

INDIAN ECONOMICS

By the same authors

INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS

PART I: ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS

PART II: ELEMENTS OF INDIAN ECONOMICS

ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS

INDIAN ECONOMICS

A Comprehensive and Critical Survey

BY

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
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PREFACE

The pace of economic development in India has been quickened appreciably in recent years, especially since the outbreak of war in September 1939. Although less than three years have elapsed since the last edition of this volume was published, extensive changes have had to be made in almost every chapter. In revising the volume for this sixth edition opportunity has been taken to bring facts and figures up to date and to review the economic position in India in relation to recent world trends, especially after the 'recession' of 1937-8 and the commencement of the present world conflict.

In Chapter I, 'Industrialization: Means and Methods', the adjustments of the policy of discriminate protection to the conditions created by the war and the new official schemes of training war technicians have been noticed. In Chapter II, 'Industries: Old and New', the acceleration of the pace of industrialization of the country, stimulated by the war, and its effects on the several major industries of the country have been indicated. As regards cottage industries, recent measures of State Aid and the series of useful recommendations made by the Bombay Industrial and Economic Survey Committee (1938-40) have been reviewed. In Chapter III, 'Industrial Labour', the progress made by labour legislation, especially in the Bombay province, and the reactions of the war on the relation between capital and labour and on the economic condition of the industrial worker in this country have been dealt with. Owing to the delay in the publication of the final report of the Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee, the main recommendations made by that body have been surveyed in Appendix I at the end of the present volume. In Chapter IV, 'The National Dividend', the latest estimate of India's national income as given by Dr V. K. R. V. Rao has been discussed. In Chapter V, 'Transport', the effects of the present war on India's transport system with special reference to railway transport and finances and the three great projects, viz., the shipbuilding yard, the aircraft factory and the proposed automobile factory have been examined. In Chapter VI, 'The Trade of India', the effects of the war on India's foreign trade and balance of trade have been noticed, and the findings of the Gregory-Meek trade mission to the United States of America have been scrutinized. The two chapters on Currency and Exchange (VII and VIII) have been brought up to date, and the effects of the war on the currency

and exchange situation in the country have been fully discussed. In Chapter IX, 'Prices in India', the course of Indian prices in relation to world prices after the 'recession', more particularly since the beginning of the war and its effects on Indian economy have been surveyed, and the pros and cons of the price control policy of the Government have been examined. In Chapter X, 'Banking and Credit', various recent happenings in the sphere of Indian banking, such as the South Indian Banking Crisis (1938), the proposals of the Reserve Bank for an Indian Bank Act etc. have been reviewed, as also the reactions of the war on the Indian money market and the banking system. The revised Chapter XI, 'Finance and Taxation', deals with the financial position of the provinces after the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy, the working of the Niemeyer Award, the introduction of new provincial taxes such as the Sales Tax, and the fortunes of Central (General) and Railway finances as reflected in recent budgets, especially since the beginning of the present war. The discussion of changes in income-tax under the Income Tax Amendment Act of 1939, war-time taxation and borrowing, the position of the defence budget in recent years and the scheme for the repatriation of India's sterling debt, is a special feature of the revised Chapter on Finance and Taxation. In Chapter XII, 'Unemployment', reference has been made to the recent scheme of the Government of Bombay for providing for vocational education for boys who have no aptitude for higher literary studies. In the last Chapter, 'Indo-British and other Trade Agreements', the new Indo-British Trade Agreement of 1939 has been scrutinized, the Indo-Burma Trade Agreement (1941) outlined and evaluated, and recent (1939-40) negotiations for a fresh Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement, which have since been abandoned *sine die*, have been reviewed.

Bombay
September, 1941

G. B. JATHAR
S. G. BERI

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CHAPTER I

INDUSTRIALIZATION : MEANS AND METHODS

§1. **The main argument for protection in India.**—Among the measures advocated for promoting industrialization in India, the first place is generally accorded to a definitely protective tariff, and in support of protection in this country, the main emphasis is placed on what is called the infant industry argument. It is assumed that under protection a large number of industries will spring up and, if assured of reasonable profits during the early years of development, they will rapidly grow in strength and efficiency so that they will be able eventually to dispense with all artificial aid, and that the loss entailed during the initial stages of development will be more than covered by the ultimate advantage to the nation. The Fiscal Commission quote with approval the following words of Professor A. C. Pigou, pointing out their obvious applicability to India : ‘The case for protection with a view to building up productive power is strong in any agricultural country which seems to possess natural advantages for manufacturing. In such a country the immediate loss arising from the check to the exchange of native produce for foreign manufactures may well be outweighed by the gain from the greater rapidity with which the home manufacturing power is developed. The “ crutches to teach the new manufactures to walk ”, as Colbert called protective duties, may teach them this so much earlier than they would have learnt it, if left to themselves, that the cost of the crutches is more than repaid.’¹

§2. **Protection and diversification of industry.**—The development of a varied type of industry is in itself a desirable goal as affording a field for the employment of different grades of skill and as having a salutary influence on the national character, and in so far as protection leads to such development we have another argument in its favour. It would, however, seem needless for this country to undergo any special sacrifice for the express object of securing a sufficient diversification of industries, as this object will be incidentally fulfilled even if protection is extended only to those industries which will eventually be able to discard it.

§3. **Protection and national self-sufficiency.**—Protection is sometimes advocated on the ground that it can be used for making a country economically self-sufficient. It may, however, be

¹ *Fiscal Commission Report*, par. 74.

pointed out that those who are in favour of protection are also for encouraging exports by every possible means. But this is clearly incompatible with the ideal of self-sufficiency as imports must increase *pari passu* with exports. Apart from this consideration, it may be questioned whether national self-sufficiency is any more desirable an ideal than individual self-sufficiency. As Dr Edwin Cannan remarks, 'the superlative protectionist is the hermit who declines to buy anything from his neighbours'.¹ And a hermit nation is no more worthy of admiration than a hermit individual. Generally speaking, the ideal of self-sufficiency should be pursued only within the limits set by the principle of comparative cost, and protection thought of only in connexion with those industries in which a country possesses undoubted natural advantages.

The doctrine of national self-sufficiency is often supported from the standpoint of national defence. National safety, it is argued, requires that a country should aim at economic independence even if this should entail a permanent burden on the community. It may indeed be feasible and desirable to sacrifice economic considerations and to nurse certain industries for the avowed purpose of national defence. And yet it would be unwise to try to regulate the whole of the normal peace economy on a war basis. The fact that India is a huge country possessing varied resources brings self-sufficiency more within the bounds of practicability for her than, for example, for a country like Great Britain. But it is neither possible nor desirable that she should be completely independent of other countries for the satisfaction of all her wants during peace and war.

The following extracts from Mr Aldous Huxley's book, *Ends and Means*, are interesting as illustrating a new point of view on the subject of national self-sufficiency: 'For the sake of prestige and out of fear of what might happen during war-time, most governments now desire, whatever the cost and however great the natural handicaps, to produce within their own territory as many as possible of the commodities produced more easily elsewhere. Nor is this all: the progress of technology has made it possible for governments to fulfil such wishes, at any rate to a considerable extent, in practice The influence of nationalistic idolatry is now so strong that every contact between nations threatens to produce discord. Accordingly, the less we have to do with one another, the more likely are we to keep the peace.'

§4. **Protection and public revenue.**—Apart from rapid industrial development, other advantages are also claimed for protection.

¹ *Economic Journal* (March 1919), p. 79.

It is said, for example, that protection will have a salutary effect on the public revenues. To say the least, however, this is highly problematical. If, before levying protective duties, certain commodities were being admitted free of duty, it is obvious that so far the income from customs duties will increase. On the other hand, however, the inevitable rise in prices will decrease the taxable capacity of the consumers. If it is a case of raising an existing duty on the imported article for purposes of protection, the effect on the revenue will depend on the quantity that continues to be imported in spite of the higher duty. If the duty is really effective, the imports ought to contract rapidly with corresponding diminution of revenue and consequential difficulties in connexion with the balancing of the Government's budget.¹ In any case, it would always be necessary to make some deduction on account of the smaller taxable capacity of the consumers. It is further conceivable that protection, by concentrating wealth in the hands of a small number of people engaged in the favoured industries, may increase the yield of direct taxes like income-tax; the larger yield from the higher incomes may outweigh the reduced yield from the taxes on the smaller incomes, direct as well as indirect. The net result of protection on revenue depends on so many complex factors that it is impossible to predict with confidence whether the revenue will gain or lose.

These considerations apply to short-period results. If, however, we take a sufficiently long period for the protective duties to work out their full effects and if we assume that they have been wisely levied, the public revenue ought certainly to benefit in the long run from the enrichment of the country and the greater taxable capacity of the people.

§5. **Strong sentiment for protection in India.**—The policy of free trade until recently pursued by the Government was particularly unpopular owing to the suspicion that the open door in India was favoured by England, not so much in India's as in her own interests. The way in which Lancashire was allowed to meddle from time to time with fiscal and industrial policy in this country strengthened this attitude of distrust. Further, the memories of bygone days, when India was renowned for her manufactures, added poignancy to the natural regret felt by patriotic Indians contemplating her present insignificant position as an industrial nation. Other countries like the United States, Germany, and

¹ For example, the protection to sugar, textiles and matches having been found to entail a loss of revenue, the policy of excise duties on sugar and matches had to be adopted in the Budget of 1934-5.

above all Japan, appeared to have prospered exceedingly under, and because of, protection; and arguments, however plausible, that their prosperity was mainly due to quite other causes and that protection was rather an impediment than a help to their industrial development, failed to carry conviction. It was pointed out that England herself had discarded protection only when her pre-eminence in industry had been securely established and that anyhow the beginnings of the free trade regime in England aimed at assisting industry by withdrawing protection from agriculture. Lastly, since 1915 England herself has drifted steadily into a policy of protection and it now scarcely lies in her mouth to preach free trade to India.

The enormous increase of public expenditure after the war of 1914-18 had already compelled our Government very greatly to increase duties on imports—a procedure which was unintentionally protective as regards many manufactures. Such protection being 'casual and haphazard' was bound to carry with it certain undesirable consequences. It gave shelter without any assurance of a permanent policy and not necessarily to industries which deserved it. High customs duties intended for revenue but accidentally protective may, far from accelerating India's development, actually hinder it very seriously, for example by taxing raw materials and semi-manufactured articles. These circumstances may be said to have facilitated the advent of conscious and deliberate protection in this country. However it was not adopted, and it would have been wrong if it had been adopted as a kind of *pis aller*. Protection was introduced for the positive benefits expected from it and not merely as an escape from a system of unintentionally protective revenue duties.

§6. **The cost of protection.**—The doctrine of protection possesses a certain persuasive plausibility, and its appeal is instant to the man in the street not accustomed to economic analysis. In order, however, that protection should be used to the best advantage, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the various kinds of sacrifice it involves, and an intelligent attempt must be made to minimize the sacrifice. In the first place, protection will necessarily increase the cost of living. The consumers will suffer as well as those industries which are not protected, owing to increase of expenses. The burden imposed on unprotected industries is commonly ignored and that is one of the reasons why protection finds ready adherents amongst the uninstructed public.¹

¹ 'For every plus there must be a minus; perhaps people are protectionists merely because it is generally easier to see one plus than a multitude of

Wages may rise with the cost of living but generally they do not rise as fast as prices. Although the skilled labourer, especially in the protected industry, will benefit, the unskilled labourers, on account of their excessive numbers, will probably be worse off as the result of protection. The wages of the agricultural labourer may also rise, particularly in the neighbourhood of industrial centres, but it is doubtful whether they will quite overtake the increased cost of living. As regards the owner-cultivator, his expenses will be greater owing to the higher wages of any outside labour he may employ and the higher prices for his implements. On the other hand, he will get more for the produce he sells. But if he has not much surplus to sell, he will lose by protection. The middle classes will undoubtedly be the losers under a protective system, for their incomes will not rise in proportion to or as fast as the increase in prices. The middle classes, however, have been the strongest supporters of protection in this country. To some extent, no doubt, that is because their education and enlightenment enable them to take a broad national view of protection. They welcome it in the interests of industrial advancement and are prepared cheerfully to face the harder life which it must mean to them as a class. But their enthusiasm for protection is also largely the product of ignorance and incapacity to realize vividly its inconveniences. When, however, it has been in actual operation for some time and produces the expected consequence of enhanced prices, the enthusiasm of the middle classes for protection will sensibly cool off.¹

§7. Discriminate protection.—The policy of Discriminate Protection as adopted in India aims at giving the necessary stimulus to industrial development while minimizing the burden on the community. This involves granting protection only to industries which are proved to be suitable, and insistence on the adoption of efficient methods as one of the necessary conditions of admission to the benefits of protection. Wise discrimination is essential in the best interests of the industries themselves. High duties indiscriminately levied on imports are likely to stimulate a host

minuses.—C. H. Oldham's article 'Industrial Ireland under Free Trade' in the *Economic Journal* (June 1917).

¹ For a very interesting analysis of the tax-burden associated with tariff duties see T. E. Gregory and W. R. Natu, *The Burden of the Indian Tariff* (Studies in Indian Economics Series issued by the Office of the Economic Adviser). The authors conclude that the weight of import duties presses most heavily on goods of general consumption because some goods in this group are heavily taxed to give protection to supplies produced at home.

of weak and inefficient enterprises. Their inevitable collapse will shake the confidence of capital, which is essential for steady industrial progress. They are also likely to unsettle labour because it will be attracted from the sound to the unsound industries in the period of unhealthy boom caused by indiscriminate protection and will be involved in the ruin sure to overtake them sooner or later.

The following general principles of discriminate protection, as enunciated by the Fiscal Commission, have been adopted for the guidance of the Tariff Board—a body first appointed in 1924 to consider the claims for protection put forward by different industries from time to time.

(i) The industry must be one possessing natural advantages, such as an abundant supply of raw materials, cheap power, a sufficient supply of labour, and a large home market.

(ii) The industry must be one which, without the help of protection, is either not likely to develop at all or is not likely to develop so rapidly as is desirable in the interests of the country.

(iii) The industry must be one which will eventually be able to face world competition without protection.

Other subsidiary suggestions are that industries subject to the law of increasing returns as well as those which promise, before long, to satisfy the entire needs of the country should generally be regarded as fit subjects for protection. On the other hand, as a general rule, an industry which can never meet more than an insignificant proportion of the home demand, should not receive protection. Protection of one industry may possibly injure another; but it should not necessarily be refused to an industry on this ground for there may be a net advantage on the whole.

Protection may sometimes have to be resorted to or increased as a measure against dumping. When dumping is clearly proved to exist and to be injuring some industry whose prosperity is a matter of national concern, a special dumping duty may be necessary. Similar action may be justified against the goods of a country whose currency is seriously depreciated, enabling it to export them at prices which are excessively low in terms of a relatively stable foreign currency. Lastly, bounty-fed articles coming from abroad may necessitate special measures of protection and there is already legal provision in this country for dealing with such a contingency. Act XIV of 1899 provides that 'where any country pays directly or indirectly any bounty upon export, the Governor-General-in-Council may, by notification in the

Gazette of India, impose an additional duty on importation into India equal to the net amount of such bounty'.¹

In the opinion of the Fiscal Commission the industries that will be found to deserve protection will generally be young industries. They recognize, however, that occasionally cases may arise where protection even to a strong and well-developed industry may be justifiable so as to enable it to recover from temporary depression due to causes beyond its control. No universal and dogmatic rule can, therefore, be laid down as regards the stage of development at which protection is justified.

In the case of absolutely new industries, however, the Commissioners think that it would be running too great a risk to grant protection relying on 'the anticipations of the promoters' of the new venture rather than on actual facts. But even in dealing with existing industries, it will not be possible altogether to avoid the traffic in anticipations and uncertainties. The speculative element would be greater when it is proposed to extend protection to an industry in order that it may develop some new branch. The Commissioners do not look with disfavour on the policy of protecting an industry on this ground.² It is thus clear that the element of uncertainty will always be present in a greater or less degree in every case where protection is demanded. It may happen, however, that even in the case of an absolutely new industry, reliable data available in other countries where it has been securely established, may be of such a character as to leave no reasonable doubt about its success here. The Fiscal Commission think that generally in the case of new industries, protection will not only be objectionable but unnecessary, as the financial necessities of Government will compel the retention of a general level of fairly high revenue duties and this will give all the protection that is necessary at the start. But this rather underrates the difficulties of making a start and loses sight of the fact that, in some cases, the beginnings may present far greater difficulties than the later stages of development and may require assurance of substantial help from the State before an industry, otherwise promising, can be started at all. The principle of the Government assisting new ventures by providing the necessary guarantees for a bank granting accommodation (see

¹ Under the Safeguarding of Industries Act passed in April 1933 the Governor-General-in-Council was empowered to impose additional duties in all cases in which he was satisfied that foreign goods were being imported at such abnormally low prices as to threaten the existence of an established industry. The Act expired on 31 March 1935.

² See *Fiscal Commission Report*, par. 100.

§18 below), which has been favourably received in most quarters, is not essentially different from the principle of giving consideration to them with a view to protection. The main point involved in each case is whether the industry satisfies the general conditions laid down above. However, the Fiscal Commission's suggestion that bounties should be the rule rather than a protective tariff in the case of new industries, seems sound because so long as an industry is not supplying any considerable proportion of the total needs of the country, a protective duty will entail too heavy a burden on the consumer. Basic industries or 'key industries', i.e. industries whose products are utilized as raw materials which are indispensable for other important industries, have been recognized as deserving of special consideration.

After it is decided to grant protection to an industry, the next important question is to settle the rate of protection. The industry should not be protected so heavily that it ceases to exert itself any further. What is really wanted is a stimulant and not an opiate. The task of fixing upon a rate of duty that is just sufficient and not too much or too little, is most difficult. It will be necessary to make sure that the relatively higher costs of production in India are not wholly due to inefficiency or other easily preventable causes. Again, for comparing the costs of production in India and foreign countries, average firms will have to be taken and not more than ordinarily efficient or more than ordinarily inefficient firms.¹ The rate of protection must also be considered in relation to the convenience of the consumer. A high rate may have the advantage of bringing about a rapid development, but it may have to be low none the less, so as to prevent an undue rise of prices, and a comparatively slow development may have to be accepted as the lesser evil.

The adoption of the policy of discriminate protection has, according to some critics, led in practice to an indiscriminate refusal to protect on the part of the Government. If, however, it is true that the Government have been unduly cautious, the fault cannot be laid at the door of the principles of discriminate protection, which are opposed not only to *too much* protection but also *too little* protection. The tendency towards an unduly strict and ungenerous interpretation of the principles of discriminate protection can no doubt be corrected to some

¹ To get an idea of the complexity of cost analysis, the reader should refer to Sir J. C. Coyajee, *The Indian Fiscal Problem*, pp. 36-7; V. G. Kale, *Economics of Protection in India*; C. N. Vakil and M. C. Munshi, *Industrial Policy of India with Special Reference to Customs Tariff*, pp. 82-5; and the various reports of the Tariff Board.

extent by phrasing them somewhat differently. For example, the condition regarding the availability of abundant raw material within the country itself may safely be omitted. At the same time it must be admitted that the decisions of the Central Government will always remain suspect until its character is changed so as to make it truly national in outlook. Essentially therefore the problem is more political than economic.

§8. **Need for war-time adjustment of the policy of discriminate protection.**—The present war has brought into prominence the question of relaxing the conditions for the grant of protection laid down by the Fiscal Commission, and the Indian business community has for some time been pressing the Government of India to announce a liberal war-time policy of protection. The Government of India have emphasized the difficulties of a general pronouncement, but in a Notification issued in June 1940 they announce that they are prepared to consider the question of assuring specified industries, the starting of which is considered essential under the conditions created by the war, of such measure of protection against unfair competition from outside India *after* the war as may be necessary to enable them to continue their existence after the war. This notification had special reference to the grant of an assurance to the steel pipe and tubes industry. There is however a demand that industries not directly affected by the war but for the starting of which the conditions created by the war are favourable, should also be given an assurance of protection after the war.¹

§9. **Dangers of protection.**—The Fiscal Commission refer approvingly to Lala Harkishen Lal's maxim, 'Nurse the baby, protect the child and free the adult', as a good summary of the correct principles of protection. The last part of this dictum, namely the freeing of the adult, presents one of the toughest problems of protection, because the adult is apt to kick and otherwise make himself unpleasant if an attempt is made to 'free' him from his protectionist fetters which he finds very comfortable on the whole. When an industry comes under protection, it will naturally try to retain the advantage as long as possible, and one of the methods it may adopt is to disguise its prosperity and make a show of infantine helplessness. The other method is to bring political influence to bear upon the authority invested with the power of lessening or withdrawing the duty. To fix in advance a definite period for protection is not practicable, because the conditions affecting the industry cannot be counted

¹ See *Journal of the Indian Merchants' Chamber*, September 1940.

upon to remain unchanged. If conditions are fundamentally changed, it will be necessary to reconsider the position and possibly extend the period of protection.

The Fiscal Commission express the view that the only way of maintaining satisfactory control would be for the Tariff Board to review periodically the position of the protected industry and make reasoned recommendations as to whether the duty should be continued or withdrawn and, if continued, whether the rate should be modified.

It is necessary to choose the personnel of the Tariff Board with the greatest possible care. The success of the protectionist experiment depends on the manner in which this body works, for the Tariff Board has been erected into a kind of *deus ex machina* which is expected to solve every difficulty that will arise in giving practical effect to the policy of protection.¹

In most countries which have adopted protection, tariff legislation is the resultant of the struggle of interested cliques and rarely follows a definite intelligent plan conceived in the interests of the country as a whole. The Fiscal Commission, however, point out that the danger of political corruption is not so great in India as in some other countries on account of the variety of interests represented in the Legislature and the important position which the agricultural and landed interests will always occupy in the legislative bodies. This is perhaps taking an unduly optimistic view of the situation and underestimating the dangers of political corruption. The interests which prosper under protection will be able to command larger resources and better organization than the interests opposed to them, which would be too varied in character to combine effectively. At the same time all these dangers have to be faced, now that the plunge has been taken deliberately. The utmost publicity should be given to the investigations by the Tariff Board into the conditions of

¹ Mr N. S. Subba Rao in his Presidential Address at the Indian Economic Conference, Allahabad, 1929, suggested that the present Tariff Board in India should be converted into a National Economic Board on the lines of permanent bodies like the Tariff Commission and the Federal Trade Commission in the United States which make investigations as the result of a comprehensive plan of action. The Tariff Board may be suitably enlarged and allowed to appoint sub-committees and individual expert investigators. It should have power to make inquiries and surveys on its own initiative, and submit recommendations to the Government from time to time. This would replace the present hurried and piecemeal investigations, lead to an orderly economic development and facilitate the necessary industrial adjustments in the country. Sir H. P. Mody suggested in March 1936 in the Assembly that the Tariff Board procedure should be revised to make it more speedy and effective as in the case of the Import Duties Advisory Committee in Great Britain.

the industries soliciting special treatment. This would reduce the danger of corruption, provided the public is sufficiently instructed and vigilant. It would be highly desirable if consumers also learnt to organize themselves into powerful associations and helped to keep protection within legitimate bounds.

Besides political corruption, another evil to be guarded against is the development of combinations of manufacturers, which is stimulated by protection. Here again it would fall to the Tariff Board to make sure whether a combination that may have arisen is actually injurious to the country and, if satisfied that such is the case, to recommend diminution or withdrawal of protection.

§10. **Protective export duties.**—Something has already been said in another connexion about the economic effects of restrictions on the free export of the raw materials of industry, and we have seen that export duties cause a disproportionate injury to the producer of raw materials without being of appreciable assistance to the manufacturers. The duties would have to be very high even to produce a comparatively small difference in the cost of the finished article in favour of the home manufacturer, as the cost of raw materials generally forms but a small part of the total cost of the manufactured article, and the hardship to the producer will be so great as to make unthinkable the adoption of any general system of protection on this plan. Moreover, if protection to a particular industry is necessary, its burden should rest as far as possible on the shoulders of the whole community. It is a wrong principle to penalize only one particular class for the benefit of the protected industry. For this reason, as we have already suggested, bounties and protective import duties are to be preferred to export duties. Another objection to export duties is the risk of a loss of the foreign market altogether, as our bitter experience in the case of saltpetre has shown.

§11. **Essentials other than protection.**—India has adopted protection as an essential aid to the speedy development of industries. We cannot, however, merely legislate a nation into wealth and prosperity, and protection alone will not convert the medieval organization of a country into an up-to-date modern organization as it were by the wand of a magician.¹ Even with protection, a country may remain for ever economically backward in the absence of an adequate development of indispensable adjuncts of modern economic life such as an efficient banking organization, a properly developed system of transport, a sympathetic railway and shipping rates policy, an effective marketing organization, an efficient

¹ See Coyajee, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-4.

system of commercial and industrial intelligence, adequate command of capital, etc.

§12. **Education.**—Above everything else, what is required is a change in the mental outlook of all classes of people in India.¹ The diffidence and lack of enterprise which characterize the Indian people today are defects largely attributable to the present faulty system of education. From top to bottom our educational system is too literary and academic and it is necessary to give a more practical bent to it. A sensibly planned system of education will take particular care to emphasize the principle of the dignity of labour. 'Manual work, that is, creative manual activities of diverse kinds, should be part of the curriculum of every school.'²

¹ Asked by an old pupil what he thought of protection for India, Dr Alfred Marshall wrote:—'I have no objection on principle to the "protection" of nascent Indian industries. But a customs tariff is an expensive method to this end: and under existing circumstances it would enrich European capitalists rather than Indian. Therefore, I think it should not be applied until other methods have been tried, not until those industries which already receive a *very high* protection from cost of carriage (in some cases double cost of carriage) have succeeded in evoking Indian enterprise. Strong cases in point I understand to be the leather, paper and oil-seed industries. If India had a score or two of men like Mr Tata, and some thousands of men with Japanese interest in realities, with virile contempt of mere speech-making in politics and law courts; and with no scorn for work on *things* while the mind was full of *thoughts*, India would soon be a great nation. Nothing could stop her: no tariff could hinder her: she would enter into her heritage. But so long as an Indian who has received a high education generally spends his time in cultured ease; or seeks money in Indian law suits—which are as barren of good to the country as the sand of the seashore—nothing can do her much good; so long as, with the exception of Bombay cotton which after all is of Parsee origin and a few works of which Mr Tata's are at the head, all enterprise seems to be in European hands, in spite of the fact that the unhealthiness of India for the young children of Europeans is in effect a protective duty of perhaps 50-100 per cent in favour of Indian enterprise in India as against European. For twenty years I have been urging on Indians in Cambridge to say to others: "How few of us when we go to the West think of any other aim save that of our *individual culture*? Does not the Japanese nearly always ask himself in what way he can strengthen himself to do *good service to his country* on his return? Does he not seek real studies? Does he not watch the sources of Western power? Is not that the chief reason for Japan's quick progress? Cannot we imitate her? Do we need any other change than, like the Japanese, to think of our country in the first place and ourselves as a long way behind?"'—A. C. Pigou, *Memoirs of Alfred Marshall*, p. 472. For better or worse (we think, on the whole, for better) India has made up her mind in favour of protection. None the less, Dr Marshall's words deserve to be pondered over; for, protection or no protection, no considerable economic progress is possible unless the defects in national character which Dr Marshall points out are remedied. We must however add that this cannot well be left to individual action and initiative alone. The state must take the necessary educational and other measures.

