

a majority of votes. The last-mentioned result was frequently produced by a large number of the electors voting for only one candidate out of the five or six who were in the field.

With a view of avoiding these serious defects, the cities of Hobart and Launceston were converted into two electorates under the Clark-Hare system, which enables every section of political opinion which can command the requisite quota of votes to secure a number of representatives proportionate to its numerical strength. It also utilizes every vote recorded, if the elector chooses to exercise the whole of his power to indicate his preferences. If any vote is not used to help in the election of a representative, it is because the voter has chosen to indicate his preferences for a less number of candidates than the number of representatives to be elected in the electorate in which he votes.

So far the causes which led to the introduction of the Clark-Hare system of voting in Tasmania have very clearly been revealed by the author and originator of the modified form of the Hare system known as the "Clark-Hare" system, which, in the opinion of those who have given "true representation" the most careful investigation, has fulfilled in every way the original anticipations of its introducer, and for the first time has given for the electorates affected a closer approach to the true voice of the electors than has ever been attained by any other system of election. It is only natural that those candidates who have failed to be returned under the Clark-Hare system should comfort themselves with the idea that the machinery of election was at fault, and that under some other system than that of "proportional representation" they might have a better chance of success. These, however, together with the typical electioneering agent or canvasser, are well aware that it is less costly, or easier, to come in touch personally with a small electorate, and hence they form a very strong adverse influence to the retention or expansion of the Hare system of voting in any shape whatever. This is naively indicated by all such objectors, by the restriction of their ideas on representation, not to fairer representation of the elector and his greater freedom of choice, but entirely to considerations confined to the ease and convenience of the candidate as such. The rights of the electors and their freedom of choice are scarcely ever dwelt upon by many such who are desirous of appearing as their true representatives in Parliament.

ELECTIONS UNDER THE HARE SYSTEM.

The following is a list of the Elections conducted under the Hare system in Tasmania since its first introduction :—

STATE ELECTIONS.

Date.	Electorate.	No. of Seats.	No. of Candidates.
20th January, 1897 - - - - -	Hobart - - - - -	6	12
20th January, 1897 - - - - -	Launceston- - - - -	4	—
12th March, 1900 - - - - -	Hobart - - - - -	6	9
12th March, 1900 - - - - -	Launceston. - - - - -	4	—

COMMONWEALTH ELECTIONS.

March, 1901 - - - - -	House of Representatives - -	5	9
March, 1901 - - - - -	Senate - - - - -	6	15

(For the election of members to represent Tasmania, both for House of Representatives and Senate, the State as a whole formed one electorate.)

WORKING RESULTS OF THE HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

The working results of the first four State elections under the Hare system in Tasmania has already been very fully investigated by Mr. R. M. Johnston, Government Statistician, who had immediate charge of the work of tabulation at the elections in Hobart, under the returning officer, Mr. George Davis, C.M.G., M.H.A., Mayor.

It may be of advantage, in this Report, to confine attention, as far as possible, to the working results of the two last elections under the Hare system in returning members to represent Tasmania in the Commonwealth, six for the Senate, and five for the House of Representatives.

That some difference in the results would likely happen if the whole State was, as originally suggested, broken up into six single electorates, would not at all be improbable. The Hare system gave a choice to each elector of fifteen candidates, and thus favoured those candidates who were in general as well as in local favour among the great body of electors. The single electorate method would restrict the electors' choice to at most two or three candidates, none of which, perhaps, were in particular favour, but might happen to succeed if voting were restricted to the single district where alone the candidate had any considerable following. Fortunately the effect of the ballot, if worked on the single electorate plan, can be very closely gauged, for out of the total 18,403 votes polled for the whole State, 16,897 can be referred to each of the five principal divisions into which at one time it was suggested that the State should be divided.

The following analysis shows, in all probability, what the result would be if the election was conducted upon the single electorate system.

To understand more clearly this localisation into five single divisions it may be of advantage to give a rough idea of the composition of the five districts, thus:—

Natone:—Comprises Kelly's Basin, Crotty, Queenstown, Gormanston, Zeehan, remainder of Zeehan District, Waratah, and Wellington.

Paratana:—Comprises Devonport, Latrobe, Deloraine, Westbury, Longford, Cressy, and Evandale.

Mangana:—Comprises Launceston, Selby, George Town, Ringarooma, and Fingal.

Taline:—Cumberland, Campbelltown, Glamorgan, Oatlands, Brighton, Richmond, Sorrell, New Norfolk, Franklin, and Kingborough.

Loinah:—Comprises Hobart, Glenorchy, and Queenborough.

We have seen already that the six candidates who were returned elected obtained actually out of 18,403 effective first preference votes a total of 12,403 votes, or 67·40 per cent, while the nine unsuccessful candidates only obtained 6,000 effective first preference votes, or 32·60 per cent. Whatever qualification we make, therefore, it is manifest that the returned members commanded fully two-thirds of all effective votes within the State, irrespective of the party or opinions which, as a group, they may have represented. So far, therefore, as the represented—the Hamlet of all matters regarding representation—are concerned, the major power of the opinions or wishes of the majority is indubitably honestly represented, so far as Tasmania is concerned, in the Commonwealth Senate.

But while this result cannot very well be disputed, there are those who, in the history of candidates, merely—bear in mind candidates are not necessarily in harmony with the electors, so far as their respective interests in the election of representatives are concerned—are always eager to affirm that better results would have been secured had the State been cut up into single electorates.

So far as local politics are concerned as regards country districts particularly, there is much to be said in favour of single member electorates (conjoined with the contingent absolute majority vote), for the often large and undeveloped areas of agricultural, pastoral, mineral, and other primary industries are far more concerned about politics centred in means of communication (railways, roads, bridges, harbours, jetties, &c., *e.g.*) than in any matter common to all divisions of the State, such, for example, as defence, external trade (ex-Australian), tariff, excise, judicature, charities, education, old-age pensions, and such like.

These are now the peculiarly distinguishing features between Commonwealth and State politics. The interests of the Commonwealth, so far as its functions extend, are common or homogeneous to all the divisions of any State, and therefore the State in itself need not be broken up into separate divisions to obtain the best results for the State as a whole. In this respect, it is in a similar condition to the different divisions or wards of a great town or city whose interests, politico-geographical, are in common. To break up such homogeneous units into local artificial divisions would not serve the true interests of electors, neither could it, except by chance, produce a fair indication of the wishes and choice of the majority of the electors within each State.

Notwithstanding these critical observations, let us examine, as far as possible, what different effect would likely have been produced had the State of Tasmania been, for Federal purposes, divided into single electorates.

For this purpose, let us reasonably assume that candidates under such circumstances would seek for election in that division which would appear to the candidate to possess the largest body of his own particular following, or in that division where he was likely to succeed.

To make the comparisons more fair, it may be desirable in the interests of the single district sympathisers to contrast the intensity of local support against all local competitors with the intensity of first preference effective votes obtained by all such as against other candidates within the State as a whole.

Probable Results if the same Candidates Contested for One out of the Five House of Representatives Seats in that One of the Five Districts in which the Particular Candidate had the Greatest Following.

The following are in all probability the candidates that would be elected by this localisation together with the probable strength of their following, and the order of their preference generally:—

Candidate.	Following No.	Preference Order. No.	District.	Percentage.	
				1-Member.	6-Member.
O'Malley - - -	2,402	1	Natone - - -	51·67	21·84
Braddon - - -	1,424	2	Paratana - - -	49·91	26·19
Piesse - - -	841	3	Loinah - - -	22·98	10·08
Hartnoll - - -	652	4	Mangana - - -	17·32	7·93
Cameron - - -	374	5 (?) }	Talune - - -	19·63	11·68
Fysh - - -	316	5 (??) }		22·49	9·95

From this analysis it will be seen that the only defeated candidate under the six-member system who would probably be returned under the one-member system would be Hartnoll, while the fifth seat would lie between Cameron and Fysh.

It must be shown, however, that Hartnoll would only be placed third for Mangana if Braddon and O'Malley contested, for, in the order of names, the latter gained the first and second positions. Similarly for Talune, it is probable that neither Cameron nor Fysh would have been elected by the one-member system if Braddon and Piesse had contested it with them, for it has been found that, in the order of their names, the latter would have gained in election the first and second positions.

These wonderfully close results by the two different systems of election demonstrate the great advantages and the almost complete freedom from the element of chance secured under the Clark-Hare system of election.

INVALID BALLOT-PAPERS.

SENATE ELECTIONS.

The total number of ballot-papers polled for the election of Senators numbered 18,822; 18,403 were declared valid and 419 were declared invalid. The following gives a more complete analysis of the invalid papers:—

	No.	Per cent.
Defective preference numbering - - - - -	268	1·42
Unrecognisable figures - - - - -	3	·02
Total due to Hare system - - - - -	271	1·44
Illegal marking or scoring - - - - -	104	·55
Adding signature - - - - -	4	·03
Disfigured or blank papers - - - - -	40	·21
Defects not due to Hare system - - - - -	148	·79
Total invalid papers, Senate - - - - -	419	2·23

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The total number of ballot-papers polled for the election of Members for the House of Representatives numbered 18,572, of which 18,039 were declared valid and 533 were declared invalid. The following is a more complete analysis of the invalid papers:—

	No.	Per cent.
Defective preference numbering - - - - -	329	1·77
Unrecognisable figures - - - - -	6	·03
Total due to Hare system - - - - -	335	1·80
Illegal marking or scoring - - - - -	110	·60
Adding signature - - - - -	6	·03
Disfigured or blank papers - - - - -	82	·44
Defects not due to Hare system - - - - -	198	1·07
Total invalid papers, House of Representatives - - - - -	533	2·87

APPENDIX B.

1898.—VICTORIA.

HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

THE HARE SYSTEM IN TASMANIA—being a Paper read before the Royal Society of Tasmania,
by PROFESSOR JETHRO BROWN, M.A., LL.D.

The fate of the Hare system constitutes one of the most remarkable incidents in the history of representative government. Mr. Hare's treatise, "The Election of Representatives," was published in 1859. It claimed to have discovered a remedy for some of the most serious of the evils to which Democracy is subject, and almost immediately received an attention not unworthy of the capacity of the writer and the magnitude of the problems discussed. In 1860 the celebrated Henry Fawcett was responsible for the publication, "Mr. Hare's Reform Bill Simplified and Explained." In the following year there appeared the "Representative Government" of John Stuart Mill. The latest advocate spoke in no uncertain tone:—"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends, of scarcely inferior importance. . . . Such and so numerous are its advantages that they place it among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government." Such commendation, where it failed to invoke the enthusiasm of the reformer, should at least have aroused the interest of the citizen. No champion came forward to defend the older system; many of the evils which the new was designed to remedy were becoming increasingly grave. If we attach to such circumstances the importance they deserve, the issue must appear surprising. Thirty-five years after the publication of Mill's treatise, when the Hon. A. I. Clark, Attorney-General of Tasmania, introduced a Bill to apply the Hare system to city constituencies, he could appeal to no precedent in the Parliamentary experience of English-speaking peoples!

Weighed in the balance and found wanting! The conclusion seems irresistible, but it is not supported by facts. Neither experience nor argument has condemned the Hare system. To what circumstances, then, may we attribute its ill-fortune? Not to the objections which have been urged, for these are more frequently afterthought which justify an argument founded in prejudice. Even where they are serious they are not unanswerable. The solution of the mystery is rather to be found in two facts, of which one is a weakness of human nature, and the other a satire on party government. In the first place, the plan of Mr. Hare suggests innovation. In the second place, it is one of those innovations which share the fate of the inconstant lover; by affecting all parties it secures the allegiance of none. It might be added as a third explanation that the most serious of the evils it claims to correct are only beginning to receive adequate recognition. Each of these facts would admit of illustration and proof. But it is not so much the object of this paper to attack or to defend the Hare system, as to give an exposition of its application to this colony. The Bill of 1896 has become law, and it includes several important modifications upon the proposals of Mr. Hare, which should be of more than local interest. Before attempting their consideration, it may be well to indulge the curiosity of the uninitiated by a statement of the merits which have been claimed for the system whose defects the Tasmanian modifications are designed to remedy.

The determination of constituencies by reference to geographical considerations is at once the great aversion of Mr. Hare and the most conspicuous trait of the usual system. In substitution, he proposes the determination of constituencies by voluntary association. The tie by local contiguity is to be superseded by the bond of kinship—kinship not of blood but of ideas! The great law of progress, defined by Maine as from status to contract, already abundantly illustrated in the sphere of private law, is to find a new illustration in the domain of *Jus Publicum*. Every constituency is to be a partnership "in which there are to be no sleeping partners, much less partners repudiating and protesting against the acts of the rest and yet unable to extricate themselves. . . . Full scope will be given to every generous sentiment by which men may be drawn together. Devotion to a great principle, regard for an illustrious name, affection for an ancient house, admiration of worthy deeds, attachment to a particular neighbourhood, love of country or of class, community of feeling, harmony of taste, may all form so many occasions of concord, and create innumerable circles, binding together in society all varieties of rank and

voting and a deepening of political interest. I allude to the circumstance that the classification of a number of candidates in an order of merit affords some occasion for the display of a useful vanity. The elaborate discussions which took place in this colony at an election just held under the Hare system, suggest a study no less suggestive to the thoughtful than engaging to the curious. The arguments were not always distinguished by exceptional intelligence or an exceptional integrity; but the interest was phenomenal. "Who should be first? Who second?" &c. He is no true friend to liberty who does not place a high value upon such discussions.

Mr. Hare claimed for his system that it would lessen the evils, if not remove the causes, of political corruption. The arguments by which this claim is supported are not always convincing; but they are invariably respectable, and in one case conclusive. When it is open to no one to effect a sale of his constituency by turning the scale at an election, the obstacles to bribery must be materially increased. For this reason as well as for others which have already engaged our attention, one may indulge the hope of a more virtuous Legislature. The hope becomes stronger when reflection has weighed those independent grounds by which it is justified. The unrestricted freedom of choice favours the nomination of intelligence and probity. Parties anxious to retain or to recover the confidence of the country must bind the allegiance of their followers by the nomination of the acceptable—the wise, the good, or at least the strong. But the freedom of choice affects the character of the Legislature in a manner more direct and more effective; it fosters a spirit of independence, since a candidate can spurn a dishonest compliance when he relies upon the electors of a colony. No longer compelled to humour the several sections of a single constituency, he is freed from a disagreeable dilemma—so common and so demoralising! Avoiding alike the mean subterfuge and the fatal avowal, he relies for support upon the diversity of his electorate. In such respects, a comparison of the Hare system and the referendum suggest a fact of some importance. The referendum is the natural resource of a people perplexed by the domination of a corrupt or unrepresentative Legislature. But the reference to the popular vote implies a diminution of Parliamentary responsibility, and may, therefore, aggravate those evils whose effects it is designed to correct. The Hare system seeks, by improving the character of the Legislature, to remove the causes of the evil.

This seems the proper place to consider the argument of Bagehot that the Hare system is inconsistent with the independence of Parliament; that a voluntary constituency would be a Church with tenets, and would, therefore, reserve the despotism in its own hands. This argument is fast losing whatever importance might once have attached to it. The difference between the candidate elected under the Hare system and one elected under the usual system, is not that the latter is the more independent, but that the former is bound to a constituency whose general sentiments he represents and not to one whose general sentiments he represents in part but must respect *in toto*.

I have spoken of the merits of an equality of representation; of a new and deeper interest in political life; of politics made purer and of a Parliament made more worthy. At this stage it might seem proper to attempt a systematic consideration of the objections which have engaged the attention of Constitutional writers. Such objections, however, may more conveniently be discussed in connexion with the modifications adopted in this colony for the purpose of weakening, if not destroying, their force. It will be seen that a compromise has not always been effected without some diminution of the merits of Mr. Hare's scheme. But I think in each case there is a great and obvious gain. Of the modifications to which allusion is made, the first has been generally associated in this colony with the name of Sir John Lubbock. It must be regarded as a complete answer to the objection, so commonly urged and so difficult to impugn, that the Hare system is too complicated to be practicable. The student of Mr. Hare's treatise is often tempted to regard the task of the Returning Officer as beyond the reach of mortals. In the application of the method to a whole country it is difficult to see how the formation of voluntary constituencies could be effected without incurring all the evils of a constituency-making trade. In the Tasmanian Bill the method has been confined to city constituencies. These return six or four members. Though the constituencies might be larger with advantage, the present arrangement has one very obvious merit; the argument from complexity only remains as the frail support of those whose prejudice, or whose indifference, has rendered them impervious to reason. The simplicity both of the process of voting and of the general principle of the Act, is clearly shown by the following instructions suggested by Miss Spence, of South Australia:—

1. There are here twelve candidates, six to be elected.
2. Vote by numbering candidates in the order of your choice, that is to say:—Place 1 to the left of the candidate you like best. Place 2 to the left of the name of the candidate you like second best. Place 3 to the left of the name of the candidate you like next best, and so on.
3. Vote for not less than three names.
4. The same number must not be placed against more than one name.
5. The numbers must be placed opposite the names.

NOTE.—Your vote will be used for one candidate according to your preference. If the candidate you like most, either (a) Does not need your vote (has enough votes to elect him without your vote), or (b) cannot use your vote (has so few votes that he cannot possibly be selected), your vote will be transferred to the candidate you like next best, as shown by your numbers, and used—not wasted.

result of this distribution, it is to be redistributed in a proportion determined by reference to the next preferences on the whole of the ballot-papers previously transferred to him. The process of elimination, occasionally alternated with the distribution of a surplus, is continued until the number of candidates does not exceed the number of vacancies.

The principles underlying the Tasmanian Electoral Act have been explained with studious brevity. The courtesy of my audience may excuse, if their curiosity does not solicit, an account of the election held under its provisions. It will be sufficient to speak of the district of Hobart. Consistently with the anticipations of the Legislature, the occasion was honoured by a display of interest equally remarkable for its diffusion and for its intensity. For ten hours the crowd barred the approaches to the polling booth. The proceedings were enlivened by the usual humours of the election day, such phrases as "Rabid on the Hare System," suggested alluring opportunities for distinction, requiring little intelligence in the wit and less in the auditors. The mode of distributing the surplus afforded endless occasion for discussion and misunderstanding, and for that humour which, as it was unconscious, we may perhaps impute to genius. "It all comes to this," said one elector, "when Clark has all the votes he needs, any other vote for him goes to the next man on the list who needs it most." One dialogue deserved to be specially recorded. "The practical common-sense men tell me the old system is the best." "But I expect the practical common-sense men of whom you speak do not understand the Hare system." "That's so; they said as much; but still they are practical common-sense men, and that is sufficient for me." Such remarks illustrate, with admirable felicity, the character of the most serious opposition which the advocate of the Hare system must encounter. They further illustrate the folly of efforts to instruct the electors in the minutiae of a Bill with whose general principles they are unfamiliar. As Mr. Hare remarked in his treatise, a passenger is satisfied to travel by the express though ignorant of the details of the steam-engine. The justice of the parallel is admirable, and it is a matter for regret that more attention has not been paid to it in the politics of this colony. Instead of instruction in the broad principles of proportional representation, its general fairness and distinctive merits, the elector has been perplexed by the processes involved in the distribution of a surplus. For this reason, among others, the list of informal votes was large. Even the prophets fell; a candidate for parliamentary honours, deeply versed in the lore of proportional distribution, rendered his vote informal by scoring out the names of opposing candidates—the method formerly adopted. His success at the election may be taken to prove the indulgence of fate.

At 6.30 p.m., soon after the prescribed time for closing the poll, the process of counting the votes began. The ballot-boxes were brought to the Returning Officer, the ballot-papers were removed, unfolded, and taken to the scrutineers, who began to sort them for the first count. Attached to each of the scrutineers' tables there was a box with several compartments—one for each candidate, one for doubtful, and one for invalid papers. The work of the scrutineers consisted in taking the papers one by one, and calling out the names of the candidates marked 1, and placing them in the compartments appropriated to the respective candidates. Two clerks registered the votes on their recording sheets. Finally, these recording sheets were tabulated and handed to Mr. Johnston, the Government Statistician, and presiding genius of the election. When the various numbers had been totalled, the result of the first or primary votes became known. The totals of Mr. Johnston were checked by the Returning Officer, who had previously settled the destination of doubtful papers. It was found that the total number of valid votes were 2,745. As there were six seats, the quota was fixed at 457. Only one of the candidates (Sir Phillip Fysh) obtained a quota as the result of the first count. As the primary votes of this candidate amounted to 501, there was a surplus of 44 for distribution among remaining candidates. After the whole 501 ballot-papers had been given to the scrutineers for the purpose of estimating second preferences, it was found that Bradley claimed 41, Clark 304, Cox 2, Crisp 38, Dillon 9, Fulton 1, Hiddlestone 30, Mulcahy 42, Page 19, Paton 4, and St. Hill 10. A sum in simple proportion followed. If Bradley is entitled to 41 votes out of 501, to how many is he entitled out of a surplus of 44?

$\frac{44 \times 41}{501} = 3\frac{3}{5}$ or, getting rid of the fraction, 4. The Returning Officer had then to take from Fysh's

box any four ballot-papers on which Bradley was marked 2, and to place them in Bradley's box. In this manner, by the aid of Fuller's spiral slide rule, the whole surplus of 44 votes was instantly distributed among the unelected candidates. This completed the second count. Had any candidate secured a surplus as the result of this count, that surplus must have been distributed in a proportion determined by reference to the third votes on the whole of the ballot-papers he had received from Sir Phillip Fysh. As a matter of fact, no additional candidate had received a quota, and it remained to begin the process of excluding lowest candidates. The first victim was Mr. Cox, whose 33 votes were now distributed among second preferences except where Sir Philip Fysh was second, in which case it went to the third preference. No candidate gained a surplus as a result of this count, Mr. Fulton, who was lowest on the poll at this stage, was then excluded, and his 122 papers were distributed among the candidates whose fate yet remained uncertain. The result of this distribution was to raise Mr. Bradley's total to 483. As this involved a surplus of 26, that surplus had to be distributed in a proportion determined by reference to the next preferences on the whole votes transferred to Bradley from other candidates, i.e., from Fysh, Cox, or Fulton. The process of elimination, alternated with the occasional distribution of a surplus, was continued until only six candidates remained. These were then declared elected. It will be seen from the accompanying table that only four were successful in obtaining a quota.


the names; 3 were illegible; 2 had contributed their signatures; 2 had marked all their candidates 2 instead of 1, 2, 3, &c.; 1 had given his numbers in writing; and 1 had scrawled over the whole of his paper, apparently to express an abhorrence of the system.

If we regard the Act as a whole, I am not aware that experience has exposed its defects. Whatever objections a captious criticism may discover, there is, perhaps, but one which requires serious attention. If X receives 2,000 primary votes, and the quota be 1,000, the resulting surplus is distributed in a proportion determined by reference to secondary preferences on the whole of X's 2,000 votes. Under such a mode of distribution nothing is left to chance or to the discretion of the Returning Officer. But let us go a step further—let us suppose that Y has 800 primary votes, and that he receives 600 from X's surplus. In that case he obtains his quota and 400 excess votes. How are these excess votes to be distributed? Several modes suggest themselves. The Returning Officer may take the 400 ballot-papers from the top of Y's box and pass them on to next preferences; he may do this after having first shuffled the whole of Y's papers; or, again, he may exercise his own sweet will upon them. The objection to each of these courses is clear. But if the surplus of 400 is to be distributed according to a proportion, by reference to what ballot-papers is the proportion to be determined? The Act, apparently with the intention of simplifying the work of the Returning Officer, answers "By reference to the 600 papers transferred from X to Y." It will be at once seen that this introduces the element of chance. We know that if Y gained 600 of X's surplus of 1,000, he must have been marked 2 on 6-10ths of X's total number of primary votes, $2,000 \times 6-10 = 1,200$. The actual 600 papers transferred from X to Y were to be chosen at random from the whole of the 1,200 papers on which Y was marked 2. The proportion among the third votes of one chance selection from this 1,200 might be very different from the proportion among the third votes of another chance selection. If the Returning Officer choose "to take a hand," the variations may be increased. All such objections may be avoided by distributing Y's surplus of 400 in a proportion determined by reference to the whole of the 1,200 papers, i.e., the whole of the X Y papers. It might save time if the Returning Officer, in transferring the 600 papers which constituted Y's share of X's surplus, were to preserve the same proportion of third votes on transferred papers, as existed on the whole 1,200 X Y papers. In the distribution of Y's surplus of 400 it would then be sufficient to make a calculation on the basis of the papers transferred from X to Y. It may be interesting to note that the distribution of Y's surplus might also be determined by reference (1) to the third votes on the whole of X's original papers; (2) to the third votes on the total number of X's original papers taken together with the second votes on the total number of Y's original papers; (3) to the third votes of the whole electorate. The evils of complexity form an answer to the arguments by which these alternatives can be supported. Any proposal to effect a distribution by reference to third votes on the whole electorate is open to an additional objection; it would give an undue influence to electors voting according to prescribed ticket. The objection would apply with peculiar force to any proposal to distribute surpluses arising as a result of the first count in a proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the whole electorate.

In conclusion, I crave your indulgence, while directing your attention to the dreaded reproach of innovation. Professor Freeman has observed how often these great reforms, which mark the progress of our race, have involved a return to the traditions, institutions or ideas of an earlier time. The barons who wrung from a reluctant monarch the Great Charter of our liberties, only sought to record and to secure the acknowledged birthrights of Englishmen. The Parliament of De Montfort was a device for restoring the freedom of the Teuton. For the primitive assembly of the tribe there was substituted the Representative Parliament of a nation; for appearance in person the new conditions required an appearance through chosen deputies. Yet the great principle of the right of the people to share in the work of government underlay both institutions. Thus it happened that the privileges which English forefathers had enjoyed in the forest of ancient Germany, but which had been sacrificed in the process of migration and national consolidation, were to be regained in the great and painful crises of a later century.

If we consider the characteristics of the Hare system in connection with the Parliament of the thirteenth century, I believe we shall arrive at a startling conclusion. Mr. Hare sought to introduce an organic element into our system of representation. The new constituencies were designed to be united by allegiance to one object, to be animated by one spirit. I believe that here again in the history of our race we may discover, under the semblance of innovation, the reality of an ancient practice. This is no place to justify such a generalisation by an inadequate induction from the facts of mediæval history. Yet the interest and the importance of the inquiry may justify an illustration of its meaning. In the first place, the mediæval Parliament represented the estates of the realm—the Clergy, the Baronage, and the Commons. These were not arbitrary divisions of the State, but organic parts of the nation. The means by which they acquired the reality and the consciousness of internal cohesion, form one of the most engrossing chapters in the national annals. The facts of history lend no encouragement to the suggestion of a residuary class in the estate of the Commons. The third estate represented the alliance of the communities of the shires with the communities of the towns, and was the result of many causes, among which we may distinguish the appreciations of common dangers, the inducements of royal policy, and the similarity of the processes employed in the exercise of political rights.

Starting from the established fact that the mediæval Parliament was an assemblage of estates, we have yet to inquire the character of the constituencies of the third estate. Were they, too, organic? I confess I see no answer to this question but the affirmative. The representatives of the Commons were the deputies of the shires and the towns. Each shire was a unit of the nation bound together by its common court, its common judicial and administrative organisation. The county was an organised body of men—a *communitas*—almost a kingdom in miniature. If we





(1) Return "of net public income and public expenditure" (Great Britain). 1906.

X7.3.N

D8

(2) East India (India Office Balances).

Memorandum "on India Office Balances, 1913

X7:87.2

E3

(3) Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Municipal Representation Bill. 1907

V3, 6:91: (2).N076

PUBLIC INCOME AND EXPENDITURE.

RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons
dated 18 June 1906 ;—for,

S207
1420

1627

RETURN "of NET PUBLIC INCOME and NET PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
under certain specified Heads, as represented by RECEIPTS into and
ISSUES out of the EXCHEQUER from 1891-92 to 1905-6, inclusive
(in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 239, of Session 1905)."

Treasury Chambers,
17 July 1906. }

REGINALD McKENNA.

①

(*Sir Henry Fowler.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
17 July 1906.

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1906.

[NOTE.—In the Editions issued previously to 1900–1901, the figures of this annual Return were carried back to 1869–70. In order, however, to reduce its bulk, the first year given in the present Return is 1891–92; and, accordingly, if the figures for any of the earlier years are required, reference must be made to the Return No. 357 of Session 1900.]

EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

THE Account of Exchequer transactions, which appears on the first pages of the Finance Accounts of the United Kingdom, constitutes the National Balance Sheet of each financial year. It gives, on the one side, the total receipts paid into the Exchequer as Revenue; and, on the other side, the total issues made out of the Exchequer to meet payments chargeable against Revenue.

The figures, however, include many items on both sides of the Account which are so closely connected with one another as to justify the set-off of the particular receipts against the corresponding payments or *vice versa*; and in this Return, for which Sir Henry H. Fowler has moved for some years, the set-off is (so far as is possible) made; the object being that the true cost of the Imperial Government, so far as it falls on the general taxpayer or the community at large, may be shown in broad detail over a series of years. The Return, in short, is an extension of the system now adopted for many years of appropriating extra receipts in aid of Expenditure; the result of which is to bring out smaller totals on both sides of the account.

Thus:—According to the Finance Accounts for 1905–6 the total	£
Revenue (page 8) amounted to	- 143,977,575
and the total Expenditure chargeable against Revenue (page 9) to	- 140,511,955
The Revenue, therefore, exceeded the Expenditure by	<u>3,465,620</u>

In Sir H. Fowler's Return the Revenue (page 17) is set down at	- 126,870,474
and the Expenditure (page 25) at	- 123,404,854
bringing out the same result, viz., a surplus of	<u>3,465,620</u>

The difference, however, in the amounts of the Revenue and Expenditure as given in the two Accounts is	<u>17,107,101</u>
--	-------------------

Before this difference is accounted for, it is necessary to explain the basis of the Return, and to reconcile the figures which it contains with those in the Finance Accounts.

Part I. gives as *Public Income*:

1. The amounts received into the Exchequer in respect of Revenue derived from taxes.
2. The amounts received into the Exchequer in respect of Revenue derived from sources other than taxes, viz.:—
 - (1.) Postal and Telegraph Revenue, together with such extra receipts as are cognate to Postal Services, less the Expenditure incurred on those services, as represented by Exchequer issues on account of Post Office, Telegraph, and Packet Services.
 - (2.) Revenues of the Crown.
 - (3.) Interest and Dividends on the Suez Canal Shares belonging to His Majesty's Government.

The amounts received into the Exchequer under the head of Miscellaneous Revenue (less the receipts cognate to the Postal Services), and the receipts in respect of loans, are set off against the heads of Expenditure to which they most appropriately belong.

Part II. classifies *Public Expenditure* under certain specified heads, viz. :—

1. National Debt Services.
2. Naval and Military Expenditure.
3. Civil Services, grouped under three main sub-heads, viz. :
 - (1.) Civil List and Civil Administration.
 - (2.) Elementary Education.
 - (3.) Charges transferred at different times from Local to Imperial Funds, and other Expenditure deemed to be of a local character.
4. Customs and Inland Revenue (Collection of Taxes).
5. Special Services (if any), which do not fall under the other heads.

Under this classification, all charges belonging to each head or sub-head are brought together; that is, those which are included among *Consolidated Fund Services* and as such are permanent charges, as well as those which are included among *Supply Services* and as such are charges voted annually. From the gross totals so arrived at under the prescribed heads there are deducted the items of receipt which can properly be set off against those totals.

It should, however, be stated that the classification of Expenditure proceeds on broad lines only. It does not attempt to be exhaustive. For instance, the charges borne on Civil Votes in respect of buildings, stationery, &c., for the Revenue Departments are not eliminated from expenditure on civil administration, and transferred to the services to which they more properly belong. Indeed, a detailed classification would in many instances be impossible; for it could only be done with precision when the final accounts of the various Votes are rendered, and they are not yet rendered for the past year when this Return is issued. Moreover, numerous transfers of charges from one service to another would greatly complicate the Return.

The figures in this Return and the Finance Accounts for the latest year (1905-6) have next to be reconciled.

PART I.—INCOME (p. 17).

The figures relating to Revenue derived from Taxes are identical in both Returns so also are those relating to Crown Lands.

It is only with respect to Postal Services that explanation on the Income side is needed.

	£.
Postal Revenue - - - - -	16,880,000
Telegraph Revenue - - - - -	4,130,000

TOTAL in FINANCE ACCOUNTS for 1905-6 (p. 8) - 21,010,000

Cognate Receipts under the head "Miscellaneous Revenue," Finance Accounts (p. 28) - 24,367

21,034,367

Deduct,—Expenditure in Finance Accounts for 1905-6 (p. 9), viz. :—

	£.
(1.) Post Office - - - - -	10,630,000
(2.) Telegraph Service - - - - -	4,648,000
(3.) Packet Service - - - - -	700,000

15,978,000

Less,—Charges transferred—

To National Debt Services:

(Charges connected with borrowing
under Telegraph Acts, 1892 to
1904) - - - - - 399,351

To Civil Services:

(Rates on Telegraph premises) - 6,433

405,784

15,572,216

TOTAL in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN for 1905-6 (p. 17) - 5,462,151

PART II.—EXPENDITURE (p. 25).

I.—NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES:

Appendix A. (p. 33) shows in detail how the figure under this head is arrived at.

Thus, for the year 1905-6 :—

The Permanent or Fixed Annual Charge (Finance Accounts, p. 9.) - £. 28,000,000

Outside the Permanent or Fixed Annual Charge (Finance Accounts, p. 9) 25,027

Add,—Other charges connected with capital liabilities transferred from :— £.

(1.) Consolidated Fund (Civil) Services :—

Charges connected with borrowing—

Under Russian-Dutch Loan Act, 1891 - £. 43,554

Under Cunard Agreement (Money) Act, 1904 7,500

51,054

(2.) Naval and Military Supply Services :

Charges connected with borrowing—

Under the Barracks Act, 1890 - £. 303,967

" " Military Works Acts, 1897 to 1903 716,858

" " Naval Works Acts, 1895 to 1905 1,015,812

2,036,637

(3.) Civil Supply Services :

Charges connected with—

Borrowing under Uganda Railway Acts, 1896 to 1902 - £. 306,042

" " Royal Niger Company Act, 1899 44,474

" " Public Offices (Acquisition of Site) Act, 1895 16,766

" " Public Offices (Whitehall) Site Act, 1897 19,386

" " Pacific Cable Act, 1901 21,540

" " Land Registry (New Buildings) Act, 1900 8,005

" " Public Buildings Expenses Act, 1903 13,708

" " Public Offices Site (Dublin) Act, 1903 2,430

432,301

Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks and Friendly Societies, Deficiencies of Interest for 1904 144,310

576,611

(4.) Post Office, Telegraph Service, and Packet Service - 399,351

(Charges connected with borrowing under the Telegraph Acts, 1892 to 1904.)

3,063,653

31,088,680

Deduct,—Cognate receipts under the head of "Miscellaneous Revenue" (p. 33) - 205,045

TOTAL in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN (pp. 25 and 33) - 30,883,635

II.—NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE:

Appendix B. (p. 41) shows in detail how the figure under this head is arrived at.

Thus, for the year 1905-6 :—

SUPPLY SERVICES:

1. Army (Including Ordnance Factories) - £. 28,850,000

2. Navy - 33,300,000

TOTAL in FINANCE ACCOUNTS (p. 9) - 62,150,000

Add,—Charge on Consolidated Fund in respect of Indian

Army Pension Deficiency Fund Annuity - 215,000

62,365,000

Deduct,—

(1.) Charges transferred from Naval and Military Supply Services :

(a) To National Debt Services (as above) - £. 2,036,637

(b) To Civil Services - 23,160

(Contribution in lieu of rates for Ordnance Factories.)

2,059,797

60,305,203

Deduct,—

Cognate Receipts under the head of Receipts from

Suez Canal Shares and Sundry Loans - 2,726

TOTAL in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN (pp. 25 and 41) - 60,302,477

III.—CIVIL

III.—CIVIL SERVICES:

It will be well to explain severally how the amounts under the three main heads of expenditure into which these services are divided (p. 25) are arrived at.

1. Civil List and Civil Administration :—

(a) Expenditure charged on Consolidated Fund in Finance	£.
Accounts for 1905-6 (page 9) - - - - -	1,624,160

Deduct,—Charges transferred

(1.) To National Debt Services (Charges connected with Capital Liabilities):

Under the Russian-Dutch Loan Act, 1891	£.
Under the Cunard Agreement (Money) Act, 1904 - - - - -	43,554
	7,500
	51,054

(2.) To Naval and Military Services:

Indian Army Pension Deficiency Annuity - - -	215,000
	266,054

Amount given in Part II. of this Return (p. 25) -	1,358,106
---	-----------

(b) Expenditure charged on Votes in Finance Accounts for 1905-6 (p. 9) - - - - -	28,430,000
--	------------

Add,—Expenditure of a local character transferred:—

(1.) From Postal Services - - - - -	£.
(2.) From Naval and Military Services - - -	6,433
	23,160
	29,593
	28,459,593

Deduct,—

(1.) Transferred to National Debt Services:

Charges connected with Capital Liabilities:

Under the Uganda Railway Acts, 1896 to 1902	£.
Under the Royal Niger Company Act, 1899 - - - - -	306,042
Under the Public Offices (Acquisition of Site) Act, 1895 - - - - -	44,474
Under the Public Offices (Whitehall) Site Act, 1897 - - - - -	16,766
Under the Pacific Cable Act, 1901 - - - - -	19,336
Under the Land Registry (New Buildings) Act, 1900 - - - - -	21,540
Under the Public Buildings Expenses Act, 1903 - - - - -	8,005
Under the Public Offices Site (Dublin) Act, 1903 - - - - -	13,708
	2,430
	432,301
Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks and Friendly Societies, Deficiencies of Interest for 1904 - - - - -	144,310
	576,611

(2.) Elementary Education, as arrived at below under the second separate head - - -	14,965,461
---	------------

(3.) Charges transferred at different times from local to Imperial Funds and other expenditure deemed to be of a local character, as given under the third separate head -	3,441,242
	18,983,314

Amount given in Part II. of this Return (p. 25) -	9,476,279
---	-----------

Totals as above.

(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund - - - - -	1,358,106
(b) „ Votes - - - - -	9,476,279
	10,834,385

<i>Deduct</i> ,—Cognate receipts under the heads of “Miscellaneous Revenue” and Receipts in respect of Loans - - -	1,273,664
--	-----------

TOTAL (NET) EXPENDITURE in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN under head of “Civil List and Civil Administration” (p. 25) - - - - -	9,560,721
---	-----------

2. Elementary Education :—

The cost of Elementary Education, for 1905-6 is arrived at as follows :—

	£
Vote for Board of Education (p 79 of Finance Accounts)	12,835,748
„ Public Education in Scotland (p. 79 of Finance Accounts)	1,704,828
„ „ „ „ Ireland „ „ „	1,393,706
	15,934,282
<i>Deduct,—</i> Payments in respect of Secondary Education	968,821
	14,965,461
<i>Deduct,—</i> also Cognate receipts under the head of Miscellaneous Revenue	493
TOTAL (NET) EXPENDITURE in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN under head of Elementary Education (p. 25)	14,964,968

3. The details of the expenditure under the third head, namely, of "Charges transferred at different times from local to Imperial Funds, and of other expenditure deemed to be of a local character," are given in the present edition of this Return, but only for four years (1891-92, 1901-2, 1904-5 and 1905-6), in order to curtail its length. (Appendix C, pp. 43-47.)

(1.) Charges on the Consolidated Fund in Finance Accounts for 1905-6 under head of payments to Local Taxation Accounts (p. 9)	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	£ 1,156,768
(2.) Charged on Votes-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	 3,441,242
								 4,598,010

Deduct,—Cognate receipts under the head of Miscellaneous	
Revenue	52,957

TOTAL (NET) EXPENDITURE in Sir H. FOWLER'S
RETURN under this head (pp. 25 and 47) - - 4,545,053

IV.—CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE:

CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE:	£.
1. Customs - - - - -	931,000
2 Inland Revenue - - - - -	2,217,000

TOTAL	(in FINANCE ACCOUNTS for 1905-6 (p. 9)	}	3,148,000
	(in Sir H. FOWLER'S RETURN (p. 25) -		

The smaller totals in both sides of the Account of Sir H. Fowler's Return, as compared with the National Balance Sheet in the Finance Accounts, can now be accounted for. It is due to two main causes :—

1. The setting off the postal expenditure against the postal receipts,	£.
viz. (as above at p. 4) - - - - -	15,572,216
2. The setting off of miscellaneous receipts against corresponding payments, viz. :—	£.
(a) National Debt Services (p. 5) - - -	205,045
(b) Naval and Military Services (p. 5) - -	2,726
(c) Civil Services (pp. 6 and 7) - - -	1,327,114
	<u>1,534,885</u>
TOTAL (as above on p. 3) - - -	<u>17,107,101</u>

This Return, as the heading of it shows, is a Return relating to payments into the Exchequer on account of Revenue, and to issues out of the Exchequer on account of Expenditure charged against Revenue.

But for the purposes of comparison with years prior to 1888-89 it is necessary to include separately—

(1.) On the Receipt side the Revenue which, in accordance with arrangements explained in earlier issues of this Return, is diverted from the Exchequer in relief of local charges (see p. 106 of Finance Accounts for 1905-6), and

(2.) On the Expenditure side, the amounts paid out of such Revenue to the Local Taxation Accounts of England, Scotland, and Ireland (see page 107 of Finance Accounts for 1905-6.)

E. W. HAMILTON.

16th July 1906.

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(11)

PART I.

INCOME.

PART I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS) 1891-92 TO 1905-6.

	1891-92.			1892-93.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
I. REVENUE DERIVED FROM TAXES:						
1. CUSTOMS	—	—	19,736,000	—	—	19,715,000
2. EXCISE	—	—	25,810,000	—	—	25,360,000
3. ESTATE, &c., DUTIES	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. STAMPS:						
(a) Death Duties	—	8,242,416	—	—	8,350,588	—
(b) General Stamps (exclusive of Fee, &c. Stamps).	—	5,457,584	—	—	5,454,412	—
TOTAL STAMPS	—	—	13,700,000	—	—	13,805,000
5. LAND TAX	—	—	1,050,000	—	—	1,040,000
6. HOUSE DUTY	—	—	1,434,000	—	—	1,410,000
7. PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX	—	—	13,810,000	—	—	13,470,000
TOTAL REVENUE derived from TAXES	—	—	75,340,000	—	—	74,800,000
II. REVENUE DERIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES:						
1. POST OFFICE SERVICES:						
(a) POSTAL REVENUE	10,150,000			10,400,000		
" Extra Receipts	13,160			4,691		
(b) TELEGRAPH REVENUE	2,480,000			2,480,000		
" Extra Receipts	25,448			3,367		
Deduct,—		12,668,608			12,888,058	
Postal Expenditure	6,126,481			6,513,000		
Telegraph Expenditure	2,485,305			2,591,037		
Packet Service Expenditure	701,136			321,081		
	—	9,312,922		—	9,825,118	
TOTAL (Net) RECEIPTS from POST OFFICE SERVICES	—	3,355,686	—	—	3,062,940	—
2. CROWN LANDS	—	430,000	—	—	430,000	—
3. SUEZ CANAL SHARE RECEIPTS	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL REVENUE derived from other SOURCES	—	—	3,785,686	—	—	3,492,940
			79,125,686			78,292,940
EXCESS of EXPENDITURE over INCOME	—	—	—	—	—	—
		£.	79,125,686		£.	78,292,940

PAYMENTS TO

	1891-92.			1892-93.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1. SURTAX ON BEER AND SPIRIT:						
(a) Customs	—	—	212,213	—	—	200,148
(b) Excise	—	—	1,184,213	—	—	1,171,241
2. EXCISE LICENCES	—	—	3,391,738	—	—	3,433,627
3. SHARE OF PROBATE DUTY & ESTATE DUTY	—	—	2,793,668	—	—	2,409,187
TOTAL PAYMENTS TO LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.	—	£.	7,581,832	—	£.	7,214,203

PART I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS) 1891-92 TO 1905-6.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	19,707,000	—	—	20,115,000	—	—	20,756,000
—	—	25,200,000	—	—	26,050,000	—	—	26,800,000
—	—	—	—	—	8,719,000	—	—	11,600,000
—	7,578,798	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	5,281,204	—	—	5,721,000	—	—	7,350,000	—
—	—	12,860,000	—	—	5,721,000	—	—	7,350,000
—	—	1,035,000	—	—	1,015,000	—	—	1,015,000
—	—	1,425,000	—	—	1,435,000	—	—	1,495,000
—	—	15,200,000	—	—	15,600,000	—	—	16,100,000
—	—	75,427,000	—	—	78,655,000	—	—	85,116,000
10,470,000	—	—	10,760,000	—	—	11,380,000	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,540,000	—	—	2,580,000	—	—	2,840,000	—	—
—	13,010,000	—	—	13,340,000	—	—	14,220,000	—
6,721,000	—	—	6,369,000	—	—	7,018,000	—	—
2,657,844	—	—	2,652,804	—	—	2,720,498	—	—
723,000	—	—	727,000	—	—	715,000	—	—
—	10,101,844	—	—	10,248,304	—	—	10,453,493	—
—	2,908,156	—	—	3,091,196	—	—	3,766,502	—
—	420,000	—	—	410,000	—	—	415,000	—
—	—	—	—	394,995	—	—	673,418	—
—	—	3,328,156	—	—	3,896,191	—	—	4,854,920
—	—	78,755,156	—	—	82,551,191	—	—	89,970,920
—	—	169,436	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	£.	78,924,592	—	£.	82,551,191	—	£.	89,970,920

LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	196,888	—	—	195,675	—	—	203,490
—	—	1,135,781	—	—	1,125,866	—	—	1,185,983
—	—	3,472,253	—	—	3,538,942	—	—	3,524,102
—	—	2,359,030	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	2,153,059	—	—	2,452,542
—	£.	7,163,952	—	£.	7,013,542	—	£.	7,366,117

* Prior to 1st April 1894 the receipts from Suez Canal Shares were set off against the Debt Charges, vide p. 28.

PART I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS)—continued.

	1896-97.			1897-98.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
I. REVENUE DERIVED FROM TAXES:						
1. CUSTOMS	—	—	21,254,000	—	—	21,798,000
2. EXCISE	—	—	27,460,000	—	—	28,300,000
3. ESTATE, &c., DUTIES	—	—	10,830,000	—	—	11,100,000
4. STAMPS (exclusive of Fee, &c., Stamps)	—	—	7,350,000	—	—	7,650,000
5. LAND TAX	—	—	920,000	—	—	940,000
6. HOUSE DUTY	—	—	1,510,000	—	—	1,510,000
7. PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX	—	—	16,650,000	—	—	17,250,000
TOTAL REVENUE derived from TAXES	—	—	85,974,000	—	—	88,548,000
II. REVENUE DERIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES:						
1. POST OFFICE SERVICES:						
(a) POSTAL REVENUE	11,860,000			12,170,000		
" Extra Receipts	39,841			—		
(b) TELEGRAPH REVENUE	2,910,000			3,010,000		
		14,809,841			15,180,000	
Deduct,—						
Postal Expenditure	7,150,000			7,592,000		
Telegraph Expenditure	2,926,939			3,146,515		
Packet Service Expenditure	723,000			747,000		
		10,799,939			11,485,515	
TOTAL (Net) RECEIPTS from POST OFFICE SERVICES	—	4,009,902		—	3,694,485	
2. CROWN LANDS	—	415,000		—	415,000	
3. SUEZ CANAL SHARE RECEIPTS	—	694,076		—	698,684	
TOTAL REVENUE derived from other SOURCES	—	—	5,118,978	—	—	4,808,169
EXCESS of EXPENDITURE over INCOME	—	—	91,092,978	—	—	93,356,169
		£.	91,092,978		£.	93,356,169

PAYMENTS TO LOCAL

	1896-97.		1897-98.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1. SURTAX ON BEER AND SPIRIT:				
(a) Customs	—	208,571	—	207,302
(b) Excise	—	1,221,990	—	1,267,336
2. EXCISE LICENCES	—	3,684,880	—	3,699,790
3. SHARE of ESTATE DUTY, &c.:				
(a) Under the Finance Act, 1894				
(1) In relief of rates generally	2,301,325		—	2,560,779
(2) In relief of rates on Tithe rent charges attached to benefices (62 & 63 Vict. c. 17)	—		—	—
(b) Under Agricultural Rates Acts and consequential Acts	831,896		—	1,667,103
		3,133,221		4,227,882
TOTAL PAYMENTS TO LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.	—	£.	—	£.
		8,248,662		9,402,310

Part I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS)—continued.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-01.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	20,850,000	—	—	23,800,000	—	—	26,262,000
—	—	29,200,000	—	—	32,100,000	—	—	33,100,000
—	—	11,400,000	—	—	14,020,000	—	—	12,980,000
—	—	7,630,000	—	—	8,500,000	—	—	7,825,000
—	—	770,000	—	—	790,000	—	—	755,000
—	—	1,600,000	—	—	1,670,000	—	—	1,720,000
—	—	18,000,000	—	—	18,750,000	—	—	26,920,000
—	—	89,450,000	—	—	99,630,000	—	—	109,562,000
12,710,000			13,300,000			13,800,000		
—			—			—		
3,150,000	15,860,000		3,350,000	16,650,000		3,450,000	17,250,000	
8,030,000			8,480,000			8,963,000		
3,967,465			3,504,837			3,618,480		
820,000			760,000			771,000		
	12,117,465			12,744,837			13,352,480	
—	3,742,535		—	3,905,163		—	3,897,520	
—	430,000		—	450,000		—	500,000	
—	678,856		—	801,818		—	814,767	
—	—	4,851,391	—	—	5,156,981	—	—	5,212,287
—	—	94,301,391	—	—	104,786,981	—	—	114,774,287
—	—	—	—	—	13,882,502	—	—	53,207,580
—	—	£. 94,301,391	—	—	£. 118,669,483	—	—	£. 167,981,867

TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-01.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	204,011	—	—	228,348	—	—	227,196
—	—	1,293,184	—	—	1,398,491	—	—	1,437,014
—	—	3,791,365	—	—	3,837,051	—	—	3,860,400
—	2,640,797		2,939,353			2,599,502		
—	—		47,836	2,987,189		105,687	2,705,249	
—	1,591,803	4,232,600	—	1,513,582	4,500,771	—	1,509,767	4,215,016
—	—	£. 9,521,160	—	—	£. 9,964,661	—	—	£. 9,739,626

PART I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS)—continued.

	1901-2.			1902-3.		
	£.	£.	£.	£	£	£
I. REVENUE DERIVED FROM TAXES :						
1. CUSTOMS	—	—	30,993,000	—	—	34,433,000
2. EXCISE	—	—	31,600,000	—	—	32,100,000
3. ESTATE, &C., DUTIES	—	—	14,200,000	—	—	13,850,000
4. STAMPS (exclusive of Fee, &c., Stamps)	—	—	7,800,000	—	—	8,200,000
5. LAND TAX	—	—	725,000	—	—	725,000
6. HOUSE DUTY	—	—	1,775,000	—	—	1,825,000
7. PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX	—	—	34,800,000	—	—	38,800,000
TOTAL REVENUE derived from TAXES	—	—	121,893,000			129,933,000
II. REVENUE DERIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES :						
1. POST OFFICE SERVICES :						
(a) POSTAL REVENUE	14,300,000			14,750,000		
" Extra Receipts	—			—		
(b) TELEGRAPH REVENUE	3,490,000			3,630,000		
		17,790,000			18,380,000	
Deduct,—						
Postal Expenditure	9,240,000			9,630,000		
Telegraph Expenditure	3,830,956			3,928,013		
Packet Service Expenditure	762,000			771,000		
		13,832,956			14,329,013	
TOTAL (Net) RECEIPTS from POST OFFICE SERVICES		3,957,044			4,050,987	
2. CROWN LANDS		455,000			455,000	
3. SUEZ CANAL SHARE RECEIPTS		847,570			933,778	
TOTAL REVENUE Derived from other SOURCES			5,259,614			5,439,765
			127,152,614			135,372,765
EXCESS of EXPENDITURE over INCOME			52,524,216			32,932,010
		£.	179,676,830		£.	168,304,775

PAYMENTS TO

	1901-2.			1902-3.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1. SURTAX ON BEER AND SPIRIT :						
(a) Customs	—	—	210,090	—	—	216,937
(b) Excise	—	—	1,265,230	—	—	1,279,723
2. EXCISE LICENCES	—	—	3,929,269	—	—	4,035,044
3. SHARE OF ESTATE DUTY, &C. :						
(a) Under the Finance Act, 1894						
(1) In relief of rates generally	2,687,414			2,605,799		
(2) In relief of rates on Tithe rent charges attached to benefices (62 and 63 Vict. c. 17)	110,452			119,291		
		2,797,866			2,725,090	
(b) Under Agricultural Rates Acts and consequential Acts	—	1,511,635	4,309,501	—	1,510,579	4,235,669
TOTAL PAYMENTS TO LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.	—	£.	9,714,090	—	£.	9,767,373

PART I.—INCOME (NET EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS)—continued.

1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.		
£.	£	£	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	33,850,000	—	—	35,730,000	—	—	34,475,000
—	—	31,550,000	—	—	30,750,000	—	—	30,230,000
—	—	13,000,000	—	—	12,350,000	—	—	12,970,000
—	—	7,500,000	—	—	7,700,000	—	—	8,180,000
—	—	725,000	—	—	750,000	—	—	720,000
—	—	1,925,000	—	—	2,000,000	—	—	1,950,000
—	—	30,800,000	—	—	31,250,000	—	—	31,350,000
		119,350,000			120,530,000			119,875,000
15,450,000			16,100,000			16,880,000		
—			—			24,367		
3,700,000	19,150,000		3,830,000	19,930,000		4,130,000	21,034,367	
9,753,000			10,198,000			10,530,000		
4,236,933			4,322,050			4,242,216		
786,000	14,780,933		735,000	15,255,050		700,000	15,572,216	
	4,369,067		—	4,674,950		—	5,462,151	
	460,000		—	470,000		—	480,000	
	936,151		—	990,198		—	1,053,323	
		5,765,218	—	—	6,135,148	—	—	6,995,474
		125,115,218			126,665,148			126,870,474
		5,415,557			—			—
	£.	130,530,775		£.	126,665,148		£.	126,870,474

LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS, &c.

1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	203,105	—	—	177,746	—	—	169,650
—	—	1,300,059	—	—	1,275,909	—	—	1,230,474
—	—	4,096,328	—	—	4,039,764	—	—	4,142,377
2,556,633			2,674,242			2,709,839		
128,152			135,679			139,382		
	2,684,785			2,809,921			2,849,221	
—	1,510,796		—	1,508,038		—	1,509,568	
		4,195,581			4,318,959			4,358,789
	£.	9,795,073		£.	9,812,378		£.	9,901,290

PART II.

EXPENDITURE.

Part II.—EXPENDITURE (NET EXCHEQUER ISSUES), 1891-92 TO 1905-6.

	1891-92.			1892-93.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
I. NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES:						
For Details, <i>see</i> Appendix A.	—	—	24,825,085	—	—	24,919,902
II. NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE:						
For Details, <i>see</i> Appendix B.	—	—	33,162,789	—	—	33,265,683
III. CIVIL SERVICES						
1. CIVIL LIST AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION :						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	1,432,733			1,443,904		
(b) Voted	7,800,602			6,479,639		
	9,233,335			7,923,543		
Less,— <i>Extra Receipts</i>	1,842,946			1,695,068		
TOTAL (Net)	—	7,410,389		—	6,228,475	
2. ELEMENTARY EDUCATION	6,328,687			8,131,549		
Less,— <i>Extra Receipts</i>	5,121			1,939		
TOTAL (Net)	—	6,323,566		—	8,129,610	
3. CHARGES TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS AND OTHER EXPENDITURE DEEMED TO BE OF A LOCAL CHARACTER :						
For Details in 1891-92, 1901-2, 1904-5, and 1905-6 <i>see</i> Appendix C.						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	40,000			40,000		
(b) Voted	3,398,526			3,173,105		
(See also under Local Taxation Revenue below.)	3,438,526			3,213,105		
Less,— <i>Extra Receipts</i>	111,606			76,920		
TOTAL (Net)	—	3,326,920		—	3,136,185	
TOTAL, CIVIL SERVICES	—	—	17,060,875	—	—	17,494,270
IV. CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE:						
CUSTOMS	897,924			850,595		
Less,— <i>Extra Receipts</i>	51,170	46,754		12,746	837,849	
INLAND REVENUE	1,794,024			1,765,000		
Less,— <i>Extra Receipts</i>	30,854	1,763,170		9,775	1,755,225	
TOTAL (Net)	—	—	2,609,924	—	—	2,593,074
V. SPECIAL SERVICES:						
EXPENSES UNDER THE COINAGE ACT, 1891	—	400,000		—	—	—
TOTAL, SPECIAL SERVICES	—	—	400,000	—	—	—
			78,058,673			78,272,929
EXCESS of INCOME over EXPENDITURE	—	—	1,067,013	—	—	20,011
		£.	79,125,686		£.	78,292,940

EXPENDITURE OUT OF

			1891-92.			1892-93.
			£.			£.
ENGLAND	—	—	6,426,860	—	—	6,109,910
SCOTLAND	—	—	795,712	—	—	752,415
IRELAND	—	—	359,260	—	—	351,878
		£.	7,581,832		£.	7,214,203

PART II.—EXPENDITURE (NET EXCHEQUER ISSUES), 1891-92 TO 1905-6.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	25,038,723	—	—	24,977,912	—	—	25,068,092
—	—	33,327,475	—	—	35,143,563	—	—	38,116,674
1,447,642			1,408,867			1,367,804		
6,489,839			6,742,270			7,082,279		
7,937,481			8,151,137			8,450,083		
1,753,109			1,254,290			1,243,590		
—	6,184,372		—	6,896,847		—	7,206,493	
8,594,656			8,914,576			9,357,269		
813			787			1,588		
—	8,598,843		—	8,943,789		—	9,355,681	
40,000			40,000			40,000		
3,139,938			3,220,242			3,348,096		
3,179,938			3,260,242			3,388,096		
70,640			82,418			75,504		
—	3,109,298		—	3,177,824		—	3,312,592	
—	—	17,867,513	—	—	19,018,460	—	—	19,874,766
845,048			835,000			860,000		
—	845,948		—	835,000		—	860,000	
1,825,040			1,811,000			1,842,000		
107			85			84		
—	1,824,938		—	1,810,915		—	1,841,916	
—	—	2,670,881	—	—	2,645,915	—	—	2,701,916
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	78,924,592	—	—	81,785,850	—	—	85,761,448
—	—	—	—	—	765,341	—	—	†4,209,472
—	—	£. 78,924,592	—	—	£. 82,551,191	—	—	£. 89,970,920

LOCAL TAXATION REVENUE.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	6,106,197	—	—	5,976,281	—	—	6,257,021
—	—	736,741	—	—	713,495	—	—	755,156
—	—	321,014	—	—	323,766	—	—	353,940
—	—	£. 7,163,952	—	—	£. 7,013,542	—	—	£. 7,366,117

† This surplus, instead of being treated as Sinking Fund, was made applicable to Naval Works Expenditure chargeable to Capital Account under the Act 59 Vict. c. 6, and issues were made from the Exchequer as required; the balance was issued in 1899-1900.

Part II.—EXPENDITURE (*Net* EXCHEQUER ISSUES)—continued.

	1896-97.			1897-98.		
I. NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES:	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
For Details, <i>see</i> Appendix A.	—	—	25,158,150	—	—	25,323,247
II. NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE:						
For Details, <i>see</i> Appendix B.	—	—	40,376,962	—	—	40,093,712
III. CIVIL SERVICES:						
1. CIVIL LIST AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION:						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	1,344,313			1,337,440		
(b) Voted	6,903,988			7,517,467		
	8,248,301			8,854,907		
<i>Less,—Extra Receipts</i>	1,743,077			1,470,710		
TOTAL (Net)	—	6,505,224		—	7,384,197	
2. ELEMENTARY EDUCATION	9,797,383			10,612,115		
<i>Less,—Extra Receipts</i>	849			1,219		
TOTAL (Net)	—	9,796,534		—	10,610,896	
3. CHARGES TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS AND OTHER EXPENDITURE DEEMED TO BE OF A LOCAL CHARACTER:						
For Details in 1891-92, 1901-2, 1904-5 and 1905-6, <i>see</i> Appendix C.						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	40,000			40,000		
(b) Voted	3,300,828			3,294,824		
(<i>See also under Local Taxation Revenue below.</i>)	3,340,828			3,334,824		
<i>Less,—Extra Receipts</i>	72,689			63,696		
TOTAL (Net)	—	3,268,139		—	3,271,128	
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICES	—	—	19,569,897	—	—	21,266,221
IV. CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE:						
CUSTOMS	844,000			850,000		
		844,000			850,000	
INLAND REVENUE	1,872,000			1,895,000		
<i>Less,—Extra Receipts</i>	49			21		
		1,871,951			1,894,979	
TOTAL (Net)	—	—	2,715,951	—	—	2,744,979
V. SPECIAL SERVICES:						
1. EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, GRANT IN AID	—	798,802		—	—	
2. EXPENSES UNDER THE COINAGE ACTS, 1891 AND 1893	—	—	798,802	—	250,000	250,000
			88,619,762			89,678,159
EXCESS OF INCOME OVER EXPENDITURE	—	—	‡ 2,473,216	—	—	§ 3,678,010
		£.	91,092,978		£.	93,356,169

EXPENDITURE OUT OF

	1896-97.			1897-98.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
ENGLAND	—	—	6,990,940	—	—	7,911,042
SCOTLAND	—	—	856,705	—	—	980,329
IRELAND	—	—	401,017	—	—	510,939
		£.	8,248,662		£.	9,402,310

‡ This Surplus, instead of being treated as Sinking Fund, was made applicable to Military Works Expenditure chargeable to Capital Account under the Act 60 Vict. c. 7, and issues were made from the Exchequer as required; the balance was issued in 1899-1900.

§ £. 2,550,000 of this Surplus, instead of being treated as Sinking Fund, was made applicable to Public Buildings Expenditure chargeable to Capital Account under the Act 61 Vict. c. 5, and was issued from the Exchequer in the financial year 1898-99; 2,360,000 of the amount issued was invested under Sub-section 2 of Section 1 of that Act.

PART II.—EXPENDITURE (NET EXCHEQUER ISSUES)—continued.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-01.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	25,237,723	—	—	23,535,285	—	—	20,368,517
—	—	43,996,949	—	—	69,372,359	—	—	121,044,541
1,333,300			1,326,256			1,310,853		
7,630,452			8,139,155			8,492,866		
8,963,752			9,465,411			9,803,219		
1,649,042			1,929,972			1,976,542		
—	7,314,710		—	7,535,439		—	7,826,677	
11,004,210			11,195,254			11,585,224		
863			709			227		
—	11,003,347		—	11,194,545		—	11,584,997	
452,382			1,149,940			1,152,368		
3,342,865			3,136,758			3,219,796		
3,795,247			4,288,698			4,372,164		
48,512			54,823			49,015		
—	3,746,735		—	4,231,875		—	4,323,149	
—	—	22,064,792	—	—	22,961,859	—	—	23,734,823
840,000			840,000			823,000		
—	840,000		—	840,000		—	823,000	
1,976,000			1,960,000			2,011,000		
30			20			14		
—	1,975,970		—	1,959,980		—	2,010,986	
—	—	2,815,970	—	—	2,799,980	—	—	2,833,986
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	94,115,434	—	—	118,669,483	—	—	167,981,867
—	—	185,957	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	£.	94,301,391	—	£.	118,669,483	—	£.	167,981,867

LOCAL TAXATION REVENUE.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-01.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	8,080,912	—	—	8,495,850	—	—	8,310,739
—	—	992,735	—	—	1,059,874	—	—	1,027,412
—	—	447,513	—	—	408,937	—	—	401,475
—	£.	9,521,160	—	£.	9,964,661	—	£.	9,739,626

Part II.—EXPENDITURE (NET EXCHEQUER ISSUES)—continued.

	1901-2.			1902-3.		
	£	£	£	£	£	£
I. NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES:						
For Details, see Appendix A.	—		22,492,436	—		28,430,618
II. NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE:						
For Details, see Appendix B.	—		129,767,790	—		110,844,488
III. CIVIL SERVICES:						
1. CIVIL LIST AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION :						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	1,385,237			1,374,053		
(b) Voted	8,542,152			9,635,620		
	9,927,389			10,909,679		
Less,—Extra Receipts	1,702,104			1,615,509		
TOTAL (Net)	—	8,225,285		—	9,394,170	
2. ELEMENTARY EDUCATION	11,830,227			12,159,224		
Less,—Extra Receipts	231			40		
TOTAL (Net)	—	11,829,996		—	12,159,184	
3. CHARGES TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS AND OTHER EXPENDITURE DEEMED TO BE OF A LOCAL CHARACTER :						
For Details in 1891-92, 1901-2, 1904-5, and 1905-6, see Appendix C.						
(a) Charged on Consolidated Fund	1,153,892			1,156,043		
(b) Voted	3,305,495			3,335,295		
(See also under Local Taxation Revenue below.)	4,459,387			4,491,338		
Less,—Extra Receipts	53,012			55,020		
TOTAL (Net)	—	4,406,375		—	4,436,318	
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICES			24,461,656			25,989,672
IV. CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE:						
CUSTOMS	870,000	870,000		900,000	900,000	
INLAND REVENUE	2,085,000			2,140,000		
Less,—Extra Receipts	52	2,084,948		3	2,139,997	
TOTAL (Net)			2,954,948			3,039,997
V. SPECIAL SERVICES:						
	—	—	—	—	—	—
			179,676,830			168,304,775
EXCESS OF INCOME over EXPENDITURE			—			—
		£.	179,676,830		£.	168,304,775

EXPENDITURE OUT OF

			1901-2.			1902-3.
			£			£
ENGLAND	—	—	8,296,748	—	—	8,383,604
SCOTLAND	—	—	1,027,855	—	—	1,000,917
IRELAND	—	—	389,487	—	—	382,852
		£.	9,714,090		£.	9,767,373

PART II.—EXPENDITURE (NET EXCHEQUER ISSUES)—continued.

1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
—	—	28,787,338	—	—	28,866,939	—	—	30,883,635
—	—	71,299,217	—	—	64,967,770	—	—	60,302,477
1,365,877			1,350,076			1,358,106		
9,506,917			9,413,360			9,476,279		
10,872,824			10,763,436			10,834,385		
1,340,022			1,193,864			1,273,664		
—	9,532,802		—	9,569,572		—	9,560,721	
13,333,916			14,235,887			14,965,461		
1,111			159			493		
—	13,332,805		—	14,235,728		—	14,964,968	
1,156,705			1,156,867			1,156,768		
3,398,841			3,413,456			3,441,242		
4,555,546			4,570,323			4,598,010		
61,938			52,091			52,957		
—	4,493,813	27,359,220	—	4,518,232	28,323,532	—	4,545,053	29,070,742
897,000	897,000		908,000	908,000		931,000	931,000	
2,188,000			2,185,000			2,217,000		
—	2,188,000	3,085,000	—	2,185,000	3,093,000	—	2,217,000	3,148,000
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	130,530,775	—	—	125,251,241	—	—	123,404,854
—	—	—	—	—	1,413,907	—	—	3,465,620
—	£.	130,530,775	—	£.	126,665,148	—	£.	126,870,474

LOCAL TAXATION REVENUE.

		1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.
		£.			£.			£.
—	—	8,391,568	—	—	8,391,823	—	—	8,480,644
—	—	1,027,046	—	—	1,046,501	—	—	1,034,268
—	—	376,459	—	—	374,054	—	—	386,378
—	£.	9,795,073	—	£.	9,812,378	—	£.	9,901,290

APPENDIX A.

DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES.

Appendix A.—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES.

	1891-92.			1892-93.		
	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
(1.) INSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Interest of the Funded Debt	15,893,049	—	15,893,049	16,052,835	—	16,052,835
Terminable Annuities	1,816,344	4,741,294	6,557,638	1,758,526	4,591,875	6,350,401
Interest of the Unfunded Debt	820,292	—	820,292	659,826	—	659,826
Adjustments under the Finance Act, 1894	—	—	—	—	—	—
Management of the Debt	187,233	—	187,233	185,193	—	185,193
New Sinking Fund	—	1,541,788	1,541,788	—	1,751,745	1,751,745
£.	18,716,918	6,283,082	25,000,000	18,656,380	6,343,620	25,000,000
(2.) OUTSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:						
Principal and Interest, Suez Canal Exchange Bonds £.	18,194	181,806	200,000	11,776	188,224	200,000
(3.) OTHER CHARGES CONNECTED WITH CAPITAL LIABILITIES:						
(1.) Borne on Consolidated Fund:						
(a.) Cost of advertising the Issue of Exchange Bonds under the National Debt Redemption Act, 1889	169	—	169	146	—	146
(b.) Russian Dutch Loan	13,025	—	13,025	15,598	27,956	43,554
(2.) Borne on Votes:						
(a.) Under the <i>Barracks Act, 1890</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—
(b.) Under Imperial Defence Act, (Army 1888)	56,099	—	56,099	66,993	—	66,993
(Navy)	4,507	40,653	45,160	15,024	34,981	* 50,005
(c.) Under the Naval Defence Act, 1889	—	—	—	15,566	—	15,566
(d.) Under the Telegraph Acts, 1892 to 1904	—	—	—	—	—	—
(e.) Trustee Savings Banks, Post Office Savings Banks and Friendly Societies Deficiencies	9,647	—	9,647	9,215	—	9,215
£.	83,447	40,653	124,100	122,542	62,937	185,479
TOTAL ISSUES £.	18,818,559	6,505,541	25,324,100	18,790,698	6,594,781	25,385,479
Sundry Receipts to be set off:						
Interest on Sardinian Loan	23,281	—	23,281	21,567	—	21,567
Interest on Purchase Money of Suez Canal Shares†	17,024	181,806	198,830	10,605	188,224	198,829
Profits of Issue and Fees on Stock Certificates	168,878	—	168,878	170,971	—	170,971
Moiety of Red Sea Annuity repaid from Indian Revenues	8,134	9,893	18,027	7,784	10,243	18,027
Post Office Savings Banks, Surplus of Interest	65,663	—	65,663	51,118	—	51,118
Trustee Savings Banks, Moiety of Surplus of Interest	24,334	—	24,334	5,065	—	5,065
Miscellaneous	2	—	2	—	—	—
£.	307,316	191,699	499,015	267,410	198,467	465,877
NET EXPENDITURE . . . £.	18,511,243	6,313,842	24,825,085	18,523,588	6,396,314	24,919,902

† The annuity paid by the Admiralty was 69,822l.; the difference represents the amount received from the Colonies, in pursuance of the Australian Agreement, and appropriated in aid of the Naval Vote bearing the charge.

* The annuity paid by the Admiralty was 95,342l. 16s.; the difference represents the amount received from the Colonies, in pursuance of the Australian Agreement, and appropriated in aid of the Naval Vote bearing the charge.

Appendix A.—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
16,132,688	—	16,132,688	16,069,869	—	16,069,869	16,110,274	—	16,110,274
1,642,593	4,750,911	6,393,504	1,588,890	4,833,520	6,422,410	1,456,086	4,986,052	6,442,138
468,305	—	468,305	461,830	—	461,830	118,367	—	118,367
—	—	—	150,675	—	150,675	—	—	—
178,911	—	178,911	176,953	—	176,953	176,447	—	176,447
—	1,826,592	1,826,592	—	1,718,263	1,718,263	—	2,152,774	2,152,774
18,422,497	6,577,503	25,000,000	18,448,217	6,551,783	25,000,000	17,861,174	7,138,826	25,000,000
5,130	194,870	200,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
14,760	28,794	43,554	13,896	29,658	43,554	13,006	30,547	43,553
11,867	20,723	32,590	30,920	44,644	75,564	52,426	79,065	131,491
73,996	—	73,996	—	—	—	—	—	—
12,707	37,359	*50,066	11,278	49,520	*60,798	9,807	50,359	*60,166
57,535	—	57,535	—	—	—	—	—	—
312	1,666	1,978	5,573	11,365	16,938	7,305	11,774	19,079
15,351	—	15,351	21,710	—	21,710	27,154	—	27,154
186,528	88,642	275,070	83,377	135,187	218,564	109,698	171,745	281,443
18,614,155	6,860,915	25,475,070	18,531,594	6,686,970	25,218,564	17,970,872	7,310,571	25,281,443
19,801	—	19,801	17,981	—	17,981	16,107	—	16,107
3,959	194,870	† 198,829	—	—	—	—	—	—
169,767	—	169,767	169,543	—	169,543	175,379	—	175,379
7,423	10,604	18,027	7,048	10,979	18,027	6,661	11,366	18,027
29,923	—	29,923	35,101	—	35,101	3,836	—	3,836
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
230,873	205,474	436,347	229,673	10,979	240,652	201,985	11,366	213,351
19,383,282	6,653,441	25,038,723	18,301,921	6,675,991	24,977,912	17,768,887	7,299,205	25,068,092

† After the 31st March, 1894, the Receipts from Suez Canal Shares are given in Part I. on pages 14 to 17.

* The annuity paid by the Admiralty was £5,342. 16s.; the difference represents the amount received from the Colonies, in pursuance of the Australian Agreement, and appropriated in aid of the Naval Vote bearing the charge.

Appendix A.—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES—*continued.*

	1896-97.			1897-98.		
	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
(1.) INSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Interest of the Funded Debt	16,108,037	—	16,108,037	16,063,925	—	16,063,925
Terminable Annuities	1,382,794	5,766,949	7,149,743	1,262,174	5,998,985	7,261,159
Interest of the Unfunded Debt	112,534	—	112,534	139,300	—	139,300
Management of the Debt	175,692	—	175,692	174,309	—	174,309
New Sinking Fund	—	1,453,994	1,453,994	—	1,361,307	1,361,307
£.	17,779,057	7,220,943	25,000,000	17,639,708	7,360,292	25,000,000
(2.) OUTSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:						
(a.) Interest on War Stock and War Bonds	—	—	—	—	—	—
(b.) Interest on Exchequer Bonds	—	—	—	—	—	—
(c.) Interest on Treasury Bills	—	—	—	—	—	—
(d.) Expenses in connection with War Loans	—	—	—	—	—	—
£.						
(3.) OTHER CHARGES CONNECTED WITH CAPITAL LIABILITIES:						
(1.) Borne on Consolidated Fund:						
(a.) Russian Dutch Loan	12,090	31,464	43,554	11,146	32,408	43,554
(2.) Borne on Votes:						
(a.) Under the Barracks Act, 1890	69,268	118,465	187,753	67,559	128,988	196,547
(b.) Under Imperial Defence Act, 1888, Part I., Navy	8,291	52,329	*60,620	6,729	53,753	*60,482
(c.) Under the Telegraph Acts, 1892 to 1904	11,264	18,782	30,046	22,130	52,530	74,660
(d.) Under the Uganda Railway Acts, 1896 to 1902	—	—	—	4,873	2,590	7,463
(e.) Under the Public Offices (Acquisition of Site) Act, 1895	—	—	—	—	—	—
(f.) Under Public Offices (Whitehall) Site Act 1897	—	—	—	—	—	—
(g.) Trustee Savings Banks, Post Office Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies Deficiencies	61,237	—	61,237	46,423	—	46,423
(h.) Grant for redeeming Land Tax on Government Property	—	—	—	—	100,000	100,000
(i.) Grant of the balance of a Life Annuity forfeited	—	—	—	—	—	—
£.	162,170	221,040	383,210	158,860	370,269	529,129
TOTAL ISSUES £.	17,941,227	7,441,983	25,383,210	17,798,568	7,730,561	25,529,129
Sundry Receipts to be set off:						
Interest on Sardinian Loan	14,176	—	14,176	12,136	—	12,136
Unexpended balance of Loan raised under the Imperial Defence Act, 1888.	—	236	236	—	—	—
Profits of Issue and Fees on Stock Certificates	175,638	—	175,638	175,562	—	175,562
Moiety of Red Sea Annuity repaid from Indian Revenues	6,259	11,768	18,027	5,843	12,184	18,027
Post Office Savings Banks, Surplus of Interest	16,983	—	16,983	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	—	—	—	7	100	107
£.	213,056	12,004	225,060	193,598	12,284	205,882
NET EXPENDITURE . . . £.	17,728,171	7,429,979	25,158,150	17,604,970	7,718,277	25,323,247

* The annuity paid by the Admiralty was 95,342*l.* 18*s.*; the difference represents the amount received from the Colonies, in pursuance of the Australian Agreement, and appropriated in aid of the Naval Vote bearing the charge.

Appendix A.—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES—*continued*.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-01.		
On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
16,009,557	—	16,009,557	15,242,192	—	15,242,192	15,106,532	—	15,106,532
1,099,561	6,182,142	7,281,703	1,508,630	5,781,861	7,290,491	1,607,853	†1,148,760	2,756,613
139,254	—	139,254	272,577	—	272,577	415,254	—	415,254
175,027	—	175,027	174,864	—	174,864	174,310	—	174,310
—	1,394,459	1,394,459	—	19,876	19,876	—	† —	† —
17,423,399	7,576,601	25,000,000	17,198,263	5,801,737	23,000,000	17,303,949	†1,148,760	18,452,709
—	—	—	—	—	—	618,750	—	618,750
—	—	—	—	—	—	172,500	—	172,500
—	—	—	216,657	—	216,657	493,883	—	493,883
—	—	—	—	—	—	97,647	—	97,647
—	—	—	216,657	—	216,657	1,382,780	—	1,382,780
10,174	33,380	43,554	9,172	34,382	43,554	8,141	35,413	43,554
62,555	133,992	196,547	73,870	174,206	248,076	81,098	204,645	285,743
5,121	55,708	* 60,829	3,463	56,838	* 60,301	1,818	67,722	* 69,540
25,730	48,930	74,660	26,990	63,140	90,130	33,795	78,817	112,612
3,971	3,492	7,463	3,876	3,587	7,463	111,139	24,646	135,785
—	—	—	9,462	3,316	12,778	13,384	3,382	16,766
—	—	—	—	—	—	19,336	—	19,336
58,416	—	58,416	58,029	—	58,029	51,756	—	51,756
—	—	—	—	466	466	—	—	—
—	—	—	56	194	250	—	—	—
†165,967	275,502	441,469	184,918	336,129	521,047	320,467	414,625	735,092
17,589,366	7,852,103	25,441,469	17,599,838	6,137,866	23,737,704	19,007,196	†1,563,385	20,570,581
10,137	—	10,137	8,025	—	8,025	5,849	—	5,849
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
175,582	—	175,582	176,367	—	176,367	178,188	—	178,188
5,413	12,614	18,027	4,969	13,058	18,027	4,507	13,520	18,027
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
191,132	12,614	203,746	189,361	13,058	202,419	188,544	13,520	202,064
17,398,234	7,839,489	25,237,723	17,410,477	6,124,808	23,535,285	18,818,652	†1,549,865	20,368,517

† The portion of certain Terminable Annuities representing replacement of capital and the New Sinking Fund were suspended in 1900-1901 under the Finance Act, 1930 (63, Vict. c. 7).

Appendix A—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES—continued.

	1901-2.			1902-3.		
	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
(1.) INSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Interest of the Funded Debt - - -	15,076,023	—	15,076,023	15,033,212	—	15,033,212
Terminable Annuities - - -	1,652,211	† 1,102,214	2,754,425	1,650,792	5,676,647	7,327,439
Interest of the Unfunded Debt - - -	314,751	—	314,751	385,661	—	385,661
Management of the Debt - - -	173,617	—	173,617	180,144	—	180,144
New Sinking Fund - - -	—	†—	†—	—	73,544	73,544
£.	17,216,602	† 1,102,214	18,318,816	17,249,809	5,750,191	23,000,000
(2.) OUTSIDE THE PERMANENT OR FIXED ANNUAL CHARGE:						
(a.) Interest of the Funded Debt.	1,237,500	—	1,237,500	2,310,000	—	2,310,000
(b.) Interest on War, Stock and War Bonds - - -	825,000	—	825,000	825,000	—	825,000
(c.) Interest on Exchequer Bonds - - -	720,000	—	720,000	720,000	—	720,000
(d.) Interest on Treasury Bills - - -	419,223	—	419,223	350,050	—	350,050
(e.) Expenses in connection with War Loans - - -	164,993	—	164,993	77,008	—	77,008
(f.) Expenses in connection with the issue of Exchequer Bonds under the Finance Act, 1905 - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
£.	3,366,716	—	3,366,716	4,282,058	—	4,282,058
(3.) OTHER CHARGES CONNECTED WITH CAPITAL LIABILITIES:						
(1.) Borne on Consolidated Fund:						
(a.) Under the Russian Dutch Loan Act, 1891 - - -	7,078	36,476	43,554	5,984	37,570	43,554
(b.) Under the Cunard Agreement (Money) Act, 1904 - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
(2.) Borne on Votes:						
(a.) Under the Barracks Act, 1890 - - -	77,329	226,839	304,168	69,407	234,560	303,967
(b.) Under Naval Works Acts, 1895 to 1905 - - -	†84,187	36,299	† 120,486	† 163,246	130,784	† 294,030
(c.) Under Military Works Acts, 1897 to 1903 - - -	30,185	17,617	47,802	80,813	42,584	123,397
(d.) Under the Telegraph Acts, 1892 to 1904 - - -	43,763	127,546	173,309	60,524	166,907	227,431
(e.) Under the Uganda Railway Acts, 1896 to 1902 - - -	124,505	90,544	215,049	138,424	122,669	261,093
(f.) Under the Royal Niger Company Act, 1899 - - -	39,557	4,917	44,474	24,453	20,022	44,475
(g.) Under Public Offices (Acquisition of Site) Act, 1895 - - -	12,791	3,975	16,766	12,081	4,685	16,766
(h.) Under Public Offices (Whitehall) Site Act, 1897 - - -	15,055	4,281	19,336	13,632	5,704	19,336
(i.) Under Pacific Cable Act, 1901 - - -	—	—	—	47,098	—	47,098
(j.) Under Land Registry (New Buildings) Act, 1900 - - -	—	—	—	3,838	2,923	6,761
(k.) Under the Public Buildings Expenses Act, 1903 - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
(l.) Under the Public Offices Site (Dublin) Act, 1903 - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
(m.) Trustee Savings Banks, Post Office Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies Deficiencies - - -	48,940	—	48,940	—	—	—
£.	485,390	548,494	1,033,884	619,500	768,408	1,387,908
TOTAL ISSUES - - -	£. 21,068,708	† 1,650,708	22,719,416	22,151,367	6,518,599	28,669,966
Sundry Receipts to be set off:						
Interest on Sardinian Loan - - -	3,608	—	3,608	1,300	—	1,300
Profits of Issue and Fees on Stock Certificates - - -	194,880	—	194,880	193,725	—	193,725
Mortgage of Red Sea Annuity repaid from Indian Revenues - - -	4,030	13,397	18,027	3,536	14,491	18,027
Post Office Savings Banks, Surplus of Interest - - -	10,465	—	10,465	26,177	—	26,177
Miscellaneous - - -	—	—	—	119	—	119
£.	212,983	13,397	226,380	224,857	14,491	239,348
NET EXPENDITURE - - -	£. 20,855,725	† 1,636,711	22,492,436	21,926,510	6,504,10	28,430,618

† The portion of certain Terminable Annuities representing replacement of capital and the new Sinking Fund were suspended in 1901-2 under the Finance Act, 1901 (1 Edw. 7 c 7).

Appendix A.—DETAILS OF NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES—*continued*.

1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.		
On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.	On Account of Interest and Management.	On Account of Capital.	TOTAL.
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
16,390,445	—	16,390,445	15,938,911	—	15,938,911	15,899,397	—	15,899,397
1,492,169	5,045,845	6,538,014	1,315,397	5,203,341	6,518,738	1,208,343	5,340,325	6,548,668
2,422,435	—	2,422,435	2,116,447	—	2,116,447	1,918,821	—	1,918,821
185,019	—	185,019	188,225	—	188,225	183,776	—	183,776
—	1,464,087	1,464,087	—	2,237,679	2,237,679	—	3,449,338	3,449,338
20,490,068	6,509,932	27,000,000	19,558,980	7,441,020	27,000,000	19,210,337	8,789,663	28,000,000
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	25,027	—	25,027
—	—	—	—	—	—	25,027	—	25,027
4,857	38,097	43,554	3,696	39,858	43,554	2,500	41,054	43,554
—	—	—	—	—	—	7,500	—	7,500
62,502	241,405	303,907	55,517	248,450	303,967	48,266	255,701	303,967
†266,395	227,033	†493,428	†317,498	310,289	†627,787	535,130	480,682	1,015,812
151,856	97,041	248,897	193,781	153,776	347,557	335,854	381,004	716,858
77,612	207,267	284,879	86,725	242,744	331,469	100,224	299,127	399,351
142,038	139,554	281,592	149,891	155,225	305,116	137,965	168,977	306,942
23,852	20,622	44,474	23,233	21,241	44,474	22,596	21,878	44,474
11,953	4,813	16,766	11,820	4,946	16,766	11,684	5,082	16,766
13,475	5,861	19,336	13,314	6,022	19,336	13,148	6,188	19,336
21,053	22,477	**43,530	19,554	1,986	**21,540	15,933	5,607	**21,540
4,647	2,334	6,981	4,744	2,416	7,160	5,178	2,827	8,005
—	—	—	1,549	756	2,305	10,087	3,021	13,708
—	—	—	—	—	—	1,035	1,395	2,430
246,296	—	246,296	—	—	—	144,310	—	144,310
1,026,596	1,007,104	2,033,700	883,322	1,187,709	2,071,031	1,392,010	1,671,643	3,063,653
21,516,664	7,517,036	29,033,700	20,442,302	8,628,729	29,071,031	20,627,374	10,461,306	31,088,680
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
198,526	—	198,526	186,065	—	186,065	187,018	—	187,018
3,024	15,003	18,027	2,495	15,532	18,027	1,945	16,082	18,027
29,809	—	29,809	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
231,359	15,003	246,362	188,560	15,532	204,092	188,963	16,082	205,045
21,285,305	7,502,033	28,787,338	20,253,742	8,613,197	28,866,939	20,438,411	10,445,224	30,883,635

† The Interest received from the Colony of Gibraltar on expenditure connected with the Commercial Mole, and appropriated in aid of the Naval Vote bearing the charge for the Annuity, has been abated from the full amount of the Annuity, viz., £1,769 in 1901-2, £3,865 in 1902-3, £8,582 in 1903-4, and £6,451 in 1904-5.

** The full amount of the Annuity issued each year was £77,544 18s., the difference represents the amount repaid by the various Colonies and appropriated in aid of the Vote bearing the charge for the Annuity.

APPENDIX B.

DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

	1891-92.			1892-93.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
ARMY—Voted:						
ARMY - - - - -	17,258,900			17,541,700		
ORDNANCE FACTORIES - - - - -	100			300		
		17,259,000			17,542,000	
Charged on Consolidated Fund:						
(1.) INDIAN ARMY PENSION DEFICIENCY FUND ANNUITY (48 & 49 Vict. c. 67)	—	150,000		—	150,000	
(2.) CONSTRUCTION OF BARRACKS, 53 & 54 VICT. C. 25 (MET OUT OF REVENUE) - - - - -	—	325,000		—	—	
		17,734,000			17,692,000	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Interest on Money raised under the Imperial Defence Act, 1888 - - -	56,099			66,993		
(2.) Annuities created under the Barracks Act, 1890 - - - - -	—			—		
(3.) Special Services shown below - - -	—			—		
		56,099			66,993	
(4.) Sundry Receipts: Unclaimed Balances - - - - -		17,677,901			17,625,007	
		—	17,677,901		—	17,625,007
NAVY:						
Voted - - - - -	14,150,000			14,302,000		
Charged on Consolidated Fund for Naval Defence Fund - - - - -	1,428,571			1,428,571		
		15,578,571			15,730,571	
Deduct.—						
(1.) Annuities created under the Im- perial Defence Act, 1888 - - -	45,160			50,005		
(2.) Interest on Money raised under the Naval Defence Act, 1888 - - -	—			15,566		
(3.) Special Services shown below - - -	—	45,160		—	65,571	
(4.) Sundry Receipts: Naval Prize Fund - - - - -	400			200		
Naval Defence Account Balance - - -	—			—		
		400			200	
			15,533,011			15,664,800
Deduct,—			33,210,912			33,289,807
Contribution in lieu of Rates for Ordnance Factories - - - - -	—	—	33,058	—	—	9,030
TOTAL ARMY AND NAVY - - -	—	—	33,177,854	—	—	33,280,777
VOTES OF CREDIT AND SPECIAL SERVICES:						
Less,—Sundry Receipts:						
Miscellaneous - - - - -	15,065			15,094		
		15,065			15,094	
TOTAL VOTES OF CREDIT, &c. - -	—		— 15,065			— 15,094
		£.	33,162,789		£.	33,265,683

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

1893-94.			1894-95.			1895-96.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
17,939,700			17,899,800			18,459,800		
300			200			200		
	17,940,000			17,900,000			18,460,000	
—	150,000		—	150,000		150,000		
—	—		—	—		—	150,000	
	18,090,000			18,050,000			18,610,000	
73,396			—			—		
32,530			75,564			131,491		
—	—		—	—		—	131,491	
	106,586			75,564			18,478,509	
	17,983,414			17,974,436			—	18,478,509
—	—	17,983,414		1,303	17,973,133			
14,048,000			17,545,000			18,724,900		
1,428,571			—			—		
	15,476,571			17,545,000			19,724,000	
50,066			60,798			60,166		
57,535			—			—		
—	—		—			—		
	107,601			60,798			60,166	
	15,368,970			17,484,202			19,663,834	
300			300			200		
—	300	15,368,670	288,357	289,167	17,195,045		—	19,663,634
		33,352,084			35,168,178			38,142,143
—	—	9,515	—	—	9,540	—	—	10,375
—	—	33,342,569	—	—	35,158,638	—	—	38,131,768
15,094			15,075			15,094		
	15,094			15,075			15,094	
	— 15,094			— 15,075		—		— 15,094
	£.	33,327,475		£.	35,143,563		£.	38,116,674

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE—continued.

	1896-97.			1897-98.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
ARMY—Voted:						
ARMY	18,269,800			19,329,900		
ORDNANCE FACTORIES	200	18,270,000		100	19,330,000	
Charged on Consolidated Fund:						
INDIAN ARMY PENSION DEFICIENCY FUND ANNUITY (48 & 49 Vict. c. 67 and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 28)	—	215,000		—	215,000	
		18,485,000			19,545,000	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Annuities created under the Barracks Act, 1890	187,753			196,547		
(2.) Special Services shown below	145,000	332,753		—	196,547	
(3.) Sundry Receipts:		18,162,247			19,348,453	
Surplus on Military Savings Banks Funds	—	—		—	—	
		18,152,247			19,348,453	
NAVY:						
Voted	22,170,000	22,170,000		20,850,000	20,850,000	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Annuities created under the Imperial Defence Act, 1888	60,620			60,482		
(2.) Special Services shown below	—	60,620		—	60,482	
(3.) Sundry Receipts:		22,109,380			20,789,518	
Naval Prize Fund	150			300		
Contribution from Revenues of Cape Colony	—	150		—	300	
		22,109,230			20,789,218	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Contribution in lieu of Rates for Ordnance Factories	14,421		40,261,477	13,467		40,137,671
(2.) Sundry Receipts:						
Part of Surplus on the Ordnance Factories	—	14,421		15,398	28,865	
		14,421			28,865	
TOTAL ARMY AND NAVY	—	—	40,247,056	—	—	40,108,806
VOTES OF CREDIT AND SPECIAL SERVICES:						
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA	—			—		
CHARGE FOR INDIAN TROOPS EMPLOYED AT SUAKIN, ARMY	145,000			—		
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA	—	145,000		—		
Less,—Sundry Receipts:						
Miscellaneous	15,094	15,094		15,094	15,094	
. TOTAL VOTES OF CREDIT, &c.	—	—	129,906	—	—	— 15,094
		£. 40,376,962			£. 40,093,712	

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE—*continued*.

1898-99.			1899-1900.			1900-1901.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
19,999,700			43,552,900			91,505,900		
300	20,000,000		47,100	43,600,000		204,100	91,710,000	
—	215,000		—	215,000		—	215,000	
	20,215,000			43,815,000			91,925,000	
196,547			248,076			286,743		
—	196,547		23,000,000	23,248,076		67,237,000	67,522,743	
—	20,018,453			20,566,924		—	24,402,257	
	—	20,018,453		75,000	20,491,924		—	24,402,257
24,068,000	24,068,000		26,000,000	26,000,000		29,520,000	29,520,000	
60,829			60,301			69,540		
—	60,829		—	60,301		—	69,540	
50	24,007,171		50	25,939,899		50	29,450,460	
—	50		30,000	30,060		30,000	30,060	
		24,007,121			25,909,649			29,420,410
		44,025,574			46,401,573			53,822,667
13,531			14,120			15,121		
—			—			—		
	13,531			14,120			15,121	
		13,531			14,120			15,121
—	—	44,012,043	—	—	46,387,453	—	—	53,807,546
—			—			3,500,000		
—			—			—		
—			23,000,000	23,000,000		63,737,000	67,237,000	
15,094	15,094		15,094	15,094		5	5	
—	—	— 15,094	—	—	22,984,906	—	—	67,236,995
	£.	43,996,949		£.	69,372,359		£.	121,044,541

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE—continued.

