

# ALL FOR THE GOLDEN AGE

OR

THE WAY OF PROGRESS

BY

G. F. WATES

LONDON

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.

MUSEUM STREET

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

## The Magic of Common Sense

Cr. 8vo.

3s. 6d.

"A sound little guide to life, as sensible in matter as it is pleasant in manner."—*Daily News*.

"Offers a broad and sane view of life and its infinite perplexities."—*Bookman*.

Published by

JOHN MURRAY, Albemarle Street, W.1.

## The Religion of Wise Men

Cr. 8vo.

4s. 6d.

"Most suggestive and thought-provoking."—*Truth*.

"Mr. Wates deals many a shrewd blow, too many of which get home."—*Expository Times*.

## Progress and the Past

A Glance Down the Ages

Cr. 8vo.

5s.

"An agreeable and well-informed writer."—*The Times*.

"The present volume sustains his reputation for earnestness combined with vivacity and breadth of learning added to lucidity of statement."—*Inquirer*.

Both published by

**GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.**

All the above have been re-published in America; the last by the Oxford University Press.

*First published in 1928*

*(All rights reserved)*

*Printed in Great Britain by  
Unwin Brothers, Ltd., Woking*

*" It makes all the difference in the world whether we put Truth in the first place or in the second place."*

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.

*" We are living in a new world : it is ours if we are true to the faith that is in us to seek to make it a better world."*

PREFACE BY THE BISHOPS TO THE  
REVISED PRAYER BOOK.

*" What man of you, having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it ?"*

LUKE xv. 4.

## PREFACE

IN following out the main idea of this book—that the Golden Age cannot come through this or that panacea, but by patient and strenuous work in all directions—it has been necessary for me to deal with many things on which I can claim no special knowledge. In these matters I am in the position of a jurymen who, not himself a specialist, has heard the evidence of those who are, and then makes his own deductions. It is also owing to the wide range of subjects that I am compelled to touch upon that, amongst them, there are a few of a comparatively trivial kind; trivial in themselves, but significant as indicating a particular outlook on life, or attitude of mind, better perhaps than some other things to which we usually attach more importance.

And for the same reason it has been necessary for me to deal with the question of personal sincerity. In doing this, it has not been my intention to adopt a censorious attitude. The power of unconscious bias is so great, and so easily leads to self-deception, that the imputation of consciously evil motives would be quite gratuitous. Of course there are cases in which, for unworthy reasons, men have deliberately suppressed or modified their views—both Erasmus and Descartes confessed as much. But we should not be too ready to take upon ourselves to decide whether the bias of other people is conscious or unconscious. It is enough, with honest introspection, to endeavour to decide the matter as to ourselves. If anywhere in the following pages I appear to have departed from this maxim, I

hope that the intention here expressed will be read into the passage.

Then it will be noticed that there is no attempt at an elaborate chain of argument ; and that there is, on the other hand, a constant recurrence of incident and narrative. This is because it has been my desire to keep as closely as possible to men and things. Is not an ounce of fact worth a ton of theory ? In any case, whether this method be, intrinsically, the best suited to the subject or not, I feel confident that it is, for me at least, the only possible way to convey my meaning.

I take this opportunity of thanking Mr. W. G. Ayres, Mr. H. E. Brown, Mr. Montagu C. Butler, Mr. E. Edmonds, the Rev. F. E. England, M.A., B.D., Captain A. J. Gray, M.A., B.Sc., Mr. C. E. Lawrence, the Right. Hon. Sidney Webb, M.P., LL.B., my son, Mr. G. Leslie Wates, and the Staff of the British Museum Library for their very valuable assistance.

*September 1927.*

# CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . .	PAGE 7
-------------------	-----------

## A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

### CHAPTER I

TRUTH FIRST . . . . .	15
-----------------------	----

A Golden Age, i.e. an age where the conditions are such as to favour the highest development of the individual and the race, can only come by a combination of good will, good sense and good guidance; and, to be permanent, must be based on Truth. Truth is not static, but developing, and cannot be dogmatically defined. It is the attitude towards life of the open and unbiassed mind, the endeavour to bring our opinions into conformity with things as they are, that will lead us to Truth and to the Golden Age.

### CHAPTER II

THE PULL OF THE EGO, THE NEED OF INTROSPECTION, AND THE BANE OF EXCLUSIVISM . . .	26
---	----

Individual and group Egoisms are amongst the greatest obstacles to progress. . . . The petrifying effect of partisanship which obscures truth, and encourages feelings of enmity and contempt. There is great need, therefore, of introspection, of candour with one's self. . . . The bane of Exclusivism (undue exclusiveness) in tribe, nation, class, and religion.

### CHAPTER III

CONFUCIUS AND HIS TIMES. THE GOLDEN AGE AND THE GOLDEN MEAN . . . . .	41
---	----

As the spirit of moderation is one of the greatest aids to progress, this chapter deals with the great teacher who first emphasized the doctrine of the Golden Mean, and who pleaded for reasonableness, sincerity, humility, earnestness, and benevolence.

## CHAPTER IV

PAGE

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A UNIVERSAL RELIGION, A UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE, AND UNIVERSAL PEACE	50
---	----

A Golden Age cannot be achieved without a common ethic, a common reasonableness, a common ideal, and a common emotion ; and the above three Universals would tend in this direction, as they all lead to the realization of common interests, and therefore to the elimination of exclusivism, and to the solidarity of mankind.

## CHAPTER V

ON BEING SHOCKED . . . . .	64
----------------------------	----

Moral passion, showing itself in righteous indignation, is a very important factor in progress. To be rightly shocked may keep us off the wrong path, as to be wrongly shocked may keep us off the right path.

## CHAPTER VI

PROGRESS AND PROVIDENCE . . . . .	69
-----------------------------------	----

The difficulty of reconciling past and present world conditions with the doctrine of a Creator who is both benevolent and almighty. Confident assertions as to a Providence, through whom comes inevitable progress, very unconvincing. Better, in any case, to act as though progress depended upon ourselves. . . . The great principle of development, and the spiritual springs of the Universe.

## CHAPTER VII

THE PRESENT AGE : INDUSTRIALISM. . . . .	86
--	----

Material progress of no avail unless accompanied by moral betterment. This is illustrated by the Industrial Revolution, when the enormous increase in the production of goods, brought about by the application of steam to machinery, resulted in the amassing of great riches by the few at the expense of the misery and degradation of the many. In spite of all efforts to better the conditions



of the people, improvement was very slow—the love of gain being often so much stronger than moral passion—until the extension of the franchise put more power in the hands of the wage-earners. The memory and experience of these things accentuated the bitterness of class feeling and class prejudice, and resulted in struggles for partisan domination—for the benefit of a class rather than for the good of the whole.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRESENT AGE : NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM . . . . . 108

Democratic internationalism was advocated by Baron von Cloots near the end of the eighteenth century ; but the course of events did not favour the idea. For a time, and for the most part, freedom in Europe was suppressed or “driven underground.” But later the forces of reaction began to weaken, and the idea of Free Nationalism to gain strength. . . . The Greek struggle for freedom, an outstanding example of the cruel, crude, and costly methods of the old diplomacy founded on State Sovereignty, and of the clash of noble aspirations with unworthy egoisms. . . . Re-emergence of Internationalism in the limited form of Class Internationalism, at once a uniting and a dividing force.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRESENT AGE : THE BIBLE AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE . . . . . 123

A limitless Universe and a limited theology. . . . The efforts of the Broad Church Party to bring the creeds into conformity with science, and the anger of the orthodox who still insisted upon the infallibility of the Bible. The idea of an infallible book creates more difficulties than it solves. . . . The lack of enough candour in many Modernists. Frankness and courage needed in those who would tread the path to the Golden Age.

## CHAPTER X

THE COMMON ETHIC. VAUVENARGUES . . . . .	PAGE 142
--	-------------

Religion and ethics should be one and indivisible. Evidence of the Common Ethic in the earliest civilizations and in the lower culture. The Golden Rule and the idea of Universal Brotherhood as old (or older) than recorded history. . . . Vauvenargues, the Saint of Deism: his life and maxims.

## CHAPTER XI

SOME ASPECTS OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY . . . . .	149
--	-----

The progress of thought retarded when a hypothesis becomes an obsession, and when what is limited in scope is given a universal application. . . . Many of the basic ideas of new psychologists are well founded, but they are prone to exaggeration, to sweeping assertion, and sometimes lack caution and common sense in the framing of hypotheses. As modern psychology purports to be very practical and far-reaching, and as it is so widely studied, it is of the utmost importance that these and other pitfalls should be avoided.

## CHAPTER XII

INDIVIDUALISM AND SOME OF ITS FRUITS . . . . .	164
--	-----

Political economy, like psychology, not an exact science as it has to do with complex and unpredictable human beings. Doctrines of Individualism not universal but local and temporary. . . . The rich man out of focus with humanity as a whole. The contrast between earning and getting. The corroding effect upon character of the pursuit of wealth and luxury. The Golden Mean between Individualism and the spoon-fed brand of Socialism.

## CHAPTER XIII

TO-DAY: CURRENTS AND CROSS-CURRENTS . . . . .	180
---	-----

The world-changes of the last hundred years have enormously increased human potentiality for good, or for evil. The greater need for clear and unbiassed thought.

# CONTENTS

13

PAGE

. . . The present state of religion and the need of wider religious knowledge. The danger of payment for the advocacy of ideas and the temptation to casuistry. . . . Reason does not necessarily reject intuition, inward experience or mysticism ; but it may question the interpretations put upon them. . . . The whirl of modern life. A new trumpet call needed for the New Time.

## CHAPTER XIV

TO-MORROW AND AFTER. FORWARD TO THE GOLDEN AGE . . . . .	199
--	-----

Good government cannot exist without good citizens. This suggests the need of a Religion which should be mainly ethical. The Rallying-points of a Universal Religion. . . . The quest after the good and well-proportioned life is the greatest adventure possible to the human spirit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	217
INDEX . . . . .	219

# ALL FOR THE GOLDEN AGE

## CHAPTER I

### TRUTH FIRST

EVER since Sir Thomas More wrote his famous book, which added both a substantive and an adjective to our language, *Utopias* have been generally dismissed from our serious consideration because they are *Utopian*. And it cannot be a matter for surprise that ready-made schemes to bring about the Golden Age are looked upon with suspicion; for when we read our newspapers thoughtfully, scan the pages of history, or glance at the map of the world with its many dark spots, we cannot fail to be impressed with the great gulf that lies between man as he is and as he ought to be, and with the apparent hopelessness of our ever even approaching to that ideal state about which many of us have dreamed.

But we need not cease to hope; for at certain times and places the conditions of life have been far happier and better than those that usually obtain; and these blue patches in an otherwise grey sky are, at least, indications that our strivings for a Golden Age may not be altogether in vain. With good sense, good will, and good guidance we may hope to attain to a civilization equal to any that has gone before; and, as no one can put a limit to progress, we may also cherish the hope of yet further advance.

Why the conditions of life have been so much happier and better at some periods and in some

countries, and why they ceased to be so, are most interesting problems. In each case there were, doubtless, special reasons, for history never exactly repeats itself; but there can also be no doubt that, in varying degrees, good will, good sense and good guidance combined to produce the favourable conditions; and that they came to an end owing to a lack in the favoured nation, or in those who came in contact with it, of one or other of these prime factors of the adequate life.

There can, indeed, be no guarantee of the permanency of any Golden Age so long as its advantages are circumscribed; for the less cultured nations are not seldom the more powerful, the will to power and possessions being so often far stronger than the will to live the good life.<sup>1</sup> Thus higher civilizations have been swept away by lower, and nations have had to begin again the upward climb. The highest development of all is, therefore, to the interest of all. "A limited Golden Age—for a nation, a continent, or even a hemisphere—has no chance of permanence; and none of us should desire it until it can be fully shared."<sup>2</sup> Selfish sectionalism has retarded progress from the beginning, and our aim, and—may I say?—our watchword should be, "All for the Golden Age."

The writer does not approach this subject in the spirit of easy optimism, and he has no universal panacea with which to dazzle the eyes of the reader. "This kind cometh not but by prayer and fasting"; or, as freely interpreted, the Golden Age will not be brought

<sup>1</sup> "Culture" is used in this book in the sense of that highest development of the individual that tends also to the highest development of the race; that moves, as Matthew Arnold has said, "by the force not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good."

<sup>2</sup> *Progress and the Past*, p. 170.

about without strenuous thought and strenuous work in all beneficent and, on occasion, self-denying ways. And we must bear in mind the story of the heel of Achilles and not fall into a similar error. It is not this thing or that alone that is going to bring us to better times. All things that have any bearing upon our lives claim our vigilance, and nothing must be neglected. To this end we must cultivate what has been called the synthetic mind : the mind that, as far as it can, sees life as a whole, and that, taking all things into account and comparing them with each other, tries to discover the laws of life and to obey them. It is a supreme task, worthy of the best that we can give. In becoming workers for the Golden Age we are providing ourselves with a stimulus that never fails, and with a universal test of conduct ; for when the question " Will this or that help towards the coming of the Golden Age for all ? " is put conscientiously, and answered sincerely and intelligently by the majority of mankind, the Golden Age will already have begun.

As all life and all conduct are concerned in this matter, I cannot hope to do more than to deal with a few of the salient points ; and in the first place must be put the unbiassed search for truth. Clear and true thinking is the essential foundation of all right action. " The scope of all speculation," said Thomas Hobbes, " is the performing of some action or thing to be done " ; Descartes endeavoured to distinguish truth from falsehood that he might be able to " walk sure-footedly in this life " ; and Auguste Comte taught the most complete life must be that which rests on the fullest knowledge. So there must be an earnest endeavour to find the truth, and an earnest resolve to accept it when found ; and rigid adherence to the

teachings, or the reputed teachings, of any of the prophets—of Buddha or Mohammed, of Confucius or Comte, or even of the greatest of them all—should not be allowed to stand in the way of its acceptance. Indeed, as an exaggerated devotion to one set of ideas prevents us from giving the rightful place to other ideas, so an exaggerated devotion to one teacher prevents us from getting all the good we might from other teachers.

Some of my readers may, perhaps, be surprised at the reference in this connection to "the greatest of them all." But, as that very distinguished scholar, Bishop Gore, admits, the teaching of Jesus, as recorded in the Gospels, and his science, cosmology, and psychology reflect the characteristics of the time when he lived; and it is thought by many, though not by the Bishop, that in one thing at least, and that a very important matter—the second Advent—he was mistaken. Granting, however, the inerrancy of Jesus, there are very few scholars to-day who venture to maintain the inerrancy of the record. We are, therefore, thrown back on our good sense, our right reason, to judge in this as in all other things. And this is not a matter for regret. The spirit of Jesus and His profound originality are the most precious and potent of influences; but theories of inerrancy or infallibility are neither essential, nor even helpful to spread His influence through the world.<sup>1</sup>

However this may be, let us at least be sure of this—that no Golden Age can ever come until men's lives are founded on right thoughts, on the bedrock of Truth.

But what is Truth? The answer is not to be found in any definition, for, except in such matters as physics

<sup>1</sup> See Bishop Gore's *Reconstruction of Belief. Belief in Christ*, p. 115; also p. 126 ff. of this book.

and mathematics where formulas are in place, truth cannot be exactly defined. That water freezes at a temperature of 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, it is always safe to affirm. But when we come to such things as truth, justice, love, beauty, goodness, religion, the case is very different. These things cannot be defined without harmful limitation; they can only be illustrated, commented upon, and considered in various aspects, until they become real to us—a part of ourselves. Says Professor William McDougall: "Such pointing to instances is the only satisfactory and, in strictness, the only legitimate way of defining any abstract notion";<sup>1</sup> and we have abundant evidence, both in the past and in the present, of the futility of confining our thoughts on such matters in the strait-jackets of rigid formulas. When men have tried to think out a complete philosophy of life, and to set it down in definite terms, it has always been found inadequate or misleading.

Some reflections of this kind must have been in the mind of Socrates, as he purposely refrained from dogmatic definition, or from setting up any philosophical system. But his great disciple, Plato, did not exercise the same restraint; and from his time until now we have had a succession of these systems confidently recommended for our adoption, and previous systems as confidently disparaged. One need only call as witnesses the philosophers themselves. Aristotle said of Plato's metaphysics: "All these disquisitions have brilliancy, originality, grace, and profound subtlety, but they settle nothing in the end"; and Giordano Bruno and Francis Bacon were extremely critical of Aristotle—Bacon including in his depreciation most

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology*, p. 32.



of the Greek philosophers. Thomas Hobbes said that professors of philosophy are of all men most subject to the "privilege of absurdity": William Molyneux, the friend of John Locke, wrote of the "metaphysical whimsies" of all his friends' predecessors; and Hegel, who had remarked that Schelling's *Absolute* was like a "night in which all cows were black," confessed regretfully at the last that "only one man understood him," and he "misunderstood him," surely an unintentional criticism of himself! Many of Herbert Spencer's conclusions, monumental as were his labours, are to-day but little regarded; and Bergson speaks of the unsatisfactory nature of the ready-made concepts of previous philosophers.<sup>1</sup>

These wide and continual divergencies—and the list could be indefinitely extended—point to something more than the results arising from ordinary differences of opinion and liability to error; and—if an outsider may venture so far—seem to show that the evolution of thought must have proceeded on wrong lines. Sweeping generalizations and hard-and-fast conclusions drawn with mathematical precision are out of place when dealing with anything that concerns human beings, because their natures are far too complex, elusive, and mercurial for such treatment, and because, as Bergson has said—and Greek and Hindu philosophers had said much the same things thousands of years before—life is not a static condition, but a flowing, a real becoming, a change that is a continuous unbounded movement. When these things are given their due emphasis, we shall better understand why a philosophy

<sup>1</sup> Voltaire said of Bayle that he was wise enough and great enough to be without a system. See Lord Morley's *Voltaire*, p. 285, G. H. Lewes's *History of Philosophy*, ii, 229 f., and also *The Magic of Common Sense*, pp. 3-5, 17 and 18.

of life cannot be rigidly confined between the high walls of dogmatic definition.

The same may be said of definitions of religion. There are said to be over a thousand of these; and every one of them must, of necessity, be inadequate, and nearly all narrowing and exclusive. It is sometimes, for example, contended that no man can be religious who does not believe in the supernatural, or in personal immortality, or in a personal God, or in this or that. And not seldom in such cases the person who defines is simply narrowing down the meaning of the word to the special tenet or tenets that he himself believes. Surely he who thinks he can define religion fails to realize the vastness of the subject.

And yet it is of the first importance that we should have a clear idea of what we mean by religion. Some years ago I had a long and earnest discussion with a friend as to whether it was desirable for us to have anything to do with it—he arguing in the negative, I in the affirmative. But on reflection I came to believe that we were far nearer agreement than it seemed at the time; and that, if I had stated more clearly and fully what I meant by religion, approximation of view would have been evident. When, indeed, the compass of the word is wide enough to include all earnest-minded men of good will, there will be very few who would object to be called *religious*.

This leads us to the consideration of those detailed definitions of religious belief, the creeds.

We are continually being told that it is time that the creeds were *restated*—euphemism for *altered*. But why have creeds at all, if they have continually to be restated? And besides, the “restatement” is not easily done. A creed once formulated and adopted,

and—with frequent reiteration—commended and expounded, in course of time becomes sacrosanct, those powerful factors, habitude, intimate association, religious feeling, and vested interest being all enlisted in its favour. Some may, wholly or partially, come to disbelieve in it ; and a few of them may say as much. But the great majority will think it best to say nothing, or—with that want of candour too common in religious circles—profess to find that the creed means something quite different from what the literal sense would lead us to suppose ; has a meaning, indeed, that it had never occurred to anyone that the words would bear until the necessity arose to justify an equivocal position. And the strangest thing of all is that hardly anybody minds. There is, on the contrary, a very common feeling that it is better so, and safer. There are, of course, truths that, although obvious to some, are new and startling to others. These should not be blurted out without tact or discretion, and may have to be imparted gradually and in small doses. But this is merely a matter of method. There can be no justification for a policy of concealment and evasion ; and truth should not, in any case, be permanently withheld. “ It makes all the difference,” said Archbishop Whately, “ whether we put truth in the first place or in the second place ” ; and no Golden Age will ever come until this is generally recognized.

But it is not altogether wonderful that the love of truth is so far to seek. There are many very specious excuses, and one of them has already been suggested. If truth be so difficult to find, if even the most learned have differed so much about it, what hope is there of the ordinary man ever finding it ? And is it not better for us to follow some one teacher, church, or society, to believe as we wish to believe, even to shout

with the largest crowd, than to spend our lives in an endeavour to achieve the impossible ?

But it is neither necessary nor indeed desirable that we should formulate definite and static opinions upon all the subjects that come in our way, for the world of thought—like the world of matter—is always changing, and therefore dogmatism is always dying. Said the late Sir Henry Jones in *A Faith that Enquires* : “ There is no knowledge but only knowing.” It is the attitude, the frame of mind, that counts ; and this should be both a stimulus and an encouragement to us ordinary folk. If we are always willing to follow the argument whithersoever it would lead us, if we face the sun, walking “ arm-in-arm with Nature all his way,” our attitude to life will be true, will be reasonable and right. And right reason is more than intellect, which it includes—with much else.

Some qualification, however, is necessary here. Even in matters of mind and spirit, definitions and generalizations may be useful, providing that we recognize that they are more or less hypothetical, not final and complete, but steps on the way. It is, indeed, a good intellectual exercise to redact, to put down clearly and concisely what the truth means, so far, to us ; but the spirit in which we do this is very important. Both in science, philosophy, and religion, what may be helpful when put forward as hypotheses may be injurious when presented as dogmas. And if we realize its limitations, our “ little knowledge ” will not be “ a dangerous thing,” as the old adage has it, but a stepping-stone to greater knowledge and a broader outlook.

In our search for truth we should ever keep an open mind. A great deal of foolish sarcasm has been

let loose on this subject. Open minds have been likened to empty ones, open-mindedness to woolliness ; and it has been sagely suggested that, if open at all, it must be open at both ends, as though the ideal mind should be like a box hermetically sealed. But the mind, if it would grow, must be open to all the winds of heaven—from north, south, east or west. How, indeed, can we find the truth on any subject if we ignore any aspect of it ? Yet, for the most part, tribes and nations, sects and parties have been busily engaged through the ages in building high walls of separation between each other, thus cutting themselves off from those opportunities of mutual help that are so vital to progress ; and this exclusiveness has been a most fruitful source of the mental confusion and moral obliquity, of the bitterness and strife, that have cursed the round earth from the beginning until now, disastrously retarding the coming of better times.

On the other hand, men have had visions of the wider truth. Universal brotherhood was taught in the Hindu Scriptures, the Rig-Veda, many thousands of years ago ; later in Egypt by Akhnaton, in Greece by Aristotle and the Stoics, and by Jesus and St. Paul ; and it is professed, more or less sincerely, by millions of men to-day. But, alas ! the tendency to strife and division still obtains. We read of “ the present rampant orgy of small nationalism (of Eastern Europe) with their armies, their custom houses, and the standing menace of their subjugated minorities,”<sup>1</sup> and, in Viscount Grey's memoirs, of a series of diplomatic squabbles, with envy, hatred, and malice not far in the background, giving ample evidence of the same spirit of narrowness in large nationalities, as in small.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. J. L. Garvin in *The Observer*, February 8, 1925.

That the discussion of the open mind has led us so far afield as to refer to universal brotherhood and to the embitterment of diplomatic relationships is not a sign of inconsequent digression, but an illustration of the fact that the things that concern the welfare of mankind cannot be judged apart, for they act and react upon each other. There is considerable affinity between the open mind and the open heart ; and right thinking cannot be maintained unless right feeling be also in evidence.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PULL OF THE EGO, THE NEED OF INTROSPECTION, AND THE BANE OF EXCLUSIVISM

OF all the obstacles to truth, egoism—which we may roughly define as an exaggerated care and conceit of oneself—is perhaps the greatest. Its manifestations are legion ; and, to guard against it, we need the most searching introspection. But it is necessary to discriminate somewhat as there has been a great deal of confusion of thought on this subject, fostered by well-meaning preachers and others who, by stressing too much the duty of self-sacrifice—which neither they nor their hearers could, or should, practise to an unlimited extent—have imparted an unreality to their teaching which has inevitably weakened its effect. “ The mass of commonplace people who go to church or chapel are constantly deterred from embracing a serious view of life’s duties, just because a standard of such exalted perfection is proposed to them that they know it is of no use attempting to reach it.”<sup>1</sup> So some preachers and ethical teachers endeavour to combat egoism by exaggerating the duty of altruism, apparently thinking that an exaggerated view on one side is best countered by an exaggerated view on the other, thus restoring the equilibrium. Many years ago an organ was built in one of the principal churches of Edinburgh, and dedicatory services were held on the Sunday following its erection. The preacher in the morning spoke of the beauty of holiness, and how the best in culture and art should be given to God and His Church. But in

<sup>1</sup> *The Service of Man* (J. C. Morison), p. 228.

the evening the preacher took for his subject, "The Simplicity of Worship," and so strongly did he stress his point, and so entirely did he ignore the other side, that someone said to him after the service that such a sermon would have been more appropriate on taking down the organ rather than on setting it up. "Ah!" said the preacher, "it is the way we learn. A blow on one side of the head and then on the other." The story is typical of the swing of the pendulum that characterizes so much of our thinking. A crude and blundering and lazy method that is too often considered the best available, and, by some, even inevitable. "What else would you have?" they say. "It is the way we learn." But surely the best way of meeting error or exaggeration is not by error or exaggeration of an opposite kind, but by a plain and unvarnished statement of truth.

Care for self is quite as legitimate as care for others; and is, with a reasonable self-respect, essential to the adequate life. Altruism is not always incumbent upon us, and not always wise, or—in the end—good for the "others." An old motto of the Rotarians "Service before Self" is a wholesome reminder to us all; but, owing to its necessary brevity, it leaves out much. "Self and Service" is nearer the truth; and even "Self before Service" is sometimes to be inculcated. Life begins with many years of the care of children by others, and enlightened parents endeavour to surround them with a happy, wholesome environment, in which the "Self" will have the best chance of development; and, as soon as they are old enough to understand, they teach them to co-operate in the task, to help to take care of themselves. As the children grow older they should also be taught that they are being cared for, disciplined and trained not only that they may be



strong and happy and good, but that they may be able to help others who are less fortunate. It is not Self only, or Service only, but a better Self helping to better Service, and better Service, in beneficent reaction, helping to a better Self; for, as we serve, the Self grows. Thus our true interests are best served neither by egoism only nor altruism only, but by a due and just regard for each—by our caring for self *and* for others as the occasion demands—neglecting nothing that conduces to our own highest development, and, at the same time, not forgetting, but having always at the back of our minds, the interests of all.<sup>1</sup>

There is little danger, however, of men as a whole thinking too much of others and too little of themselves—the pull of the Ego is too insistent for that. Its influence is as wide as the world. It affects the actions of men, in small things as in great. It leads us astray. It blinds our eyes. It makes us think ourselves magnanimous when we are mean, wise when we are foolish, kind when we are cruel. Many a home has been wrecked by it; many a nation has been brought low. And, although some of its manifestations may be less harmful than these, they are so abundant, so diverse and so subtle, that their cumulative effect has been equally disastrous.

### THE EGOISM OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The history of Egoism from the remote past to the present day would provide us with most interesting

<sup>1</sup> "Service before Self" was followed by "Service—not Self," and later by "Service above Self," now the official motto of the Rotarians, which seems to state the true position as nearly as any three words could do it.

and suggestive reading ; but, on account of the enormous amount of the material at his disposal, any writer who essayed the task would have to exercise to the full his skill in selecting and condensing. He might begin, perhaps, with the witch doctor or magical priest of primitive times who—owing to his cleverness and the credulity of his fellows—gains an authority over them which he uses for his own ends. A modern representative of this priestly caste, conveying a message from a dead chief to his tribe, began : “ Give my best pig to the priest.” One is reminded of those famous forgeries—the pretended Donation of Constantine, and the False Decretals of Isidore. Then the jerry-builders might be mentioned who, with their unscrupulous selfishness, have been in our midst for at least four thousand years ;<sup>1</sup> and the false prophets (jerry-builders these too) speaking smooth things for the sake of place, pelf, or applause. We have them yet ; and many a public hall resounds from time to time with the cheers of those who have been told for the *n*th time the things they wanted to hear. The orator purrs inwardly. Verily, he has his reward !

The greed of wealth and the love of popularity and power may become such absorbing passions as to override all other motives, and make those infected by them see little else but what is in line with their own aggrandizement. Then there is the pride that makes men persist in error in spite of their better selves. Mr. Arthur Porritt, in *The Best I Remember*, tells of the case of a well-known evangelist who “ had assailed the moral character of Tom Paine, and even when it had been proved to demonstration that he had done injustice to a dead man, he would not withdraw what

<sup>1</sup> In the *Hammurabi Code* (Sections 229 to 233) various punishments are assigned for careless building. See *Progress and the Past*, p. 31.

he had said." This is not only deplorable and despicable in itself, but engenders an attitude of mind that makes it impossible to arrive at the truth—the Ego blocks the way. The more egoistical a man is, the more difficult is it for him to absorb ideas other than those he already holds, for that would be to acknowledge that he had yet much to learn. "What I have said, I have said!" Thus, because of that most common of all prejudices, the prejudice in his own favour, the egoist builds round himself and his opinions a high wall of self-satisfaction and self-complacency that opposing views find it very difficult to get over; and this leads not only to wrong thinking, but to wrong doing.

Perhaps the evils of Egoism are felt most acutely in the domestic sphere where it enacts its hidden tragedies, upsetting, and sometimes obliterating, the tenderest relationships. "Incompatibility of temperament" is the comparatively mild phrase which we use to describe that unyielding selfishness that has wrecked many a home and ruined many a life. Differences of temperament and disposition there may well be. They add a charm and a piquancy to the family circle which would be dull without them. But it is when the unyielding self-assertive spirit comes athwart these differences that they become not only different but "incompatible," and unchecked Egoism drives out the spirit of good will.

These are but a few indications of what might be written of the blight that the undue emphasis of Self has brought, and is bringing, upon the world.

#### THE EGOISM OF THE GROUP

The line between legitimate and excessive care of, and devotion to, the group is very difficult to draw;

for association nearly always implies a certain amount of altruism. The affection and attachment one feels towards one's family, fraternity, church, guild, or country, have in them much of generous feeling and high-mindedness; and it is all the more difficult to realize that even these things, if in excess, may cause a great deal of harm. So true is it that vice is often an exaggeration of virtue, that to achieve the well-proportioned life we must avoid extravagancies in any direction. The old Chinese doctrine of The Golden Mean has far more than a mere verbal connection with The Golden Age—it is an integral and essential factor of it.

Many examples could be given of excessive devotion to the group. The legitimate and helpful association of men and women for public ends in political, ethical, religious, and kindred societies, often degenerates into mere partisanship and the struggle for power. And many of those who begin the search for truth with an open mind are caught in the toils of some society which, although professing, as all such societies do, to stand for the pure and unadulterated truth, so surrounds and saturates its members with its ideas, and evokes in them in such large measure the spirit of mutual friendliness, that henceforth they cease to be seekers after truth and become disciples of a cult, as Mr. H. G. Wells has somewhere said, losing their zeal for truth in *esprit de corps*.

The petrifying effect of partisanship can be seen in almost every direction. The minds, even of some of the ablest of men, seem to cease to function when any subject is broached in which their party prejudices are involved; and this spirit of partisanship is shown, not only in positive and one-sided assertions, but in ignoring any acts that tell against the opinions of the

cult. Take, for instance, the case of the Mosaic Code. For nearly two thousand years we have been assured that it was of Divine Origin, having been revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai; and men have expatiated at length on its excellence and originality as proofs thereof. But in 1901 the Code of the Babylonian king, Hammurabi, was found. It had been compiled hundreds of years before the Code attributed to Moses, which, as the many resemblances clearly showed, was largely derived from it; unless both were derived from some common source of yet earlier date. If the discovery had shown that the Mosaic Code was hundreds of years in advance of Hammurabi's, how the pulpits of Christendom would have resounded with this further proof of its originality, and of its wonderful and incomparable wisdom from which other nations had, perforce, to borrow! But as it was otherwise, there has been—as far, at least, as the pulpits are concerned—almost complete silence on the point. Then, how often have we heard from Protestant Non-conformists that Foreign Missions began near the end of the eighteenth century with Dr. William Carey! But the Roman Catholic Church has always been a missionary Church; and the first Protestants were too busy quarrelling over the meaning of texts in which they were more deeply interested to pay much attention to the passage containing the commission to preach the Gospel to every creature.<sup>1</sup> Anglican Church missions began about A.D. 1700; Moravian Missions thirty years later. And it was not till near the end of the eighteenth century that British Non-conformists were persuaded by Dr. Carey to take their

<sup>1</sup> With that free interpretation habitual to him Martin Luther conveniently assumed that this passage *only referred to the nations of Europe!*

part in the work. So the group-spirit, when over-emphasized, acts as blinkers on the understanding, as coloured glasses which impair the vision or deceive the eye.

It also affects our estimate of, and attitude towards, particular persons. The writer was lately reading a book advocating a certain artistic cult, and he was informed therein that all the painting that was worth while had for many years been done by adherents of this cult, and only amongst those who belonged to it could we find our great artists. And if we read newspapers and periodicals that have been established to advocate partisan views we shall find much of the same kind of thing, although sometimes qualified, in greater or lesser degree, by the spirit of moderation and good sense, which is the greatest antidote to the exaggerations of Egoism.

And what has been said about societies and cults may be said with equal truth about races and nations. Patriotism, a noble and generous virtue so long as it means pride and love of country, is distorted and becomes a vice when, and so far as, it implies hatred and contempt of other countries. Since tribes and nations first began, there has been an overwhelming emphasis on this extension of the group-spirit and very little of larger and broader views. "The Slav nature," says a Slav, "is a broad and powerful nature, which is to others what the sea is to small rivulets";<sup>1</sup> and, "If God speaks," says the Arab, "He would speak in Arabic . . . which is the language of Heaven."<sup>2</sup> Such exaggerations—harmless, perhaps, in themselves—lead to contempt of others, which may eventuate in misunderstanding and division, in bitterness and strife.

<sup>1</sup> Golgol in *Zaras Bulba*.

<sup>2</sup> Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*.

