnee	1st Seikh Infantry ...	5	0	912	
	1st Punjaub Cavalry ...	5	0	588	
Abbottabad (Huzarah)	Huzarah Mountain Train } Battery ... }	1	0	108	
	4th Seikh Infantry ...	5	0	912	
Siribandh (Huzarah) ..	2nd or Hill Regiment of } Seikh Infantry ... }	5	0	912	
Murdan	Corps of Guides .. { Infantry ...	4	0	578	
	{ Cavalry ..	1	0	294	
	Total ...	89	6	13,701	

ABSTRACT.

Corps.	European Com- missioned Officers.	European Non-Com- missioned and Rank and File.	Natives.	Remarks.
3 Punjaub Light Field Batteries	6	6	435	
No. 4 or Garrison Company of Artillery	2	0	118	
Huzarah Mountain Train Battery	1	0	108	
5 Regiments of Punjaub Cavalry	25	0	2,040	
8 Regiments of Punjaub Infantry	30	0	5,580	
4 Regiments of Seikh Infantry	20	0	3,618	
Corps of Guides	5	0	872	
Total	89	6	13,701	

*DISPOSITION RETURN of the Punjaub Irregular Force on the 1st April 1858
after the Outbreak.*

CORPS.	STATIONS.
ARTILLERY.	
No. 1 Punjaub Light Field Battery	Derah Ishmael Khan.
No. 2 Ditto	Kohat.
No. 3 Ditto	Bunnoo.
No. 4 or Garrison Company of Artillery	Derah Ishmael Khan.
Huzara Mountain Train	Bunnoo.
CAVALRY.	
1st Regiment Seikh Cavalry	Lucknow.
2nd Ditto	Delhi.
3rd Ditto	Azimgurh Field Force.
4th Ditto	Lahore.
1st Regiment Punjaub Cavalry	Roorkee.
2nd Ditto	Lucknow, with Field Force.
3rd Ditto	Derah Ghazee Khan.
4th Ditto	Asnee.
5th Ditto	Kolachee.
Peshawur Light Horse	Campbellpore.
Cavalry of the Guide Corps	Murdan.
INFANTRY.	
1st Regiment Seikh Infantry	Roorkee.
2nd Ditto	Abbottabad.
3rd Ditto	Bunnoo.
4th Ditto	Delhi.
1st Regiment Punjaub Infantry	Roorkee.
2nd Ditto	Lucknow.
3rd Ditto	Kohat.
4th Ditto	Lucknow, with Field Force.
5th Ditto	Lucknow.
6th Ditto	Kohat.
7th Ditto	Futtehgurh.
8th Ditto	Nowshera.
9th Ditto	Peshawur.
10th Ditto	Derah Ishmael Khan.
11th Ditto	Mooltan.
12th Ditto	Hurreepoor.
13th Ditto	Umballah.
14th Ditto	Peshawur.
15th Ditto	Googaira.
16th Ditto	Jullundur.
17th Ditto	Roorkee.
18th Ditto	Peshawur.
19th Ditto	Rawul Pindee.
20th Ditto	Ferozepore.
21st Ditto	Lahore.
22nd Ditto	Gungerees.
23rd Ditto	Kanound.
24th Ditto	Lucknow, with Field Force.
Guide Corps	Murdan.

MEMORANDUM of Foot Levies entertained in the several Districts of the Punjaub, and for Field Service out of the Punjaub. (Received in a Letter from the Secretary Military Department, with the Governor General, No. 438, dated the 27th May 1858.)

DISTRICTS.	Date of Return.	No. of all Ranks.	REMARKS.
Peshawur	15th April 1858	605	
Kohat	Ditto	290	
Huzara	Ditto	155	
Leia	1st Ditto	192	
Derah Ishmael Khan	15th Ditto	1,016	
Rajah Jowahir Sing's Contingent	1st Ditto	700	At Hissar.
Hafizeollah Kazir Khaim's Foot	Ditto	27	Ditto.
Artillery Hurreeana Field Force	Ditto	99	Kunoude, Delhi Territory.
Mooltanee Irregulars	15th Ditto	27	At Loodianah.
Seikh Artillery, 3 Companies	Ditto	276	Mozuffernuggur, Delhi and Futtehgurh.
8th Punjaub Police Battalion	1st May 1858	946	At Delhi.
Benares Police Battalion N. W. P.	1st March 1858	1,126	En route to Benares.
Loodianah General Service Levy	1st May 1858	120	} Loodianah and Mithunkote.
Derah Ghazee Khan	15th Ditto	233	
Total	5,812	

*MEMORANDUM of Horse Levies entertained in the several Districts of the Pun-
jaub, and for Field Service out of the Punjaub.*

DISTRICTS.	Date of Return.	No. of all Ranks.	Total.	REMARKS.
Peshawur	15th April 1858 ...	1,089	2,352	
Kohat	Ditto ...	201		
Huzara	Ditto ...	48		
Leia	Ditto ...	12		
Derah Ishmael Khan	Ditto ...	792		
Derah Ghazee Khan	Ditto ...	210		
Googaira		
Jhelum	1st April 1858 ...	13		
Rawul Pindee	Ditto ...	4		
Shahpore	1st May 1858 ...	19		
Goojrat	Ditto ...	30		
Lahore	1st April 1858 ...	336		
Umballah	Ditto ...	336		
Goozranwalla	Ditto ...	15		
Hooshiarpoor	Ditto ...	83		
Kangrah		
Mooltan Horse	1st February 1858	345		
Rajah Jowahir Sing's Contingent ...	1st April 1858 ...	17		At Hissar.
Isha Khail's Ressallah	15th Ditto ...	108		At Jhujjur.
Khairoodeen's Ditto	1st Ditto ...	89		At Hissar.
Shumshoodeen's Ditto	15th Ditto ...	80		Ditto.
Hafizoollah Hazir Kaim's Ressallah ...	1st Ditto ...	17		Ditto.
Shah Newaz Khan's Ditto	1st March 1858 ...	32		Ditto.
Surfraz Khan, Lukozai	15th April 1858 ...	80	Muzuffernugur.	
Ruzza Mohamed Khan	1st Ditto ...	236		
Mohamed Surfraz Khan				
Mohamed Ufzul Khan				
Sooltan Jan's Ressallah	Ditto ..	106	Muzuffernugur	
Ressaldar Typhoor's Ressallah	Ditto ...	115	At Lucknow.	
Carried over ...		2070	2352	

MEMORANDUM of Horse Levies entertained in the several Districts of the Punjab, and for Field Service out of the Punjab.—(Concluded).

DISTRICTS.	Date of Return.	No. of all Ranks.	Total.	REMARKS.
Brought over		2,070	2,352	
Meer Mobarick Shah's Ressallah, at- } tached to the 1st Punjab Infantry... }	15th April 1858 ...	74		Camp Rohilcund.
Mustapha Khan Khagwanie's Ressallah ...	Ditto ...	106		Mooltan.
Sirdar Khan Sing, Kohareea	1st March 1858 ...	29		Lahore.
Joudhpoor Seikh Horse	Ditto ..	401		Ajmere.
Allahabad Mounted Police	15th April 1858 ...	215		
Towanna Ressallah of Mullicks, Futteh } Sher Khan and Alum Sher Khan ... }	Ditto ...	222		Pulwul.
Police Horse for Cawnpore	No Returns	3,117	
Total	5,469	

ABSTRACT.

Horse Levies	5,469
Foot Levies	5,812
Total	11,281

PUNJAUB POLICE FORCE IN 1857.

STATEMENT showing the Strength and Distribution of the Police Force in the Punjab, before the outbreak; extracted from a Return, dated 1st October 1857, received with Memo. from Foreign Department, No. 2217, dated 18th June 1858.

ABSTRACT.		European Officers.	Native Officers and Men.	
29	Ressallahs, Mounted Police	0	3,244	
7	Battalions of Foot Police	4	7,471	
Total		4	10,715	
DISTRIBUTION.				
Derah Ghazee Khan	3	Ressallahs	0	332
Derah Ishmail Khan	2	Ditto	0	222
	6th	Police Battalion	0	680
Bunnoo and Leia		Ditto	0	352
Huzara	1½	Ressallah.. .. .	0	164
Lahore Division	6½	Ditto	0	728
	1st	Police Battalion	1	1300
Umritsur.. .. .	1½	Ressallah	0	170
	7th	Police Battalion	0	1,290
Goordaspore	1½	Ressallah.. .. .	0	142
Goojranwallah	1½	Ditto	0	139
Sealkote	1	Ditto	0	111
Rawul Pindee.. .. .	1	Ditto	0	110
	5th	Police Battalion	0	1,101
Goozerat.. .. .	1	Ressallah.. .. .	0	111
Jhelum	1	Ditto	0	108
Shahpore.. .. .	1	Ditto	0	109
Peshawur	2	Ditto	0	222
Mooltan	1	Ditto	0	111
	3rd	Police Battalion	1	922
Googaira	1	Ressallah.. .. .	0	109
Jhung	1	Ditto	0	109
Khangurb	1	Ditto	0	110
Leia.. .. .	1	Ditto	0	137
Dhurmsalla.. .. .	2nd and 4th Police Battalions		1	1,826
Total		3	10,715	

Note.—One European Officer not accounted for in the Disposition Return.

Police Force in Bengal before the Outbreak in 1857.

- 2 Companies of Paiks in Cuttack.
- 10 „ Behar Guards, Patna.
- 2 „ in Assam.
- 8 Ditto, and 1 Troop Rattray's Seikhs.

POLICE CORPS under the Government of Bengal in 1858 (See Bengal Secretary's Letter No. 2475 of the 15th July 1858).

CORPS.	NUMBER ON THE ROLL.		AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.		REMARKS.
	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	
	Bengal Police Battalion Rattray's ...	855	100	1,000	
Behar Station Guards	1,040	0	1,300	0	
Behar Irregular Cavalry	0	184	0	500	
Behar European Mounted Police	0	26	0	26	
Sasseeram Sebundy Police	158	20	0	0	
Sarun Levy	231	0	0	0	
Purneah Military Police Parbutteas ...	700	0	500	0	
Sonthal Levy	280	0	3 Companies		
Sonthal Pergunnah Police Force	180	0	180	0	
Cole and Sonthal Levy ...	461	0	500	0	
Orissa Paik Companies ...	400	0	400	0	
Kookee Levy	200	0	200	0	
Kamroop Sham Guard ...	12	0	12	0	
Nowgong Police Militia ...	150	0	150	0	
Sebsaugor Police Militia	100	0	100	0	
Total ...	4,767	330	4,622		

STRENGTH and Distribution of Police Corps, proposed to be raised for duty in the Bengal Provinces (now under the consideration of Government in the Home Department). See Letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2037, dated the 14th June 1858.

	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
CAVALRY.			
10 Ressallahs of Cavalry	0	30	1,090
INFANTRY.			
10 Battalions of Infantry	50	200	11,300
<i>Note.</i> —100 Sowars to be stationed at the Head Quarters of each Police Battalion			
Total ...	50	230	12,390
DISTRIBUTION.			
1ST BATTALION.			
Sooree	2	8	452
Sonthal Pergunnahs, Nya Doomka, &c., and Rajmehal ...	2	8	452
Berhampore	1	4	226
2ND BATTALION.			
Patna	1	6	339
Chuprah	1	4	226
Shahabad	1	4	226
Chumparun	1	2	113
Behar	1	4	226
3RD BATTALION.			
Ranee or Dorundah... ..	1	8	452
Hazareebagh	1	4	226
Chyebassa	1	4	226
Purulia	1	2	113
Palamow	1	2	113
4TH BATTALION.			
Bhaugulpore	2	8	452
Mozufferpore	1	4	226
Monghyr	1	4	226
Purneah	1	4	226
Carried over	20	80	4,520

STRENGTH and Distribution of Police Corps, proposed to be raised for duty in the Bengal Provinces (now under the consideration of Government in the Home Department). See Letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2037, dated the 14th June 1858.—(Concluded.)

	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
Brought over	20	80	4,520
5TH BATTALION.			
Dinagepore	1	8	452
Rungpore	1	4	226
Rajshahye	1	4	226
Bograh	1	2	113
Maldah	1	2	113
6TH BATTALION.			
Dacca	1	8	452
Sylhet	1	4	226
Mymensing	1	4	226
Serajunge	1	2	113
Pubna	1	2	113
7TH BATTALION.			
Chittagong	2	8	452
Noacolly	1	4	226
Tipperah	1	4	226
Backergunge	1	4	226
8TH BATTALION.			
Twenty-four Pergunnahs	1	8	452
Kishnaghur	1	4	226
Jessore	1	4	226
Furreedpore	1	2	113
Baraset	1	2	113
9TH BATTALION.			
Burdwan	1	8	452
Bancoorah	1	2	113
Hooghly	1	4	226
Midnapore	1	4	226
Howrah	1	2	113
10TH BATTALION.			
Cuttack	2	8	452
Pooree	1	4	226
Balasore	1	4	226
Tributary Mehals	1	4	226
Total	50	200	11,300
Add 10 Ressallahs of Cavalry	0	30	1,090
Grand Total	50	230	12,390

OUDE POLICE IN 1857.

	European Com- missioned Offi- cers.	Natives of all Ranks.
HORSE POLICE.		
1 Regiment of Horse	1	999
FOOT POLICE.		
1st Police Battalion	1	850
2nd Ditto	1	850
3rd Ditto	1	850
Total	4	3,549
OUDE POLICE IN 1858.		
HORSE POLICE.		
1st Regiment Mounted Police	1	500
2nd Ditto	1	449
Total	2	949
FOOT POLICE.		
1st Police Battalion	2	880
2nd Ditto	1	748
3rd Ditto	2	796
4th Ditto	0	615
5th Ditto	1	372
6th Ditto	1	903
Total	9	2,63
Allahabad Mounted Police	1	331
Remains of Oude Irregular Cavalry Corps	1	65

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ALLAHABAD,
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY,

The 12th September 1858.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

To

COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,

THE undersigned begs to forward to Colonel Durand, an Abstract of the work done in providing cover for European Troops during the past season in the Lower Provinces, North-Western Provinces, Oude, Saugor Territory and Nagpore, including also Delhi, but excluding the rest of the Punjaub.

The amount of cover included in these Abstracts may be approximately divided as follows:—

	Lower Provinces.	N. W. Provinces, (Nagpore and Saugor Territory.)	Total.
	<i>For Men.</i>	<i>For Men.</i>	
New Barracks entirely built, a few permanent, and others of various degrees of durability	8,400	18,800	27,200
Barracks restored, and miscellaneous buildings restored and adapted for cover ...	3,350	28,800	32,150
Existing permanent Barracks	4,850	5,900	10,750
	16,600	53,500	70,100

This Estimate is exclusive of the Hospital accommodation and cover for Officers which has also been provided.

The "New Barracks entirely built" vary exceedingly in character and substance, from shelter of the most hasty and temporary character to that of the kind usually understood as "permanent." Out of the whole amount, new cover for about 2,200 men may lay claim to the latter character, including the work at Fort William which has been some years in progress. Cover for about 8,000 or 9,000 men is of a very temporary kind, and the greater part of this has been entirely undertaken since the latter part of May.

The remainder is of a medium kind, of which the better examples may last 12 or 15 years with ordinary repairs.

A copy of an Abstract of accommodation in the Punjaub is also added. This was received in the early part of the year, but requires little modification; it shows accom-

modation in Barracks, omitting resort to other buildings, or to extraordinary crowding, for 16,840 men.

Hence we have a total of accommodation for 68,940 men entirely excluding the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, Sindh, Pegu, &c.

(Signed) H. YULE, *Captain,*
Offg. Secy. to the Govt. of India,
with the Governor General.

ABSTRACT OF PROGRESS OF BARRACK BUILDING IN THE LOWER PROVINCES.

Artillery Barracks (three in number) for 160 men and 20 families, with out-Offices are nearly complete. Stabling for 138 horses and harness room not yet complete.
 Barrackpore.

Seven Infantry Barracks for 100 men each complete. One Barrack for 25 families complete. Four more nearly complete.

Two small Barracks for (say) 50 men each, complete.

These will all be ready by 30th September. Two large circular skittle sheds in progress.

The five old Native Infantry Hospitals have been repaired and used as Barracks during the construction of the above. They will now be used as Hospitals for the Europeans.