	1901-2.			1902-3.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
ARMY—Voted:						
ARMY	92,282,000			69,055,282		
ORDNANCE FACTORIES	280,000			384,738		
		92,542,000			69,440,000	
Charged on Consolidated Fund:						
INDIAN ARMY PENSION DEFICIENCY FUND ANNUITY (48 & 49 Vict. c. 67 and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 29)	—	215,000		—	215,000	
		92,757,000			69,655,000	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Annuities created under the Barracks Act, 1890	304,168			303,967		
Annuities created under the Military Works Acts, 1897 to 1903	47,802			123,397		
(2.) Special Services shown below	63,230,000			40,000,000		
		63,581,970			40,127,364	
(3.) Sundry Receipts	—	29,175,030		—	29,227,636	
		29,175,030			29,227,636	
NAVY:						
Voted	31,030,000			31,170,000		
		31,030,000			31,170,000	
Deduct,—						
(1.) Annuities created under the Naval Works Acts, 1895 to 1905	120,486			294,030		
(2.) Special Services shown below	—			—		
		120,486			294,030	
(3.) Sundry Receipts:						
Contribution from Revenues of Cape Colony	30,000	30,909,514		40,000	30,875,970	
		30,000			40,000	
		30,879,514			30,835,970	
Deduct,—						
Contribution in lieu of Rates for Ordnance Factories		60,054,544			60,063,606	
		16,704			19,118	
TOTAL ARMY AND NAVY		60,037,840			60,044,488	
VOTES OF CREDIT AND SPECIAL SERVICES:						
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA	61,070,000			39,650,000		
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA	2,160,000			350,000		
GRANT IN AID TO THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE RIVER COLONY	6,500,000			† 10,800,000		
SOMALILAND EXPEDITION	—			—		
Less,—Sundry Receipts:		69,730,000			50,800,000	
Miscellaneous	50	50		—	—	
TOTAL VOTES OF CREDIT, &c.	—	69,729,950		—	50,800,000	
		£. 129,767,790			£. 110,844,488	

* Including temporary advances amounting to £3,000,000 subsequently repaid by the Colonies.
† Including a temporary advance of £3,000,000 subsequently repaid by the Colonies.

Appendix B.—DETAILS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE—*continued*.

1903-4.			1904-5.			1905-6.		
£	£	£	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
36,499,057			29,162,838			28,849,900		
177,943			61,162			100		
	36,677,000			29,225,000			28,850,000	
—	215,000		—	215,000		—	215,000	
	36,892,000			29,440,000			29,065,000	
303,967			303,967			303,967		
248,897			347,557			716,858		
5,995,000	6,547,864		550,000	1,201,524		—	1,020,825	
—	30,344,136		—	28,238,476		—	28,044,175	
		30,344,136			28,238,476		2,726	28,041,449
35,476,000	35,476,000		36,830,000	36,830,000		33,300,000	33,300,000	
493,428			627,787			1,015,812		
—	493,426		—	627,787		—	1,015,812	*
	34,982,572			36,202,213			32,284,188	
—			—			—		
		34,982,572			36,202,213			32,284,188
		65,326,708			64,440,689			60,325,637
		22,491			22,919			23,160
		65,304,217			64,417,770			60,302,477
3,695,000			—			—		
450,000			—			—		
—			—			—		
1,850,000			550,000			—		
	5,995,000			550,000		—		
—			—			—		
—			—			—		
		5,995,000	—		550,000	—		
	£	71,299,217		£	64,967,770		£	60,302,477

‡ A sum of £1,255,308 was received by the National Debt Commissioners under the South African Loan and War Contribution Act, 1903, and applied by them direct in the reduction of debt.

APPENDIX C.

**DETAILS OF CHARGES TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES
FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS, AND OTHER EX-
PENDITURE DEEMED TO BE OF A LOCAL CHARACTER.**

APPENDIX C.—DETAILS OF CHARGES TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS, AND OTHER EXPENDITURE DEEMED TO BE OF A LOCAL CHARACTER, IN EACH OF THE YEARS 1891-92, 1901-2, 1904-5, AND 1905-6.

NET EXPENDITURE (after deducting Cognate Receipts).

	1891-92.	1901-2.	1904-5.	1905-6.
ENGLAND AND WALES.				
<i>Charged on Votes.</i>	£.	£.	£.	£.
RATES ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY :				
Payments and Contributions in lieu	183,912	409,198	497,340	521,693
Rates on Telegraph Wires	3,120	4,487	5,263	5,241
Rates on Houses occupied by representatives of Foreign Powers	—	3,523	4,002	3,852
METROPOLITAN FIRE BRIGADE :				
Contribution towards the Funds for Establishment and Maintenance. (28/29, Vict., c. 90, sec. 18.)	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
POOR LAW UNIONS :				
Poor Law Auditors—Salaries and Expenses	14,070	10,255	18,446	19,023
ditto - ditto Superannuation Allowances	1,517	3,703	4,122	4,213
Public Vaccination—Supply of Lymph	1,248	4,466	2,936	2,705
PAUPER LUNATICS :				
Contribution in aid of Maintenance	83	91	90	—
	(Repayment)	(Repayment)	(Repayment)	
Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum—Charges transferred to the Exchequer under the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1884.	8,022	5,715	5,207	5,024
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS :				
Clerks of Assize—Salaries and Expenses	17,397	16,540	16,048	16,428
London (formerly Middlesex) Sessions—Salaries	1,454	—	—	—
Clerks of the Peace, &c.—Compensations	198	9	—	—
METROPOLITAN POLICE :				
Salaries of Commissioners and Receiver	4,300	5,200	4,700	4,700
Pensions of late Commissioners and Receiver	1,669	233	1,229	1,229
PRISONS, REFORMATORIES, &c. :				
Prisons transferred to the Government by 40 & 41 Vict. c. 21 and Maintenance of State Inebriate Reformatories. }	380,227	516,725	553,409	574,975
Ditto - Pensions and Commutation Annuities	16,077	27,808	35,651	36,293
Ditto - Stationery	3,850	6,920	5,000	5,300
Maintenance of Children in Reformatory and Industrial Schools	194,144	185,124	174,687	169,277
Inebriate Reformatories—Contribution under Act 61 & 62 Vict., c. 60, and Maintenance of Criminal Lunatics transferred from certified Inebriate Reformatories to Local Asylums. }	—	7,021	18,556	24,668
BERWICK CORPORATION :				
For repairs of Berwick Bridge	90	90	90	90
DISEASES OF ANIMALS :				
Grants in Aid under 53 & 54 Vict. c. 14 and 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57	138,200	42,680	30,800	29,128
<i>Total Charged on Votes</i>	<i>979,412</i>	<i>1,259,606</i>	<i>1,387,396</i>	<i>1,433,839</i>
TOTAL, ENGLAND AND WALES	979,412	1,259,606	1,387,396	1,433,839

Appendix C.—DETAILS OF CHARGES TRANSFERRED FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS, &c.

	1891-92.	1901-2.	1904-5.	1905-6.
SCOTLAND.				
<i>1. Charged on Consolidated Fund.</i>				
PAYMENTS TO LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS:	£.	£.	£.	£.
Increased Agricultural Grant under Section 1 of the Local Taxation Account (Scotland) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 56).	—	97,975	98,002	97,938
<i>2. Charged on Votes.</i>				
RATES ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY:				
Payments and Contributions in lieu - - - - -	11,502	21,281	23,708	25,029
Rates on Telegraph Wires, &c. - - - - -	47	493	575	539
MEDICAL RELIEF:				
Supply of Vaccine Lymph - - - - -	79	122	110	107
PAUPER LUNATICS:				
Contribution in Aid of Maintenance † - - - - -	—	99 (Repayment)	144 (Repayment)	129 (Repayment)
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, SCOTLAND:				
Sheriffs' Accounts and Criminal Prosecutions, &c. in Sheriffs' Courts.	17,429	16,147	14,046	14,335
Procurators Fiscal—Salaries - - - - -	28,863	28,047	28,750	29,162
Ditto - Stationery - - - - -	180	150	80	120
PRISONS, REFORMATORIES, &c.:				
Prisons transferred to the Government by 40 & 41 Vict. c. 53 } and Maintenance of State Inebriate Reformatories - - - - -	54,950	65,906	67,364	67,176
Ditto - Pensions - - - - -	3,853	6,252	7,068	7,060
Ditto - Stationery - - - - -	500	780	750	760
Maintenance of Children in Reformatory and Industrial Schools -	62,913	59,727	59,230	59,289
Inebriate Reformatories, Contributions under 61/62 Vict. c. 60 -	—	466	1,665	1,359
SHERIFF COURT HOUSES:				
One-half of Cost of Erecting or Improving (exclusive of Grants for Maintenance).	33	4,520	5,407	318
DISEASES OF ANIMALS:				
Grant in Aid under 53 & 54 Vict. c. 14 and 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57 -	16,800	5,820	4,200	3,972
LOCAL TAXATION RELIEF:				
Grant in Aid of Local Rates—being the equivalent of the Fee Grants in England and Wales under the Elementary Education Act, 1891 - - - - -	110,000	—	—	—
Total Charged on Votes - - £.	305,149	209,612	212,809	209,097
TOTAL, SCOTLAND - - £.	305,149	307,587	310,811	307,035

† These Charges were transferred from the Exchequer to the Local Taxation Accounts under the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1889 (52/3 Vict. c. 50).

Appendix C.—DETAILS OF CHARGES TRANSFERRED FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS, &c.—*continued*

	1891-92.	1901-2.	1904-5.	1905-6.
IRELAND.				
1. Charged on Consolidated Fund.	£.	£.	£.	£.
PAYMENTS TO LOCAL TAXATION ACCOUNTS :				
Exchequer Contribution under Land Purchase (Ireland) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 48, s. 5).	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
Under the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 37):				
Agricultural Grant, sec. 48	—	727,655	727,655	727,635
In lieu of Local Grants:				
Equivalent of Local Taxation Licences (s. 58 (a))	—	209,262	212,210	212,175
Annual sum under sec. 58 (b)	—	79,000	79,000	79,000
Total Charged on Consolidated Fund - - £.	40,000	1,055,917	1,058,865	1,058,830
2. Charged on Votes.				
RATES ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY :				
Payments and Contributions in lieu	30,107	47,199	53,578	54,156
Rates on Telegraph Wires, &c.	528	755	643	653
POOR LAW UNIONS :				
Salaries of Schoolmasters and Schoolmistresses in Workhouses	9,513	†—	†—	†—
Half Salaries of Sanitary Officers	15,670	†—	†—	†—
Half Salaries of Medical Officers and half cost of Medicines	74,190	†—	†—	†—
Poor Law Auditors—Salaries and Pensions	4,001	8,373	6,115	6,588
Cost of Vaccine Lymph	749	1,180	1,441	1,390
PAUPER LUNATICS :				
Contribution in aid of Maintenance	111,666	†—	†—	†—
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS :				
Expenses of Prosecutors and Witnesses formerly provided for by presentment.	20,494	11,741	9,609	10,800
DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE :				
Salaries, Pensions and Expenses	90,642	92,022	92,840	92,882
Buildings	8,025	17,982	8,970	7,839
Stationery	475	680	540	770
IRISH CONSTABULARY :				
Pay and Pensions, and other Expenses, including Escort and Conveyance of Industrial School Children, &c.	1,353,084	1,350,113	1,323,000	1,295,000
Buildings	20,604	14,957	9,921	11,572
Stationery	2,175	1,630	1,565	1,900
PRISONS, REFORMATORIES, &c. :				
Prisons transferred to the Government by 40 & 41 Vict. c. 49, cost of State Inebriate Reformatories, and Maintenance of Criminal Lunatics under Lunacy (Ireland) Act, 1901	95,937	77,684	87,096	94,504
Ditto - Pensions and Commutations	2,767	4,301	4,707	5,046
Ditto - Stationery	600	820	707	840
Maintenance of Children in Reformatory and Industrial Schools	107,519	104,613	106,194	106,513
Carried forward - - £.	1,948,746	1,734,050	1,706,926	1,690,503

† These Charges were transferred to the Local Taxation Account under the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 37).

Appendix C.—DETAILS OF CHARGES TRANSFERRED FROM LOCAL TO IMPERIAL FUNDS, &c.—continued.

	1891-92.	1901-2.	1904-5.	1905-6.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Brought forward . . .	1,948,746	1,734,050	1,706,926	1,690,503
IRELAND—continued.				
SURVEY AND VALUATION :				
Salaries and Expenses (after abating Expenses for Boundary Survey).	13,814	15,396	16,119	15,861
Pensions	2,684	4,271	4,572	4,572
Buildings	714	469	1,002	778
Stationery	150	485	330	400
INFIRMARIES :				
Grants under 5 Geo. 3 c. 20	401	312	312	312
DUBLIN HOSPITALS :				
Grants in Aid	15,850	15,782	15,699	15,723
DISEASES OF ANIMALS :				
Grants in Aid under 53 & 54 Vict. c. 14 and 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57.	20,000	12,500	16,200	17,200
Total charged on Votes . . . £.	2,002,359	1,783,265	1,761,160	1,745,349
TOTAL, IRELAND . . . £.	2,042,359	2,839,182	2,820,025	2,804,179

SUMMARY.

	ENGLAND.	SCOTLAND.	IRELAND.	TOTAL.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1891-92.—Charged on Consolidated Fund . . .	—	—	40,000	40,000
Charged on Votes	979,412	305,149	2,002,359	3,286,920
TOTAL met out of Exchequer Revenue £.	979,412	305,149	2,042,359	3,326,920
1901-2.—Charged on Consolidated Fund . . .	—	97,975	1,055,917	1,153,892
Charged on Votes	1,259,606	209,612	1,783,265	3,252,483
TOTAL met out of Exchequer Revenue £.	1,259,606	307,587	2,839,182	4,406,375
1904-5.—Charged on Consolidated Fund . . .	—	98,002	1,058,865	1,156,867
Charged on Votes	1,387,396	212,809	1,761,160	3,361,365
TOTAL met out of Exchequer Revenue £.	1,387,396	310,811	2,820,025	4,518,232
1905-6.—Charged on Consolidated Fund . . .	—	97,938	1,058,830	1,156,768
Charged on Votes	1,433,839	209,097	1,745,349	3,388,285
TOTAL met out of Exchequer Revenue £.	1,433,839	307,035	2,804,179	4,545,053

EAST INDIA (INDIA OFFICE BALANCES).

MEMORANDUM

ON

INDIA OFFICE BALANCES

(PREPARED UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INDIA).

• Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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EAST INDIA (INDIA OFFICE BALANCES).

MEMORANDUM

ON

INDIA OFFICE BALANCES

(PREPARED UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA).

I.—*India Office Balances part of the general balance of the Government of India.*

This memorandum is written in order to give information about the India Office balances, and especially their amount from 1906-07 onwards. It is important to mention at the outset that these balances are part of the general balance of the Government of India, and are liable (as explained in succeeding sections) to be affected to a very considerable extent by variations in its amount.

The general balance, in India and England, was of the following amount at the end of each year from 1905-06 to 1911-12 :—

	£
1905-06	19,931,097
1906-07	15,633,744
1907-08	17,458,679
1908-09	18,219,381
1909-10	25,074,522 (including a receipt of £6,370,000 from a loan raised towards the end of the year in anticipation of capital requirements in 1910-11).
	£
1910-11	30,263,912
1911-12	30,669,702

The high level of the general balance at the end of each of the last three years was due to various causes of which the most important (except, as explained above, in 1909-10) was the large excess of revenue over expenditure. Excluding adjustments between the Government of India and Provincial Governments (which, though they affect the surplus of the Government of India, do not affect the total balance held by them), the excess of revenue over expenditure in each year from 1905-06 to 1911-12 (in India and England combined), compares as follows with the Budget Estimate :—

	Budget Estimate of Excess (+) or Deficit (—)	Actual Excess (+) or Deficit (—).	Increase (+) or Decrease (—).
	£	£	£
1905-06	— 466,500	+ 2,115,848	+ 2,582,348
1906-07	— 203,500	+ 1,901,617	+ 2,105,117
1907-08	+ 331,400	— 715,140	— 1,046,540
1908-09	+ 46,400	— 4,405,053	— 4,451,453
1909-10	+ 30,400	+ 1,500,677	+ 1,470,277
1910-11	— 246,200	+ 5,897,489	+ 6,143,689
1911-12	— 896,800	+ 4,909,418	+ 5,806,218

The causes of the increases and decreases shown in these figures have been explained in the annual Financial Statements of the Government of India, the annual Explanatory Memorandum presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State, and the speeches made in the House of Commons in the annual debates on the Indian Accounts and Estimates. Of the aggregate improvement of £13,420,184 in the years 1909-10 to 1911-12, £5,737,687 has occurred under Opium and £2,771,088 under Railways. The fact that so large a portion of

the surpluses has been derived from Opium, the exports of which are being steadily diminished while its price is very uncertain, has prevented the reduction of taxation which would, no doubt, have occurred in 1911-12 or 1912-13 if revenue from so unstable a source had not formed an important part of the total receipts.

II.—Sources from which Balances are derived.

The money held in the India Office balances is supplied almost entirely from two sources, viz., the proceeds of the sale of Council bills and telegraphic transfers on India, and the proceeds of loans issued in London for the purpose of providing a portion of the money required for capital expenditure on railways.

The bills and telegraphic transfers on India are sold by tenders which are received weekly at the Bank of England; they are bought by bankers and merchants who pay the sterling price to the Secretary of State's account at the Bank of England. The rupees in respect of which they are sold are paid out by the Government of India in India. The bills and transfers serve a double purpose. They enable the Secretary of State to receive in London money required for meeting his disbursements, and bankers and merchants to remit to India the money required for settling the balance of trade.

III.—Preparation of India Office Budget.

The estimate of the total receipts required for each year is framed so as to provide that, as far as can be foreseen when the estimate is prepared, the Secretary of State in Council shall have at the end of the year, after meeting his disbursements on revenue and capital account, the sum required as a safe working balance together with any sum that it may be desirable to keep in hand for meeting exceptional disbursements in the following year that can be foreseen or for the possibility of which it is prudent to make provision. The amount of the closing balance for which it is ordinarily desirable to provide is discussed in Section V. below; and in later paragraphs it is shown that in certain recent years there have been good reasons for providing for a somewhat higher figure.

In estimating the portions of the total sums required for each year that will be derived respectively from bills and transfers and from the issue of loans, the practice is, and has long been, (1) to enter under the former head the full amount that the Government of India expect to be able to provide from their general balances for meeting the drawings of the Secretary of State; (2) to estimate for loans sufficient to supply the rest of the amount required. The effect of this is to keep the net addition to debt to the lowest figure which appears, when the Budget is prepared, to be practicable. The new loans actually issued are sometimes less, and the floating debt paid off is sometimes higher, than the Budget estimate, the practice being to avoid increases of debt when the disbursements of the year can without imprudent disregard of future liabilities be met from other sources, *e.g.*, from the addition that accrues to general balances when the year is a very favourable one and revenue is unexpectedly large. But the details given in Section VII. below show that it is difficult to make on this account large changes in the programme of loans for any year, because the issue of loans must usually take place, if at all, early in the financial year, or before its commencement (since the first half of the calendar year is notoriously the most favourable season for issues), whereas improvements in revenue, if they come, nearly always come late in the financial year when a good monsoon has been assured and its effects have had time to make themselves felt.

IV.—Sales of Council Bills and Telegraphic Transfers.

In times of active trade, it has been the practice for many years to sell bills and telegraphic transfers freely, whether in excess of the Budget estimate or not, subject to the condition of not selling so freely as to prevent the importation into India of such amounts of gold as the public appears likely to be able to absorb. This well-known practice was mentioned in the Financial Statement of the Government of India of March, 1906 (paragraph 52), when the amount required to meet the Home Charges was given and the Financial Member added: "additional bills will, as usual, be sold if needed to meet the demands of trade." In another portion of the same Statement (paragraph 77) he remarked: "the policy of Government has been to sell Council drafts freely so as to supply the trade demand to the fullest extent up to the limit of our capacity to meet them." The Financial Member's remark may be illustrated by the facts of 1903-04, 1904-05, and 1905-06, in which

years the sales of bills and telegraphic transfers compared as follows with the Budget Estimates of the requirements of the Secretary of State :—

	Budget.	Actuals.	Excess.
	£	£	£
1903-04	17,000,000	23,859,303	6,859,303
1904-05	16,500,000	24,425,558	7,925,558
1905-06	17,833,300	32,166,973	14,333,673

The reasons for selling in excess of the Secretary of State's immediate requirements are as follows :—

- (a.) The sales are of great convenience to Indian trade in the busy season as enabling large amounts of money to be placed at its disposal very rapidly. For example, in 16 days in January-February, 1912, telegraphic transfers were sold for £3,500,000, and the corresponding amount was liberated in rupees from the Treasuries of the Government of India and passed into mercantile hands. The absence of such facilities would undoubtedly be very prejudicial to Indian trade in times of pressure. There has accordingly been in force since January, 1904, an undertaking that bills will be sold without limit of amount at 1s. 4½d. the rupee.
- (b.) The alternative method of trade remittance open to bankers and merchants is to send sovereigns to India. Experience shows that sovereigns so sent do not ordinarily pass into circulation direct, but are tendered to the Government to be exchanged for rupees or notes; and on various occasions in the past it has been found that the Government holding of sovereigns has been so high and their holding of rupees so low that sovereigns shipped to India by the public and tendered there have had to be shipped to London by, and at the cost of, Government to buy silver for the coinage of additional rupees. The comparatively free sale of bills and telegraphic transfers has the effect of preventing this wasteful procedure (*cf.* paragraph 77 of the Financial Statement of the Government of India of March, 1906 :—“ Since the closing of the mints and the establishment of the “ Gold Standard, the only means of obtaining currency that was open “ to trade, apart from the purchase of Council drafts and transfers, “ was to bring out gold to India. When, as is now the case, a “ sufficient stock of gold has been accumulated in the Currency Reserve “ to make the standard effective, and so long as gold is not to any “ large extent in active circulation, this method is wasteful; for it “ involves the eventual reshipment of the imports of that metal to “ Europe for the purchase of silver for coinage. To avoid this result “ the policy of Government has been to sell Council drafts freely “ *ut supra*). ”
- (c.) It is desirable to have in hand at the end of each year a certain sum to be used as a reserve against the possibilities that the receipts in the coming year from remittances and loans may fall short of what is expected, or that unexpected charges may have to be met in London. It is always quite uncertain during the first half of the year whether the sales of bills and telegraphic transfers during the year will fall short of or exceed the estimated amount. When the monsoon is unfavourable, as it may become so late as September, the sales are liable to fall much below the estimate. Thus in the twenty years from 1892-93 to 1911-12 the sales fell short of the estimate in eight years and exceeded it in twelve. It is also uncertain throughout each year what part of the bills sold in the year the Government of India will be able to meet from their Treasury balances, in which case the proceeds are available for the general purposes of the Secretary of State, and what part will have to be met from silver purchased for the purpose, or from the Paper Currency Reserve or from the Gold Standard Reserve, in which cases the proceeds are not so available.

The uncertainty whether it will be practicable to issue the loans estimated for in the Budget of any year is notorious.

(d.) The balances held in London earn interest, the receipts on this account in the twenty years from 1892-93 to 1911-12 having been £2,193,879. In India the only interest earned on the balances is on special loans occasionally granted to Presidency banks at the discretion of the Government of India, by way of addition to the large amounts ordinarily deposited with them. It is not the practice of the Government of India to lend to other institutions and firms in India. Whether larger loans to the Presidency banks or loans to other bodies and firms are desirable and practicable is a question on which it is well not to dogmatise. But it should be noted that on 18th September, 1911, Sir G. Fleetwood Wilson was asked at a meeting of the Governor-General's Council "whether Government will lend to the money markets in India against the deposit of securities of approved character when their Treasury balances are high," and replied, "The Government of India leave considerable sums out of their Indian cash balances on deposit with the Presidency banks. They do not consider it advisable to make a practice of lending to the money markets in India in any other manner or to any larger extent." It should also be noted that there are two special difficulties in the way of lending money to Indian firms from the Government balances—(1) The loans would probably be secured in most cases on rupee paper; and if, through the default of borrowers, large quantities had to be sold in any year, the annual Government loan in India, which is effected by the issue of rupee paper, might be injured; (2) In the comparatively small and sensitive Indian money markets, the rapid calling in of large loans to meet an emergency might be difficult and dangerous.

It will be shown later that the great variations in the amount available from Council bills for general purposes (of which a large part is liable to occur in the latter part of the year, when most of the capital transactions of the year have already been carried out) are the chief cause of the large balances that have been held at various times from 1910.

The figures in the Appendix illustrate the range of variation from 1902-03 to 1911-12. It will be seen that the annual amounts available for general purposes from 1902-03 to 1911-12 varied from £12,424,002 in 1908-09 to £25,070,217 in 1911-12, and that the amounts so available in the second half of each year (from October to March) varied from £7,118,306 in 1907-08 to £14,383,666 in 1911-12.

V.—Estimate of Closing Balance to be provided for in the Annual Budget.

During the first thirteen weeks of each of the financial years 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13, the disbursements of the India Office were as follows :—

—	1910-11.	1911-12.	1912-13.
	£	£	£
For discharge of debt	155,000	1,734,000	3,559,100
For other purposes	5,207,000	5,404,950	7,105,762

These figures suggest that the annual Budget estimates should be drawn up so as to provide that, apart from exceptional requirements in the following year (such as the large sums occasionally needed for the discharge of bonds and India bills, as mentioned below in the details relating to 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13), each year should end, and its successor begin, with a balance of about £4,000,000. But if a Budget is drawn up to provide for this amount, and there are unfavourable circumstances during the year, such as (to mention circumstances which are of frequent occurrence) a failure to sell the full estimated amount of Council Bills or to issue one of the loans contemplated, the result may be that the year closes, and its successor opens, with a balance so small that, soon after the commencement of the succeeding year, the Secretary of State is compelled to issue a loan at a bad time in order to provide funds for immediate necessities. There are thus considerable advantages in estimating for a closing balance, apart from provision for known exceptional requirements, somewhat higher than £4,000,000.

VI.—Budget Estimates of Closing Balances from 1906-07 to 1912-13.

The closing balances from 1906-07, as estimated in the Budgets, have been as follows :—

	£
1906-07	5,218,981
1907-08	3,437,119
1908-09	3,759,012
1909-10	3,328,689
1910-11	5,265,915
1911-12	8,738,218
1912-13	6,721,849

The following remarks explain the figures where explanation appears to be needed :—

1906-07. When the Budget for this year was prepared, it was intended to give notice to the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Company of the intention to terminate their contract on 30th June, 1907, so that one more favourable to Indian revenues might be substituted for it. A revised contract in the sense desired was in due course made, but it was necessary to allow for the possibility that an agreement would not be reached, in which event it would have been necessary to repay early in 1907-08 the Company's capital of £3,500,000. In view of this contingency it was desirable to close 1906-07 and begin 1907-08 with a balance somewhat above the normal.

1907-08, 1908-09, and 1909-10. The figures for these years do not appear to call for explanation.

1910-11. It was desirable to have in hand at the end of the year money to be used towards repaying the £2,276,200 of temporary debt which was to be discharged in 1911-12.

1911-12. The reason for estimating for so high a balance as £8,738,200 on 31st March, 1912, was as follows :—

At the end of the year 1911-12 there was expected to be in existence temporary debt as follows :—

	£
India bills	4,500,000
India bonds	3,500,000 (repayable at the rate of £500,000 annually.)
Debenture bonds for which the liability had been transferred to the Secretary of State in Council on the termination of contracts with certain Railway Companies	3,166,300
Total	£11,166,300

It had been decided that certain exceptional revenue receipts in 1910-11, amounting to approximately £2,000,000, should be used towards the discharge of this debt; and that the portion of the debt of which the discharge was most urgently required, apart from the India bonds, was the railway debenture bonds, since it was absolutely necessary to discharge these bonds at maturity, whereas India bills could be replaced annually until funds were available for discharging them without replacement. The amount of the India and debenture bonds falling due in 1912-13 was £1,977,600, and in 1913-14, £1,781,200. It was decided to keep in hand the exceptional receipts just mentioned, in order that they might be available towards the discharge of these bonds as they fell due. Other considerations which affected the estimate of the closing balance on 31 March, 1912, are referred to below, under Section VII.

1912-13. The chief reason for estimating for so high a balance as £6,721,849 on 31st March, 1913, was that it was desirable to have in hand means for discharging the £1,781,200 bonds maturing in 1913-14. Other reasons are referred to under Section VII.

VII.—Divergence between Budget Estimates of Closing Balances and Actuals.

It is now necessary to turn to the causes which led to the actual balances at the end of certain years being so much higher than the amount estimated in the Budget and required by the Secretary of State.

The actual closing balances from 1906-07 onwards have been as follows:—

	£
1906-07	5,606,812
1907-08	4,607,266
1908-09	7,983,898
1909-10	12,779,094
1910-11	16,696,990
1911-12	18,390,013

1906-07.

The actual closing balance was £5,606,812, an excess of £387,831 over the Budget Estimate of £5,218,981. This difference, though comparatively unimportant, was due to a number of important changes which largely counteracted one another:—The receipts from Council bills and telegraphic transfers were £15,357,196 beyond the estimate, the capital outlay on stores for Railways and Irrigation works was less by £1,951,200, and the net expenditure chargeable to revenue was less by £397,357. On the other hand, the payments for silver were greater by £11,620,929; £2,775,000 was transferred to the Paper Currency Reserve (a transaction not contemplated in the Budget); and the capital receipts from Railway Companies were £3,046,716 below the Budget Estimate.

1907-08.

The closing balance was £4,607,266 or £1,170,147 more than the Budget Estimate. As the financial prospects at the end of the year were gloomy, owing to famine, the closing balance was obviously not more than it was prudent to hold.

1908-09.

The closing balance was £4,224,886 more than the Budget Estimate, or £7,983,898 in all. This amount included a receipt of £4,475,000 out of a loan of £7,500,000 which was estimated to be required for the Railway programme of 1909-10 and was issued in February, 1909, because the market was then favourable. Excluding this amount, which was in effect a receipt on account of 1909-10, though received shortly before the end of 1908-09, the closing balance was £3,508,898.

1909-10.

The closing balance was £12,779,091 or an excess of £9,450,402 over the Budget Estimate. Of this £6,370,000 represents receipts from a loan of £7,500,000 estimated to be required for the Railway programme of 1910-11, which was issued in January, 1910, because the market seemed favourable. Deducting this amount, which, like the £4,475,000 mentioned in connection with 1908-09, was in effect a receipt in advance on account of the subsequent year, the closing balance of 1909-10 was £6,409,091. This excess over the figure (£3,328,689) estimated in the Budget was due mainly to the following causes, viz.:—

Excess of bills and telegraphic transfers actually sold (£17,850,586) over Budget Estimate (£16,200,000)	1,650,586
Decrease in the amount withdrawn by Railway Companies for expenditure on Stores, &c.	952,500
	£2,603,086

The reasons for not restricting the sale of Council Bills have been given above.

If it had been possible to foresee in January, 1910, when the loan was issued, that the receipts from Council bills would exceed the Budget Estimate, and that the withdrawals by Railway Companies would fall below it, the loan would no doubt have been reduced. But the estimate of Council bills and telegraphic transfers formed in December, 1909, in consultation with the Government of India, on the material then available, was £16,000,000, and the estimates, for which Railway Companies are responsible, of their withdrawals for stores were given by them in December, 1909, at £4,794,400, the final figures being only £3,596,900.

1910-11.

The closing balance was £16,696,990, or £11,431,075 more than the Budget Estimate.

The most important differences between the Budget Estimate and the Actuals were as follows:—

Increase of receipts and reduction of disbursements:—	£
Excess of actual sales of bills and telegraphic transfers over Budget Estimate	8,138,000
Reduction of withdrawals by Railway Companies for expenditure on stores	1,044,300
Net decrease of miscellaneous disbursements	1,106,700
Money raised by loan in 1910-11 towards providing for capital requirements of 1911-12	2,210,000

Increase of disbursements:—

Discharge of India bills without replacement	1,000,000
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The excess sales of Council bills and telegraphic transfers were rendered possible by large increases over the Budget Estimate of the resources at the disposal of the Government of India: the most important being an increase of £5,694,900 in the excess of revenue receipts over expenditure chargeable to revenue in India and a diminution of £2,767,700 in the capital outlay in India. If it had been known at a sufficiently early period of the year that the sales of Council bills and telegraphic transfers would so largely exceed the Budget Estimate, and that the other changes shown above under the head of "increase of receipts and reduction of disbursements" would occur, and if the requirements of 1910-11 had alone been considered, it would have been possible to reduce the amount borrowed or to increase the amount of India bills discharged.

As a matter of fact the estimate of receipts from bills and telegraphic transfers taken in the Budget at £15,500,000 was raised, in consultation with the Government of India, to £18,000,000 on 7th December, 1910, £19,500,000 on 19th December, 1910, £23,000,000 on 27th January, 1911, and £23,500,000 on 19th February, 1911. The actual amount was £23,638,000. Similarly the probability of a reduction in the various disbursements of the India Office only became clear as the Estimates of the year were revised in November, 1910, and February and March, 1911. These facts had an important bearing on the course actually followed in the issue and discharge of loans. In the following statement the loan transactions of the year are given and are compared with the Budget Estimate:—

Money used for discharge of debt:—

	Budget Estimate. £	Actual. £
Discharge of debenture bonds for which liability had been transferred to Secretary of State in Council on termination of contracts with Railway Companies	817,900	817,900
India bills discharged without replacement ... (£6,000,000 matured and £5,000,000 replaced.)	—	1,000,000
Total	£817,900	£1,817,900

	Budget Estimate. £	Actual. £
Money raised by loan:—		
Balance of India 3½ per cent. stock for £7,500,000 issued in January, 1910*	589,600	764,820
Issue of debenture stock by Railway Companies To be raised for repayment of capital of Indian Midland Railway Company in 1910-11 ...	2,597,500	2,294,278
Raised for repayment of capital (£2,250,000) of Indian Midland Railway Company in 1910-11, and discharge of debenture bonds of this and other companies in 1911-12 (£1,750,000)	2,250,000	—
Instalment on account of India 3½ per cent. stock issued in March, 1911, to provide for capital expenditure to be incurred in 1911-12	—	4,000,000
Total	£5,437,100	£7,519,098

* The amount paid up in 1909-10 was less than was expected when the Budget was prepared.

The following remarks explain in detail, except where explanation is obviously unnecessary, why the transactions summarised in the foregoing table were carried out.

(a.) *India Bills.*—The replacement of India bills took place as follows:—

	£
April, 1910	1,000,000
June, 1910	2,500,000
December, 1910 (advertisement issued 18th November, 1910)	1,500,000
	(£1,000,000 discharged without replacement).

In April and June it was estimated on the basis of information received from the Government of India that the receipts from bills and telegraphic transfers would be £15,500,000, or less by £8,138,300 than the amount actually received, and there was no reason to anticipate the reduction that actually occurred in expenditure on capital and revenue account. There was thus no ground for expecting that the Budget Estimate of the closing balance would be exceeded.

In November, when it was necessary to decide whether the bills maturing 1st December should be replaced, it was clear that the Budget Estimate of Treasury receipts from Council bills and telegraphic transfers would be exceeded. But—

- (1) It could not be foreseen how large the increase would be because, as shown above, the increase was estimated by the Government of India, a month later, at £4,138,000 less than actually occurred :
- (2) The probable variations from the Budget estimate of miscellaneous receipts and disbursements could be only imperfectly foreseen :
- (3) It was known that it would be necessary to discharge at least £2,276,200 of bonds in 1911-12 and £1,977,600 in 1912-13, besides large amounts in subsequent years. It was very desirable to avoid the risk of having to meet these obligations, as they matured, from the capital funds that would otherwise be available for the construction of railways and irrigation works; and it was, therefore, thought expedient that such funds as were available from balances for the discharge of temporary debt should be to a great extent reserved for the discharge of bonds, and that, until some progress had been made in this direction, the discharge of India bills should proceed slowly.

The amount of India bills to be discharged in December, 1910, without replacement was, therefore, fixed in November at £1,000,000.

(b.) *Issue of Debenture Stock by Railway Companies.*—The one issue made was of £2,500,000 debenture stock of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company. It was made in June, when there was no reason to anticipate that the Budget estimate of receipts would be exceeded.

(c.) *Issue of India Bonds.*—The issue of £4,000,000 bonds in October was made, as stated above, for two purposes:—

- (1) To provide funds for repaying to the Indian Midland Railway Company on 31st December, 1910, their share capital of £2,250,000. The raising of the necessary money by loan had been included in the Budget, and was one of the transactions contributing to the estimated closing balance of £5,265,900.
- (2) To provide towards the discharge in 1911-12 of debenture bonds of this and other companies which the Secretary of State was bound to pay off as they matured. It was not thought probable that these exceptional requirements could be met, otherwise than from borrowed funds, without reducing at a subsequent time the India Office balance below the amount desirable as a working balance in view of its large liabilities. It would not, in October, have been prudent to count on the large increase which actually occurred in Treasury receipts from the sales of bills and telegraphic transfers.

(d.) *Issue of India Stock in March, 1911.*—When the loan of £3,500,000 was issued the Budget arrangements for 1911-12 were practically complete. It was estimated that £2,276,200 bonds and £500,000 India bills would be discharged, and that if the receipts from bills and telegraphic transfers amounted to £15,825,000 (the estimate adopted after consultation with the Government of India), the India Office balance would be reduced during 1911-12 by £7,317,300, and would, at the end of the year, amount to £8,738,218. The reasons for regarding this as a suitable amount are stated under 1911-12.

1911-12.

The Budget estimated for Capital receipts as follows :—

	£
Balance of receipts on account of issue of £3,500,000 India	
Stock made in March, 1911	3,137,500
Loan to be issued through a Railway Company	1,357,000

It also estimated for the discharge of £2,276,200 bonds and debentures, the discharge of £500,000 India bills without replacement, and the replacement of £4,500,000 India bills; and for receipts of £15,825,000 from the sale of Council bills and telegraphic transfers, this figure being based on information received from the Government of India. It was anticipated that on this basis the closing balance on 31st March, 1912, would be £8,738,218. The reasons for regarding this as a not excessive estimate were as follows :—

- (1) It was desirable to have in hand at the end of 1911-12 money for the discharge of £1,977,600 bonds and debentures maturing during 1912-13, so as to avoid the risk of having to curtail the Railway and Irrigation Programme for that year owing to the necessity of meeting this large extra liability.
- (2) It was necessary to have regard to the possibility that some of the estimated receipts contributing to the estimated closing balance of £8,738,218 at the end of 1911-12 might fail to be realised. This actually occurred, since owing to the depressed state of the investment market in 1911, a loan of £1,500,000 that was to have been issued by a railway company had to be abandoned. And, during part of 1911-12, as mentioned by Sir G. Fleetwood Wilson in his speech introducing the Financial Statement of 1912-13, "the half of India was on the verge of a drought for which we might have had to go back thirty-four years for a parallel It was a striking lesson of how narrow is the line in India between plenty and want, and how incessant is the need for caution in our forecasts."
- (3) It was contemplated that any money available in excess of the estimates would be used for the discharge of India bills whenever there was a clear prospect that this could be done with safety.

The actual closing balance was £18,390,013, or £9,651,795 in excess of the estimate, the increase being mainly due to an excess of £9,245,216 in the sales of bills and telegraphic transfers, and to the withdrawals by Railway Companies for capital expenditure falling short of the estimate by £905,300. The increased sales of Council bills and telegraphic transfers were rendered possible mainly through the following additions to the resources at the disposal of the Government of India :— Increase in excess of revenue receipts over expenditure chargeable to revenue in India, £5,566,064; increase under Deposits, Advances, Savings Bank balances, &c., £1,966,500; increased net receipts on account of remittance transactions in India, £811,800. If there had been any indication of an increase of receipts and a diminution of expenditure of the amount stated, when the time came for replacing the £4,500,000 India bills during the year, those bills could have been discharged without replacement. The reasons why this was not done are as follows :—

£1,000,000 bills maturing in April, 1911, were replaced and £2,000,000 out of £2,500,000 maturing in June were replaced, the remaining £500,000 being finally discharged. This was in accordance with the Budget programme. At this period of the financial year it would have been imprudent to count on an improvement in the general position as compared with the Budget estimate, a point which is sufficiently illustrated by the fact that during part of the summer there was, as shown in the extract quoted above from Sir G. Fleetwood Wilson's speech, serious risk of a widespread drought, a calamity which would have thrown out the whole financial arrangements of the year.

£1,500,000 bills were replaced on 1st December, 1911. The question of discharging these without replacement was considered in November when the decision had to be taken. The position was that, as far as could be seen, an increase of revenue of rather more than £2,000,000 was probable, but on the other hand "Durbar boons," not provided for in the Budget and estimated to cost about £600,000, had just been sanctioned. Famine conditions, the chief cause of uncertainty in Indian Finance, prevailed in parts of Bombay, where the number of persons on relief on 25th November, 1911, was 31,346, and was growing every week. It had also been

necessary to abandon the proposed issue of a loan by a Railway Company, since the investment market was depressed by rumours of international complications. It was, therefore, thought desirable to replace the bills maturing in December, thus postponing their final discharge.

Owing to the remarkable improvement in Indian revenues in the latter part of the year, this postponement proved to be unnecessary, but the improvement did not come in time to influence the decision.

As will be mentioned below, the India bills replaced in 1911-12 are to be discharged without replacement in 1912-13.

1912-13.

On the assumptions that the receipts from bills and telegraphic transfers would be £15,500,000 (the figure fixed in consultation with the Government of India), that £3,000,000 India stock would be issued, that £1,812,100 would be raised through a Railway Company, and that £4,500,000 India bills and £1,977,600 bonds would be discharged, the Budget estimated that the closing balance would be £6,721,800. This figure was considered suitable for the following reasons :—

- (1) It was necessary to allow for the possibility that part of the estimated capital receipts of 1912-13 would not be realised. This is now extremely probable. Of the £1,812,100 estimated to be raised through a Railway Company, there has been received up-to-date only £500,000: the total receipts under this head will almost certainly be very much below the estimate.
- (2) It was also necessary to allow for the possibility that the rains might fail in India in 1912, and that the sale of bills and telegraphic transfers would be reduced in consequence.
- (3) It was desirable to have in hand on 31st March, 1913, funds to be used for or towards the discharge of the £1,781,200 bonds maturing in 1913-14, since otherwise it might be necessary to use for their discharge part of the proceeds of a loan issued in 1913-14, thus diminishing *pro tanto* the amount that would be available for capital expenditure in that year on railways and irrigation works.
- (4) It was also desirable to have in hand, if possible, some money to be used towards the Railway and Irrigation Programme of 1913-14 in the event of the issue of loans for the programme being restricted on account of continued depression in the investment market.

Since the Budget was prepared many changes have taken place. Revenue has exceeded expectations, and sales of bills and telegraphic transfers will be considerably above the estimate. On the other hand the amount to be raised by loan will be below the estimate; large payments have been made for silver; the programme of capital expenditure has been increased; and it will also be necessary to make transfers in England to the Gold Standard Reserve. The amount of the closing balance can therefore not be closely estimated at present; but there is no reason to anticipate that it will exceed the estimate by amounts at all comparable to the increases that occurred in 1910-11 and 1911-12.

VIII.—Summary of India Office transactions in 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13.

It will be seen from the facts detailed above that the history of the India Office balances in the three years 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13, during which they have been exceptionally high, has been as follows :—

In preparing the Budgets the object has been to make such arrangements as would secure that the India Office balance, at the end of each year, should consist, first, of an ordinary working balance of an amount adequate but not excessive, having regard to the uncertainty whether the chief items in the estimated receipts would be actually realised, and secondly, of a provision towards discharging during the coming year at least that portion of the temporary debt of which the discharge was obligatory. In each of the two years 1910-11 and 1911-12, there occurred a very considerable increase (mainly due to enhanced Revenue receipts) over the Budget estimate of the total cash assets of the Government of India, of which the India Office balance forms part; and the demand for trade remittance, met by the Secretary of State in the way that has long been customary, has caused a large part of the total increase to be held in London. The amount so held has been utilised as far as possible to reduce the loans issued and to discharge temporary debt. But in 1910-11 and 1911-12

a large part of the increase in receipts occurred late in the year. If it had occurred earlier, the effect would have been that the Secretary of State would have been enabled to alter somewhat the time of discharge of temporary debt. The total amount discharged in the three years would not have been greater, since by 31st March, 1913, all the temporary debt maturing by that date will have been paid off; but the final instalment of India bills would have been paid off in June, 1912, instead of in December. The cautious policy that has been followed has lessened, though it could not entirely remove, the liability of India to have to make issues of loans in London at unfavourable times for meeting her capital commitments, and will enable her to finish the three years free from a great part of the load of temporary debt and other obligations that she had to bear in the early part of the period. As far as can be foreseen, the balance at the India Office on 31st March, 1913, will be about half of what it was at the corresponding date in 1912; while there is no present probability that on 31st March, 1914, it will exceed the amount required as a safe working balance.

The way in which the large remittances from India for general purposes have been used can best be shown by the following figures :—

£

A.

The greater part of the capital expenditure in England and India on Railways and Irrigation Works would normally be met from loans raised in England. The expenditure in 1910-11 and 1911-12, and the estimated expenditure in 1912-13 amount to	30,155,100
Towards meeting this expenditure the capital receipts in England from the issue of India stock in the three years (including the amount received for 1910-11 from the loan of January, 1910), and from capital raised by Railway Companies have been	15,988,120

B.

The discharge of floating debt in 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13 is as follows :—	
Discharge of India bills	6,000,000
Discharge of India bonds	1,000,000
Discharge of debentures for which liability had fallen on the Secretary of State on the termination of contracts with Railway Companies ...	4,071,700
Repayment of capital of Indian Midland Railway Company	2,250,000
Total	£13,321,700
Less India bonds issued	4,000,000
Net amount discharged or repaid ...	£9,321,700

IX.—Utilisation of India Office Balances.

It now remains to explain why the balance held at any given time is put out at interest and the procedure that is followed.

A considerable part of the disbursements in each year consists of very large payments which are made within very short periods. This is illustrated by the following figures showing the total payments in certain periods in 1911-12 :—

1st to 5th April, 1911, £3,624,304 (including £2,084,897 for annuities and interest, and £1,333,333 for Paper Currency Reserve investment); 1st to 5th July, 1911, £3,815,710 (including £2,694,367 for annuities and interest, £487,757 for Gold Standard Reserve investment, and £301,800 for discharge of debt); 1st to 5th October, £2,462,000 (including £2,114,605 for annuities and interest); 1st to 5th January, 1912, £3,100,857 (including £2,685,769 for annuities and interest, and £75,000 for discharge of debt).

There are also other large payments, such as those for railway stores, which have to be made at very short notice, but at dates that cannot be exactly foreseen, since they depend on the punctuality or otherwise of contractors.

The money from which these payments are made is not received just at the moment at which it is needed. The greater part of it is derived from the sales of Council bills and telegraphic transfers which, though in unfavourable years they are liable to cease for considerable periods, take place as a rule every week. Sometimes, but in many years not more than once in the year, large sums are received in a short time as the proceeds of a loan or loans.

It is thus necessary, as a rule, in preparation for the periods of heavy payments, to accumulate the weekly receipts so as to have them in hand or at call for use when the money is required.

The whole of the working balance thus required might be allowed to remain at the credit of the Secretary of State at the Bank of England, in which case the revenues of India would receive no interest on it; but the practice followed since 1838 has been to keep a certain part of the balance at the Bank and to lend the remainder at interest.

The usual method is to lend to certain banks, discount houses, and stockbrokers of high standing, whose names are included in an approved list, now containing 62 names. The list is revised periodically and applications for admission are carefully considered with reference to the standing and resources of the applicants and the nature of their business. Loans to borrowers on the approved list are granted as a rule for periods from three to five weeks, occasionally for six weeks, so that the whole balance could, if needed, be called in within six weeks.

The Accountant-General informs the Secretary of State's broker daily of the amount of loans that may be renewed, the amount of new loans that may be placed, or the amount that must be called. He also furnishes the dates for the maturity of the renewals and new loans, so that money may be available to meet requirements. The broker is responsible for obtaining the best possible rate of interest. The amount of a loan is not paid out from the Secretary of State's account at the Bank of England until the security has been lodged at the Bank. The securities which the broker is authorised to accept are as follows:—Exchequer bills and bonds, Treasury bills, Parliamentary stocks and annuities of the United Kingdom, securities on which the interest is guaranteed by Parliament; India stock, debentures, bonds, and bills; Rupee paper; Guaranteed debenture scrip (fully paid) or bonds of Indian railway companies; London County stock and bills; Metropolitan consolidated stock, Corporation of London debentures, Metropolitan Water Board bills and "B" stock. The particulars of each loan transaction are submitted each week to the Finance Committee for approval, and each month to the Auditor of the Accounts of the Secretary of State in Council.

In 1909 it was found that the borrowers on the approved list could not take the full amount of the balances available for loan; and, in order to obtain employment for the funds, the broker was instructed, as a temporary measure, to deposit the excess amount from time to time with leading London banks, usually for periods of between one and three months. The procedure adopted was as follows:—The Accountant-General informed the Secretary of State's broker of the amounts available and the periods for which he desired to employ them. After consultation with the Chairman of the Finance Committee the broker negotiated with the various banks so as to obtain the best possible rates of interest, which were governed by the rates current in the discount market. He then reported to the Accountant-General, and the particulars of all deposits were submitted to the Finance Committee and the Auditor. In November, 1911, it was decided that, so long as it should be found necessary to continue the practice of depositing with banks, the amount on deposit at any one bank should be limited as a general rule to £1,000,000, and the number of banks at which deposits were made was increased to seven. The balance has now been so much reduced that it is no longer necessary to deposit with banks.

The rates obtainable on the India Office balances necessarily depend on those current in the London Money Market for short loans and deposits; and these are sometimes higher and sometimes lower than those at which permanent loans, bonds, or bills for a year can be issued. In 1909-10, 1910-11, and 1911-12 the rates paid by the India Office on issues of India stock, bonds, and bills have varied between £3 12s. 11d. and £2 3s. 11d. per cent. During 1911-12 the average rate of interest received by the India Office on loans to approved borrowers was 2·60 per cent. and on deposits 2·43 per cent. Information to this effect was given in the Viceroy's

Legislative Council on 22nd March, 1912, and the difference between the rates received and paid respectively attracted the notice of Colonel Yate, M.P., Mr. Stewart, M.P., and Mr. Thorne, M.P., the latter of whom asked (6th November, 1912) "whether there is any truth in the statement that the India Office is in the habit of lending money at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and borrowing it back at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent." The explanation is, of course, that the India Office borrows only when it appears necessary to do so in order to meet capital expenditure or (very exceptionally) to make good, temporarily, a deficit due to famine or other causes of a similar exceptional nature, and pays the rate of interest necessitated by market conditions on the loans, mostly in the form of permanent stock, which it issues, whereas it lends for short periods to prevent its balance from lying idle and gets on such loans the best rate that is at the time possible in the condition of the money market, having regard to the fact that the security required is of a very high class and that loans are granted only to firms of very high standing. The alternative to lending for short periods at rates which are sometimes below those paid on the stocks and other securities that it is necessary to issue would be to discontinue entirely or occasionally the practice of lending, which brought in to Indian revenues £2,193,879 in the last 20 years.

RECEIPTS from BILLS AND TRANSFERS in each year from 1902-3 to 1911-12

	1902-3.			1903-4.			1904-5.	
	For General Purposes.	For Purchase of Silver.	Gold Standard Reserve.	For General Purposes.	For Purchase of Silver.	Gold Standard Reserve.	For General Purposes.	For Purchase of Silver.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
To end of April -	1,197,875	—	—	1,378,214	17,962	—	1,606,967	—
„ May -	2,235,478	—	—	3,222,088	17,962	—	2,493,578	563,000
„ June -	3,233,049	—	—	4,811,041	17,962	—	3,713,364	849,592
„ July -	4,471,299	—	—	6,529,932	17,962	—	4,613,536	1,354,095
„ August -	5,737,196	—	—	7,950,637	17,962	—	5,549,274	1,953,473
„ September -	6,603,929	—	—	9,349,925	152,962	—	6,705,235	2,287,993
„ October -	7,751,082	—	—	10,493,362	730,962	—	7,879,738	2,748,493
„ November -	9,236,644	—	—	11,362,451	1,351,676	—	10,488,336	3,040,359
„ December -	10,871,497	—	—	12,253,399	2,245,073	—	12,526,994	3,531,822
„ January -	13,351,537	—	—	14,626,111	3,324,418	323,000	14,915,923	3,734,382
„ February -	16,140,838	—	—	16,202,839	3,900,764	1,539,250	16,747,221	4,202,382
„ March -	17,951,946	285,000	263,000	17,603,976	4,055,327	2,200,000	19,184,784	4,540,378
Total, October to March -	11,348,017	285,000	263,000	8,254,051	3,902,365	2,200,000	12,479,549	2,252,385

Gold earmarked for the Paper Currency Reserve has been deducted from the amount of bills, &c., so

- (a) The sum of 1,045,000*l.* temporarily deposited during 1905-6 and repaid in 1906-7.
- (b) The sum of 1,000,000*l.* appropriated from the proceeds of bills, and earmarked during 1909
- (c) The sum of 2,545,000*l.* appropriated from the proceeds of bills, and earmarked during 1910
- (d) The sum of 655,000*l.* appropriated from the proceeds of bills, and earmarked during 1911-

Gold taken from the Paper Currency Reserve to meet payments for silver has been deducted from the purchases of silver.

The sum of 156,000*l.* paid in 1909-10 in respect of bills sold in India has been deducted from Re-

REPORT.

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

ON

MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL

[H.L.];

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

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1907.

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ORDER OF REFERENCE.

..
MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL. [H.L.]

Die Martis, 30° Aprilis 1907.

2-5-07 Order of the Day for the Second Reading read: *Moved*, That the Bill be now read 2a; after debate, *agreed to*: Bill read 2a accordingly, and *referred* to a Select Committee.

Die Martis, 14° Maii 1907.

The Lords following were named of the Select Committee:

Earl of Hardwicke.	Lord Ampthill.
Earl Cathcart.	Lord Avebury.
Earl Beauchamp.	Lord Haversham.
Lord Colchester.	Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.	Lord Allendale.
Lord Belper.	

The Committee to meet on Thursday next, at half-past Three o'clock, and to appoint their own Chairman.

Die Mercurii, 29° Maii 1907.

The Lord Bishop of Bristol added to the Select Committee.

Die Martis, 4° Junii 1907.

The evidence taken before the Select Committee from time to time to be *printed*, but no copies to be delivered out except to members of the Committee and such other persons as the Committee shall think fit until further order.

REPORT

BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to consider the MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL [H.L.], and to REPORT to the House.

ORDERED TO REPORT:—

••

That the Committee have met and considered the said Bill, and have examined various witnesses.

1. The Committee have had the system of voting proposed in the Bill explained to them in detail by Mr. Fischer Williams who drafted the measure, and by Mr. Humphreys, the Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society. They have also had an opportunity of being present at the counting of the votes at an election of the British Medical Association conducted on the proposed system and under the superintendence of the Council of the Proportional Representation Society.

2. The Committee are of opinion that the machinery as set out in the Bill would work properly and that the instructions and examples contained in the Schedule and Appendix accurately explain the process of carrying on an election under the proposed system.

The Committee have received a Blue Book (Cd. 3501) which has been issued during the course of their enquiry, containing Reports from His Majesty's representatives abroad on the subject of Proportional Representation in the countries by which it has been adopted. These Reports confirm the opinion expressed by the Committee in this paragraph.

3. At first sight the various rules and regulations laid down in the Schedule undoubtedly appear complex, but the Committee believe that experienced and capable Returning Officers would have no real difficulty in understanding them, and would soon succeed in instructing their officials to carry out an election without any serious mistakes. But, with regard to the electors themselves, the Committee consider it extremely doubtful whether a large majority of them would at first, at any rate, be able to understand the new system sufficiently to grasp the full significance of indicating on the ballot papers the various candidates in the order of their preference.

4. The Committee are of opinion that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the ordinary voter to satisfy himself that, even if he carried out accurately the instructions given to him, it would lead to the result he desired to obtain. He would, in fact, be obliged to take it for granted on the authority of those specially acquainted with the system that his vote had been accorded its full value.

5. The Committee have had before them several gentlemen with experience of municipal affairs who gave evidence with regard to the existing modes of conducting municipal elections, and expressed their views as to whether changes were or were not desirable. Most of these witnesses expressed some opinion as to whether, in the event of the Bill passing into law, advantage would be taken by the Councils in their respective boroughs of making use of the discretionary power given to them of adopting the new system.

Their evidence on this point is obviously a matter of pure conjecture, as none of the witnesses were definitely empowered to speak on behalf of their Councils, but the Committee consider it desirable to state shortly the substance of this evidence and the impression that it has made upon them:—

(a) With regard to the Metropolitan Boroughs.

The Committee are led to believe that some dissatisfaction is felt with regard to the system of election at present in force by which the whole of the Council is elected triennially under a method which enables the majority of the electors in a ward to elect all the Councillors to be chosen for that ward.

Instances were brought to the notice of the Committee of large London Boroughs in which the minority at the last election were unable to secure a single seat on the Municipal Council.

If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if little more than one half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in one borough the Progressives with 19,430 votes obtained all the 30 seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the Progressives did not secure any representation.

On the other hand, the system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts, the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only obtained 24.

The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903 election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in 1906, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42 seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one.

The Committee are informed that the result of this state of things is that many Councillors with the most experience in municipal affairs lose their seats at the same time, and that there is in consequence no security for continuity in the administration of the business of the Metropolitan Boroughs. It is perhaps scarcely surprising that, in boroughs in which one party has succeeded in securing all, or nearly all, the seats on the Council, the party in the minority should turn its attention to some system of election which would insure a fair representation of minorities.

The Committee, however, have no definite evidence before them to show to what extent the system of election proposed in the Bill would be likely to be adopted by the Metropolitan Borough Councils.

(b) With regard to Boroughs in the Country.

In the country the system of election is different to that in London. One third of the members of a Borough Council retire every year. This method has the advantage of securing to some extent a continuity of administration, but, although the diversity of character of the wards in some cases gives a certain representation to the minority, the system of election does not secure this result.

The Committee have heard evidence from two witnesses on behalf of the Municipal Corporations Association which represents 295 towns, both large and small.

This Association discussed the Bill at a meeting of the Executive Council specially called for the purpose, at which 43 Corporations were represented. The Executive Council passed the following resolution unanimously:—

“That this Council is of opinion that the present method of electing one-third of the members of Provincial Municipal Councils is preferable to the Metropolitan system of triennial elections; and that, even if the system of voting and obtaining the results of the poll proposed by the Bill were adopted, it seems to this Council doubtful whether it should be introduced into municipal elections, having regard to the complications involved and the delay which will be incurred in declaring the results, and also having regard to the desirability of maintaining the existing uniform method of voting at all elections.”

The witnesses who appeared before the Committee were the Town Clerks of two very large towns. They expressed themselves as satisfied with the present mode of election under which one-third of the Councillors in every ward are elected each year, and argued that the system was a safeguard against any crushing reversal of the policy of the Council. They also stated confidently that the method of election proposed in the Bill would not be adopted by their Councils if the Bill became law.

They admitted, however, that they themselves had not studied the scheme as they did not consider it a practical proposition, and that, therefore, they had not examined it in detail or tested its mathematical accuracy. But the Committee have no difficulty

in believing from the evidence of these witnesses that there is no effective desire in the provincial boroughs for any alteration in the present system of election.

6. The Committee, after careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that the proposals in the Bill would provide for a more adequate representation of minorities than is possible under the method of voting at present in force, although it is doubtful whether they would do away with the political factor in municipal elections as effectually as some of the supporters of the Bill seem to imagine.

The Committee also think it right to point out that they were strictly limited by their terms of reference to a consideration of the proposals in the Bill. They have not attempted, for this reason, to form any judgment on the comparative merits of the proposed system, and of the various schemes for securing a more adequate representation of minorities which have from time to time been put forward.

As, therefore, it is possible that some other system of proportional representation may be found to be more practical and more generally acceptable, the Committee recommend that, if the Bill is allowed to proceed, it should be made perfectly clear that its proposals are purely in the nature of an experiment to which the Council in any borough, in which the feeling is evidently in favour of such an experiment, is allowed to give a trial.

7. The Committee do not approve of the provisions in the Bill which give power to a Borough Council from time to time to alter by the votes of a bare majority of the members of the Council present the system under which the municipal elections are to be carried on in the borough.

There seems to be no precedent for such a proposal, and it might under certain circumstances be open to great abuse.

They recommend, therefore, that these clauses of the Bill should be so amended as to enable an experiment to be made of the proposed system for a period of three years (practically one election of the whole Council) in any borough, if a resolution in favour of the change is carried by a majority of three-fifths of the Council after due notice has been given.

The Committee would also suggest that, if it is wished after the expiration of the period of three years to continue the experiment, it should be possible for a Council by a resolution of a majority of its members to continue the new system of voting for another period of equal duration. They are of opinion that after the expiration of this second period of three years any further resolution of a Council in favour of the continuance of the proportional system should be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than forty days during the Session of Parliament, and that, if either of such Houses before the expiration of such forty days presents an address to His Majesty against the resolution, no further effect should be given to it.

The Committee consider that, failing any such resolution by a Council at the expiration either of the first period or of the second period of three years, and also in the event of either House of Parliament presenting an address to His Majesty against a resolution, the borough should revert automatically at the next municipal election to the mode of conducting an election at present in force.

8. The Committee consider that it would be of advantage if a return were made to Parliament from time to time, showing the boroughs which had adopted the system of voting proposed in the Bill.

9. The Committee have not proceeded to the task of amending the Bill, as they are of opinion that their recommendations should be considered in Committee of the whole House.

23 July 1907.

LORDS PRESENT, AND MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT EACH SITTING OF THE COMMITTEE.

Die Foris, 16^o Maii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.

Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

The Order of Reference is read.

It is moved, That the Lord Courtney of Penwith do take the Chair for this day's Sitting of the Committee.

The same is *agreed to*.

The Course of Proceedings is considered.

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday, the 4th of June, at Twelve o'clock.

Die Martis, 4^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Belper.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Thursday, the 16th of May are read.

It is moved, That the Lord Belper do take the Chair.

The same is *agreed to*.

The Course of Proceedings is considered.

It is moved, That the Committee be an open one.

The same is *agreed to*.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witness is called in, and examined, viz. : Mr. *J. Fischer Williams* (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Friday next, at Eleven o'clock.

Die Veneris, 7^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceeding of Tuesday last are read.

In the absence of the Lord Belper, it is moved, That the Lord Courtney of Penwith do take the Chair.

The same is *agreed to*.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witness is called in and examined, viz.: Mr. *John H. Humphreys* (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Die Martis, 11^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Friday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witnesses are called in, and examined, viz.: Mr. *J. H. Humphreys* (recalled), and Mr. *A. W. Hiscox* (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Friday next, at Eleven o'clock.

Die Veneris, 14^o Junii 1907

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Tuesday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witnesses are called in and examined, viz.: Mr. *G. Udney Yule*, Mr. *Kingsley Bayly*, and Mr. *J. J. Stephenson* (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Die Martis, 18° Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Colchester.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Friday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witnesses are called in, and examined, viz. : Dr. G. Slater, Mr. Douglas Eyre and Mr. C. E. Hecht (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, at Two o'clock.

Die Martis, 25° Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of Hardwicke.
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Amptill.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Tuesday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witnesses are called in and examined, viz. : Mr. Edward Ralph Pickmere and Sir Samuel George Johnson (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Die Martis, 2° Julii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Colchester.

Lord Amptill.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Tuesday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witness is called in and examined, viz. : Sir Samuel George Johnson (re-called) (*vide* the Evidence).

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Die Martis, 9^o Julii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol
Lord Colchester.
Lord Ampthill.

Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Tuesday last are read.

The Municipal Representation Bill [H.L.] is considered.

The following Witness is called in and examined, viz. : Rev. *J. H. Anderson* (*vide* the Evidence).

The Committee deliberate.

The Course of Proceedings is considered.

The Chairman is requested to draw up a Draft Report.

Ordered, That the Committee be adjourned to Tuesday, the 23rd July, at Eleven o'clock.

Die Martis, 23^o Julii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.

Lord Ampthill.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Lord BELPER in the Chair.

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The Proceedings of Tuesday, the 9th of July, are read.

The following DRAFT REPORT is laid before the Committee:—

" 1. The Committee have had the system of voting proposed in the Bill explained to them in detail by Mr. Fischer Williams who drafted the measure, and by Mr. Humphreys, the Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society. They have also had an opportunity of being present at the counting of the votes at an election of the British Medical Association conducted on the proposed system, and under the superintendence of the Council of the Proportional Representation Society.

" 2. The Committee are of opinion that the machinery as set out in the Bill would work properly, and that the instructions and examples contained in the Schedule and Appendix accurately explain the process of carrying on an election under the proposed system.

" 3. At first sight the various rules and regulations laid down in the Schedule undoubtedly appear complex, but the Committee believe that experienced and capable Returning Officers would have no real difficulty in understanding them, and would soon succeed in instructing their officials to carry out an election without any serious mistakes. But, with regard to the electors themselves, the Committee consider it extremely doubtful whether a large majority of them would at first, at any rate, be able to understand the new system sufficiently to grasp the full significance of indicating on the ballot papers the various candidates in order of their preference.

" It is consequently not improbable that this want of knowledge on their part might lead to unexpected results.

" 4. A more serious objection, however, to the system of voting under consideration seems to be that it would always be very difficult, if not impossible, for the ordinary voter to satisfy himself that, even if he carried out accurately the instructions given to him, it would lead to the result he desired to obtain. He would in fact be obliged to take it for granted on the authority of those who had made a thorough study of the Bill that his vote had been accorded its full value. If, therefore, the result of the election differed from that which had been expected, it might cause disappointment and dissatisfaction with the system under which it had been conducted.

" 5. The Committee have had before them several gentlemen with experience of municipal affairs who gave evidence with regard to the existing modes of conducting municipal elections, and expressed their views as to whether changes were or were not desirable. Most of these witnesses expressed some opinion as to whether, in the event of the Bill passing into law, advantage would be taken by the Councils in their respective boroughs of making use of the discretionary power given to them in adopting the new system.

" Their evidence on this point is obviously a matter of pure conjecture, as none of these witnesses were definitely empowered to speak on behalf of their Councils, but the Committee consider it desirable to state shortly the substance of this evidence and the impression that it has made upon them:—

" (a) *With regard to the Metropolitan Boroughs.*

" The Committee are led to believe that some dissatisfaction is felt with regard to the system of election at present in force by which the whole of the Council is elected triennially.

" Instances were brought to the notice of the Committee of large London boroughs in which the minority at the last election were unable to secure a single seat on the Municipal Council, although in one case at any rate it was stated that the minority were entitled to more than a third of the seats if they had their proper numerical representation.

" The Committee are informed that the result of this state of things is that many Councillors with the most experience in municipal affairs lose their seats at the same time, and that there is in consequence no security for continuity in the administration of the business of the Metropolitan Boroughs. It is perhaps scarcely surprising that, in boroughs in which one party has succeeded in securing all, or nearly all, the seats on the Council, the party in the minority should turn its attention to some system of election which would insure a fair representation of minorities. But whether under such circumstances the majority on the Council would be likely to adopt a resolution, the result of which would almost inevitably mean the loss of some seats to their own party, seems to the Committee to be open to considerable doubt.

" (b) *With regard to Boroughs in the Country.*

" The Committee have heard evidence from two witnesses on behalf of the Municipal Corporations Association, which represents 295 towns, both large and small.

" This Association discussed the Bill at a meeting of the Executive Council specially called for the purpose, at which 43 Corporations were represented. The Executive Council passed the following resolution unanimously:—

" 'That this Council is of opinion that the present method of electing one-third of the members of Provincial Municipal Councils is preferable to the Metropolitan system of triennial elections; and that, even if the system of voting and obtaining the results of the poll proposed by the Bill were adopted, it seems to this Council doubtful whether it should be introduced into municipal elections, having regard to the complications involved and the delay which will be incurred in declaring the results, and also having regard to the desirability of maintaining the existing uniform method of voting at all elections.'

" The witnesses who appeared before the Committee were the Town Clerks of two very large towns. They expressed themselves as satisfied with the present mode of election under which one-third of the Councillors in every ward are elected each year, and argued that the system was a safeguard against any crushing reversal of the policy of the Council. They also stated confidently that the method of election proposed in the Bill would not be adopted by their Councils if the Bill became law. The general effect of their evidence made it clear to the Committee that there was no desire in the provincial boroughs for any alteration in the present system of election.

" 6. The Committee, after careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that the proposals in the Bill would probably insure a more adequate representation of minorities than is possible under the method of voting at present in force, although it is doubtful whether they would do away with the political factor in municipal elections as effectually as some of the supporters of the Bill seem to imagine.

" The Committee also think it right to point out that they were strictly limited by their terms of reference to a consideration of the proposals in the Bill. They have not attempted, for this reason, to form any judgment on the comparative merits of the proposed system, and of the various schemes for securing a more adequate representation of minorities which have from time to time been put forward.

" As, therefore, it is possible that some other system of proportional representation may be found to be more practical and more generally acceptable, the Committee recommend that, if the Bill is allowed to proceed, it should be strictly limited in its scope. They consider that it should be made perfectly clear that its proposals are purely in the nature of an experiment to which the Council in any borough, in which the feeling is evidently in favour of such an experiment, is allowed to give a trial.

" 7. The Committee do not approve of the provisions in the Bill which give power to a Borough Council from time to time to alter by the votes of a bare majority of the members of the Council present the system under which the municipal elections are to be carried on in the borough.

"There seems to be no precedent for such a proposal, and it might under certain circumstances be open to great abuse.

"They recommend, therefore, that these clauses of the Bill should be so amended as to enable an experiment to be made of the proposed system for a period of three years (practically one election of the whole Council) in any borough, if a resolution in favour of the change is carried by a majority of two-thirds of the Council after due notice has been given.

"The Committee would also suggest that, if it is wished after the expiration of the period of three years to continue the experiment, it should be possible for the Council by resolution to continue the new system of voting for another period of equal duration.

"Failing such resolution, the Committee consider that the Borough should revert automatically at the next municipal election to the mode of conducting the election at present in force.

"8. The Committee consider that it would be of advantage if a return were made to Parliament from time to time, showing the boroughs which had adopted the system of voting proposed in the Bill.

"9. The Committee have not proceeded to the task of amending the Bill, as they are of opinion that their recommendations should be considered in Committee of the whole House.

The said Report is considered.

Paragraph 1 is read and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 2 is read.

It is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to insert, at the end of the said paragraph "The Committee have received a Blue Book (Cd. 3,501), which has been issued during the course of their enquiry, containing Reports from His Majesty's representatives abroad on the subject of Proportional Representation in the countries by which it has been adopted. These Reports confirm the opinion expressed by the Committee in this paragraph.

After discussion the same is *agreed to*.

Paragraph 2, as amended, is again read and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 3 is read.

It is moved by Lord *Haversham* to leave out "experienced and capable," and after "officers" to insert "of ordinary ability and experience."

On Question :

Contents (4).

Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (6).

Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Belper.
Lord Ampthill.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by Lord *Avebury* to leave out "But, with regard to the electors themselves, the Committee consider it extremely doubtful whether a large majority of them would at first, at any rate, be able to understand the new system sufficiently to grasp the full significance of indicating on the ballot papers the various candidates in the order of their preference."

On Question :

Contents (4).

Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Ampthill.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (7).

Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Belper.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to leave out "It is consequently not improbable that this want of knowledge on their part might lead to unexpected results."

After discussion, the same is *agreed to*.

A further amendment is made.

Paragraph 3, as amended, is again read and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 4 is read

It is moved by Lord Avebury to leave out the said paragraph.

On Question:

Contents (5).
Lord Colchester.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Ampthill.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (6).
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Belper.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by the Lord Bishop of Bristol to leave out "A more serious objection, however, to the system of voting under consideration seems to be that it would always be very difficult, if not impossible," and insert "The Committee are of opinion that it would be difficult."

After discussion, the same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord Ampthill to leave out "who had made a thorough study of the Bill," and insert "specially acquainted with the system."

The same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord Avebury to leave out "If, therefore, the result of the election differed from that which had been expected, it might cause disappointment and dissatisfaction with the system under which it had been conducted."

After discussion, the same is *agreed to*.

Paragraph 4, as amended, is again read and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 5 is read.

It is moved by Lord Courtney of Penwith to insert after "triennially" in sub-paragraph (a), "under a method which enables a majority of the electors in a ward to elect all the Councillors to be chosen for that ward."

The same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord Avebury to leave out, "although in one case at any rate it was stated that the minority were entitled to more than a third of the seats if they had their proper numerical representation," and insert "If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if little more than one-half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in one borough the Progressives with 19,430 votes obtained all the 30 seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the Progressives did not secure any representation. On the other hand, the system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts, the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only obtained 24. The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903 election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in 1906, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42 seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one."

The same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord Avebury to leave out "It is perhaps scarcely surprising that, in boroughs in which one party has succeeded in securing all, or nearly all, the seats on the Council, the party in the minority should turn its attention to some system of election which would insure a fair representation of minorities."

On Question:—

Contents (3).
Lord Colchester.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (8).
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Belper.
Lord Ampthill.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by Lord Avebury to leave out "But whether under such circumstances the majority on the Council would be likely to adopt a resolution, the result of which would almost inevitably mean the loss of some seats to their own party, seems to the Committee to be open to considerable doubt."

On Question :—

Contents (6).
 Lord Colchester.
 Lord Monteagle of Brandon
 Lord Ampthill.
 Lord Avebury.
 Lord Courtney of Penwith.
 Lord Allendale.

Not Contents (5).
 Earl Cathcart.
 Earl Beauchamp.
 Lord Bishop of Bristol.
 Lord Belper.
 Lord Aversham.

It is resolved in the *affirmative*.

It is moved by Lord *Ampthill* to insert "The Committee, however, have no definite evidence before them to show to what extent the system of election proposed in the Bill would be likely to be adopted by the Metropolitan Borough Councils."

The same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord *Avebury* at the beginning of sub-paragraph (b) to insert "In the country the system of election is different to that in London. One third of the members of a Borough Council retire every year. This method has the advantage of securing to some extent a continuity of administration, but, although the diversity of character of the wards in some cases gives a certain representation to the minority, the system of election does not secure this result."

After discussion, the same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to leave out "The general effect of their evidence made it clear to the Committee that there was no desire in the provincial boroughs for any alteration in the present system of election."

After discussion, the same is *agreed to*.

It is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to insert "They admitted, however, that they themselves had not studied the scheme, as they did not consider it a practical proposition, and that, therefore, they had not examined it in detail or tested its mathematical accuracy. But the Committee have no difficulty in believing, from the evidence of these witnesses, that there is no effective desire in the provincial boroughs for any alteration in the present system of election."

It is moved by Earl *Beauchamp* to leave out "effective" in the said amendment.

On Question :—

Contents (5).
 Earl Cathcart.
 Earl Beauchamp.
 Lord Bishop of Bristol.
 Lord Belper.
 Lord Allendale.

Not Contents (6).
 Lord Colchester.
 Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
 Lord Ampthill.
 Lord Avebury.
 Lord Haversham.
 Lord Courtney of Penwith.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

Paragraph 5, as amended, is again read, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 6 is read.

It is moved by Lord *Colchester*, to leave out "than is possible under" and insert "the absence of which is a serious defect of."

On Question :—

Contents (4).
 Lord Colchester.
 Lord Ampthill.
 Lord Avebury.
 Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (7).
 Earl Cathcart.
 Earl Beauchamp.
 Lord Bishop of Bristol.
 Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
 Lord Belper.
 Lord Haversham.
 Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by Lord *Avebury* after "force" to insert, "and would diminish."

Contents (4).
 Lord Colchester.
 Lord Ampthill.
 Lord Avebury.
 Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (7).
 Earl Cathcart.
 Earl Beauchamp.
 Lord Bishop of Bristol.
 Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
 Lord Belper.
 Lord Haversham.
 Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

Further amendments are made.

Paragraph 6 as amended is again read and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 7 is read.

It is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to leave out from "abuse" to the end of the paragraph and insert: "On the whole the Committee have been convinced that the scheme of the Bill is workable, and they see no objection in principle to its being tried by any municipal council desirous of adopting it. But they think that the conditions of adoption might be made a little more stringent, either by requiring its adoption by simple majorities at two consecutive meetings convened for the purpose, or by requiring a three-fifths majority instead of a bare majority at one meeting. Where it has been adopted the Committee think that it might, after the experience of an election, be abandoned by a bare majority; but they would recommend no other conditions for the maintenance or abandonment that can be found in the decision of such a majority. A motion for re-adoption should require a three-fifths majority or majorities at two meetings as before."

On Question:—

Contents (2)
Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (8)
Earl Cathcart.
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Belper.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *negative*.

It is moved by Lord *Monteagle of Brandon* to leave out "two-thirds" and insert "three-fifths."

On Question:—

Contents (5).
Earl Cathcart.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Colchester.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.

Not Contents (4)
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Belper.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Allendale.

It is resolved in the *affirmative*

It is moved by the Lord *Bishop of Bristol*, after "resolution," to insert "of three-fifths of its members." To which amendment an amendment is moved by Lord *Courtney of Penwith* to leave out "three-fifths" and insert "a majority."

On Question:—

Contents (7)
Earl Cathcart.
Lord Monteagle of Brandon.
Lord Ampthill.
Lord Avebury.
Lord Haversham.
Lord Courtney of Penwith.
Lord Allendale.

Not Contents (3)
Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Lord Colchester.

It is resolved in the *affirmative*.

The amendment moved by the Lord *Bishop of Bristol*, as amended, is *agreed to*.

A further amendment is made.

Paragraph 7, as amended, is again read and *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 8 and 9 are read and *agreed to*.

The Draft Report, as amended, is *agreed to*.

Ordered, That the Lord in the Chair do make the said Report to the House.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Die Martis, 4^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of HARDWICKE.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

MR. J. FISCHER WILLIAMS, is called in, and Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

1. I think you have paid a great deal of attention to this matter?—That is so.

2. I will ask Lord Courtney to examine you, and perhaps you will give the Committee any evidence you can in explanation of the Bill?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

3. You are a barrister, I believe?—That is so.

4. Have you been for some time interested in the subject of proportional representation?—Yes.

5. Are you connected with the Proportional Representation Society?—Yes, I am a member of the committee.

6. At the request of the committee did you draft the Bill which is under consideration?—Yes.

7. And you are therefore very familiar with its clauses and scope?—Yes.

8. Will you explain to the Committee its character; it is divided, I think, into two parts?—It is divided into two parts. The first part of the Bill is what I may call adopting machinery. It provides the machinery for the adoption of the Act, and also contains the usual common form clauses—the short title clause and the interpretation clause. The second part of the Bill contains the method of voting so far as the elector is concerned. There are also two schedules to the Bill. The first schedule contains the rules for the guidance of the Returning Officer, and it is illustrated by an appendix showing an imaginary election. The second (0.13).

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

schedule contains certain forms which are necessary in substitution for two of the statutory forms under the Ballot Act.

9. Will you go through those in detail. In the first place the first part of the Bill provides for the adoption of the Act, does it not?—Yes, that is so; and I may say at once that it applies as drawn to all Municipal Corporations under the Municipal Corporations Act, and it also applies to the London Borough Councils. It does not apply to any County Council, including the London County Council, and it does not apply to Urban and Rural District Councils which are not Boroughs.

10. It could be extended easily, could it not to Urban District Councils if found desirable?—I believe there would be no difficulty in extending it to Urban District Councils, because I understand that Urban District Councils are elected by divisions or constituencies which return several members.

11. Do the adoptive clauses in the first part of the Bill follow the general method of adoptive Acts?—Yes, that is so; the particular Act which I took as suggesting the adoptive clauses in this Act was the Public Libraries, 1893, Amendment Act.

12. Due notice has to be given with regard to its adoption, but there is a little distinction, is there not, in this Act as compared with the Act you have mentioned as to the length of time which must intervene between the resolution of adoption and the putting of it into operation?—Yes; the suggestion of the Bill is that the system is to come into force only after an interval of six months after the resolution of the Council adopting

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MR. J. FISCHER WILLIAMS.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

ing it. The idea at the bottom of that was that it would prevent anything in the nature of an electoral manoeuvre, so that you might not have a Council by a majority adopting the new system of elections immediately before an election; but they must allow an interval of six months to elapse

Chairman.

13. Do you mean that there must be six months interval between the passing of a resolution and an election?—The new system when adopted is to apply to the first election which occurs not less than six months afterwards.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

14. May I put it in this way: The ordinary date of a municipal election is the 1st of November, is it not?—Yes.

15. If the Act were adopted by a Council in October it would not apply to the election on the first of the next month, but it would apply to the election of November twelvemonth?—It would apply to the election of November twelvemonth, or three years hence, as the case might be.

16. It must be adopted at least six months before putting it to work?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

17. Supposing a resolution were come to in May and the election came in November, it could be acted upon, I suppose?—Yes, I suppose that would be so if the election was on a later day in November.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

18. Is there any other variation between the Acts to which you want to call the attention of the Committee?—The Public Libraries Amendment Act provides that notice of the proposal of the resolution in the Council shall be given in the local newspapers as well as supplied to the members of the Council. That provision does not appear in this Bill. I suppose that extra precautions were taken with regard to public libraries, because they involved the levying of a small additional rate; but that extra provision for notice to the inhabitants might easily be inserted if thought desirable.

19. And there was put in as well a proviso as to a poll in the case of the Public Libraries Act, was there not?—My impression is that the Amendment Act of 1893 has got rid of the necessity of a poll in an Urban District.

Chairman.

20. But as a matter of fact this provision would be adopted by one resolution of the Council, would it not?—Yes, on a month's notice.

21. No confirmatory meeting is necessary, and it would come into force if it were adopted by a bare majority at one meeting, would it not?—That is so—at a month's notice and on special notice being given.

Lord Haversham.

22. Could it be discontinued in the same way?—It could be discontinued in the same way.

Lord Avebury.

23. There would be six months in which it could be discontinued if there were a change of opinion in the Council?—Yes, certainly.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

24. Then with reference to Municipal Corporations, what have you to say?—That question deals with Clause 3. Clause 3 of the Bill prescribes the necessary modifications of the statutory provisions which would otherwise conflict with the system. Taking Sub-clause 1 first. That runs:—"The whole of the councillors shall retire together on the first ordinary day of election next after the expiration of six months from the passing of the resolution, and in every subsequent third year." The object of this alteration is to secure that whereas at present in the provinces, but not in London, Councils are renewed by annual election, one-third of the Council retiring each year, the whole Council shall retire together instead of one-third retiring annually. The necessity for it arises in this way: that in order to work the system you must have more than one member to be elected. At present a ward of a Municipal Council elects either three members, or a multiple of three members, three, six, or nine; consequently, it is necessary for the working of the system to have all these members retiring and eligible together, otherwise you have not got a divisible number of representatives to divide among the various interests in the Borough. If, for instance, you have a Borough divided into wards, or which contained some wards, returning three members only, on the present triennial system at each election you are electing only one member in that ward; consequently the system would be inapplicable; it seems to be necessary to make this system apply to have triennial elections of the whole in the same way as you have the County Council elections at the present time.

25. In short, in order to apply the idea of proportional representation you must have a constituency returning more than one member?—Returning more than one member at one election.

26. According to the present practice in electing Municipal Corporations a ward with three members has one retiring every year, has it not?—Yes.

27. And there is only one member to be elected?—Yes.

28. This system could not be applied, could it, unless that plan were altered, and the proposed alteration is to make all three vacate their seats, and that all three should be re-elected at the same time. That is the alteration made in reference to provincial Municipal Corporations by the proposed Act, is it not?—Yes.

29. Elections occur every third year for all the representatives of a ward, instead of every year for a third?—Yes.

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Mr. J. FISCHER WILLIAMS.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

30. Then as to London, what do you say?—As to London the present system is triennial elections for the whole of the Council, but, of course, under the present system there is no provision for securing anything like a proportional representation of the opinions of the electors. At the present time in London the whole of the Borough Councils retire at the end of every third year, each elector can give one vote for any number of candidates not exceeding the number of vacancies, and the consequence is that any party which has a bare majority can make a clean sweep of the whole representation.

31. Do you know a case of a London Borough with a ward electing eight members?—Take a ward with six members.

32. The election takes place every third year for the whole six members?—Yes.

33. But every elector in that ward has six votes which he can give, one to each of the six candidates?—Yes.

34. Consequently the majority of the electors can return all six?—Yes, the majority of the electors can return all six.

35. And in recent experience has that happened?—Constantly.

36. To the entire exclusion of representatives on the other side?—That is so, and, if you have three parties putting forward three separate lists, you get a clean sweep made by the largest of the three parties, which might be a minority of the whole. I do not know if it is necessary that I should go into the statutory provisions under which that system operates, and explain the exact meaning of the amendment which the Bill proposes.

37. I will ask you one question about it. Under the Act of 1899 constituting the London boroughs, the method of electing the members was not determined in this fashion, was it?—The Act of 1899 simply applied to Borough Councils the system which applied to the old Vestries, and it appears to have been contemplated that the annual system, what I may call for short the provincial system, by which a third of the Council is renewed annually, should be extended to London unless the Borough Councils themselves petitioned the Local Government Board for an order restoring, so far as I remember, the old London system. At any rate, whether it was a restoration or not, all the new Borough Councils I think, without a single exception, did in fact petition to have triennial elections of the whole body, instead of annual elections of a third of the body, and the Local Government Board made orders accordingly.

Chairman.

38. I think that is a principle which has been adopted with regard to other bodies besides London, that if they pass such a resolution, leave might be given them to adopt that principle?—That is so. In fact, the metropolitan boroughs at the present time do all renew themselves entirely every three years.

Earl of Hardwicke.

39. Do I understand that this Bill would only apply to cases where there are three members to be elected?—It would apply only to Borough Councils in London and to provincial municipal corporations. So far as I know (there may be one or two exceptions) all those bodies are divided into wards, which return three members or a multiple of three members.

40. If there were less than three members what would happen; you would not be able to carry it out, would you?—If there were only two members you would be able to carry it out, and in cases where there is only one member to be returned the adoption of the Act is not to affect the procedure for the election of one member only. Of course, you cannot proportionally divide one man.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

41. That would refer to a casual vacancy, would it not?—Only one vacancy, casual or otherwise. I suppose in almost every case one vacancy would be casual, but I am not prepared to say there does not exist somewhere in England a corporation, one of the wards for which may in some way or other have only one representative.

42. There are some small boroughs in England which are not divided into wards, but even in those cases the numbers of members are multiples of three. The method of election in all municipal boroughs in England is election annually in thirds, and therefore the number must be at least three, must it not?—Yes.

Lord Haversham.

43. In the case of a death vacancy the old system would always be adopted, would it?—Yes, that is the effect of the Bill, you would simply have an ordinary election on the present lines as the Bill stands.

44. Would you require a difference in the ballot papers then?—This Act would not then apply at all. The proviso at the end of section 3 is to the effect that "any election where only one vacancy whether casual or otherwise is to be filled shall be conducted in the same manner as if this Act had not been adopted." It would, of course, have been possible to so draft the Bill that you could use the transferable vote system, which this Bill proposes, to the election of a single member, but of course you cannot get proportional representation when only one member has to be returned. The effect of using the transferable system where only one member is to be elected is to make it certain that the elected member represents a majority of the electors if you have more than two candidates for the vacancy.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

45. It could be provided for in our municipal systems as they now exist, because they do return three members?—Yes; and that is the reason why Municipal corporations without any change of machinery except such as is involved in the actual machinery of the election itself are adaptable to the present system.

46. You

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

46. You want no alteration of the areas of the constituencies?—Exactly; you want no redistribution.

Lord Avebury.

47. But even if there is only one member to be returned, if there are three or four candidates, then the system would be an advantage over the present system, because it would secure that whoever was elected would represent the majority of the electors, would it not?—Yes, it would have that advantage.

Lord Haversham.

48. Supposing there is a death vacancy, and there are three candidates for election, are the people to be entitled to transfer votes on an election like that?—Not as the Bill is drawn.

49. It is mandatory, is it not, that the old mode of election should apply?—Yes.

Lord Colchester.

50. Where you have three members, you might have a proportional representation without going so far as this Bill does, might you not? Of course that would involve a discussion of the merits of the cumulative vote, and also the old three-cornered constituencies.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

51. As to the change in the ballot paper which is consequential on the application of this method, what have you to say?—As to that that falls within Sub-section C of Sub-clause 2 of Clause 3: "The forms contained in the second schedule to this Act shall be substituted for the forms of front of ballot paper and of directions for the guidance of the voter." Turning to the second schedule, the only alteration is this, the old Ballot Act form numbers the candidates on the left hand side. I have a copy of the form which perhaps will make plain what is intended. This is the form which obtains in all Parliamentary and Municipal elections. (*The witness here handed in a copy of the Ballot Act showing the statutory form of ballot paper.*) The candidates are numbered on the left hand side. It appeared to those responsible for this Bill that when what the ordinary elector has to do is to write a number in a blank space, it would be highly misleading that the form already should number the candidates; and, consequently, the only change is to omit the numbers as printed in the form.

52. It is not easy to see why those numbers should be there in any case, is it?—I do not know why they are there.

53. They do not appear to serve any purpose?—No, because the names are simply in alphabetical order.

54. Then it is proposed to have ballot papers without the numbers preceding the names, is it?—Yes; and also there will be directions to the voter at the foot of the ballot paper as provided by the second schedule, page 13. There is a note: "Vote by placing the figure 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom you vote. You can also place the figure 2 or the

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

figures 2 and 3, or 2, 3, and 4, and so on in the squares opposite the names of other candidates in the order of your preference for them." That note is, of course, an innovation.

55. It is an instruction attached to the ballot paper for the guidance of the voter, is it not?—That is all that it is. Besides the new form, on the front of the ballot paper it is proposed to have a modified form of direction for the guidance of the voter in voting. The Ballot Act already prescribes a form of directions for the guidance of the voter in voting, and of course those directions embody the present system of marking a cross against the name of the candidate for whom the voter votes. The substituted form of directions varies from the old form of directions only in so far as it instructs the voter to mark one, two, three, and so on instead of the cross. I think it is a piece of necessary machinery, and it is proposed to illustrate the directions to the voters by examples of papers validly marked. Three are given at the end of the schedule of the Act. In one of them it will be seen that the voter has marked the whole of the six names in order of preference; in the second he has marked only one name, and in the third he has marked three names. All those would be valid modes of marking the ballot paper. It is not necessary for me to go into the particular effect of the existing subsections which are proposed to be modified. I could trace it through the Acts if necessary. Those are the statutory provisions in which the present system is incorporated, and which of course will need modification if this system is adopted.

56. Is there a clause in the Bill providing for the case where this Act has been adopted and abandoned?—Yes, there is a clause giving an option to any Municipal body which adopts this Act, and is dissatisfied with it, to discontinue it in the same way, and subject to the same formalities as on its adoption.

57. And it will be necessary for them to provide which third is to retire at the end of the first, second or third year, will it not?—Yes, that is consequential, and there is a sub-clause dealing with that.

Chairman.

58. You permit a Municipal body to change its mind extremely quickly if it likes, that is to say. It can adopt the Act and put it into force after six months, and immediately after an election it can pass a resolution to go back to its old system; therefore within 12 months it can be back again to the old state of affairs, cannot it?—They could, of course, so change their minds. It would permit them to do so as the Bill is drawn.

59. You do not recognise the unfortunate councillor, who by the adoption of this Act, has had two years cut off his Municipal life and who then, when the change is made back again, would have to take his chance of election, but would not be allowed to fulfil the rest of the life he has lost by the adoption of the Act?—That is so. There is no special provision to meet his case if it is a hard one. I think probably as far as the discontinuance

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

discontinuance of the Act at any rate immediately is concerned, Municipal councillors may very likely have a prejudice in favour of the particular system which has resulted in their own election.

Lord Avebury.

60. At any rate, if they did not wish to lose their seats they would not be likely to vote to alter it at once?—No, I do not think they would.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

61. Will you deal with Clause 5?—Clause 5 is a mere piece of consequential legislation. The Ballot Act, of course, is a temporary Act, and it is merely in order to provide for the contingency that the Ballot Act should cease to be renewed by the Expiring Laws Act. Of course, you can adopt a proportional representation to open voting, but you could not adopt this Act to open voting. This Act must fall to the ground if the Ballot Act should cease to be law.

Lord Colchester.

62. It only bears on one or two details, does it not?—I think that it would be impossible to work this alteration with the Act as drawn if the Ballot Act ceased to be in force, because it involves the sorting of papers, and I suppose in the old days when votes were given *viva voce* they were not each recorded on a separate paper.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

63. Then follow definitions which we need not dwell upon, I think?—No, I think not.

64. Then coming to the mode of voting, what do you say?—That is the second part of the Act.

65. It begins with the way in which the elector is to exercise his powers, does it not?—Yes. If I might explain very briefly the principles upon which this Act is drawn, it is stated in the Act what the elector has to do, and in the schedule what the Returning Officer has to do. Section 7 states the duty of the elector. He is to have one vote only. That is the essential feature of the scheme. At the present time in multiple constituencies he has several votes, and it is owing to the fact that he has several votes that a bare majority can sweep the whole representation.

Chairman.

66. I should say after reading this clause that the elector had several votes. It is not very clear, because the vote he might give to the second man might be as effective as the first vote, might it not?—What he does is to use one vote only, and, if the first man to whom he gives his one vote for some reason or other does not want it, that one vote is transferred to the person whom he has marked two. It is not

Chairman—continued.

that he gives one vote for Mr. A. and another vote for Mr. B.; it is that he has one indivisible vote. If Mr. A. wants it he keeps it, if the elector has given it to Mr. A.

Earl of Hardwicke.

67. That means No. 1, I suppose?—That means No. 1. If the person whom he has marked No. 1 does not want his vote, then it goes over to the person whom he has marked No. 2. At some time or other I shall have to explain what I mean by saying "does not want his vote." You can conceive this principle applied as it were *viva voce*, and a voter coming to the poll and saying, "I want to vote for Mr. A," and the Returning Officer telling him "Mr. A does not want your vote, he has already enough votes," or "Mr. A is so hopelessly behind the other candidates that it is no good your voting for him; for whom, in that event, will you vote," and he answers, "I vote for Mr. B," he does that on paper by marking "A" first and "B" second; the difference in the actual practice is that neither the elector nor the Returning Officer knows the state of the poll at the time when the vote is given, and the ultimate destination of the vote is found out afterwards by the Returning Officer; the elector has not many votes which he distributes, but he has one vote only, and it is the business of the Returning Officer to distribute the votes not wanted by particular candidates, according to strict rules, of course, in such a way that you secure a proportional representation of opinion throughout the constituency.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

68. Might it be put in this way: Every elector has one effective vote?—Yes.

69. He indicates provisionally by putting the figure 1 against the name of a person for whom he would have that effective vote given, but if for some reason or other that person does not want it, or that person is not capable of using it, then the effective vote which he has provisionally given to No. 1 is, by putting the figure 2 against another name, passed to No. 2, and it may go on to No. 3 or No. 4, but there is only one effective vote which passes according to the will of the voter, in certain contingencies, from one candidate to another?—Yes, that is so.