² Abbott and Wood, *Report on Vocational Education in India*, p. 33.

The prejudice against manual work to be found in India may be partly due to social reasons. But it is also largely explained by the fact that until recently the schools have been almost entirely without provision for manual activities of a satisfying kind for their pupils.¹ The Wardha Scheme of Education, based on Mahatma Gandhi's basic idea of imparting education in primary schools through some craft or productive work, is calculated to remedy the above defect of our educational system.² It is being tried out in several provinces and States.³ (One of the ideas in a sound scheme of education would be to make the scholar use his hands and eyes as much as possible.) Lack of any education or of education of the proper kind not only makes the Indian workman inefficient and unreliable, but also kills all desire for self-improvement. Education will develop his wants, produce in him an incentive to work more and better in order to satisfy them, and raise the whole tone of his life. One of the difficulties under which Indian industries labour, is that skilled labourers as well as supervisors and foremen have often to be imported from abroad. The men thus imported are naturally expensive and they have to be given a high scale of wages and, in addition to this, heavy expenditure has to be incurred in connexion with their repatriation. The Fiscal Commission recommended that the Government should make the training of apprentices one of the conditions of the tender when they place important orders with foreign firms. Besides skilled labourers, supervisors and foremen, it is necessary to have Indian managers. The system of state technical scholarships abroad can satisfy the need for the necessary training in this connexion only to a very limited extent. The only real solution is to start technical institutes of all grades in the country itself so as to make it possible for Indian industries to dispense with foreign labour of every kind. Research in industrial problems is a function of the highest importance and the necessary institutions for this purpose must be created and maintained. For industrial progress something more than mere technical knowledge is required. Men of insight, daring and organizing ability are necessary to lead the country in the industrial march and to enable it to keep pace with other nations. The multiplication of commercial colleges is likely to help men of this type to discover themselves. The present deficiency in this regard is at least partially due to the fact that our educational system has not hitherto made it its special business to foster the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 21.

² *Report of the Zakir Husain Committee*, Section I.

³ C. J. Varkey, *The Wardha Scheme of Education*, 2nd ed., ch. ix.

qualities required for making a successful business man. The excessively literary character of the education, which was originally intended merely to provide for the administrative needs of the Government, has been in some measure mitigated in recent years by the increasing importance given to the teaching of modern science in our schools and universities. The personal contact with specific realities and the exercise in verifiable reasoning which the laboratory makes possible help in turning the thoughts and actions of men into useful practical channels. Commercial and technical schools and colleges ought also to have the same desirable effect. The increasing keenness of the struggle for existence is gradually forcing the educated classes to seek careers in business rather than in Government service, which cannot possibly provide for an unlimited number of graduates. The attractions of Government service and the overcrowded professions of law and medicine will diminish when other openings are offered by the development of industries. All these changes must come far more rapidly than at present, and for this heroic efforts are necessary.

§13. **The position of industrial education in India.**—The Government seem to have realized the necessity and importance of improving and extending educational and industrial opportunities as early as 1888, when a Resolution was issued on the subject calling upon the Provincial Governments to take action in the matter. The practical effect of this, however, was almost nil and for a long time the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute, started in 1877 in Bombay, chiefly through private efforts to provide courses of instruction suitable to the needs of the growing local mill industry, was the only institution of its kind in the country. The investigation into the defects of the educational system of India set on foot by Lord Curzon, who called a conference of educational experts at Simla in 1901, raised the question of technical education once more, but the only practical outcome of this was some improvement in the teaching of science at the universities and the institution of a number of technical scholarships by the Government of India to enable Indians to proceed to England and America. This system also did not work well and failed to produce satisfactory results.

In recent years the question of technical and general education has figured prominently in public discussions. It received detailed attention at the hands of the Industrial Commission (1916-18), the Calcutta University (Sadler) Commission (1917-19), committees appointed by the Government of Bombay in 1921 and 1938, the Zakir Husain Committee appointed by the Wardha

Education Conference (1937)¹ and Messrs Abbott and Wood, educational experts from England (1937). (See next section.) The Industrial Commission made a number of recommendations for (i) the provision by local Governments and authorities of a suitable system of primary education with an industrial bias for the artisan and labouring population, including subsidization of such of the employers of labour as might undertake to supply educational facilities for the benefit of their employees; (ii) provision of industrial or craft schools under the control of the Department of Industries for cottage industries; and (iii) provision for the training of men for organized industries. These were divided into the manipulative industries such as mechanical engineering, and non-manipulative or operative industries, such as the manufacture of chemicals. The training for the foremen was to be given in the works themselves, to which theoretical classes were to be attached, though in some cases like the textile trade, in technical schools with workshops attached to them. For the operative industries technological schools were to be supplemented by practical experience in the factory. In addition to the existing provincial institutions the Commission recommended the establishment of two Imperial Colleges, one for the highest grade teaching of engineering, and the other for metallurgy and mineral technology.²

Under the 1919 Reforms, education became a provincial transferred subject, the promotion of industrial and technical education being controlled by the Provincial Departments of Industries. But owing to financial stringency, no solid results have so far been achieved. Even primary education is making very slow progress in spite of the enabling and compulsory Primary Education Acts that have been passed in several provinces and the raising of the age of employment of children in factories by the Factory Act of 1922. Recognizing the necessity of a wider extension of technical education and industrial training, the Government of Bombay appointed a committee on technical and industrial education in February 1921. The committee produced two reports, one by the European majority and the other by the Indian minority (the President, Sir M. Visvesvaraya, supporting the minority), the main points of difference between the two sections being in regard to types of institutions, number of pupils to be trained and estimates of cost, and organization and agencies for carrying out the scheme.

¹ See vol. I. ch. viii, §2 (Rural Education).

² The Indian Schol of Mines at Dhanbad was opened at the end of 1926 and is intended to serve as a training ground for mining engineers and geologists.

It has not been found possible, however, to take action even on the limited scale contemplated by the Majority Report, though the weaving schools maintained by the Department of Industries continue to help the hand-loom industry.¹ Thus the present position in regard to general, technical and commercial education is unsatisfactory and the actual provision that has been made by Government or private effort can scarcely be called adequate considering the huge size and large requirements of the country. Also as the Hartog Committee remark, 'such of the attempts as have been made to provide vocational and technical training have little contact with the educational system and are therefore largely infructuous'.

§14. **Abbott-Wood Report.**—At the invitation of the Government of India two educational experts from England, Mr A. Abbott and Mr S. H. Wood, visited India in November, 1936, in order to advise on educational reorganization, particularly on problems of vocational education, and submitted their Report in June, 1937. The following are some of their recommendations :

(i) The education of children in the Primary schools should be based more upon the natural interests and activities of young children and less upon book learning.

(ii) The Indian languages should, so far as possible, be the medium of instruction throughout the High (or Higher Secondary) schools, but English should be a compulsory language for all pupils in these schools.

(iii) The expansion of vocational education should not greatly outstrip the development of industry. If vocational education is not too specialized and if it aims at cultivating flexibility of mind and certain personal qualities which are as much moral as intellectual, industry and commerce should be able to absorb a somewhat larger proportion of trained men than an exact computation of their existing needs would appear to justify.

(iv) Every province should make a survey of the educational needs of its industries and commerce and thus determine the type of vocational education to be provided, and especially the number of recruits that can be absorbed annually.

(v) Industry and commerce must co-operate with educational organizations if the vocational education is to be appropriate and adequate. Organized co-operation of this kind does not yet exist in India.

(vi) It is the supervisory grade of workers, i.e. foremen, chargehands, etc., on whose education and training great attention

¹ The University of Bombay has recently established an Institute of Textile Technology.

should be concentrated at this stage in the development of organized industry in India, since they hold the key to efficiency in production.¹

§15. **Supply of technicians for war industries.**—The question of extending facilities for technical education has come into prominence during the present war. The Government of India appointed the Technical Training Enquiry Committee in June 1940, under the presidentship of Mr J. Sargent, the Educational Commissioner, to go into the question of training of technicians needed by war industries in the country. In accordance with the recommendations of the committee, whose report was published in September 1940, the Government of India are making immediate arrangements to train about 3,000 technicians for war industries. It was estimated that approximately 10,000 men would be required for war work within the next nine months. The Sargent Committee expressed the view that the stimulus given to Indian industries by war production would be maintained after the war, and most of the skilled men released from war industries would be absorbed in others. It is necessary, however, for the Government from now on to pursue an industrial policy which will avert a post-war depression. Anyway, we welcome the committee's recommendations and the prompt Government action taken on them, as being calculated to supply a much-needed corrective to the excessive emphasis placed on academic studies by the present system of education.

§16. **Stores purchase policy.**—The various public departments as well as the railways in the country purchase immense quantities of stores of all kinds, many of which were till recently imported from abroad, mostly from England, through the Stores Department of the India Office, London. Government stores imported in 1914-15 were valued at Rs. 7 crores, in 1921 at 16.25 crores and in 1928-9 at 10.09 crores. In recent years the value of the Government stores imported has appreciably decreased, being 4.27 crores in 1931-2, 1.95 crores in 1933-4 and 2.38 crores in 1936-7. The figures for 1937-8 and 1938-9 show some increase being Rs. 3.44 crores and 3.19 crores respectively. One way of encouraging industries would be to make purchases of Government requirements as far as possible within the country. Like many another excellent principle this was also recognized long ago without being translated into action. About fifty years ago, the Government enunciated the policy of purchasing, for State use, stores of Indian origin or manufacture rather than stores produced

¹ A. Abbott and S. H. Wood, *Report on Vocational Education in India*, h. xiv.

or manufactured abroad. Rules, which were revised from time to time, were also made governing stores purchase, under which preference was to be given to articles wholly or partially manufactured in India, subject to certain conditions as regards quality, etc. In cases where the articles available in India are as good as can be had elsewhere and are as cheap as elsewhere, it goes without saying that preference should be given to indigenous goods. There are some who would go even further than this and would have articles of home manufacture preferred even if they were to cost considerably more. Such a policy would entail an increased burden on the taxpayer and would, strictly speaking, amount to a grant of protection. And before action is taken under it in favour of a particular industry involving considerable increase of public expenditure, opportunity might well be given to the Tariff Board to express an opinion on the matter. In any case, the question would require to be considered in the light of the principles of protection as outlined above. It is not clear whether the rules to which we have referred required a preferential purchase of Indian goods even when their prices were appreciably higher.¹ However that may be, in actual practice, according to the finding of the Industrial Commission, preference was given to British stores even when they could have been supplied equally well both as regards price and quality by Indian manufacturers, who were handicapped in various other ways in meeting the demands of the Government departments when competing with tenders received by the India Office Stores Department in London. The failure on the part of the Government to avail themselves of the stores purchase rules and utilize fully the manufacturing capacity of the country was attempted to be excused, if not justified, by pointing out that there was no suitable inspecting agency to direct and advise the indenting officer in India, who relieved himself of all trouble and responsibility by sending orders to the India Office Stores Department in London. The explanation provokes the query why steps were not taken to provide the requisite agency for obtaining expert advice, and it cannot be accepted as a sufficient and satisfactory answer to the charge of remissness and anti-national conduct levelled against the Government by their critics. The idea that it is possible to regulate the stores purchase policy in such a manner

¹ A Government Resolution on the subject issued in 1928 contains the following direction: 'The departments of the Government of India or the officers expressly authorized by them in this behalf may, when they are satisfied that such measures are justified, allow a limited degree of preference, in respect of the price, to articles produced or manufactured in India.'

as to stimulate Indian industries was endorsed by the Indian Industrial Commission. Even if the policy of 'fair field and no favour' is adopted, without what we may call protective preference being shown to Indian manufactures, the advantage of securing the large custom of the Government would in itself act as a healthy and valuable stimulus. Also, as the Industrial Commission have pointed out, if certain suggestions for improving the method of placing orders were accepted, not only would existing industries benefit, but also new industries might be started. For example, if instead of allowing unnecessary diversity in orders for the same kind of goods, standard patterns were adopted, it might be profitable to put down special plant in India in view of the large demand for goods of a standard type which would thus result.

With the progress of industrial development it is becoming more and more possible for the Government to have their needs supplied by local industries, particularly as arrangements have now been made for removing the difficulty arising from lack of information as to sources and market values of Indian supplies and the absence of an inspecting agency. The Stores Purchase Committee (1921) appointed in accordance with the Industrial Commission's recommendation supported the latter's suggestion that a central expert agency for the purpose of inspecting Government stores should be established. The Indian Stores Department was instituted accordingly, and though it is intended primarily to serve the Government of India, it is open to the Provincial Governments, municipalities, Port authorities, company-managed railways and other public or semi-public bodies and Indian States to avail themselves of its services. The Department acts in an advisory capacity as a purchase and inspection agency, scrutinizes the indents with a view to preventing orders being placed abroad when purchases of goods of indigenous origin are possible subject to conditions of price and quality, purchases and inspects certain specified commodities in India, acts as a central bureau of information on all matters connected with the purchase and prices of stores, and discharges other important functions so as to encourage Indian industries. Local purchasing branches have been created at Calcutta and Bombay, and inspection agencies at Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Cawnpore and Delhi. For the convenience and encouragement of Indian firms competing with foreign firms, the Department has adopted and is progressively developing the policy of inviting rupee tenders for delivery in India. In order to ensure the successful working of the rupee tender system, the consulting engineers to the High Commissioner

in London have been appointed expert advisers and have opened a branch office in Calcutta for that purpose. An important part of the work of the Stores Department consists of making continual investigations into the potentialities of indigenous sources of supply, resulting in a constant enlargement of the list of approved contractors in India.

In pursuance of the policy of the Government as enunciated in 1928, articles wholly or partially manufactured in India worth Rs. 15.56 crores were purchased for Government use during the eight years, 1928-9 to 1935-6, by the Indian Stores Department.¹ The Supply Department set up during the present war is calculated further to increase the purchases made in India by the Government.

§17. Industrial research.—The Fifth Industries Conference of July 1934 considered a proposal to establish a Central Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau with a view to the co-ordination of research. The Bureau now called the Industrial Research Bureau was established in April 1935 with a research branch at Alipore. The Bureau, which is given the assistance of an advisory body, called the Industrial Research Council, is attached to the Indian Stores Department. Its functions are : the collection and dissemination of industrial intelligence, collaboration with industry in industrial research, the publication of appropriate bulletins giving advice with a view to industrial standardization, and assistance in the organization of industrial exhibitions. The need for such a central agency and the value of industrial research can hardly be exaggerated. Further steps have recently been taken to promote industrial research under the conditions created by the present war. To this end, a new body, called the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research, has been set up. Representatives of the principal industries are associated with the Board, which at its meeting held in Bombay in September 1940 discussed several schemes to tackle the problem of industrial deficiency in India during the war period, with special reference to the production of vegetable dyes, heavy chemicals, utilization of vegetable oils to make up for the loss of export markets for India's oilseeds, etc.

§18. Work of the Provincial Departments of Industries.—We have already referred to the establishment of the Provincial Departments of Industries as recommended by the Industrial Commission.² The main work of these departments falls under

¹ *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, p. 27.

² See vol. I, ch. xiii, §4.

three classes : (i) promotion of technical and industrial education ; (ii) supply of industrial intelligence ; and (iii) assistance to industries, financial as well as by means of arts and crafts depots and industrial exhibitions.¹ Their activities are, however, largely devoted to the development of cottage² and rural industries rather than to large-scale industry. Success on the lines and the scale anticipated by the Industrial Commission has not been achieved by the Departments of Industries, because of want of funds and the great change, since the time of the Industrial Commission, in industrial conditions. The constitutional changes of 1919 and 1935, by which responsibility for industrial development devolved largely on the provinces, have also handicapped the adoption of a systematic and comprehensive industrial policy. A certain amount of useful co-ordination has, however, been effected through the annual sessions of the All-India Industries Conference which are attended by the Provincial Ministers and Directors of Industries and also representatives of some Indian States. Comparatively greater success has attended the efforts of the Bengal Industries Department, which with its fully adequate staff and after the opening of a research laboratory in Calcutta, may be regarded as well equipped to carry out the policy recommended by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Chemist in that province has undertaken a number of investigations relating to the better utilization of raw materials available in Bengal. The Bengal Tanning Institute is doing research work on problems connected with local leather and tanning. We may also mention the industrial surveys carried out in the United Provinces, Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Demonstration factories have been started in some provinces. But unfortunately only a few of them, as for example, the manufacture of ink in Madras, have proved successful ; others like the Government tannery at Lahore and bobbin-manufacture in the United Provinces have failed.

We have already referred to the Acts passed by some of the Provincial Legislatures for giving financial assistance to industries. These Acts have been in force in Madras, the Punjab and Bihar and Orissa since 1923. Similar Acts passed in Bengal and the Central Provinces became law in 1931 and 1933 respectively. In Bombay, the State-Aid to Small Industries Rules (1935) having been found inadequate, new rules have recently been framed pursuant to a Resolution passed by the Bombay Legislative Assembly. Those rules provide for various forms of State aid,

¹ For an account of the work done in the various provinces see A. G. Clow, *The State and Industry*; and *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*.

² These activities are reviewed in the chapter following.

including guarantee of interest on shares or debentures, taking of shares and debentures, grant of a loan, subsidies for research work, etc.¹ Under the State-Aid to Industries Acts, loans can be given to private enterprises for starting new industries subject to certain conditions. In actual operation these Acts have been of greater use to small, rather than to large-scale industries.² The failure of the few big loans given to large concerns like the Carnatic Paper Mills (Madras) and the Indian Steel Wire Products Ltd. (Bihar) only serves to emphasize the need for special measures to solve the problem of financing large industries.

The Report of the Madras Department of Industries for the year ending March 1935 confessed that during the period of twelve years that the State-Aid to Industries Act had been in force, it could not claim to have achieved any measure of success in stimulating industrial development, and suggested that, following the example of the United Provinces, a special committee should be set up to formulate a new scheme of financial aid to industries. The Committee in the United Provinces known as the Industrial Finance Committee had been appointed in 1934 under the chairmanship of the late Sir S. N. Pochkhanawala. This Committee held that direct State aid to industries was not desirable. It recommended the establishment of a joint bank called 'The United Provinces Industrial Credit Bank, Limited', with a capital of Rs. 25 lakhs, with a Government guarantee for a maximum period of 20 years of a 4 per cent dividend on the shares free of tax in order to provide long- and short-term credit to major and minor industries. The Committee also suggested the starting of a new marketing organization to be called 'The United Provinces Financing and Marketing Company, Limited', run on joint-stock lines with a capital of Rs. 5 lakhs, to be underwritten by the Industrial Bank.³ The United Provinces Legislature approved of the Government's scheme, drafted generally in accordance with the Committee's recommendations, in June 1936.⁴ The Bengal Legislature also approved the establishment of an Industrial Credit Corporation in December 1936. It is meant for providing loans for the establishment of small-scale industries by released detenus and by any Bengal citizen who can put

¹ See *Annual Report of the Department of Industries, Bombay Province, 1938-9*, par. 45.

² See *Proceedings of the Fifth Industries Conference (1933)* and D. R. Gadgil, *Industrial Evolution of India* (third edition), p. 313.

³ *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, p. 42.

⁴ Further particulars of this scheme are indicated in the sections dealing with Industrial Finance in ch. x.

forward feasible propositions.¹ It remains to be seen how far these new experiments in industrial finance will fulfil the purpose in view.

From the above survey it will have been clear that since the war of 1914-18 India has entered upon a new phase of development. The old policy of laissez-faire has given place to a policy of active intervention on the part of the Central as well as the Provincial Governments to regulate and expedite industrial advance. This policy has received a further impetus during the present war, as is indicated by the various measures adopted by the Government to bring about the industrial expansion of India for the successful prosecution of the war.

¹ For Fuller details see N. Das, *Industrial Enterprise in India*, pp. 138-40.

CHAPTER II

INDIAN INDUSTRIES: OLD AND NEW

§1. **Scope of the chapter.**—Indian industries may be divided into two classes: (i) industries carried on with hand-operated appliances in the home of the worker, which may be called cottage industries. Here the scale of operations is small, organization limited and the supplies intended largely for meeting local needs. These we shall discuss at the end of this chapter; (ii) organized industries with power-operated machinery, carried on in workshops or factories which vary in size from simple rural factories carrying out a single operative process to the large textile mills and engineering workshops employing thousands of hands and possessed of a complete organization, both for manufacture and trade.¹ Organized industries connected with agriculture such as tea, coffee, indigo and sugar industries have been already treated under agriculture.² We shall now first of all attempt a description of the principal organized industries of the new type in India. This will give us some idea of the advance in industrialization already made, and incidentally throw light on the manner in which the new protective system is being applied under the guidance of the Tariff Board.

§2. **Statistics of industrial development.**—A fair idea of the extent of industrial development in India can be formed by a combined study of the following statistical sources: (i) *Large Industrial Establishments in India* (1937), (ii) returns of Indian factories under the Indian Factories Act in 1938, and (iii) the

¹ In recent classifications of Indian industries the organized industries are further subdivided into two categories: small-scale industries and large-scale industries. For instance, the Bombay Industrial and Economic Survey Committee observe: 'By small-scale industries we understand industries where power is used and where the number of workers does not exceed 50 and the capital invested is less than Rs. 30,000,' e.g. motor-repairing, oil-pressing, hosiery, watch-manufacture, soap-making, rice and flour mills, etc. Large-scale industries are those where power is used, and the number employed exceeds 50 and the capital invested is above Rs. 30,000, e.g. cotton mills, sugar factories, paper mills, etc. (*Report*, pars. 15-16). The National Planning Committee also divide Indian industries into three classes: cottage industries, small-scale (or medium-sized) industries, and large-scale industries.

² See vol. I, ch. vi.

returns of Joint-Stock Companies registered in India and elsewhere than in India but working in India in 1937-8.

(i) *Large Industrial Establishments in India.*—The statistics given below are taken from the publication *Large Industrial Establishments in India in 1937 (1939)*.

Large Industrial Establishments in India (1937)

Kind of Establishment	Number	Persons employed
I. Textiles—	832	916,575
Cotton (Spinning, weaving and other factories)	423	569,025
Jute Mills	105	308,715
Silk Mills	60	6,917
Woollen Mills	18	8,075
II. Engineering—	928	217,443
Dockyards	8	4,328
Electrical Engineering	57	8,653
General Engineering	326	44,407
Railway Workshops	165	108,924
Shipbuilding and Engineering	13	14,755
III. Minerals and Metals—	154	57,433
Foundries	78	4,527
Iron and Steel Mills	13	42,158
Petroleum Refineries	4	2,479
IV. Food, Drink and Tobacco—	2,774	240,617
Flour Mills	74	6,071
Rice Mills	1,009	43,882
Sugar Factories	175	79,078
Tea Factories	991	67,101
Tobacco Factories	30	10,984
V. Chemicals, Dyes, etc.—	632	65,484
Dyeing and Bleaching	76	9,391
Chemicals	28	4,687
Matches	118	16,363
Oil Mills	265	16,949
VI. Paper and Printing—	489	51,174
Paper Mills	12	8,095
Printing, Book-binding, etc.	452	40,926
Paper Pulp	1	719
VII. Processes relating to Wood, Stone and Glass—	484	85,807
Tiles and Brick Factories	142	16,290
Saw Mills	50	3,844
Glass Factories	63	7,997

Kind of Establishment	Number	Persons employed
VIII. <i>Processes connected with Skins and Hides—</i>	73	14,067
Leather and Shoes	12	6,510
Tanneries	39	6,126
IX. <i>Gins and Presses—</i>	2,804	227,545
Cotton Ginning and Baling	2,526	181,898
Jute Presses	101	36,308
X. <i>Miscellaneous—</i>	252	64,332
Grand Total	9,422	1,940,477

The large industrial establishments include all factories subject to the Indian Factories Act of 1934 (excepting those in which the average number of persons employed daily is less than twenty), and also those establishments in Indian States which are considered to be of sufficient industrial importance, so far as it has been possible to procure information. The totals of the principal classes (I to X) are given in italics and only the main sub-classes have been included in the above table. Of the 9,422 large industrial establishments, 4,085 were seasonal, employing 368,905 persons and 5,337 were perennial, employing 1,571,572 persons.

(ii) According to the returns of the Indian factories during 1938 subject to the Indian Factories Act, the total average daily number of persons employed was 1,737,755 and the total number of factories actually working was 9,743 distributed as follows :

Madras, 1,818 ; Bombay, 2,495 ; Sind, 322 ; Bengal, 1,735 ; United Provinces, 530 ; Punjab, 780 ; Bihar, 311 ; Orissa, 80 ; Central Provinces and Berar, 737 ; Assam, 765 ; North-West Frontier Province, 30 ; Baluchistan, 14 ; Ajmer-Merwara, 35 ; Delhi, 78 ; Bangalore and Coorg, 13. Of the 9,743 factories, 6,086 were perennial and 3,657 were seasonal.¹

(iii) *Returns of Joint-Stock Companies.*—The increase in the pace of industrialization in India, especially after 1914, may be gauged from the following figures relating to Joint-Stock Companies registered in British India and in Indian States in 1914-15 and 1937-8 respectively :²

¹ *Statistics of Factories for the year ending December 31, 1938*, pp. 1 and 10.

² We have already given statistics of Joint-Stock Companies registered elsewhere than in India but working in India, while dealing with the question of external capital invested in India (see vol. I, ch. xiii, §15).—*Statistical Abstract for British India (1937-8)*, Tables 167-8.

Class of Companies	1914-15		1937-8	
	No.	Paid-Up Capital	No.	Paid-Up Capital
		Rs. (lakhs)		Rs. (lakhs)
Banking and Loan	436	7,80	1,894	21,73
Insurance	182	50	702	3,61
Navigation	24	1,28	38	2,81
Railways and Tramways	44	8,30	44	14,72
Other Transit and Transport	323	4,48
Trading and Manufacturing	754	11,32	4,128	95,20
Tea	208	4,31	417	12,37
Other Planting Companies	29	41	74	70
Coal Mining	140	6,09	200	8,09
Gold Mining	8	33	3	4
Other Mining and Quarrying Companies	57	5,76	77	11,07
Cotton Mills	205	16,70	324	31,92
Jute Mills	34	7,61	78	20,28
Mills for Wool, Silk, Hemp, etc.	13	1,22	40	2,32
Cotton Ginning, Pressing, Baling, etc.	143	2,20
Jute Presses	139	2,70	29	90
Flour Mills	30	80	26	1,15
Estate, Land and Building	32	2,17	190	12,07
Sugar (including Jaggery)	22	80	171	9,43
Other Companies	123	2,05	776	8,36
Total (British India)	2,480	80,24	9,677	2,64,05
Total (Indian States)	65	54	980	15,13
Grand Total	2,545	80,78	10,657	2,79,18

The above statistics leave us in no doubt regarding the growing industrialization of India and a considerable growth of large-scale industries in the country, though we are still far from the position held by the industrially advanced nations of the West such as England, Germany or the U.S.A. 'Organized industries as yet play too small a part in the national economy, and even in the industrial population a very large proportion is engaged in simpler, seasonal, miscellaneous or repair industries. Cotton gins and presses, jute presses, rice mills and timber mills, engineering workshops, foundries—all these employ the major portion of the Indian population engaged in modern industry.'¹ All told the population engaged in modern industry is less than two per cent of the total population of the country. The situation is now changing and both the pace and range of industrialization are being extended, especially since the outbreak of war in 1939. The needs of her own defence and her importance as a source of supply of war materials are expanding,—especially for the

¹ See Gadgil, op. cit., p. 282.

countries included in the Eastern Group of the British Empire having regard to the spread of the war to North Africa and the possibilities of its extension to the Near East and the Far East. This is indicated by the Eastern Group Conference which met at New Delhi in October 1940 and the Roger Mission which in September 1940 came to India on behalf of the British Ministry of Supply.