Two of the large, and the two small Barracks were begun in January and February. The remainder in April and May, the site of some previously commenced having been disapproved. In all, the foundations are of brick and mortar, the superstructure in some is partially of sun burnt brick, and of others of burnt brick in clay. In the married Barracks the iron frames sent out by the Court of Directors have been used.

Cover for 500 men of the Company's depôt has lately been ordered in addition.

The earlier work was done by Captain J. Eliot, Artillery, the work since April by Captain A. Fraser of Engineers. The cover when complete will accommodate 1 Regiment Infantry, 1 Battery Royal Artillery, and the usual number of families.

Large progress has been made in the improvements, alterations and extensions of buildings at Berhampore to adapt them to the reception of the 1st Regiment of Infantry, and one Battery of Artillery with their families, but the site is too bulky, and the operations too various to admit of easy condensation.

Eight hundred men can be accommodated, and on emergency 1,100, without great crowding.

Captain Layard is the Officer in charge.

Two large stables, each stated to be equal to the reception of 300 men, have been repaired and fitted for Troops. Captain Alexander, Executive Engineer.

Buxar.

The additions, to fit the permanent Barracks at Chinsurah for the accommodation of a whole Regiment of Infantry with families, have made fair progress under Captain A. Fraser, but they will not be complete probably till the beginning of 1859.

Chinsurah.

Buildings at this Station have been adapted for the accommodation of 328 men, besides a Hospital, out-offices, skittle shed, &c. Commenced June 16th. Lieutenant Hitchens, Executive Engineer.

Dacca.

The Barracks in progress here are 20 in number, intended for 1000 men, but capable, if necessary, of holding a larger number. Three are quite complete, the remainder are well advanced, and will be habitable in November probably.

Darjeeling.

The foundation, plinth and $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet of walls are of rubble stone in clay, the remainder of spar walls plastered with clay and white-washed. The roofing of sheet iron plastered with clay and white-washed.

The work was commenced in September 1857, and has been executed by Lieutenant W. S. Trevor, of Engineers.

Seven Barracks for 100 men each completed, with main guard, and all the usual out-offices. The foundations, plinth, cross walls, piers at intervals in the walls, and verandah pillars, are of brick in lime, the remainder of sun-dried brick in clay.

Dinapore.

The roofs of tiles over 6 inches of thatch. Begun 21st January, Executive Engineer Captain Alexander, of Artillery.

Additions to the present permanent Barracks, were commenced in the middle of February 1858, and quarters for 430 men are ready for occupation; substantial Barracks, though called temporary, have also been built near the same locality for 639 men.

Dum-Dum.

Three Artillery stables have been greatly changed and adapted as Barracks for 360 men.

Five ranges of bullock sheds have been fitted by raising, ventilating, addition of verandahs, &c., for the reception of 600 men.

Temporary stables for 400 horses have been erected.

The work was commenced early in February. The total permanent and temporary new accommodation is for 2,029 men. The old Barracks for 1,200 men have been occupied by women and children.

Besides the above, iron framed Barracks for 200 more men, a temporary Hospital, and other subsidiary buildings are in progress, also the adaptation of the Riding School as a Barrack for 160 men. The Executive Officer has been Mr. G. N. Dodd.

The Queen's Barrack is expected to be complete on 1st November next, the Dalhousie Barrack 1st January next. The Fort Barracks will then afford good quarters for 1,700 men, 132 families, and Officers in proportion. Buildings available and suitable for quarters in the town, afford ready cover for 1,200 to 1,300 men in addition.

Two old Barracks have been re-constructed for hospital, main guard, canteen, &c., and six new Barracks for 100 men each have been constructed with all usual out-offices. They are similar to those at Dinapore, two more Barracks are in progress. A new Hospital is also in progress. Regimental prison has been repaired and extended, and numerous Bungalows restored and adapted for use of Officers, Commissariat, &c. Commenced in November 1857. Executive Engineer, Lieutenant F. W. Peile, of Engineers.

Two Barracks exactly similar to those erected at Dinapore with out-houses completed. Commenced 31st December 1857. Captain F. Alexander, Executive Engineer.

Temporary shelter for 1,000 men has been ordered here, in which use is to be made of the iron frames sent out by the Court of Directors. The parts built last year in haste were not of a character to serve beyond the emergency under which they were constructed.

Three Barracks for 253 men, and a Hospital for 60 have been completed. The two largest Barracks were burnt down in June and had to be re-built.

These are of palm tree frame work, with wattle and dab sides, thatch and tiles.

Three bungalows for 13 Officers have also been completed. Foundations of rubble stone, walls of sun-dried brick, roofs of thatch tiled over, glass doors.

Also the usual out-offices, gun-sheds and stables for 50 Artillery horses.

The lateness of the season when these buildings were ordered, prevented the use of more substantial material in the Barracks.

Two Barracks similar to the above, for 150 men with subsidiary buildings have been completed. Begun 11th June. Halting Stations affording accommodation for 150 men at each of the ten stations along the road, are also well advanced.

The above work is under Lieutenant Stanton, Executive Engineer, 2nd Division, Grand Trunk Road, who has also nearly completed a Cantonment for 300 Seikh Infantry, 100 Cavalry and their Officers at Dehra on the Soane.

ABSTRACT OF PROGRESS OF BARRACK BUILDING IN THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES, (INCLUDING NAGPORE AND THE SAUGOR AND NERBUDDA TERRITORIES.)

Agra. Five new European Barracks, which had been burnt by the rebels, have been restored and re-roofed, and the 6th, which was incomplete when the mutiny broke out, has been completed. The Artillery Barracks have also been completely restored, and seven out of eleven old Infantry Barracks, the rest being incapable of repair.

The works were commenced in December 1857, and finished in July. The old Barracks were restored by Captain J. D. Campbell of Engineers, and the new Barracks by Mr. Sub-Engineer Clarke, the accommodation at Agra will in all suffice for 2,377 men besides two or even four Companies in the Fort.

Allahabad. For Infantry, 29 Barracks, each intended for 100 men, are ready. For Cavalry, eight Barracks, each capable of holding 90 men. For Artillery, four Barracks, each intended for 100 men. The aggregate number is therefore 4,020, but they would hold 4,500 on emergency without inconvenience. The foundations and plinth, door chinks, verandah pillars, and arches, are of burnt brick in lime, the remainder sun-dried brick in clay. The roof trusses of Sal-wood with thatch and tiles over all; the flooring generally of stone flags over brick.

Besides these, Hospitals, equal to the reception of 400 sick, have been constructed. Two Barrack Churches (for Protestants and Roman Catholics) each equal to the reception of a congregation of 700 to 800 men. Three ranges of Officers' quarters, and all the usual Barrack out-offices, besides the repair and almost re-construction of several Bungalows for officers, and many minor works.

These works were commenced in December 1857, and have been carried on throughout by Captain A. Impey, of Engineers.

Allyghur. The buildings erected here are within the old Fort. They consist of seven Barracks for 312 men, Hospital, Commissariat Godown, and Officers' quarters. They are all of brick in clay with door-ways, &c., brick in lime mortar. Begun 1st March 1858, finished 31st May. Executive Engineer, Lieutenant J. L. Watts, of Engineers.

Azimghur. Existing buildings extensively repaired, nearly all re-roofed and fitted for Troops, between 20th April and 11th July, besides Officers' quarters. Quarters for 610 men. Captain J. Dawson, 43rd Native Infantry, in charge.

Banda. The arrangements for covering the Troops at Banda have been made by Officers of General Whitlock's Force, and no report has been received in this Office.

Buildings accommodating 1,085 men, (including the Jail buildings) have been re-roofed, repaired, and adapted. New Barracks for 1,040 men have been erected. Two buildings have been erected as Hospitals, and five others repaired and adapted. Grounds, wash-houses, canteens, skittle alleys, &c., have been erected, in all 111 separate buildings between the middle of May and the middle of August.

The new work is stated to be of brick in clay, with some thatched and some tiled roofing. Much of it is probably of a very temporary character, but the speed with which it has been executed at an unfavorable season is remarkable; for the greater part by Captain John Humę, Executive Engineer, Bareilly Division.

The accommodation here is distributed in three localities :—

1st.—In the Cantonment at Secrole, taking the old Artillery Barrack as a nucleus by the addition of temporary Barracks, the loan of a building called the Mint from the Rajah of Benares, and the hire of other houses, excellent cover has been completed for 1,212 men, including special provision for 52 married. In the Hospitals of the old Native Infantry Corps, which have been altered and improved, there is sick accommodation for 200 men.

2nd.—In the (intended) Lunatic Asylum, Pandypore, at the North end of the Civil Station of Benares.

These buildings had been commenced and partially built as a Central Lunatic Asylum.

They were taken over by the Department Public Works, and additional buildings erected so as to fit them for the reception of a Head Quarter's Wing of a Regiment of Infantry; they accommodate 550 men, including 26 families.

In the neighbourhood of these Barracks, a large building called the "Normal School," has also been taken up, which will give good cover to 150 men.

3rd.—Within the entrenchment at Rajghat on the Ganges.

Here a few existing buildings and a number of temporary Barracks which have been constructed give good accommodation for 651 men, including 26 married men.

The total accommodation provided at Benares is :—

In Barracks	2,433
Married Men	130
					<hr/>
					2,563
					<hr/>

besides Hospital accommodation. The Barracks are of the same general description as at Allahabad, but perhaps superior to them. The work, with the numerous out-offices required, has been heavy. Lieutenant W. R. Tucker, of Engineers, has been the Officer in charge. The work was commenced in December.

Seven new permanent Barracks in progress when the mutiny broke out, had been completed to the top of the lower story. These have been roofed
 Cawnpore. over, one entirely with terrace roof, the others with centre ward thatched, and verandahs terraced. They hold 1,050 men. The old Cavalry stables were entirely re-modelled, the walls and floors raised, and verandahs added, and makes very good quarters for 900 men.

The repair of the Artillery Barracks and Dragoon Hospital, which survived the mutiny, gives cover for 750 men, and the adaptation of the gun sheds as a Barrack for 200 more.

Out-offices have been provided for all these Barracks.

For Officers' quarters, 13 bungalows more or less ruined, have been repaired—one large range of Officers' Barracks built, other large buildings restored and fitted as Officers' Barracks and Mess-room. All these also have been supplied with out-offices.

The two ruined Artillery Hospitals, and the ruined Riding School have been repaired, roofed and fitted for Hospitals.

St. John's Chapel, also entirely ruined, has been restored, roofed, and adapted for Divine Service.

The baths in the Dragoon and Artillery lines have been restored and fitted for use.

Much other work has been done, including sheds for the Camel Corps.

The above accommodation, together with that afforded by Bungalows within the entrenchments, will give cover for about 3,500 Europeans.

The work was commenced in the end of January, and was nearly all executed by Captain G. Sim, lately succeeded by Lieutenant D. Simond.

Buildings both inside and outside the Palace have been adapted as temporary
 Delli. Barracks, and others are still in process of adaptation. Inside the Palace, 543 Europeans are already accommodated, and 103 more will be when the arrangements are complete. In the College and other buildings outside the Palace, 871 are now accommodated, and 1,125 more can be, if necessary, by 20th September. Total 2,647. The Executive Engineer is Lieutenant Newmarch, Engineers.

Buildings for 360 men, exclusive of large hospital accommodation, repaired and adapted. Half Company Barracks for 750 men entirely built, four
 Futtehgurh. more Barracks for 200 men will be ready in September.

Bgun by Captain Hume, Executive Engineer of Bareilly, chiefly by Lieutenant Gillespie, Artillery.

Six large ranges, originally Dragoon Barracks, and afterwards Stud stables, have been adapted with a large amount of reconstruction. The out-
 Ghazecpore. buildings are partly adapted and repaired, partly new.

The work was begun at the beginning of the year, and is now complete, with the exception of the verandah of one Barrack. Chiefly done by Captain J. Dawson, 43rd Native Infantry, completed by Lieutenant J. R. Martin, Artillery. The Barracks are stated to be equal to the accommodation of 1,130 men, besides the hospitals.

At Goruckpore, cover for 750 men existed in the public buildings, and a serai was repaired and adapted for 250 more, only a small part of this accommodation has been required at Bustee. Only one bungalow was available. This was at once converted into a hospital. Other quarters for 75 Officers and 1,126 men, with offices and with stables for 560 horses, and sheds for six guns, and 84 gun bullocks have been erected of timber, mats and thatch, between 14th May and 20th July. The Executive Engineer, Lieutenant Gully, 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

Captain A. D. Turnbull, of Engineers, has been employed in covering the Garrison at Gwalior under Military authority. No report has yet been received in this office.

The late Kutcherry, the Residency, the Palace, some large serais, and other buildings have been adapted as Barracks for nearly 2,500 men of all arms, but it is not stated how many of these are Europeans. The work has been done by Captain John Baillie of the Bengal Native Infantry. The communication with Jhansi is still obstructed, and a regular report has not been received.

Two thatched mat Barracks for 160 men built in the old Fort, and existing buildings repaired, improved and adapted, with addition of out-houses, &c. for 330 more, commenced 1st May, and finished by middle of June. Captain Dawson, 43rd N. I., in charge.

Ten substantial brick Barracks and out-houses equal to the accommodation of 1,000 men have been entirely constructed between the 10th of February and the 15th of July. When the orders were received, (on the 21st January) there was no material in stock; stone and lime had to be quarried, bricks and tiles to be moulded and burnt, timber cut and carted, an average of 30 miles.

Lieutenant Crossman, 41st Madras Native Infantry, is the Officer who has executed this work.

The Chief Engineer's Office has also been fitted for a Company of Artillery with guard rooms, &c., attached.

The buildings occupied here are chiefly a range of large cotton godowns with very lofty roofs, which, with a few repairs, and the opening of a few additional doors, made good barracks.

There are also some bungalows and other buildings within the Fort.

The whole accommodation is good for upwards of 800 men.

The work has been executed in June and July by Lieutenant Eckford, of the Bengal Engineers.

By Lieutenant Medley, Engineers (Garrison Engineer); Barracks (brick with flat roofs) for 160 men have been built, and a variety of buildings repaired and adapted, to accommodate 550 men and 15 Officers. This work was begun in the early part of May, and lies within the fortified posts on the banks of the Goomtee.

The work at Muridon (Lucknow Cantonment) has been under Mr. H. Dewes, Sub-Engineer. The work is of a very temporary character, and has been done with great rapidity. The new buildings are erected on the site of the old Native Infantry lines, which had to be levelled for the purpose. They are thatched on timber skeletons, with brick gables, and the sides made of tent walls on dwarf walls of brick.

In this way, cover for 300 Artillery, 450 Cavalry, and 1,600 Infantry, has been prepared by Mr. Dewes between the 9th June and the 20th July.

Hospital accommodation for 500 men also has been prepared, partly in the same way, and partly by the repair of ruined buildings.

Officers' quarters and out-offices have also been adapted from buildings in a very ruinous condition, in which the whole of the roofs and wood work had been utterly destroyed.

Two Bullock sheds have been adapted as Barracks for 150 men with addition of verandahs. A vaulted stable has been converted into quarters for 24 families, by a thatched roof being put over the vault, and a verandah added all round.

Three Rum Godowns have been converted into Barracks for 510 men, a temporary shed for the Rum having been constructed. Canteen, Orderly room, Cells and other subsidiary buildings have been constructed or adapted. The large European hospital has been adapted to accommodate a larger number by the addition of exterior verandahs.

By these adaptations of existing buildings with some temporary additions, cover is now available here for 2½ Regiments Infantry, one Regiment Cavalry, two Troops and two Companies of Artillery, and for the Artillery recruits. The work was executed by Captain S. Pott, of Engineers. It was begun in the middle of January, and finished by 15th March.

Six barracks for 60 men each have been built here, partly of brick in clay, and partly of rubble stone, with verandah pillars, &c., of brick in lime, roofs thatched, verandahs tiled. These are nearly ready; also six Cavalry stables with vaulted roofs have been converted into Barracks for 135 men each, ventilators being knocked out, second roofs of thatch or tiles and verandahs added, &c. These are not quite complete, but are occupied.

The usual subsidiary buildings have been provided.

There have been great difficulties at Mhow in finding either labor or material, and a variety of expedients have been resorted to in completing the cover. The work was begun in February, and has been carried on first by Lieutenant Mytton, and afterwards by Lieutenant Davidson, of Bombay Engineers.