It should also be noted how the individual Egoism manipulates the group Egoism, and the group Egoism reacts upon the individual Egoism—each increasing the intensity of the other. In nations this is peculiarly noticeable. A leader inspires the courage of his followers by well-timed appeals to their pride of race and nation, and then—having risen to greatness—his own pride is increased by the success which they have helped him to achieve. A famous instance is that of Napoleon Bonaparte. The French, before he became supreme, were—with at least a measure of sincerity—inclined to share the benefits of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" with other nations. But their pride was so inflated by his victories that he had no difficulty in gaining their support for his policy of conquest and domination; and his great success (or what is usually judged to be success) so increased his pride and arrogance that he could not be satisfied with the wonderful administrative triumphs he achieved during an interval of peace, but plunged once more into war and eventual defeat.

In a book, written a few years ago by M. Eli Faure, it is claimed that Napoleon was the poet in action, and that his meanness, duplicity, and unscrupulousness, his inhumanity that could boast "a man such as myself thinks nothing of the lives of a million men," and his arrogance that could say, "I command or I am silent," were all parts of this supreme "poem"! But for intense national egoism such a book as this would surely never have been published.

#### THE NEED OF INTROSPECTION

It is abundantly evident, therefore, that the search for truth in thought and deed is a moral as well as an

intellectual process. If we would be successful in the search, we must, by the strictest introspection and moral restraint, guard against the subtle influences that would turn us from the path. It is so easy to persuade ourselves that what we want to do is what we ought to do. There seems, indeed, to be no limit to the plausible and ingenious fallacies to which we, often unconsciously, resort when arguing in favour of something to our personal interest or aggrandizement—to gain money or applause, to save our face, or to help forward our propaganda. We need constantly to ask ourselves the question, "Am I led to reason so, because I wish to think so?" For nothing but the most candid, detached, and dispassionate self-examination, deliberately cultivated until it becomes habitual, can keep us—or, at least, the vast majority of us—from mistaking the promptings of desire for the dictates of duty. This seems a hard saying, but it is not so hard as it seems. For, when once the habit of ruthless candour with one's self is formed, it is a perpetual tonic to the mind, a perpetual source of strength and satisfaction, and, in the end, of gladness.

Introspection has been supposed to imply an unpractical temper. "While saints are engaged in introspection," says John Dewey, "burly sinners run the world."† But, except when it is morbid and too engrossing, the "saints" are no worse for it; and many of the "burly sinners" would be the better—some might even be "burlier." For to know and to be true to one's self is the foundation of all right-thinking and right-doing.

† *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 196.



## THE BANE OF EXCLUSIVISM

This subject naturally arises out of the considerations already advanced ; for egoism leads to exclusivism, and exclusivism fosters egoism ; and it also lends itself to the same kind of treatment, for there is a right kind of exclusiveness—that which promotes the good of the individual and is also in line with the development of the race—and a wrong kind, which, in default of a word that better expresses my meaning, I have called “exclusivism.” And here also it is a matter of proportion, of due emphasis, of the Golden Mean. A certain amount of exclusiveness is necessary to growth and development ; while too much of it spells decay, disaster, and eventually death.

The first social effort for protection and comfort seems to have been the segregation of peoples into families and family tribes ; and this recognition of mutual dependence, of the need of mutual help, was a great step forward. But, alas ! the wholesome and beneficial family bond brought along with it the unwholesome and evil family feud, and this first movement in group friendship was, at the same time, the first movement in group enmity.

The next step forward—for we cannot but consider every step in the direction of larger bodies of men learning to work together as a step forward—is the larger tribe and the nation. But these group *friendships* were also group *enmities* on a wider scale. How baleful and pernicious this kind of exclusivism has been it is impossible to estimate. World progress—to which every nation should make its special contribution—needs co-operation, and, if not organic unity, at least unity of spirit in working out a common purpose. Instead of this, nations that might have

worked together have been, for the most part, mutually exclusive, and—notably in the case of those whose boundaries were contiguous—"natural enemies," bringing untold miseries upon each other, and often tending either to cancel one another out, or to so weaken one another that each in turn fell an easy prey to those who, for the nonce, were stronger powers. Their ethics, their religion, their literature, disappeared, and they relapsed into barbarism. They would have excluded one another from prosperity and civilization, and in the end are all excluded from these blessings.

Looking at this matter from another angle we see that, in addition to the exclusivism practised by nations against each other, exclusive classes were formed within the nations themselves. The magical priests were, perhaps, the first of these. Then wars making military leaders necessary, another class, the kings, arose; and, as to them was attributed a divine ancestry, a wide gap was made between their families and those of their subjects. Then the king, gathering skilled fighting men round him and attaching them to his service by favours and rewards, creates yet another exclusive class, the nobles. And wars beget the slave; slaves being either prisoners taken in battle, or the subjugated inhabitants of an enemy country.<sup>1</sup> Thus we have priests, kings, nobles, and slaves.

Then by processes, which cannot be traced or specified here, other castes and classes are evolved: patricians, plebeians, serfs, and many others. All these—as far as they were steps in necessary social segregation—were wise and beneficial. But personal

<sup>1</sup> Some nations gave no quarter; killing their soldier-enemies, and making slaves of all the rest. In the Sennacherib Gallery of the British Museum, Babylonian soldiers can be seen bringing their tale of heads to a clerk at a desk, who records on a tablet the number to their credit.

and group egoism continually deflected their course. Differences hardened, selfish interests became paramount, and each group played for its own hand rather than for the general good. So we get struggles for power, pelf, and predominance, between kings and churches, between oligarchies and democracies, between lords and commons : the miserable waste and futility of internecine strife.

We find this exclusivism also in the realm of thought. The things are here, but, owing to the darkness of ignorance, we do not see them. Knowledge comes by the bringing of these things to light ; and ignorance is due, in great measure, either to the voluntary or involuntary exclusion of knowledge. Primitive man, and any little child, are examples of involuntary, the bigot and the mentally lazy of voluntary exclusion. Truth is all round us in space, before and after us in time ; so vast, indeed, that the accumulated knowledge of the wisest is but as a few pebbles gathered on a limitless shore. Let us, then, gather as many of the pebbles as we can ; and, in any case, not be guilty of the sin of deliberate exclusion, of shutting our eyes to anything simply because we do not wish to see it, of this exclusivism of the mind.

The history of the exclusivism of religions is suggestive but melancholy reading. The doctrine of exclusive salvation—of the idea that *only* by belief in a certain person, by the adoption of a certain set of opinions, or by the performance of a certain rite, can anyone be saved—seems to have been of comparatively recent growth. The ancients who believed in Hell reserved it for the really wicked, in some religions only for the very wicked. It was left for Christians to teach that there was nothing but damnation for

everyone but themselves—surely the last word in brutal intolerance!—and, hundreds of years after, the Mohammedans followed suit. “Why mention this?” someone may say. “We have passed all that.” It is true that to-day the majority of Christians do not hold such views. But there are a considerable number who do; and what guarantee have we that there will not be “a reversion to type”? It is less than a century ago that the Rev. Andrew Reed, D.D., a very able and very religious man, a philanthropist and founder of many homes and orphanages, preaching the annual sermon of the London Missionary Society, described the heathen as perishing, passing to judgment and sinking down into endless night, and appealing to his hearers, lest they, too, should be judged for their neglect, to do all in their power to save these benighted souls from such a fate.<sup>1</sup>

Passing from Protestants to Roman Catholics, and from the nineteenth century to the twentieth, we may notice an advertisement of a “Home for Motherless Babes” that appeared in the *Catholic Times* of September 10, 1909, in which we read:

If we do not take them they will get into Protestant hands and grow up without any knowledge of our Holy Faith. Will you, for the love of Our Lady and of the Holy Child, send me a donation to help to build the Home and to save these souls from eternal destruction?

But of all exclusivists, perhaps the American Fundamentalists are the most extreme. Dr. W. L. Pettingell, the president of the Philadelphia Bible School, declared only a few years ago that:

Only those of us who believe in Christ as God, in his virgin birth and his resurrection—an irreducible minimum of

<sup>1</sup> *Memoirs of Andrew Reed, D.D.*, by Andrew and Charles Reed.

Christian faith—will go to Heaven . . . those who deny all or any of these Christian tenets will be lost and go to Hell.

And he goes on to affirm his unquestioning belief in every word of the Bible, and to call for the "smoking out" of all who do not so believe.<sup>1</sup>

Against all this we may put a passage from Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter's *Comparative Religion* :

As early as the sixth century (A.D.) a famous Buddhist scholar, Fu Hhi, was asked by the Emperor Wu-ti if he was a Buddhist, and he pointed to his Taoist cap. "Are you a Taoist?" He showed his Confucian shoes. "Are you a Confucian?" He wore a Buddhist scarf. When the Abbé Huc made his famous journey two generations ago, he observed that when strangers met, politeness required that each should ask his neighbour "To what sublime religion do you belong?" The first might be a Confucian, the second a Taoist, the third a disciple of the Buddha. Each would then begin to commend the religion not his own, and they would conclude by saying, "Religions are many, reason is one; we are all brothers."

And Chinese eclecticism is not only shown in matters of religion; for when Sun-Yat-Sen was one of the doctors of the hospital at Macao, he persuaded the governors to open a wing to be devoted to European methods, so that the results of native and European treatment could be compared. An instance of a broad-mindedness that is often far to seek.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Register*, January 3, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> *Sun-Yat-Sen* (Dr. James Cantlie), p. 49. See also *Progress and the Past*, chapter x, for the eclecticism of New Japan.

### CHAPTER III

#### CONFUCIUS AND HIS TIMES. THE GOLDEN AGE AND THE GOLDEN MEAN

ONE of the most striking examples of the influence of geographical conditions upon the character and fate of nations is found in the case of China whose high mountain barriers shut it out for thousands of years from a great part of the rest of the Eurasian Continent. How much this aloofness meant of gain or of loss it is impossible to say ; but it can hardly be doubted that had there been freer communication between the Chinese and their neighbours the history of the world would have been markedly different.

Of all the ancient civilizations of the world, China alone has preserved its existence. Its geographical position, as already suggested, has had something to do with this, and its unique system of educational culture and training. It is also very remarkable that its permanence does not appear to have been due to military prowess ; for the Chinese " have none of the characteristics of a warlike race, and their triumphs over less cultivated peoples have been gained rather by peaceful advance than by force of arms." <sup>1</sup> They are the only people who have, from the earliest times of which we have authentic records, put in the forefront the things of the mind. Alongside the Ruler is the Man of Intelligence to give him advice and help, and to spread among the people the lessons of truth and duty. We know the Chinese philosophy as Confucianism, but—like many other systems of thought—

<sup>1</sup> *China* (Story of the Nations Series), Sir R. K. Douglas.

its main features date back much earlier than Confucius; and, like them also, it is coloured by the circumstances of the times in which it was promulgated, containing, therefore, much that is ephemeral and local, as well as much that is permanent and universal.

The authentic history of China begins about 2200 B.C. at which date, according to the more or less legendary records of previous times, its Golden Age came to an end. During the next two thousand years the Emperors, with but few exceptions, degenerated, the central authority weakened, the feudal system arose—the country splitting up into small and yet smaller divisions—and luxury in high places, misrule and internecine war brought the most awful misery upon the people.

It is a curious coincidence that, during this same period, when feudalism was at its worst, literature and the fine arts flourished, agriculture became universal, all traces of nomad life disappeared, and great public works were constructed. How complex is this life of ours, and how difficult to estimate!

During this period—afterwards known as "The Age of Confusion"—about 550 B.C., Confucius was born; and one can imagine him a kindly, thoughtful, and studious youth, looking out with wise, discerning eyes upon those troublous times; and—with the conviction that "as we use a glass to examine the forms of things, so must we study the past to understand the present"—turning to the ancient records to see if he could find in them suggestions for reform and redress. From these records he learned that, in the far distant past, China had enjoyed her Golden Age. How much of this was fact, and how much was owing to the distance that lends enchantment to the view, it is impossible

to say. Confucius, at any rate, not only believed in it, but based his philosophy upon it; and it is not surprising that, as he read and pondered, he became convinced that true happiness could only come by a return to the old paths. He thus became the great Conservative Reformer; his constant theme, the virtue of the ancient sages; his universal panacea, a return to the old traditions.

At nineteen Confucius entered the public service as a keeper of stores, and was soon promoted to the position of superintendent of parks and herds. At twenty-two he began his life-work as a teacher, and gathered many pupils around him. Thirty years later he was appointed chief magistrate of a city in the feudal province of Lu; so much to its advantage that the Duke of Lu made him his Minister of Crime, and asked and accepted his advice on the affairs of State. Owing to his wise guidance the power and prestige of the State of Lu so increased that the jealous neighbouring chiefs endeavoured, and with success, to undermine his influence by corrupting the mind of the Duke, persuading him to take more interest in his personal pleasures than in the duties of his office. So, at the age of fifty-six, Confucius, finding that his advice was disregarded, and that he could do no more good in his official position, resigned his place and his emoluments and set out on his wanderings, enduring privations and persecutions, teaching all who would listen the way of the good life, and hoping to persuade one or other of the chiefs of the various provinces to accept his advice. He was, however, scouted by most of them—except when for some reason they wanted his support, and after thirteen years, invited by the son of the late Duke, he returned to his native State, and spent the rest of his life "encouraging others in the



study and practice of virtue and edifying all by his noble example." <sup>1</sup>

Exclusive emphasis upon the past, however good that past may have been, cannot result in the highest kind of civilization ; and there was much in the system of Confucius that was defective and inadequate. But, as it has been for over two thousand years " the guiding star of the nation throughout its many changes and chances," <sup>2</sup> it was, doubtless, the best that could be devised at the time, and also contains much that is good for all time. It is set forth in writings of his own, and in a book of his sayings compiled by his grandson, entitled, *Chung Yung*, meaning universal standard of right, or right reason. His was a charming personality ; affectionate, sympathetic, and considerate, modest, unaffected, and courteous ; inclined to gravity, yet with a natural cheerfulness and sense of humour. He inculcated the five moral virtues—humanity, justice, order, prudence, and rectitude ; and he urges us to sincerity of thought, candour of speech, and earnestness of conduct. Earnestness is, indeed, one of the essentials of perfect virtue. " Our greatest glory," he says, " is not in never falling, but in rising every time we fall." He pleads for humility, patience, gentleness, introspection, self-control, and the well-balanced life ; and he lays great stress upon etiquette, or manners, believing that the highest wisdom and morality are best developed through behaviour. He also emphasized the value of knowledge, holding, like the Hindus, Socrates, Buddha, and our own Shakespeare, that the only darkness is ignorance ; and he was said to be free from four things : foregone con-

<sup>1</sup> *The Ethics of Confucius* (M. M. Dawson).

<sup>2</sup> *China* (Story of the Nations Series), Sir R. K. Douglas.

clusions, arbitrary determinations, obstinacy, and egoism.

“Do not think yourself so large as to deem others small. . . . He who says that others are not equal to himself comes to ruin. . . . To know that you do not know is the beginning of wisdom,” are amongst his maxims. And again, “I am not concerned that I have no place; I am concerned how I may fit myself for one; I am not concerned that I am not known; I seek to be worthy to be known.” He writes of the “superior man,” that is, of the ideal or moral man, the man of culture—culture including ethical as well as intellectual qualities, a mixture of reason and love. The superior man “watches diligently over his secret thoughts . . . examines his heart that there may be nothing wrong there, that he may have no cause for dissatisfaction with himself.” He pleads also for “active goodness.” “To see what is right and not do it is want of courage.” We should be “patient and gentle, ready to teach, returning not evil for evil.” When labouring for others, “let it be with the same zeal as if it were for yourself”; and the troubles and sorrows of his time were constantly in his mind. “With whom should I associate,” he said once, “but with suffering man? The disorder that prevails is what requires my efforts.”

But the chief feature by which he is specially remembered, the central clue of his system, is the Idea of the Mean which runs through all his philosophy and influences all his conclusions. In the *Chung Yung* he relates with approval the custom of Shun, one of their ancient rulers and sages, who in employing, judging, and dealing with people was accustomed to take the two extremes of negative and positive, and apply the mean between the two. Noble natures, he contends,

want to live too high above their ordinary selves, and ignoble natures too low; therefore, we should live on a middle level. And in the *Liki*, the Book of Ceremonies, he says, "Pride should not be allowed to grow. The will should not be gratified to the full. Pleasures should not be carried to excess." He is, indeed, opposed to extremes of any kind, in small things as in great. He was one day criticizing a singer, whose tones were unnecessarily loud. "Why use an ox knife," he said, "to kill a fowl?"<sup>1</sup>

But this doctrine of the Mean sometimes led him to conclusions that many moralists would find it difficult to accept. His very moderation was carried out to immoderate lengths. There is sometimes in his judgments a cold and logical precision that does not seem to compass the whole matter. He taught, for instance, that we should not do to others what we should not like them to do to us; and admitted its obvious implication, that we should do to others what we should like them to do to us. Thus, so far, the *Golden Mean* leads to the *Golden Rule*. But he would not take the further step and return good for evil, as that appeared to him an excess of virtue, and therefore, as not in accord with the doctrine of the Mean, to be discouraged. Lâu-tsze, his older contemporary, took a different view. "To the good," he said, "I would be good; to the not good I would also be good, in order to make them good. . . . Requite injury with kindness"; and Jesus, Plato, and Buddha took the same view. But, objected Confucius, with more logic than largeness of heart, "if you recompense evil with good, with what will you recompense good?"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Ethics of Confucius* (M. M. Dawson).

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, nearly two hundred years later, taught the doctrine of the Mean, and he also seems to have driven it too hard.

In such questions as these we cannot lay down hard-and-fast rules. Nearly every moral situation is unique, either in itself or in its setting. There are times when we should return good for evil; but there are also times when kindness would be throwing pearls before swine, when the evildoer should be punished—for his own sake, as well as for the sake of others. It is a matter of discrimination. The willingness, however, on fit occasion to return good for evil implies a rightly generous attitude; and in this respect the ethical position of Confucius leaves something to be desired.

Still, while it is open to considerable criticism, the teaching of Confucius, with its emphasis on kindness, integrity, and reasonableness, represents a great step in the world's progress. There is a disposition to-day to stress too much the part that feeling and emotion play in human affairs as compared with the faculty of reason. Under normal conditions, however, men are far more likely to respond to a reasonable appeal than many moderns would have us believe. However this may be, no Golden Age can ever come without right reasoning, and it is because of this that it is necessary to draw attention to the teachings of that great Sage, who, with so much evidence of the folly of men around him, did not supinely despair of a better state of things as some are doing now, but gave his life to finding and propagating his plans for a remedy.

Mencius, who lived about 450 B.C., a hundred years after Confucius, was the greatest interpreter of the spirit and teaching of his master. In his day there were men who travelled all over China as preachers of love and peace.<sup>1</sup> "Heaven desires," says Mencius, "that men should love and be of use to one another";

<sup>1</sup> *Christianity and the Religions of the World* (Dr. A. Schweitzer).

and he advocated old-age pensions and mutual support of neighbours at birth, sickness, and death, a sufficiency of seed for those who had not enough, and a like provision in cases of a deficient harvest. Many of his sayings are well worth remembering, but a very few must suffice here. "The path of truth lies in what is near, and men seek it in what is remote. . . . The way of truth is like a great road. It is not hard to find it. The trouble is only that men will not look for it. . . . There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on examination. . . . The great man is he who does not lose his child's heart." Of the great man he has more to say :

To dwell in love, the wide house of the world, to stand in propriety, the correct seat of the world, and to walk in righteousness, the great path of the world ; when he obtains his office, to practise his own principles for the good of the people, and when that desire is disappointed to practise them alone ; to be above the power of riches and honours to make dissipated, of poverty and mean conditions to make swerve from the right, and of power and force to make bend. These characteristics constitute the great man.<sup>1</sup>

The civilization of China, as already noted, is especially remarkable in that it has given a higher position to intelligence and education than it has assigned to the warrior ; and that—although it has not been distinguished for its military prowess, but for its continuous pursuit of the arts of peace—it has existed as a nation longer than any other ; for its records go back to the times of the ancient Kingdoms of Sumeria and Egypt, and its borders have been gradually extended for at least three thousand years. "The pen is mightier than the sword" might, indeed,

<sup>1</sup> See *Ethics of Confucius* (M. M. Dawson), and *Hibbert Journal* ("Significant Persons," by H. C. Tracy), October 1925.

have been adopted as the national motto, for, although at times conquered and ruled by aliens, the Chinese have not only retained their national traditions, but have absorbed and moulded their conquerors.<sup>1</sup>

Yet another factor of stability—filial obedience and piety culminating in ancestor worship—must also be mentioned, as it is at the very root of Chinese civilization and ethics. Like its exclusive reference to the past, however, it is too one-sided to be adequate. There are duties that parents owe to their children, as well as those that children owe to their parents; and as soon as the young people arrive at the years of discretion they should be given liberty to think and act for themselves. No half-truth can continue for ever; and although for thousands of years this subservience of the present to the past, and of the child to the parent, may have promoted stability, it has also promoted stagnation. And now, faced with the irresistible movements of the modern spirit, China, confused and bewildered, has turned to the pitiful and futile arbitrament of the sword. But we may hope that she will emerge from these troubles with a philosophy of life broader and more adequate to the present times, and will again take her place amongst the great nations of the earth.

<sup>1</sup> See *Outline of History* (H. G. Wells).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A UNIVERSAL RELIGION, A UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE AND UNIVERSAL PEACE

It will be seen from what has been already written that a permanent Golden Age cannot be achieved without determined and continuous effort, and the co-operation of an infinite number of forces. And an effort of this kind, which must banish egoism and selfish sectionalism and be ever open to the truth, is impossible to the majority of men unless prompted and supported by moral passion. Religion there must be; and—the task being so great—a religion of the purest, highest, and most enduring kind. It must also be universal, for religious divisions have been amongst the most fruitful causes of trouble, bringing wars, persecutions and endless other miseries upon the world. What is wanted is a common ethic, a common reasonableness, a common ideal, and a common emotion; or, at least, an approximation to these things. This may seem Utopian, but a little reflection will show that it is not so Utopian as it seems. For although there are powerful forces still making for division, there is an increasing sense of religious solidarity (conferences and services having been held in which men of many religions have joined) and a growing feeling that as the world is now "one neighbourhood" we must find a way to make it "one brotherhood."

The remarkable similarities in the ethical teaching of the great seers and prophets clearly indicate that when religions are divested of their various parochialisms

a common ethic is not far to seek ; the frequency in these days of world conferences of many kinds, of which the League of Nations is the most conspicuous example, testifies to the willingness of men to exchange ideas in order to arrive at reasonable solutions ; and the fact of sharing the ideal that I have ventured to express in the title of this book would surely beget a common emotion. The times in which we live are very critical and fraught with great issues ; the need of right thoughts and wise conduct was surely never greater. There is a story of a steep-roofed cottage somewhere in the Rocky Mountains so placed that a rain-drop falling on one side of the roof would find its way into a stream on that side of the cottage and, at last, to the Atlantic Ocean ; but if on the other side it would fall into another stream, and finally would mingle with the waters of the Pacific. The slightest puff of wind might decide its fate. This is a parable with many applications, but never truer than when applied to us to-day. As we are all neighbours, it behoves us to be friends ; and it is dangerous to run the slightest risk of any other issue. An inflammatory word, an encouragement of the idea of an *inevitable* war, and the world may be plunged into an Armageddon compared to which the Great War would be but a very small one. We are getting used to hearing of " inevitable " wars that never come to pass ; but the prophets encourage themselves by only remembering the few cases in which they were right. Such prophecies, however, induce an atmosphere unfavourable to peace, and thus may help to bring about their own fulfilment. On the other hand, if we " take heed to our ways," if we act with good sense and good will, we may keep the peace and help forward all things that tend towards happier and better times. The issues are delicately



poised, and it is for each one of us to use our influence, slight though it may be, to help the right and to resist the wrong; for it may be but a few puffs of wind that will determine the destiny of the race.

A universal religion should be, not a creed, but an attitude of mind; and it should be a reasonable religion, both broad and deep, that our minds can follow and our hearts rejoice in, and that would appeal to the ordinary man. The effect of this more rational religious attitude should not be destructive but constructive. An ethical religion that "can bear all naked truth and still keep its singing voice," and with the supreme task of eliminating division and turning indifferentists and opponents to love and practise it, would surely be an improvement upon present conditions, where there is so much that is merely nominal and so much only skin deep.

It is impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to how many people in the world are really "religious," for so much depends upon what we put into the word; and, besides, statistics on the point, as may be supposed, are very unreliable. We are told in one computation that there are about 530 millions of Christians in the world, 300 millions of Confucians, 210 millions of Hindus, and 140 million Buddhists; and in another the Buddhists are put down at 500 millions, the Christians 330 millions, and the Confucians 80 millions. These figures cannot be reconciled, and if they could they are not of such importance as might at first appear. For a large proportion of the enumerated are indifferentists and not a few unbelievers, or even opponents of the religions of which they are reckoned to be adherents. In France, for instance, at a quinquennial census about twenty-five years ago, over nine million Frenchmen returned themselves as of no religion. They

were doubtless, with many millions in other countries, counted in the world totals as Christians. Moreover, it is obvious that the more men think for themselves, the more unreliable will these statistics become.

It is neither one great Church that is wanted, and "services," nor priestism, ecclesiasticism, or professionalism of any other kind, for these things promote discord and division, partisanship and desire for a personal or sectional predominance, but a society and an assembly. Dean Stanley surmised long ago that the Christian religion might ultimately be severed from religious services; and it is significant in this connection that the word *ecclesia*, so frequently used in the New Testament, meant a public assembly of the people until ecclesiastics deflected its meaning by translating it "church." When religion becomes wide enough to embrace all cults we may be able to return to the ancient practice (that in some countries has never become quite obsolete) and have public gatherings of the people, a true *ecclesia*, to consult together as to religious and ethical matters, the Mayor of the city, the Chairman of the Urban District Council, or other prominent citizen, presiding.

The sphere of Christianity [said Henry Drummond, and it applies to religion generally] is the street, the market-place, the working life of the world . . . with actual things, with humanity in its everyday dress, with the traffic of the streets, with gates and houses, with work and wages, with sin and poverty, with these *things*, and all these things and all the relations and all the people of the City, Christianity has to do, and has more to do than with anything else.<sup>1</sup>

Should the Universal Religion be brought about by the adoption of one of the prevailing religions? The answer is surely in the negative; for each of them

<sup>1</sup> From *A City without a Church*.

would claim that its way was the most excellent way. "Judaism," says Herbert Loewe, "awaits the day when it will, as originally, exert its influence over both of them (Christianity and Islam) and so over all mankind";<sup>1</sup> and devotees of other religions have cherished the same idea. It is a vain and impracticable dream. Some other way—of give and take—must be found. By this I do not mean mere bargaining and compromise, but willingness to give up some opinions and adopt others, if (and when) we are convinced of their truth, and a disposition to attach no importance to trivial questions. And this is not only the way of discretion, but the right way; for no religion has all the truth; each has its special contribution to make to the common stock. And the same attitude should be taken as to a leader. To insist upon one being recognized by all as pre-eminent, and especially to hold that "there is no salvation in any other," would be a fatal mistake. The writer has many times stated his own view as to the unique influence of Jesus upon mankind, and of the warmth, beauty, and dynamic power of His teaching; and he believes that, as the nations get closer together, and the spirit of reason and good will increasingly prevail, the position of Jesus will in the end be assured; but this conclusion must not be forced. Says J. E. Esslemont, "The different religious communities have failed to unite in the past because the adherents of each have regarded the founder of their own community as the one supreme authority, and his law as the divine law. Any prophet who proclaimed a different message was, therefore, regarded as an enemy of the truth."<sup>2</sup> And, moreover, when a religion, a philosophy, or any great principle centres in a special

<sup>1</sup> Hastings's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Judaism).

<sup>2</sup> *Bahā'u'llāh*, p. 110.

person, there is a strong tendency unduly to magnify his authority. As an exaggerated devotion to one set of ideas prevents us from giving the right place in our lives to other ideas, so an exaggerated deference and loyalty to one teacher prevents us getting all the good we might out of other teachers. Confucius, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all believed in searching for the truth wherever it could be found, and not in stopping and settling down to certain ideas; but most of their disciples venerated them so much that—more Confucian than Confucius, more Socratean than Socrates, more Platonist than Plato, and more Aristotelian than Aristotle—they turned their teachings into prescriptive authority. Aristotle's assumption of a number of eternally distinct *kinds* or *species* delayed our knowledge of evolutionary development, and the "application of his speculations about motion to a theory of the physical universe, exercised a bad influence (especially in the case of astronomy) on those whose admiration led them to accept his opinions as unquestionable dogmas."<sup>1</sup> The extent of this exaggerated deference and loyalty to Aristotle may be gauged by the fact that Masters and Bachelors at Oxford used to be fined five shillings every time they dared to differ from him. But this slavish deference is not confined to the past, for Wesleyan Methodist ministers and local preachers of to-day solemnly pledge themselves "not to preach any doctrines contrary to those contained in the first four volumes of John Wesley's *Sermons* and in his *Notes on the New Testament*."<sup>2</sup> More Wesleyan, let us hope, than John Wesley!

How radically and how beneficially this idea of a

<sup>1</sup> See *History of Philosophy* (C. C. J. Webb), and *Chambers's Encyclopædia*.

<sup>2</sup> *John Wesley v. Modernism* (Rev. G. A. Bennetts, B.A.). See also *Religion of Wise Men*, pp. 113 ff.

Universal Religion, which neither implied the predominance of any of the present religions nor the exclusive authority of any of their founders, would change the character of missionary effort! Christian missions have experienced the strangest vicissitudes; and there has been no evidence of continuous progress, but only of ebb and flow. Most of the scenes of the labours of the first missionaries in Asia Minor and in Northern Africa are now *in partibus infidelium*; the Mohammedans, who supplanted the Christians, are in some quarters still making headway; and in China and Japan, where in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Catholic missions met with an extraordinary measure of success, they were subsequently suppressed almost to extinction. During the eighteenth century the Moravians stimulated Protestantism to take its share in the mission field; and since then it may be said that the whole of Christendom has, more or less, recognized the obligation; the love, devotion, heroism, patience, self-sacrifice, capacity, and indefatigable industry manifested, making up a story as romantic as any in the history of the world. But it cannot be said that the results are commensurate with the efforts expended; and the hope of a universal Christendom seems to be as far off as ever. The writer remembers, about fifty years ago, hearing the then secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society tell of his journey through India, and how the Indians were losing faith in their old gods and were ripe for the Gospel message; and, before and since, many similar statements have been made. The hope that all men should come "unto the knowledge of the truth" is a great hope, the greatest that man can cherish. But what has been so often alleged as the ground of that hope is really a symptom that is to-day affecting Christendom as

well as other parts of the world ; for Christians are rapidly ceasing to believe—or, at least, to emphasize—the distinctive doctrines of their Faith. Is not this a sure sign that the time for a Universal Religion may not be far distant ? What might have happened if—instead of putting a ring-fence round Christ of dogmas alien to His nature and making Him into a Great Sectarian—men had gone forth in the Christ-spirit and proclaimed to all nations an ethical and undogmatic religion of universal brotherhood, we can only, of course, conjecture ; but there is little room for doubt that the world was never more prepared for such a movement than it is to-day. Not only are divisive doctrines losing their hold upon men, but there is evidence in many quarters that Universalism is gaining ground. Bahāism, begun in Persia in 1828, an offshoot of Mohammedanism ; the Brahma Samaj movement in India in 1830, an offshoot of Hinduism ; the Positivist religion begun in France in 1852 ; and Theosophy in New York in 1875 ; all these advocate a universal religion with the emphasis on the love of humanity, universal peace, and universal brotherhood. It is true that, with most of them, there are many superstitions and unreasonable assumptions. Bahāists, for example, have a college of nineteen infallible prophets, and hold that Bahā'u'llāh was the channel of a wondrous grace that transcended all previous outpourings. And Positivists are, perhaps, too much inclined to take an exaggerated view of the work of Auguste Comte and to think that he has finally settled what our religion should be. But we may not have long to wait when all such fetters shall be broken ; and when these shall join with ethical societies, social workers, the man in the street, and religionists who pine for more freedom, to form the nucleus of a world-

wide religion that appeals to our reason, our conscience, and our enthusiasm for humanity, and in which there is neither supernaturalism nor magic nor exclusivist assumptions of special spiritual knowledge and power.

Especially may we expect that such a religion would appeal to the Chinese, who number nearly one-fourth of the population of the world. It is not difficult to imagine that such a race who hold the divisive points of religion but lightly, and whose most famous teacher emphasized the great reconciling force of right reason, would join with others in this movement and—slightly mending their more than a thousand-year-old saying—declare that “Religion and Reason is one ; we are all brothers.” As the intercourse and interdependence of nations increases “humanity is becoming a unit, morally and spiritually ; and that means, and cannot but mean, that there must be one religion . . . it would not be for the common good of mankind that so many different and conflicting religions should prevail. If we want one religion for mankind we must conceive that religion as adequate and effective for man, not only at the highest stage of development he has already reached, but at the final goal to which his ideals point.”<sup>1</sup>

Lord Haldane has said that thousands of millions of pounds—and he might have added, of lives—have been wasted because of failure to understand the other person's point of view. Misunderstanding is, indeed, accountable for countless wars ; and, when not the initial cause, serves to embitter and prolong the struggle and to keep nations apart in sullen enmity. Of course,

<sup>1</sup> Principal A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D. The scope and character of a Universal Religion is dealt with more fully in *The Religion of Wise Men*.

as long as we are as egotistical and muddle-headed as—we must humbly confess—we are at present, misunderstandings will continually recur. “ Knowledge comes, but Wisdom lingers ” ; and in our schools and colleges we are so very busy imparting knowledge that we do not pay enough heed to the necessity of training the mind to wholesome thinking. But, next to egotism and muddle-headedness, the chief factors that have produced these tragic misunderstandings are geographical obstacles, exclusive religions, and differences of language. These things have combined to keep men in ignorance, and therefore more or less in contempt of one another. Geographical obstacles—owing to our wonderful strides in practical science—are being rapidly overcome, but the difficulties produced by exclusive religions and differences of language are still working much mischief in the world. There are hopeful signs, however—although the pace of progress is slow and the set-backs many—that both these difficulties may in time be overcome. Could the world be carried along on the shoulders of the learned who are also wise, the pace might be sensibly quickened. But this cannot be, for the bulk of the people must be convinced before solid progress can be made. The popular appeal is, therefore, essential, as without it advance is liable to be followed by retreat. But a universal popular appeal is hardly practicable without a universal language, which, by bringing the nations to understand one another, would do much to help forward both a universal religion and universal peace.

Of all the great reforms that would bless mankind, none could be accomplished more easily than this device of a universal language.