§3. **The cotton mill industry.**—We shall now proceed to give a short account of some of the large-scale industries in India. The first cotton mill in India was erected at Calcutta in 1818. The first mill in Bombay, which was destined to be the home of the cotton mill industry, was the result of Parsee enterprise and began working in 1854.

The early concentration of the industry in the Bombay island was governed not so much by natural and permanent factors as by other advantages, such as abundance of capital and credit facilities, the presence of cheap and speedy means of transport and the temporary growth of the demand for yarn from China, which Bombay was in an exceptionally favourable situation to meet. The year 1877 marks the turning point in the development of the industry from the point of view of its distribution. It saw the beginning of a rapid construction of mills in up-country centres like Nagpur, Ahmedabad, and Sholapur, situated right in the heart of the cotton-producing tracts. This later distribution was influenced to a very much larger extent by natural factors, such as the vicinity of sources of raw material, plentiful labour and large marketing centres, and was made possible by the development of railway communication. The decline of the China trade in yarn from the commencement of the present century also affected adversely Bombay's position of unequalled pre-eminence. The swadeshi movement, moreover, stimulated the growth of weaving outside the Bombay Presidency. Latterly the developments in factory legislation in British India have set up a tendency for the migration of the industry to some of the Indian States where the administration of the Factory Laws is more lax.

Recently, there has been a tendency on the part of the Indian mills to increase the manufacture of finer counts, and a certain amount of long-staple cotton is imported from the U.S.A. and elsewhere for this purpose. But the spinning of finer counts is limited by the expensiveness of foreign cottons as well as that of the new machinery which has to be laid down. An improvement in the quality of the home-grown cotton will help the situation.

The cotton industry received a considerable stimulus from the conditions created by the war of 1914-18. The large patronage

extended to the mills by the Government in respect of their military requirements in cotton goods in the eastern theatres of the war, together with the shrinkage in the Lancashire imports into India due to the preoccupation of the Lancashire mills with war work and the sharp rise in the prices of imported cloth due to shortage of shipping, led to a considerable increase in home production, though the difficulty of importing machinery prevented as speedy a development as would otherwise have taken place. As it was, the home production in piece-goods increased from 1,164 million yards in 1913-14 to 1,614 million yards in 1917-18. The increase was particularly noticeable as regards the better class of goods of high counts which were mostly imported before the war. Since then production has gone on steadily increasing along with an increase in the number of mills in the country. The production of Indian mills in the whole country in 1938-9 was 4,269 million yards of woven goods.

§4. **Growth of the cotton mill industry.**—The following two tables bring out the progress made by the cotton mills in the whole of India and the decline in the imports of piece-goods.

Table I¹

Year	No. of mills	No. of spindles	No. of looms	Average no. of hands employed
1877	51	1,244,206	10,385	Not stated
1900	193	4,945,783	40,124	161,189
1914	271	6,778,895	104,179	260,276
1918	262	6,653,871	116,484	282,227
1922	298	7,331,219	134,620	343,723
1927	336	8,702,760	161,952	384,623
1930	348	9,124,768	179,250	384,022
1932	339	9,506,083	186,341	403,226
1936	379	9,856,658	200,062	417,803
1939	389	10,059,370	202,464	441,949

Table II²

	1904-5	1913-14	1919-20	1924-5	1930-1	1934-5	1938-9
<i>Million yards</i>							
Mill production in India	678	1,164	1,640	1,970	2,561	3,397	4,269
Imports ...	2,288	3,159	1,064	1,801	882	944	647
Total ...	2,966	4,323	2,704	3,771	3,443	4,341	4,916

¹ *Indian Year Book*, 1940-1, p. 762 and *Report of the Millowners' Association* (1939), p. 389.

² *Review of the Trade of India* (1938-9), pp. 30 and 87. These figures are exclusive of fents.

The continuous progress of the export trade in yarn till 1904-5 was due to the geographical advantage enjoyed by Bombay with respect to the Chinese market. The mills in the Bombay island supplied more than ninety per cent of the total exports, of which China absorbed ninety per cent. Japan was another important customer till the year 1890. New markets had also been developed in the Straits Settlements and Arabia. After 1905 the trade declined as rapidly as it had developed before. The principal factors that led to the decline were the disturbance in the exchange rates with China consequent upon the closing of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver, the rise of the spinning industry in China, the shipping difficulties of the Indian merchants caused by the war which gave to Japan her coveted opportunity, the growth of weaving in India itself, and the neglect of foreign markets on the part of Indian producers due to the large internal profits. It may be noted that Japan did not appear as a rival to India in the Chinese market for yarn till after the outbreak of the last war. Since then, however, not only has she succeeded in ousting India from the Chinese market but the imports of Japanese yarn into India itself have increased with alarming rapidity and have seriously affected the prosperity of our spinning industry. The exports of cotton twist and yarn declined from 244 million lb. in 1899-1900 to 193 million lb. (average of five years before 1914); to 130 million lb. (war average of five years); to 82 (post-war average of five years); and to 38 million lb. in 1938-9. In the same year the total Indian mill production of yarn was as much as 1.303 million lb. Thus India now exports only a small percentage of her yarn production, practically the whole of it being absorbed in the country itself. Since the beginning of the present century there has been a remarkable expansion in the weaving industry stimulated by the virtual extinction of the China trade in yarn, and consequently our reliance on foreign cloths has diminished considerably.

Causes connected with the war led to the memorable boom which started in 1917. The capital investments in the industry increased from 20.84 to 40.98 crores of rupees between 1917-18 and 1921-2. Under the influence of soaring prices the mills were working to their full capacity. The Bombay cotton mill industry paid very high dividends amounting to 40.1 per cent of the paid-up capital in 1919; 35.2 per cent in 1920; and 30 per cent in 1921.¹

The boom lasted for a period of six years at the end of which

¹ See *Report of the Tariff Board (Textile Industry)*, 1927, Appendix V and Brij Narain, *Economic Life in India*, p. 458.

the crash came. In the meanwhile, Japan had stolen a march over us not only in the Chinese market but had also begun to pour cheap goods into India, which forced down the prices of goods produced in Indian mills. India had to participate in the world depression as it did in the world boom. The boom and the depression in India belong to what is called the Trade Cycle. Other world factors are the altered relations between agrarian and general prices since 1920 and violent fluctuations in the prices of cotton since 1917. The general depression in industry all over the world was the result of the reduced purchasing power of the agrarian classes due to the fall in the world agricultural prices since 1920. The extensions planned during the boom period were not completed before 1922. 'The new concerns started had of course incurred capital expenditure at the boom level of prices and these high capitalized charges were still further increased in most cases by the turn that exchange took in 1920.'¹ Violent fluctuations in prices of cotton in India affected by the American prices and supplies of cotton since 1917 may be held to be another factor which increased the embarrassments of the cotton industry in India. Probably the worst year for the industry was 1923, especially in Bombay, its principal centre (see § 8 below).

§5. *Per capita consumption of cotton piece-goods in India.*—The following table² gives interesting figures relating to the consumption *per capita* of cotton piece-goods, including hand-loom products, in India.

Year	Net imports ³		Net available mill production ⁴		Hand-loom production		Net available for consumption	
	Actual	<i>Per capita</i>	Actual	<i>Per capita</i>	Estimated	<i>Per capita</i>	Total	<i>Per capita</i>
	Yards (crores)	Yards	Yards (crores)	Yards	Yards (crores)	Yards	Yards (crores)	Yards
1905-6	239	7.97	61	2.03	108	3.60	408	13.60
1909-10	214	6.90	87	2.81	90	2.90	391	12.61
1913-14	313	9.78	108	3.38	107	3.34	528	16.50
1918-19	101	3.16	130	4.06	105	3.28	336	10.50
1923-4	142	4.30	154	4.67	101	3.06	397	12.03
1926-7	176	5.18	206	6.06	133	3.91	515	15.15
1930-1	87	2.49	246	7.03	139	3.97	472	13.49
1936-7	79	2.13	347	9.38	149	4.03	575	15.54

¹ See Gadgil, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

² *Review of the Trade of India (1936-7)*, p. 43. These figures are inclusive of tents. Complete figures for subsequent years are not available.

³ Net imports = Imports of foreign goods minus re-exports of foreign goods.

⁴ Net available mill production = mill production in India minus exports of Indian piece-goods.

In calculating *per capita* consumption variations in population from year to year have been allowed for, It has not been possible to take into account exports by land, and stocks left from year to year. The figures for hand-loom production are only estimates based on the quantity of yarn available for consumption each year.

The above table is instructive from several points of view. In the first place, it shows that Indian production is now able to meet the greater part of the total demand for cloth in India and that foreign imports have been substantially reduced. The position in this respect at the beginning of the present century has been reversed. In the second place, the table shows that the hand-loom weaver's contribution to the total amount of cloth consumed in India is still very substantial, being nearly twenty-five per cent of the total consumption and between forty and fifty per cent of the Indian mill production. In the third place, the above table shows that the consumption of cloth *per capita* received a set-back during the war when it fell from 16.5 yards in 1913-14 to 10.5 yards in 1918-19. Since then it has gradually recovered itself, though the process of recovery was handicapped in recent years by the trade depression which adversely affected the purchasing power of the masses. The war which started in 1939 has had a similar effect, as commodity prices, after showing an initial rise, have again declined, mainly owing to the loss of the continental markets for our exports.

§6. **Some difficulties of the cotton mill industry.**—The position of the trade in piece-goods is in some ways more secure than that of the yarn trade. The weakness of the yarn trade lay in its excessive dependence on one market; that of China, while as regards the export of piece-goods, it commands a large number of markets, some of which are showing a steadily growing capacity for consuming Indian goods. The diminution in the off-take of a single customer is not, therefore, likely to affect the total volume of the trade to any considerable extent. It must, however, be admitted that Indian industrialists have not hitherto put forth any special efforts to develop foreign markets—an omission which is all the more serious having regard to the present state of the industry. The imports of piece-goods advanced considerably before 1930-1. Japan is a formidable rival as her goods, unlike those of Lancashire, compete directly with Indian manufactures. Japan's ability to undersell the Indian manufacturer is due to certain special facilities such as her superior climatic conditions which are conducive to greater efficiency of labour, the larger employment of cheap female labour which social conditions in

Japan make possible, etc. Further, Japan's cotton purchases are on a large scale and highly organized both in the United States and in India (with the Chinese crop in reserve) which gives her a considerable advantage over India, though in regard to short-staple cotton the advantage, of course, is on India's side. The mixed Indian and American grey cotton cloth from Japan is more attractive than the Indian stuff. All these can scarcely be called unfair advantages. But this description certainly applies, to the consequences of Japan's failure to ratify the Labour Conventions of the Washington Conference in respect of hours of work, prohibition of employment of young persons and of women during night hours. These conditions are inferior in Japan to those in India and they were obviously so till the Japanese Factory Law of 1926 came into operation in June 1929. Even now Japan enjoys certain advantages as regards hours of work.¹

The difficulties of the cotton industry have been enhanced by the frequent changes in the currency policy since 1893 and the enhancement of the ratio from 1s. 4d. to 1s. 6d. in 1924. The depreciation of the Japanese yen, e.g. in 1923-5 and again in 1932, intensified Japanese competition in Indian markets.

The depression in the cotton mill industry is also to some extent to be attributed to certain defects of organization such as over-capitalization; absence of technical experts on the boards of directors leading to expensive mistakes; improper handling of machinery which is also not replaced sufficiently often by new machinery; absence of up-to-date labour-saving devices; uneconomical handling of cotton, coal, waste and stores; absence of a systematic plan of short time when demand is slack, etc. We must also mention the defects of the selling agency system, and the absence of any satisfactory system of finance,² which has seriously inconvenienced both mills and dealers.

§7. **The managing agency system.**—The managing agency system has come in for a good deal of damaging criticism and a few words about it may be permissible.³ The managing agency is a private partnership of three or four members usually related

¹ For further figures and a survey of labour conditions, see M. C. Matheson, *Indian Industry*, ch. iv.

² 'Another common defect is that many mills depend for working capital mainly on short-term deposits, cash credits and loans, all of which are apt to be drastically curtailed in difficult times.'—Vera Anstey, *The Economic Development of India*, p. 275.

³ For a brief and instructive account of the origin, uses and dangers of the managing agency system in India, see Anstey, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-15, 253 and *Report of the Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile Industry)*, 1932, pars. 65-83.

to each other. The ownership of the agency was often, till recently (1936), governed by the hereditary principle, so that management often passed into incompetent hands. The managing agents hold a large number of shares in the mill and make themselves responsible for the financing as well as management of the mill, the purchase of supplies and the sale of the goods. Some of the methods of remunerating the agents were apt to lead them into action which, while it added to their private gain, was prejudicial to the interests of the mill. For example, where their commission was based on the total volume of production, the interest of the agents lay in swelling the output as much as possible irrespective of the effect of such a policy on the profits of the mill. The managing agents have also been charged with taking secret commissions in the course of the buying and selling transactions which they undertake on behalf of the mill. Other disadvantages of the system are that it fosters indifference and ignorance on the part of the directors, who have no real responsibility. It also tends to make the shareholders powerless and irresponsible and therefore unwilling to make sacrifices for the company or invest more money in the business. It further favours excessive conservatism and lack of enterprise. Lastly, the fact that the economic development of India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been commercial rather than industrial is partly attributable to the managing agency system. It is quite true that if the managing agents had not taken upon themselves the responsibility for finance, in many cases providing finance themselves for industrial and commercial ventures, the economic development of India would have been even slower than it has been. Capital in India is proverbially shy, and the welcome change in the direction of greater readiness to subscribe on the part of the public is only a very recent phase. Even now no bank will make any advance unless the application is signed by the managing agents, who are held responsible in their personal capacity. Apart from the provision of the finances required for industries in respect both of fixed and working capital, the managing agency system is also associated with the pioneering of new industrial enterprises in the sense of prospecting, research, etc. It may also be admitted that during the last unexampled depression the managing agents readily bore their full share of the losses suffered by the industries, and not only surrendered any claim to their commission but provided much-needed funds. At the same time, it was generally recognized that the time had come for undertaking a radical reform of the managing agency system.¹

¹ 'It may be perfectly true that many, or even most, of the managing agents have performed their functions efficiently and with integrity, but this

The Tariff Board in 1932 recommended an early inquiry regarding legislative action so as to bring the managing agency system under better control. The recently amended Indian Companies Act (1936) seeks to remove many of the managing agency evils by limiting the term of office of a managing agent to twenty years at a time, restricting transfer of his office and assignment of his remuneration by a managing agent, providing for his removal for fraud or breach of trust, prescribing a uniform basis (namely net annual profits) for the agent's remuneration, restricting the grant of loans to and purchase of debentures of one company by another under the same managing agent, etc.

§8. **Depression in Bombay.**—The depression was specially acute in the case of Bombay owing to circumstances already mentioned, namely the virtual loss of the China trade in yarn owing to Japanese competition and the expansion of the Chinese industry (a loss not wholly compensated by an increase in the export of piece-goods), difficulties of freight during and after the last war, and the increase in the severity of internal competition from up-country mills which have shown a remarkable expansion during recent years, especially from mills in the Indian States where labour regulations are lax and where there are often special duties against the products of mills in British India. No doubt part of the blame for this rests on the Bombay mills which have paid insufficient attention to up-country markets in respect of diversification of production, especially in higher counts, more direct contact with the consuming centres and greater alertness on the part of commission agents. But Bombay also suffers from certain serious disabilities for which it cannot be blamed, for example its relatively higher cost of labour, fuel, water power, high local taxation (including the 10 per cent Property Tax levied in 1939 to pay for the cost of Prohibition), distance from the mofussil markets and from sources of raw material. That Bombay is

does not absolve from criticism a system which undoubtedly gives special opportunities for exploitation and even fraud. In any case it is generally recognized that the system is to a great extent responsible for the undoubted fact that industrial and commercial enterprise in India mainly rests with a comparatively small group of individuals, both Europeans and Indians. Consider, for instance, the position of the famous firm of Andrew Yule & Company, which acts as managing agents for a large number of industrial and commercial concerns, including at least ten jute mills, fifteen coal companies, two hydraulic companies, two oil mills, a flour mill, navigation, rubber, sugar, brick and pottery, and miscellaneous concerns of all descriptions (*Capital*, 3 March 1927). It is obvious that incidental earnings must be large and that it must at times be difficult to reconcile the various interests, and still more difficult for any one firm to control the destinies of such a vast and heterogeneous collection of businesses.—Anstey, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-2.

losing the dominating place in the textile industry of the country that it had fourteen years ago is clearly seen from the fact that the number of mills working in Bombay declined from 78 in 1926 to 68 in 1939. During the same period the number of mills working in Ahmedabad increased from 59 to 77. Nevertheless Bombay is still the home of large combined spinning and weaving establishments.

§9. **Protection to the textile industry.**—Since 1926 the question of protection to the cotton textile industry in India has been examined on three separate occasions by the Tariff Board, and also came into prominence in connexion with the Indo-British Trade Agreement (1939). The first survey was conducted in 1926, when it became evident that the industry was not in a satisfactory condition, particularly in Bombay. The Board reported in 1927 that the deterioration was mainly due to unhealthy internal conditions, to the unfair and uneconomic competition from Japan and to the general trade depression.¹ To remedy the depression, which was particularly acute in Bombay, the Board suggested a better-organized purchase of raw materials, for example under a single hedge contract system; adoption of various devices to obtain a greater output from labour, such as the piece-work system, greater care in recruitment of labour, better housing and education for the labourer; more combined action furthering common interests on the part of millowners; greater diversification of production and more specialization in products of higher counts so as to take full advantage of the damp climate and the favourable situation of Bombay in respect of the imports of long-staple American and African cotton; development of new lines of production, for example the establishment of the cotton printing industry; more attention to the development of promising markets such as Iran and Iraq; maintenance of a closer touch with consuming centres in India as well as abroad, etc.

As regards protection, the main recommendations of the Board were the raising of the import duty from 11 per cent to 15 per cent, bounty on the spinning of higher counts of yarn and the exemption from import duty of cotton textile machinery and mill stores. The Government of India proposed to accept only the last recommendation. Strong protests were made against this decision by the millowners, and, as a result, protective duties were imposed on cotton yarn to the extent of 5 per cent *ad valorem* or 1½ annas per pound, whichever was higher, by the Indian Tariff (Cotton Yarn Amendment) Act, 1927 for a period extending up

¹ *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, p. 62.

to 31 March 1930. The duty on machinery and mill stores was also removed.

The existing import duty on artificial silk yarn was also reduced from 15 to 7½ per cent, so as to give some relief to the hand-loom industry from the burden imposed on it by the revised import duty on yarn, and to facilitate the diversification of Indian mill production. It may be noted that the hand-looms and cotton mills in India are using increasing quantities of such artificial silk yarn. The Government of India also appointed a Commercial Mission as suggested by the Board.¹ All this, however, did not satisfy either the mill industry or public opinion in India. The depression in the industry continued and the general feeling was that more substantial help was needed.

§10. **Mr G. S. Hardy's Inquiry (1929).**—As a result, the Government appointed Mr G. S. Hardy, Collector of Customs, Calcutta, in July 1929 to investigate the extent and severity of external competition.

Mr Hardy's Report² amply proved the necessity of granting substantial assistance to the mill industry, and the Government of India were called upon to make amends for the mistake they had committed in 1927 in refusing to come to the rescue of the industry even on the modest lines recommended by the Tariff Board. They responded by passing in April 1930 the Cotton Textile Industry Protection Act which was mainly designed to afford sufficient protection against Japan until 31 March 1933. In consequence of this Act the general *ad valorem* duty was raised to 15 per cent. In addition to this, in order to enable Bombay to organize itself financially and technically, a minimum duty of 3½ annas per lb. was levied on the plain grey goods, which, in the words of Sir George Rainy, constitute 'the bread and butter part' of Bombay's business.

On top of this, a special protective duty of 5 per cent was imposed. The scope of this duty, however, was limited to non-British goods to limit the sacrifice which the consumer would be called upon to make without corresponding gain to the industry, which suffered more from Japanese than British competition. In spite of the Government's declaration that the preference to British goods was wholly accidental, the suspicion lingers in the minds of many people in India that it was deliberate. The cause of Imperial Preference is not likely to be helped by what public

¹ See ch. vi.

² See *Report on External Competition in Piece-goods* by G. S. Hardy, par. 11.

opinion in this country insists on regarding as a backdoor approach to it.

§11. **Further alterations in the duties (1931).**—Additional protection was secured by the cotton mill industry, first, under the Indian Finance Act of March 1931, which placed an additional duty of 5 per cent *ad valorem* on imported cotton piece-goods, and secondly, under the Supplementary Finance Act of November 1931 which imposed a surcharge of 25 per cent on all import duties then existing, thus bringing the import duty to 25 per cent *ad valorem* or $4\frac{3}{8}$ annas per lb., whichever was higher, in the case of plain grey goods of British manufacture, and $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent *ad valorem* or $4\frac{3}{8}$ annas per lb., whichever was higher, in the case of non-British plain grey goods. In the case of other goods the duty was 25 per cent on British goods and $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent on non-British goods. The increased duty of 40 per cent on imports of artificial silk piece-goods was also expected to help the Indian cotton textile industry.

§12. **Second inquiry by the Tariff Board (1932).**—As the protective duties imposed by the Act of 1930 were due to expire on 31 March 1933, the Tariff Board was asked in April 1932 to inquire into the question of further protection to the cotton industry in India. Before the Board could complete its investigations, there was a serious fall in the Japanese yen and consequently in the rupee prices of cotton piece-goods imported from Japan. The Board was therefore directed to make an emergency inquiry (July 1932), as a result of which the import duty on non-British cotton piece-goods was raised from $3\frac{1}{4}$ to 50 per cent *ad valorem*, and the minimum specific duty on plain grey goods not of British manufacture from $4\frac{3}{8}$ to $5\frac{1}{4}$ annas per lb. with effect from 30 August 1932. These rates were further increased to 75 per cent *ad valorem* and $6\frac{3}{4}$ annas per lb. respectively with effect from 7 June 1933, in order fully to counteract Japanese dumping. In the meantime the operation of the protective duties imposed in 1930 was extended up to 31 October 1933 so as to enable the Government of India to consider the Report of the Tariff Board on the textile industry. This period was again extended to 30 April 1934 pending the discussion of the question of the conclusion of a new commercial agreement between India and Japan in place of the old Indo-Japanese Convention of 1904, which was formally denounced by the Government of India in April 1933 since under that Convention they were not in a position to impose safeguarding duties on Japanese goods alone. At last the Indian Legislature passed the Indian Tariff (Textile Protection) Amendment Act, 1934 on 26 April 1934. The Act,

which came into force on 1 May, gave effect to the conclusions of the Tariff Board recommending substantive protection to the cotton textile industry, modified in the light of a new Trade Agreement with Japan (1934) and of the unofficial agreement between the representatives of the Indian and the United Kingdom textile industries (known as the Mody-Lees Pact).¹ The Act fixed the rate of import duty on cotton piece-goods, not of British manufacture, at 50 per cent *ad valorem*, subject to a minimum of 5¼ annas per lb. in the case of plain greys.² The same Act also extended protection to the sericultural industry (see §45). The life of this Act was limited to 31 March 1939.

§13. **The special Textile Tariff Board (1935).**—In the course of the debate on the Textile Protection Amendment Bill (1934), Sir Joseph Bhore, the Commerce Member, gave a promise to the effect that the tariff rates on British goods would be reviewed on the expiry of the two years covered by the Bombay-Lancashire Textile Agreement. Accordingly, a special Tariff Board was appointed by the Government of India on 10 September 1935 to investigate into and report on the question of protection to the Indian textile industry against imports from the United Kingdom.

The Board concluded its inquiry in December 1935 and its Report was released for publication in June 1936. Simultaneously, the Government of India announced, by a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Indian Tariff Act, immediate reduction (with effect from 25 June 1936) in the rates of duties on Lancashire piece-goods as recommended unanimously by the Tariff Board. The recommendations of the Tariff Board were :³

(i) That the duty on plain grey goods should be reduced from 25 per cent *ad valorem* or 4¾ annas per lb. whichever was higher, to 20 per cent *ad valorem* or 3½ annas per lb. whichever was higher.

(ii) That the duty on bordered grey, bleached and coloured piece-goods (other than prints) should be reduced from 25 per cent *ad valorem* to 20 per cent *ad valorem*.

(iii) That the duty on cotton yarn should remain the same. Lancashire professed to be disappointed that the tariff reductions were not as substantial as the case merited. On the other hand,

¹ See ch. xiii.

² This was already the rate of import duty in force on non-British goods with effect from 8 January 1934, when the 75 per cent duty was reduced to 50 per cent as a result of the Indo-Japanese negotiations.

³ *Report of the Special Tariff Board on the grant of protection to the Indian Cotton Textile Industry* (1936), pp. 109-14.

prominent Indian business men criticized the reduction of duties as being detrimental to the interests of the Indian mill industry which had only a limited scope for its natural expansion in the country.

§14. **Tariff changes under the Indo-British Trade Agreement (1939).**—The question of revising the duties on British piece-goods once again came into prominence in connexion with the protracted negotiations for the conclusion of a new trade agreement between India and the United Kingdom in place of the Ottawa Agreement.¹ Under the new Indo-British Trade Agreement signed on 20 March 1939, the exports of Indian raw cotton to the United Kingdom were to be linked up with the imports of British cotton piece-goods into India; and to this end the import duties on British piece-goods were to be further reduced. Accordingly by the Indian Tariff (Third Amendment) Act enacted in April 1939, the protective import duties on British piece-goods were reduced to 17½ per cent *ad valorem* on printed goods, 15 per cent *ad valorem* or 2 annas 7½ pies per lb., whichever is higher, on grey goods and 15 per cent *ad valorem* on all others. These are to be the basic duties. The United Kingdom is granted a minimum import quota of 350 million yards, and the basic duties have to be reduced by 2½ per cent if the imports of cotton piece-goods from the United Kingdom in any cotton piece-goods year fall below 350 million yards. The rates might be increased above the basic rates should the imports of British piece-goods to India exceed the maximum of 500 million yards. The enhanced duties are, however, to be reduced to the basic rates after the end of any such year in which total imports from the United Kingdom have not exceeded 425 million yards. In determining the rates of duty to be charged on the United Kingdom piece-goods, regard must also be paid to the exports of Indian cotton to the United Kingdom. The new agreement provides, on the one hand, for penalties in the event of a fall in the consumption of Indian cotton by the United Kingdom below a certain minimum (5 lakhs bales for the cotton year ending 31 December 1939, 5½ lakhs for the year ending 31 December 1940 and 6 lakhs for any subsequent year) and, on the other hand, for rewards in the event of an increase in consumption above 7½ lakhs of bales.²

This new arrangement of a sliding scale of duties was strongly opposed by the Legislative Assembly, and the Indian cotton textile industry, on the ground that it unduly favoured Lancashire

¹ See ch. xiii.