At Mhow there are also old Artillery Barracks available for one Troop.

Buildings capable of accommodating 510 men, have been adapted and fitted with out-houses by Mr. G. Nolan, Assistant Executive Engineer.

Mirzapore.

The work here consisted chiefly in extensive restoration and adaptation of existing buildings, with addition of out-offices, canteen, amusement shed, &c. Accommodation has thus been provided for 491 men, exclusive of hospitals. The work was begun May 31st, and has been executed by Lieutenant G. F. Chesney and Lieutenant McNeill, of Engineers.

Moradabad.

Old Artillery Barracks for 160 men have been extensively repaired.

Muttra.

Stables of old Cavalry lines have been repaired and adapted for 384 men.

Three New Barracks for 312 men built; stables for a Troop of Artillery, and a Regiment of Cavalry exteriorly repaired. Out-houses partly built, and partly repaired. Work commenced in January. Executive Engineer, Captain E. Smalley, 36th Native Infantry.

The Jail buildings have been adapted for 278 men by adding verandahs, knocking out additional openings, removal of enclosure wall, &c.; a new Barrack has been built for 80 men, and two hospitals giving accommodation together for 124 men. The Judge's Kutcherry has been repaired and adapted as a Barrack, and two other private houses repaired for Officers' quarters.

Mynpoorie.

Total including hospital accommodation, 642.

The Executive Officer Lieutenant A. H. B. Bruce, 43rd Native Infantry.

The old Barracks for 1,000 Infantry have been thoroughly repaired. Barracks for 400 European Cavalry have been built, and one for 80 more men altered and adapted.

Nagpore.

Quarters for 108 families of Infantry and 38 families of Cavalry have been built.

The foundations of new buildings are of rubble stone, outer walls of burnt brick in clay, inner walls of sun-burnt brick, roofs of main wards thatched, of verandahs and out-offices tiled.

The old and new accommodation together will give good cover for nearly 1,800 men, including the regular proportion of families. The work was begun in January, and has been executed by Lieutenant A. Cadell, Bengal Engineers.

Huts have been built here for 980 men, besides Hospitals for 290. The floors are raised one foot six inches from the ground, the roof thatch on poles, the sides are tent walls. The work was done between 18th June and 15th August, by Lieutenant R. B. Pemberton, Bengal Engineers.

Nawabgunge (Fyzabad road from Lucknow)

Nineteen Barracks have been built, viz., 3 for 60 men each, 10 for 40 men each, and 6 for 20 men each. Two more for 48 and 64 men respectively have been formed by the improvement of existing buildings.

Nyneer Tal.

A house called "Drury Castle" has been adapted as an Hospital, and a large range attached to the house has been converted into quarters for medical subordinates.

The site required the construction of a new road along the hill side, which is nearly completed, and of a temporary aqueduct from the lake, 4,000 feet in length.

The new Barracks and Offices are built of stone, with mud cement and roofed with thatch.

Begun in February. Captain F. G. Glover, of Engineers, has done the work.

Twenty half Company Barracks have been built, and the greater part of the necessary out-offices. These Barracks are of a superior construction, considered as temporary, the large Ganges Canal establishments affording facilities not found elsewhere. The work was begun in the middle of January, and by the end of May the Barracks were fit for occupation. Mr. Harington, Sub-Engineer has done this work very creditably under Captain S. Pott, Executive Engineer, of the Meerut Division.

Roorkee.

The Sapper Barracks also afford accommodation for 250 men.

Only one new Barrack (for 70 Artillerymen) has been built here. The rest of the accommodation has been provided by adapting and improving existing buildings, adding new offices, &c.

Saugor.

The work was begun in February, and has been done by Lieutenant B. Prior of the Madras Army, at very moderate cost.

With the Artillery Barrack previously existing, good cover is afforded for 1,700 men, if required.

Thirty-one small new temporary Barracks have been built for 1,080 men, other buildings for 770 men and for Officers' quarters, Commissariat, Hospitals, &c., have been restored and adapted, and the usual out-office added. The work was begun in the end of May, and has been performed by Lieutenant Lindsay Russell, of Engineers, under great difficulties.

Shajehanpoor.

Temporary Barracks for 200 men with Hospital and Officers' quarters, &c., have been erected here. Raised plat-forms were also prepared for the tents of Colonel Berkely's Column.

Soraon (10 miles North of Allahabad.)

ABSTRACT.

STATIONS.	EUROPEAN INFANTRY.		EUROPEAN ARTILLERY.		ACCOMMODATION WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE BY 30TH APRIL.		Number there can be accommodated in other Buildings.
	Number of men for whom accommodation has been provided.	How many could be provided with accommodation by use of Verandahs in extraordinary times.	Number of men for whom accommodation has been provided.	How many could be provided with accommodation by use of Verandahs in extraordinary times.	Infantry.	Artillery.	
Peshawur	2,396	2,994	884	1,000	504	50	160
Nowshera	768	1,150	288	60
Attock	300	300
Rawul Pindie	1,230	1,710
Sealkote	1,020	1,500	182	263
Mooltan	108	120	144	420
Meean Meer	1,020	1,500	508	695	115	250
Lahore Citadel	100	150	144	210	450
Anar Kullee	450
Umritsur Cantonment and Fort	100	150	308
Ferozepore	880	1,320	156	220	1,000
Loodianah	200
Jullunder	1,000	1,480	231	340	35
Hoshearpore	75
Umballah	424	650	1,500
Kussowlee	934	1,000
Subathoo	596	596	300
Dugshaie	960	1,000
Total... ..	11,204	14,700	2,737	3,648	2,736	165	3,408

FROM

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. M. DURAND, C. B.,
On special duty with the Governor General,

TO

THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA.

Allahabad, 16th August 1858.

MY LORD,

ON the 21st May last, under your Lordship's instructions, a Circular Letter, enclosing the first series of questions upon the subject of Army re-organization, was despatched to the various public servants, Civil and Military, whose opinions it was deemed advisable to obtain.

2. In the Circular Letter in question, it was stated that in your Lordship's opinion the main features of the revolt of the Native Army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entailed, were of themselves sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being the strength and the composition of the European Army which must be permanently maintained in India, as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security. That consequently the 5th para. of the Hon'ble Court's despatch No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, became the one of primary importance, and that a decision upon the strength and composition of the European Army, and the proportion it should bear to the Native Army at each Presidency separately, and in India generally, would go far to simplify enquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which would then be brought clearly into view.

3. I have now the honor to lay before your Lordship a precis of the replies which have been received upon the first series of questions.

4. I beg likewise to represent that a precis of the replies upon the subsequent series of questions is in course of preparation; but with reference to the views expressed in the 5th para. of the Circular Letter of the 21st May 1858, it seemed advisable to submit without delay the accompanying paper for your Lordship's consideration and orders.

5. Upon the political question raised by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab respecting Peshawur, the precis avoids remarks; the subject however being one, which though of political character, has an incidental bearing on the amount and disposition of Force necessary for the Punjab, it will not fail to meet with the attention which the importance of the question demands.

6. I have endeavoured to conform to the instructions conveyed to me in the Military Secretary's letter No. 238, of the 16th May 1858, and have therefore abstained from offering any opinions upon the various subjects contained in the precis.

7. A correct return of the Barrack accommodation of the Bengal Presidency is in course of preparation by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Public Works. It did not seem advisable to delay the papers for this return, which can be separately submitted when received.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

H. M. DURAND, *Lieut.-Col., Engrs.,*
On special duty with the Governor General.

PRECIS

Of the replies to the questions having reference to Paragraph 5, of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1,2,3,and4.

1. The Adjutant General of the Bengal Army, Colonel Mayhew, in his letter No. 1473 A. of the 6th July 1858, after stating that considerable delay had taken place in submitting his replies in consequence of the difficulty he had experienced in collecting material for the returns called for by questions 1, 3 and 5, proceeds to answer questions 1 and 3, by enclosing the Distribution Return of the Troops, European and Native, serving on the Bengal Establishment on the 1st May 1858. He notes however with regret that the returns are somewhat imperfect, which is attributable partly to his having no information as to the various Police Corps lately raised, and partly to having received no Returns from six of Her Majesty's Corps of Infantry, a Battalion of Company's European Artillery, and two Battalions of Company's Native Artillery, besides having no returns from the Sirmoor Battalion, and from the Levies of Horse raised since the mutiny.

2. From the Distribution Return of the 1st May 1858, it appears, omitting the Corps of Infantry and the Artillery from which no Returns had been received, that the strength of European Troops of all Arms was—

Officers	1,665
Rank and File	42,947

In order to include the omitted Corps, if an average be struck upon those whose strength is shown by the Return, then the total of the European Troops would be about—

Officers	1,864
Non-Commissioned and Rank and File...	48,433

3. From the same source the strength of the Native Troops, omitting those Corps of which Colonel Mayhew had no Returns, was, on the 1st May 1858, as follows—

European Officers	713
„ Non-Commissioned Officers...	115
Native Commissioned, Non-Commis- sioned and Rank and File ... }	77,550

Allowing for the Sirmoor Battalion, and for the Cavalry Levies, the strength of the Native Troops may be taken at—

European Officers	750
„ Non-Commissioned	150
Native Commissioned, Non-Commis- sioned and Rank and File ... }	80,000

4. Colonel Mayhew expresses the opinion that, for many years to come, a European Force of not less than 60,000 men of all arms will be required, and that without taking into account the Sappers and Miners, the European Force should be composed of 10,000 Artillery, 8,000 Cavalry, and 40,000 Infantry. The distribution of this Force, Colonel Mayhew would leave very much as it is at present, making Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Lahore and Jhelum large entrepôts for European Troops, on which all their outposts might be assembled, whether for offensive or defensive operations, and where large stores of every kind should be always in a state of preparation for service.

5. Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that, the Native Troops might be retained numerically in equal proportions with Europeans for Cavalry, Infantry and Sappers; and be distributed in like manner, and always associated as much as possible. He considers, however, that the Native Troops of the line have one and all forfeited every claim to consideration, and should be disbanded at once. That every man should be given distinctly to understand that all claim had ceased under old Regulations; but to such portion as had shown active loyalty to the State, enhanced benefits might be granted as a reward.

6. This recommendation would involve the disbanding at once, of about 20,000 men, and would thus reduce the 80,000 Native Troops to about 60,000 men, the equal proportion which the Adjutant General proposes.

7. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier General N. Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes have given full and valuable replies to the series of questions, both as restricted to the Punjab, and as applied generally to the Bengal Presidency. They have further added general remarks replete with important observations.

8. It appears that there are now serving in the Territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence, the following European Force :—

Artillery	1,691
Cavalry	707
Infantry	11,157
Total	13,555

The European Force deemed necessary is as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of men.
Sappers	0	2	200
Artillery	0	29	2,900
Cavalry	5	0	2,500
Infantry	17	0	17,000
Total			22,600

9. The strength of Native Troops, exclusive of those un-armed, is—

Native Regulars	1,000
„ Irregulars	7,710
Punjab Ditto	20,860
Police	13,050
Depôts	2,750
Levies	7,076
Total	52,446

The strength recommended varies but little in amount from the foregoing, and is given as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of men.
Pioneers... ..	0	2	200
Artillery	0	8½	840
Irregular Cavalry... ..	15	0	7,400
Police Horse	0	54	5,400
Infantry... ..	31	0	27,624
Police Battalion	12	1	10,900
Total			52,364

10. With regard to the number of European Troops necessary for the Bengal Presidency, Sir J. Lawrence and the Officers associated with him, observe that, to speak confidently on this point, would require a more detailed knowledge of many parts of the Presidency than they possess, but that to the best of their judgments 54,600 men should be the strength of European

Troops for the Bengal Presidency. This number they distribute as follows :—

Bengal including Arracan and Pegu ...	10,000
North-West Provinces	17,000
Central India	5,000
Punjab including Peshawur ...	22,600
	Total
	54,600

11. They do not enter into a detail of the different Arms, as that seems a mere question of proportion, but in distributing European Troops Sir J. Lawrence and his Committee are decidedly of opinion that these should not be frittered away in Detachments, but centralized; firstly, with reference to political requirements, and secondly, to the healthiest places within those political Circles.

12. Having no correct data available as to the present strength and distribution of the Native Troops, a Statement is subjoined showing the Troops serving in the Bengal Presidency in January 1857, before the mutiny—

Europeans	19,670
Natives	1,76,834
	Total
	1,96,504

Laying down the principle that Native Soldiers should be as five to two Europeans, that is, three Native Infantry and two Police to two European Soldiers, Sir J. Lawrence and his Committee would distribute them as follows :—

	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal	10,000	25,000	35,000
North-West Provinces	17,000	42,500	59,500
Central India	5,000	12,500	17,500
Punjab	22,600	56,500	79,100
	54,600	1,36,500	1,91,100
Bengal Presidency			

13. Mr. C. B. Thornhill gives a Tabular Statement, which in one view supplies an answer to Questions 1 to 4, and exhibits the strength and disposition of the European and Native Army in the

North-West Provinces before the mutiny, and the arrangement he would suggest for the future. The value of the Tabular Statement is increased by Mr. Thornhill entering clearly, though concisely, in his letter upon the grounds on which his replies are based; and also by the information which the letter contains regarding the Police Battalions now forming for the North-West Provinces.

14. In framing his estimate of the Force required for the North-West Provinces, Mr. Thornhill adheres to the Civil division of the Country into the seven Circles of Commissioner's jurisdictions, because this has formed the basis of the organization of the new Police Battalions, which force he anticipates, will, in a great measure, supply the place of the old Native Army as mere local guards. It will be observed that the seventh Circle comprehends the Central India agency.

15. According to the Tabular Statement, the strength of Europeans requisite for the North-West Provinces may be taken at $16\frac{1}{2}$ Batteries or Companies of Artillery, 5 Regiments of European Cavalry, $18\frac{1}{2}$ Regiments of European Infantry, besides a Corps of Veterans, and some Invalids. In Para. 21 of the letter which accompanied the Tabular Statement, the suggested strength of Europeans would be, 5 Regiments of Cavalry and about 17 of Infantry, besides Artillery.

16. The Native Troops required are, six Regiments of Irregular Cavalry, eight Regiments of Native Infantry, and 32 District Police Battalions. In Para. 20 of Mr. Thornhill's letter it is laid down that each Divisional Battalion will consist of an average of about 3000 Foot and 500 Horse, and that, in round numbers, the organized Police for the six divisions of the North-West Provinces may be taken at 20,000 Foot and 3,500 Horse. If a Regiment of Native Infantry be assumed at 1,000 bayonets, and a Regiment of Irregular Cavalry at 584 Sabres, then the total of Native Troops for the North-West Provinces would amount to 28,000 Infantry and 7,000 Cavalry or 35,000 men.

17. Major General Sir Sydney Cotton proposes to combine the Regular Native Horse and Foot altogether with the European Corps in the proportion of two Europeans to one native. To the 40,000 European Infantry which he would fix as the least amount of force required for the Bengal Presidency, Sir S. Cotton would attach 20,000 natives, trained, armed and disciplined precisely in the same manner and incorporated with the Europeans. Consentaneously with the Adjutant General, Colonel Mayhew, Sir S. Cotton advocates as a preliminary step to reorganization, that the whole of the Regular Cavalry and Infantry of the Bengal Army remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed, whether apparently loyal or otherwise, be *in limine* discharged from the service of the British Government.

The new Levies Sir S. Cotton would graft and amalgamate with the European Troops, and if it were deemed expedient to re-enlist any part of the old native Army, it should be on similar terms, and with a like object as in the case of the new Levies. The Artillery should, in the opinion of Sir S. Cotton, be entirely European, and as he objects to native Drivers, it follows that to the 40,000 European Infantry must be added an Artillery of such strength as would be able to furnish Drivers as well as Gunners.

18. The Police Force of the country, not armed and trained as Soldiers, as heretofore, Sir S. Cotton would increase, so as to do away with the necessity of employing the Troops on detached duties ; but in addition to the 20,000 natives, armed and trained like, and amalgamated with the 40,000 European Infantry, Sir S. Cotton proposes about 40,000 Irregular Infantry, armed with Fire-locks and two-grooved Rifles, but not trusted with the Enfield Rifle. The proposed strength of Irregular Cavalry is not given.