70. Strictly, therefore, it is correct to say a man has only one vote, is it not?—Yes, and the Bill seeks to emphasise that and put it in the forefront, because there has been some misconception about it. It is supposed he has several votes, or what I have heard called secondary votes; but it is not so, he has only one vote.

Chairman.

71. Your explanation is perfectly clear that he has only one effective vote, but at the same time I should say if anyone read that clause without all the explanation we have had they would not understand it, and it might be likely that a voter might say: I have only one vote, and I shall only put a figure against one name?—It is a matter that has been a good deal discussed.

72. Would

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury.

72. Would not the word "require" express your meaning better than the word "want" because a candidate might want to get as many votes as he could in the first instance?—Yes, I think I could accept that correction.

Earl of Hurdwicke.

73. There is no doubt, is there, that a man has only one vote according to the provision in the Bill?—Yes, there can be no possible doubt about that. I might call attention to Sub-clause 2, which states what the elector must do and what he may not do in giving his vote. He must place on his ballot paper the figure 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom he votes, and he need do nothing more. If one candidate only has his confidence he puts the figure 1 against his name, and that is all that is necessary; but if there are other candidates for whom in certain contingencies he would like his vote to be used he can mark their names with the figures 2, 3, 4, and so on. The effect of that is that in certain contingencies those candidates in the order of their preference will receive his vote.

Lord Avebury.

74. One of those candidates you mean?—One of those candidates.

Chairman.

75. But the elector's vote is invalid unless he puts the figure 1, I understand?—His vote is invalid unless he puts the figure 1.

Earl Beauchamp.

76. And you would not allow him to make the cross which he makes at present?—As the Bill is drawn, no. The point was considered and it was thought it would have a confusing effect on the mind of a voter, because 2 does not follow necessarily after a cross. I may say that the Proportional Representation Society held a dummy election in which close on 12,500 people voted, composed of all classes of society; it was conducted in accordance with the system proposed by this Act, and out of the whole number of voting papers there were, I think, only 20 papers which, on a rigid scrutiny, could have been rejected as invalid through mistakes of the voter.

Lord Avebury.

77. And out of those 20, I think 10 were in consequence of their making some remarks on the paper?—I do not think it was purely on account of remarks. I think about ten did not merely write remarks, but deliberately one can say distorted their papers in such a way that they were valueless. I think *bona fide* mistakes there were only perhaps ten, out of the whole 12,500.

Lord Haversham.

78. What class of people were they?—All classes, certainly very nearly a third of them were working men. We did our best to distribute our papers among all classes of society, and I think we succeeded.

Lord Avebury.

79. A large number of working men at Woolwich voted, I think?—Yes, in Woolwich the matter was taken up with considerable vigour and a large number of Woolwich working men voted. The "Woolwich Pioneer" took the matter up and printed the ballot paper, and obtained a good many votes in that way.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

80. Is it within your knowledge that there are many other cases illustrating the facility of this means of voting at public meetings and so on?—Yes.

81. At which the percentage of errors was found to be extremely small?—So far as my experience goes, extremely small.

82. The system has been worked amongst the miners of Northumberland for many years, has it not?—Yes, I understand so; but another witness is coming who can tell the Committee more about it. I understand, however, that the system has been in vogue amongst the miners of Northumberland in electing their representatives, and it has been found to work very satisfactorily.

83. Does that conclude what you have to say with regard to directions to the voter?—Yes. Perhaps I ought to call attention to Clause 9, which states what makes a vote invalid. I omit Clause 8, for the moment, which is the clause incorporating the duties of the Returning Officer. Clause 9 is the clause which invalidates a ballot paper on which, first, the figure 1 is not marked, that is obviously necessary; 2. "Where the figure 1, is set opposite the name of more than one candidate." That is obviously necessary. Then 3 "where the figure 1 and some other figure is set opposite the name of the same candidate." I think you may assume that a person who does that has not clearly indicated whether that candidate is his first choice or not; and lastly, "Where any mark is made not authorised by the Ballot Act, 1872, as modified by this Act." That incorporates the statutory provisions as to secrecy and against identification of the voter.

84. What have you to say with regard to the Returning Officer?—In the first schedule the duties of the Returning Officer are dealt with. I do not know whether I should be allowed to conduct a dummy election, as it were, illustrating these rules, but to make these rules plain without something of the kind is a little difficult. It is rather like reading a book of rules of cricket without illustrations.

Chairman.

85. How do you propose to do that?—I have brought

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

brought with me a large number of the papers which were used in the illustrative election I have referred to. I have gone through all the purely mechanical processes so that I should have no counting to do, and I think I could show very briefly the various stages in an election.

..

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

86. I think you have also provided forms to enable the members of the Committee to follow your illustration, have you not?—Yes. Before I go into details, I ought to say that these rules are modelled on a number of Australian Bills. The system has had considerable support in Australia, and a good many Bills have been introduced there in the State legislatures and also in the Commonwealth Parliament; consequently I have had considerable help from those Bills.

Chairman.

87. When you say "Bills," did they never take the form of Acts?—Yes, an Act was passed in Tasmania in 1896, and it was in force for some little time. It applied to only two constituencies, unfortunately. After it had been in force for some little time the party against whose interest it militated got into power, and it was repealed. Subsequently, in Tasmania the system was reintroduced, and a Bill was passed through the Representative House last year, or two years ago, but I do not know whether it has yet passed the Upper House.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

88. The Act applied to Hobart Town and Launceston, I think?—Yes, I think those were the two constituencies.

89. Then a party thought that it injured their prospects, and when they were in the majority in the House of Representatives they got the Act repealed, did they?—Yes.

90. Then there was a General Election, and the new House of Representatives at once reintroduced the scheme of proportional representation, applied, I think, to the whole colony and passed it with great celerity?—I think that is so, but I have not studied the details.

91. Then it got before the Legislative Council, where it was defeated by a narrow majority in Committee. Was that the experience?—Yes. In addition to the Tasmanian Act there was the Tasmanian Bill of 1905, the South Australian Bill of 1905, and the Commonwealth Electoral Bill of 1902. They all differ in detail one from the other, and they differ in some details from the system proposed by this Bill, but the basis of them is the same and the principle is the same. They are all modifications of the system originally proposed by Mr. Hare and favoured by John Stuart Mill. Of these systems the present system is a development, and, as we think, an improvement. This system does not attempt to do more than to secure that within each fairly large constituency a fraction of the votes corresponding roughly to the number of

(0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

members who have to be elected gets representation. Mr. Hare hoped to treat the whole of the United Kingdom as one constituency, and to allow 1-672nd, I think the number would be now, to return one member. That, of course, we do not attempt to do.

92. We really are not concerned with that counsel of perfection, and we are not dealing even with a Bill for the Kingdom, but only for Municipal Corporations, are we not?—Yes; but of course the system of counting the votes would be the same, whether it was Municipal or Parliamentary. The schedule, in fact, would apply to a Parliamentary election in the same way as it would to a Municipal election. I have here a number of sheets similar to the counting sheet which a returning officer would have to use, and, if I hand them to the Committee, it will be comparatively easy for them to follow my explanation. (*The witness hands the sheets to the Committee. Vide Appendix.*)

93. Are those specimens of the ballot papers you used at the illustrative election, and do the papers you have produced show how some of the voters marked them?—Yes. I ought to explain that at the illustrative election we assumed that we were electing five members, and for this illustration I am giving now I want to assume the election of seven members in order to show the adaptability of the system and to show that you can deal with large numbers without any trouble.

Earl Beauchamp.

94. But the chances are you might have two candidates for every vacancy, are they not?—No, I think not. Each party would only run rather more than the number of people they expected to elect. Each party would know its strength roughly in the constituency; and say you had seven vacancies, the majority party might run five candidates, the party which was in the minority might run three candidates, and a party in a very small minority would perhaps only run one candidate. Certainly as soon as the system was understood no one would think of running a candidate for every vacancy unless it was practically an unanimous constituency.

I was proposing, as it were, to take the rules as they come naturally in their order. The stage at which I am asking you to imagine the counting of the votes to be, is the stage which follows after Rule 1 in the first schedule. Rule 1 is: "After the ballot papers have been mixed in accordance with the rules contained in the first schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872" (those are the ordinary rules under which the returning officer has to mix all the ballot papers, the idea being to avoid identification) "the returning officer shall draw out all ballot papers which he does not reject as invalid, and file in a separate parcel those in which the figure 1 is set opposite the name of the same candidate. The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel." That is a perfectly simple operation. He sees how many votes each one candidate has got, and

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he files them separately. I have here altogether 2,012 ballot papers, and they have been arranged under the names of the candidates in accordance with the figures 1 that are marked against each candidate.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

95. You took the 2,012 papers, you separated those in which Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman is marked 1, and made a heap of those, and another heap of those in which Mr. Austen Chamberlain is marked 1, did you?—Yes.

96. And you added them up and found they numbered 2,012?—Yes.

97. And, secondly, you found that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had how many?—The result of the voting was this: Sir Alexander Acland Hood has 58, that is to say he was marked "1" on 58 papers; Mr. Bell has 102 votes, that is to say he is marked "1" on 102; Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has 510, Lord Hugh Cecil 213, Mr. Austen Chamberlain 253, Mr. Churchill 124, Mr. Haldane 195, Mr. Keir Hardie 290, Mr. Henderson 60, Mr. Bonar Law 42, Mr. Snowden 115, and Sir Thomas Whittaker 50. The papers on which each candidate is marked "1" are put in a single heap in exactly the same way as the ballot papers at an election now are filed together, and I have them here actually filed together—a parcel for each candidate.

Earl of Hardwicke.

98. Are those all marked "1"?—Those are all arranged under the names of the people who are marked "1," that is to say under the names of the people for whom the elector has voted. For instance, here is the largest heap, the Campbell-Bannerman heap, there are 510 papers here and on every single paper his name is marked "1," and on no other paper is his name marked "1."

99. Are there any other numbers besides on those papers?—Yes, a large number of numbers certainly indicating further preferences. The next operation is prescribed by Rule 2. The Returning Officer adds together the numbers of the papers in all the parcels, he gets the total of all the valid votes, and "divides the total by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by one disregarding any fractional remainder will obviously be the number of votes sufficient to secure the return of a candidate," and it is called the "quota." I ought to explain the meaning of that. If you look briefly at the head of the sheet you will see the operation actually set out, you will see that the number of vacancies is seven. The quota is obtained if you look at the right hand at the top of the sheet by dividing 2,012, which is the total of the valid votes, by seven plus one, that is 8, and by adding one to the result, the result is the figure of 252, fractions being disregarded.

Lord Colchester.

100. Why is the 1 added to the number?—The reason that is done is this: The problem is to find in a constituency returning several members

Lord Colchester—continued.

the smallest number of votes which makes a man certain of election. This number is called the "quota." When the system first began to be developed the quota used to be ascertained merely by dividing the number of votes by the number of vacancies, that is to say, supposing you had five vacancies and 5,000 votes you divided 5,000 by five, the idea being that each fifth of the constituency was entitled to one member, and you had to discover what was a fifth of the constituency (the constituency being understood to mean that part of the constituency which took the trouble to vote), and that fifth returned one member. But it was soon apparent that your true quota would be rather less than that. The new system adopted is to find the quota by dividing the total number of votes by one more than the vacancies, and increasing the result by one.

Chairman.

101. You state it as if it was an axiom, but I do not understand it?—It is perhaps most easily understood if you take a single-member constituency. If you take a single-member constituency the number of votes which a man wants in order to be elected is not the whole of the votes of course, but it is half the votes plus one. Half the votes plus one is a bare majority.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

102. If a thousand persons are voting in a single-member constituency, the man will be elected who gets 1,000 divided by two, plus one, will he not?—Yes, that is so; if he gets 501 votes he must be elected. Similarly, if you had a two-member constituency the number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate is a third plus one, because there do not remain in the constituency sufficient voters to give more votes to two other candidates. If you think of the constituency as a body of men, and if you think of each member as taking off with him a number of supporters, the question is what is the least number of supporters which he can take away and leave so small a number remaining that the total number of other people to be elected cannot each take away more than he has got. Assuming a constituency of 600 voters, and assuming there are five vacancies, if your first man has the support of one sixth of those 600, that is 100, plus 1, 101, that leaves only 499 people unappropriated, if I may so express it. You cannot get out of 499 people five blocks each equal to 101, because 499 if divided by five will not give you five 101's. What one wants to get is the lowest figure which makes a man certain of election. Just as in a single member constituency what makes him certain of election is a bare majority, that is, one-half plus one, so when you deal with a number of members to be elected the number that makes you certain of election is the result of dividing a constituency by one more than the total number of vacancies and adding one to the result; for example, in a five-member constituency there does not remain, when you have taken away the quota, the necessary number of other electors left to give more

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

more votes to five other people than the first man already has.

103. If I may put it in this way, with your hypothetical case of 600 voters to elect five persons, A has got 101 votes, that is, a sixth plus one, and what remains will be five-sixths minus one, but you cannot divide five-sixths minus one into five lots, each greater than one-sixth plus one; therefore you cannot get out of the five-sixths minus one five candidates returned ahead of the one you already have set aside, can you?—That is so.

104. To come to figures again, if A gets 101 of the votes there are 499 left, and if you divide them equally amongst five persons each one would get less than 100, and you cannot divide it unequally so as to give each of the five persons more than 101?—Yes.

105. Is it not this: If a man is fighting for one seat, and gets one more than half the votes, he is sure; if he is fighting for one of two seats, and gets one more than a third of the votes, he is sure, because there is left one less than two-thirds which could not be divided among two people superior to himself?—Yes.

106. So with three seats if he gets one more than a fourth of the votes, what is left would be one less than three-fourths to be divided among three people?—Yes. In other words, to take the illustration of the thirds, you cannot get out of one "less than two-thirds" two results, which each of them are greater than one-third.

Chairman.

107. I can understand, referring to your paper, that some figure, which will be less than the total dividend by seven is necessary. Supposing one takes the figure on your paper of 2,012, that divided by eight is 251, without fractions; but, if you divide it by seven it is very different, because it is 287, and therefore there is a large margin. As there is such a large margin, why are you obliged to add one afterwards? The difference between dividing by seven and eight one would have thought would leave sufficient margin in order to elect seven people, even although the first man must have one more vote. Why is not that margin of 35 over the number that each candidate has to get enough without adding one to it, and if it is why do you add one?—I find it a little difficult to follow the question, but supposing you divide the 2,012 by eight and do not add one, the result is that you get 251, which is an eighth of the whole. Now it is conceivable that you might get eight people each with 251 votes, supposing they were all exactly equally divided.

108. If that is the case, what is the effect of adding one? As soon as you add one to the result you cannot get eight people each with the resulting number of votes—you can only get seven and there are only seven vacancies.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

109. If you divide by seven you get 287, do you not?—Yes.

110. And that you say is too large a number—that is to say it is more than is wanted?—Yes, it is an unnecessarily large number
(0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

111. You find, do you, that 252 is all that is wanted?—Yes.

112. The Chairman wants to know why you should add 1 to 251 if there is a margin running up to 287; but there is no margin, 287 is more than is wanted. You aim, I understand, at the smallest number of votes which is essential to returning a man?—Yes.

113. And that number is one greater than the figure next above the number arrived at by dividing by eight?—Yes. It was only by way of a logical explanation and also to some extent an historical explanation that I started by saying that your first instinct is to divide the total number of votes by the total number of vacancies, and, in fact, did when the system was first introduced.

Earl Beauchamp.

114. Supposing you did that, would the result of the election be just the same as if you divided by seven and added one?—I do not think that is a question which I can answer.

115. Suppose you divide the number by seven, would not the result of the election be exactly the same as if you divided by seven plus one?—No, not necessarily, because the result would be a certain waste of votes.

116. But the whole point of this Bill is that there should be no waste of votes at all, but that all votes should be transferred to one individual or another, I understand?—Yes.

117. So that surely the result would be, would it not, that if you divide by seven the quota would be 287 odd?—Yes.

118. The difference between 252 and 287 would have to be transferred to various people, would it not?—No; the result would be that the people who had over 287 votes would remain credited with 287 votes instead of 252 as their quota, and that figure of 287 being in excess of the minimum which is necessary to elect them, the difference between 287 and 252, the minimum, would be wasted votes.

Lord Avebury.

119. There are seven people to be elected and you take the quota as 252 in the manner you have described. If seven candidates have each got 252 votes, that makes 1,764 votes, and 1,764 votes deducted from the total number of 2,012 leaves 248, so that if seven have 252 nobody else can get more than 248, even assuming that he gets every vote there is over—is not that so?—Yes.

120. Therefore it is quite clear, is it not, that anybody who gets 252 votes is entitled to be returned?—Yes.

121. And nobody in addition to seven can get as many as 252 votes?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

122. You are then utilising as far as possible the voting wishes of the community. You are not accumulating, are you, an unnecessary number on one party?—Yes, if you get an unnecessary
B 2
number

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[Continued.]

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number of votes credited to any one candidate, you *pro tanto* weaken the hands of his supporters on the representation.

Lord Avebury.

123. Of course, taking Lord Beauchamp's case, there are fewer votes to be distributed, are there not?—Obviously.

124. Therefore those votes would probably be lost to the candidate?—Yes. Perhaps I may say that the whole reason why votes are made transferable is in order to prevent that very thing which results when you do not make them transferable in many-membered constituencies with one vote given to each elector. In Japan, where the system is: constituencies returning each several members; one elector one vote and no possibility of transfer, if a party over estimates or under estimates its voting strength it gets a false representation; it may get too little and it may lose its representation altogether.

125. Can you illustrate that by the figures you have here. If there were no transfer and if the Japanese plan were adopted, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman would be elected, but all his additional votes would be lost: in that case which seven would you get elected?—You would get in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman first, Mr. Keir Hardie second, Mr. Austen Chamberlain third, Lord Hugh Cecil fourth, Mr. Haldane fifth, Mr. Churchill sixth, and Mr. Snowden seventh. It does not follow that that might not be the actual result of the election, and it very often is so, but I should like to point out that in this election no formal party instructions were issued. One would imagine that in any election in England, you would get instructions issued to the supporters of each party, "Mark your voting paper thus," the leader of the party being 1 and the next person in eminence 2, and so on, with the result that you would find that each party leader had a very large poll and each second man in the party had a very small one. Of course that principle has not had its full play in this dummy election, because no instructions were issued. Probably if there had been instructions issued Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's poll would have been a great deal larger and Mr. Haldane's and Mr. Churchill's polls very much less.

Lord Colchester.

126. But this is a case in which all the best-known men in the country are adopted?—Yes; of course there is a certain amount of unreality about it, because one had to take well-known names to get people to vote. But I think there was no doubt that the electors thoroughly understood the effect of their markings.

Lord Courtney of Penwith

127. And worked on political principles?—Yes, entirely. The principle is that as soon as a man gets the quota he is elected, and his surplus votes are then carried on. I ought perhaps to say that in Australia this method of the quota has been invariably adopted in

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

preference to the old method of dividing by the number of vacancies, because it is found that dividing by the number of vacancies wastes a certain number of votes.

Chairman.

128. And your object is that the quota should be the lowest number that can be arrived at without any chance of more candidates than the number of candidates to be elected being chosen?—Yes, that is exactly the object of the quota. And I think there is no doubt you get it by this method. You get the minimum number of votes which render a man certain of election. Anything else beyond that you transfer if the electors so wish it.

Earl of Hardwicke.

129. To No. 2?—Yes, and that I will explain directly.

[After a short adjournment.]

Witness. When we adjourned we had assumed that the election had got to the stage at the end of Rule 2. That is to say, that the Returning Officer has counted the votes he has grouped the papers upon which the candidates are marked as No. 1 in groups (or "parcels" as they are called in the schedule to the Bill) under the names of the candidates, and he has ascertained the quota which may be shortly described as the minimum of votes necessary to render certain the election of the candidate. His next duty is under Rule 3, "Any candidate whose parcel contains a number of papers equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected." That I do not think needs very much explanation. In this particular election, the quota being 252, when he looks at the figures he finds that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has 510 votes; he is declared elected; Mr. Chamberlain has 253, which curiously is just one above the quota. He also is declared elected, and Mr. Keir Hardie has 290, and he also is declared elected, so that the Returning Officer has filled three places and there remain four places to be filled. The next task which the Returning Officer has to perform is to transfer the votes in excess of the quota of the elected candidate, and he begins with the candidate who has the largest number of votes—that is Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Earl Beauchamp.

130. Why should he begin with him particularly? Why should not he take the top man elected in alphabetical order and not the man who has the largest number of votes?—I think the reason is that you have to begin with somebody, and it is as well to begin with the person the transfer of whose votes would make the greatest difference to the election. He is the most important person, and the transfer of his vote is the biggest transfer. In certain events it might terminate the election, while a smaller transfer would not.

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[Continued.]

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131. In fact you mean it would be more convenient?—It is rather more convenient, but nothing turns on it.

Chairman.

132. Are you sure nothing turns on it?—Nothing as far as I know.

133. Suppose instead of there being this very large preponderance there were two people who had, one 160 and the other 165 votes over, why should one be taken first? There must be some reason. Is it purely because it makes the process rather shorter or easier?—I cannot conceive any case in which, following these rules in other respects, when the taking of the candidate with the larger or smaller surplus first would make any difference.

134. But you put it as a rule. I should have thought if it makes no difference there would be no reason for not allowing the Returning Officer to take anybody next he likes?—It is probably better to describe exactly what a Returning Officer has to do. He has to begin with one candidate or another, and the simpler thing seems to me to begin with the candidate at the top of the poll.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

135. All the votes of the candidates who have surpluses would be transferred in due course, would they not?—Yes, each of them one after the other. It really is a matter, so far as I know, of no moment whatever, whichever you take first.

136. And it makes in your opinion no difference whatever in the result, but it is most desirable that the Returning Officer should have as little discretion as possible, is it not? No suggestion of motive can be inferred if it is prescribed by Act which he shall take first?—I think the Returning Officer at the inception might find himself considerably embarrassed if he had not it strictly laid down which candidate he should take first, and he might have suggestions made to him, and I think it is important for his protection alone to be able to say the Act states which he is to take first.

Chairman.

137. You see this is a most definite direction: "The parcel of the candidate having the largest number of votes shall first be dealt with."—Yes.

138. It is an absolute direction, is it not?—Yes.

139. However you have nothing more I understand to say about it?—No, it would come to exactly the same thing in the final result, whichever is taken first.

Earl Beauchamp.

140. Is it quite impossible to imagine any election in which it would make any difference at all?—I cannot imagine any election in which it would make any difference at all. The Returning Officer then has declared returned Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Keir Hardie, and he

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

proceeds to distribute the surplus votes of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as being the candidate with the largest number of votes.

Chairman.

141. Why is the number of surplus votes on this paper of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's 255?—That will appear very shortly when I come to explain the distribution of the surplus votes. What the Returning Officer has to do is to make a distribution of the surplus votes amongst other candidates, excluding Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, because they are both elected, and therefore it would be idle to transfer to them any of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus votes. He makes the distribution according to the rules by counting over again the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes, and ascertaining on how many papers each particular candidate is numbered 2, and on how many papers, if any, no candidate is numbered. When this system was first introduced it was proposed to allow the returning officer to take the papers last filed in the candidate's parcel—that is to say, the last votes counted—and simply to transfer them without going into any question as to the whole of the votes, but it was objected that if you take certain particular votes which you choose by chance out of, say, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's, total, you may be unduly favouring some particular candidate marked "2." For instance, it was said: Suppose a candidate has 100 votes and 50 is the quota, and suppose of his 100 supporters 50 marked Mr. A No. 2 and 50 Mr. B No. 2, it is conceivable if you take the last 50 votes of the parcel you will transfer 50 votes to Mr. A and none at all to Mr. B. That was what appeared to be a formidable criticism which was directed against the system. The answer to that was, I think, that on the theory of chances—and it was tested by experiment very many times—if you have a heap of papers in which second preferences existed in certain definite proportions—that is to say, half one and half another—and then if you take at random any particular number of papers out of the heap, the heap having been well shuffled, you find the same proportions in the surplus papers which you draw out as those that exist in the whole heap; in other words, supposing you have 100 balls in a ballot-box, half of them black and half of them white, and they are well mixed, and you set a blind man to put his hand in and pull out 20, you find the same proportion of black and white balls in the 20 as exist in the 100.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

142. Before you go on I might put it in another way with special reference to this case. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has 510 votes, has he not?—Yes.

143. He only wants 252. There are therefore 258 surplus?—Yes.

144. And the question is what 258 you would take out of the 510. The first answer was, take any 258 you like at random, and the result would be the same; but many persons object; one

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one 258 being taken out might be to the advantage of Mr. Haldane, for example; another 258 might be to the advantage of Mr. Churchill or some other person; and you introduce an element of chance if you leave the selection of the 258 entirely to chance; but you are going to obviate that difficulty, are you not?—Yes; that was the difficulty that was felt, and in order to obviate that difficulty the following scheme was devised in Tasmania. Count the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes over again and arrange them according to their second preferences for what I will call "continuing candidates," which implies candidates who have not been excluded from the poll or declared elected, then discover in what proportion second preferences exist for the respective candidates, and then transfer to each candidate his strict proportion of votes. In other words, see that each candidate gets transferred to him as part of the surplus the same proportion of the surplus as the proportion which all his second preferences in the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes bear to the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes. That is to say, supposing a third of the supporters of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman have supported Mr. Haldane as second preference, a third of the surplus of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes is transferred to Mr. Haldane, and so on.

145. Again, to come to figures, taking Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's 510 papers, you go through them and see how many, if any, voters have marked Sir Acland Hood or how many Mr. Churchill "2," and pass them over if they are elected?—Yes.

146. And if you find them marked "2," you take the man marked "3"?—Yes.

147. And then you say the 258 to be transferred, if that is the number, shall be taken in exact proportion to the division of the original 510?—Yes; in other words, we produce in the votes transferred from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman the proportions of second preferences which exist in the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes. In most cases, of course, the candidate who is marked "2" on Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's paper will be the person who is credited with that particular vote if and when it is transferred. Supposing, however, that Mr. Keir Hardie or Mr. Chamberlain is marked "2" on any one paper, as he is elected you leave him out and you see who is marked "3," so that it is perhaps a little more accurate to use the phrase "next preference" instead of "second preference," because there are cases in which the second preference man may be already elected.

Earl Beauchamp.

148. You took the proportion, as I understand, of 255?—I will explain that in a moment. I have compiled a little table which shows the way in which it is done. (*The witness hands a table to their Lordships. Vide Appendix.*) I may say that these transfer forms are not provided for by the rules, but they are things which it would be useful for the Returning Officer to have. I have no doubt if the system came to be worked out in practice there would be many mechanical aids which would soon be adopted. If I may explain

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

this transfer sheet, it is headed "Distribution of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's Surplus (258 votes)." "Number of papers showing a next preference, 510." It so happens that the whole of the people who voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman expressed a next preference. It might have happened of course that a considerable number of his supporters might not have expressed a next preference at all. In that case the votes of those of his supporters who had not expressed a next preference would have been preserved as part of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's quota, or it might even have happened that a number of his supporters in excess of the quota might have expressed no just preference. As to that, if I may refer for a moment to Clause 4 (d) of the Bill at the top of page 5, it reads: "If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less than the surplus votes, the Returning Officer shall transfer all the votes capable of transfer." That is to provide for this apparently unlikely case in which you have more voters than the quota who have voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman only. In that very unlikely case you would keep, of course, the votes marked Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman only for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman only, and you would simply transfer the other votes. That is not likely to occur in practice, but one has to provide for it. Then to go back to the transfer form the next line of the sheet is,

$$\text{" Multiplying fraction } = \frac{\text{Surplus } 258}{\text{Total of next preferences } 510}$$

That is, of course, simply working out the rule of three sum which is set for the Returning Officer. What you have to transfer, being, 258 votes, and the total number of papers on which a second preference is shown being 510, you have to give each candidate as nearly as you can $\frac{258}{510}$ th of the voting papers on which he has the next preference. That is the fairest possible thing you can do. Then referring to the Sub-clause (f) of Rule 4 (i.) of the First Schedule to the Bill, fractional remainders are disregarded; that is to say, when the result of multiplying the number of next preferences which any man has is to bring out a fraction, you disregard the fraction and transfer only the whole number, and it is because you disregard the fraction that you get a small difference between the surplus—the 258 which you are seeking to transfer, and the 255 which you actually transfer. In other words, supposing you find as a result of your process that you have to transfer to Mr. A $1\frac{1}{2}$ votes you only transfer him one, and the half, the fractional remainder, remains credited to the person whose votes you are transferring, and the sum of those fractional remainders is two or three votes, so here there remain credited to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 255 votes instead of 252.

Chairman.

149. With regard to the rule that no one should have more than one vote, as I understand some of the people who have voted for Sir Henry

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Chairman—continued.

Henry Campbell-Bannerman have an interest also in getting someone else elected, at all events a proportionate part of their vote is counted for the purpose of electing someone else?—With great deference I do not think that is so. 510 people have voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. He wants to elect him 252 votes; therefore the votes of 252 voters remain in any event credited to him as his quota; the balance of 258 voters' votes are not counted to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at all, but are carried over to the candidates whom the voters have marked as second in their preferences.

150. But, as I understand, not only the people who have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but the people who have voted for him, are counted in the number out of which the proportion has to be taken to elect the second man. It seems to me therefore they are taking a share in two votes, are they not?—With great deference I should hardly have thought that was the true conclusion. Their votes are taken into account, not for the purpose of electing anybody, but simply for the purpose of ascertaining what are the fair proportions in which to divide up Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus votes.

151. But if they are divided amongst the whole number, and if those people who have already voted are counted amongst the number from which the proportion is taken to elect the second man, then certainly they have given some proportion of their vote to the second man as well as to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, have they not?—No, it seems to me that that is not so. The quota of voters who have voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman remain reckoned to him.

152. But let me point out they are taken in this proportion—Sir Acland Hood, eight votes; 11 for Mr. Bell; Mr. Churchill, 191, and Mr. Haldane, 263, and you arrive at the number of votes to be transferred to next preference by taking the proportion of each of those; that is 510. Therefore, supposing nearly the whole of those voting for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who required 252 to elect him, had given their votes to Mr. Haldane, who has 263 second preference votes, it would be the other votes you ought to count and not those, would it not, in deciding who was the second preference to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman?—No. If I may say so, you do not at first set aside certain definite votes as representing Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's quota and then transfer the surplus votes. What you do is to divide each group of second preferences strictly proportionately between quota and surplus, that is to say, between Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the person marked 2; in other words, you do not first take 252 out of Mr. Haldane's 263 second preference and say that is the quota, but you determine simultaneously by the same operation which votes are to remain credited to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and which are to be carried to second preferences as the surplus.

153. If I follow you, you calculate the proportion of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's first votes as well as the proportion of preference

Chairman—continued.

votes, therefore you do not set aside the 252 votes; but you only calculate the proportion of the 510 as having voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, otherwise it is clear they have given more than one vote?—I think I should accept your first alternative, my Lord.

154. The proportion of the first vote as well as the second vote?—Not the proportion of the first vote: the first vote is not divided at all.

155. He has 510 votes, and instead of setting aside 252 to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, you calculate that he has 252 votes; and you do not take 252 particular votes, but you take the proportion which 252 bears to 510 for the first votes which have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Then, when you come to the second preference you do the same thing?—I am afraid I cannot follow you, my Lord. I should like, if possible, to get at the bottom of it, because it is so important a question. You have 510 votes for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, those votes are represented by single individual ballot papers; you have to determine what is the fair way of distributing those 510 votes between Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the next preference marked. You do not begin by setting aside a quota for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. What you do is to reckon the whole of the 510 votes and group them according to the second preferences, and you take from each group of second preferences sufficient to make Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's quota, and as part of the same operation you transfer the balance of that group to the second preference.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

156. Might it not be put in this way: Suppose Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had 504 votes, just double 252, so that he had exactly twice the number quoted, then there would be 252 to transfer. You go through the whole of the 504, and since the 504 is double the number to be transferred, you take one-half of the votes given to Sir Acland Hood and transfer them, and one-half to Mr. Bell and transfer them, and one-half to Mr. Haldane and transfer them, and so on in strictly arithmetical proportion. It is undoubtedly true that in determining the half which you are to take out you take into account the mind and will of all who have voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, which is the Chairman's point, but the ultimate result is that you take 252 and put them aside for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the other half you transfer; no one gets a second vote. The votes that are reserved for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman are exhausted, but the people who joined in that vote, and people who are transferred did influence the proportion of transfer. That is the point, is it not?—Yes.

Chairman.

157. Then if they do not give more than one vote the only answer is that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has been elected by 504 half votes, that is by 252 votes, and that then you take the other half votes left and divide them amongst other

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

other people. If 252 people have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and they are afterwards counted in electing a man second on the list in whatever small proportion it may be, they give something more than one vote?—If I may say so, the difficulty I feel about accepting that is it seems to me that you assume he is elected by a certain 252 votes, and then that those 252 are no longer taken into account. He is declared elected as the result of the 510 votes that are credited to him, not as the result of 252 particular votes. It is only in working out the fairness of the transfers that you have to go through this process and set aside 252 particular votes as representing the people who have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. The suggestion as to half votes is a suggestion which in effect has been sought to be carried out by some of the Australian Bills.

158. It seems to me that you do it in this Bill. If a man is not given more than a whole vote, he must be given half votes on each. Supposing the number was double the number of votes required, he is elected as you say, not by particular votes, but it must be by 504 half votes, and in that way you have the other half votes left which can be given to the second preference in the proportion required. That is the effect, is it not, but you do not say so in the Bill?—With great deference I should not be prepared to accept that.

Earl of Hardwicke.

159. You have a note here: "Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Keir Hardie being already elected are not taken into account." Why should not their surplus votes be taken into account as well as those of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.—Their surplus votes will be subsequently when we come to distribute them; but those candidates are not taken into account now as transferees.

Earl Beauchamp.

160. With regard to the multiplying fraction why do you take the total of next preferences rather than some other figure, for instance, the quota?—Because the total of next preferences is the only possible figure it seems to me you can take. The problem before you is, you have a number of votes containing next preferences. You have also got a surplus—that is to say, you have a number of votes which you have to transfer. One is assuming that the number of votes showing second preferences exceeds the surplus; if it does not, *cadit quæstio*, and there is another rule which provides for it. Consequently, you have in the mass of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes a certain number called the surplus votes, which you have to transfer. The whole mass of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's next preferences falls into groups of second preference to A, B, and C, and so on. You have to transfer out of each group a number of votes which bears the same proportion to the group as the surplus—that is to say, as to the total of votes you have to transfer—bears to the number of next preferences. In other words, you have to multiply the number of papers on which any

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

particular candidate is a second preference by the surplus over the total of second preferences. That is the best answer I can give. Any other figure does not give you the proportion which you are seeking to get.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

161. All this, it may be observed, arises out of a scrupulous desire to avoid the suggestion of chance taking away surplus votes, does it not?—Yes, it has been devised with that object.

162. If you take away at random surplus votes this discussion and this machinery would fall away, would it not?—This discussion and this machinery would fall away, and, speaking for myself, I think that this machinery is not necessary, but the popular objection that if you do not have this machinery you introduce an element of chance, has been found so strong in practice that this machinery has been devised to meet it. I do not believe in the objection, but there it is, and it has a great influence over many minds.

Earl of Hardwicke.

163. Without this machinery how would you compare it with the voting of the present day?—It would be an enormous improvement.

165. Do you say it would be an enormous improvement as elections are conducted now?—Yes.

Chairman.

165. You mean in the result, do you not, not in the machinery, that you would get at the minority representation?—You would get at the will of the electors enormously more accurately than you do at present, even if you did not adopt this particular machinery of the distribution of surplus votes.

166. You do not contend, do you, that a Bill which requires 40 rules to explain what the process is is an advantage over the present mode of voting as far as machinery goes?—I should not contend it gives less trouble to the Returning Officer.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

167. This particular branch of the machinery I understand, you consider would be an enormous improvement on the existing system?—Yes.

168. And as the noble Chairman says as to results; and there, there is no doubt. Even as to machinery, if this particular branch were taken away, would you say it was much more difficult, or less difficult, than the existing system, speaking of the mode of distributing the surplus?—It certainly gives more work to the Returning Officer than the existing system, even if you eliminate the proportional distribution of the surplus.

Chairman.

169. As long as the voter has faith it depends upon the Returning Officer being accurate, does it

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

it not?—Yes, of course, in the same sense that any election depends on the accuracy of the Returning Officer.

170. The voter, of course, cannot follow these elaborate calculations?—No; but no doubt the candidate and his agent in the room would take good care it was done.

171. That is no doubt right, and the Returning Officer would understand it, but the machinery is more complicated than the ordinary mode of voting, is it not?—Of course more complicated than the ordinary mode of counting votes.

172. And that is not an advantage, is it?—Unquestionably the Returning Officer would have a more complicated task than at present; I do not deny that for a moment.

173. The whole machinery is more complicated. I should not put that to you only you volunteered an answer which induced me to?—I should not assert that, of course. If I might go on with the illustration of this process, these votes of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's are taken and divided into heaps according to the next preference shown on them. The result is, turning to this transfer sheet, you find that Sir Acland Hood has eight votes in which he has second preference, Mr. Bell eleven, Lord Hugh Cecil none, and so on. You then have to transfer to next preference the due proportion of the total number of papers on which the candidate in question is marked as next preference; the result is that Sir Acland Hood, for instance, gets four, Mr. Bell five, and so on all down the list. The result of the neglected fraction is that there is a small difference between the total number of votes transferred and the surplus—that is to say, you cannot transfer fractions. The process is quite simple. If you will assume that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes have been recounted, and the Returning Officer has taken the proper number in each case which he has ascertained from each heap of second preferences, I have here a heap of votes on which Mr. Haldane is second preference; that heap of votes is put on Mr. Haldane's heap and is reckoned to him. Five are transferred to Mr. Bell, 96 to Mr. Churchill, four to Sir Alexander Acland Hood, two to Mr. Henderson, 14 to Sir Thomas Whittaker, and one to Mr. Snowden. That exhausts the lists of votes to be transferred. Now, what remain in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's parcel are the votes which are reckoned to him, and which are henceforth left out of account altogether, as they have done their work; they have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and are put aside.

174. Are you now referring to Sub-section 3?—Yes, that is under Rule 4, Sub-section 3: "All ballot papers in the parcel of an elected candidate not transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account." I think the reason for that is obvious. They have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, they have no more to do with the election, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman henceforth is left out of account altogether.

175. They have not only elected Sir Henry (0.13.)

Chairman—continued.

Campbell-Bannerman, but they have helped to elect someone else, have they not?—That I do not admit. The ballot papers which form the surplus are now transferred by various distributions to these other parcels of other candidates, as I have already explained. Those votes have been carried over and are now credited to the other candidates.

Earl Beauchamp.

176. So are the other votes, are they not?—No; Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes are the votes which elect him.

177. But you have calculated them in your calculation just now. In the preference they come into your proportion, do they not?—They came into proportion in this sense, that in order to ascertain how many, not of these votes but of some other votes, are to be transferred, you have to ascertain the total number of next preferences in the whole of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's group. The next duty of the Returning Officer is under Rule 5: "After the transfer of the surplus votes of an elected candidate any candidate who shall, as the result of the transfer, obtain the quota of votes shall be declared elected." The justice of that, of course, is obvious, and in this particular case the result has been to give Mr. Haldane 133 votes in addition to the 195 that he had already, which makes a total of 328. The result is to make Sir Acland Hood's total 62, Mr. Bell's 107, and to reduce Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's total to the quota as nearly as possible—that is to say, to bring it down to 255. Lord Hugh Cecil remains unaffected. Mr. Chamberlain also, of course, remains unaffected, because he is already elected. Mr. Churchill gets 96 further votes, which brings him up to 220, not the quota yet. Mr. Haldane gets 133 new votes, bringing him up to 328, and he is at once elected under Rule 5, so that you have now elected four members. Mr. Keir Hardie, like Mr. Chamberlain, remains where he was. The other figures are, Mr. Henderson 62, Mr. Law 42, Mr. Snowden 116, and Sir Thomas Whittaker 64. The next task of the Returning Officer is (going back to Rule 4) to distribute the surplus votes of Mr. Keir Hardie.

Earl Beauchamp.

178. Were there no second preferences from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Hugh Cecil's papers?—No.

179. Nor to Mr. Bonar Law's?—He was second preference on one vote, but as you cannot transfer a fraction of one, you give him nothing. Exactly the same process is now to be gone through with Mr. Keir Hardie's votes. He had 290 votes and that gives a surplus of 38, and precisely the same process as was gone through with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes has to be gone through with Mr. Hardie's. It is exactly the same process, the only difference being that owing to the fact that the surplus is only 38, the number

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of.

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[Continued.]

Earl Beauchamp—continued

of votes transferred is very much smaller, the multiplying fraction, as it has been called, is very much smaller, and consequently you get a very much smaller proportion of votes transferred. The actual figures are: Mr. Bell gets three votes, Mr. Churchill two, Mr. Keir Hardie is minus 35. Again there is a slight difference between the surplus and the number subtracted from the elected candidate's total owing to the neglect of fractional remainders. Mr. Henderson gets seven, Mr. Law none, Mr. Snowden 23, and Sir Thomas Whittaker none. Of course, one sees at once that the candidates who are in political sympathy with the candidate whose votes are being distributed are the largest gainers. That was so in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's distribution, and that is so in this distribution. The result is that Sir Acland Hood is 62, Mr. Bell 110, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 255, Lord Hugh Cecil 213, Mr. Chamberlain 253, Mr. Churchill 222, Mr. Haldane 328, Mr. Keir Hardie 255, Mr. Henderson 69, Mr. Bonar Law 42, Mr. Snowden 139, and Sir Thomas Whittaker 64. I think I should weary the Committee if I went through the actual distributions in fact. Now one has two quotas set aside—one of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's and one of Mr. Keir Hardie's. One still has to distribute the surplus on the first count. Now, the only other candidate elected on the first count is Mr. Chamberlain, but his surplus is a surplus of one only, and that is not transferred owing to a provision in the Rules, sub-rule 5 of Rule 4, line 28 of page 5: "A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate exceed the difference between the totals of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll." The whole object of that rule is to save the Returning Officer any unnecessary trouble. A distribution of a surplus would only be material at any particular stage in case it is going to influence the election as it stands at that stage, and it is not necessary to burden the Returning Officer with trouble by attempting to transfer one or two odd votes when they cannot make any difference.

180. That is where there are two candidates. What happens when there are more than two?—It is the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll—that is, Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Thomas Whittaker; the difference between them is 22. If the effect of making the transfer at this stage could in theory be to put Mr. Law above Sir Thomas Whittaker, it would be worth while to make the transfer at this stage, because one is coming to the stage at which you exclude candidates at the bottom of the poll; but in cases where the transfer of the surplus votes cannot produce any material effect, it is allowed to stand over because it is unnecessary trouble to the Returning Officer; consequently in the case of Mr. Austen Chamberlain's 253 votes, no attempt would be made to transfer the one surplus vote because it is unnecessary trouble.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

181. It would be practically impossible also, would it not, owing to the fraction?—You

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

probably would not have got a transferable vote. You can only get a transferable vote where there is only one to transfer on the hypothesis where there is only one person named as a next preference on all the papers showing next preferences. Now the next process is to distribute Mr. Haldane's surplus, and that is in rather a different position from the surpluses of the people who were elected on the first count, because he has been elected, not as the result of votes on which he was No. 1, but as the result of transfers from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman—votes in which he was No. 2. The distribution of his votes is made under Rule 6. Rule 6 applies the processes of Rule 4 to the distribution of a surplus which a candidate has acquired during the process of the election, but with this difference: that for the purpose of making the transfers, for the purposes of determining in what proportion the transfers are to be made, you take into account only the last batch of votes which were transferred to the candidate, and which raised him above the quota. That is to say, in this case Mr. Haldane received 133 votes from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Those raised him above the quota and so elected him. When you have to consider how you are going to transfer Mr. Haldane's surplus the rules provide that you are to take into account only the 133 last votes transferred to Mr. Haldane. The object of that is partly that it expedites the process; you have not got to go through the process of reckoning all Mr. Haldane's votes, including those transferred to him, and partly also it rests upon the view that, Mr. Haldane having been elected by a transfer of votes from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, you may look upon his original supporters as a firm body of people whom it is quite unnecessary to disturb, and you may consider yourself in a sense as still distributing Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus; that is to say his surplus having had the effect of electing Mr. Haldane, a certain number of his votes alight on Mr. Haldane and remain there, the balance is carried on.

Earl of Hardwicke.

182. The surplus is carried on?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

183. In fact, you might have arrested the transfer from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to Mr. Haldane the moment Mr. Haldane had reached the quota?—Yes, you might have done that. You could not do it because it is physically impossible to do it, but when you come to retransfer Mr. Haldane's surplus you treat yourself as if that operation had been possible, which seems a fair way of doing it.

Lord Colchester.

184. Then Mr. Haldane's second preferences are not counted?—No. I think one ought to look at this as far as one can from the point of view of the voter rather than the point of view of the candidate. You may suppose you are saying to a certain number of the people who have

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have originally supported Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, "Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has been elected; Mr. Haldane, who has been marked No. 2, has been elected; therefore neither of them want your votes; who do you vote for?" and they have answered your question by marking your candidate No. 3. It may be that No. 3 having been elected their effective next preference is for the candidates whom they have marked No. 4. The result of the transfers and distribution of Mr. Haldane's surplus is to give Sir Acland Hood 1, Mr. Bell 12, Lord Hugh Cecil 3, Mr. Churchill 33, and 72 come off Mr. Haldane. Mr. Keir Hardie, of course, gets none, Mr. Henderson gets 2, Mr. Bonar Law 1, Mr. Snowden 5, and Sir Thomas Whittaker gets 15. Those being added to the votes already given, it makes Sir Acland Hood 63, Mr. Bell 122, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman remains 255, Lord Hugh Cecil 216, Mr. Chamberlain remains 253, and Mr. Churchill 255, and at that stage he is elected, because he has now the quota; Mr. Haldane remains at 256, Mr. Keir Hardie at 255, Mr. Henderson is 71, Mr. Bonar Law 43, Mr. Snowden 144, and Sir Thomas Whittaker 79. Now we have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Keir Hardie, Mr. Haldane and Mr. Churchill. Those are the five candidates elected, and if there had only been five vacancies that would have terminated the election, but there are two more vacancies, and the next process consists of this: There are no surpluses left to distribute, and you now proceed to what I may call the second process or the process of the second class, namely, distributing the votes of the people at the bottom of the poll, beginning at the last candidate. That is under Rule 7. "Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under the provisions hereinafter contained, if under the transfers under the preceding rules there shall still remain one or more vacancies" "or, if no candidate shall have been declared elected under Rule 3" (it is conceivable, of course, that down to this stage no one may have been elected, though very unlikely) "the Returning Officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate having the lowest number of votes, and shall distribute the votes capable of transfer on the ballot papers in his parcel among the continuing candidates next in order of the voter's preference. Any ballot papers in the parcel on which votes not capable of transfer are given shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall henceforth not be taken into account." Mr. Bonar Law is at the bottom of the poll, and has 43 votes.

Earl Beauchamp.

185. Do you take the man who is lowest on the poll at this moment, or the man who is lowest on the first count?—The man who is lowest on the poll at this moment. There is a special provision to meet the case of a tie at the bottom of the poll (See Rule 10.) In that case you would first distribute the man's votes lowest on the first count as between those two, that is to say, supposing one candidate had 30 votes on the (0.13.)

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

first count and the other 20, and then the numbers were brought up to an equality of 40 each by transfers, you would distribute the votes of the man who had originally 20 votes.

Chairman

186. What is the principle of that?—The principle is, I think, that first you have to decide it one way or the other.

187. A tossing-up principle?—No, I do not think so. It is a disadvantage to have your votes distributed at once, because that puts you out of the election. There is a shadowy chance that there might be a number of transfers available for you, but if you have to decide between two people at the bottom, the greatest claim is in favour of the man for whom originally more preference had been declared.

188. But that is not an element you have been considering before, is it?—You have been considering the number who have had most votes, have you not. I do not know whether it affects the question, but, as a matter of fact, it is your last resort for finding out some distinction between the two people, is it not?—It is my last resort for finding out some distinction between the two people. The alternative, of course, would be to give the Returning Officer a casting vote.

189. That is when there is a tie?—And there is supposed to be a tie here, of course.

190. When there is a tie in the last record, you decide in favour of the man who had most votes originally, do you?—Yes, that gives you some distinction. If they were equal on the first count, then let the Returning Officer decide. One wants, as far as possible, to give no loophole to the Returning Officer to have any sort of arbitrary power of influencing the result in any way, and one only brings him in in the last resort.

191. You practically give the Returning Officer the same sort of right of a casting vote that he used to have at elections, do you not?—Yes, and as I think he still has. The process now which the Returning Officer has to go through is to distribute in this supposed election Mr. Bonar Law's votes. Those are transferred directly, and no question of proportion arises. You have not to retain any quota, but simply transfer them to the next preferences—it is the simplest possible operation—assuming there to be a preference. Any papers in which no next preference is shown are set aside—the voter has voted for Mr. Bonar Law and nobody else, and therefore there is no further use left for his vote.

Earl of Hardwicke.

192. He has no chance of being elected, I understand?—He has no chance of being elected, but the process of transfer is one of absolute simplicity. You simply transfer every single vote to the next preference marked upon the paper.

Earl Beauchamp.

193. Do not you then give a preference to the people who have voted for the least popular person, because you do not take any proportion

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[Continued.]

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

off Mr. Law's preference, but you do off the others?—No, we do not; you either transfer or retain the whole of each vote. The supporter of Mr. Bonar Law has no advantage over the supporter of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in this respect.

194. But surely some of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes, of which you transfer a certain proportion to various people like Mr. Haldane—you did not take a number of second preference for Mr. Haldane, but you took the proportion of them did you not?—Yes, certainly.

194*. Then here you take no proportion at all, and all the people who voted on second preference for Mr. Bonar Law had their votes counted, whereas you only took a proportion of the people giving a second preference on Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's papers?—I think the distinction is that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has been already elected, whereas those who have supported Mr. Law have failed in carrying out their wish in getting Mr. Bonar Law elected.

Lord Avebury.

195. Every one has one vote and one vote only; that is your contention?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

196. 252 extra votes are distributed in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's case, but in the case of Mr. Bonar Law he has 43 votes, and he is not able to keep one of them. There is no advantage in one case over the other?—That is so. I cannot see that the voter for Mr. Bonar Law who does not get him elected can conceive he has an advantage over the voter who votes for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and gets him elected. The point I want to emphasise on this distribution of the people's votes at the bottom of the poll is that you are not troubled with any question of proportions; you simply transfer the votes to the candidates marked as next preference. In cases where no preference is shown, then, of course, you cannot transfer them, and you simply set the votes aside.

Chairman.

197. As a matter of fact, when you get to the bottom of the poll neither of the men get sufficient votes, do they?—That is so in this election. Continuing this election, I do not think I need trouble the Committee with the exact figures, but Mr. Law's votes are first distributed. Then it is found that Mr. Henderson is at the bottom of the poll. His votes are then distributed.

Lord Avebury.

198. Had not you better tell us how Mr. Bonar Law's votes are distributed?—Sir Alexander Acland Hood gets 23, as might be expected from the political connection; Mr. Bell gets 1, Lord Hugh Cecil gets 17, Mr. Law, of course, is minus 43, and there are two votes upon which no further preference is shown. The result is Sir Alexander Acland Hood 86, Mr. Bell 123, and so on, the only change of importance being

Lord Avebury—continued.

that of Lord Hugh Cecil, whose figure becomes 233; the remainder are unaffected. The next distribution is Mr. Henderson's 71 votes. Those go in a great majority to Mr. Snowden, he gets 57 out of the 71; Sir Thomas Whittaker gets 4; there are two exhausted preferences, and Mr. Bell gets 8. The only alterations are to bring up Mr. Bell's poll to 131, and Mr. Snowden's poll to 201, and Sir Thomas Whittaker's poll to 83. Still nobody is elected. It so happens that at this particular election there are a large number of candidates with comparatively few votes and consequently one has to go through more processes than there might be if the figures had run rather differently.

Earl Beauchamp.

199. It is curious to notice that Mr. Snowden, who only began with 115, has crept up so nearly to Lord Hugh Cecil, who began with 213?—Yes, and I am obliged to your Lordship for the illustration. The reason of that is that Mr. Henderson's votes have been distributed, and Mr. Henderson, being a member of the Labour Party, and there being a surplus of Mr. Keir Hardie's votes also, Mr. Snowden stood to gain from the transfer of votes of people in sympathy with him, whereas with regard to Lord Hugh Cecil, Mr. Bonar Law is the only member of the same party whose votes have been distributed, and in that case Sir Acland Hood got a considerable proportion of the votes distributed. The next votes that are to be distributed are Sir Thomas Whittaker's. There are still two more members to be elected. The result of distributing his votes is to give Sir Acland Hood 6 more, Mr. Bell 39 more, Lord Hugh Cecil 8, Mr. Snowden 12, and Sir Thomas Whittaker loses 83, and there are 18 preferences exhausted. That is rather an interesting feature. All the members of the official Liberal Party have been elected at this stage, and you would probably find a large number of preferences for Mr. Haldane, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and Mr. Churchill on Sir Thomas Whittaker's votes, but as they have been elected those votes cannot be utilised, and you get a larger proportion of exhausted preferences. Mr. Bell, it will be observed, is the largest gainer by the distribution of Sir Thomas Whittaker's votes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

200. The voters are not picked out, are they?—No. There we are distributing the whole of the votes. The result is to give Sir Acland Hood 92, Mr. Bell 170, Lord Hugh Cecil 241, Mr. Snowden 213. The next operation is to distribute Sir Alexander Acland Hood's, the lowest, the 92 votes with which he is credited. Mr. Bell gets 18 and Lord Hugh Cecil 56. Of course we now get the distribution of the lowest distributable candidate who might be considered to be in sympathy with Lord Hugh Cecil, and consequently he is a large gainer on this distribution. He gets 56, Mr. Snowden gets 6, and there are 12 votes exhausted. The effect is to give Lord Hugh Cecil a total of 297, and to elect him. Mr. Bell has a total of 188 and Mr. Snowden 219.

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Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

Now the only thing that remains to do is to distribute Lord Hugh Cecil's surplus. He has 297 votes in all, that is a surplus of 45 votes, and when one comes to distribute that surplus one takes into account, as I have already explained in Mr. Haldane's surplus, only the 56 votes which last came to him on Sir Acland Hood's distribution. When you come to distribute them, as perhaps might be expected, Mr. Snowden and Mr. Bell being the only two continuing candidates, you find that there are very few next preferences shown at all. In fact, in the whole 56 votes there are 43 exhausted preferences, of which 11 remain credited to Lord Hugh Cecil to make up his quota and 32 are set aside as finally dealt with under Rule 6 (1) 2 (3); there are eight voters who have expressed a preference for Mr. Snowden, and five who have expressed a preference for Mr. Bell, and as these added together are less than the surplus they are all transferred (Rule 4 (1) (d) without any calculation of proportion. There is now only one vacancy, and there remains Mr. Bell and Mr. Snowden, who are competitors for the last place; of those Mr. Bell has 193 and Mr. Snowden has 227 votes; the result is, therefore, to elect Mr. Snowden because, there being only two continuing candidates and there being only one vacancy, you elect the man with the larger number of votes. The filling of the last vacancy is provided for by Rule 9. There are various contingencies which might happen, and this is perhaps the simplest possible contingency. Having two people left on the poll you elect the man with the largest number of votes. There are certain other provisions in Rule 9 which I do not think I need go into in detail, but the effect of which is in certain cases when further transfers and distributions could obviously not affect the result, to dispense with the need of making those further transfers and distributions.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

201. You have now gone through the rules, have you?—I have now gone through the rules as far as the actual election is concerned; there is a provision for giving public notice of these transfers, and there is a provision by which any question may be raised as to the validity of transfers, and, if raised during the counting, the question can be tested upon an Election Petition, but it is hardly necessary for me to go into details upon that point. The net result of the election has been to elect Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Hugh Cecil, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Haldane, Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Snowden, and I think it will be found, if anyone will consider the number of votes given on the first count, not only to them but to people in sympathy with them, that that results is a fair and accurate representation of the whole opinion of this imaginary constituency of the 2,012 people whose papers we have been considering.

Earl Beauchamp.

202. Would not you consider it a hardship that those who have a second preference, say on Mr. Bell, should not have their votes considered,

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

whereas all the second preferences and all the other votes given to Sir Thomas Whittaker have been considered?—I should not admit any hardship whatever.

203. Because some of them have got their reward in the election of their friends; but Mr. Bell, you see, is not elected, and his second preferences are not considered; whereas the second preferences of Mr. Snowden are considered, and do something perhaps towards the successful election of one of those candidates?—I do not think the second preferences of Mr. Snowden are considered; no transfer is ever made from Mr. Snowden.

204. What about Sir Thomas Whittaker—he is not elected, but you have distributed his votes, have you not?—Yes—that is so. The people who have voted for him have been told "It is impossible to elect Sir Thomas Whittaker; for whom will you vote?" People who have, voted for Mr. Bell have not in the course of the election had that question put to them, because, they being less in number than the quota, it has so happened that that question could not be put to them except at a period of the election when it is idle to put it. I mean the supporters of Mr. Bell are less in number than the quota, and their votes have not in fact been transferred.

205. Mr. Snowden did not equal the quota either, did he?—He was elected.

206. But his votes did not come up to the quota any more than Mr. Bell's?—No, but he had the largest group after setting aside all the quota groups.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

207. It is quite likely if you had pursued, which was quite unnecessary, Mr. Bell's quota, and distributed them, it would be found Mr. Snowden had got the quota?—No doubt that might be so.

Lord Avebury.

208. And nobody else could be elected?—No, certainly not.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

209. Have you had experience of illustrative elections of this kind?—I acted as Returning Officer for an illustrative election in which there were five people to be elected, and there were 12,400 odd votes, as I have told the Committee already, and in a pamphlet we published we state the exact time which it took to count the votes. It was all done in the course of an evening without difficulty. The counting involved was done within four hours. We began at six o'clock and the counting was over at a quarter to 11, with an interval for supper.

210. And it was not a specially trained body, was it, who did the counting?—No.

Earl of Hardwicke.

211. That is to say, you could tell who had been elected in four hours?—Yes, the whole thing was over within four hours from the start. The main part of the time is occupied in the sorting of the surpluses and the calculations necessary.

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[Continued.]

Chairman.

212. The statement in your pamphlet is: "The time spent in making the calculations and arrangements necessary before each distribution takes place would be practically the same for large numbers as for small." Do you mean that to be literally true?—I think what was in the mind of the writer was that the time is not in direct proportion of the number of votes to be handled. In other words, it does not take twelve times as long to count 12,000 votes as it does to count 1,000. I may say in my experience of municipal elections the counting has been spread over two days in some cases. The present counting in a municipal election is an extremely lengthy process, because you have to have pairs of clerks; one to read off the ballot papers and another to mark down on a sheet the votes—I, 1, 1—because each voting paper does not represent one vote, and consequently cannot be handed about. You have to record the result on a separate sheet and it is a very lengthy process.

Lord Avebury.

213. Therefore you consider this process would not take so long as the present system so far as the counting of votes is concerned?—So far as my experience goes I should say it would be less.

Earl of Hardwicke.

214. Not with the transfer of the votes?—According to my experience it would take longer if applied to Parliamentary Elections; but as compared with the present municipal system in which one man has more than one vote, and you have to record by a stroke of the pen every single vote given to every single candidate, that

Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

is a lengthy system; and more lengthy I should say than this one.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

215. Infinitely longer, I put it to you, supposing you have to elect six Members in a London Borough and there are a dozen candidates for those six places, every voter may mark his paper for six candidates. He may mark it for five, or for four, or for three, or for two, or for one only. He may mark it with every combination possible of six, and you may have hundreds of thousands of different ways for marking the paper possible, although party combinations would reduce that, but you would have, would you not, tens of thousands of ways of marking a paper, and it is necessary to record the marking of each paper, so that the time consumed is great?—Yes, and also there is a great risk of error, because once a clerk gets in the habit of reading what I may call the party ticket A, B, C, D, and E, he goes on unconsciously repeating it, and there is considerable risk of error in that respect, and consequently very great deliberation and care are necessary.

216. I think there is an election coming on on Tuesday which will be conducted on this system, is there not?—Yes; of the British Medical Association, or a branch of it. They have adopted the system, and they are going to have their elections conducted on this system this day week, I think, at 3 o'clock, at the offices of the British Medical Association, which, I think, are at Catherine Street, Strand, so that if any member of the Committee is sufficiently interested they might attend. I am told there are about 2,000 votes to be recorded, and I think the Society would be only too honoured if the Committee cared to attend and see the process at work.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Friday next, 11 o'clock.

Die Veneris, 7^o Junii, 1907.

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of HARDWICKE.
Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH IN THE CHAIR.

MR. JOHN HENRY HUMPHREYS, having been called in, is Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

217. Are you honorary secretary of the Proportional Representation Society?—That is so.

218. Have you been so for some little time?—About two years.

219. Have you been interested in this subject some long time?—Yes, for the last seven or eight years.

220. As secretary, did you have much to do with the arrangements for the illustrative election which occurred last autumn?—Yes, the greater part of the details passed through my hands.

221. Will you tell the Committee how it was arranged?—We endeavoured to make the election as general as possible, so as to include all classes of persons. Communications enclosing ballot papers were sent to Members of your Lordship's House, the Members of the House of Commons, to the clubs, to the Universities, to trade unions, and also to such men as we could reach personally. I think your Lordships have already had copies of the ballot papers which were used on that occasion, and if I read one or two communications that I received in connection with the papers, the general interest taken in the election may be more clearly realised.

222. Besides the circular which you sent out to the Members of the two Houses and to others, had you the assistance of certain newspapers?—Yes, to which I also propose to refer. Lord Dartmouth, who voted in this election, returned his paper with this communication: "Lord Dartmouth returns the voting papers. He has always been in favour of some form of proportional representation, though he does not pledge himself to support any particular scheme at present." I received a communication from Earl Grey, the Governor-General of Canada, as follows: "The papers you have sent me with regard to the new move by the old Proportional Representation Society have interested me much. I enclose some ballot papers which have been marked by some voters at a dinner party at Government House. I am sorry that I cannot, in my official position, identify myself at present with the society with whose aims I am so heartily in sympathy. I shall be glad if you will send me all the reports and papers issued by your

Chairman—continued.

society." Then I received a communication from the Secretary of the Oxford Union from which I will read one excerpt: "At the same time the electoral reform which you advocate, which at first sight appeared to me complicated in the extreme, on close inspection seems undoubtedly to have much in its favour. I have therefore privately distributed the whole of the voting papers that you were good enough to send me, to various members of the University, and will let you have the filled-up papers by the first post on Monday, together with a list of those who have voted." In the end, the Secretary of the Oxford Union placed ballot papers in all the colleges, so that the students might vote. Professor Westlake distributed papers in Cambridge University, and Dr. Gregory in Glasgow University. Many working men take part in the voting, and I may mention that a platelayer called upon me, took about a hundred papers, distributed them among men working on the railway lines, and had them filled up by the men and returned to me. In all we had some 5,600 papers returned. In addition, in our endeavour to make the election even more general, we were fortunate enough to secure the assistance of newspapers, some eight in number, representative of all shades of political opinion. I have with me the articles which appeared in those papers describing what we proposed to do, with a copy of the ballot paper.

223. Will you give the names of the papers?—"The Tribune," representing the Liberals in London; "The Manchester Guardian," representing the Liberals in the North; and "The Western Daily Mercury," representing the Liberals in the West; "The Morning Post," representing the Unionists in London; "The Yorkshire Post" and "The Western Morning News," representing the Unionists in the North and West respectively. For the Labour party the papers chosen were the "Labour Leader," one of the most representative of their papers, and the "Woolwich Pioneer," which is run by a Labour Organisation Committee. The ballot papers returned by the readers of these newspapers varied considerably in size—each newspaper printed it as it chose—and this rather added to the difficulties of the election. So great

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

great was the interest taken in the matter that papers other than the eight papers I have named printed copies of our ballot papers. I had some returned to me from the "Westminster Gazette," from another paper in the West, and from another paper which I could not identify, but certainly not one of the papers with which we had been in communication.

Earl Beauchamp.

224. Can you tell me how many voting papers altogether were distributed?—About 25,000.

225. Out of which how many were returned?—Nearly 6,000—5,600.

Earl of Hardwicke.

226. Did you ever get any opinions from Oxford on the matter afterwards?—Yes; the secretary returned the papers with a letter stating that they had all been filled up. I have not received any direct communication from the students expressing any opinion. The papers were returned to me through the secretary of the Oxford Union Society.

Chairman.

227. These papers were all sent back, I believe, to Caxton Hall, addressed to Lord Avebury, were they not?—The newspaper ballot papers.

228. Will you proceed to the next step?—I should like to read, if I may, a few words from the leading article of the "Morning Post" which appeared on that day, because these papers, in addition to printing an article communicated from the Society, urged their readers to take part in the election. "It is to be hoped that a large proportion of our readers will take part in the very interesting experiment propounded in our columns to-day. This is an illustrative election for Parliament, conducted on the system of the single transferable vote." Similar articles appeared elsewhere, and in the end—and I think it is a fact to which attention should be directed—quite voluntarily 6,800 persons filled up ballot papers cut from the newspapers and sent them to Caxton Hall by post, so that a total of 12,400 papers was brought together from all classes of society. I think, therefore, one can regard this election as a real test of the practicability of the scheme from the point of view of the general public. There is one more point, before leaving the question of the newspapers, on which I should like to lay stress. At the counting several representatives of the Press attended, and as the subject was new to them, the Returning Officer was compelled, in addition to his other duties, to answer the questions of these representatives of the Press seeking information. Although they knew nothing about the particular subject when they came they were able, after watching the election, to return to their papers a correct account of what took place. On the very next morning, although our operations were not concluded until 11 o'clock at night, a very full statement, prepared by the "Tribune" correspondent, appeared in his paper,

Chairman—continued.

occupying nearly a column, the details being perfectly accurate; and, a more complete account was telegraphed after 11 o'clock at night, consisting of a whole column, to the "Manchester Guardian," in which the details were absolutely correct. So that the Press representatives were able to follow the election, to understand it, and to telegraph to their papers the same evening an absolutely correct account of what took place. I have here the "Tribune" account, and I can produce the "Manchester Guardian" account, which is even more complete.

229. Will you put in the account in the "Manchester Guardian" later on?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

230. Did you count the votes the same night?—Yes.

231. And you knew exactly how the matter stood that night, did you?—Yes, at 11 o'clock.

232. How long did it take you to count the votes?—Four hours; a full description of the election was telegraphed that same evening to the Manchester Guardian."

Chairman.

233. Will you give a description of what you did and how the matter was arranged?—I have here a plan of the room as it was arranged for that particular evening. I may say that I have had no practical experience as a returning officer, although I have been present at the counting of votes by returning officers at elections. I had to think out the details of the way in which the votes should be counted, and this is the plan adopted. There was a central table in the room with a dozen gentlemen sitting round it, and then at the side of this table some small tables, at each of which two gentlemen sat. The 12,000 voting papers were placed upon the central table, and the 12 gentlemen who were seated round that table sorted the papers according to the first four names, the second four names, and the third four names, or, to speak more exactly, if the figure one appeared against any of the first four names that paper was placed with the first heap; if against any of the second four names with the second heap, and so on. There was a fourth heap, with which invalid or doubtful papers were placed. I will deal with the doubtful papers first. Messengers between these tables collected the doubtful papers and took them to Mr. Fischer Williams, who sat at the head of the table, and who decided whether the papers were admissible.

Lord Haversham.

234. What were they mostly invalid for? Was there any particular defect in them?—I have the actual spoiled papers here, and will deal with them later on. Your Lordships may see how the voters spoiled the papers. At each of the side tables, four on one side and five on the other, sat two gentlemen, and messengers brought the papers from the central table to these tables, where they were sorted according

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[Continued.]

Lord Haversham—continued.

cording to the names of the candidates. I will take the group in which there were papers on which the figure "1" had been placed against any of the first four names.

Chairman.

235. In the first place there were twelve candidates' names on the papers, I believe?—That is so.

236. And the object of the process you have described was to distribute the papers among the candidates whose names were marked "one" on the several papers?—That is so.

237. So that ultimately there would be 12 heaps, one for the papers in which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's name was marked "1," one for those on which Mr. Austen Chamberlain's name was marked "1," and so on?—Yes.

238. But for the purposes of convenience did you begin by separating them into three heaps, so that the persons at the central table divided them according as the first, second, third, or fourth name was marked "1"?—Yes.

239. Then were those lots taken again to the side tables, where they were separated into the ultimate groups of votes for the several candidates?—Yes, that arrangement was made to facilitate the sorting. If I was a returning officer, conducting a real election, I should have constructed pigeon-holes, a pigeon-hole for each candidate, and I should sort the papers in the same way as a postman would sort letters; but it was rather difficult with the means at our disposal to have 12 heaps for each sorter, so I simplified matters by sorting the papers into three heaps first of all, and then re-sorting each heap into four smaller heaps at a second stage. It was doing the work in two stages instead of one. With 12 pigeon-holes the whole operation could have been concluded in one stage.

240. You were limited by the number of people employed?—By the arrangements generally; while the papers were being sorted by one gentleman at the side table his colleague counted them and checked them also. He made parcels of 50, and these bundles of 50's were collected by the messengers, and taken to the returning officer's table. The returning officer had two assistants, Mr. Finch and Mr. McGibbon, who sat at a table by themselves, and it was their duty to receive the bundles of 50's and to make the 12 heaps corresponding to the 12 candidates, which was the object in view. That was done, and the assistants of the returning officer recorded the total number of votes obtained by each candidate. I do not know whether it is necessary to state how many votes were recorded for each candidate.

241. The Committee have already had that evidence, I think, so that you need not go through the whole particulars. In the result there were a certain number of votes, I believe?—There were 12,398 votes in all, and there were in addition 20 spoiled papers, to which I will refer at a later stage.

(0.13.)

Earl Beauchamp.

242. Do you mean there were 12,000 out of the 25,000 returned?—There were 5,600 returned from the papers which we ourselves sent out; there were in addition 6,800 returned by the newspaper readers quite voluntarily.

243. How many of those were sent out?—They were printed in the ordinary editions of the papers, and 6,800 of their readers voted voluntarily.

244. I want to know how far you can say that the public who read the papers took an interest in the matter?—6,800 persons cut out these forms and paid their own postage.

245. Out of a very large circulation?—Certainly; it would be a large circulation, but if you consider the amount of trouble people usually take I think the result is good. People may see a thing in a newspaper, and be interested in it, but take no further trouble. Here they cut the forms out, and posted them.

Chairman.

246. They were not going to get a prize for so doing?—They were not. They did it to assist in the experiment.

Lord Avebury.

247. And they had to pay the postage, did they not?—They had to pay the postage.

Chairman.

248. Of course, you cannot tell what proportion of readers thought it worth while to do it; you only know that 6,800 did so?—Yes. I am sure my own feeling was one of satisfaction that so many people had taken the trouble to cut out the voting papers and send them to us. Then came the first duty of the returning officer. I do not know how far I should go into detail on the point, and whether the question of the quota has been explained to your Lordships. Shall I explain to the Committee how the quota was arrived at?

249. There were 12,000 odd votes ascertained to be good votes?—Yes.

250. And the number of members to be elected was how many?—Five.

251. And you divided that 12,000 by six, one more than the number to be elected, did you not?—Yes.

252. And the result was what?—The actual number was 2,067.

253. 2,066 was the result of the division, was it not, and you added one, making 2,067, which was the quota?—Yes.

254. For the reason given on the last occasion by Mr. Fischer Williams?—I have not seen the evidence, but I can explain it in this way: If you multiply that number by five (the number of members to be returned), the result is 10,335. If you deduct that figure from the total number of votes, you will find that the remainder is 2,063, which is less than the quota.

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255. Less

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

255. Less than what each of the other five have got?—That is so.

256. And therefore no other person than those five could get elected?—That is so. The votes not used are less than a quota. More than five-sixths of the votes that are in play are used in the election of the five successful candidates, so that every member returned represents a larger number of voters than those 2,063 voters who do not obtain representation. As the result of the ascertainment of the quota 2,067, it was found that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had largely exceeded the quota, and that Mr. Keir Hardie had also exceeded the quota, and both were declared elected. They had received the support of more than the quota; indeed, it was found that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's supporters numbered, as it were, two quotas, and were it possible the supporters of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman should have been represented in Parliament by two Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermans, but that was absolutely impossible. There were so many people who desired him as their representative, two quotas, that, to be quite just to them, they were allowed to choose not only Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as their representative, but another. Again, in order to meet quite fairly the wishes of these supporters of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, all his papers were re-examined and sorted according to the names marked "2," that is to say, the second preferences of these electors. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's supporters had indicated on the papers whom they desired as their second member, and the number of second preferences for each candidate was ascertained in the same way as we found the number of votes for each candidate on the first count. Now came what I suppose is regarded as the most difficult part of this particular scheme, namely, the distribution of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus votes with absolute justice to the claims of the second preferences. We ascertained the number of the second preferences for each candidate, we knew the amount of the surplus, and the problem was to transfer to each of the second preferences his proportionate share of that surplus. We did not have on that occasion a transfer sheet such as that shown to your Lordships by the last witness, but the process already described by him was followed. The returning officer's assistant put the number of papers on which each candidate has next preference in one column, he would give the total number of papers showing the preference by adding those together, and in order to ascertain how many votes were to be transferred, he would multiply the particular number of papers on which the candidate is the next preference, by a fraction, and that fraction is represented by a surplus over the total number of next preferences. I do not know whether that is quite clear, but perhaps I can explain it in figures, having referred to it in general terms. In this particular case the second preferences, marked for Sir Acland Hood, were 77.

257. You had better begin, I think, by saying the number of votes Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had?—Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had 4,891 votes.

Chairman—continued.

258. And the quota was what?—The quota was 2,067.

259. The number to be distributed as surplus therefore was what?—2,824.

260. You went through the whole of the 4,891 votes given to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and you found that Sir Acland Hood was marked No. 2 on 77 of them?—Yes.

261. Now will you proceed with the next one?—The numbers for Mr. Bell were 387, for Lord Hugh Cecil 85, and so on, but for Mr. Winston Churchill the number of second preferences was 2,053; for Mr. Haldane 1,727. As one would expect, the larger number of second preferences were recorded for Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Haldane, who were of the same party as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

262. The voters for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, by a very large majority, expressed their second preferences for his colleagues, did they?—Yes. Sir Acland Hood was marked as second preference on 77 papers, and in order to find out how many votes were to be transferred to Sir Acland Hood and how many were to be retained in order to constitute Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's quota, the returning officer multiplied 77 by the fraction $\frac{2,824}{4,891}$. That multiplying fraction was constant for each candidate, and it represented the surplus divided by the total number of next preference.

263. This process gives a different figure, but I believe it is the same thing as was explained to us on the last occasion, is it not?—Yes, the process is merely multiplying by one number and dividing by another. Any clerk can carry out these operations. You thus find the number of votes in each case that must be retained for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the number to be transferred to the candidate who is the second preference. The same operation was carried through in the case of Mr. Keir Hardie, but even when the transfers had been completed we found that no other candidate had received the quota.

264. There is one point which might be referred to here, and which was raised on the last occasion we met. You begin with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman because he had the bigger surplus?—That is so.

265. The question was raised: Was there any principle involved in that; does anything turn on the rule that you begin with a candidate who had the bigger surplus?—I think one can show that the counting can be completed much more rapidly very often by transferring the largest surplus first. You must determine upon an order. I would put another reason, and that is, that although this particular form of election is regarded as a protection for minorities, yet at the same time it deals out absolute justice to the majority. It always regards the majority as having prior claim over a minority, and so in this election the two quotas of voters supporting Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, being the largest section of the electorate, had the first claim to the distribution of their votes.

266. Nothing turns upon it, except, possibly, greater expedition in coming to a result, I understand?

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

stand?—That is so; that is to say, by the transfer of the larger surplus you may bring some of the remaining candidates above the quota, and thereby finish the election, whereas if you distribute the smaller number of surplus votes first you might have two operations arriving at the same result.

..

Earl Beauchamp.

267. Touching on the point as to whether the order in which the surplus votes are taken does not make any difference, may I draw your attention to some figures which were given to the Committee at the last meeting. Have you seen the minutes of the proceedings?—No, I have not.

268. The result was that in the end Mr. Bell and Mr. Snowden were the two candidates between whom a choice had to be made for the last vacant place, and Mr. Snowden got in, but in the last four counts Mr. Snowden's votes went up from only 201 to 227, while Mr. Bell's votes during the same time went up from 131 to 193, so that you see, while Mr. Snowden only went up 26, Mr. Bell went up 62, and a large proportion of Mr. Bell's votes were given at the next vote after the 31, when he got an addition of 39 from the distribution of Sir Thomas Whittaker's votes, and Mr. Bell only got 12. Does it not seem to you possible that if there had been an alteration earlier in the proceedings by which those second preferences which were given to Mr. Snowden came later, Mr. Bell might have got in before Mr. Snowden?—I understand your point to be that if there had been a different order of transfer a certain candidate would be elected to the exclusion of another candidate?

269. Yes?—If I had the figures before me I might be able to explain it to you. May I try and explain it from the beginning. In regard to this electoral method you cannot at a stage subsequent to the first count imagine that the figures can be re-arranged without due regard to what has taken place. Owing to the fact that in the first count you have determined a quota, all your subsequent operations depend upon that fact, and at any subsequent stage the other numbers bear definite relations to each other consequent on that fact. For instance, if I may deal with the figures with which I am somewhat more familiar—that is to say, the election to which I have referred—

Chairman.

270. You appreciate, do you, the question put by Lord Beauchamp. You have to distribute surpluses; you have two candidates each with a surplus to be transferred, and one has a bigger surplus than the other. The suggestion made is that a different ultimate result might be obtained by beginning with one or the other. Can a different result be reached according as you begin with one or the other surplus?—No, and I think I can explain why now. I had to think about it for the moment, because the question is somewhat new to me in the form raised by Lord (0.13.)

Chairman—continued.

Beauchamp, but now that I have thought about it I think I can show why it must be so.

271. The figures you are submitting to us now are entirely different to those given to the Committee by Mr. Fischer Williams. It is a similar process, but you are dealing with a different set of figures which rather confuses the members of the Committee, who followed and appreciated the process explained by Mr. Fischer Williams?—I think, perhaps, this point should be dealt with that has been raised by Lord Beauchamp.

272. Can you deal concisely with it and pass on?—Yes.

273. If you have a certain number of votes to pass over as surplus votes, from two or more candidates, a final result of a different character might be obtained according as you begin with one or other of the candidates whose votes have to be distributed?—I can explain it in this way: There is a large surplus to distribute, and a small surplus to distribute, and for the sake of simplicity I will assume that three candidates are to be elected. Therefore you have two candidates elected on the first count. Assume that one has 1,000 votes and the other 600 votes, and that 220 and 180 votes have been given to two other candidates, making exactly 2,000. The quota in this case is 501. There is a large surplus of 499, and a smaller surplus of 99, and the point is whether it matters which surplus you distribute first, the 99 or the 499. I say no. If you distribute the 499 votes it may or may not bring one of the other candidates in. Suppose these 699 votes, or in round figures 500 votes, were distributed equally between the two candidates at the bottom of the poll, and that 250 were added to each of the lower candidates, they would have 470 and 430 respectively, and both of them would be beneath the quota. The distribution of the small surplus will still determine which of those two are elected. Now I have to explain what would happen if you took the smaller surplus first. Suppose, taking an extreme case, that the whole of those votes were transferred to one of the two lower candidates (which is giving the fullest advantage to the smaller surplus). The transfer may raise the total of one to 319, and you must distribute the other surplus in order to determine which of the candidates is to be elected. The result, therefore, is just the same, and the details of the process explain my opening remark, that when you have established a quota all the other numbers are governed by that fact, and the candidate who is not elected in this election represents a number of votes which is less than the quota. By no method of transfer can you alter that fact. You have established a quota in the first instance, and the candidates who are finally at the bottom of the poll taken together have fewer votes than the quota, and no method of transfer, except by deliberately passing over the claims of men who have been marked with a higher preference number, can bring them above the quota.

Lord Acrebury.

274. You have two gentlemen with more than the quota in this case, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

Bannerman and Mr. Keir Hardie, and Lord Beauchamp's question, as I understand, is, would it make any difference if, instead of distributing Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus first, and Mr. Keir Hardie's surplus second, you distribute Mr. Keir Hardie's votes first and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's second? I suggest to you, if you have any given number, say 10, and you add to it 4 and 3, it does not matter whether you put the 4 first and the 3 afterwards, or the 3 first and the 4 afterwards, because in both cases it would come to 17. So also in this case it would not make the slightest difference whether you transfer Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes first and Mr. Keir Hardie's votes second, or Mr. Keir Hardie's votes first and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's votes second, because the result would be exactly the same in the end, would it not?—That is so.

Chairman.

275. May I suggest this: You know the number of votes given, you know the number of votes which each candidate must get in order to be elected; in one case A and B have got more than the quota, and certain votes have to be passed over to others. No other candidate can be elected unless he gets the quota, and that does not depend on whether the papers come from A first or from B first, but it depends, does it not, on the papers coming from both to make up the quota, and only by getting the quota can he be elected?—That is so.

276. So in the case of the distribution of the lowest votes it is only by a quota that a man is elected, and by all the surplus papers being distributed the same result will be reached in the same fashion and by the same persons in the end; if a man has sufficient surplus that the transfer of his surplus will at once bring in another favoured colleague, taking his surplus first would accelerate the result, it is only producing more quickly what would be produced more slowly in the other way if you dealt with the lowest number first. The distribution is ultimately the same, whatever person you begin distributing from, is it not?—Yes, it must be so; you have only a certain number of surplus votes to distribute; there are no others. You distribute them all.

Earl Beauchamp.

277. Then all the various preferences which a voter puts down to the No. 5 are all considered, are they?—No, not necessarily.

278. Why not. Why do you give a preference to some of the candidates and not to others?—The surplus votes are always distributed in proportion to the next preferences marked for other candidates.

Chairman.

279. They are considered if necessary, are they not?—Yes.

280. The third preference is considered if the second preference is not already effective to

Chairman—continued.

bring in a particular person. That is so, is it not?—Yes.

281. When a voter has exhausted his purpose by electing a candidate his paper is done with, is it not?—That is so.

282. If that is done on a first vote or by transfer of a second vote, it is done with. If he has not fulfilled his purpose, then his paper gets passed on, if he has indicated a third, to No. 3; but the preference is only brought into play if the first or the second or the third has failed in his purpose of bringing in a candidate?—That is so. You may take a case in which one candidate has obtained the quota of votes, and no more. 2,067 voters constituting a quota, and, therefore, having a right to elect a member, have made their choice. There are no votes to be transferred, and these particular voters, having exerted their full share of influence, take no further part in the election.

Lord Avebury.

283. In the case put before the Committee on the last occasion Mr. Austen Chamberlain, it so happened, got exactly the number of votes which constituted the quota, and was therefore elected, and, that being the case, the second preference indicated on his papers did not come into play, because the first preference voters elected their candidate?—That is so. I think it should be clearly understood that each elector has one vote only, and if that vote is effective in the first instance, the elector has obtained his full share of representation; and only if more than a quota vote for the same candidate do the second preferences come into play.

Chairman.

284. Or if there are so few?—Or if they are too few to return a candidate of their own.

285. The second preference comes into play only if the first preference is ineffective?—That is so.

Lord Colchester.

286. The only case in which it might make a difference is this, is it not: Candidates who are not elected, and whose second preferences are not gone into, might turn the scale, might they not, supposing a man was not elected at all, but all the second preferences given him had been for some candidate who had just less than the quota?—But they are transferred.

287. But supposing a case where a man did not get elected whose second preferences were nearly all for the highest candidate, in the election those second preferences would never be counted, would they?—Yes, they are transferred.

288. Even if a man has never got a quota at all?—Yes.

Earl Beauchamp.

289. But surely they are not all transferred, are they? Mr. Bell, you see, was not elected, and his preferences were never transferred, were they?—Yes, unless only the last vacancy remains unfilled.

290. It

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[Continued.]

Lord Colchester.

290. It might happen, might it not, that all Mr. Bell's preferences might have been for some man who just meets the poll?—At the end of the count, there was only one man not elected, Mr. Bell, so that all the other candidates had been elected, or their votes transferred.

291. But there were 12 candidates, and only seven elected, were there not?—Yes.

Lord Avebury.

292. Supposing Mr. Bell's votes had all been given to any one of those who were not elected, they still would not have been sufficient to make up the quota, would they?—No. May I refer to the figures? I am extremely sorry that I have not seen them, but with regard to the suggestion that if Mr. Bell's votes had been transferred to Mr. Henderson they might have put Mr. Henderson in, at what stage could the transfer be made? You have already eliminated Mr. Henderson because he was lower than Mr. Bell, and you cannot transfer votes of a candidate not elected without excluding that candidate from the poll. You have excluded Mr. Henderson from the poll because he had received a fewer number of votes than Mr. Bell. You cannot now consider that Mr. Bell had more votes than Mr. Henderson at the previous stage, and that Mr. Bell was excluded, and his votes transferred to Mr. Henderson, because the supporters of Mr. Bell were more numerous than the supporters of Mr. Henderson.

293. But even if you did transfer the whole of the votes given to Mr. Bell to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Henderson would not have the quota, because on this paper the quota being 252 there are only 248 votes altogether, so that all combined they would not give every one the quota, would they?—Quite so.

Lord Colchester.

294. My point is that it might make all the difference, one candidate having the votes transferred to him?—When once you have ascertained the number of votes for each candidate and determined the quota you cannot imagine certain changes afterwards; after you have ascertained the quota and transferred those votes above the quota to the second preferences, there is a definite relation between the figures which you cannot disturb without going back to the beginning.

295. What I meant was that although a man's votes might not bring him in, the preference expressed for another person added to him, would bring him up to the quota, or put him above some of the others who were at first above him?—If that candidate is at the bottom of the poll, and there are still one or two or more candidates to be elected, then his votes are transferred, and the second preferences count, and if they are all for one candidate they are transferred to that candidate; but if there are only two candidates not elected and there is only one vacancy then the votes of the lower candidate are not transferred. He represents that final fraction of the

Lord Colchester—continued.

constituency which is unfortunate enough not to secure representation.

296. No, it would be because the numbers are too small, but if the first preferences are added might not they bring such a man up to the requisite number?—If a candidate is at the bottom of the poll, and there is only one vacancy, and there is only one other candidate in play, and he has more votes than his rival, then you declare the candidate with the higher number of votes elected.

Lord Avebury.

297. When you transfer the votes only one of those two would be elected, would he not?—That is so.

298. And therefore it is quite right, is it not, that the man with the larger number of votes should be the one elected?—Yes. For instance, you could in this particular election have transferred Mr. Bell's votes if desired; but there was no object in so doing.

299. Because it would not bring anybody up to the quota?—Yes.

Chairman.

300. Those who have got in have already obtained the quota, and you cannot count the votes twice over. The voters who have elected those persons have had their powers exhausted, and there only remain, do there not, those persons to be considered who have voted for the two last candidates for the last seat?—That is so.

301. Are you aware that there have been other elections besides this one which you conducted?—Yes. I would like to say a word or two about an election which was carried out on somewhat similar lines to the election held last November, by the Northumberland miners 20 years ago, and I propose to read a brief extract from a report which appeared in the "Times" on that occasion.

302. Was it a similar election in principle?—Yes, in which the present Lord Grey, Mr. Albert Grey, M.P., as he was then, was Returning Officer. He was assisted in the count by 30 miners, a body of utterly untrained men, whose hands, accustomed by daily usage to the contact of pickaxe and shovel, were new and strange to the somewhat delicate task of finger-ing and separating flimsy ballot papers. They had received no instructions before they were assembled in the room as to the duties they would be required to transact, and the expedition, good humour, and correctness with which they got through the several stages of the count justly earned for them the admiration of those who had come from a distance, as well as the compliment which Mr. Grey deservedly paid them at the conclusion of the day's proceedings. The contents of the ballot boxes, 23 in number, were emptied on to a large table in the middle of the room at 12 o'clock. The unopened papers were then shuffled until the Returning Officer and the agents representing the different candidates were satisfied. The agents appointed to look after the interests of the different candidates were selected from the secretaries and other lead-ing

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ing officials of the Liberal and Conservative political associations for Newcastle, Morpeth, and South Northumberland.

303. How many votes were there given on that occasion?—6,600.

304. How many people were to be elected?—Three.

305. How many candidates were there?—Six.

306. Give us the names?—Mr. Chaplin, Lord Randolph Churchill, Mr. Courtney, General Gordon, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and Mr. Gladstone. The total number of votes was 6,601. I refer to this particular election because there has been a practical outcome from it.

307. That election was perfectly successful; it was done in the same way by separating the votes and carrying out precisely the same method as you have indicated, was it not?—In precisely the same way.

308. Will you give the Committee the result of that election. Who was elected on the first count?—Mr. Gladstone, with 4,427 votes; Sir Wilfrid Lawson had 664; Lord Randolph Churchill had 581; Mr. Courtney, 384; General Gordon, 286; and Mr. Chaplin, 259.

309. Mr. Gladstone was elected, and then what followed?—In the report of the election, the "Times" says: "Before Mr. Gladstone's 2,776 surplus votes were distributed, Mr. Grey said that it was his intention to distribute them in three several batches in order that they might have an opportunity of testing the value of the objection arising out of the element of chance which was so frequently brought forward against the system of the single transferable vote by its opponents. The 1,651 votes which had been filed first for Mr. Gladstone were then placed aside as Mr. Gladstone's constituency" (that was the quota 1,651), "and the remaining 2,776 votes were divided into three groups in the order in which they had been filed, numbering respectively 995, 1,006, and 775." The result of the distribution proved a thorough justification of the confidence of the proportionalists. Mr. Gladstone's votes were distributed as follows: In the first batch of 995 votes there were 13 for Mr. Chaplin, 22 for Lord Randolph Churchill, 167 for Mr. Courtney, 262 for General Gordon, and 416 for Wilfrid Lawson. In the second batch the votes retained the same proportions, 5 for Mr. Chaplin, 21 for Lord Randolph Churchill, 168 for Mr. Courtney, 264 for General Gordon, and 426 for Sir Wilfrid Lawson. In the next column, the third batch, there were 3 for Mr. Chaplin, 23 for Lord Randolph Churchill, 136 for Mr. Courtney, 194 for General Gordon, and 340 for Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and the proportions were as follows: For Mr. Courtney in the first batch the proportion was 16.9, in the second the proportion was 16.7, and in the third batch the proportion was 17.6. The figures show how close the proportions were. For General Gordon the proportions were 26.5 in the first batch, 26.1 in the second batch, and in the third batch 25 per cent.; and for Sir Wilfrid Lawson the proportions were 42.1, 42.6, and 43.9 respectively.

310. In fact, the distribution of the surplus made by chance came out to the same thing as applied to the three different groups?—Yes, that is so.

Chairman—continued.

311. Will you tell us the result of that election?—Mr. Gladstone was first elected and then Mr. Grey declared Sir Wilfrid Lawson elected, his score having been brought up by the transfer of Mr. Gladstone's surplus to 1,846. The 195 votes transfer was that no candidate was brought in. Mr. Grey then declared Lord Randolph Churchill, who was lowest on the list, not elected, and his votes were distributed as follows: 180 to Mr. Courtney, 354 to General Gordon. Mr. Grey then declared General Gordon, who stood highest of the two remaining candidates, elected, so the three candidates elected were Mr. Gladstone, Sir William Lawson, and General Gordon.

Lord Colchester.

312. When was that?—In the year 1885.

Chairman.

313. Then will you now deal with the practical result of that election?—The Northumberland Miners' Mutual Association, as the result of that experiment, adopted this system of voting in the election of their officers. The secretary has sent me a copy of the ballot paper which is used. This is a ballot paper on which 10 names have been nominated for the position of agent. Each branch of the Northumberland Miners' Association received a copy of the paper, and were asked to place the candidates in order of preference; on this paper "1" is placed against John Cairns, "2" against Joseph English, and so on. These branches have votes in proportion to their size, so that you have in the Association a combination of our system with plural voting. This paper counts as four votes, so that in adding up the preferences four first votes would be credited to John Cairns in this particular case. This system is still in practice amongst the Northumberland miners as the result of the experiment carried out 20 years ago.

314. And has there ever been any difficulty about it?—I have heard of none.

Lord Colchester.

315. Do you mean the parties vote in proportion to their number?—Yes.

316. They are votes, not of individuals, but of branches?—Yes.

Lord Avebury.

317. What was the date of that ballot paper?—June 29th, 1906; it was last year's ballot paper. As the election 20 years ago had a practical outcome, so the experiment of last November has had a practical outcome in the same way, and I will read, if I may, a brief statement of what has been done by the Metropolitan Counties Branch of the British Medical Association. Dr. G. Crichton, a member of the Branch Council, was interested in the account of the illustrative election held last December, as reported in the "Morning Post," and, on the 17th January, brought the question before the notice of the members of the Council. At the Council meeting

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Lord Avebury—continued.

ing on February 21st Dr. Crichton moved—"That the election of members of the Central Council of the Association in June next and of the vice-presidents of the branch be according to the method of proportional representation," whereupon the honorary secretary of the branch moved—"That Dr. Crichton's scheme be referred to a small committee of three, chosen by Dr. Crichton, for report." The committee was duly appointed, and reported to a further meeting of the Council on April 18th as follows:—"The Committee has given the plan careful consideration, and concludes that its adoption cannot possibly do any harm to any one division, and would certainly enable the smaller divisions to obtain representation; it therefore advises the Council to adopt the method for the election of vice-presidents of the branch and of representatives of the branch on the Central Council. For the latter election the Committee consider the method would avoid any possible necessity for attempting to bring the divisions into line by meetings, etc., as it would give the nominees of any, even the smallest, division a fair chance of election. The Committee considers that the proposal to adopt the system is not one which can be usefully debated in a full Council. A copy of the Explanatory Pamphlet is therefore enclosed, which will enable every member of Council to see for himself the probable benefits of the plan, which requires no alteration of rule for its adoption." As stated in this report, every member of the Branch Council was supplied with a copy of the pamphlet issued by the Proportional Representation Society, in which the details of the illustrative election, already referred to, are set forth. The recommendation of the committee was, with the cordial approval of the honorary secretary of the branch, adopted, subject to the consent of the Central Council of the Association. The central authority gave the required consent, and the election of five representatives of the branch to serve on the Central Council and four vice-presidents of the branch will therefore be conducted on June 11th in accordance with the provisions contained in the Municipal Representation Bill. I produce a copy of the ballot paper which is being used in that election. May I read the directions which are given to the voters?