² B. N. Adarkar, *The History of the Indian Tariff, 1924-39*, pp. 46 and 77.

without ensuring a corresponding gain to the Indian cotton grower, and sacrificed the interest of the Indian cotton mill industry by appreciably curtailing the protection granted to it at a time when the industry was doing none too well.¹

The Indian Tariff (Third Amendment) Act (1939), referred to above, also extended the period of operation of the protective duty on cotton piece-goods up to 31 March 1942.²

§15. Prospects of the cotton mill industry during the present war (1939).—The cotton mill industry was not doing very well on the eve of the second world war. The reduction in domestic demand caused by the 'recession' in business conditions, the increased cost of production, the growing internal competition, and the re-entry of Japan as a competitor in the Indian and overseas markets, were the main factors apart from the reduction of the import duties on Lancashire goods in April 1939 responsible for the none too satisfactory state of the industry. The increased cost was due to the increases in wages as a result of the various Provincial inquiries, the doubling of the import duty on cotton under the Finance Act of March 1939 and the levy of the 10 per cent Property Tax in Bombay and Ahmedabad for meeting the cost of Prohibition. The declaration of war on Germany by Great Britain in September 1939 created a feeling of buoyancy in the cotton piece-goods market. The first year of the war has not, however, proved substantially profitable to the industry in general and to Bombay, its main centre, in particular. The war orders amounted to less than two per cent of its normal annual production, the total war orders for the entire industry being worth Rs. 5 crores; while the scarcity of freight checked the enterprise of the industry to expand its overseas trade. The fall in commodity prices after an initial rise and the growing uncertainty about the future resulted in shrinkage of domestic demand. It should also be borne in mind that unlike during the last world war, India today is very largely self-sufficient in respect of its cloth requirements, and hence the scope for further expansion of mill-made cloth is limited. Greater hope lies in the growing expansion of overseas trade, as is shown by the substantial jump in exports of Indian cotton piece-goods to East, South and West Africa, Australia, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies during recent months. The industry may shortly be called upon to meet

¹ *Report of the Millowners' Association, Bombay* (1939), pp. 69 and 238-42.

² The import duties on British cloth were reduced with effect from 17 April 1940, in accordance with the Trade Pact with Great Britain. They are not likely to have any effect since the war has radically changed the condition of the trade.

in greater measure war requirements in India, the Middle East and other parts of the Empire. It is adjusting itself to the circumstances created by the war and is looking forward to a moderate measure of prosperity. There is, however, one element of uncertainty, the Japanese competition, which was less severe during the last war than today. It is necessary to secure adequate protection to the Indian textile industry against Japan in the proposed revision of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement.

§16. **The jute industry.**—The first jute-spinning mill was started at Rishra near Serampore in Bengal in 1855, and the first power-loom was introduced in 1859. The progress of the industry was slow during the first thirty years or so and there was scarcely any export trade in jute manufactures. During this initial stage of comparatively slow development, however, periods of great prosperity were enjoyed by the industry. From 1868 to 1873, for instance, it was said that the mills 'simply coined money', and paid dividends ranging from 15 to 25 per cent. This led to the establishment of a large number of new mills and to overproduction. Consequently, profits declined rapidly. The industry passed through a crisis and a number of mills had to be closed down. The jute industry, however, had reached large dimensions and in 1881 there were as many as 5,000 power-looms at work in Bengal. Since 1885 a tendency has been discernible towards a larger output of hessian cloth than gunny bags. Between 1877 and 1915, while sacking looms increased from 2,950 to 17,750 the hessian looms increased from 910 to 22,603, that is there was a growth of 2,400 per cent in hessian looms as against 430 per cent in sacking looms. The last war led to a considerable expansion and prosperity of the jute industry, which was called upon to meet the demands in the various theatres of the war for sandbags for the trenches and jute canvas cloth for war purposes such as tent cloth, tarpaulins, waggon covers, etc. This new development was stimulated by the necessity of substituting jute for Russian flax, the supply of which was largely cut off by the overrunning of Russia by Germany in 1915-16. The present war has also imparted a stimulus to the jute mill industry owing to the large Government and overseas demand for sandbags and hessian cloth. (See §19 below.)

Barring vicissitudes the story of the jute industry has been on the whole one of steady and continuous progress. In 1891 there were 8,000 power-looms at work in Bengal; in 1901, 16,000; in 1911, 33,000; in 1921, 43,000; in 1926-7, 51,061; and in 1937-8, 66,705. The following statistics further bring out the remarkable progress made by the industry, especially during and since the

last world war. The effects of the world depression and of the present war respectively on the jute industry are reviewed in later sections.

	Number of mills at work	Authorized capital in lakhs of rupees	Number in thousands		
			Persons employed	Looms	Spindles
Average					
1879-80 to 1883-4 ...	21	270.7	38.8	5.5	88
1899-1900 to 1903-4 ...	36	680	114.2	16.2	334.6
1909-10 to 1913-14 ...	60	1,209	208.4	33.5	691.8
1914-15 to 1918-19 ...	73	1,403.6	259.3	39.7	821.2
1925-6 ...	90	2,134.7	331.3	50.5	1,063.7
1928-9 ...	95	2,336.7	343.9	52	1,108.1
1930-1 ...	100	2,360.6	307.6	61.8	1,224.9
1933-4 ...	99	2,370.6	257.1	59.5	1,194.4
1937-8 ...	105	2,488.5	308.7(a)	52.4	1,108.1

(a) According to *Large Industrial Establishments in India* (1937).

For many years Great Britain was the only country which manufactured jute goods, Dundee being the principal centre of manufacture. Calcutta has now taken a large part of the trade held by Dundee in the past. The value of jute manufactures exported by sea in 1928-9 was Rs. 56.9 crores, whereas the average value of the export in the period 1879-80 to 1883-4 was only Rs. 1.2 crores. Owing to trade depression the value of these exports declined to Rs. 21.38 crores in 1933-4. Since 1934-5, some improvement has been in evidence, the value of the exports of jute manufactures being Rs. 29.10 crores in 1937-8. It declined to Rs. 26.26 crores in 1938-9. Nearly two-thirds of the jute grown is now consumed by the Bengal mills as compared with less than half before 1914, so that Bengal produces about twice as great a bulk of jute manufactured goods, mainly in the form of gunny bags, hessian cloth and cordage, as all the rest of the world.¹ The demand for jute goods depends on the volume of agricultural production throughout the world, jute manufactures being required for moving agricultural produce from one place to another in the course of internal as well as international commerce. A favourable agricultural season in India leads to a shrinkage of exports of jute manufactures as the demand for packing material increases within the country itself for moving the large volume of crops. So also a fall in external demand as in recent years of economic depression adversely affects exports of jute manufactures. The search for a substitute for jute has not

¹ See article on India, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th edn.

so far met with any marked success, and indeed new uses have been found for jute. The U. S. A. and other countries are, however, to some extent resorting to cotton in place of jute bags. Such a possibility has now arisen in India itself. The Indian Central Jute Committee, established in 1936, has undertaken research work in jute and jute products with a view to preventing any possible loss of markets.

§17. **Jute and cotton industries compared.**—The jute and cotton manufactures are outstanding examples of the progress of modern large-scale industry in India. The position of the jute industry in international trade is much stronger than that of the cotton industry, jute being an Indian monopoly. As already pointed out, one remarkable contrast between these two most important organized industries of India is that, while the cotton mill industry is almost entirely in Indian hands and financed by capital raised in India, the jute industry owes its origin and development to European—mostly Scottish—enterprise and capital. Another point of difference is that while the cotton industry is decentralized, the jute industry is highly centralized, there being as many as ninety jute mills within a radius of forty miles. Then again an average jute mill is a far bigger unit than an average cotton mill.

As Dr Pillai observes, 'in point of efficient organization, the jute industry is perhaps second to none in India'.¹ This has been facilitated by its highly centralized position. The Indian Jute Mills Association was formed in 1886, to facilitate among other things the adoption of concerted action as regards introduction of short-time working in the mills to avoid overproduction, etc. The high profits reaped during the last war led to overproduction, and after the war was over the industry had to pass through bad times. While the demand slackened, the costs of production increased, owing to a rise in the price of jute and in wages.² In 1921-2 the Association invited an American business expert to advise it on the possibility of forming a jute trust with a view to exercising some control over the production and price of jute. The termination of the slump, however, led to the abandonment of the project for the time being. The Calcutta Jute Dealers' Association looks after the common interests of its members as dealers in jute for local consumption.

§18. **The jute industry during the depression and after.**—The jute mill industry by no means escaped from the effects of the last world economic depression, which affected almost every industry to a greater or less extent. The jute industry suffered

¹ P. P. Pillai, *Economic Conditions in India*, p. 175.

² For a survey of the jute industry see Matheson, *op. cit.*, ch. v.

from declining prices, presence of heavy stocks at the principal consuming centres, frequent labour troubles, etc. But on the whole it faced the difficulties of the post-war (1919) depression much better than the Bombay cotton mill industry. It has thus been rewarded for its care in maintaining adequate reserves and its systematic adoption of short time when necessary. During the ten years ended in March 1936, a policy of curtailment of output was continuously in force. The mills in the membership of the Association worked forty hours a week and with a certain percentage, varying from fifteen in 1931 to ten in 1935, of looms sealed. The lowering of the percentage of the looms sealed was caused by the competition of the mills who were not parties to the Restriction Scheme as also by the improved outlook in trading conditions and the competition from other manufacturing centres. Agreement could not be reached with the non-Association mills and mills in the membership of the Association were therefore given liberty to work without any restriction either on the hours of work or machinery. The year 1937 was critical for the jute manufacturing industry, owing to unrestricted production and labour trouble.

The following year saw a worsening of the position due, among other factors, to the effects of 'recession' in business conditions and the growing internal unrestricted competition. By September 1938, the jute industry appeared to be heading towards a major crisis, and in the interests of the well-being of Bengal, the Provincial Government had to step in and by an Ordinance issued in September 1938 assumed control over the industry and limited the hours of work to 45 per week.

The conclusion of a new voluntary short-time working agreement between the Association and the outside mills in January 1939, which was accelerated by the apprehension of the industry of the Government Ordinance being converted into permanent legislation, did away with the need for restricting the working hours by law. By a supplementary agreement in the following July the mills agreed to work 45 hours per week with 20 per cent of the hessian and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the sacking looms sealed. The fall in the price of raw jute and its adverse effects on the jute-grower in Bengal led to the promulgation of two Ordinances by the Provincial Government for fixing the minimum prices of raw jute and hessian in August 1939. The Government also promised to restrict the area for the next jute crop by issuing another Ordinance.¹

¹ See *Commerce*, 1939 Annual Review Number, p. 18 and *Capital*, Indian Industries Supplement (December 1939), p. 9.

§19. **Effects of the present war on the jute mill industry.**—Before the Ordinances of 1939 had had time to show their effect came the news that war had begun in Europe. The outbreak of war at the beginning of September 1939 brought a feverish overseas demand for all sorts of jute goods. Already in January 1939 an order for 200 million sandbags had been placed by the British Government with the Indian Jute Mills Association. The beginning of hostilities brought a flow of orders amounting to Rs. 11 crores in the first thirteen weeks. This lifted the jute industry out of acute depression and the monthly production sharply rose from 90,700 tons in September 1939 to 125,700 tons in March 1940. Shipments of jute manufactures established a fresh record for the decade and totalled 1,098,725 tons out of 1,280,400 tons produced during the year. There was a remarkable rise, largely speculative in character, in the prices both of jute and jute manufactures. The European war thus appeared to have transformed the depression into prosperity and did away with the need for regulation of output and fixation of minimum prices. Restrictions on working hours were withdrawn and the mills went into full production at sixty hours per week, the Government of India having suspended certain provisions of the Factories Act by an Ordinance. The Government of Bengal also postponed consideration of a Bill for restricting the area under jute cultivation.¹

The position of the jute industry is not, however, entirely healthy. The speculative rise in jute prices has already had adverse reactions on the industry. There are indications that the demand has been checked by high prices, and the adoption of substitutes is being encouraged. The slackening of war orders in recent months and the loss of the continental markets of Europe have also had a bearish effect. The Jute Mills Association has recently (August 1940) wisely enough decided to curtail the working hours to 45 per week and to work for only three weeks in the month. Altogether it does not appear that the jute industry will benefit as much by the present war as it did during the last war.

§20. **Iron and steel industry.**—The iron and steel industry has a better claim than almost any other to be called a basic or 'key' industry, and its national importance cannot be exaggerated. A

¹ Subsequently, however, the Bengal Legislature passed the Bengal Jute Regulation Bill in August 1940 which is to be applied to the crop to be grown in 1941, in the interest of the growers. Earlier, in May 1940, the Government of Bengal issued two Ordinances for fixing the minimum and the maximum prices of raw jute and hessian in the Futures markets.

striking contrast between the industrial revolution of India and of England is that, while the revolution began in India with the application of steam to the textile industries, it began in England with the development of the essential iron and steel industries. The new industrial system in England had a solid foundation in the firm establishment of the iron and steel industry and the ancillary mechanical engineering industries. But such a development has not marked the course of the revolution in India. Until recently Indian industries have relied almost exclusively upon imported machinery and machine tools, and hardware goods in general. However, both the Government and the public have at last awakened to the extreme importance on national grounds of the iron and steel industry, and certain important steps to be alluded to presently have been taken to ensure its rapid progress.

Pioneer attempts to introduce modern methods for the manufacture of pig-iron and steel were made as early as 1830 in the South Arcot district. They were all destined to failure until the Barakar Iron Works, which were acquired in 1889 by the Bengal Steel and Iron Company, were started in 1874 in Bengal on the Jherria coal-fields. The Bengal Steel and Iron Company began to show a profit only from 1899. The annual production at the beginning of the present century was about 35,000 tons. An attempt to make steel resulted in heavy loss owing to the low price of imported steel, small orders for numerous sections, the inferior quality of pig-iron then produced for steel-making and dependence on imported supplies of fire-bricks and ferro-manganese.¹ A new era in the history of the Bengal company, however, was opened in 1910 with the beginning of the exploitation of a new source of iron ore in the Singhbhum and Manbhum districts.

The next important stage in the history of the industry was ushered in by the formation of the Tata company. The company was established at Sakchi in the Singhbhum district by the late J. N. Tata in 1907, and the construction of the works began in 1908. Pig-iron was first produced in December 1911, and steel—for the first time in India in modern times—in 1913; and by 1916, under the stimulus of the war demand, the whole plant was in full production. Thus after a somewhat anxious period, which was to be expected in a pioneer enterprise of this character, especially in the face of unfettered foreign competition, the works were placed on a sound footing and proved of invaluable assistance in prosecuting the last war by providing large quantities of rails and sleepers for military railways in Mesopotamia, Palestine, East

¹ *Industrial Handbook of the Munitions Board*, pp. 138-9.

Africa and Salonika. In 1917 a large scheme of extension was mooted and completed in 1924, the delay being the result of difficulties of the last war and the post-war periods, such as that in connexion with the import of the necessary machinery. The old plant turned out finished steel products, such as rails, heavy structurals (beams, angles, channels), bars, light structurals, light rails and fish-plates. The additional products which the new plant, which has been in operation since 1926, turns out, are plates, sheets (black and galvanized), sheet bars and sheet sleepers.¹ The success of the Tata enterprise has called into existence some new companies, such as the Indian Iron and Steel Company formed in 1908 by Messrs Burn & Co. of Calcutta, at Hirapur near Asansol; the Mysore State Iron Works started at Bhadravati in 1923, etc. It may be noted that at the last named works blast furnaces are fired by charcoal.

The steady expansion of the industry under the stimulus of protection (see §§24-6) is reflected in the figures of production and imports. The production of pig-iron advanced from 35,000 tons at the beginning of the century to 162,282 tons in 1914; 232,268 tons in 1919 and 1,376,000 tons in 1929-30. In 1930-1 it declined to 1,140,000 tons owing to reduced exports. In 1938-9, the production of pig-iron stood at 1,576,000 tons, and 514,000 tons valued at Rs. 256 lakhs was exported, Japan being the principal customer. Next to Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. are substantial buyers of Indian pig-iron. The quality of the pig-iron turned out is fully equal to that of the continental product; indeed the imports of pig-iron are now almost negligible being 2,800 tons in 1938-9, mostly from the United Kingdom.² The production of steel advanced from 139,433 tons in 1916-17 to 599,565 tons in 1927-8, and that of finished steel from 98,726 to 428,654 tons during the same period. The production of steel ingots was 977,000 tons and that of finished steel 726,000 tons during 1938-9. The world-wide campaign of rearmament gave an impetus to the steel and iron industry and India took advantage of the world situation to consolidate her own industry.

§24. **The iron and steel industry today.**—The outbreak of the European war in September 1939 has given a fresh stimulus to the iron and steel industry of India. The mills have received large orders from the Government and Railways and have consequently enjoyed a period of boom, which is reflected in high dividends on steel shares and a sharp rise in their prices.

¹ *Report of the Tariff Board on the Steel Industry (1924)*, pars. 14-15.

² *Review of the Trade of India, 1938-9*, pp. 94 and 136.

Special mention may be made of the order of the value of Rs. 28 lakhs for the production of steel huts for overseas forces. The rapid expansion of Government Ordnance factories in India is also calculated to accelerate the expansion of the Indian steel and engineering industries. This is indicated by the figures during the year 1939, when the output of pig-iron totalled 1,835,000 tons compared with 1,575,000 tons in 1938. The manufacture of steel ingots and finished steel increased to 1,067,000 tons and 1,062,900 tons respectively, showing a gain of 9.2 per cent and 14.1 per cent respectively over the previous year. Production in 1939 was almost double that in 1932-3.

Owing to the war, imports of protected iron and steel in the year 1939 were the lowest in the history of the industry. On the other hand, Indian exports of iron and steel excluding pig-iron and iron ore were up during the year by 25 per cent. The prices realized were also high. It is presumed that this production will be surpassed in 1940.

Plans are in hand for new steel plants at Jamshedpur for rolling billets and the manufacture of wheels, tyres and axles, thereby enabling the early construction of locomotives and wagons in the country.

§22. Imports of iron and steel.—India is still dependent to a large extent upon foreign iron and steel in spite of her own increasing production. The pre-1914 average of India's imports of iron and steel was 808,000 tons valued at Rs. 12.48 crores. During the five war years the average imports declined to 422,000 tons valued at 10.11 crores. It was during this period that the Tata company increased its output and supplied the Government with war materials. During the post-war years the imports steadily increased from the post-war average of five years of 661,000 tons valued at Rs. 21.38 crores to 968,000 tons in 1929-30 valued at Rs. 17.16 crores. These increased imports in spite of increasing home production were attributed to increasing consumption in India by railways and other public works, as also by the building trade. This post-war increase in imports furnished an added plea for protection being granted to the industry. Owing to the economic depression prevalent throughout the world and increase in home production imports have declined in recent years, being 272,000 tons valued at Rs. 6.68 crores in 1938-9. As stated above they have declined further during the present war.

§23. Subsidiary Industries.—Before turning to the question of protection let us refer to some striking developments in connexion with the establishment of subsidiary industries, including those

utilizing by-products, in the neighbourhood of Jamshedpur (formerly Sakchi). The following are some of the various manufactures which are produced under the Extension Scheme :—steel tubes, tinplate, enamel ware, wire, nails, railway wagons, tea and jute mill machinery, agricultural tools, galvanized products, iron and steel castings, heavy chemicals, sulphuric acid, nitric acid, fertilizers, lime, ammonium sulphate, etc. Various manufacturing companies have already been established for this purpose. Jamshedpur and the surrounding territory are thus developing into a veritable beehive of modern industries.

§24. **Grant of protection to the steel and iron industry.**—The policy of discriminate protection adopted by the Assembly early in 1923 was brought into operation for the first time in India in the case of the steel and iron industry, as recommended by the Fiscal Commission. A Tariff Board was accordingly constituted and was entrusted with the task of investigating the claim put forward by the Tata Steel and Iron Company for protection to the steel industry

The Board after a careful inquiry came to the conclusion that the case for protection was not ill-founded, and that development had been recently hindered by severe competition from abroad coinciding with a large scheme of expansion set on foot by the Tata company. The Board held that the industry satisfied all the conditions laid down by the Fiscal Commission. India possesses great natural advantages for the manufacture of steel owing to the richness and abundance of iron ore deposits in the Singhbhum and Orissa iron belts and the comparatively short distance which separates them from the coal-fields. Most of the other raw materials required, limestone, manganese, and materials for refractory bricks, exist in India in sufficient quantities. The industry also possesses the advantage of a large and expanding home market. In respect of labour, however, 'India suffers under a disadvantage inevitable in any country mainly agricultural, and where industrial experience and training has still to be acquired', rendering it necessary to import at present skilled supervisors from America and Europe. This is, however, a temporary handicap which will eventually disappear. The Board held that, unless protection was given, there was no hope of the industry developing for many years to come, and there was a serious danger that it might cease altogether. The Board agreed that it was also an essential industry for military purposes, and was, therefore, specially entitled to protection. The burden on the consumer was expected to be temporary and widely diffused.

The Steel Protection Bill incorporating the recommendations,

of the Board was considered and passed by a special session of the Indian Legislature in May and June 1924. The duties on certain articles manufactured from steel were increased, and bounties (amounting in all to about Rs. 242 lakhs during 1924-7) were granted on heavy steel rails, fish-plates and railway wagons manufactured in India. At the end of the period, the bounties and duties alike were to be subject to revision.

Subsidiary measures of protection had to be taken to safeguard the interests of such of the industries as make use of steel as their raw material. An increase in its price due to protection was likely to be detrimental to many branches of the engineering industry at a time when it was holding its own with difficulty in the face of foreign competition. The Tariff Board made certain recommendations to meet this aspect of protection to steel, which were accepted by the Government and the Assembly. The engineering industry was protected by higher duties on imported fabricated steel with certain exceptions.

§25. **Statutory inquiry into the steel industry (1926-7).**—As provided for by the Steel Protection Act, 1924, which was due to expire on 31 March 1927, the Tariff Board carefully examined the position of the industry in 1926 and recommended the continuance of protection on certain lines for a further period of seven years. The industry was now to receive protection in the form of increased duties on import and not by bounties on production, since the latter would be too costly to maintain over a period of seven years, at the end of which a fresh inquiry was to be made in order to ascertain what kind and amount of protection might still be necessary.¹ Accordingly, a Bill was introduced in the 1927 Delhi Session and came into force on 1 April 1927. It provided for an imposition of different rates on certain iron and steel articles, with a basic duty on articles of British manufacture and an additional duty on those of non-British origin. There was a heated debate in the Assembly on the proposal to differentiate between standard and non-standard steel, that was, practically, between British and continental steel. The Government, agreeing with the Board, held that this was necessary in order to secure a fair distribution of the burden on the different classes of the consumers and to ensure stability to the scheme of protection. The opposition suspected that the Bill contained the principle of preference to British steel, to which they were opposed.

§26. **Further measures of protection to the steel and iron industry.**—The Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Act,

¹ See *Report of the Tariff Board regarding the Continuance of Protection to the Steel Industry (1927)*, par. 167.

1932, which came into force from 1 January 1933, gave effect to the tariff changes necessitated by the trade agreement made by the Government of India and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at the Ottawa Conference held during July and August 1932 and the supplementary agreement regarding iron and steel in the September following. In the class of iron and steel goods, the preference extended only to those commodities not subject to the protective duties. The supplementary agreement provided for the adjustment of the Indian import duty on galvanized sheets as follows: Rs. 30 per ton on sheet made in the United Kingdom from Indian sheet bar; Rs. 53 per ton on sheet made in the United Kingdom from other sheet bar; Rs. 83 per ton on sheet not made in the United Kingdom. The period of operation of the protective duties imposed by the Act of 1927 was extended up to 31 October 1934. Meanwhile, in accordance with the Steel Industry (Protection) Act, 1927, the whole question of the renewal of protection was reviewed by the Tariff Board. The Iron and Steel Duties Act, 1934, gave effect on and from 1 November 1934 to the protective measures recommended by the Board. As the recommendations of the Board involved considerable reduction in the level of import duties in certain important cases with a resultant reduction in the revenue derived from customs, it was found necessary to impose as a revenue measure an excise duty of Rs. 4 per ton on the production of steel ingots in British India, and to impose a countervailing customs duty on steel ingots. This countervailing duty is additional to the protective duties recommended by the Board and alternative to the *ad valorem* revenue duties on articles in respect of which protection had not been proposed. As recommended by the Tariff Board the supplementary agreement was terminated in 1934.¹

On the whole, we may approve of the general policy followed in regard to the steel and iron industry since 1924. Although it is true that without the timely intervention of the State the industry could not have survived the shock of post-war competition, the protection afforded between 1924 and 1927 was not quite adequate and the Tata Steel Company was barely able to pay its way. In spite of certain unfavourable circumstances, however, the industry made appreciable progress 'as evidenced by increase of output, improvement in the efficiency of labour, reduction in the number of foreign hands, and considerable reduction in works costs' and also by 'considerable improvement in the conditions

¹ B. N. Adarkar, *History of Indian Tariffs*, p. 22.

of labour, especially in respect of wages, housing and various amenities of life'.¹ The reduction in the cost of production has stabilized and improved the condition of the industry and as a result imports have been diminishing.² The decision to continue the protection until the year 1941 by renewal of the protective measures adopted in 1934 would thus seem to be abundantly justified.

§27. **Tanning and leather industry.**³—India possesses a large supply of hides and skins. The cow-hides, 'the East India kips' as they are called, goatskins, buffalo-hides and sheepskins, etc., may be regarded as the by-products of her agricultural industry. Previous to the war of 1914-18, India sent large exports of raw hides, especially to Germany and Austria, which were valued at Rs. 7.17 crores in 1913. In the same year, raw skins valued at 3.4 crores were exported, mainly to the U.S.A. There was a large demand in foreign countries and high prices were offered. The war brought about important changes in the Indian tanning industry and in the export trade in hides and skins, partly because of the cutting off of the enemy markets and partly owing to the control exercised by the Government.