19. If it be assumed that Sir S. Cotton's requirements as to Artillery Demand 10,000 Europeans, then the total of European Troops for the Bengal Presidency will be 50,000 men, exclusive of Cavalry, which does not enter into Sir S. Cotton's estimate. The total of Native Infantry, Regular and Irregular, amounts to 60,000 men.

20. In the opinion of Brigadier General J. Jacob, the strength of European Troops, exclusive of Artillery and Sappers, sufficient for the Bengal Presidency would be 20,000 men. Of these, 10,000 for Bengal, and 10,000 to be placed at Simla ; but he would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee as a Reserve Force, generally applicable to service whether on the Indus Frontier or elsewhere.

21. If the foregoing opinions are compared, the disparities will be found considerable, chiefly however with respect to the native portion of the Force to be maintained. Comparison in detail cannot be instituted, because where two appear to concur, as in the instance of Sir J. Lawrence's Committee, and Mr. Thornhill in their calculation of the European Troops required for the North West Provinces, it will be observed that the comparison would be fallacious to a certain extent, in as much as Sir J. Lawrence probably includes Oude, and excludes especially Central India from the North-West Provinces, whereas Mr. Thornhill excludes Oude and includes Central India, or a good part of it. Sir J. Lawrence's Committee and Brigadier General J. Jacob concur as to the amount of European Force advisable to maintain in Bengal, *viz.*, 10,000 men ; but they differ widely as to what is necessary for the Punjab, for which Sir J. Lawrence requires 22,600 men, whereas Brigadier General J. Jacob considers 10,000 men at

Simla sufficient for the North-West Provinces and the Punjab, but would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee, which he considers to be the best and most convenient position in all India for European Troops, and especially useful as a Reserve Force for the Punjab and the North-West frontier. Sir S. Cotton, except in casually mentioning what he considers advisable for the Trans-Jhelum Frontier, does not enter into details as to the position of the *Corps d'armees* into which he would divide the Troops of the Bengal Presidency.

22. The general results, as respects the strength of Europeans approximate more nearly, and are as follows :—

	<i>Europeans.</i>	<i>Natives.</i>
Colonel Mayhew	60,000	60,000
Sir J. Lawrence	} 54,600	1,36,500
Brigr. Genl. Chamberlain		
Lieut. Colonel Edwardes...		
Major General Sir S. Cotton	40,000 Infantry	60,000 Infantry.
Brigr. General J. Jacob ...	20,000 Infantry and Cavalry.	

As Artillery and Cavalry must be added to Sir S. Cotton's proposed strength of European Infantry, his estimate would probably be raised to a total strength of European Force about a mean between Colonel Mayhew's and Sir J. Lawrence's; or probably nearer that of the former than of the latter. As Brigadier General J. Jacob regards the Punjab as being well within the sphere of influence and action of his proposed Reserved Force of 10,000 men at Kurrachee, he would not of course bring into comparison, in disconnection from his Reserve, the 20,000 men he assigns to the Bengal Presidency. Making allowance for this, the widest disparity is between the proposal of Brigadier General J. Jacob and those of the other recorded opinions.

23. The closest apparent agreement is between Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew, for their proposals would seem to concur in the Force of Natives as well as of Europeans. It has been seen that both suggest that the remnants of the old Bengal Army, whether armed or disarmed, be at once disbanded; but neither enter into particulars to show how this can be safely carried into effect; that is, without adding to the number of Rebels still in arms, and to the general insecurity of the North-West Provinces. The strength of Native Troops proposed by Sir J. Lawrence is more than double that recommended by Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew; but Sir S. Cotton calculates upon an increase of the Police, which, though not armed or trained as Soldiers, is to relieve the Army of detached or Escort

duty in every possible case. Colonel Mayhew likewise excludes Police, a point he leaves untouched. Sir J. Lawrence includes Police, and Mr. Thornhill, in his estimate of 35,000 Native Troops for the North-West Provinces, includes as many as 23,000 Police of Horse and Foot, armed, trained, and having a thoroughly Military organization, under the command and supervision of about 120 European Officers.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

5,6,7,and8.

24. The proportion of races in the Native Troops serving under Sir J. Lawrence in the Punjab is—

Mussulmans	30,188
Sikhs	14,692
Hindoos of mixed Castes	7,566
					—————
Total	52,446

The Sikh element usually thought to predominate in the Forces under Sir John Lawrence's orders is in the ratio of about one Sikh to two Mussulmans, and when the mixed Hindoo Castes are added, the ratio is one Sikh to two and a half Mussulmans and Hindoos. The pure Sikh element has therefore a counterpoise in the greater armed numerical strength of Mussulmans and Hindoos.

25. In the Territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence, the ratio of European Troops, inclusive of Police, is as 3 to 7; exclusive of Police, as 5 to 8. The Committee lay down as a rule that the minimum of Europeans should be one to three Natives, and the maximum one to two; and they point out that, assuming this principle to be expedient, to 22,600 Europeans they might have 67,800 Natives. The actual proposition, 52,364 Natives, is a mean between the two ratios. They justly remark that the country can neither be held nor worked by Europeans alone; and although as a mere question of security a large European Force is essential, a still larger number of Natives is indispensable for the administration of the country. They add that if at first sight the ratio of Natives in their proposal be deemed too great for safety, it must be borne in mind that on the side of the Europeans are ranged 102 Field Pieces of Artillery, against 22 on the side of the Natives. Or if it be thought that less Natives would suffice for the administration, they answer that at every point the Natives have been reduced to the

lowest practical numbers. The increase and decrease of the several arms are shown as follows :—

Arm.	Former Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Increase.	Decrease.
Europeans ...	12,050	22,600	9,550	0
Natives Regular and Irregular Police ...	58,717	36,064	0	22,653
	9,000	16,300	7,300	0
Total, ...	79,767	74,964	16,850	22,653
Result, Actual Decrease				5,803

26. As a general rule, Sir John Lawrence and his associated Officers lay down the principle that Native Soldiers should be as five to two Europeans; and that they would keep as nearly as practicable to the following proportions :—

European Soldiers...	2
Native Infantry	3
Police	2
Total ..				7

This is merely laid down as a general rule, for they correctly observe that some of the races of India are much more warlike and robust than others, and that the European check ought to vary with the Native power. Thus, they state it as their opinion that in the Punjab and Upper India less than one European to two Sikhs or Pathans or Goorkhas would not be safe, whereas with the Hindoostanees it might be one to three, and with the Southern races one to four. They show that before the mutiny European Soldiers were only one to nine. For India generally they maintain that the proportion laid down for Bengal should pervade the whole of India, and that they know of no element of security which would render it safe to increase the proportion of Natives, except that of Christianity.

27. Mr. Thornhill considers that the European arm should not be less than one-third of the total strength of armed and disciplined Natives of all kinds, and that recourse should be had chiefly to a system of organized Police for the performance of all guard, escort, and interior detachment duties, which formerly were discharged by the Native Army. This as will be seen by his letter and Tabular Statement is in course of being rapidly

carried into effect, in so far as the raising, arming and training of a Military organized Police is concerned. Taking the average strength of European Corps of Cavalry and Infantry, the proportion of Europeans to Natives, armed and trained, would be in the North-West Provinces, according to Mr. Thornhill's proposed distribution, about two Europeans to three and a half Natives.

28. Colonel Mayhew would have the European and the Native Troops in equal proportions in the Bengal Presidency, and as one to three for India generally, exclusive of Police. Sir S. Cotton would have them in the ratio of two Europeans to three Natives exclusive of Police; in which ratio of two to three he is in accordance with Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues. As Sir S. Cotton writes from Peshawur, it may be said that the replies from the Punjab are unanimous upon the proportion which the European should bear to the Regular Native Troops, *viz.*, two to three, exclusive of Police.

29. Upon this point it may be here observed that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, Sir P. Grant, formerly the Adjutant General of the Bengal Army, and an Officer of much experience in the Field, states as his opinion, that in the Madras Presidency and in India generally, he considers that the European Force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the Native Troops of the line; and that he would not allow Police Corps to affect the calculation either way.

30. Upon this subject His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, observes, that the proportion of European Troops to the whole Native Force of the Bengal Presidency, Police, Regulars and Irregulars should never be less than one-fourth; a proportion which admits of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the Police, Sir H. Somerset would have the Europeans bear a proportion of about half the Regulars and Irregulars put together. He considers that it would be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to Native Troops than one-fourth, but that it is politic to maintain that if possible.

QUESTIONS.

ANSWERS.

1,2,3,and4.

31. The object of the 1st series of questions having been, as before remarked, to ascertain the strength and composition of the European Army which must be permanently maintained in India generally, as well as in each Presidency separately, it is now advisable to give a *résumé* of the requirements of the Madras and of the Bombay Presidencies, and in doing so the Madras Presidency will be first taken.

32. Sir P. Grant refers to a letter, copy of which he appended the 1st January 1858, addressed to Major General Sir William Mansfield, as containing full information as to the European Troops of all Arms, belonging to both services, stationed in the Presidency of Madras, and also as to the European Forces which Sir P. Grant considers necessary for the various British Provinces, including Burmah, under His Excellency's Command.

33. Sir P. Grant is of opinion that, until the European Force is increased to the extent proposed, and until a Local Force is organized for Pegu, and an efficient Police is formed for that Province, the existing number of Native Troops in the Madras Army is quite necessary for that Presidency. When those arrangements shall have been carried out, he considers that all Native Artillery may, and ought to, be dispensed with; that the Light Cavalry may be reduced from eight to four Regiments; and he hopes that a considerable reduction may be effected in the strength of the Native Infantry, though he cannot say to what precise extent.

34. It has already been shown that in his replies to questions 7 and 8, Sir P. Grant was of opinion that the European Force in India should never be below the proportion of one-third of the Native Troops of the line; that ratio is nearly kept in Sir P. Grant's estimate of the strength of European and Native Troops required for the Madras Presidency; which is as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
43 Companies of Artillery } each averaging 121 of all ranks }	5,203	4 Regiments of Cavalry, } each 703 Sabres }	2,812
3 Regiments of Dragoons, } each 703 Sabres }	2,109	55 Regiments of Infantry } and 12 Battalions of Veterans, amounting in all to Bayonets }	63,920
13 Regiments of Infantry, } each 1152 Bayonets }	14,976		
Total Europeans ..	22,288	Total Natives ..	66,732

The present strength of the Madras Army is as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery	214	2 Troops Company's Horse Artillery	180
4 Troops Company's Horse Artillery	510	1 Regiment of Golundaze	600
2 Regiments of Her Majesty's Dragoons	1,148	1 „ Sappers and Miners	1,450
4 Companies of Royal Artillery	652	7 Regiments of Light Cavalry	2,268
16 Companies of Company's Artillery	1,550	52 Regiments of Native Infantry	55,120
8 Regiments of Her Majesty's Infantry	7,012	3 Regiments Extra	3,180
3 Regiments of Company's Infantry	2,550	2 „ Veterans	2,220
		1 „ Madras Sappers Militia	1,024
Total Europeans...	13,636	Total Natives ...	66,042

The proposed future strength of Force for the Madras Presidency and its dependencies is therefore much the same as to Native Troops, but shows an increase of 8,652 European Troops, of whom 2,277 are Artillerymen. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief includes no European Regiment for the Straits in this estimate of required strength.

With respect to the proportion of Irregulars and Police, Sir P. Grant is unable at present to form an opinion, except as regards Pegu, for which Province His Excellency has recommended a Local Force in his Report to the Government of India, dated 2nd February 1857.

The Right Honorable the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, considers that when the Police of the Madras Presidency is re-organized, that Force will relieve the Troops of some of the duties on which they are employed. The Police when re-organized is to amount to about 22,000 men, and when in operation, His Lordship is of opinion that the Native Army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided the six Local Corps for Pegu are raised; that it might however be advisable to diminish the number of Native Cavalry Regiments and replace them by Europeans, but that the subject requires serious consideration and further information, before giving a deliberate opinion.

The established strength of the European and Native Troops of the Madras Army are as follows :—

Europeans.		Natives.	
Dragoons and Lancers	1,416	Cavalry	2,754
Royal Artillery... ..	933	Artillery	849
Company's Artillery... ..	1,845	Sappers and Miners ..	1,505
Veteran's Artillery ...	125	Infantry, including 3 Extra Regiments and Madras Sap- pers Militia	62,722
Her Majesty's Infantry	8,629		
Company's Infantry... ..	2,841		
Veterans	115	Veterans	2,324
European Sappers ...	75		
Total . . .	15,979	Total	70,154
Real Strength ...	13,950	Real Strength ...	52,859

Lord Harris' proposal as to the amount of European Infantry required for the Madras Presidency agrees with that of Sir P. Grant, *viz.*, 13 Regiments; but the Governor of Madras suggests for the decision of the Government of India the question of making the Straits a station for a European Corps, which would raise the estimated strength of Europeans to fourteen. As the Governor of Madras states that it has been already determined to do away with the Native Artillery, the 35 Troops, Batteries and Reserve Companies which Lord Harris deems sufficient would be European; but there are eight less than Sir P. Grant's proposed Force, and one Dragoon Regiment more. The two distributions may be seen in the following Table—

	LORD HARRIS.					SIR P. GRANT.					
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.			Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.			
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Companies.			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Companies.	
Kamptee } to supply Saugor {	1	1	1	2	1	Kamptee	1	1	3	2	
Jaulnah } and Mhow {	1	1	1	0	0	Secunderabad and	2	1	4	1	
Secunderabad ...	2	1	1	2	1	Jaulnah ...	1	0	2	2	
Northern Division ...	1	0	0	1	0	Northern Division ...	1	0	2	2	
Bellary ...	1	0	0	1	1	Bellary ...	1	0	2	1	
Bangalore ...	1	1	1	2	1	Bangalore ...	1	1	3	1	
Mercara to provide Malabar .	1	0	0	1	0	Cannanore ...	1	0	1	1	
Jackatalla } to provide ...	1	0	0	0	0	Jackatalla ...	1	0	0	0	
Trichinopoly } Trichinopoly .	0	0	1	1	0	Trichinopoly ...	1	0	2	1	
Fort St. George ...	1	0	0	0	1	Fort St. George ...	1	0	0	1	
St. Thomas' Mount ...	0	0	1	2	2	St. Thomas' Mount ...	0	0	2	2	
Penang ...	0	0	0	1	0	Penang ...	0	0	0	1	
Singapore ...	1	0	0	1	1	Singapore ...	0	0	0	1	
Thayet-myo ...	1	0	0	1	1	Thayet-myo ...	1	0	2	1	
Toung-hoo ...	1	0	0	1	1	Toung-hoo ...	1	0	2	1	
Rangoon ...	1	0	0	1	0	Rangoon ...	1	0	2	1	
Maulmain ...	1	0	0	1	0	Maulmain ...	0	0	1	0	
Total ...	14	4	6	19	10	Total ...	13	3	26	17	
			35					Troops are not distinguished from Batteries.			
									47		

The requirements of the Madras Presidency, according to Sir P. Grant, are 156 Field Guns, 13 Regiments of European Infantry, three Regiments of Dragoons, 43 Troops, Batteries and Companies of Reserve. To meet these requirements there are available and in prospect 150 Field Guns, 25 Troops and Companies of Royal and Company's Artillery, two Regiments of Dragoons, and 11 Regiments of European Infantry. Thus the means in hand and in prospect fall short of what Sir P. Grant considers the necessities of the Madras Presidency, to the extent of six Field Guns and twenty Companies of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons and two of Infantry. His Excellency adds, that if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor Territory North of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras Presidency, that a further accession of 18 Field Guns and five Companies of Artillery, one Regiment of Dragoons and one Regiment of Infantry will be necessary. This would raise the total of Cavalry and Infantry to a par with Lord Harris', and the Companies of European Artillery to 48, or 13 more than the Governor of Madras proposes.

Lord Harris observes that the object he has in view in recommending this force and its distribution is to ensure the moral effect produced by the presence of Europeans, and to secure the speedy formation of small Forces capable of acting within certain areas with rapidity and effect. He considers that if this course be adopted, and if at the same time the Native Corps be formed with discretion in the selection of materials and disciplined with vigour, the proportions of mere numbers are of little importance, and cannot very well be taken as any significant test for ensuring safety and predominance.

When the Madras Presidency Police is organized, and is of the complement of 22,000 men, the whole body of armed Natives would be about 88,000 men, exclusive of the Pegu Local Force, and the Hyderabad and Nagpore Contingents. If the two latter bodies be included, then in round numbers the Madras European Force will be associated with 100,000 armed Natives, exclusive of the Pegu Local Force.