It only needs [said the late William Archer] an agreement among five or six nations to have the selected language taught



in their schools, and in ten years at the outside all the younger generation of Western Europe would be able to converse with each other and to read newspapers addressing themselves to this enormous new public. As for the facilitation of all international meetings, no one who has suffered from the intolerable tedium and manifold misunderstandings of translated speeches can doubt its enormous value. . . . Everyone who cherishes the slightest hope for the peaceful development of European civilization ought to be alive to the importance of this subject. No progress can be made until one tongue or other is officially selected, but when that is done the movement will assuredly spread like wildfire.<sup>1</sup>

But the manifold misunderstandings of translated speeches at gatherings where men are doing their best to understand one another cannot be compared to those which occur owing to carelessness, to ignorance, or to unfriendly disposition. There is a story of an English soldier in the Great War, who, saying good-bye to his French chum, and wanting to wish him the best of luck, expressed the hope that he might be *blessé* (wounded). The Frenchman was puzzled, but gave the other credit for good intention. Under some conditions, however, and especially when there was not good will on both sides, such a mistake might have been more tragic than amusing.<sup>2</sup> And how many of us, travelling, say, on the Continent and being indifferent linguists, have found the language difficulty a very troublesome one. But, when the contrast is between a nation using the alphabetical system and one using ideograms and signs, the difficulty is far greater. We read in Lord W. M. Gascoyne Cecil's *Changing China* of certain Christian converts who thought that Elijah left the earth in a railway train, i.e. a fire carriage ;

<sup>1</sup> Letter to the *Westminster Gazette* dated September 2, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> It is said that an English bishop, addressing some French soldiers at the Front, made the same mistake, and that it was afterwards referred to by our men as "the Bishop's blessing."

and also of some missionaries who wanted a title for a chapel they had just built to convey the idea that there the souls of men were fed, and that all were freely welcomed. They consulted an educated Chinaman, who wrote something in Chinese and handed it to them with the assurance that the title would be very popular. And so it was, for hundreds of the poorer classes flocked into the first meeting, and the place was crowded out. They listened for a short time, but soon left in a very discontented mood ; for the title signified, " Health-giving Free Restaurant."

There can be no doubt, too, that many of the internal troubles in China have been, and are, due to the fact that, though they have a common script, they can hardly be said to have a common language, as the various provincial dialects prevent the majority of the people from clearly understanding one another. In India the difficulties resulting from its many languages and dialects must be very great. Sir Rabindranath Tagore has stated that, owing to the low standard of knowledge of the vernacular, in the examination for the Indian Civil Service many officials do not clearly understand the natives ; and such misunderstandings may, at least in some measure, account for the unrest that has been so prevalent of late.<sup>1</sup> But perhaps the most striking instances of racial and national bitterness, aggravated and intensified by hostile faiths and differences of language, is found in the history of that " cockpit of Europe," the Balkan Peninsula. And what awful tragedies have ensued !

Near the end of Viscount Grey's *Memoirs*, after pointing out that future wars would mean " the destruction by chemical agencies of the crowded centres

<sup>1</sup> See *Rabindranath Tagore* (E. J. Thompson, B.A., M.C.).

of population . . . physical, moral, and economic ruin," he contends that the most effective way to avoid them would be "that nations should dislike each other a little less and like each other a little more"; and he adds, "but this aspect takes us into regions of moral or religious speculation. Nations cannot understand each other, and they cannot help disliking what they do not understand." Surely the case for the present need of a universal religion and a universal language could hardly be better expressed! And if we look back to the past, there can be little doubt in our minds that the permanent distinction of language has been a fruitful cause of embitterment and strife, and to a very large extent the cause of the destruction of ancient civilizations.

The idea of a universal language was advocated in a book published in A.D. 1653 by Sir Thomas Urquhart, of Cromarty; and, later in the same century, by three other writers, of whom Leibniz was one. Near the end of the eighteenth century Condorcet wrote in its favour, as did various authors in the nineteenth, the last of these, Dr. Zamenhof, of Warsaw, who, after long study and preparation, issued (in 1887) his treatise on *Esperanto*. This is not intended to supersede other languages, but to be a second or auxiliary language that all should learn; and, simple in construction and beautiful in sound, it is rapidly commending itself throughout the world. Indeed, to give a full account of its progress one would have to mention almost all civilized nations. It is officially recognized by many of them, and by the International Telegraphic Union. It is taught in foreign universities, and recommended by innumerable Chambers of Commerce. Mr. David Sarnoff, Vice-President of the United States Radio

Corporation, has predicted that the world-wide use of wireless will necessitate the adoption of a Universal Language; the *Union Internationale de Radiophonie*, which represents all the more important radio stations of the world, advises regular transmissions in Esperanto once a week; and the League of Nations has reported very favourably on the teaching of Esperanto in the schools. In this country we are not too quick to adopt new ideas, and official recognition is long in coming, but many distinguished men have given in their adhesion to the movement, amongst them the late William Archer, who has been quoted above, and Professor Gilbert Murray, who says that "there are few more profitable ways in which a man can now spend his leisure than in thoroughly mastering Esperanto." It also is favoured by the British Association's Committee on International Language, who have provisionally chosen Esperanto on the grounds of its neutrality, simplicity, and scientific principles; the rapidity with which it can be learned, and the extent to which it is already being used.

It seems obvious that the most practicable order of procedure would be that a Universal Language should come first. Then, the ground being prepared by a greater measure of mutual understanding, conferences of men and women of all nations and languages to consider the subjects of a Universal Religion and Universal Peace might be held with a better prospect of success.

We are so apt to condone the sins we "are inclined to by damning those we have no mind to"; and our indignation is often aroused at some unworthy act by one who belongs to a sect or party with which we disagree, while we find it easy to excuse similar acts in our own case or that of our friends! For, as we have already seen,<sup>1</sup> men, when segregated in groups, are accustomed to build around them the high walls of exclusivism; and although there are sometimes windows in the walls they are mostly of coloured glass. Thus we are often shocked at one another, not because the things done are really wrong, but because the very methods we adopt lead to mutual misunderstanding.

This capacity for being shocked has, indeed, added many bricks to the walls of exclusivism; and of these those marked "blasphemy" are the topmost of all, shutting out both light and air. The influence of the idea for which blasphemy stands is, perhaps, as pernicious as any that has ever stood in the way of truth; for it says, in effect, to every seeker who approaches some of the most serious and important subjects where frankness is most essential: "Whatever you think on these things, unless your thoughts are with the majority, you must not utter them." No one, of course, should wilfully wound the feelings of another. But why should special penalties be imposed, or why—which is more to the purpose here—should people indulge in shocked feelings, because certain religious opinions that *they* consider vital are impugned by others? Blasphemy, as commonly used, is a question-begging word and should be expunged from the dictionary; or, at least, marked obsolete, as it stands directly in the path of free enquiry. In the quest on

<sup>1</sup> P. 36 ff.

which we have set out it is necessary to see life steadily, and, as far as it is possible to us, to see it whole. "Half the ignorance of the world," said Mr. C. E. Lawrence (in *Mr. Ambrose*) "is due to stopped ears." The world wants saving; and those who would find the way, for themselves and others, must not, by indulging any feelings of abhorrence or intense dislike, refuse to consider opinions to which they are opposed, and turn away from them without enquiry and without thought.

There is another kind of shocked feeling, due to the terrible and tragic character of many of the facts of life, common to every normal person. We do not like to read or hear much about the gruesome and dreadful happenings, past and present; and it is owing to this very natural feeling that books written for the general reader pass but lightly over such things; and that our skeletons are, as far as possible, kept in cupboards. But unless, without dwelling too much upon the dark side, we try to realize its significance, we shall not be able, even approximately, to see life steadily and see it whole. Arm-chair philosophers in comfortable circumstances have spun their optimistic webs to the great satisfaction of other comfortably situated persons; and a few others, on the other hand, have been morbidly pessimistic. It must, therefore, be our endeavour to avoid the loose-mindedness of the optimist or the pessimist, and—while we cannot, of course, balance the pros and cons—take as sane a view of life as possible. Although at times we may be led into dark places we must not, from any pained or shocked feelings, shirk from our quest; for though truth "be stern in its candour" it is yet gentle as a mother, and brings its own healing and calm." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Chart and Voyage* (T. J. Hardy).

There is a story of some travellers in Central Europe being taken in a small boat through a long, dark tunnel, coming out at last into the sunshine, a clear sky above, and, on both banks of the river, peasants making hay. So is the way to the Golden Age !

## CHAPTER VI

### PROGRESS AND PROVIDENCE

Is the ethical and cultural progress of mankind a continuous process with but occasional ebbings of the tide? Does it proceed in cycles? Or is there no evidence of any regular or consistent course? In *Progress and the Past* I have contended that it has been ever backwards and forwards in zigzags, approximating rather to the lines of a weather-chart than to those of any symmetrical figure, and its brief glance down the ages seems to support that contention. The doctrine, however, of a continuous progress that has persisted in spite of all set-backs and will persist, has been, and is, strongly held by many philosophers and religious teachers. In the eighteenth century the Encyclopædists and others maintained that the possibilities of human progress were without limit, and that there was an ever upward movement to human perfectibility; and one cannot read the literature of the nineteenth century, both prose and verse, without being struck with the fact that this view was almost invariably taken for granted, and that writers not only enunciated theories of progress, but were also accustomed to refer to certain things of which they disapproved as passing, or as having passed, away altogether. So Thackeray writes, in *The Four Georges*, of boxing and gambling, and Lecky, in his *Rationalism in Europe*, of "the countless miracles that were once associated with every holy relic and every village shrine" which "have rapidly and silently dis-



appeared"; Froude, in *Fraser's Magazine* (in 1863), that the day of despotism is done; Buckle, in his *History of Civilization*, that the time of great wars had passed; and many another author could be quoted in a similar sense.

On the other hand, there are those who hold out no hope of any real or permanent progress at all, maintaining, with Sir H. Rider Haggard, that "human nature would remain the one unchangeable thing in the world"; and with Dean Inge, who, in an article in the *Evening Standard* of March 28, 1923, affirms that "a wolf is always a wolf." It is true that he advises us at the end to pray for the coming of the Kingdom, and to try to bring it nearer; but the general tone of the article leaves the impression with the reader that he does not believe to any extent in the possibility of the betterment of mankind; and that he is very much afraid that, if the Kingdom should come, this world would be a very tame place to live in!<sup>1</sup>

Surely neither of the positions—that progress is inevitable, or that human nature is static—are supported by the facts of history or experience. We may change for the better; we may change for the worse. And these great alternative possibilities constitute the most vibrant challenge ever presented to the world. The result—better or worse—depends upon ourselves.

Upon ourselves alone? Is there not an Almighty Power that helps us in our upward climb?

These questions are not easy to answer, as they raise the great problem of the providential government of the world; a problem, perhaps, as old as the beginnings of abstract thought, and one which has puzzled the

<sup>1</sup> The article is well worth reading; but it is strange that "a wolf is always a wolf" is in the same paragraph as an assenting reference to evolution. As to the tameness of the good life, see pp. 197, 210 f. and 216.

mind of man ever since it first was mooted. How can the idea of an omnipotent and benevolent Creator be reconciled with the existence of evil, and with the state of the world as it is and as it has been?

It is contended, in reply, that the existence of evil and suffering is not in itself a valid objection; for without evil there cannot be positive goodness; without pain, positive pleasure; and that to be good when one has no option to be otherwise is not goodness at all.

But whatever may be thought as to the theoretical value of this and other arguments for theodicy, it is not, as John Stuart Mill has pointed out, so much the *existence* as the enormous *amount* of evil and suffering that is the stumbling-block; and this produces an effect upon sympathetic minds that makes such reasoning little more than mere logic-chopping. The late Dean Rashdall was evidently not satisfied with such arguments, for he says, "We can only explain the presence of evil in a world which that spirit causes by supposing him to have a limited amount of Power or a limited amount of Love or Good Will."† Here the dilemma is acknowledged and a way of escape suggested. But surely the solution of one of the greatest of cosmical mysteries is not to be found in an argument of the "either/or" type, a statement of alternatives—as though only one of these two solutions was possible—and then a choice of the one we prefer. Dean Rashdall, following John Stuart Mill, chose a god of limited power as the preferable alternative. Such a god, however, is not the god of Christian theology at all.

As well as reasoned views of Providence which, whether correct or not, appeal to the thoughtful mind,

† The Problem of Evil in *The Faith and the War*.

crude ideas are very prevalent. "They may be disowned," says Mr. H. G. Wells, "in the *Hibbert Journal*, but are unblushingly advocated in the *Parish Magazine*,"<sup>1</sup> and, one might add, in pulpit and on platform. "Never mind," said a preacher a few years ago, "how great the pulpit, how uniquely difficult the occasion, if they looked for the right man in the right way God always had the right man ready." What does all this amount to? Simply that a "great pulpit" means a successful, and probably a wealthy, Church, and therefore attracts a man of distinction who finds there good scope for his talents; and, if by any chance the chosen minister does not succeed, it is always easy to account for it and preserve the doctrine of Providence intact by saying that "the right man" was not looked for "in the right way." On the same lines is the dictum, "With the Hour comes the Man"—an assertion that can only be justified by selecting those cases that favour it, and forgetting the larger number on the other side. "Men appear," says Olive Schreiner, "act and react upon each other, and pass away. When the crisis comes the man who would fit it does not return"; and Dr. F. W. Norwood asserts that "we lack leadership . . . history teaches the lesson over and over again with monotonous reiteration."<sup>2</sup>

But upholders of theodicy are not deterred by the facts. Paul Linebarger, for instance, in his *Sun-Yat-Sen*, after recording the devastating blunders and crimes that were taking place in China, tells us that his hero had been, "by Providence, as it were," settled in Japan, from whence he could direct measures for

<sup>1</sup> *God the Invisible King*, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> See Preface to *The Story of an African Farm*, *The Magic of Common Sense*, pp. 55 ff., and *Progress and the Past*, pp. 143 ff.

the good of his country ; ignoring all the blunders and crimes, and the essential fact that very little, if any, good had resulted from his hero's direction. Then John Telford, in his *Life of John Wesley*, finds it providential that Wesley's mother was such an excellent woman ; and John Wesley opined that it was providential that his wife was so refractory because, had it been otherwise, he might have loved her more than his work. There is not the least doubt that if his mother had been refractory and his wife an excellent helpmeet it would have been equally providential. Similarly, a few years ago a missionary referred to the upheavals in Russia, China, and elsewhere, as evidence that Christ's spirit was working in the world making men dissatisfied with things as they are. Had the world been peaceful and quiet he would, no doubt, have found in that the same evidence of a world-providence.

There are innumerable examples of the same sort of reasoning—or rather, of the want of it—happening every day. Only a little while ago a noble lady wrote to a daily paper, moved thereto by what she had read of the cruelty of some sportsmen, and, after referring to the obvious decadence of the race and the apparently haphazard nature of events, consoles herself with the reflection that we are in one of those periods when “ God unmakes but to remake a world ” (how many such periods, I wonder, do we count ?) ; and she ends by praising God “ not only for the beauty of His Heaven, but for the perfect working, the living mechanism, of His Hell.”

But perhaps the most grotesque example of this habit of fitting the facts to our preconceptions we owe to Benjamin Franklin, who, in his *Autobiography* tells us how some half-naked North American Indians, both men and women, were quarrelling and fighting round

a bonfire, running after and beating one another with firebrands, yelling horribly the while; and how at midnight a number of them came thundering at his door, clamouring for more rum. On this the pious Deist comments: "If it be the design of Providence to extirpate these savages in order to make room for cultivators of the earth it seems not improbable that rum may be the appointed means. It has already annihilated all the tribes who formerly inhabited the sea coast." And yet Franklin's conception of the Deity was "Powerful Goodness"!

A very common device used to justify and explain the world's terrible happenings to puzzled folk is to point out *some* good that came from them. As good and bad are so entangled in most things this is not a difficult task to the ingenious mind. The Great War, with its awful holocaust of the slain, and its frightful legacy of misery, is a striking example of this device. It was sent to shake us out of our selfishness and to call forth our courage and self-sacrifice, or to warn us against the non-observance of the Sabbath, or the sin of schism, or to teach us to simplify our lives and raise our moral standards.<sup>1</sup> It is, indeed, strange that it has been found necessary to teach us these things in such a very cumbrous and "highly expensive way"—akin to burning down the house to roast the pig. But, when brought to bay, the advocate of theodicy has an answer ready, and will refer you to the compensations that will accrue in the next life—a very easy, but somewhat inadequate, form of consolation—or he will put in the plea of mystery.

There is something singularly inappropriate in such a plea from such a quarter; for in this question of Providence—although admitting at large that "God

<sup>1</sup> See George Whale (*Theism and the War*), pp. 138 ff.

moves in a mysterious way"—religious teachers are continually making positive statements as to God's purpose in the world and how it is being fulfilled, bringing forward all kinds of facts and arguments in their support. The plea of mystery is, indeed, the last refuge of theological casuists in a tight corner. If they realized how great the mystery is they would not be so ready with their confident assertions.

Whatever conclusion we come to in the end, it is essential that we should, as nearly as we can, get an adequate idea of the main facts of the problem. I do not mean that we should try to discover whether good or evil, happiness or misery, have predominated; for this is an impossible task. Here, for example, is a case of one who has had a mainly happy life and then five closing years of pain, continuous and acute. Who can measure the happiness and misery, and strike a balance? And, as the task is impossible in an individual case, how much more so in the mass! This is not a matter of pros and cons; for even though a balance could be struck which showed that, since the beginnings of sentient life there had been more happiness than unhappiness, more good than evil, the problem would still remain. "Why so much sorrow and suffering, waste and futility, blunders and crimes? And is it essential that in order that man should rise to the highest he should be capable of sinking to the lowest?" It is surely only the heartless and unfeeling, or those lacking knowledge and imagination, or arm-chair philosophers atrophied by the atmosphere of the study, who think they can settle these things with a few smooth generalizations or pious platitudes.

Here are a few *dicta* from a professor's chair.

Principal E. Griffith-Jones, B.A., D.D., writes in *Providence-Divine and Human* of

God's moral government of the world in the interests of His wise, holy, and all-controlling ends. In this sense it implies His power, His sovereignty, His moral purpose, His continual and effective control of all that is and all that happens. . . . The Christian doctrine of Providence is one that lays emphatic stress on the personal aspect of God's activity in nature and history.

And yet this same professor tells us, in a sermon in August 1927, only two years after this book was written, that to-day

we see the most fear-ridden world of all the ages. What men fear now is not God above nor Nature around, but one another. The outstanding fact of to-day is that the human race stands in terror of itself.

Like much else from pulpit, platform, and printed page, this statement is far too sweeping. For there is another outstanding fact of to-day, the sincere efforts towards the brotherhood of men and nations that are made in many quarters, and by men and women of all shades of belief and no belief. The subject is very complex and very difficult to summarize; but it is passing strange that one who has stoutly upheld the Christian doctrine of Providence should declare that after countless ages of "continual and effective control of all that is and all that happens" we have come to this, the fear-ridden human race "in terror of itself."

In another place Dr. Griffith-Jones, after blandly explaining how much alike pain and pleasure really are, sums up the matter by stating that it is "abundantly clear that pain is only a relative 'evil' in sensory experience, and may on the whole even conduce to the general well-being of the organism. It

is only by a false abstraction that it ever takes on the appearance of an evil in the absolute sense." So cancer and consumption and acute attacks of lumbago and gout are only *evils in inverted commas*! The academic aloofness and lack of humour of some writers on theodicy are indeed astonishing. We want some one to write another, but more decent, *Candide*. It might, perhaps, be the best kind of answer to such theorists.

But, because of the confidence with which the doctrine of an all-loving and all-powerful Providence is held, and because this confidence is mainly due to ignoring, or passing lightly over the practical objections to it, we must remind ourselves of some of those things in world history which should, at least, make a dogmatic attitude impossible. For although we may reassure ourselves with Gibbon's consoling reflection that history is "little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind," we must also consider that the crimes, follies, and misfortunes that have been recorded are but as a drop in the ocean to those of which we know nothing, and that about some tragedies that are known we are only told part of the story because the rest is too painful to relate. "Human suffering," said Richard Jefferies in *The Story of My Heart*, "is so great, so endless, so awful, that I can hardly write of it." But, as already said, we must have patience and courage to consider some things that we should like to ignore, although we could not bear to consider many of them. While studying this subject I brought together a number of calamitous events from the earliest historic times until now, but find it impossible to set them all down. And, even if I could, probably no publisher would consent to issue a book



with such a sombre anthology of sorrow ; and few readers would care to read it. Nevertheless, some thought must be given to those long ages of the past when primitive man was painfully emerging from savagery ; not only because of their bearing upon the doctrine of Providence, but also because they throw some light upon its origin and development.

To keep alive, primitive man had to battle continually with forces that seemed bent on his destruction ; and as he became capable of thinking and drawing conclusions he was deeply impressed with the hardness of his lot ; he began to look upon the Unseen Powers as his enemies, a harmful Providence, to be bribed or appeased. When this idea took shape we cannot say. It may have been born of the experience of thousands of centuries. But no one who tries to realize, even remotely, his bewilderment and fear—without clothes, house, or weapons, wholly absorbed in the arduous task of finding sufficient food, and at the mercy of the inexorable powers of Nature and of animals stronger than himself—can wonder at it. Gradually he learns how better to defend himself, and for mutual protection to unite with others in tribes and families. He finds, too, that communal life is impossible without customs—*mores*, or morals. Thus we come to the earliest civilized peoples, whom we must no longer call primitives, for, although we loosely confuse them together, there is a vast difference between those rightly called primitive and the first members of organized society. These we will call "Post-primitives."

Of the primitives we only know what geology has revealed to us. Of the post-primitives we have also the stories of travellers from Herodotus to the present

day. How closely the post-primitives of to-day resemble those of prehistoric time we cannot tell; but we may reasonably assume that those whose culture has not been deflected by contact with our more advanced civilization represent, in the main, the ordinary course of human evolution. Travellers tell us that many of their sentiments and customs are both pleasant and wholesome. They are often found singing at their work; and are, in some tribes, taught to be unselfish and truthful, to respect old age, to avoid contention and strife. In West Africa the tribal secret societies have been admirable engines of government and of great ethical value; and the method of taboo, crude as it is, evidences a keen desire for a well-ordered communal life. It is also interesting to note that, as with better and less strenuous conditions men were able to enjoy some of the amenities of life, the first idea of the Unseen Powers as constant enemies is modified; and good spirits, as well as evil, are believed in. But here, as with us, the existence of so much evil puzzles the thoughtful mind. One of the quaintest solutions of the problem comes from Kenya, where it is said that "God is always good to everybody, but his half-witted brother keeps butting in and does not give God a chance."<sup>1</sup> This solution is not, in its essence, unlike Dean Rashdall's, for it affirms the goodness of God but not His omnipotence. It is well, in any case, that men are beginning to see, and to endeavour to face the difficulties of the "riddle of the painful earth."

And how difficult the riddle is the pages of history amply testify. Here are a few striking and suggestive

<sup>1</sup> See *West African Studies* (Miss M. H. Kingsley), *The Making of Religion and Myth, Ritual, and Religion* (A. Lang), and an address by Mr. R. St. Barbe Baker at the Conference of Living Religions (1924).

facts that may help us to realize the seriousness of the problem.

When in ancient times the Persians wished to re-people an island which they had conquered with their own race, they drew a line of soldiers across it from shore to shore, who, marching along, swept all the natives before them into the sea. In many countries children were sacrificed to Moloch, sometimes thousands together; and the Assyrians and others used to kill all prisoners and enslave the whole of the enemy's civil population. We also read that the desert tribes of Asia always desired the fat lands of the settled. This last statement does not look at first sight so terrible as the others, but to the man of sympathy and imagination what scenes it conjures up of devastation and pillage, of terror and hatred, going on for untold centuries! <sup>1</sup>

Then, coming to later times, we note in passing the troubles in the Riviera, now so gay and splendid, where for about 1,700 years there was almost continual disorder, cruelty, and bloodshed; the horrible persecutions of the Jews in Spain and elsewhere, and of witches (real or supposed) throughout the Middle Ages and after. So fierce, indeed, was the persecution of these last unhappy creatures that no limit was placed on the kind of torture meted out to them. Then, during the Thirty Years' War, Central Europe was overrun by opposing armies, which, coming to a large extent from other countries, campaigned and fought within its borders. The misery and loss of life was terrible. The population of Mecklenburg was reduced from three hundred thousand to fifty thousand; and in Brandenburg "one recognized the sites of the villages by heaps of ashes

<sup>1</sup> *Cassell's Universal History*, vol. i, p. 250, and *Ancient History of the Near East* (H. R. H. Hall, M.A., D.Litt.), and note p. 37.

that prevented the grass from growing." And not only during this great "religious" war did the people of Central Europe undergo such special trials, for owing to its defenceless geographical position it is always liable to attack. It has been said that in 1530 from the summit of a hill in one of the Hessian duchies eighteen villages could be counted, and that, two hundred and fifty years later, there were only three! <sup>1</sup> And similar results have been produced by causes other than war. Rich men, because they wanted to be richer or wanted increased opportunities for sport, have cleared wide areas of their inhabitants. Dr. E. A. Baker, in *The Highlands with Rope and Rucksack*, tells of the dispossession of the peasantry, descendants of the clansmen who were joint owners with the chieftains, but who were subsequently "denied any part or lot in the lands their forefathers tilled." With the result, poverty and starvation, wholesale evictions and emigration; until one-fifth of the entire soil of Scotland was turned into a rich man's preserve. And the forces of nature have also shared in this devastating work. Earthquakes have taken their toll, and malaria. It has even been conjectured that malaria is responsible for the disappearance of some of the nations of antiquity. In any case its ravages have been terrible and prolonged.

It must also be remembered that the lives of great masses of the people in many countries—Russia, India, and China, for example—are, and have been for centuries, and perhaps in some cases for

<sup>1</sup> *The Riviera of the Corniche Road* (Sir F. Treves), *The Jews* (Story of the Nations Series), Professor J. K. Hosmer; *Rationalism in Europe* (W. E. H. Lecky), vol. ii, pp. 100-2; Dr. A. S. Peake's *Commentary of the Bible*, p. 5; *Germany* (Sir A. W. Ward, F.B.A., Litt.D.), vol. i, pp. 117-8; and *When Blood is their Argument* (F. M. Hueffer).

thousands of years, one long struggle with abject poverty.

Turning from the world view to matters of our everyday knowledge and experience, consider the criminals, incurables, lunatics, and feeble-minded, whose existence we mostly forget as they live within the walls of institutions; and also the enormous number of those who have some serious congenital defect, not (alas!) in institutions, who are a perpetual source of harassment and trouble to their relatives and friends. And nearly all of us who have lived long must have come across many other unrecorded tragedies, skeletons in family cupboards, and (perhaps most arresting of all!) the long-drawn-out weariness of so many of the aged, amongst them some of the best of mankind, waiting year after year for deliverance from a life every hour of which is an added burden.

In face of these and countless other facts of history and experience it is no wonder that Dean Rashdall and others thought that the time had come to restate the doctrine of Providence; but, in the writer's opinion, there should not be a *doctrine* of Providence. Here we must have the courage to be vague, and speak only in terms of hope and aspiration. In subjects of this kind it is not vagueness, it is the positiveness of dogmatism that shows weakness. The question is not on the plane of argument, of definite assertion; and no one who realizes its vastness and intricacy can be dogmatic about it. But as there is a spirit of love, truth, beauty, and goodness, "The Beyond that is Within," and as there is a principle of development whereby we may rise "on stepping-stones of our dead selves," we may hope in our struggle towards a higher level of existence to have the help of these great cosmic

forces, forces as real to life and experience as any others, whose total unity we call God. This is a great hope and a wholesome stimulus.

Perhaps it would be well to explain a little more at large how the principle of development forms part of the grounds of our hope and part of the stimulus to action.

At birth we are equipped with faculties of feeling, doing, perceiving, and remembering ; and with various urges, tendencies, and inclinations. In no two cases are these things of equal strength or quality ; and, at first, they are only potentialities. The individual has not become, but has the power of becoming ; and develops by means of the great law that repetition begets habit ; that the more a thing is done in a certain way the easier is it to do it again. And so in the realm of thought. Every reasonable or kindly thought makes it easier to think again in the same way. On this law all efforts towards progress must rest.

In line with this is that great scientific truth so neatly expressed in the epigram, *La fonction fait l'organe*. We may go farther and say that the function makes not only the organ, but the organism. All physical life is subject to this law, from molecule to man ; and all mental and moral life. What man is depends in the main upon how he and his forbears have functioned. And what we, and those who will come after us, will be, depends, therefore, partly upon us. It is a stupendous and fundamental fact of life : a rock on which we can safely build. And when our wills are motivated by high principle and guided by good sense, when we will to function aright, there is no limit—or, at least, we cannot place a limit—to the possibilities of mental and moral growth.

It is not denied that the old doctrine of Providence

has done much good. But it has also done much harm. Poverty, slavery, war, and disease have often been justified by it; and the cruellest of deaths attributed to it. In a cemetery not far from London there is a grave where seven people, between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two, were buried after having been burned to death; and under their names on the stone a couplet indicating that it was the will of God.

And this doctrine is often in danger of being merged in a baleful fatalism. The prevailing selfishness and inertia is glad enough to justify itself by an excuse that sounds so high and noble. And the call to help to make this world a better world is far less clamant to our ears when we believe that the plan of Providence, even though we do not take a share in it, will somehow be carried out. How much more ennobling to feel that if we close our minds to the urge to beneficence, if we do not do our part, no one else can do it for us, and to that extent the world will be the poorer!

There are some forms of philosophical teaching, such as the doctrine of determinism, that have a similarly unwholesome tendency; and so has the theory of evolution, when no discrimination is made between its physical and its human aspects. One may deplore, for example, the prevalence of some national vice. But why worry about it? In course of time (shall we say at the return of the Ice Age?) it will all come right! It is only a stage in the evolutionary process!

To countless multitudes the idea of a personal Providence has, doubtless, been both stimulus and encouragement. But it is surely probable that, had they been nurtured in a more bracing atmosphere, the

† See also *Religion of Wise Men*, Appendix V. Evolution of the Rate of Human Progress.

stimulus and encouragement would have been far greater. To feel that betterment, that the coming of the Golden Age depends upon ourselves is more virile and ennobling ; and this need not exclude the glorious hope of our being strengthened for our work by drinking at the great spiritual springs of the Universe, and of our sharing with others the joy of working together with the eternal spirit of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE PRESENT AGE: INDUSTRIALISM

WE may fitly date the present age from near the close of the eighteenth century, when the steam engine was first employed in the textile industry. Its employment was not altogether new; for nearly a hundred years steam-pumps had been used in the draining of mines. But the use of steam in factories, following so closely on the heels of Arkwright's inventions of machinery, and being followed by many other notable inventions and improvements, wrought changes in four generations more remarkable than in thousands of previous years. With material progress, except as it affects ethical and cultural progress, this book has little to do. But, as all life is one, material and ethical things must influence one another in greater or lesser degree; and there is probably no period that illustrates this more forcibly than the present age.

More power means more responsibility; and material, unless accompanied by moral betterment, is of little avail. Our wonderful machinery of transport, for instance, combined with the yet more wonderful developments of electrical forces, have made the world one neighbourhood. With good will our power to help one another is far greater than ever before. But without good will we can the more easily hinder and destroy. So as to our progress in chemical science. Nearly every improvement in chemistry may turn out to be a blessing or a curse, according to the use to which it is put. Certain elements may help towards

the making of chloroform on the one hand and poison gas on the other. The increased efficiency in the art of printing and the spread of education have multiplied many times the number of writers and readers. But it is no sign of progress that so much is printed and read, for whether this is on the whole for good or ill, whether it be a "savour of life unto life," or of "death unto death," depends on the quality, not quantity. And the same may be said of broadcasting and the film. Whether for good or ill depends upon what is broadcasted or filmed. We are, however, so astonished, so overwhelmed, so hypnotized by our extraordinary mechanical and scientific achievements that we rarely stop to ask ourselves how far these things have ministered to our highest development, or to that of the race. With noisy jangling we tear along the roads or through the air; our trains and our ships beat all previous records; we have put a girdle round the earth and can talk with a friend in New York or in San Francisco without moving from our office chair. And yet we may, with much gain, have suffered some loss. When we see the "road-hog," with glaring head-lights, rushing along in frenzied haste, apparently his chief desire to get in front of all the rest, we may, perhaps with profit, think of the patriarch Isaac going out "to meditate in the field at the eventide." What a contrast! And the comparison not all in favour of the more enlightened modern.

Much might be said as to road-hogs in this connection. We constantly hear of motorists who, after knocking down pedestrians, continue unconcerned on their way. One would have thought that such villainy was impossible even to a hardened criminal. But the mad rush, made possible by mechanical invention, seems in many cases to obliterate all sense of justice

or pity. And it is the very excellence of the machinery that tends to encourage the fierce egotism of these motor-fiends by enabling them so easily to elude detection or pursuit. Escape is also made easier for the burglar, the thief, and other sinners against society.

How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds  
Make ill deeds done.

But perhaps the most striking example of mechanical and scientific inventions being used for base purposes will be found in aviation. In May 1927 Signor Balbo, Italian Air Minister, referring to the aerial weapon as an offensive against industrial centres and big cities, suggested that cruelty shortened the duration of war, and that probably in the future the last *humanitarian prejudices* would have been overcome on the ground that "necessity has no law." This grotesque doctrine of "frightfulness" is not new; but with modern appliances it assumes a shape unspeakably more horrible than its first sponsors ever imagined.

One could enlarge to almost any extent on this theme, and show how skill and learning, unless accompanied by high ethical qualities, may only pave the way to hell. I must not be tempted, however, to pursue such reflections; nor do I wish to be understood to depreciate the present, to assume the rôle of a *laudator temporis acti*. My only object is to point out that mechanical and scientific progress, while enormously increasing the potential forces of mankind, unless accompanied by goodwill will not conduce to the permanent benefit of the race.