Chairman.

318. They are the same thing as you have already referred to, are they not?—Yes. I may say that in this branch there are 2,800 members, and no further explanatory statement will be issued to the voters other than the directions printed upon the ballot paper. The instructions were to place figures against each candidate, in the order of the voters' preference. The votes will be counted by 15 scrutineers, one being appointed by each of the 15 divisions of the branch, and these will report the result of the election to the Council. The names of the scrutineers will not be known until the day of the election, and it will therefore be impossible to instruct them as to the method of counting the votes prior to their assembly on the day in question, so that there will be a complete test of the practicability of the scheme. The Honorary

Chairman—continued.

Secretary of the branch, Dr. F. J. Smith, informs me that practically all those officials of the British Medical Association, and also of the Metropolitan Counties Branch, to whom the matter has been explained, approve of the suggested method of election, and I may add that I have received a letter from Dr. Smith Whitaker, the Medical Secretary of the British Medical Association, in which he states that he is in hearty sympathy with the objects of the Proportional Representation Society.

319. This election will take place at three o'clock on Tuesday afternoon next, I believe?—Yes; and I am empowered to say that if any members of your Lordship's Committee would like to be present at that election they can attend at 6, Catherine Street, Strand. The votes have to be returned to the Central Offices by the morning of that day, and the count will commence at three o'clock.

320. Have you any other experience you wish to refer to?—I would like to refer to the progress of this method of election among trade unions, particularly in Canada. I have an extract from a letter which I received on May 30th, 1905, from the secretary of the American Proportional Representation League. He says: "The chief labour organisation of Canada, the Trades and Labour Congress, uses proportional representation in its annual elections (since 1903), and its official platform contains the following plank: '14. Proportional representation, with grouped constituencies and abolition of municipal wards.' Proportional representation has been used by the Toronto District Labour Council in all its elections for about ten years." I have here an extract from a letter from the secretary of the Toronto Trades and Labour Council, dated August 17th, 1899, written to Mr. Mervyn Stewart. He says: "The Toronto Trades and Labour Council have for the past five years and is now using the Hare Spence system of voting for all of its elections, and the system gives entire satisfaction to all parties, preventing, as it does, the possibility of the majority holding the whole of the offices at the expense of the minority. The continued use of the system insures the representation of all minorities of sufficient strength to be represented on its executive and committee boards. It also tends to make more candidates run for the positions to be filled, with the result that all interests are conserved and placed in their proportionate position. All opinions are thus given full scope, and justice is fully done to them. I do not think that under any circumstances the Trades and Labour Council of Toronto would return to the old method of voting. We are more than satisfied that the Hare Spence system is much superior, and also gives more fair results with perfectly fair representation of all minorities. That is the opinion of the Secretary in 1899, and I have here also a copy of the last election, which took place in June of last year. The practice is still in operation, and has been in operation in this particular trades union for twelve years. I do not propose to deal with the details of that election, but everything was carried out to the satisfaction of the members.

321. What

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Lord Colchester.

321. What is the Hare Spence system? Is it a modification of Mr. Hare's system?—No; but Miss Spence is a very ardent advocate of the system, and I think as an honour to her her name has been linked with that of Mr. Hare in connection with this system. There is no modification so far as the actual method of voting is concerned, only in the size of constituencies. I may also say that the system is used in connection with the elections of the Toronto Teachers' Association, in electing officers of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, in the Bricklayers' Union, in the State of Kansas, and in the Typographical Union of Winnipeg.

Earl of Hardwicke.

322. Do you consider there is anything in this scheme which would be confusing to an ordinary returning officer—an ordinary man with not much education?—I think not. I can give evidence now as to what the returning officer of Tasmania thinks of the scheme. He has been responsible for the conduct of elections in Tasmania in accordance with the provisions of the Act on which this Municipal Representation is based.

Chairman.

323. Can you give the Committee a report from the returning officer in Tasmania of the way in which elections are worked there?—Yes. (*The Report is handed in. Vide Appendix.*)

Earl Beauchamp.

324. I thought Tasmania had abandoned the system?—They have abandoned the system; but I have some correspondence relating to that particular point. I have a rather long report of 1898, which I thought I might put in as a document, reading some excerpts relating to the system of election. (*The Report is handed in. Vide Appendix.*)

Chairman.

325. Will you describe the circumstances under which these reports were prepared?—The first report I handed in was prepared for the use of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, and was laid on the Table of the Senate on the 13th December, 1901. It gives complete details of the conduct of elections in Tasmania for the members of the Senate, and also for the members of the Lower House, the House of Assembly, showing how the system worked, and at the conclusion (which for the purposes of this Committee is, perhaps, valuable) there is a complete statement of the number of spoiled papers throughout the Colony of Tasmania when employing this system. There is one particular point in the Report of 1898 to which I would like to direct the attention of the Committee, in which the returning officer makes this remark. He says: "The Hamlet of the Hare system as a whole is not the mere mode of preference and transfer votes to which general attention is too often restricted. The latter aids are important no doubt,

Chairman—continued.

but of themselves they can only be regarded as valuable accessories of the Hare system. The key-stone of the Hare system upon which commonly too little or no attention is directed, is the Hare constitution of large electoral divisions. Without the latter, all the nice arrangements of first, second, third, etc., preferences and transfer of quota excesses and lowest excluded candidate votes would be a cumbrous farce. With the former secured, together with even the ordinary one man one vote principle, the results attained would be such an improvement upon methods hitherto prevailing that they would not fall far short of the more complete Hare scheme with its method of preference and transfer voting." On that I would like to remark that the candidates in all the four elections which were held in Tasmania under this scheme who were finally successful were the candidates who were at the head of the poll on the first count; that is to say, that the process of transfer did not affect the position of the candidates who were finally elected. My Lords may therefore think: Why go to the trouble of having any transfers at all? It is to give an additional accuracy to the result. In our test election, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman obtained two quotas of votes, therefore the transfer of his votes did have an influence upon the final result, but in the ordinary case where the candidates are of fairly equal calibre, and no candidate stands out far above the rest, the transfer of votes will have but a subsidiary effect upon the actual result of the election. The single vote in large constituencies is the basis of this system, because it enables every section of a constituency of any considerable size to obtain representation, and the value of the transfer is make quite sure that in all cases those sections obtain representation proportionate to their size.

Lord Colchester.

326. But the size makes it much more complicated, does it not, if you have seven members to elect instead of three, say?—It does to a certain extent, but it does not actually complicate the process.

327. You would want more preferences, would you not?—The voter need not go further than he chooses in marking preferences.

Chairman.

328. That is rather a matter of chance, is it not? You could not rely upon the persons who come out first at the first voting being those who would come out first in the end in the absence of power to transfer surplus votes and in the absence of transfer votes of those at the bottom? It is true that in the Tasmanian experience, in the final result, the five persons elected were those who came out at the top on the first counting, but that is a matter of chance; you could not rely on it being always the case, could you?—No, you could not rely on it, as shown by our own illustrative election, but the experience of Tasmania is also the experience of the trade unions in Canada, that the transfers have not really affected the result, and therefore attention

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tion is directed in the Report referred to to the great value of a system which gives a vote even without the power of transfer to an elector who has a choice of several candidates in a large constituency.

329. Does the system of giving one vote only to one man to each elector, if several persons are to be returned, effect a great deal of improvement?—A great deal of improvement.

330. And might possibly result in a different representation, might it not?—That is so.

331. But you do not recommend that?—I do not recommend that, because with the transfers a good basis is made perfect.

332. And it ensures what otherwise might come to pass as a matter in which there would be a strong element or at least an element of chance?—That is so.

Earl Cathcart.

333. Is this system still in use in Tasmania?—No. If I may, I will read some correspondence I have had with the Agent-General for Tasmania bearing upon this question. The Act was passed in 1896, and was repealed in 1901, and I have endeavoured to obtain a copy of the reports of the debate which took place in that Parliament, but unfortunately I have not been successful. The Secretary to the Tasmanian Agent-General says in a letter dated 3rd of June, 1907: "I am directed by the Agent-General for Tasmania to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, asking to be furnished with the latest information as to the progress of the Proportional Representation Bill, which was introduced into the Tasmanian Parliament last Session, etc., and in reply to inform you that he regrets very much that he cannot at the present moment give you the reason why the Act of 1896 was repealed in 1901. Unfortunately there is no Tasmanian Parliamentary Hansard, and the files of newspapers containing Parliamentary debates in this office are not kept for more than a few years. So far as the Agent-General is aware, the system of proportional representation has worked satisfactorily in Tasmania, and he believes that before long an Act of Parliament will be carried through the Legislature again introducing the system. The Agent-General proposes to obtain some definite information from his Government upon the working of the former Act and the subject generally, and he will communicate with your society again."

Lord Avebury.

334. The Government which brought up the Bill and carried the Bill repealing the Act of 1896, was defeated, I think, at the next general election?—That is so.

335. And the majority who have come in under the next General Election have brought in a Bill to reinstate the system?—Yes, and that Bill has already passed through the Lower House.

Earl of Hardwicke.

336. Can you say why it was repealed?—I can give you alleged reasons. I can only give (0.13.)

Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

hearsay evidence, that is to say, I have seen no documentary evidence to explain why the measure was defeated. It has been stated by the opponents of the then existing Government that by a reversal to the former method of voting the Government hoped to increase its majority. It did not, however, count on the feeling of the electorate in the matter. That is one view, but I think a more reasonable explanation is that objection was taken by the representatives of the country districts to the application of this system to the country. They did not mind it being applied to Hobart and Launceston, the towns, but they thought that if this system was applied to the large country constituencies it would be more difficult for them as candidates. Therefore, in order to be consistent, they also objected to it for the towns, and so the Act was repealed, but in consequence of the repeal of the Act the Government was defeated, and the new Government is pledged to pass proportional representation. It has introduced a Bill which has passed the Lower House, but it was not placed before the Upper House, because the Constitutional Act Amendment Bill was defeated in the Upper House, by 8 votes to 6, and the Government therefore withdrew from the Upper House the Proportional Representation Bill, which was a Bill consequent on the Constitutional Act Amendment Bill. The measure will be reintroduced into Parliament by the Government this Session, and as shown by the letter of the Tasmanian Agent-General there was no dissatisfaction on the part of the public with the working of proportional representation. Its abolition was due, so far as I can ascertain, from the objections of the members for the country districts.

Chairman.

337. Without inquiring into the motives, these are the facts, I think, that the Act of 1901, which established proportional representation, was repealed?—That is so.

338. There was then a general election under the old system, and the Assembly which met proceeded at once with a Bill for the re-establishment of proportional representation?—I am not quite sure whether it was at once; at any rate, in 1905 a Bill was introduced.

339. Into the Assembly elected under the old system there was introduced sooner or later a Bill re-establishing proportional representation?—Yes.

340. And the Assembly elected under the old system passed, through all its stages, the Bill re-establishing proportional representation?—Yes, and going beyond the earlier measure.

341. Extending it to the whole Colony, do you mean?—Making it applicable to the whole Colony, instead of the two towns—Hobart and Launceston.

342. Did they pass it, do you know, after much debate?—There does not seem to have been very much debate. I can read the account of the debate, if necessary. Mr. Burt, one of the Members, congratulated the Attorney-General

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on having carried the Bill through at record speed.

343. It was passed at record speed—that is to say, the Assembly elected under the old system, after the abolition of proportional representation, passed at record speed a Bill for its re-establishment?—Proportional representation—yes, on a larger scale.

344. That Bill ultimately failed to get through the Legislative Council for some reason or other, but it is again being brought forward?—It is again being brought forward.

Earl of Hardwicke.

345. It was thrown out by the Senate, was it not?—It was not actually placed before the Senate, because the Constitutional Act Amendment Bill was rejected by 8 votes to 6.

Chairman.

346. There was an obstacle in the Legislative Council which caused it to be dropped, was there not?—It was withdrawn by the Government for the time being.

Lord Colchester.

347. As I understand, originally it applied to two towns only?—Yes.

348. Do you know what proportion of the whole body the Members returned under that system represented?—There were ten Members for the two towns.

349. What proportion was that of the whole Assembly?—I am afraid I cannot say; I should say it would be about a third.

350. And is what is now proposed to make it apply to all the constituencies in Tasmania alike?—That is so. I may add with regard to the size of constituencies that this system was applied to the election of the Members of the Senate of the Commonwealth Parliament, and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth Parliament, when the whole Colony was treated as one constituency.

351. Is that for both Chambers or for one?—For both Chambers. There were separate elections, of course, for the two Chambers, but the whole Colony was treated as a single constituency for both purposes.

Earl Beauchamp.

352. Are you quite sure you are right?—I have the report before me of the Returning Officer. As my Lord knows, for the elections of the Senate of the Commonwealth Parliament each Colony is treated as a single constituency, not only Tasmania, but Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and the other States.

Lord Colchester.

353. Is that the case as regards the Lower House?—No; not the Lower House, but for Tasmania it was so, because the system of proportional representation was applied to both elections.

354. Do I understand you attribute its failure to its being mixed up with another Act, introducing other constitutional changes?—That is so.

Lord Colchester—continued.

355. Is the body which it did not pass an elected body?—Yes.

356. Elected for a time?—I cannot speak as to the details. The Lower Assembly, which is also an elected body, passed this Bill at record speed.

Lord Haversham.

357. You will agree with me, will you not, that the crux of this difficulty is the distribution of the surplus votes?—That is the point which causes most discussion.

358. As I understand, at the election you count all the votes first, you distribute them into packets, and ascertain a quota, and you then put aside the papers of the persons elected?—Yes.

359. What difficulty would there be then in simply counting the second preferences as you do the first?—On all the papers?

360. Yes?—What would happen to these second preferences? Would they have an equal value with the first preferences?

361. No, they would be given to the persons who had not reached the quota?—If you have twelve bundles of papers representing the votes for the twelve candidates, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's bundle is larger than the quota, you have to distribute his surplus vote.

362. Why do not you look at the papers themselves and see which of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's surplus goes to each candidate?—We do that. We examine all the papers, but we do not transfer them all, because there must finally remain a packet of votes equal to the quota which constitutes, as it were, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's constituency. We examine all the papers, and find out the number of second preferences for each of the candidates, and instead of transferring them all, as you suggest, we transfer to each candidate the proportion which is his due; we must keep back a certain portion in order to form a bundle for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and this bundle must contain a quota of votes.

Chairman.

363. If you did not, the same man would vote twice over, and you would not have the equality of voting power, would you?—No.

364. If 5,000 persons voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and 3,000 were all the votes wanted, those 3,000 have done their work, exhausted their papers, and you transfer the other 2,000; if you transfer the 5,000, the 3,000 would count a second time, would they not?—That is so.

Lord Colchester.

365. Is there not a danger that candidates might be taken in a certain order, according to some instructions from headquarters?—If the headquarters issued those instructions, and the electors followed them, it would be so. We issued no instructions in the illustrative election, but we found the same party feeling shown. The voter gave his second preference as a rule to a candidate of the same party.

366. The people who voted at your election were

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were rather above the average, were they not?—They included working men. May I read a statement which I have prepared as to the actual number of votes spoilt, not only in this election, but in similar elections? I have here the actual papers which were spoilt on that occasion, and the members of the Committee can see them for themselves.

367. What I meant was that the people who voted at your election would show more intelligence than the ordinary voter?—The figures I propose to give will deal with that point. The total number of voting papers received was 12,418, and 20 were spoilt; but, as will be seen, more than half were deliberately spoilt. For instance, a voter put A, B, C, instead of 1, 2, 3, or he put five O's, in order to show his contempt for the whole business. Some 6,800 ballot papers were returned from newspapers, and of these 13 were spoilt; it is, therefore, quite clear that the newspaper readers, with the instructions given at the time of voting, clearly understood what they had to do. In the test election, organised and carried through by the Northumberland miners in 1885, there were 44 spoilt papers out of a total of 6,645, or .66 per cent., that is, considerably less than 1 per cent. But the most valuable evidence relating to the difficulty of the system from the point of view of the voter is contained in the Report prepared by the Returning Officer of Tasmania, by command of the Senate of the Australian Commonwealth, laid upon the Table on the 13th of December, 1901. In the election of Senators to represent Tasmania in the Commonwealth Senate, 18,822 voters recorded their votes, and of these 419 were declared invalid. Of these, only 271 were due to the new method of voting; 148 were due to illegal marking, adding signatures, etc.

Chairman.

368. Was that an election applying to all the electors of Tasmania?—Yes. The percentage of spoilt papers due to the Hare system is 1.44, but the Returning Officer adds that "this would have been much less had it not been that the old defective system previously in force in Tasmania required the actual scoring out of every rejected candidate instead of, as in most countries, the marking of a cross or sign only against those candidates who were selected. Had this better form of marking been in practice in Tasmania previous to the introduction of the Hare system of voting, it is probable that there would be very few invalid papers due to the Hare system of marking with preference numbers." That is the Report of the Tasmanian Returning Officer. The figures relating to the election for members of the Legislative Assembly are similar. In the account of the election of the District Labour Council, which appeared in the "Tribune" of Toronto on 28th July, 1906, the statement is made that 124 ballots were marked for this election, and there was not a spoilt paper amongst them. This election was held by members of the Council for the purpose of electing Delegates to the Trades Congress, trustees and members of committees. I may add that in the elections conducted at the meetings addressed by members of (0.13.)

Chairman—continued.

the Society, the number of spoilt votes is extremely low, never numbering more than one or two. Your Lordships will be interested in the experience obtained during the Finland election, which was conducted in accordance with the principles of proportional representation, but not according to the method under discussion. The following is quoted from an article by a Finnish journalist, which appeared in the "Daily Chronicle" of June 1st. He says: "The first election under the new system took place on March 15th and 16th. The total electorate amounts to some 1,390,000 people, or 47 per cent. of the whole population. Of these about 887,000, or nearly 64 per cent., nollod. In the more thickly-populated electoral divisions the percentage was much higher; thus, in the Nyland division, which comprises Helsingfors, it was 74.2 per cent; in several polling districts as many as 95, and even 98, per cent. came to the polling station. The often-used arguments against proportional representation, that the system is too involved to be understood by the average voter, was in Finland completely refuted. The number of spoilt papers in the whole country probably is less than 1 per cent.; in the Nyland division, the largest of all, returning 23 members, the ballot paper contained 95 candidates, and yet only 0.59 per cent. were spoilt." That is, a little more than half per cent. were spoilt in the largest division in Finland, and in this division he says 74.2 per cent. of the electors voted, and "in several polling districts as many as 95, and even 98 per cent., came to the polling stations." In a letter which I received from Count Goblet D'Alviella relative to the Belgian system he states: "All the objections brought forward beforehand have been set at naught. The proportional representation would complicate fearfully the voting and the counting. The new system has worked easier and quicker than the old one. The electors have understood at once how they were to vote, and the scrutineers made fewer mistakes than before."

Lord Avebury.

369. Proportional representation has been in operation in Denmark for a great number of years, has it not?—In a restricted form, yes.

370. In some form or other it has been in operation?—Yes.

371. And it has been in operation for some time in several of the Swiss Cantons, namely, Neuchâtel, Geneva, Soleure, Zug, and others, has it not?—Yes.

372. And in a good many municipalities in Switzerland?—Yes.

373. And it has been in operation for some time in Belgium for certain municipal elections, has it not?—Yes.

374. And M. Braun, the Burgomaster of Ghent, says that it has given general satisfaction there, does he not?—Yes.

375. It has also been adopted by Sweden, Finland, and Japan, has it not?—Yes.

376. And it is in operation, is it not, for 16 of the German cities for their workmen elections?—Yes.

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377. You

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

377. You have told us that it is in operation in Toronto; therefore is it not reasonable to conclude, if it works smoothly in so many places abroad, that the English elector should be also able to work it satisfactorily?—I have not the least doubt about it.

378. All that the elector has to do is simply to mark 1, just at present as he has to make a cross; so that it is really as easy for him to mark 1 as a cross, is it not?—I think so.

379. Would you submit therefore to the Committee, if at so many places abroad the system works well and all the elector has to do is so very simple, that there is no reason to apprehend any failure in this country?—I think that there is no reason whatever

Earl Beauchamp.

380. When the elected candidate has a surplus, you go over his votes, I understand, meanwhile putting on one side his quota?—Yes.

381. Which papers are included in that quota; any particular papers?—Yes; the Returning Officer has strict instructions; the papers are filed in the order in which they are counted, and then, after having ascertained what proportion is due to the second preference, that proportion is taken from the top of the papers so filed.

382. They are taken purely by chance, are they?—Yes, from the top.

383. Is there no provision by which the votes for an elected candidate are included in the quota?—Yes, there is a provision.

384. Are they always put into the quota if there is only one vote?—Yes. They have been first examined, and all those on which there is only the figure 1 certainly form part of the quota; they must form part of the quota; and, so far as the transfers are concerned, only those papers are dealt with which show a next preference. A clause in the schedule Rule 4 (b), page 4 of the Bill, says: "The returning Officer shall also make a separate sub-parcel of the ballot papers in the parcel on which the votes are not capable of transfer"; that is to say, those papers on which only the figure "1" is marked.

385. And those are put into the quota, are they?—That is so.

386. By some other provision, or by the same provision?—By some other provision. On page 5, Sub-section (3) it is provided: "All ballot papers in a parcel of an elected candidate not transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account."

387. Then can you imagine a case in which the total next preferences would be the same as the surplus?—Yes; and provision is made for that on page 5, Rule 4 (1), Clause (d). It says: "If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less than the surplus votes, the Returning Officer shall transfer all the votes capable of transfer." That is to say, that if the surplus is 500 and there are only 400 papers on which next preferences have been marked, all those 400 have to be transferred, and the remaining papers, although they exceed the quota, must constitute the elected candidate's quota.

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

388. Do you mean that the surplus is never equal to the total of next preferences?—It may be. This clause provides both for the case in which it is equal to and also when it is less than the total of next preferences.

Lord Haversham.

389. We know what happens when the votes already given to Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman are put aside; but why is there a proportion only given to the candidate? Why do not all the votes which are marked 2 go to the second candidate at once?—Because we are not transferring all the votes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

390. I suppose you do not think anything could be simpler than the way voting papers are marked now?—No; but I hope to show that the way the papers are now marked does not produce true representation.

391. When rather uneducated electors have to put preferences down, do not you think they would be confused a little?—I have read the statement in the Tasmanian Agent-General's report relating to the whole electorate of Tasmania, from which it appears that 1.44 per cent. of the papers only were spoiled.

392. And that is a small percentage, is it?—Very small.

Chairman.

393. Out of 18,000 odd electors in Tasmania, only 271 went wrong in marking?—Yes, that is so.

Lord Colchester.

394. Have you stated exactly on what system the voting is carried on there? Is it a universal suffrage?—I think it is universal suffrage in Tasmania; but I cannot say for certain.

Lord Avebury.

395. Moreover, the elector has not to mark the order of his preference. All he needs to do, if he wants to vote at all, is to mark 1 against the man he wishes to go in, and he has the option of marking preferences?—According to the Bill under discussion, but according to the Tasmanian Act, he was compelled to mark 1, 2, and 3; the proportion of spoilt papers would not be so many under this Bill. The voter had a harder task in Tasmania than we ask the voter to undertake here.

Earl of Hardwicke.

396. He was obliged to vote for more than one person, was he?—Yes, he had to put at least three preferences, according to the Act.

397. And if there were six candidates, might he vote for the whole of them?—He had discretionary powers to do so, but he was compelled by the Act to vote for three candidates, in the order of his preference. I think the figures relating to spoilt papers in Tasmania, the figures relating to spoilt papers in our own elections, the figures relating to spoilt papers in Finland and elsewhere, show that even with universal

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Mr. J. H. HUMPHREYS.

[Continued.]

Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

universal suffrage the proportion of spoilt votes will be small; and I may remark that this is an immense improvement on what takes place now, because although theoretically votes according to our present system are not declared to be spoilt, they are often invalid—that is to say, worth nothing. In the last election in Wales, what happened? Probably 90,000 Unionist voters in Wales went to the poll and put a mark on their papers, but they might just as well have spoilt their papers; they counted for nothing; they obtained no representation. That is why in Australia this new method of voting is called effective voting. The voter exercises some influence in the choice of a representative.

Lord Colchester.

398. That is an argument against the present system, but not in favour of this particular system, is it?—That may be so, but I was dealing with the question of spoilt votes only. Certain critics think that under the new proposals there will be a large number of spoilt votes, but the number of ineffective votes will be very much smaller than under the present system. Having dealt with the question of the spoilt votes, I should like to say a word or two on the duties of the Returning Officer, which seem to have given rise to some misapprehension. I have a quotation from Professor Jethro Brown's "The New Democracy: A Political Study." Professor Brown is Professor of Law in Modern History in the University of Tasmania, and was present at the elections in Tasmania. He states that "the work of the Returning Officer, while less simple than that of the elector, demands no exceptional qualifications. He need display the industry of a clerk—scarcely more." It really consists of a series of sortings and countings, with a few calculations at intervals.

Lord Avebury.

399. I think at the 1905 election there were 96,000 Unionist voters in Wales who have no representation at all, were there not?—I forget the exact figures, but their votes were invalid.

400. They were not invalid, were they?—They were worth nothing. The question has been asked as to the time required for counting. On the occasion of the illustrative election we took four hours to deal with 12,300 votes, and that with inadequate arrangements. Coming back to the scope of the Bill, in no ward will there be so many as 12,000 votes to count, probably in many wards the number of votes would not be more than 2,000; and if the time now required for counting the votes under the present system in a municipal election is compared with the time required under the proposed scheme, I think if any thing the advantage is in favour of the scheme, because six councillors are to be chosen out of a list of twelve or thirteen candidates under the present system, the six crosses or votes must be extracted from each paper and noted on the recording sheet. With the new scheme it is a question of sortings and countings, and not extracting the details of each ballot paper and noting them upon a recording sheet. I have watched the operations at borough

Lord Avebury—continued.

council elections. In Lewisham there is to be an illustrative election for a Borough Council, and I am confident that we shall not consume more time. Before leaving the duties of the Returning Officer, I wish to refer to a remark of the Marquess of Ripon in the debate on the second reading of this Bill, a remark to which I think attention should be directed, as his statement has been repeated in the Press, and has been mentioned by other members of your Lordships' House. He stated that this Bill gives considerable powers to Returning Officers. I wish particularly to emphasise the fact that this Bill does not give any discretionary powers to Returning Officers other than are possessed under the present Ballot Act. The circumstances in which the Returning Officer has any discretionary power are defined on page 5 of the Bill. Sub-section 4 of Rule 4 provides, "If two or more parcels of elected candidates are equal in size, the Returning Officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under this Rule." If there is a tie in an election, the Returning Officer has now to give a casting vote. Your Lordships are well aware that the number of ties in elections are very few indeed, so with this new method of voting there will be very few ties; and only when two candidates have a surplus and they are equal in votes has the Returning Officer any discretionary power to choose between them. It is not when they tie without a surplus, but only when on the first count they are equal in votes, and are both above the quota, that he is instructed to use his discretion. The only other occasion on which the Returning Officer has discretionary powers is defined on page 7 of the Bill, Rule 10. The Rule deals with the question of excluding candidates from the poll, and if there are two candidates who are equal, the Returning Officer has to refer to the figures on the first count, and the relative position on that count decides. The Returning Officer has no discretionary power, except when, both at the particular stage of the count, and also at the first stage of the count those two candidates are equal; and the possibility of the candidates being equal in two stages of the same election is very small indeed. The discretionary powers of the Returning Officer are also referred to in Rule 12, which says: "If any question shall arise in relation to any transfer, the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final, unless an objection is made by any candidate or his agent before the declaration of the poll." That is exactly what takes place at the present time. If there is a dispute between candidates as to the validity of any vote, it is the Returning Officer who decides, but his decision can be appealed against. I lay stress, my Lords, upon this fact: that there are no discretionary powers given to the Returning Officer in the Schedule to this Bill, except such discretionary powers as he now enjoys. He now has to decide when there are ties between candidates; and ties necessitating a decision by the Returning Officer will occur with less frequency because of the conditions of this new scheme; and there are very few cases in which they do occur at the present time.

401. There

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[Continued.]

Chairman.

401. There is no power of manipulating the process by the Returning Officer, is there?—No, none.

402. Of course, he has by him the representatives of the several candidates, even if he could think of such a process, or attempt any such thing?—He would have.

403. So that there is really no scope for any ingenuity of the kind suggested?—There is none.

404. Have you some figures as to the necessity of a change in our borough council elections, especially in London, which you wish to submit to the Committee?—Yes. I have extracted the figures, or, rather, I have taken the totals furnished by different authorities of the number of votes polled at all the Metropolitan Borough Council elections last November, and the totals are as follows:—The Municipal Reformers polled 994,462 votes; the Progressives, in round numbers, polled 712,000—a difference of 280,000; but in seats the Municipal Reformers hold 959, and the Progressives 272, a difference of 687. The seats in proportion to votes are 717 for the Municipal Reformers and 514 for the Progressives, a majority of 203. So that by our inaccurate system a majority of 203 has been transformed into a majority of 687; or if put in another way, a Municipal Reformer Councillor represents on an average 1,037 votes, whilst a Progressive Councillor represents on an average 2,612 votes, or 2½ times as many as his colleague. That is the result of the present system of election.

Lord Colchester.

405. Have you similar figures for the election before the last one?—I have not the figures for the votes, but I have for the seats, and they are as follows:—The Municipal Reformers had 587, which have now been increased to 959; and the Progressives had 634, and these have been reduced to 272.

406. Have you the voting for that election?—No, not the votes, but you see what an enormous change there has been, and I propose to deal with some of the boroughs in detail, showing what has actually taken place.

Earl of Hardwicke.

407. Would proportional representation have altered the numbers of candidates, according to you?—Certainly.

408. In what proportion do you think it would have altered it?—The Progressive Councillors, instead of being 272 in number, would have been 514, and the Municipal Reformers would be, instead of 959, 717.

409. Then they would have got in?—Yes, they would have been in a majority, but not in such an enormous majority.

410. Would the men now in have got in only by a smaller majority?—Only 717 out of 959 would have got in. There are 959 who have been elected, but out of those only 717 would have been returned; that is to say, 242 would have lost their seats, and this shows the great need for this proposed change in the method of election.

Chairman.

411. You mean would not have gained their seats?—Yes. Again, Fulham, Lewisham, and Wandsworth are three boroughs in which the Progressives are without any representation whatever. That is to say, there are 36 Municipal Reformers elected for Fulham, no Progressives; 42 for Lewisham, no Progressives; 58 for Wandsworth, no Progressives, only two Independents. Therefore there are three Councils on which the Progressives are not represented. Then Bethnal Green is a borough in which no Municipal Reformers were elected, but 30 Progressives; that is to say, the Municipal Reformers in Bethnal Green have not a single representative on the Council. Take 9 other councils, Deptford with 30 Municipal Reformers and 1 Progressive; Islington with 58 Municipal Reformers, 2 Progressives; Chelsea with 33 Municipal Reformers, 3 Progressives; Lambeth with 55 Municipal Reformers and 4 Progressives; Holborn with 37 Municipal Reformers and 4 Progressives; Marylebone with 51 Municipal Reformers and 5 Progressives; Westminster with 53 Municipal Reformers and 5 Progressives; Kensington with 43 Municipal Reformers and 5 Progressives; Greenwich with 20 Municipal Reformers and 5 Progressives respectively, showing that the representation of the minority, although not entirely annihilated, is very small indeed. I have given 9 boroughs in which the number of Progressives is less than 5, and four boroughs in which the minority has no representation whatever.

Lord Avebury.

412. Is your contention that the present system leads to very great fluctuation?—Yes.

413. And that under the system set forth in Lord Courtney's Bill the best candidates or the most popular candidates on both sides would secure election?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

414. And that the minority would also be represented?—And that the minority would obtain its share of representation.

415. The majority would secure a majority and the minority would secure a hearing. That is the contention, is it not?—Yes.

416. You would submit, I suppose, to the Committee, that whatever differences of opinion there may be, there are useful councillors who are Progressives and very useful Moderates, and that a system which practically excludes the whole of one, and sometimes the whole of the other, throws municipal working out of gear, and is very undesirable?—Yes.

Chairman.

417. Another point is, you might have an exclusion of Moderates or an exclusion of Progressives, but there are some candidates who decline to be called either, and who really stand independently?—Yes.

418. Under the Bill now before the Committee, they would have an opportunity, would they not, of being elected?—They would.

419. If

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

419. If they got a sufficient number of voters akin to themselves desirous of being represented by some independent person, they are sure to come in?—Yes.

420. While at present they have very small or no chance of coming in?—Yes. There are also very violent changes in representation, and I would like to call attention to one or two cases. In Lewisham, in the previous Council, there were six Moderate representatives and 34 Progressives. The next election witnessed the defeat of those 34 Progressives and the return of 42 Moderates.

Lord Avebury.

421. So that all the experience gained by the wiser of the Progressive candidates was lost to the Borough of Lewisham?—That is so. In Camberwell, which is almost as bad, there were 45 Progressives and 9 Moderates on the old Council: now those 9 Moderates have become 43 Moderates, and those 45 Progressives have become 11, a complete change in the character of the Council. In Fulham, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham, St. Pancras, Stepney, Wandsworth, and Woolwich, similar complete changes have been effected.

422. In the last election but one one party had a great many more seats than they ought to have had, and in the last election the other party got a great many more seats than they ought to have had?—That is so.

Lord Colchester.

423. Do you remember the state of things which existed at elections under the London School Board?—Yes.

424. I think generally at their elections every minority had a representative, did it not?—Yes; and an instance occurred in the last Borough Council elections which throws some light on the point. The Roman Catholics are rather numerous in Southwark, and under the London School Board system of election they were always able to obtain a representative on the School Board, but at the Borough Council election, although the Roman Catholics put forward their list of candidates, they could not obtain a single representative. Under the scheme of this Bill they would once more gain the privilege of being represented.

425. What I mean was that by a simpler scheme than yours the minority always secured representation on the London School Board, did it not?—It did not always secure accurate representation; there were a large number of votes wasted.

Chairman.

426. The difference between the cumulative vote and this scheme is not one of principle but one of machinery, is it not, and the question is which is the simpler. Do you agree with Lord Colchester in thinking that the cumulative vote is simpler?—No, not for the voter.

427. Or for the Returning Officer?—I should say not, especially if there were a large number of candidates, because the details of each ballot

Chairman—continued.

paper would have to be extracted and noted on a score sheet, as I have already explained.

428. Then, under cumulative votes, in order to secure anything like a due proportion of representation, the different parties, especially if the wards are large, have to exercise a good deal of drilling of voters?—That is so.

429. Telling them how to vote. Supposing 15 votes are to be given they would have to be told how to distribute their 15 votes?—Yes, in order to obtain their full share of representation.

430. And that produced a feature of an irksome character, did it not, which largely contributed to the repeal of the system?—Yes, I think it encourages rather unduly the powers of the organising body.

431. Caucuses arranged how they should go in, do they?—That is so.

432. But under this system the elector is emancipated, as it were, is he not?—Yes. The action of the caucus was rendered necessary with cumulative voting in order to prevent the waste of votes. There is the simple device of transfer in this Bill to prevent the wasting of votes.

433. You could never tell, could you, whether you were wasting your power by running too few candidates or losing a chance of an election by running too many?—That is so, and sometimes mistakes were made.

434. I do not know whether you are acquainted with the election of the first School Board of London, when Miss Garrett had an enormous preponderance of votes—47,000 votes—so many, that if her surplus was distributed she could have brought in about half the members for Marylebone, whilst those at the bottom of the election got extremely few votes?—Quite so.

435. And this Bill gets rid of that element of chance, and effects the emancipation of voters from caucuses?—That is so. The voter under the old system had to obey the caucuses in order to secure the best result for his party; under this system he can obey or disobey, but his vote is never wasted.

Lord Colchester.

436. It may depend on the way in which the election works out or how he votes, may it not?—Not unless he is a member of a very small section which desires to return a particular candidate and which cannot muster a quota of votes.

Chairman.

437. Or unless he refuses to mark more than one man. Of course, if Miss Garrett's voters, under this system refused to mark anyone else than Miss Garrett, she would have had a great number of votes capable of transfer?—That is so.

438. But under the cumulative vote, the caucus man can say to the electors, "Unless you vote as we direct our force will be spoilt, and we shall not get due representation; under this scheme the voter may reply to that, "I am going to vote exactly as I choose, and my vote will tell," and all parties will get their due by the evolution of the wills of the voters expressed in the preferences?—That is so.

439. I

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury.

439. I think in the Marylebone Election Miss Garrett had 47,800 votes, and Mr. Watson, who was the lowest on the list, had 8,000 only?—Yes, that is so.

440. Therefore in that case there were 39,000 of Miss Garrett's votes really wasted?—That is

so.

Lord Avebury—continued.

441. If this system of the Bill of Lord Courtney had been in operation those votes would have gone over to the candidates whom the voters wished to elect next to Miss Garrett, and would not have been thrown away, would they?—That is so.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, 12 o'clock.

Die Martis, 11^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of HARDWICKE.

Earl CATHCART.

Earl BEAUCHAMP.

Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord MONTEAGLE OF BRANDON.

Lord AVEBURY.

Lord HAVERSHAM.

Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.

Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. JOHN HENRY HUMPHREYS, is recalled; and further Examined as follows.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

442. You are not quite satisfied, I believe, with an answer you gave to one of Lord Beauchamp's questions last time? That is so.

443. And you wish, if he consents, and the Committee see no reason to the contrary, to substitute another answer for it?—That is so.

444. It does not differ in conclusion, but it differs in statement and is clearer, you think?—It is certainly clearer.

445. If you have the evidence of last week, at Question 273, I think it comes to the point for which a substitute might be made?—Yes.

446. The question was this. When you come to distribute surpluses, if you have two candidates who have been successful in obtaining election, the one with a larger surplus than the other, the question was whether it would produce a different result if you began by distributing the larger surplus than if you began with the smaller, and your answer was to the effect that it would produce the same result in the end, but that beginning with the larger surplus was more convenient, as settling, sometimes, the question at an earlier stage?—That is so.

447. Will you read the answer which you now propose to give to that question?—The order in which surpluses are distributed cannot possibly affect the ultimate result of an election; in the end the same candidates must be elected. There are two types of cases to be considered: (1) Where, at the conclusion of the poll, all surpluses have been distributed; and (2) Where, at the conclusion of the poll, there still remains a surplus which has not been distributed. In the first case all candidates have received all the votes that could possibly be transferred to them under the rules, each successful candidate has obtained a quota of votes, and the total votes of all the unsuccessful candidates are necessarily less than a quota. Even if all the votes not appropriated by the successful candidates were transferred to some one of the unsuccessful candidates, he could not possibly obtain a quota of votes—he would still be unsuccessful. In the

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

second case, the same argument applies. Each of the successful candidates has obtained a quota of votes. The total votes of the unsuccessful candidates, together with the surplus votes not distributed, number less than a quota. There is only one possible change which can be produced by varying the order in which surpluses are distributed. It is not a change which will invariably take place; but sometimes, as a result of varying the order of distribution, the order in which candidates are declared elected may vary. For example, on the first count, both a Conservative candidate and a Liberal candidate may have a surplus. The transfer of the Conservative surplus may result in the election of another Conservative; that of the Liberal in the election of another Liberal, and the order in which these further candidates are declared elected will depend upon the order in which the surpluses are distributed. The final result of the distribution of both the surpluses will be the same—namely, the election of another Conservative and of another Liberal candidate. There is, however, a practical advantage in distributing the largest surplus first. The election may be completed at an earlier stage. This advantage will, of course, only accrue when the surplus votes not distributed, together with the votes of the unsuccessful candidates, number less than a quota. I append three examples in which the results of distributing (1) The larger surplus first; and (2) The smaller surplus first, are compared.

448. You might go very briefly through those, I think; if the members of the Committee will take the numbers down, they will see how it works?—In the first example there are four candidates—A, B, C, and D. A has 916 votes, B 580 votes, C 400 votes, and D 100 votes. The total number of votes is 1,996. There are three vacancies, and therefore it is necessary to divide by 4 to obtain the quota. The result is 499, and the quota is therefore 500. A's surplus is 416, and B's surplus 80. If you distribute the larger surplus first, and allot 100 of these votes to C,

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and

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Mr. J. H. HUMPHREYS.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

and 316 to D, the result is that C's votes number 500. He has obtained the quota, is declared elected, and the counting is at an end. The votes of the unsuccessful candidate D, namely, 416, plus the surplus votes not distributed (those of B, namely 80), number together 496, and these are less than a quota.

449. So that by no process of cumulation could he have got in?—He could not.

Earl of Hardwicke.

450. The quota there would be 499?—Plus 1.

451. Then he would only be 3 or 4 below?—That is so. The illustration is the most favourable for D, and was chosen because it is so. In going through A's votes a second time for the purpose of distributing the surplus, all errors must be discovered. This particular system of counting provides in this way a valuable check.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

452. Therefore ensuring complete accuracy?—That is so.

453. Now, give us your second example?—It is the same example with the transfer of the smaller surplus first. The same result is obtained, but the election is concluded in two distributions instead of one; that is to say, if you distribute B's surplus, the smaller surplus, first—80—and allot the whole of the surplus to D, his votes are then 180—that is, 100, plus 80. He is still not elected, and in order to complete the election you must then proceed to distribute the larger surplus—namely, A's. The result is just the same. Although 316 of these votes may be allotted to D, the total votes for D are, as in the first instance, only 496.

454. And that single case illustrates the advantage of proceeding with the bigger surplus first, because with that distribution you fill up the remaining vacancy?—That is so.

455. Whereas, with the other process, you have to go through two distributions before you get that result?—Yes.

456. But the result is exactly the same?—Yes. —Example No. 3, if I may put it in, shows that seats to be filled, you are building up gradually three quotas of votes, and you obtain those three quotas of votes in whichever order you deal with these surpluses, and the remaining votes are those of the unsuccessful candidate, or the fraction of the electorate which does not obtain representation. The next example, in which there are four vacancies, is more complicated.

Chairman.

457. I think you had better leave that. Can you assure us, taking that simple case which you have taken, that the principle would not vary if you took a more complicated case with the numbers not so clearly in favour of one person?—Example No. 3, if I may put it in, shows that.

458. Would you answer my question first. You have taken a very simple case with a large preponderance of numbers for one candidate; can you show us that whatever the numbers are the

Chairman—continued.

same principle would hold good and that there would be no chance of anybody else being elected, no change in the election by varying the surplus, whosoever surplus is taken first?—Absolutely.

Earl of Hardwicke.

459. Would you make it obligatory to have the first example, the larger surplus, taken first by law?—Yes, as provided in the Bill, the larger surplus should be distributed first.

460. Always?—Yes.

Chairman.

461. I understand that it makes no difference in the result, but that it is more convenient to have a rule which, at all events, in some cases, would make the election much shorter than if you began with another candidate?—That is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

462. Now we will resume the examination where we left it off last time. You were dealing then with the defects of the present system which justified the suggestion of an alteration?—That is so.

463. Especially in connection with the London boroughs?—Yes.

464. What were the defects in the present system in relation to the London boroughs which you pointed out?—I pointed out that on the average a Municipal Reform Councillor represented 1,037 votes and a Progressive Councillor represented 2,612 votes, or two and a-half times as many as his colleague.

465. That is at the last election in 1906?—Yes. I also pointed out that there were four boroughs in which the minority was absolutely without representation, namely, Fulham, Lewisham, Wandsworth and Bethnal Green. In the first three the Progressives are without representation, in Bethnal Green the Moderates are without representation. I also pointed out that in nine other boroughs—Deptford, Islington, Chelsea, Lambeth, Holborn, St. Marylebone, Westminster, Kensington and Greenwich, the Progressives have less than six representatives. I also pointed out that in at least ten boroughs—Camberwell, Finsbury, Fulham, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham, St. Pancras, Stepney, Wandsworth, and Woolwich, the change in representation had been so violent as to change almost entirely the actual membership of the Borough Councils.

Chairman.

466. Compared with what they were before?—Yes; as an example of this change it may be stated that the mayors of Wandsworth, Lewisham, and Woolwich, who, although well versed in the affairs of their boroughs, were defeated. They belonged to members of the party unpopular for the time being.

467. But that may happen anywhere; a change in public opinion will always unseat a man?—Possibly so.

468. What

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

468. What you probably mean is that the mayor, being a prominent and representative person, possessing the confidence of one of the parties in the borough, would be secure of re-election?—Yes, if the proposed Bill were law.

469. Although his side may have a minority of the seats?—Yes, as being one of the most valued members of his party.

Chairman.

470. I think, personally, that your case is much stronger if you do not mention the case of the mayors?—I may add that there were also chairman of committees who suffered the same fate.

471. Of course, what you have said is specially important in the case of a number of boroughs which, although they form one great city, are all separate boroughs, and therefore, as they stand separately, as each municipality is separate, the fact of one side in one place getting a larger majority is not counteracted by another side getting a majority in another place?—That is quite so.

472. It would not have such an unfortunate result if they were elections to a Parliament which represented the whole of London?—I think that it might have a similar result.

473. It could not have a similar result, because you mentioned yourself that in one borough the whole of the Progressives got in, although they had no right to have so many seats, and that in other boroughs the whole of the other side got in, although they had no right to have so many seats; therefore to some extent it must be counteracted if all those people elected in all those different places were going to sit together in one Parliament?—Yes, to some extent. In my first statement I pointed out that the Progressives throughout London obtained 272 members and the Municipal Reformers 959. There was compensation, to some extent, but only to half the extent that there should have been.

474. My question did not go to whether it was as much as it should be; but I say that it is counteracted in a case where all the people are going to set together in the same elected body. Is not that the case?—It is often so; but there is no guarantee, with the present system of voting, that it will be so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

475. You do not run the risk of extinction, but you do run the risk of undue depreciation of representation?—Yes.

476. And you run the risk in the separate boroughs of extinction; that has been realised?—That is quite so.

Lord Haversham.

477. You mean that the change in the Council is much greater than the revolution of feeling as shown by the votes?—Yes, and to the extent of an almost complete extinction of the minority.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

478. It did so in these boroughs?—Yes.
(0.13)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

479. In an aggregation of boroughs like the County Council, it would probably not go to that extent, but would produce an undue diminution?—Yes.

Chairman.

480. If those boroughs were wards of one city, and the members were going to be elected on the same municipal council, at all events, the very extreme cases which you have mentioned would be somehow counteracted by one side getting more than their proper representation in one place and another side getting more than their proper representation in another place?—To some extent only.

Lord Colchester.

481. Is it not the case that if one party is distributed pretty evenly through the whole district, though it may be short of a majority, it may be quite extinguished by a still smaller party concentrated in one corner, which would get more than its fair share of representation?—The result depends upon the way in which the forces of the various political parties are distributed over the different constituencies.

482. And a party which only existed in a few divisions might carry those divisions; whereas if it were scattered over the whole district and its numbers were larger, it might be in a minority everywhere?—Yes.

Lord Avebury.

483. You say there are four boroughs in which one party or the other had no representation at all in the last election?—That is so.

484. Could you give the Committee the figures in those boroughs, or any of them?—In Fulham there are 36 Municipal Reformers.

485. But can you give us the figures of the voters?—No, not the figures of the voters.

486. I think it is important, if you could put them in, because what I wanted to bring out before the Committee was that, although the minority was a very considerable minority, they had absolutely no representation at all. That was so, was it not?—I can obtain for the Committee the figures you desire.

Chairman.

487. I think it would be very desirable to get the total number of voters and the result of the election?—I will do so. (*Vide the Appendix.*)

Lord Avebury.

488. Take the case of Lewisham, for instance, that is one of the cases in which one side had no representation at all?—Yes.

489. Where there were a considerable number of voters on that side although not so many as on the other, but those voters, although so numerous, had absolutely no representation at all?—That is so.

490. I understand that you will put in for the Committee what the votes on either side were in those four cases where one side was entirely eliminated?—Yes.

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

491. You will be able to get some, if not all?—I can give from memory the figures for Lewisham; there were about 25,000 votes in Lewisham for the minority.

492. And how many for the other side?—About 43,000.

Lord Avebury.

493. The 43,000 got the whole representation, and the 25,000 got no representation at all?—Yes.

494. How many seats are there in Lewisham?—42.

495. There are 42 seats. One side got about double the number of votes of the other; but the larger side got the whole 42 seats, and the smaller side got none at all?—Yes.

496. Your submission to the Committee, I take it, is that, in any proper system of representation, if you have 43,000 voters on one side and 25,000 on the other, it is a great hardship that the 25,000 should be absolutely unrepresented?—Yes.

497. The result is to throw out, in most cases, a number of good men who have done good service to the borough; but, although they have a considerable amount of support, still, the other side, having a rather larger amount on the whole, their side is thrown out at the election?—Yes, that is so. That is why I instanced those particular cases.

498. And if the system advocated by Lord Courtney in his Bill had been in operation, those 25,000 voters in Lewisham, and the corresponding minority in other boroughs, would have had a certain amount of representation on the borough councils?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

499. You do not know how many they would have had, I suppose?—Those figures can be put in, because I have prepared a statement as to the figures for Lewisham at the last election.

Lord Avebury.

500. It must be approximately their population according to the number of votes?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

501. They would get something like 16 out of the 42?—Yes.

502. More than a third?—Speaking from memory, I think I calculated that the true majority was 12.

Lord Avebury.

503. But whatever the exact number may be, there can be no question that they would have secured approximately a number of seats in proportion to the number of votes?—Yes; and I can say so far as this, that in every ward save one, the south ward—Lee, the minority would have obtained a representative.

504. Would you kindly answer my question as I put it. What exact number of seats the minority would have secured you cannot say; but they certainly would have secured a number of seats approximately bearing relation to the proportion of their votes as compared with the other side?—Undoubtedly.

Chairman.

505. I should just like to ask you one question. This Bill suggests that a borough may adopt this system for their election. Is it suggested that they should continue in a large borough to divide the borough into wards and adopt this system separately in each ward, or that they should take the whole of the borough as a whole, and elect the whole number of municipal councillors who have to be elected out of the whole borough on this system?—The Bill does not provide for any alteration in the existing wards; if the method was adopted by any borough, then the members for each ward would be elected in accordance with the schedule of the Bill.

506. It makes some difference; because, of course, if you divide the borough into wards, although you get a minority in each ward, you need not necessarily get the minority properly represented in the whole of the borough. It would do a great deal to correct what you call the present anomaly, but it would not correct it to the same extent as if you were taking the whole of the borough and electing the whole of the members for that borough on this principle?—That is so, but I think it would be advisable to start with wards first until people were more experienced with this method of election.

507. Is there no power to do it the other way, under this Bill?—No.

Earl of Hardwicke.

508. Supposing there were an election to Parliament of only two members, this system could not come into force, could it?—Yes, it could.

509. I mean only two opponents, one on each side. This system would be no use then, would it?—No, it would be no use.

510. Or with three?—With three, yes.

Lord Montague of Brandon.

511. It depends upon the number of vacancies, the number of seats to be filled?—Yes.

512. In single-member constituencies with three opponents, you would not get any result by this system?—No, we must have constituencies returning at least three members, if any real advantage is to be secured.

Lord Colchester.

513. Do you say that you could work it with two members to a constituency?—That is so; that every successful candidate must obtain a quota of votes—that is to say, one-third of the votes, plus one.

514. But you cannot have any real proportion?—No, you cannot.

515. Either you must make both parties equal, or one must govern both?—That is so.

Lord Avebury.

516. Is that quite so in all cases? Take this Durham election. We are told that there are going to be four candidates for one seat. It might very well happen therefore that one side might get in, although the other side was more numerous, if the votes were divided between two, or even three candidates?—That is so.

517. So that it would have some effect, although not all the effect that you desire?—Yes.

518. And

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

518. And in fact, they meet that abroad by having a second election?—That is so.

519. In this case the result would be practically to take the two elections, as it were, together?—Yes; and I may add that the Australian Government last year introduced a Bill for that very purpose, providing for this method of voting. Mr. Deakin, during the general election, at the end of last year, promised that the Bill should be reintroduced.

520. So that this system would have some effect, and a beneficial effect, you think, even if there were only one member, although, of course, the full advantage cannot be gained unless there are three, five, or seven members?—That is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

521. To complete the historical statement, is it not true that in Queensland this method of voting has been applied for some time?—For about 14 years.

522. With complete satisfaction?—I think so.

523. To single-member seats?—And also to two-member seats.

524. So as to avoid what some reformers wish to avoid here, by a second ballot?—Yes.

525. But our practical proposal is only concerned with elections to constituencies with three or more members?—Yes.

Lord Allendale.

526. Has it met with the approval of the returning officers; or do they complain of it as complicated?—I have seen no report of the returning officers of Queensland, but I put in at the last sitting the report of the Returning Officer of Tasmania, who is heartily in favour of the system, and has been considering what practical steps might be taken to facilitate the method of counting.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

527. I think you are prepared to proceed to a somewhat detailed examination of events in the London boroughs. I think you have something to say of the experience in Battersea?—Yes, I desire to point out that, although in some boroughs the minority are without representation, and in other boroughs the minority have very little representation, yet it is quite possible, with the system of voting which now obtains, for the minority in a borough to obtain a majority of the seats; and that has actually taken place in the borough of Battersea.

528. This is another evil you wish to bring out?—Yes. For instance, the total number of votes polled for the Municipal Reformers in Battersea amount to 53,910 votes recorded for the Municipal Reformers; for the Progressives there were recorded 46,274; for the Independents 3,590; and for the Socialists 2,154. The Municipal Reformers have a majority in votes over the Progressives.

529. You are dealing now with the figures of the voters?—Yes, the Municipal Reformers had a majority of 7,636—that is, in votes.

Lord Monteaule of Brandon.

530. The majority over the Progressives alone?—The majority over the Progressives alone. I thought I would keep to the main parties, in order to simplify matters.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

531. But they have a majority over all the voters?—Yes, they have. The majority is 7,636 in votes.

532. That is, the Municipal Reformers over Progressives?—Yes.

533. They have a small majority over the three parties—Independents, Progressives, and Socialists?—Yes; but as the result of the election the Progressives have 30 seats, and the Municipal Reformers 24 seats; that is to say, a majority of votes of 7,636 votes in favour of one party has become transformed on the Council into a minority of six seats. I wish to explain why such a result is possible. There is, indeed, an attempt to give proportional representation to the various wards; that is to say, if a large ward is three times the size of another ward, by the Act which is now in existence nine seats are allotted, say, to the one ward and three to the other ward; and nine seats are given to the larger ward on the ground that it is three times as large as the smaller ward. So far, good; it is quite fair that the ward which is three times as large as the small ward should have three times as much representation. But by the system of giving nine votes to each elector, the party which can defeat the other party, say, by 100 votes in the large ward, obtains the nine seats; and so the object of the present Act is defeated. Nine seats are allotted to the larger ward, because it is the object of the law to give representation to that larger ward; but the result of the voting method is to give the whole of the representation to one section of that ward.

534. The predominant section?—The predominant section.

535. But it may be only slightly predominant?—Yes. So that you may have this result: that in a ward returning nine members the Progressives may have a majority of 100 votes, and thereby obtain nine seats; whilst in a neighbouring ward returning three members, the Municipal Reformers may have a majority of 600 votes, and so, although taking the two wards together, the Municipal Reformers are in the majority, yet the Progressive obtain a majority of the seats. And that is what has taken place in Battersea.

Chairman.

536. That is really rather a criticism on the way in which the wards are at present divided, is it not?—No, upon the way in which seats are allotted in proportion to the size of the wards.

537. They are all right in proportion, but having a larger ward than another makes the anomaly much greater than it otherwise would be?—Yes, but the anomaly may still remain. If the wards are of equal size the same evil arises.

538. I thought you were expatiating upon the fact

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[Continued.]

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fact that it was much more acute when one ward was three times the size of others, and therefore, although it was a very large ward, and ought to have very considerable representation, the minority, which was a very large one, would have no representation on that very account. Is that your point?—I agree that a large ward should have a large number of seats.

539. When you say you agree with it I did not suggest it?—

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

540. But it does not depend upon the inequality of the wards?—No.

541. Supposing that you had one ward returning five members, in which the Municipal Reformers had a majority of 1,000, another ward returning five members in which the Municipal Reformers had a majority of 1,000, and another ward returning five members in which the Progressives had a majority of 3,000, there being equality in wards, would not the result of that be that the Municipal Reformers would get ten members and the Progressives would get five members?—That is so.

542. But the Progressives would be in a majority altogether of 1,000?—That is so.

Chairman.

543. Then your illustration with regard to one large ward being larger than another is not an element in the case which you are putting. You talked about its being such a serious case, one ward being very much larger than a very small minority on one side should get no representation?—My point in speaking of the larger wards was that there is a sense of the need of proportionate representation, because to the large ward the law allots nine seats, whereas to the small ward it only allots three.

544. I quite agree. I think it is a much greater advantage to have one larger ward where there are large populations than to divide it into several small wards.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

545. You mean that what the Legislature ignorantly aims at is not realised?—Yes.

546. It does ignorantly aim at getting representation corresponding to the voters by giving big wards?—Yes.

547. But it does not realise that?—No, it does not realise it. To complete it you must introduce a system of proportional representation.

Lord Colchester.

548. To follow that up, does not that rather tend to show that equalisation of constituencies so as to proportion the size of constituencies to the number of votes by proportionate representation, rather aggravates than diminishes the inequalities?—Not necessarily.

549. But it may do so?—But the inequalities are not removed.

550. The small constituencies often represent the minority better than the large ones, do they not?—It may be so.

551. And, as a matter of fact, it is, is it not,

Lord Colchester—continued.

very often so throughout the country?—I do not think you can deduce that from it.

552. What I mean is, whether in Municipal or Parliamentary election, in some small districts may it not often happen that there is a majority which corresponds to large minorities in large constituencies, which might otherwise be unrepresented altogether?—

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

553. You may get a chance of election through the preponderance of what is a majority in the whole borough, being a minority in a small area?—That is so.

Lord Colchester.

554. You may remember the famous case of Arundel, which Lord Beaconsfield said returned the only Roman Catholic member in England. That is the sort of case that may occur, may it not?—It may.

555. Therefore the point is that redistribution may do as much good as harm unless it is accompanied by some alteration of the present system?—Undoubtedly.

556. Did either of these minorities return any councillors in Battersea, either the Socialists or the Independents?—No, they obtained no representative.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

557. We had better get back to Battersea?—In Battersea the true proportion should have been 28 seats for the Municipal Reformers, and for the Progressives 24 seats. There should have been a majority for the Municipal Reformers. I have applied, tentatively, the proposed system to the results of every ward, and I find that 29 Municipal Reformers, 23 Progressives, and one Independent would have been elected. One seat could not be allotted definitely. The figures in one of the wards, the Broomwood Ward, did not admit of it. If this system had been applied at the last election in Battersea, there would have been a Council which would have corresponded with the opinions held by the citizens of Battersea.

Lord Monteaule of Brandon.

558. Did the Independents get any look in at all?—No, although they numbered 3,590 votes. Again, in four wards, the minority obtained no representation; whilst with the system provided in the Bill there would have been only one ward, St. John's ward, in which the minority was too small to entitle it to a representative.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

559. Have you anything further to say about Battersea?—There was just one illustration that was reported in the press last week. I noticed in the "Tribune" of May 31st, that there was a discussion as to paying the Mayor of Battersea a salary. The report is as follows: "Members of the Borough Council sat until a late hour on Wednesday night discussing a resolution by Councillor Willis (leader of the Progressive party), that a sum of £100 per annum should be placed

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placed in the hands of the Town Clerk to enable the Mayor to defray the expenses to which his worship is put during his term of office. Mr. Willis stated that the object of giving the money was not to act as a bait to a mayor, but to enable a mayor who might be a working man (as was the case with the present Chief Magistrate), to uphold the dignity of his position without dipping into his own meagre financial resources. Some opposition was raised to the proposal by members of the Moderate Party on the Council, but eventually, on a division, the motion was carried by 24 votes to 21." This is a decision, possibly of little consequence, but decisions of great moment may be adopted by a Council which is not truly representative, which is not in accordance with the wishes of the electors.

560. You suggest there that the representatives of the minority are taxing the borough?—Yes.

561. It may be a small affair, the Mayor's salary, but they can exercise their power to a larger extent?—It is the kind of incident which is reported in the Press. The figures of the divisions were given, and so I am able to mention it as an illustration. But I can refer to a matter which excited considerable attention in the borough of Lewisham, and that was the election of the Mayor in 1901. Mr. T. W. Williams had served the office of Mayor in the previous year, and it was proposed that he should serve for a second year. There was a considerable discussion upon the question; so much so that there was a great division of opinion in the party usually supporting the Mayor; yet, although the Mayor had been defeated when he had stood as a candidate for the London County Council in the previous March he was elected Mayor a second time. I had the curiosity to analyse at that time the votes given on either side, and I found that the votes given in the Council for the election of Mr. T. W. Williams as Mayor a second time, represented 13,832 votes, and the vote against the re-election of Mr. T. W. Williams represented 24,956 votes—almost twice as many votes. The Minority was so much under-represented on the Borough Council that although the number of Councillors supporting Mr. Williams were in the majority, he was elected contrary to the wishes of the people. Again, at the same time there was a motion that there should be an annual allowance of £500 for each mayoral year of office. The vote "for" represented 14,560 votes, and the vote "against" represented 17,929 votes.

562. But the vote "for" prevailed?—The vote "for" prevailed, because it was supported on the Council by 20 Moderate Councillors, and the vote "against" was only supported by six Progressives and eight Moderates. There is one more point that I should like to direct attention to, namely, that when the minority is unrepresented, or very much under-represented, there cannot be effective criticism of the various proposals which are brought before the Council. There is a tendency for certain decisions of previous decisions to be treated as partisan decisions, of which I may give an ex-

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

ample. In the borough of Lewisham a dust-destructor was erected by the vestry, just prior to the formation of the Borough Council, by the Moderate Party, of which Mr. T. W. Williams was at the time the chief. Its erection was a partisan decision; and when there was a complete change in the character of the Council, the dust-destructor, although it had cost £6,000 or £7,000, was left alone, and no steps were taken with regard to that enterprise.

563. Had it not been completed?—Yes, it had been completed.

564. It was not used?—It had not worked very successfully; and now it merely cumbered ground. If in the first instance the decision to erect a dust-destructor had been taken by a representative Council, then if the succeeding Council was also representative, it would feel more responsibility towards a decision which had been taken by the previous Council.

565. Has it since been put to use?—It has not since been put to use.

566. And it lies derelict?—It lies derelict.

Earl of Hardwicke.

567. Does that mean that the present Council are greatly against this destructor, and the one before it was greatly in favour of it? Is that what you mean?—No. It was left by the outgoing Council as a kind of monument to the misdeeds of the previous Council.

568. It was not the immediately preceding Council, but the Vestry which existed ten years ago?—That was when the first decision was taken. I can take a more recent example in Woolwich, in connection with the electric light undertaking, on which there has been a very great loss. I am not speaking for or against these particular matters, but, considering that a very large number of enterprises which involve considerable expenditure of money are undertaken by local Councils, it is essential that there should be effective criticism of all contracts entered into, and that effective criticism is not forthcoming if the minority is unrepresented; because it is much easier for one man to dominate the Council when it is composed of men of his own party only than it is when there is a strong opposition. Criticism, I think, is essential if the economic treatment of Council questions is to be secured.

569. Is there not also this element: that, under the present method of election, there is more coherency on the part of the majority; they are the same party, and necessarily they stick together, supporting one another in order to maintain their place and secure their re-election?—I think so.

570. What is the illustration from Woolwich?—The policy with regard to electric lighting was decided upon by a Council which was very largely of one colour.

571. When was that?—I think about six years ago, but I have not the exact date. I contend that had the question been effectively discussed by a strong opposition probably not so much loss would

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Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

would have taken place in carrying out the enterprise.

572. What did happen? They resolved six years ago to adopt electric light in that part of the borough?—The loss occurred consequent upon violent changes of policy.

Chairman.

573. Had we not better have results and not remarks as to whether politics were high or low?

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

574. You want to bring out what the result was; what the change was?—In one case the Council decided to work an electric light enterprise, but afterwards sold it to a private company. Then it was bought back again; and it was owing to these violent changes of policy that there was a very large loss resulting from it.

575. I understand you to say that one Council instituted an electric light undertaking and worked it themselves?—It intended to work the undertaking, but the concession was sold.

576. That was done by a subsequent Council?—Yes.

577. And then a third Council bought it back again?—Yes.

Chairman.

578. It really comes to this: that if one side is in a majority they do a certain thing, and when the other side get a majority, being sure that their predecessors are wrong, they upset it; and in municipal affairs that is very unfortunate for the ratepayers, who have to pay for the mistakes made by one side or the other. That is what you mean?—That is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

579. I think you also wish to go on to press this view on the Committee: that under the system of proportionate representation you get a Council so composed that it would be fairly moderate, uniform, and steady in its action, and these blunders and corrections and stumblings from side to side would not follow?—That is the point I wish to bring out.

Lord Allendale.

580. But that system would not guard against any great change of opinion?—But if you have a Council representing only one opinion, then the existence of the opposite opinion is ignored, and enterprises are entered into by the dominant party for the time being when there is no reasonable guarantee that they will meet with the approval of the ratepayers. A change in representation follows, which is more violent than the actual change of opinion, and enterprises which might have been considered more carefully are at once thrown on one side.

Lord Avebury.

581. You get a change of representation which is much greater than any actual change of opinion?—Yes.

Earl Beauchamp.

582. It is your opinion that there is no other way in which all these evils can possibly be corrected except by proportional representation?—I think proportional representation would go a great way towards remedying those evils.

583. And you do not know of any other way?—There is the general consideration, that of the gradual enlightenment of the electorate. I think that is certainly one of the factors to be considered.

584. But you do not know of any method of revising our electoral laws which will effect it?—No.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

585. You are not bound to declare a reason; but there is an old Latin quotation which Lord Beauchamp will remember. You have got a method which you think will do; if he has a better one you will be glad to hear it from him.

Lord Colchester.

586. And it is very doubtful whether some other alteration might not render things worse instead of better—might not rather aggravate the evil?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

587. Do you know what the result would have been under your idea of election with regard to this last election of the Municipal Boroughs, how it would have come out?—For the whole of London or for any one borough, do you mean?

588. For the whole of London?—For the County Council?

589. Yes?—On the London County Council the Municipal Reformers obtained 79 seats, and the Progressives and Labour 38 seats, a majority of 41, but the true majority should have been 17. There should have been 67 Municipal Reformers and 50 Progressives.

590. That would only make a majority of 17?—Yes.

Lord Allendale.

591. How do you arrive at that, may I ask?—The total number of votes recorded for the Municipal Reformers was 526,700 and for the Progressive and Labour 395,749. By ascertaining the average number of votes given per seat it will be found that the Municipal Reformers should have had 67 seats and the Progressives 50 seats, a difference of 17. There was a violent change in representation on the London County Council. At the previous election the Progressives had a majority of 49.

Earl of Hardwicke.

592. But how many votes?—On that occasion the Progressives had 357,000 and the Moderates 287,000 votes; the Progressives had 83 seats and the Moderates 34 seats, a difference of 49; but the true majority should have been twelve. The true fluctuation of opinion was represented by a change of a majority of 12 to a change of a majority for the opposite party of 17; whereas the change which did take place as the result of the election was from a majority of 49 to a majority of 41.

953. Just

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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury.

593. Just before we pass on from this present question, you would consider, would you not, that the two main objects to be gained by any system of representation are, that the majority of the electors should have a majority of the representatives, and that the minority of the electors should get a fair bearing?—Yes.

594. You would agree, would you not, that the present system secures neither the one of those advantages nor the other?—Yes.

595. Although the majority may be left in a minority, as you have pointed out to us, that majority may sweep the whole representation, and exclude the minority altogether?—Yes.

596. And you contend that the system under this Bill would secure both those advantages, both a majority of the seats for the majority of the electors, and a fair hearing for the minority?—That is so.

597. Would you consider those to be the main advantages?—The main advantages.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

598. You have much evidence ready to give to the Committee as to the growth of proportional representation in other countries, I think?—Yes.

599. How has it been adopted, for instance, in Japan?—In the year 1900 the country was divided into 47 electoral districts returning several members each.

600. Do you know within what limits?—Not from memory.

601. I think in one case it ran up to 15?—Yes, if not more; there is considerable variation, but in each district the elector has one vote only.

Lord Avebury.

602. Without any power of transference?—Without any power of transference. That plan, I understand, was adopted after a consideration of the methods of voting employed in European countries.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

603. What is the case in Belgium?—The system was first applied in Belgium to municipal elections in 1895, and I may perhaps read the opinion of one of the Burgomasters on this question. He says: "During the four years that proportional representation has been applied to the communal elections of Ghent, everyone has been able to appreciate the happy effects of the reform. Everybody recognises that, far from being endangered, the material prosperity of the city has increased, and that the ameliorating and pacifying effects of the altered electoral method have even exceeded the expectations and hopes of its advocates." In 1899, that is four years later, proportional representation was applied to Parliamentary elections in Belgium, and Count Goblet d'Alviella, who is a Senator and has taken a considerable part in the movement, summarises the result of the reform in the following words: "We have gained the consciousness that the groups of deputies fairly represent the proportional forces of the respective parties. We have secured for each party the absolute right to choose and return its own leaders. We have introduced more sincerity into the electoral platform (0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

forms. Political life has never been more active; it has even reached several districts where there had been no contest for more than twenty years. We have everywhere diminished party animosities, and all parties are satisfied with the working of the system"; and he says: "There are reforms on which a nation never turns back whilst it pursues the normal and peaceful course of its development. Our representative institutions doubtless will still undergo many changes . . . but that which in Belgium will last as long as there are parties to represent is the system which assures henceforth to every important section of the electorate its legitimate share of influence and of control in the deliberations of Parliament. The day will come even when one will ask why nations, unceasingly occupied in giving precision to their methods in matters of science, should have resisted with so much doubt and opposition the adoption of an improvement so simple and so logical as proportional representation."

604. Then it has been adopted also in Switzerland very largely —Yes, very largely, and success is still attending the movement. This year the Canton of Schwyz has been added to the list of those which had previously adopted the reform.

Earl of Hardwicke.

605. Is the Belgian system the same as the one you propose?—No, it is not the same.

606. Has it the same result?—Practically the same result.

Chairman.

607. But is it the same sort of principle; do they work by a certain number of transfer votes?—No, there is no principle of transfer in the Belgian system. Each party puts forward a list of candidates, and the voter is restricted to voting for one list and for one member of a list.

608. What becomes of the unfortunate person who is an independent voter and does not wish to belong to either party?—He does not obtain so much advantage as he does in the system outlined in the schedule to the Bill under consideration.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

609. He may constitute himself a party?—He may.

610. The end aimed at is the same?—Yes, the end aimed at is the same.

611. But the machinery adopted is different?—Yes.

612. We find, in fact, that the Continental opinion has followed one line of thought in the way of machinery?—That is so.

613. English opinion here and in the Colonies, and in America, I suppose we may say, has followed another line?—That is so.

Lord Avebury.

614. But the result will be substantially the same in either case?—Yes.

Lord Colchester.

615. You mean that the Continental opinion

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[Continued.]

Lord Colchester—continued.

is not by transfer of votes; it has been the single vote without transfer?—Yes; in Belgium.

616. Has that been so in all Continental countries?—Not a single vote, but a list vote; each party puts forward a list, and the electors vote for members of the list. The votes recorded for each list are added up so as to ascertain how many votes are recorded for each party, and then a sum in proportion is necessary in order to ascertain how many seats should be allotted to each party.

617. Do you mean for one constituency or for the whole country?—For one constituency returning several members.

618. Is that the system established in Denmark?—No, not in Denmark; in Denmark the system established is analogous to that in the schedule of this Bill.

619. I thought so. The Continental practice, then, is not uniform?—Denmark is an exception.

620. The countries which have adopted it are Switzerland, Belgium, and what others?—Finland, Sweden, Wurtemberg (in Germany), and some workmen's association in Germany.

621. And have all those, except Denmark, adopted simply a list, with addition of votes, but not transfer?—Yes.

622. As to Belgium, I think there was something said about political life having been very much quickened. But is it not the fact that everybody in Belgium is compelled to go to the poll by a law passed before this system was introduced; is not that so?—I am not sure.

623. At the same time that they extended the franchise?—I am not aware.

624. And I believe in Belgium it is very complicated in many ways; they have a complicated system of voting?—Yes, they have the plural system of voting.

Earl of Hardwicke.

625. I believe they are compelled to go to the poll.

Lord Avebury.

626. There are differences between the system in Switzerland and in Belgium?—Yes.

627. They are not identical?—No.

628. Your contention, as I understand, is, that although there are differences of detail in these different systems, the practical and final result is the same, whether you adopt the list system which is prevalent on the Continent, or the system in this Bill, which is that generally adopted in English-speaking communities?—Yes, and if there is any difference, it is in favour of the schedule to this Bill.

Lord Colchester.

629. In Switzerland in the Canton of Schwyz, is the system adopted for the Legislature or for local elections?—For the Legislature.

630. Then is there a Legislature; I thought it was a sort of mass meeting that legislated?—Not in every Canton.

631. But in those particular Cantons?—I cannot state as to the practice in the various Cantons, but there was a report in the Press (I forget the exact date, but this year) that proportional representation had been adopted for the Cantonal Council of Schwyz.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

632. I think you have a list of several Cantons in which the system has been adopted?—Yes.

633. You can give the names of some of them, no doubt?—Ticino in 1890; Geneva, 1892; Neuenberg, 1891; Freiburg, 1894; Zug, 1894; Solothurn, 1895; Berne, 1899. I can also state that the Canton of Basle City adopted the reform in 1905, that in 1906 the Cantons of St. Gall and Zurich voted upon the question, and although the reform was not carried, yet in each Canton the adverse majority was smaller than on previous occasions; and this year there is the Canton of Schwyz.

634. It goes on spreading itself?—Yes.

635. Additional Cantons are being added, and in some Cantons the majority against is diminishing?—Yes.

Lord Haversham.

636. Why did you introduce Japan; the Japan system seems to be not in the least like this system; you said there were 47 electoral districts returning several members for each, and one vote for each person not transferable?—Because by that system of voting every considerable section of the electorate can obtain representation—not perfectly accurate representation, as is provided for in the schedule to this Bill: in a constituency returning seven members, if each of the electors has one vote only, one-seventh of the electorate, by concentrating their forces on any one candidate, can make sure of returning that candidate as their representative.

637. But a great deal depends upon the distribution of the voters previous to the election—how they are in each of the districts?—That does not alter the fact that one-seventh of the electorate in a constituency returning seven members, by concentrating their votes upon one candidate can render his election sure.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

638. The case is something like this. Supposing that Tokio has 13 members—it has a considerable number of members, we will assume for the sake of clearness that it has 13—each elector in Tokio has one vote?—Yes.

639. For one man?—Yes.

640. Consequently the process of election is exactly the same as under our system; each of a certain number of candidates comes out having a certain number of votes; you ascertain the quota as under our system, but one candidate may have an enormous overplus of votes which will not be capable of transfer?—That is so.

641. That is to say, there will be a great overplus on the first who come out, and those who come out at the bottom will have a smaller number of votes—so much smaller that if the overplus could have been distributed as by our system, they would have been excluded perhaps in favour of others?—Yes.

Chairman.

642. The evil of that system seems to be that it puts a premium on party management?—Yes.

643. So that if you can calculate within a reasonable amount what the strength of your party is you can insure representation?—Yes.

644. In

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

644. In order to carry it out you have to be very strict and to tell the party voters in one ward to vote for one man and in another ward to vote for another, or else you have to tell all the electors whose names begin with A, B, and C to vote for one man, and the electors whose names begin with D, E, and F to vote for another, and so on, according to the calculation of the strength that you have?—Yes.

645. Our transfer vote therefore enables all that to be done at the will of the elector inside the ballot boxes?—Yes.

646. And Japan has, as an illustration, the same aim and the same principle without the correction of the transfer vote?—That is so.

Lord Montague of Brandon.

647. The Continental system is more or less of the same kind as the Japanese, is it not?—No.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

648. If I may put it to you, under the Continental system—take Brussels, Brussels has a large number of representatives in the Chamber of Representatives in Belgium. The Liberals of Brussels put out a large list of candidates, the Catholics of Brussels put out a large list of candidates, and the Socialists of Brussels put out a large list of candidates; each elector votes for one of those lists with the power of marking a name in it.

*Lord Montague of Brandon.] One only.**Lord Courtney of Penwith.*

649. One only. The number of votes for each list is counted and to each list is attributed a number of seats proportional to the number of votes you have got; that is so, is it not?—Yes.

650. So that if the Liberals have got two-fifths of the votes they would get two-fifths of the seats?—That is so.

651. And if the Socialists have got one-fifth of the votes they would get one-fifth of the seats?—Yes.

652. And if the Catholics have got two-fifths of the votes they would get the other two-fifths of the seats?—Yes.

653. Then as to what seats are to be distributed among them, they take them in the order on the list subject to the variation indicated by the special votes given by special electors. That is roughly the plan?—That is a rough statement, I think, of what takes place in Belgium.

Lord Colchester.

654. It is a curious fact, is it not, that the introduction of it in Belgium was an afterthought of the three parties before there was any element of Socialists?—Prior to the introduction of proportional representation the Liberal party was practically extinguished.

655. They were extinguished by the changes made some time before the extension of the franchise—So far as I understand, the Liberals were crushed out between the Conservatives and the Socialists; but since the introduction of proportional legislation the Liberal forces have concentrated, and they have gradually increased, and at the last election they were higher than at any time since proportional representation was introduced.

(0.13.)

Lord Avebury.

656. The old system favoured the two extremes?—Yes.

657. When proportional representation was adopted the Central party secured their fair number of seats?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

658. Only one other question I will ask you, and then my examination so far as I am concerned is at an end. This system has been adopted in Germany in respect of the election of what we should call Arbitration Boards between employers and workmen in trade disputes?—That is so.

659. Has it been adopted to a large extent?—I know that it has been adopted in 16 towns, including Franfort-on-Maine, Munich, and Carlsruhe; they have availed themselves of the privilege, and the results have been most satisfactory. Much greater interest has been taken in the elections, and in Carlsruhe the number of voters has increased from 1,103 in 1897 to 3,546 in 1903.

660. And the Arbitration Boards so elected have given satisfaction; do you know anything about that?—I cannot speak to that point.

Chairman.

661. That system was adopted by the workmen themselves, was it?—Yes.

662. But, I presume, if the workmen agreed to it, at all events they have studied the system sufficiently to be able to understand it; they approved of it, I mean?—Yes.

663. Therefore they must have understood it. I do not suppose they would have approved of a thing they could not understand?—Quite so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

664. They have been able to work it without any errors?—Yes, quite so; there is no reason why there should be any errors.

Chairman.

665. There is just one more question I should like to ask you which I asked before. I am not sure that it is very important, but I rather want to make the point clear. You have explained the system of transfer of surplus votes to a candidate when only a certain number were required to elect one of the members and how the rest were transferred. The system, so far as I understand it, is this: I will take this case. I see you say here that if 5,000 persons voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and 3,000 were all the votes wanted, those 3,000 have done their work, exhausted their powers, and you transfer the other 2,000?—Yes.

666. Now 3,000 were required to elect Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and I do not understand that you put those papers aside and do not deal with them at all, but you take the whole of the 5,000 and find out who the second votes were given for in all cases, and then you take a proportion of the 2,000 votes which are surplus votes, and you take the same proportion with regard to the votes for the second candidate as there are of the whole 5,000; is that so?—Yes: that is to say, we sort the whole of the

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

votes according to the second preferences, and for each candidate who is marked as the second preference we take the same proportion of votes.

667. That is to say, you count over again the voters who have already elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in calculating what proportion of the 2,000 votes are to be given to B, C, or D, as the case may be?—That is so.

668. I contended the other day with a former witness, that in addition to having elected a particular candidate, those people who had elected him exerted an influence in the election of the second one to whom the votes were transferred, because they were counted amongst the number of the second preferences, although they had already elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, or the first member. I was told I was wrong in that; but I should like to have it proved how that is not the case. Let me give you an instance. There are 5,000 votes; 3,000 have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and there are 2,000 surplus votes which are to be devoted to finding out what their second preference is. Supposing that those 2,000 voters happened to have voted, 1,000 for B, and 1,000 for C as second votes, if the 3,000 are out of consideration, half of them give their preference to one man, and half of them give their preference to another; therefore they are in equal proportions. But supposing that the 3,000 votes which have already been given to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman are counted, as they are to be counted under your rule, to find out for whom they would give their second preference, and supposing that 2,000 of them give their second preference to B, and 1,000 to C, it is clear that if you add those 3,000 to the 2,000, they alter the proportion which would be given to certain people as second preference. That is to say, if you only count the 2,000, the proportion is one-half to B, and one-half to C; but if you count the 3,000, adding the two together, it makes 3,000 to B, and 2,000 to C; therefore there is a proportion of three to two. Then I say by that process those people who have elected Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman are exerting an influence upon the man who is elected by their own second preference votes, and so they alter the proportion which would be the proportion if only those were taken who had not already voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. What is your answer to that?—I would explain the operation in this way—

669. I see the operation. I want the explanation. This arose, I may say, on the point that is put in the Bill—that every man has only one vote?—That is so.

670. What is your answer?—I can give the answer in this way. There are 5,000 votes given for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 2,000 of which are to be transferred. Each of these 5,000 voters has one vote, and therefore at no stage will there be more than 5,000 votes. We are transferring 2,000, and in order to make quite sure that each of the second preferences receives his fair share of the surplus, we examine the whole of the votes; 3,000 have marked B as their second preference, and 2,000 have marked C as their second preference. In order to return Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman

Chairman—continued.

only 3,000 votes are required, and therefore you can regard each single vote as having been split into two parts.

671. That is what I said?—That is to say, three-fifths of each vote, as it were, is retained for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Three-fifths of 5,000 is 3,000; so that each voter has not given one vote to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but three-fifths of a vote to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the remaining two-fifths of his vote has been transferred to his second choice. Now, these 5,000 votes are divided into two heaps, 3,000 for B, and 2,000 for C, and two-fifths of 3,000, that is 1,200, and two-fifths of 2,000, that is 800, are transferred to B and C respectively. Instead of transferring 3,000 votes at the value of two-fifths each, you transfer 1,200 whole votes. Each voter is exercising an influence to the value of one vote only, three-fifths of which has been accredited to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and two-fifths of which has been carried forward to his second preference.

672. I am very glad I asked you the question, because I asked the same question of the first witness, and he gave his answer. Then I put to him this further question. We were taking it that 3,000 votes were required to elect Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and there were 2,000 surplus; and I say, what you really mean is that each of these men who have voted for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has given half his vote already, and the other half will be used for the purpose of transferring. He said: Not at all, I do not admit that at all. I said: Very well. then, I do not understand what you do mean. I have now asked you the question, and you have given the exact explanation that I put to the first witness which he would not accept at all as the common-sense explanation of the process that is gone through; but as I understand you now, you say practically that the first people who have not given the whole of their vote to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman have given three-fifths of it, because 3,000 votes are required to elect him, and therefore they are able to be counted and to use their influence to the remaining extent in electing the second man to whom their surplus votes would be given. Therefore I say I am glad you have given that explanation, because it entirely confirms my own view of what the process really is?—I certainly think that that is the actual process.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

673. It is a process of statement, not of fact. In the end, under the plan of the Bill, the plan you advocate, 2,000 actual voting papers are taken from the 5,000 voting papers and passed to B and C. Is not that so?—That is so.

674. Those 2,000 are determined in the proportion in which the whole 5,000 are divided?—Yes.

675. In the end 3,000 are kept for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 1,200 transferred to B, and 800 transferred to C?—Yes.

676. That is the final result?—That is the final result.

676*. I think the answer of the witness at our first sitting, to the chairman was, that the result

was

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

was that the 3,000 papers kept for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman represented 3,000 votes, which were retained for him, that that 1,200 which went to B represented 1,200 which went to him, and the 800 which went to C represented 800 which went to him; and he contended that it was still correct to say that each voter had only voted once, because the 3,000 represented the single votes to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the other two batches represented single batches of electors passed on to the others. It was a matter of personal opinion. Do you contest the accuracy of the statement in the end, that each voter has only one vote?—Certainly not; in the explanation which I gave I emphasise the fact that each elector has only one vote.

Lord Avebury.

677. In the early days of the Proportional Representation Society, I think the plan suggested was that the papers should all be sorted up, and then taking, say, a total number of 5,000 votes, and, supposing the quota to be 3,000, the first 3,000 are put on one side, and the other 2,000 only are examined and divided, according to the votes marked in the second preference?—Yes, that was the first process.

678. Then we were told, Oh, but you introduce an element of chance, because the 3,000 papers you put on one side may have been marked differently from the 2,000 that you are going to distribute?—Yes.

679. It was thought that in ordinary elections people generally vote for their party, and it

Lord Avebury—continued.

would practically make no difference which papers were put on one side and which were distributed?—Yes.

680. But in order to eliminate any possible chance, it was suggested that the surplus votes to be transferred should be taken in the proportion of the whole?—Yes.

681. That is the system which is in Lord Courtney's Bill?—Yes.

682. And you would contend, would you not, that if each person who has given one vote for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, is then said as giving a certain influence to the second candidate, then you should take it that he has given two-thirds, or whatever the proportion is, of his vote to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the rest to somebody else?—Yes.

683. But in any case there is only one vote?—Yes, only one vote.

Lord Monteaule of Brandon.

684. Did I correctly understand you to say that a Report was put in from some Returning Officer of Tasmania?—Yes.

685. Have you seen the print of your evidence?—No.

686. Is it what you mention at No. 368; is that all that has been put in?—No, a complete Report has been put in.

*(The witness is directed to withdraw.)**(After a short adjournment.)*

MR. ARTHUR WILLIAM HISCOX is called in; and Examined as follows:—

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

687. You are ex-Mayor of Lewisham?—Yes.

688. How long were you a member of the Council of Lewisham?—For six years.

689. Did you belong to the Vestry?—Yes, previously to that I belonged to the Vestry at the time of its extinction.

690. Are you one of the first members of the first Council?—Yes.

691. And you continued so up to the last election?—Yes.

692. At that time you were mayor?—Yes.

693. What had you done in that capacity as mayor. Had you been specially associated with any work, the introduction of libraries, for instance?—Not as mayor.

694. As a member of the Council?—I helped in the starting of the libraries in 1890. I was secretary then of the movement in Lewisham.

695. That was before the Council existed?—Yes.

696. And you have been a Library Commissioner?—Yes.

697. And you have taken an active interest in the local affairs of Lewisham for a good many years?—Yes, for a long time.

698. Have you also been a Guardian?—Yes, for three years.

699. At the last election you were unfortunate enough not to be elected?—Yes, I was thrown out, with the whole of the Progressive Party, as it was called.

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

700. The Progressive Party in Lewisham was extinguished so far as representation is concerned?—Yes, entirely.

701. How did it stand before that?—Before that it had a very large majority.

702. There was a greatly increased poll, I suppose, at that last election?—Yes, there was a considerable increase.

703. How did your numbers stand with respect to the supporters of your side; did they fall off?—No, there was not much falling off in regard to the poll on our side; but there was an increase on the other side.

704. Was there a great increase on the other side?—Yes.

705. You are not pleased with the result, naturally?—No, I am not; but I advocated always when I was speaking in public, that, whatever the result might be, I should be pleased to see a greater interest taken in local affairs, and a large poll, even if the vote went against my own particular party. I wanted to see an increased poll.

706. At the same time you felt the loss of your position?—Distinctly.

707. And you still more strongly feel, perhaps, the different situation in which your friends are in respect of the powers of the local Council?—Yes.

708. Being altogether banished from it?—Yes.

709. Were

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

709. Were these elections fought entirely on political lines?—Yes, I think entirely. There was a third party.

Chairman.

710. Are you talking of the Municipal election?—Yes, there was a third party in one or two of the wards, which caused a split.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

711. How many wards are there in Lewisham?—Nine, right through the borough.

712. In one or two of the wards there were persons who put up as Independents?—Yes, I can recall three wards, at any rate, where there was that; and in our ward the successful men got in with a minority of the votes on that account.

713. In consequence of the division of the majority?—Yes, in consequence of the division.

714. Do you find it necessary as a candidate to belong to a ticket in order to get in?—That is so. I have heard complaints from men on both sides—men whom one would like to see elected to do the local work; they say that they must go on to a ticket; and I have known men who are opponents to me but who are highly capable men, who do not desire to go on a ticket, because they think they ought to be free to work independently when they get on the Council.

715. Men whom you would recognise as useful members of the Council?—I should recognise them as very useful members of the Council.

716. And you regret their inability to come in, except by alliance with political parties?—Yes.

717. May I ask you, did you feel before the last General Election the same regret?—Quite the same.

718. You were then a party with a majority?—Yes, and it was frequently felt during the three years that I was on the Council that there were members of the old Council whom we would prefer to have back, as capable business men, to some of those whom we had who were on our own side.

719. And who had stood?—And who had stood, but were defeated simply in the same way; because three years ago it was a Progressive majority, and a lot of new members were put on who knew very little of local work; they had very little experience.

720. And you lost experienced men who had a good deal of support, but did not get a majority?—That was so.

721. Has your attention, in consequence, been turned to the suggestion of securing the election of representatives of all parties in proportion to their strength?—Yes.

722. And on securing a comparative permanence of position as representatives on the part of leading members?—Yes.

723. These men whose absence you regret, under some system of that kind would be almost certain of re-election if they stood?—Yes, almost certain, I think.

724. And that would lend coherence and stability to the action of the Council?—Yes.

725. Have you any illustrations of the way in which the action of the Council suffers now?—

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

I know that in regard to many of the things which are brought up by the officials there is a want of continuity. The officials themselves complain that they have only to mention that such-and-such a thing was proposed at the last Council, which was of a different way of thinking, and it will be condemned. They have to bring it up *de novo* as though it was something which had just come into their own minds, and then it will be considered. I say that without any reference to party whatever; it occurs whether the clean sweep takes place on one side or the other.

726. In each case there is a tendency to abandon what has been left incomplete?—Yes.

727. And to reverse former action?—Yes, decidedly.

728. And you want greater stability?—Yes.

729. Have you taken to studying modes of securing these better results?—I had the honour of hearing your Lordship address a meeting, and I have read various papers on the subject, and I came to the conclusion that proportional representation was a much better system. I came to that conclusion some time ago before I knew what the result of the elections was going to be.

730. That meeting had no connection with municipal politics, I think?—No, none whatever.

731. It was on Parliamentary representation?—Yes.

732. And it happened some years ago—three years ago?—I think it was within the last two years, but I am not quite sure of the date.

733. At all events, it had no connection with the change of character of your Council?—None whatever.

734. Or with your fortunes in the Council?—No.

735. You came to the conclusion that it offered a better principle of representative reform?—Certainly.

736. Did you come to any conclusion as to the difficulty of working it?—Yes, I have discussed it sometimes with folks who raise the difficulty that people will not understand the voting papers; but for myself I think that is a difficulty which would be found to be non-existent directly the system was put into practice.

737. Probably you took part in the illustrative election that we had?—Yes, I did.

738. Did some of your friends do so?—Yes.

739. You did not hear of any difficulty in filling up the papers on their part?—No, none whatever and even some of those who talked about difficulties had no difficulty themselves. If you give them a paper they fill it up easily enough.

740. And with respect to the electors of Lewisham, with whom you must now have a pretty large acquaintance, do you think that if it were put to the test they would be able to fill up the papers?—I think so, quite well.

741. Have you followed also the mode of counting the votes and ascertaining the quota?—No, we have not had any practical experience of that at all.

742. You could not give us any opinion as to the ease with which it could be done?—No, I am afraid I cannot do that.

743. But

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Mr. A. W. HISCOX.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

743. But you would like to see the experiment tried?—Yes, I should very much.

744. The present system gives great power to the managers of parties?—Yes, it does. Those who try to work the party make their influence felt both outside and inside the Council, especially at the time of elections.

745. Are there distinct party committees formed for promoting election?—Yes.

746. Do they keep a standing organisation; have they got a secretary for keeping up the register and looking after the registers and anything of that kind?—At the last election the ordinary Parliamentary organisation was brought to work. Of course, they have a paid secretary.

747. All of which tends to make Municipal elections a part of party politics?—Yes.

748. And it alters the character of the Council?—Yes.

749. And the character of their proceedings?—Yes.

750. Then, of course, another result is that a very large proportion of the voters have no representation?—That is so.

751. In the present case there must be nearly half, or a very large section, of the community that are not represented at all on the Council?

Chairman.

752. Why?—Because all one party got their ticket elected in each ward.

753. You mean that being a minority they do not get any representation?—The other side are not represented at all on the present Council.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

754. Have you got the numbers or statistics of your elections?—I have some statistics which Mr. Humphreys has prepared. I have nothing else with me.

Chairman.

755. I understand that you are here to complain that politics are allowed to enter into your Municipal affairs?—Partly so.

756. That is your case for, as I understand, some change in the mode of electing your representatives?—Do you mean Imperial politics, or do you mean merely party?

757. You said you were very much disgusted with the state of things in Lewisham, because nobody had any chance of being elected unless he were a member of one party or the other and took an active part in party politics; and you thought it was very undesirable that that should be necessarily the case in Local Government and Municipal affairs?—Yes.

758. But that is, of course, a matter which is not peculiar to Lewisham itself; that is the case in a very large number of boroughs?—Exactly.

759. I suppose it exists because the majority of the people who pull the strings and lead affairs wish it to do so?—It is impossible for anyone to stand for an election at all unless he joins in this party fight.

760. But what I want to know is how you are going to prevent people having party committees and party organisation because you change the mode of election?—If you ask people to vote for

Chairman—continued.