There has long existed a considerable indigenous tanning industry in the country under which locally available tanning materials are used for curing and tanning hides mainly to meet the local demand for inferior kinds of leather. But the most striking changes have taken place in the European methods of tanning which were first introduced by the military authorities to manufacture superior leather suitable for harness and other military requirements; and tanneries usually followed the establishment of arsenals. At Cawnpore, a further step in production was taken in 1860 when the Government Harness and Saddlery Factory was set up. Shortly afterwards, Messrs Allen and Cooper established the Army Boot and Equipment Factory and received at the outset considerable financial assistance from the Government. 'A marked degree of success has attended the efforts to develop the leather trade in Cawnpore, and, up till the time of the outbreak of the war, the factories which have

¹ See H. L. Dey's article, 'Protection of the Steel Industry, 1924-7' in *Indian Journal of Economics*, July 1928.

² *Review of the Trade of India in 1938-9*, p. 42.

³ The Hides Cess Inquiry Committee estimate the value to India of this industry taken as a whole (that is the raw stock and leather trades and the leather, leather-working and allied industries) at about forty to fifty crores of rupees. It provides employment to large numbers of men and is a factor in the economic well-being of millions of India's depressed classes.—*Report of the Hides Cess Inquiry Committee* (1930), par. 158.

come into existence, though largely dependent on the army for orders, were by no means apanages to the military department.¹ The Western India Army and Equipment Factory was started at Sion in Bombay by Adamjee Peerbhoy. A few more factories were established at various centres where the production of finished goods was attempted. Although considerable use of machinery is made in European tanneries and leather-working factories, it was until recently conspicuous by its absence in the Indian tanneries except in the Cawnpore and Sion factories and the Madras Tannery, which produced the whole of the half-tanned leather and skins that loom largely in the export trade of the country. Before 1914, the bulk of the export trade in tanned hides and skins was confined to the south of India where the bark of *Cassia auriculata*, known in Madras as *avaram* and in Bombay as *tarwad*, is obtainable, Madras having by far the larger number of tanneries.²

§28. **Effects of war on the tanning and leather industry.**—The tanning and leather industry underwent a remarkable transformation during the war of 1914-18. The Indian Munitions Board directed its activities towards increasing the outturn and regulating the production of those kinds of leather which possess a special value as war material. The most important development was connected with the great increase in the production of the rough-tanned cow-hides, known as the East India tanned kips, from the Madras and Bombay tanneries. The value of these kips for making the 'uppers' for the army boots was realized during the war and the Government assumed complete control of the trade, purchasing in India the whole of the available supply for export direct to the British War Office. Whereas 194,763 cwt of tanned hides valued at Rs. 1.75 crores was exported in 1913, in 1917-18, 361,674 cwt valued at Rs. 4.86 crores was exported. In addition to the export trade in East India kips, Indian tanneries produced during the war period greatly increased quantities of leather accoutrements of all sorts and boots for the army in India and the Indian Expeditionary Forces. Thus under the direction of the Munitions Board the Government gave a great stimulus to the tanning industry, and the output of the annually produced boots and shoes was twenty times bigger at the end of the war than before it.

The tanning and leather industry is being expanded to meet the large demand during the present war. Special mention may be made of the order for the supply of boots to the value of

¹ *Industrial Commission Report*, Appendixes, p. 57.

² Matheson, *op. cit.*, ch. vi.

Rs. 1 crore placed in India by the United Kingdom. Extended machinery and a large labour force are now being employed in fulfilling war supply orders.

The chrome process of tanning which enables superior leather to be produced has made very slow progress in India, though it was thoroughly well established in America by about 1895. The Government of Madras did valuable pioneering work from 1903 to 1911 to demonstrate that chrome tanning could be successfully established in this country. It is, however, to be regretted that the Government had to sell the factory in response to protests from the Upper India and Madras Chambers of Commerce who raised the cry that private trade was invaded. Upon the outbreak of the last war, however, progress was more rapid; and Indian chrome leather hides found a profitable market in Great Britain. There are several difficulties experienced in connexion with the development of chrome tanning in India, such as the highly technical processes requiring chemical knowledge and costly mechanical equipment. A considerable proportion of Indian cow-hides and goatskins is, however, eminently suited to this class of work, and promising developments may be expected under the guidance of the expert tanner whose services have been secured by the Government for the development of the tanning industry. The Industrial Research Bureau undertook in 1939 an industrial survey of the Indian tanning industry with a view to effecting a general improvement in the standard of tanning technique and thereby developing an export trade of finished leather of good quality.

§29. **Protection to the tanning industry.**—In 1919, the Indian Tariff Act of 1894 was amended and an export duty of 15 per cent on hides and skins was levied with a rebate of 10 per cent on hides and skins exported to other parts of the Empire and actually tanned there. The duty was imposed as a measure of protection to the Indian tanning industry which had received a great stimulus from Government patronage during the war but which was likely to dwindle with the fall in military needs unless some other support was given to it. As the Indian tanneries, however, could only deal with a small proportion of the total supply of hides and skins in the country, the rebate was defended as a measure of help to the tanning industry within the Empire, so as to divert the tanning of Indian hides from Germany to the British Empire. The experiment, however, failed to achieve either of the objects. The Fiscal Commission condemned the duty as wrong in principle, on the ground that if protection was needed, it should have been given through an import and not an export duty. The

Government of India, impressed with the defects of the duty, reduced the rate to 5 per cent and abolished the 10 per cent rebate in 1923, the retention of the 5 per cent duty being justified on the ground of revenue need. The majority of the Taxation Inquiry Committee, however, agreeing with the Fiscal Commission advised its early abolition. The Taxation Committee, however, recommended the retention of the duty on skins which enjoy a good reputation in the world market and were not injuriously affected by the duty. Accordingly, the Finance Member proposed the abolition of the 5 per cent export duty on raw hides in the Finance Bill of 1927. The Assembly rejected the proposal, to the great disappointment of the exporters, as it was of the opinion that the interests of the Indian tanning industry would be injured by such a course.

The 5 per cent export duty on raw hides was abolished by the Finance Act of 1934 owing to the decline in the export trade in raw hides with Germany, while the export duty on raw skins was abolished by the Finance Act of 1935 in order generally to help the revival of the export trade of India (see also ch. xi).

The claims for protection of the Indian tanning and leather manufacturing industry as a key industry deserve to be carefully considered. Alongside of protection, however, there is considerable scope yet for internal improvement, for the principal difficulty which the industry has to face is the lack of organization and expert skill.

§80. Chemical Industries.—‘In a modern state the development of chemical industries on a scale that renders them an important factor in the economic life of the State—as they are in England, Germany and America—necessitates the provision of certain essentials at sufficiently low rates.’ These essentials are, at first, the fundamental heavy chemicals, especially sulphuric and hydrochloric acids, lime, caustic soda, sodium carbonate, nitric acid, etc. They are used in the production of other chemicals from indigenous sources, and also for refining the various natural products or materials derived from such products. Thus large quantities of sulphuric acid and alkali are required for refining fixed and mineral oils. The other two essentials are (i) fuel for power, heating purposes and metallurgical operations; and (ii) chemical plant.¹

Though the war of 1914-18 gave a considerable stimulus to many of the chemical industries, India still depends largely upon foreign chemicals. Thus in 1938-9 she imported chemicals of the value of Rs. 305 lakhs, as compared with the pre-1914 average

¹ *Industrial Handbook*, p. 58.

of Rs. 90 lakhs. The production of chemicals in India, though gradually on the increase, is not sufficient to meet her own requirements. Chemicals derived from sulphuric acid have, so far, been manufactured, but no serious attempt has been made for the manufacture of alkalis, which do not enjoy the advantage of natural protection possessed by acids on account of the heavy cost of their transport by sea. An interesting recent development is the flotation of two companies—one by the Imperial Chemical Industries and the other under the management of Messrs Tata & Sons—for the manufacture of soda ash, caustic soda and eventually of other allied chemicals.¹

India's sources of raw materials for heavy chemicals are not deficient if only the various mineral ores were to be properly treated. Her varied mineral wealth in sulphide ores, saltpetre, alum salts, limestone, magnesium, etc. has been already indicated. Striking success has already been achieved in the manufacture of sulphuric acid which is a most important material for all chemical industries, so much so that its production is suggested as a test for judging the wealth of a country. There was a large demand for it, especially between 1914 and 1918, for explosives, and the industry is already established. The Eastern Chemical Co. Ltd., Bombay, put up a case in 1928 before the Tariff Board for a substantial subsidy for the manufacture of sulphuric acid. The industry before the present war had to face the keen competition of powerful European syndicates, Germany and the United Kingdom being the most serious rivals.²

The other essentials of chemical industries are fuel and plant. The fuel situation has already been examined and it has been shown how Indian coal deposits are unevenly distributed. Attempts are necessary to supply cheap electric power for the development of electro-metallurgical and electro-chemical industries. The special plant required by the chemical industries was imported before 1914, but much of the simpler plant can be locally manufactured and a start has already been made in this direction.

§91. **Effects of the present war on the chemical industries.**—The war which began in 1939 has given a fresh stimulus to the chemical industry and has brought into prominence the question of replacing imports which have been appreciably curtailed. Chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers, who met in conference at Calcutta in November 1939, are exploring the possibilities of

¹ *Review of the Trade of India in 1938-9*, p. 105.

² See *Report of the Tariff Board on the Heavy Chemical Industry (1929)*, par. 72.

the development of manufacture of new lines of chemicals in India. The Government of India is also taking a keen interest in this development and has recently undertaken a survey of the manufacturing capacity within the country, and sanctioned the erection of a Government plant for the manufacture of heavy chemicals. A large variety of drugs previously imported are now being made in this country. Aviation spirit is being manufactured from Indian crude oils; while the manufacture of bichromite is well in hand. It is noteworthy that the production of sulphuric acid and sulphate of ammonia has risen by 15 per cent. The production of soda ash and other heavy chemicals was expected to start during 1940. While the Government have taken steps to produce bleaching powder, the Scientific and Industrial Research Board is also considering the possibility of manufacturing dyestuffs, vegetable and synthetic, out of indigenous materials.

§32. **Protection to the heavy chemical industry.**—This question was referred to the Tariff Board in July 1928. The Board concluded that the claim of the chemical industry for protection rested primarily on its supreme national importance. It was a key industry whose products were used in almost all industries, it was indispensable for national defence and it provided an essential foundation for chemical research in industries and agriculture. The industry substantially fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Fiscal Commission and had made out a case for protection. This was to be given generally in the form of specific duties. At the expiration of a period of seven years of protection, a fresh inquiry was to be held as in the case of the steel industry. A bounty was to be granted for the manufacture of superphosphate which is used as an artificial fertilizer. The Board recommended reduction of railway freights with a view to the formation of a large-scale chemical industry in India.¹ After a considerable delay the Heavy Chemical Industry (Protection) Act, 1931, gave effect to some of the recommendations of the Tariff Board. It removed magnesium chloride from the free list and imposed on this and certain other heavy chemicals protective duties at various rates. These duties were to remain in force till 31 March 1933 except in the case of magnesium chloride. The protective duty on the latter was to operate up to 31 March 1939 and could be enhanced if necessary. The duties imposed by the Act lapsed on 31 March 1933 with the exception of the duty on magnesium chloride. The question of continuance of

¹ See *Report of the Tariff Board on the Heavy Chemical Industry* (1929), par. 74.

protection was referred to the Tariff Board in December 1937. The Board recommended continuance of protection for safeguarding the industry against foreign competition, especially dumping from Japan.¹ Protection at a reduced rate, namely twelve annas instead of fifteen annas per cwt recommended by the Board, has been provided for by the Indian Tariff Amendment Act (1939) enacted in April 1939. The period of protection has been extended to 31 March 1946. The Government's decision to reduce the amount of protection was subjected to criticism by the Assembly.

§33. Oil-milling industry.—We may here say something regarding the oil-milling industry. Though India produces a variety of oil-seeds, she is mainly a seed-exporting country and has not properly developed the manufacture of finished products such as refined oils and oil-seed cakes. In Europe and America, efficient plant and improved processes are used. In India we still do our oil-pressing mostly by the archaic method of the bullock and the *ghani*, which leaves a large percentage of oil in the cakes, impairing their usefulness for cattle feeding or as fertilizers. In addition to this the oil is usually highly coloured and impure and fetches comparatively low prices in the market.

There has been in recent years a great increase in the number of oil-mills worked by steam or other mechanical power, especially in the case of mustard oil, castor oil, and groundnut oil. There are several difficulties experienced by the oil-milling industry in India. In the first place, oil-seeds are admitted duty free into most countries, whereas finished products are subjected to a tariff duty. Secondly, freight on seed is lower than on oil and even on cakes. Moreover, the Indian cultivator is prejudiced against machine-made cakes as cattle food or manure. Lastly, India cannot absorb today all the cakes or meal manufactured for fertilizers and feeding, though her interests require an increase in this demand. It is, however, both unsound and uneconomic for India to export her oil-seeds instead of manufacturing the oils and oil-cakes herself. She is thereby deprived of the manufacturer's profits, and Indian agriculture of cattle food and manure of high value. Moreover, vegetable oils have several important uses and play a great part in the economic life of a civilized community. Vegetable oils and tallow are necessary for the manufacture of soap, glycerine, and for culinary and lubricating purposes, etc. Since the last war considerable attention has been given to the possibility of developing the Indian oil-milling

¹ Report of the Tariff Board on Magnesium Chloride Industry (1938), p. 15.

industry on a large scale. The present war has given a fresh stimulus to the oil-milling industry, the need for developing which has become all the more urgent owing to the decline in the export trade in oil-seeds following the closing down of the continental markets. Persistent effort to place the industry on a sound footing will undoubtedly be crowned with success.

§34. Paper-making.—The production of machine-made paper in India in modern times apparently dates from 1870 when the Bally Mills were established on the Hooghly. Its neighbourhood is still the principal centre of the industry. The Titaghur Paper Mills were established in 1882 and absorbed in 1903 the Imperial Paper Mill, which had been started at Kankinara in 1892-4. The Bally Mills after an apparently promising career for some years were liquidated in 1905. For thirty years after 1892 no new paper mill was established on the Hooghly, but in 1922, the Indian Paper Pulp Company, which was formed in 1918 for the production of pulp and paper from bamboo, commenced manufacture of paper in the Naihati Mill. As regards the up-country paper mills the oldest of them, the Upper India Couper Mill, was established at Lucknow in 1879. In 1885 the Deccan Paper Mill Company was formed and started work at Poona in 1887. The most important up-country paper mill at present is at Raniganj. It was started in 1891 by the Bengal Paper Mill Company formed in 1889. There are two small paper mills at Bombay and one at Punalur in the Travancore State. In 1927-8, the Carnatic Paper Mills started operations at Rajahmundry for making paper from paddy, straw and bamboo. The Punjab Paper Mills Company has obtained a large concession with regard to *bhabbar* grass in the Punjab for its factory near Saharanpur. In Assam, a new company has been formed and at Chittagong a new factory for manufacturing paper pulp from bamboos has been opened. The Indian production of paper amounted to 1,184,000 cwt in 1938-9 as compared with 804,000 cwt in 1932-3. In the same year there were altogether eleven paper mills in India, namely four each in Bengal and Bombay, and one each in the United Provinces, Madras and Travancore. Two new paper mills were started during the year 1938-9. The present war has benefited the paper industry as is shown by the increase in production, which in the year 1939-40 amounted to 1,416,267 cwt. This increase is likely to continue as long as the war lasts, for the paper-producing countries of Europe are no longer able to supply the Indian market. The prices of paper have also gone up. Several concerns were floated during 1939 for the manufacture of paper in India.

The Tariff Board estimated the market open to the Indian paper-maker at the present rate of consumption at about 50,000 tons out of a total annual consumption estimated by the Board at 100,000 tons.

The staple material of the paper-maker in India was until recent years *sabai* grass, which grows abundantly in northern India. Indian wood has not yet been used to make paper, and pulp is imported from Europe. For the cheaper kinds of paper, rags, hemp, jute waste and waste paper are used. The Indian Paper Pulp Company was the first to make paper from bamboo pulp. *Sabai* grass grows in scattered tufts intermixed with other vegetation and is affected by unfavourable seasons. The yield of bamboo per acre is larger than of grasses and the cost of production also smaller. Bamboo is easily available in Bengal, Orissa and south-west India. For the great bulk of the paper consumed in India, bamboo fibre is quite good enough, though as a paper-making material bamboo is inferior to *sabai* grass in strength and durability. But as already pointed out, the Indian demand for the better qualities of paper is small. Bamboo has been the subject of a good deal of attention from this point of view since 1875. As a result of the researches carried out at the Forest Research Institute, great expectations have been raised regarding the future of the bamboo paper pulp industry. However although the outlook in respect of raw material is promising, the industry has been working under certain disadvantages, such as the high cost of chemicals, heavy transport charges for coal, and severe foreign competition from Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Japan, and the U.S.A. The imports of paper and pasteboards combined are even today substantial and amounted to 3,073,000 cwt valued at Rs. 3.23 crores in 1938-9 as compared with 3,633,000 cwt valued at Rs. 4.15 crores in the previous year. As stated above imports have declined since the outbreak of war in 1939.

§35. **Protection to paper.**—The Tariff Board was asked to consider the claim to protection made on behalf of the paper and paper pulp industry in April 1924. The Board's investigation justified the hope that the manufacture of paper pulp and paper from bamboo could be successfully developed in India. They recommended a protective duty of 1 anna per lb. for five years on certain classes of writing and printing paper competing with Indian paper.

In 1925 the Bamboo Paper Industry (Protection) Act was passed providing for the imposition of a protective duty of 1 anna per lb. for seven years until 31 March 1932, so as to secure

a firm basis for the industry. The Bamboo Paper Industry (Protection) Act of 1932 renewed the protective duty up to 31 March 1939 as recommended by the Tariff Board, which found that considerable progress had been made in developing the bamboo paper industry, that ample supplies of raw material were available at lower prices than in 1925, and that the cost of production in Indian mills had been materially reduced during the period of protection. The same Act imposed a new protective duty of Rs. 45 per ton on imported wood pulp to supply a definite stimulus to the manufacture and use of bamboo pulp. The question of continuing protection to the paper industry beyond 31 March 1939 was the subject of an inquiry by the Tariff Board in 1937-8. The Government of India decided to continue protection to the industry but at a rate lower than that recommended by the Board,¹ and gave effect to their decision by the enactment of the Indian Tariff (Second Amendment) Act, 1939. The period for which protection was granted was fixed at three years instead of seven in view of the imperfections revealed in the Board's inquiry. The duty on wood pulp was fixed at Rs. 30 per ton or 25 per cent *ad valorem*, whichever was higher. The protective duty on paper was fixed at 9 pies instead of 11 pies per lb. The curtailment of both the rate and the period of protection was much criticized in the legislature and by the business community.

§36. Glass manufacture.—Glass-making is a very ancient industry, and reference is made to it by Pliny who speaks of the superior 'Indian glass' made from crystals. However, no traces survive of the ancient industry, and all that is certain is that in the sixteenth century it existed as an established industry but had not advanced beyond the stage of producing very inferior material utilized for the manufacture of bangles and, to a small extent, small bottles and flasks. Then as now there was a large demand for bangles in the country. More recently, between 1892 and 1893, five glass factories of the modern type were established, but they were all wound up sooner or later. Those started under European management struggled hard and survived longer, but the last of them failed in 1908. Another European attempt, also unsuccessful, was made in Madras in 1909.

The glass industry, however, seems to have a peculiar fascination for Indians, for, in spite of the previous failures, as many as sixteen factories on a small scale were started during the swadeshi period 1906-13 and were the products of Indian enterprise. Only

¹ See *Report of the Tariff Board on Paper and Paper-Pulp Industries* (1938), par. 71.

three of these factories, however, were in operation in 1914, and none of them was making a commercial profit, though the Talegaon factory in the Poona district, aided by the Paisa Fund, was paying its way on the somewhat peculiar and non-commercial lines on which it was run.

Two well-defined classes of the industry in its present stage can be distinguished : (i) the indigenous cottage (bangle-making) industry ; and (ii) the modern factory industry. The indigenous industry is spread all over India but is chiefly concentrated in the Ferozabad district of the United Provinces and the Belgaum district in the south. There is a large colony of bangle-makers and about sixty bangle factories in Ferozabad. The 'silk' bangles imported from Japan are, however, a serious rival to the home-made article.

The factory industry is yet in a condition of infancy and its production is mainly confined to manufacture of lampware and, to a less extent, of bottles and carboys. As a result of the stimulus given during the war period (1914-18) by the demand for specialized glass passing through the Munitions Board, several factories have with some success turned out glass tubing, flasks, beakers, Petri dishes and test-tubes ; and a few works have been started to meet the demands of scientific laboratories controlled by the Indian Medical Service.

§37. Imports of glass.—Before 1914 India, imported glass and glassware valued at Rs. 190 lakhs, the principal imports being bangles, beads, false pearls, sheet and plate glass, lampware, bottles and phials, soda-water bottles, tableware, etc. Austria and Germany held a predominant position in the trade, their share being 57 per cent of the aggregate imports. During the war, the imports of bangles and lampware decreased and their place was partially taken up by Indian wares. Japan has increased her share in the imports of glass enormously. In 1929-30, imports were valued at Rs. 252 lakhs and mainly came from Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, which shows that the Indian industry was still in a condition of infancy. The value of the imports receded from Rs. 252 lakhs in 1929-30 to 122 lakhs in 1931-2. In 1937-8 it increased to 152 lakhs, but declined to 125 lakhs in 1938-9. Japan still retained her foremost position in the trade.

In addition to foreign competition other difficulties are inexperienced control, lack of trained men, insufficient supply of essential materials like coal and soda ash, sand and lime, inadequate finance, etc. In 1932, according to the figures published by the Tariff Board, there were 59 glass factories, the chief

centres being Bombay, Jubbulpore, Allahabad, Naini, Bijhoi, Ambala, Lahore and Calcutta. Allahabad and Naini in the United Provinces enjoy enormous advantages over other centres like Bombay owing to their location in the vicinity of raw materials and fuel supplies.¹

The fuel difficulty may be overcome by the supply of cheap electricity for working electric glass-furnaces, but this is not such an easy matter as used to be once fondly imagined. Labour difficulties are no doubt serious as the glass industry even in its simple form is highly technical and can be efficiently conducted only by scientifically trained managers and expert workmen. Useful work has been done by the Paise Fund Glassworks at Talegaon in training glass-blowers, and the expansion of the industry under war conditions was chiefly due to the supply of men who came from this place, although the training given there leaves much to be desired. Railway facilities are also necessary.

§38. **Protection to the glass industry.**—The prospects of the glass industry have been improved as the result of the appointment of a Glass Technologist by the Government of the United Provinces. Satisfactory results have been achieved in manufacturing bulbs for electric lamps, glass-stoppered bottles, laboratory glass, etc. The present war has given further stimulus to the industry. Two new factories were added in 1939, and imports have shown an appreciable decline. In response to the representation of the glass manufacturers in India the Government of India referred the claim of the glass industry for protection to the Tariff Board in October 1931. The Board, which submitted its report in 1932, recommended the grant of protection for a period of ten years and outlined proposals for protective duties on sheet and plate glass, bangles, beads, false pearls, glass and glassware. The Government of India's decision, which was announced as late as June 1935, was adverse to the findings of the Tariff Board. They did not accept the plea for protection on the ground that the absence of indigenous supplies of raw materials (namely soda ash) constitutes a disadvantage to the industry which cannot possibly be balanced by any advantages which it possesses in other respects. They, however, postponed their final decision until the possibilities of tapping new sources of supply of soda ash are fully explored. In the meantime they decided to afford the glass-manufacturing industry a certain measure of relief by way of a rebate of duty on imported soda ash. This concession was to continue for three years. This decision of the Government of

¹ See Fox, *Notes on Glass Manufacture* [Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour, No. 29 (1922)].

India caused great disappointment among the glass manufacturers and was the subject of adverse criticism in general. The Tariff Board, while admitting that satisfactory sources of soda ash were not yet in existence in India, did not consider that this fact in itself invalidated the claim for protection advanced by the glass industry.¹

§39. **The cement industry.**—It is surprising that in spite of the large home market in India, favourable conditions for manufacture and the national importance of the industry, the cement industry occupied an insignificant position before 1914, and was not able to produce cement up to the requirements of the British standard specifications. Even before 1914 India consumed large quantities of cement, importing about 180,000 tons a year. The demand for cement rapidly increased after the war and now exceeds 1,000,000 tons a year. The use of ferro-concrete in bridges and heavy structural work of all kinds is extending rapidly. It has even been said that the Steel Age is now giving place to the Cement and Ferro-concrete Age.

The manufacture of Portland cement commenced in Madras as long ago as 1904. It was, however, not until ten years later that production on a large scale began. Three companies were formed in 1912-13; the earliest to start operations was the Indian Cement Company at Porbundar (Kathiawar), followed by the Katni Cement and Industrial Company (Central Provinces) and the Bundi Portland Cement Company (Rajputana). Subsequently the industry developed especially under the patronage of the Government who purchased, during the latter part of the war, the great bulk of the output. In the post-war boom period, a number of companies were floated under the temptation of large profits which the industry was then earning. The three old companies doubled their output and seven new ones were projected and six of them started operations by 1923. Thus the development was very rapid and the aggregate production increased from 945 tons in 1914 to 236,746 tons in 1924, the imports showing a decrease from 165,733 tons to 124,186 tons during the same period. The imports further declined to 112,000 tons in 1930-1 of which 63,200 tons was supplied by the United Kingdom, other principal sources being Japan, Germany, Italy and Belgium. In 1938-9 imports of cement showed a further drop and shrank to the low figure of 21,000 tons valued at Rs. 10 lakhs. It is only in Madras that imported cement has a market. The Associated Cement Companies (see below) are trying to counter foreign competition

¹ *Report of the Tariff Board (Glass Industry)*, par. 39.

by starting a new cement factory at Bezwada and extending their unit at Coimbatore. India has thus become almost self-supporting in respect of her cement requirements. Production of cement in India amounted to 593,000 tons in 1932-3. In 1937-8 it had nearly doubled. The quality of Indian cement is not inferior to that of the British product and it more than holds its own against the cheaper continental cement. The Indian cement industry recently (1936) took a great step forward with the formation of an effective combine known as the Associated Cement Companies of India, Ltd., thanks to the initiative taken by the late Sir F. E. Dinshaw. This striking merger of the ten principal concerns has improved the technical and commercial organization of the industry.¹ In recent years, however, internal competition and price-cutting devices have again been intensified owing to new works of the Dalmia Cement Ltd. having come into operation in Sind and other provinces. Unfortunately negotiations for the merger of the rival companies did not materialize. The slackening of the building boom in many important cities, the levy of the Property Tax in Bombay and Ahmedabad, and the war-time increases in the price of steel have also had adverse effects on the immediate demand for cement in the country. On the other hand, although the present war has handicapped the industry by raising the cost of manufacture, it has also opened up prospects of a substantial export demand. The A.C.C. have already entered into several contracts for supplies to overseas markets. There is also a promising field outside the building trade.²

The Tariff Board found that the industry possessed natural advantages in respect of raw materials, but laboured under a considerable handicap with regard to fuel as most of the works are situated away from the coal-fields. Regarding markets, the Board points out that the up-country market is a naturally protected market for the Indian cement works, which, except for the Kathiawar factories, are above 300 miles from any port. Elsewhere, Indian cement has to face the competition of foreign supplies. However, as the principal market for cement in India is not up-country but in the ports of Bombay and Calcutta, most Indian factories are at a disadvantage here, being away from the ports.³

¹ Since then while one unit (the Katni works) has been closed down, two new factories commenced operations in the year 1939.