Before the Napoleonic wars agriculture was the mainstay of Great Britain, but owing to this country being first and foremost in the application of steam to

machinery, to the fact that its coal was so good and so near to its iron, to the boom in canal construction, which enormously reduced the cost of transport, and to the extraordinary demand during these wars for our goods on the continent of Europe, its commerce increased by leaps and bounds—ten-fold in twenty years—and it became “the workshop of the world.” This period is rightly called *The Industrial Revolution*, for its changes were rapid and violent; and it was a tragic misfortune that no leader was forthcoming to see that all things possible were done to safeguard the people against the miseries that, without such safeguards, are almost inseparable from sudden social and economic displacements. The employers took nearly all the wealth produced by the joint efforts of their employees and themselves, leaving the former only just enough to live upon. Riches were amassed with fatal rapidity, demoralizing the masters, whose degeneracy was bound to influence for evil those under their control. Workers of both sexes, even including little children under five years of age, were herded together in factories under conditions neither sanitary nor decent. Long hours and grinding poverty went together, and the fate of the children was appalling. An Apprentices Act had been passed near the end of the seventeenth century, partly to prevent future unemployment and vagrancy by training pauper children in habits and knowledge of industry, and partly because “from children thus trained up to constant labour we may venture to hope the lowering of its price.” Of this Act full advantage was taken. Local authorities, by handing over these “parish apprentices” to the millowners, saved the expense of their maintenance, and the millowners conveyed the children from the workhouses to the various factories.

“ For all day we drag our burden, tiring  
Through the coal-dark underground,  
Or all day we drive the wheels of iron  
In the factories, round and round.”

These lines help us to realize something of what the exploitation of child-labour meant. Much might be added of the degradation and misery of adult workers, for whose benefit there does not appear to be any special legislation until 1842, and then only for women working in mines. “ One dares not trust one’s self,” says one writer, “ to try and set down calmly all that might be told about this awful page in the history of Industrial England ”; and another refers to “ the most awful influx the world ever saw of furious provocatives to unbridled sensuality and riotous animalism.”<sup>1</sup> So bit by bit, gingerly and tardily, the work of reform proceeds. During the next ten years the bleaching and dyeing factories, lace factories, and bakehouses were regulated, and the regulations as to child-labour further extended. And it was in this decade a Royal Commission reported that there was very great mortality and sickness among metalliferous miners, and that this was owing to the inhalation of gritty particles, bad ventilation, great changes of temperature, excessive physical exertion, exposure to wet and other causes. It is very significant that, although an Act was passed in 1872 “ to promote health and safety in metalliferous mines,” it was not until more than twenty years after the report of the Commission that the evils complained of were effectively remedied. And it is also very significant that the Sweating System—exposed in the

<sup>1</sup> H. de B. Gibbons (*Industry in England*) and Lord Morley (quoted in *Early Life and Letters*, by F. W. Hirst). Lord Morley, writing specially of Blackburn, also notes the good service done by the Evangelicals, through their Sunday Schools and otherwise, in impressing a kind of moral organization on this mass of barbarism.

*Morning Chronicle* in 1847-48, and in 1850 by Charles Kingsley in *Cheap Clothes and Nasty* and *Alton Locke*—still prevailed forty years later, when, as reported in 1890 by the Select Committee of the House of Lords, “the earnings of the lowest class of workers are barely sufficient to sustain existence. The hours of labour are such as to make the lives of the workers periods of almost ceaseless toil, hard and often unhealthy,” and the sanitary conditions of their workrooms dangerous both to themselves and to the public. Had the spirit of good will been more general, had men’s social conscience been keener and not too engrossed in their own affairs, far greater progress would have been made. And always, as well as the difficulty of getting the laws passed, there was the difficulty, already noted, of getting them enforced.

I do not wish to be understood to bring a wholesale indictment against the employing class. There were many benevolent and public-spirited employers; and we even read of a woman looking back with pleasure to the time when she worked at the factory, and declaring that they were the happiest hours of her life. But the history of this period surely proves that the selfishness and greed, both of employers and parents, required a stronger and a speedier curb; and that one of the chief reasons why this was not applied was because the men of those days were obsessed with the doctrine of *laissez faire*, of letting things alone, the negation of all good government. Thus it was for many decades possible for the rich, urged thereto by the desire to get richer, to exploit the labour of the poor; and for the poor, because of the urge of their poverty, to exploit the labours of their own children. And although a growing spirit of good will did something to alter these conditions, there was wanting the

common sense that should have taught men that, without a good deal of compulsion and restraint, the weak must always suffer from the selfishness of the strong.

We must not, however, leave this part of the subject without some reference to what was called the Truck System. Wages, in whole or in part, were often paid in goods instead of money. Sometimes in goods that the workers had helped to produce, whether they wanted them or not; or in commodities which they really needed. At other times full payment in money might be made, but with a tacit understanding that all goods should be bought at the master's shop; of course, at the master's price.

When and how this practice first began it is hard to say. It is, at least, many hundreds of years old, for an Act was passed in 1465 forbidding payment to workers "in pins, girdles, and unprofitable wares." This Act referred only to makers of woollen goods; and in 1749 Parliament extended the rule, enacting that all wages in woollen, iron, and other manufactures should be paid "in good and lawful money of this kingdom." The law was often evaded, and when the enormous and sudden increase of the country's commerce began there was some excuse for it, as coins could not be manufactured quickly enough to meet the demand; and although in 1797 this difficulty was removed by Boulton's invention of a coinage machine, the evasion of the law still continued. In 1817 the law against the Truck System was again extended to include steel industries and mines; and other Acts followed which stiffened procedure and still further extended the scope of the prohibitions, but with little effect. For many decades men were not independent enough to take

much advantage of them, and were still compelled to take part of their wages from the shops set up by the masters, whose conduct in this matter can only be characterized as calculated meanness. Here we see again the urgent need of compulsion and restraint, and of continued and unceasing vigilance to see that Acts, once passed, are carried out.

Since the last Act (of 1896) the practice of "Truck" has greatly diminished, partly owing to the increasing power and independence of the wage-earners, and partly also to the kindlier and more enlightened spirit of most of the employers. As, however, His Majesty's Stationery Office thought it well, only a few years ago, to reprint their memorandum on the subject, we may take it that vigilance is still necessary.

Side by side with the workers were the workless : an unhappy conjunction seemingly inseparable from modern industrialism. The poor were between the devil and the deep sea. It was either no work or hard and cruel work ; no wages or not enough. And this conjunction of workers and workless had an enormous effect upon wages and working conditions ; for, until the principle of a minimum wage is granted, the existence of out-of-works enables the employer to beat down the wage-earner to the point of barest subsistence. And the larger the number of unemployed the more severe must be the competition for employment ; and therefore the easier for the employer to get an ample supply of the cheapest labour.

The details of the industrial struggle and of its related political movements, of the growing discontent, of the " Peterloo Massacre " and the Chartist



riots must be read elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> We may only note here a few of the main features, so that, with what has already been told of the condition of the workers, we may get a general view of the situation as it developed.

At first, partly owing to the influence of French philosophers and partly to the successful beginnings of the French Revolution, the opinions of English statesmen were, on the whole, favourable to the working classes. In 1792 the London Corresponding Society was formed: the first political body in England that was distinctively Labour. It was largely educational, and had the approval of many outside the Labour ranks. But the wild and violent excesses of the revolutionaries caused a great revulsion of feeling over here, especially amongst the moneyed and governing classes. There was an anti-Jacobin panic. Repression was the order of the day, and all advocacy of the rights of labour, or even of common justice to the poor, were taboo. Since the first Statute of Labourers in 1349 the law had always leant to the side of the masters. Labourers were to take what was offered, or what was fixed as a proper wage by those above them; and were not to combine to get better pay or conditions. The workers, however, could not always be restrained; unlawful combinations and crude forms of trade unions were active from time to time. So, in the closing years of the eighteenth century, William Pitt passed two Combination Acts to confirm and enforce the old provisions against any associations of workmen to raise wages.<sup>2</sup> The last of these Acts included provisions for compulsory arbitration. It seems probable that these

<sup>1</sup> See *Life of Thomas Cooper Written by Himself, History of Modern England* (H. W. Paul), *History of Our Own Times* (Justin McCarthy).

<sup>2</sup> The short-lived London Corresponding Society was repressed in 1799, probably by the first of these Acts.

clauses became obsolete; but, in any case, as the arbitrators were to be local justices, with an appeal to quarter sessions, the workers could not but be suspicious of their impartiality. And with reason enough; for Justices of the Peace, so active in these days in putting down "Jacobinism," were hardly fit judges in such a cause. It was not till 1825 that combinations of workmen to raise the rate of wages were allowed; and it was only very gradually that the same liberty of combined action was given to workmen as had always been conceded to employers. But the wide extension of the franchise in 1867 produced its natural effect. Our legislators began to pay more attention to labour questions. It is significant that in this year a *Master and Servant Act* was passed, while eight years thereafter we have an *Employers and Workmen Act*.

The new voters were beginning to realize their power, to increase the effectiveness of their organizations, and to bring increasing pressure upon their representatives in Parliament. It must also be added that many employers were coming to see that sound and sanitary factory conditions and a "living wage" were to their interest, as well as to the interest of their employees; and some of them established Garden Cities on industrial lines that were very successful, both from a business and a social point of view.

But much yet remained to be remedied, and opposition to be met. Workmen clamoured for more pay, and many strikes occurred to enforce the claim. A strike of the match-girls in the East of London in July 1888 revealed the fact that these poor girls were being exploited by employers who were making large profits. Twopence farthing per gross was paid for match-boxes, and the girls had to buy their own string and paste. In the factory, eight or nine shillings a

week was *good money* ; some earned—or, at least, were paid—as little as four shillings ; and the average wage of an *adult* female worker was only about eleven shillings. Yet the employers declared that they had tried to give their workpeople as fair a remuneration as the profits would permit, that their wages were from 15 to 20 per cent. better than the same class of labour in other industries in the East End, and that there were no grievances and no justification for the strike.

The grinding poverty of the match-girls, however, was hardly so terrible as that of the dock-labourers. At the London docks the casual dockers, the majority, were paid fivepence an hour and might only get half an hour's work in a day. At Tilbury it was fourpence an hour ; and the average per man per week about five shillings. And so often the amount was in inverse ratio to the trouble and anxiety ; for how intolerable to have to wait and struggle in vain for the best part of the day, and at the end to get the merest pittance ! During the strike of 1889 an article appeared in *The Times*, describing the struggle that usually took place at the dock-gates, which I have abbreviated as follows :

As there might be a call for hands at any moment, the men who were always on the spot got the best chance. So when the news spread that a ship was due in any particular dock, the gates were besieged in the early morning. The struggle for work varied in intensity, but was generally most intense at the London and St. Katherine Docks. Here a chain was drawn across the entrance, the contractors on the inner side of it, the men—some 1,500 to 2,000 of them—on the other. The men in front were forced up against the chain ; those behind tried to climb over them ; the strong trampled on the weak and pushed them aside ; the contractors, meanwhile, picking out their men. In this scramble, as may well be imagined, many of the strugglers were badly injured.

After the strike was over, the sixpence an hour being conceded and casual employment abolished, an extraordinary general meeting of this Dock Company was held, at which the chairman told the shareholders that a wholly unjustifiable contest had been forced upon them; and that, although the ostensible object of the strike was to improve the condition of the casual docker, it was really a deliberately planned socialistic movement, finally determined upon by the extreme section of a Labour Congress held in Switzerland a few weeks previously. This is an attitude characteristic of a large number of the employing class, and of many who are not employers. They find it so hard to believe that workmen's grievances may be genuine. In this case, had not the sense of humour been obscured by personal interest, the idea that the dockers needed to be told by some of the members of a Labour Congress in Switzerland before they could find that there was anything to trouble about, would have been received by the meeting with incredulous smiles. It is, however, a matter for something more than smiles. It is a sign, amongst many others, how the lust of gold warps the mind and hardens the heart.

But hardness of heart is not confined to any class. In the Annual Register of 1889 we find it stated that, up to this time, the representatives of the skilled workmen had shown very little readiness "to throw in their lot with and to support unskilled labour in its struggle with the employers."

We have seen that, during the match-girls' strike, the employers, although making large profits, claimed that they paid as much in wages as they could afford. Some employers have gone farther than this, meeting the demand for more wages with the cry that to pay

more was impossible, that it would ruin the industry. In some cases this may have been true. But it has been found so often that no such calamity has occurred, that profits have been well maintained, and some of the protesting employers have left such enormous sums behind them, that workmen naturally became suspicious of such statements. On the other hand, the suspicion of the masters that the discontent of their workmen was stimulated, if not actually initiated, by agitators and demagogues (foreign or other), although in most cases a groundless and absurd obsession, was not altogether without justification. We must all admit—except those who seem to think that all “workers” are saints and all capitalists sinners—that there are foolish, unreasoning, or designing men on both sides; and that demagoguery is sometimes a profitable trade and much to be preferred to ordinary work. In any case, whatever may have been the reasons, the negotiations between the employers and the trade unions were carried on in an atmosphere of so much mutual suspicion and distrust that the workmen began to look to Parliament to fix a minimum wage for all trades. At this the *laissez-faire* politicians were up in arms again. For Parliament to fix the rate of wages, they said, was against the laws of Nature; or rather, against the laws of political economy laid down by Adam Smith and others—which was much the same thing. “If you will only let things be, let these beautiful laws of Nature work themselves out” (do we not remember Herbert Spencer’s “beautiful equilibrium?”), “everything will come right in the end.” But, in spite of all opposition, the principle of the legal minimum was conceded by an Act of 1909, which set up Trade Boards with authority to go into the circumstances of each case, and to settle the amount. This Act only referred

to four trades, but a later Act doubled the number, and in 1918 its scope was again largely extended.

Some years before this (in 1901) a Factory and Workshops Act brought nearly every place where work is carried on under the purview of the inspectors, and more drastic regulations were made for the health and comfort of the workers. And so their conditions went on improving and their increasingly efficient organization, combined with their political influence as electors, enabled them to get better terms from their employers, to bring greater pressure upon Parliament, and ultimately to form a Labour Government. And they have the right to strike, and to collect from the members of their Unions money for political purposes.

And still the industrial millennium is far to seek. The divisive and exclusivist feelings of class consciousness are still with us; and the forces of Capital and Labour are facing one another, elaborately organized for war and constantly manœuvring for position, each suspicious of the other and thinking of their own interests rather than those of the community. And even those whose motto is "All for Each, and Each for All" are too much in the habit of giving to this great phrase a restricted interpretation.

We have seen how lamentably the employing class failed to appreciate the position of the wage-earners, and our sympathies could not but be with those who were struggling against such adverse conditions. But when the tide began to turn, the wage-earners also failed to appreciate any other point of view than their own. The extraordinary attitude of a considerable section of the Labour Party to the Russian Revolution is one of the most significant indications of this

exclusivism, and of that exaggerated feeling of class consciousness that makes clear thinking and, therefore, just conclusions impossible.

Let us recall a few of the facts. In March 1917, after the Russian Revolution was accomplished, the just-formed Council of Soviets pressed upon the provisional Government the calling of a Constituent Assembly which should decide the future constitution and fundamental laws of the Russian State. The Government agreed to the proposal, but did not act upon it; and in the following December, after Lenin and Trotsky's *coup d'état*, the elections for the Assembly took place under Bolshevik auspices. The Assembly was opened at Petrograd on January 18, 1918, and a motion in favour of Bolshevism, after having been debated in the presence of soldiers armed with rifles with bayonets fixed, was rejected by about two to one. On the 19th of the month the Assembly was dissolved; the Government continuing to rule, in spite of the adverse vote of this body that they had themselves called into being. And a few days later Lenin declared that universal suffrage was out of date, and that only the dictatorship of the proletariat could save the country.

Soon after this outrage on public liberty—this fundamental sin against democracy—was consummated, the (then) weekly *Herald* came out with a flaming *Manifesto to Workers*, in which it said that "The Russian Revolution has raised a sun in Heaven which can never go out. . . . THE HOUR OF DEMOCRACY COMES. . . . Let Russia be your inspiration." In the same issue of the paper was a strong protest against "The Murder of Democracy" in Germany, where German comrades had come out on strike and been suppressed. Evidently, in the opinion of the *Herald*,

the right to suppress anybody is restricted to the proletariat !<sup>1</sup>

This strong and unreasoning partisanship is not confined to one section of the Labour Party. In February 1925, in the Report of a Trade Union Delegation to Russia, it was admitted that freedom of the Press, of combination, and of opinion, did not exist in Russia. "Democracy, as understood elsewhere," it says, "has no place in it." And then comments, "This amounts to a denial in principle of individual liberty, as hitherto understood." What can these qualifying phrases mean but that, to these Trade Unionists, democracy and liberty may legitimately be understood to mean something quite different from what they have always been understood to mean ; and that even tyranny is a venial offence, if, and so long as, it is exercised by Labourists, and not by Capitalists or the bourgeoisie ? And not only are the strictures—if strictures they can be called—strangely mild, but the report even hints at approval of the Soviet Government's tyrannical system, which, it says, must be judged by its results. This is not only very short-sighted, for injustice and oppression can never be good policy in the end ; but the same defence might be put up for any kind of benevolent despotism. And thus a party that has protested from the beginning against injustice and oppression, and that has for the most part championed constitutional democracy, has stooped, not only to defend, but to acclaim those things which they have always in the past condemned, because they are done in order to secure predominance for their own class. If any reader considers this statement an exaggeration, let him consider that, little

<sup>1</sup> How far the *Herald* of 1918 voiced the opinions of Labourists it is not easy to say. But it had a wide circulation in Labour circles.



more than a year after this report, the Trade Union Council called a General Strike, which is nothing less than an endeavour by one section of the community to gain their ends by making war on all the rest. I know that this interpretation of the meaning of the General Strike of 1926 has been characterized by eminent Labourists as "absurd" and "wicked." But this is only another instance of how partisanship warps the judgment; for it must have been evident to every man who took the trouble to think that, whatever may be the motives alleged, the inevitable result of such a strike, if successful, must be the triumph of force and the defeat of constitutional methods.

Looking back, however, upon the past history of industrialism one cannot sit in judgment on our fellow-workers, the manual labourers. Through many centuries they were kept down, as far as this could safely be done. Of the last phase we have hinted something in this chapter. But the terrible tale can never be fully told. And it should not be forgotten that, when our masters of industry set up their factories in other lands, where there were no Factory Acts, the old miseries and injustices were too apt to be repeated. "The best thought in India," says Mr. W. E. S. Holland, "shrinks with horror from the introduction of the industrial system of the West, with its slums and soul-destroying materialism." And he points out that in Bombay, where Western Industrialism is rife, the infant mortality is 66 per cent. for the whole city, and over 80 per cent. for the mill area.<sup>1</sup> We must not be too resentful, therefore, if the Labourists, having suffered so much from the lack of justice and the desire for power and predominance of others, may sometimes

<sup>1</sup> *The Indian Outlook*, p. 106.

in their turn lose sight of justice in their struggle for fuller freedom.

But no sort of Golden Age can come by way of violent partisanship, by denial of liberty, or by struggles for power of any section of the community in order to dominate the rest. Such struggles give rise to unwholesome feelings of triumph on the one hand and bitterness on the other ; and reprisals follow in vicious circles. The way of industrial progress does not lie in this direction, but in the free and energetic labour of a self-governing and contented people ; contented because they treat others, and are themselves treated, with fairness and consideration.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PRESENT AGE: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

IN glancing at the history of modern industrialism we have confined our attention to Great Britain, as the first and foremost in the Industrial Revolution. Now it will be useful to turn to general politics, especially noticing the currents and cross-currents of nationalism and internationalism, so characteristic of the age, and so full of meaning for the future.

There may have been hundreds of thousands of years of human life on the earth before there was any unitary group of sufficient size to be called a nation. Primitive man's thoughts could not compass more than the narrower bonds of family and tribe, and it is at least doubtful if he would have voluntarily chosen any larger groupings. Even now there are an infinite number of languages and dialects that keep men apart; and parochialisms and provincialisms are very closely cherished, the narrower being often stronger than the wider bond. Men wanted happiness and security; and, so long as these things could be secured while still retaining their tribal organizations, it does not seem probable that nations would have come into being. But impelled by the clamant needs of hunger, or by the strong will and ambition of warrior chiefs who aspired to possess and rule wider territories, tribes attacked and subdued their neighbours; and such happenings would serve to warn other tribes of the need of union for purposes of defence. Then if in any of these larger groupings there should be a leader of

wider outlook and greater organizing power than his fellows, the tribesmen would settle down and become reconciled to his rule; a feeling of common interest and of common hopes and fears, and, perhaps, of satisfaction and pride in their common prosperity and achievements, will weld them together, and they will become a nation. At length, with the same national traditions and memories, living, working, and fighting together, a fervid patriotism is engendered, and men begin to think that nationality—with its natural implication, State sovereignty—is sacrosanct, an essential factor in the government of mankind. But nationality is a matter of expediency, of circumstance, of growth, not an eternal principle. There is no finality in such matters. As the world has developed from the herd to the tribe, the nation, the Empire, and the League of Nations, it may still develop.

Reference has been made in the previous chapter to the remarkable changes in world conditions since the close of the eighteenth century. As to transport, for instance, we can now go from London to New York in less time than our forbears could get to Paris. As to communication and the transmission of news, we have annihilated time and space. And yet, only a little more than one hundred years ago, it took eight days for the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba to reach Vienna, and six days for the result of Waterloo to reach Berlin. Such vast changes cannot fail to influence our political organisms, and must necessarily call for adjustments and modifications suited to the new conditions, which, as they bring us so much nearer together, inevitably suggest closer ties between the nations, and consequently a loosening of State sovereignty. As we have seen in the past the develop-

ment from the herd to the League of Nations, so, moving in the same direction, we may come to a federation of the world. In any case, State sovereignty, though a very important *stage* in world-development, is not necessarily the *terminus*.

But a word of caution is necessary here. We are so accustomed to speak in terms of evolution that we are in danger of forgetting that when man's will and purpose become factors in the case, the strains, tendencies, and developments that would otherwise proceed in their regular course and at their regular pace may be quickened or retarded, altered or even contradicted. So, as already said, the course of human history is something like the zigzags of the weather-chart, and the unexpected often happens.<sup>1</sup> If a man's limitations had only been slightly less than the animals', if he had not been capable of such heights and depths, the world would have gone on developing much as the evolutionary theory suggests. But the incalculable and unpredictable human element defies all such theories; and by the side of, and intermingled with, the continuous influence of the general principles of life and growth, of individual and social tendencies, there are always other influences that can neither be formulated nor accounted for.

The first prophet of Internationalism was Baron—appropriately named Anacharsis—von Cloots; and of all the singular and fantastic figures that the upheaval of the French Revolution brought to the surface there were few more remarkable than this one. It has been the fashion to consider him merely an eccentric, and by some of his ways and opinions, his frothy enthusiasm

<sup>1</sup> Not *always* happens, as is sometimes alleged. That is, of course, absurd.

and his endless rant, he lays himself open to the charge. But he had travelled widely and read much ; and in his life advocacy of the great idea of the union of all nations in one family, his greatest misfortune was to be far in advance of his time. And, it should be added, this idea of a universal Republic of freedom and brotherhood, of an all-comprehensive Internationalism, does not seem to have begun as a germ and to have gradually developed, but to have come upon the world full-blown from his brain.

This is not to say that the idea of world-solidarity originated with von Cloots. It is to be found in the oldest scriptures, the Hindu Rig-Veda. His special contribution was to add liberty, equality, and a universal republic to the original idea of the brotherhood of all men.

The doctrine had a great vogue for a time ; and the Revolutionary armies, considering themselves missionaries of the new evangel, proclaimed, as they marched, death to all tyrants, and liberty, equality, and fraternity to all peoples who would range themselves at their side. Internationalism, however, was too big and too new a thing to have been in those days more than an aspiration or a passing emotion ; but the more limited idea of free nationalism, i.e. of State sovereignty combined with democratic government, was at once more familiar and more practicable.

How these things were affected by the Napoleonic régime it is not easy to say. The question is very complex, and its discussion would take more time than can be given to it here. Napoleon was not averse to liberal ideas when they suited his purpose, and even made use of them to divide his enemies and to extend his power. But they were altogether abhorrent to Metternich, who, at the Congress at Vienna, with

his wonderful powers of persuasion and his position as Chairman of the Congress, was able to prevent any genuine movement in the direction of freedom of any sort or kind. So the settlement of Europe after Napoleon's defeat was mainly a matter of change and barter, each diplomat or sovereign prince on the alert to get as much as he could, and with very little regard to the interests of the people. The Greeks, for instance, persistently prayed the Congress for liberation from Turkish rule, but their prayer was disregarded. Nor would the Congress take any steps on behalf of any other of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Metternich was too busy propping up mouldering institutions and driving disaffection underground to attend to such matters, even in the unlikely event of his wishing to do so. His hatred of freedom was a constant obsession, if it might not be called a mania. He was the great apostle of reaction, and for many years the most powerful personal force in Europe; and it was largely owing to his skilful and unrelenting diplomacy that for many years liberty was nearly everywhere suppressed and could only be spoken of in secret. As a natural outcome of all this, the numbers and influence of secret societies rapidly increased.

Metternich's policy was obviously unsuited to the times and was bound to fail in the end. During the eighteenth century the ideas of freedom, from extreme republicanism to moderate constitutionalism, were sedulously promulgated. In 1762 Rousseau with his *Social Contract* had set the heather on fire, and the fire spread into many countries; it might be damped down, but it could not be put out. Ideas that had been so openly proclaimed and so widely spread could never be completely lost. During periods of reaction

they may sleep, or be driven underground, but they will awake and come again to the surface. And Metternich's policy was bound to fail for another reason. Much as the European Courts wished to keep the democracy in subjection, the circumstances of life were so complex, and the interests and ambitions of princes and nations were so often opposed to one another that they could not always agree on identical measures of repression. And it was difficult for an autocrat or a Government to feel altogether displeased when a dreaded rival Power was weakened by internal dissensions. Thus the course of these champions of reaction was often deflected by varying, and sometimes contradictory, motives and circumstances. The Czar of Russia, for instance, persuaded by Metternich and Castlereagh, refrained from assisting the Greeks in their revolt against the Turks; but finding that George Canning, the new Prime Minister of Great Britain, was a warm friend of the rebels, and afraid that Great Britain might, by befriending the Greeks, gain power and influence in the South-East of Europe, he changed his attitude to one of friendship, and helped them to gain their independence. A few years later, the British Government, fearing that the growing power of Russia would be still further increased by her influence over the Greeks, insisted on the limitation of the Greek State to a very narrow area, thus circumscribing as far as possible Russian influence in that part of the world.

The motives of the rulers and their Governments were often mixed and contradictory, as were those of the democracy and its leaders. The highest motives, political, national, and religious freedom, the freedom of the spirit ("space in which a free spirit might find room to soar"), were all at work; but so also



were motives of a lower kind, egotistical, personal, and local.

Of this mixture of motives in men and Governments the story of the Greek revolt is, perhaps, one of the most interesting and suggestive illustrations. It is also an illustration of the cruel, crude, and costly methods of settling disputes which so often obtained under the old diplomacy.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Greeks were mainly a nation of herdsmen and brigands ; but, during the first part of the nineteenth, their economic conditions began to improve, and there arose a wealthier merchant and trading class. With more comfort and a wider outlook there began an intellectual movement, especially an interest in the Greek classics, which stimulated pride of race and a love of liberty. And as they improved in knowledge they also improved in culture capacity and enterprise.

It would have been well if this advance in knowledge and capacity had been accompanied by an equal advance in moral character. This, however, was not the case ; and consequently, in their struggles with the Turks, the cause of liberty was disgraced by their cruelty and bad faith, their unscrupulous egotism, and their incurable spirit of faction.

The position of the Greeks while under Turkish rule was, in theory, a hopeless one ; for no infidel had any claim to justice, which was a privilege reserved for believers in the Koran. But although there was nothing to expect from the justice of the Turks, much might be expected from their slackness and indifference ; for they were far too indolent even to tyrannize with system

and industry. They looked upon all their subject races, not as people to be shepherded and governed, but as cows to be milked; the fatter and more flourishing the cow, the more milk there would be for the master; and they encouraged, if they did not initiate, the local self-government of the native communes whose principal duty, in their eyes, was to apportion the requisite taxes and hand them over to the governors of the provinces. If this were done the Greeks were left very much to themselves, electing their own officers and seeing to all the details of local administration. But although there was no systematic oppression, there was always the consciousness of subjection to another race, a consciousness made more acute by spasmodic acts of injustice and cruelty which there was no law either to punish or restrain. The rising discontent became known to the Empress Catharine of Russia, who, like many autocrats before and since, was not averse to fishing in troubled waters; and in 1768 she encouraged the Greeks of the Morea to revolt. Six years later, however, when it suited her purpose to make peace with the Porte, she abandoned them to the fury of their enemies. But although the Greeks of the Morea were so basely deserted, Greece as a whole, including the islands, reaped great benefit from the treaty which was then concluded; for it gave to Russia the right to make representations to the Porte on behalf of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula. Greece was thus taken under Russian patronage; hundreds of Greek merchantmen were permitted to fly the Russian flag; their business immensely increased; their ships were enlarged; and their commerce extended to England, and even to America.

Meanwhile, the French Revolution had been accomplished, and its influence spread throughout Europe.

Greek students from French universities, and Greek merchants engaged in the carrying trade with Marseilles, brought back revolutionary ideas of social progress and constitutional right, and stimulated the desire for national, political, and religious independence. This desire was further stimulated by the Serbian revolt against Turkey, which, beginning in 1804, with alternating success and failure, ended in 1817 in the Serbians achieving a modified form of self-government. Three years before this, as we have seen, the Congress of Vienna, which paid only lip service to the principle of nationalism, had disregarded the prayer of the Greeks for liberation from Turkish control. Seeing, therefore, no prospect of help from outside, they started an armed secret society at the new and thriving Russian city of Odessa, where there were many Greek traders, in order to organize the spirit of disaffection. The society was called *Hetœria Philiké*, and its objects, the utter extermination of the Turks and the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire. And although its ultimate goal could not be reached, it drew within its ranks all the Greeks of note, both in Greece and the islands, and bound the nation together in a secret pledge to strike for liberty when the time was ripe. The first revolt was in Rumania. A serious tactical mistake; for the Rumanian Slavs had no love for the Greeks, and certainly no wish to have a Greek master installed at Constantinople. It utterly failed; and with it all hope of a great Eastern Empire. But soon after, in April 1821, the revolt of the Greeks of the Morea met with more success; and for many weeks they murdered every Turk, man, woman, or child within their reach.

The news of the revolt, doubtless without the horrible details, was received in Western Europe with great

enthusiasm, especially by scholars and literary men, who confused these degenerate Greeks with the wonderful race of classical times; and many volunteers from other countries joined the rebels. In August of this year Navarino was taken; and in spite of a formal promise that on capitulation the inhabitants should be spared, the Turks were all massacred. Tripolitza, the modern capital of the Morea, was besieged for six months, and, when it was about to surrender, some of the rebel chiefs bargained with rich inhabitants to protect them in return for their money and jewels. Hearing of this, the Greek soldiery defied all orders, rushed upon the fortifications, which they carried by storm, and in three days the sack of the town was thoroughly accomplished. Thoroughly, indeed! For the roads were so choked with the dead that as the general in command rode from the gateway to the citadel his horse's hoofs never touched the ground.

In less than a year the Turks were turned out of Greece, but the spirit of faction—a development of that centrifugal tendency characteristic of the Greeks more than two thousand years before—soon asserted itself. Civil war ensued; and the Mussulmans, with the aid of troops from Egypt, regained possession of the country. During the struggle the Greeks found out, at terrible cost, how dangerous it was to compete in acts of cruelty with such past masters in the art as the Turks. In duplicity, the Greek was a match for most; but in sustained brutality, or in wholesale massacre of the defenceless, the Turk was easily first. Again my pen almost refuses to function. To write about these things, while at the same time one is realizing something of what they mean, is like gazing into the pit of hell. One example, however, of Turkish

methods must be given. In 1822 the Samians landed in the island of Chios and tried, with but little success, to incite the Chians to join them. The Samians, however, proceeded with their enterprise against the Turks, and were soon defeated and driven from the island. Chios was then given up to massacre. They were slain, pillaged, and sold into slavery at the pleasure of their enemies. Taking refuge in monasteries they were slaughtered by thousands. Others, persuaded to return to their homes by the promise of an amnesty, perished family by family. It has been estimated that 25,000 were slain, 47,000 sold into slavery, and only 5,000 were spared.

The Greek revolt was, at first, viewed by European diplomats with coldness and suspicion; a not unnatural attitude when we consider its revolutionary character, its massacres so reminiscent of the hated French Revolution, the great secret society that was behind it, and the enormous influence of the reactionary spirit in Europe which Metternich had done so much to foster. But Metternich's influence was beginning to wane; and the awful reprisals of the Turks created a profound impression and turned the general sympathy of Europe towards the Greeks. So in 1827 Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened to save the Christian Greeks from Ottoman rule. As the Porte refused their mediation, the allied fleet destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino, and with the aid of French troops the Greeks drove their enemies out of the country. Meanwhile, a republic was proclaimed and a president elected.

This would never do! Free Nationalism might be tolerated, even under certain circumstances encouraged, but Republicanism was out of the question. Therefore, after much conference and negotiation, the three

protecting Powers imposed a king on the people. Prince Otho, of Bavaria, who came into the country with Bavarian councillors and troops, brought with him also ideas of absolute rule, which he was able to put into practice for about eleven years when, owing to a military revolt, he was compelled to grant a constitution.

Such was the devious course through which modern Greece, by secret agitation, by open rebellion, and by the aid of foreign Powers, eventually achieved national and constitutional freedom. But at what a cost! It is reckoned that during the years of conflict (1821-27) three hundred thousand Greeks had perished out of a total population of little more than a million. And to this must be added the number of survivors whose lives were totally or partially wrecked; the devastation of the country, including the destruction in large areas of the fruit-bearing trees; and, in some places, the reduction of the people to a state of barbarism.

While these events were proceeding another nation was endeavouring to free itself from alien rule. The story of Italy's struggle and achievement—of Garibaldi, her intrepid soldier-hero; of Cavour, her great constitutional statesman; and of Mazzini, her prophet, philosopher, and, by sad necessity, arch-conspirator—it is too well known to need repetition here. But brief reference must be made to Mazzini's teaching, as it represents a definite development in world politics, a half-way house between nationalism and internationalism. He preached the doctrine of political variety in unity; that each nation had its own special mission in the world, a moral purpose that could only be fulfilled through liberty; and he held that only when this came about should we be ready for the

world republic of peace. He thus supported the idea of a universal republic, first proclaimed by von Cloots; but he recognized, what his fanatical predecessor failed to do, that this could not come about until, by the general raising of the moral tone and standard, the world was prepared for it.

It is well to note that to Mazzini a Republic, in order to be lasting, must be founded upon a religious basis; upon a new conception of Progress—not considered as a mere philosophical theory, but as the divine law of life working through human effort. And he held that the principle of the association between man and man, peoples and peoples, should be with a view to the fulfilment, through the highest possible development of liberty, of that law of equality between soul and soul which, visibly or not, lies at the root of every great synthesis linking man to God.