The ratio of European Troops to Native may be taken as being at present one to six, and the proposals raise the ratio of European to Native Troops to one to three and a half ; or, if the Police be included and Pegu Local Force, to about one European to five native armed men.

Pegu and the Nizam's Territory being occupied by Madras Troops, and therefore included in the replies from the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Presidency, the remarks of the Commissioners of the Eastern side of the Bay of Bengal and of the Resident at Hyderabad, may be here noticed in subordination to the more general review of the requirements of the Madras Presidency.

Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, proposes to raise two African Corps in place of two of the present Infantry Regiments of Sepoys of the Hyderabad Contingent. If troops of this description are not entertained, he advocates the location of an additional European Regiment in the Nizam's Territory, somewhere near Lingsoogoor or Moodgul, whichever is found the more favorable in point of climate; and would have another European Regiment at Ellichpore with a sanatory station near the latter Cantonment at Chikuldah. He observes that this would be a more expensive arrangement than the enrolment of African Corps, and considered with reference to tropical service, probably not so efficient.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson remarks that if the strict letter of Treaties be adhered to, we might not be able to place any European Infantry in the Subsidiary Force excepting a few Artillerymen. *Vide* Article 3 of Treaties of 1798 and 1800 respectively, but he considers that according to the Treaty of 1853, the Hyderabad Contingent might be all Europeans; only the numbers, not the description of troops being therein specified. No objection has however ever been made by the Nizam to the introduction of European Troops, and the practice seems to have been to regard the specification of Sepoy Battalions in the Treaties as having reference to the expense, and in keeping up the Subsidiary Force one European Soldier has been considered numerically as two natives. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson would substitute European Artillerymen for the Golundaze of the Hyderabad Contingent, and he does not think that the augmentation of European Infantry he proposes would cause the Nizam any uneasiness.

The Troops which Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson proposes for the occupation of the Nizam's Territories are as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
1 Regiment Cavalry ...	700	SUBSIDIARY FORCE.	
3 „ Infantry ...	3,000	1 Regiment Cavalry ...	350
2 Troops Horse Artillery ...	200	5 „ Infantry ...	4,000
6 Horse Batteries ...	600	HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.	
		4 Regiments Irregular Cavalry ...	2,336
		6 Regiments Native Infantry ...	5,412
		POLICE.	
		District ...	1,744
		Hill Rangers &c. ...	441
		Total Native Troops ...	12,098
		Total Police ...	2,185
		Total Natives ...	14,283
Total ...	4,500		

The European Force ordinarily consisted of one Regiment of European Infantry and two Companies Artillery ; it was lately increased by a Regiment of Cavalry and a Battery of Royal Artillery, so that it amounts to 1,894 of all Arms. The proposed increase amounts therefore to about 2,600 Europeans. As the Nizam has at present in service 18,000 Arabs and about 5000 Afghans, or altogether 23,000 men, the armed Natives may be taken at 37,000 men of Regular and Irregular Troops, British and Nizam's. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson's proposal therefore gives the proportion of European to Native Troops—

Exclusive of

Police and Arabs, &c. ... 1 European to 2·68 Natives.

Inclusive of Police

Exclusive of Arabs &c. .. 1 European to 3·17 Natives.

Inclusive of Arabs

And Afghan Soldiery ... 1 European to 8·2 Natives.

The Commissioner of Pegu, Major A. P. Phayre, has in his replies, included the Tenasserim Provinces ; and states the present strength of the European and Native Troops serving in Burmah as follows :—

Europeans.		Natives.	
3 Regiments Infantry ...	2,168	4 Companies Madras Sappers ...	361
5 Companies of Artillery ..	351	13 Regiments of Madras Native Infantry ..	7,550
MOULMEIN.		1 Regiment Pegu Light Infantry ..	800
Artillery ...	76	3 Regiments Police ...	1,600
Infantry ...	110	1 Company Native Artillery ...	53
		MOULMEIN.	
		2 Regiments of Infantry...	1,409
Total Europeans ..	2,705	Total Natives ...	11,772

Major Phayre remarks that another class of Troops differing from those entered in his Returns is now being raised in the Madras Presidency, as "Pegu Police Corps." They are to be composed of the same races generally as the Madras Regiments of the Line. The Commissioner observes that, knowing neither the language, the manners, the people, nor the country, they will

scarcely be useful as Police in the strict sense of the term ; but that as Jail and Treasury Guards, and in taking ordinary station duties at large Stations, they may facilitate a permanent reduction of the number of Regular Troops in Pegu. They would also, if half the Force were composed of these Police Corps, diminish the frequency with which the turn for service in Burmah will fall upon the Regular Native Infantry of the Madras Army.

Major Phayre recommends that a European Regiment be added to the present strength and be placed at Moulmein, where he considers it would be of great service with reference to the display of Force towards the Burmese Territory ; would be readily available if required at Calcutta or Madras, and have the advantage of the healthiness of Maulmain. With this exception the present number and distribution of European Troops in Pegu appears to Major Phayre all that can be desired. He would however reduce the Native Regiments from 13 to 9, and make minor changes in their distribution. Of the nine Regiments four might be the " Pegu Police Corps" now raising in Madras. The whole proposed Force would then be as follows :—

European Infantry and Artillery	...	5,400
Native Regular Infantry	5,000
„ Indian Police	4,000
Pegu Light Infantry	1,600
Native Sappers	575
		<hr/>
Total,	16,575

The Native Regiments are here assumed at their full strength, and the augmentation is almost entirely in the European part of the Force, and amounts to 2,700 men.

Major General J. Bell, who commands the Pegu Division, does not include the Tenasserim Provinces in his replies. He proposes no increase to the European Force now in Pegu, but would have the Battery of European Artillery which was withdrawn, restored to Pegu, so as to allow of one being at Thayet-myo. He suggests no alteration in the distribution at present existing.

With respect to the Native Troops, the Major General remarks that there are now serving in Burmah eleven Regiments, of an average strength of 600 Privates each. When each Corps is augmented to its full complement of 1,000 Privates, he considers that two Regiments might be safely withdrawn, one Regiment from Rangoon and one from Thayet-myo ; and that if a Pegu Police Corps of 1,000 strong be given, then two more Corps of Regulars might be withdrawn, one from Henzadah and one from Thayet-myo. He would postpone the consideration of Police

Corps until the one promised be obtained, and experience shows how it works.

The proportions involved in the Major General's proposals are—

European Soldiers to Regular Native Infantry ... 3 to 7.
European Soldiers to Native Infantry and Police ... 3 to 8.

Captain Hopkinson, the Officiating Commissioner in the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces, proposes no increase to the Force of European and Native Troops on that coast, except that the Companies of Artillery and Infantry should be at their full strength. But both Colonel Stevenson, the Officer Commanding, and Captain Hopkinson, though not deeming such an increase absolutely necessary, consider that the presence of two or three hundred Europeans at Maulmain would make assurance doubly sure, and prove highly satisfactory to the mercantile community. Both Officers however assume the invariable presence of a Vessel of War on the Coast. Upon this subject a letter from Captain F. B. Seymour, of Her Majesty's Ship *Pilorus*, is appended.

Major General Sir M. Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore considers the European Force for the Territories under his administration should not be fewer than one complete European Regiment of Infantry, at least 1,000 strong, or still better, 1,200. One complete Regiment of European Dragoons, at least 700 strong, and 300 European Artillery, Horse and Foot; the whole to be stationed at Bangalore.

With respect to Native Troops, Sir M. Cubbon considers one entire Regiment necessary at Mercara in Coorg, together with one Brigade of European Artillery for special reasons. One Regiment at Hurryhur in the northern boundary of Mysore, and one Native Regiment at the French Rocks, or at a new Station proposed by the Commander-in-Chief between Seringapatam and Mysore. At Bangalore two Regiments of Native Infantry, but no Native Light Cavalry.

Of Irregular Troops there are four Battalions of Mysore Irregular Infantry, consisting of about 2,200 men, and seven Regiments of Mysore Irregular Horse, numbering about 2,500 Privates. Both are distributed throughout the Country as Revenue and Judicial Guards, as Escort for Treasure, and generally for Police purposes. 1,000 of the Silladars are now serving under the orders of the Madras Government beyond the Frontier of Mysore.

The number of European Troops proposed is in the ratio of 2 to 5 of the Regular Native Troops, and 2 to between 9 and 10 of the Regular and Irregular Troops.

Sir M. Cubbon's proposal as to European Troops agrees with that of the Commander-in-Chief for Mysore, but differs in distribution of Native Troops, as the Commissioner would dispense with the Regiment of Light Cavalry, and has only two instead of three Native Infantry Regiments at Bangalore; he also would place a Brigade of European Artillery at Mercara, but of what strength the Brigade should be is not stated.

From the replies of His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, it appears that according to the information and Returns received at Head-Quarters up to the 22nd July 1858, the following was the strength of the European Troops borne on the strength of the Bombay Army.

Her Majesty's Troops.	Officers.	Non-Commis- sioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the } Presidency }	475	10,986
Serving beyond the limits of the } Presidency }	203	5,299
Total, of Her Majesty's } Troops }	678	16,285

Hon'ble Company's Troops.	Officers.	Non-Commis- sioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the } Presidency }	67	2,101
Serving beyond the limits of the } Presidency }	66	2,242
Total Company's Euro- } pean Troops... .. }	133	4,343
Grand Total of European } Troops }	811	20,628

The same Return and Distribution List show the strength of Native Troops as follows :—

	European Officers.	Natives.
Serving in the limits of the Presidency } Non-Commissioned Officers ...	437 50 37,229
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency } Non-Commissioned Officers ...	90 16 5,781
Total, European Officers 527, Non-Commissioned Officers 66 ... }		Natives .. 41,985

The proposed strength of European and Native Troops is as follows :—

	ESTABLISHED STRENGTH.			
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned Officers.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
2 Battalions of Sappers and Miners }	30	10	500	570
6 Troops Horse Artillery ...	30	900	150
9 Companies Reserve Artillery }	45	945	288
18 Light Field Batteries ...	90	*2,682	576
3 Regiments of European Cavalry }	129	2,244
Military Train }	26	800
15 European Regiments ...	750	16,155
3 Regiments Native Light Cavalry }	78	48	6	1,950
39 Regiments Native Infantry }	1,092	780	78	38,220
Total	2,270	838	24,310	41,754

Including Officers European Troops .. 26,580
Ditto ditto Native 42,592

An examination of the details of the proposed strength of European and Native Troops will show that the increase of Europeans, amounting to 4,548 of all ranks, is due to the substitution of Europeans for Golundaze and Drivers, to the Battalion of Euro-

pean Sappers and Miners, and to the Military Train. The same number of Batteries now on the Rolls of the Presidency is recommended, namely twenty-four ; but instead of—

European Officers	100	;	Native Officers	52
European Non-Commission-					Native Non-Commissioned				
ed and Rank and File	2,573		and Rank and File...	2,013

Sir H. Somerset proposes for the Artillery 24 Batteries, manned by—

European Officers	165
European Non-Commissioned and Rank				
and File	4,527
Native Non-Commissioned and Rank				
and File	1,014

Hence the increase of Europeans for the Artillery is 65 Officers, and 1,954 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File.

There are now on the Rolls of the Presidency four Regiments of Her Majesty's Cavalry, which have 130 Officers, and 2339 Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. Sir H. Somerset proposes three Regiments of European Cavalry of full strength, *viz.*, 129 Officers and 2,244 Rank and File, in other words nearly the same strength of men and Officers.

Of Her Majesty's Infantry there are now borne on the Rolls of the Presidency 14 $\frac{3}{4}$ Regiments, giving 505 Officers and 12,712 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates. To these must be added three Regiments of Company's European Infantry, giving 84 Officers and 2,783 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File, or a total of 17 $\frac{3}{4}$ Regiments, having 589 Officers and 15,495 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates. Sir H. Somerset proposes 15 European Regiments, of full strength, giving 750 Officers and 16,155 Privates. Here again the increase is due to the assumption that the 15 Regiments are at their full complement, for there is a reduction of 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ Regiments of European Infantry.

As compared with the strength of European Troops at the time of the mutiny at Meerut, the proposed augmentation amounts to 17,000 of all ranks, and is therefore considerable—but close on 8,000 Europeans of all ranks borne on the Rolls of the Bombay Presidency are serving beyond its limits in Malwa, Rajpootana and Gwalior.

His Excellency proposes that the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army, which now consists of 29 Regiments of 12 Companies, and 1,180 Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File, should be reconstructed into 39 Regiments of ten Companies, and 1,000 Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned

and Rank and File. He calculates that an extra expenditure of a lac and a half of Rupees would be about the cost of this re-organization. The present strength of 34,200 men has been found totally so inadequate, that 2,000 Pensioners and two extra Battalions of 1,180 strong each, had to be enrolled; of these the Pensioners, an expensive body, being too old and infirm, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged. Thus over and above the 34,220 men of Regular Native Infantry, 4,360 were enrolled to meet present emergencies; thus making in all 38,850 Regular Native Infantry, or about 420 men less than the strength proposed by Sir H. Somerset.

The three branches of Regulars, Irregulars and Police and Local Corps will shortly be of the following strength :—

Native Regular Troops	42,036
„ Irregulars	10,185
„ Police and Local	28,738
				80,959
Grand Total...	80,959

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the question, what proportion of our Establishment should be Regulars, Irregulars and Police, involves some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad, the practical adoption of which would lead, His Excellency fears, to great evils and fresh complications. He considers the duty of the Soldier and the Policeman so diverse as to render their unfettered performance by one and the same body impossible; that the qualifications of a Policeman are a local knowledge of the country and people, whilst those of the Soldier are perfect freedom from all local sympathies or encumbrances, a readiness to move anywhere on any duty at a moment's warning, and submission to a strict discipline. To maintain such a state of discipline, His Excellency considers that the European element must be increased, not diminished; that though Police Corps may be sufficiently officered by having three European Officers, such a number is quite inadequate for the Corps of the Line, and he would do away with the Native Commissioned Officers in order to find means, with no additional charge to the State, to augment the number of European Officers above the existing Establishment. He argues that the contrary course cannot fail to lower the discipline of the Troops, and throw undue power into the hands of the Native Officers. He thinks that the past year shows the imperative necessity of keeping the reins both of our Civil and of our Military administration in the hands of Europeans. That our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element, but more upon its judicious fusion among the mass to be governed, than upon its bare physical strength; and he believes that no addition of European strength in our power to

make would compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European Officers would occasion to the Native Army, and through it to the State. He regards any measure which tends to lessen that association in the Army of the European with the Native as clearing the way for the dominance of superstition and fanaticism, and he quotes the conduct of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry at Mhow in the midst of mutiny and rebellion in Malwa, as an instance of the effect of the vigilance of the European and Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, and of the good feeling which existed between them and their men. After adverting to the opinion of such distinguished and practical Generals as Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier, Sir H. Somerset says :—“ When I reflect that out of the three
 “ Officers proposed for each Regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders
 “ for every difficult occasion have to be supplied ; casualties
 “ filled ; the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together
 “ the wavering, or rallying the broken mass ; I feel utterly at a
 “ loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under notice,
 “ involving, as I before remarked, undue power being thrown into
 “ the hands of the Native Officers, and even placing them in
 “ command of Regiments on Field Service.”

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the Police must be a perfectly distinct Force, and that including Local Corps it should not exceed about a half of the Regulars and Irregulars put together, and that the Irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one-fourth of the Regulars. These proportions are the existing ones, or very nearly so, and His Excellency urges upon the notice of the Governor General “ that they have of late years, and
 “ especially during the one that is past, stood a test that affords
 “ the best guarantee we could desire for their general adaptation
 “ to foreign and home service.”

The proportion of European Troops to the whole Native Force of the Bombay Presidency, Police, Regulars and Irregulars should never in His Excellency's opinion be less than one-fourth, a proportion which would admit of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the Police the European Troops should bear a proportion of about half the Regulars and Irregulars put together.

From the foregoing abstract of the various opinions of the requirements of the different Presidencies, it would appear that, when brought together, the following is the strength of European Force proposed—

Bengal from 54,000 to 60,000.
 Madras from 22,288 to 23,140.
 Bombay 24,226.