No. 1 instead of being able to vote for a party ticket, I think that alters the case entirely.

761. But if they know that No. 1 represents their party ticket with a second vote for No. 3 and another vote for No. 4, of course the party wirepullers will give exactly the same instructions to attain their object as they do now. Is not that the case?—It would hardly bring about the same result.

762. Never mind the result. My question was: how are you going to do away with the party organisation and party committees to which you object?—I do not see that there would be the advantage of a party ticket.

763. Why not?—Because if a man has to be voted for on his merits it would make all the difference between the men.

764. Quite so, that is the whole point of the question; but, if you cannot make them vote for a man on his merits now, how are you going to make people vote for a man on his merits in future? I quite agree with you, I think it is a great misfortune having party politics in Local Government. I am entirely opposed to politics being allowed to enter into it, but I want to know how you are going to bring about the very desirable result of entirely doing away with politics in Municipal affairs by adopting another system of voting?—It appears to me that if you have an undesirable third candidate, say, on a ticket, with proportional representation, he being third, would stand no chance of getting in.

765. Why not?—Because with the parties even not equally balanced, but with a large minority, No. 1 on the other ticket is certain to be elected, and therefore No. 3 on the one ticket must be left out.

766. Have you studied this system?—Yes, I have given some little time to it.

767. Are you aware that not only the man who gets a large majority is elected, but, if he gets so many more votes than are required to elect him his surplus votes can be transferred to another candidate, and are the means of electing also that other candidate; and, if after that candidate is elected there are still votes to be transferred either from himself or from the man from whom he has got them, those votes may be transferred to a third candidate, and therefore if the party is sufficiently strong it can take care that although all its supporters vote for the first man, they all put down the second man, No. 2, as one of their party, so as to get No. 3 in, and No. 4 elected besides?—But that presumes a very overwhelming majority for the party.

768. No, it does not. It presumes a certain knowledge of what the strength of the party is; but even then, so far as I understand the system, the object is that everybody should get their proper representation. If one side has got a majority it will get that representation, and you will not prevent the party getting its majority although it may not get an overwhelming number or an undue number, according to its numbers?—But then, as I understand it, the vote cannot be transferred until the first vote of every person has been taken into account.

769. That is so, no doubt; but that does not prevent

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

prevent the party majority still getting representation. They would not get such undue representation as they do now; but it will not prevent the party wire-pullers from continuing to pull the strings and getting the party elected. I do not think it is contended—I do not think Lord Courtney contends that?—I do not think also that it does away with the parties; but what I do think the effect would be is that the undesirable elements in both parties would find themselves left out.

770. I am very glad you find it necessary to get rid of the undesirable elements in both parties; but I am bound to say that I do not see how you are going to do it. How is your election carried on now; have you different wards?—Yes, there are nine wards in Lewisham borough.

771. And each selects so many members?—Yes, in some cases three, and in some cases six, and in one ward nine members.

772. But the result of your last election was that one party got no representation at all?—One party has no representation at all.

773. Then, of course, so far as that is concerned, the object and result, so far as we can learn from this Bill, would be to give fair representation to everybody; which would be a great improvement on the result of your last election at all events?—Yes; there would be a working minority, who could tell what the past Council had been doing, and so provide continuity in the work and business arrangements.

774. I am afraid I do not think it would prevent undesirable party managers having their weight, to a certain extent. So far as they could get the party elected they would continue to try and do so, would they not. I mean, the whole of this précis of your evidence, which I have read, goes on the desirability of doing away with party politics in municipal elections?—In speaking of party, I mean men joining together as a party. It may not be party politics that unites them; sometimes it is merely uniting to form a ticket to run the election.

775. I am taking your own words, that in local elections the present method is responsible for creating disgust, and so on, among capable men; and therefore you get rid of your capable men because they will not stand: and you think it very undesirable that party politics should have the influence that they do?—Yes, and by party there I meant the party method—the method of uniting to run on a ticket, and so forming a party on one side or the other in the contest.

776. When you use the word “party” you mean political party?—I did not use it in that sense.

777. Then would you explain what you mean when you say that the party feeling which is aroused at elections is often continued afterwards. What are the parties in your municipal elections if they are not political?—You sometimes get a party formed for carrying out some particular purpose, say a party of economy who will promise to do various things; but I do not mean necessarily a political party.

778. You would not think that a party of economy was a very undesirable party?—Not because of that.

779. The more you can educate the feeling of that party the better.

Earl of Hardwicke.

780. Have you not a refuse destructor at Lewisham that the last party built?—Not the last party. There is a refuse destructor which has never been worked—it is useless?

781. But you say there is another party in now, and they do not work it. The first party built it, I suppose, and found that it did not answer, and this was money lost to the constituency?—Yes, exactly.

782. And they have been carrying on, you say, continuity of work? Apparently this party have left this destructor not working?—Yes.

783. There is some continuity in that?—The thing would not work. The money was sunk on it, and it has proved of no value at all.

784. Why was a sum of money sunk on it in the first place, then?—It was purchased before it was found that it was really of no use.

Chairman.

785. You say that under the system of party contests the wirepuller is all-powerful. Do you not mean that party politics are all-powerful?—It might not be. Sometimes in municipal affairs you have persons who are on one side in party politics, who take what appears to be the opposite side in municipal affairs.

786. But I should rather like to know what you mean when you say that under the system of party contests the wirepuller is all-powerful and makes his influence felt both inside the elected body and outside. Do you mean that to refer to politics or not?—No, not only to politics; it refers to any man who wants to work for a party throughout the borough.

787. Whether a good object or a bad object?—Whether a good object or a bad object.

788. You think it is objectionable that anybody should form any organisation for any purpose?—I think if we could have a method of electing which would not enable him to score a clean sweep such as he gets now in various wards, that would somewhat modify it.

789. So far as it would secure representatives of the real opinion in the borough, I quite follow you; but I do not quite see your object in doing away with an organisation for a special purpose which may be a good one?—I do not suppose that organisations can be done away with.

790. You have not had any experience of this proposed system in Lewisham?—No.

791. Then you are an advocate of the proposed system because you think that as at present managed the results of elections are very unsatisfactory, and also that a feeling is created which it is undesirable should exist, and that the party wire-pullers pull the strings without leaving a feeling of independence to the electors?—Yes.

792. And that is all.

Earl Beauchamp.

793. I would only ask you whether you have considered other methods of preventing the same result, such as the cumulative vote?—We had the cumulative vote in the case of the School Board Elections in London; but I do not think our experience was very satisfactory with regard to that.

794. That is why you are convinced that proportional representation is the only way?—So far as I understand it.

795. As

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Mr. A. W. HISCOX.

[Continued.]

Lord Colchester.

795. As I understand your view, it is this. You think that if the minority had a share in the representation the undesirables of either party would fall through?—Yes.

796. You think that if each section of the community was represented proportionately, the best men of each side would get in?—Yes.

797. And the weaker ones would fall through?—Yes.

798. That is assuming that the best men would always get the larger proportion of their party vote?—Yes.

799. I suppose, also, your idea was that if there were a certain number of people who wanted to run a candidate apart from any ticket they would have a greater chance of carrying him on proportional representation?—Yes.

800. He would have a chance then that he would not have now?—Yes.

801. On the other hand, what was your objection to the cumulative voting system under the School Board?—It gave rise, I think, to some of the same difficulties as the other system of voting—namely, of parties simply fighting one party against the other, and it did not give the proportional representation according to the actual votes.

802. But it was the case, was it not, sometimes, that small minorities who were not exactly powerless now and then got their candidate in?—I think the minorities then got more than their fair representation.

803. Like the Roman Catholics, who got a candidate in in Southwark, and the same thing in other cases where one or two special candidates were returned on their own merits by the cumulative vote, perhaps rather on personal grounds than otherwise?—Yes.

804. I forget how you stood in Lewisham—what your balance there was of majority and minority under the School Board generally?—Lewisham Borough was included in the Greenwich Division.

805. In Greenwich I think the representation was divided about equally very often?—Yes, it was.

806. But you certainly never had a clean sweep of the School Board either way?—I think not; there certainly was not the same as has happened now.

807. You never had a case where each elector had not at least some one man in sympathy with him among his representatives?—I think not.

808. Was not one of the great inconveniences of that system the very big unwieldy size of the School Board constituencies. I think, if I remember rightly, that one of the old School Board Divisions of London was formed into six or seven for the County Council?—Yes.

809. Those divisions were very unwieldy in size?—Yes. The Greenwich Division included what are now the four boroughs of Lewisham, Greenwich, Deptford, and Woolwich.

810. I can quite understand that under those circumstances there were certain inconveniences which would not exist if there were single-member constituencies?—Yes.

(O 13)

Lord Avebury.

811. Do you remember that when we had the Committee of the House of Commons—I may say I quite agree with you that cumulative voting would not be so good a system as that in Lord Courtney's Bill—the representatives of the Education Department expressed a very strong opinion that that system contributed greatly to the successful working of the Act?—Yes; I think they had that opinion.

812. But still you think that this system would be a better one than the cumulative voting system?—I think so.

813. I understood you to say (I did not quite understand your answer in the same way as our Chairman did) that your objection to the present system was the violent fluctuations and the annihilation at times of the minority?—Yes, that is my objection. You see in Lewisham first of all we had, if I may use party terms, what was called a Moderate Council with a very large majority of Moderates. The second Council was just the other way, a large majority of Progressives; and, as I mentioned just now, we used to say on that Council that we suffered from the lack of men who were our opponents, but who had been thrown out. And now the sweep has gone the other way again, so as to entirely sweep out the Progressives.

813*. The discouragement of Independent candidates was rather a subsidiary objection, as I understood you, the others being the main objections in your mind?—Yes.

814. And is it not the case—it is the case, of course—that at present the party which has a majority may get the whole representation, to the exclusion of the minority?—Yes.

815. On the other hand, under Lord Courtney's Bill the minority would be sure to secure some seats in proportion to their strength?—Yes, they are certain to do so.

816. Is it not reasonable to conclude that they would bring in their best men, and that would exclude the less popular, and, presumably, less useful members on the other side?—I think so.

817. So that the tendency would be to bring in the best men of the minority, and to exclude the weakest men of the majority?—Yes.

818. And you think that is very important to the good working of our municipal institutions?—Yes.

819. There is just one other point, and one only, I think, that I should like to ask about. Is there not also this point to be considered that there are many cases in which municipal bodies have to nominate representatives on other bodies?—Yes.

820. And from that point of view it is important that both sides should be fairly represented in proportion to their strength?—Yes.

821. And that would be another advantage which you would have if Lord Courtney's Bill were adopted?—I think that if you get a fair representation of both sides, when men were elected on the Council they would consider quite fairly who were the best men to represent them. That has been my experience.

822. On other bodies you mean?—On other bodies. But when you get a clean sweep, of course, the men elected are bound to choose only representatives from their own body.

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823. I

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Mr. A. W. HISCOX.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

823. I did not understand you to suggest or to wish or to think it possible to do away with party organisations, but that what you did wish was that the independent man who was not prepared to work with either organisation should have a fair chance; and that you think we would obtain under this Bill?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

824. But do not you think that some folly of a municipal body while they were in office, would be likely to bring about a change at the next election; for instance, take the building of this dust destructor; do you not suppose that that made any difference in the election?—I do not think so. In that particular case the dust destructor was set up by the Vestry; and the same party that set it up (if it was done by a party; I think probably it was done by one man more particularly) had a majority on the first Borough Council.

825. But surely if the electors see that a folly has been committed it must make a difference next time?—It does influence the election, of course.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

826. I want to direct your attention to one of your wards—a ward which returns six members. You said that the wards returned, three, six, and nine members?—Yes.

827. The ward which returns six members would be an average ward?—Yes.

828. At present the majority of the electors can elect all six members?—Yes.

829. A ticket is put out of six candidates on each side?—Yes.

830. That is the process?—Yes.

831. And the electors are exhorted to vote for each of the six?—Exactly.

832. According to their predilections?—Yes.

833. And they are assured that unless they stick together and vote for the whole six, they may not get any representation at all?—That is so.

834. The consequence is that the contest generally lies between two complete lists?—Yes.

835. An independent man may now and then put himself forward, but he has to struggle between the two lists?—Yes.

836. The fact that the majority of electors can get all six seats strengthens if it does not produce the party feeling, the ticket feeling?—Yes, it does.

837. You are told again and again that you are absolutely powerless unless you go in with your fellows?—"Stick to the party."

838. You must stick to the party?—Yes.

839. That is the essence, as we think the vicious essence, of the present system?—Yes.

840. You cannot get rid of people working together, but the present system gives such power to that co-operation that it tends to create parties, where otherwise they would not exist?—Yes.

841. In that way each party makes up probably its best six?—Yes.

842. But they must be of various degrees of goodness?—Yes.

843. And you generally get people to vote for

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

them irrespective of their personal merits?—Yes.

844. If you belong to the party supporting one six you go in for the whole six, although you feel that one or two of the other six would be preferable perhaps to one or two of your own?—Yes.

845. That is simply what we are endeavouring to struggle against?—Yes.

846. Under the scheme of this Bill no party could hope to get all six in?—No.

847. A party might still put out, say, four?—Yes.

848. And might urge its followers to join in supporting their four?—Yes.

849. Another party would put out four?—Yes.

850. But would there not be this answer even to their appeals: "I shall vote independently. I shall take care to give preferential votes. My votes will tell. It will be for the good man in your party and the good man of another party, and perhaps for an independent man. I shall do my best to bring them all in, and I am not powerless, my vote will prevail somehow or other"?—I think so. I think the tendency would be to give the votes in that way.

851. The new system cannot destroy party?—No.

852. It cannot destroy the tendency of people to work together, but it reduces the machine to such a degree that you can resist it, and still be able to exercise your vote?—Yes.

853. That is what we want to do?—It is so.

Chairman.

854. I should like to ask you one more question. You understand that the Bill gives power to any Municipality to adopt this system of voting as a trial?—Yes.

855. That is to say, to adopt it for an election, and if they do not like it when they have got it they can go back to the old system?—Yes.

856. Do you think that if this Bill were passed into law there is any chance of Lewisham, which has suffered so much from the present system, adopting for municipal purposes the Bill and giving it a trial?—I cannot say whether there would be a majority on the Council for it, but I know some who are very strongly in favour of it.

857. It depends upon the majority, of course?—Yes, and the present majority are making the same complaint about this Council which some of us used to make on the last Council—that they would like to be without some of their present members, although they came in on their party ticket.

858. I am afraid that the people who would like to get rid of the present system are not on the Council at the present moment; is not that your complaint?—No, the gentlemen who have spoken to me are on the Council.

859. I thought you said that they were all party people who were on the Council, and that one party alone was represented?—But some members of the present Council complained to me that they see the difficulty, the same as we did on the last Council.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

860. In spite of all there are some members of the present party who see a better plan?—Yes.

861. And

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

861. And many members, of course, of the defeated party see a better plan?—Yes.

862. And possibly, not in the present party, not in this Council, but in the next Council or in the next but one, you would be able out of these materials to get a majority for adopting the better plan?—I think so.

863. You have got some even now?—Yes.

864. You have got some who will come back; there is sure to be a reaction?—Yes.

865. If you keep those that you have now, and have those that come back, you will gradually have a better opinion?—Yes.

Chairman.

866. Lord Courtney is very persuasive and rather induced you to say that in a future Council you think there may be a majority in favour of this scheme?—No.

867. I gathered that. I will correct myself, that in a future Council there would be a majority for the scheme. Do you think there would be?—I cannot really estimate it.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

868. But you do not think it is impossible?—No.

869. Not even improbable, perhaps?—Not improbable. I happen to be mixing with people who are in favour of the scheme. The Municipal Association of Lewisham have considered it, and think it worth a trial. They consist very largely of friends whom I am constantly meeting with—the Vicar and various members who have just been elected on the Council.

Chairman.

870. Is that a powerful organisation?—It has some hundreds of members—between 200 and 300 from all parts of the borough.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

871. Your Vicar is one?—Yes, the Vicar is president.

872. Following up my other question I was going to put this further one. Having that ward returning six members at present, as you have said, an independent man has little or no chance in standing?—Exactly.

873. Under the proposed system, if an independent man stood in a ward which returned six members and got one-seventh or one more than one-seventh of those who voted to give him their votes he would get in?—Yes.

874. So that the independent man would have a very good chance?—He would stand a very good chance.

875. So that you would be not only breaking down instantly the power of parties, but giving very good chances of success to independent men who recommend themselves to their fellows?—Yes.

876. They would not be required to get the majority to vote for them; if they got one-seventh of the votes they are successful?—Yes.

877. In fact, the change which we promote, and your society is advocating throughout Lewisham, would give a new life to these Municipal Councils by bringing in all the elements of life in the municipality?—I think so.

878. In proportion to their strength?—Yes.

879. Combining as they might desire to combine, but not by force of combination excluding others?—That is so.

Lord Avebury.

880. Under your present system there is a ward with nine members, I think I understood you to say?—Yes.

881. Supposing the two sides are fighting, that which has a minority, even if it be only a single vote, carries the whole nine seats?—Yes.

882. And that you think is a ridiculous system of representation?—Yes.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Friday next, 12 o'clock.

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[60]

Die Veneris, 14^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of HARDWICKE.
Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.
Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. G. U. YULE is called in and Examined.

Chairman.

883. I think you are a member of the Council of the Statistical Society?—Yes.

884. Have you had an opportunity of studying this Bill which is before the Committee?—Yes; during the last two weeks, or so, I have been able to give some amount of attention to it.

885. Have you some remarks to make about it to the Committee. Having looked over the précis of your evidence I see there are a good many criticisms in detail on the different clauses, but I think, perhaps, it would be most convenient for you to give the Committee your views generally on the subject of the Bill, and the principles which it embodies, and then to go through it afterwards and refer the Committee to any particular part on which you wish to make any comment?—Certainly. I take it that it is hardly the general question of proportional representation that is under discussion, but merely the special rules for obtaining that end. Concerning the Bill generally, I think there is very little to be said. I think it is straightforward and comprehensible except perhaps on a point of detail, to which I might return later. The points which strike one, reading through the whole Bill, are chiefly points in the Schedules, more particularly in the first Schedule, the Schedule of Rules; and, coming to the study of the Schedules without a previous knowledge of such Bills as have been passed in other countries with regard to proportional representation, I may say that I did find the rules extremely complex and difficult to follow. As I think the first witness remarked, trying to follow such rules without an example is rather like trying to follow the rules of whist when you are not playing the game, and I should have thought it desirable in so very important a matter, concerning the rules affecting all the voters of a country, that not merely the principle of the Bill, but the application of that principle ought to be such as could be fol-

Chairman—continued.

lowed by the average man as well as by a returning officer who necessarily has to give considerable study to the Act in order to be quite certain of performing his duties in such a way as not to make any mistake.

886. Would you say in considering whether you should adopt a new principle of this sort, it would be desirable, as far as possible, that the ordinary voter should be able to follow, and understand, that by voting in a particular way the result will be arrived at which he wishes to obtain by giving his vote?—Yes. I feel that is so.

887. Of course it is imperative that Returning Officers should understand it, but it is also desirable, is it not, that at all events a considerable number of electors who might take the trouble to look into it, should be able to understand it on the face of the Bill without any information from someone else?—Yes, that is precisely what I wish to convey to the Committee, and, perhaps, as a slightly different matter, but also on the same point, I think as the adoption of the Act is permissive, certainly the ordinary local authorities ought to be able to follow it without any difficulty; I do not think they would be inclined to take up a matter which they could not understand. Therefore, from the standpoint of those who desire proportional representation, I think it is desirable that the rules should be made somewhat simpler.

888. Having looked at the Bill, are you satisfied from your knowledge of such matters that practically if the rules of the Bill were followed, the Bill would carry out the principles which it is desired to obtain, namely, that everybody who is a candidate should get the support to which he is fairly entitled?—Yes, I think so.

889. There is another point as to whether the system works out mathematically correct, is there

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Mr. G. U. YULE.

[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

there not?—Yes, I think so. I think you might draft other rules which might conceivably lead to a different result in an election, but I do not think the mere assumption of proportional representation as a principle would lead necessarily to one set of rules producing a mathematically correct result. Taking the Schedule on page 4 of the Bill, the first difficulty that would occur, I think, to anyone reading the rules would be as regards the definition of the quota. Some little time, I think, has been spent on that point. I do not think that the word “obviously,” in line 14, is quite applicable; in fact, the definition puzzled me for some little time, but I think now it is quite right. Of course, the word does not affect the sense at all, it is merely unnecessary. It is the case that a candidate with the quota, if there are three vacancies to be filled, cannot be lower than the third; if there are four vacancies to be filled cannot be lower than the fourth, and so on; so that a candidate with the quota of votes must be elected. I take it that the quota as defined in the Act is the lowest possible value which it is possible to assign to the quota under any system of vote transfer; with different rules as to the transfer the quota might take another value, I think. To that point, perhaps, one might return in connection with a later matter. Then taking the rules as to transfer generally, there seem to me to be four rules of a different kind affecting the matter. First, the rules under Section 4, under which the surplus of the candidate with the greatest surplus is proportionately transferred to other candidates. Secondly, the rules under Section 6, under which only the votes in the sub-parcel last transferred to a candidate are proportionately transferred.

890. That is under Section 6, is it not?—Yes, Section 6, pages 5 and 6. Then thirdly, under Section 7, lower down on page 6, when you have transferred all surpluses of candidates having a surplus, you proceed to distribute the votes of the lowest candidate as a whole, and then finally under Section 9 there is a fourth type of rule for filling the last vacancy by declaring elected all the continuing candidates if they are equal in number to the remaining vacancies, or the highest continuing candidates if their positions could not be affected by going on with the process of transfer. That is really four different types of rule which the returning officer has to bear in mind in conducting the transfers. If the number of rules could be reduced, so that the whole process went forward on only one principle or two principles, it would seem simpler than in the present case, where he has to bear in mind four principles.

Lord Avebury.

891. I do not understand why you call them different principles; will you please explain?—Perhaps “principles” is too wide a term. If you prefer the term I will say “different rules.” First, the Returning Officer transfers the whole of the candidates’ votes proportionately under Section 4, then under Section 6 he has only to deal with the parcel of votes last transferred to the candidates and has not to take the whole

Lord Avebury—continued.

parcel of votes. Then under Section 7 there is the change of process of distributing the votes of the candidate lowest on the poll, and then under Section 9 there is filling the last vacancy.

Chairman.

892. Do you mean that instead of following exactly the same rule all through, according to the rules they vary according to the part of the election you have got to?—Yes, at different stages. Then to the first two rules there are two exceptions which are mandatory—Sub-section (5) of Section 4 on page 5 provides:—“A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate exceed the difference between the total of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll”; and there is a precisely similar clause under Section 6, Sub-section (7). There I think the wording is identical. I found it a little difficult to understand on what principle the whole of these rules had been drafted. Several sections, more particularly the mandatory exceptions, seem to have been introduced merely for the purpose of saving labour, and not making a transfer of votes if the transfer was not essential. There is a similar, but only a permissive exception in Section 7, Sub-section (2); but that being permissive, I do not think it is of so much consequence. That is the section as to permitting the Returning Officer to transfer the votes of the two lowest candidates bodily instead of separately. I would like to ask again—whether it is not better to consider the rules rather from the standpoint of getting the greatest possible simplicity than from the standpoint of lessening the mere labour of vote transfer. It does seem to me rather probable that under the present rules some breach might unintentionally be made, for instance, an oversight as to the exceptions under Section 4, Sub-section (6), and Section 6, Sub-section (7). There is no essential reason, I think, for making this mandatory.

893. Do I understand you to mean that, if in the Act of Parliament you put into the Schedule of the Act a mandatory rule, although a variation from that rule would not affect the election, the election might be voided by the fact that the Returning Officer had not followed a rule which is laid down in an Act of Parliament?—That is what I supposed. Of course I am not a lawyer, and I do not know if that would be the effect.

894. As a matter of fact would it be probably more satisfactory to lay down those rules which necessarily must be followed, and to embody any other suggestions as to carrying out the election in some form which would not have the effect of being a part of an Act of Parliament?—Yes, that is what struck me; but, of course, on the legal point I could not speak. One suggestion I made in my *précis* was, whether it would be legitimate and would save a good deal of labour and complexity in the rules to adopt the principle, not of proportionate transfer as worked out in the example on page 9, but the principle simply of transferring the votes last polled for a candidate. If you found that there were so many votes surplus, starting at the top of the candidates’ parcel of votes and distributing onwards until you had distributed

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distributed either the number required or as many as possible. If that were legitimate it would mean enormous simplicity.

895. Do you contend that that would make no difference in the result of an election if followed?—It is adopting a process of selection instead of considering the whole of the votes, and so far might be thought undesirable; because if you shuffled the votes in a different way there might be a slight difference in the final result.

896. Do I understand you are satisfied that by adopting some alternative system of that sort it will not have any effect on the final result. That is an important point to consider, is it not?—Yes, it might lead to a different result to that arrived at under this Act; that is quite conceivable.

897. If you are satisfied that a result is correct and that it might lead to a different result, it might lead to a result which is not correct, might it not?—Is it not conceivable that one might be satisfied with either, recognising that a thoroughly ideal system would be impossible? For instance, it is not possible to apply the principle of the Act to England as a whole, and though one might regard the ideal system of proportional transfer as just, one would not be dissatisfied with its application within simpler limits.

898. I am rather looking at whether this result arrived at in following out these rules is the absolutely correct result mathematically, which is the only result which can be correct to give the due proportionate representation to every candidate according to the number of people who vote. If it is only to a certain extent correct, and another system of rules is also to a certain extent correct, that does not quite answer my question as to whether this is absolutely mathematically certain to produce the result which it is sought to produce?—I do not feel that the principle of proportional representation transfer need necessarily lead to one system of rules, and one only, and that it is quite possible that two different systems might give different results.

899. But if one result is correct the other must be incorrect, must it not?—I do not think that is so, necessarily.

900. If you have a certain number of voters, and by taking mathematically the people you wish to represent a certain candidate, you get in the result an absolute reflex of the mind and intention of every voter, and then that is mathematically correct. If you do not, but only get something approaching to it, then although the two systems may be good, one may be slightly better than the other, or they might both lead to the same result if they are followed out. I want to know whether this is only approximately correct, or whether it is absolutely correct?—I have come rather definitely to the conclusion that the problem is not one with a unique solution, but that you might get two solutions which might be correct. It is very difficult to be quite certain in a problem of this sort. I could not put the thing in the terms of a formula.

Chairman—continued.

901. Then you will not commit yourself to the fact that this is so correct that you could not alter or improve on it by any other system?—No, I do not think I could go as far as that. It is quite correct; but I would not say that no other system could be correct.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

902. As I understand, this is your position. The system worked out in the Bill may produce, for aught you know, an absolutely correct result; you are not disposed to dispute that, are you?—No.

903. Although with the wide possibility of speculation, you would not like to commit yourself to it. But you do think, I understand, that it might be simplified, and a result produced which, in 99 cases out of 100, would be the same though in a small number of cases it might be slightly different?—Yes.

904. But you think it would be quite worth while to run the risk of error of a large series of elections, in order to have a simpler process, do you?—Yes, I think that quite expresses my view.

Chairman.

905. I think you have made a rough draft of suggestions by which you think that the rules would be simplified, have you not, as regards ordinary persons who have not studied the matter?—Those were the rules based on the suggestion that I made—whether it might not be possible to adopt the principle of transferring votes last filed, instead of the proportional system of transfer in the rules. There might be three rules with possible additions as regards the exclusion of candidates in special cases, and so on, where two candidates have the same number of votes; those are rather particular matters. Then my suggested rules on that principle might read something like this, though they are only rather roughly drafted:—Rules 1 and 2 would stand at present, that is, the rules as regards the mixing of papers and the ascertainment of the quota, though a different rule might be substituted for defining the quota without altering my rules. Then for Rule 3, I would read: “If either after the first operation of the ballot or the operation of the next following rule any candidate shall possess surplus votes in excess of the quota, the Returning Officer shall transfer a number of votes equal to such excess from the parcel of the candidate having the greatest excess to the parcels of the candidates or continuing candidates next in order of the voters’ preference, the particular votes transferred being those last filed in the candidate’s parcel. When the candidate’s votes have been reduced to the quota he shall be declared elected and excluded from the further operation of the poll. This process shall be continued so long as any candidate possess an excess of votes above the quota.” Then my Rule 4 is: “If either after the first operation of the ballot or the operation of the preceding rule no candidate possess any votes in excess of the quota, the Returning Officer shall, as far as possible, transfer the votes
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of the candidate lowest on the poll to the candidates or continuing candidates next in order of the voters' preference. Any candidate whose votes have been as far as possible so transferred shall be regarded as excluded from the further operation of the poll." And Rule 5 is: "The processes of transferring shall be continued as directed by Rules 3 and 4 until either the required number of candidates has been elected, or until the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the number of vacancies remaining unfilled, when the continuing candidates shall be declared elected." I think those rules would cover the essence of the proposed suggested system.

906. And you think, do you, that those rules would allow an election to be better understood by an ordinary voter than the large number of rules, somewhat varying in principle, which exist in the Bill?—That is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

907. Do you quite adopt the words "varying in principle"?—Perhaps those words are rather too wide. I did not wish to imply anything too wide.

Chairman.

908. Are there any other points you would like to refer to in the Bill?—As regards the question of errors which might arise under the Bill—the point especially mentioned to me as one requiring attention—there are three sorts of errors that can arise, errors of the kind that occur in ordinary elections now, due to the sorting of individual ballot papers into wrong parcels (which would include the case of mere errors in counting), then there is a possible, though, no doubt, rather improbable error—namely, the sorting of an entire sub-parcel into the wrong parcel, and then a misunderstanding of the rules, which is quite a different kind of error altogether.

909. With regard to the two first, I suppose those really would be sources of errors which would be equally found in other modes of election?—Yes, certainly; it was only that I thought the question ought to be raised as to whether the proposed arrangement would tend to increase such errors. In the election in the appendix to the Bill, on page 8, I take it that the proportion of ballot papers missorted, one may assume, would be simply a percentage of such papers, and the important thing is how many would be mis-sorted. In the present case under the Act, you have not only to sort 6,000, but owing to the subsequent processes collected together on page 12 of the Bill you have to sort 1,007 in the case of the first transfer, 93 in the next transfer, and so on, and adding together all those ballot papers which you have to sort again, it would make a virtual total of 1,884 ballot papers to be sorted in addition to the first 6,000. Of course, they are the same individual papers, but you have to sort them again, so that practically you have 7,884 sortings to do altogether, and the number of papers missorted would be a certain percentage on that number. Under the present system

Chairman—continued.

of election it is the case, I think, that each voter has five votes in a case where there are five vacancies. I am afraid I am not sufficiently familiar with the process at present to know what does happen, but there are five distinct ballot papers or votes to be sorted for each candidate, are not there?

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

910. No, it is not done in that way. Are you speaking of the system in London?—Yes.

911. If there is a ward in which five persons are to be elected, there may be a dozen or 15, or more candidates, a ballot paper is given to each elector with all the candidates' names on it, and the elector is entitled to put a cross against five names if five are to be elected. Do you understand that?—Yes, so far I am familiar with the process.

912. He must not put more crosses because that would void the paper, but he may put less than five; not using his full power; he may mark 4, 3, 2, or 1, plumping for one man only. Then there is no sorting of the papers, each paper is called out separately to a clerk or clerks who stand by, one for A, one for B, and one for C, and so on, so that you could have as many papers as there are combinations of five out of a total number of combinations plus combinations of four out of the total number of candidates, plus combinations of three, plus combinations of two, and so on, so that you might have thousands of varieties of papers?—Yes, but you cannot have more, in the case of the appendix, than 30,000 votes to sort, because each voter cannot have given more than five votes. There are 6,000 voters voting, and each one cannot give more than five votes, so that you have not more than 30,000 votes to sort. It is votes to sort and not papers, it is true, but I do not think that makes any essential difference.

913. You cannot have more than those votes, it is true, but the votes on each paper may be different?—Yes.

914. You cannot sort them in heaps, can you?—No, you cannot sort them in heaps, but the clerks to whom they are called out may book the names on to the wrong paper; it is the same type of error. The votes to be sorted will not be more than 30,000, but they will probably be greatly in excess of 6,000, and consequently there would be a chance of a greater number of mis-sortings on the present system than on the transfer system, because you are dealing with something like 20,000 or 30,000 votes to sort instead of only about 8,000.

Lord Avebury.

915. There are more chances of error under the present system than there are under the proposed system, you mean, do you not?—Yes, there is a chance of a greater number of errors. As regards the error of sorting an entire sub-parcel into the wrong parcel, it is, of course, a improbable error, and I take it there is nothing equivalent under the present system, as there are no sub-parcels to deal with. But from experience in other work I have an impression that every possible error does in time occur, though

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though it certainly would not occur at all frequently, obviously. On the third point I felt that unintentional breaches of the rules might be possible at first, until the Returning Officers got familiar with the process, and especially in the case of the mandatory exceptions, because they are rather unexpected. I think it is very difficult to lay down anything definite and general as to the possibilities of error; I do not think one can say much about it, and it is really a matter of common sense, but of course, again, the simpler the rules can be made the smaller the chances of error. One question which raises itself in my mind, and which I did not feel certain I could answer, was if a recount was demanded would it be possible to hold it exactly on the same lines as the original count? My difficulty arose at first owing to misunderstanding the rules in Section 6. There would be no difficulty, I suppose, in putting the papers back to their original parcels?

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

916. If you have an absolute recount from top to bottom you would mix all the papers, and go through the process as before?—Quite so. I think that really covers all the points I have noted as to the schedules. There is a clause in the Bill itself, the reason for which I did not understand. It is upon page 2, Section 3, lines 30, 31, and 32. It seemed to me that the Bill should apply to all cases where there are more than two candidates for one vacancy, otherwise you might get a candidate elected on a minority of voters. It seemed to me where there was one vacancy and only two candidates, then the Act need not apply, but if there were more than two candidates I think it should apply, because if there were three candidates, the winning candidate might only have just over a third of the votes instead of just over a half.

Lord Avebury.

917. Would you like to apply the principles of this Bill even where there was only one candidate to be elected?—Only one vacancy, but more than two candidates.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

918. You mean the method of the Bill, do you?—Yes.

Chairman.

919. Is there any other point to which you wish to call the attention of the Committee?—I think I have covered the points I noted in studying the Bill.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

920. You are a Member of the Council of the Statistical Society, I believe?—Yes.

921. And you have been for some time?—Yes.

922. And you have frequently contributed papers to the Society's Journal, have you not?—Yes.

923. Have you ever read any paper on this subject?—No.

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

924. Has your mind not been specially directed to it?—Not specially. I had noted references to the matter with some interest before, but I had never gone into the question of detail of method.

925. Are you aware of any papers in the Journal of the Society which do in any degree touch the subject?—The question, I believe, has been mentioned, but only *en passant*, in papers that I remember. There was an address by Sir Richard Martin, and there were some papers read, I think, some years ago, in which it was just mentioned; but I am speaking rather from memory.

926. Do not you remember an elaborate paper by the late Mr. Doop on General Elections?—I am afraid I do not.

927. In fact your mind, as you say, has not been very specially directed to the matter?—It has not.

928. You have dwelt on the difficulties which a voter and the Returning Officer would have in reference to the process under this Bill, and that the ordinary voter might not understand it, and it is desirable that he should understand it we agree. Have you any knowledge of what has happened outside England in respect to proposals for achieving proportional representation?—No, I have no special knowledge.

929. You do not know that the process was adopted practically in the strict form of this Bill in Tasmania?—I knew it had been adopted, but do you know whether the voters understand the system?

930. You are not aware at all events, are you, that the voter ever raised any objection to it in Tasmania?—No.

931. It has been abandoned in the elections in Tasmania; but are you aware it has been continued in the election of the Senators of the Commonwealth Parliament in Tasmania?—No, I was not aware of that. I knew the principle had been adopted in Tasmania, but I was not aware as to the details.

932. You know, probably Tasmania, like every other State in the Commonwealth, elects six Senators, and are you aware that they followed in that election the process laid down in this Bill?—No.

933. We have been told that they did so, and that 18,000 odd electors voted, and there were under 250 errors?—May I say I do not think that quite meets my point? My point was not hostility to the principle, nor necessarily to the Bill, but it looked to me as if it ought to be possible to make the rules simpler than they are at present.

934. We all desire simplicity, but you may, or may not, be aware of the pitfalls on the other side?—Of course that is quite possible.

935. Everyone would like to have as simple a rule as possible. The complexity of the present rules has not interfered with the successful elections in Tasmania; which is rather a striking fact, is it not?—Of course it is a very important fact.

936. Nor has it interfered with the action of the Returning Officers. The Committee have had before them a Report by the Tasmania Returning Officer as to the different cases in which
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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

the Act has been put into operation in Tasmania furnished to the Commonwealth Government, and it is extremely satisfactory, showing that he experienced no difficulty. Are you aware of what has been done on the Continent in reference to schemes of proportional representation?—Only very slightly, again in a general way; I am not aware of the details.

937. Do you know that in some fashion or other it has been adopted in Belgium?—Yes.

938. And in Switzerland, in several Cantons, and quite recently in Finland, and in all those places some election on the lines of proportional representation has been put into operation?—Yes.

939. You might take it from me that those systems are a good deal more complex than this process under the Bill, and are not so easily followed yet that they have given no trouble to the ordinary voter; in fact, the evidence from Belgium is otherwise, and that the voter is perfectly satisfied?—Is not the average voter perfectly satisfied with the present system of election here?

940. Your criticisms are not insurmountable you will admit, I suppose?—Of course, I do not say that.

941. When compared with the results aimed at, with the regeneration, if I may use the word, which is desired to be accomplished, these practical difficulties, which are speculative after all, practical experience has demonstrated, are not very serious, and may not be of very great importance, your great criticism was directed to the simplification which would be effected in the process, was it not, if instead of taking the transfers of voters on the principle of proportionality we took them as they were offered by chance; and you said if that plan were followed the processes would be much simpler, did you not?—Yes.

942. But, I understand, you admit that there might be in very rare cases a slightly different result produced?—Yes.

943. You have not followed the course of the advocacy of proportional representation, I understand?—Only so far as one has followed it in daily papers with a good deal of interest.

944. But you have not gone into the whole history of the matter as a student, have you?—I have not.

945. And you are not aware that the great stumbling block which advocates of proportional representation have had presented to them in former years has been that the taking the surplus votes out by chance may produce a different result, and we cannot agree to any scheme which involves any element of chance in the operation?—If you cannot, you cannot, of course, and there is an end of the matter.

946. You may take it from me that that has been the criticism presented over and over again, but mathematical demonstrations have been produced to show that the element of chance is infinitesimally small; the political objection has been constantly raised, so that we have introduced first in Tasmania, and by the adoption here, the strict principle of proportionality so as to get over that difficulty?—You call it the strict prin-

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

ciple, but is not it rather considerably modified by Section 6, in which the strict principle is only applied to the sub-parcel last transferred? It seems to me the strict principle should apply to the whole parcel.

947. It all turns, does it not, on the apprehension of the element of chance?—Yes.

948. Have you seen the evidence given before the Committee as to an election held in Northumberland more than 20 years ago?—No.

949. There was a test election held by Northumberland miners more than 20 years ago, and, following our then plan, the surplus votes were transferred on the principle of chance; a very large number of surplus votes had to be transferred from Mr. Gladstone, among other candidates, amounting, I think, to about 2,000, and they were taken out in three batches—600, 600, and 800 say—and it was found that in each of these three batches the distribution of surplus amongst the other candidates was almost exactly the same percentage. Do you see that on the minutes?—Yes.

Chairman.

950. Question 310 sums up the result, you see?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

951. But the point I am dwelling upon now is that Mr. Gladstone had a large number of surplus votes which had to be transferred, and they were taken out in three batches, and then it was found that 33 per cent. of them went to So-and-so, and that in the different batches the percentage was almost the same?—Yes, so far, that is in favour of the chance system.

952. Quite so; that was a special practical illustration of the comparative powerlessness of the element of chance, but here do you not see we have departed from that plan in favour of the strict plan, because we find it is a stumbling-block in our way, so that the point you raise is not a new point, is it?—I know it is not a new point.

953. And in persuading the Committee to adopt a simpler plan, you are trying to persuade us to follow a plan which has been followed, and which has been abandoned. Do you see that?—Yes.

954. With reference to your proposals to alter the mandatory clause to a direction, these rules have been drawn up so as to make the thing as simple as possible at the time of counting, so that there shall be no dispute between the Returning Officer and the representatives of the different candidates as to the particular line which should be taken, but nothing turns on the particular order of principle; there would be no objection, so far as I know, to putting in a note that although the officer is directed to do this, the election would not be invalid if a different order of things were pursued; what do you say as to that?—Really I think the exception might be omitted without altering anything essential, might it not?

955. It is only for convenience that it is done, and any alteration for the sake of convenience is admissible; so that your criticism would be met in that way, would it not?—Yes.

956. You

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Lord Avebury.

956. You stated as an objection to the system, that you thought an ordinary elector looking at this Bill would find some difficulty in understanding it. Do you think that practically ordinary electors ever looked at the Ballot Bill, for instance, or at any of the other Bills; do not they follow the instructions given on the voting papers?—Yes, but I think that they at least understand the principle of the present election—it is so very simple; and I do not think they would follow the principle of this.

957. You stated to the Committee that you have not followed what has been going on abroad, and you are not aware that the principle is in operation in a considerable number of foreign countries?—No. Of course, you might put the principle into operation, but is that evidence that the voters would follow it? The details are so important here that they are almost principles.

958. I quite agree; but I only want to know how far you have followed the matter, and whether you are aware that the principle of proportional representation in one form or another has been adopted in many foreign countries?—Yes, I was aware that it had been followed in several.

959. Have you followed the processes which have been adopted at all?—No; I was only aware of the principle.

960. Are you aware that it has been adopted by a very considerable number of associations of working men?—No, I was not aware of that.

961. You are aware that the Northumberland Election, to which Lord Courtney has referred, was mainly an election conducted on these principles?—Yes.

962. Have you followed the correspondence between the Proportional Representation Society and the late president of the Royal Society, Sir George Gabriel Stokes, on the question whether the first votes should be counted and the last ones distributed, or whether it should be done proportionally?—No, I have not seen that.

963. I quite agree with you that it makes very little difference; and that was Sir George Stokes' opinion, too?—That is obvious.

964. But if it is necessary to avoid any chance of error, do you think there is any other system than that adopted in this Bill of avoiding it? You propose, I understand, to go back to what was originally suggested—namely, taking the first votes on the file and distributing them?—Yes. I do not object to the rules in the Bill on any question of principle.

965. But do you object to them on any point of practice, except as regards the point you have mentioned?—I do not think so. It might be simpler if Section 4 could be applied right through, but that would obviously enormously increase the labour.

966. What alteration do you suggest?—I meant if the principle of proportionally transferring were adopted right through, but that would obviously enormously increase the Returning Officer's labour.

967. Do you mean, taking the votes first on the file? That is part of the suggestion we have been dealing with, is it not? What do you wish
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Lord Avebury—continued.

to alter in Rule 6?—I meant that after the first process of transferring, Section 6 directs that the process of transferring shall be applied to the last sub-parcel of the candidate who has an excess. I refer to Sub-section (2) of Rule 6, line 2: "In the same manner as if the votes included in the sub-parcel last transferred had been the only votes given to the candidate." That is really the special principle of Section 6.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

968. Do I understand that you desire to suggest that a change might be made which would make the process much more complicated?—No, simpler in principle, but longer in working out.

969. Why would it be simpler in principle?—Because it applies one rule right through.

Lord Avebury.

970. How would you suggest that that clause should run?—It would be simpler if the whole of Section 6 were omitted, and Section 4 would apply to every candidate who had a surplus.

971. How would you alter Sub-section (2) of Section 6?—I am afraid what I suggest would mean not only altering Sub-section (2), but Sub-section (1) of Section 6 also mentions a sub-parcel.

972. Then is it Sub-section (1) which creates your difficulty? You see you suggest an alteration should be made, and I asked you what the alteration was, and I understood you first of all to refer me to Sub-section (2) from which you read some words. Then I asked you what words you would substitute for them. Now you tell me the objection is to Sub-section (1)?—It is rather difficult to draft an amendment offhand, and I think that the alteration suggested might involve alterations in several of the Sub-sections of Section 6, or the omission of Section 6 entirely.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

973. It is surely enough to say, is it not, that the principle of proportionality should be extended to all the votes, and not confined to the sub-parcels last transferred?—That is my point.

Lord Avebury.

974. You said, did you not, there were three different processes—first, with regard to the distribution of the votes where a majority was to be distributed; secondly, with regard to the distribution of the votes when the number was below the quota; and thirdly, when there were only three candidates left, but necessarily there must be a difference, must there not, when you are distributing a majority, and when you are distributing the whole votes?—Yes, but there is the difference between Section 4 and Section 6, the one dealing with the proportional transfer of the whole, and the other with the proportional transfer of a part.

975. Because in one case you are distributing a part, and in the other case you are distributing the whole. Do you suggest that is not a right way of dealing with the matter? You see, where a person has a very small number of votes
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Lord Avebury—continued.

and you are going to distribute them because he has no chance of being elected, the question of proportion does not arise, does it?—Of course not.

976. You made some remarks about the quota, but I did not understand you to question the principle by which the quota is arrived at, did I?—No, I think that is correct; from the standpoint of simplicity one might like the quota to be votes divided by vacancies, but the rules would have to be altered.

977. You do not, as I understand, urge that the mode suggested of arriving at the quota is an incorrect method?—No, certainly not.

Lord Haversham.

978. Lord Beauchamp, who is not now present, desired me to ask you if you are aware that there is any general desire for a change in the mode of voting amongst people generally?—One knows from the daily press that there is some demand for it, but from personal talk I have found very little indeed. Certain persons, who are interested in such questions, are I know in favour of such a process, but the average voter to whom I have put the question does not seem to feel the present system unjust.

979. Probably they do not much concern themselves with the Act, but they follow the instructions given them?—Yes, that is so.

980. Asking the question for myself, do I understand you to say you would prefer to have the whole rule of proportion eliminated from the distribution of surplus?—If it were possible to adopt the principle of distributing the votes last filed, but Lord Courtney says that that has been rejected already.

981. Do you think an ordinary man conducting an election would understand these rules on page 5 of the Bill?—I think an ordinary man of fair intelligence would understand them if he gave some time to the study of them. If the Returning Officer were a man of legal training he would no doubt understand them a great deal quicker than an ordinary man would.

982. Do you think an ordinary man would require preparation to understand them?—Certainly, and there are a number of small points of phrasing which may possibly be grammatical, but which might puzzle one a good deal at first, such as the use of the singular for the plural, for instance, in some of the instructions. I merely take at random one subsection, which I could not follow at first reading, but which one could follow all right afterwards. I refer to Section 4 (a) on page 4: "The Returning Officer shall arrange all the ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate on which votes capable of transfer are given, by filing in a separate sub-paragraph those on which a next preference is indicated for some one continuing candidate." I took that to mean one sub-paragraph, and it meant reading the Sub-section several times and referring to the example before I could see what it meant. Strictly, I suppose, the use of the singular is correct, but I should have expected the use of the plural in some way.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

983. But the examples helped you, did they?—Yes, and were of great assistance.

Earl of Hardwicke.

984. Am I to understand that as the Bill stands now you are not favourable to it?—No, I should say I was favourable to it, only I wish it could be made simpler; but perhaps I have not seen the difficulties on the other side.

985. Do you prefer the Bill as it now stands to the present mode of election?—Yes, I should say I was in favour of it even as it now stands if it is not possible to simplify it.

986. Do you think as a rule that the electors take much interest in the Returning Officer's business?—No, I should say not, except so far as they are anxious to have the result correct; but I think they are interested in knowing how the result of the election has been obtained.

987. They are satisfied with the result without cavilling over the mode of the election, you think?—Yes, satisfied or dissatisfied.

988. But they would not cavil over the way in which it is conducted, would they?—I do not feel very sure, if a complicated system of election were introduced, that they would not cavil at the mode in which it was conducted, though experience, I take it, is against me.

Lord Colchester.

989. As to the question whether there is any great amount of imperfection in the present system, or a demand for a change, I understand you have no decided opinion on the point?—No, because I have not attempted to get any wide experience.

990. Do you think the attention of the general public and the general voters has been called lately to the great disproportion there is in the majorities in the House of Commons, and the actual majority of the voters in the country?—Yes, their attention has been frequently called to that.

991. I mean, not in any one case only, but as to the great difference between the total number of voters at the general election and the results. Do you think it is the general opinion that the majority in the House of Commons ought to be very much greater than the real majority?—No, I should say not. Of course, you have to average political opinion.

992. Is not it very probable that if no form of proportional representation was adopted other equalising measures, such as altering the constituencies, might rather increase than diminish the existing inequality?—Do you mean adhering to the present mode of election?

993. Yes, and that then any such measure might increase rather than diminish it?—It would be quite possible that an increase in the number of single Member constituencies would do that.

994. Taking an extreme case, is it not quite possible, as a statistical matter, minorities might get a representation which under the present system they do not get?—Yes, that is so.

995. Therefore if this question is not dealt with it rather throws a difficulty, does it not, in the way of adopting the other equalising measures

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Mr. G. U. YULE.

[Continued.]

Lord Colchester—continued.

asures I have suggested?—Of course this Bill only applies to municipal representation, and you rather raise the question of Parliamentary representation. If this principle were carried out it would facilitate the carrying out of further measures of reform, but although such measures of reform might increase the present tendencies to great majorities on one side or the other, they need not necessarily do so to any large extent, I think. They might tend to do so a little.

996. With regard to the complexity in parts of this Bill, do you think the objects of the Bill would be attained to a very considerable extent if we had either a system of limiting each voter to one vote or adopting the old three-member district system, where a man could only vote for two out of three members, or by adopting a system like that adopted at the School Board elections, where he might give all his votes simply for one candidate?—That is rather a difficult question to answer offhand.

997. But you are aware, are you not, that both those systems have been tried?—Yes. The system of accumulating votes on one candidate, if you are allowed to distribute your votes as you please, might tend, I think, to give representation to a minority if the voters were well organised by outside organisers, but if not, it seems to me it might tend to give an enormous amount of votes to a favourite, like Mr. Gladstone was in the test election, to which reference has been made, and the object would not be attained at all, I think. It might leave the inequality untouched unless the voters were well organised.

998. It would produce a more exact representation, would it not?—I was really thinking whether it would better the present state of affairs.

Lord Colchester—continued.

999. Did you follow the School Board elections at all?—I am afraid not.

1000. Are you aware that almost in every district the minority did obtain some representation?—That was so, if I remember right.

1001. And that was the case in regard to the three-cornered districts, was it not?—Yes, that does look as if it were a mode by which the minority might obtain representation, but I have not gone into the matter thoroughly. With regard to the three-cornered constituency system that would tend to give representation to the minority, and I should think it would be the better one of the two.

1002. And as a matter of fact it did, did it not, in many cases?—Yes, I should think so.

Lord Allendale.

1003. Are not you of opinion that the accumulative system in the School Board elections would lead to the object desired?—It seemed to attain the object to a greater or less extent at the elections, but I do not see that it need. It seems to me that one candidate who was exceedingly popular might upset the balance altogether by so many persons giving all their votes to him. It might lead to minority representation, but I do not think so certainly as by this Bill.

1004. Have you any knowledge of the views of returning officers as to whether they would favour the introduction of this process?—No, I am afraid I cannot speak of that.

1005. There has not been any demand for it, that you know of, from them?—No.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

MR. KINGSLEY BAYLY is called in; and Examined.

Chairman.

1006. You are a solicitor living at Lewisham, I think?—Yes.

Lord Avebury.

1007. You are honorary secretary, are you not, of the Lewisham Municipal Association?—That is so.

1008. Is that association non-political and non-party, and is not what is generally called a ratepayers' association?—That is so.

1009. Is the chairman the Vicar of Lewisham?—Yes.

1010. Are three ex-Mayors of Lewisham members?—Yes.

1011. And more than twenty of your borough councillors and ex-councillors?—Yes.

1012. Are ten of the Guardians and ex-Guardians members?—Yes.

1013. Are the last and present chairmen of the Board of Guardians members?—Yes.

1014. Are eight ministers of religion in Lewisham members?—Yes.

1015. Is the chairman and secretary of the Lewisham Labour Representation Association a member?—Yes.

Lord Avebury—continued.

1016. Is the secretary of the Lewisham University Extension Society a member?—Yes.

1017. Is the secretary of the Lewisham Anti-quarian Society a member?—Yes.

1018. And are the churchwardens of Lewisham Parish Church members?—Yes.

1019. As I understand, they have all joined this association on account of their dissatisfaction at the result of the last and previous elections in Lewisham?—I cannot quite say that; they joined before the matter was brought before the association, but a meeting of the association was held, of which all members had notice, and it was unanimously resolved that a new aim should be attached to the objects of the association, which aim was to promote the adoption of a system of proportional representation in municipal elections. This was unanimously adopted, to be incorporated in the aims.

1020. Was this the resolution of the association:—"That in view of the repeated failure of the existing electoral methods to secure for Lewisham a borough council which is representative of all its citizens, this association shall include the following in its specified aims: To promote

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Mr. K. BAYLY.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

promote the adoption of a system of proportional representation for municipal elections"?—Yes.

1021. And that was adopted, was it, on account of dissatisfaction with the method of the present system and the results which it gave?—Yes.

1022. And you are arranging, I believe, to hold meetings in Lewisham to ventilate your views upon this question?—Yes, and we are arranging in November an election to show the results of an election, in which all the residents of Lewisham should take part, of a small council, say, of five or six, to be conducted on the lines of this present Bill.

1023. In the first election at Lewisham I believe the Moderates obtained thirty-five seats and the Progressives seven, the Moderates having a majority of twenty-eight seats?—That is so.

1024. At the next election, in 1903, did the Progressives carry thirty-four seats and the Moderates five, and were there three independent candidates, so that the Progressives had a majority of twenty-nine seats?—That is so.

1025. And in 1906, at the next election, did the Municipal Reform Party capture all the seats on the Council?—Yes.

1026. Are those changes quite out of proportion to any change of opinion in the borough itself?—Quite out of proportion to any change of opinion in the borough.

1027. It is the fact, is it not, that more than one-half of the present Council have never before sat on a local authority?—So far as I am aware that is so, and also the Mayor has never before sat on a local authority.

1028. So that there is a great loss of the experience which has been gained by administrations in these violent changes, and is that one of your objections?—That is so, distinctly.

1029. Again, in the election for the Lewisham Board of Guardians last March, with one single exception were all the seats gained by one party?—That is so, and that was only by one vote.

1030. The difference between the parties, we have already been told, is not so very great as that indicated?—No; I should think, having had the figures before me, that in the case of the last election of the Borough Council, in which one party had the whole of the representation, they only had at most two-thirds of the votes.

1031. So that one-third of the voters are entirely without representation?—That is so.

1032. And that you think, do you, is wrong on any system of representation?—Most decidedly.

1033. Amongst the defeated candidates were there men of great ability and knowledge of public affairs, and whose loss upon the Council is a misfortune to the borough?—Yes, there were two ex-Mayors and very many others who had been in public life and occupied seats on the Council for many years.

1034. And if there had been any system of proportional representation do you think that those men who were well qualified to act and who had had so much experience would have retained their seats?—A very large proportion of them, at any rate.

Lord Haversham.

1035. Are you divided into wards at Lewisham?—Yes.

1036. And there was a majority of Moderates, or Reformers, in each ward, I suppose?—That is so.

1037. That is how the result came about, I suppose?—Yes; there was a majority in each ward.

1038. Would you be in favour of a change, such as putting two instead of three Councillors in each ward?—In Lewisham there are six in some wards and three in others, and I should think possibly if this Bill were adopted it would not be necessary to upset the wards or make any alteration in them.

1039. Do you think if proportional representation were adopted the minority would have their fair chance?—Yes.

1040. Do you see any difficulty, with regard to these rules, as to the Returning Officer counting the votes?—No, I do not see any insuperable difficulty at all. Of course, a Returning Officer's work at the present time is quite a matter for experienced men with an expert staff. You cannot put anybody into the position of Returning Officer. They are men of long experience, and they have an expert staff, and my opinion is that the same expert staff could quite readily carry out the provisions of the Bill.

Lord Colchester.

1041. Do you consider the minority would have got fairer representation, supposing in these wards returning three members, or a multiple of three, either no voter had been able to vote for no more than two-thirds of the vacancies to be filled or had been at liberty to give all his votes to one of three members if he pleased? Supposing there were three members, if no voter had been able to vote for more than two of the three members, or if any one voter could have given three votes to one of the candidates, or divided his votes as he pleased among them, do you think that would have altered the result?—That might or might not have altered the result of the election, but I do not think it would have secured a certain representation for the minority.

1042. You have not considered how the numbers in that case would have worked out, I suppose?—No, I have not really considered it from that point of view.

1043. Have you the figures of the majority and minority?—Yes.

1044. You put the minority at one-fourth, do you not?—The minority were 25 out of 70, that is more than a third.

1045. I suppose these great changes in Lewisham were owing to a large increase in population?—There has been an increase in the population, and, of course, a consequent change in the votes; but the results of the election were quite out of proportion to the change in the votes.

1046. In each election, as I understand, since you have been a separate borough, you have had an enormous change?—That is so.

1047. Do you connect it at all with any change in the district by its becoming more completely urban, owing to the increase of building, and so on?—I have not considered the reason for the changes

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Mr. K. BAYLY.

[Continued.]

Lord Colchester—continued.

changes, but I think the people rather tired of the last Council, and put in the other side; then they got tired of that and put in the next.

1048. It was a great swing of the pendulum, and I understand you would prefer to have a more continuous representation?—Yes. ..

Lord Allendale.

1049. Do you think if the system proposed by the Bill was introduced it would have the effect of encouraging a good many more candidates to come forward, men who would have no chance of getting in in any other way?—I do.

1050. Do you think that would not be a disadvantage?—No; I think it would be an advantage to have as many candidates as possible.

1051. Do you think that Returning Officers would think that an advantage?—I am unfortunately not a Returning Officer.

1052. Do you know the views of Returning Officers as to this Bill?—No.

1053. And you have not heard any representations made by them either for or against any system of this sort?—No; but I rather fancy they are paid by fee which would be calculated on a scale commensurate with the work involved, and they probably would be glad to do extra work.

1054. Probably, and it would complicate the counting of votes, would it not, if there were many more candidates coming forward? It would encourage candidates, would it not, coming forward or being run by cliques who on ordinary grounds under the present system would not have any chance of election?—My view is rather that you would get entirely independent candidates to come forward whom we do not get under the present system. Either a man must be a Municipal Reformer or he must be a Socialist, otherwise he has no chance of getting in, but there are people between the two.

1055. You mean he must stick to his party, do you?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1056. Are you preparing for an election in Lewisham in the autumn?—That is so.

1057. You will perhaps take a share in the management of that election?—In all probability.

1058. Have you studied this Bill?—Yes.

1059. And are you acquainted with the duties thrown on the Returning Officer?—Yes.

1060. Without any tax on your modesty, would you shrink from being a Returning Officer?—No.

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1061. You think you would be quite equal to the work, do you?—Yes.

1062. Would the work of a Returning Officer be much increased, do you think, by an increase in the number of candidates?—I think not.

1063. Suppose you multiply the candidates by three, would the work be increased by half?—It would be increased somewhat.

1064. But the trouble turns more on the number of votes, does it not, than on the number of candidates. There would be a slight increase in the labour by an increase in the number of candidates, but it would not be anything like in proportion to the increase of papers, would it?—No.

1065. And you would not shrink from the work on that account?—No.

Chairman.

1066. The increase in the trouble and complication depends very much on how the votes are given, and especially on the superfluous votes, I suppose?—Yes.

1067. You might have to go through a good many processes of transfer, might you not, if the number allotted to each candidate was somewhat similar, and the getting of the result might take much longer in consequence, I suppose, and be much shorter if a number of candidates had a predominating number of votes?—Yes, that is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1068. There is no great trouble in transferring the votes of those candidates who do not reach a quota, is there?—No.

1069. And an increase in that number of candidates does not very much increase the labour, does it?—No.

Lord Avebury.

1070. With reference to a question asked you by a noble Lord, if a candidate gets very few votes, it adds very little indeed, does it, to the trouble of the Returning Officer?—That would be so.

1071. And if he gets a considerable number of votes, is not it desirable in your opinion that a person who represents a considerable section of the electors should have a good chance of success if he gets a necessary number?—Yes, certainly.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

(A)

Mr. J. J. STEPHENSON is called in; and Examined.

Lord Avebury.

1072. Are you Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Independent Labour Party?—I am ex-Chairman of the Executive.

1073. Have you been a Borough Councillor?—I was a Borough Councillor in the Lewisham Borough.

Lord Avebury—continued

1074. Have you had considerable experience in municipal and other public work?—Yes. I have been practically sixteen years in politics, working in one way and another in them.

1075. Do you think that the present system of municipal election is defective in certain points?

—I believe

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Mr. J. J. STEPHENSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

—I believe it is absolutely objectionable. My first objection to it is, that it fails to secure a representation of all the sections of the community; and I regard that, particularly as your Bill deals with municipalities, as absolutely wrong in municipalities. The heroics of party politics should not apply in a municipality; there should be all sections of the life of the municipality represented, so as to have the municipality run on the best lines.

1076. You think that a municipality should in fact be a reflection of the opinion of all the sections of the community in it, do you?—Yes.

1077. Then I think your second objection is, that it results in the removal of worthy citizens, owing to the sweeping changes which are made by slight alterations in voting power?—That is so. At the last election in Lewisham there were some men who had sat on the Borough Council since its inauguration, and on the vestries before, and owing to the transfer of 100 votes in one case, these men were thrown out; and I say that by the system of proportional representation that seems to me to be impossible.

1078. And in fact the changes in the Council have no relation to the changes of opinion in the borough, have they?—That is so.

1079. A very small change of opinion in the borough might result in a complete change in the Council, might it not?—Yes.

1080. With the result of turning out men who have served the borough well and are very valuable Councillors?—Yes, apart from the parties to which they belonged they were skilled citizens and schooled in the way of citizenship.

1081. As I understand, your other objection to the system is that a comparatively small majority may sweep the whole of the seats and exclude the minority altogether?—That is so.

1082. Has that in fact happened in your borough?—Yes. There are three instances in Lewisham which I suppose the Committee have had before them, but ever since it became a Borough Council the opinion of the minorities has always been unrepresented, no matter which party was in power. In 1900, when the Moderates were in power, they had 35 seats against 7, and in each case the minority has always been under-represented, according to the voting strength. That seems to me to point to the fact that these changes do make a difference in the representation.

1083. Do you think that proportional representation would remedy the evils you have alluded to?—Yes, I believe it would. From the fact that an elector has to put his first, second, and third preference, and so on, down to the number of candidates to be elected, I believe you would break up the party system of voting, and that men would vote for men whom they considered fit to represent them.

1084. Do you think that the introduction of Imperial politics into municipal elections is undesirable?—Yes, and detrimental to a community.

1085. Do you think that the system of voting proposed in the Bill would offer any difficulties to working men?—No. I have had some experience of working men and I have never found

Lord Avebury—continued.

them any slower in intelligence than any other part of the community—in fact, the very reverse—and there are few working men who could not tell in order of merit the men they wanted to vote for. That is my personal experience gained after some years of work.

Chairman.

1086. Have you studied this Bill yourself?—I have looked through the Bill, and I have followed with some closeness the literature issued by the Proportional Representative Association; and I do not see anything insurmountable in it.

1087. I suppose you would admit that it is desirable at all events that a considerable portion not only of working men, but of other voters should have a sufficient knowledge of the rules in the Bill to appreciate that if they give a vote in a particular way it will have the result which they desire?—I should say that is so.

1088. No doubt at first it would take some amount of explanation, not only to working men, but to other voters, to make them quite understand what the process was which arrives at the desired result of giving due representation to the minority?—I should say the difficulty would disappear as to understanding it after the first election.

1089. Do you think at first voters would have hesitation in adopting a system of this sort, without understanding how the result would work out?—No, I do not think so; because I think it would be pretty evident to them that the system would be bound to work out much better than it does to-day. I have never met any section of the community yet, as far as municipal life in London is concerned, who have not recognised that powerful minorities are unrepresented, much to their regret.

1090. At the last election the side that was in the majority found itself in a minority?—It found itself wiped out.

1091. The minority appreciate this fact in Lewisham, because it has no representation at all?—Yes.

1092. Naturally the minority thinks that any system would be an improvement on that?—No, we do not come to a reason for the alteration of the system by the result of the last election; we have come to the reason owing to the inequalities it has inflicted on the population ever since the system has been in force.

1093. Knowing what you do about the Bill, and representing your brother working-men, do you think they would be satisfied to adopt this system, although at first they might not understand it thoroughly?—I believe they would understand it at the beginning, and would adopt it in preference to the present one; there is nothing insurmountable in it to understand.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1094. Have you had experience outside Lewisham?—I have had experience of working men in every part of the United Kingdom—Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England.

1095. Did not you occupy some position at Belfast

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Mr. J. J. STEPHENSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

Belfast recently?—I was Chairman of the Labour Conference at Belfast.

1096. Therefore you are conversant with the opinions of working men, and with their ways of thinking, are you?—Yes.

1097. Do you know anything about the action which the Northumberland miners took in reference to something like this Bill?—No.

Earl of Hardwicke.

1098. If a Municipal Council or people who have to manage the affairs of an urban district make great mistakes and put the ratepayers to extra expense, has not that a great influence on the voting at an election?—I do not think so. Before answering that question, I should want to see what the effect would be on the rates for the next three years.

Lord Haversham.

1099. Have you had any expression of opinion from the working men in favour of this Bill?—The party to which I belong, which is the Labour Association in Lewisham, in the main are favourable to an alteration of this sort.

1100. Outside Lewisham do you know what the opinion is?—The majority of workmen outside Lewisham do believe that some alteration ought to be made, and many of them follow the lines laid down by my Lord Courtney for at least 20 years in his idea of proportional representation. It has a great many more adherents now than it had when he began his crusade, and it is beginning to be understood and, particularly amongst the workers of the country.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1101. You think, do you, that the general feeling of working men is that they recognise the objection under the present system to large majorities?—Yes, that is so.

1102. Do you think that a great deal of this swing of the pendulum would be got rid of which results in the effacement of one side altogether?—It would be bound to do, because there are always minorities which would at least have proportionate representation.

Lord Haversham.

1103. As to preferences, you said that each man would know whom he wanted to vote for. Do not you think that after a man had voted for the first, he would vote very much at random for Nos. 2, 3, or 4?—A man is bound to know who he wants second, who third, and who fourth.

1104. Is not it likely that the managers of a party would arrange a list of their candidates and ask the voters to give their preference in order?—No, I do not think the manager of any party could do it. Taking the ward for which I sat, there were nine candidates. There is one ward with nine candidates, two with six, and the others with three each, but there is no man in any one place who would dare say that one man was No. 1 and another man was No. 9 in merit.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, 12 o'clock.

(0.13.)

K

Lord Avebury.

1105. You do not advocate this change in order to benefit one party as against another party, but in order that there may be a fair representation of the general opinion of the borough?—I advocate it for the opposite reason, because I think it would do away largely with one party only, and you would get the whole community represented as against a party, which is what you want in municipal life.

Earl Cathcart.

1106. I think you said you are familiar with the Bill we are considering. Have you had any difficulty whatever in understanding any portion of it or the Schedules to it?—No, I have had no difficulty. I have got my interpretation of the Bill, but whether that would be the interpretation generally put on it, is a different matter; but I see no difficulty about it.

1107. From an arithmetical point of view do you see any difficulty about it?—No, I do not see any difficulty. I have heard objections raised as to the distribution of the surplus votes, and the agents being able to do this and that, but I always think your election agent is an abler man than an ordinary elector, and his higher intelligence will enable him to deal with the matter.

1108. Did you ever hear any of your friends propose any suggestion in the way of simplifying the Bill in any way or making it more comprehensible?—No.

Lord Allendale.

1109. Have you had any discussions about it in any associations or bodies of working men which you belong to, or have they had the Bill before them?—No.

1110. Then you do not know whether it has been considered much?—No.

Chairman.

1111. But, in fact, you think the working men are in favour of some system by which minorities would get better representation than they have now, do you?—Yes.

1112. But they have not attended particularly to the provisions of this Bill?—That is so.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1113. Are you aware that the President of the Trades Unions Congress referred to the subject of proportional representation in an address last year?—Yes.

1114. So that it was popularised to that extent amongst trades unions?—That is so.

1115. Do you know anything about Continental programmes and that proportional representation is an item in the programme of most Socialist bodies on the Continent?—That is so, and the system is actually in existence, I think, in Belgium, and is being seriously discussed in France, I believe.

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LORDS PRESENT:

Earl of HARDWICKE.
Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord COURTNEY of PENWITH.
Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

MR. GILBERT SLATER, D.Sc., is called in; and Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

1116. Do you hold any municipal position at the present time?—I do not hold any municipal position at present. I am ex-Mayor of Woolwich. I served on the Woolwich Borough Council for three years, and was defeated at the last election.

Lord Avebury.

1117. I believe you have watched the working of municipal institutions, both in London and the country, for a good many years?—Yes. I was born and lived in Plymouth until 14 years ago. Since then I have lived in London, and I have been a student of municipal questions for a considerable time.

1118. No doubt the good working of municipal institutions turns considerably on the manner of election, does it not?—I find that the way in which elections are carried on has a very important effect on the working of municipal institutions.

1119. When you say the way in which elections are carried on, perhaps you will just explain to the Committee exactly what is the method you are referring to?—I notice that the provincial system of electing the Council, by the retirement of one-third annually, has certain effects upon municipal administration, and the London method of retiring the whole of the members at the end of three years, and electing them all together, has certain other effects. Of course, the fact that you get a certain character of elections resulting from the method of the election itself shows how closely the two things are connected. Then my experience in the country of one-third retiring annually is that you do not get the real municipal issue put before the electors; that they usually are largely biased by personal considerations; but, at any rate up to very recently, mainly by questions of Imperial politics; so that you have the rather absurd position that the electors in a town in which there are most important issues, say, of
(0.13.)

Lord Avebury—continued.

water and gas, and public health, are asked to vote for this or that candidate on account of his views on Home Rule in Ireland. Imperial politics are generally the issue which is before the electors in provincial municipal contests, and I attribute this very largely to the fact that when the electors have a municipal election they cannot usually decide a municipal issue, as they only have at the maximum one-third of the seats to fill, and the possibility of getting a clear verdict is very remote.

1120. You suggest to the Committee that the present mode of election tends to introduce party politics into municipal elections?—Yes, that is so.

1121. Which, in your opinion, is not desirable?—In my opinion that is defeating the object of having a municipal election. The object of having a municipal election is to make the people responsible, and feel their responsibility for the government of the town.

Chairman.

1122. You are now arguing against one thing and championing the other?—Yes, my point is that the present system has two forms.

1123. You mean that there are two present systems. You are alluding to the system in force in Woolwich?—The system in force in municipalities has two forms, neither of which is proportional representation, and each of these two alternative forms of non-proportional representation has its own special evils. The provincial system has those evils to which I have referred.

Lord Avebury.

1124. Do not you think that the London system has also had an effect in introducing Imperial politics into municipal elections?—I think that the fact that the whole of the Borough Council retires together brings the municipal issues much more powerfully before the electors,

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and, compared with the provincial system, it makes Imperial politics less prominent. My experience has been that, at any rate in Woolwich, the issues have been questions of rates and municipal electricity, baths, bye-laws for houses, let in lodgings—those are the questions which were discussed, and on which the candidates appealed to the electors. They did appeal to the electors on municipal issues, at any rate in Woolwich, and I think all over London it was a question of rates on which they appealed to the electors; and therefore in that way I consider that the London system has an advantage over the provincial system. But it has correspondingly very great disadvantages, because you get a possible clean sweep and a possibility of the whole of the minority being left unrepresented on the Council.

1125. Even when the minority is in very large proportion to the majority?—Yes; you may have it so, of course. You might have, of course, an actual minority of the electors represented by three-fourths or more of your Council.

1126. In the notes of your evidence you refer to the question of the Plymouth water policy?—Plymouth water.

1127. What do you wish to say about that?—I hoped to be able to give more exact dates, but unfortunately the information that I asked for has not been sent up to me in time; but Plymouth, back in the eighties, had a most important water question. The ancient supply of water was insufficient for the town with its growth, and the Council, after a considerable amount of deliberation, adopted an extremely foolish plan for the purpose of increasing the water supply, and although the whole mass of the town was against the Council, it was many years before the Council began to reflect the opinion of the town upon that matter.

Chairman.

1128. You say that the whole mass of the town was against the Council?—Yes; that was proved, first of all by a series of town's meetings. The question was so challenged that they were obliged to call town's meetings to confirm their action; and they were beaten again and again. They then had a poll of the town, and I think the votes were something like 3 to 1 against the Council; so that you had a solid majority in the Town Council in favour of a certain policy with regard to water—that is, the building of the storage reservoir very high up in the watershed; and you had three-quarters of the town in favour of another policy—namely, of building their storage reservoir at the site of the existing intake. As a matter of fact, since then the policy which the Council disapproved of, and which the town approved of, has been carried out, and carried out with extreme success. So that, as the event shows, there is no possibility of doubt that the Council were entirely wrong in the old days.

Lord Avebury.

1129. You bring forward that illustration to show that under the provincial system of election the Town Council may fail to represent the views of the electors; that is your point?—Yes, and may be entirely out of sympathy with the

Lord Avebury—continued.

people. In this case, you see, the Councillors who were in favour of the mistaken policy were influenced by social influences. It was the policy which suited the dominant landlord in the neighbourhood, and the social influences acting upon the Council caused the Council to act just as any non-elected body might be expected to act.

Chairman.

1130. But I suppose in another form of election social influences may have away in affecting the result?—Yes, I think if you had a proper method of election you might have such a position for a while; but then, when the next municipal election came on (the question was felt to be of the utmost importance to the town, on which the town had a very emphatic opinion) you would have the constitution of the Council affected by the opinion in the town. As a matter of fact, we had this mistaken reservoir policy on the Plymouth Council going on for long years; election after election happened, but the Council did not change. That is my point: that the elections which took place during that time did not bring the Council into harmony with the opinion of the town; whereas a proper method of election would bring the Council's opinion into harmony with the opinion of the town.

Lord Avebury.

1131. And you prefer the system in London; but I think I understood you to say that, in your opinion, that also has its drawbacks?—I think both systems are bad. And my point with regard to the system in London is that, through the fact that the whole Council retires triennially, the system does not allow for safeguarding the representation of the minority, and you have the possibility that the minority may get a majority in the Council, and you have the probability that the majority will be very much over-represented and the minority very much under-represented.

1132. In many cases the majority, even if it exceeds the minority by a very small number, may carry the whole of the seats, and in other cases the seats may so fall that the minority of the electors may secure the majority of representation?—That would be conceivable. I have not gone into all the details.

1133. You know that that has been the case in Bethnal Green?—Yes.

1134. It is not only conceivable therefore, but it has actually happened?—Yes.

1135. You wish to illustrate your opinion, I think, by the case of Woolwich?—I think Woolwich is a fair case, because we have not had more false representation in Woolwich than you get on the average. The representation has been about as good, I take it, as for the whole of London, on the average. We have had three Borough Council elections since the borough was formed. Before that the borough existed in the form of three separate parishes.

1136. When you say that the representation has been as good, you mean rather that it has been no worse?—Just so. In each case the majority of the electors have been represented by the majority of the Council, but in each case the majority has been over-represented. In the first election in 1900 the Progressives got 10 seats

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out of 36, and the Moderates practically got 26; they came in as 24 Moderates and 2 Independents.

1137. Can you give the number of votes?—The number of votes, I am sorry to say, I have not got with me, but the Moderates had a majority of votes, and proportional representation would have made it about 20 to 16.

1138. Instead of 26 to 10?—Instead of 26 to 10.

1139. Then in 1903 the result was very different?—In 1903 there was a clean sweep, and the 10 Progressives were replaced by 25 Labour Councillors (they altered the name in between), and the 26 Moderates were reduced to 11; so that in each case there was a majority of three-fourths practically for the dominant party.

1140. Could you put in the relative numbers of voters?—I can send them on.

Chairman.

1141. You have got the actual figures, have you?—I have not worked out the figures, and I have not brought them, because I understood that Councillor Chambers, who has gone into the figures very exactly, was going to give evidence also, so I left the figures to him. If he is not giving evidence, it will be quite easy for me to send on the figures.

Lord Avebury.

1142. Then we come to the election of 1906?—Then again there was a complete reversal, and this time the Labour Councillors were reduced to 13, and the Municipal Reformers (who this time altered their title) were increased to 23, and by proportional representation it should have been 20 and 16.

1143. Then your point, as I understand, is, that in 1900 the Moderate Councillors swept the constituency?—Yes.

1144. In 1903 the Labour Councillors swept the constituency?—Yes.

1145. And in 1906 there was again a clean sweep, and the Moderate Councillors, then called Municipal Reform candidates, again swept the constituency?—That is so.

1146. So that there were three almost complete changes in the governing body, with no corresponding change in the numbers of the electors belonging to the different parties?—I should rather say with a very much smaller corresponding change; because in each case, as I said before, the majority on the elected Council did represent the majority of the electorate, but over-represented it.

1147. But the change in the Council was in no proportion to the change in the views of the electors?—That is so.

Chairman.

1148. May I just ask a question to make these figures clear? Are the six Aldermen (I think the number is six) all elected every three years?—No, half of them.

1149. Then I do not understand this. You say that the Council in 1900 was made up of 24 Moderates, 4 Moderate Aldermen, 1 Progressive Alderman, and 1 Independent?—Yes.

Chairman—continued.

1150. In 1903 3 Labour Aldermen and 3 Moderates. Had only three been elected each three years?—Yes; half the Aldermen retired. In 1900 all the Aldermen had to be appointed for the first time; then in 1903 half of those Aldermen retired, and, as a matter of fact, owing to the death of another Alderman there were 4 vacancies to fill in; and in 1906 there were three vacancies to fill in. Of course, the effect has been slightly, at any rate on the present Council, to diminish the over-representation of the majority.

1151. The effect is that the change in the opinion of the electors of the borough was reflected, so far as the Aldermen go, as to half their number?—Yes.

1152. And the particular party who got the majority on each of these different occasions elected the three Aldermen in favour of their views?—Yes, they elected Aldermen of their own colour. In the 1903 election there were 4 vacancies to fill in, and the Labour Party, being in the majority, offered one seat to the minority; so that there would be 3 and 3. But the offer was not accepted by the man to whom it was offered; so they elected all 4 of their own colour. This time the Municipal Reformers, having 3 seats to fill, filled them in according to their own colour.

Lord Avebury.

1153. You consider this by no means an extreme case; but that what happened at Woolwich is typical of what has taken place over the whole of London?—Yes, I do not think it is at all in excess of the average misrepresentation over the whole of London.

1154. You yourself were a member of the second Council from 1903 to 1906?—Yes.

1155. And Vice-chairman of the Finance Committee?—Yes, in the first year.

1156. And then Chairman?—And then Chairman, and then Mayor; and at the end of that time I was one of the defeated candidates, and so I am no longer a member of the Council.

1157. Is there much party feeling in Woolwich?—It is very strong, to a degree which is by many people very much deplored. I think I may say that there is an excessive amount of party feeling in Woolwich; and that, to my mind, is very much increased by the fact that it is possible for the dominant party to secure this great over-representation in the governing of affairs. So that we have this sort of feeling on the Council: that the party which is in power is entirely responsible for the management of the Council, all the Chairmanships are filled up by the party in power, and the minority do not feel that they are administrators at all, but that it is their business to criticise and find fault.

1158. The minority consider that they have a right to be represented, something like in proportion to their numbers?—Yes, they feel, of course, that they individually represent a great many more voters than the members of the majority do.

1159. Then I see in your notes that you think that the sweeping away of the members of one party and bringing in such an extreme number of members of the other party results in a succession

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cession of men without much experience in municipal affairs?—Yes, that is to my mind really the chief thing I have to say; and that is what I have experienced very much myself. I found, of course, when I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was Vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a weakness. If we had not as a matter of fact studied very carefully while we were outsiders the drift of affairs, there would have been a complete stop to the development of the financial machinery until we had learnt the ropes.

1160. It takes some time for a Municipal Councillor to study and make himself acquainted with the general principles of municipal institutions?—Yes.

1161. That is your point?—Yes, and to get a real knowledge of the details. By the time I was thrown out of the Council I was just beginning to understand the work of the Council.

1162. And that would apply to some other members?—I think it would apply to all other members. I think you want three years' hard work before you can really understand the affairs of a London borough, and I am sure it must be just the same with a provincial borough.

1163. And you are anxious to secure a system which would give more continuity of policy?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

1164. Could they not have appointed a man who was up to the ropes as Chairman and Vice-chairman?—You see, there were only 10 old members, and it so happened that among those 10 old members there was no one who was at all specialised in financial work. In 1903, when the Labour Party came in, there was a man whom they wished, as I said just now, to appoint from the other party to an Aldermanic seat. The man whom they wished to appoint was ex-Chairman of the Finance Committee, and the Council wanted to secure his services; but he felt that if he took the seat from us he would be putting himself in antagonism with his own party, and he did not care to take it; so he declined; and accordingly, not being able to secure the benefit of his experience, we had to do the best we could.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1165. Had he been an Alderman before?—No; he had been a Councillor, but he had not stood at the election.

Lord Avebury.

1166. I see in your notes you express your opinion that proportional representation would secure the election of the most experienced and

Lord Avebury—continued

able men on both sides?—I think so; I think if we had an appeal to a somewhat wider body than a ward, by some system like the single transferable vote, the effect would be that those Councillors who are known to have put in the best work on each side, the pick of the Councillors on each side, would get elected.

1167. Then how would you sum up the advantages of proportional representation; can you put it in a few words?—Yes. I think proportional representation would prevent these specific evils that I have referred to, which evils tend to diminish the efficiency of the London municipalities, and to lower their prestige, and to make the municipal service less attractive to the men who would give the best service.

Chairman.

1168. I quite sympathise with your view, that where you have a man experienced in the work of the Council turned off the Council, or unwilling to serve on the Committees of the new Council, the management of municipal affairs must naturally suffer very materially. Is not one of the effects of that state of things that a much larger share of the management of the work of the Council is thrown into the hands of the permanent officials than is at all desirable?—I think so. They are, of course, the only people who know, and the newcoming party for a while, when there is this change, entirely depend upon their permanent officials.

1169. The fact is, they are the only people who hold the threads of the work which have been going on before?—Yes.

1170. Inexperienced people put on important Committees for the first time must necessarily not only be a great deal in their hands, but must learn their work from the permanent officials?—That is so.

1171. You would agree probably that this is not a desirable thing in any local government?—No. Of course, I feel that the permanent officials have their own most important duties, and I should in no way wish to depreciate the responsibility which rests upon them; but at the same time, the object of having elected Councillors is, that they should take the wider responsibilities, and I think that is defeated by the present system.

1172. I quite concur in your view as to the permanent officials doing their work in an extremely efficient manner; but it is desirable that their work should be confined to the work they are appointed to perform, and not to managing and directing the administration of things?—Quite so.

Earl Beauchamp.

1173. Have you considered any other possible means of securing the same object, such as that of the cumulative vote?—My first feeling with regard to that was, in considering the evils of the London system, that the best plan would be to introduce the provincial system; but when I bear in mind the evils of the provincial system, it seems to me that the best way out of the difficulty

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difficulty that I have heard of is the system of proportional representation.

1174. Were you dissatisfied with the results of the election of the London School Board? Did you think that the minorities were sufficiently represented?—Of course, in one case, a special case in which I took interest, and in which there was a great deal of popular interest, the result was that the minority got the majority of representation.

1175. Under the London School Board?—Under the London School Board.

1176. How was that?—That was the case when there was a little pamphlet issued, "The Fight against Diggleism."

1177. Are you referring to the minority of votes through the whole of London getting a majority, or do you mean that the minority of votes in one of the districts of the London School Board got the majority?—Unless I am very much mistaken, the minority of voters over the whole of London obtained the majority, a very small majority, but still a majority on the London School Board.

1178. But surely there is nothing under this Proportional Representation Bill which will prevent that from happening again if the size of the wards was very different, is there?—Of course, if you divide London into about the same size and number of constituencies as under the London School Board, possibly you would have a chance of getting false representation.

1179. There is nothing in this Bill which would prevent that?

Chairman.

1180. But you, I understand, agree that the circumstance that the minority got the majority of seats was not owing to the system; it was owing to the different electoral divisions being of unequal size and not returning the same number of members?—No; the cause of it was that there was a false impression with regard to the feeling of the electors.

1181. You mean that the managers who were pulling the strings did not manage very well?—Yes, that was it; there was party blundering in the management. I mean to say that there was a great development of feeling over that election, and the consequence was that Independent candidates got no chance. But the Progressive Party managers left a large number of vacancies to Independent candidates, and they got defeated. The consequence was that the Progressive Party in that election was very much under-represented, and the Clerical Party, I suppose it should be called, on that occasion was over-represented.

Earl Beauchamp.

1182. But speaking generally, do not you think that some measure by which the wards were made with more equal division would get rid of that difficulty?—I do not see why it should at all theoretically; and if the method was to reduce the size of the wards, then I think it would have in itself a bad effect by narrowing the issues. We have got too much ward feeling in municipal politics already, in my mind.

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

1183. But supposing that in any number of School Board elections the wards had been of equal size, do you think it would have been possible for a minority of the voters to have had a majority of the seats?—Do you mean at a School Board election under the system of cumulative votes?—Yes.

1184. I think there is no mathematical difficulty in imagining an arrangement of electors by which you would get a majority of voters one way and a majority of the elected people the other way.

Chairman.

1185. But to arrive at exactly the proper representation, every party must be managing its affairs with equal skill in the directions given to the voters as to how many votes they should give to each candidate?—Yes; the School Board system was very much a gamble, and success depended almost entirely, at least very largely, upon accurately gauging the number of voters whom you could bring up to the scratch, and running exactly the right number of candidates for your voters.

Lord Avebury.

1186. Of course there was no system of transfer?—No.

1187. So that a popular candidate very often got a great many more votes than he required, which were lost to the party?—Yes; but I may say that my general observation has been, in the provinces, in School Board elections, where you had the whole body elected; you did get, as a rule, something very closely approximating to proportional representation. On the Plymouth School Board, for instance, I think they had thirteen members, and all the different parties were generally able to secure something very close to proportional representation.

1188. In fact, the cumulative vote is one form of proportional representation?—It is intended for that, I believe.

Lord Allendale.

1189. How long have you given attention to this question, may I ask?—In various forms for a considerable time; I mean to say that I had it brought before my mind in Plymouth at the time when we had a Municipal School Board election; and the difference between the provincial and London systems and the possibility of having the provincial system in London, was the issue before us. But what I imagine is the specific issue here, the single transferable vote, has only recently come before my attention.

1190. Did you pay much attention to it when you were on the Municipality of Woolwich?—Well, that is rather a difficult question to answer.

1191. What has made you give attention to this question?—I think mainly that my friend, Mr. Grinling, who was a colleague with me on the Woolwich Borough Council, and with whom I worked very closely, has been, I believe, one of the original members of the Proportional Representation Society—at any rate, he has been very much interested in it for about twenty years, and

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as he is a man who makes sure that other people he comes in contact with shall be interested in his ideas, that is the circumstance which has specially brought it before my mind.

1192. Then he has influenced you?—He has influenced me to the extent of making me think about it.

1193. Possibly since you have had the misfortune to be defeated you have given more attention to it?—Well, possibly; I am not sure. I have noticed that other people who have wider influence in the Borough of Woolwich than I have undergone a similar experience. Although I happened to be chosen for Mayor, it did not follow that I was one of those people who would ordinarily expect to be elected as a matter of course. But we have had a case since then. We had a Guardians election, and we had Archdeacon Escreet, who is certainly one of the men who would be put at the top of the poll by a vote of the whole borough, and he was defeated through the operation of the present system.

1194. Do you think that his defeat, considering the great turnover at the last election, was very largely due to the present system?—Yes.

1195. You think it could not have occurred if there had been some such system as that advocated in this Bill?—Certainly not. Again, when first the Borough of Woolwich was formed, the Chairman of the late vestry, Mr. George Bishop, one of the people most highly esteemed by all parties in Woolwich, was defeated through the operation of the same system; and it has been the same with other people who were defeated with me in 1907, and with people defeated in 1903—it has been the same right through, that many of the people who would be selected as among the best servants of the public have been defeated.

Lord Colchester.

1196. I presume that the reason given for the minority of voters, if it does so, obtaining the majority of seats is that the majority members have been returned by very close contests, and the minority members sit for districts where they have had much larger numbers in proportion?—Yes.

1197. That may exist, of course, when the wards are nearly equal in size?—Yes.

1198. I think I understood you to say that the only remedy is a system which includes the transferable vote?—The system which I think would be best would be the single transferable vote system.

1199. When you spoke of the School Board Elections, were you referring to the election of 1894?—Yes.

1200. That was not an election when there were such great changes; the great change was afterwards?—No; there was not a great change then; but there was a change in the feeling of the electorate which did not immediately affect the Board.

1201. The general complaint is the other way—that a change in the feeling of the electors makes too much change among the elected members?—Yes.

1202. Generally speaking, you would say that

Lord Colchester—continued.

the turnover is only the sort of floating fringe that has changed, and not the bulk of either party?—Yes.

1203. That is quite capable now, with no proportional representation, of making a great change in the numbers on the elected body?—Yes, that is of course what we have experienced in Woolwich; that is, a comparatively small change in the electorate making a very great and exaggerated change in the elected body.

1204. In the School Board it was the case, was it not, that in almost every district there was always some one member who represented the minority all through the School Board time, if I am not mistaken?—Yes; and what happened in that election of 1894 I think was found in a number of cases: that where there were four-member seats there were two and two, and so the minority got equally represented with the majority.

1205. Then you may say that the cause of that was the evenness of numbers?—Yes.

1206. It could not happen if the numbers were not even?—No; they ought to have had no less than five members.

1207. Was not really the great awkwardness of that system the fact of the constituencies being so enormously unwieldy? When you compare them with wards anywhere else, you had enormous constituencies which were unwieldy and ought to have been divided under any system, do you not think?—It is very difficult for me to deal with that. Of course, at the time when the School Board Elections were on I had little experience in London politics. I did not come to London until 1893. I saw one or two School Board Elections, but I was not very closely in touch with the thing at that time, and I noticed a very general dissatisfaction in London with the School Board method, which contrasted in my mind with what I may say was the general contentment with the School Board method I had previously been accustomed to in the country.

1208. But was not one great point, I think I am right in saying, that the districts were founded on the old Parliamentary Divisions of 1865, when London was divided?—Yes.

1209. Therefore, apart entirely from anything else, it was an unwieldy system, having these very large numbers of members and these very large constituencies?—Yes.

1210. Supposing the place were divided into constituencies of only three members each, some of those difficulties would have been removed?—Yes, in some ways; but then, of course, if you had even distribution of parties in a number of districts and a very strong disproportion of parties in other districts, you might get false representation with three-member wards.

1211. You mean that the minority might carry off the three seats in some cases?—I meant rather, that in many cases a very small majority of voters might carry two.

1212. You do not remember an election before 1894 of the London School Board?—I only remember seeing the results reported when they occurred.

1213. You do not remember one case in one district where one party had five candidates and carried

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carried only three, and the next time when they had four they carried four out of five?—Yes; that just illustrates my point, that the important thing was to get just the right number of candidates for your electorate.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1214. The cumulative vote was an attempt to obtain the end of proportional representation?—Yes.

1215. And in comparing it with the single transfer vote, you are comparing two methods of trying to obtain the same end?—Yes.

1216. In the cumulative vote, you said, in answer to Lord Colchester, that the great difficulty was that the party did not know what its strength in the electorate was; it might put forward more candidates than it could carry, and would not then get as many as it could carry?—Yes.

1217. Or it might put forward less candidates than it could carry, and so also get less members than it could carry?—Yes.

1218. It lent itself very much to party management?—Yes.

1219. Because, without party management, it was impossible to get any approximate representation for the different divisions of the electorate?—Yes, party management, I should say, or sect management.

1220. And at the same time party management was necessarily ignorant management?—Yes, it was a guess in the dark very often.

1221. The failure, therefore, to return members corresponding to the divisions of the electorate arose mainly from that ignorance?—Yes.

1222. It did not depend upon the unequal size of the divisions of your area?—Well, as I said before, that is a point on which I should not like to speak very definitely. I think the ignorance of the electoral possibilities might have a good deal to do with the arrangements of the areas; and, of course, when you have in London some four-member divisions and some five-member divisions it complicated the gamble. In a provincial town, as long as things were going on steadily, the Free Churches, the Church of England, and the Roman Catholics, and the rest, could pretty accurately gauge their strength, and they could get pretty close to real representation. In London in 1894 there was a real change in the opinion of the electorate, and, although it did not take effect in that election, it took effect in the next election, when the parties had learned more as to what the electoral position really was.

1223. They found out what their strength was?—They found out what their strength was, then they got it pretty fairly.

1224. I am going to take you to what was at the time a very striking example of the failure of the party to secure representation because of its absolute misapprehension of its own strength. Do you know anything of the first election of the School Board for Birmingham?—I do not.

1225. Birmingham was one constituency with 15 members, you may take it from me; there was no question therefore of unequal division into wards or sub-divisions of the electoral area; (0.13)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

it was one constituency returning 15 members. The leaders of the Radical party in Birmingham thought they were strong enough to carry all 15 seats, and they ran a ticket of 15 candidates. The consequence was that although they were in a very large majority they succeeded in getting six, I think, out of the 15; and for three years Birmingham was governed by a School Board wholly opposed to the dominant feeling of the electors of Birmingham in consequence of the stupendous ignorance of the dominant party. This led up to your own conclusion, that misrepresentation, the minority obtaining a majority of the seats, arose out of the ignorance which more or less attended the action of the cumulative vote?—Yes, that has been my experience. Where both parties have correctly calculated their possibilities they have got true representation. Where one party has been just a little bit too sanguine probably, and the other party has been much out either way, the party which has been a little bit too sanguine has succeeded in getting much more than proportional representation.

1226. You do not often get such a gross example as that of Birmingham?—I expect, without knowing the history of Birmingham, that at the next election they had learnt experience, and they ran the right number.