Obviously, the world was not prepared for such an international republic as is adumbrated here, or for anything remotely approximating to it. But in 1839 the idea of Internationalism, in the attenuated form of Class Internationalism, was adopted by a number of exiles in London, chiefly Germans, who formed an international league in the interests of the working classes. The league, mainly confined to the German-speaking peoples of Northern Europe, was dissolved in consequence of the failure of the attempted revolution at Berlin in 1848. But the idea was not allowed to sleep, and in 1864 another association was founded known as the International, and this association rapidly increased in power and influence, and had branches from Hungary to San Francisco. In 1869 Bakurin and other Russian Nihilists joined it; but so much dissension resulted from the accession of this "apostle of universal destruction" and his followers that in

1872 they were expelled from the society. The excommunicated promptly formed a rival International which, in the following year, stimulated and supported Communal risings in Southern Spain. These risings were eventually suppressed; and the society quietly expired in 1879, five years after its more moderate rival had met with the same fate.

The principle of the solidarity of Labour, however, was gaining ground. Occasional International Conferences were held at various times; and in 1889 what is called the *Second* International, but might have been called the *Fourth*, was formed for the purpose of holding periodic congresses. In 1900 it was organized as a permanent body, with a constitution and an International Socialist Bureau. Although a somewhat loose confederation without much power or influence, it had in 1914 twelve million members from twenty-eight affiliated nations. At the outbreak of the Great War it split into two sections—pro-war and anti-war, and, national feeling proving so much stronger than international, ceased to function. It was reconstructed directly the war was over, but with too moderate a constitution for the extreme Labourists and Communists, who, as in 1872, promptly formed a rival association, the *Third* International. This Third International, at a Congress in 1920, defined its object as “a single aim: the overthrow of capitalism, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the International Soviet Republic, the complete abolition of classes and the realization of socialism—as the first step to communist society.” Great stress was laid at this Congress on the necessity for illegal work and the preparation for eventual armed conflict. Only genuine communists are enrolled; and the policy of the society is decided at headquarters.



There is yet another International, mainly composed of those who left the *Second*, but had not joined the *Third*, which hopes to unite all three. It is called the *Vienna International* after its birthplace, or, in full, "The International Working Union of Socialist Parties." It claims that each national group shall determine its own method of action; and, in its endeavour to steer a middle course between the *Second* and *Third* Internationals, insists on the probable necessity of expecting the use of violent measures by the capitalist class. A subtle way of seeming to deprecate violence, and, at the same time, providing itself with an excuse for getting ready to use it; so that when a constitutional Government defends itself by force against those who try to bring about "the dictatorship of the proletariat"—which, as a last resort, it is bound to do—they can justify their methods of violence by the plea that the "capitalist class" began it.

Here we see the special disadvantages that attach to a political internationalism that is restricted to a class. Although it unites, it also divides; and, in encouraging an extreme form of class-consciousness, it increases that feeling of bitter partisanship that is one of the greatest enemies of goodwill. There is no doubt, however, that these international societies of working men, and also the vocational societies of lawyers, doctors, nurses, and others, are familiarizing men's minds with the international idea, and, to some extent at least, preparing them for wider movements in the same direction.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE PRESENT AGE : THE BIBLE AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE

UNTIL the middle of the eighteenth century it was generally believed throughout Christendom that the world was made in six days, and that the date of Creation could only be found by studying the chronology of the Bible. Scholars have differed very much, however, in their calculations, and over two hundred varying results have been given, ranging from 3483 to 6984 B.C. One of these scholars, the learned Archbishop Usher (in his *Annals of the Old and New Testament*, published in the middle of the seventeenth century), computes it to have been 4004 B.C., and this date was generally accepted by all English-speaking peoples, and was printed in English Bibles ; a practice still continued.<sup>1</sup>

But about one hundred years after Archbishop Usher's *Annals*, the Comte de Buffon produced his *Histoire Naturelle*, in which he contended that there was evidence of an unbroken succession of forms in the Animal Kingdom, and that the working out of this succession would take about 70,000 years. He, however, endeavoured to mollify the traditionalists by suggesting that the six days of creation were really long periods of time ; and accordingly divided his 70,000 years into six stages. This book, although not

<sup>1</sup> It was a pity that the Archbishop did not give the month ; for this might have helped to settle the minds of some historians of the following century who, busy on a Universal History, debated whether the Creation began on the 21st of March or September 21st of that year !

now thought to be of great scientific value, was professedly based on concrete facts, and was a distinct challenge to the then orthodox position.

The next and more serious challenge came from two astronomers, one in France and the other in England, who were exploring the heavens with their telescopes and coming to somewhat similar conclusions as to the genesis of the universe. In 1796 one of them, the Marquis de Laplace, published his *Exposition du Système du monde*, setting forth his theory of a primeval nebula (an extremely rarefied incandescent gas of intense heat) revolving upon its axis; cooling, condensing, and contracting; throwing off rings which became planets; and, in countless millions of years, forming the solar system. Six years later, Sir William Herschel announced that he had discovered distant stars with planetary systems like our own; and that there were nebulae on either side of the Milky Way revolving round their centres of gravity. In subsequent years many still more distant stars were added to our knowledge by Sir William, his sister, and his son; and, as science follows its tools, improvements in the telescope and the invention of the spectroscope enabled their successors yet further to enlarge our knowledge.

Less than three hundred years before this the idea not only of a world made in six days, but of a limited firmament with the earth in the centre was generally held in Christendom; and Copernicus was rebuked by Martin Luther as "an arrogant fool" because he taught that it was the sun, and not the earth, round which the planets revolved. Now at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was unfolded before the civilized world this conception of a limitless universe, as infinite in complexity of structure as in extent,

subject to one common law of motion and development, compared with which our solar system was but an item, our earth but a speck of dust. And as it appeared from the work of these astronomers that the creation of the world had taken, not six days, but vast and immeasurable ages, it was soon to appear from the work of geologists and naturalists that the time since its creation was to be reckoned, not in thousands, as orthodox Christendom averred, but in millions of years.

The existence of fossils had been observed by some of the ancients, and by many of the curious in Christendom. But until the nineteenth century it does not seem to have occurred to anyone that they could teach us anything as to the age of the earth. They were either looked upon as merely freaks of nature, or were attributed to the devil, to the influence of the stars, or to Noah's Flood. From this time, however, the opinion of scientists as to the earth's great age was for various reasons gaining ground; and in 1859 Charles Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, in which it was pointed out that there was no evidence of a special creation of separate species, but that through long ages all animal and plant life had been in process of development. In 1863 came Sir Charles Lyell's *Geological Evidence of the Antiquity of Man*, and in 1871 Darwin's *Descent of Man*. So in the course of seventy-five years a continuous evolutionary system was unfolded, from the incandescent nebulæ to the earth's firm crust, then to plants, animals, and man.

One of the most outspoken and uncompromising supporters of this evolutionary hypothesis was the great physicist, Professor Tyndall, who, addressing the British Association at Belfast in August 1874, boldly

declared his belief that the origin of life and consciousness was to be found in the potency of matter. But the Professor went on to say that he had no wish to banish religion from the human mind ; referred to the immovable basis of the religious sentiment in the emotional nature of man which the understanding can never satisfy, and expressed himself, in closing, as opposed to all the restrictions of Materialism. The challenge, indeed, was not to religion, but to orthodoxy. . . . And it was not only on scientific grounds.

But here we must go back a little. The Protestant revolt from Rome had accustomed men's minds to many and wide differences of view on religious matters, and eventually created an atmosphere favourable to liberty of thought and expression. From near the end of the sixteenth century men began in increasing numbers to throw off the shackles of traditionalism ; and, by the end of the eighteenth, many direct attacks had been made both on the Bible and Christianity, in which, with much that was futile, many shrewd blows were struck. We are not so much concerned here with these frontal attacks as with the attitude of what came to be called the Broad Church Party. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in Germany and in England, some theologians presumed to overhaul the evidence for Scriptural authority, and to re-examine the bases of religious truth ; and, while still believing in a general inspiration, they also came to believe that there were in the Bible traces of human fallibility and of a departure from the highest ethical standpoint, which called for the exercise of judgment and discrimination in the study of the text. They also held that, as all truth is God's truth, the best way to defend religion was to keep the mind open to all

new knowledge and new thought, confident that this could always be reconciled with an enlightened Christianity.

But the large orthodox majority would not have it so, and assumed an intransigent attitude; an attitude still maintained by a section of the Church which, although diminishing, shows signs of vitality that cannot be ignored, and sometimes even seems to be recovering lost ground. This is not altogether surprising. For when those who do not know how great is the vision of a wider Gospel feel that the very foundations of religion are being undermined, they naturally shudder at the idea of being deprived of what, to them, is the only possible way of salvation. So when in 1853 Denison Maurice published his mildly heterodox *Theological Essays* he was dismissed from his professorship of theology at King's College; and when, seven years later, *Essays and Reviews* came out—the avowed object being to reconcile the central truths of Christianity with the new developments in science and philosophy—it was censured by all the English bishops, and condemned by Convocation. In the following year, however, Bishop Colenso, of Natal, published his *Translation of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, in which he objected to the doctrine of eternal punishment—a sad lapse from orthodoxy in those days; and from time to time, and for many years there appeared from his pen critical studies of the Pentateuch, the Book of Joshua, and of other books of the Old Testament. He concluded, amongst other things, that there were two or more self-disproving accounts of the Creation and the Deluge; that Moses may or may not have been, and that Joshua certainly was, a mythical personage; and that the book of Chronicles was a fictitious story put together for a

special purpose hundreds of years after the Babylonian exile. There followed a storm of protest and remonstrance, condemnation by Convocation, and excommunication by his Metropolitan, Bishop Gray, of Cape Town. But in spite of all opposition he sturdily held on his course. The particular views held by him or by other nineteenth-century Broad Churchmen cannot be discussed here. The point specially to be noticed is that—within the Church itself—there arose a small but increasing number of men who claimed the right to use their reason in matters that, according to orthodox belief, had been settled once for all by Divine Authority.

Of course, in the arguments advanced, or in tone and temper, the advantage was not always on the same side. But it must be said that, while as a rule the scientists and the Broad Churchmen showed a real desire to know the truth and observed a certain moderation in statement, the upholders of traditionalism were too often betrayed into unworthy ebullitions of temper and into the meannesses of persecution. When in 1869 Dr. Temple, who had written the first article in *Essays and Reviews*, was appointed to the bishopric of Exeter, Dr. Pusey's fury knew no bounds, and he charged the new bishop with participating in the ruin of countless souls, and with going about "with the blood of all those souls upon his head."

The central idea of these religious intransigents was that of an infallible book. There is scarcely any idea more calculated to hinder the free play of intelligence than this. Over and over again has the writer heard and read explanations and apologies that, but for this obsession, would never have been made. In the

*Homilies* (compiled in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Elizabeth, and referred to in the Thirty-nine Articles as giving authoritative explanations on some doctrinal points) there is a quaint chapter entitled "An Information for them which take offence at certain places of Holy Scripture." In this chapter we read that "the plurality of wives was, by a special prerogative, suffered to the Fathers of the Old Testament, not for satisfying their carnal and fleshy lusts, but to have many children, because every one of these hoped and begged sometimes of God, in their prayers, that that blessed seed which God promised should come into the world to break the serpent's head, might come and be born of his stock and kindred." <sup>2</sup> This is not quoted as a fair specimen of the answers of orthodoxy, but as an interesting illustration of the effect that the doctrine of an infallible book has upon some of its advocates. Starting with the idea that every word of the book is true, they have somehow to accommodate the facts to the theory. So centuries later, when the presence of fossils in the rocks was advanced as evidence for evolutionary creation, Philip Henry Gosse, the great naturalist, admitted that the apparent evidence of previous ages of life was there, but maintained that God put it there. Thus implying, as Charles Kingsley said, that God had written on the rocks "one enormous and superfluous lie."

<sup>2</sup> This follows St. Augustine in his letter to Juliana. See *Seventeen Short Treatises* in Pusey's Library of the Fathers. In another chapter of the *Homilies*, "Against Excess of Apparel," an instance of excess is the wearing of different garments for night and day.

It is noteworthy that the creed with which every clergyman declares his substantial agreement was compiled, either by the same men who wrote the *Homilies*, or by others of the same school of theology, of the same limited vision.



This doctrine of an infallible book creates more difficulties than it solves, and the harm it has done is incalculable. It has caused an appalling waste of time over meticulous details, over things that do not matter in the least, but which, because they are in the inspired Book are—it is supposed—of real importance. For when one believes with John Wesley that every part of the Old and New Testament "is worthy of God, and all together are one entire body wherein is no defect, no excess," and that "an exact knowledge of the truth was accompanied, in the inspired writers, with an exactly regular series of arguments, a precise expression of their meaning, and a genuine vigour of suitable affections," the slightest word may easily seem of the utmost importance. During recent years a series of "Bible Problems," compiled by a minister of repute, have been published in one of the London daily papers. Here are a few of them :

What is the longest verse in the Bible ?

What three men in the Bible are said to have worn hats ?

Where do we read of ivory bedsteads ?

Who were Huz and Buz ?

What was the name of King David's uncle ?

Who was Rab-mag ?

Where do we read of 4,000 porters ?

"The detailed study of the Old Testament verse by verse, and writing commentaries upon them," said Professor Bethune Baker (in a letter to the *Guardian* of October 21, 1921), "is a wicked waste of time." One wonders what the Professor would say to such questions as these ; or to another series of questions propounded by one who hails from the other side of the Atlantic, and who asks us, amongst other things,

how many words and how many letters there are in the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Apocrypha? What is the middle verse of the Bible? What verse contains all the letters of the alphabet? He calls these "curious" questions. They are! But he mercifully gives us the answers, so we need not wickedly waste our time in trying to find them!

Then, because this doctrine emphasizes so strongly the words of the Bible, texts have been quoted to justify slavery, the burning of witches, the tyranny of rulers, relentless war and persecution, the subjection of women, the continuance of poverty, and an unwise charity. And the doctrine leads to shuffling out of an awkward position. "When the word of God," says Pascal, "is false literally, it is true spiritually"; as though an all-good God would use a literal falsehood as a vehicle of a spiritual truth!

But perhaps the greatest harm that has come to Christendom through the belief in an infallible book is that it has led to a doctrine as to the punishment of the "lost" (not necessarily the wicked) that dominated Europe for at least 1,200 years, and still dominates the thought of multitudes in Europe and America. As far as the writer can discover, this is the most awful doctrine of future punishment that has ever been held.<sup>1</sup> And it is fair to assume that, if good will and good sense had not been overwhelmed by the thought that it was sinful to doubt any word of Scripture, the belief in such a doctrine could not have lasted so long.

There could hardly be said to be any eschatology in the Old Testament; and the Jews appear to have subsequently adopted the idea of rewards and punish-

<sup>1</sup> I do not forget the Mohammedan hell. But that was an imitation, with many ingenious alterations and additions, of the ideas of Jews and Christians.

ments in the next world from the Persians. Jesus who, although for all time, was in many things a man of His time and country, is recorded to have given His sanction to the idea. But whatever view is taken of the passages imputed to Him that refer to the hell of fire, one knows instinctively that the development of the doctrine of hell in the Middle Ages, the emphasis put upon it, and the lurid details of the sufferings of the damned, were absolutely contrary to His spirit. The subject seemed to have a strange fascination for both learned and simple. St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, speculates whether hair and nails are burnt away, and whether the limbus of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom. In this latter speculation he suggests a milder view of the fate of those whose defect was their want of baptism than generally obtained, a view adopted by Dante in the *Divina Commedia*. It is interesting to note that although the poet takes a comparatively merciful view of hell, allowing gradations of punishment, and the milder fate of the limbus for the worthy but unbaptized, he consigns to this edge of hell such men as Adam, Moses, Abraham, Homer, Virgil, Plato, and Socrates, who as they "before the gospel lived" are only so far afflicted that they "live desiring without hope." Milder indeed, but dreadful enough!

As already mentioned in a previous chapter, Catholics and Protestants are both involved in this matter. A little book about hell by a Jesuit, Piamonti, was translated by the Rev. J. Furniss, published *permissu superiorum* and sold for a penny. It was specially intended for children and young persons, and was circulating in the middle of the eighteenth century. Hell, it was thought probable, was in the middle of the earth, 4,000 miles away. It is red hot. For every sinner there is a special dungeon. One of them a

red-hot oven in which is a little child. The child's agonies are then described with vivid realism; and we are told that God was very good to this child, because, knowing that it would get worse and worse and would never repent, He *in His mercy* called it out of the world in its early childhood.

In 1864 Dr. Pusey preached before the University of Oxford on the same subject. He tells of "fierce, fiery eyes of hate, spite, frenzied rage . . . yells . . . lurid vaults of hell," and much more of the same sort. And Dr. A. S. Peake in his *Life of Sir William Hartley*, referring to Primitive Methodist ministers before the year 1891, states that the bulk of them "accepted without any shadow of misgiving the current eschatology . . . the destiny of the unsaved was appalling beyond all conception. . . . Its penalties were those of physical torture by fire, intolerable and unending."

This gruesome subject, already referred to in the second chapter, is referred to again because of its bearing upon the question of Divine inspiration, and Dr. Peake's statement as to eschatology, current less than forty years ago amongst Primitive Methodist ministers, lends very strong support to my contention. For they were brought up on the idea that the Bible taught these things, and that every word of that book was "worthy of God." It is necessary to know something of the effect in the past of this idea of Divine inspiration; enough, at least, to give us the courage frankly to discard it. Through the ages, as we have seen, much that is unjust, horrible, and foolish, has been defended because of it. And as long as it is tolerated there is no clear course before us. The Bible, considered in its historic setting and with reason, judgment, and good will, is, in the writer's opinion, the greatest book in all literature to guide, to help, and

to inspire. But, treated in a wrong way, it may bring with it as many curses as blessings.

The attitude of the Modernist (the twentieth-century Broad Churchman) on this question is not easy to understand; and how much the truth has suffered from lack of courage it is impossible to tell. There is so much temptation to "play for safety"; and but few really believe that nothing can be so safe as the truth. "It does not do," it has been said, "to go too deeply into religion." There is a timid feeling that, if we follow the truth all the way, we cannot tell where it may lead; and so we are afraid of what may happen if we speak out boldly the truth that is in us. There is, of course, a time to be silent as well as a time to speak. But surely frankness should be the rule. Always to be reserved when we differ from convention, and always outspoken when we agree with it, is to give a false impression, and to help to perpetuate error by refraining from opposing it. We must sometimes run the risk of shocking even our friends. It may be the only way to make them think. Better, indeed, to shock a whole generation than fail to do our part, small though it may be, to help on the cause of progress.

Many who do not believe in the special inspiration of the Bible, but who are afraid to follow out their non-belief in all its implications, try to work round, somehow, to a more or less orthodox position. So on this question, as well as on that of the divinity of Christ, the Modernists seem to be anxious, by using time-honoured phrases, to convince the world that they are not so far from orthodoxy, when all the while their opinions are in flat contradiction to it. Thus the phrases, "the divinity of Christ" and the "inspiration

of the Bible," are retained. But it is added that we are all divine. It is a matter of degree although the difference in degree is very great. And Shakespeare and Milton and many others were also inspired. It is again a matter of degree. But divinity, as applied to Christ, has always had a distinctive meaning; that he is a part of the Deity, divine in a sense that no other man is or could be divine; that in essence divinity is different from humanity. In orthodox theology God is essentially and fundamentally distinct from all his creatures; and, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, the Son and the Holy Ghost were of like substance with the Father. Instead, therefore, of an approximation to orthodoxy as the use of the word *divinity* would seem to suggest, the Modernist view of *difference of degree* is very far away from it. So is it as to inspiration. If the Bible is inspired as Shakespeare and Milton are inspired, but in greater degree, it is not in the ordinary sense inspired at all. For who can doubt that the word was meant to convey the idea of a special inspiration by the Almighty in a sense in which no other book has ever been inspired? To use the same words in opposite senses, in order to bridge over difficulties and make things comfortable all round, is like building a house upon the sand.

On similar lines is that ingenious afterthought of a Progressive Revelation. It was a welcome *via media*, a way of escape from the disagreeable necessity of perfect frankness, and therefore a very popular expedient. It cannot be denied that there is evidence in the Bible of a progressive development of spiritual ideas, although with serious set-backs, such as the formalism and ecclesiasticism of the Book of Chronicles and the arid Rabbinism of a later date. Besides, the vengeance invoked on one's enemies, personal and

national, in the Psalms, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, clearly shows that the spirit of awful and pitiless cruelty was cherished by many of the religious leaders till at least near the close of the Old Testament canon. And yet it is sometimes suggested that the development of religion led up to the teachings of Jesus. A strange travesty of the facts; for Jesus flatly opposed the prevailing tendencies of His time, and His opposition cost Him His life. Thus the history of religion, as recorded in the Bible—like the history of other religions—gives evidence of progress and also of decay; and the assumption of revelation, progressive or otherwise, seems to be gratuitous and unnecessary. It is surely inconceivable that after man had been on the earth some hundreds of thousands of years and great civilizations had come and gone, Divine revelations should, from time to time, have been vouchsafed to the Hebrews, who wrote them down in a series of books; that these books contained many things that were incongruous with the idea of a just and holy God; and that it was so ordained—or, shall we say, allowed?—that the idea of plenary inspiration should have been so firmly held that men, who otherwise were kind and reasonable, were impelled to defend these incongruities; and that it was not till the eighteenth century A.D. that it was seen how it could all be explained in a satisfactory manner by the doctrine of a Progressive Revelation.

Of symbolism as a *via media* something must also be said. There are many kinds of symbols. There is the pure symbol, such as the symbol of colour, of which the black, red, and white Prussian flag is a most striking instance: "Through the night of our shame, through the blood of our fathers, into the light of a new day." Then there is the symbol which is based

on a fact. Not to hide the fact, but to sublimate it, or draw a moral from it. These two methods are quite legitimate, although the lure of the second of them has been such that it has been used much too often, and in very fantastic and extravagant ways. But to set up a plea that certain things which have been recorded as facts are generally recorded, and have been accepted as such for centuries, were really only symbols and not facts at all; and to do this because it is found impossible any longer to fit them in with our ideas of moral conduct, or with what we have got to know of physical laws, shows a lamentable want of intellectual honesty. It is an old device, known to the Pythagoreans and the Stoics, to the Greeks and the Romans. Men resorted to it partly from fear of an absolute breach with the past, of cutting one's self adrift; and partly, perhaps—as we are moved by many unconscious motives—from the love of ease and comfort, of position and popularity. We are not all, as Erasmus used to say, born to be martyrs. But whatever the motives it cannot be good in the end to temporize with the truth. On such lines the Golden Age can never come.

It has been asserted that the Church is fighting a rearguard action, and there is much to be said for this view. One thing after another that was thought to be fundamental has been dropped; and, as military men have often pretended—sometimes perhaps really believed—that a retreat was only a strategic movement to the rear, so the Modernists console themselves, when some point of doctrine cannot any longer be maintained, that it is of no consequence. Statements of fact in the Old Testament, some of them referred to as authentic in the New, may not now be credible.



It is of no consequence. It is only the spirit underlying the story that matters. And it is admitted that there may be mistakes in the record in both Testaments. But this is surely of the utmost importance; for if there be mistakes, how can there be final authority on any passage? Bishop Gore, for example, admits that there are inaccuracies in the New Testament, and that even Christ may, at times, have been mis-reported; and then goes on to affirm that in a certain passage we can be sure that we have the authentic words of the Master. Professor T. H. Andrews, after stating very emphatically that Christ made a mistake as to the period of His Second Advent, goes on to invoke His authority for a future Second Advent as a *cardinal article of faith*. And Dr. R. H. Charles, Archdeacon of Westminster, in discussing Christ's teaching about divorce, admits that the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark differ materially on the question, and finds many reasons for believing that, while St. Matthew's account is historical and trustworthy, St. Mark's is unhistorical on important points, false in statements of fact, and contains interpolations by some unknown transmitter.

It will not do. That our conduct and our salvation depend upon the opinion of men, however eminent in scholarship, as to the authenticity of certain passages in a book is not to be thought of. Once admit any inaccuracy in the record, the whole theory of divine authority tumbles to the ground, and we are thrown back upon our right reason. If there is picking and choosing to be done, let us do it for ourselves. Respectfully regarding what the scholars have to say as to their own domain, we are as likely—if with good will and good sense—to come to as sound a conclusion as men with ecclesiastical and academic minds. If this

be not so, it clearly follows that one must be a very learned and very subtle scholar before one can know if any word in the record be infallible or not. In fact, as already said, the doctrines of infallibility and revelation, partial or complete, like many other doctrines, create more difficulties than they solve.

But for unconscious bias, the far-reaching implications of modern thought would be more readily acknowledged; and this bias, which, like so much else, grows by what it feeds on, is often increased by the glossing over of anything that might reflect upon our prejudices or preconceptions. Euphemistic glosses are abundant. "The conclusions of the fathers," said one apologist, "are not exactly ours." Not exactly, indeed! And others have often contended that what we want is the old gospel somewhat differently stated. But the breach with the past is very wide, and cannot be closed by referring to serious divergences as though they were but slight.

Another way of evading the consequences of the revolution in religious thought is the habit indulged in by many Modernists who, to prove some point or other, bring together with industrious elaboration certain passages of Scripture, and quote them with such an air of authority as to give their hearers the impression that in this way the matter is absolutely and finally settled. And this although they themselves do not believe in verbal inspiration. Such conduct does not seem to show much respect for one's self or one's audience, and tends to perpetuate an idea that has done infinite harm in the past, and that hinders the wholesome development of truth in the future. It also prevents the coming of a Universal Religion; for the adherents of the other great religions will not give up their sacred books for ours, although

they might be induced to accept the best from ours were we willing to reciprocate.

But of all the strange phenomena in modern Christendom perhaps the strangest is that a large body of clergymen, week by week and year by year, stand up and declare in the presence of God and the people that they believe what they do not believe. And still "it is of no consequence," for the creeds may be taken symbolically. But the purpose of the creeds is plain enough. They were made definite and categorical in order that only those who really believed them should minister in holy things; those who, for example, could say with Bishop Gore, "He truly was born of the Virgin, and truly died, and truly after His resurrection appeared to His disciples and ascended to heaven." The creeds are not symbolic; their object was to express distinct and definite ideas and to ensure that all the clergy cherished those ideas, and no amount of casuistry of this kind can palliate or excuse anyone affirming that he believes what in his heart he denies. "What merit can there be," wrote Voltaire in his *Dictionary of Philosophy*, "in telling God that one is persuaded of things of which, in fact, one cannot be persuaded?"

No wonder that Dr. R. J. Campbell has said (at the City Temple in 1906) that "there seems to be something in the average religious character tending to disingenuousness; a high standard of religious profession seems to be compatible with a comparatively low standard of loyalty to truth"; and that Dean Inge has said (at a Conference of Modern Churchmen at Oxford in 1924) that "intellectual honesty is to a large extent drained out of the Church." The Dean, however, is himself not altogether consistent in this matter; for he wrote (in the *Church Family Newspaper* of

May 4, 1923) "there is a tacit agreement that certain clauses in the Apostles' Creed may be understood symbolically." But if tacit agreements of this sort are legitimate, why stop at *certain clauses* of the Apostles' Creed?

In spite, however, of any criticisms that may be made, Christianity is—as most of us, at least, believe—the greatest of the religions of the world, producing on the whole the finest individual characters and the best results. And every man who, by frankness and courage, helps to free it from its impediments, of which the irrational view of the Bible is one of the greatest, will encourage others to follow his example, and so help to prepare the way for a Universal Religion, which must necessarily be an amalgam of religions, but in which Jesus would have His rightful place.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In *Progress and the Past* (pp. 39 ff.) I have suggested that religions tend to become amalgams, and this tendency would naturally be accentuated in a Universal Religion.

## CHAPTER X

### THE COMMON ETHIC. VAUVENARGUES

IT is a relief to turn from these controversial matters to consider the Common Ethic—that attitude of kindness and honour, justice and beneficence, that can be traced, in greater or lesser degree, down the ages.

Ethics are not dealt with here as apart from religion ; and the practice of separating them cannot be too strongly deprecated. They are not like two bricks side by side on a wall, but like two gases chemically mingled. It is urgent and vital that they should be one and indivisible ; and any form of religion that fails in this stands self-condemned. We cannot deal with ethics apart from good sense ; for more harm is often done by want of knowledge and thought than want of heart. A well-intentioned but uninformed ethical feeling, showing itself, perhaps, in misguided charity or affection, is of little use, or even worse than useless. What is always wanted is ethical feeling inspired by religion and illumined by good sense. "No virtuous character," says Aristotle, "is foolish or silly."<sup>1</sup>

Some of the most ancient inscriptions on stone, brick, or papyrus show that with the earliest recorded civilizations there was developed a sense of honour, an obligation of justice and a feeling of pity and compassion for the poor ; and in all the great religions and philosophies we find the Common Ethic. The Rig-Veda, the earliest of all religious books, emphasizes the

<sup>1</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*. This aphorism, however, is somewhat too sweeping.

virtues of duty, love, forgiveness, charity, humility, and universal brotherhood ; neither a blow for a blow, nor a curse for a curse, but rather blessings. Craftiness, meanness, and love of wealth are to be shunned. The key to Buddhist Religion and Philosophy is love to all sentient beings ; and it teaches that anger should be overcome by kindness, as hatred does not cease by hatred, but by love ; that defilement does not come by eating this or that, prepared or given by this or that person, but from folly in deed or word or thought ; and that it is no use praying unless you have truth in your heart.

Socrates, the first great ethical teacher in Europe, held that we should do evil to no one, not even by way of requital ; and that it is better to suffer injustice than to be unjust. From this time onward Greek philosophers laid great stress upon conduct ; both Plato and Aristotle enforcing the vital truth that good government could not come unless men themselves were good. An interesting example of the quality of mercy is to be found in the practice that obtained in trials at Athens when the votes of the judges for and against the accused were equal. In such cases, the voting being by white and black stones, a special white (Minerva's) stone was added ; and an acquittal declared. This is in line with an aphorism of Pittacus, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece—"pardon was often a more effectual check on crime than punishment"—and is also a practical anticipation of our British custom of giving the accused the benefit of the doubt.

Confucius, as we have seen, taught that we should not do to others what we should not like them to do to us—the Golden Rule in its negative form—and also admitted its obvious positive implication. The negative

form was also taught by Isocrates and the Stoics, and by some of the Rabbis; in the apocryphal book of Tobit; and in a quaint saying of the Hindus, "Do not force on your neighbour a hat which hurts your own head." The Hindus also have it in the positive form, and in this form it was taught by Gautama Buddha, Mohammed, and Aristotle; and by Plato, whose version of it, "May I, being of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should do to me," approximates very closely to the words of Jesus.

We need not stay to give examples of the allied idea of universal brotherhood, or to go into the question of the origin of such ideas. It is certainly futile to try and discover an original man who first invented and enunciated either these, or any other, of the great ethical doctrines. As we may perceive one ceaseless law of motion in all things, an eternal energy suffused and permeated with an eternal mind, the very molecules seeming inspired "with the desire for Union and growth," so we may well believe that this eternal mind, this universal consciousness, is working in ethical directions also, and producing results, like all else in nature, infinitely varied, but with a fundamental unity.

This view is supported by what we know of post-primitive races, who, with a good deal that is distasteful and abhorrent, have a more or less developed ethical sense and many fine feelings and customs. All have their moral standards, differing much, but agreeing more, and not dissimilar in many things from Christian ethics. Here are a few examples:

When in the early days of North American colonization one of the Dutch missionaries began to expound the Ten Commandments to the Hudson River tribes, he was sent back in scorn. "Thou fool," said a Mohican chief, "dost thou think my mother did not

teach me these things while I was still at her breast ? Begone ! ”<sup>1</sup>

And William Dampier, the first British explorer of Australia, who visited New Holland in 1688, attests that the natives were unselfish—unselfishness being the main feature of their religion—and that even the lowest of the Australian savages were taught, in connection with their tribal religious mysteries, to avoid adultery and quarrelsomeness, to speak the truth, and to respect old age.

In West Africa there are many and, on the whole, successful efforts towards law, order, justice, and morality—efforts often associated with mysticism and secret societies. Some of the tribesmen are, indeed, so fond of secretiveness that when one of them wanted to get anything done he thought good for the community, he would form a small secret society (perhaps of only two or three) to get it carried out. In East Africa we are told that many sing at their work, and that (in Kikuyu) the love of children and ancestors is inculcated ; and I have read that amongst South Sea Islanders quarrelling among children is practically unknown. Surely wholesome signs these !

But turning from the lower to the higher culture we find the Common Ethic in those who, acknowledging neither religious, mystical, nor traditional authority of any kind, claim the right to test all things by their own sense of what is reasonable and good. Rejecting Plato's mysticism, they may be said to have adopted his trinity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. How far they acted up to their ideals, or whether their conduct would, on the whole, compare with that of others, it is impossible to say. That a very high moral standard could be reached is evidenced by the life of one of

<sup>1</sup> *The Red Man in the United States* (G. E. E. Lindquist).



them, Sire de Clapiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues, who may well be called the Saint of Deism.

Born in 1715 in Aix, near Marseilles, of the *petite noblesse*, neither wealthy, nor strong, nor very learned, he had the inestimable advantage—in itself an education—of a good father. Choosing the army for a career, he at first led the careless and dissolute life common to officers of the period. But not for long; for he soon became known as a brave soldier of simple life and studious habits, and devoted to his profession. He endured many horrible sufferings in the wars: mid-winter marches, defeat, and famine, and the sights—especially distressing to such a man—of the dead and dying; and returned to France with his health utterly ruined, his legs frost-bitten, and his lungs seriously affected. In spite of these things, he rejoined his regiment in Germany; but was obliged very soon to return again, an invalid for life. Having tried in vain to obtain diplomatic employment, he retired to his native town, where he was attacked by small-pox which left him much disfigured and almost blind. Years before he had been advised to adopt literature as a profession, but had preferred to remain a soldier. Now, encouraged thereto by Voltaire, he went to Paris, and in a very humble lodging began the literary life. Disappointed, disfigured, a failure; cast off by his own class, who looked with disfavour upon the vocation of literature; often in pain of body and mind, a prey to consumption and alone in a great city; he “looked out on the world which had given him nothing, with serene and patient eyes”; and not only did he face his terrible trials with courage and equanimity, but he gave to the world a book full of wisdom and comfort, a stimulus and a source of strength to all who wished to live a life of virtue.