² Sir H. P. Mody's speech at the Annual General Meeting of the A.C.C. Ltd., on 12 January 1940.

³ *Report of the Tariff Board (Cement Industry) 1925*, pars. 8-12.

The Tariff Board, to whom the claim of the industry for protection was referred in April 1924, declined to recommend protection to the industry on the ground that it was suffering from over-production and prices were determined by internal competition among the Indian manufacturers and not by the imports. It considered, however, that it would not be long before conditions became stable, and with a view to the removal of the handicap to which Indian cement is subject owing to the great distance of most of the factories from the coal-fields or the ports, recommended that legislation should be introduced authorizing the Government to pay bounties on cement consigned from Indian factories to certain ports or to railway stations within a specified radius of these ports, provided the payment of bounties did not lead to a reduction in the price of Indian cement in relation to the price of imported cement. The Government of India did not accept the principle of such conditional legislation and decided not to take any action on the report.

§40. **Match industry**¹.—With the exception of the Gujarat Islam Match Factory in Ahmedabad founded in 1895, there was no successful manufacture of matches on a commercial scale in India before 1921. From time to time factories on a small scale were started, but they soon closed down owing to unsuitable location, inadequate capital, or inefficient management. There has been considerable expansion in recent years as a result of the imposition, in 1922, of an import duty for revenue purposes on matches of Re. 1-8-0 per gross, or more than 100 per cent *ad valorem*. The industry commands a large home market, consumption being estimated at seventeen million gross a year. Labour is cheap and well able to manipulate the simple machinery. The most striking development has been the establishment, in view of the import duty, of match factories in India by the gigantic Swedish combine, which controls about seventy per cent of the total world's demand, and there has been considerable agitation by the Indian match manufacturers about the adverse repercussions of this dominant foreign concern on the indigenous industry. Regarding the claim for protection, the Board reporting in 1928 held that the prices of Indian matches were regulated by internal competition and the consumer got them as cheap as it was possible to get them and that the industry would be able to resist world competition without the assistance of the State. It recommended, however, that the current revenue import duty of Re. 1-8-0 per gross should be converted into a protective duty for an indefinite

¹ The coal and salt industries are dealt with in vol. I, ch. ii, while the sugar and tea industries are dealt with in ch. vi of the same volume.

period so as to give assurance to the industry that it would not be deprived suddenly of the protection it had enjoyed so far. It did not, however, recommend any measures for the time being to safeguard Indian interests against the Swedish Match Company in India. It held that the company had been doing useful work in the expansion of the industry in India. The Board, however, advised the Swedish Match Company to adapt itself to Indian nationalist and political sensitiveness by reconstructing itself with a rupee capital and admitting Indian directors, and acknowledged the necessity of keeping a watch on the company to see that it did not employ its large resources to establish a monopoly in India.¹

The Assembly passed the Match Industry Protection Bill in September 1928 as recommended by the Tariff Board, by which a duty of Re. 1-8-0 was levied on a gross of boxes each containing 100 matches.² A duty of $4\frac{1}{2}$ annas was levied on every pound of undipped splints used for match-making, and of 6 annas per lb. on veneers used in box-making. A considerable section of public opinion in the country along with the Indian Chambers of Commerce was strongly opposed to the policy of the Tariff Board and the Government in allowing a foreign concern like the Swedish Match Company to avail itself of the advantage of protection without the statutory adoption of the usual precautions to safeguard Indian interests. The Government assured the Assembly, however, that they would certainly take special precautions to see that the Swedish combine did not prove a menace to the indigenous industry by developing into a monopolistic concern.³

The Indian match industry, sheltered by a high tariff, has been able to meet India's domestic requirements, and imports of foreign matches are now small. Only 1,263,000 gross of boxes of matches valued at Rs. 23.5 lakhs was imported in 1938-9, as compared with 13 $\frac{2}{3}$ million gross valued at Rs. 204 lakhs in 1921-2. Decreasing imports of match-making materials show that the industry is increasingly meeting all its requirements from indigenous sources.

¹ The Board held that it was utterly impossible to build up a cottage match-making industry in India, in view of the competition of the mass production of factories. See *Report of the Tariff Board (Match Industry)*, 1928, pars. 131-2.

² The imposition of an excise duty on matches in 1934 and the consequent changes in the import duties are dealt with in ch. xi.

³ A deputation on behalf of the Indian manufacturers recently urged upon the Government of India that the time had come to take action suggested by the Indian Tariff Board in 1928 to safeguard the Indian match industry against unfair competition by the Swedish combine.

COTTAGE INDUSTRIES

§41. Causes of the persistence of small-scale production.—Industrial advance at the present time is generally associated with the predominance of production on a large scale. It must be remembered, however, that it does not necessarily bring about the total extinction of small-scale industry. The increasing use of electricity instead of steam has tended to make the unit of production smaller than the average factory at present without involving any sacrifice of important external and internal economies. Again, in every progressive society there are a number of articles, such as artistic products and many luxury goods, which do not lend themselves to standardized production. Further, many of the improvements in the material equipment of civilization give rise to a number of small establishments to keep them going. Finally, new industries, so long as they are in an experimental stage, are first tried on a small scale and it is only when their success is demonstrated that they are organized on a large scale.¹ It thus comes about that even in the most advanced countries of the West, a number of small industries exist and flourish side by side with large-scale industries. The important part played by small-scale and cottage industries in the economic structure of Japan is well known.

§42. Industrialization and cottage industries in India.—In India, particularly under the present conditions, industrial expansion in the near future is likely to be marked by the multiplication of small-scale enterprises all over the country. This is, however, a different thing from saying that India's progress in industrialization will leave all the industries of the old type intact and in undiminished vigour. Some old, lifeless industries will almost always lie about the cradles of new-born modern industries, and we must expect that intense industrialization will be injurious to some of the handicrafts which exist at present. In some cases, the disappearance of old handicrafts may be unavoidable and must be accepted as the price of industrial progress. A brief account has already been given of the manner in which the economic transition in India has affected the various indigenous industries,² and it has been pointed out that the artisans were left to their own resources and had to meet the new situation as best they could without any sort of guidance or help from the State. This was a mistake and care should be taken not to repeat it in future.

(i) Some of the old industries like hand-spinning have already

¹ Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Foundations of Indian Economics*, p. 360.

² See vol. I, ch. v, §§ 21, 22, 25; also see *Report on the Survey of Cottage Industries in Madras Presidency* (1929).

succumbed, and we do not believe that the country is likely to gain by attempts to resuscitate it by artificial means, though we have already admitted that as an ancillary occupation to agriculture it has some small possibilities. (ii) There are other cottage industries whose products are competing directly with machine-made goods and which may be described as being in a state of suspended animation. Those who cling to them do so because of their unwillingness to give up their hereditary occupation, or because they are deterred by the hard conditions of factory work as at present organized, or it may be that a craftsman is forced to remain in his traditional vocation by 'the patron and incubus' of the petty artisan in India—the merchant-financier, who is interested in keeping him there indefinitely, so that he may recover his money and continue to exploit him.¹ Each of these cases suggests its own appropriate remedy. Sheer conservatism must be overcome by propaganda and education which should teach the artisan quickly to adapt himself to changed circumstances. The dread of factory work must be removed by improving the lot of the factory worker and making conditions of work in the cities less deterrent than they happen to be at present. Emancipation from indebtedness must be effected by co-operative credit and other methods already discussed. (iii) The third category is that of cottage industries which do not suffer from inherent and irremediable weakness like the first two classes just noticed and may be fit to survive even under modern conditions. Those industries, for example, which are closely connected with agriculture and which require simple tools have generally nothing to fear from factory goods. There are also cases where the artisans have successfully adapted themselves to the new conditions and learnt to use superior raw materials and better tools. 'The weaver has taken to mill yarn, the dyer to synthetic dyes, the brass and coppersmith to sheet metal, the blacksmith to iron rolled in convenient sections, in each case with advantage to himself from the lessened cost of production, which has greatly extended his market. In some districts in Lower Bengal, the weavers use the fly-shuttle slay extensively; and they have recently adopted it in large numbers in the coast districts of the Madras Presidency; while it is also gradually coming into use elsewhere. The tailors invariably employ sewing machines, and town artisans readily take to improved tools of European or American manufacture.'²

¹ For fuller particulars regarding the financial and other handicaps of cottage industries see *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee*, pars. 106-42.

² Industrial Commission Report, par. 255.

Again, the economic strength of some of the handicraftsmen is due to the fact that the goods they turn out are of such a character that they allow no scope for the employment of automatic machinery and large-scale production, or are not any cheaper or better for being machine-made rather than hand-made. Also, popular taste may require too great a variety for the goods to be profitably turned out on a large scale by means of modern mechanical appliances. Proximity of the market, and a more intimate knowledge of the consumers' wants may further turn the scale in favour of the cottage worker. Further, the self-sufficiency of the village, though no longer preserved in its entirety, is not altogether a thing of the past even now, particularly where the railway has not yet penetrated, and consequently some of the artisans still continue to occupy their old recognized place in the corporate organization of the village and serve the simpler needs of the village-folk as in the days of yore, receiving their remuneration in the manner already described.¹ However, the self-sufficiency of the village is being invaded more and more, and as it disappears the position of these artisans will need to be adjusted.

Modern industry has made only a moderate advance in this country so far. Nor has the policy of free imports of cheap foreign manufactures, which was in full swing until the adoption of the policy of discriminate protection in 1923, wrought anything like the complete destruction of all the indigenous industries. Workers in the various cottage industries still form a large percentage of the population in almost every town and village. Their numbers are still vastly larger than those of the operatives employed in organized industries.² And while striving for rapid industrial expansion we must watch it with reference to its effects on the welfare of these numerous humble artisans throughout the country.

We may repeat that this does not imply that the State should try to perpetuate the existence of all old industries whatsoever at any cost, but it does suggest a thorough investigation of the position of each cottage industry in view of the prospect in the near future of substantial progress towards industrialization. Where an industry of the old type is not beyond redemption and possesses elements of inherent vitality, its survival should be assisted by every possible means. If large-scale organization is the essential condition of industrial progress we must accept it unhesitatingly while guarding against its peculiar evils and

¹ See vol. I, ch. v, §14.

² See *Industrial Commission Report*, par. 255.

dangers. But it is obvious that where organization of the old type does not spell economic stagnation or weakness its continued prosperity should be the object of our solicitude. The cottage industry secures a happier existence for the craftsman who works under comparatively healthy conditions in his own home in the midst of his family. Understanding as he does the whole series of connexions between the making and the using of the articles he produces, he can take much greater interest in his work and is able to enjoy something of the pleasure of artistic creation. It is also clear that in the cottage industry with its autonomous worker, there is no place for any antagonism between the employers and the employed, the possibility of which constitutes an ever-present difficulty of modern industry.

In the light of these remarks we shall now proceed to examine briefly the present position of some of the cottage industries in India, and for this purpose we shall select the textile industries which are far and away the most important and the widest in extent in India.

§43. **The cotton hand-loom industry.**—Hand-spinning of cotton is now almost completely extinguished and it need not detain us.¹ The extent and importance of the hand-loom industry are not generally appreciated. The Cotton Textile Tariff Board in its Report published in 1932 estimated the number of hand-looms at 1,984,950 while the census of 1931 returned 2,575,000 workers as being engaged in cotton and silk weaving and spinning.² And though it is no longer true that 'everyone from the Cape of Good Hope to China, man and woman, is clothed from head to foot in the product of Indian looms' (Pyrard), and though the present position of the industry is far from satisfactory, it has a great future before it if suitable measures are taken to organize it properly.

There is no gainsaying the fact that hand-loom weaving has suffered—and in some cases suffered severely—on account of the competition of mill-made goods, and the weaver has had no chance of success when pitted against large-scale organization turning out exactly identical articles at a much smaller cost. In these

¹ We have already discussed the possibility of the revival of the charka in vol. I, ch. viii, §19.

² For an excellent summary of the present position of the cotton hand-loom industry in the various provinces see *Report of the Central Banking Inquiry Committee*, par. 299. See also *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, ch. iii. For a recent (1940) review of the industry in the Bombay province see the *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee*, pars. 70-73.

circumstances, the weaver has had to abandon his calling in favour of agriculture, often joining the ranks of landless labourers, and is forced to lead a very precarious existence with even less power of resistance against famine and scarcity than the ordinary cultivator. His position is, however, stronger in the case of goods which are either too coarse or too refined and artistic and as regards which the hand-loom can hold its own against machinery. The poorer classes, especially the villagers, prefer the hand-loom cloth as it is supposed to be stronger and more durable than anything of the same kind produced by the mills. The mills cannot take up the manufacture of the large number of specialized types of cloth, the use of which is decreed by the slow-moving Indian custom, because although the demand in the aggregate is large, the demand for each type is too small to make its manufacture in a factory economically worth considering. There is, of course, also the case of the finest fabrics of genuine artistic excellence where individual skill is required. There is thus a clearly demarcated field where the handicraftsman remains supreme and which cannot be usurped by the factory. The table on page 31 shows an increase in the Indian hand-loom production between 1905-6 and 1936-7 from 108 crore yards to 149 crore yards. This means that the hand-loom supplies nearly 25 per cent of the total demand for cloth in India. The inability of the Indian mills to make up adequately the deficiency of imported cloth during the war of 1914-18 and the very high prices of mill-woven cloth after the Armistice were factors which substantially helped the weaver. Since 1922 however, the weaver has suffered by foreign (especially Japanese) competition and increased competition of Indian mills; though the more skilful and enterprising men have taken to silk-weaving and lace work. Altogether the hand-loom weaving industry has displayed a surprising degree of vitality and adaptability.

The weaver working in his own home works longer hours than the factory labourer, and has also the advantage of unpaid assistance from the women in the family in the intervals of domestic work. He is moreover content with a very small margin of profits as his standard of comfort is low. While this is a factor which increases his competitive power, its existence is not a matter for congratulation. The aim of reform ought to be so to improve the efficiency of the hand-worker as to enable him to adopt and maintain a higher standard of life. Although there are sound economic reasons for hoping that he ought to prosper if he confines himself to his proper sphere of work where the factory cannot trench on his dominion, his actual position is one

of extreme poverty and distress. The discussion of the causes of and remedies for this state of things is capable of a generalized treatment applicable to all the cottage industries and has been placed at the end of the chapter together with the recent measures of help to the hand-loom industry adopted by the Government of India.

§44. **Woollen Industry.**—The manufacture of woollen goods in some shape or form is found in all parts of the country for the simple reason that the sheep is a ubiquitous animal, though the quality of the wool varies from place to place, the sheep in the hilly tracts generally yielding wool of finer quality than those in the plains. The woollen hand-loom industry gives part-time employment to about 40,000 people.

Under the Moguls the manufacture of woollen carpets had reached a high pitch of excellence. The demand for woollen carpets came mainly from the royal courts and the nobility, and the industry found its natural habitat in the principal capital cities, though it migrated to other centres on the break-up of the Mogul Empire. The downfall of the Empire practically extinguished the local demand for carpets, but it was gradually replaced by foreign demand after the establishment of British rule. The foreign demand, however, although it helped to stay the economic ruin of the artisans, was responsible for a deterioration in the quality of the goods. It encouraged the production of cheap articles fashioned according to patterns sent out to India from abroad. The growing use of aniline dyes was a further cause of deterioration. The opening of the foreign markets also led to the appearance of a large number of middlemen, which is the characteristic feature of trade in modern India, especially of the export trade. Carpet-weaving in India at the present time depends almost entirely on foreign demand, which absorbs as much as 90 per cent of the total production.

Considered as a cottage industry, carpet-weaving is in a languishing condition on account of the ignorance and poverty of the weaver and the absence of organization.¹ It is usual for the weaver to accept advances of money from the dealer, and the system of advances tends to convert the independent handicraftsman into a bond slave of the dealer and destroys personal interest in the work on the part of the weaver and all incentive for improvement. He is not able to take his labour or goods to the best possible market but must work according to the dictation of the dealer.

The manufacture of shawls had attained great renown in India

¹ A certain amount of carpet-weaving is also done in the Indian jails.

in the pre-British days, especially in Kashmir and the Punjab, and the Moguls were particularly interested in its development. The famine of 1830 dealt a severe blow to the industry from which it never quite recovered and its difficulties were enhanced by the numerous imposts to which it was subjected in the Kashmir State. The development of an export trade to Europe which began in the early years of the nineteenth century was helpful in arresting the decline of the industry and is supposed to have at one time provided employment for over 15,000 workers. The Franco-German war of 1871, however, was responsible for an abrupt shrinkage of the European demand. Nor was this sudden check temporary in character, for shawls rapidly went out of fashion in Europe and in spite of the close of the war no revival was experienced by the trade. Another important factor which contributed to this result was the starting of shawl manufacture at Paisley in England.

Another woollen manufacture that is widely prevalent in the country is that of the coarse rough blanket (*kambli*), which is put to such a variety of uses by the humble folk in the villages and 'serves as bed, portmanteau, overcoat or umbrella'. The production of blankets is generally a by-occupation pursued by shepherds or agriculturists who are mostly Hindus. There is no export trade in these articles but the industry is nevertheless important because a very large number of people are engaged in it. It is immune from the competition of machine-made goods because the latter cannot stand the rough wear to which the *kambli* is subjected. Having regard to the facility with which the raw materials can be obtained in every part of the country and the largeness of the home market, blanket-weaving would appear to hold out great promise as a cottage industry and its possibilities should be systematically explored.

The woollen hand-loom industry is likely to benefit much by the big army orders for blankets. As the woollen mills are working to capacity to fulfil orders placed through the United Kingdom, the hand-loom interest in supplying the local market has palpably widened. If the hand-loom worker is to participate also in the production of war supplies a material extension and improvement will be required.

§45. **Sericulture and silk manufactures.**—Whatever success sericulture has achieved in India has been confined to those parts of the country, like Bengal, Kashmir and Mysore, where the requisite conditions regarding an adequate stock of mulberry trees and ample labour supply are found to be present.

Roughly, during the first three-quarters of the seventeenth

century the East India Company was primarily interested in the trade in raw silk. Subsequently the Company realized the greater profits were to be made by exporting Indian silk manufactures to England and they pursued this policy with sufficient vigour and success to alarm weavers in England. Owing to the opposition of English weavers and for other reasons, the East India Company once more reverted to the trade in raw silk. The policy of favouring the production of raw silk and discouraging that of manufactures had an adverse influence on the indigenous weaving industry.¹ Its position was further worsened by causes similar to those referred to in explanation of the decline of the woollen manufactures of carpets and shawls, namely a change in the nature of the European demand and the progress of silk-weaving in Europe, which soon outstripped the Indian industry as regards technique. To this list of causes must be added the emergence of Japan, China and the United States as competitors in the European markets; and as regards the local market, the demand for the kind of goods produced on the hand-loom was diminishing among the educated and well-to-do classes who might have been expected to fill, but did not fill, the void created by the extinction of the old nobility and the royal courts.

In short, both sericulture and silk-weaving have suffered in India in recent times. India's exports of the raw material have not only decreased in volume but have changed in form. Most of the silk exported at present is in the form of waste or cocoons. The reeling is so badly done in India that foreign countries prefer to take the cocoons from this country and do the reeling themselves. The same reason explains the increasing popularity of imported silk in India. The Indian weavers themselves prefer the more evenly reeled Chinese or Japanese to the home-made product. Efforts are being made, especially in Bengal, to improve the quality of the Indian silk. The Agricultural Department in that province runs two sericultural schools. Attempts are also being made in Assam and the Indian States of Kashmir and Mysore to encourage sericulture. In 1935 the Government of India established the Imperial Sericultural Committee, and grants amounting to Rs. 93,000 as recommended by it were allotted to various provinces to enable them to set up schemes for the benefit of sericulture in Bengal, Assam, Madras, Bihar and Orissa and Burma.² The schemes are designed to increase production of

¹ The decline of the silk industry is indicated in a striking manner by figures for the export trade. The value of the export of silk manufactures in 1886 was Rs. 32,96,000; in 1938-9 it amounted to only Rs. 1,88,000.

² See *India in 1934-5*, p. 25.

disease-free seeds and to help in investigating questions connected with silk-worm disease. An annual grant of Rs. 1,00,000 for five years from 1 April 1935 to 31 March 1940 was made by the Government of India. Imports of artificial silk yarn have been rapidly increasing in recent years. The increase between 1922-3 and 1928-9 was from 225,000 lb. to 7,700,000 lb. The imports in 1937-8 reached the record level of 31.6 million lb. valued at Rs. 2.05 lakhs. In the same year the total imports of artificial silk amounted to Rs. 4.87 lakhs. The year 1938-9 registered a decline, imports of artificial silk yarn amounting to 17.2 million lb. valued at Rs. 96 lakhs. Japan until recently dominated all branches of the import trade, but in consequence of the depression in the artificial silk industry in that country and the difficulty of obtaining the raw material after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Italy, before she entered the war in 1940, displaced Japan from the foremost position. Reduced prices and improved quality have contributed to the increasing popularity of rayon products. Japanese imports are again increasing in spite of the present conditions. As to silk-weaving, the indigenous industry has been steadily losing ground to manufactures from abroad for want of efficient organization, the hopelessly inadequate resources of the average weaver and his antiquated methods of production. The manufacture of silk goods as a cottage industry enjoys certain exceptional advantages in the existing circumstances in India. Large-scale production with modern mechanical appliances is relatively more difficult than in the case of cotton manufactures and has hardly yet made a beginning in this country. Besides, silk manufactures, being largely of the nature of luxury goods in India, admit of a great diversity in workmanship. As regards imports of finished goods from abroad, the home industry is sheltered in a large measure by the import duty on manufactured goods which is twice as high as in the case of the raw material. Lastly, there has been in recent years the growth of a well-marked tendency on the part of Indians to extend a patriotic preference to indigenous as against foreign goods. Circumstances would thus seem to be peculiarly propitious at present for reviving the silk cottage industry.

It may be mentioned in this connexion that the Indian Tariff (Textile Protection) Act, 1934, also gave effect to the decisions of the Government of India on the recommendations of the Tariff Board appointed to investigate the claims of the sericultural industry to protection. It imposed protective duties on raw silk, silk yarn, piece-goods and mixtures as well as on fabrics of artificial silk and mixtures; in addition the duty on artificial silk yarn,

which competes with silk yarn, was raised to 25 per cent *ad valorem* with an alternative minimum specific duty of 3 annas per lb. Recently (April 1940) the existing protective duties on silk and silk manufactures were extended for a further period of two years, although the Tariff Board (1938) had recommended a five-year protection to the Indian silk industry and an all-round increase in the import duties. The rise in the prices of silk and silk manufactures owing to war conditions and the present position of uncertainty were adduced as reasons by the Government of India for departure from the recommendations of the Tariff Board.

§46. **Other cottage industries.**—The present position of different cottage industries has already been indicated in the chapter 'Economic Transition in India' (vol. I, ch. v), while the cottage branches of the oil-milling, tanning, glass-making and match-making industries have been noticed in our treatment of these industries. The present position and prospects of subsidiary agricultural industries have also been discussed under Agricultural Organization (vol. I, ch. viii). There are numerous other cottage industries such as embroidery work, furniture, metal and cutlery, gold and silver thread industries, pottery, soap-making, cap-making, doll- and statuette-making, bead manufacture, etc.¹ For want of space we cannot enter upon an exhaustive treatment of all cottage industries. Suffice it to say that, having regard to the important place they will always occupy in our national economy, we can no more afford to neglect them than we can afford to neglect agriculture, however keen our concern for the rapid progress of modern industrialism.

§47. **Methods of aid to cottage industries.**²—The ignorance and poverty of the small artisan together with the absence of any effective organization for directing him make it necessary that a comprehensive scheme for assisting him must be elaborated and put into operation. The first obvious step, of course, is better general education which should make some attempt to provide manual training and instruction in industrial crafts. We endorse the recommendation of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee that basic education through the media of

¹ For an interesting description of the various cottage industries in Madras, see *Report on the Survey of Cottage Industries in Madras Presidency* and for cottage industries in Bombay see *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee* (1940), pars. 64-105.

² See A. G. Clow, *The State and Industry*, ch. vi, *Report of the Central Banking Inquiry Committee*, par. 300, and *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee*, pars. 143-79.

crafts should be introduced particularly in rural areas.¹ Over and above this, sufficient provision for the education of the artisan in special industrial schools, preferably controlled by the Director of Industries, is necessary. In Bombay, the Department maintains six weaving schools for the benefit of the hand-loom weavers. The Industrial Commission also recommended that, for the training of the more intelligent of the artisans, demonstration hand-loom factories assisted by the Government should be started, and a commercial section should be attached to the weaving schools, so that the more enterprising artisans so trained might be fitted to start small hand-loom factories on their own account. The jails and reformatory schools make a speciality of teaching various industrial crafts to their inmates such as carpentry, cane and bamboo work, etc. with a view to enable the prisoners to set up as craftsmen after they are discharged. Their career, however, after they are released is not systematically watched over a sufficiently long period and it is difficult to say how far this effort at giving instruction in handicrafts to the prisoners is helping the maintenance of cottage industries. One of the handicaps from which the cottage industries very often suffer is the difficulty of obtaining cheap raw material of good quality. The necessity of improving the quality of indigenous cotton and silk, for example, is obvious from this point of view. Another needful reform is the invention and introduction of more efficient tools and implements. In Bihar and Orissa demonstrators have been appointed to conduct peripatetic demonstrations of improved appliances. These demonstrations are based on the Cottage Industries Institute which carries out experiments in its various sections, arranges for the supply of looms, dyes, accessories, etc. and introduces new cloths and new patterns among weavers. Similar services for the silk industry are performed by the Bhagalpur Silk Institute, while the experimental blanket factory at Gaya is attempting to do the same for the primitive blanket industry in the south of the Patna Division. In the Central Provinces, the Department of Industries is carrying on a campaign to introduce improved slays among weavers. Valuable assistance can also be granted by providing technical advice and facilities for technical training and by giving the artisans new patterns and designs to work upon so as to increase the sales. The Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee recommend the establishment of a Provincial Cottage Industries Research Institute under the Deputy Director for Cottage Industries to study problems of

¹ Report, par. 234.

interest to cottage industries. The Institute will not only attempt to improve the tools and existing methods of manufacture, but will also explore the possibilities of starting new cottage industries (par. 213).