In other words, for all India from 1,00,000 to 1,07,000 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File are considered necessary. Of these, upwards of 18,000 men are required for the Artillery Force, upwards of 72,000 for the Infantry, and the remainder for Engineer Soldiers, Cavalry and Military Train.

From the Return laid before the House of Commons in compliance with the order of the 4th December 1857, entitled "a Return of the actual Military Force that was in India, at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny at Meerut," &c., &c., it seems that at the time of that occurrence, the strength of the European Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File was as follows:—

Bengal	22,688	Europeans.
Madras	10,194	„
Bombay	9,589	„
Total		42,471	Europeans.

Of Native Troops, there were—

Bengal	1,18,663
Madras	49,737
Bombay	30,940
Total		1,99,340

There were on the 1st May 1858, borne on the several Rolls of the several Presidencies, as follows:—

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

Bengal	51,197
Madras	13,636
Bombay	22,032
Total,		86,865

NATIVE TROOPS.

Bengal	80,000
Madras	66,042
Bombay	41,985
Total		1,88,027

It is to be regretted that the absence of any replies from Bengal Proper prevents a correct approximation to the existing strength of the armed Police, either actually organized or in course of organization. From the replies received, it is however

known that the following is the strength of the various bodies of armed Police having a Military organization :—

Bombay	28,738
Madras	22,000
North-West Provinces ...	23,500
Punjab Police, Levies and Depots	22,876
Total... ..	<u>97,114</u>

But this omits the Military Police forming in and for Oudh, and for Bengal Proper, as also for Pegu.

Added to the 1,88,000 Native Troops there will result a total of 2,85,000 Natives armed and under Military organization. Considering that Bengal Proper, Oudh and Pegu are omitted, it may be safely said that there are or shortly will be upwards of 3,00,000 Natives, armed and Military organized in the pay of the British Government.

Upon the very serious consideration of the available cover for European Troops, it appears that in the Punjab, the total accommodation is more than sufficient for the 13,655 Soldiers actually present, and that there is accommodation permanent or temporary for 20,000 men ; that temporary Barracks are constructing at Campbellpore and permanent ones at Umritsur and Mooltan, and that new Barracks have been sanctioned at Ferozepore ; that no difficulty has been experienced this year in sheltering the European Troops, but that additional accommodation for 12,131 men would be required to meet the wants of the force of European Troops recommended by Sir John Lawrence's Committee. This results from some of the present Barracks being temporary, and others not in the places where they are wanted. In no place however would really good Barracks be thrown away by the proposed arrangements except at Peshawur, where it is necessary to save life.

For Bengal and the North-West Provinces the return now in course of preparation by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Public Works, will show the cover available, or likely shortly to be so, as the data for a correct Return are not as yet complete ; it will when received form an Appendix to this Precis.

For the Madras Presidency, there will, according to the return which accompanies Sir P. Grant's replies, be required additional Barrack accommodation for four Regiments and two Companies of European Infantry, two European Infantry Depôts, and

fourteen and a half Companies of Artillery, according to His Excellency's arrangements.

From the Bombay Presidency Sir H. Somerset calculates that according to the proposed strength and distribution of European Troops, there will be required of additional Barrack accommodation, cover for—

- 8 Regiments of Infantry.
- 2 Regiments of Cavalry.
- 18 Troops and Companies of Artillery.
- 10 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Corps of Military Train.

In round numbers it may be estimated that the augmentations proposed for Madras, Bombay and Punjab involve the construction of Barracks to accommodate upwards of 32,000 European Troops. It cannot be doubted but that the permanent increase to the European Force proposed for Bengal would also involve additional Barrack accommodation to an amount which could scarcely be less than the difference between the strength of European Troops serving in the Bengal Presidency on the 1st May 1858 and that proposed, *viz.*, 60,000 of all arms. The difference may be taken at 9,000 men; and the total additional Barrack accommodation that would be requisite would not fall short of cover for 41,000 European Troops.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

11.

Upon the question what proportion of the European Force should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, and what portion should be composed of Troops raised for service in India, Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that the majority of the European Army of India should be raised for exclusive service in the country, and should be in the proportion of three Locals to one of Her Majesty's Regular Troops.

Sir J. Lawrence and his Colleagues recommend :—

	LINE.	LOCAL.
Artillery	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$
Cavalry	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$
Infantry	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Sappers and Miners. None...	All.

Both Sir John Lawrence and the Adjutant General concur in the desirableness of keeping up emulation and improvement by having fresh Regiments from home periodically; both note the attendant evils of expense of transport, non-acclimation and ignorance of the country and people. Sir John Lawrence considers the Artillery as the great strength of the Army, that it should be

chiefly local, and as little liable as possible to calls from England for general service. The Cavalry for India would have to be of a totally different kind from that in vogue for the British line, what are called Light Dragoons being too heavy for Indian Horses, climate and warfare. He would have every possible ounce of steel and brass got rid of and accoutrements brought down as nearly as practicable to the standard of a Cross-Country sportsman, and as so plain and simple a Cavalry would not probably be admitted into the Line, he would have this branch of the Indian Army chiefly local. The Engineer branch he would have wholly local, as they would be of little use if not thoroughly acquainted with the country.

Sir S. Cotton is strongly in favor of the amalgamation of the Indian Armies, and of their being blended and becoming part of the Regular Army of the Crown. The European Troops would therefore according to this proposition all belong to the Line, and none but the native portion be Local Troops.

Lord Harris would be disposed to have three-fourths of the Infantry and Cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's Regular Army, but would recommend that the Regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present. The Artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

Sir P. Grant is of opinion that there are no better Troops in the world than the European Regiments of the Company's Service, but that associating them with Troops of the Royal Army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. He believes that the system of interior economy of Regiments of Her Majesty's Service is superior to that of any Army in the world, and that it should be strictly followed in all European Regiments of the Company's Service. His Excellency does not state the proportion of the European Troops which should belong to the Line, or be Local, but he states that a part of the European Force should always belong to Her Majesty's Line.

Sir H. Somerset considers that the proportion of European Force to be drawn from Her Majesty's Army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that Army in the time of war. His Excellency is strongly of opinion that it will never answer in the event of an European War to denude India to the extent already done; a view he deems accordant with past experience, and he thinks that two-thirds of the European Force required for the permanent occupation of India, should be composed of Troops raised exclusively for that service.

QUESTION.

12.

Colonel P. Melville conceives it to be immaterial what proportion of the European Troops belong to Her Majesty's Line, or are Local, and that it may be allowed to fluctuate according to circumstances.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

12.

Upon the question of the best mode of officering the Local European Corps, the Adjutant General, Colonel Mayhew, is of opinion that the permanent European Corps cannot be more readily commanded than by the British Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Native Army; forming the complement of one European Regiment out of two Native ones, as is being done at present with the new Cavalry and Infantry Corps.

Sir P. Grant proposes that the existing Establishment of Officers of Native Regiments of each branch, Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on as at present, regimentally. That the Officers to serve with the European Corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole Army, and in the proportions obtaining in Her Majesty's Service. That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the staff duties of the Army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with the Native Corps. Officers who proved unfit for duty with a European Regiment, Sir P. Grant would have remanded to the Native Corps, supplying their places by selection as before; and he anticipates most favorable results from this mode of officering additional European Corps, as it would secure with each Corps the number of Officers necessary for discipline and perfect efficiency, and would operate as a check to the system of purchasing out seniors, as the Officers attached to European Corps would belong to distinct Native Corps, and thus would have no interest in purchasing out those with whom they were for the time serving. Sir P. Grant considers that frequent changes would thus in a great measure be obviated. An important feature in his Excellency's proposal is that the Officers appointed to these European Corps, should be sent home to raise and organize their Regiments, for until these are formed and fit for duty, it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's Troops.

On the other hand Sir John Lawrence's Committee advocate a different system from either of the preceding, though they concur as to the sources from whence the Officers are to be drawn. Their proposal and the grounds upon which it is made are given as follows—

“The new Regiments of Europeans should, we think, be officered from the Officers of the old Native Army. The temporary disadvantages inseparable from their inexperience of European

"Soldiers would be compensated by their knowledge of the coun-
 "try and language. The State too, must find employment for
 "these Officers, whose devoted services as a body, during the
 "late crisis, have established claims which cannot be overlooked,
 "and there seems no other opening for them. The circumstances
 "of the late crisis have however been so exceptional, and caused
 "in the Bengal Presidency such great derangement of promotion,
 "that justice to the Officers as well as the Service seems to de-
 "mand that the whole of the Officers of the Cavalry and Infan-
 "try of that Presidency, should be thrown into two general lists
 "for the two branches, and be placed according to seniority
 "from their status on the 10th May 1857. As it is, the survi-
 "ving Officers of the worst Corps have benefitted by the mutiny,
 "and have superseded not only their contemporaries of the best
 "Native Regiments, but also those of European Regiments who
 "have been putting down the Mutineers. A very general dissa-
 "tisfaction prevails on this head, and it is very easy to remedy
 "it now before beginning a new system. Having thrown all the
 "Officers into a general Cavalry and general Infantry list, the
 "Adjutant General's Department of the Army, and the Generals
 "of Divisions should be called on to report those Officers whose
 "inefficiency for the public service is notorious, and such Officers
 "should be struck off the Rolls of the Army, and allowed to retire
 "on the pension of their rank or on a bonus commensurate with
 "their services, or in some cases, both. The really efficient
 "Officers should then be posted to the new Army according
 "to seniority."

Sir S. Cotton's proposal is again wholly different, in as much
 as he would first amalgamate the Indian Armies with that of the
 Crown, abolishing all distinction between the Officers and Soldiers
 of these hitherto distinct Armies. He regards India as the only
 field for the training of Officers to command, and that it is of im-
 perial importance to England, as a great European power, that all
 European Officers serving in the same Army should be placed on
 the same footing and rendered available in common for all duties.

After having described how he would organize and officer
 the Irregular Infantry and Cavalry of the Native portion of the
 Army, he proceeds to advocate that the European Officers serving
 on the Staff and other detached duties, and in Irregular Corps in
 India, be placed on one general list as in the Artillery—and Sir
 S. Cotton is of opinion that it would be far better to have them
 so, than on Regimental lists, because from those general lists selec-
 tion being made for the Regimental and Staff duties, the Officers
 best suited for the various occupations would find their way into
 their proper places. In the first place the Officers would be
 appointed in the *Regular Service* and rise accordingly; that is,

regimentally, being only placed upon the general list or Staff list, when attached to the Staff or to Irregular Native Corps.

It will at once be observed that Sir S. Cotton's proposed scheme is radically different from that of Sir John Lawrence's Committee, and Sir P. Grant's, and all three are distinct from that advocated by the Adjutant General, Colonel Mayhew, which last has been already partially instituted by the orders of Government and the Court of Directors.

Colonel P. Melvill, the Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay, would have the additional Corps officered from the present establishment of the Indian Army on the same principle as when augmentations were made in former times.

Sir Henry Somerset would officer the additional European Corps, as at present, on the seniority promotion system, and if requisite, would absorb the unemployed Officers of the Bengal Army in their organization and the reconstruction of the Native Army. Lord Harris would also officer the additional Corps through the regular course of the Honorable Company's Service, as the simplest course, though other plans might be suggested.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

3.

In reply to this question the Adjutant General of the Bengal Army apprehends that a considerable accession of seniority promotion Corps would not be productive of greater embarrassment than now exists. Sir John Lawrence's Committee are of a similar opinion; but they add that should it create additional embarrassment they have no hesitation in recommending that the present purchase promotion system be no further extended, considering it based on vicious principles, and depriving the State of the Military ability which would otherwise be available. They remark that the system which attains in the Indian Armies of purchasing out seniors, and benefitting by the promotion according to seniority, is a very legitimate and a very useful way of giving money its influence in quickening promotion, and one on which public opinion keeps a wholesome check.

Sir P. Grant is also of opinion, that an increase to the number of Corps raised for service in India, and officered from the Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army, ought not to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion, that the purchase promotion system of Her Majesty's Army produces no embarrassment in juxtaposition with the seniority promotion system of the Indian Army, and that no augmentation in the number of Corps on the one side or the other can cause any embarrassment so long as the

two systems stand divided from each other, but that any attempt to amalgamate them would produce the utmost confusion.

Sir Henry Somerset remarks upon this question that the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxtaposition of the seniority and purchase promotion systems would be very great unless some remedy similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's Engineers and Artillery be granted to the Company's Cavalry and Infantry also, the Officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of Major in the Artillery and Engineers gives the Officers of these Arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority promotion system. Upon this point His Excellency suggests for consideration the addition of a 2nd Lieutenant-Colonel to each Native Cavalry and Infantry Regiment, to receive the pay of Major until he attained a certain position on the general list of Lieutenant-Colonels, after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank.

Sir S. Cotton does not touch upon this point; according to his proposal all Officers would enter the Royal Service, and that being one in which, with the exception of the Ordnance and Marine Corps, purchase is the rule, all Officers except those of the Artillery and Engineers would necessarily come under its operation.

QUESTION.

ANSWER.

14.

Upon this question the reply of Sir John Lawrence and his Committee merits especial attention, and will be found to concur with the views of distinct and distant authorities belonging to other Presidencies. In the event of Foreign mercenaries (coloured races) being raised for service in India, Sir John Lawrence's Committee does not think that the proportion of European Troops could be modified to any sensible degree. The Committee strongly object to such a system, and upon grounds thus stated:—"Military service is one of the most powerful means of conciliation which the British Indian Government has at its disposal, but after we have given all the service that is available, it is still one of the popular complaints that we give so little. It is a necessity of our position that we must spend a large proportion of the revenues of the country on European Soldiers; but such necessity exists for bringing in Mahomedan, Hindoo and Budhist foreigners from other Tropical Countries. Such a policy would be felt to be oppressive, and would be departing from the benevolent desire we have ever had to rule India for the benefit of the Indians. Moreover, with the memories of 1857 still fresh, we doubt much whether the natives of India are not the most docile of coloured Military races. Again every foreign coloured Soldier that you bring into India displaces an Indian Soldier; a Soldier by caste and profession who will take no other livelihood. What would the advocates of foreign mercenaries propose to do with these

“ displaced Military classes? No Statesman can ignore them ; the
 “ wise policy is to feed, use, and control them.”

Upon this question the Adjutant General of the Bengal Army contents himself with the observation that, in the event of another rise against British dominion in India, no troops are safely to be trusted but European ones ; he thus by inference discountenances the idea of the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries.

Sir S. Cotton is averse to the employment of foreign coloured mercenaries in the Indian service, and apprehends that they would become a very great burden to the State when worn out, and perhaps very troublesome ; and in support of his opinion upon this point he instances the Arabs in the Deccan in the service of the Nizam, and the Ceylon Corps composed of Malays, Caffrees and Sepoys, which were not found to answer.

The Resident of Hyderabad of the Deccan, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Davidson, takes a different view, and proposes to enlist in the Hyderabad Contingent in the place of the two Infantry Regiments of Sepoys, two African Corps taken indiscriminately from the races inhabiting that great Continent. He would apply this principle throughout the armies of India, and out of every eight Regiments embodied, he proposes that two should be foreigners capable of serving in a tropical climate. After questioning the policy of entertaining low caste men, and pointing out that low caste men are equally disinclined to go on board a ship, or proceed on foreign service, and to the full as great adepts at secret combinations to resist authority as high caste men, Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson observes that the Native Government have long since “ given us a practical lesson as to their opinion of the
 “ loyalty and fidelity of the Sepoy Soldiery in India. It will be
 “ found that their most trusted Troops were always foreign
 “ mercenaries. The Nizam has at this present moment in his employ
 “ 18,000 Arabs, and about 5,000 Rohillas (Affghans) and many
 “ more of the latter tribe are in his Territory seeking employment.
 “ Not a petty Rajah in Guzerat but has, or endeavoured to have his
 “ Arab or Foreign Guard, however small it may be numerically,
 “ for the protection of his person and Treasury ; alleging, they
 “ find the Foreign mercenaries faithful, while their own immediate
 “ subjects cannot be trusted. So far as the difference of circum-
 “ stances admits, we might do well to imitate the Roman policy,
 “ which jealously excluded the employment in their conquered
 “ Provinces of Troops native to the place, and substituted for
 “ them men having no local sympathies of country and kindred.”