His philosophy was eminently practical. He cared little for ultimate questions; and discussion and speculation about another world did not interest him at all. There was too much to do in this! Like Gautama, he was deeply impressed by the phenomena of moral and physical evil; and he tried to help all he could. Here are a few of his maxims:

The earliest days of spring have less charm than the budding virtues of a young man.

Great thoughts come from the heart.

He who has great feeling knows much.

Would you say great things? Then first accustom yourself never to say false ones.

Who can bear all can dare all.

Envy is confessed inferiority.

Few sorrows are without remedy: despair is more deceptive than hope.

If you possess any passion which you feel to be noble and generous, be sure you foster it.

Vauvenargues did not believe in that cynicism which turns men from virtue by persuading them that it is never genuine. He believed in goodness, and that the best way to reform the world was to begin with one's self; and it was his ardent wish to help the poor and the unfortunate to live happily, easily, and profitably, and to raise men to a higher level of life and happiness.

When in the army he was once accosted by a prostitute, and being told, on gently questioning her, of the wretched poverty that had driven her to vice, he tried to revive in her some feelings of modesty, and left her with a small gift of money. It was unheard of in those days and in that circle to pity such; and, when his story was laughed at by his brother officers, he replied: "I am sorry for these poor creatures,

obliged to ply such a profession to earn their bread. The world is full of sorrows which wring my heart ; if we are to be kind only to those who deserve it, we may never be called upon at all."

This life of practical philanthropy was continued in Paris where, although poor himself, he would stop those who seemed the poorest and the most wretched and offer them his help. He died on May 28, 1747, cheerfully, patiently, and courageously.

His writings are good, but with the wealth of literature available to-day are little regarded. But his life, a shining example of the power of the Common Ethic, should never be forgotten.

To point out the age, the reality, the power, and the widespread nature of the Common Ethic is not to depreciate the Christian Ethic, which is the Common Ethic *plus* the dynamic of Jesus. The chief difficulty is not so much to teach an ethical code as to stimulate ethical feeling that it may be strong enough to influence the whole life, individual and corporate. And that this difficulty is best overcome by the dynamic of Jesus is shown by the fact that, in the matter of beneficent activity, the finest fruit of ethical conduct, Christianity is pre-eminent throughout the world

## CHAPTER XI

### SOME ASPECTS OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

BUT it may be asked, "If the Common Ethic has always been with us both in the higher and lower cultures, how is it that progress has been so slow and irregular?"

The answer to the question is, as already suggested, not single but multiple. Some of the obstacles to progress have been already referred to, and some will be mentioned later. In this chapter a few examples will be given of what has been one of the greatest of these obstacles, the want in so many of our intellectual mentors of the capacity "to see life steadily and see it whole." We suffer from too much obsession and too much specialization. Obsessions are as blinkers on the understanding. He who is immersed in one subject, which with great thoroughness and industry he endeavours to master, may come to attach such importance to every detail, however minute, that his mind gets clogged with so much erudition: he cannot see the wood for the trees. And as the study of almost every subject helps, directly or indirectly, to a clearer view of other subjects, a man of wider culture, although with far less data at his disposal, may come to sounder conclusions.

Too much specialism is also apt to imply the want of a due sense of proportion, and therefore of humour; and a specialist may be so enamoured with his subject that he cannot leave it alone, even when he has found out all about it that it is possible for him to find, that

can at the time be clearly and certainly known. An author, for example, in a book purporting to be scientific, gave as his reason for enunciating a certain theory, not because there were sufficient grounds for it, but because one must have a hypothesis of some sort. But why *must have*? When one comes to this point, would it not be better to take a holiday—or to study something else?

Of course it is by "trial and error" that knowledge grows; and the above criticism is only (or, at least, mainly) directed against the framing of hypotheses too soon, before even a *primâ facie* case has been made out. Having too lightly invented one, and having nailed our colours to the mast by making it known, our egotism may prompt us to a strong partiality in its favour; for is it not our own invention? <sup>1</sup>

A word more may also be said as to the long and elaborate treatises that specialists deem it necessary to write. Some of these are invaluable—monuments of great learning and clear thought. But too many are without such blessed compensations; for prolixity is not always profundity.

So, since Goethe wrote that books "do little more than give our errors names," the number of such books has considerably increased; and even very learned men have helped to swell the total. When capacity, scholarship, and patience have not been wanting, ordinary common sense has sometimes been far to seek; and, added to this, the fondness of a pet theory—especially if it be one's own—has led to so strong an obsession in its favour that it has often obliterated in the mind of the writer the difference between a

<sup>1</sup> See *Magic of Common Sense*, p. 74 f., and also p. 161 of this book.

hypothesis and an established principle. So we get unfounded generalizations, exaggerated statements, and rigid dogmatism ; and much valuable time and thought spent in false theorizing has thus been lost to progress. In recent years the pundits have been exceptionally busy defining, dividing, segregating, labelling, and also, alas ! compiling fresh vocabularies, until the harassed maker of dictionaries toils after them in vain.

Perhaps the most flagrant offenders in this matter are Professor Sigmund Freud and some of his disciples, who—in a mania for systemization—apply methods and lay down inflexible rules and formulas only possible to the exact sciences, to so elusive, volatile, and incalculable a thing as the mind. Sweeping generalizations are as plentiful as blackberries. Dreams are *always* the imagined fulfilment of ungratified wishes, and should *always* be interpreted in symbols of sex. All the dreams of one night, when considered with respect to their content, are simply parts of one unit ; *every* dream is absolutely egotistical and fulfils a conscious or unconscious wish ; and it is “ an undoubted fact that there are dreams for *every* individual *every* night.” It may be admitted that there are exceptions, but a thoroughgoing Freudian, like his master, is generally prepared to explain them away ; and interpretations are suggested as the only possible ones when others would do equally well. Of such is the practice of questioning a dreamer as to his past life until something is called to mind that may seem to explain the meaning of the dream. The circumstances of life are so numerous, and the possible explanations so many, that it could not be very difficult to find some event that could be made, by specious reasoning, to look like a clue to any sort of dream ; and, although some of the explanations given are reasonable enough, in the

majority of cases they are pure suppositions. Freud's analysis of dreams—his development of the *latent* from the *manifest* content—is not a method at all, but an arbitrary selection of coincidences, partial resemblances, and even differences, mingled with flimsy argumentations. And when it is found impossible to reconcile facts with theory, he adds words to our glossary, such as Distortion and Displacement, to account for the discrepancies. It is not denied that distortion and displacement have a good deal of influence in the dream-world; but to spell them with capital letters and to use them as part of a technique framed so as to favour an obsession is not likely to forward the cause of truth. For by such devices—and the assumption of symbolism when nothing else will serve the purpose—almost anything can be “proved!”

Then the conscious and unconscious mind are sometimes treated by psycho-analysts as though they were distinct entities; and we have diagrams with complexes hanging round the “unconscious” like so many bunches of carrots. We might almost be dealing with two separate slabs in the brick libraries of Babylon, instead of with the plastic, ever-changing mind. It seems to the writer that the difference between conscious and unconscious is somewhat similar to the difference between the centre and margin of consciousness; and that the perpetual movements of the mind are akin to the compression and expansion of waves of sound from many quarters that cross and re-cross one another at many points—plastic, volatile, ever-changing and elusive. But your psycho-analyst will have none of this. Dr. W. H. Maxwell Telling, in an address a few years ago to the Leeds Luncheon Club, declared that “we can explore a mind with a precision and accuracy such as is comparable to that with which

the distinguished surgeon, who was to have presided to-day, would open an abdomen." And Dr. Wilfred Lay, who, in *Man's Unconscious Conflict*, writes of Professor Freud as "the first aeronaut in the empyrean of the human mind," also claims that psycho-analysis is a "new instrument of precision." Let us see, then, how this great Professor uses this "instrument of precision."

In his *Interpretation of Dreams* he relates some of his own. In one of them he is in Rome and he sees "a little river with black water, on one side of which are black rocks, on the other, large white flowers. I notice a certain Mr. Zucker (with whom I am superficially acquainted), and make up my mind to ask him to show me the way into the city. In the swamps around Ravenna we had seen the most beautiful water-lilies in the middle of black pools of water; the dream makes them now on meadows, like the narcissi of our own Aussee, because at Ravenna it was such tedious work to fetch them out of the water. The black rock, so close to the water, vividly recalls the valley of the Zepf at Karlsbad."

The meadows "of our own Aussee" would naturally come to the mind of the dreamer, and to see water-lilies on them is one of those incongruities to which dreams are always liable, and the reason adduced is quite gratuitous. As to a certain Mr. Zucker, we are told that *Zucker* (sugar) points to Karlsbad because people go there to be cured of diabetes—*Zuckerkrankheit* (sugar-disease). A trivial playing upon words in an unconscious endeavour to find significance where there is none.

We are also told that dreams of missing a train are "consolation dreams directed against another feeling of fear perceived in the dream, the fear of dying"; and that "to depart is one of the most frequent and



one of the most easily reached symbols of death. The dream thus says, consolingly : 'Compose yourself, you are not going to die (to depart).' " Could any interpretation be more strained and far-fetched than this ?

Then " dreams which are conspicuously innocent invariably embody coarse erotic wishes." Evidently conspicuous innocence is taboo ! And our Professor goes into details as to the latent content of some dreams which one would have thought would be unprintable, but that they have been printed. And he goes out of his way to find sexual significance ; anything that, by hook or by crook, can be made to suggest it is eagerly pressed into the service. A young woman dreams that she sees a burglar in her bedroom, and another dreams of falling. Such dreams must be common enough to young and old, male and female. But we are told that a woman's *burglar* dream is mostly based on a crass sexual desire of her unconscious ; and that a woman's dream of falling has almost always a sexual meaning, and suggests a " fallen woman."

Dreams of " saving " are connected with parturition. To save, especially to save from the water, signifies childbirth when dreamed by a woman ; but the sense is modified when the dreamer is a man. But not only are " saving " dreams connected with parturition. The theory of *Displacement* comes in very handily here. In dreams, the displacement of the values of life (the important becoming trivial, and the trivial important) turns things upside down ; or rather, it turns things upside down when, to fit our sexual theory, we want them turned that way ; and thus, if a woman dreams of throwing herself *into* the water it really means coming *out* of the water : that is, being born !

Our last dream is of a young lady who dreams that a heavy-laden market-basket is thrown at her. *Korb*

(basket) means also snub, refusal. A market-basket, therefore, probably refers to snubs which the lady dreamer has given or taken. But it is conceded that the market-basket may admit of more than one interpretation, and may refer to the fact that the lady who fell was not helped to rise; or it might have some relation to the fact that she married beneath her station, and therefore has sometimes to carry a market-basket; or it might suggest memories of a cook who was sent away because she stole; or it might be this, or that, or the other! Here at last we are getting on the right track; and it would have saved our Professor and his disciples from wasting so much time, ingenuity, and talent, if they could have seen how futile it is to try to base a scientific method on a series of mere conjectures.<sup>1</sup>

A sidelight is thrown on these "interpretations" by Dr. Wilfred Lay when explaining in *Man's Unconscious Conflict* the method of psycho-analysis. The "analysand" (the patient), in an easy-chair or on a couch, is instructed to utter whatever comes into his head, however trivial, and, adds Dr. Lay, "it has been found over and over again that nothing really irrelevant comes to mind." Farther on he says that there are "no absurd or trivial dreams." Statements like these only serve to reveal the mentality of the psycho-analyst, who is bent on finding significance and importance in dreams and confessions, however absurd, trivial, or irrelevant they may be.

If we turn to the auto-suggestion school we have the same unreasonableness, the same dogmatic and sweeping generalizations, elevating a principle which is very limited in its application to an almost universa

<sup>1</sup> The Professor lays himself open to the same kind of criticism in his strained and tortuous analysis of the infantile mind.

law; and the same want of perception that there is a vital difference between psychology and, say, mathematics.

Whatever we think [says M. Coué] becomes true for us. . . . The Unconscious is the storehouse of memory, where every impression we receive from earliest infancy to the last hour of life is recorded with the minutest accuracy. . . . When the will and the imagination are in conflict, the imagination invariably wins the day. . . . In conflict between will and imagination the imagination varies in direct ratio to the square of the will.

The thesis that the imagination always wins is called by M. Coué's translator, Mr. C. H. Brooks, "a new and startling discovery." New and startling it certainly is!<sup>1</sup> As is also the statement that "success is not gained by effort but by the right use of the imagination." Success is, of course, gained by both in varying combinations.

There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in auto-suggestion, as in psycho-analysis. But as truth is to so great an extent a matter of emphasis and degree, of pros and cons, such unqualified statements are more likely to retard than to advance it. I do not forget that there are numerous cases where success has resulted from practical work on these lines. But this does not prove their intrinsic value; for the cures do not depend so much upon the *accuracy* of the conclusions arrived at, as upon the patient's *belief in their accuracy*. A man, for instance, who is ill through the fear that another war is imminent and that he will be conscripted, may be cured if he can be persuaded that there will not be war—whether the prognostication be true or false. Similarly, people have been cured by medicines that had no intrinsic value whatever—

<sup>1</sup> But later, in a lecture in December 1924, "invariably" becomes "in nine cases out of ten," an almost equally untenable proposition.

their only value was in the faith of the patient. Results, therefore, are not always proofs of the truth of a method; and, if not true, its success can only be partial and temporary.

Perhaps the strangest thing about the auto-suggestionists is that they do not see that, while claiming to put the imagination above the will, they are actually putting the will above the imagination. For they call upon the will to exert its authority over the imagination—to compel the imagination to take an optimistic view. And if by any laxity the imagination is drifting from its optimistic position, the will expostulates with it, "Come now, you are losing grip of the right attitude to adopt. You must keep on imagining you are better and better every day." So although the sprightly, imaginative steed may trot gaily along the road, the watchful and persistent will is in the saddle, and has, all the while, to keep hold of the reins.

While writing this chapter I had occasion to glance at the *The Hidden Self*, by Mr. H. E. Hunt, written in 1921. Mr. Hunt shows much more discrimination and reserve than many previous writers. Thus we read :

By a little manipulation of inference, analogy, and symbolism, everything can be traced more or less directly to a sexual course. . . . It is well, therefore, to avoid extremes, and to accept theories so far as they have been shown to justify themselves by fitting in with all the facts, while discounting extravagant and wholesale claims,

and the positive assertion that everyone dreams every night becomes with him only a probability. But he, too, indulges in the practice, so common to psychoanalysts, of gratuitous interpretation of dreams, as the following passage will show :

We also know of a case where a lady woke herself up at night by her violent efforts to free herself from a cat which

had fastened on to her arm. This lady was at that time labouring under an attack of keen resentment from which she was trying hard to shake herself free. The jealous feelings were in this case pretty obviously symbolized by the attacking cat.

This may be a possible interpretation, but surely not obvious. A lady's keen resentment is hardly likely to be associated in her own mind—conscious or unconscious—with cats; and, as cats are so common, to dream of one at such a time is not very remarkable, and might well have been but a coincidence.

On memory Mr. Hunt's comments are as sweeping as the rest. "We have vast evidence," he says, "for memory, and none whatever for forgetting . . . of any wiping out or process of erasure psychology knows nothing. We may, therefore, accept definite record of every experience as a fact. . . . We cannot forget, we can only repress or mislay."

This is quite unconvincing. During an average life the number of sense impressions we receive is enormous and incalculable. Of these we remember only a few—some of them all the time, some most of the time, and some others but seldom. Men have told us that, while apparently drowning, all their past lives have come suddenly into consciousness; and this has been claimed as evidence of the perfect completeness of memory. Surely it is taking the statement far too literally to make it mean that every incident of every day passed before them; and, unless it does mean this, it is no proof of the contention. It only shows that many things are recorded that are seldom remembered, and that great mental excitement may bring some of these into consciousness. Completeness of memory can therefore only be upheld by making a rule from the exceptions.

The memory may perhaps be compared to a soft

and malleable substance that will record those experiences which have made some definite impression on the mind; and probably the strength of the impression would be in proportion to the strength or vividness of the experience. And whatever be the physical basis of memory it cannot be of the same efficiency in all cases; but sometimes, like a defective photographic plate, may fail to make a complete impression. The perfect memory, therefore, must for the present be considered "not proven," and also very improbable, as it is not in line with our experience of life that any faculty should work with absolute perfection.

This *imperfect functioning* may explain certain phenomena that are often attributed to other causes. But such an explanation is much too simple for many of our scholastics, who prefer the recondite and the subtle, and seem to think that truth is nearly always at the bottom of a well. They appear, indeed, to be so afraid of being superficial that plain straightforward explanations are taboo. Sometimes, however, while they are peering down the well to find it, the truth may be near the surface and so they fail to notice it. It has been contended, for example, that all forgetfulness is due to "repression." We have driven the fact down to the depths of our Unconscious, because we do not want to remember it. This may apply to some cases, but there are many to which it cannot apply. Do not students who are being examined want to remember what they have been taught? And yet, how much they forget! And do we not all at times desire most earnestly to recall many things that nevertheless elude our memories?

Repression is also adduced as the<sup>1</sup> reason for a host of blunders and slips of the tongue that are common

to us all. We say the wrong word because we wish it, and therefore repress the right one. But in numberless cases some of us are caught saying the opposite to what we mean—"hot" for "cold," "wet" for "dry," etc.—when no such wish can by any possibility be presumed. Such cases, and much else, can surely be as reasonably put down to imperfect functioning as to anything else.

Many of the basic ideas of the new psychology, however, cannot be controverted; and it is interesting to note that some of these are not altogether new. The theory that dreams may reveal our latent tendencies is as old as Plato and Zeno; and Aristotle taught that animal and human psychology had much in common. Auto-suggestion may be said to be at least as old as Virgil, who wrote: "They can because they think they can"; and Leibniz held that all knowledge is simply the awakening of slumbering ideas, an adumbration, at least, of the germinal idea of which Professor Freud's "Unconscious" is a very original development and extension. It must also be acknowledged that there is a good deal of truth in the very interesting hypothesis of the Censor, the inward monitor, the subconscious Mrs. Grundy, who sternly suppresses our illegitimate desires—a sort of negative conscience. But psycho-analysts are too fond of using such words as "always" and "never," when "sometimes" or "hardly ever" would be nearer the truth; and they seem, for the most part, to lack that due sense of proportion and of humour which keeps us from gross exaggeration and the overstraining of arguments. One would think, for instance, that no one with a sense of humour could read Professor Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* without seeing how grotesque are most of his interpretations, and how

absurdly anxious he is to bring everything within the orbit of sex.

But it may be asked: How is it that, if your criticisms are well founded, the new psychology has been, and is being, taught by so many learned professors and able authors? The answer is not so very difficult to those who have some acquaintance with the history of thought. For that has been an almost continuous record of what we moderns—for want of a better word—call “stunts.” The pendulum swings violently in one direction—it is the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the age; and then it swings as violently the other way, and, learned and simple, we are all affected by it. In art, “Fashion in pictures,” says the *Annual Register* of 1919, “changes rapidly, and it will be curious to see how these manifestations of a phase of current painting will be regarded by the public in a few years’ time.” In medicine, “Remedies and modes of treatment,” says the *British Medical Journal*,<sup>1</sup> “like fashions in dress, have their little day and cease to be.” In philosophy, “Whatever school or tendency may from time to time be in fashion,” says Dr. F. H. Bradley in *Truth and Reality*. A very apt illustration of this last statement is the fact that, about one hundred years ago, it was held that in the rational faculty was found the principal, if not the sole, motive for our actions; and to-day we are told that our actions are mainly motived by our emotions and desires, and that reason has very little to do with them. The swing of the pendulum is very evident here; for in both contentions, while there is some truth, there is also a good deal of exaggeration.

We can, of course, only learn by framing hypotheses which seem to us in line with the facts, and then—

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in *Truth* of April 5, 1922.



having patiently examined all further evidence that we can collect—accepting some of them and rejecting others. But the spirit in which we examine the evidence is all important. Sir Isaac Newton exercised great caution in framing hypotheses, defining them as “working ideas”; and Charles Darwin was so sensible of the danger of too readily accepting everything that agreed with his hypotheses and too readily rejecting the evidence against them, that he accustomed himself to pay more attention to the facts that seemed to contradict than to those that seemed to favour his theories.

The fallacy to which I have already briefly referred—that the things of the mind can be dealt with on the same lines as the exact sciences—seems to be increasingly taken for granted, and is responsible for a great deal of error and misdirection. It has been contended, as we saw, that the mind can be explored with *as much* precision and accuracy as a surgeon can open an abdomen; and Dr. Charles Singer, in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, has lately affirmed that there are laws of heredity *as much* as there are laws of chemical combination. Such analogies entirely ignore the uniqueness of human personality, its complexity and its unaccountableness. Greed and generosity, egoism and altruism, whim and purpose, weakness and strength, jostle each other in the same mind; and the result of their action and interaction cannot with any certainty be foretold. “Nothing necessarily follows,” says the Countess Russell, “when you get to human beings.” And, says Sir Francis Younghusband, “the response to the world about him is different in every man.” These things should be remembered, and the study of psychology pursued, not in the spirit of a specialist with a mania for sweeping generalizations

and fixed formulas, but with a wider outlook, testing all theories by the canons of common sense, which, according to Huxley, are one and the same with the canons of science.

There is another side to this question that must at least be touched upon—the moral side. Professor Freud has said somewhere that things are what they are and will be what they will be; and that what we want is, not moral sentiments, but facts. Of course, we want both. With all his laborious endeavours to give us the facts, the Professor has so coloured and besmirched them that they are at times almost unrecognizable; although his moral sentiments may be far to seek, there are not wanting tendencies towards sentiments of quite another kind. As man is capable of rising to great moral heights, and of sinking to the lowest depths, it is obviously our duty to foster in ourselves and others those tendencies that help us to choose the higher in the presence of the lower. But we cannot reach a high moral standard unless we learn not to think meanly of ourselves, and not to think meanly of others.<sup>1</sup> If we are taught to believe that we are base and corrupt, and encouraged to indulge in morbid introspection with the idea that in this way we shall find certain proof of it, our moral standard will be sensibly lowered; and, as it seems to the writer, reasonable and wholesome-minded persons, after perusing *The Interpretation of Dreams* and many other books that have followed on similar lines, would come to the conclusion that much of what is there enunciated is not calculated to promote either good sense or good morals.

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from John Locke's definition of a gentleman.

## CHAPTER XII

### INDIVIDUALISM AND SOME OF ITS FRUITS

IN entering upon the consideration of this subject, one encounters some initial difficulties that stand in the way of a clear and sane comprehension of the points at issue. (1) The difficulty of getting people to understand how absolutely inadequate, how futile, is the drawing of the hard-and-fast lines of dogma in all matters—such as political economy, sociology, and (as already noted) psychology—in which human will and purpose are the prime factors. (2) The difficulty of convincing the ordinary man that the general conditions under which he lives are not necessarily essential to the carrying on of the world's business; that other times have seen, not only other manners, but differences so great in the characters and purposes of men that they might almost be called fundamental. And (3) the difficulty of convincing those who have prospered under a certain system of its deficiencies, however glaring they may be.

(1) The professors of political economy expound to us its laws. But political economy, as it has to do with complex and unpredictable human beings, cannot be an exact science. It is saturated through and through with human passion, energy, and volition. It works all the time through human agency; and although many of the things with which it has to do are subject to certain general tendencies, there are many other things that are as much psychological as politico-economical. So an economic law can only

be one amongst other factors which modify, or even contradict it. We have been told, for example, that supply and demand regulate prices. But we must accept this law with a grain of salt ; for its course is often deflected. The patriotic appeal to " buy British goods " creates an artificial demand and an artificial price ; and the ingenuities of profiteers easily evade the normal working of the " law." Two of the most common devices are the destruction, or the holding back of commodities. A few years ago (in 1922) in order to keep up prices a Combine in South Africa bought the whole of a farmer's wine crop and poured it all down a gully ; and food is sometimes destroyed for the same reason. In 1924, a year of bad European harvests, there was a corner in wheat in the United States, the owners holding it back, and in 1926 a million carcasses were kept in cold storage ; the calculation being in both cases that they would get bigger prices. Another device to give a fictitious value to a commodity is the newspaper article. A Food Council report has stated that a broker who had tea to sell wrote alarmist articles in a trade journal " obviously designed to stimulate still further buying by retail traders at a price when wholesale tea prices had shown a continuous and serious increase." These are only a few of the many examples that could be given. There are, indeed, so many complicated circumstances, so many wheels within wheels, in modern business that economic laws by themselves are of doubtful value. And the circumstances are concrete facts that often can only be judged on their particular merits, while the laws are only abstractions.

(2) It has been pointed out in a previous chapter that, owing to the Industrial Revolution, there have been changes in the world during the last four genera-

tions more remarkable than in thousands of previous years; and it is noteworthy that, during this period, a system of political philosophy sprang up in France, under the name of *Laissez Faire*, which soon took root in England, and developed into the doctrine of Individualism. It was held to be for the best interests of the State that man should struggle for his own personal advantage; that the function of Government was merely to see that in this struggle he did not tread on other people's toes; and that this would result in a beautiful equilibrium, that "each for himself" was ultimately for the good of all. It was the apotheosis of selfishness; and some of its consequences in the industrial field have already been touched upon. Here it need only be noted that the doctrine had a great vogue, and for a time dominated the political world; and that it is still strongly held by large bodies of citizens who take for granted that to strive and struggle for one's own selfish interest is a permanent part of our nature—always was, and always will be. But such ideas have not been by any means universal; nations having carried on for centuries on quite other principles. Through the ages, it is true, egotism has always been a strong force in the world. But so has altruism, although it has not been so much noticed, as it does not make so much noise. And egotism has been modified in greater or less degree by the group spirit manifesting itself in custom and tradition. There is ample evidence that multitudes of men do not think mainly in terms of self-interest, and that the love of money and possessions has gripped them hardly at all. This can be said even of to-day, although we are so accustomed to think in terms of individualism that it is not easy to believe that any other orientation of our minds is possible.

(3) But the greatest difficulty of all is to believe that any other system may be preferable to that under whose auspices one has grown fat and flourishing. Riches tend to warp the vision. "Truth," say the Upanishads, "is hidden from us by the love of wealth." The very rich (and, indeed, the very poor) are out of focus with humanity at large, and can scarcely ever attain to a clear and level view of life; and the bias in favour of the *status quo* is naturally very strong in those who have tasted the sweets of luxurious living, position, and power.

While contending that Individualism and *Laissez Faire* are responsible for much that is evil, one cannot deny that they have also been productive of much that is good. *Laissez Faire* was a protest against the fussy interference of French Officialdom which was often detrimental to the public welfare, as Officialdom on this side of the Channel has on occasion also been. And Individualism implies self-help, self-reliance, and a sturdy independence (qualities that some forms of Socialism would tend to undermine), and holds that the health of the State depends on the exertions of individuals for their personal benefit. This is, however, only a half-truth, for our exertions should not be solely for our personal benefit. And it was a dire calamity that these doctrines were so emphatically proclaimed when—more, perhaps, than at any other time—the other side of the case should have been emphasized, the duty of the State and of the citizens to have regard to the interests of others, to the general health and the general welfare. And, also arising out of Individualism, the absurd glorification of the self-made man who has risen from the ranks to power and affluence, so deservedly ridiculed by John Ruskin

and others, is very pernicious ; because it implies that he, being *self-made*, is entitled to all he *makes*, which is often very far from being the case. An employer, for example, paying his workmen at a certain rate, sells what was mainly the products of their labour at a price that leaves him with a net profit of, say, £100,000. Is this money justly his ? Has he really earned it ? And if by taking full advantage of the ignorance or the need of the purchasers he could have doubled that sum, would that also have been earned ? By the manipulation of men and things money may be legally drawn into one's coffers ; but it does not necessarily follow that all of it should belong to the manipulator. The money has fallen to him because he has the sanction and protection of society, and because the conditions of that society give ample scope for the exercise of that kind of cleverness (not the best kind) that leads to money-making. Not *self-made*, therefore, but *society-made*, or, perhaps more exactly, *self-and-society-made*. And if at any time men should get to believe that large accumulations of wealth are inimical to the general welfare, they are surely right in withdrawing their sanction from such manipulations.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, these accumulations have, in most cases, only become possible by the invention of coins and the system of banking—practices which society might have forbidden had it wished. To allow and encourage them may have been, on the whole, a wise decision ; but, in view of some of the results, one cannot but feel a certain amount of sympathy with the somewhat exaggerative philosopher

<sup>1</sup> In writing of man as *self-and-society-made*, I do not mean to imply that this is all that goes to the making of men. But I am only dealing here with his economic relation to society.

who said, "God made gold; the Devil turned it into money."<sup>1</sup>

After coins came banking; and then the modern banking system with its wonderful network of inter-communication, by which credits can be transferred, or even wired, from almost any part of the globe to any other. If the Devil helped in the making of coins, he must be still more active in these later operations; for it has now become possible to amass such colossal fortunes that the brain reels in the effort to imagine what they mean in terms of value, in the amount of material things, of goods that could be purchased, and of labour to produce them.

For all wealth comes by labour. Money does not "make money." Without labour, it makes nothing. And yet great wealth, got mainly through the labour of others, represents also an enormous claim on the further labour of others. Take, for example, the case of one whose annual income runs into millions. It is surely absurd to contend that, however got, these millions have been earned. But their possessor has thereby a claim on society equivalent to the labour of thousands of men. This is a matter of the most serious import, as it accounts for a great deal of the mistrust and bitter feeling at the bottom of most Labour disputes. Labour journals do not forget to draw attention to these things, and also to the extravagance, waste, and ostentatious luxury of the "upper classes."

"Why," the workman may ask, "should I work hard in order to increase the wealth of those who already have more than enough? And what right have they to insist on my obligation to work when

<sup>1</sup> Compare Hesiod in *Works and Days*. "The gods have hidden the ways of money from mankind; otherwise you might get enough in a day to keep you for a twelvemonth." But the gods could not keep the secret much longer!



they themselves belong to a class who can, and often do, live without working?" Very natural questions these, and they may be asked without censoriously condemning the rich, or failing to remember that all of us are, to a great extent, creatures of our environment, and that each class has its special failings. As long as the present conditions obtain; as long as it is thought a fine thing to be rich; as long as flaunting luxury is generally admired, and as far as possible, imitated; men will strive to get as near the top (what is called the top) of the social scale as they can.

These ideas may be held, not only without condemning anyone, but without any desire to injure anyone. (Class bitterness, leading to class war, is generally a boomerang.) We do, however, want so to alter the economic conditions of life that gross inequalities shall cease. And this would, in the end, be for the good of all. It is not good for man, woman, or child to have a superfluity of material things, to have far more than they can ever want; or, owing to their power to commandeer the labour of others, to be in a predominant position, due not to their mental or moral deserts, but simply to their great wealth. "Few positions," says a recent writer,<sup>1</sup> "are intellectually and morally more enervating than the position of the man who can satisfy every passing fancy; and, besides, increase of wealth does not bring a proportionate increase of satisfaction. Two motor-cars do not yield double the pleasure of one." And, it might be added, a further increase in their number might tend to be a nuisance. And so with other things. Only a little while ago a woman was going about from place to place with one hundred and fifty thousand pounds' worth of jewellery in a fruit basket. What pleasure

<sup>1</sup> H. G. Wood, M.A., in *Personal Economy and Social Reform*.

can it be to any normal person to continually have to resort to such a method of disguise because of anxiety as to his or her belongings? "Where your treasure is there will your heart be also." And the necessity of having to pay so much attention to such treasures must result in a poor dwarfed personality. If there were more wholesome conditions springing from more wholesome opinions, if such ostentation was considered to be a sign of vulgarity, it would be far better for the rich, and, indirectly, for the rest of us.

Happiness depends so much upon the point of view. One brought up to a life of ease and self-indulgence may find great pleasure in the thought of comfort and possessions beyond the reach of the average man. The county magnate may preen himself that he lives in a park that is so enwalled that he can shut its gates on whom he pleases. Others may not desire advantages above their fellows, and may rejoice, not that they have what others cannot have, but that others also can enjoy what they themselves enjoy. And this kind of happiness is the best kind and the most lasting. We should work not, indeed, for absolute equality, which is neither desirable nor practicable, but for equal opportunity, for the widest possible culture for all, and for the restraint of extremes at either end of the social scale. This is not to war against the rich. For if such conditions obtained, and we were surrounded on all sides with contentment and cultured happiness, it would be better for them, as well as for the rest of us.

Reference has been made above to the manipulation of money. It is a very serious blot upon the present system that men may (I will not say *earn*) get enough money for themselves to enable them to live luxuriously,

who have hardly ever done any useful service to the community, but have been occupied merely in the manipulation of stocks and shares. Through the manifold activities of such, companies formed for legitimate trading purposes become the happy hunting-ground of the gambler. So scandalous have some of these practices become that in the United States in 1925, two bear speculators (speculators for a fall) were said to have been enriched by more than four million pounds made almost overnight. This is only "said to have been," but it is significant that it was considered probable enough to be seriously recorded. How grotesque and how monstrous that it is possible that such stupendous claims upon the labour of others could be carved out in this way! And what a great temptation the bare possibility of such enormous gains must be!

Another very serious blot upon the present system is that it gives such wide scope to the profiteer. The question, "What is a fair price?" is in many cases a very puzzling one. But this fact should not be used to justify high prices, for it cuts both ways. It could even be urged that, as the conscientious business man must be aware that the promptings of personal interest might lead him to fix the price too high, he should give the benefit of the doubt to a somewhat lower figure; he should be as anxious not to charge too much as not to charge too little. In any case, if we had more good will, if we only desired mutual service and mutual advantage, and were not so keen to add more to more, the problem would be far less difficult; and we should not hear so much of the plea, so often advanced and acted upon, that "the value of a thing is what it will fetch." This phrase rules ethics out of the account. But where there are transactions between human

beings, ethical considerations should never be absent. If a thing is worth whatever it will fetch there can be no limit to the amount that the seller may demand. That he gets it is his sufficient justification. A "pioneer of civilization," for example, goes to a primitive race and gives the natives a few beads in exchange for pearls and diamonds. Why not, if a thing is worth just what it will fetch?

This is, admittedly, an extreme case. My only object in mentioning it is to point out that men with a high ethical standard would have acted differently, would not have taken such advantage of the ignorance of these primitives, but would have found some fairer way to recompense them. Surely there is room for ethical conduct in the fixing of prices! There are all sorts of cases under all sorts of conditions, and all sorts of factors to influence judgment; and no one rule can be a sufficient guide. But with good will—which implies the desire to be just—and good sense, the decision will, at least, be approximately fair. That there are many cases where the line cannot be exactly drawn is not peculiar to this question. Indeed, is not the well-proportioned life just the life in which, on the various questions that from time to time arise, the line has to be drawn as nearly as we can?