1227. They ran what was nearer the right number. But now you are acquainted with Plymouth?—Yes.

1228. Which allowed 13 to be elected?—I think that was the number, if I remember rightly.

1229. I wanted to ask you: have you any experience of another difficulty connected with the cumulative vote—that is to say, if the Free Churches thought they were able to return four out of those 13, and put forward a ticket of four, how could they manage to get them elected even if it was a perfectly correct estimate of their strength?—They had considerable difficulties, of course. They had to give rather complicated directions to their electors. As a general rule, what they managed was this. We will say they ran four. Say that the Wesleyans were the most popular body, they would ask all the Wesleyans to vote for two Wesleyan candidates, and then the Congregationalists to vote for the Congregationalist candidate, and the Baptist to vote for the Baptist candidate; and they generally ran something on that principle. They all worked together, but they allotted their strength according to the churches.

1230. There was a certain amount of drilling necessary in order to get the force tallying in relation to its strength?—Yes; but then when the two parties—the Church and the Free Church parties—crystallised rather more, the Free churches ran their candidates together as an unsectarian body, and then in the different wards they had to say, "In this ward you must give three votes to this man, and two to that, and so on," and give precise instructions to the electors how to allot their votes among the different candidates; and by giving different instructions in different wards they could bring their men in approximately equal.

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1231. In

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Mr. G. SLATER, D.S.C.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1231. In fact, the system developed an immense amount of caucus machinery?—Yes, and necessarily so.

1232. And did it produce a good feeling or a bad feeling?—So far as it produced a feeling I should say it undoubtedly produced a bad feeling; but I am not sure that it produced any very violent feeling.

1233. Are you not aware that in some cases there was a feeling of resentment excited against all this?—I have noticed no such feeling myself.

1234. In your experience?—No, it has not come forcibly before me in any way.

1235. That would naturally be the outcome?—Yes.

1236. And very difficult?—Yes, and also I think it certainly tended to reduce the poll.

1237. Under the single transfer vote system the voter is free from all those difficulties?—That, to my mind, is one of its chief recommendations.

1238. So that the temptation to revert to the cumulative vote is almost a craving to return to the beggarly elements of which we are ashamed?—To tell the truth, I did not expect to be asked a single question about the cumulative vote.

1239. You thought it was dead and done with?—I thought it was dead and done with.

Lord Colchester.

1240. May I put one question arising out of that? You prefer the cumulative vote to the present system, I suppose, or do you not?—For provincial boroughs I think I should prefer the cumulative vote to the present system; but I have not closely enough watched it in London to be able to say. London is different. You have got a different sort of electorate, and not the same amount of local knowledge.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1241. I want to ask you something about provincial elections of Town Councils, which you dwelt upon in the first part of your evidence. In your case of Plymouth there was a water question?—Yes.

1242. The Town Council resolved upon certain plans?—Yes.

1243. To alter their water system, which was decidedly hostile to the opinion of the majority of the electors?—Yes.

1244. They resolved upon it, I suppose, soon after one election; soon after November they began their plans?—I am sorry I could not give you the exact dates; but it was a matter spread over years.

1245. It does not matter. There is a scheme resolved upon. At the next November Election was not that an element in the election contest?—It gradually became an element of election contests; but at each election contest that followed, it was still a contest between Liberals and Conservatives. I do not think there ever was specifically an election on the water issue.

1246. You would say, according to your experience that the system of election in country boroughs does not provide, even after the lapse of three years, for a complete establishment of what

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

we may call a popular judgment upon the Council?—No.

1247. Although you get a change of one-third every year, it does not work so as to produce in three years a certain correspondence between the popular judgment and the Council?—Certainly not.

1248. That is independent of the fact that some aldermen remain?—Quite independent. In the first place, it seldom happens that all the wards are challenged. In the next place, the mere fact that you have an election of the Council spread over three different elections prevents the interest being taken in it as a municipal issue, which otherwise would be taken in it. I may say that so far as I have watched, it is the exception, it is an increasing exception, but it is the exception to have provincial Councils really elected on the issues that are determined by them. I believe in Manchester they have sufficient local life to override the political issue; but it is exceptional.

Chairman.

1249. May I interrupt you there, and ask you what you mean by provincial Councils?—I meant provincial Municipal Councils, Municipal Councils in the provinces.

1250. It is a new term in local government—provincial Councils—what you really mean is Borough Councils not in London?—Yes.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1251. The system of electing in thirds does, however, secure some continuity in the composition of the Council?—It secures continuity in the composition of the Council, but there is a danger that the continuity will be the continuity of a clique.

1252. And you prefer the system of the Bill before this Committee on two grounds: first of all, that it gives power to the community at large to decide upon issues as a whole, which is impossible under the present system in country boroughs; and next, it preserves continuity by securing the re-election of the best men?—That is so.

Chairman.

1253. Have you read the Bill?—I think so, I really forget exactly.

1254. You had better have the Bill before you. Have you seen that there is a proposal by which Borough Councils can adopt the Bill, if a majority of the Council are in favour of it?—Yes, I know that.

1255. We have had a good many gentlemen like yourself who object to the present system, and come here rather suffering from the present system in not having been elected. Do you think the majority who have not suffered but have been successful this time are likely to come to a resolution in favour of adopting a Bill of this sort?—I think it is very problematical. I may say that the experience I have had throws some light upon it, because when, for instance, the Woolwich Borough Council first had the question before them it was remitted to them under the London Government Act to decide whether

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

whether they should retire one-third annually or all together; and I do not think the majority of the members gave any thought to the question from the point of view of civic policy; they only considered that if they retired one-third annually, one-third of them would have to face the electors in a year, and another third would have to face the electorate within two years, and therefore they decided that they would all sit there for three years for certain.

1256. In your opinion, therefore, they would be still more likely to come to the conclusion not to commit the happy dispatch and give up all their seats *en bloc* on the first opportunity at the next election without, so far as a good many were concerned, any chance of being re-elected?—I think if the coming in of the Bill would in any way shorten the duration of their service before the election, that would militate very much against their voting for it, but I do not suppose it would. It would only apply to the next November election in 1910, and I think they would give it fair consideration.

1257. But if they are elected by only one-third?—I am not talking of that.

1258. You are taking a pretty large chance?—Yes. In London I think it would get fair consideration. But if it would in any way shorten the occupancy of the seat by most Councillors, I do not think it would get fair consideration.

1259. Then you do not think the argument, which is the argument in favour of the Bill, that it would give a definite representation to the minority who are not now able to get in, would frighten them, because they are a majority, and if the principle on which they were elected were changed, a large portion of them would not find seats on the Council again?—In London I think they would give it fair consideration, as I say.

1260. But my question was not whether they would give it fair consideration, but would there be likely to be a majority in favour of the change?—I expect in some London boroughs there would be a majority in favour of the change. I think it would have enough effect to give the method a trial. I should be very loath to say that the majority of Borough Councils would adopt the Bill if it were passed.

1261. Do you think that Woolwich would adopt it entirely?—I am inclined to think that

Chairman—continued.

Woolwich would adopt it entirely. I think the general feeling would be in that direction. I mean to say, that it is felt on all sides that we have had as the result of the present system too much party spirit brought into things, and I think the general feeling would be that a change would be desirable, and they probably would adopt it.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1262. If we had carried our minds forwards eighteen months ago to a period just six months or more before the next General Election, it might occur to some members of the Council at that time that they were not certain of re-election under the present system?—Yes.

1263. There are such changes to and fro that the dominant party in the Council to-day might be beaten at the coming election?—Yes.

1264. They would be favourable to a suggestion which would prolong the existence of a certain number of them?—Yes, if they expected at all to be in a minority they would desire that that minority should be fully represented, naturally.

1265. The changes of the past may show what the changes of the future may be?—Yes.

1266. So that from the most selfish point of view they are not resigning very much by voting for the introduction of a method which would preserve the representation of a fair number?—Yes, but you can never tell, of course. I think the general feeling (I should put it rather more broadly) is that the present system is really very much of a gamble, and that a system which could be relied upon to give something like true representation would be felt to be a relief against the gamble.

1267. That Mr. Grinling that you spoke of was on the Council?—He was on the Council for six years.

1268. And he certainly would have voted for the change if it had been open to him?—Yes, certainly.

1269. And he would have carried a certain number of his colleagues with him?—Yes, I think he would have carried the majority of his colleagues with him any time between 1903 and 1906.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Mr. DOUGLAS EYRE, M.A., is called in; and Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

1270. I think you are the vice-head of Oxford House, Bethnal Green?—I am.

Lord Avebury.

1271. You have been connected with the district of Bethnal Green for many years?—Yes, for over twenty years.

1272. And you have taken considerable interest in municipal affairs in the district?—Yes.

1273. And in fact in all that concerns the public welfare of the locality?—Yes.

1274. I think you have recently formed an (0.13.)

Lord Avebury—continued.

association, have you not, for social purposes?—Yes, a Public Welfare Association for the district.

1275. That Association is composed of representatives of various bodies working for the good of the district?—Yes.

1276. Have you got a list of members?—Yes.

1277. It is a very representative body, I understand?—I think it may be said to be very representative, and it will be more fully representative, I hope, before very long. I hope to get even more persons on it shortly.

1278. It does not belong to any particular party

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Mr. D. EYRE, M.A.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

party or section, I believe, but consists of those who are interested in the general welfare of the locality?—That is so.

1279. Perhaps you will just state briefly to the Committee the objects of the Association?—I think I might read the objects as contained in a leaflet. Its general objects are, "To promote the general welfare of the people of the borough and to combine and strengthen all organisations and agencies engaged in the endeavour to improve the moral and social condition of the population." It includes the Members of Parliament for the district and officers and members of medical, charitable, trade, thrift and other philanthropic societies and institutions, managers of, and teachers in elementary and other schools, representatives of the various religious bodies, and others.

Earl of Hardwicke.

1280. It is not confined altogether to dealing with municipal elections?—No, it took a part in the last municipal election with a certain object, which object was to secure on the Council the return of the best men, irrespective of party politics, that is how it comes into connection with this subject.

Lord Avebury.

1281. What is your opinion with reference to the existing system of elections for municipal work?—My opinion is that it does not secure the return of all the good material available for municipal work. The party which has a majority in any borough can secure the whole representation. The Borough of Bethnal Green is a conspicuous instance of that.

1282. You are not satisfied, I understand, with the present mode of returning members to municipal bodies?—No.

1283. What system would you suggest to the Committee?—I should suggest a system whereby all thought is more truly represented upon the Council, which I must admit cannot be under a system which enables the whole of the representation to be in the hands of one political party.

1284. Have you considered the Bill which has been introduced by Lord Courtney?—I have.

1285. Would you be good enough to favour the Committee with your views as to the way in which that Bill would work?—I think, in the first place, the result would be not only that the other side in politics would have a very much better chance of representation in conjunction with the dominant political party, but also that a portion of the constituency would be represented, which is altogether unrepresented now—that is, that portion of the constituency which does not feel itself wedded to either political party at all.

1286. You think that it would secure a majority to the majority of the electors, and a fair hearing to the minority?—Yes.

1287. And it would secure seats to the most popular and presumably the most useful members of all parties in the borough?—Yes, those who do not wish to pose as party politicians in a contest.

1288. But even if they do, the best men of each

Lord Avebury—continued.

party and those who are likely to be the most useful would be the most likely to secure seats under this system?—I think so.

1289. Under the present system, however good men may be, if they happen to belong to the minority they are liable to be swept out at a municipal election?—Yes.

1290. And you consider that the system under the Bill would secure more continuity of action in the Borough Council?—I think that certainly it would secure that the best men had a very much better chance of being elected.

1291. And there would be more continuity of policy on the part of the Council?—Well, in Bethnal Green the political majority has been so much in force that in connection with these last three elections that there has been hardly any Moderate representation at all. I have the figures here. In 1900 the Progressives were 22 and the Moderates 8; in 1903 the Progressives were 28 and the Moderates 2; and in 1906 the whole representation passed into the hands of the Progressives—that is to say, they had the whole of the 30 seats, and in one ward there was no election at all, the whole of the Progressives were returned without any contest.

1292. That you regard as a travesty of representation?—I do.

1293. Do you think the Bill would have any tendency towards raising the general standard of those who become candidates for Municipal offices?—Yes, I think that there are people in the boroughs who would come forward if they thought that they were likely to be able to secure a seat without coming in under the party political standard.

1294. Then should I be right in coming to the conclusion that you advocate some such Bill as this, firstly, on the ground that it would secure a majority to the majority of the electors; secondly, that it would secure a hearing for the minority; thirdly, that it would secure the election of the best men on both sides; and, fourthly, that it would tend to encourage good men to come forward for Municipal offices?—Yes, on all those four grounds.

1295. And on all those four grounds you think that such a change is one of considerable importance?—I do.

Lord Allendale.

1296. You said just now, and I see it is in your written statement, that in your opinion under the system proposed by the Bill, many more people would come forward of the right sort. You think, I suppose, that it would induce more candidates to come forward altogether?—Yes, I think it would.

1297. Do you think that would be an advantage?—Yes, I think so.

1298. Do you think that all those who were induced to come forward would necessarily be of the right sort?—I think as a consequence that there would be more people voting and taking an interest in the election.

1299. I am talking of candidates. Do you not think there would be a good many more candidates come forward just on the chance of being able to slip in somehow, and that they might not be of the right sort?—I do not think that candidates

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[Continued.]

Lord Allendale—continued.

dates of that sort would come forward on the basis of the change embodied in this Bill.

1300. But if the system proposed under this Bill were carried out, and that induced more people to come forward, it does not follow that they would all be what you might call the right sort; there would be a great many different sorts?—I think that is the case now; that in a good many of the poorer districts of London people are now coming forward who are not of the right sort. They will be confronted under this system by others who are of the right sort, and do not wish to take part in Municipal life under the condition in which they have to face the electorate at the present time.

1301. But it would have a tendency to multiply the number of candidates generally?—Yes, I think it might.

Lord Colchester.

1302. I gather that your opinion is that under the present system you have practically a false representation?—I think that there is not only a false representation, but that there is no representation at all of a very important part of the Municipal thought and Municipal life, and that is that portion of the Municipality which is not wedded to party politics at all, which probably may be the most valuable electoral asset of all.

1303. You think that in the locality there are plenty of people to whom you could point who would be a valuable asset, but who under the present system have no chance?—That is so.

1304. And that that arises from the fact that, though they might have a large share of the votes, they would have no possibility of obtaining a majority?—That would be so, but I understand that under this Bill they would go to work by getting one-seventh, plus one, and in that case they would have a very good chance of getting a majority.

1305. I suppose that you consider that almost anything would be an improvement on the present system, which gave more representation to minorities than they have now?—Yes, but this is the only system which has been presented to me, and it seems to me certainly a very great improvement. Whether it is an ideal system or not, I am not prepared to say.

1306. You spoke of your object being to return the best men independently of party?—Yes.

1307. Does that mean that you would have a list of independent candidates, or that you would pick out those whom you thought the best men from the candidates on both sides?—I should be rather inclined to pick out issues to which people would be committed which are of great importance to the borough. It seems to me that under the present conditions the issues put before the electorate are not the true issues; they are irrelevant issues.

1308. You mean that the true issues are not taken up by either party?—That is so. It is merely a question whether the Radicals or the Conservatives shall be on the Municipal Council.

1309. They are not divided on these particular issues to which you refer?—There may be a great many points of importance to the borough

Lord Colchester—continued.

which have not occurred to either one political party or the other.

1310. You would run, as it were, an independent ticket?—Yes. I should hope to see party politics, as much as possible, eliminated from the whole of the election.

1311. Were you connected with Bethnal Green at the time of the London School Board elections?—Yes.

1312. Were you satisfied with the way in which parties were represented then?—I did not address myself to the question very much at that time.

1313. On one other point, with regard to what you said as to representation, are all your wards single-member wards now?—No. There are nine representatives in one, six in another, and so on.

1314. According to the size of the ward?—Yes. In the East ward there are nine, in the North ward there are six, in the South ward nine, and in the West ward five.

Chairman.

1315. They are not all the same size?—No.

Lord Colchester.

1316. I gather that you think some change is desirable over the present system; is this Bill the only form of change to which you have given consideration?—Yes; it seems to me to effectively deal with the main points which require reform.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1317. You have been 20 years in Bethnal Green?—Yes.

1318. All the time in Oxford House?—Yes.

1319. Do the inmates of Oxford House ever take any part in elections?—Not in these borough elections. The authorities of the Council are against the House taking part in political contests, but they have taken part in the Guardians' elections.

1320. In those 20 years you have, of course, become conversant with the different elements of life in Bethnal Green?—Yes.

1321. Do you think that they are very imperfectly represented on the Borough Council?—I think they are very imperfectly represented.

1322. There is one point which was raised by Lord Allendale on which I want to ask you a question. At present you have wards returning five, six, and nine members?—Yes.

1323. Each party wishes to win all five seats, all six seats, and all nine seats?—Yes.

1324. And puts out a ticket with five, six, and nine candidates?—Yes.

1325. Under the system of single transferable votes, do you think that it would be possible for a party to carry all the seats?—I do not think so.

1326. Would they then put out a ticket in the same fashion?—I do not think they would.

1327. So that you would have a diminution in the number of candidates put out by each particular party?—Yes.

1328. You would have new candidates springing up who would be in some way compensated for

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

for by the diminution in the numbers of candidates who thought they could carry all the seats?—Yes, I think that would be so.

1329. And therefore you need not apprehend

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

such a tremendous increase in the total number of candidates?—Taking them altogether, no.

(*The witness is directed to withdraw.*)

MR. CHARLES EDWARD HECHT, M.A., is called in; and Examined as follows:—

Lord Avebury.

1330. I believe you have been responsible for the conduct of a good many elections, both Parliamentary and municipal, both in London and the country?—Yes, I have. I have also been a member of the committee of the London Reform Union since 1895, and for some time chairman of a representative committee of borough councillors in connection with that body.

1331. Have you heard the evidence that was given by Dr. Slater?—Yes, I have.

1332. Do you agree generally with what he stated?—Yes.

1333. Then perhaps I need not take you over the same ground. You have been Honorary Secretary, I believe, of the Hampstead Non-political and Progressive Association since its formation in May, 1900?—Yes. I was Secretary when it was formed prior to the first Borough Council Election.

1334. The Executive Committee have authorised you to give evidence in support of Lord Courtney's Bill?—Yes, and they also hope to arrange for a demonstration of proportional representation and possibly an address in connection with it in the autumn—a trial election such as is contemplated I believe in Lewisham.

1335. How is that Committee constituted?—The Association has a membership of over 400, and is very representative of all sections of the community. Sir Walter Besant was our first President, and although he was in rather bad health during the last year or two of his life he took a really active interest in the work of the Association and in the municipal government of the country generally, as I know from conversation with him. Canon Barnett is our second President.

1336. You think that the present system tends to develop violent party feeling?—I do, and I think also, and this is the general trend of my evidence, that if the present system is capable of working anywhere it ought to work well in Hampstead owing to advantages we have. In Hampstead we have no parties at all on the Council.

1337. But you do not consider that it works well even in Hampstead?—No, I do not, and the efforts of my Association to obtain something like proportional representation of classes have been unsuccessful.

1338. You think, as I understand, that the system proposed in the Bill would secure seats for the best candidates on either side in proportion to their numbers?—Yes.

1339. In several of your wards I think that the majority carried a number of the seats, quite out of proportion to their numbers?—Yes, that was so on both sides, though in consequence of our special methods—*e.g.*, the principle laid down by our ward centres at the outset that candidates

Lord Avebury—continued.

not adopted by them or committed in any way to their programme might be "recommended" if their record as councillors or qualifications for public service appeared high, the primary aim being to secure a good Council as a whole—and the tendency of our Association to discourage the running of party tickets we have not had such extreme instances as have been given to your Lordships from other districts.

1340. I see in your notes of evidence you allude particularly to the Belsize ward?—Yes, that was the ward in which in 1900 my Committee carried all their candidates but one, and they were not really entitled to that share of the representation in that ward.

1341. What was the voting strength of the different parties?—In that ward I should put it approximately at 4 to 3.

1342. And they carried how many seats?—They carried five seats.

1343. Out of how many?—Out of six seats. Then, again, there were two striking instances last November in two wards; there was a certain growth of party spirit last November, and there the Municipal Reformers, an association which had not existed before, in two wards carried all their four candidates by large majorities, and it is perfectly clear by a reference to the figures that if they had run the full ticket they would have carried all the seats, although the minority were clearly entitled to representation.

1344. You think that the system suggested in Lord Courtney's Bill would prevent the violent fluctuations which now occur in the representations of London boroughs?—I do.

1345. And that it would tend to secure a fair representation of the minority?—Yes.

1346. And that it would lead to the election of the best men on both sides?—Yes.

1347. And thus secure continuity of policy on the part of the Councils?—Yes. We have had more continuity in Hampstead than elsewhere because of the absence of the party system.

1348. You have also had experience I think in Manchester?—I lived the first portion of my life there.

1349. Is there anything that you wish to say to the Committee as to the working of the present system in provincial elections?—I have heard Dr. Slater's evidence and I generally concur with him as to the objections to the system of one-third retiring every year, and also as to the evils of the party system. I might mention that a relative of mine, for many years the leader of the Conservative party in Manchester, and who was offered high honours for his services in that connection, told me—he is now dead—that he so strongly objected to the introduction of party politics into the City Council, that during many years there he abstained from attendance at the party meetings

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Mr. C. E. HECHT.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

ings which were held before such meeting for the discussion of various items on the agenda.

1350. And you attach great importance to the amelioration of elections to municipal bodies?—Yes.

Chairman

1351. We have had a good deal of evidence with regard to the points that you have put before us which you have made quite clear also, I do not think it will be necessary for me to trouble you further.

Earl of Hardwicke.

1352. We have heard a good deal about the political side of the question with regard to the Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals. I want

Earl of Hardwicke—continued.

to ask you, supposing that a municipality does some very stupid thing which turns out a failure, does that not make a difference at the next election?—Under the present system I think so, undoubtedly, but I think that there is a danger under the present system of a clean sweep, which you have had in so many boroughs, which upsets the continuity of administration and puts responsible business, as Dr. Slater pointed out, in the hands of men without any previous training at all. We have not had that clean sweep in Hampstead, because we excluded party politics like Stoke Newington; we have not, except at the last elections, lost suitable Councillors owing to excessive party spirit, and we have also induced a better class of men to come forward.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, two o'clock.

Die Martis, 25^o Junii 1907.

LORDS PRESENT :

Earl of HARDWICKE.
Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Lord AMPTHILL.

Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.
Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

MR. EDWARD RALPH PICKMERE, called in ; and Examined.

Chairman.

1353. You are Town Clerk of Liverpool?—I am.

1354. And you have come to speak about the conduct of elections, both Parliamentary and Municipal, in your City?—Yes.

1355. I think there has been a meeting of the Council of the Municipal Corporations Association, at which you were present?—Yes, on the 13th of this month.

1356. Was this Bill discussed at that meeting?—Yes, it was.

1357. What conclusion did the meeting come to?—As expressed in the resolution which was passed, which is as follows: "That this Council is of opinion that the present method of electing one-third of the Members of Provincial Municipal Councils is preferable to the Metropolitan System of Triennial elections; and that even if the system of voting and obtaining the results of the poll proposed by the Bill were adopted it seems to this Council doubtful whether it should be introduced into Municipal Elections, having regard to the complications involved and the delay which will be incurred in declaring the results, and also having regard to the desirability of maintaining the existing uniform method of voting at all elections." That was carried unanimously, I may say.

1358. Was it a large meeting?—Yes, a fairly large meeting; it was an ordinary meeting of the Council of the Association; it would consist of about 46 members, I should think. It was about the usual size of the meetings. There were 43 Corporations represented.

1359. On that Council?—Yes.

1360. Would you describe the system in your own borough?—In Liverpool there are three Councillors elected for each ward, and one retires every year; that means to say, a third of the Council retires every year, of course, other than the Aldermen.

1361. Then you have an election in every ward every year?—There is an election in every ward every year.

(C.13.)

Chairman—continued.

1362. I think you say that Liverpool is divided into 35 wards?—Yes, 35 wards, and in 34 of them one Councillor retires each year. I may explain with regard to the 35th ward, that it was a district that was incorporated within the City boundaries last year, and only returns one Member until the constituency comes to a certain size.

1363. Until it increases in population?—Yes, until it increases really to a certain number of electors.

1364. Have you studied this Bill?—I have read it through, and read the rules and regulations and the schedule, the method set out for the election, the model election, I think, it is called; but I cannot say that I have studied it with very great care mathematically, because my evidence I think is rather on the question of the method of triennial election as opposed to the present method of election in the provinces.

1365. Do you think that Liverpool would be likely to take the opportunity of adopting the method proposed by the Bill, supposing the Bill passed into law?—I should say certainly not. I think the general feeling at the meeting of the Council of Municipal Associations was, that even on the triennial election question it would not be favoured in the provinces.

1366. You do not think that the majority of members would be prepared to put an end to their own existence as Councillors with the uncertainty before them of the new method of election?—That is quite so. The only time that has been done in Liverpool was when there was an extension in 1895, and the whole Council retired in order that there might be a new Council composed of the old wards and the outer districts as well. I may say that the Liberals were in power when that took place, and they were very heavily defeated at the polls when the new Council was elected, through the new districts coming into the City.

1367. Are your elections carried on on party lines generally?—Yes, they are.

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1368. Has

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

1368. Has any non-party man got any chance of being elected?—Very seldom indeed; I do not remember one case so far. I have been with the Council now twenty-two years nearly, and I cannot recollect one case. My clerk reminds me that there was a Protestant reaction in Liverpool a short time ago, but they formed another party really, and carried a few seats as against Conservatives and Liberals.

1369. I think you are satisfied with your present mode of election, one-third retiring every year?—Quite. I think it is far preferable.

1370. Will you give the reason why you say so?—In the first place, because in a triennial election there might be too great a disturbance, in my opinion, of the existing state of affairs in the Council.

1371. You think it is more likely to ensure some continuity of policy with regard to Municipal affairs if only one-third change every year?—That is so. We find in Liverpool that where there is a matter brought before the ratepayers, there is sufficient public opinion expressed in the election that is then coming on or taking place, which by the return of certain members to the Council is a hint, I may call it, to the Council that a certain policy is to be adopted more or less. But that, of course, might go too far in some cases, having regard to the very large public interest involved in many of our large undertakings; and in my opinion it is advisable that there should not be too serious or too sudden a change in the existing state of affairs.

1372. Then with regard to the proposals in this Bill, I think you see some objection to the proposal which would allow a Council first to adopt it by a bare majority and then a short time afterwards by another majority to revert again to your present system?—Yes, I do, for two reasons. In the first place because, I think, it would give too great a power to the dominant party, who might be verging on a narrow majority, above the other party, and they might think that by adopting the Act in the first instance they might get a further sweeping majority; and again, on the other hand, if they found that, and after getting it the other party came into power and thought it would be better to revert to the old system again, then they might adopt it again; and that would cause a great deal of confusion and disturbance in the general government of the City. One must have regard to the fact that the officials very often initiate policies or schemes of different undertakings which are taken up by the Council, and a sudden reversal of any policy or scheme might tend to cause a great deal of loss to the ratepayers. The other reason is, that it would, in my opinion, cause very great confusion in the minds of the voters. It has taken some years now to get the voters to understand the voting under the Ballot Act by the simple method of making a cross, and, of course, if the Act were adopted, no doubt they could in time be taught to make the numerals 1, 2, and 3, and as soon as they had been taught to vote in that method they might be, by a decision of the Council, set back again to the old system. We have noticed that in the case of the old School Board elections, where numerals were used, we had 15 representatives

Chairman—continued.

on the School Board, and, as a rule, the electors were taught to plump—that is to say, to put 15 votes for one particular candidate. The Church Party, the Roman Catholic Party, and the Non-conformist Party held schools in which these people were taught to vote in a certain way, and we found at the next municipal election that very often people were putting these 15's down in our voting papers instead of the cross, showing that the voters were a good deal troubled in their minds to know exactly how to record their votes, and we had more spoilt papers in consequence.

1373. Owing to confusion between the two systems?—Owing to confusion between the two systems.

1374. But apart from that, should you say that it would not be desirable to be having constant changes in the mode of electing; that it would unsettle people's minds about the elections, and it would have a tendency to make the party which thought it would gain something by a change try and get a majority to go back again to the other system?—That is so.

1375. Whatever the methods of election are, it is not desirable to have constant changes in the system?—I quite agree with that.

1376. Under the Bill that would be possible?—Under the Bill that would be possible. I would prefer that the Bill, instead of being adoptive, should be made statutorily obligatory, if it is to be done at all, and make a triennial system throughout the country, although, as I have already said, I do not approve of the triennial system.

1377. As you do not approve of the principle of the measure, I do not suppose you would like it better than the present system?—No, I do not say for a moment that I like it better than the present system; but I say that rather than have it chopping and changing I would make it a fixed method of election all over the country, including Parliamentary elections if possible.

1378. With regard to your present system you say it is very simple, and that the electors understand it, and also that it takes a very short time for the Returning Officer to count the votes and get the result?—Yes, a very short time indeed. We can get through our elections, the ordinary municipal elections in each ward, in about an hour—sometimes less.

1379. About an hour after the votes are handed in?—Yes, after the ballot boxes are brought in we can declare the result in about an hour. I may say, that I think that most of these comparisons which have been made in other evidence as to time, have been between the triennial system in the London boroughs and this new system which is proposed under the Bill.

1380. According to the principal part of the evidence we have had from gentlemen representing municipalities, they have been from places in the London district, where there are triennial elections?—Yes, and where they have to use sheets, of course, transferring the numbers until they add them up; and that takes some time. In our School Board elections, which we used to conduct for the School Board, it took us the whole day.

1381. That

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

1381. That was with a large list of candidates, I suppose?—Yes, a large list of candidates.

1382. And the power of voting for a considerable number?—Yes, with the power of voting up to 15, either by plumping or dividing into 9, 3, and 3, and so on.

1383. That would take much longer than even the triennial system?—Yes, I think it would.

1384. Under the ordinary system?—Yes.

1385. With regard to the system which is proposed in this Bill, have you looked at it sufficiently to be able to express any opinion, first with regard to whether the voter would follow it and understand it, and, secondly, whether it would be as easy and as rapid in its results as the present system?—As regards the method of voting, I think I am right in saying that the Bill does not require a voter to give his first, second, and third votes; he can give one vote only if he wishes, I think.

1386. The voter can vote for only one candidate if he wishes; but if he does he loses any power he has of assisting another candidate, and by his vote helping to elect another candidate in the second or third or fourth place?—Yes. Therefore the voting paper would not be a bad one if he only voted for one candidate?

1387. No?—That might complicate matters to some extent, perhaps; but my view is, I cannot help saying, that the cross for one candidate where one member retires from a ward each year is a very much more simple method. The other method, as I have said before, in my opinion, tends to confuse the voter. With regard to the counting, there can be no comparison, I take it, between the simple method which is now adopted in the provincial boroughs, and that which is proposed to be adopted by the Bill. The latter can be worked, no doubt, but the voter certainly would not understand it, and I doubt very much whether the agents of the candidates would. Generally there are two or three agents of each candidate who attend in the counting room, and I am quite certain that those men would not understand it. As a rule, their intelligence is not above that of the ordinary voter, and they would generally be very much confused and troubled, I should think, from what I know of the class of men. And of course, it would require very careful handling. The chief counting assistants would need to have a thorough training in the method of recording the votes and counting, although there are a number of men who now act as chief counting assistants and assist the Returning Officer in each ward, upon whom I have very great reliance; still, I should hesitate even to place those gentlemen in a position of this kind, and probably I should have to employ some special assistants for the purpose, for which we should have to pay, no doubt. And then there is another question, of course. If the election was an annual one, they would get more *au fait* with the method than they would if it was a triennial election.

1388. If you had an annual election, and there was only one candidate to be elected in each ward, it would not be necessary to bring this proposal into operation at all?—I quite appreciate that.

(0.13.)

Chairman—continued.

1389. But the proposal in the Bill, I think, is that the whole of the present Council should retire and that there should be an election in each ward for the number of members that the ward returns?—Yes, I quite understand that.

1390. And if you brought the Act into force in Liverpool that would have to be done in the first instance?—Yes, so I understand.

1391. Therefore, following out your argument, you would want somebody in each ward who was sufficiently experienced and had sufficient knowledge of the rules of this Bill to carry out the election without making mistakes?—That is so.

1392. And you think that at first there might be some difficulty about it?—Yes, I think certainly there would be.

1393. I take it that if it were desired to adopt such a system, you would have plenty of people experienced enough to learn it?—No doubt it could be done.

1394. Then, as to the time it would take, have you calculated at all, or formed any judgment?—I am not prepared to say definitely, but I think I should have to postpone it until the following day.

1395. At all events, you think it would take longer than the present system?—Yes, I am certain of that.

1396. And you think that the result would not be declared the same day?—I am sure it could not be. With the excitement of an election and the hurry that there is over these matters, bringing in the ballot boxes, I think one might get so far, at any rate, as to open the ballot boxes and count the number of papers; but I should certainly advise the Returning Officer not to proceed with the count the same evening. I should advise that the ballot boxes containing the papers should be sealed and placed in a sealed safe, as we used to do with the School Board election papers, and that the count should be renewed the next morning; and I should think that the result might be declared about noon—the count renewed, say, about nine, o'clock and the result declared about noon.

1397. I think you are aware that there have been elections carried on in this country in some cases as illustrative elections?—Yes, I have read of it.

1398. And one or two cases of elections for a particular purpose?—Yes, I have seen that in the evidence.

1399. Do you think the experience gained in them would not govern an election held in a large borough like yours?—I must have regard to the fact, of course, first of all, that if what I have heard is correct (and I think it is), that 5,600 papers were returned out of 25,000 distributed, the voters on those papers must have been those persons who understand how to vote in the first instance; and then the elections, of course, were conducted by experts who would have the whole process at their fingers' ends, and be able to conduct it, of course, much more expeditiously than a fresh set of men coming into it for the first time.

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1400. Where

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[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1400. Where did you get that figure of 5,600?—My clerk made it up for me. It was a statement in the evidence somewhere. May I also point out one other matter in connection with that, which I think is very important, and which has occurred to me since I prepared my evidence. I take it that in this particular election which has been referred to as the model election, there were no candidates' agents, who were anxious to see whether there were any mistakes or not; that is to say, the candidates would not be there themselves, of course, nor any representatives of them. In our case we should have two or three agents present for each candidate, and probably the candidates themselves. All these men would require to be thoroughly satisfied that every calculation had been made correctly, and that would tend, I think, to probably one of these men being appointed specially to go through the papers and to go through all the figures, and the poll could not be declared until that had been done. I have not hitherto calculated for that at all, and I should say that another hour or two might very well be added on for that purpose. I think that is a most important point.

Chairman.

1401. I do not know that you have put down all the matters that you wish to give evidence upon, but I should like to ask you whether you consider it a good thing, or the reverse, that your municipal elections are carried on entirely on party lines, and that practically no independent candidate, who is not one of the accepted candidates of a party, has a chance of getting in?—Opinions differ among Town Clerks upon that point.

1402. I am asking a Town Clerk, because I know that he is in an independent position?—Quite; I am not a party man in any way. My view is rather that the introduction of a candidate on party lines is not objectionable; I put it that far. Men are brought forward who work generally at the Parliamentary elections, and are generally known as public men, party men, and they come in on party lines; and I cannot see really any objection to it. In Liverpool we find that although they come in on party lines, party is usually dropped when they get into the Council; after the November elections and after the appointment of committees there is very little party spirit shown. Of course, there are a few occasions when it crops up, but it is not often, and all the members of the committees work very well indeed together for the benefit of the town generally; they do not exhibit any party spirit as between Conservatives and Liberals, or even the working men—we have two working men members in as well; I forgot to mention that.

1403. The question I put to you is whether you think any men who might be very useful on municipal affairs are excluded from standing at elections, or, if they do stand, have very little chance of getting in, in consequence of the party system being adopted?—I do not think so in Liverpool. Of course, it is rather the habit to cry down Town Councils by other gentlemen

Chairman—continued.

who might, perhaps, come into the Council if they cared to give their time to it.

1404. I did not mean to suggest that party men might not be very useful members, but that there might be others as well?—Yes, there are a number of gentlemen who might have come into the Liverpool Council if they would give the time to it, no doubt; but I do not think really it makes very much difference.

1405. You have probably gathered that the object of this Bill is to get a fair representation, according to the support they get, for each candidate, which would give a man standing independently a better chance than he probably would have under a system where the election was being very actively worked by the two parties?—Quite so. Of course, there are matters which arise during the municipal year which are quite outside party, and which become important matters on the platforms of the November elections. We have had one or two cases where men have come out on those lines. We had one independent candidate, I remember, some years ago, but he was generally supported by all parties, and when he had been in the Council—I think it was about twelve months or two years—he seemed to become a Conservative; that is all I can say from his voting and from the fact that I think he now attends the Conservative caucus. But, as I say, party is not rife in the Council; it is more in name than anything else; and I think it serves in this way: that the party on one side watch the party on the other side, and I think it is for the benefit of the ratepayers that they should have some controlling influence in the elections.

1405¹. Do you believe that the present mode of elections enables each side, whatever its numerical majority or minority, to be fairly represented according to its numbers?—I do. I should like to put in one Table which I have had prepared since I sent in my proof. My registration clerk prepared this Table for the purpose of showing the gradual change which has taken place in the political complexion of the councillors in the years 1895, 1903, and 1907. In the 1895 election, when I told your Lordships just now the Conservatives got in with a very large majority, although the Liberals were the party in power, who really organised the extension, so to speak, or brought in the Bill for the provisional order, there were 61 Conservatives elected, 13 Liberal members, and 10 Nationalists. These are councillors, of course. In 1903 the Conservatives had dropped to 58, the Liberals had risen to 30, and the Nationalists were 12. (I may say that we had some wards divided in the meantime under our Provisional Order, under which further representation was to be given when the electors exceeded a certain number), and there were two Protestants. In 1907 the Conservatives dropped to 48, the Liberals went up to 38, the Nationalists remained the same, 12, and the other parties, Labour and Protestants, 4. That shows that there was a gradual change in the complexion of the Council through this very system which is now being observed—the system of one-third retiring every year.

1406. Was that in consequence of a change

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Chairman—continued.

in the mode of election?—No, on the contrary, it is a change in the constitution of the Council politically through our present mode of election, showing that the ratepayers had reasons for having this change; and they did it gradually without interfering with the general policy of the Council.

1407. Has it ever happened, as it has in some other places about which we have had evidence, in Liverpool that all the public men who have taken part in municipal affairs have lost their seats at the same time, so that there was no continuity of policy, or even of management?—No, we have never had that.

1408. You could not with the system at present in force?—We might have had it in 1895, when the large extension took place.

1409. But it did not happen?—It did not happen. There was a removal from the Liberals to the Conservatives, but still, so many of the old members were retained that there was really no change of policy in any way.

1410. I suppose it is clear that such a change as has taken place in some London boroughs, where the minority have almost been unrepresented at particular elections, could not happen where you are having your elections held for a part of the members every year?—That is why I think our system is so far preferable to the system of triennial elections. That is one of my main reasons.

1411. You are so satisfied with your present system that you are not looking about for anything new?—That is so.

1412. I think you have some papers with regard to your mode of conducting elections which might be put in?—Yes, I have them here. The first shows the number of citizens on the roll in each ward for 1906-7, a printed return. The next is a statement showing the party candidates and the independent candidates elected in 1895. Then I have a statement showing the party candidates during the past five years; and another statement showing the percentage of spoilt votes during the last ten years, from 1897 to 1906. Then a paper containing the instructions to counting assistants; and I think I might hand in this last statement which I have referred to, but it is not mentioned in my statement of evidence, a schedule showing the political complexions in the years 1895, 1903 and 1907. (*The witness handed in the above-mentioned statements.*)

1413. There is one point I think you have not alluded to. I think you said that you had a statement which shows the number of spoiled votes in a particular election in Liverpool, which you think is considerably less than it would be under the proportional system?—Yes, it would, I think.

1414. You refer, for the purpose of comparison, I think, to the elections on the Hare system which have been held in Tasmania?—Yes, that I have handed in, showing that the number of spoiled votes in Liverpool in November, 1906, is considerably less than under the elections on the Hare system in Tasmania.

1415. I refer to a statement with regard to the municipal elections in Liverpool in 1906, in

Chairman—continued.

which there appear particulars of the number of voters on the roll, the number of votes recorded, the percentage of votes polled, and the last column is the one we are on particularly, the number of spoilt votes?—Yes.

1416. In that election there were 147 spoilt votes out of 37,732 votes recorded, and you give several previous years, some larger and some smaller, but I do not see the paper you mention here, where you made the comparison of the number of votes under the Hare system?—The Tasmanian Table is headed, "House of Representatives." The total number of ballot papers polled for the election of members to the House of Representatives numbered 18,572, of which 18,039 were declared valid, and 533 were declared invalid. Then follows a more complete analysis of these valid papers, showing that the Hare system is responsible for 335 of those, according to this return.

1417. Out of how many?—Out of 18,500.

1418. I think in your case, in the particular year taken, it was 147 out of 37,000?—Yes.

1419. Therefore it is a much smaller percentage?—Very much smaller.

1420. The number of votes recorded was double that in the Appendix paper, and the number of votes spoiled is considerably less than half. You will put forward a paper to show that?—Yes.

1421. I want you to put in your comparison?—Yes, I will do that.

1422. Is there any other point that you wish to allude to?—I do not think there is anything else.

1423. I see you refer to your rules for holding elections and counting the votes. I do not know that it is necessary to go through those; if you think it is necessary you can put in a paper about it?—I do not think so.

1424. Those are probably the ordinary rules under which the ordinary elections are conducted?—Yes, and the instructions to those counting assistants show what is to be done. I think that is sufficient.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1425. You were present at this meeting of the Committee of the Municipal Corporations Association?—Yes, it was a council meeting of this association, and I was present.

1426. Does that council meet every month or quarterly, or how often?—It meets, I think, once a month for the greater portion of the year—about once a month.

1427. At this particular council meeting was this subject put down for discussion before it met?—Yes, it was.

1428. How long notice was given?—The meeting was specially summoned for this purpose and for the purpose of considering the Afforestation Conference, which is being held to-day. There was three weeks' notice on the agenda, Mr. Baxter tells me.

1429. How many members are there on the Council?—There are 63 members on the Council.

1430. It was a very fair attendance?—There were 47 Corporations represented, rather more than I thought.

1431. The

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1431. The result was unanimous?—Yes.

1432. It was not decisively adverse to any change; it expressed a doubt, I think?—I do not think there was any doubt expressed. The resolution was very carefully worded; in fact, I was the author of that motion, really, and it decidedly says that the present method of electing one-third is preferable, and then it does further say that it seems doubtful whether the new method should be introduced into municipal elections.

1433. It expresses a doubt?—It expresses a doubt, yes.

1434. It is pretty clear that it prefers annual elections in preference to a triennial election of the whole body?—Yes.

1435. But as to the other points it is doubtful?—On other points it expresses a doubt, for the simple reason that many of them had not considered it.

1436. It is doubtful. That is the only point at present?—Yes.

1437. Have you clearly kept in your mind throughout the distinction between an election in thirds, which is your method, and the triennial election, which has been adopted in London, and thirdly the method of the Bill?—I do not quite catch your Lordship's point.

1438. There are three things to be compared with one another: the election in thirds, which is your method; the election of the whole body triennially, as followed in London; and the election as proposed by the Bill. Have you kept those three things quite clear in your mind?—I gather that the method of election proposed by the Bill is triennial election—the whole Council to retire every third year, I understand.

1439. It is triennial, but it is a perfectly distinct method of election. Apparently you have not kept that clear in your mind?—Yes, quite. The method of voting, and the method of arriving at the result is quite different; but the period is the same in the proposed Bill as it is in the London boroughs.

1440. The period is the same?—Yes.

1441. I ask you if you have kept quite clear in your own mind the working of the three separate systems?—Certainly.

1442. The resolution in favour of election in thirds, as against triennial election, applied not only by comparison of your method with the London method, but of your method with the proposed method of the Bill?—I do not quite appreciate the question.

1443. The Council, with your assistance, at your instigation, passed a resolution in favour of the principle of election by thirds, as against a triennial election?—Yes.

1444. I want to know whether that applied as against triennial election, according to the plan conducted in London, or whether it also applied as to a triennial election, according to the proposal contained in the Bill—two perfectly distinct methods of election?—I should say that the whole question before the Council was the Bill, and they applied themselves to the consideration of whether the method proposed by the Bill would be suitable, not only as to triennial election, but as to the method of voting and counting

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

the votes to provincial boroughs. Therefore the comparison made was, I take it, for the moment, between our existing system and the system proposed by the Bill. That was the real comparison.

1445. Some of the reasons which you adduce in favour of election annually by thirds, as against triennial election, would apply very strongly against the London elections, but would not apply, I venture to say, as against elections on the plan proposed by the Bill. That is the reason I ask you, and repeat: have you kept in your mind throughout the distinction between the two methods?—I do not think I have altogether. I should say I considered it from two points of view—first of all, the triennial election question; and then the next point of view, if the triennial system is adopted, whether the method of counting and declaring the result, proposed by this Bill, would be satisfactory. That is the way in which I have considered it.

1446. In fact, the two other methods have been a little run together?—Probably.

1447. I put it in this way. Can you conceive of the Committee or any other body strongly preferring your provincial method to the London method?—I can, most certainly.

1448. But, at the same time, strongly preferring election according to the plan in the Bill to both methods?—No, I cannot.

1449. Cannot your imagination go that far?—No, I cannot imagine my Council adopting it.

1450. I did not ask you that; I said this Committee?—I beg your pardon.

1451. Or any other body, I believe I went on to say?—I have had a great deal of experience in elections, and I certainly should not say so.

1452. But as a matter of mental discrimination, although you may not be able to conceive of the Committee arriving at this or that result, you can surely conceive of a person or a set of persons arriving at a result that your provincial method is much better than the London method, but is inferior to the method under the Bill?—Yes, that might be so of course, prefacing my reply to that by saying that I should be strongly opposed to triennial election. I should say that if it was decided that triennial election should be adopted, probably the method proposed by this Bill might be satisfactory. I say that, theoretically, the basis of proportional representation is a good one.

1453. Are you aware that much evidence was taken on this subject before the Unification of London Commission?—I have not read that evidence at all.

1454. Has not your mind been directed to that?—No, it has not, I am sorry to say.

1455. That Commission had before it a representative of the Municipal Corporations Association, who gave evidence at great length and with great ability, in favour of the position you now assume—in favour of election by thirds every year. You have not seen that?—I have not.

1456. Are you not aware that the then Lord Mayor of Liverpool was a member of that Commission?—I had forgotten it. I was not Town Clerk then; probably it was not brought to my special notice.

1457. And

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1457. And also you will be unaware that that Commission, having to consider the question, left the point open as to whether the elections for the London boroughs should be by thirds annually or should be of the whole triennially?—I was not aware of that.

1458. Do you know that it was left open to the London boroughs to adopt one or the other method?—Yes, I think I do know that.

1459. And that they adopted the triennial election method?—So I believe.

1460. Leaving it to experience to work out which was the better?—Yes.

1461. Now, in your comparison of the system which you have at work with the proposed system, you have dwelt very largely upon speculations as to what would happen, have you not?—No, I think my opinions are based on experience.

1462. But you have not had much experience of the proposed system?—No, but I think I can compare it with certain elections in Liverpool which have been conducted there, which would show, to some extent, what the results would be if a system of this kind were adopted.

1463. Would you tell us what elections those were?—I referred to them before; for instance, the School Board election. There was a great deal of confusion there at first, and, as I pointed out, after the School Board election, the mind of the voter had rather settled down to that mode of voting for the time being, and he often recorded his votes in numerals on the ballot paper for the Municipal election, showing that he was disturbed to some extent by the different method of voting previously adopted shortly before.

1464. You said, in answer to the noble Chairman, that the voter often did that, but you had no figures. I suppose you would not venture on any figures as to how many people did that?—No, I would not do that; but it did tend to a great deal of confusion. May I also say that for the School Board election a very large percentage of the voters voted by crosses; 15 crosses would be put, for instance, to one man's name instead of numerals.

1465. Would that make the votes void?—No, as long as he showed clearly his intention.

1466. No doubt it is well to have one method, but it would only lead to the confusion produced by the co-existence of two methods; and I suppose, if you allow that the second method is better, we should not hesitate to adopt the second method, because it would produce some confusion?—If a better method could be established for all elections, I should say adopt it for all elections, because the voter would get to understand it in time.

1467. One word, as you have mentioned School Board elections and the Municipal Corporation. It is rather a delicate question to ask, but would you suggest any comparison, or any contrast, between the persons composing the one body and the persons composing the other in Liverpool?—As between Conservatives and Liberals?

1468. No, as between the School Board and the Municipal Corporation?—I beg your pardon.

1469. Would you institute (it is a very deli-

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

cate question; I do not wish to commit you if it is invidious) any comparison between the persons composing the one body and the persons composing the other?—Of course they were elected for different reasons and on different grounds. There were clergymen of the Church of England as candidates at the School Board elections, of course, and prominent laymen in the Roman Catholic Church, and others. I do not think there was really very much difference in the constitution, so far as the ordinary members went, in position.

1470. Would you admit that, apart from this question of the clerical profession, there were persons on the School Board who would have had no chance, even if they had been willing to stand, as candidates for the Municipal Corporation?—No, I would not say that. I would say that Mr. Wise, the Protestant, polled at one of the recent School Board elections, before the extension of the boundary, 107,063 votes; the next highest was a lady, a non-sectarian, who polled 52,909. The next in order were four Roman Catholics, who organised the election in such a manner that the electors plumped for each candidate, they came next with 50,000, leaving out the odd figures—50,000 and 49,000, showing how closely they worked it. Mr. Wise, who came out with 107,063 votes, obtained a seat on the Council in the following year, the following November.

1471. I did not say that you would not have persons sitting on both sides; but do you admit that there were persons sitting on the School Board of a particular kind of character and position who would have had no chance if they had stood, and were willing to stand, of being elected on the Council?—Many of them, of course, were clergymen, who could not be elected on the Council.

1472. And a lady?—No, the lady could not be elected. We had Mr. Wise, taking his name first; he definitely became the minister of an independent church in Liverpool, and therefore he became disqualified to sit. Otherwise he was on the Council for some few years. Mr. Fitzpatrick, a Roman Catholic, was quite a capable man, and would have made an excellent member of the Council.

1473. Did he ever stand?—No.

1474. Would he have been likely to have been elected?—I should certainly say that he would. If he had stood for a Nationalist seat he must certainly have been elected, because he was a very popular man in Liverpool, Mr. Fitzpatrick. Then there was Dr. Clarke on the School Board, a Churchman, whose brother was on the Council for many years, also a doctor.

1475. I will not pursue it any further than this. We have heard from other quarters of persons standing for the School Board who were able and willing to present themselves and go through the ordinary election for the Town Council, but they thought they had very little chance of election if they stood. Would you find any difficulty in accepting that as probably the case elsewhere?—There would have been no difficulty in Liverpool. I see another name on that list, who is now a member of the Council, Mr. Evans,

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

Mr. Evans, who got in with a very good majority.

1476. You began by answering some questions as to the conditions of adopting this Bill in any municipality, but they turned ultimately upon a bare majority being sufficient, and the possibility of its being changed in a limited time?—Yes, I think the change confuses matters very much and makes it very awkward. One would never know quite what the Council was going to do, and it might upset some particular policy or proceeding which might really be for the good of the ratepayers, only the ratepayers did not know it. It might make a great deal of trouble.

1477. Would your first objection be in any way met by requiring a proportional number of Councillors, more than the bare majority, to vote for the adoption of the scheme?—I do not know that that would affect it very much. Do you mean, my Lord, if the Act provided that there should be a certain majority of the Council?

1478. Yes?—That would make a difference, I think.

1479. You said a bare majority; would two-thirds meet your objection?—I think that would be an improvement, certainly.

1480. That would diminish your objection?—Yes, it would diminish it.

1481. You think there is a possibility after the system has been adopted of a vote being passed again for reversion to the old system?—Yes, I do.

1482. Have you considered what would be the position of Councillors, supposing the Act were adopted and Councillors were elected under it, of reverting to the old system. You suggested this motive, that they would get a sweeping victory (you used the word "sweeping"), the next time?—Are you referring to the first time it was adopted, when the whole Council came out?

1483. Yes?—Yes, they might, of course, get it, as they did in 1895, in Liverpool, when the Conservatives came in with a very sweeping majority; and the Liberals, by promoting that Provisional Order for the extension of the City really put themselves out of power.

1484. In 1895 the whole of your Council were re-elected, and the Conservatives came in with a sweeping majority?—They did.

1485. And you think that if this Bill became an Act and was adopted in any constituency there might be the same temptation to adopt it in the hope of getting a sweeping majority?—That is exactly what I think.

1486. Have you realised that the two methods of election are essentially different; that in the first case they could get a sweeping majority because they had the command of the majority in every ward, and in the next case they could not get a sweeping majority because the minority would get representatives also?—Under your proposed system of voting, no doubt it is preferable that if they do go out every third year, that system should be adopted or some system like it in order to prevent what you are now referring to. I quite agree.

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1488. And you fortify that by the experience in your own borough in 1895?—Yes.

1487. But we are dealing with the adoption of the Bill, and you suggest that it might be adopted by a narrow majority in the hope of getting a swamping majority at the poll?—Yes.

1489. Do you realise that the experience in your borough in 1895 has no bearing on the other suggestion, because the sweeping majority was secured by a method in one case which is not applicable in the other?—I can only repeat that if a triennial election system is to be adopted—I do not want to commit myself to the system proposed by this Bill—but some form of proportional representation would no doubt be advisable.

1490. I do not want you to commit yourself to anything, but I ask you simply to do this—to keep in mind the two different methods of election. What I asked you was, did you not apply in this case your experience in 1895 under one system to the probable experience under a totally different system?—Yes, that is quite true. Subject to anything that might be further said with regard to this proposed mode of voting and counting the votes and declaring the results, I should say that a system of proportional representation would be theoretically a good system, if triennial elections are adopted; but I prefer the present system of a third of the Council retiring every year.

1491. You prefer what you have to speculations of what might be?—I do; and I think I can judge pretty well.

1492. Now, going to that election of 1895, you returned 61 Conservatives, was it not?—Yes.

1493. And 13 Liberals?—Yes, 61 Conservatives, 13 Liberals.

1494. And 10 Nationalists?—Yes.

1495. 61 Conservatives against 23 of all the others?—Yes, quite so.

1496. Was that really a representation of the division of opinion in Liverpool?—No, I do not approve of that, as I have said. That is the triennial election which I do not approve of.

1497. But subsequently you had a correction of that?—Yes.

1498. Have you any security that you would get the correction? Take any one ward in the elections since 1895—the elections of 1896, 1897, and 1898. There is an election of one member only required?—Yes.

1499. That is the case in the usual way?—Yes.

1500. And the majority of those who vote return that one member?—Yes.

1501. If the majority stuck together, would they not keep up the same result?—Yes, there would be a clear majority in that ward in favour of a particular man, or a particular policy—usually the policy.

1502. You have no security in that mode of election of getting at anything like the representation of the different forces of the different parties, have you?—I would not admit that. In this particular case, you see, the ward election method (the one-third election method) produced a change in 1903 and again in 1907.

1503. That

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1503. That is to say, the dominance of particular wards has been changed?—Quite.

1504. You have no security, even under that result, that the proportion of persons returned corresponds to the proportion of the electors?—Yes. There was a majority.

1505. You made a statement that your members came in as politicians?—As a rule they do.

1506. And after they are in politics disappear?—To a great extent.

1507. You also made a statement that one man came in as an Independent, but after a time he became a politician?—Yes, I suppose he did. He seems to vote with one party.

1508. Those things are a little inconsistent with one another, are they not?—No, I do not think so.

1509. The experience, in the first place, of political opinions disappearing, and the marshalling of members from one party or another is falsified in the second, is it not?—I think it arose a great deal in this way. This gentleman came in on some particular matter that was being discussed, I cannot remember exactly what it was, and he took a very independent position in the Council. He evidently was a Conservative; he did not change his politics.

Chairman.

1510. But may I ask you one question on that? I do not know whether it is in your knowledge, at all events it is in the knowledge of a good many other people, that although elections may be carried out on party lines, the management of the affairs of the borough or the county, when the members elected get on to the representative body, is not carried on on party lines at all?—Not at all.

1511. Therefore, although politics come to the front during the election in a large number of cases, they cease in the management of affairs afterwards?—Certainly.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1512. That is an excellent result, which prevails in many Councils, I know, and especially in the County Council which the noble Chairman is connected with. But the members of your Liverpool Borough Council, a City Council now, are classified from beginning to end as politicians?—The only time, really, when it comes into being, so to speak, is in forming the committees, when it is generally understood that the parties are represented proportionately on these committees. The wards are represented, and then the different parties are represented.

1513. And occasionally, in the way of patronage appointments?—No, it never comes in there. I can say decidedly of Liverpool that there is no question of patronage or appointments on political grounds—absolutely none.

1514. But would you say, speaking abstractedly, that on the whole it is better for people to come in as politicians than to come in as independent people, if they could?—So far in Liverpool it has worked very satisfactorily.

1515. That is not an answer to the question?—I really should not care to express an opinion (0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

generally on that, because so much depends, I think, on each town itself.

1516. I said abstractedly, you know?—Personally, if you ask me the question as Town Clerk, I should prefer very much indeed that they should not come in as politicians.

1517. And if a method were offered you which would reduce the influence of political associations as much as possible, you would favourably incline to that method?—I would, certainly.

1518. I have given you a very long turn, but there are only one or two other things I should like to ask you. Your Council said that it was very doubtful whether the Bill should be adopted, first on account of its complexity?—Yes, that is mentioned.

1519. Of course they were reasoning on what probably would happen with respect to the voters and the Returning Officer?—Yes.

1520. Had they any experience before them when they expressed that opinion, or were they reasoning on the nature of things?—They were reasoning, I think, on the Bill itself, having read it and read the schedules.

1521. On the probabilities?—Yes; possibly on what would occur if the system advised or mentioned in the Bill was carried out.

1522. But they had not had opportunities of considering the experience of elections conducted on the plan in the Bill?—I do not suppose so. They would naturally compare the plan in the Bill with the present system which they all had in their minds.

1523. In order to lead them out of the region of doubt (I am bound to say, greatly to their credit, they express a mere doubt) they would require some experience?—Yes.

1524. That they have not got?—That they have not got.

1525. Do you really think a voter would have much greater difficulty in putting "1" against a name than in putting a cross?—No, I think if it was left to the voter to put the "1." and that was all he had to do, he would do it very well; and a cross would do in place of a "1."

1526. All that is necessary under the Bill is that he should put "1"?—If that is all that is necessary it is quite right.

1527. He is advised to go on and put "2" or "3." Do you think the ordinary voter would be embarrassed by that?—Yes, I think it would embarrass him; he would probably put the "1," "2," "3" opposite the same man.

1528. Have you ever attended any meeting, heard any discussion, or read any paper illustrative of the action of this plan?—No, I have not.

1529. If you are told that no person ever did put "1," "2," and "3" opposite the same man in the course of thousands of trials, would you hesitate to receive that statement?—I must say that I should be surprised.

1530. Blunders are committed, but I have never heard of that particular blunder?—If you had to do with the Irish voters in Liverpool, I think we should see a great deal of that. It is a very large vote.

1531. You did look at the papers about Tasmania?—Yes.

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1532. Out

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1532. Out of 18,000 who voted, 335 apparently went wrong?—Yes.

1533. That is a much greater proportion than yours, no doubt, but it is not a very large proportion?—Of course, one has to know what the nature of the constituency was—what was the intelligence of the voter, to a great extent.

1534. There is universal suffrage in Tasmania?—Yes. I should consider it a high proportion.

1535. You have a great distrust, apparently of the intelligence of the ordinary man, especially in Liverpool?—In Liverpool, notwithstanding the large Irish population, I should consider that it was a very large percentage, even with the large Irish population, who have to be so much instructed on the question of voting.

1536. With respect to the actual process of counting, you spoke of the interference that might happen in consequence of the candidates being represented by persons watching?—Yes.

1537. Do those candidates' agents interfere with your action now, much?—They do to some extent.

1538. In what way?—They stand behind the counting assistants, and they are very quick to point out any little miss that a man may make in putting one paper here and not there; it is not often that it happens, of course, but they are very quick; and also in venturing an opinion whether a vote is a doubtful or bad vote. My instructions are very clear, that if there is any doubt at all on the subject in the mind of the counter, even if it is a "1" instead of a cross (and a "1" is a good vote), he is to put it on the file and send it to the Returning Officer, so that no question can arise. But they are very quick to point out what they consider to be some error in the counting.

1539. That would be precisely the same under the system proposed in this Bill?—Yes, quite so; certainly there would have to be a number of calculations made.

1540. I have not come to that point yet. I am dealing with the sorters and people who go round—the ordinary process which corresponds with your experience. The ordinary process is that there are people round the table, sorting and sorting; the candidates' agents move around at the back and look over their shoulders, and see what is going on?—Yes.

1541. That has happened in the cases you have been interested in over and over again?—Yes.

1542. They do not otherwise interfere?—No. In the first place, may I point out that the papers in each box are counted, whether they are good or bad; they are counted to see whether they tally with the Presiding Officer's ballot paper account.

1543. That would be the same under every system?—That, I take it, would be the same under your system. Then the ballot papers are mixed up together, and taken out in lots to each assistant, who then separates them between A and B. That is a very simple process, of course. Any bad or doubtful votes in that particular bundle that he sees he picks out and puts on a file, and sends them up to the Returning Officer. I take it that that would be the same in this

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

principle at first, but it is the question of the method of transfer that seems to me to cause the difficulty.

1544. I am coming to that. Up to the point of transfer is there any material difference?—No, there is no material difference.

1545. There is no addition made practically to the labours of counting?—No, I take it not.

1546. It all turns upon the transfer?—It seems to me to do so.

1547. Now, in considering the question of the election of three persons instead of one person—that would be your case?—Yes, that would be my case.

1548. The transfer would be of the surplus of any person who got more than the quota and got elected, to those below him?—Yes.

1549-50. That would occupy a little time?—Yes.

1551. What is the average number of persons voting in a ward with you?—About 37,000 persons voted according to the paper you put in?—Yes.

1552. Was there a contest in every ward?—In 1906 in a little more than half the wards.

1553. In 17 wards there would be a contest?—As a matter of fact, there was 18 contests, I think.

1554. That means something about 2,000 voting in a ward?—Yes, that is about right.

1555. You say it takes an hour to count?—Yes.

1556. Do you seriously think that it would take four or five hours under the principle of this Bill?—I do.

1557. Would you be surprised to be told by one who has conducted several elections that, taking chance persons as his assessors, it would be done in two hours?—I should be surprised, certainly.

1558. But you have not followed the process?—I have looked very carefully through the rules for the model election.

1559. But you have never seen it done?—No.

1560. And you know, of course, very well how different things look in words and when put into practice?—Yes, no doubt. I have conducted School Board elections, of course, when we had 18 or 20 candidates for 15 places.

1561. And no end of different combinations of votes: 15: 10 and 5; 9 and 6; 9-3 and 3; and so on?—Yes.

1562. Endless complications?—Yes.

1563. But according to this method the whole difficulty, you say, is in the transfer?—The whole difficulty seems to be in the transfer.

1564. Would you be surprised to hear that that does not occupy one-half of the time of the Returning Officer?—I should be surprised to hear it. May I just add to that last answer that of course, as I stated in answer to the noble Chairman, in the particular case of your trial elections, you have not had to satisfy either the candidates or the candidates' agents, which I think would probably take, before the poll could be declared, as long again as the first part of the proceeding.

1565. But you admit you are indulging in the region of speculation—probability?—I know

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

know what it is in elections now how very particular they are; and how particular they were in the 1895 election.

1566. I have got you to this point, that in the process of counting there is no substantial difference?—No. Just in the first verification of the ballot papers with the ballot papers account there would be no difference.

1567. And in the distribution, in the actual sorting under the proposed plan, as under the existing plan, the interference of the representatives of the candidates would not be more serious in one case than in the other; you admitted that?—It would to some extent, because you might have a dozen candidates for three places, whereas now you have only two candidates for one place usually. It would take longer than at the present time, with the system of one-third retiring every year.

1568. It would take a little longer than the present system, but you would have one election in three years, instead of one every year, and the whole time taken would not be greater?—You may take it that possibly half-an-hour added on to the present time would cover it up to that point. I think that might be reasonable.

1569. If you can do the whole business in an hour now, you could do it in three hours under the proposed plan?—I think I have gone so far as to admit that, although I am rather doubtful.

1570. Only one other question. I have dealt with the reasons of complexity and delay. There is only one other reason put forward by the Council whom you appear to represent, and that is, the desirability of having a uniform system throughout the country?—Yes.

1571. Do you personally consider that very serious?—Yes, I do.

1572. And if a plan is suggested which it is thought gives promise of much improvement, and certain municipalities are ready to adopt it, you would not allow it to be adopted and tried with the aid of the experience so derived unless you could get the whole country, through Parliament, of opinion that it should be adopted everywhere?—I think that the answer to that question would rather turn on what would the municipalities do. Liverpool, I do not think, would adopt the system, one of the reasons being because it would be one system out of others; whereas if it were made general and the Parliamentary system were made the same, then Liverpool, I think, probably might adopt it.

1573. I do not mind about Liverpool. Do you mean to say that no municipality could be trusted to adopt one Act of this kind?—They could be trusted, no doubt.

1574. But you cannot conceive of it as likely to adopt it?—No, I do not think they would really. Sir Samuel Johnson, who has had more experience of municipal life than I have, can give you evidence with greater weight than I can on that point.

1575. Putting yourself for a moment in the position of a person concerned with a London borough, do you think it impossible that a London borough should adopt it?—No, I would not think it impossible at all.

(0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

1576. Do you think it would be an improvement on the method of election in the London boroughs?—I think proportional representation is an improvement following on the triennial election system.

1577. You think it might be adopted in a London borough?—I think it might be adopted in a London borough.

1578. In a municipal borough, you think, the reasons against its adoption are so great that you would not allow it to be adopted, even if a municipal borough desired it?—No, I do not think I have gone quite so far as that. You have made the Act adoptive.

1579. But that is your principle—that unless it is universal it should not be tried?—I think it would be better to have it universal if it is to be tried at all.

1580. I think good counsels are always the best everywhere—they do not always prevail. Would you refuse to allow it to be adopted unless it could be universal?—No, I would not do that at all?

1581. The proposal of the Bill is that it shall be adoptive only?—Yes.

1582. And it is no argument against allowing a Bill to pass and allowing it to be adoptive, that it would not be universally adopted?—One of the weaknesses of the Bill is that it may be adopted and put an end to, and then adopted again, and then probably put an end to again. I think that is one weak point of the Bill.

1583. I was talking with the late Mr. Darwin once, and he said to me, "The weak point in English political life is that you do not allow experiments to be tried." You think that is a foolish canon on the part of Mr. Darwin?—No, I do not indeed. I think it is a very sound opinion, and I should say that if an experiment were tried in the London boroughs, as they have adopted the triennial election system, it would be a very useful experiment indeed, and might be an object lesson to other municipalities. I think that would be an excellent idea.

Lord Avebury.

1584. The resolution which you have been good enough to submit to us from the Council of the Municipal Corporations Association begins by asserting their opinion that the present mode of electing one-third of the members is preferable to the Metropolitan system of triennial elections?—Yes.

1585. That is not expressing an opinion upon the present Bill, you admit?—No, it is not.

1586. Then they go on to express a doubt and say, "It seems to this Council doubtful whether the system suggested in the Bill could be introduced into Municipal elections"?—Yes.

1587. That is the last resolution?—Yes.

1588. I think I understood you to say, in answer to Lord Courtney, that you disapprove of the system in London boroughs, and if the London boroughs wish to adopt the system in the Bill you would not wish to prevent them doing so?—No, not at all. I say, as they have adopted the triennial election system, the experiment of proportional representation in those boroughs would be a very useful experiment.

1589. You rather object, I understand, as
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[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

other witnesses have done, to the system in London, because it leads to sweeping changes?—Yes.

1590. And you wish to preserve continuity?—Yes.

1591. You also said, I think, in answer to the noble Chairman, that you were anxious personally, to secure representation according to the number of voters?—Yes.

1592. But now, under your Liverpool system, supposing that in one year one side of the electors (call it A) brings in its candidates by a majority of 10 per cent., I suppose, then, next year, if there has been no great change, it will also bring in its candidates by a majority of 10 per cent. —Yes.

1593. And the same thing would happen in the third year?—Yes.

1594. Therefore the minority in that case would be left without any representation?—Yes, they would.

1595. I think you have already expressed the opinion that it would be desirable that any substantial number of voters should have their views represented on the Town Council?—Yes, it would if it could be done satisfactorily.

1596. One objection that you brought forward to the Bill is that you think frequent changes—and I quite concur, if I may be allowed to say so, with that opinion—are undesirable?—Yes.

1597. Do you think it is at all likely that municipal bodies would make frequent changes under this Bill if it were adopted?—That, of course, I am afraid I am not quite able to give an opinion upon. If the triennial system were adopted without this further safeguard, as it may be, if it merely worked out in that way, I say that it would cause a sweeping change in many cases.

1598. But with the safeguards in the Bill?—With the safeguards and rules it might not. I should, of course, wish to repeat what I have said before two or three times, that I am not quite in a position to give a definite opinion on the particular method proposed by this Bill. I have considered it, but I have not gone into the details of the method adopted, because I think having regard to the opinion of the Municipal Corporations Association—and I am here to represent them—they have not really gone into that in sufficient detail to warrant me in giving an opinion upon it.

1599. Then another objection that you had was to the number of spoiled papers, and you referred to the Tasmanian experience. I think their spoilt papers were about 314?—Yes.

1600. And those spoilt papers would be generally by the less educated voters?—That is so, as a rule, in Liverpool.

1601. It would not very much matter, perhaps, if a certain number of those less educated voters did not have their papers counted. But you would not suppose that our English electors would find more difficulty in working the system of proportional representation than voters in foreign countries, would you?—You mean the electors themselves in voting?

1602. Yes?—They would not in time. If it was made the system of voting throughout the country I think they would be educated up to it.

Lord Avebury—continued.

1603. It would be generally the case in Liverpool, would it not, that the voting would follow party lines?—Yes.

1604. So that, supposing an election for three, as there might be under this Bill, probably each party would put up two candidates, and the great majority of electors would either vote for two Liberals or two Conservatives?—Yes.

Earl of Hardwicke.

1605. If a system of this kind was adopted, is it your opinion that the Returning Officers would be puzzled over this system?—I am sure they would at first, at any rate.

1606. You think it is beyond the average of well-educated men?—The Returning Officers (I speak now again for Liverpool) are members of the Council, of course, and they are guided a great deal by the chief counting assistant in the room with them. Very often a man serves as Returning Officer for the first time, and he knows very little about the method of counting, and is guided to a great extent—I may say altogether—by the chief counting assistant, who would really take the sole responsibility of seeing that these votes were properly added up and the return made.

1607. Do you think it would take a longer time than under the present system?—I am sure it would; there is no question about it.

Earl Beauchamp.

1608. I understand that the Municipal Corporations Association did not discuss the matter at all until their meeting of the 13th June?—No.

1609. So that so far as you know and the association can gather, there is no great feeling with regard to this question in the country?—No, I do not know that there is. I think the association really considered the two points of triennial election and the complications of the Bill; they did not go into the details of the rules and regulations, and how it would work out, or whether, if proportional representation was adopted, that would be the best form to adopt; but only into the simple or broad question of triennial election and the method of voting and recording votes proposed by the Bill. Those were just simply the two points they discussed.

1610. And there was no great mass of evidence before them that there was any great desire for this Bill in any part of the country?—Not the slightest.

1611. You spoke of the system under the Bill as being perhaps preferable to the present London system. Have you had any experience of London elections in the past?—No, I have not.

1612. So that you do not speak as an expert?—I take it that it is very similar to the election that we had in 1895. They have sheets on which the votes are recorded as the name is called out by one clerk, and then totalled up at the end, and added up afterwards. It is somewhat similar to the method of voting in the School Board elections. It must be a longer system in itself than the present system in the provincial municipalities.

1613. I was not thinking so much of the actual details

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Earl Beauchamp—continued.

details as of the general question, whether it would be a good thing that this Bill should be substituted for the present method of election in London?—That is rather a matter for the London boroughs to consider, is it not?

1614. You do not speak as an expert yourself—you have had no experience of London boroughs?—No.

1615. The only other point I want to refer to is with regard to the influence of political parties which, I gather from Lord Courtney, he lays a great deal of stress upon. Have you any reason to suppose that this Bill would diminish the influence of political parties on municipal elections?—Not at all; I do not think it would have the slightest effect on political parties; they would so manipulate it that they would get their men in just the same. That is my strong conviction on that point.

Lord Haversham.

1616. You speak very strongly in your proof; you say that you dread to think of the result of introducing such an intricate system, as it would require 34 expert statisticians (one for each ward) to superintend the counting, who would have to be thoroughly acquainted with the rules. What are the rules that you think so intricate?—All of them, practically; they would all have to be very carefully followed, and we should have to instruct all these men and teach them how to conduct this election. And these men change from year to year.

1617. And it would always be necessary to have an expert man, well up in the rules, at each ward election?—I should certainly have to look round to see the sort of men I could get who would be competent to get at the proper result of the election, so that it will not be called into question by an election petition afterwards.

Lord Allendale.

1618. You are of opinion, bearing on what Lord Hardwicke asked you, that the new system of voting and counting is complicated and would not be easily mastered by the Returning Officer?—Yes, I think so, certainly.

1619. And by the voter also?—And by the voter also. The voter would at first, no doubt, be troubled to know quite how to vote, and I feel sure in Liverpool, from the experience we have had on the School Board elections, that many voters would think that they had to vote as they did then, and would probably put 12 or 23 opposite a name.

1620. You think the voter, then, would probably have made up his mind very decidedly as to his first choice, but would be rather muddled as to his next choice?—I think he would. I should say, from the experience I have had of the Irish voter in Liverpool, that if he thought that he could vote for three candidates, he would mark each candidate with a cross or a 1. If he was told that he was to put the numerals, he would put one to each candidate he thought he had to vote for. And that, I take it, would be a spoiled paper.

1621. Practically you do not think there would be any advantage, so far as the party wire-pullers

Lord Allendale—continued.

are concerned, but rather that the system of voting by ticket would be increased?—Yes. I think what the party wire-pullers would do would be that they would take districts and instruct the voters to put the 1 down for a particular candidate, as was done in the School Board elections.

Lord Avebury.

1622. That was necessary in the School Board elections, because there was no transfer, was it not?—Yes, there was no transfer. But my point is rather that they would separate the candidates, I think, in some such way that each voter was to just vote 1, or put a stroke opposite each candidate he voted for.

Chairman.

1623. I do not think, when they knew the Bill, they would do that, if they wanted to get their share of representation. The principle of the Bill, if each party wants to get sufficient representation, is to mark as many of those they wish to give a preference to as possible 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; because their votes for the others may come in to be considered, and may elect one of their men?—That is the part I cannot quite understand: why a voter, if he votes for one man, should have his votes removed to another with whom he does not agree.

Lord Amphill.

1624. Following up what you have just said, do you think it would be a serious loss of electoral efficiency or municipal efficiency if the votes were lost to those people who are so unintelligent that they put 1, 2, and 3 in the same square, or put three 1's instead of one 1. Do you think it would be much loss to the Corporation of Liverpool?—I do not know that it would be very much loss, but it might tend to put in a candidate and throw out another one through the bad votes.

1625. But do you think it would be a serious thing to lose a candidate who was put in by the votes of voters so unintelligent?—I do not think there is anything in it.

1626. I am afraid you have a very poor opinion of the intelligence of the average voter?—I do not think so at all. I think the average voter now has got to understand perfectly well how to mark a ballot paper. Probably even the rather above the average voter might be somewhat troubled to understand this system for a long time.

1627. Do you think there is much value in the opinion on big municipal affairs, like some great gas or water questions, or some big financial question, of the voter who takes two or three years to learn to put down his order of preference in ordinary numerals—1, 2, and 3?—It is impossible to say how it will affect municipal affairs. It would probably disqualify or disfranchise a large number of voters, because they could not do it. It might affect a candidate very materially. One candidate might have been carried had he not had so many spoiled papers among the votes.

1628. There is just a question I should like to ask you about this meeting of your Council of the Municipal

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Mr. PICKMERE.

[Continued.]

Lord Ampthill—continued.

Municipal Corporations Association of the 13th of June. Have you a copy of the agenda? What I want to know is the exact terms of reference; how did you refer this question to them?—There was a note put on the summons, I am reminded, to consider the provisions of this Bill, and it would be headed "Municipal Representation Bill. To take such action as might be deemed desirable"—some words to that effect.

1629. Did you circulate copies of the Bill?—Yes, that was done.

1630. Were there any notes upon it?—No, there was the usual memorandum on the Bill itself.

1631. Was there much discussion?—I should think for about half an hour, perhaps.

1632. How many votes were taken?—Only one vote was taken.

1633. And was this resolution on the agenda, or was it drafted on the spot?—I drafted it myself after the discussion. I had considered it before hand, and drafted it; but during the discussion I altered it to some extent, and read it after the discussion had proceeded for a short time, and moved it.

1634. Did anybody take part in the discussion who had made a special study of the question of proportional representation, or had especially studied this particular Bill?—I could not say that.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1635. Can you tell us what your original draft was, how it varied from the ultimate form?—I have not got it at the present time.

Chairman.

1636. I do not understand that it was put to the vote?—No, it was not.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1637. But it was discussed and altered?—No, it was not quite discussed. The debate was opened. I think the president opened the question—Mr. Harwood Banner, M.P.—and then after a short time I spoke on the question, and proposed it in this form. It was rather different from this, but it was not materially different. I think it was just the introductory part. I could not quite recollect it now. It was nothing material. It was more a matter of wording than anything else.

1638. I should like to know, out of curiosity, in what form the slight discussion you had changed the resolution?—I really could not tell you now. I do not think there was anything very much in it. It was more a matter of wording than anything else.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

SIR SAMUEL GEORGE JOHNSON, called in; and Examined.

Chairman.

1639. You are Town Clerk of Nottingham?—I am.

1640. And you have held that position for a great many years?—I have held the position for 36 years. Before that I was Town Clerk of a smaller place for seven years, and before that I was Mayor of the same town, and an Alderman and Town Councillor, so that I have had considerable experience of municipal matters.

1641. The elections in the city are conducted, not by you directly, but by the Deputy Town Clerk?—For very many years they were conducted by myself personally, but the work of the Council has so much increased that I am obliged to depute that work to the Deputy Town Clerk, who now conducts those elections.

1642. We have heard that there was a large attendance at this meeting of the Council of the Municipal Corporations Association, and that they passed this resolution unanimously. I understand that you were not present on that occasion?—I was not present. Nottingham was represented by the Chairman of the Parliamentary Bills Committee of the Corporation.

1643. What is your view with regard to that resolution?—I have been requested by that meeting to come before your Lordships' Committee to support that resolution. Perhaps I might put in the minutes of that meeting (*handing in the same*).

1644. With regard to the City of Nottingham, would you just explain shortly how elections are carried on there?—The City of Nottingham, prior to 1877, was divided into seven wards, and each ward was represented by six members,

Chairman—continued.

one-third of whom, that is two members, retired annually. In the year 1877 the borough was considerably extended, and the whole of the members of the Council then retired, including the Aldermen, and the borough was then divided into 16 wards. The question was debated at that time whether we should have two members to a ward, or whether we should have single-member constituencies; and in the result the conclusion was unanimously come to that we should have ward constituencies, and that each ward should be represented by three members only, one of whom would retire every year.

1645. Therefore you have an election every year in each ward?—Yes.

1646. What is your experience of the system?—That it is found to work well. It produces occasionally anomalous results, but, taking one year with another, and one ward with another, we get a very fair representation. I have here a list of the present Council, and I have marked their occupations, and if you choose to have the results, I can give you them. The wards now not only represent the population and the rateable value, but they also represent, so far as is possible, classes of individuals.

1647. Was that aimed at in dividing the wards?—Yes; in 1877 we had a careful consideration of the whole question of representation; the officials of the Corporation were called in, and we all agreed together to get the best representation that we could. It was so well arranged and so agreeably to all the parties who are moving in municipal matters in the town that when the Commissioner came down to hold

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Sir S. G. JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

an Inquiry there was not a single thing for him to do; he had simply to confirm what we had already agreed upon. And that has been working from that time to this.

1648. I think the elections are carried on mainly on political lines, are they not?—There are two parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, which interfere in elections. There is a Labour Party now, to some extent, which interferes. But those are the two principal parties which seek out and propose candidates. But the questions that they have to decide in the Town Council have no relation whatever to political matters—such matters as whether we shall extend tramways to a certain street or build a new bridge over the Trent, or whether we shall have a Stipendiary Magistrate. I might go on a long while occupying your Lordships' time with the various questions which come before us—non-political questions.

1649. Speaking generally, the vast number of questions which come before the Council are not political questions?—Certainly not. What is done is this: When the fight is over and the parties are elected, it becomes the duty of my Deputy Town Clerk to see how many Liberals there are and how many Conservatives there are (at the present moment there are 26 Liberals and 22 Conservatives), and then he works out a rule of three sum. The number of each Committee is ascertained; there are, perhaps, 24 Committees, or something like that. He then says: "You are entitled to so many Liberals and you are entitled to so many Conservatives to each Committee." Each Party then nominates whom they choose to serve from their Party. Then those Committees are elected without any discussion by the Town Council, and after they are formed they address themselves to the municipal work of the town, and you would not know who was a Liberal and who was a Conservative.

1650. I suppose that your object in so arranging the Committees is to ensure that neither Party should think it is unfairly dealt with owing to its political complexion?—Certainly.

1651. Are there any Members on the Municipal Council who did not subscribe themselves under the head of either political party?—Yes, there were two Liberal candidates who I think may be fairly described absolutely as Labour candidates, and one Conservative who describes himself as a Labour candidate.

1652. I suppose you would say that owing to your annual elections, in which you have only one Member in each ward re-elected every year, you are able to ensure continuity of policy on the Council?—That is so, and that is the most important thing we have to assure ourselves of.

1653. And you never have violent changes which get rid of a considerable number of your most useful men on the Council at one election?—That is so. In fact, we agree with the noble Lord who introduced this Bill into your Lordships' House, when he said that he thought violent changes were most undesirable. They are certainly most undesirable in municipal government.

1654. But your view is that, if you were to adopt a system of triennial elections such as that

Chairman—continued.

adopted in the London boroughs, you might be sometimes exposed to that sort of violent change?—Yes, we have proved that. Then if that were so, I conceive that in addition to breaking up the continuity of business, it would throw so much into the hands of the permanent officials that they would have so much more control over those who are elected.

1655. You would admit, probably, that the permanent officials have plenty to do without having to do the work of the elected members as well?—Yes; their business is to obey their orders as far as possible, and as intelligently as they can, and not to devise policy.

1656. Now with regard to this proposal which is before us, have you anything to say about it?—First, as to the triennial election proposed by this Bill, it seems to us in Nottingham to be a fatal thing that we should have triennial elections. We had once this sort of thing happen. A contractor proposed to build a new Guildhall. The contractor obtained the contract from Liverpool. It was offensive to a large body of ratepayers. He also brought men to work there, and I am afraid he did not pay them the standard rate of wages, and that was another offence to a large body of ratepayers. Ultimately they thought they found that he was not using Darley Dale stone according to his contract, and they obtained some geologist to give them an opinion upon the question. There was a fearful agitation about it; we were obliged to guard the building then, so that it should not be burnt—they threatened to burn it. If an election had taken place then—it was in November—of the whole borough, passion was so prominent in everybody's mind who had votes, that most of them would have been in the majority, and would have swept the board, and we should have had a whole change of the Council on that one question. Time was given, and when investigation was properly made, it was found that the man was actually fulfilling his contract, and the thing died out. But the changed Council would have remained for years. Only one-third went out, and the other two-thirds remained to see that the contract was properly carried out, and the thing is there today, a substantial building.

1657. I do not know whether you have had an opportunity of seeing the evidence, but we have had evidence from one borough in which we were told that all the gentlemen who had taken a prominent part in municipal affairs before a particular election were turned out. There was not even anybody who knew about the Finance Committee left to take the chair of the Finance Committee, and a new member had to be chosen?—It must be a great evil in that borough.

1658. In your opinion, from your experience, you would think that a disastrous state of things?—Yes. For another thing, it is too long a period of time before you can consult the ratepayers upon any project that you have in hand. Something comes up suddenly, and you want to know what the feeling of the ratepayers may be about a recreation ground, for instance—lands offered for a recreation ground—whether the price offered is thought to be reasonable.

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Sir S. G. JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

You cannot wait until the end of two years to know whether to buy that land or not; you want to get some intimation every year what the ratepayers are thinking about, and what their wishes may be about matters of everyday life. In the case of the School Board elections, when they were three years, we had this happen: Not only did the minority, by clever manipulation of the voters, get a majority on the board, but when they knew that next time they would be turned out because the majority of the town was against them, they entered into all sorts of contracts, built new schools, and gave teachers increasing salaries, and so forth, so that the next Board should not be able to revoke their policy.

1659. Was that under the cumulative voting system?—Under the cumulative voting system.

1660. Had the minority managed their affairs better than the majority did on that occasion?—Yes, they had.

1661. It is a question of management, of course?—It is a mere question of wire pulling.

1662. Perhaps we might now go on to this present Bill. What do you say about it?—Taking the triennial election first of all, then we come next to voting by preference.

1663. Have you studied the Bill?—I have tried to study it; we have had discussions in my office with my Deputy Town Clerk; we had solicitors there; some of them have been there many years, and they have conducted all the elections in the city of Nottingham; the County Council always invite them to go out and become Presiding Officers at elections, and they help to conduct the elections, and they help to conduct the elections to the Board of Guardians. I gave them this Bill and told them to take it away and see what they could make out of it. We have had two or three meetings among us. We think it a most intricate thing; it is the most fascinating problem I ever came across. But I do not know—I could not work it now. I could not stand an examination on it in this Committee-room. If I had to work it, I should have to get it up again; it is a most intricate and difficult thing. Perhaps I have not the same intelligence—I do not suppose that I have—as other people; but what intelligence I have makes it appear to me to be most difficult. And I am quite certain of this, that my present Returning Officers taken suddenly could not carry this Act out.

1664. Not unless they were further instructed?—Not unless they had by their side competent persons who understood the Act well and could tell them what to do from moment to moment. Then even if we had such competent persons we should have to be drilled before each election. With triennial elections we should forget before the third year came along, and should have to drill before every election to be sure that we took the processes required by the Act of Parliament. Then with regard to the counting clerks, I think they ought to know something about it, what the cross means, and so forth; and they would have to be drilled. They fall out at every election and fresh ones would come. Then when you come to the persons appointed by the candidates to watch the proceedings, I do not know where you would get the

Chairman—continued.

men qualified to watch the proceedings. You may in London and other places, but I do not know where we would get them in Nottingham. These men are hangers on usually at election times, appointed by the candidate, probably on the recommendation of his own party, and they know very little about elections at all at any time; and this system I am certain would be to them such a nut that they could not crack it. And then it leads to a very great deal of suspicion. If they saw under this system that somebody was transferred from the low parts to the high parts in the Return they would not believe but that something had taken place in the counting that was not quite straight and proper, especially when those put out of the running by such methods were of their own party. Simplicity is really what the electors require; the greater the simplicity the better it is for them.

1665. I suppose you would say that it is very desirable at all events that a considerable proportion of the voters should have thorough confidence in their own mind that when they give their votes in a certain way it would lead to the result they desire?—Under this system they cannot quite accomplish that.

1666. You would say that that was desirable in the first instance?—Yes, certainly.

1667. And until they knew a good deal about it, more than they can learn at first at all events that would not be the case?—Certainly.

1668. With regard to the officers, I take it that the view which you express is that at all events they would have to have a great deal of teaching in order to do the work in a thoroughly satisfactory way?—Certainly.

1669. It is a difficult lesson, but we have learnt it here, and so I believe they would be able to learn it well if they had it sufficiently taught to them?—Yes, I think it is quite possible to master the problems.

1670. That is not an insuperable obstacle if you have proper teaching?—It is a sort of *pon asinorum* in municipal voting to get over, but I think we should all get over it.

1671. Do you think that the Town Council of Nottingham will be likely to adopt this system if it becomes law?—I have spoken to the leader of both political parties, and neither of them agrees with it. They would not adopt it.

1672. Are you well satisfied with your own mode of voting at present?—Yes, it gives simplicity of voting which is so desirable. We have now trained the electors to it, and they make very few mistakes in voting. There are very few spoiled ballot papers. But two years ago there came two vacancies in one ward, casual vacancy and an ordinary vacancy; we did all we could; we had separate papers, and did all we could to make it a very plain issue to the intelligence of the ordinary ratepayers; and the result was that out of 2,038 votes recorded for the ordinary election there were 112 spoiled ballot papers, and for the casual election we had 105 spoiled ballot papers, whilst the average for the other elections was only 3 per 1,000. As soon as you complicate the question in the slightest degree, take what pains you may to make the voter

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[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

voter understand, he is always sure to go wrong if he can.

1673. Those voters, you suppose, had a confusion in their mind between the two systems?

—There were two vacancies filled up on the same day. I thought that with all the instructions we gave them and the care we took to inform them, they would make no mistakes; but mistakes were made to the tune of 112 in the ordinary vacancy and 105 in the casual vacancy. I only quote that to show how necessary it is that we should have simplicity in the method of voting.

Lord Avebury.

1674. Can you tell us how the 112 were divided between the two candidates?—112 for one election and 105 for the other. The average was 50 per 1,000, whereas the ordinary average is 3 per 1,000.

1675. There was a difference of five between the two candidates?—No. That was the difference between the number of spoiled voting papers at the two elections.

1676. There is a difference of five between the two?—Yes. Altogether the spoiled papers were on the average 50 per 1,000, whereas in the rest of the wards that year there were only 3 per 1,000—that is, in the rest of the wards where there were contests; there was not a contest in two wards.

1677. The difference of five votes made no difference in the return?—I think the winning party had a very much larger majority than would have been affected by any such votes as that.

1678. My point was that it made no difference in the result of the election?—I do not suppose it did. I should think there was a large majority. I have not the figures here.

Chairman.

1679. Have you anything to say with regard to the provision in the Bill which allows a Borough Council to adopt this system, and again, if they like, very shortly afterwards to revert to the old system, and again, if they like, to adopt it on a future occasion?—I am afraid I do not quite agree with some of my friends. I see no reason why every sort of experiment should not be adopted if anybody likes to run the risk of it. I am afraid we do not make enough experiments.

1680. But it means a little more than experiment, does it not?—What I suspect would happen would be this: that if a party was losing its control gradually on the three years system and found their power was flowing away, they would say, Let us try the proportional representation election. They then would try it, and if they succeeded by it, and got their seats very firm, and found then that they were the winning

Chairman—continued.

party, I think they would want to revoke the previous resolution after the end of six months, and come in with the first system. I think you will find a great many changes take place if you allow it.

1681. It would not be satisfactory?—It would be very unsatisfactory. But so far as I know anything of Nottingham they would not attempt anything of the kind, because they think they get fair representation of the whole community by the present arrangement. The Council represents all classes and all parts of the community fairly.

1682. You believe that you have got that at Nottingham at present under the existing system?—We think we have a system that is as perfect as we can get anything in this workaday world. I think this proposed system is rather too good for human nature's daily food, that is all.

1683. Is there anything else you wish to say?—I would rather sit at the feet of the promoters of the Bill and be their disciple than come here to speak to them; but it seems to me that we do abridge somewhat by this Bill the full force of the votes, for when there are three candidates a man can only vote for one. The result may become a diminution of his power of voting; he may lose it because someone may come in on preference votes—the third candidate may come in on preference votes who would not get in without the preference votes. And I understand that the object of the Bill is to give to minorities the opportunity of coming on to the Council and taking part in its deliberations. If that is so, I think we want strong councils. We do not want for purposes of administration people who come there only to discuss and talk. We have too much talking on Town Councils now. If we could have more people who would attend to work the thing, it would be better for us. If a question comes up, we want to know what the constituency desires to have done, and we want to know what the majority is. And, if the majority is sufficient to carry the measure, the measure goes forward; and the stronger the majority is the better you can work at it; the more help you get in Committees. But if there is a very strong minority opposing you all through, preventing your carrying work out and delaying you at every point, the strength of the minority does no good to local self-government.

1684. I suppose whether the minority is strong or not depends upon what number of voters went to vote, if the minority is strong enough, under the Bill?—Yes. Under our present arrangement at this present moment, for instance, we are in such a position in Nottingham that I believe four more seats lost to one party would turn the whole representation of the City. That is an awkward position to be in.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next at 11.30 o'clock.

Die Martis, 2^o Julii 1907.

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
Bishop of BRISTOL.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AMPHILL.
Lord AVEBURY.
Lord HAVERSHAM.
Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

SIR SAMUEL GEORGE JOHNSON, having been recalled ; is further Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

1685. Is there anything you would like to add to what you have already said?—I think not.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1686. The Municipal Corporations Association is incorporated, is it, or is it a voluntary Association?—It is entirely voluntary. It was initiated by myself, the Town Clerk of Liverpool, and the Town Clerk of Manchester. We began it in 1873, after Parliament passed the Act called the Borough Funds Act; that was the cause of the formation of the Association.

1687. It does not apply to all the municipal corporations in the country, does it?—I do not think there are many corporations who are not within it. The secretary is here, and can tell you the number.

1688. I was struck with the comparative fewness of the members of the Association?—The Association is governed by a council, and it was at a meeting of the council that the resolution was passed. The council consists of representatives from boroughs called county boroughs, of more than 50,000 inhabitants, and boroughs that have less than 50,000 inhabitants.

Chairman.

1689. Does the Association include all the smaller boroughs?—The Association includes every county borough in England and Wales, and every non-county borough having a population of over 12,000, except one.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1690. Do I understand that every county borough has a representative on the council?—Not every one. At the annual meeting they elect the council. There are two meetings of the whole of the Association—an autumnal meeting and an annual meeting; at one of those meetings the council is elected, and it is apportioned according to the rules between the (0.13.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

boroughs having more than 50,000 inhabitants, and the boroughs having less than 50,000 inhabitants.