It will be observed that Sir H. Somerset enters upon the question under consideration at some length, and opens his replies

by treating the subject with a care and completeness which is the more valuable from the experience which His Excellency has had in the British possessions of Southern Africa, a quarter from whence many have proposed to draw a supply of Foreign coloured mercenaries. Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that in the long run, Regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans without possessing their general efficiency. He however deprecates the enlistment of Foreign coloured mercenaries chiefly on political grounds thus stated :—“ If a section of our subjects, “ carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength and “ underrate ours, to forget the substantial privileges which they “ enjoyed, derived solely on their connection with us, and *not* on “ the soundness of their own constitution, moral or social, we may “ conclude that having now had ocular demonstration that the “ European Force in this Country can be trebled, and having “ learnt such severe lessons through its instrumentality, they will, “ as a body, abandon such fallacies and readily believe that our “ ascendancy, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a “ practical as well as a moral truth.” Having thus arrived at the conclusion that events of 1857 and of 1858, have resulted in the affirmation of our ascendancy, Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that foreign coloured mercenaries would fail to command the respect European Troops do ; that they could not be introduced in sufficient numbers to render us independent of the Sepoys, who, numerically speaking, must always preponderate, and that should a moral epidemic recur like that from which we are now emerging, the foreign mercenaries would not be one whit more trustworthy than are the Natives of India. Further, that foreign mercenaries might occasion jealousy and mistrust between ourselves and the whole Native Army, and lead to the dangerous conclusion of our inability to maintain in India an adequate European Force. Sir H. Somerset objects to the enlistment of Foreign coloured mercenaries, and advocates the maintenance of a fixed European Force *en evidence* in the country, and the steady perseverance in the attempt to free the people of India from the moral thralldom to Brahminical influence, which His Excellency asserts to be the disaffected element in the Bombay Presidency, and the influence with which we are practically in conflict, and to which either our influence must become superior or in time yield.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion that the presence of Foreign coloured mercenaries would not enable the Government to dispense with any portion of the English Troops in India.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army is as much opposed to the entertainment of Foreign colored mercenaries as

the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army. Sir P. Grant's words are :—" I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting " Natives of other tropical countries for service in India, for I am " convinced that, as a general rule, the black man will always " fraternize with the black man against the white man, and if " the Natives of other tropical countries are, as I believe them " to be, composed of better stuff for Soldiers than the Natives " of this country, it is to my mind an additional reason against " enlisting them for service in India."

The Commissioner of Mysore, Sir M. Cubbon, says positively that the introduction of Foreign colored mercenaries will be received with great distaste, not only by the existing Madras Army, but by the population in general. Lord Harris considers that the presence of Foreign mercenaries from other tropical countries would not admit of the proportion of European Troops necessary for the permanent occupation of India being altered.

To his replies to the questions on the Infantry, Sir William Mansfield appends a Minute on the reconstruction of the Bengal Army, in the hope of more thoroughly elucidating his thoughts on the great subject of the questions, than could be effected by presenting them in a form likely to interfere with the connection and course of his argument.

He represents these opinions as the production not of yesterday, but of the observation and thought of many years, having, when commanding one of Her Majesty's Regiments in India, been thrown much into contact with the Native Army of Bengal.

Sir W. Mansfield divides his Minute into several chapters, under the following heads :—

- I. The principle on which Native Armies should be formed.
- II. Caste.
- III. The Regular Army of Bengal.
- IV. The European Force for the Bengal Army.
- V. The Command of Native Regiments.
- VI. On the Questions having reference to Para. 5 of the Court's Despatch No. 235, of the 25th November 1857.
- VII. The future distribution of the Regular Forces in Bengal in times of tranquility.
- VIII. The Army of Bengal.
- IX. On the Financial result of the scheme submitted.
- X. The organization of the Artillery for Bengal.

The following is an analysis of these Chapters :—

I. THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH NATIVE ARMIES SHOULD BE FORMED.

Sir W. Mansfield, without attempting to indicate the original causes of the mutiny of the Bengal Army, is of opinion that the loyalty of the Corps which remained true

to their colors is an affair of circumstances, and that the same may be said of the Native Troops of Madras and Bombay, in which Mutiny did at times make its appearance, though it did not spread, the two Armies having passed through a very terrible ordeal in a manner almost incredible.

This result Sir W. Mansfield considers to be attributable only to a limited extent to their better system of discipline as compared with the Bengal Army; but he assigns it rather to the entire separation of the Native Armies of Madras and Bombay from that of Bengal, which, with different interests and systems and different services are animated by an *esprit-de-corps* of their own, and are jealous of the pre-eminence awarded to the Bengal Army from its much larger size, and from the constant wars in which it has been engaged.

The strong feelings of the Officers, which they freely express, warrants us, it is observed, in ascribing antipathy towards the Bengal Army to the Soldiery of the Madras and Bombay Armies.

Noticing the quasi-masonic brotherhood in the Bengal Army from the system of recruiting, Sir W. Mansfield mentions the unwise tendency of the Bombay Government of late years to give a preference to the comely Poorbiah recruit, so as nearly to affiliate the Bombay to the Bengal Army.

He attributes the steadiness of the former during last year's troubles to the happy circumstance that the process had not been completed. The feeling shown in the Madras Cavalry is attributed to the same cause.

The flocking of Sikhs to our standard to aid us in crushing the Mutiny, Sir W. Mansfield notices as a further instance of the sentiment of separate interests which has so largely conduced to the safety of Southern India. The Sikhs have enlisted, not for love of the British rule, but in order to revenge themselves, and to plunder the Hindoostanee Cities; and even have turned to profit the *esprit-de-corps* of the old Khalsa Army of Runjeet Sing.

The lesson which Sir W. Mansfield draws from those great instances is, that instead of creating a grand centralized Army like that which has lately been dissolved, we should have several Local Armies, distinct and separate from one another, and in which an *esprit-de-corps* peculiar to itself, should be fostered:—that we should recognize the fact that the Native Army of India is not wanted for foreign war, and that the defence of India is what is to be provided for, in the manner most agreeable to the Troops and to the people, without sacrificing efficiency.

The passage of the Indus is noticed as perhaps the first severe shock given to the fidelity of the Sepoy:—and taking for granted that we have passed the acquisition phase of our Indian policy, it is concluded that consolidation is to be our object in future, an object to which Local Armies, with somewhat of the character of the Militia at home, would best conduce.

The Trans-Indus frontier, it is observed, should fall to the Army of the Punjaub, but in other parts of the Empire, the Native Armies would be a better sort of Police in

ordinary times, and employed in appropriate duties, instead of being allowed to remain idle and useless in large cantonments as heretofore.

Sir W. Mansfield would treat the various Provinces or Chief Commissionerships of this immense Presidency, as a confederacy of States, each having its local force, the binding string of the forces of States being the British Army proper of the Queen and the Company, reinforced slightly by bodies of light Troops, which should be gathered from every district and corner of India, and should be closely incorporated with the British Battalions.

Sir W. Mansfield considers Native Troops and trained Police to be convertible terms; he can see no essential difference between them, recruited as they are and trained alike, and if local forces are established there should, he thinks, be no distinct appellation, the training required for the Police being the best preparation for the Army. He instances the Police of Ireland as perhaps the most efficient body of Troops in the whole world, and places the Police Battalions in Scinde and the Punjab on perfect equality with the Native Regiments of the line. When not assembled for the purposes of Military duty proper, the Native Army should, in his opinion, be dispersed, not on furlough as heretofore, but on duty, in the discharge of ordinary Police functions. On this understanding a system of relief might be established, under which a certain number of Regiments would be kept together for Military training, and the remainder be employed in districts with the Magistrates, each Corps having its own tour of both duties, at stated intervals under the European Officers: a system which, it is observed, would teach the Officers the duties of Magistrates, would bring the Officers into contact with the people, and terminate that segregation of British Officers which accounts for the late wide spread conspiracy having taken place without the cognizance of a single white man throughout the Presidency.

The local forces (it is suggested) might, during the season of camps and drill, meet the Regular Army for exercise. The families should live in the cantonments with the men. Long furloughs should be abolished; furlough should be left to Commanding Officers, to be granted or not according to the conduct of the applicants.

Sir W. Mansfield has long seen that the only condition of safety with respect to the Bengal Army was its constant employment in war: he had noticed the surly conduct of the Sepoys when called on to do any thing they did not fancy as elements of danger, and he declares that the Officers yielded to and pampered the prejudices of their men.

He notices as a great mistake the recommendation of Sir Charles Napier, that great divisions of Troops should be concentrated. This measure he thinks could only tend to unlawful combination and alienate the men from civil duties.

To remedy the evil of Sepoys overvaluing themselves, Sir W. Mansfield would abolish unlimited enlistment, and admit men for ten years only, with re-enlistment as a great favor for five years only, and when that period expired, for five years more, and at every subsequent period of five years, the bond should be again renewed.

He would not allow a Sepoy to take his discharge while engaged in active service.

On this footing the men would have the strongest incentive to merit the favor of re-enlistment. Inefficient men would be got rid of without trouble, and seniority promotion would be done away with.

Sir W. Mansfield would only have pensions to exist as a reward for good service, after a series of re-enlistments.

In elucidation of his remarks on the privileges of the Native soldiery, Sir W. Mansfield gives a large quotation from the late Sir W. H. Sleeman's work, bearing on the preference and facilities given by order of Government to complaints and suits of Sepoys, and on the abuses of long furloughs.

II.—CASTE, AS REGARDS THE CONSTITUTION OF REGIMENTS.

Sir W. Mansfield would abolish finally all exclusiveness in the choice of Recruits, and would let all castes, and let the Mussulman share, and share alike in the Regiments of the Local Armies.

He considers uniformity in the composition of corps to be neither desirable nor advisable; and would have low caste corps, high caste corps, and Mussulman corps; also Regiments formed of Companies of different castes, and in all he would have a Company or two of Mussulmans.

As a test for all, he would make it indispensable that all the Sepoys forming a Company should mess together, any man objecting to this should be discharged.

It is mentioned that this test has, to a certain extent, been carried out in the Punjaut Regiments; and tried, but without success, in certain Hindoo low caste corps, raised in 1858. On the urgent representation of some Commanding Officers, the Commander-in-Chief has not persevered in this measure, one persuasive argument being, that just now there is so much fear in the Native mind about tampering with their religion that serious danger might arise from the measure which, in ordinary times, would not be the case.

Sir W. Mansfield thinks that Mussulmans should not be in the same Company with Hindoos or Sikhs, and that Sikhs and Hindoos should not be mingled together. He considers that rivalry or even hate between two Companies or Troops, might exist, without at all impairing the discipline of Regiments.

III. THE REGULAR ARMY OF BENGAL.

Sir W. Mansfield advocates a large European Force, to which should be permanently attached special Native Corps.

He would attach a Native Battalion 600 strong to every British Battalion, whether of the Regular or of the Local European Force. He would attach Native Cavalry to British Cavalry of equal strength.

Officers for the Native Battalions he would take from the British Regiments, placing the whole under the Commanding Officers of the latter as a sort of Brigadier, but giving a Commandant to the Native Battalion or Cavalry, as on the Irregular system, and this Commandant should be one of the Majors of the British Regiments, or a selected Captain to be taken from some other Corps. But this measure would require a large increase of Officers to Regiments.

Sir W. Mansfield would never separate these Regiments of two Battalions, one European and one Native, except for temporary purposes. Of course Regiments coming from England would take over the Native Battalions attached to the Corps relieved.

He considers that Bengal requires not less than 50,000 European Troops *i. e.*, an establishment of about 64,000 exclusive of Gwalior and Rajpootana, but that when tranquillity is fully restored, the requisite Force will not exceed 35,000 Europeans, *i. e.*, an establishment of about 48,000.

With the European Force of 50,000 men, he would associate 30,000 Natives, Cavalry and Infantry; and he would make the Head-Quarters of each European Regiment the scene of a new Levy.

Alluding to the necessity which has compelled us to employ not less than 60,000 Sikhs and Punjaubees, and the expediency of dissolving that large body as soon as circumstances admit, Sir W. Mansfield urges that no time should be lost in directing every European Regiment of Infantry and Cavalry excepting those in the Punjab to raise a Native Corps for General Service. The enlistment of Sikhs and Punjaubees he would resolutely stop, until recruits of other races should have restored an equilibrium in the ranks.

IV.—THE EUROPEAN FORCES FOR THE ARMY OF BENGAL.

Sir W. Mansfield proposes that the permanent Local European Force shall consist of an Artillery Regiment of about the same strength as the present one, English Companies being substituted for the old native Companies—of ten Cavalry Regiments of 400 sabres each—and of 30 Infantry Regiments of 1,140 Privates each, in 12 Companies, ten in India, and two in Depôt at home.

He proposes further that the British Army should furnish for service in India, with periodical relief, 12 Troops and Field Batteries of Artillery, 4 Companies of Royal Engineers, 2 Regiments of Dragoons, and 15 Infantry Regiments.

He would make the standard height for India, 5 feet 3 inches for grown men, and 5 feet 2½ inches for growing lads—for the Artillery 5 feet 6 inches, excepting the Drivers,

who might be 5 feet 3 inches, and no man should be enlisted who has not completed his 20th year.

As the Artillery and Cavalry already exist, it remains, it is observed, to form 24 additional Battalions, and these might be formed by taking for each the Officers of two Regiments of the old Native Infantry.

The three European Infantry Regiments recently authorized, and the 24 other Corps to be raised, to complete the Local Infantry to 30 Regiments, will absorb on this plan the Officers of 54 old Regiments. There would remain 20 Corps of Officers, who should be distributed according to their seniority in the 30 European Corps; thus increasing the permanent establishment of Regiments as the only means of meeting the constant draughts for Staff and detached employ.

But as even then the proper discharge of the service will not be provided for, Sir W. Mansfield would have an unattached list, on which he would place Assistant Commissioners of the 1st and 2nd Classes, and all Officers in Civil employ of superior position.

Officers connected with the Secretariat of Government.

Officers Commanding Police Corps.

Officers having the rank of Deputy Assistant Adjutant General and all superior grades.

Officers Commanding Irregular Corps or Corps of the Local Forces proposed in the first Chapter.

To make up for the loss of Regimental promotion, each Officer accepting Staff employment should receive a step of effective rank for every four years so passed. There should be Regimental promotion in the place of every Officer so removed. The plan would be expensive, but the expense, it is observed, must be incurred.

Sir W. Mansfield would have all Officers to belong to the European Regiments, and would select them thence for Native Corps to be formed on the Irregular system—employment to be a Staff appointment as in the present Irregular Corps, and he would give larger allowances to the Officers serving with Native Corps.

Sir W. Mansfield would place the Local Army on a footing of absolute equality with that of the moveable Army of England, by allowing exchanges between the Officers of the two Armies, just as Officers of a West India Regiment can now go to the Guards, or Officers of the Ceylon Rifles to the Blues. He would, however, not allow such exchanges till an Officer had completed ten years service in India, nor would he permit the transfer of a Staff appointment to the Officer exchanging into the Local Army. Previous misconduct of either party he would make an absolute bar to such exchange.

Officers in the unattached list of all ranks, should, in his opinion, be made available for service elsewhere, so as to abolish all distinction between two services of Englishmen.

He would have the Local Army and the other Royal Forces subject to the same Mutiny Act and Articles of War.

For the Local Army the present furlough rules should exist, but furlough should not exceed two years.

Alluding to the Army Funds for widows and orphans, Sir W. Mansfield would dissolve these, which he objects to as "associations" which establish an interest in "a body of Officers apart from their Military profession, and not possessing a Military character." But he admits that the task of disposing of this part of the subject will be most delicate and difficult.

V. THE COMMAND OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

Considering the measures already authorized, that the powers of Commanding Officers of Native Infantry Regiments shall be increased, and that incompetent Lieutenant-Colonels may be shelved under the orders of Government, to be a step in the right direction, but not sufficient for the purpose, Sir W. Mansfield would further propose that certain simple Rules be substituted for the Articles of War, and that Commandants of Regiments should have power to dismiss and to inflict corporal punishment, records of their proceedings being carefully preserved for submission to the Commander-in-Chief.

While in the field, every Native Regiment should have at least one European Officer per Troop or Company; each Corps in the "Local or Police Armies" should have a Commandant, a Second in Command and an Adjutant, and never less than these.

VI. ON THE QUESTIONS HAVING REFERENCE TO PARA. 5, OF THE DESPATCH No. 235, OF 25TH NOVEMBER 1857, MILITARY DEPARTMENT, FROM COURT TO DIRECTORS.