One of the weird developments of Individualism is the financier who gambles with millions. A terrible crash, and perhaps a suicide or two, brings such things now and then before the public, revealing something of what has been going on behind the scenes. One of the latest of these catastrophes is the failure and suicide of a great oil magnate and financier. Another financier (who gambled in opposition, and won) is reported to have said, "It is a case of the Monte Carlo

game. A man puts his last 10,000 francs on the red and loses. Then he goes into the garden. You know the rest. . . . I am sorry, but it is all in the game." So Individualism sees and hears and passes over on the other side—and forgets! What else? Is it not all in the game? And cannot a man do what he likes with his own?

Then there is one feature of this individualist system that does much to poison the social atmosphere—the existence of a large number of able-bodied folk who live without work, briefly described (and not altogether unjustly) as the *idle rich*. There are many thousands of British men and women scattered over the most delectable parts of Great Britain and the continent of Europe whose main idea is simply to live at ease. They swarm on the Riviera during the autumn and winter; and when the spring comes round and the heat begins to be oppressive, they go to Switzerland or other cooler climes until, like the swallows they return again to the South. That able-bodied men and women are able to live without working is surely as incongruous and absurd as a pyramid on its apex. But few of those who condemn the workmen for not loving their work have any censure for these supreme instances of idleness. As long as an idle class like this is sanctioned by society, can we wonder that so many of the working classes think it a good thing to work as little as possible, and are not so much affected as they should be by well-meant exhortations on the beauty and dignity of labour?

And there is the exclusivist feeling of class-consciousness that emphasizes and embitters class distinctions. In the working classes this feeling tends to foster ignorance of, and animosity against, those

in a higher social scale. In the others it tends to encourage that first sign of decadence, a sense of superiority over the grades below. Persons of the "lower middle class," who, the head of the family being skilful in the art of money-getting, attain to the "upper middle class," look down on the class from which they came; and so in other grades.

The paltry and pitiable pride that is often engendered by these petty distinctions is one of the greatest obstacles to a wholesome social spirit. One of its manifestations—the reluctance of those whose houses have a name to add a number thereto—may seem at the first glance very trivial, but is really very significant, a straw that shows the way of the wind. How many of us have, from time to time, been compelled to walk hundreds of unnecessary yards, perhaps in the darkness and the rain, scrutinizing every gate, and, in most cases, a more or less indistinct screed on a fan-light, because the houses were not numbered, or the householders disguised the fact by making the number as inconspicuous as it could be made! How anti-social is such conduct, and what waste of labour and irritation (i.e. waste of nerve power) is the consequence! And yet there is no doubt of the great reluctance of householders to use the number; for local authorities have found it necessary, when informing them that their houses have been numbered, to threaten them with a fine if, within a very short time, the number is not displayed.

The above are some of the fruits, direct and indirect, of Individualism, and of some of the tendencies that it fosters. It remains to consider a few of its alleged advantages.

It gives scope, it has been said, for the large ideas of the big capitalist, for great and well-sustained

commercial enterprises ; and under its sway the wealth of the country has increased as never before. But if there was a different spirit in the country, if the emphasis was more upon social service and less upon personal advantage, the great captains of industry would be willing to use their ability and energy for the benefit of their fellows without expecting or desiring the huge rewards which fall to their lot to-day ; and would find their satisfaction in the work, and in an adequate, but not inordinate, monetary recompense.

That the total wealth of the country has increased as never before is an undoubted fact ; but that it might not have increased still more under other conditions is not a necessary deduction. Change the orientation of mind and heart and you may have to change your political economy. A nation of willing workers and willing captains of industry, with desire for the general good as one at least of their chief motives, might produce results unprecedented in the history of industrialism.

But even if it be true that the total wealth would be greater under present conditions, it does not follow that the total prosperity would be greater. True prosperity consists not in wealth but in life ; and if men on the whole live a more wholesome and cultured life, it is far better than an increase in economic wealth. So if men could be persuaded, as some nations at some periods have been persuaded, that the amassing of great wealth was a discreditable thing, and that true riches lies not so much in the greatness of our possessions as in the smallness of our wants, the political economist's theories would be all awry.

I may here anticipate the objection that, as in this case there would be less things to be produced, there would be more unemployment. But it would not be

difficult, in such a social atmosphere, so to adjust the conditions of life as to ensure to each able-bodied person a fair share of the work to be done.

Then it has also been alleged that one of the most salutary effects of Individualism is that, by encouraging competition, it insures quality combined with cheapness. This is only true to a very limited extent. Business men soon find a more profitable method than competing with one another, and combine to keep up prices. In 1923 Mr. Neville Chamberlain stated that the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Health were carefully watching building rings and trusts; but it seems very doubtful if any good has come from their vigilance. And the profiteering in food, to a great extent due to understandings explicit or implicit, has also proceeded gaily. The price of turkeys, for instance, was some years ago, and perhaps to-day, put up and down at the will of an American, English, and Irish syndicate; and the Food Council tells us that for years the best brains in the milk trade have been engaged in trying to find ways of keeping cheap milk off the market. The Food Council, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Health, and other bodies may sit, take evidence, and confer; but the power to check profiteering under the present economic system is still to seek.

Competition is also eluded by many other devices. Private companies are bought up by larger ones with whom they are competing; shops by tradesmen near by, so that they can make sure that they will not be let to one of the same trade; and firms have been known to buy up new inventions and take the inventors into their employment so as to prevent better inventions than their own being on the market. What a sordid scramble does this race for wealth so often become!

Of course there are great and honourable exceptions.



But it is a reproach to Individualism that it fosters and encourages tendencies that are inimical to the general welfare. This is surely clear from what has been written above. It is a system under which so many anti-social practices are not only possible, but frequent. There is, indeed, far too little inducement to ethical conduct, and so often much to be gained by trickery and deceit. It is inevitable that, under such conditions, there should be widespread suspicion and distrust. During the war it was asserted that a great wholesale firm was making exorbitant charges for its goods; and a member of the firm wrote to the daily papers repelling the accusation and assuring the public that the prices could not be any lower. Ten members of the firm have died, and the probates of their wills showed that all have been millionaires—the last will being proved at a little under four million pounds. Some of this wealth may have been passed on from one to another; but in any case such facts (and they are often repeated) give rise to serious reflections. When it is added that slums seem an inseparable adjunct to Individualism, that statisticians have contended that a vast amount of unemployment must always exist in an industrial country like our own, and that the sacred right to strike (or to be locked out) is an essential part of the system, I think I have written enough to show that Individualism is not sacrosanct, and that one should approach the consideration of other suggested systems that might, either wholly or partly, take its place, with at least an open mind.

In drawing attention, however, to some of the effects of individualism, it must not be forgotten that, as already intimated, there are real dangers of an opposite

kind in Socialism as sometimes understood. If every man and woman is led to feel that, whether willing to work or not, there is always unemployment benefit ; that however many children are born the State will always feed them ; and that none need exercise economy or forethought, as whatever illness or trouble comes there is always the State to fall back upon ; there would be an end to sturdy helpful citizenship, and therefore an end to individual or communal progress. Once again it is the Golden Mean that is wanted. And this suggests a state of society where man's comfort and well-being depend largely upon his own exertions, but where these exertions are not exploited so as to add superfluous wealth to those who already have more than enough ; and where also work is done with cheerfulness and hope because it is known that in case of misfortune and trouble the State will not forget its citizens. Thus comes sturdy independence, but also mutual help in times of need.

## CHAPTER XIII

### TO-DAY: CURRENTS AND CROSS-CURRENTS

THERE is a legend of an Englishman who, captured by cannibals, was about to be sentenced to be killed and eaten, when the chief caught sight of his hat which had a familiar look. On examination he found "Balliol College" written inside the crown. "So you were at Balliol," said he in excellent English. "Yes," replied the prisoner. "You can go," said the other; "dog does not eat dog. I was at Balliol, too."

The legend is a symbol of the extraordinary and unprecedented changes that, during the last few generations, have brought us all so much closer to one another. Not only do ships from all parts of the world forgather in the great ports and harbours, and railways link up civilized with primitive communities, penetrating into regions that a decade or so ago had not even a name on the map; but the centres of learning are becoming cosmopolitan, the Mongol, the African, and the Hindu listening to the same lectures, joining in the same social functions, and passing the same examinations as his pale-faced fellow-students. There is a *Japan Society* in London where one can, from time to time, hear and discuss sympathetically the Japanese point of view; and there are English professors in Tokio. In China, as in Japan, English and American magazines and books circulate in great numbers; and in Egypt grave Mohammedans and their wives go to the cinemas and gaze at moving pictures that are saturated with Western thought and feeling,

Modern man has wrested her secrets from Nature, and harnessed her powers to his chariot, to an extent undreamt of by any of his predecessors ; and with the world-wide diffusion of this knowledge and power, his total potentiality for good or for evil is enormously increased. There are many signs that give us, at least, the hope that, through this wide diffusion, the brains of the world may be pooled for its good. There are also many signs that make us fear lest, with all its wonderful achievements, the race may once more take the wrong turning. It is for us to get to know the truth, to get a clear idea of the times in which we live and our duty therein, so that we may put all our weight on the right side.

To trace some of the currents and cross-currents in the life of to-day is a difficult task. It is easy, and as futile as it is easy, to start with an *a priori* theory of progress, of the "march of Civilization," and so on, and then, by judicious selection, fit in our facts. Life—and especially the life of to-day—is too complex to respond to such treatment ; and it is only by un-biassed study and thought, and careful observation of the tendencies of the times, that we can see our way through the labyrinth, or, at least, see enough to help us to judge as to the direction in which we should go.

In religion there are curiously contradictory tendencies ; but one thing stands out clearly. Amid all divergencies there is, throughout the world, a far greater appreciation of the Common Ethic than ever before ; and also a wider acknowledgment that it is better to emphasize the things on which we are agreed, rather than those on which we differ. On the other hand there has been a recrudescence of obscurantism or credulity, or of both together ; Fundamentalism and

Second-Adventism are rampant, and Faith-healing, Spiritualism, and esoteric doctrines are constantly being accepted on very inadequate evidence. These things, and our blundering divisions on petty issues—often on matters about which we know, and can know nothing—are alienating many from organized religion, amongst them some of the best of our young people. As to this alienation, one could summon into the witness-box most of the leaders in the Christian Church; for scarcely a month passes without some pronouncement of the kind being made, Dean Inge, Bishop Gore, the Reverend Stuart Holden, Dr. R. F. Horton, Dr. W. Russell Maltby, Dr. J. D. Jones, and Dr. F. W. Norwood amongst the witnesses. The *Church Times* of September 16, 1921, stated that 75 per cent. of the English people are alien to institutional religion; Dr. Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham, declared in December 1926 that the drift from the Churches has been widespread, and that it is difficult to get well-educated youth of character and ability to enter the ministry; and Dr. Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham, writing in the *Nineteenth Century and After* of July 1927, refers to the growing alienation of the educated classes, and goes on to say that for the present we have to envisage "a process of disintegration and decline, of which the logical conclusion is neither pleasant to contemplate nor possible to doubt." A year or two ago was published the report of the World's Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association on the questionnaires to the youth of thirty-six nations; and from the answers we find that there is very little interest taken by them in credal or organized religion, and that many of them express disgust at what they understand to be orthodox Christianity. So impressed was the Secretary of this World-wide Inquiry at its result that

he came to the drastic conclusion that, unless both the Church and the Y.M.C.A. change their methods, they "will have to go out of business."

There is surely little doubt that many of the present methods might be altered with advantage. Sectarianism, for one thing, although its divisive tendencies have been greatly modified, is still too much in evidence, and often leads to petty groupings and to absorption in trivial matters connected with one's own sect or local church; in fact, to a hole-and-corner religion. And this even at times with those who profess opinions of the broadest kind. In the local church or chapel there are many meetings which one is constantly being urged to attend. There are also the county and national denominational associations with their special conferences and assemblies; and the denominational weekly, monthly, and perhaps quarterly magazines which claim our support. So not only do people surround themselves, or are deliberately surrounded, with one particular atmosphere, and encouraged to look at life from one particular point of view, but they have so much to do to keep their own church and their own denomination going that there is little time to attend to the wider claims of civic, national, or world citizenship.

A good deal of what has been said in previous chapters about specialism and exclusivism applies to the specialists in a particular religion or in a particular denomination. He who only knows one religion, being out of focus with life as a whole, cannot properly understand even that one. For as all things are relative, it is by comparison that we are able to estimate duly the good and the bad points in our own religion or any other.

But, it may be asked, how can a person with only

the average amount of leisure get to know more than a smattering (the "little knowledge" which is "a dangerous thing") about other religions as well as about his own?

The answer is not so difficult as it seems. The broad principles of a religion can be grasped in a comparatively short time, and stand out far more clearly when unencumbered with a superfluity of detail. If, instead of repeating with wearisome reiteration the same things in almost the same words, our religious mentors would tell us, as impartially as may be, the main principles (and something of the history) of the principal religions of the world, we should be greatly benefited. The present writer, and his is not by any means an extreme case, roughly computes that he has heard, during the last fifty years, about four thousand sermons, as many more addresses, and has read innumerable books and pamphlets on the Christian religion. For much that he has heard and read he cannot adequately express his thankfulness; but he cannot repress the thought that the greater part of the time thus spent could have been far better employed. Some years ago the Reverend J. Leslie Chown asked at a Conference of Baptist ministers and laymen what was the use of a good deal of their preaching. He was bored stiff, he said, with preaching; and many of their people were, especially with "star preaching."

It is no wonder! Not only because of the constant repetition and the narrowness of range, but because the sermon is an altogether artificial form of speech. It was quite unknown to the Early Christian evangelists and teachers, who were accustomed to express themselves with more naturalness and without complexity. Gradually a more artificial style grew up, pedantic and rhetorical and reminiscent of the Greek sophists; and

as it grew the custom of paying for it grew also. The sermon, partly on this account and partly, no doubt, on other accounts, makes its appearance; and, as the preparation of sermons required scholarship, and as scholarship was confined to the few, professional religious oratory would naturally accentuate the tendency towards the growth of a professional clergy; a tendency further accentuated when the State assumed the control of religion.<sup>1</sup>

Although sometimes opposed by the clergy, the rulers found them, on the whole, supporters of the *status quo*, and therefore a valuable aid to stable government. For the most part, and for many centuries, this system may have promoted the happiness and well-being of Christendom; but with the spread of education amongst the laity, with freedom of thought and a more democratic atmosphere, it is rapidly becoming an anachronism. A book entitled *A Voluntary Clergy*, recently published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, is well worth attention. Mr. Roland Allen, the author, points out that in the Early Church a regular stipend for the clergy was condemned as anti-Catholic, and the vast majority of them earned their living in trade. He contends that when it is realized that clergymen make their living by their profession, suspicion as to their absolute sincerity cannot but arise; and that, although great spiritual power can and does overleap this barrier, the barrier is always there, and it is a far more serious one than is generally supposed. When the S.P.C.K. sent a Mission of Help to South Africa it was found that as soon as the natives were persuaded a missionary was

<sup>1</sup> St. Augustine protested against artificiality in preaching. He rejected formal arrangements and divisions, and insisted on simplicity and directness of appeal. "He who speaks sophistically," he said, "is odious."



perfectly disinterested he would get a response; and Mr. Allen quoted a letter to the *Guardian* in which the writer states that "the greatest hindrance to a clergyman in his work is his official position or his clerical dress. Does he invite the absentee to attend church? The retort is: 'Come now, you yourself would not be always there unless you had to be: you are paid for it.' Or, 'It is your duty: each man to his trade.'"

Another hindrance, says our author, is the system of encouraging young men to train for the ministry, as it is easier for them than for older men to mistake their vocation, and thus make a false start in life. Often they do not know their own minds or their own powers, or what it is they are undertaking; and hedged about with certain conventions, they do not get the experience of life that comes to others. For it is only the few who possess enough sympathy and power of imagination to make up for this lack of actual experience. Men with little or no literary education have often been highly educated men; and those who have attained much literary knowledge have often been profoundly uneducated and quite incapable of directing their course in this world aright. And it must be remembered that it is the business of the Christian minister not only to perform certain acts on behalf of the congregation, but to lead the counsels of the Church. Voluntary clergy, on the other hand, living in the daily life of men and sharing their everyday temptations and struggles for daily bread, would be better able to make men realize that religion was at once more vital and all-embracing than most people think; that it belongs to the whole of life.

It is interesting to note that more than two thousand years ago Socrates, warned by the venality of many

of the sophists, held that men should not be paid for the advocacy of ideas. We cannot, with the more complex society of to-day, accept such a sweeping generalization; but it may, I think, be reasonably held that the payment should be exceptional, and that there should be no longer a clerical class. How this class is becoming an anachronism may be clearly seen by supposing a case of a young man of evangelical upbringing who, say, about thirty years ago, took Holy orders making his declaration of belief with all sincerity. After some years, and having by this time wife and children, he comes under other influences than those of his evangelically environed youth and begins to doubt the truth of the Virgin Birth, the deity of Christ, and the miracles. He is now of an age when he cannot get other suitable employment. What is he to do? He has his family to consider, and his position in the Church which he loves and is very loath to leave. The strength of these objections to the only honest course are overwhelming and induce him, although unconsciously, to take refuge in what may be called the *Casistry Complex*. The Virgin Birth and the miracles are but symbols, and Christ, although He may not be deity is, at least, divine. And thus he justifies himself in continuing solemnly to declare that he verily believes in the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection; and that Christ is Very God of Very God. Perhaps such a man is more to be pitied than blamed. But what of the outside world? Of the 75 per cent. who take no interest in institutional religion? Are they likely to be attracted to it by the advocacy of those who only profess "from the teeth outwards" to believe in some of its main tenets?

It is sometimes contended that a paid clergy are necessary because of the special theological studies

that have to be pursued. But it is, at least, open to argument that less theology and a more normal life would be an advantage. "I have even heard it suggested by extremists," says Dr. L. P. Jacks in *Religious Perplexities*, "that there would be more believers in God if all the theologians would take themselves off."

Of course no hard-and-fast line can be drawn, so much must depend upon particular circumstances and conditions; but it seems safe to conclude that professionalism in religion should be the exception rather than the rule.

There are many reasons for want of frankness in matters of religion besides the mainly unconscious effect of professionalism. There is the feeling of timidity, referred to in a previous chapter; and there is the love of publicity—of public notice and public favour—which, although in degree natural and legitimate, is, when accentuated, a dangerous snare, perverting the minds of many who would be unaffected by grosser temptations. In matters of opinion, would a public speaker be popular, he must tell his audience what they already believe, or wish to believe. He may, perhaps, on occasion venture to differ from the prevailing view; but unless he be an exceptionally brilliant man, he must not so venture very often. So it comes about that speakers who, we may presume, have a better knowledge of the subject in hand than the average person, instead of educating their audiences, are, for the most part, content to please by confirming them in the opinions they already hold. The result being to leave them where they are. In this category are some who seem to think of platform oratory as an end in itself. What they say is hardly so important

as that they have been given the opportunity to say it.

This is not written to depreciate public speaking, but to encourage introspection in the speaker. There is so much need for good guidance in these, as in all days, that every wise and helpful word is abundantly welcome. And both speaker and hearers would benefit if, before facing his audience, the speaker sometimes examined himself as to the soundness of his motives, and their possible effect upon his platform efforts. Were this followed, there might be fewer meetings and fewer speeches; but the truth would have a better chance of being heard.

In a former chapter it was pointed out that the progress of science and the freer study of the Bible had resulted in a more rational view of religion. And in the effect that this has had upon the thought-movements of to-day, there is a curious resemblance to the time of Socrates and Plato. Socrates, rejecting the idea of man being able by study and thought to gain certain knowledge of the Universe, held that Conduct was the most fruitful topic on which we should concentrate; and Plato added to his master's philosophy his theory of Ideas, of an Unseen Reality behind the world of visible phenomena. So to-day many of our religious teachers, seeing that the old foundations on which authority rested will not bear, turn, like Socrates, to ethics; and, like Plato, to intuition, inward experience, and mysticism. The first tendency, to concentrate on ethics is, of course, very salutary; especially when practice follows theory. The second tendency needs great circumspection, as there are many pitfalls for the unwary.

How strangely the currents of thought intersect

each other, even in the same mind! And especially so when our reason points one way, but our wishes point another. So the current of reason is crossed by that of desire; and we endeavour to find something other than reason for our beliefs, so as somehow to "save face" by justifying ourselves to ourselves, and to others. In this frame of mind we are glad to remember that knowledge is not exclusively a matter of the intellect; that intuition has also its part to play.

It is quite true that knowledge does not entirely rest on the intellect; that intuition also plays its part in guiding our judgments and our actions. But reliance upon the inner consciousness should not be unduly stressed. W. E. H. Lecky said of Plato's philosophy that, by greatly extending the sphere of the spiritual, it did much to foster the belief in sorcery and witchcraft. Too much emphasis on intuition is sure to favour the tendency, strong enough in any case, to bigotry and superstition. And a further result of this over-emphasis is that it is made the excuse for claims to special knowledge, unattainable by and, in some cases, contrary to reason.

There is an ineffable spirit in man that responds to the stimulus of every good and beautiful thought, to everything that is of the highest and deepest. When this spirit is manifest to our consciousness—and the testimony as to its existence cannot be ignored—we feel we are at one with the great cosmic forces of the universe. It is a feeling that is not irrational, but ultra-rational, and has been well described as the peace that passeth all understanding. But although the fact of these experiences cannot be reasonably denied the interpretation may often be doubted. "The eye sees what it brings to the seeing"; and those who have been soaked from their childhood with traditional

views will interpret their experiences in traditional terms. There is a tendency to-day, in those who cannot rest content with the mainly external and objective Evidences of Christianity that satisfied our fathers, to fall back as a last line of defence upon the testimony within, upon inward experience and mysticism; and to bring these things in to strengthen belief in a particular form of religion, or of esoteric philosophy. But the mysterious sense of the ineffable is a pure white emotion, and is not the monopoly of any church or school of thought. As there is a Common Ethic, so there is a Common Spiritual Experience.

Something like this may also be affirmed as to Faith-healing, Christian Science, and all kinds of supposedly miraculous cures. Underlying them all is the undoubted, but inexplicable, connection between mind and matter. But the belief that these things are somehow inter-related should not induce us to accept esoteric ideas or wonder stories too readily. It is still necessary to remember that the strength of the evidence of any occurrence should be in proportion to the extent to which it runs counter to general experience. And these cures, even when authentic, are not, of course, evidence of the truth of any particular dogma; although it is well that religion should be associated with the will and the imagination in such work; for, by adding strength to them both, it helps towards recovery. And this association of religion with will and imagination helps us also towards the conception of the oneness of life, to the realization that no part of it can be entirely separated from the rest, and, therefore, to the cultivation of the synthetic mind.

Another matter that deserves some notice here is the extraordinary credulity manifested, not only by

the ignorant and thoughtless, but even by some of the educated and the thoughtful in regard to Scripture prophecy.<sup>1</sup> In spite of all the progress in science and in Biblical criticism it is very difficult, if not impossible, for so many to shake themselves free from the old traditions. If this were done, and the Bible studied in a rational way, it would be seen that the prophetic writings cannot be understood unless some attention is paid to the psychology of the prophets. These men, being Jews, shared with the rest of their countrymen a great capacity for emotional religion; and an intense and fierce patriotism which they sometimes mistook for religion. So we have terrible censures of "heathen" nations, and predictions of their downfall. The fulfilment of these prophecies of doom have profoundly impressed Bible students. But as—except in the case of China—every nation that was intact when these prophets lived has gone the same road, there does not seem any good reason for such an impression. As to other prophecies, when we take into account their vagueness and imagery and the great number of them, it is not surprising that, with zeal and industry, people can manage to find in the almost infinite number of events in subsequent world history many remarkable coincidences. In most cases they find either what they meant to find, or what they have been led by others to expect. It is also as well to bear in mind that some of the records of the predictions were not written until after the alleged fulfilment; and that, in the numerous copyings and recopyings of the Scriptures a zealous scribe, tired of the monotonous rôle of the mere copyist, might write, perhaps in the margin, something of his own to elucidate the text,

<sup>1</sup> Prophecy is used in this connection in its limited sense of prediction.

and to add to its value as propaganda by showing how a prophecy was fulfilled ; and the next copyist might embody the marginal note in the text.

And then there is the method, started by the Rabbis, of twisting and straining texts to make them prove what we wish them to prove. Their example was followed by St. Paul, by many other writers of the New Testament, by the Fathers of the Church, and by most of its leaders from that time to this. Especially is noticeable the way that every passage that could by any means be pressed into the service is represented as referring to Christ. This can readily be seen by consulting a reference Bible with summaries of chapters and running head-lines. It is hardly too much to say that by adopting this method of exegesis, and by a careful selection of texts that suit our purpose, almost anything can be proved ; and that, as to the correctness or otherwise of their predictions, there is nothing whatever to mark these writings off from those of other prophets with only secular pretensions. But considering the passionate earnestness, the vivid imagination, and the power of expression of the Hebrew prophets, it is not wonderful that their unique literary outpourings should have so greatly impressed the religious world, and that, the love of the marvellous and the supernatural being so strong in man, simple and common-sense explanations of these outpourings are not very welcome.

In the Palestine pavilion of the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1924, one of the most interesting exhibits (according to the Official Guide) was that of a German bayonet which had been beaten into a pruning-hook and found in actual use in the Jordan Valley, " thus fulfilling the Biblical prophecy." Could any statement be more fatuous than this?



From the time of the Stone Age, when the primitive man used the flint implement with which he stirred the soil to slay his enemy, peace tools have been used for purposes of war; and when war is done the tools, with such alterations as might be required, have resumed their pacific activities. That the finding of a single bayonet beaten into a pruning-hook should have given rise to such a comment as in this guide book is an indication both of the strength and the folly of the prophecy obsession.

But one of the strangest things in the history of Christendom is that, in spite of so many failures, the idea of the speedy coming of the Second Advent still persists. It is supposed that St. Paul discouraged marriage because he expected that the end of the world was near at hand; and about four hundred years later St. Augustine (in his letter to Juliana) discourages child-bearing for the same reason. During the Middle Ages the expectation of the day of doom was much in men's minds, and in modern times 1785, 1830, 1843, 1867, and 1878 have all been given as the date. When the Great War was raging a Free Church minister wrote a little book in which he states that it will be "before 1923"; and after the War (in 1925), Miss Christabel Pankhurst said that in the same year a number of nations would unite under a leader who would be the Antichrist of prophecy. The history of a dogma, it has been said, is its greatest condemnation; and one wonders how many people, after studying its history, would continue to believe in Second Adventism.

In this chapter some religious conditions have been considered by themselves. But this is for convenience only, for no hard-and-fast line can be drawn. Social and political conditions, art and philosophy, indeed all of life may be viewed as one with religion—a

religion that should include and bind together in a great fellowship all men of good will of whatever clime or colour.

Looking at mankind from a broadly ethical standpoint, we find in many an abnormal love of pleasure, a lack of earnestness, and no desire for moral or mental enlightenment. Others are comparatively enlightened and ethically-minded, but with so little earnestness that the desire for gain and the love of pleasure soon get the upper hand. Others, again, are earnest and enthusiastic, but not according to knowledge. And yet others who with knowledge and wisdom have a moral passion that cleanses the soul from selfishness, and fills it with love for humanity. With these last is the hope of the future.

The emphasis is still too much on "getting and spending"; and many who (at first sincerely enough) talked as though they were idealists, caught up in the whirl of modern life, fritter away their time in this or that. While still sometimes using the language of high endeavour, they are, for the most part, the slaves of wealth, fashion, and self-indulgence, worshipping "before Mrs. Grundy or the Golden Calf while professing to worship elsewhere." <sup>1</sup> And this is not confined to any class, to any station in life, or to individuals; for many societies, religious, social, philanthropic, and others share the same characteristics. What a medley of societies there are! And with what wonderful names and high pretensions! And yet in so many of them the main interest (if not the main object) is sport, feasting, whist-driving, dancing, acting, and concert-giving. Even some churches and chapels are in danger of degenerating into places for making

<sup>1</sup> *George Whale*, p. 60.

their members as comfortable as possible, and providing them with entertainments. This is not, of course, an attack on recreation, but a plea for the Golden Mean, and for that good life which cannot be attained without the great dynamic of moral passion.

But no survey, however brief, of the currents and cross-currents of to-day should omit some reference to the gambling habit, once described by John Ruskin as uniting "every condition of folly and vice." It is no sufficient answer to the moralist to say (as we hear *ad nauseam*) that gambling is part of human nature, that men always have gambled and always will. Waiving the question as to human nature, which is dealt with elsewhere, one may consider it simply as a matter of less or more. Anyone with a memory of, say, half a century knows that gambling has spread enormously in that period. In 1926 the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that there was "more betting in this island of ours than in any country in the world"; and it has been computed that one hundred million pounds changes hands every year in this way. Even hospitals and orphanages do not scruple to add to their funds by encouraging the habit, one of the latter giving away as much as £10,000 in lottery prizes.

There are, of course, many excuses made for gambling. Do we not all gamble? Is not every insurance, and indeed every business, a gamble? And some moral and religious teachers have contended that, to those whose lives are tame and colourless, the indulgence in this form of the natural love of risk and adventure gives an added interest to existence.

That there is a certain amount of chance inevitable in carrying on legitimate business is undoubted; but the object of the business man is to reduce it to a

minimum. The object of the gambler to increase it to a maximum. The chances of insurance are, it is true, very great; but the result of insurance is to promote stability. Whereas gambling promotes instability; and the money thus obtained ("easily got, easily goes") is far more likely to be squandered than when it has been earned.

Those who hold that the world would be tame and colourless without gambling show a very limited vision, and a lamentable want of appreciation of human potentialities. Fortunately there is hope that as this debasing habit, pointing as it does to "a poverty of the personality, a bareness of the chambers of the mind,"<sup>1</sup> has increased, it may also diminish; and the more it diminishes the more will it be seen that, instead of life being duller in consequence, it will be infinitely fuller of all that makes for permanent interest and satisfaction; and with glorious risks and wonderful adventures of which the mind obsessed with the gambling craze can have no conception.

About fifty years ago, at the time of the great revival meetings of Moody and Sankey, the spirit of Evangelical Protestantism was greatly stirred; and one heard in pulpit, on platform, and by the wayside, such texts as "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" constantly quoted and enforced. Many of us who were in sympathy with this movement, and are still alive, look at these things differently now, and perhaps are too much inclined to depreciate such revivals as merely selfish—for the saving of our own souls. They were that, but they were more than that. For the converts were fired with an enthusiasm that went far beyond their individual

<sup>1</sup> The Rt. Hon. J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.

salvation, and longed and worked and prayed for that of others. Now the *old* "passion for souls," for "plucking brands from the burning," has gone; or at least, let us hope, it is going with the old orthodoxy from which it arose. What we need is a new passion for souls, and a new trumpet call suited to the New Time.

First, there must be a love of humanity and a realization of the depth and intensity of the world's need, based on knowledge, direct as well as indirect. Next, a resolve to do what we can to meet this need, not as superior persons, but as comrades who believe that by mutual trust and co-operation the Golden Age may, at least, be brought nearer. This may mean much personal sacrifice. But when things are seen in their right perspective, the fact that we are working together with all the forces of good in the world will be ample compensation if, indeed, compensation be required. Thus in thinking of the present we cannot but think of our hopes for the future, and this leads us to our last chapter.

## CHAPTER XIV

### TO-MORROW AND AFTER. FORWARD TO THE GOLDEN AGE

It can hardly be too often repeated that there cannot be good government without good citizens ; and the Golden Age can never come until the conditions of personal culture, as well as the conditions of society, are such as will conduce to the highest development of both the individual and the race. And in a society so developing it may be taken for granted that there will be little satisfaction in a Golden Age that is only enjoyed by a favoured class or nation, by a continent, or even a hemisphere. The ninety and nine have no right to be content so long as the one is lost in the wilderness. The Golden Age must be fully shared.

Some years ago (in *The Religion of Wise Men*) I made certain tentative suggestions as to the " Rallying-points " of a Universal Religion ; not, of course, in the direction of a creed, but in order to indicate what the general attitude of such a religion might be. They were as follows :

1. God the All-pervading Spirit.
2. Jesus the Unique.
3. Willingness to accept Truth from any Quarter.
4. Universal Obligation on the Able-bodied to Work.
5. Universal Brotherhood.
6. Obligation to Active Benevolence.
7. The Simple Life.
8. Belief in the Moral Betterment of Mankind.

These points were dealt with very briefly, and I venture to return to them.

### I. GOD THE ALL-PERVADING SPIRIT

In the infancy of the race the conception of a God higher than a supernatural Super-man or Super-animal was impossible. But when men began to be capable of abstract thought, the ideas emerged of a Universal Spirit, an Infinite and Eternal Energy, and a Universal Consciousness. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that men could not be content with these and kindred ideas; and that, craving for a personal God who would be more or less like themselves, they have created Him in their own image, and proceeded to define what cannot be defined, and to give us all kinds of specific explanations of His character, attributes, and purposes. Many of the ills of the world are due to the fact that men are so often vague where they ought to be definite, and definite where they ought to be vague. In this case we should be vague, and vagueness, when legitimate, is not weakness but strength. With the ancient Hebrew Rabbi we must teach our tongues to say: "I do not know." Those who have been brought up with distinctive and particularist views of God may think this very cold comfort; but the sense of an infinite and mysterious essence behind all things may be a far greater help and stimulus than any such ideas. As Goethe says:

I have no name to give it!

The Name is sound and smoke,  
Obscuring Heaven's clear glow.

And futile attempts to define God have taken up time that might have been better employed, and have also

been productive of division and strife. The history of the doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, and how it came at last to be adopted, is sorry reading. The less such definitions are attempted the better chance will there be of the coming of a Universal Religion of all men of good will.