By way of providing the handicraftsman with the requisite capital, the Industrial Commission suggest that in some cases small loans should be given by the Director of Industries, or that tools and plants should be supplied on the hire-purchase system so that they become eventually the property of the artisans. But the most promising solution of the problem is afforded by co-operative credit. The principle of co-operation is of very fruitful application¹ for the purpose of bettering the lot of the small artisan, whether by providing loans at a moderate rate of interest or helping him in the purchase of raw materials, tools and implements and in the sale of the finished article. The Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee recommend a special State-Aid organization for the purpose of financing the requirements of cottage workers in case it is found difficult for co-operative banks to supply the financial accommodation. In the alternative the Government may place Rs. 25 lakhs at the disposal of the cottage industries section of the Industries Department.²

Another weakness of the present system is the absence of an effective marketing organization. The artisan fails to get the best price for his goods, being unable to advertise his wares properly. The Arts and Crafts Emporium at Lucknow and similar ones at Lahore and Madras are intended to remove this handicap to some extent but many more such emporiums are required to produce any appreciable effect in the desired direction. Much attention is paid in foreign countries to marketing. The toy industry of Germany and the cottage industries of Japan owe their success to the existence of the essential business organization which takes over the produce of the industries and disposes of it within the country as well as abroad. At present the foreign markets are neglected in India and even the home market is not properly nursed. The Swadeshi Stores in Bombay form a good example of an active and successful agency for internal distribution of indigenous products and furnish a type worthy of imitation. It is gratifying that the Department of Industries, Bombay, has opened a Sales Depot in Bombay for popularizing the products of cottage industries. To the same end, the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee recommend the holding of periodic exhibitions and creation of permanent museums.³

¹ See vol. I, ch. x, §§10 and 14.

² *Report*, par. 217.

³ *Report*, par. 208.

The question of the marketing of the hand-loom products was considered at the sixth Industries Conference (1934) and promising schemes which are based on co-operative effort have since been adopted by the Provincial Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the Central Provinces and Berar, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa. In Bombay, eight Co-operative Industrial District Associations have been formed at important centres. Each Association is to have a shop of its own which will accept on consignment account against partial advances, and sell, on a commission basis, products of hand-loom weavers. A marketing officer and a textile designer have also been appointed.¹ The Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee recommend that each district should have a District Industrial Association in charge of a District Industrial Officer assisted by a local Advisory Committee. These Associations should be co-ordinated by a Divisional Association.²

One often hears complaints about the deterioration of artistic taste among the people of this country including the educated classes. A wide advertisement of artistic indigenous products will not only benefit the handicrafts, but it will also assist the formation of a more discriminating taste among the people.

Another way in which the Government might help is by extending their patronage to the cottage industries. The Provincial Stores Purchase Department in the United Provinces, for instance, has apparently accepted this policy and buys goods whenever possible from local manufacturers. The execution of a stores purchase policy with a cottage bias was also recommended by the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee.³

Reference has already been made to another welcome sign of increasing State interest in the regeneration of cottage industries, namely the State Aid to Industries Acts passed by the various provinces and the more liberal interpretation given to the rules governing the grant of financial assistance to small industries in Bombay. We are in full agreement with the recommendation of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee that State help and initiative of a substantial nature and over a continued period are essential and that in the beginning State management is also necessary to enable the cottage industries to overcome their difficulties. The Committee emphasizes the need

¹ For further particulars regarding the various marketing schemes see *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, pp. 26-9, and *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee*, par. 156.

² *Report*, pars. 209 and 212.

³ *Report*, par. 214.

for a positive industrial policy and for industrial planning by the State with the assistance of an Economic Development Department.¹

§48. **Recent measures of State help to cottage industries.**—The Government of India have in recent years keenly interested themselves in the promotion of cottage industries in India, especially the cotton hand-loom industry and the sericultural industry. The sixth Inter-Provincial Industries Conference held in July 1934 discussed schemes submitted by the various Provincial Governments for the development of the hand-loom industry, the premier cottage industry of the country. The Government of India announced at the conference that they had decided to spend about Rs. 5 lakhs every year for five years for the development of the hand-loom industry.² The schemes in the several provinces thus financed are of a varied character. They include the training of weavers in improved methods of production, the establishment of sale depots and weavers' co-operative societies for marketing of hand-loom products, and the introduction of new patterns, new designs and improved appliances. The grants to the provinces are allocated on the basis of provincial expenditure and the consumption of yarn. The seventh Industries Conference also decided in favour of holding exhibitions of hand-loom machinery and fabrics.³ We have already reviewed the measures adopted by the Government of India to encourage and protect the sericultural industry. Early in 1936, the Government of India, when declining to accept the Tariff Board's recommendation in favour of grant of protection to the woollen (mill) industry, announced their intention of asking the Assembly to sanction a grant of Rs. 5,00,000, to be spread over five years, for the benefit of the cottage industry.

The interest now being taken in the revival of cottage industries in the country by the several Provincial Governments since the advent of Congress Ministries in 1937 is calculated to accelerate the pace of progress in this direction. It may be added that the All-India Village Industries Association, established in 1935 under the auspices of the Indian National Congress, has been devising measures for the revival of cottage industries in the villages. The work of the National Planning Committee, set up in 1939 by the Working Committee of the Congress, has also served to attract attention to the important place cottage industries should occupy in any scheme of economic planning for the country.

¹ *Report*, pars. 208 and 231.

² *State Action in Respect of Industries, 1928-35*, p. 20.

³ Proceedings of the seventh session of the Industries Conference held at Delhi, October 1935.

CHAPTER III

INDUSTRIAL LABOUR

§1. **Growing urgency of labour problems in India.**—Owing to the slowness of our industrialization, our labour problems are not so formidable as in the West. But the time is not far distant when they will assume similar dimensions. The war of 1914-18 led to a new mass awakening, and workmen are becoming more and more conscious of their importance and rights. The rise in prices during the last war and after, by greatly increasing the cost of living, led to labour unrest and forced labour to organize itself in order to safeguard its interests. The Indian labour movement has now been linked up with the international labour movement, and India's labour representatives attend the International Labour Conference held annually. India has been already recognized as one of the first eight countries of industrial importance by the League of Nations. The national importance of ensuring an adequate supply of an efficient and contented labour force in industries is being understood more and more by the Government and the people. This was attested by the appointment in May 1929 of a Royal Commission on Labour presided over by the late Rt Hon. J. H. Whitley. The recommendations of the Whitley Commission have been accepted as the foundation for the Government's labour policy and have powerfully influenced recent labour legislation.¹ Another factor which exercised a decisive influence on the labour policy of the Government was the advent of Congress ministries in a number of provinces in the middle of 1937. We may in this connexion invite attention to the press note which the Government of Bombay issued in August 1937 explaining their policy in respect of the industrial worker. 'The aim of the Government is to try and adjust the social and economic mechanism in such a way as to assure to the worker the satisfaction of at least his minimum human needs, security of service, provision of alternative occupations in periods of unemployment and maintenance during periods of incapacity for work.'² The Bombay programme has been accepted as the basis of an All-India labour policy. It is unfortunate that the Congress ministries resigned office in November 1939, for during

¹ The Whitley Commission's Report which was published in June 1931 is referred to throughout this chapter as *L.C.R.* The figures refer to pages of the Report. Thus: *L.C.R.*, 4=*Labour Commission Report*, p. 4.

² *Labour Gazette*, Bombay, August 1937, pp. 891 and 922-4.

the period they were in office there was a spate of labour legislation. The present war has once again brought the labour problem into prominence, as the workers, being now better organized than during the last war, have in many industries demanded 'dearness allowances' (see §35 below). It is significant that an All-India Conference of the representatives of large industries was held in Bombay in September 1940 to decide what attitude the employers should take towards various measures contemplated by the Central and Provincial Governments, for ameliorating the conditions of labour.¹

§2. Supply of industrial labour and its migratory character.—The factory labourers in India do not constitute a wage-earning class exactly corresponding to the factory labourers in the Western countries. In those countries the labourers form a permanent class of industrial workers completely divorced from the land. Most of them have been brought up in the towns and some have abandoned the country permanently for the towns. The superiority of the industrial worker in the West is to no small extent due to his early upbringing in a factory area. The Indian factory operative on the other hand is generally a migrant and he rarely severs his connexion with his village.² It is not true that the typical Indian factory worker is essentially an agriculturist who has only temporarily forsaken his agricultural work in order to add to his income by a brief spell of industrial work in the city. The conception of the short-term recruit from agriculture is kept alive by the fact that a number of new recruits revert quickly to the village and the fact that the average worker does not remain in one factory for any length of time. The great majority of Indian workers in industrial centres are, however, at heart villagers with a village upbringing and village traditions, and most of them intend to get back—and succeed in getting back—to their villages. Agriculture supplies the bulk of the recently established industrial population though some of it is drawn from the different village crafts also. The proportion of factory workers deriving some pecuniary benefit from agriculture is not so large as commonly supposed. Many of them have only an indirect interest in agriculture. For

¹ These measures include proposals for giving one and a half day's holiday with pay per week to employees in shops and commercial establishments, recognition of trade unions, sickness insurance, and machinery for preventing and settling industrial disputes and for collection of labour statistics.

² For instance, 84 per cent of the inhabitants of Bombay were returned by the census of 1921, as having been born outside the city. The percentage declined to 75.4 in 1931, but there is some doubt as to whether the returns were accurate in this respect.

example, they may be members of a joint family having an agricultural holding or may have close relations actively engaged in agriculture. Most industrial workers are born in villages and spend their childhood in villages—a tendency strengthened by the raising of the minimum age for industrial employment. Many workers leave their families behind them in their village and even when the wife accompanies the husband to the city she is generally sent back to the village for confinement. The numbers of workers supplied from the rural areas are increasing with the steady expansion of Indian industry. The labourer visits his village as often as financial circumstances permit. When he returns to the village, however, it is not necessarily in order that he may assist in the agricultural operations. He may prefer to remain unoccupied and enjoy a holiday as long as he can. Whilst in the city he maintains contact with the village in so far as he has to send remittances to his family or relations or his sahuakar (*L.C.R.*, 11-14).

The causes of the migration of labour from the villages to the towns may be briefly examined. The growing class of landless rural labourers are the first to feel the pinch of agricultural distress, and improved means of communication enable them to leave the villages in search of work and higher wages in the factories, workshops, dockyards, mines, plantations and the great public works like railways and irrigation. In some provinces, for example the United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, and certain districts like Ratnagiri in the Bombay Presidency, the density of the population and the pressure on land are so great and the evil of uneconomic holdings has assumed such serious proportions that the petty landholders are under the necessity of migrating every year to the towns in order to eke out a livelihood. The joint-family system also facilitates such migration, as some members of the family can leave the village without having to break up their home or give up their land, as these can be left in the charge of other members who remain behind. Sometimes the agriculturist may seek employment in the towns to evade the village money-lender or to earn enough for buying cattle or more land. Sometimes again the village menials and drudges belonging to the depressed classes migrate to towns in the hope of bettering their prospects. But whatever may be the causes which drive the villager into the city the important fact to remember is his retention of the village connexion. According to the Labour Commission the chief cause of this is that 'the driving force in migration comes almost entirely from one end of the channel, that is, the village end. The industrial worker is not prompted by the lure

of city life or by any great ambition. The city, as such, has no attraction for him and, when he leaves the village, he has seldom an ambition beyond that of securing the necessities of life. Few industrial workers would remain in industry if they could secure sufficient food and clothing in the village; they are pushed, not pulled, to the city' (*L.C.R.*, 4).

§3. *Effects of migration.*—As a result of migration many sections of factory workers find themselves in an entirely unfamiliar environment of customs and traditions, and even the language may be different. The force of old customs and sanctions is weakened. 'The ties which give village life its corporate and organic character are loosened, new ties are not easily formed, and life tends to become more individual.' The health of the worker may be subjected to a severe strain owing to radical difference of climate, a defective dietary, excessive congestion and lack of sanitation, the temptations of enforced separation from his family. The worker is further demoralized by certain evils, comparatively unknown in the villages, such as drunkenness and gambling. As regards conditions of work, the worker finds himself subjected to unaccustomed strain of body and mind owing to disciplined hours of continuous toil instead of the spasmodic work with long intervals of rest to which he has been used. These hardships are more than many new recruits can bear and compel them to return to their villages. As the labourer desires ultimately to return to his village home, he is unable to develop a permanent interest in his employment in the city and this is probably one of the reasons which prevents him from acquiring a high standard of technical efficiency. His frequent absence from work owing to his repeated visits to his village or to other causes makes it difficult to establish contact between employers and employees and militates against any form of effective organization among the workers themselves. The worker who returns after a period of absence has no guarantee of re-employment after his return, and difficulties of reinstatement often place him at the mercy of the money-lender, the jobber or the labour supplier, the foreman and the liquor-seller.¹

The contact with the village, however, is not without its advantages. In so far as the industrial workers have been brought up in healthier surroundings they bring with them a better foundation of physical health than could be built up in the cities. The periodical migrations to the village are also a great help in recuperating mental and physical energy. The home in the village is a convenient shelter to the labourer and his family in case of

¹ See B. Hurst, *Labour and Housing in Bombay*, Foreword by Sir Stanley Reed, pp. v, vi.

unemployment, sickness, etc. The village provides some kind of insurance against unemployment in the towns just as the towns help in easing the economic pressure in the villages. The combination of urban and rural life is beneficial to the town as well as to the village. It serves to diffuse in the countryside a wider knowledge of the outside world and helps the villager to liberate himself from the fetters of custom and prejudice as it enables the townsman to obtain a valuable insight into the realities of Indian life. In these circumstances the Labour Commission give it as their considered opinion that at the present stage the link with the village must be regarded as a distinct asset and that the aim should be not to undermine it but rather to encourage and regularize it.¹

§4. **Scarcity of industrial labour.**—We have already referred to the alleged scarcity and dearness of labour.² The true explanation of any scarcity that may be felt must be sought in the appalling housing conditions in towns like Bombay, low wages and high cost of living, the absence of a suitable labour-recruiting organization. All these causes have from time to time been reinforced by the heavy mortality caused by famines, and epidemics like plague and influenza. The migratory character of the industrial labour further emphasizes the feeling of labour scarcity. Skilled labour is particularly difficult to get and this is of course due to the very meagre facilities that exist for training labour for modern industry. The scarcity of men of the *mistry* or foreman class, possessing the requisite technical and business experience, has also been ascribed to 'the average educated Indian's aversion to all forms of manual work'.

According to the Labour Commission, while organized industry in India has throughout the greater part of its history suffered from a shortage of labour, the position has latterly tended to become easier, roughly since 1925. Communications have improved steadily so that labour can now be drawn from a wider area than before. Conditions of life in cities and the factories, although far from ideal, are generally improving. Owing to the spread of knowledge the village population is showing greater readiness to migrate while the pressure on land is showing no signs of abating. Indian factories may therefore be considered as about to be entering on an era of abundant labour. Competition among labourers for jobs is becoming keener and keener, which makes it all the more important for labour to organize itself and save itself from the danger of exploitation on the part of the employers (*L.C.R.*, 21-2).

¹ See *L.C.R.*, 17-20.

² See vol. I, ch. iii, §27.

§5. **Methods of recruitment.**—In this connexion a word may be said regarding the methods of recruitment. The mill management does not directly recruit the required labour. Personal recruiting by contractors going round the countryside may be necessary in exceptional cases, as in the Assam tea gardens, but it is no longer generally so. Still the foreman or jobber is usually the man through whom the labour is secured (see, however, below) and who continues to act as an intermediary between employer and employee. Some of his functions are like those of trade union officials in the West and occasionally he acts as a strike leader.¹ The jobber manages to make himself indispensable to the workmen in a variety of ways. He lends them money, advises them in family affairs and arbitrates in disputes. Since all labour is recruited through him, the newcomer generally finds that the only way of getting employment, temporary or permanent, is to bribe him. Extensive bribery known as *dasturi* (unacknowledged commission) prevails in the jute mills of Calcutta, and petty exactions may swell the monthly income of the *sirdar* to four or five times his wages. Even the pay-clerks 'are known to reap harvests of this kind. Women workers also share with men the burden imposed by the overseers, but are particularly liable to be oppressed, especially if they happen to be widows'.² In the Bombay cotton mills, it is usual to have women overseers, known as *naikins* or forewomen, in the departments where women work, such as the winding and reeling departments. They are as a class considered to be persons of low morals and often abuse their power over the young girls and women workers under them.

The general prevalence of the system of jobbers has been recognized to be a great evil. The only remedy is stricter supervision by the mill officers and direct control over recruitment, appointments and dismissals. There is at present a close connexion between bribery and turnover. Where the jobber is in the habit of exacting a bribe on all fresh engagements he is interested in seeing to it that such engagements are as numerous as possible and encouraging the movements of the operative from factory to factory. Jobbers should be excluded from the engagement or dismissal of labour. In pursuance of the Labour Commission's recommendation several large organizations such as E. D. Sassoon & Co. and the Burmah-Shell Company have appointed special Labour Welfare officers to recruit labourers and look after their welfare, and it is understood that the system, wherever introduced, has been an unqualified

¹ The jobber is known in different parts of India by different names, such as *sirdar*, *mukaddam* or *mistry*.

² J. H. Kelman, *Labour in India*, pp. 108-9.

success.¹ Owing to the trade depression a general adoption of this system in place of recruitment through jobbers has not been possible. The Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee urge the complete dissociation of *mistris* (jobbers) from recruitment of labour and recommend the establishment of a Labour Exchange under government control, which would provide employment to applicants on demand from factories.² It would be desirable to introduce a system of regular leave, and holiday allowances should be introduced as this would tend to diminish the power of the jobber and create a contented and efficient labour force.³

The question of holidays with pay for industrial workers in India was one of the items discussed at the first Conference of the Labour Ministers held in January 1940. Central legislation on the subject was favoured by the Conference.

The Congress ministry of Bombay had under their consideration the feasibility of legislation for leave with pay during periods of sickness.⁴ The Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee are also in favour of fifteen days' leave with full pay and in addition 15 days' sick leave with half pay for workers with not less than two years' continuous service to their credit.⁵

§6. **Periods of wage payments.**—In most Bombay mills wages are paid once a month, usually⁶ on the fifteenth of the month next following the one for which wages are earned, so that a new recruit has to wait for six weeks before he can get his wages. This is a source of much hardship and accounts for a large part of the indebtedness of the factory population. In fact, indebtedness is as much a feature of town life as of village life. The millowner on his part pleads that holding wages in arrears is the only method of preventing his labour force from deserting him without notice. The system of monthly payments necessitates at least one month's notice from a workman desiring to leave. Many new workmen, ignorant of this, leave without notice and thus forfeit a month's pay. Generally speaking the longer the wage period, the more delayed is the payment of wages. In the Calcutta jute mills, weekly wages are paid and only a week's wages are held back. In Ahmedabad, wages are paid by the *hapta*, or intervals of fourteen to sixteen days.

Local Governments were asked in September 1924 to collect information on the periods of wage payments and this revealed the most striking absence of uniformity as to the method adopted from industry to industry and place to place. Even within the

¹ *Indian Year Book*, 1940-41, p. 542.

² *Report*, pars. 139-40.

³ *L.C.R.*, 23-7.

⁴ *Labour Gazette*, Bombay, August 1937, p. 923.

⁵ *Report*, par. 161.

⁶ Until recently.

same establishment different systems may be found.¹ The Payment of Wages Act which was passed in April 1936, and came into force in March 1937 provides (i) that no wage period shall exceed one month,² (ii) that all wages must be paid in coin and/or currency notes and, (iii) that the wages of any person employed upon or in (a) any railway factory or industrial establishment employing more than 1,000 persons shall be paid before the expiry of the seventh day, and (b) in any other railway, factory or industrial establishment, shall be paid before the expiry of the tenth day, after the last day of the wage period in respect of which the wages are payable.

§7. **Deductions from wages.**—The Payment of Wages Act referred to above seeks to regularize and restrict deductions from wages.

Deductions from the wages of an employed person may be of the following kinds only, namely, fines; deductions for absence from duty; deductions for damages to or loss of goods expressly entrusted to the employed person for custody, or for loss of money for which he is required to account, where such damage or loss is directly attributable to his neglect or default; deductions for house-accommodation provided by the employer; deductions of subscriptions to, and for repayment of, advances from any provident fund, etc.

Fines.—Fines can only be imposed on any employed person for certain specified acts and omissions on his part notified in the prescribed manner on the premises in which the employment is carried on. The total amount of fine which may be imposed in any one wage-period shall not exceed an amount equal to half an anna in the rupee of the wages payable to him. No fine shall be imposed on any employed person who is under the age of fifteen years.

The Payment of Wages Act may thus be looked upon as an advanced and difficult piece of social legislation in India.

§8. **Hours of work and the loitering habit.**—One of the grievances of the employers of labour in India has always been that the Indian mill-hand is incapable of steady and continuous work. He is given to loitering and loafing away his time under various pretexts. Men are often found to be absent from their machines,

¹ The information has been published in *Periods of Wage Payment* [Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour, No. 34 (1925)].

² Amendments to the Payment of Wages Bill, moved by Labour members to reduce the wage period to a week or fortnight were defeated, owing mainly to the opposition of the monthly-paid workmen, who argued that if rents and bills were to be settled monthly, they would be in difficulties if they had frittered away their weekly or fortnightly earnings.—*Indian Year Book*, 1937-8, p. 510.

and spare hands have to be employed to attend to the machines of the idlers. The Indian Factory Commission (1908) declared that, 'while the Indian factory worker may work hard for a comparatively short period, his natural inclination is to spread the work he has to do over a long period of time, working in a leisurely manner throughout and taking intervals of rest whenever he feels disinclined for further exertion'. The excessively long hours of work—twelve to fourteen hours—which prevailed, especially before the passing of the Factory Acts of 1911 and 1922, are held to be the chief cause of loitering. Dr T. M. Nair in his Minute of Dissent to the Report of the Factory Commission calls it 'a manifestation of the adaptive capacity, which all human beings possess more or less, a device to reduce the intensity of labour as a safeguard to his physical well-being'. Climatic conditions, feeble physique and the agricultural interests of the labourer are also suggested as other causes. With the reduction in the hours of work, improved sanitary conditions, ventilation in factories, and better supervision through the institution of the pass system, the loitering habit will be largely checked, and efficiency of labour enhanced. There is, for example, less loitering in the Calcutta jute mills, where labourers work in shifts for shorter hours, and in the engineering shops, where also the working day does not exceed eight hours.

§9. **Trying conditions of work in the mills.**—In the interests of the health and efficiency of the operatives, special attention is necessary to such matters as ventilation, the regulation of humidification in factories, arrangements for meals, bathing and latrine accommodation, etc. Conditions in all these respects are gradually getting better, but there is still ample scope for improvement. The problem of ventilation is one of light and free air in motion and presents special difficulties in cotton mills, which in large cities like Bombay are built in blocks of several storeys, where roof light is not possible except on the top floor. 'Experiments that have been made show a fall in efficiency during the hot weather in an ill-ventilated weaving shed as reaching twenty per cent.' Humidification presents another difficult problem. India does not possess the advantage of the naturally humid climate which is required for the spinning and weaving of cotton. To avoid breakage of thread and loss of material, artificial humidification of factories is therefore necessary. Such humidification, especially when effected by letting in steam and the use of impure water, is injurious to the health of the operatives. The Government of India have taken a step in the right direction by the appointment of an expert adviser on humidification to ensure the adoption of the best possible methods.

In most mills and factories in India, there are no proper arrangements for the meals of the operatives. A very small number of mills, such as the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras, have supplied dining sheds for the different caste people employed by them. There is an urgent need for suitable canteens which can be patronized by workers of both sexes. Supply of pure drinking water, arrangements for bathing, so essential in a hot country, and sanitary latrine accommodation, are further points in regard to the conditions in factories to which the employers of labour have not yet learnt to attach sufficient importance as increasing the comfort of the worker and improving his efficiency. The Government of Bombay in a Press Note (1937) regarding labour policy propose to make satisfactory dining accommodation and adequate medical aid a legal obligation on employers.

§10. **Absenteeism in Indian factories.**—The large percentage of absenteeism among the operatives in India makes smooth working of the factory extraordinarily difficult. The millowners assert that there is an increase in absenteeism after increase of wages or payment of wages and bonus, and that the worker is satisfied when he has earned enough to keep body and soul together. The percentage of absenteeism (which in the case of Bombay varies on an average from eight to twelve per cent) shows seasonal variations, reaching its maximum in the monsoon months and the festival and marriage seasons, being thus highest from March to June and lowest in December and January. In Calcutta there is a large annual exodus in the hot season because the jute industry season is slack after winter and because the climate in the early part of summer is particularly trying.

Absenteeism on this scale necessitates the maintenance of an excessively large muster roll and leads to the employment of inferior substitutes casually recruited, and therefore to inferior work. It is, however, not easy to suggest remedies. Attendance allowances have been tried with some success. The Textile Tariff Board suggests the formation of labour reserves which would make a casual *badliwala* unnecessary and also facilitate the grant of leave (*Report*, par. 60).

The rapid turnover of labour in factories is another drawback, and is closely connected with absenteeism.¹ The personnel of the

¹ Dissatisfaction with hours of work or wages leads to changes from one mill to another and the absence of standardization of wages intensifies the motive to change (R. K. Das, *Factory Labour in India*, pp. 44-5). The activities of the jobber going from mill to mill in search of labour are also held to be partly responsible for the evil, which Government employment bureaux may mitigate to some extent.

workers in mills in industrial centres like Bombay, Madras and Nagpur may change almost completely in about a year and a half on an average. There is thus a needless increase in the costs of production and the efficiency of the workers suffers.

§11. **Efficiency of industrial labour.**— The position as regards the alleged inefficiency of Indian labour needs to be clearly stated. Indian labour is generally regarded as much less efficient than European labour. If by this we mean that the European labourer is capable of turning out much more work than the Indian labourer in a given time, it will not be possible to contradict such a statement. In his evidence before the Industrial Commission, Sir Alexander McRobert stated that the English worker was 3·5 or even four times as efficient as the Indian. Sir Clement Simpson calculated that 2·67 hands in an Indian cotton-spinning and weaving mill are equal to one hand in a Lancashire mill. Dr Gilbert Slater, however, points out that, in this calculation, the inferiority of the Indian worker is overstated. The difference in the number of weavers employed to attend one loom in India and England does not by itself provide an accurate measure of the difference in efficiency between Indian and English labour. In India, a larger number of workmen are employed because the value of the additional output is greater than the increase in the wage bill. In England, wages being much higher, economy in the number of workmen employed is imperative. Dr Slater, however, admits that though the inferiority of Indian labour is generally exaggerated, it is real enough, and indeed, it need cause no surprise if we remember the much superior physique, the greater intelligence, amenability to discipline and capacity for steady continuous toil of the English labourer. It is, however, necessary to accept with caution pseudo-mathematical statements such as those alluded to above. The smaller outturn in an Indian mill cannot be wholly put down to the inferiority of the Indian operative, for his lower productivity may partly be the result of relatively inefficient management. Moreover, owing to the inferior quality of the cotton, there is continuous breakage in thread and more men have thus to be employed. It is also complained that, unlike the Lancashire millowners, the millowners in India do not use the most up-to-date labour-saving devices and machinery. One reason for this is that all machinery has to be imported from abroad, which makes it much more expensive than in England, and as wages are lower in India, this often determines the balance in favour of employing more hands rather than investing in the most up-to-date machinery and the latest labour-saving appliances.