QUESTIONS.

1 to 8.

ANSWERS.

Sir W. Mansfield submits Returns of the present number of European and Native Troops in Bengal, and a Tabular Statement of the number which he thinks necessary, with a Distribution Return of them.

It appears from the Returns that, including Military Police and Levies of every kind, the present ratio is about three Natives to one European Soldier. As tranquillity is restored, he considers that we shall be able to manage with a proportion of four to one.

Referring to question 13, asking whether if a large increase takes place in the Local Force to be officered largely from the

mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army, this accession of seniority promotion Corps will create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system, than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal Artillery, Engineers and Marines, and the three Indian Armies, in all which seniority promotion is the system. Sir W. Mansfield does not think that in legislating on the future organization of the Indian Army the question of purchase or non-purchase should be entertained.

He repeats that he would advocate exchanges under certain conditions ; states that purchase, though winked at, has never been authorized in the Indian Armies, and that no step should be taken to authorize it. He would not interfere with Officers desirous so to lay out their money.

VII. THE FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF THE REGULAR FORCES IN THE PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL IN TIMES OF TRANQUILLITY.

A Tabular Statement shows how Sir W. Mansfield would distribute the Troops. In this he makes no allusion to Burmah or Rajpootana, because the former, he concludes, will, as now, be held by Madras, and the latter by Bombay ; he would provide for Goonah and Mhow from the Rajpootana Force.

He observes that a Battalion standing at 1,000 Rank and File never in fact has in its ranks more than 750, so that the number given by him—62,000—will be really reduced to 46,500 ready for effective duty.

VIII. THE ARMY OF BENGAL.

Sir W. Mansfield remarks that his calculations are based on the association of a limited Native Army with the European Force ; that if not so extended by a body of Native Soldiery, the numbers of European Corps must be largely increased. Heretofore the European Force has been the auxiliary of the Sepoy Army, but that must now be reversed, and we must have every European Battalion supported by a weak Native Battalion, either separate, or, as he has proposed, attached to it.

He would further maintain in their integrity the Goorkha Regiments, the Nusseeree, Kumaon Battalions and the 66th and 73rd Regiments. These he would generally canton in the Hills, and only bring them down for service. Each Cantonment of their Regiments might be a Goorkha Colony.

The few Corps which have remained faithful, *viz.*, the 31st, Khelat-i-Ghilzie, Lucknow Regiment. Three Regiments to be formed out of remnants of mutinous

Corps. These six he would form into a Brigade with Officer specially appointed.

On the whole then we should have a Native Army, as distinguished from the Local or Police Armies, rather more than 40,000 men, *viz.*—

12 Regiments @ 400 men each	4,800 Cavalry.
45 Battalions @ 600 ditto	27,000 Infantry.
5 Regiments @ 800 ditto	4,000 Goorkhas.
6 Regiments @ 800 ditto	4,800 Other N. I.
			—————
			40,600

To this add proposed European Establishment of all arms :—

Excluding Officers and Serjeants	62,000
			—————
		Total ...	1,02,600
			—————

This Force would hold the Bengal Presidency, provided each large Government had, at the same time, a Local or Police Army, including Irregular Cavalry and Infantry, available for either Military or Civil purposes.

IX. ON THE FINANCIAL RESULT TO BE ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENT ON THE SCHEME SUBMITTED.

On the 1st January 1857, the Native Army of all descriptions amounted to 1,70,000 men, and the European Force to 15,750 men.

The expense of one European Soldier being equal to that of two Sepoys—

From the proposed European Establishment	62,000
Deduct the old Establishment	15,750
			—————
			46,250
Multiply by 2 to give the equivalent in Sepoys	2
			—————
			92,500
Add the proposed Sepoy Establishment for the Moveable Army			40,600
			—————
		Total ...	1,33,100
			—————
From the Native Establishment on the 1st of January 1857...			1,70,000
Deduct the Total	1,33,100
			—————
The difference between the two will be	36,900
			—————

This, Sir W. Mansfield observes, is independent of the pension list, which, with certain exceptions, he has proposed to abolish. The saving thence he cannot estimate; but he concludes it will be very large.

In such case, he remarks, if the Local or Police Armies be allowed to swell to 80,000 men, the cost to the State would exceed that of the commencement of 1857 while there would be a considerable diminution in the cost of Burkundaz, though this class of Police might not altogether be dispensed with.

PRECIS ON REPLY FROM MR. MUIR, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
N. W. PROVINCES.

MR. MUIR observes that his ignorance of professional details renders it unnecessary for him to follow the questions *seriatim*; but he takes them as a guide for the order of his remarks.

His first remark is, that the number of European Troops for the North-Western Provinces must be sufficient to crush the idea of successful opposition by the Native Army. He notices the paucity of European Troops heretofore as having led the Sepoys to overvalue themselves, and that one of their number told the late Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor—"it is *we* who have conquered India for you from Ceylon to Peshawur."

Mr. Muir considers that in proportion to the degree in which the Native Army is broken up into Provincial Battalions and Local Forces, it will lose its sense of unity and independent power, and any attempt at measuring itself with the British in India will not be so dangerous as before. But the late general mutiny will make the idea of opposition more easy of suggestion than before. With due precaution on our part, he considers that the two centres of warlike races, the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces—will not fraternize, and the lowest possible limit of European Troops is that force which would at any moment afford moveable Troops to crush either the Punjab or the Hindoostanee Army.

Mr. Muir would have large Brigades at a few prominent Stations throughout the Country; and he mentions Allahabad, Meerut and Lucknow as such Brigade Stations. Agra, he observes, will be protected by Gwalior, where he concludes that a powerful European armament will be placed in room of the late Contingent.

In Rajpootana there should be two other European Brigades, at Nusseerabad and Mhow, the cost of which would be debitable to Rajpootana and Bundelkund. At Nagpore, Calcutta and Dinapore, Mr. Muir presumes, there will also be European Brigades; and at three Commanding positions in the Punjab.

At each Brigade Station he would place three, and at less important ones, two Regiments of European Infantry, one of European Cavalry, two European Batteries, and a Reserve Artillery Company. This would make available for the Field, from the Chief Brigade Stations, two Infantry and one Cavalry Regiments, with two Batteries.

Estimating each European Infantry Regiment at 1,000 men, a Cavalry Regiment at 400, and a Battery, Troop or Company, at 100, Mr. Muir would have for the supposed Brigade Stations above enumerated—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
For Moveable Columns	25,000	5,200	2,500	32,700
For the defence of the Brigade Stations...	16,000	0	1,600	17,600
Making a Grand Total of	41,000	5,200	4,100	
And Total of all Arms	50,300

But besides the main Military posts, Mr. Muir would have other important central points guarded by European Troops, such as the Divisional Head Quarters of Civil administrations, and where we have Treasuries. The Divisional Stations would be Bareilly, Agra, Benares, Goruckpore, Saugor, Jubbulpore, Jhansie, in all seven, and he would place at each half a European Infantry Regiment, a Squadron of Cavalry, a Battery or Troop of Artillery (at some places half a Battery might suffice) and a Reserve Company or half Company for the fortresses or entrenchments.

For these objects probably four Infantry Regiments, three or four of Cavalry, six or seven Batteries, and three or four Reserve Companies would be required.

But there would still remain some twenty-nine or thirty Stations, Head Quarters of Civil administrations, to be properly protected. These he enumerates; they are found in the Divisions of Meerut, Rohilcund, Agra, Allahabad, Benares, Goruckpore, Jhansie, Jubbulpore, Kemaon, Jawud, Nimar, Ajmere, in each of which from two to six Stations are specified.

These are all centres of administrations, having each a distinct Treasury, several European Officers with their Establishments, and in many cases large Cities close by. In some there are already strong Forts, as Allygurh, Almorah, Furruckabad; while at others, such as Shajehanpore, Etawah, Mynpooree, Cawnpore, Futtehpoore, Mirzapore, Azimgurh, since the outbreak, fortifications or entrenchments of greater or less strength have been constructed. Mr. Muir considers it important to have such defences at all the chief District Head Quarters, as places of refuge and as receptacles for Treasure, and to have them permanently garrisoned by Europeans trained to the use of Artillery. To effect this, he would have Garrison Corps, to be raised from amongst the Invalids and Pensioners, and Soldiers constitutionally unfit for active employment in the Field. The Head Quarters might be at Chunar, and Garrisons be furnished thence. Probably 1,200 men would supply all that is required in the North-Western Provinces, or with a Reserve at Head Quarters, 1,500 men.

To estimate the requisite amount of a Native Army, Mr. Muir observes that it will be first necessary to consider how far the duties of the late Native Army will be performed by the Military Police.

With a semi-military organization, detached from the Native Army, and composed of local and isolated Corps, the Police Battalions will have no sympathy and no concern in common with the Regular Regiments; the latter will not regard them as part of their own body, and the same gigantic union of purpose and corporate action which pervaded the entire Bengal Army, will be scarcely possible.

The Regular Army would be employed on its proper duties, and might be greatly reduced in numbers.

Mr. Muir would make the pay of the Police Corps lower than that of the Line. For the Infantry six Rupees a month, and twenty-two or twenty-three Rupees for the Cavalry of the Police would suffice, and a fourth or fifth part of each Corps might be kept up at the present high rates of seven Rupees and twenty-five Rupees respectively, as an incentive to good conduct; or if the lower rates were made universal, an increase might be given when Police Detachments were called out of their division for Field service.

Mr. Muir would make the District Commandants and Adjutants, Assistants to the District Civil Officers to avoid jealousies, and ensure co-operation between the Military and Civil functionaries; and the former might be encouraged to rise to Special Assistants, or Joint Magistrates and Deputy Collectors, on passing the prescribed examinations, and with an increase of salary.

Including the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories, but excluding Ajmere, Mhairwarra, Jawud Neemuch, Mhair, (and of course Oude also) Mr. Muir's estimate of the requisite Police Force is--

For seven Divisional Head Quarters Stations—

				Total.
Each Station	Infantry	800	5,600
		Cavalry	250	1,750
For thirty-one Districts—				
Each Station	Infantry	400	12,400
		Cavalry	100	3,100
Grand Total		Infantry	18,800	
		Cavalry	5,100	

But on the restoration of tranquillity, their numbers might be reduced to 15,000 Infantry and 3,000 Cavalry.

Mr. Muir would enlist from none exclusively, from all indiscriminately, choosing the most active, able-bodied men of good general character and repute. The supply might be drawn from the Division in which the men are to serve, but not too much of one caste or one social connection.

Mr. Muir is not in favor of low-caste Police Corps. He considers low-caste more objectionable in the Police than in the Army, as the men come more in contact with the people and are more connected with the Civil administration. It is not wise, he observes, to exercise our Government in a way to breed contempt, if not disgust. But he would not object to have occasionally

Classes from which to recruit the Military Police.

Caste.

Companies of low-caste men of the more respectable classes. He would vary, as much as possible, the composition of the Police, and he would have similar castes generally arranged in Companies, in order to work more readily together.

The District Police would take all the ordinary duties of protection, guards, &c.

He would jealously avoid recruiting the Regular Army from the Police, for that would push down the wall of partition which should be fully maintained between the two bodies.

The name should be altered from "Police Corps" to "Local Battalions," the term *Police* indicating something inferior.

Mr. Muir mentions that there are large Cities where, either from their own importance, or owing to the distance of European Troops, Native Regular Corps will be required independently of the Local Battalions, such as Allyghur, Moradabad, Furruckabad and Banda. At the two last, there should be Native Cavalry also.

At Almorah, there would always be a Hill Corps, and another at Deyrah; in all, six isolated Regiments.

At each first Class or Brigade Station, there should be two Native Corps of Infantry and one of Cavalry.

They might all move out for Field service, and the European Force would receive then an accession of Native Soldiers equal in number to itself.

At inferior Stations there might be a Native Infantry Corps for fatigue and Field duty, and sometimes a Native Cavalry Regiment or Squadron.

Mr. Muir would have no Native Artillery, and he would have Native States limited in their number of Artillerymen and in the calibre of their Guns, if this can be done without offence.

But he would make an exception in favor of Native Christians, of whom an Artillery Company might be formed.

Mr. Muir gives a table of the amount of "Peace Force" for the North-Western Provinces. The totals are as follows—

<i>European Corps.</i>		Total
Cavalry 3, Infantry 11, Batteries	10½	} ... 14,700 Men
Companies	9½	

Native Troops.

Cavalry 5, Infantry 17, Artillery 100 men . 19,600 Men

The ratio is 1½ Native Regular Soldiers to 1 European, and with a Police Force about equal to the Native Army, the ratio will be 2⅔ Natives to 1 European.

Mr. Muir states that his calculations of Troops depend on the conclusion that Oude will be equally strongly provided for with the North-Western Provinces, and he points out particularly that his estimates are for a Peace Force, so that for some time yet more Troops than he has stated will be required.

He notices the reduction of Troops, which will eventually be caused by the extension of means of rapid locomotion.

Regarding the Regular Native Army he observes that the fault of enlistment heretofore lay in our having two or three leading castes, so that
 Caste. clanship grew up in our Regiments. He would now by no means exclude Brahmins, Rajpoots, or Mussulmans, from our new Army; but would limit their numbers. He would fix a percentage throughout the Army, for each main caste or cluster of castes, and jealously watch any variation from it. At Paragraph 60 of his paper he gives a scale of castes to which, however, he would not rigidly adhere; but he thinks there should be a *maximum*, say 15 per cent, beyond which none of the three grand castes—Brahmins, Rajpoots, Mussulmans—should on any account be admitted.

He would, however, enlist a small proportion of low-caste men, not expecting any greater faithfulness from them than from the high caste, for they are even more under the influence of Brahmins, and under caste bondage, than the higher castes.

Mr. Muir would enlist in every District where the people show a readiness to enter
 Enlistment. the ranks. This will break *local* associations throughout the Army. He would stop the old plan of allowing recruiting parties to bring their own relations to their Regiments, and would recruit *solely* through Officers deputed to the several Districts; not needing the aid of the Civil Officers, except when doubt arose as to respectability, feigning of caste, residence, or name.

Mr. Muir would have Local or District Armies, that is, a Local Army for each
 Distribution of the Native Army. Local Government; one for Bengal Proper, one for the North-Western Provinces (including Oude) and one for the Punjab; and he would keep the tour of duty for each Army by ordinary relief, within the limits of its own administration. But they would always be prepared at emergencies to march anywhere for foreign service, as an exception however.

Further, he would have each Local Army composed of local materials. The Seikhs and Punjabees should be kept mainly to their own Country, and every thing be done to keep up the separate and independent nationality of each Army.

Still, while the main portion of the Local Armies should be locally raised, Mr. Muir sees the advantage of having a small portion both of the Regular Army and the Police formed of men from a distance, as a wholesale check on the rest.

Mr. Muir thinks there might be advantage in having Companies composed each of a
 Internal composition of Regiments. separate caste, and he sees no objection to some Regiments being wholly of a single caste. The more that Regiments are raised, he observes, from a given District, each, or from a limited area, the better.

Without feeling competent to speak on Military discipline, Mr. Muir would abolish Native Courts Martial; as, if Commanding Officers are, they ought to be, selected for intelligence and judgment, reins should, to a great extent, be placed in their hands, and the ordinary punishments—dismissal, &c.—should rest with them.

Mr. Muir would not do away with pensions; but give them after terms of faithful service. The pension, he says, has undoubtedly had a very beneficial effect in the long series of service rendered by the Native Army; and though it failed of its effect before still stronger motives, pseudo-patriotism, and the lust of power and plunder, yet if we have ever again a foreign foe to encounter the Native Soldier will side with Government, and the privilege of pension will greatly nerve him to the fight.

Mr. Muir objects to the system that by constantly changing the material of our Army, we shall scatter over the land greater numbers of trained Soldiers. It might be well, he thinks, to enlist with no period for discharge, but the pleasure of the Commanding Officer, which would increase the power and influence of the Officer.

In conclusion Mr. Muir adverts to the possibility of our present vigilance not always lasting. He deprecates the taking away of Brigades for foreign service, retrenchments for the sake of economy when we shall have regained a sense of security; both which measures might cause a dangerous diminution of our European Force.

To his paper Mr. Muir has appended a copy of his Memorandum on the organization of the Police, written in October 1857.