1691. Is there a certain number of representatives for the bigger councils, so as to secure representation for the smaller councils?—That is so.

1692. Are they all elected together every year?—They are elected by voting papers throughout the Association. Every borough has a right to nominate certain persons.

1693. As a matter of fact, do the same council go on from year to year?—There have been considerable changes recently. Some of the older boroughs have felt that they would not ask for a position on the council, and there has been a little loss on that account. Some of the boroughs have been canvassing. The older members, who objected to canvassing for places on the council, refused to canvass; but some of the other smaller boroughs have canvassed, and have therefore changed the personnel somewhat of the council.

1694. But before that, did it go on pretty steadily?—Yes, it did not change very much.

1695. Was a list issued of places exceeding the number of vacancies?—Yes, there was a surplus sometimes of 10 or 12. The Association is under the management of a council consisting of two representatives from 30 county boroughs, 30 ordinary boroughs, one from the City of London, and one for every three Metropolitan boroughs belonging to the Association.

Chairman.

1696. Are Metropolitan boroughs generally represented on the Association?—There are only at the present moment 3 Metropolitan boroughs belonging to the Association. We originally had 12 in the Association, but owing to the surcharge by the Local Government auditor, they had to withdraw. There are two Metropolitan boroughs represented on the Council, viz.: Woolwich and Hampstead.

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Sir S. G. JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1697. What is the total number of members on the council?—63; representing 30 County Boroughs, 30 non-County Boroughs, 2 Metropolitan Boroughs, and 1 for the City of London. Each corporation sends 2 representatives, but they have only 1 vote on a division.

1698. Do they all send 2 representatives?—Yes, they all send 2—every borough sends 2 representatives.

1699. But every borough has only 1 vote?—Yes.

Chairman.

1700. Do I understand that every borough sends to the meetings 1 of the members of the council and 1 official?—As a rule that is so; it is the Town Clerk generally.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1701. Out of those is the council elected?—On the 1st January we send out a notice to every corporation members of the Association, asking if they desire to be represented on the council, and, if so, to give us notice thereof. As a rule we get about 40 applications from county boroughs, and perhaps 45 from non-county boroughs. Then we send out voting papers, and each corporation is entitled to vote for 30 candidate boroughs of their own class, and the 30 county boroughs, who have the highest number of votes, are elected; the same rule applies with regard to the ordinary boroughs. The City of London is on the council all through without an election, as being different from other boroughs.

1701A. What is the number approximately of the persons' names on the list out of which the 63 are elected?—As regards the county boroughs there are about 40 candidates, as a rule, and about 45 candidates from non-county boroughs, and 30 out of each class are elected.

Chairman.

1702. You said that the Association consisted of representatives from county boroughs, and from non-county boroughs of over 12,000 population; did you not?—Yes, with one exception.

1703. But I see in your list that there are many towns of under 10,000 which are represented?—Yes. What I meant to say was that the Association included every town with a population of over 12,000 and many under. There are about 330 corporations in the whole, and the Association comprises 293 of them; therefore there are about 30 small corporations not members of the Association, which have a population of less than 10,000.

1704. I thought that some of the smaller boroughs had an association of their own apart from your association?—Yes. There is another Association, called the Non-County Boroughs Association, which was formed when the Local Government Act was being passed, because there was a difference of opinion between the county boroughs and the non-county boroughs.

1705. They did not withdraw from your Association, but they formed an Association of their own, did they?—Yes. When there is a question which seems not quite to affect both classes of boroughs, they can vote by classes in the Council.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1706. You have no retiring in rotation by thirds in the Council, have you?—No. Like every other institution in this country, it is an annual election, at which everything can be changed.

1707. I understand your objection to the proposed Bill turns largely on its complexity and difficulty?—The main objection is the triennial election; that is the strongest objection we have to the Bill. So far as the elections are concerned, we object to the complexity of them, but not in the same way that we object to triennial elections.

1708. And you object to triennial elections because you desire continuity, do you?—Yes, as to our policy; not as to members especially, but as to policy.

1709. As opposed to the practice in the London Borough Councils of course the triennial elections are associated with the possibility of a complete change, and you strongly object to that, do you?—Certainly. They chose that themselves. They might have been elected annually if they liked, but they chose to be elected triennially.

1710. And that has resulted in very large changes, and sometimes a complete change, has it?—Yes.

1711. A complete change is not necessarily connected with every form of triennial election, is it?—No; it does not follow as a matter of course that there will be a change every triennial election.

1712. But, more than that, under the process in London the majority of the electors in the borough can return by united action every member of the Council, can they not?—Yes, one party may do that.

1713. And therefore with a change in the majority, however small, all the members of the Council can be changed?—Yes.

1714. And you strongly object to that, do you?—Yes, I do.

1715. And, if I may say so, I agree with you?—Your Lordship's speech in the House is a strong authority for that position. You said: "I do not think it requires much argument to show that the system is a bad system which enables a borough council to be completely overturned." I take the position from you.

1716. I want to know whether you think that danger is involved in the scheme contained in this Bill?—Certainly it does involve that danger. You mean the system of election in this Bill?

1717. Yes?—I think it is not so complete. I think you would probably get a minority represented, unless there was a very strong sweeping opinion, and then this Bill even would not prevent a change.

1718. What do you mean by a strong sweeping opinion?—I am taking such a case as recently occurred in London with respect to Lewisham, where every sitting member was turned out.

1719. Do you think under the scheme in the Bill every member would be liable to be turned out?—If that feeling was predominant I think the wire-pullers would be strong enough to bring on

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in those they wished to bring in and change the complexion of the whole body.

1720. Have you looked at the evidence on that point?—Yes, I did with regard to Lewisham.

1721. Do you know the total number of electors on both sides?—No, I do not. I read it, but I cannot bear it in mind.

1722. Suppose we take these imaginary figures, that there were 6,000 municipal reformers and 4,000 progressives; that would sweep every seat in Lewisham under the existing plan, and did, did it not?—Yes.

1723. Under the plan contained in the Bill could it do so?—Perhaps not. But it would only give you a very small majority, which for all working purposes would not be much good.

1724. If there are 6,000 to 4,000 the proportion would be 6 to 4?—Yes, and in a case of that kind there would be probably a minority returned.

1725. Under the existing system there would be no difficulty in getting all the members of one party returned, would there?—That is the result of the passing feeling of the moment.

1726. But that is the result, is it not?—Yes, that is the result.

1727. Under the proposed system, if the numbers are as I suggest, you would only get three-fifths representing one party and two-fifths representing the other, would you not?—Then *cui bono*, what is the good of it? If you have not the majority you cannot prevent the sweep.

1728. But if you have three-fifths to two-fifths you have both sides represented, have you not?—But under the triennial system that could not occur, because only a third could go out, and by the next year there would be time for things to cool down.

1729. If there is a habitual predominance of one party it could run through all three elections, and secure all three elections, could it not?—Yes, it does, occasionally.

1730. Irrespective of the strength of the minority?—Certainly.

1731. So that the plan in the Bill does give a security for minority representation, does it not, which not even annual elections give?—It is problematical.

1732. Whatever the worth of it a minority representation is secured, is it not, under the plan of the Bill?—Better secured than it would be under the present system.

1733. But it is not secured at all under the present system. It is a matter of chance, is it not?—It is a matter of the opinion of the voters.

1734. I am supposing that there is a solid minority of votes. Under the existing system in London there is no security that a solid minority will get any representation, is there?—They may be swept out by a majority.

1735. Under the Bill there is an absolute security that a solid minority will get representation?—Yes, it might be solid, or might not be solid; I do not object to the adjective; but a minority would certainly be represented under this Bill.

1736. Have you ever seen the result of an

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

election under the scheme propounded in the Bill?—No, I have not.

1737. Nor assisted at one?—No.

1738. Have you read any account of such an election?—I have read the papers, which have been handed to this committee.

1739. Is your memory charged with an account of any election held under the scheme in the Bill?—No, it is not.

1740. Could you say by practical experience what the special difficulties are which you put forward?—No, I cannot. I have no experience whatever.

1741. Do you know that in Nottingham, some 20 years ago, there was an election on the plan contained in this Bill, held in the Town Hall?—I believe your Lordship was there, and Lord Avebury was there, and you lectured and had meetings there, and I heard you. The people had the benefit of your lecture and your experience, but it has not convinced them. I have not looked upon this system as coming within the region of practical politics. I am a busy man and have other things to do, and cannot indulge in ideals.

1742. You have treated it with something like neglect—I will not say contempt?—I will not plead guilty to that. I do not say that our representative system cannot be improved.

1743. I am glad to hear an admission in favour of making experiments?—But I do not think your Bill does that.

1744. You are a practical man, and you attend to practical politics. Do not you think it wise to proceed on the plan of least resistance?—It is impertinent on my part to even make a suggestion to your Lordships.

1745. Are you aware that at that meeting we passed a resolution, in spite of Alderman Gripper, in favour of proportionate representation?—I will take it from you.

1746. Are you aware that we had an election at the same time?—I had quite forgotten that fact.

1747. You will take it from me, will you not?—Yes.

1748. Will you also take it from me that there was no difficulty in conducting that election?—I will.

1749. Although the persons who assisted in it were quite untaught and uninstructed?—But it is not like a real election, after all, where everyone has been trained to it and tutored to it; and the people who vote have not that passion about them which they have at election times.

1750. I assure you that people were not taught and instructed, but were brought there to listen; and will you take it from me that the names of the candidates submitted were those of prominent politicians belonging to three parties? So that if there was any political feeling on the part of the electors, it was excited?—I do not think this would excite any political feeling in Nottingham now; it would be a dry question: Is this the best method of ascertaining the wishes of the voters?

1751. Do you think the best method of ascertaining the wishes of the voters is to take a town, cut it up in pieces, and ascertain by elections

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Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

elections every third year what the opinion of each section is?—Yes; that is one way. But I am quite open to believe that if the whole of the borough returned its candidates every year, it might be a better way; though I should not like to advocate it.

1752. Do you mean in wards?—No; I mean to abolish the wards.

1753. And elect all the councillors once a year; you think that might be a better way, do you?—I think it might.

1754. But what about the question of passion then?—Because at present there is a party committee in every ward, and the fact that there is a party committee in every ward makes it certain that the men who are prominent in that ward and who are not perhaps prominent in the city will be the men sent in; whereas, if the whole city had the nomination of men, they would be men who would be prominent before the whole town, whose usefulness might be undisputed. It may be that I am idealising, like this Bill does, but that is my opinion.

1755. Let me ask you to apply the state of circumstances which you describe when there was some excitement in Nottingham with regard to a contract for a certain building, and some passion was excited against a certain builder. Supposing an election had happened at that time, and the whole of Nottingham were electing the whole of the Council at that time, do you think you could have trusted to the result?—Oh, no. There was a motion made in the Council to rescind the contract on that very ground, and the contract was only saved by the vote of the aldermen.

1756. You are throwing out the suggestion of electing the whole Council of Nottingham at one time, and I am asking you how that would have worked under those circumstances?—It would only affect those elected that year; that would be only one-third.

1757. I thought you said the whole of them were to be elected each year?—No, I was speaking of triennial elections; if I said every year I made a mistake.

1758. I do not wish you to express any opinion about larger political questions, but have you followed the Parliamentary representation of Nottingham?—No, I have not; I take no interest in the Parliamentary elections at Nottingham. Since I have been Town Clerk of Nottingham I have never voted, because I thought that my position demanded that I should not take any part in party politics. I have been sterilised by my office.

1759. But still you have probably watched from your tower the passions surging about you?—I know we returned three Liberal members to Parliament, and I know we returned two Conservatives and one Liberal before that, and we have sometimes returned three Conservatives—two Conservatives, at all events, constantly. The representation has varied according to the feeling or passion of the moment.

1760. At present there are 20,000 Liberal and Labour voters who have returned three members, as against 15,000 voters who have no re-

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

presentation at all, are there not?—Yes, and the same thing obtains on the Council.

1761. But that is the fact, is it not?—I will take it from you that that is so.

1762. And you are not concerned in those things?—I am not concerned officially. I am concerned as a citizen, I hope, and feel very strongly about some questions.

1763. And in one of the cases do you know that one of the two Conservatives represented a large minority of the total electors of the borough?—Very likely that was so. The borough is divided into wards, and there is a different class of population in some wards to the others, and if you put rateable value against population I think you would have a fair result.

1764. I should like to ask you about the case in which you said your voters went wrong in spite of much instruction. There were two vacancies in one ward, one an ordinary vacancy and the other a casual vacancy, and you issued two voting papers, I understand?—Yes, of different colours.

1765. And there were two candidates named on each paper, two candidates for the full term and two for the short term, I understand?—Yes.

1766. How did the miscarriage come about? Did some of the voters vote for both candidates on one paper and none on the other?—That was so; a great number voted for both candidates on one paper. They failed to understand the instructions as to 112 in one case and 105 in the other.

1767. Inasmuch as in ordinary cases there are very few spoilt papers, I suppose the spoiling was occasioned by this confusion?—Yes.

1768. And a good many voters voted for both candidates on one paper?—I am told that is so.

1769. Which shows a very small degree of political education, does it not?—One of my staff came to me the other day and told me that a clergyman came into the polling booth, where there was no difficulty whatever; he read the instructions on one side of the card and the instructions on the other, and he asked the clerk whether he had to write his name or make a mark. If there is the slightest complexity in voting you raise confusion; you want the simplest possible method in regard to voting.

1770. Has it ever occurred to you that some people, when there are two candidates in one case, mark a cross against both candidates on purpose?—I should think it is very probable.

1771. Not because they are ignorant or blundering, but of set purpose they mark both?—Do you mean in order to make their vote invalid? No, I do not think so; I would not charge them with that. I know I voted once on a School Board election, and I marked my paper with numerals, with a cross and three ones, and I believe it got through.

Chairman.

1772. If they did not want to vote it would be easier not to mark any name at all, would it not?—Yes.

1773. I have

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1773. I have often been one of two candidates and attended at the counting of papers, and have seen not a few papers in which both names have had crosses marked against them, and I have come to the conclusion that the man who did it was a knave who told each side "I have voted for your man"—I should have my suspicions that he was more than a knave.

1774. You were asked a question with regard to the option of adopting this Bill; and you suggested, did you not, that one party—the Liberal Party—finding that they were losing power at the annual elections of thirds, but yet, having a majority, might go for the adoption of the bill?—Yes.

1775. And that having served their purpose, and having got a majority, they could go back to the old system?—Yes.

1776. Why should they do that? I did not follow your reasoning. If a party finds that by adopting the plan in the Bill their purpose is served by it, why should they revert to the old system?—Because if they were losing votes they would try it to retain their position. I see very plainly how that could be obviated.

1777. Will you read your answer to the question which was put to you?—"What I suspect would happen would be this: that if a party was losing its control gradually on the three years system, and found their power was flowing away, they would say, Let us try the proportional representation election. They then would try it, and if they succeeded by it, and got their seats very firm, and found then that they were the winning party, I think they would want to revoke the previous resolution after the end of six months."

1778. Why should they, at the end of six months, revoke a plan they were winning on?—Because they would shut out the minority, which this system is meant to bring about. May I say one word about that suggestion? That seems to me a very weak point in the Bill. When councils have passed a resolution they are bound by it. We cannot adopt a resolution to-day and throw it out to-morrow. No doubt this Bill might be taken up with a lighter heart than otherwise it might be, because they might get out of it again. But if it were adopted with a Provisional Order by the Local Government Board then my objection would go.

1779. Is that an amendment you would suggest?—Yes. It would give this opportunity: then everybody would have an opportunity of being heard, both before the Local Government Board and before Parliament, before any alteration took place.

Chairman.

1780. Do you mean that to refer to the first time of trying or when they had tried back?—When they tried back.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1781. I do not think the promoters of the Bill would see any objection to that?—Then that would meet my objection.

1782. But I do not see the force of your objection. In your Council, after the election is over,

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

you lose sight very largely of political opinions, do you not?—Yes.

1783. There is a great toleration of one another, is there not?—Yes.

1784. And do not you think that the feeling under this Bill would be the same and that each party would understand that the other was there by right of representation of the burgesses of the borough?—When it comes to a political question I think even a family would be divided then, let alone a town council. If it came to a question of deciding a November election they would fight, and would not fight with the gloves on.

1785. Now, at all events, you must have persons, must you not, introduced by political parties as candidates?—It is the fact that they are so introduced, but the law does not require it.

1786. But that is the experience, is it not?—Yes.

1787. Qualified by the fact that in Nottingham labour candidates appear as a third party?—Yes.

1788. Has that led to any triangular contest?—Yes, there was a triangular contest last election.

1789. With what result?—The result was that the votes given to the Conservative candidate were 963, the votes given to the Liberal candidate were 962, and the Labour candidate 361; consequently, with one more vote the Conservative would have been out and the Liberal returned, and it is only fair to suppose that the Labour candidate took away that vote in his 361 votes.

1790. In that case the winning candidate represented a minority of the electors, did he not?—Yes.

1791. And that might happen in many wards where these triangular contests take place, I suppose?—Yes, there is no denying that.

1792. Have you considered that that danger would not occur under the plan in the proposed Bill?—I cannot go into that, but, as I have said, though you might strengthen your minority in the council, I do not know that you would affect the result of anything done in the work of the council.

1793. Your plan of a single member to be elected may be said to work pretty well when you have only two parties fighting for a seat, but when you have three the plan shows a difficulty, does it not?—But it is very rare where you find three parties fighting for a seat.

1794. But you say it has occurred, do you not?—It is evident in Nottingham that the Liberal party and the Labour party will have to come to some arrangement if they are not to allow the Conservative party to gain all the seats, and it is the same everywhere.

1795. It would not be necessary to have those caucus arrangements under this Bill, would it? Each of the three divisions or more would get a representation in proportion to their strength?—I have no experience about it, but I am quite willing to take it it will be so, if your Lordship says so.

1796. But you confess you have not followed it?—I have not.

1797. And

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1797. And you have not followed the working of the thing in detail?—I have not.

1798. Are not there persons in Nottingham interested in public affairs who are not Conservatives, Liberals, or Labour men?—There may be a few.

1799. Such persons get put on Library Committees, and so on, I suppose?—Yes, but they are the sort of men who never would contest a constituency.

1800. But permit me to suggest that you are speaking of the present system when you say that, but if it was a question of electing one or three or four or five members, and not of getting a majority, but of getting adequate support, would not those persons have their names put forward?—I cannot follow your Lordship into the realms of the unknown.

1801. But you did when you said they would never allow their names to be put forward, did you not?—I said so because they are men of retiring dispositions, men who have given themselves up to studying special subjects, and who would not come before a boisterous meeting or address constituents.

1802. But you are speaking, are you not, of the present plan of election, and you cannot prophesy what they would do?—Quite. I do not think either system would stop public meetings and the necessity for candidates going from schoolroom to schoolroom and addressing their constituents and canvassing for votes. It is not the system of voting but the system of canvassing and public meetings which some people will not go near.

1803. Do you think this plan of bringing in new members would increase the number of talkers as against the number of workers?—So far as I can prophesy it would have that effect.

1804. Why?—Because faddists would come in; men with special axes to grind, and so forth.

1805. Do not you consider it important that a large number of voters do not get representation on your Council because they are in a minority?—About 60 per cent. of the electors vote, and the other 40 per cent. do not vote.

1806. And out of the 60 per cent. who do vote 25 per cent. do not get representation, do they?—That may be so.

1807. And you do not consider that of much importance, I gather?—I consider the majority must rule, and this is the way we have of fighting it out.

1808. But if you could have a plan by which the majority would be certain of a majority, and the minority would be certain of being represented, do not you think it would be better?—No, they would be there to obstruct the majority.

1809. But they would express the views of the minority, would they not, and do not you think that is desirable?—Under the present system there is a very large minority in our Council: at the present moment I think there are about 30 on one side, and the rest of the Council on the other side, but if four wards changed the government of the town would change; there is always a very powerful minority.

1810. And do not you think it possible that the working men of Nottingham would say

Lord Courtney of Penwith—continued.

they had not their representation?—I have not heard it said.

1811. You said the working men's candidate is coming to appear on the scene, did you not?—I said in my opinion there would be some agreement made between one party and the other party, which would obviate what has occurred occurring in the future, and may I say why? In the particular case I gave you the man only represented himself. He was a working man who insisted on standing himself.

1812. I do not want to press you, but may I ask you to consider the fact that in other towns than Nottingham—Bradford, Halifax, and other towns—working men candidates are appearing and being supported for municipal councils, which suggests that there is a feeling on the part of the working man that hitherto he has had no representation?—That is so, I believe, throughout the country.

Earl Beauchamp.

1813. Have you ever lived in London yourself?—Yes, I have lived in London, but no part of my business life has been passed in London.

1814. So that you have had no experience of the triennial elections in London, have you, —No, no personal experience whatever. I was one of the Commissioners for setting out the boundaries in London, and we passed some 200 or 300 provisional orders.

1815. Would it be your opinion that in London the electors would be well advised if they adopted the system in vogue in ordinary municipal boroughs?—If you will forgive me, I should not like to offer an opinion upon a point of that sort; I think they ought to settle that for themselves.

1816. Do I understand you would not like to offer an opinion as to whether it would be more satisfactory for them to adopt any system or the system under the Bill?—The system under the Bill, including triennial elections I think would be a great mistake. I said they made a mistake when they went for triennial elections, and I think they know it now; they ought to have gone for annual elections. Of course, all the candidates for municipal honours do not like annual elections; they have to pay the expenses themselves, and they like triennial elections with the expenses divided between three candidates. But, if you will forgive me, I should not like to say whether they would be well advised to accept this Bill or not.

1817. Have you any returns of spoilt papers?—Yes, but how they are spoilt I do not know.

1818. Can you tell us at all how many have been spoilt at elections?—The average with us is 5 in 1,000.

Lord Avebury.

1819. Do I understand you prefer the provincial system to the London system because of the continuity?—Yes.

1820. Mr. Pickmere, in his evidence, said he thought that, if the London boroughs retained their present system, it would be an improvement to introduce some form of proportional representation. Do you agree with that?—I have not sufficiently

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sufficiently considered the question to be able to give anything but an offhand answer, which I think would be perfectly useless under the circumstances, and misleading perhaps.

1821. Do I gather that you also wish that the parties in a borough should be represented in the council in some proportion to their numbers?—Wards are not exactly laid out in regard to population; they are laid out in rateable value as well, and also in something with regard to like class. For instance, in our case one very large ward with a large population consists almost entirely of miners, another ward consists of residential people, and another of tradesmen.

1822. Do not you think it an advantage that the different parties should be represented in some reasonable proportion?—Yes, certainly; but that is constantly changing; the representation does not continue the same.

1823. Supposing you have an election, do not you think it a desirable thing that the different parties in a borough should be represented somewhat in proportion to their numbers, or in some fair proportion to their numbers?—I think the majority should have sway, and should rule in the borough, and the minority, if there is anyone who has different views, I think, can be well represented by the other members.

1824. Supposing there are two parties, one in the proportion of 11 to 20, and the other of 9 to 20, do you wish the 9 to be represented or not?—If a man can get a large voting power then I think he should have his views represented.

1825. Do you consider that could be done under the present rule? Supposing you have a general election every year, and one party is in the proportion to the other party of 11 to 9, the 11 will carry the seat?—Yes.

1826. Then supposing next year you have another election, and there is no change of opinion, the same party will carry the second seat, and so on; so the party which is in the proportion of 11 to 9 will have all the seats, and the party which is in the proportion of 9 to 11 will have none of the seats, will they?—That is so.

1827. And I understand that that you do not approve of?—There are some wards that are steadily Liberal and some that are steadily Conservative, and others constantly change.

1828. Therefore your system does not secure any representation for the minority, however large it may be, does it?—In all the wards there is almost sure to be someone representing the minority opinion.

1829. The injustice in one ward is compensated for by injustice in another ward?—That is so.

1830. That you would hardly consider a satisfactory mode of representation, would you?—It is as near satisfactory as we can get things in this world. Mathematical certainty cannot be arrived at. I should not expect my butcher to weigh out my meat on scales from the chemist's laboratory; it is too good a thing to apply to everyday life.

1831. With regard to your voting for the Council on the Municipal Boroughs Association, (0.13.)

Lord Avebury—continued.

as I understand there are more candidates than there are seats to be allotted?—That is so.

1832. And each borough has a single vote?—No, each one has as many votes as there are vacancies. For instance, there are 30 members on the Council representing the county boroughs; the Borough of Nottingham would have 30 votes, and would select from a list of about 40.

1833. So that if there were two parties the one with the slight majority might carry all the seats?—No, I think not.

1834. You may say that the system of proportional representation is not, from your point of view, within the region of practical politics. I suppose you have not followed what has been going on abroad?—No, I have only read about it.

1835. You really have not thought it worth while to consider it thoroughly, believing it to be out of the question, I understand?—I have not. I have looked upon it as an ideal system, but at my time of life I do not want to see any change.

Lord Haversham.

1836. Do you object to this system mainly because you prefer annual elections?—I do, because it gives us slower changes.

1837. Do you think that metropolitan boroughs which now have triennial elections should adopt this system, or do you agree that the two systems might be contemporaneously carried on?—I feel very reluctant to offer any advice to the metropolitan boroughs.

1838. Do you consider that the ballot papers under the system suggested would involve the voter in any difficulty?—I think so; I think the majority of voters would be puzzled by the preference. They are so ignorant, most of them.

1839. The chief difficulty you see, I understand, is the changing of the officers?—Yes; every three years there would be a change of officers, especially the scrutineers who have to look after the ballot on behalf of candidates. Even now they are very suspicious of what is done, and I am afraid that if they saw a transfer of papers under this system they would regard it with still greater suspicion.

1840. With regard to their training, do you think they would be able to do the sums and that kind of thing?—I do not think so, with the class of men who are employed.

Earl Cathcart.

1841. Do not you consider that under some circumstances it might be quite conceivable that a break of continuity in representation might be desirable?—It ought to come about gradually, I think.

1842. For instance, in the case of reckless expenditure, the cooking of accounts, or any question of that sort?—I think if that were shown it would be inevitable that everybody would have to go during the three years. I think that is certain, and as far as my experience goes they would have to go under the present system. There are many questions decided at an annual election which cannot properly wait for

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the three years, and some of them that are decided like that, if they do not turn the majority of the Council, turn the policy of the Council, because members have been sent in with a strong feeling that it is a thing not approved of.

Lord Colchester.

1843. Your impression is, I take it, that the general intelligence of voters does not even extend to anything that is extremely simple?—That is so.

1844. Do you think the present system is as perfect as anything you can have?—Yes. The present system, with a borough divided into a number of wards with carefully considered divisions, so that the representatives should well represent the whole of the voters.

1845. If a minority of two-fifths is scattered equally throughout the whole borough, it might well have no representation at all, I suppose?—Yes.

1846. And if the majority is collected in a very small part, it might get considerably more than its share of representation, might it not?—Yes. I think under the present system the abiding feeling of a town is sure to prevail in the town council, and it often prevails after one or two elections.

1847. And you do not think the representation at present is very disproportionate, I take it?—I do not think so. As to 19 out of 20 of the things which have to be done by a town council, it does not matter which side is in power, and the twentieth thing is the one which perhaps would turn an election.

1848. If a small number of votes were distributed in a certain way it might make a very great change in the representation, might it not?—Yes, but it might be avoided by giving, not only population, but classes of population, to different wards.

1849. Do you remember when the high schools introduced a new constitution, when the opponents of some of the plans complained that all the local institutions were in party hands?—I remember that; Mr. Gripper and I fought that scheme; I think that scheme came from the town of Nottingham.

1850. But the town of Nottingham was very much divided, was it not, on the question?—Yes. Mr. Mundella at that time was at the Education Office, I believe.

1851. Is your objection to any change an objection to the particular points in this Bill, or to any change at all?—I should be very glad if any simple scheme could be proposed to modify the difficulties which at present exist.

1852. How would you explain the majorities and the results of elections with regard to the late School Boards?—I should say it was a very clever piece of wire-pulling.

1853. How many members had you on the School Board?—Fifteen. They were returned for the whole of the city. It was one Board for the whole of the borough.

1854. It was not like the London system?—No.

Chairman.

1855. The fact was, was it not, that the party which made the most accurate calculation of their strength were enabled to return all their candidates; and the other party, which over-estimated their strength, did not get in any of their candidates?—You put it quite rightly.

Lord Colchester.

1856. Do you think generally the effect of the system was that the minority got more than their share of representation?—The point of my answer was not as to the mode of election, but as to giving anyone a power to go out triennially and before the close of the year, doing what they could to push their views unfairly against the incoming tide.

1857. Do you think it did not give a fairer representation than you have now?—No.

1858. If a constituency had been divided, do you suppose it would make any difference?—I do not think so. I think the cumulative vote gives every opportunity for wire-pulling.

1859. More than the present system?—Yes.

1860. Or that proposed under the present Bill?—I am not at all certain about this Bill.

1861. Do I gather that you do not see any objection to rather disproportionate representation, even if it exists?—As an executive officer my strong point is that the majority must rule, and we do not want to be obstructed by minorities. We are an administrative body, with duties to perform.

1862. Do I gather that you think the great danger is that things will go too slowly? You said: "But if there is a very strong minority opposing you all through, preventing your carrying work out and delaying you at every point, the strength of the minority does no good to local self-government." You do not see any danger on the other side, do you, that the majority may go too fast?—I think after the matter has been decided upon, and has been thoroughly threshed out, it wants to be carried out strongly. We do get obstructions now occasionally. Some persons object to this and that, and try to keep things back if they can.

Bishop of Bristol.

1863. You were speaking of a Liberal ward being represented entirely by Liberals, and a Conservative ward entirely by Conservatives, and your point appeared to be that in the representation of the borough one ward corrected another; and Lord Avebury put this to you: "Do you mean that injustice in one ward is corrected by injustice in another," and you said "Yea." Do you really mean that it is an injustice that a decidedly Liberal ward should be represented entirely by Liberals?—Did I commit myself to the word injustice? If so, I should like to withdraw the word, because there is no injustice attached to it.

Lord Avebury.

1864. Supposing in that ward there was one-third of the other party, do you think it fair that they should have no representation?—They would get representation at the election if they had a candidate.

1865. But how would they get representation if

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Sir S. G. JOHNSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury—continued.

if they were only a third of the voters?—A third would not get representation on the Town Council, and would have no right to under any system.

1866. You think that a third of the electors have no right under any system to representation, do you?—I do; the majority must rule.

1867. Of course the majority would rule if they only had two votes out of three, but do you hold that the third should not be heard in the Council?—The right of audience, do you mean?

1868. No—that they should have the right of representation on a Council?—I cannot say more than that I think the majority should rule. Somebody must rule in the borough; somebody must rule in the country.

1869. I quite agree with you, but it is no answer to my question. I want to know whether you think that the two-thirds should have the whole of the representation and that one-third should have no representation?—Most decidedly.

Lord Amptill.

1870. At our last meeting you spoke of the agents appointed by the candidates to watch the counting at one of your elections, and it seemed to me that you spoke of them slightly as a class. What class of men are they?—I do not know quite what kind of men they are. They are men who hang about at elections.

1871. What do they do at other times?—I really do not know what they do at other times. A class of men spring up at election times almost everywhere, men who seek employment at a few shillings a day.

1872. Do I understand that you do not think they are sufficiently intelligent to understand this system?—No; the person who would do all that on behalf of a candidate is his legal representative. He would do that, and there would be the permanent secretary of their party also present, and he had to get whom he could to assist him.

1873. Do you think it would be possible to get more intelligent men who were not of this rather degraded class to watch these proceedings?—I hope your Lordship will not put upon

Lord Amptill—continued.

me “degraded class”; they are a partially-educated class, and I think this scheme would, perhaps, force better educated men to be employed, because the men who are employed now would not be able to do the work.

1874. Do you think such men could be got?—If they paid them, no doubt.

Chairman.

1875. I think you expressed the view that you would have no objection to an experiment being tried with regard to this matter?—It would be foolish of us to say, for instance, that Leeds should not try it.

1876. As far as the Bill is concerned, would you prefer to confine it purely to an experiment under certain safeguards in some particular constituency or constituencies?—Yes.

1877. Do I understand that you strongly object to the principle that a town council or a borough council should have the power by a majority of one, or a mere majority, of not only adopting a new system, but changing six months afterwards to the old system by another majority of one? A mere majority may adopt the proposal of the Bill; they may hold an election within a certain time afterwards, not more than six months, and then afterwards, if they wished they could by a mere majority again go back to the old system, and then again, if they liked, by a mere majority they might try the new system again. I understand you think that would allow an element to get into the council which might give rise to considerable difficulties, and love of change?—I think it would be most disastrous if we came to that condition of things. In a borough changing like that you would get no good men either as officials or on the council.

1878. And a party which, for some reason or other, thought they were not getting on very well, if they could get a majority of one, could alter the system at the next election, in the hope that it might be more favourable to them?—Yes, so I understand the Bill.

1879. And that, I understand, you do not approve of?—I do not.

(The witness is directed to withdraw.)

Ordered,—That this Committee be adjourned to Tuesday next, 12 o'clock.

Die Martis, 9^o Julii 1907.

..
LORDS PRESENT:

Earl CATHCART.
Earl BEAUCHAMP.
BISHOP OF BRISTOL.
Lord COLCHESTER.

Lord AMPHILL.
Lord AVEBURY.
Lord COURTNEY OF PENWITH.
Lord ALLENDALE.

LORD BELPER IN THE CHAIR.

THE REVEREND JOHN HENDRY ANDERSON is called in; and Examined as follows:—

Chairman.

1880. Are you Chairman of the Association of the Metropolitan Borough Councils?—I am.

1881. Is that an Association which represents the whole of the London boroughs?—There are some boroughs which are not in it, but it represents the majority of them.

1882. The Committee have heard that there are some of those boroughs which belong to the Municipal Corporations Association, which includes other boroughs in England, does it not?—Yes, those are boroughs in the provinces.

1883. Do you know what number of boroughs your Society represents?—I believe some 17 out of the 28 give actual adhesion to it, but there are others which are more or less attached, perhaps because the Local Government Board does not sanction any expenditure out of the rates for the expenses of the Association.

1884. Does not the Act of Parliament allow any contributions to be given?—Not in the Metropolis; it only applies in the provinces.

1885. And you have no provision inserted in any Bill for that purpose?—No. A Bill has been introduced twice, and it was starred as a Government measure just before the last Dissolution, but unfortunately it fell through.

1886. Has the Bill which is before the Committee been considered by your Association?—Not by the whole Association. The Executive responsible for drawing up the agenda, I am sorry to say, did not think it worth while to discuss the Bill, because they considered it was so complicated that it would not pass into law. That was the opinion of the Executive.

1887. Had they seen the Bill?—I presume they had.

1888. Has there been any meeting of the Executive Council since this Committee commenced their sittings?—No.

1889. You are not able to give us any expression of opinion from the Council on the matter?—No, I am not. I may say also that the same thing took place with regard to my

Chairman—continued.

own Borough Council of Wandsworth. The Town Clerk did not think it worth while to submit it to the Law and Parliamentary Committee; but that is not my opinion.

1890. What conclusion did they come to?—That it was cumbersome in its provisions. The Town Clerk is the Returning Officer, you see, and I do not think from the point of view of a Returning Officer the Bill is much favoured.

1891. Under those circumstances will you give the Committee your own views on the Bill?—I think if it is representation that people are caring for, or which they ought to care for, then they ought to care very much for a measure which professes to give a better means of securing representation than the existing system does.

1892. Have you studied the Bill?—I have. I have it in my pocket, and I have it in my head to a certain extent.

1893. You are conversant with its provisions, are you?—Yes. I have carefully looked through the Schedule and the examples given there, and I have argued with some of my friends on the matter.

1894. Do you think the system proposed by the Bill is preferable to the present system of voting at municipal elections?—I think you would get more equitable representation; but I think that a great deal of "spade work" will have to be done before you will get people to believe in the system of election, and also to overcome a great deal of prejudice on the part of the Returning Officers. Perhaps it is ignorance rather than prejudice, because they will not take the trouble to look at the Bill. I was thinking rather of the mathematical calculations, which is a matter which seems to prey most on the minds of those I have spoken to.

1895. Do you mean with regard to the proportional element?—Yes; which seems to be too much for some people.

1896. That you think rather puzzles the public

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Rev. J. H. ANDERSON.

[Continued.]

Chairman—continued.

public?—Yes; but I think I could get a few seventh-standard children who would be able to teach the Returning Officers how to do the sums. I think the system would be much more applicable to municipal representation than it would be to any other kind of representation. The work in a municipality is so very largely administrative and not so much based upon principle, that I think it would meet with favour first in the municipalities.

1897. You think that the system in the Bill would give a better opportunity for independent people of different views who might be useful on a Council of being elected?—I think so, and I think there are other causes in operation at the present time. There are a great many people who think they have lost something by losing the cumulative vote; and I think this would be a better method of voting than the cumulative method.

1898. You do not think, I understand, that municipalities want to adopt the measure at present?—No, I do not think so. As I have said, I think a great deal of "spade work" will have to be done.

1899. The Committee have had evidence from representatives of the Municipal Corporations Association, but the only evidence they have had from Borough Councils was from gentlemen who objected very strongly to the fact that at the last election and at previous elections, the minority, which formed a considerable proportion of the electors, got no representation at all?—Is not that very true of the House of Commons as at present constituted?

1900. Perhaps we had better keep to the municipal aspect of the question. We have not had evidence from anybody representing the people who were in the majority which was selected, but rather from the minority which was smarting by not being represented. I understand you represent Wandsworth?—Yes, I was Mayor the year before last.

1901. Is there a good minority representation there?—No, there are only three men not Unionists on the Borough Council.

1902. Did the last election result in a great change in representation?—Yes; the parties were about evenly divided before.

1906. In Wandsworth, I suppose, as in the other Borough Councils, the elections are held triennially?—Yes, they are all so held in London.

1904. Is it the case that in your borough, owing to the change, the continuity of policy of the Council has been destroyed?—I do not think there is such a wide scope for any change of policy.

1903. In Wandsworth, I suppose, you mean?—Yes, we have always had a Conservative majority.

1906. Then there was no upset there, as there was in some places?—No.

1907. We have heard of some places where it was difficult to get men of any experience in municipal affairs to take responsible positions on Councils. Have you had any experience as to that?—That is becoming increasingly difficult, because if one compares the existing Council with two previous Councils then as regards the

Chairman—continued.

quality of the men, if I may venture to use the word, there is no comparison.

1908. I did not mean to make any comment on the quality of the individuals composing the Council, but on the fact that in some boroughs all those who had taken part in municipal affairs were turned out at the last election, and therefore that it was difficult to get anybody with any experience to take responsible positions. Is that the case in Wandsworth?—No, I think not.

Lord Courtney of Penwith.

1909. Do you approve of the aim of the Bill?—Yes, very much.

1910. Do you think it would produce not merely a juster representation, but would bring in elements which are now difficult to bring in?—Yes, and I think there is a very considerable section smarting under a grievance that they do not get such a fair chance of getting representation on Councils, especially with regard to educational matters now that they have lost the cumulative vote.

1911. Your chief difficulty is the practicability of its adoption, I understand?—I think it is perfectly practicable, and I agree with its aim.

1912. You think it practicable?—I do.

1913. But you think it will require a fair amount of education, I understand, to bring the majority in any borough to desire it?—Yes, I do, a great deal of education.

1914. I suppose you will admit that the experience at the last election has proved educational already in some boroughs?—Yes.

1915. For instance, in a place like Lewisham, where there was a complete overturn, the defeated party are beginning to think they will probably secure some representation at the next election under the scheme of the Bill?—Yes. I do not know that that would apply to me because I have always gone on an independent ticket and headed the poll.

1916. We need not despair, you think, of gradual conversion?—No, and on the whole it would be a most excellent thing to pass this as a facultative or adoptive measure; then it would be before the country and people might adopt it.

1917. Do you think the option of adopting the Bill would be a desirable thing?—Yes.

1918. And once used in any place, do you think it would prove an education to other places?—I do; I think the mere fact that it was passed as a facultative measure would in itself be an excellent piece of spade work, and people would begin to ask for it.

1919. You would admit, I suppose, that the thing aimed at is more wanted in Metropolitan boroughs than in country boroughs?—I can hardly compare them, never having been to any extent concerned in a country borough, but I know it is much needed in the Metropolis.

1920. And is it desirable, in your opinion, that the power of adopting this machinery in Metropolitan boroughs should be given, and that there would be no harm if the option were given to the country generally?—I think not.

1921. You

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Rev. J. H. ANDERSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Avebury.

1921. You said that the matter had not been considered by the Association, because they thought it was so complicated that there was no chance of its passing into law?—The Executive responsible for drawing up the agenda thought that at the present time it was so far from the range of practical politics that it was not worth while to discuss it.

1922. Probably they were not aware that it was in operation in Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and other countries?—I should think it is most likely.

1923. You say that in Wandsworth there are only three Progressives on the Borough Council, I understand?—Yes.

1924. Can you put in figures the number of Progressive and Moderate votes, and the number of representatives secured by those votes?—Yes.

1925. Was there a contest in every division in Wandsworth?—No; in one there was not—in Putney. Putney agreed to accept one Progressive candidate, so that there was no poll.

1926. Perhaps it would be well if you can give the figures as to the contested seats?—It is only those that I can give you.

1927. Do I gather from your evidence that in your judgment some system such as that contained in the Bill would tend to bring in the best, or at any rate the most esteemed, representatives of both sides?—It would give representation to respectable minorities. I suppose the "best esteemed" would be a correct expression, because the voting would be by preferences.

1928. There are sure to be some voters on both sides, and assuming there were two-thirds on one side and one-third on the other the men elected would probably be the most esteemed men on both sides, would they not?—I suppose so.

1929. And therefore the tendency would be to secure the best men for a Borough Council, would it not?—Yes, if you can only get the best men to become candidates.

Earl Beauchamp.

1930. Have you considered the question of the second ballot as an alternative to the scheme under the Bill?—No. Do you mean as it obtains in France?

1931. Yes.—I have not.

1932. So that you have not formed any opinion as to whether the second ballot would be preferable as a method of getting representation?—I should say it would not be so good as this proposal, because there would be practically two elections.

1933. Do I understand you do not advocate the system proposed by the Bill for Parliamentary Elections?—No; I do not think it would be so good for a Parliamentary Election as for municipal work, and my reason is that the work in the municipalities is so largely administrative.

1934. Do not you desire to see a change in the system of Parliamentary Elections as well?—I think it would be highly desirable, but it is as well, I think, to begin with municipalities.

1935. Do you approve of the system in ordinary municipalities throughout the country with regard to retirement every third year?—I think

Earl Beauchamp—continued.

it is better to have a triennial election. I think where you have one every third year the grievance under which minorities smart is magnified three-fold, because where there is only one man there is no preference.

1936. Have you heard any general desire expressed for such a Bill as this?—No, on the contrary, I think one ought rather to be an apostle in favour of it.

The Bishop of Bristol.

1937. You said that you yourself stand as an independent person, and come in at the head of the poll. How is your candidature made known?—I announce the fact and issue an address and post it, and have a meeting.

1938. How does that affect what may be called the party tickets, which we are so anxious to get rid of?—I object to the party ticket because they ask you to pay £25; the seats are sold; it is a perfect Tammany Hall.

1939. In spite of these party tickets an independent man can at present, with a full chance of success, stand, you think?—I do not say that; I can do it, but many try it and fail.

1940. Do you think a method of the kind proposed would give a better chance to an independent man, that is to say, that it would have a tendency to spoil the system of party tickets?—I think, speaking generally, independent candidates have not very much chance before the electors: if a man wishes to secure success he must really join one or other of the parties; but perhaps my own position as Rector of a great parish in London is rather different. Having served the office of Mayor and been Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee, I have been before the public a great deal, and perhaps that gives me additional weight which another man might not have.

1941. Under the proposed method do you think there is a better chance than there is now of getting rid of the party ticket?—Yes.

1942. I should have thought that this system would have furnished a mathematical certainty to wire-pullers which now they have not got?—I should have thought it would operate the other way.

1943. Will you tell me how?—You vote for one man to begin with.

Chairman.

1944. Do you mean under the proposed system, or under the present system?—I take it there is one man preferred, that is the proposal. That gives the opportunity to each voter, who does not care about the party ticket, to plump for his own man.

The Bishop of Bristol.

1945. He could do so now, could he not?—He could, but he is asked to go for the ticket, and as a matter of fact they all do go for the ticket.

1946. And why would not they under the system proposed?—They might, they might be obedient.

1947. Why should they be less obedient under the new system than under the old?—They have an opportunity of going for their own man more under the proposed system than under the present one, I think.

1948. I gather

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Rev. J. H. ANDERSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Colchester.

1948. I gather that you say there is a strong feeling with regard to educational matters that the minorities have lost the position they used to have?—Yes, I have heard so.

1949. Under the system of the School Board elections, the minority in every district had a representative, had they not?—Yes.

1950. And there was scarcely one district in London where each elector had not some representation?—Quite so.

1951. And that does not happen, does it, under the present system of election?—No.

1952. I think the great inconvenience in these elections, was the very unwieldy size of some of the constituencies, was it not?—Yes, the constituencies were very large.

1953. Do I gather that you feel strongly that there ought to be some modification of the existing system which risks the total disfranchisement of large minorities?—Yes.

1954. Would you be in favour of any means which might bring about the desired result in preference to the existing system?—I am not so certain that I should be in favour of the system of cumulative voting; although it had the advantage to which you have alluded, there was a tendency in it to produce an assembly perhaps of faddists.

1955. Do you think that that system is better than the existing system, as a choice between the two?—I do not think I would go back to it.

1956. A minority might get more than its share, you think?—Yes, if it is a large constituency.

1957. With regard to the second ballot; it would meet certain deficiencies, but not the one of disfranchisement, would it?—No, you would then have a double election.

1958. But that would not meet the case of a large minority getting no representation, would it?—No, it would not.

1959. Do you consider that this proposed system is more suited to executive work?—Yes, my reason is that where the work is mainly administrative it does not matter so much how you get the vehicle together, or what the quality or colour of it might be, but when you have to deal with matters of principle, or with a legislative assembly, I think it is possible you might get an unworkable assembly by the adoption of this method; you would not get a cohesive party.

1960. Do I understand that you have always been an independent candidate?—Yes, I have, but only independent in municipal matters; the people know perfectly well my colour in Parliamentary matters.

1961. You did not stand on any party ticket?—No, I never have.

Lord Amptill.

1962. Do not you think the system proposed by the Bill is rather complicated?—I do not; I have heard a good many people say so, but I do not think it is.

1963. Do you think any difficulty would be easily mastered by an ordinary elector?—I have said already I think I could get a Seventh Standard school boy to teach the returning officer how to do the sums.

1964. Do not you think the average elector

Lord Amptill—continued.

prefers generally to say Yea or Nay at an election?—Yes, I do; but I do not think he is right. I should think that in his view, and I think very likely for some time, he would consider that he was being done in some way if he did not get his direct vote, and that the election was the result of a mathematical problem rather than a vote. That would be his idea; but I think it would be a delusion.

1965. I understood you to say just now that a voter might be induced to plump for one man under this Bill?—I think this Bill would give an incentive to various organisations to run candidates of their own, which they do not do now, and cannot do now very well with the enormous force which is wielded by party organisations.

1966. Do you think it would be an advantage that the elector should plump for one man?—That would be for him to decide. If he wants his representation then he must take the best way of getting it.

1967. That would be rather against the idea of this Bill, would it not?—Yes; an elector could express his preference.

1968. Did I understand you to think that it would be an advantage to electors to go for one man?—No, not for the electors generally. Probably a man with a broad and generous mind would distribute his votes; but you have to regard the fact that there are noisy and self-assertive people who will plump for one man.

Chairman

1969. Are you aware that if they plump for one man then there is no minority representation?—Yes, but I am not suggesting that they should take my advice; I am not giving them that advice.

Lord Allendale.

1970. Having regard to the fact that the Bill is purely permissive, do you think any conceivable harm would result if it were passed into law?—I do not.

1971. Do you think it would be a valuable experiment to make?—I think so, and it would throw the onus of adoption on the constituency.

Lord Courtney of Penrith.

1972. With regard to the question put to you by the Bishop of Bristol, how many members are there for the ward you represent?—Three.

1973. Are three candidates put forward generally for such a ward by each party?—Yes, we had nine put forward in our case.

1974. Does not the strength of the party organisation lie in this, that they tell their men, "If you do not vote together, and if we are not cohesive, and scatter our forces, we shall get nothing; but if we stick together we shall get everything"?—Yes.

1975. Is not that the particular power which party organisation has under the present system?—That is so.

1976. Under the proposed system would any party organisation be able to appeal with the same effect to the electors?—No, I think the Bill would open out a wider range of thought.

1977. A section

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Rev. J. H. ANDERSON.

[Continued.]

Lord Courtney of Penrith—continued.

1977. A section might say: "No, it is not necessary we should stick together to get the majority; we will stick together, being a quarter of the electorate, and get our one man in"—Yes.

1978. And that would be the answer to the party machine, would it not?—Yes.

1979. So that the machinery under the Bill, so far from magnifying party organisation—would diminish it, would it not?—Yes.

1980. It would take away, would it not, the motive to which party leaders now appeal, namely, the necessity of coherence?—Yes, there would be separate independent parties cohering amongst themselves; there would be more of them.

1981. And, if a party, as it probably would, recommended its friends to mark one, two, three, according to the three persons they liked, they could not get all three returned, could they, unless their party was sufficiently strong to exclude every other party; in fact amounting to three-fourths?—Yes, they would have to act in that way, very much as they acted under the cumulative voting principle.

1982. But they would not be powerful enough to secure the whole representation, would they?—No, only a partial representation.

1983. A majority, if they formed the majority, but not the whole?—Yes.

The Bishop of Bristol.

1984. There are two kinds of cohesion, are there not; you could press for cohesion under the present system, but you could do the same thing under the proposed system, could you not?—Yes, but the parties do not exist as it were; there is nothing to call them into activity. The feeling is that one of two parties dominate and there is no scope for anything else. I think this measure creates the idea that they may adopt new methods now.

1985. Taking a constituency with 6,000 voters and a dominant majority of just more than three-fourths of Liberals say, why should not the party leaders say: "You must all vote one, two, three for our three candidates," then the

The Bishop of Bristol—continued.

Liberal people would carry them all, would they not, and that is cohesion, is it not?—Yes.

1986. Then I do not see how this proposal destroys cohesion as compared with the present system?—My case is that it would produce a number of bodies cohesive amongst themselves.

1987. That is another question, is it not? My friend, Lord Courtney, seemed to think that under the proposed system they could not press the cohesion in the same way as it is pressed at present?—The effect of the Bill will be to encourage minorities to seek representation and to that extent the old cohesive force will be diminished in quantity, and my view is that it is likely to happen.

Lord Avebury.

1988. Supposing the majority cohere under the present system it would carry the whole of the seats, and the minority would get none, would it?—That is so.

1989. If the majority and the minority both cohere, they would get representation in proportion to their numbers, whatever they might be, would they not?—Yes, that is the effect, I take it, of this measure.

1990. It was put to you, if everybody plumped, the minority would not get a hearing, but if there were two-thirds Progressive and one-third Moderate, and everyone plumped, would not the result be that there would be equitable representation and the minority would be represented in something like proportion to its numbers?—Yes.

1991. And that, I think, you regard as being of great advantage?—Yes, if it is representation we are after.

Chairman.

1992. I understand you have been always successful at elections yourself, although you have not stood as a party man?—Yes.

1993. I suppose you are one of the exceptions who prove the rule?—You said "always," but you will bear in mind that the Metropolitan Borough Councils have only been in existence seven years, so that I have only stood twice.

The Witness is directed to withdraw.

Ordered.—That this Committee be adjourned

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APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.—THE SENATE.

CLARK-HARE SYSTEM OF VOTING.

(REPORT by J. G. DAVIES, Esq., Returning Officer, Tasmania, and R. M. JOHNSTON, Esq.,
Statistician of Tasmania.)

THE HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

The existing law in Tasmania with respect to the election of parliamentary representatives is that in any constituency where there are more than one member to be elected, the mode of voting must be conducted upon the Hare system. The first elections under this system in Tasmania took place on the 20th January, 1897, in the larger constituencies of Hobart and Launceston. The rest of the colony was, and is still, divided into single electorates, and therefore does not come within the working of the Hare system.

It is to the present Mr. Justice Clark, when acting in the capacity of Attorney-General to the Braddon Ministry (XIXth), that Tasmania is indebted for the introduction of the Hare system of election.

The causes which led to the introduction of the Hare system in Tasmania, generally known as "Proportional Representation," is here given in Mr. Justice Clark's own words, as follows:—

The Clark-Hare system of voting was introduced into the electoral law of Tasmania in consequence of the frequent failure of the ordinary system of voting to secure a proportionate representation of the preponderating opinions of the electors on political questions, either in single or plural electorates. Under the first Electoral Act, which provided for the election of the members of a bicameral Legislature, the city of Hobart, by the "block vote," elected five representatives to the House of Assembly, as one electorate, and the city of Launceston elected three representatives to the same branch of the Legislature in the same manner.

Under that system it was discovered that a majority of the electors, in each of the two electorates, could elect all the representatives, and leave a very large minority totally unrepresented in the Legislature. To remedy this evil, those two electorates were divided into eight single electorates. But under this system it was discovered that when three or more candidates presented themselves for election, it very frequently happened that the successful candidate was elected by a minority of the total number of votes recorded. The same thing sometimes occurred in the rural electorates, which were all single electorates, but the number of candidates in the rural electorates did not often exceed two. It was also discovered that the division of the cities of Hobart and Launceston into eight single electorates reduced the area of each electorate, and the number of voters to such small dimensions that the agents and canvassers of the several candidates could easily interview every resident elector and ascertain very closely the number of purchasable or otherwise controllable votes.

After the representation of the cities of Hobart and Launceston was increased to six and four members, those electorates were divided into five electorates, each of which returned two members. At the same time, two rural electorates, each returning two members, were created. Under this plan it was discovered that the majority of electors in the total number of electorates which returned two members frequently secured a much larger representation in Parliament than that to which it was proportionally entitled, and thereby gave a preponderance of voting power in the Legislature to a political party which had secured only a minority of the total number of votes recorded at a general election. In several instances neither of the successful candidates in a double electorate was elected by

a majority of votes. The last-mentioned result was frequently produced by a large number of the electors voting for only one candidate out of the five or six who were in the field.

With a view of avoiding these serious defects, the cities of Hobart and Launceston were converted into electorates under the Clark-Hare system, which enables every section of political opinion which can command the requisite quota of votes to secure a number of representatives proportionate to its numerical strength. It also utilizes every vote recorded, if the elector chooses to exercise the whole of his power to indicate his preferences. If any vote is not used to help in the election of a representative, it is because the voter has chosen to indicate his preference for a less number of candidates than the number of representatives to be elected in the electorate in which he votes.

So far the causes which led to the introduction of the Clark-Hare system of voting in Tasmania have very clearly been revealed by the author and originator of the modified form of the Hare system known as the "Clark-Hare" system, which, in the opinion of those who have given "true representation" the most careful investigation, has fulfilled in every way the original anticipations of its introducer, and for the first time has given for the electorates affected a closer approach to the true voice of the electors than has ever been attained by any other system of election. It is only natural that those candidates who have failed to be returned under the Clark-Hare system should comfort themselves with the idea that the machinery of election was at fault, and that under some other system than that of "proportional representation" they might have a better chance of success. These, however, together with the typical electioneering agent or canvasser, are well aware that it is less costly, or easier, to come in touch personally with a small electorate, and hence they form a very strong adverse influence to the retention or expansion of the Hare system of voting in any shape whatever. This is naively indicated by all such objections by the restriction of their ideas on representation, not to fairer representation of the elector and his greater freedom of choice, but entirely to considerations confined to the ease and convenience of the candidate as such. The rights of the electors and their freedom of choice are scarcely ever dwelt upon by many such who are desirous of appearing as their true representatives in Parliament.

ELECTIONS UNDER THE HARE SYSTEM.

The following is a list of the Elections conducted under the Hare system in Tasmania since its first introduction :—

STATE ELECTIONS.

Date.	Electorate.	No. of Seats.	No. of Candidates.
20th January, 1897 - - - - -	Hobart - - - - -	6	12
20th January, 1897 - - - - -	Launceston - - - - -	4	—
12th March, 1900 - - - - -	Hobart - - - - -	6	9
12th March, 1900 - - - - -	Launceston - - - - -	4	—

COMMONWEALTH ELECTIONS.

March, 1901 - - - - -	House of Representatives - -	5	9
March, 1901 - - - - -	Senate - - - - -	6	15

(For the election of members to represent Tasmania, both for House of Representatives and Senate, the State as a whole formed one electorate.)

WORKING RESULTS OF THE HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

The working results of the first four State elections under the Hare system in Tasmania have already been very fully investigated by Mr. R. M. Johnston, Government Statistician, who has immediate charge of the work of tabulation at the elections in Hobart, under the returning officer Mr. George Davis, C.M.G., M.H.A., Mayor.

It may be of advantage, in this Report, to confine attention, as far as possible, to the working results of the two last elections under the Hare system in returning members to represent Tasmania in the Commonwealth, six for the Senate, and five for the House of Representatives.

RESULT OF ELECTIONS FOR SENATE.

The following table gives a condensed account of the results of the contest of fifteen candidates to secure one of the six Senatorial seats :—

(Effective preference. Votes obtained.)

Candidate.	Preference 1. No.	Preference 2, 3, and over. No.	All Effectives. No.
Keating	3,761	—	3,761
Clemons	2,519	578	3,097
O'Keefe	1,904	1,284	3,158
Dobson	1,568	1,561	3,129
Cameron	1,452	1,136	2,588
Macfarlane	1,199	1,236	2,435
Group A	12,403	5,795	18,168
Urquhart	1,159	458	1,617
Moore	969	437	1,406
Best	960	248	1,208
Waldron	755	268	1,023
Murray	740	64	804
Patterson	586	123	709
Page	416	49	465
Woolnough	229	8	237
Morrisby	186	10	196
Group B	8,000	1,665	7,665
Total effective	18,403	7,460	25,833
Quota :-	—	3,067	—

Senate Effective Votes (Per Cental).

Candidate.	Preference 1.		All Effectives.		Count No.
	Order.	Per cent.	Order.	Per cent.	
Keating	1	20.43	1	14.54	1st.
Clemons	2	13.69	2	11.98	7th
O'Keefe	3	10.35	3	12.33	12th
Dobson	4	8.52	4	12.10	13th
Cameron	5	7.90	5	10.00	14th
Macfarlane	6	6.51	6	9.41	14th
Group A		67.40		70.36	
Urquhart	7	6.30	7	6.25	12th
Moore	8	5.26	8	5.44	11th
Best	9	5.22	9	4.67	10th
Waldron	10	4.10	10	3.95	9th
Murray	11	4.02	11	3.11	7th
Patterson	12	3.18	12	2.74	6th
Page	13	2.26	13	1.80	5th
Woolnough	14	1.25	14	0.92	4th
Morrisby	15	1.01	15	0.76	3rd
Group B		32.60		29.64	
Total effective		100.00		100.00	

(A) Indicates successful candidates ; (B) indicates the group of unsuccessful candidates.

It will be seen that in the contest for the six Senatorial seats there were fifteen candidates. It is curious that in the successful group (A) only one candidate (Dobson) had ever occupied the position of a representative in our local State Parliament, while among the nine unsuccessful candidates all but one (Waldron) are or have been representatives of our local Parliament.

The marked success of what has been termed the "new blood" element was the occasion of much comment. The opponents of the Hare system and some of the unsuccessful candidates were not slow to affirm that the introduction of the "new blood" and the defeat of the old well-known local representatives was entirely due to the Hare system, meaning, thereby, to some imaginary defect in its mode of operation.

That some difference in the results would likely happen if the whole State was, as originally suggested, broken up into six single electorates, would not at all be improbable. The Hare system gave a choice to each elector of fifteen candidates, and thus favoured those candidates who were in general as well as in local favour among the great body of electors. The single electorate method would restrict the electors' choice to at most two or three candidates, none of which, perhaps, were in particular favour, but might happen to succeed if voting were restricted to the single district where alone the candidate had any considerable following. Fortunately the effect of the ballot, if worked on the single electorate plan, can be very closely gauged, for out of the total 18,403 votes polled for the whole State, 16,897 can be referred to each of the five principal divisions into which at one time it was suggested that the State should be divided.

The following analysis shows, in all probability, what the result would be if the election was conducted upon the single electorate system.

To understand more clearly this localisation into five single divisions it may be of advantage to give a rough idea of the composition of the five districts, thus:—

- Natone:—Comprises Kelly's Basin, Crotty, Queenstown, Gormanston, Zeehan, remainder of Zeehan District, Waratah, and Wellington.
- Paratana:—Comprises Devonport, Latrobe, Deloraine, Westbury, Longford, Cressy, and Evandale.
- Mangana:—Comprises Launceston, Selby, George Town, Ringarooma, and Fingal.
- Talune:—Cumberland, Campbelltown, Glamorgan, Oatlands, Brighton, Richmond, Sorrell, New Norfolk, Franklin, and Kingborough.
- Loinah:—Comprises Hobart, Glenorchy, and Queenborough.

We have seen already that the six candidates who were returned elected obtained actually out of 18,403 effective first preference votes a total of 12,403 votes, or 67·40 per cent, while the nine unsuccessful candidates only obtained 6,000 effective first preference votes, or 32·60 per cent. Whatever qualification we make, therefore, it is manifest that the returned members commanded fully two-thirds of all effective votes within the State, irrespective of the party or opinions which, as a group, they may have represented. So far, therefore, as the represented—the Hamlet of all matters regarding representation—are concerned, the major power of the opinions or wishes of the majority is indubitably honestly represented, so far as Tasmania is concerned, in the Commonwealth Senate.

But while this result cannot very well be disputed, there are those who, in the history of candidates, merely—bear in mind candidates are not necessarily in harmony with the electors, so far as their respective interests in the election of representatives are concerned—are always eager to affirm that better results would have been secured had the State been cut up into single electorates.

So far as local politics are concerned as regards country districts particularly, there is much to be said in favour of single member electorates (conjoined with the contingent absolute majority vote), for the often large and undeveloped areas of agricultural, pastoral, mineral, and other primary industries are far more concerned about politics centred in means of communication (railways, roads, bridges, harbours, jetties, &c., *e.g.*) than in any matter common to all divisions of the State, such, for example, as defence, external trade (ex-Australian), tariff, excise, judicature, charities, education, old-age pensions, and such like.

These are now the peculiarly distinguishing features between Commonwealth and State politics. The interests of the Commonwealth, so far as its functions extend, are common or homogeneous to all the divisions of any State, and therefore the State in itself need not be broken up into separate divisions to obtain the best results for the State as a whole. In this respect, it is in a similar condition to the different divisions or wards of a great town or city whose interests, politico-geographical, are in common. To break up such homogeneous units into local artificial divisions would not serve the true interests of electors, neither could it, except by chance, produce a fair indication of the wishes and choice of the majority of the electors within each State.

Notwithstanding these critical observations, let us examine, as far as possible, what different effect would likely have been produced had the State of Tasmania been, for Federal purposes, divided into single electorates.

For this purpose, let us reasonably assume that candidates under such circumstances would seek for election in that division which would appear to the candidate to possess the largest body of his own particular following, or in that division where he was likely to succeed.

To make the comparisons more fair, it may be desirable in the interests of the single district sympathisers to contrast the intensity of local support against all local competitors with the intensity of first preference effective votes obtained by all such as against other candidates within the State as a whole.

At the last election for the Senate the following are the names of the successful candidates, together with the natural order of their precedence, based upon the percentage of the absolute first preference votes obtained. The result of the preference transfer votes did not disturb this order of precedence, and it goes to show, therefore, that the element of chance in election was practically eliminated thus:—

Order of Precedence of Successful Candidates at First Count and after Final Transfer Votes.

Candidate.	Order of Precedence.			
	Preference 1.		All Preferences, including transfers.	
	Order.	Per cent.	Order Returned.	Count.
Keating	1	29.43	1	1st
Clemons	2	13.69	2	7th
O'Keefe	3	10.35	3	12th
Dobson	4	8.52	4	13th
Cameron	5	7.90	5	14th
Macfarlane	6	6.51	6	14th
Six successful	--	67.40	—	—

If we now endeavour to ascertain what the probable result would have been had each candidate been restricted to that single division in which he had the greatest local following, we must make the following analysis:—

Intensity of Local Support within Five Great Divisions where Principal Candidates were most strongly supported.

Division.	Candidate.	— (Defined Effective Votes). Local Votes.	Percentage to	
			Local Div.	State.
Natone	O'Keefe	1,499	31.74	10.35
	Urquhart	978	20.92	6.30
	Keating	949	20.10	20.43
	Moore	405	08.68	5.26
	Clemons	243	5.15	13.69
	All others (10)	647	13.71	43.97
	Total Natone	4,721	100.00	100.00
Paratana	Murray	581	20.34	4.02
	Clemons	478	16.73	13.67
	Best	477	16.70	5.22
	Cameron	420	14.70	7.90
	Keating	271	9.48	20.43
	All others	630	22.05	48.74
	Total Paratana	2,857	100.00	100.00
Mangana	Keating	1,138	30.52	20.43
	Clemons	1,130	30.32	13.69
	Cameron	340	9.12	7.90
	Waldron	237	6.36	4.10
	O'Keefe	216	5.79	10.35
	All others	667	17.89	43.53
	Total Mangana	3,728	100.00	100.00

Intensity of Local Support within Five Great Divisions where Principal Candidates were most strongly supported :

Division.	Candidate.	(Defined effective votes). Local Votes.	Percentage to	
			Local Div.	State.
TALUNE—	Dobson - - - - -	525	24.07	8.52
	Keating - - - - -	396	18.22	20.43
	Macfarlane - - - - -	236	10.86	6.51
	Clemons - - - - -	211	9.71	13.69
	Page - - - - -	149	6.86	2.26
	All others - - - - -	656	30.28	48.59
	Total Talune - - - - -	2,173	100.00	100.00
LOINAH—	Keating - - - - -	878	25.69	20.43
	Macfarlane - - - - -	738	21.59	6.51
	Dobson - - - - -	549	16.06	8.52
	Cameron - - - - -	348	10.18	7.90
	Clemons - - - - -	244	7.14	13.69
	Patterson - - - - -	241	7.05	3.18
	All others - - - - -	420	12.29	39.77
	Total Loinah - - - - -	3,415	100.00	100.00

From the foregoing analysis, showing the strength of the principal candidates within each of five great divisions of the State, we may reasonably infer that the candidates standing at the top each division would be returned for the respective divisions. Keating, though relatively taking inferior position of order to O'Keefe (1,499), heads the list in two separate divisions (Mangana & Loinah); but as it is probable under such conditions that this candidate would only stand Mangana, it would have the effect of allowing Macfarlane to be raised into the first position Loinah.

The position taken up by Clemons by this restriction to one subdivision is very curious and instructive. As this candidate would in all probability stand for Mangana, where it is shown that he had his strongest following, it is likely that he would, as indicated, be defeated Keating. This shows how, by the single-electorate system, a candidate who commanded second highest number of followers in the State, and even the third highest following within single division, would nevertheless be excluded from the poll; while a candidate who only took the eleventh position (Murray) in the single six-member electorate would in all probability be returned for his local division of Paratana, even though his local following (581) is only about half the number of Clemon's following in Mangana (1,130), where, in all probability, the latter would be defeated by the superior following of Keating (1,138).

If we now give precedence among the six single-division successful candidates to those who are shown to have the largest absolute local following, the order would probably be as follows:—

Probable Order of Precedence of Successful Candidates if restricted to a Single Local Division :

Order of Precedence,	Candidate.	No. of Votes.	Percentage to	
			Local Division.	State.
(1)	O'Keefe - - - - -	1,499	31.74	10.35
(2)	Keating - - - - -	1,138	30.52	20.43
(3)	Macfarlane - - - - -	738	21.59	6.51
(4)	Murray - - - - -	581	20.34	4.02
(5)	Dobson - - - - -	525	24.07	8.52
(5)	Clemons (?) - - - - -	—	30.32	13.69
(6)	Cameron (?) - - - - -	—	14.70	7.90

It would therefore appear, apart from the mere order of precedence, that, with one exception, the same candidates would be returned for the Senate by the imaginary six single electorates as were actually returned at the last Senate election under the Clark-Hare system. Seeing that there were fifteen candidates in all, this result is very remarkable, and demonstrates the superiority of the Hare system of voting, or True Proportional Representation.

RESULT OF ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The following table gives a condensed account of the results of the contest of nine candidates to secure one of the five seats in the Commonwealth House of Representatives :—

Effective Preference Votes obtained.

Candidate.	Preference 1. No.	Preference 2, 3, and Over. No.	All Effectives. No.
Braddon - - - - -	4,723	—	4,723
O'Malley - - - - -	3,940	—	3,940
Cameron - - - - -	2,092	1,588	3,680
Fysh - - - - -	1,794	1,364	3,158
Piesse - - - - -	1,818	1,225	3,043
Group A - - - - -	14,367	4,177	18,544
Hartnoll - - - - -	1,430	578	2,008
Whitelaw - - - - -	1,160	358	1,518
Fenton - - - - -	912	131	1,073
Blanchard - - - - -	140	9	149
Group B - - - - -	3,672	1,076	4,748
Total effective - - - - -	18,039	5,253	23,292
Quota - - - - -	3,608		

Per Cental.

—	Order.	Per cent.	Order.	Per cent.	Count.
Braddon - - - - -	1	26.19	1	20.28	1st
O'Malley - - - - -	2	21.84	2	16.92	2nd
Cameron - - - - -	3	11.60	3	15.80	7th
Fysh - - - - -	4	9.75	4	13.56	8th
Piesse - - - - -	5	10.08	5	13.06	8th
Group A - - - - -		79.66		79.62	
Hartnoll - - - - -	6	7.93	6	8.62	6th
Whitelaw - - - - -	7	6.43	7	6.52	5th
Fenton - - - - -	8	5.21	8	4.60	4th
Blanchard - - - - -	9	0.77	9	0.64	3rd
Group B - - - - -		20.34		20.38	
Total effective - - - - -		100.00		100.00	

(A) Indicates group of successful candidates. (B) Indicates group of unsuccessful candidates.

Of the five successful candidates who, on the first count, obtained as much as 79.66 per cent of all effective votes only one candidate represented the element of "new blood" as regards local State representation, viz., O'Malley. The other four successful candidates have all been members of our State Parliament, and three of them were prominent figures in the last Braddon Ministry. Of the four unsuccessful candidates two—Hartnoll and Fenton—are well-known figures in our local State Parliament. Both O'Malley and Whitelaw, prominent representatives of the "new blood," were very strongly supported by the great body of electors connected with our local mining industries.

Of the 23,292 effective votes (that is, including those preference transfers which were effective to some candidates, at least in the earlier stages) nearly the same percentage as in the first count was obtained by the five successful candidates, viz., 79.62 per cent. As showing the non-accidental character of the Hare system, it will again be observed that, as in the elections for the Senate, the order of preference of the various candidates was not at all disturbed by the transfer of the second, third, and higher preference transfer votes.

As to the possible difference which might have occurred had the State been divided into five single electoral districts, each returning one member, a similar analysis as in that relating to the Senate elections has been made with the following final probable results :—

(0.13.)

Probable Results if the same Candidates Contested for One out of the Five House of Representatives Seats in that One of the Five Districts in which the Particular Candidate had the Greatest Following.

The following are in all probability the candidates that would be elected by this localisation together with the probable strength of their following, and the order of their preference generally:—

Candidate.	Following No.	Preference Order. No.	District.	Percentage.	
				1-Member.	6-Member.
O'Malley - - -	2,402	1	Natone - - -	51·67	21·84
Braddon - - -	1,424	2	Paratana - - -	49·91	26·19
Piesse - - -	841	3	Loinah - - -	22·98	10·08
Hartnoll - - -	652	4	Mangana - - -	17·32	7·93
Cameron - - -	374	5 (?)	Talune - - -	{ 19·63	{ 11·68
Fysh - - -	316	5 (?)		{ 22·49	{ 9·95

From this analysis it will be seen that the only defeated candidate under the six-member system who would probably be returned under the one-member system would be Hartnoll while the fifth seat would lie between Cameron and Fysh.

It must be shown, however, that Hartnoll would only be placed third for Mangana. Braddon and O'Malley contested, for, in the order of names, the latter gained the first and second positions. Similarly for Talune, it is probable that neither Cameron nor Fysh would have been elected by the one-member system if Braddon and Piesse had contested it with them, for it has been found that, in the order of their names, the latter would have gained the first and second positions.

These wonderfully close results by the two different systems of election demonstrate the great advantages and the almost complete freedom from the element of chance secured under the Clark-Hare system of election.

INVALID BALLOT-PAPERS.

SENATE ELECTIONS.

The total number of ballot-papers polled for the election of Senators numbered 18,822; 18,403 were declared valid and 419 were declared invalid. The following gives a more complete analysis of the invalid papers:—

	No.	Per cent.
Defective preference numbering - - - - -	268	1·42
Unrecognisable figures - - - - -	3	·02
Total due to Hare system - - - - -	271	1·44
Illegal marking or scoring - - - - -	104	·55
Adding signature - - - - -	4	·02
Disfigured or blank papers - - - - -	40	·21
Defects not due to Hare system - - - - -	148	·79
Total invalid papers, Senate - - - - -	419	2·23

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The total number of ballot-papers polled for the election of Members for the House of Representatives numbered 18,572, of which 18,039 were declared valid and 533 were declared invalid. The following is a more complete analysis of the invalid papers:—

	No.	Per cent.
Defective preference numbering - - - - -	329	1·77
Unrecognisable figures - - - - -	6	·03
Total due to Hare system - - - - -	335	1·80
Illegal marking or scoring - - - - -	110	·60
Adding signature - - - - -	6	·03
Disfigured or blank papers - - - - -	82	·44
Defects not due to Hare system - - - - -	198	1·07
Total invalid papers, House of Representatives - - - - -	533	2·87

From the foregoing analysis of the "Invalid" papers it will be seen, as regards the Senate, that the total number of invalid papers (419) represents 2·23 per cent. of the total number of ballot-papers polled. The number due to Hare system alone (271) only represents 1·44 per cent.

The latter number, however, would have been much less had it not been that the old defective system previously in force in Tasmania required the actual scoring out of every rejected candidate, instead of as in most countries the marking of a cross or sign only against the names of those candidates who were selected. Had this better form of marking been in practice in Tasmania previous to the introduction of the Hare system of voting, it is probable that there would be very few invalid papers due to the Hare system of marking with preference numbers.

As regards the elections for the House of Representatives it will also be seen that the total number of invalid papers (533) represents 2·87 per cent. of the total number of ballot-papers polled. The number due to the Hare system alone (335) only represents 1·80 per cent.

Of the 419 invalid papers (Senate) only 108 can be traced to their first preference; 69 were lost to successful candidates and 39 were lost to unsuccessful candidates.

Of the 533 invalid papers (House of Representatives) only 140 can be traced to their first preference; 103 were lost to successful candidates and 37 were lost to unsuccessful candidates.

The preceding part of this brief report gives a very complete account of the working of the Clark-Hare system of voting in Tasmania, so far as it relates to the elections for the last Commonwealth Senate and House of Representatives.

In this paper there are some recommendations made of some importance regarding improvements that might in the future be introduced in—

THE WORK OF COUNTING AND DETERMINING THE RESULTS OF THE POLL.

Towards this end Mr. Johnston, among other things, makes the following observations:—

The work of counting and determining the results of the poll within, say, an hour of its close, might be accomplished with ease and accuracy if the following plan were adopted:—1st. Set a room apart for the counting staff—properly safeguarded as regards privacy and scrutiny—adjacent to the chief polling room; and let the work of sorting, counting, and distributing ballot-papers be carried on simultaneously with the work of polling.

2nd. Depute the duty of transmitting, in due order from time to time, the various ballot-boxes to counting-room to a particular officer, who shall see that the contents are discharged upon the first sorting-table by the Superintendent of the counting-room, who alone possesses the power to unlock the boxes. A spare box should be always available in the polling-room to take the place of the box during its transmission and return from counting-room.

3rd. Let the chief returning officer periodically examine and finally determine all doubtful and invalid papers set apart for his decision.

J. G. DAVIES,
Returning Officer, Tasmania.

R. M. JOHNSTON,
Statistician of Tasmania.

APPENDIX B.

1898.—VICTORIA.

HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

THE HARE SYSTEM IN TASMANIA—being a Paper read before the Royal Society of Tasmania
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The fate of the Hare system constitutes one of the most remarkable incidents in the history of representative government. Mr. Hare's treatise, "The Election of Representatives," was published in 1859. It claimed to have discovered a remedy for some of the most serious of the evils to which Democracy is subject, and almost immediately received an attention not unworthy of the capacity of the writer and the magnitude of the problems discussed. In 1860 the celebrated Henry Fawcett was responsible for the publication, "Mr. Hare's Reform Bill Simplified and Explained." In the following year there appeared the "Representative Government" of John Stuart Mill. The latest advocate spoke in no uncertain tone:—"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends, of scarcely inferior importance. . . . Such and so numerous are its advantages that they place it among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government." Such commendation where it failed to invoke the enthusiasm of the reformer, should at least have aroused the interest of the citizen. No champion came forward to defend the older system; many of the evils which the new was designed to remedy were becoming increasingly grave. If we attach to such circumstances the importance they deserve, the issue must appear surprising. Thirty-five years after the publication of Mill's treatise, when the Hon. A. I. Clark, Attorney-General of Tasmania, introduced a Bill to apply the Hare system to city constituencies, he could appeal to no precedent in the Parliamentary experience of English-speaking peoples!

Weighed in the balance and found wanting! The conclusion seems irresistible, but it is not supported by facts. Neither experience nor argument has condemned the Hare system. To what circumstances, then, may we attribute its ill-fortune? Not to the objections which have been urged for these are more frequently afterthought which justify an argument founded in prejudice. Even where they are serious they are not unanswerable. The solution of the mystery is rather to be found in two facts, of which one is a weakness of human nature, and the other a satire on party government. In the first place, the plan of Mr. Hare suggests innovation. In the second place, it is one of those innovations which share the fate of the inconstant lover; by affecting all parties it secures the allegiance of none. It might be added as a third explanation that the most serious of the evils it claims to correct are only beginning to receive adequate recognition. Each of these facts would admit of illustration and proof. But it is not so much the object of this paper to attack or to defend the Hare system, as to give an exposition of its application to this colony. The Bill of 1896 has become law, and it includes several important modifications upon the proposals of Mr. Hare which should be of more than local interest. Before attempting their consideration, it may be well to indulge the curiosity of the uninitiated by a statement of the merits which have been claimed for the system whose defects the Tasmanian modifications are designed to remedy.

The determination of constituencies by reference to geographical considerations is at once the great aversion of Mr. Hare and the most conspicuous trait of the usual system. In substitution, he proposes the determination of constituencies by voluntary association. The tie by local contiguity is to be superseded by the bond of kinship—kinship not of blood but of ideas. The great law of progress, defined by Maine as from status to contract, already abundantly illustrated in the sphere of private law, is to find a new illustration in the domain of *Jus Publicum*. Every constituency is to be a partnership "in which there are to be no sleeping partners, much less partners repudiating and protesting against the acts of the rest and yet unable to extricate themselves. . . . Full scope will be given to every generous sentiment by which men may be drawn together. Devotion to a great principle, regard for an illustrious name, affection for an ancient house, admiration of worthy deeds, attachment to a particular neighbourhood, love of country or of class, community of feeling, harmony of taste, may all form so many occasions of concord, and create innumerable circles, binding together in society all varieties of rank and

station."* But how is this unanimity to be attained? If the electors are left to their own devices attempts at the formation of voluntary constituencies may end in a Parliament of party leaders. To avoid such a contingency it is necessary to establish a quota by dividing the number of voters by the number of seats. Whoever obtains the quota is elected, and any excess vote recorded in his favour is given to the next preference of the voter. This simple plan of transferring the vote is also followed in cases where the candidate at the head of the list has no apparent chance of election. As nothing is to be gained by transferring a vote to a candidate who is already elected, or excluded, next preference must be understood to mean, invariably, next available preference. Such refinements need not perplex the elector, who is only required to express his preference by placing the numbers 1, 2, 3, &c., opposite the names of favoured candidates.

However we may differ in estimating the importance of the fact, it must be admitted that such a system secures equity of representation. The legislature represents the opinion of the country, with an approach to ideal fidelity; its members are the representatives of the people—not of the chance majorities of arbitrarily formed electorates. It is not easy to doubt the fairness of such an arrangement. "The electors are the dispersed inhabitants of an extensive and populous kingdom, possessing knowledge and powers of thought infinitely varied and diffused; and to expect that the electoral forms of a rude and illiterate age will gather for the national benefit the fruit of this expanded intelligence, is as reasonable as to suppose that the vast manufacturing results of to-day could be produced by the primitive loom and the hammer. To succeed in this work it is indispensable that every elector should have the widest field of choice and the most extensive sphere for co-operation." Thus Mr. Hare. The unfairness of the present system in England has been sufficiently established in the publications of Sir John Lubbock. In 1886, the actual voting strength in the constituencies was—Unionists, 349; Home Rulers, 320; the actual voting strength in the House of Commons was—Unionists, 394; Home Rulers, 275. The majority, which should have been 29, was 119. Again, in 1895, the Conservative-Unionist majority should have been 72 instead of 152. The injustice is more glaring where a minority of the electors return a majority of the representatives. This may happen without the aid of the mystical gerrymander. In the Canton Ticino the more numerous party, as a result of its concentration in particular districts, found itself in a minority in the Representative Chamber. It is a significant circumstance that a Reform was only secured by a Revolution.

Apart from the general question of fairness, equity of representation means representation of minorities. It would seem almost superfluous to insist upon the importance of this fact. The national welfare demands the possibility of sustained conflict. If we would have the wise rule of the strong, we must provide for the sustained opposition of the weak. Should victory put an end to strife, the days of good government are numbered. For what can we hope in an age of Democracy, if the tendency of political life is toward the extinction of minorities? Yet the reality of this tendency must appear indisputable. The organisation of labour is incomplete, but it will not always remain so. When the transitional stage is past, what can prevent the labour vote from carrying the election in every constituency? Yet it would be an unhappy day for the people when education and intelligence were excluded from a just share in the representation of the country; or when the infinitely varied character of the national life found no correspondence in the National Parliament. No one claims that the minority should rule; but it must be heard. Ultimately, all questions must be decided according to the wisdom of the Parliamentary majority; but the decision should be made under conditions which insure an adequate expression to the opinion of the minority. Light is the best policeman within as well as beyond the precincts of our Legislatures. It must never be forgotten that the dilemma of the future is not whether the few or the many shall rule, but whether the sway of the majority shall be absolute or qualified.

Equity of representation constitutes but the first of those merits, which a disinterested advocacy may claim for the Hare system. The judgment of the impartial, as well as the expectations of the sanguine, may well indulge the hope of a deeper and more general interest in the politics of the country. There are few who will question the reality or the extent of the evil of popular indifference, the fatal results which must follow from voting without reflection, judgment without deliberation, or, worst of all, from that spirit which attempts to justify or excuse a selfish isolation. Does the scheme of Mr. Hare hold out a reasonable hope of remedying such evils? I believe it does. The virtual disfranchisement of the minority in each constituency is a most conspicuous evil of the present system, and one which must too frequently condone the indifference of the elector. When the stronger party is well organised, the disfranchisement of the weaker party acquires a prospect of disagreeable permanency. Under the Hare method of voting the extinction of the minority ceases. Every elector must have a representative in Parliament. No longer need he console himself with the hope, often faint and illusory, that unfair losses in some constituencies will be compensated by unfair gains in others. Such a consideration suggests a fact of great importance. If equity of representation strengthen the interest of the elector where he is weak, must it not affect him where he is strong? By the zeal of the minority we may judge the energy and often the prudence of the majority. But it is not from the stimulus of a constant rivalry alone, that we may venture to predict a new and deeper interest in political questions. At a recent election in this colony two questions excited the interest and divided the allegiance of the electors—Tattersall's and the Income Tax. Electors often refused to vote rather than return a candidate who, though he represented their views on the Income Tax, regarded with complacency the revenue derived from Tattersall's. This is an evil of the system, not a vice in the voter; and it is equally common and pernicious. Under the Hare scheme the electors can plead no such excuse for inaction. The choice is sufficiently liberal to gratify the most fastidious taste. While human nature remains unaltered, there remains a third reason for connecting the proposed method of

* Hare: "Representative Government," pp. 38-9.

voting and a deepening of political interest. I allude to the circumstance that the classification of a number of candidates in an order of merit affords some occasion for the display of a useful vote. The elaborate discussions which took place in this colony at an election just held under the present system, suggest a study no less suggestive to the thoughtful than engaging to the curious. The arguments were not always distinguished by exceptional intelligence or an exceptional integrity, but the interest was phenomenal. "Who should be first? Who second?" &c. He is not a friend to liberty who does not place a high value upon such discussions.

Mr. Hare claimed for his system that it would lessen the evils, if not remove the causes of political corruption. The arguments by which this claim is supported are not always convincing, but they are invariably respectable, and in one case conclusive. When it is open to no other effect a sale of his constituency by turning the scale at an election, the obstacles to bribery may be materially increased. For this reason as well as for others which have already engaged the attention, one may indulge the hope of a more virtuous Legislature. The hope becomes stronger when reflection has weighed those independent grounds by which it is justified. The unrestrained freedom of choice favours the nomination of intelligence and probity. Parties anxious to retain the confidence of the country must bind the allegiance of their followers by the nomination of the acceptable—the wise, the good, or at least the strong. But the freedom of choice affects the character of the Legislature in a manner more direct and more effective; it fosters a spirit of independence, since a candidate can spurn a dishonest compliance when he relies upon the election of a colony. No longer compelled to humour the several sections of a single constituency, he is freed from a disagreeable dilemma—so common and so demoralising! Avoiding alike the mean subterfuge and the fatal avowal, he relies for support upon the diversity of his electorate. In these respects, a comparison of the Hare system and the referendum suggest a fact of some importance. The referendum is the natural resource of a people perplexed by the domination of a corrupt and unrepresentative Legislature. But the reference to the popular vote implies a diminution of Parliamentary responsibility, and may, therefore, aggravate those evils whose effects it is designed to correct. The Hare system seeks, by improving the character of the Legislature, to remove the causes of the evil.

This seems the proper place to consider the argument of Bagehot that the Hare system is inconsistent with the independence of Parliament; that a voluntary constituency would be a Chamber with tenets, and would, therefore, reserve the despotism in its own hands. This argument is losing whatever importance might once have attached to it. The difference between the candidate elected under the Hare system and one elected under the usual system, is not that the latter is more independent, but that the former is bound to a constituency whose general sentiments he represents and not to one whose general sentiments he represents in part but must respect *in toto*.

I have spoken of the merits of an equality of representation; of a new and deeper interest in political life; of politics made purer and of a Parliament made more worthy. At this stage it might seem proper to attempt a systematic consideration of the objections which have engaged the attention of Constitutional writers. Such objections, however, may more conveniently be discussed in connexion with the modifications adopted in this colony for the purpose of weakening, if not destroying, their force. It will be seen that a compromise has not always been effected without some diminution of the merits of Mr. Hare's scheme. But I think in each case there is a great and obvious gain. Of the modifications to which allusion is made, the first has been generally associated in this colony with the name of Sir John Lubbock. It must be regarded as a complete answer to the objection, so commonly urged and so difficult to impugn, that the Hare system is too complicated to be practicable. The student of Mr. Hare's treatise is often tempted to regard the task of the Returning Officer as beyond the reach of mortals. In the application of the method to a whole country it is difficult to see how the formation of voluntary constituencies could be effected without incurring all the evils of a constituency-making trade. In the Tasmanian Bill the method has been confined to city constituencies. These return six or four members. Though these constituencies might be larger with advantage, the present arrangement has one very obvious merit; the argument from complexity only remains as the frail support of those whose prejudice or whose indifference, has rendered them impervious to reason. The simplicity both of the process of voting and of the general principle of the Act, is clearly shown by the following instructions suggested by Miss Spence, of South Australia:—

1. There are here twelve candidates, six to be elected.
2. Vote by numbering candidates in the order of your choice, that is to say:—Place 1 to the left of the candidate you like best. Place 2 to the left of the name of the candidate you like second best. Place 3 to the left of the name of the candidate you like next best, and so on.
3. Vote for not less than three names.
4. The same number must not be placed against more than one name.
5. The numbers must be placed opposite the names.

NOTE.—Your vote will be used for one candidate according to your preference. If the candidate you like most, either (a) Does not need your vote (has enough votes to elect him without your vote), or (b) cannot use your vote (has so few votes that he cannot possibly be selected), your vote will be transferred to the candidate you like next best, as shown by your numbers, and used not wasted.

The work of the Returning Officer, while less simple than that of the elector, demands no exceptional qualifications. He need display the intelligence of a clerk—scarcely more.

The limitation of the Hare system to districts returning a small number of members has the additional merit of removing objections based on an alleged encouragement of faddism. It is difficult to believe that sincerely Democratic principles can sanction the exclusion of electors from representation, simply because they have the misfortune to advocate opinions which the great majority regard with aversion. Yet the cause of proportional representation has often suffered on this account. Whatever importance must be attached to the objection, it ceases to apply to that modification of the Hare system which has been adopted in this colony. In a constituency returning only six members, the electors who are strong enough to secure a representative may claim to be exempt from the imputation of singularity. The minorities which the Act encourages must always be respectable. If it is further objected that the necessity for constant compromise destroys the consistency of party government, even where only respectable minorities are represented, the retort is simple. Compromise is equally necessary under both systems; under the old, it is effected at the hustings, in all the excitement and turmoil of an election; under the new, it is effected in the relatively calm and judicial atmosphere of the Legislature.

A perusal of the instructions already mentioned suggests a further peculiarity. The industry of the elector must be equal to the task of voting for three candidates. The limit may be raised when experience of the system forbids the excuse of novelty. The elector whose capacity or whose interest is taxed by the nomination of three candidates, fails to influence the election if those for whom he votes have a quota without his assistance; or, indeed, if their need be so extreme that his assistance is unavailing. The elector who pleads a fastidious taste as an excuse for a limited selection, must remember that it is possible to classify candidates in an order of aversion as well as in an order of preference. An entirely different line of argument was taken by one opponent of the Bill, a gentleman of much zeal and some originality. "Compel an elector to vote for three candidates and it will often end in his choosing, as second and third preferences, candidates who cannot be raised up as rivals to his first preference. This must prove fatal to the success of the Act." The statement is only quoted as illustrating the character of the opposition to which the Bill was occasionally subjected. It would be difficult to suggest a more felicitous example of unreasoning aversion. Second and third preferences can never be employed for the purposes of defeating first preferences; until the fate of the latter has been determined, no reference to the former is permissible.

The distribution of the surplus votes is a subject of great importance, and one which remains for consideration. The method adopted in the Tasmanian Bill constitutes its chief claim to the consideration of Home and foreign statesmen. One may only judge of the value of the means which have been employed by appreciating the difficulties which have been overcome. If a candidate obtain 2,000 votes when the quota is fixed at 1,000, 1,000 ballot-papers are available for distribution among the candidates whose names are marked 2. The result of the distribution varies according to the principle which determines the appropriation of the papers of the favoured candidate. If an analysis of second preferences yield 1,000 for Y and a like number for Z, it would be within the power of the Returning Officer to effect the election of whichever candidate he preferred. This element of chance has been declared the only really formidable obstacle to the practical application of Mr. Hare's system.* How has the obstacle been overcome in the Tasmanian Act? Mr. Clark has suggested a plan, at once so simple and so just, that the fact of its novelty must appear incredible. X has a surplus; how is it to be distributed? Not indiscriminately, nor according to the caprice of the Returning Officer; but in a proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the whole of X's papers; or, as was at first suggested, on the whole of the electorate. For the purposes of this calculation, a candidate marked 3 is credited with a second vote if the candidate marked 2 had obtained his quota before the distribution in question had been commenced. In the case already suggested, of the 1,000 excess votes, Y and Z alike secure 500. In one respect the plan involves a slight departure from the scheme of Mr. Hare, who proposed to confine the influence of the elector to a single transferable vote.

In the case already suggested, X's constituents not only return their chosen candidate, but also have a voice in the distribution of his surplus votes. Such a voice might almost be described as the fraction of a vote. While it is difficult to see any serious objection to this departure, its merit is clear. The element of chance ceases to exist.

So far we have only considered the case of a surplus arising from the first count, and, therefore, without the aid of votes transferred from other candidates. After every surplus of this kind has been distributed, it may be found that fresh surpluses have been created. How are these to be distributed? We have supposed a case in which, as a result of the distribution of X's surplus, 500 voting papers go to Y. If Y only requires 400 to complete his quota, what is to be done with the excess? Is the Returning Officer to take the 100 papers on the top of Y's lot and distribute them according to third preferences? This would leave too much to chance, or to the discretion of the Returning Officer. In pursuance of a principle already illustrated, the Act requires the distribution of the 100 excess votes in a proportion determined by reference to third preferences on the whole 500 papers taken from the box of X.

If, as the result of the foregoing counts, an insufficient number of candidates have obtained a quota, the candidate who has secured the lowest number of votes is excluded from the poll; and his ballot-papers are then transferred to the candidates whom the electors have chosen in substitution. Whenever the next preference of the voter is a candidate already elected, the name is cancelled and the papers are passed on to a later preference. If any candidate gain a surplus as a

* "Essays and Lectures," H. and M. G. Fawcett, 1872.

result of this distribution, it is to be redistributed in a proportion determined by reference to the next preferences on the whole of the ballot-papers previously transferred to him. The process of elimination, occasionally alternated with the distribution of a surplus, is continued until the number of candidates does not exceed the number of vacancies.