Under the second and third headings I have nothing to add to what has been written already in this and other books.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION ON THE ABLE-BODIED TO WORK

“To enjoy one’s self in idleness on the toil of others,” said Bishop Gore, “is a totally illegitimate position”; and Mr. George Bernard Shaw has told us that it is “the salutary pressure of the common burden which alone keeps men unspoilt and sane.” If these things are admitted, it follows that our social and political conditions should be brought into line with them. This seems to suggest compulsion in the case of those who do not recognize the obligation as a duty. But (and this is the safeguard of liberty) compulsion should only be exercised with the clear assent of the people, and always alongside of it should be educative propaganda to enlist sympathy, as well as assent; and to convince, as far as possible, even those who have to suffer compulsion of its essential justice. And such compulsion is often, in itself, of educative value; for “many a child and many a man have come to see that the things they were compelled to do were right, and to continue to do them with whole-hearted assent,

<sup>1</sup> *The Magic of Common Sense, The Religion of Wise Men, and Progress and the Past.*



although they would never have begun to do them but for compulsion. Paradoxical as it may sound, the greatest compulsion means sometimes the greatest freedom, as witness the policemen who compulsorily regulate our traffic." 1

### 5. UNIVERSAL BROTHERHOOD

It has been said that many ills have been brought upon the world because men have been vague where they should have been definite, and definite where they should have been vague. Here the need is for definiteness, for detailed statement. Universal Brotherhood, as a vague aspiration, a pious statement, or a benevolent theory, is good as a beginning; but if it is not followed up in practice it will degenerate into a mere cant phrase, a soporific to conscience. It is, however, a cheering sign of the times that there are many who use the phrase in all sincerity, and, in more or less degree, try to carry it out. But the opposing forces are very strong; among them exaggerated patriotism with its superiority complex, founded to a great extent on ignorance; and partisanship, that exaggeration of *esprit de corps* which leads the adherents of a party, a cause, or other social group along the same bad road.

It is strange (and yet, perhaps, not so strange when we call to mind what complex creatures we are!) how some of those who are the greatest opponents of the kind of exclusivism that shows itself in exaggerated patriotism, encourage and foster a similar kind of exclusivism when it shows itself in partisanship. And yet what a curse this, too, has been to the world; leading men not only to emphasize and perpetuate

1 *The Magic of Common Sense*, pp. 32-3.

their prejudices, but also to pour contempt and scorn on those who belong to other groups than theirs! Examples of this are legion; and envy, hatred, and malice and all uncharitableness have often resulted. Said a Labour leader a few years ago, justifying the threat of a lightning strike, "You don't send a man notice *when you are going to knock him down.*" And perhaps the most outstanding example of personal antipathy and uncharitableness is that of the abuse levelled at that noble and high-minded statesman, William Ewart Gladstone, who in his lifetime was vilified and insulted by many of those who disagreed with his opinions, and after his death was scandalously traduced by one who, as it appeared in court afterwards, had not a shred of evidence to justify his accusations. This may be an extreme case, but there have been many others only slightly less culpable. And still we go on encouraging the party spirit which easily and imperceptibly slides into the partisan spirit; and, in the realm of politics, even contending that the party system is essential to democratic government. But as wars are largely due to the folly and ambition of rulers, politicians, and journalists, and not to the natural pugnacity of man who, on the whole, suffers rather from easy-going inertia, so the party system is to some extent an outcome of the ambition or the folly of political leaders, and is not, in the writer's opinion at least, essential to democracy. It is, of course, all to the good that men should combine to help forward a cause that they believe to be right. But to form permanent parties with huge funds at their disposal, ostensibly to forward certain principles, actually (in most cases at least) to put their own party into power and to keep all other parties out, is not conducive to the best interests of the nation, and is

certainly not in a line with universal brotherhood. One illustration of this is found in the attitude of British parties to the scheme of Proportional Representation. It does not concern us here whether that particular method of election is the best or not ; but it does concern us that, though many arguments for and against are put forward, it is scarcely ever considered on its merits. Some years ago, in the comparatively impartial atmosphere of a House of Commons committee-room, it was unanimously resolved to advise the House that at the next General Election two hundred members should be elected in this way, so that experience might help to a just conclusion in the matter. This advice, however, was never carried out by Parliament ; and the principal reason for the omission is not far to seek. The members having been elected under one system, and too mindful of their own personal interests, would not run the risk of a change to another. It has also been a very marked feature in the history of this movement that the attitude of parties as a whole has been guided by the probability of gain or loss to their particular group. The desire to find out what plan would be most likely to render equal justice to all our "brothers" has generally been subordinated to the desire for party predominance.

When men are infected with partisanship (whether in political, religious, or any other matters) there is hardly any limit to their gullibility. And there are plenty of people in all parties who descend to the ignoble practice of exploiting this weakness and thus gaining popularity for themselves. Partisanship, indeed, so dulls the senses that it renders men quite incapable of a just judgment ; and when added to this is a great capacity for being shocked at, or con-

temptuous of, all opinions that happen to be different from our own, and of the people who hold those opinions, the result is disastrous. Take, for example, the attitude of hatred and contempt of the Bourgeois to the Bolshevik and the Bolshevik to the Bourgeois. Both condemn the other indiscriminately, and very few on either side try to understand before they censure. "Every struggle towards intellectual probity, every effort to face reality, every honest striving to grasp an opponent's position, is a service to our ideal and a step towards our moral goal." <sup>1</sup> These are wise words; and from the time men first began to gather into groups and parties until now, what awful misery and injustice have come from their failure to think and act in this spirit!

The implications of brotherhood are, indeed, very far-reaching. They imply that the general interest should outweigh the individual interest, that individual life should be subordinate to the scheme of life as a whole, that there are no "rights" of property apart from the general good, and that therefore these rights should only be considered valid as far as they subserve this end. And this is better, in the long run, for the individual; even for that minority whose material gains might be diminished. For the highest development of each brings greater real satisfaction than large fortunes, and is really the only true success. There is surely something wrong about a social order that results in multi-millionaires at the top (whose huge surplus cannot make them any happier, certainly no better, than if they had just a competency) and the poorly housed and badly fed at the bottom. And we should be ready to acquiesce in any workable system which emphasizes character and capacity rather than

<sup>1</sup> From the *New Leader* of August 22, 1924.

wealth, and would, therefore, tend to the highest development of mankind.

In a Universal Brotherhood, none of the fortunate "brothers" should be entirely satisfied, so long as others are in misery and trouble. Unlike St. Gregory's Golden Age, whose heavenly joys were increased by the thought of the agonies of the damned, the Golden Age adumbrated here will not have arrived until all has been done to mitigate, as far as possible, the troubles of the world. The late Joseph Chamberlain urged his countrymen to think imperially. We must do better than this. We must think universally. As long ago as the ancient Stoics, it was held that the world should be looked upon as one city, and that the interests of each should be to the interest of all. And how much more should it be so in these days when we are all nearer together than ever before!

## 6. OBLIGATION TO ACTIVE BENEVOLENCE

This is, of course, one of the obvious implications of brotherhood; and there is always ample opportunity for its exercise if we have the eyes to see and the will to respond. Sympathy with the troubled, companionship for the lonely (and maybe unattractive) soul, the adoption of a child, the rescue of a drunkard, the help of neighbour or friend in times of stress and difficulty. In turn, we need help; in turn, we should give it. Whatever the state of society, there will always be scope for personal benevolence. Our capacity for kindness need never rust. Surely to live a selfish life in a world in so much need of help and cheer is one of the greatest of crimes! And active benevolence is essential to our own development. "No matter how full a reservoir of *maxims* one may possess, and

no matter how good one's *sentiments* may be, if one has not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one's character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions hell is proverbially paved." <sup>1</sup>

## 7. THE SIMPLE LIFE

Although the phrase "plain living and high thinking", like Martin Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy*, and perhaps for the same reason, has gone out of fashion, the idea which it embodies is still as true as ever. "When things are in the saddle," said Emerson, "they ride mankind." And the accumulation of riches combined with luxurious ways, leads, sooner or later, to a soul-destroying materialism, however overlaid it may be in some cases with a thin veneer of religion. It has been calculated that in Great Britain as much as four hundred million pounds (about a quarter of the national income) is spent on luxury by the rich and the middle classes; <sup>2</sup> and luxury or extravagance or the loss of simplicity of life is not confined to these, but affects in measure all classes. In the matter of food, one has only to look at the display in confectioners' windows, or at the catalogues issued by business firms, to see what meticulous care is taken to provide the public with every conceivable variety to tickle its palate. Dr. W. H. Maxwell Telling has said that the modern child suffers from "that premature induction into the art and mysteries of 'flavour' which makes modern feeding such a highly sensual procedure, and leads inevitably to so much quantitative over-feeding in adult life with

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Psychology* (W. James).

<sup>2</sup> *Personal Economy and Social Progress* (H. G. Wood, M.A.).

manifold and untold disease consequences." <sup>1</sup> Here is the description in a daily journal's hints to housewives of a sweet, eminently suitable, we are told, for a wedding reception: "An oblong foundation of biscuit ice-cream in which crushed French almond rock was an ingredient." Alas, we are left in doubt as to how many other ingredients there should be in the biscuit ice-cream in order to satisfy the exigent demands of the modern gourmet! But we are consoled by further particulars: "On top were arranged roses of ice-cream moulded in rose-shaped moulds. The ice-flowers were touched with carmine to resemble blush roses, and the whole was veiled in spun sugar. The biscuit ice-cream was frozen in the mould; for the roses the ice-cream was first made in the freezing machine and then moulded. Spinning sugar is not difficult, but to ensure success a lesson is necessary." And this is only one item taken from the menu of an entire dinner. But let not the aspiring housewife be discouraged at the task before her; for we are assured that it is "quite worth while"!

Then 1927, so our daily paper tells us, is a record year for Easter eggs. Some of them weigh as much as fifty pounds; and, with the other presents inside, twice that amount. And they are not only for children; for young men and women favour them, and find a good deal of fascination in the hidden gifts. Twenty pounds sterling may be paid for one of these eggs; and we are told that they take about three months to make!

And turning from food to clothing, a correspondent in another daily journal glows with enthusiasm over Gold Cup Day at Ascot, where exclusiveness is well matched with expensiveness; five to six hundred guineas being "quite an ordinary amount for a Society woman to expend upon her *toilette* for one day's wear

<sup>1</sup> Address at Leeds on July 3, 1922.

to see the Gold Cup run." And "her clothes must have that *cachet* of smartness which anticipates the fashion of the year after next, and gives the appearance of having been specially created for her, as it has." We are also informed that a woman attending the Royal enclosure must *of course* display a different outfit every day; and that, as we might have guessed, "expense does not stop with clothes." However, this journalist also evidently thinks it "quite worth while."

One other example is of a row of "slave bangles" worn from wrist to elbow, and usually of gold. Some of them have names inside, and it is the wonderful ambition of some women to collect one from each of their friends; all being exactly alike except for the difference in the names. This array of gold bangles upon one arm, we are told, "looks very chic when in combination with a plain dress." We may well believe it!

Of the amusements of the idle rich, one example must suffice: a ball given at the London house of a duchess. Another duchess and her party were amongst the arrivals, the women dressed as children being wheeled in old perambulators by men dressed as nursemaids. During the evening (or was it the morning?) some of the guests went upstairs, and returning, dressed as cocks and hens, proceeded to lay eggs on the ball-room floor. Many others also changed their costumes; one lady who at first had appeared as a little girl, afterwards became a donkey! This "remarkable costume ball" was on the following day, according to the writer of the report, "the principal topic in London Society."

## 8. BELIEF IN MORAL BETTERMENT

On this question there have been various and conflicting ideas. The French Encyclopædists held that



nothing could stay the ever upward movement of human perfectibility; and similar views were held by many in English-speaking countries, Lecky amongst them, who contends in his *Rationalism in Europe* that "Providence, in the laws of history, as in the laws of matter, tends ever to perfection."

Then at the other extreme there is the theory that the more human nature changes "the more it is the same"; and those who say this, by putting the emphasis on the weaker side of human nature, show that they consider it hopeless to try to change it for the better.

Another view is that as man is a product of the forces working in the universe through countless ages, in which everything else has changed, not only by evolution but also by devolution, so he may change for the better, but also for the worse. There has been a strange hypothesis started lately, that in the counties of Wiltshire and Somersetshire the Stone Age followed the Bronze Age. Whether this be justified or not, it is symbolical of one of the possibilities of the future—the decadence of the race. And the thought of such a possibility should be a stimulus to all men of good will to guard against such happenings by seeing to it that, as changes must be, they shall be changes for the better.

Whatever one's views as to the persistence of evil tendencies in mankind, it should at least be admitted that there is not a fixed amount of evil in the world which cannot be diminished; and in practice this admission is sufficient, for it leaves us free to strive, if not for perfectibility, at least to reduce the evil in ourselves and others to a minimum.

It goes without saying that the task of finding the way to an enduring Golden Age is a very big one; big

enough for all the greatest of us working together, and opening out great adventures in which all, to the least of us, can take a hand. Big, indeed, is the task. Consider. A world for hundreds of thousands of years in dense ignorance, and saturated with credulity, showing itself in the belief in witchcraft, magic, and innumerable other forms of superstition. In a world with such a history, all endeavours towards a more rational life must necessarily be extremely arduous, and success doubtful. And if, and when, a strong personality emerges and succeeds in establishing some more rational form of belief and conduct, he is but as one who, by the erection of protecting dykes, has rescued an island swamp from the ravages of the surrounding ocean. Unless, therefore, there be constant vigilance and alertness, the circumambient flood of folly and superstition will gradually get back again through any crack or crevice that appears. But the greatness of the task, and the fact that it will last to the end of our lives and of those who may follow us, makes the call the more urgent and stimulating. A task done, we must look for another, perhaps in vain. But here is one that will never fail us! Always work to do, and always a goal ahead! And as the task is concerned with life as a whole there is endless variety to be found in it, and scope in all directions for initiative, for ingenuity, for genius, and for the help of every person of good will.

There are many difficulties, but there are also many signs to encourage. Never, perhaps, has there been so much sensitiveness to human suffering, and so many schemes, earnestly and wisely carried out, for the comfort and amelioration of the "down and outs." Never so much effort to find ways to avoid war. Never so much sense of our duty to inarticulate life. Never so

much tolerance of other creeds. Never such acknowledgment of the ties of human brotherhood. Never so much keenness in scholarship, or appreciation of the beautiful in Nature and in Art. And never such marvellous mechanical means to help to carry out a policy of world betterment. It may be, indeed, that we are within measurable distance of the Golden Age. Let us see, at least, that we do not by our blunders and our crimes miss the chance that may lie before us!

Of all the questions that confront us, our attitude to the labour question and to the relations of races and of nations to one another are amongst the most urgent. These questions, and—may we not say?—all others can only be justly settled by that union of good will and good sense which we call right reason. And it cannot be too often repeated that no permanent settlement can be made on exclusivist lines. Encrusted segregations, political, industrial, or national, or a rigid adherence to any particular cult, individualist, socialist or communist, are stumbling-blocks both to right thought and right action. We must develop along the lines that right reason would suggest, learning from the experience of the past, but not impeded by prescriptive dogmas of any kind. There are those—as the Bolsheviks and Fascists—who think they can bring in the Golden Age by forcibly and quickly imposing their systems of life upon the rest of the community. Such movements must provoke reprisals. Even granting that the ideals may be good, to try to reach them by sudden and violent methods is, in the end, to delay their realization. The Communist motto, for example, "From each according to his powers; to each according to his needs," should, let us suppose, be the governing principle of the ideal State; and this writer at least is not concerned to deny it. Even so, no

Government could be at once established on that principle without colossal injustice and untold misery. There are glaring defects in Individualism, among them the enormous disparity in incomes and the power to live in idleness. But it is not to be supposed that our great Captains of Industry could be induced to put their talents, energy, and enterprise freely at the service of the State. For at least some time yet, exceptional industry and capacity will expect some special material reward. And it would be very harsh and unjust suddenly to take away the incomes of those who from birth have been used to an easy and luxurious life, and to insist upon their doing arduous and unaccustomed work. Their very natures, influenced by their birth and environment for which they were not responsible, would make many a task a dreadful trial that one used to such labour would find both easy and congenial. Gradualness is, therefore, essential to justice.

Much the same may be said of the impatient slogan, "Socialism in our Time." As we cannot put a limit to the pace of progress, so we cannot force the pace unduly. All that can with a show of reason be said is, "Socialism as soon as possible." For no one can tell how long it would take to bring about a Socialist régime by methods of justice and consideration, and no other methods would give any hope of permanence.

But this is not written in order to excuse a snail's pace towards better conditions. Indeed, gradual and evolutionary progress, keeping step with the general consensus of opinion, is quicker in the end. The swings of the pendulum, the zigzags, saying violently "yes" and then violently "no," are clumsy, crude, and tempestuous methods of government, followed by democracies because they have not been trained to discriminate, and fostered by our party system. To

reach our ideals as quickly and as surely as the circumstance will permit, with the cordial assent of the vast majority and without injustice to any, there must be education and persuasion followed by conviction. The maxim "hasten slowly" is as old as the ancient Romans, and only thus can the Golden Age be reached.

I remember, about the year 1890, being one of a deputation to Mr. Sidney Webb, then a member of the London County Council, to ask him to stand for Parliament. In explaining his reasons for declining our request, he told us how much better the County Council of that day did its business than was the case in the House of Commons. And he attributed it, partly at least, to the fact that although in the full meetings of the Council the spirit of party predominated, the more important work was of an administrative nature, and, not having been made the subject of party controversy, could be done in committee when the members sat round a table judging the various issues on their merits. But why should not the same tractable and common-sense spirit be extended to matters of party controversy also?

In this connection the method of the Quakers is worth noting. In their business meetings they are not accustomed to settle matters by majorities, but what is shown after discussion to be the general view is, in most cases, accepted by all. In cases of acute difference matters are adjourned, and a generally accepted solution is found later on. It is not suggested that this method is suited to all circumstances, but it is an ideal to which we could, at least, more nearly approximate. It is also more democratic than to settle matters by a ruthless application of the majority system. It cannot be said that the will of the people is carried out when (1) measures are passed that are

only supported by a bare majority in Parliament, and especially when (2) they have been forced through by fictitious majorities made up (owing to a faulty system of voting) of members representing a minority of the electorate. If, for example, in the first case three millions of, say, black electors wish one thing, and two and a half millions of whites wish something else, the will of the people is not carried out by a black, but by a grey decision in which black slightly predominates. In the second case the decision not only fails to carry out, but negatives the will of the people. How much better, except in matters of real urgency, to adjourn such matters, leaving them to round-table conferences where good will and good sense are more likely to prevail! Of course, such a consummation could not be reached at once. Parliament and the electorate must be educated first. Then, in a new atmosphere, a method prompted by the spirit of moderation, by the Golden Mean, would have a better chance of success.

It is true that many round-table conferences have failed. But this has so often been because the right spirit has been wanting; because, as in the great Coal Stoppage of 1926, there was very little genuine desire on either side for a settlement, but rather a fixed resolve to destroy the power of opponents. Of course, there must be cases in any state of society where persuasion fails and a certain amount of compulsion is necessary. In our complex civilization there are so many things in which co-operation is vital, and we cannot wait until everyone voluntarily agrees to generally accepted standards of conduct, or allow a few refractory persons to obstruct the common will. Compulsion, however, is not a permanent remedy, but, as we have seen, a step towards voluntary and cheerful acquiescence.

I trust that enough has been written to show that the endeavour after the good and well-proportioned life that will usher in the Golden Age is the greatest adventure possible to the human spirit, affording ample opportunity for the exercise of all the virtues and all the talents. "Man," says the Buddhist, "is born into a world that he has made"; and, one may add, as he goes along is making a world for himself and those that will follow. For there is no static world, no world that has become, but one that is ever becoming. So we will face the future with cheerful courage, believing that, as one has said, "To-morrow is plastic to the man of faith." †

We have seen what changes the Industrial Revolution has made in the world. But, wonderful and rapid though they were, they cannot be compared with the marvellous advance in scientific knowledge and invention of the present century. Why cannot we believe that the pace of moral advance may also be quickened? If our religious leaders, cleric and lay, would concentrate on the things that are clearly known, that really matter; if our great business men would willingly devote their splendid gifts of management to the general good without looking for enormous material gains in return; if our politicians would pool their brains for their country's sake instead of (as so often) using them to outwit one another; and if we all, with sincere and wholesome introspection, would keep watch upon ourselves so that we may eschew the evil and stress the good, and "put action at the service of a great idea," the Golden Age will be here far sooner than we ever dared to hope.

† The Rev. F. W. Norwood, D.D.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amongst the books that have been consulted, but not already mentioned in the text or the notes, are the following :

*Living Races of Mankind.*

*Autobiography.* Dr. Annie Besant.

*Annual Registers* for various years.

*Cambridge Modern History*, vols. 8, 9, and 10.

*Modern Europe.* C. A. Fyffe, M.A.

*Joseph Mazzini.* Madame E. A. Venturi.

*Life of Bishop Colenso.* G. U. Cox.

*History of Modern England.* H. W. Paul.

*Manual of Ethics.* G. A. Chandavarkar.

*Buddhism (Religions of the World).* Dr. T. W. Rhys Davids.

*Three French Moralists.* E. W. Gosse.

*Making of Religion.* A. Lang.

*Myth, Ritual, and Religion.* A. Lang.

*West African Studies.* Miss M. H. Kingsley.

*The Friends of Voltaire.* S. G. Tallentyre.

*Education, its Data and First Principles.* T. Percy Nunn,  
M.A., D.Sc.

*Caste and Outcast.* D. J. Mukerji.

*Japan, an Interpretation.* Lafcadio Hearn.

*Fabian Essays* (1889).

*The Christian Ethic as an Economic Factor.* Sir Josiah  
Stamp, G.B.E., D.Sc., F.B.A.

*Industry and Property.* C.O.P.E.C. Commission Report (1924).

*The Ethics of Gambling.* W. Douglas Mackenzie, M.A.

*Gambling and Betting.* The Rev. Canon R. H. Charles, D.D.,  
D.Litt., LL.D.



*Russia in 1926.* R. F. and M. S. McWilliams.

*What I Saw in Russia.* G. Lansbury.

*Reforging of Russia.* E. W. Hullinger.

*Through Bolshevik Russia.* Mrs. Philip Snowden.

*In Darkest London.* Mrs. Cecil Chesterton.

*Communism.* H. J. Laski.

*Manufacturing Population of England.* P. Gaskell

*Short History of Industry.* G. H. D. Cole.

*British History in the Nineteenth Century.* G. M. Trevelyan.

*Industrial and Commercial Revolution in Great Britain.* Lilian  
C. A. Knowles.

*Learning and Leadership.* A. Zimmern.

*The Rise of Modern History.* J. L. and B. Hammond.

*The Sayings of Lâo-tsze.* Wisdom of the East Series.

A Pamphlet on *The Russian Revolution*, by R. Page Arnott,  
published by the Labour Research Association.

## INDEX

- Active benevolence, 206  
 Akhnaton, 24  
 Allen, Roland, 185  
 Altruism, 27, 31, 166, 206  
 Andrews, Professor T. H., 138  
 Anglican Church Missions, 32  
 Apprenticeship system, 89 ff.  
 Archer, William, 59 f., 63  
 Aristotle, 19, 24, 55, 142 f.,  
 144, 160  
 Arnold, Matthew, 16 (*note*)  
 Asia, desert tribes of, 80  
 Assyrians, 80  
 Auto-suggestion, 155 ff.
- Bacon, Sir Francis, 19  
 Bahâism, 57  
 Baker, Dr. E. A., 81  
 Baker, Professor Bethune,  
 130  
 Banking system, 168 f.  
 Barnes, Bishop, 182  
 Bayle, 20 (*note*)  
 Bergson, H., 20  
 Bible, the, 18, 123, 126 ff.,  
 130 f., 133 ff., 192 ff.  
 Blasphemy, 66  
 Bolsheviks, 104 ff., 205, 212  
 Bourgeois, 205  
 Bradley, Dr. F. H., 161  
 Brahma Samaj, 57  
 Breadth of mind, 40  
 Brotherhood, *see* Universal  
 Brotherhood  
 Browning, Mrs. E. B., 93
- Bruno, Giordano, 19  
 Buddha and Buddhism, 18,  
 44, 46, 143 f., 147, 216  
 Buffon, 123 f.
- Campbell, Dr. R. J., 140  
 Capital and Labour, 89 ff.,  
 103, 212, 215  
 Carey, Dr. William, 32  
 Carpenter, Dr. J. Estlin, 40  
 Casuistry complex, 187  
 Cecil, Lord W. M. Gascoyne,  
 60  
 Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Ne-  
 ville, 177  
 Charles, Dr. R. H., 138  
 Child-labour, 89 ff.  
 Chimney-sweepers' Act, 92  
 China and the Chinese, 40 ff.,  
 56, 58, 60 f., 81, 180  
 Chown, Rev. J. L., 184  
 Christ, 18, 24, 46, 54, 57, 132,  
 134 f., 136, 148  
 Christian Science, 191  
 Christianity, 53, 148, 182 f.  
 Class bitterness and class-  
 consciousness, 170, 174  
 Class Internationalism, 120 ff.  
 Coal stoppage of 1926, 215  
 Coins, invention of, 168  
 Colenso, Bishop, 127 f.  
 Combination Acts, 98 f.  
 Common Ethic, the, 50 f.,  
 142 ff., 181  
 Communist motto, 212

- Competition and profiteering, 177  
 Compulsion, 201 f., 215  
 Comte, Auguste, 17 f., 57  
 Condorcet, 62  
 Confucius and Confucianism, 18, 42 ff., 46, 55, 143  
 Copernicus, 124  
 Coué, M., 156 f.  
 Creation and the Bible, the, 123 ff.  
 Creeds, 21 f., 140 f.  
  
 Dampier, William, 145  
 Dante, 132  
 Darwin, Charles, 125, 162  
 Dawson, M. M., 48 (*note*)  
 Definitions, 20 f.  
 Democracy, 103 ff., 214 f.  
 Descartes, 7, 17  
 Dewey, John, 35  
 Dock-labourers' strike, 100 f.  
 Dreams, 151 ff., 157 f.  
 Drummond, Henry, 53  
  
 Earning or getting, 168 ff.  
 Egoism, 26 ff., 166  
 Emerson, 207  
 Equality, 171  
 Erasmus, 7, 137  
 Eschatology, 131 ff.  
 Esperanto, 62 f.  
 Ethics, 88 ff., 163, 172, 178, 195 (*see also* the Common Ethic)  
 Evolution, 125 ff.  
 Exclusive salvation, 38 ff.  
 Exclusivism, 36 ff., 54, 66, 183  
  
 Factory Acts and factory workers, 90 ff., 103, 106  
 Faith-healing, 182, 191  
  
 Fascists, 212  
 Fatalism, 84  
 Financial manipulations, 168 f., 171 f.  
 Foreign Missions, 32, 39, 56  
 Fossils, 125, 129  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 73 f.  
 Frankness in religion, 134  
 French Revolution, 110 f., 115  
 Freud, Professor Sigmund, 151 ff., 163  
 Fundamentalism, 181  
  
 Gambling, 172 ff., 196 f.  
 Garvie, Principal A. E., 58  
 Garvin, J. L., 24  
 General Strike, the, 106  
 Gladstone, W. E., 203  
 God, 82 f., 85, 200  
 Goethe, 150, 200  
 Golden Age, the, 15 ff., 47, 107, 198, 199, 206, 209  
 Golden Mean, the, 31, 36, 45 f., 179, 196  
 Golden Rule, the, 46  
 Gore, Bishop, 18, 138, 140, 182, 201  
 Gosse, P. H., 129  
 Gradualness, 213 f.  
 Great War, the, 60, 74  
 Greeks, 112 ff.  
 Grey of Falloden, Viscount, 24, 61  
 Griffith-Jones, Principal E., 76 f.  
  
 Haggard, Sir H. Rider, 70  
 Haldane, Lord, 58  
 Hall, H. R. H., M.A., D.Litt., 80  
 Hammurabi Code, 29 (*note*), 32  
 Hegel, 20

- Hell, 38 f., 131 ff.  
 Henson, Bishop, 182  
 Herschel, Sir William, 124  
 Hesiod, 169 (*note*)  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 17, 20  
 Holden, Dr. Stuart, 182  
 Homilies, the, 129 (*and note*)  
 Horton, Dr. R. F., 182  
 Human nature, 70, 166, 210  
 Hunt, H. E., 157 f.  
 Huxley, T. H., 163  
 Hypotheses, 150 f., 161 f.
- Idle rich, the, 174, 209  
 Imperfect functioning, 159  
 India, 61, 81, 106  
 Individualism, 164 ff.  
 Industrialism, 64, 86 ff.  
 Inge, Dean W. R., 70 (*and note*), 140, 182  
 Internationalism, 109 ff.  
 Introspection, 34 f., 189
- Jacks, Dr. L. P., 188  
 James, William, 207  
 Japan, 56, 180  
 Jefferies, Richard, 77  
 Jerry-builders, 29 (*and note*)  
 Jones, Sir Henry, 23  
 Jones, Dr. J. D., 182
- Kingsley, Charles, 95, 129  
 Kingsley, Miss M. H., 79
- Labourers, Statutes of, 98  
*Laissez Faire*, 93, 95, 102, 166 f.  
 Lâo-tsze, 46  
 Laplace, 124  
 Lawrence, C. E., 67  
 Lay, Dr. Wilfred, 153, 155  
 League of Nations, 51, 63, 109 f.
- Lecky, W. E. H., 69, 190, 210  
 Leibniz, 62, 160  
 Locke, John, 20, 163 (*note*)  
 Luther, Martin, 32 (*note*), 124  
 Luxury, 207 ff.  
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 125
- McDougall, Professor William, 19  
 Match-girls' strike, 99 f.  
 Maurice, J. F. D., 127  
 Mazzini, 119 f.  
 Memory, 156, 158 f.  
 Mencius, 47 f.  
 Metternich, 111 ff., 118  
 Mill, J. S., 71  
 Mines Acts and mine-workers, 92, 94  
 Minimum wage, 102  
 Modernists, 134 ff.  
 Mohammed and Mohammedans, 18, 56, 114, 131, 144, 180  
 Molyneux, William, 20  
 Moral betterment, 209 ff.  
 Moravian Missions, 32, 56  
 Morison, J. C., 26  
 Morley, Lord John, 94 (*note*)  
 Mosaic Code, 32  
 Murray, Professor Gilbert, 63  
 Mysticism, 189 ff.
- Narrowness of mind, 183  
 National misunderstandings, 58 ff.  
 Nationalism, 108 ff.  
 New Psychology, the, 149 ff.  
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 162  
 Norwood, Dr. F. W., 72, 182, 216  
 Numbering of houses, 175

- Open mind, the, 23 f.
- Paine, Tom, 29
- Pankhurst, Miss Christabel, 194
- Partisanship, 31 ff., 202 ff.
- Party government, 203, 214 f.
- Pascal, Blaise, 131
- Patriotism, 33
- Peake, Dr. A. S., 133
- Pittacus, 143
- Platform oratory, 29, 188 f.
- Plato, 19, 46, 55, 143 ff., 160, 189 f.
- Political economy, 164 f.
- Popular appeal, the, 59
- Porritt, Arthur, 29
- Positivism, 57
- Preaching, 184 f.
- Primitives and post-primitives, 78 f., 108, 144 f.
- Professional clergy, 185 ff.
- Profiteering, 135 165, 172 f.
- Progress, 16, 47, 59, 69 ff., 120, 181, 210 ff.
- Progressive revelation, 135 f.
- Property, rights of, 205
- Proportional representation, 204
- Protestantism, 39 f., 126
- Providence, 70 ff.
- Psycho-analysis, 156 f.
- Pusey, Dr., 128, 133
- Quakers, the, 214
- Rabbis, 144, 193, 200
- Rashdall, Dean, 71, 79, 82
- Reed, Dr. Andrew, 39
- Religion, 21, 50 ff., 181 ff. (see also Universal Religion)
- Repression, 159 f.
- Riches, 167 ff., 207
- Rig-Veda, 24, 111, 142
- Right reason, 58
- Roman Catholics, 32, 39, 56, 132 f.
- Rotarians, 27 f.
- Rousseau, 112
- Ruskin, John, 167, 196
- Russell, Countess, 162
- Russia, 81, 103 ff., 113, 115
- St. Augustine, 129 (note), 185, 194
- St. Gregory, 64 f., 206
- St. Paul, 24, 193 f.
- St. Thomas Aquinas, 132
- Salvation Army Song Book*, 65 (and note)
- Schelling's *Absolute*, 20
- Schreiner, Olive, 138
- Second Advent, 18, 182, 194
- Sectarianism, 38 ff., 57, 183
- Sectionalism, 31 ff.
- Self-care and selfishness, 27 f.
- Self-made man, the, 167 f.
- Shaftesbury, Earl, 92
- Shaw, G. B., 201
- Simple life, the, 207
- Singer, Dr. Charles, 162
- Socialism, 167, 179, 213
- Socrates, 19, 44, 55, 132, 143, 186 f., 189
- Specialism, 149 f., 163
- Specialism in religion, 183
- Spencer, Herbert, 20, 93, 102
- Spiritualism, 182
- Sport and pleasure, 195 f., 209
- State sovereignty, 109 f.
- Statistics of religions, 52 f.
- Stoics, the, 24, 144, 206
- Sweating system, the, 94 f.
- Symbolism, 136 f., 187

- Tagore, Sir R., 61  
 Taylor, R. W. C., 90  
 Telling, Dr. W. H. M., 152 f.,  
     207 f.  
 Temple, Archbishop, 128  
 Thackeray, W. M., 69  
 Theodicy, 71 ff.  
 Theosophy, 57  
 Thirty Years' War, the, 80  
 Trade Unionists and Bolshev-  
     ism, 105  
 Trinity, doctrine of the, 135,  
     201  
 Truck System, the, 96 f.  
 Truth, 17 ff.  
 Turks, 112 ff.  
 Tyndall, Professor, 125 f.
- "Unconscious," the, 152, 159  
 Universal brotherhood, 24 f.,  
     143 f., 202 ff.  
 Universal language, 59  
 Universal peace, 58 f.  
 Universal religion, 50 ff., 139,  
     141, 199 ff.  
 Usher, Archbishop, 123
- Vauvenargues, 146 ff.  
 Vienna, Congress of, 111 f.  
 Virgil, 160  
 Voltaire, 20 (*note*), 140,  
     146  
 Voluntary clergy, 185 ff.
- Webb, Rt. Hon. Sidney,  
     M.P., LL.B., 214  
 Wells, H. G., 31, 49, 72  
 Wesley, John, 55, 73, 130  
 Whale, G., 74, 195  
 Whately, Archbishop, 22  
 Witch-doctor, 29  
 Witches, persecution of, 131  
 Wood, H. G., M.A., 170  
 Work, obligation to, 201,  
     207  
 Workless, the, 97
- Younghusband, Sir Francis,  
     162  
 Young Men's Christian Asso-  
     ciation, 182 f.
- Zamenhof, Dr., 62



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.  
LONDON : 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1  
CAPE TOWN : 73 ST. GEORGE'S STREET  
SYDNEY, N.S.W. : WYNYARD SQUARE  
WELLINGTON, N.Z. : 4 WILLIS STREET