The principles underlying the Tasmanian Electoral Act have been explained with striking brevity. The courtesy of my audience may excuse, if their curiosity does not solicit, an account of the election held under its provisions. It will be sufficient to speak of the district of Hobart. Consistently with the anticipations of the Legislature, the occasion was honoured by a display of interest equally remarkable for its diffusion and for its intensity. For ten hours the crowd besieged the approaches to the polling booth. The proceedings were enlivened by the usual humours of election day, such phrases as "Rabid on the Hare System," suggested alluring opportunities of distinction, requiring little intelligence in the wit and less in the auditors. The mode of distributing the surplus afforded endless occasion for discussion and misunderstanding, and for humour which, as it was unconscious, we may perhaps impute to genius. "It all comes to the same," said one elector, "when Clark has all the votes he needs, any other vote for him goes to the next man on the list who needs it most." One dialogue deserved to be specially recorded. "The practical common-sense men tell me the old system is the best." "But I expect the practical common-sense men of whom you speak do not understand the Hare system." "That's so; they said as much; but still they are practical common-sense men, and that is sufficient for me." Such remarks illustrate, with admirable felicity, the character of the most serious opposition which the advocate of the Hare system must encounter. They further illustrate the folly of efforts to instruct the electors in the minutiae of a Bill with whose general principles they are unfamiliar. As Mr. Hare remarked in his treatise, a passenger is satisfied to travel by the express though ignorant of the details of the steam-engine. The justice of the parallel is admirable, and it is a matter for regret that more attention has not been paid to it in the politics of this colony. Instead of instruction in the broad principles of proportional representation, its general fairness and distinctive merits, the elector has been perplexed by the processes involved in the distribution of a surplus. For this reason, among others, the list of informal votes was large. Even the prophets fell; a candidate for parliamentary honours, deeply versed in the lore of proportional distribution, rendered his vote informal by scoring out the names of opposing candidates—the method formerly adopted. His success at the election may be taken to prove the indulgence of fate.

At 6.30 p.m., soon after the prescribed time for closing the poll, the process of counting the votes began. The ballot-boxes were brought to the Returning Officer, the ballot-papers were removed, unfolded, and taken to the scrutineers, who began to sort them for the first count. Attached to each of the scrutineers' tables there was a box with several compartments—one for each candidate, one for doubtful, and one for invalid papers. The work of the scrutineers consisted in taking the papers one by one, and calling out the names of the candidates marked 1, and placing them in the compartments appropriated to the respective candidates. Two clerks registered the votes on their recording sheets. Finally, these recording sheets were tabulated and handed to Mr. Johnston, the Government Statistician, and presiding genius of the election. When the various numbers had been totalled, the result of the first or primary votes became known. The totals of Mr. Johnston were checked by the Returning Officer, who had previously settled the destination of doubtful papers. It was found that the total number of valid votes were 2,745. As there were six seats, the quota was fixed at 457. Only one of the candidates (Sir Phillip Fysh) obtained a quota as the result of the first count. As the primary votes of this candidate amounted to 501, there was a surplus of 44 for distribution among remaining candidates. After the whole 501 ballot-papers had been given to the scrutineers for the purpose of estimating second preferences, it was found that Bradley claimed 41, Clark 304, Cox 2, Crisp 38, Dillon 9, Fulton 1, Hiddlestone 30, Mulcahy 42, Page 19, Paton 4, and St. Hill 10. A sum in simple proportion followed. If Bradley is entitled to 41 votes out of 501, to how many is he entitled out of a surplus of 44?

$\frac{44 \times 41}{501} = 3\frac{1}{2}$ or, getting rid of the fraction, 4. The Returning Officer had then to take from Fysh's

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box any four ballot-papers on which Bradley was marked 2, and to place them in Bradley's box. In this manner, by the aid of Fuller's spiral slide rule, the whole surplus of 44 votes was instantly distributed among the unelected candidates. This completed the second count. Had any candidate secured a surplus as the result of this count, that surplus must have been distributed in a proportion determined by reference to the third votes on the whole of the ballot-papers he had received from Sir Phillip Fysh. As a matter of fact, no additional candidate had received a quota, and it remained to begin the process of excluding lowest candidates. The first victim was Mr. Cox, whose 23 votes were now distributed among second preferences except where Sir Philip Fysh was second, in which case it went to the third preference. No candidate gained a surplus as a result of this count, Mr. Fulton, who was lowest on the poll at this stage, was then excluded, and his 122 papers were distributed among the candidates whose fate yet remained uncertain. The result of this distribution was to raise Mr. Bradley's total to 483. As this involved a surplus of 26, that surplus had to be distributed in a proportion determined by reference to the next preferences on the whole votes transferred to Bradley from other candidates, i.e., from Fysh, Cox, or Fulton. The process of elimination, alternated with the occasional distribution of a surplus, was continued until only six candidates remained. These were then declared elected. It will be seen from the accompanying table that only four were successful in obtaining a quota.

HOBART ELECTION.

ANALYSIS OF VOTING.

Count.	Total Votes Distributed.	Bradley.	Clark.	Cox.	Crisp.	Dillon.	Fulton.	Fysh.	Hiddlestone.	Mulcahy.	Page.	Paton.	St. Hill.	Exhausted Paton.	Particulars of Distribution.
1st	2,746	448	393	34	202	143	118	501 Elected	137	264	235	140	131	—	First count.
2nd	44	4	27	—	3	1	—	(-44)	2	4	2	—	1	—	Fysh's surplus.
3rd	34	3	5	(-34)	18	2	4	•	1	1	2	—	2	—	Lowest out (Cox).
4th	132	28	13	Out	12	10	Out	•	11	13	10	12	3	—	Next lowest out (Fulton).
5th	27	483 Elected -26	4	—	4	2	—	•	3	2	2	7	3	—	Bradley's surplus.
6th	145	•	29	—	16	18	—	•	15	21	14	21 (-145)	16	—	Lowest out (St. Hill).
7th	19	•	476 Elected -19	—	5	—	—	•	2	2	2	1	Out	7	Clark's surplus.
8th	171	•	•	—	53	6	—	•	(-171) Out	82	18	8	—	4	Lowest out (Hiddlestone).
9th	177	•	•	—	36	(-177)	—	•	—	51	23	32	—	30	Next lowest out (Dillon).
10th	221	•	•	—	23	—	—	•	—	53	24	(-221) Out	—	121	Next lowest out (Paton).
11th	36	•	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	498 Elected-36	2	—	—	23	Mulcahy's surplus.
Total	2,742	453 Elected	476 Elected	34 Out	272 Elected	177 Out	122 Out	501 Elected	171 Out	498 Elected	211 Elected	221 Out	145 Out	206	—

* Obtained quota.

It will be interesting to compare with the following a table, for the compilation of which I am indebted to the courtesy of the Government Statistician. The table shows how different would have been the result if the cumulative method had been adopted.

Candidate.	Preference 1.	Preference 2.	Preference 3.	Cumulative Results of Preferences.	
				One and Two.	One, Two, and Three.
	No.	No.	No.		
Clark*†	393	592‡	401‡	985‡	1,386‡
Fysh*†	501‡	427	314	928	1,242
Bradley*†	448	344	321	792	1,113
Mulcahy*†	264	231	396	495	891
Crisp*	202	218	270	420	690
Hiddlestone	137	251	269	388	657
Page*	235	167	169	402	571
Dillon	143	158	156	301	457
St. Hill	131	101	149	232	381
Fulton	118	121	130	239	369
Paton	140	90	129	230	359
Cox	34	46	42	80	122
All { Gross total	2,746	2,746	2,746	5,492	8,238
{ Legally effective	2,746	724	66	3,470	3,566

Quota—457.

The result of the election failed to give universal satisfaction. Rejected candidates found some consolation in unsparing criticism. On the part of some electors, whose candidate owed to the system the fact of his election, there was an ignoble disavowal of indebtedness. Still the results were very generally regarded with approval. There were few electors so unfortunate as to see all their preferences rejected; where such a failure occurred, the fault rested with the elector in not voting for more candidates. On a future occasion electors will probably remember this; if they soon exhaust their preferences, they have only to continue the classification on the principle of least dislike. Nor does the number of "exhaust papers" offer occasion for serious criticism. In many cases such papers were useless because candidates whose names they bore were elected without their assistance. The number of informal votes was sufficiently large to excite the hostility of the censorious; yet it was not larger than is usual on the occasion of a change in the mode of voting; indeed, the percentage was much lower than at the recent elections for the Federal Convention. In the City of Hobart the informal votes amounted to 105; 52 had been guilty of extra marking, especially of scoring out the names of rejected candidates; 20 had marked each of their chosen candidates 1, instead of 1, 2, 3, &c.; 16 had failed to mark at least three candidates, 4 had omitted to observe a proper sequence in their numbers; 3 had written the figures between

* Elected. † Obtained quota. ‡ Highest in order of general favour.

the names; 3 were illegible; 2 had contributed their signatures; 2 had marked all their candidates 2 instead of 1, 2, 3, &c.; 1 had given his numbers in writing; and 1 had scrawled over the whole of his paper, apparently to express an abhorrence of the system.

If we regard the Act as a whole, I am not aware that experience has exposed its defects. Whatever objections a captious criticism may discover, there is, perhaps, but one which requires serious attention. If X receives 2,000 primary votes, and the quota be 1,000, the resulting surplus is distributed in a proportion determined by reference to secondary preferences on the whole of X's 2,000 votes. Under such a mode of distribution nothing is left to chance or to the discretion of the Returning Officer. But let us go a step further—let us suppose that Y has 800 primary votes and that he receives 600 from X's surplus. In that case he obtains his quota and 400 excess votes. How are these excess votes to be distributed? Several modes suggest themselves. The Returning Officer may take the 400 ballot-papers from the top of Y's box and pass them on to next preferences; he may do this after having first shuffled the whole of Y's papers; or, again, he may exercise his own sweet will upon them. The objection to each of these courses is clear. But if the surplus of 400 is to be distributed according to a proportion, by reference to what ballot-papers is the proportion to be determined? The Act, apparently with the intention of simplifying the work of the Returning Officer, answers "By reference to the 600 papers transferred from X to Y." It will be at once seen that this introduces the element of chance. We know that if Y gained 600 of X's surplus of 1,000, he must have been marked 2 on 6-10ths of X's total number of primary votes. $2,000 \times 6-10 = 1,200$. The actual 600 papers transferred from X to Y were to be chosen at random from the whole of the 1,200 papers on which Y was marked 2. The proportion among the third votes of one chance selection from this 1,200 might be very different from the proportion among the third votes of another chance selection. If the Returning Officer choose "to take a hand," the variations may be increased. All such objections may be avoided by distributing Y's surplus of 400 in a proportion determined by reference to the whole of the 1,200 papers, i.e., the whole of the X Y papers. It might save time if the Returning Officer, in transferring the 600 papers which constituted Y's share of X's surplus, were to preserve the same proportion of third votes on transferred papers, as existed on the whole 1,200 X Y papers. In the distribution of Y's surplus of 400 it would then be sufficient to make a calculation on the basis of the papers transferred from X to Y. It may be interesting to note that the distribution of Y's surplus might also be determined by reference (1) to the third votes on the whole of X's original papers; (2) to the third votes on the total number of X's original papers taken together with the second votes on the total number of Y's original papers; (3) to the third votes of the whole electorate. The evils of complexity form an answer to the arguments by which these alternatives can be supported. Any proposal to effect a distribution by reference to third votes on the whole electorate is open to an additional objection; it would give an undue influence to electors voting according to prescribed ticket. The objection would apply with peculiar force to any proposal to distribute surpluses arising as a result of the first count in a proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the whole electorate.

In conclusion, I crave your indulgence, while directing your attention to the dreaded reproach of innovation. Professor Freeman has observed how often these great reforms, which mark the progress of our race, have involved a return to the traditions, institutions or ideas of an earlier time. The barons who wrung from a reluctant monarch the Great Charter of our liberties, only sought to record and to secure the acknowledged birthrights of Englishmen. The Parliament of De Montfort was a device for restoring the freedom of the Teuton. For the primitive assembly of the tribe there was substituted the Representative Parliament of a nation; for appearance in person the new conditions required an appearance through chosen deputies. Yet the great principle of the right of the people to share in the work of government underlay both institutions. Thus it happened that the privileges which English forefathers had enjoyed in the forest of ancient Germany, but which had been sacrificed in the process of migration and national consolidation, were to be regained in the great and painful crises of a later century.

If we consider the characteristics of the Hare system in connection with the Parliament of the thirteenth century, I believe we shall arrive at a startling conclusion. Mr. Hare sought to introduce an organic element into our system of representation. The new constituencies were designed to be united by allegiance to one object, to be animated by one spirit. I believe that here again in the history of our race we may discover, under the semblance of innovation, the reality of an ancient practice. This is no place to justify such a generalisation by an inadequate induction from the facts of mediæval history. Yet the interest and the importance of the inquiry may justify an illustration of its meaning. In the first place, the mediæval Parliament represented the estates of the realm—the Clergy, the Baronage, and the Commons. These were not arbitrary divisions of the State, but organic parts of the nation. The means by which they acquired the reality and the consciousness of internal cohesion, form one of the most engrossing chapters in the national annals. The facts of history lend no encouragement to the suggestion of a residuary class in the estate of the Commons. The third estate represented the alliance of the communities of the shires with the communities of the towns, and was the result of many causes, among which we may distinguish the appreciations of common dangers, the inducements of royal policy, and the similarity of the processes employed in the exercise of political rights.

Starting from the established fact that the mediæval Parliament was an assemblage of estates, we have yet to inquire the character of the constituencies of the third estate. Were they, too, organic? I confess I see no answer to this question but the affirmative. The representatives of the Commons were the deputies of the shires and the towns. Each shire was a unit of the nation bound together by its common court, its common judicial and administrative organisation. The county was an organised body of men—a *communitas*—almost a kingdom in miniature. If we

turn to the towns of the middle ages, despite the infinite variety of their customs, the reality of their organic character seems indisputable. Nor should we be altogether unprepared for this conclusion. When we remember that they were compelled to struggle for their charters, their liberties, and often for their existence, against the attacks of neighbouring barons and the tyranny of a ubiquitous monarch; that, as yet, the centralising influences of the railway and the press were unknown; that, as yet, geographical constituencies were not divided into hostile camps by the contests of national parties—when we remember these facts, we are prepared to find in the town of the middle ages a community of life, thought, and feeling, unattainable under the complex conditions of modern society. Nor are we disappointed. The superiority of the old over the new in this respect is well expressed in the writings of a brilliant essayist. Each town, writes Frederick Harrison, had its own patron saint, its own special church, and its own feudal patron, its corporate life, its own privileges, traditions, and emblems. On the other hand, the modern city is almost bereft of any religious, patriotic, or artistic character as a whole. There is much public spirit—in certain parts, a love of beauty, taste, and cultivation of a special kind. But it is not embodied in the city; it is not associated with the city; it does not radiate from the city. A typical industrial city of modern times has no founder, no traditional heroes, no patrons or saints, no emblem, no history, no definite circuit. It is ever changing, loose in organisation, casual in form.*

If we attach any importance to the foregoing facts, it must affect our attitude towards the reproach of innovation. Our methods may be new, but the idea is ancient. It is no longer possible to combine the organic principle with the geographical constituency. Which are we to retain? Ordinary usage answers this question in one way, and Mr. Hare in another. I believe there are few more important questions of to-day than this, and that few deserve a more immediate attention on the part of statesmen and thinkers.

* "The Meaning of History," p. 250. In the Model Parliament of 1295, there were 74 Knights representing the Shires and 232 Citizens and Burgesses representing the Towns.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE WORKING RESULTS OF THE HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA.

By R. M. JOHNSTON, F.L.S.

The Chief Merit of the Hare System.

The deep interest taken in all matters relating to the Hare system of voting and counting at the recent elections in Hobart and Launceston is indicated by the large number of queries put to the writer during the last three months. It is curious, however, that the large body of inquirers and critics restrict their attention mainly to questions relating either to the mode of voting, or to the mode or modes adopted for determining the quota-excesses; but, most of all, the general attention is restricted to obscure details of no importance concerning the infinitesimal influence of the element of chance still uneliminated by the Tasmanian Clark-Hare method provided for the transfer and distribution of the quota-excess of the second order.*

This unfortunate restriction is equivalent to a representation of the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark cut out.

The Hamlet of the Hare system, as a whole, is not the mere mode of preference and transfer vote to which general attention is too often restricted. The latter aids are important, no doubt, but of themselves they can only be regarded as valuable accessories of the Hare system. The keystone of the Hare system, upon which commonly too little or no attention is directed, is the Hare constitution of large electoral divisions. Without the latter all the nice arrangements of first, second, third, &c., preferences, and transfer of quota-excesses and lowest excluded candidate votes would be a cumbrous farce. With the former secured, together with even the ordinary one-man-one-vote principle, the results attained would be such an improvement upon methods hitherto prevailing that they would not fall far short of the more complete Hare scheme with its method of preference and transfer voting.

Those who ignore this keystone or foundation of the Hare system, and restrict their attention entirely to peddling or unimportant details—such as the element of chance involved in quota-excess transfer votes—fail altogether to comprehend the grandeur and perfection of the cardinal features of the system, which secures just and equitable representation of all forces, whether of majorities or minorities. The main feature of the Hare-Electorate or Electoral Division is, that it shall be sufficiently large and untrammelled so as to permit the units of any representative party or body of opinion to unite together, if numerous enough to command a quota; that is, such a proportion of electors, as on the basis of numbers, would entitle the latter to return their just share, viz., one parliamentary representative. This provision also involves the breaking down of all arbitrary and unreasonable subdivisions which, as in the unequal ward system of cities, have hitherto prevented the otherwise wasted surplusage of aggregate majorities or minorities, in one division of common locality interests, from joining forces with the weaker members of their respective parties similarly restricted in a neighbouring arbitrary subdivision; and so unjustly preventing the true ideal of real equality of representation, i.e., representation of minorities and majorities in proportion to numbers. That this should be regarded as the most important feature of the Hare system is certain, and is so regarded by all great thinkers who have devoted any attention to the subject. This opinion is sufficiently supported by a quotation from one of England's greatest thinkers—John Stuart Mill (pp. 56, 57, "On Representative Government"):

"But real equality of representation is not obtained unless any set of electors amounting to the average number of a constituency, wherever . . . they happen to reside, have the power of combining with one another to return a representative. This degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable until a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general views and for the contrivance of practical details—Mr. Thomas Hare—had proved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment, embodied in a draft of an Act of Parliament; a scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends of scarcely inferior importance. . . . The more these works are studied the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impression of the perfect feasibility of the scheme and its transcendent advantages. *Such and so numerous are these that, in my conviction, they place Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of Government.*" The italics are mine.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized, therefore, that the chief causes which tend to produce and perpetuate unfair and unequal representation are (1) inequalities in the magnitude of the population of the various electoral divisions, and (2) the unnecessary multiplication of artificial boundaries, restricting unjustly the voting force to too narrow an area, and thereby preventing the necessary and fair combination of persons who desire to act together, without which their forces are wasted or misdirected.

* That is, on all quota-excesses obtained after the first count by the aid of transfer ballot-papers. Those quota-excesses, which are produced by the distribution of the first count alone, are treated differently by our law, and for the sake of reference and distinction are here designed quota-excesses of the First Order.

The following illustration will help to convey more clearly how any great inequalities in the size of electoral divisions, conjoined with unnecessary artificial barrier subdivisions, may prevent the reasonable combination of the elementary forces, and may even prevent a strong majority within a city from securing representation justly proportionate to their total numbers.

Let us conceive the City of Hobart as having 6,000 voters, returning six Members to Parliament. On the basis of numbers it is clear, if there were no artificial barriers to reasonable combinations, that any body of persons properly organised could return that proportion of representatives which would fairly correspond with their numbers.

But suppose the major party X, constituting two-thirds of the City electorate, to be distributed unequally, and their voting force restricted within the limit of six separate unequal electoral divisions of the City, as in the following illustration, and that for simplicity they are opposed by one party Y in each division, thus:—

City.	Distribution.		Total.
	X	Y	
Division A	800*	550	1,350
" B	1,050*	300	1,350
" C	1,200*	150	1,350
" D	345	355*	700
" E	320	330*	650
" F	285	315*	600
Total	4,000	2,000	6,000

By this curious illustration it is shown how, notwithstanding its superior numbers in the aggregate, the major party X has been robbed of a fourth of its representative power by the combined adverse circumstances of artificial inequalities in the size or composition of its electoral divisions, and the unnecessary artificial restriction of voting power within each unnecessary artificial subdivision. By such unfair artificial barriers the major party X—even aided by the wisest organisation—can only return half the number of representatives, whereas, in equity, it should return two-thirds; and, conversely, the minor party Y by such means returns half the number of representatives, when in all fairness and equity they should, under ideally proper conditions, only return two, or one third.

It is the chief merit of the Hare system that it entirely removes all such artificial barriers to just and real representation of the various parties; for, by its abolition of unwise artificial restrictions it gives full fair play to all the individual forces, and it enables the surplusage of any one division to come to the aid of its own party in any other division, so that no vote would form the element of a lost or wasted surplusage. By the Hare system the inequalities of electoral subdivisions are practically rendered equal and harmless.

The major party X would in all fairness return four members, and the minor party Y would, in returning two members, be also justly dealt with, as this is the number which in all fairness it has a right to claim or expect.

The constitution of electoral divisions is thus shown to be the most important feature of the Hare system, and this importance must not be disregarded when acknowledging the full merit of its splendid accessory, the Hare method of preference and transfer vote.

The Merits of the Preference and Transferable Vote.

The most valuable accessory, not the primary principle, of Hare's system is the scheme of the Quota-excess and lowest excluded Candidate Transfer Vote. In the ordinary system of voting it often happens that the fair power of majorities and minorities is wasted by the manner in which the votes are given. The voter has no certain knowledge, and is often obliged to guess his own party's strength. If the voter's one particular choice gets, unnecessarily, too many votes from his own party, and therefore useless to him, it may so happen that the second, third, &c., in the order of the voter's preference are, from this lack of knowledge, deprived of such votes to such an extent that an opposite party's representatives are returned in larger number than their aggregate strength, if fairly measured, would entitle them. Hare's method of preference vote in a very large measure obviates this defect. By indicating his other favourite candidates in order of decreasing preference or increasing order of detestation by 1, 2, 3, &c., no previous knowledge of strength is necessary. The Hare method is *per se* a sort of special providence, preventing the waste of valuable votes by automatically distributing surplus strength fairly and exactly to the next and next of preference † until at last the full fair strength of the particular party is properly determined. If combinedly in this way any party fails to return one representative it is because all the members of the party are too feeble in numbers to have the right to be represented; if the party on the whole returns one, two, three or more representatives it is, for the best of all reasons, because this is the exact representation to which, by force of numbers, it is justly and reasonably entitled.

* Local majority returning one representative.

† If not preference, it equally serves to indicate usefully order of detestation or dislike, No. 1 being least detested, No. 2 next in order of dislike, Nos. 3, 4, 5 in a similar way next in order of the candidates disliked. Even in the order of dislike it must be of service to the elector to see that his most disliked candidates are handicapped by his influence.

Thus the method of the Hare preference index, and the transfer in order of preference, effects the part of a never-failing providence, preventing the waste of valuable forces; or, in other words, determining exactly the fair and reasonable representation of all, in spite of difficulties concerning lack of organisation, or perfect foreknowledge of the strength and the proper allotment or distribution of voting forces. The only persons who may oppose the Hare system are the selfish aggressor or the selfish indifferent; the former craves to maintain or gain more than justice; the latter too indifferent or lazy to demand it.

Popular exaggerated estimates of the influence upon Results of the Distribution of the Quota excess of the First and Second Order.

In the Hobart election the distribution of quota-excesses of the first and second order, although differing to a great extent relatively, was, as is the general experience, of little or no absolute importance in altering the effect of the values of first counts and lowest excluded candidates' preference votes in determining the final order of the results of the election. In Launceston, it so happened, there was no quota-excess of the first order, i.e., on the first count, and, consequently, there could be no inclusion of this first to form a subsequent redistributed detail element of chance in the determination of its only one quota-excess (Hartnoll 16) of the second order. The total influence of all orders of quota-excess transfer votes in Launceston was, therefore, for each candidate not excluded actually 1 (minimum) to 9 (maximum) votes = 16 in all. That is, the influence proportionate to the total effective votes of all kinds was min. 0.04 per cent.; max. 0.38 per cent.; total, 0.68 per cent.

The feebleness of this influence in altering the final determination of the all-powerful influences, viz., the first count and the votes (two or higher preference) of the previously-excluded candidates, is seen by the results. For although the lowest candidate (Sutton, 283) before distribution was only nine votes behind the next lowest in order (Fowler, 292), yet the inclusion of quota-excess distribution of the second order, although differing in force only by six votes, to the advantage of the lowest, the same order of importance was undisturbed, Fowler still keeping the lead by three votes! This inevitable result is beyond any shade of dispute, as in the distribution of the quota-surplus 16, there entered no element of chance selection. Such an element could only enter where there was a possibility of a portion of this 16 being afterwards redistributed. In Launceston such a possibility could not occur. It is proved, therefore, that in the Launceston election the possible influence of the element of chance was positively nil.

In Hobart the final results, although affected by four quota-excesses (one of the first order and three of the second), were, even in the aggregate, too feeble to exercise any disturbing influence upon the true relative positions which, as in Launceston, were altogether dominated and determined by votes of first counts and by next in order preferences of lowest excluded candidates.

The total force of the transfer votes of quota-excesses of the first and second order in Hobart only amounted to 3.45 per cent. of all effective votes, as shown by the following analysis:—

Analysis.	No Transfer.	Per cent. to total Effective Votes.	Per cent. to total.
Quota-excess Votes	44	1.25	—
Ditto { First Order (1) Fysh Second „ (3) Bradley, Clark, Mulcahy }	81	2.29	—
Both (4)	125	3.54	—
All other effective votes	3,411	96.46	—
Total effective votes	3,536	10.000	—
Difference between lowest candidate elected and the highest of the candidates excluded		129	3.39
Highest number of votes originally transferred to any one candidate of the quota-excess of the first order (Fysh 44) which in case of re-transfer still involves an infinitesimal element of chance		27	0.76
Actual number of votes re-transferred by quota-surpluses of second order and by transferred votes of lowest excluded candidates in which any element of chance selection was involved		39	1.10
Average number of such votes for each candidate		3.25	0.09

The above analysis is interesting and instructive. It shows that among the 3,536 total effective direct and next in order of preference votes only 125, or 3.54 per cent., were derived from all quota-excesses; that of these only 39 were redistributed in which any element of chance entered under the method provided by Mr. Clark, Clause 115, Sect. VI., for the determination of the proportion by which the 39 papers were actually distributed; and that this, in the aggregate, only represents 1.10 per cent. of all effective votes, or a mean of 3.25 votes per candidate. As the total redistributed quota-excess votes of the first order (39) only represent 3.25 per cent. of the final difference between the lowest candidate elected and the next in order—the highest candidate who was last excluded from the poll—it is clearly demonstrated that the remaining element of chance selection in practice is infinitesimal in its influence, and did not in the slightest degree affect the relative

order of candidates as mainly determined by the combined influence of (No. 1 preference) votes of the first count, and Nos. 2 and 3 preferences of transfer votes of the lowest excluded candidates. These latter together (3,411) represent, as already shown, 96·46 of the total effective voting force; and this fact alone should show that too much importance by far has been commonly attached to all rival modes for dealing with the distribution of quota-surpluses and their possible but small element of chance. The reduction of the original small element of chance from 1·25 per cent. of all effective to 0·09 for each candidate should surely satisfy any one that the ideal elimination of elements of chance, so far as the true order of final results is concerned, has been practically and successfully achieved by the Clark-Hare method introduced at the last general election in Hobart and Launceston.

If still, however, it is desired to entirely eliminate the remaining infinitesimal element of chance in the redistribution of any portion of quota-surpluses, the law may, with a very slight modification of Clause VI., Sect. 115, secure this end by two simple practicable methods. The first method introduced, but afterwards altered by Parliament, eliminated all elements of chance in the distribution of quota-surpluses of the first and second orders by first determining to full or aggregate force of all ballot-papers preferences 1, 2, 3, respectively, and proportionately distributing First-order quota-excesses on the basis of independent aggregate distribution of all No. 2 preferences; and all quota-excesses of the Second order similarly on the basis of the ascertained aggregate distribution of all No. 3 preferences.

The second method suggested for arriving at the same end almost as perfectly as in the first method described is, while determining, as in the existing law, the force of the No. 2 preferences for the purpose of allotting a corresponding distribution of first order of any candidate's quota-excess, also determine the full force of the No. 3 preferences in the same individual candidate's original parcel (*i.e.*, his first count). Should a second order of quota-excess be secured subsequently to any other candidate by the aid of the first quota-excess division, let the latter portion of any quota-excess be allotted according to proportion, ascertained under the original No. 3 preference votes of the elected candidate from whom such surplus was obtained; but, at the same time, limiting the number of ballot-papers to be transferred to the proportion which such original quota-surplus division bears to the aggregate of all votes which go to form the quota-surplus of the second order. The distribution of the due proportion of votes which may have been derived from first votes and lowest excluded candidate transfers to be distributed as nearly as practicable in the proportion which the next available order of preference is indicated upon such ballot-papers. The only objection to this second method is that it is more complicated and would involve more trouble and time in the final determining of the ballot. The balance of advantage, therefore, remains in favour of the first method suggested.

General Questions regarding the Working Results of the Hare System.

The question most frequently put to the writer during the last four months regarding the working results of the Clark-Hare system of voting at the recent election at Hobart and Launceston shows how wide and deep is the interest taken in the matter, and the ordinary forms of misconception of several of the more essential features of the Hare system enable him to understand more clearly what are the points which it would be well to discuss more particularly, and, if possible, to elucidate. For this purpose I have thought it best to select the more important of such questions in a systematically-arranged series in the form of Question and Answer. This method will enable the ordinary inquirer to concentrate his or her attention upon each point separately as it arises.

An endeavour has been made also to arrange the order of the several queries or subjects so that the answers given to the first in order may facilitate the comprehension of explanations or observation of those which follow. The following are the series of Questions dealt with in this way:—

First Query.—What is the special nature of the modification of the Hare system introduced by Mr. Clark at the last General Election apart from the provision which restricted its operation to the two cities—Hobart and Launceston?

Answer.—The special modification introduced by Mr. A. I. Clark, Attorney-General for Tasmania, is the provision devised by him for eliminating the element of chance in the selection and distribution of quota-excesses or surplus transfer votes.

In the original scheme of Mr. Thomas Hare there was an element of chance connected with the appropriation of the voting papers of any candidate polling in excess of the ascertained quota, inasmuch as it would depend upon the chance position of the papers forming the excess. If the excess papers were taken, however indiscriminately, from either top, bottom, or middle of the whole parcel of first counts, it is almost certain that the second and higher preferences would vary with each chance selection, and the voters whose papers were selected for transfer to next in order of preference would thus by mere chance have an undue advantage in the determination of the candidates next in order of choice. Mr. Clark's scheme disposes of this element of chance in quota-excesses of the first order or first count by giving each voter of the successful candidate equal power in determining what papers shall be selected for transfer. This is accomplished by redistributing the whole of the successful candidates' voting papers among the candidates not yet excluded from the poll on the basis of the next in order of preference—*i.e.*, No. 2—and afterwards allotting to each candidate such a proportion of papers, so distributed, to each candidate as is equivalent to the proportion which the quota-excess bears to the total parcel of first counts of the successful candidate.

Thus, if we assume that A secured 560 papers in the first count, and the quota was determined to be 460; and also assume that the redistribution of A's 560 on the basis of No. 2 preference among, say, B, C, and D, gave the following results:—

B, 230; C, 150; D, 115:

Then, as quota-excess 100: 560:: $\begin{cases} B\ 50 : 230 \\ C\ 25 : 115 \\ D\ 25 : 115 \end{cases}$

In this manner each voter has equal power (viz., $\frac{1}{560}$) in determining the quota-surplus transfer distribution. B appropriates 50 of the 230 papers having No. 2 against his name; C and D, respectively, appropriate 25 from among the papers similarly having the No. 2 preference against their names. This is a just distribution, and entirely removes the element of chance, so far as the second preference is concerned. A similar provision is made for removing, or rather minimising, the very trifling element of chance in quota-excesses of the second order—i.e., where a former transfer paper may again be transferred to the third or next in order of preference—the determinants in the latter case being the whole of the transferred papers, only, which may have helped to complete a candidate's quota. The process is extremely simple and effective. The only objection to the method is that it may add about 20 per cent. to the work of handling the papers, as in the Hobart election. Where there are no excesses of the first order, as in the Launceston election, it may add only about 4 per cent. to the work of handling and counting.

Second Query.—What is the probable total effective value of all surplus votes transferred to candidates in next order of preference in comparison with the totality of all other forms of effective votes?

Answer.—It varies considerably, according to the number of quota-excesses of the first and second orders. In Hobart the quota-excess votes of the first order represented 1.25 per cent. of all effected votes. Those of the second order represented 2.29 per cent. All quota excesses represented 3.54 per cent. In Launceston election the whole of the quota-excess transfer votes only represented 0.66 per cent. of all effective votes.

Third Query.—Does the Clark-Hare method entirely eliminate the element of chance in the transfer of quota-excesses?

Answer.—Yes, entirely, as regards quota-excesses of the first order. As regards transfers of the second order, I estimate that the element of chance for each candidate only represents 0.09 per cent. of all effective votes. This is so trifling an influence that it may be safely ignored in practice.

Fourth Query.—What, approximately, are the relative effective value of preference votes, 1, 2, 3, and over, in determining the return of any candidate?

Answer.—For Hobart the effective values were as follows:—

First preference	-	-	-	-	-	77.66 per cent.
Second ditto	-	-	-	-	-	20.47 "
Third higher	-	-	-	-	-	1.87 "

The relative values for Launceston closely agreed with those for Hobart.

Fifth Query.—Whether is the first count, all effective votes, or the aggregate of all counts (effective and ineffective) the best index of the real measure of favour in which the several candidates stand towards the electorate?

Answer.—The aggregate of all counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of the favoured groups. This accidental action would tend to conceal the true or exact measure of favour in the first count. In the aggregate of effective votes polled the true measure of favour is not quite correctly revealed by the actual numbers recorded as regards successful candidates; inasmuch as those who obtain the quota first are by the exclusion from poll deprived of the full force of the second, third, and next in order of preference, all of which are received, and swell the volume of the last successful candidate. Thus, the first candidate who polled a quota in Hobart, Sir Philip O. Fysh, was deprived of the latent force of preference, 2, 3, &c., in his favour contained in seven succeeding counts; Mr. Bradley was deprived similarly of the latent force of seven succeeding counts; Mr. Clark of five. Of the successful candidates, Messrs. Mulcahy, Crisp, and Page alone received the full force of all effective preference votes. The fairer index of the measure of general favour therefore seems to be the aggregate of all preferences, whether effective or non-effective, as shown in one of the appended tables.

Sixth Query.—What is the effect of the voter's restricting his choice of order of preference to three candidates (the minimum number compulsory by the Tasmanian law)?

Answer.—It renders the voter's influence useless in the determination of the fate of other candidates should his own three preferences, without his aid, obtain

a quota, or, otherwise, be excluded, or eliminated, from the poll. Such useless papers are said to be "exhausted." No less than 206 votes, representing 7 per cent. nearly of all votes polled, were rendered useless in this way by the voter's self-imposed sacrifice of his own right or privilege. This is a matter which demands more serious consideration, as nearly twice the voting force of all the invalid papers (104) were practically lost in the determination of the elections. It is natural to suppose that the ordinary voter's interest diminishes after his first three favourites are chosen in their order of preference. But it should be borne in mind that a further extension of indication of preference might be serviceable to the voter in excluding those whom he thought least desirable as representatives; for the order 1, 2, 3, need not be regarded as the index of favour. It is just as serviceable in determining order of dislike, No. 1 being regarded as the candidate who is least in disfavour; the others, in sequence, being regarded as next in order of greater disfavour.

Seventh Query.—How far was the voting force as a whole reduced by invalid or defective ballot-papers, and what was the nature of the defects which rendered the papers invalid?

Answer.—The voting force lost to the elections at Hobart by reason of invalid papers is represented by 104 ballot papers, equivalent to 3·65 per cent. of all ballot-papers. The following is a summary of the defects:—

	No.	No.	Per cent. to total ballot-papers.
Defective preference numbering	45	49	1·72
Defective or unrecognisable figures	4		
Illegal marking and scoring	52	55	1·93
Adding signature	2		
Disfiguring or blank papers	1	104	3·65
Total invalid papers	—		

Only 61 of these invalid papers can be traced to their first preference, and of these 46 were lost to successful candidates, and 15 were lost to the unsuccessful candidates.

From this analysis of defective ballot-papers it will be seen that only 49, representing 1·72 per cent. of all ballot-papers, can be attributed to the Hare system; and upon the first introduction of any new system such a result might naturally be expected. The defects of 55 papers, representing 1·93 per cent. of all ballot-papers, are of such a nature as might occur under any system of voting. Some of the defects might have been avoided if the ballot-papers gave clearer indication where the preference numbers were to be written against each candidate's name.

If the preference number position were indicated by a printed enclosing circle or square, and each name separated by a clearly-printed line, the defective papers would be greatly reduced, thus:—

BURNS.	
DRYDEN.	
MILTON.	
POPE.	
SHAKESPEARE.	
WORDSWORTH.	

Eighth Query.—Can you suggest any improvement in the method employed for determining the results of the poll?

Answer.—The work of counting and determining the results of the poll within, say, an hour of its close, might be accomplished with ease and accuracy if the following plan were adopted:—

First.—Set a room apart for the counting staff—properly safeguarded as regards privacy and scrutiny—adjacent to the chief polling-room; and let the work of sorting, counting, and distributing ballot-papers be carried on simultaneously with the work of polling.

Second.—Depute the duty of transmitting in due order from time to time the various ballot-boxes (one at a time) to counting-room to a particular officer, who shall see that the contents are discharged upon the first sorting-table by the superintendent of the counting-room, who alone possesses the power to unlock the boxes. A spare box should always be available in the polling-room to take the place of the box during its transmission and return from counting-room.

Third.—Let the chief returning officer periodically examine and finally determine all doubtful and invalid papers set apart for his decision.

Fourth.—Prior to the day of election the superintendent of the counting-room should make the necessary calculations which would determine the number of separate sorting and counting tables and the necessary staff. The staff, prior to the day of election, should receive an object lesson from the superintendent in the work that they are to be engaged, and the latter should by actual trial satisfy himself that each one thoroughly understands the particular process intrusted to him.

Fifth.—In the work of sorting and recording each sub-division, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, no conversation or discussion should be allowed. If a paper is challenged as doubtfully invalid, it should, without discussion or comment, be placed in the place set apart for doubtful papers, to be finally determined by the decision of the chief returning officer.

Sixth.—Apart from the candidates' onlooking scrutineers, there should be three officers set apart for each recording table, which latter should be equipped with as many named cells as there are candidates, and with two extra cells for the reception of doubtful and invalid papers respectively. The chief officer at each table should take the central position, and his duty is to examine each paper, and see at a glance whether valid, doubtful, or invalid. If valid, he should quickly call out name and preference number, thus:—Fysh, 1; Bradley, 1; Clark, 1; Fysh, 1; Clark, 1; and simultaneously place each paper in its proper receptacle. The recorders, one on each side, both enter a 1 in the proper column for each name called out.

As each pair of sheets is completed the chief clerk should compare the totals of the one with the other, and if they agree the pair of recording sheets should forthwith be initialed and transmitted to the superintendent's compiling table. If they do not agree the error must at once be traced out and corrected. A septum of coloured paper, placed in each cell above the last ballot-paper entered in a former pair of recording sheets will greatly aid in facilitating the detection of such errors.

During the last general election at Hobart each recording sheet had 50 lines numbered from 1 to 50 at each side, with a separate column for each candidate. As each recording tick 1 was marked under each name on the line immediately succeeding the last recorded tick for the same person, it followed that as soon as any one candidate's recording tick reached the fiftieth line the sheet was complete, and the numbers of all the other candidates could be ascertained by inspection without counting; for the line number of the last entry in each column would indicate exactly the number of votes to be carried to total at foot of recording sheet.

In this way the work of the superintendent in compiling the recording sheet totals was greatly facilitated, and enabled him to show at any moment the aggregate number polled for each candidate.

If the plan here indicated is adopted at any election there is every reason to believe that it would work satisfactorily, and the final results of the election might be ascertained and published within an hour of the close of the poll.

The only work of the Hare system of ballot which would have to be postponed until the close of the poll would be the distribution of transfer votes from quota-surpluses and lowest eliminated candidates.

HOW TO SIMPLIFY THE BALLOT BY THE HARE SYSTEM TO THOSE WHO CANNOT READ OR WRITE.

Many who otherwise regard the Hare system of voting with favour have objected to its introduction in Tasmania on the ground that the difficulties of instructing voters who can neither read nor write would be practically insurmountable; and they believe that attempts to record the preference 1, 2, 3, or even I., II., III., against the persons chosen in this order of preference by those who cannot read or write would involve many mistakes, and largely increase the number of invalid ballot-papers. Another, and perhaps a more serious objection to the use of written figures, is that to a great extent it invades or endangers the wisely-guarded secrecy of the ballot; for the figures written by many persons are as characteristic as their writing, and might be recognised, and the name of the voter, and how he recorded his vote, might thus be improperly disclosed by persons subsequently handling the ballot-papers.

There are, therefore, three difficulties to be met, and for which some means should be devised to dispose of them, or at any rate, to lessen their evil effects, viz. :—

1. To devise means whereby voters, who may be unable to read or write, may readily determine the position and names of the candidates preferred by them upon the ballot-paper when the latter is placed in their hands.
2. To record the figures 1, 2, 3, &c., against each name indicating voter's preference accurately and easily, without the necessity of writing by hand.
3. To record these figures, showing order of preference in such a manner as will fail to disclose to anyone the identity of the voter who has privately recorded them. Having devoted some attention to this very important matter, I think I can disclose a simple plan which would remove all such difficulties.

HOW TO DETERMINE THE NAMES OF PREFERRED CANDIDATES UPON BALLOT-PAPER.

First, to help those who cannot read, and of themselves are, therefore, unable to determine the position of the names of the candidates they prefer upon the ballot-paper, I would suggest that immediately the names of candidates for election are declared let there be prepared a large printed poster bill recording in large print the names of the various candidates exactly in the same style of type (except size), and in the same order of sequence as the names will be printed on the ballot-paper proper. Against each name, in front, print boldly the litho-photo of the head and features of the candidate. If these large posters were affixed to the principal hoardings throughout the city, where the names continuously associated with the candidate's photograph would frequently meet the eye of the citizens, it is certain that every voter, even though unable to read or write, would within seven days be well acquainted with each candidate's printed name, and could locate the exact position where such name would be found upon the ballot-paper when placed in his hands, on the day of election, without the aid of anyone. The secret of the manner in which such person voted would thus be as secure as it is now to persons who are able to read and write.

HOW ILLITERATE PERSONS—WITHOUT PERSONAL AID—MAY RECORD THE FIGURES 1, 2, 3, ETC., IN THE DESIRED ORDER OF PREFERENCE WITH THE GREATEST EASE AND WITH PERFECT ACCURACY.

In addition to marking-pencils let there be provided in the veiled recording chamber a shelf holding as many figure stamps as there are seats. For Hobart six, for Launceston four. Let the size and sequence of position of these stamps correspond exactly with the figures which the several stamps are devised to impress when stamped against, and in front of, the name selected; thus :—

1	2	3	4	5	6

1. Thus, for the first choice, let the voter select the first and tallest stamp, and stamp it exactly in front and level with the name of his first choice.
2. For the second preference, take the second stamp in order and the second in height, and impress it similarly against the name of the second candidate of his preference.
3. For the third preference, take the third stamp in order and the third in height, and impress it similarly against the name of the third candidate of his preference.
4. Continue to impress the remaining three stamps in the order of place and height (if desired) against the names of candidates whose degree of favour in the voter's eye is marked, in every case, by the order of position relative to the first; and the gradually diminishing height of the stamp corresponding with this order, and with the diminishing interest of the voter.

When an illiterate person grasps the fact that the first and biggest stamp is to be used only for the first preference, and the smallest and last stamp for that of one of the six candidates who stands lowest in his esteem, all the difficulties of recording his choice, secretly and accurately, vanish.

A separate ink-pad for the stamps may be avoided by the use of the self-inking and self-adjusting stamps now commonly used in public offices. To ensure greater success, a lesson in the simple method of impressing the stamp against any name might be given in some convenient ante-room, and the care that due order of the stamps in proper position is preserved in the veiled recording chamber might be seen to by some officer, after each candidate has recorded his vote.

I hope the suggestions made will commend themselves to those who have the responsibility of securing the success of the election by the Hare system of ballot, and also to all who are jealous of preserving intact the secrecy of the ballot.

THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF QUOTA-EXCESSES BY THE CLARK-HARE METHOD.

Some persons are fearful that the able returning officers at Hobart and Launceston—Messrs. Davies and Sadler—supported as they were by the best legal opinion, and assisted as they were by persons skilled in the particular work, have failed to carry out the law in all its entirety in the distribution of quota-surpluses at the last general election.

But, from the expressed statements of some of the critics, it is very obvious that their fears arise either from an imperfect or hazy notion of the exact processes expeditiously and correctly carried out by the responsible officers referred to, or from a very faulty notion of what our law required to be carried out. From my official position at Hobart—under Mr. Davies (acting supervisor of the counting processes)—I had the best opportunity of knowing how the various operations of the counting and distribution of ballot-papers were performed, and I can trust that I will be credited when I assure all persons that every process was faithfully carried out, expeditiously and smoothly, in strict compliance with every provision of the law as embodied in Section 115, 1—x.

It would be altogether inexcusable on my part, having such responsibilities, if I had not made myself thoroughly acquainted with every provision of the law affecting each of the stages of counting and distribution, for I had the advantage of ample time and opportunity for making myself fully acquainted with all the nice points where some difficulties of interpretation might arise. Moreover, I had the advantage of familiar discussion and helpful advice from the law officers of the Crown, and from other trained legal authorities on every occasion that a possible shade of doubt presented itself to my mind as regards some of the more obscure provisions. The result was that I had the comfort of knowing before I engaged actively on my duties that in the methods for every stage arranged and ultimately carried out by me as supervising assistant under Mr. Davies, I had the sanction and hearty approval of the law advisers of the Crown. With my own judgment independently concurring with the special advice of the law officers, who originally drew up every one of the provisions of Section 115, I have no fear that any person, however astute, who has not had the grave responsibilities of execution, and who has not devoted the same time and trouble to the study of our Electoral Act, 1896, Section 115, will be successful in the discovery of any flaw either in the interpretations put upon its various provisions, or in the processes adopted for carrying it into effect.

Those who profess to have discovered a flaw in the mode of determining the quota-excess in Hobart have misled themselves by taking hold of only a part of the truth—a source of danger in most cases to inexperienced persons.

So far as the ordinary misconceptions are concerned regarding the provisions made for determining the division of transferable quota-surpluses, it is apparent for the most part that they arise from unskilled or hasty reading of Clauses v, and iv., Section 115. Both of these clearly provide for the manner in which quota-surpluses are to be distributed, and both have for their object the distribution of the excess, freed altogether from arbitrary selection by Returning Officer, and freed, as fairly as practicable, from the element of chance selection

But the stumbling block of the average inexperienced or incautious critic is his failure to discern that the law recognises and distinguishes two distinct orders of quota-excess, while the incautious critic either only recognises one or confounds or mixes up part of the provision of the one when dealing with the other. For the sake of greater clearness we may call the quota-excess provided for in Clause v. as quota-excesses of the first order, and the quota-excesses contemplated in Clause vi. as those of the second order. Now, the manner in which the quota-excess of the first order is to be determined in distribution is altogether different from the manner provided in Clause vi. for the determination and distribution of quota-excess of the second.

For the former (*i.e.*, first order) the quota-excess—as in case of the only one of this order, the Fysh surplus, 44—Clause v., “shall include as nearly as practicable in respect of each candidate the same proportion of ballot-papers having the figure 2 set opposite to his name as the number of such ballot-papers included in the whole parcel bears to the total number of ballot-papers in the whole parcel.” The quota-excess of the first order has been derived wholly from the successful candidate's 1's without the aid of a single transfer ballot paper from any other candidate, and hence the law provides that for such first order quota-excess the determinants of mode distribution are, as in the Fysh surplus—the whole of his own original ballot-papers of the first count.

For determining the manner in which quota-excesses of the second order shall be distributed the law is entirely different; for it excludes altogether the successful candidate's first count ballot-papers as determinants, and restricts the determinant of distribution solely to the total ballot-papers previously transferred.

The successful candidates of the second order quota-excesses cannot by this provision—whether desirable or otherwise—have their own first count papers included among the determinants of distribution; the law clearly confining this function to the various subsequently transferred ballot-papers obtained preferentially from other candidates, and by whose aid the quota and its excess were actually obtained.

I hope this explanation will satisfy all reasonable persons that the various processes of the ballot in Hobart and Launceston were correctly carried out, and were not marred in any way by flaws in the manner in which the whole work was carried out.

It is interesting to note that Hobart alone had a quota-excess of the first order to distribute, while of quota-excesses of the second order Hobart had three and Launceston only one.

In conclusion, let me record gratefully, not merely my own personal indebtedness, but that of Tasmania, to the pioneer advocate of True Representation of the People in Australia (Miss C. H. Spence, of Adelaide), whose life's devotion to the cause of True Representation has not only greatly influenced, but has won the admiration and respect of England's greatest statesmen. To Miss Spence's unwearied advocacy by word and pen, the success of the introduction of the Hare System in Tasmania by Mr. Clark is largely due. I only hope she will live to see throughout the civilised world the general adoption of the Hare System of voting, which alone secures any practical approximation to a Fair and True representation of the People.

THE HARE SYSTEM AT HOBART.—The Complete Returns.—The following Ballot Recording Sheet gives the actual results of the various counts at the recent Parliamentary Election, worked out to finality. The quota, it will be remembered, was 457 :—

Count.	Total Votes Distributed.	Bradley.	Clark.	Cox.	Crisp.	Dillon.	Fulton.	Fysh.	Hiddlestone.	Mulcahy.	Page.	Paton.	St. Hill.	Exhaust Papers.	Particulars of Distribution.
1st	2,748	448	393	34	302	143	118	501	137	264	233	140	131	—	First Count.
2nd	44	4	27	—	3	1	—	Elected-14	2	4	2	—	1	—	Fysh's surplus.
3rd	34	8	5	(-34) Out	13	2	4	*	1	1	3	—	2	—	Lowest out (Cox).
4th	122	28	18	—	12	10	(-122) Out	*	11	12	10	12	8	—	Next lowest out (Fulton).
5th	27	Elected-28	4	—	4	2	—	*	3	8	2	7	3	—	Bradley's surplus.
6th	145	*	29	—	16	13	—	*	15	21	14	21	(-145) Out	16	Lowest out (St. Hill).
7th	39	*	Elected-19	—	5	—	—	*	2	3	2	1	—	7	Clark's surplus.
8th	171	*	*	—	63	6	—	*	(-171) Out	32	18	8	—	4	Lowest out (Hiddlestone).
9th	177	*	*	—	36	(-177) Out	—	*	—	51	23	32	—	30	Next lowest out (Dillon).
10th	221	*	*	—	23	—	—	*	—	53	24	(-221) Out	—	121	Next lowest out (Paton).
11th	36	*	*	—	5	—	—	*	—	Elected-36	3	—	—	36	Mulcahy's surplus.
Total	3,748	483 Elected	476 Elected	34 Out	372 Elected	177 Out	122 Out	501 Elected	171 Out	493 Elected	241 Elected	221 Out	145 Out	206	

Obtained the quota

APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE

GENERAL ELECTION, HOBART.

20th January, 1897.

ANALYSIS showing the Separate and Cumulative Value and Distribution of the Effective Portion only of the various Preference and Transfer Votes:—

Candidates,	Preference 1.		Preference 2.		Preference 3 and over.		All Effectives.	
	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.
Fysht - - - - -	501	18·24	35	—	—	—	501 ^a	14·17
Mulcahy† - - - - -	264	9·61	205	28·36	24	26·36	493 ^a	13·95
Bradley† - - - - -	448	16·31	34	4·70	1	1·52	483 ^a	13·66
Clark† - - - - -	393	14·32	78	10·79	5	7·58	476 ^a	13·46
Crisp† - - - - -	202	7·36	161	22·27	9	13·63	372 ^a	10·52
Paget - - - - -	235	8·56	99	13·69	7	10·61	341 ^a	9·64
†	2,043	74·40	577	79·81	46	69·70	2,666	75·40
Paton† - - - - -	140	5·10	72	9·96	9	13·63	221 ^b	6·25
Dillon† - - - - -	143	5·21	32	4·43	2	3·04	177 ^b	5·01
Hiddlestone† - - - - -	137	4·99	28	3·73	6	9·09	171 ^b	4·84
St. Hill† - - - - -	131	4·77	11	1·52	3	4·54	145 ^b	4·10
Fulton† - - - - -	118	4·30	4	·55	—	—	122 ^b	3·44
Cox† - - - - -	34	1·23	—	—	—	—	34 ^b	·96
‡	703	25·60	147	20·19	20	30·30	870	24·60
Totals - - - - -	2,746	—	724	—	66	—	3,536	—
Percentages—								
Vertical - - - - -	—	100	—	100	—	100	—	100
Horizontal - - - - -	77·66	—	20·47	—	1·87	—	100	—

* Obtained a quota. † Elected. ‡ Excluded.

† RESULTS OF EXCLUSION FROM POLL.

NOTES.—¹ Latent force of preference 2, 3, &c., contained in ten lower counts not recorded, having been transferred to next in order of voter's own preference among remaining candidates.

* Ditto ditto, contained in 7 lower counts, ditto ditto ditto.

³ Ditto ditto, " " " "

Ditto ditto,	"	1	"	"
Ditto ditto,	"	1	"	"

9 Ditto ditto,	"	2	"	"
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16	Ditto ditto,	"	5	"	"
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11 Ditto ditto,	H	7	"	12
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12	Ditto ditto,	"	9	"	"
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alone received the full benefit of the whole of the

4847 alone received the full benefit of the whole of "their own effective transfer preference from all counts.

¶ Those who at the several counts are either elected or lowest are thenceforward by present law excluded from the Poll.

FURTHER ANALYSIS of the Results of the Ballot for Election of Representatives at Hobart, 20th January, 1897, showing the Separate and Cumulative value of all Preference Votes (1), (2), and (3), whether effective or ineffective:—

Candidates.	Preference. 1.	Preference. 2.	Preference. 3.	Cumulative Results of Preferences.	
				One and Two.	One, Two, and Three.
	No.	No.	No.		
Clark*†	393	592†	401†	985†	1,386†
Fysh*†	501†	427	314	928	1,242
Bradley*†	448	344	321	792	1,113
Mulcahy*†	264	231	396	495	891
Crisp*	202	218	270	420	690
Hiddlestone	137	251	269	388	657
Page*	235	167	169	402	571
Dillon	143	158	156	301	457
St. Hill	131	101	149	232	381
Fulton	118	121	130	239	369
Paton	140	90	129	230	359
Cox	34	46	42	80	122
All { Gross Total	2,746	2,746	2,746	5,492	8,238
{ Legally effective	2,746	724	66	3,470	3,536

Oxyta.—457.

* Elected.

† Obtained quots.

‡ Highest in order of general favour.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CLARK-HARE SYSTEM OF ELECTION ADOPTED IN TASMANIA.

EXAMPLES OF MARKING BALLOT-PAPERS.

(i.) Where there are NINE Candidates for SIX Seats.

Austin	-	-	-		Austin	-	-	-	5
Dickens	-	-	-		Dickens	-	-	-	6
Fielding	-	-	-		Fielding	-	-	-	4
Gissing	-	-	-	4	Gissing	-	-	-	
Lytton	-	-	-	3	Lytton	-	-	-	
Meredith	-	-	-	5 ..	Meredith	-	-	-	
Richardson	-	-	-	6	Richardson	-	-	-	2
Scott	-	-	-	1	Scott	-	-	-	3
Thackeray	-	-	-	2	Thackeray	-	-	-	1

(ii.) Where there are SIX Candidates for FOUR Seats.

Burns	-	-	-	4	Burns	-	-	-	4
Dryden	-	-	-		Dryden	-	-	-	3
Milton	-	-	-	2	Milton	-	-	-	2
Pope	-	-	-		Pope	-	-	-	
Shakespeare	-	-	-	1	Shakespeare	-	-	-	
Wordsworth	-	-	-	3	Wordsworth	-	-	-	1

EXAMPLES OF AN ELECTION OF MORE THAN ONE MEMBER FOR THE SAME DISTRICT.

Suppose there are Four Members to be elected, and there are Six Candidates, and the total number of valid votes polled is 3,000.

In accordance with the directions contained in Section 115, the number of valid votes (3,000) will be divided by the number of Members to be elected (4), and the result (750) will be the quota of votes required to elect a Member.

First Count.

- A has 800 first votes.
- B has 420 first votes.
- C has 180 first votes.
- D has 780 first votes.
- E has 720 first votes.
- F has 100 first votes.

A and D are declared elected, and the surplus of A's first votes is transferred to the other candidates who are marked 2 on the same ballot-papers (in pursuance of Section 115, Sub-section v.) in such a manner that each of the other candidates receives the same proportion of such surplus votes as all the papers on which his name is marked with the figure 2 in the parcel bear to the whole 800 ballot-papers in the said parcel.

A has 50 surplus votes, and as E is marked 2 on 640 out of the 800 papers, and F is marked 2 on 160, it follows that E is entitled to four-fifths and F to one-fifth of the surplus. The Returning Officer will therefore transfer 40 of A's surplus votes to E, and the remaining 10 of A's surplus votes to F.

D has a surplus of only 30 votes, and following the same course, 20 of his surplus ballot-papers are found to be transferable to B, and the remaining 10 to C.

The numbers on the Second Count will then be as follows:—

- A, 800—50 votes transferred to other candidates = 750 (elected)
- B, 420 + 20 votes transferred from the surplus votes of D = 440
- C, 180 + 10 votes transferred from the surplus votes of D = 190
- D, 780 — 30 votes transferred to other candidates = 750 (elected)
- E, 720 + 40 votes transferred from the surplus votes of A = 760 (elected)
- F, 100 + 10 votes transferred from the surplus votes of A = 110

A, and D, E are now declared elected, but another Member is required, and there must therefore be another transfer of any surplus votes and a Third Count. The only candidate who had a surplus on the Second Count was E, who has a surplus of 10 votes in consequence of having had 40 of A's surplus votes transferred to him. He will retain permanently 30 of those surplus votes because they are necessary to give him the requisite quota of 750 votes, but the other 10 of A's surplus ballot-papers will now be transferred to the candidates whose names are marked on them with the figure 3, and on them the name of B is marked 3.

The numbers on the Third Count will therefore stand as follows:—

A	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	There still remains a Member to be elected, and there are not any more surplus votes to be transferred. It therefore becomes necessary to reduce the number of candidates by excluding the one who is lowest on the poll as it now stands, and to transfer his votes to the candidates who are marked 2 on the ballot-papers which have hitherto been counted for him. The lowest candidate on the poll is F, with 110 votes, and he is now excluded. Upon 80 of the ballot-papers hitherto counted for F the name of B is marked 2, and on the other 30 of them the name of C is marked 2.
B,	440	+	10	votes	transferred		
	from E's surplus on the second						
count =	-	-	-	-	-	450	
C	-	-	-	-	-	190	
D	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	
E	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	
F	-	-	-	-	-	110	

The numbers on the Fourth Count will therefore be as follows:—

A	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	Only three candidates have succeeded up to the present time in obtaining the requisite quota of votes, and it therefore becomes necessary to reduce again the number of candidates by excluding the one who is lowest on the poll as it now stands. The lowest candidate is C, and he is excluded, leaving only the same number of candidates as there are Members to be elected—viz., A, B, D, and E, who are therefore declared elected, and the election is closed.
B,	450	+	80	votes	transferred		
	from F	-	-	-	-	= 530 (elected)	
C,	190	+	30	votes	transferred		
	from F	-	-	-	-	= 220	
D	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	
E	-	-	-	-	-	750 (elected)	

TASMANIA, 1896.

ANNO SEXAGESIMO VICTORIÆ REGINÆ, No 49.

An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the election of members of the Parliament of Tasmania. [3rd December, 1896.]

102. Every election under this Act shall be conducted in the manner following :—

(3) In every case in which more than one candidate is to be elected for any district, each elector shall have one vote only, but may vote in the alternative for as many candidates as he pleases, provided he votes for not less than one-half of the number of members to be elected; and his vote shall be deemed to be given in the first place for the candidate opposite whose name upon the ballot-paper is placed the figure 1; but in the event of its not being required to be used for the return of such candidate, it may be transferred to the other candidates in succession, in the order of priority indicated by the figures set opposite their respective names; and the elector shall insert opposite to the names of the candidates for whom he wishes to vote the figures 1, 2, 3, and so on, in the order of his preference. He shall not strike out from the ballot-paper the name of any candidate.

(4) As soon as the elector has expunged the name or names of the candidate or candidates for whom he does not wish to vote as directed in sub-section (2), or has marked the ballot-paper as directed in sub-section (3), he shall fold up the ballot-paper in such manner that the signature or stamp of the Returning Officer or clerk of the peace shall appear on the outside of the folded ballot-paper, and shall immediately take the same into the room in which the ballot-box is kept, and, after exhibiting to the Returning Officer the signature or stamp on the back of such ballot-paper, shall place the ballot-paper in the ballot-box; and immediately the elector has so placed his ballot-paper in the ballot-box he shall leave the room, and shall not re-enter during the same election.

115. In every case in which more than one candidate is to be elected for any district, the Returning Officer shall deal with the ballot-papers as follows :—

- i. He shall first arrange the ballot-papers by placing in a separate parcel all those which have the figure 1 set opposite to the name of the same candidate, and in so doing he shall reject all ballot papers which have not the official signatures or stamps on the back thereof, or which have anything written or marked thereon by which the voter can be identified, and all ballot-papers on which no number has been placed by the voter to indicate the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, and all ballot-papers on which the same number has been placed against more names than one; and all ballot papers whereon the number of candidates marked in the order of the voters' preference is fewer than one-half the number of members to be elected.
- ii. He shall then proceed to ascertain the "quota" of votes necessary for the election of a candidate by dividing the aggregate number of all the ballot-papers contained in all the parcels by the number of members to be elected, and the result, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the "quota."
- iii. He shall then proceed to count the number of ballot-papers in each parcel, and every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected, and every ballot-paper which has been once counted in the quota for a candidate who is declared elected shall not be counted for any other candidate.
- iv. As many ballot-papers in each parcel as are in excess of the quota shall be set aside in the manner hereinafter directed to be counted for other candidates as hereinafter provided, and on all such ballot-papers so set aside the name of any candidate for whom the requisite number of ballot-papers has already been counted shall be deemed to be cancelled, and the Returning Officer shall then severally transfer such ballot papers to the candidates indicated thereon respectively as the next in the order of the voter's preference, and the votes thus transferred shall be deemed to have been given for the candidates to whom they shall be transferred as herein directed, and shall be deemed to be first votes.
- v. The ballot-papers which are set aside from any parcel after the first count of votes as hereinbefore directed shall be selected from that parcel in such manner that they shall include as nearly as practicable in respect of each candidate the same proportion of ballot papers having the figure 2 set opposite to his name as the number of such

ballot-papers included in the whole parcel bears to the total number of ballot-papers in the whole parcel ; and if any doubt or dispute shall arise as to the number of ballot-papers which should be included in respect of any candidate among the ballot-papers set aside from any parcel, the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final.

- vi. If in any case the number of ballot-papers transferred to another candidate as the second in the order of preference indicated thereon shall exceed the number required to give the quota of votes to that candidate, the excess to be transferred to other candidates shall be selected from the total number of the ballot-papers previously transferred as aforesaid in such manner that the excess shall include as nearly as practicable in the case of each candidate the same proportion of ballot-papers having the figure 3 set opposite to his name as the number of such ballot-papers included in the total number of ballot-papers previously transferred as aforesaid bears to such total number ; and if any doubt or dispute shall arise as to the number of ballot-papers which should be included in such excess in respect of any candidate, the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first votes or votes deemed first.
 - vii. If after all the ballot-papers have been counted and respectively assigned to the several candidates as hereinbefore directed it is found that no candidate, or an insufficient number of candidates, has obtained the quota of votes necessary for his or their election, then and in such case the candidate who has obtained the lowest number of votes shall be excluded from the poll, and all the ballot-papers previously counted for such candidate shall be deemed to have been unused, and to have his name cancelled thereon, and they shall be respectively transferred to and counted for the other candidates who have not received the requisite quota of votes, and who are indicated on such ballot-papers respectively as the next in the order of the voter's preference.
 - viii. The same process of excluding the candidate lowest on the poll and transferring to other candidates the ballot-papers previously counted for the excluded candidate shall be repeated as often as may be necessary until the requisite number of candidates have received the necessary quota of votes, or until the number of candidates has been reduced to the number of members to be elected.
 - ix. If at any time after the first counting of the ballot-papers it becomes necessary to exclude the lowest candidate from the poll as hereinbefore directed, and it shall be found that two or more candidates have the same number of votes and occupy together the lowest position on the poll, then, and in every such case, whichever one of such candidates was found to have received the least number of votes upon the first counting of the ballot papers shall be deemed to be the lowest on the poll ; and if at any time it becomes necessary to exclude from the poll one or more of any number of candidates who have received the same number of votes upon the first counting of the ballot-papers, the Returning Officer shall decide which one or more of such candidates shall be excluded from the poll.
 - x. When, by successive applications of the directions hereinbefore contained, the number of candidates is reduced to the number of members to be elected, the candidates constituting such reduced number shall be declared elected.
-

APPENDIX C.

PAPERS handed in by Mr. J. Fischer Williams

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1906.

Election of _____

RESULT SHEET.

Vacancies 7.

No. of Votes, 2012.

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{2012}{7+1} + 1 = 252.$$

Names of Candidates.	1st Count.	Distribution of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's Surplus.	Result.	Distribution of Mr. Keir Hardie's Surplus.	Result.	Distribution of Mr. Haldane's Surplus.	Result.	Distribution of Mr. Law's Votes.	Result.	Distribution of Mr. Henderson's Votes.	Result.	Distribution of Sir T. P. Whittaker's Votes.	Result.	Distribution of Sir A. Acland-Hood's Votes.	Result.	Distribution of Lord H. Cecil's Surplus.	Final Result.	Remarks.
Acland-Hood, Sir A.	58	+4	62	—	62	+1	63	+23	86	—	86	+6	92	-92	—	—	—	—
Bell, Richard	102	+5	107	+3	110	+12	122	+1	123	+8	131	+39	170	+18	188	+5	193	—
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. . .	510	-255	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	Elected.
Cecil, Lord Hugh	213	—	213	—	213	+3	216	+17	233	—	233	+8	241	+56	297	-45	252	Elected.
Chamberlain, J. Austen	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	—	253	Elected.
Churchill, W. L. S.	124	+96	220	+2	222	+33	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	Elected.
Haldane, R. B.	195	+133	328	—	328	-72	256	—	256	—	256	—	256	—	256	—	256	Elected.
Hardie, J. Keir	290	—	290	-35	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	—	255	Elected.
Henderson, A.	60	+2	62	+7	69	+2	71	—	71	-71	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Law, A. Bonar	42	—	42	—	42	+1	43	-43	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Snowden, P.	115	+1	116	+23	139	+5	144	—	144	+57	201	+12	213	+6	219	+8	227	Elected.
Whittaker, Sir T. P.	50	+14	64	—	64	+15	79	—	79	+4	83	-83	—	—	—	—	—	—
Preferences Exhausted	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+2	2	+2	4	+18	22	+12	34	+32	66	—
Totals	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—	2012	—

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1906.

PLEASE VOTE.

In this Illustrative Election seven members are to be elected for a single Constituency, such as Leeds. The following twelve Candidates have been nominated :—

Order of Preference.	
1	Acland-Hood, Sir A. Bell, Richard. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Cecil, Lord Hugh Chamberlain, J. Austen
3	Churchill, Winston L. S.
2	Haldane, Richard B. Hardie, J. Keir Henderson, Arthur Law, A. Bonar Snowden, Philip
4	Whittaker, Sir Thomas P.

Instructions to Voters.—Each elector has one vote, and votes :—

(a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate he likes best.

The elector, in addition, is invited to place :—

(b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice.

(c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his third choice, and so on, numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his preference.

As explained on the back of this paper, these additional preferences may, in certain contingencies, count as votes.

This ballot paper should be filled in and returned not later than Monday, December 3rd 1906, to—

JOHN H. HUMPHREYS,
Hon. Sec. Proportional Representation Society,
107, Algernon Road, Lewisham, London, S.E.

ELECTION OF _____

TRANSFER SHEET.

Distribution of Sir H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN's Surplus (258 votes).

Number of papers showing a next preference, 510.

$$\text{Multiplying fraction} = \frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Total of next preferences}} = \frac{258}{510}$$

Names of Candidates.	No. of Papers on which the Candidate is the Next Preference.	No. of Votes Transferred to the Next Preference.	No. of Votes Retained for C. Bannerman's Quota.
Acland-Hood - - - - -	8	4	4
Bell - - - - -	11	5	6
Cecil - - - - -	—	—	—
Churchill - - - - -	191	96	95
Haldane - - - - -	263	133	130
Henderson - - - - -	5	2	3
Law - - - - -	1	—	1
Snowden - - - - -	2	1	1
Whittaker - - - - -	29	14	15
Total of next preferences - -	510	255	255
Preferences exhausted - - -	—	—	—
Total - - - - -	510	255	255

N.B.—Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Keir Hardie being already elected are not taken into account.

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE.

The Object Aimed at.—The object of this method of voting is to enable the different sections of political opinion to elect representatives in fairly accurate proportion to their respective numbers. For this purpose it is necessary that each constituency (or in a municipality, each ward) should return several members.

The Method of Voting.—Each elector, however, has only one vote, and records his vote by marking the figure 1 against the name of the candidate who is his first choice. He need do no more, but in order to secure in the fullest measure that proportionate representation of the several sections of the constituency which is the object of this method, the elector should also place the figures 2, 3, &c., against the names of his second, third, and further choices. The purpose served by these indications of subsequent preferences will presently appear.

The Basis of Election.—A candidate, to ensure his election, must poll a certain proportion of the votes cast, and this proportion is called the "quota." In a constituency returning only one member a candidate who polls more than half the votes is necessarily elected, for no other candidate can possibly obtain so many. The quota in this case therefore is one more than a half. In

a two-member constituency the quota is one more than a third, because not more than two candidates can poll that number; in a three-member constituency one more than a fourth, and so on. In general terms the quota is ascertained by dividing the votes polled by one more than the number of the seats to be filled and adding one to the result.

The Counting of the Votes.—On the conclusion of the poll the ballot papers are sorted into heaps corresponding to the name against which the figure 1 has been marked, and in this way the number of votes recorded for each candidate is ascertained. We may imagine a case where there are six candidates for three seats, and where the result of the sorting is as follows:—

A	is marked 1 upon	1,801	papers, and therefore has	1,801	votes,
B	"	1	"	350	"
C	"	1	"	820	"
D	"	1	"	500	"
E	"	1	"	300	"
F	"	1	"	229	"
Total number of papers				4,000	
Total number of votes				4,000	

The "Quota."—As there are three seats the quota is one more than a fourth of the total of the votes polled. The total in this case is 4,000, and the quota is therefore 1,001.

The Election of "A."—"A" has obtained more than the necessary quota of votes, and he is therefore declared elected.

The Transfer of Surplus Votes.—It will be seen that A has no less than 800 votes more than the quota, and, in the absence of any provision for the use of these votes, A's supporters would not obtain the full share of representation to which they are entitled. The object of marking additional preferences now appears, for the next step is to transfer A's surplus votes in accordance with the wishes of his supporters, and these have indicated their second preferences on the ballot papers. The precise method in which this transfer of votes is carried out will be explained, but for the present it may be assumed that the result of the operation is to transfer—

648	of the 800 surplus votes to	B,	presumably a member of the same party as A,
132	"	800	"
20	"	800	"

The votes transferred to the several candidates are added to those already obtained by them, and the result is as follows:—

B	350 + 648 =	998
C	820 + nil =	820
D	500 + nil =	500
E	300 + 132 =	432
F	229 + 20 =	249

The Exclusion of Candidates lowest on the Poll.—Had any candidate, as a result of the transfer of "A's" surplus votes, been raised above the quota, he would have been declared elected, and his surplus votes distributed in the manner just described. In this case no candidate has, as the result of the transfer, obtained the quota, and there are therefore no further surplus votes to distribute. There are, however, two vacancies still remaining unfilled, and the next step is to distribute the voting papers of F, who, being the lowest on the poll, is clearly out of the running. F's papers are sorted, as in the previous process, according to the candidates who have been marked by the voters as their next preference, and it may be supposed that the result is as follows:—

B	has been marked as the next Preference on	20	papers,
C	"	"	200
D	"	"	29

These papers are added to the heaps of the respective candidates, B, C, and D, and, with these additions, the votes credited to each candidate may be shown thus:—

B	998 + 20 =	1018
C	820 + 200 =	1020
D	500 + 29 =	529
E	432 + nil =	432

B and C Elected.—As B and C have, as a result of the distribution, each obtained a quota of votes, they are declared elected, and as all the vacant seats are now filled the election is at an end.

The Object Attained.—The candidates elected, A, B and C, each represent a "quota" of voters. Each considerable section of the constituency has thus been able to choose a representative, whilst the party to whom A and B presumably belong has returned two Members, these candidates taken together having secured the support of the two "quotas" of voters. The voters who failed to secure a representative, namely the supporters of D and E, number less than a quota.

Note on the Transfer of Votes.—There are two methods by which surplus votes may be transferred. In the case imagined, the simplest way to distribute A's surplus votes is to take the 800 papers last filed and to sort these papers according to the second preferences indicated thereon. It is, however, often objected that if some other 800 voting papers are taken the result may be different, and that in this way an element of chance is introduced. In practice this element of chance is found to be

infinitesimal, but, as provided in the Schedule to the Municipal Representation Bill, it can be eliminated by means of a simple rule of three calculation at every distribution of a surplus. In this Schedule the Returning Officer, instead of taking from A's heap the 800 papers last filed, is instructed to take the whole of the heap, and to sort all the papers according to the second preferences. The result may be shown thus :—

	B has been marked 2 on 1,296 papers	
E	"	264 "
F	"	40 "
Total of papers showing Second Preferences		1,600
Papers on which no Second Preferences are shown		201
Total of A's papers		<u>1,801</u>

The Returning Officer is then instructed to distribute the surplus, and in making this distribution he must transfer to each candidate that number of votes which bears the same proportion to the number of second preferences marked for the candidate as the total number of votes to be transferred bears to the total number of second preferences. In this case there are 800 surplus votes, whilst there are in all 1,600 papers on which second preferences are marked. It is, therefore, clear that each candidate is entitled to one half the papers on which his name has been marked as the second preference. The complete operation may be represented thus :—

Next preferences for B - 1,296	Papers retained for A - 648	Papers transferred to B - 648
" E - 264	" A - 132	" E - 132
" F - 40	" A - 20	" F - 20
Total next preferences - <u>1,600</u>	Total retained - <u>800</u>	Total transferred - <u>800</u>

In this way the numbers of transferred represent in the strictest possible proportion each candidate's share of the surplus, whilst the papers retained for A, together with the 201 papers on which no preferences were shown, constitute A's quota of votes. In practice the proportion will not be so simple as one half, but in any case the actual calculations (multiplying by the surplus and dividing by the total of second preferences) will be but the work of a few minutes.

These calculations are only required in the distribution of a surplus. When a candidate is excluded from the poll *all* his papers are transferred.

APPENDIX D.

PAPERS handed in by Mr. J. H. HUMPHREYS.

I.

NORTHUMBERLAND TEST ELECTION.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

"From the 'Times,' January 26th, 1885."

The counting of the votes recorded in the Northumberland test election, which was got up by the miners of that county with the object of testing the practicability of the particular method of proportional representation advocated by Sir John Lubbock and Mr. Courtney, took place on Saturday, at Seghill, a small pit village in the heart of the mining district of Northumberland. The large attendance of leading Newcastle and county politicians of both parties testified to the interest taken in the election. There were six candidates—Mr. Gladstone, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and Mr. Courtney, Lord Randolph Churchill, Mr. Chaplin and General Gordon; and there were three members to be elected. Mr. Albert Grey, M.P., was the returning officer, and was assisted in the count by 30 miners—a body of utterly untrained men whose hands, accustomed by daily usage to the contact of pickaxe and shovel, were new and strange to the somewhat delicate task of fingering and separating flimsy ballot papers. They had received no instructions before they were assembled in the room as to the duties they would be required to transact, and the expedition, good humour, and correctness with which they got through the several stages of the count justly earned for them the admiration of those who had come from a distance, as well as the compliment which Mr. Grey deservedly paid them at the conclusion of the day's proceedings. The contents of the ballot boxes, 23 in number, were emptied on to a large table in the middle of the room at 12 o'clock. The unopened papers were then shuffled until the returning-officer and the agents representing the different candidates were satisfied. The agents appointed to look after the interests of the different candidates were selected from the secretaries and other leading officials of the Liberal and Conservative political associations for Newcastle, Morpeth, and South Northumberland.

Twelve miners then surrounded the table and proceeded to the work of unfolding the ballot papers. As each man unfolded a paper, he read out loud the name of the candidate against whom the No. 1 was placed, whereupon it was immediately taken from him by a messenger whose sole duty it was to collect from the unfolders the first votes given to a particular candidate, and taken by him to a table, at which all the votes given to that candidate were received and filed. There were thus six tables, one for each of the six candidates. Behind each of these tables sat a "filer," with a row of five files in front of him, whose business it was to put on the row of files, one after another, the papers in the order received. Every fifth ballot paper was thus placed on the same file. As it soon appeared that an overwhelming proportion of the votes was for Mr. Gladstone, the number of Gladstone messengers who plied between the unfolders and the filers was increased, and an additional filer was also at once added, so that the filing of the votes should, if possible, keep up with their rapid incoming. Besides this, as soon as the Gladstone files were full, the papers were removed from them and counted, each file-full, however, being kept separate and marked in order by a letter of the alphabet, so that in all there were 25 files of first votes for Mr. Gladstone. All the votes were filed in one hour and ten minutes after the work of unfolding and filing had commenced. The votes were then counted, and after some delay caused by the largeness of Mr. Gladstone's majority, Mr. Grey declared that the number of first votes received by each candidate was as follows:—Mr. Gladstone, 4,427; Sir W. Lawson, 664; Lord R. Churchill, 581; Mr. Courtney, 384; General Gordon, 286; Mr. Chaplin, 259—making a total of good and effective votes of 6,601. There were, in addition, 44 spoilt votes, owing to the voters having put the figure 1 against two candidates and some additional spoilt votes in consequence of marks leading to the identification of the voter, two or three voters having signed their name, another voter having written the word "Madman" against Lord R. Churchill, and another voter having written on his ballot paper the words, "I, Peter Pirnie, propose a vote of censure on Gray or Grey."

The total number of good votes being 6,601, the returning officer declared the returning number to be 1,651, which figure was arrived at by dividing 6,601 by four—viz., one more than the number of representatives to be elected, and adding one. He then declared Mr. Gladstone to be elected, as he had received 4,427 first votes—i. e., 2,776 votes over and above the required number of 1,651.

Before Mr. Gladstone's 2,776 surplus votes were distributed, Mr. Grey said that it was his intention to distribute them in three several batches, in order that they might have an opportunity of testing the value of the objection arising out of the element of chance which was so frequently brought forward against the system of the single transferable vote by its opponents. The 1,651

votes which had been filed first for Mr. Gladstone were then placed aside as Mr. Gladstone's constituency, and the remaining 2,776 votes were divided into three groups, in the order in which they had been filed, numbering respectively 995, 1,006, and 775.

This was the interesting part of the election, the sceptics, following Sir Henry James's recent criticism at Bury, believing that one batch of votes would show that Mr. Gladstone's second votes would be distributed in a different proportion between the five remaining candidates to the way in which they would be distributed in the second and third batch of votes, while the advocates of the plan were confident that by the law of averages it was certain that when dealing with large figures the votes would be divided in almost identical proportions between the five candidates in all three batches.

The result of the distribution proved a thorough justification of the confidence of the Proportionalists.

Mr. Gladstone's 2,776 surplus votes were distributed as follows:—

	First Batch of 995 Votes.	Second Batch of 1,006 Votes.	Third Batch of 775 Votes.	Total.
Chaplin	13	5	3	21
Churchill	22	21	23	66
Courtney	167	168	136	471
Gordon	262	264	194	720
Lawson	416	426	340	1,182
Wasted through having no second preference— i.e., Gladstone plumpers	107	122	79	308
Spoilt through the figure 2 being written against two candidates	2	1	—	3
				2,771

It will thus be observed that the 2,776 votes supposed to have been left for distribution gave, on distribution, a total of only 2,771.

This showed a disparity of six votes, the first batch of 995 votes, on distribution, being found to number only 989. This was the only error throughout the whole of the count, which when we consider the character of the men employed on the counting, and their strangeness to their task, and the rapidity with which they got through it, cannot be looked upon as casting any reflection upon the otherwise most satisfactory and accurate manner in which the count was conducted. It will be observed that the first batch of 995 gave 167 votes to Courtney, 262 to Gordon, and 416 to Lawson; the second batch of 1,006—168 to Courtney, 264 to Gordon, and 426 to Lawson; and the third batch of 775—136 to Courtney, 194 to Gordon, and 340 to Lawson—i.e., almost identical proportions in all three cases. Mr. Grey regretted that the time at their disposal did not allow them to examine how the 1,651 votes set apart for Mr. Gladstone were marked, but arrangements were made in the room for the inspection of these votes at the Liberal Club, Newcastle, on Monday afternoon. Mr. Grey then declared Sir Wilfrid Lawson elected, his score being brought up by the transfer of 1,182 second votes from Mr. Gladstone to 1,846—viz., 195 above the returning number, 1,651. The 195 votes which were last allotted to Sir W. Lawson were then removed from his file, and distributed as follows:—4 to Chaplin, making his score 284; 3 to Churchill, making his score 650; 88 to Courtney, making his score 943; and 68 to Gordon, making his score 1,074; while 32 votes were exhausted, owing to the voters having only given two preferences—viz., Gladstone 1, and Lawson 2.

* NOTE.—Actually 987, allowing for the error of 6 and 2 voting papers spoilt. The percentages of the three batches are as follows:—

	1st Batch 987 Votes.	2nd Batch 1,006 Votes	3rd Batch 775 Votes.
Courtney	16.9	16.7	17.6
Gordon	26.5	26.1	25.
Lawson	42.1	42.6	43.9

As Sir Wilfrid Lawson's surplus votes brought up the figure of none of the remaining candidates to the quota, 1,651, Mr. Grey declared Mr. Chaplin, who stood lowest on the poll, as not elected, and ordered his votes to be distributed in the way indicated by the papers. The result of this distribution was to give:—178 to Churchill, making his score 828; 35 to Courtney, making his score 978; and 28 to Gordon, making his score 1,102, 42 votes being exhausted owing to the voters not having given a sufficient number of preferences. Mr. Grey then declared Lord Randolph

Churchill, who was lowest on the list, not elected, and his votes being distributed gave:—180 to Courtney, making his score 1,158; 354 to Gordon, making his score 1,456, 294 votes being exhausted through insufficient marking. Mr. Grey then declared General Gordon, who stood highest of the two remaining candidates, to be elected, along with Mr. Gladstone and Sir Wilfrid Lawson.

Mr. Spence Watson, the Chairman of the Newcastle Liberal Association, moved a vote of thanks to Mr. Grey, and expressed his admiration of the fair and open and satisfactory way in which the election had been conducted. This vote was seconded by Mr. Plummer, Secretary of the Newcastle Conservative Association.

Mr. Grey, in returning thanks for the vote, which was most warmly given, claimed that Mr. S. Neil, the Secretary both of the Miners' Political Association and of the North of England Proportional Representation League, should participate in the vote, inasmuch as it was in great measure owing to his practical foresight, which had enabled him to make arrangements to meet and triumphantly overcome every difficulty which might present itself, that the count had been so thoroughly successful; and then proceeded to thank in his turn his minor assistants who had given such efficient aid in demonstrating how easy the system of election by the single transferable vote was, not only to the voter at the polling booth but also to the returning officer at the count. It is only necessary to add that the arrangement for securing a thorough and effective shuffle of the voting papers were very simple and admirably successful. There were three distinct shuffles—(1) the mixing of the unopened papers on the tables during the pleasure of the returning officer and candidates' agent; (2) the more effective shuffle caused by the joint action of 12 unfolders at work at different parts of the table, and the simultaneous gathering of the papers from the different unfolders by the messengers of the different candidates; (3) the most effective shuffle of all, caused by the dealing out of the first votes in the order they were placed on the five separate files.

It may be further added that the files were a most valuable aid. By their means all the votes were kept together in admirable order and were carefully preserved, so as to render a recount for the purpose of verification easy and possible.

II.

RESULTS OF LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS.

NOVEMBER 1ST, 1906.

TOTALS FOR LONDON.

Party.	Votes.	Seats obtained.	Seats in proportion to votes.
Municipal Reformers	994,462	959	717
Progressives	712,625	272	514
Majority of Municipal Reformers over Progressives	281,837	687	203

On an average a Municipal Reformer Councillor represents 1,037 votes, whilst a Progressive Councillor represents 2,612 votes, or two and a-half times as many as his colleague.

NOVEMBER 1906.

*BOROUGHs in which either Progressives or Municipal Reformers are without Representation.

Borough.	Votes.				Seats obtained.			
	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Lab.	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Lab.
Bethnal Green - - - -	11,416	19,430	—	—	—	30	—	—
Fulham - - - - -	35,500	15,118	1,212	6,347	36	—	—	—
Lewisham - - - - -	45,305	19,489	1,160	5,205	42	—	—	—
Wandsworth - - - -	95,757	27,733	16,347	3,790	58	—	2	—

* This Table does not show the total strength of the minorities, as in several wards they failed to nominate a full list of candidates.

NOVEMBER 1906.

BOROUGHs in which the minorities are considerably under-represented.

Borough.	Seats obtained.			
	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Lab.
Deptford - - - - -	30	1	5	—
Islington - - - - -	58	2	—	—
Chelsea - - - - -	33	3	—	—
Lambeth - - - - -	55	4	—	1
Holborn - - - - -	37	4	1	—
St. Marylebone - - -	51	5	4	—
Westminster - - - -	53	5	2	—
Kensington - - - - -	43	5	6	6
Greenwich - - - - -	20	5	5	—
Totals - - - - -	380	34	23	7

BOROUGHs in which violent changes in Representation have taken place.

Borough.	Seats obtained in 1903.				Seats obtained in 1906.			
	Mod.	Prog.	Ind.	Labour.	Mun. Reform.	Prog.	Ind.	Labour.
Camberwell - - - - -	9	45	6	—	43	11	6	—
Finsbury - - - - -	19	32	3	—	34	14	6	—
Fulham - - - - -	16	18	—	2	36	—	—	—
Islington - - - - -	26	34	—	—	58	2	—	—
Lambeth - - - - -	34	26	—	—	55	4	—	1
Lewisham - - - - -	6	34	2	—	42	—	—	—
St. Pancras - - - - -	20	40	—	—	48	12	—	—
Stepney - - - - -	21	23	16	—	42	14	4	—
Wandsworth - - - - -	42	18	—	—	58	—	2	—
Woolwich - - - - -	8	—	3	25	23	—	1	12
Totals - - - - -	201	270	30	27	439	57	19	13

THE BATTERSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1906.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

In this Borough the Progressives, although they polled 7,636 fewer votes than the Municipal Reformers, obtained a majority of the seats.

Ward.	Votes.				Seats obtained.			
	Municipal Reformers.	Progressives.	Independents.	Socialists.	Municipal Reformers.	Progressives.	Independents.	Socialists.
Nine Elms - -	9,188	10,559	—	—	1	8	—	—
Park Ward - -	4,830	5,054	—	—	1	5	—	—
Latchmere - -	5,893	6,107	—	347	2	4	—	—
Shaftesbury - -	4,579	5,344	—	—	—	6	—	—
Church Ward - -	5,143	5,497	—	259	2	4	—	—
Winstanley - -	4,740	4,589	—	1,548	3	3	—	—
St. John - - -	2,124	605	—	—	3	—	—	—
Bolingbroke - -	8,993	4,729	—	—	6	—	—	—
Broomwood - -	8,420	3,790	3,590	—	6	—	—	—
Totals - - -	53,910	46,274	3,590	2,154	24	30	Nil.	Nil.

TOTALS FOR THE BOROUGH.

Party.	Votes.	Seats obtained.	Seats in proportion to Votes.
Municipal Reformers - - - - -	53,910	24	27
Progressives - - - - -	46,274	30	24
Independents - - - - -	3,590	—	2
Socialists - - - - -	2,154	—	1
Totals - - - - -	105,928	54	54

THE WANDSWORTH BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS.

NOVEMBER, 1906.

The full details of the voting in this Borough are here given. The majority obtained *all* the seats in every Ward save that of Tooting, whilst the Progressives did not contest either the Putney or the Streatham Wards, although each Ward has nine representatives.

Ward.	* Votes.				Seats obtained.			
	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Soc. and Lab.	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Soc. and Lab.
Clapham N. - - - - -	1,728	1,153	—	337	—	—	—	—
	1,715	1,145	—	330	—	—	—	—
	1,714	1,104	—	274	—	—	—	—
	1,712	1,099	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,705	1,038	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,652	1,013	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	297	—	—	—	—	—	—
	10,226	6,849	—	941	6	—	—	—
Clapham S. - - - - -	2,005	1,361	222	—	—	—	—	—
	1,985	1,313	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,945	1,287	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,915	1,274	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,879	1,266	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,812	1,211	—	—	—	—	—	—
	11,541	7,712	222	—	6	—	—	—
	No contest.			—	9	—	—	—
Putney - - - - -	No contest.			—	9	—	—	—
Streatham - - - - -	2,820	—	624	—	—	—	—	—
	2,789	—	583	—	—	—	—	—
	2,764	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,764	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,755	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,754	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,735	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,732	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2,709	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	24,822	—	1,207	—	9	—	—	—
Southfield - - - - -	1,856	887	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,848	854	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,844	830	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,763	794	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,744	792	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,706	766	—	—	—	—	—	—
	10,781	4,923	—	—	6	—	—	—

The Wandsworth Borough Council Elections.—November 1906—*continued.*

Ward.	Votes.				Seats obtained.			
	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Soc. and Lab.	Mun. Ref.	Prog.	Ind.	Soc. and Lab.
Springfield	1,514	922	766	356	—	—	—	—
	1,494	905	—	321	—	—	—	—
	1,438	842	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,409	801	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,390	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,327	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	8,572	3,470	766	677	6	—	—	—
Fairfield	1,381	914	—	558	—	—	—	—
	1,286	872	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,228	849	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,227	811	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,167	712	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,147	621	—	—	—	—	—	—
	7,436	4,779	—	558	6	—	—	—
Tooting	586	—	624	473	—	—	—	—
	507	—	596	469	—	—	—	—
	440	—	486	442	—	—	—	—
	—	—	359	94	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	77	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	59	—	—	—	—
	1,533	—	2,065	1,614	1	—	2	—
Balham	2,447	—	1,363	—	—	—	—	—
	2,446	—	1,305	—	—	—	—	—
	2,390	—	1,276	—	—	—	—	—
	2,349	—	1,211	—	—	—	—	—
	2,265	—	1,168	—	—	—	—	—
	2,258	—	1,167	—	—	—	—	—
	2,238	—	1,159	—	—	—	—	—
	2,315	—	1,148	—	—	—	—	—
	2,158	—	1,131	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	728	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	431	—	—	—	—	—
	20,866	—	12,087	—	9	—	—	—

The Wandsworth Borough Council Elections.—November 1906—*continued*.

* TOTALS FOR THE BOROUGH.

Parties.	Votes.	Seats obtained.
Municipal Reformers	95,757	58
Progressives	27,733	nil.
Independents	16,347	2
Labour and Socialists	3,790	nil.
Totals	143,627	60
Majority of Municipal Reformers over other parties	47,887	58

* This table understates the strength of the minorities. The figures include the 24,822 votes polled by the Municipal Reformers in the Streatham Ward, a ward which was not contested by the Progressives.

APPENDIX (E).

PAPER handed in by Mr. GILBERT SLATER.

WOOLWICH BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS.

[N.B.—There are in the Borough of Woolwich ten wards returning three members each, in which each voter has three votes, and one ward returning six members, in which each voter has six votes. The number of voters of each party is calculated by dividing the number of votes for the ten three-member wards by three, and that for the six-member ward by six.]

1900.

	Moderate Party.	Labour or Progressive Party.
Votes cast - - - - -	18,628	13,653
Voters - - - - -	5,602	4,292
Councillors actually returned - - - - -	26	10
Votes required to return a Councillor - - - - -	716	1,365
Correct representation according to voting strength -	22 (21.9)	14 (14.1)

1903.

	Moderate Party.	Labour Party.
Votes cast - - - - -	16,637	23,541
Voters - - - - -	4,886	7,546
Councillors actually returned - - - - -	11	25
Votes required to return a Councillor - - - - -	1,512	942
Correct representation according to voting strength -	15 (14.9)	21 (21.1)

1906.

	Moderate Party.	Labour Party.
Votes cast - - - - -	29,334	23,226
Voters - - - - -	8,854	7,225
Councillors actually returned - - - - -	23	13
Votes required to return a Councillor - - - - -	1,128	1,787
Correct representation according to voting strength -	20 (20.1)	16 (15.9)

SUMMARY.

The 1900 Election resulted in a *Moderate majority* of 16. By proportional Representation the majority should have been 8.

The 1903 Election resulted in a *Labour majority* of 14. It should have been 6.

The 1906 Election resulted in a *Moderate majority* of 10. It should have been 4.

In each case the actual majority was at least twice as large as it should have been.

In 1900, in Woolwich Parish, 2,996 Progressive votes failed to return a single Councillor; 6,712 Moderate votes returned 15 Councillors.

In 1903, in Plumstead Parish, 8,121 Moderate votes returned only one Councillor; 16,610 Labour votes returned 17 Councillors.

In 1906, in Woolwich Parish, 6,147 Labour votes returned only one Councillor; 9,762 Moderate votes returned 14 Councillors.