The Industrial Commission thought that Indian labour does

not produce as cheaply as Western labour in spite of its lower wages. Dr Nair argued in 1908 that 'if one Lancashire operative is equal to 2.67 Madras operatives, then, since the average monthly wage of a Lancashire operative is about Rs. 60 (£4), while that of a Madras operative is only Rs. 15 (£1), it is clear that for the same money the Indian millowner gets nearly double the work that an English millowner does'.¹ The case for better wages is clearly weakened by such tactless defence of Indian labour. But apart from any tactical considerations, we think that, broadly speaking, at the present time, the principle of the economy of high wages will be found to apply to Indian labour, so that increased wages are likely to result in a more than proportionate increase of efficiency and that, however we conceive the matter, the present position is that Western labour is definitely more efficient than Indian labour.²

§12. **Causes of the inefficiency of Indian labour.**—Some of the causes of inefficiency are permanent while others are temporary or remediable. To the former class belong the climatic conditions in India which are generally adverse to high labour efficiency. Thinking of the cotton industry we may note that Lancashire possesses a great advantage in its cold and invigorating climate, denied to most parts of India where the industry is located. Again, the artificial humidification which is necessary in India is at best a poor substitute for the naturally moist climate of Lancashire and is liable to inflict serious injury on the health of the operatives unless it is properly regulated. The causes susceptible to remedy, such as the unsatisfactory conditions as regards ventilation and sanitation, etc. have already been referred to. Further, it may be urged that the hours of work are still much too long, especially for a tropical country, and there is probably much truth in the suggestion that the slackness and listlessness of the Indian worker are a kind of protective device which he unconsciously adopts to prevent the constitutional breakdown which strenuous labour for the long hours of work would otherwise inevitably bring about.

It is undoubtedly a fact that the physique of the average Indian

¹ P. P. Pillai, *Economic Conditions in India*, p. 224.

² Mr (now Sir) H. P. Mody, Chairman of the Bombay Millowners' Association, in his oral evidence before the Labour Commission, gave the following figures relating to comparative labour efficiency: 'In Japan a weaver minds six looms and efficiency there is 95 per cent. In China a weaver minds four looms and efficiency is 80 per cent. In Bombay a weaver minds two looms and efficiency is 80 per cent. Calculated on the basis of Japan and China a weaver in Bombay is paid between 200 and 300 per cent more than a weaver in Japan or China.'

worker is inferior to that of an average English worker. This is due especially to two causes, (i) the ravages of disease, and (ii) a poor dietary. While, as we have seen, the rural areas are by no means free from the ravages of major diseases like malaria, plague, cholera, influenzá, kala-azar, hook-worm, etc. their incidence is especially heavy in congested industrial areas. The terrible slums where the labourers have to reside are first-rate breeders of pestilence and provide almost ideal conditions for its rapid spread.

An organization for the improvement of public health, which would include the supply of pure water, unadulterated food, and a proper drainage system, is absolutely necessary along with better medical facilities and a system of insurance against sickness of industrial workers.

As regards the effects of a poor dietary, this is a question which concerns the whole Indian population and will be discussed in Chapter IV.

§13. **Conditions of housing.**—The unbelievable overcrowding and appalling conditions of sanitation in most of our industrial towns have much to answer for in respect of the instability of labour in the towns and its low efficiency. In some of the industrial areas in India where factories have been established at some distance from the towns, the problem of housing and sanitation is comparatively simple. The labourers are often housed in the neighbouring villages or in dwellings that take the form of single-storey 'lines' erected by the employer, who can acquire the necessary land without much difficulty. The second stage of development and congestion is typified by such cities as Madras, Cawnpore, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, and in a very large proportion of industrial areas round Calcutta. In these areas land is far cheaper than in Bombay and Calcutta proper, and accommodation usually consists of single-storey huts in groups known as *bastis*, erected by persons other than the owners of mills and rented to mill-hands on fairly reasonable terms. In some cases, as at Cawnpore, Calcutta and Ahmedabad, the more enlightened factory owners have found it advisable to supply housing accommodation to the employees in the hope of commanding the pick of the labour market, especially in the case of such fluid labour force as that on which the textile factories rely. Conditions in Ahmedabad ought to be better as land is cheaper than in the other cities, but actually the condition of housing in Ahmedabad appears to be worse than in any other industrial centre in India. However, the Municipality has undertaken to construct model dwellings for workers and the question is also being tackled on co-operative lines. In practically every industrial centre the evil of overcrowding has

been allowed to grow, no control having been exercised over the selection of sites for industrial development.

This has naturally led to a shocking state of affairs. 'The majority of the working classes are housed in *chawls* or tenements which consist usually of single rooms, sometimes of double rooms or *gallas*, but never of more than two rooms. These *chawls* have for their object the housing—one is almost tempted to use the expression "warehousing"—of large numbers of the labouring classes in as cheap a manner as possible.'¹

The vast majority of the working class families in Bombay live in single rooms (more than 70 per cent). The average number of persons per room in the case of working class quarters is 4·03. These figures stand in striking contrast to those of London, where only 6 per cent of the total population live in one-room tenements with an average of 1·92 persons per room. The practice of sub-letting is common among industrial workers in Bombay, which causes further overcrowding. Although the *chawl* is a special abomination of Bombay, the evil of congestion and overcrowding is by no means unparalleled in other centres. The overcrowding in certain parts of Howrah, for instance, is probably unequalled in any other industrial centre in India. Even smaller industrial towns are showing the same tendency.

§14. **The adverse effects of bad housing and sanitation.**—'Good houses mean the possibility of home life, happiness and health; bad houses spell squalor, drink, disease, immorality, crime, and in the end demand hospitals, prisons and asylums in which we seek to hide away the human derelicts of society that are largely the results of society's own neglect.' Insufficient and bad housing is also one of the factors responsible for industrial unrest. All these evils are present in varying degrees in Bombay. One of the greatest evils is the heavy infant mortality in the Bombay slum areas. The rate of mortality varies inversely with the number of rooms in the dwelling-place. For instance, in 1936, the percentage of deaths of infants in one-roomed tenements was 78·3.² The highest rate reached in the worst localities is 298 per 1,000 registered births as against the average rate of 200 to 250 for the general population.³ Lastly, the appalling conditions of *chawl* life and the absence of privacy have also a deterrent effect on those who wish to bring their families with them to the towns and have thus, in general, a very unsettling effect on the stability and efficiency of labour.

¹ Hurst, *op. cit.*, p. 20. See also *Industrial Commission Report*, par. 241.

² *Report of the Rent Enquiry Committee (Bombay)*, 1939, par. 26.

³ *L.C.R.*, 271.

§15. **Attempts at improved housing.**—In Bombay, while water-supply, sanitation and drainage were improved, no heed was given for a long time to the removal of congestion and the destruction of the slums, so that the position became worse and worse every year. The heavy mortality and the great exodus from Bombay that followed in the wake of the great plague of 1896 and the consequent paralysis of trade and industry brought matters to a head, and the Bombay Improvement Trust was established in 1898 to make new streets, open out crowded areas, reclaim land from the sea providing room for expansion, and construct sanitary dwellings for the poor. The limited powers and funds of the Trust and want of proper co-operation between the Trust and the Corporation, and its inevitable unpopularity brought on by compulsory acquisition of private property and demolition of buildings, prevented rapid progress and led to the adoption of the policy of 'slum-patching'. Nevertheless the Trust did some highly useful work.

The Municipality also had by 1920 provided 2,900 tenements for its staff and had sanctioned the construction of another 2,200. The Port Trust had provided quarters for nearly 5,000 of its employees. In the meantime, the population of the city was increasing rapidly and the millowners did little in the matter of housing their operatives. By way of preventing further congestion and securing better housing, the Industrial Commission recommended refusal of permission, with a few exceptions, to establish fresh industrial concerns;¹ the setting up of a special area for industrial development; the removal of the existing railway workshops to a reasonable distance from the city; supply of housing accommodation to their employees by railways, Government Departments and public bodies; improved communications with the object of creating industrial suburbs; a definite standard of accommodation for industrial dwellings located in the city; and a programme of construction worked out and taken up by Local Authorities. At the end of the war, a bold and comprehensive scheme of a Development Directorate to deal with the problem was drawn up by the Bombay Government. The funds were derived from the proceeds of a development loan of Rs. 9 crores and a 'town duty' of one rupee per bale of cotton on all cotton entering Bombay. However, a large number of the tenements built, especially the *chawls* at Worli, remained unoccupied for more than ten years. From an architectural point of view they are

¹ This suggestion has been accepted and no new mills are allowed to be erected in the town of Bombay proper.

profoundly ugly and their inability to attract the workers has been attributed to difficulties of access, absence of bazaar facilities, cement construction (which makes the rooms uncomfortably warm in hot weather and uncomfortably cold in cold weather), high level of rents, lack of lighting and lack of police protection. Some attempts have been made to correct these defects. The Municipality and the Port Trust are also carrying out their programme of development, and the Port Trust have constructed a new cotton depot at Sewri.

So far as the millowners are concerned, some mills, like the Jacob Sassoon Mill, have provided housing accommodation to their operatives. The difficulty of procuring land on moderate terms in the vicinity of the factories, the absence of any guarantee that the operatives housed by a mill will not accept work in other mills, and the reluctance of the operatives themselves to take advantage of such arrangements, have made progress inevitably slow. The operatives fear loss of liberty of action and probable ejection in case of strike, and resent sanitary rules and discipline, the value of which they do not understand. More favourable conditions in these respects exist at Cawnpore, Nagpur, Ahmedabad and Madras, where the millowners have taken greater interest in the housing of their operatives, with considerable advantage to both parties. Special mention may be made of the magnificent scheme of industrial housing launched by the Empress Mills at Nagpur managed by Messrs Tata Sons Ltd, and the housing scheme at Jamshedpur for the staff and employees of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.

The Labour Commission made a variety of suggestions. They recommended that (i) the Land Acquisition Act should be amended so as to enable owners of industrial concerns to acquire land for the erection of workers' dwellings. (Accordingly, on the initiative of the Government of India, the Act was amended in 1933); (ii) Provincial Governments should make a survey of urban and industrial areas to ascertain their needs with regard to housing and arrange for mutual consultations for devising practical plans of co-operation among all interested parties; (iii) the Government should lay down minimum standards in regard to cubic space, ventilation, lighting, water-supply, drainage, etc.; (iv) suitable town-planning Acts should be passed wherever necessary; (v) the provision of working-class housing should be a statutory obligation on every Improvement Trust; (vi) co-operative building societies should be encouraged; (vii) municipalities should revise, bring up to date and enforce rigorously by-laws dealing with health, housing and sanitation (*L.C.R.*, ch. xv).

The Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee in their Report (pars. 211-12) recommend that the Provincial Government should float a loan of Rs. 50 lakhs and place a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs every year for five years at the disposal of the Improvement Trust for constructing about 12,000 houses for workmen. The Rent Enquiry Committee appointed by the Government of Bombay in 1938 has made a number of useful recommendations regarding industrial housing, including a ten-year housing programme for the supply of cheap and small tenements for which the need is the largest through the agency of the Municipality, assisted by the State. The Committee also recommend that employers of 10,000 persons and more should be required to bear the responsibility of housing at least 25 per cent of their employees.¹ The problem of industrial housing bristles with difficulties connected with finance, management, design, etc. not the least of which arises from the total indifference of the workers themselves to the necessity of clean and sanitary housing. Proper education of the workmen in elementary hygiene, and as far as possible the approximation of industrial dwellings to conditions obtaining in the villages, ought to go a long way towards ensuring clean and suitable dwellings and securing the stability of industrial labour.

§16. **Wage rates.**²—The Labour Office of the Government of Bombay conducted four inquiries into the wages of workers in the cotton mills in the Bombay province in 1921, 1923, 1926 and 1934.³ The Government of Bombay in 1934 launched a comprehensive General Wage Census, which was intended to be completed in about five years, in order to collect all possible information on the subject of wages in all types of industrial concerns, perennial and seasonal, in the Bombay province.⁴

According to this Wage Census, the average daily earnings of all the adult operatives in all occupations in the Cotton Textile Industry in the Bombay province in 1934 were as follows: Re. 1-1-10 in Bombay city; Rs. 1-5-7 in Ahmedabad city; Re. 0-15-7 in Poona and Re. 0-11-8 in Sholapur city.

The average monthly earnings for men in all Engineering and 'Common' occupations excluding unskilled labourers (all factories) according to the Wage Census taken in Bombay were as follows:—

Rs. 41-8-5 in Bombay city, Rs. 33-7-4 in Ahmedabad city;

¹ *Report of the Rent Enquiry Committee* (Bombay 1939, pars. 85-7.)

² The wage rates mentioned in this section are pre-war rates (before 1939). Recently (1939-40) dearness allowances have been granted to counteract the increase in the cost of living due to the war.

³ *Wages and Unemployment in the Bombay Textile Industry* (1934).

⁴ *Labour Gazette* (Bombay), July 1937, p. 681.

Rs. 29-1-7 in Poona, and Rs. 22-1-4 in Sholapur city. The average for the province was Rs. 38-3-3.¹

In the jute industry in Bengal the average monthly wages of the different classes of employees vary from Rs. 40, for example metal turners (we exclude Chinese carpenters, who earn as much as Rs. 93 per month), to Rs. 11, for example bobbin cleaners. Wages are appreciably higher in the case of workers in the single-shift system than in that of workers in the multiple-shift system.

The daily earnings of underground workers in the more important coal-fields in British India vary according to locality from Re. 1-7-0 to about 13 annas for foremen, *sirdars*, etc., from 14 to 8 annas for miners and from 12 to 6 annas for loaders. In the case of other underground workers the rate of wages depends on whether they are skilled or unskilled.

The general scale of wages is lower for workers engaged on 'open workings' and lowest for labourers working on the surface. On the tea plantations in Assam the family has to be taken as the working unit and the monthly cash earnings of an average family vary considerably according to districts, being apparently highest (about Rs. 32) in Dibrugarh District and lowest (about Rs. 15) in the Cachar, Sadr and Hailakandi Districts.

§17. **Low standard of living.**—The low standard of living of the Indian labourer may be regarded as a further cause of inefficiency. It is both the cause and the effect of the low wages. In conformity with the rather obvious generalization known as Engel's Law we find that the average income of the worker in India being very small, a very high percentage of it is spent on food and that the percentage decreases with the increase in the size of the income. In Bombay, for example, the Report on the inquiry into working-class budgets in Bombay in 1921-2 showed that the expenditure on food varied from 60·5 per cent in the case of incomes below Rs. 30 per month to 52·6 per cent in the case of incomes between Rs. 80 and Rs. 90 per month. In countries with a high standard of living, like England and the United States, a comparatively much smaller proportion of the wage-earner's income is absorbed by food and the other elementary necessities of life and more is left over for conventional necessities and luxuries.² The standard of living of the Indian worker falls far short of what is required for full efficiency.

¹ *Report on the General Wage Census (Bombay), Engineering Industry, Part I, p. 97.*

² G. Findlay Shirras, *Working Class Budgets in Bombay* (Bombay Labour Office, 1923).

The Report on the last inquiry into the working-class budgets in Bombay city conducted by the Labour Office in 1932-3 shows that the average monthly expenditure of the family is Rs. 45-15-9. Except in the income groups 'below Rs. 30' and 'Rs. 30 to Rs. 40' the income is in excess of the expenditure and in the income group 'Rs. 50 and over' the surplus left at the end of the month is about 22.5 per cent of the monthly income. It is important to remember that this was the position at the time of the inquiry, and prior to the wage-cuts which were effected subsequently, especially in the cotton mill industry. The following comparative data regarding the distribution of expenditure on the various groups of commodities and services which comprise a family budget, would serve to indicate the life of working classes at different centres in India.¹

Percentage Distribution of Expenditure

Groups	Bombay (1932-3)	Ahmeda- bad (1933-5)	Sholapur (1925)	Nagpur (1927)	Jubbul- pore (1927)	Madras (1938)
Food	46.60	49.31	49.25	64.10	66.00	52.63
Fuel and lighting	7.11	6.65	9.60	9.62	7.95	6.67
Clothing, footwear, etc.	7.75	9.12	11.86	10.70	10.86	4.50
House-rent	12.81	10.97	6.27	1.92	1.44	11.14
Miscellaneous ²	25.73	23.95	23.02	13.66	13.75	25.06
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

The average monthly income of the family³ of a working-class family is Rs. 50-1-7 in Bombay, Rs. 46-5-0 in Ahmedabad; Rs. 39-14-10 in Sholapur, and Rs. 37-5-11 in Madras. With incomes of this order it is clearly impossible to maintain any satisfactory standard of living. The worker cannot afford sufficient wholesome food, even supposing he utilizes his income with the most complete wisdom. We have already described his sorry plight as regards shelter. His clothing is too scanty even for a warm climate. The expenditure on education is almost nil. The

¹ Report on an Inquiry into Working Class Family Budgets in Bombay City (1935), p. 19, and *The Indian Year Book*, 1940-41, pp. 562-3. The figures are not strictly comparable owing to differences in the items included in the different groups. They are nevertheless useful in giving a general indication of the variations in the distribution of expenditure.

² The miscellaneous group of expenditure, it should be noted, includes such items as interest on loans, liquor, travelling to and from villages, etc.

³ The average size of the family was 3.70 persons in Bombay, 4.05 in Ahmedabad, 4.57 in Sholapur, 4.33 in Nagpur, 3.76 in Jubbulpore and 6.03 in Madras.

only furniture he can afford is limited to a few rough deal-wood boxes, iron plate trunks, bamboo sticks, a country blanket, a worn-out mat, a few knick-knacks and cheap chromolithographs representing scenes from mythology.¹ Most workers have to spend a considerable proportion of their incomes on travelling to and from their villages. Another large part goes to meet the interest on the debt they have almost invariably incurred.² The usual rate of interest charged is one anna per rupee per mensem, or seventy-five per cent per annum, and compound interest is charged if the interest is not paid regularly. The interest on debt shows an average expenditure of nearly three per cent of the total monthly expenditure.³

§18. **Expenditure on drink.**— The evil of drink is spreading in an alarming fashion among the factory labourers, and it is believed that at least four per cent of the total expenditure of the working classes, as shown by family budgets, goes on drink, the percentage being as high as ten in the case of the lowest class of workers like scavengers. The male worker (women rarely drink) frequently tries to relieve by drink 'the hard and long day's work in the mill under the scorching humid heat of an eastern sun' (Hurst). There is some physiological connexion between craving for drink on the one hand and unwholesome conditions of work and malnutrition due to poverty on the other. The provoking part about the matter is that if the money spent on drink were to be used for buying more and better food, there would, of course, be less malnutrition. The worker is not only extremely poor, but is also unable to manage his expenditure in the best possible manner, and the expenditure on drink serves to aggravate his poverty which in its turn leads to an increase of drunkenness. Among remedies being tried are the substitution of tea shops, cinemas, clubs and other forms of recreation for the tavern, and the curtailment of the number of liquor shops and the hours of opening, along with rationing in mill areas. In this connexion reference may be made to the policy of prohibition recently (1937) announced by the Congress ministries in Bombay, Madras and other provinces. The Government of Bombay accordingly introduced total prohibition in the industrial cities of Ahmedabad (1938) and Bombay (1939). The successful challenge in the Law Courts of the legal basis of

¹ Hurst, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

² According to the inquiry in 1923 into the working-class budgets in Bombay by the Labour Office, forty-seven per cent of the families were in debt and the debt was the equivalent of two and a half months' earnings (one month's average earnings per family being Rs. 52-4-6).

³ See also §21.

prohibition has, however, led to a certain measure of relaxation of prohibition. The Government of Bombay have appealed (1940) to the Federal Court and it is to be hoped that the legal difficulties will soon be overcome and the policy of prohibition enforced in the interest of the welfare of the working class.

§19. **Case for higher wages.**— In India as elsewhere, employers are often found urging that increase in wages is either dissipated in drink or leads to greater idleness on the part of the labourer, instead of raising his standard of living, and that consequently there is no improvement in his efficiency. Professor Pigou effectively disposes of this objection to higher wages as follows :

'It is true that at any given moment the taste and temperament of persons who have long been poor are more or less adjusted to their environment and that a sudden and sharp rise of income is likely to be followed by a good deal of foolish expenditure, which involves little or no addition to economic welfare. If, however, the higher income is maintained for any length of time, this phase will pass, whereas if the increase is gradual, . . . the period of foolishness need not occur at all. In any case, to contend that the folly of poor persons is so great that the rise of income among them would not promote economic welfare in any degree, is to press paradox beyond the point up to which discussion can reasonably be called upon to follow.'¹

Another standard objection to raising the rate of wages is that the effect is likely to be very soon cancelled by an increase in population. This point has already been dealt with (see vol. I, ch. iii) and we have advanced the view that increase of wealth, although it may express itself partly in increase of numbers, may also be expected partly to result in raising the standard of living. It is not seriously disputed that the standard of living of industrial labour has in fact risen appreciably in recent years.

The conditions of international competition are also alleged to be a formidable obstacle to the levelling up of wages. We have already referred to the difficulties of the cotton mill industry, undoubtedly due in some measure to the severity of competition from Japan. The fact that a country may gain a substantial advantage, at least temporarily, over another by sweating its workers may be admitted. At the same time, it does not follow that other countries also must in self-defence adopt similar methods of sweating. It is arguable that sweated trades do not pay in the long run as they lead to diminished efficiency. In any case, no civilized community can afford to forget that, equally

¹ A. C. Pigou, *Economics of Welfare*, pp. 53-4.

important with the economic ideal of increase of production, is the moral ideal of increase in the quality of human life. The proper method of equalizing conditions of international competition is to get every nation to agree to secure certain minimum conditions of working. But even when a particular nation remains recalcitrant, protection against it must be sought in other ways than by imposing or acquiescing in a dangerously low standard of living for the workers.

The Government of Bombay appointed the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee in April 1937 to examine, among other matters, the wages paid to workers, having regard to the hours, efficiency and conditions of work in the various centres of the textile industry in the province, and to inquire, in this regard, into the adequacy or inadequacy of the wages earned in relation to a living wage standard. As recommended by the Committee in its interim report (1938) an immediate increase in the wages of the mill worker in the Bombay province was granted in view of the decided improvement in the industry since 1937.

§20. **Legal minimum wage.**¹—The Eleventh International Labour Conference held at Geneva in 1928 adopted a draft convention providing for the creation and maintenance of a machinery whereby minimum scales of wages can be fixed for workers employed in certain of the trades (and in particular in home industries) in which no arrangements exist for the effective regulation of wages by collective agreement or otherwise, and in which wages are exceptionally low. The Labour Commission suggest that before minimum wage-fixing machinery can be set up, industries in which there is a strong presumption that the conditions warrant detailed investigation should be selected and a survey of the conditions in each such industry should be undertaken as the basis on which it should be decided whether the fixing of a minimum wage is desirable and practicable. When a decision has been reached as to whether the conditions in any case justify the setting up of machinery, particular attention should be given to the cost of enforcement, which may be prohibitive owing to the slow growth of the spirit of compliance with industrial law among employers, the ignorance and illiteracy of the workers, the possibility of collusion, etc. The policy of gradualness should not be lost sight of if the desired end is to be achieved without disaster.²

The Congress ministry in Bombay stated in their Memorandum

¹ See *Indian Journal of Economics*, Conference Number, 1940. Papers on Minimum Wage Legislation and its Applicability to India by B. R. Seth and S. P. Saksena respectively.

² L.C.R., 212-14.

(August, 1937) on 'The Welfare of the Industrial Worker', that they were examining the possibility of devising measures for setting up minimum-wage-fixing machinery to meet special requirements—their objective being the satisfaction of 'at least the minimum human needs' of the industrial worker. Accordingly the Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee was asked, among other matters, to make recommendations regarding the establishment of a minimum wage and the methods of automatic adjustment of wages in future.¹ It is understood that the Committee submitted its Report to the Government in July 1940. The action taken by the Government of Bombay in instituting in 1934 a comprehensive wage census in the Bombay province is calculated to throw further light on the question of introducing minimum-wage-fixing machinery. It may be noted here that the Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee accepted the principle of a basic minimum wage, and recommended that no worker should get a wage of less than Rs. 15 per month of 26 working days. They had in view the unskilled workers who in some mills drew even less than Rs. 10 per month. They also recommended the establishment of a Wage Fixation Board to function on the lines of the British Trade Boards for the adjustment of wages from time to time on the basis of the minimum cost of living.²

§21. **Indebtedness.**—The majority of the industrial workers remain in debt for the greater part of their working lives. It is estimated that in most industrial centres not less than two-thirds of the labouring population is in debt and that the amount of debt commonly exceeds three months' wages. A great majority of the workers are in debt to their food suppliers. Defaults are common owing to the improvidence and poverty of the labourer and are in fact encouraged by the money-lender, so that a small initial loan speedily accumulates into a permanent and intolerable burden. The most important single cause of indebtedness is the expenditure on festivals, especially marriages. The worker would benefit if his attractiveness as a field of investment were reduced and if it were made unprofitable to the money-lender to advance amounts which it is beyond the capacity of the workers to repay. The Labour Commission have made some proposals to secure this end. They propose that the salary and wages of all workmen receiving less than Rs. 300 a month should be exempted from attachment, as also workers' contributions to bona fide provident funds. The Government of India have accordingly amended the Civil Procedure Code with a view to exempting salaries below a defined limit

¹ *Labour Gazette*, Bombay, August 1937, p. 922 and October 1937, p. 97.

² *Report of the Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee* (1938), pars. 85 and 98.

from attachment. It is also suggested that arrest and imprisonment should be abolished in the case of an ordinary industrial worker unless he is proved to be able and yet unwilling to pay and that summary procedure should be instituted for the liquidation of workers' unsecured debts and the Courts empowered to adjust the amount of the decree to what the worker could pay without undue hardship. For the protection of indebted workers, the Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee commended a measure on the lines of the Central Provinces Protection of Debtors Act, 1937.¹ This Act makes molestation of a debtor a cognizable offence. There is a more restricted Act in force in Bengal. Provision of co-operative credit appears to offer a more lasting solution of this problem. (See §43.)

LABOUR LEGISLATION IN INDIA

§22. **Growing scope of labour legislation in India.**—Labour legislation in India naturally does not occupy the same important position as in Western industrialized countries like England and the United States, owing to 'the deliberateness of the spread of mechanical power and narrowness of the area affected'. Much of the work is done out of doors or in sheds without walls, and the problems of overcrowding, bad ventilation and undesirable mixing together of the two sexes have not to be faced on the same scale. With the growing industrialization of the country, a better realization of the duties of the State towards labour, the awakening of the working classes in India to their rights in recent years and the acceptance by India of her obligations towards the International Labour Organization of the League of Nations, labour legislation is coming to occupy a more and more important position.² Determined State action for the purpose of minimizing the well-known evils of industrialism is necessary even if it means a certain slackening of the pace of industrialism. So far we have on the whole failed to profit by the experience of European countries. Without the excuse of ignorance we have allowed to appear in our midst certain familiar abuses, such as the rise of slum-cities, the exploitation of child-labour, excessively long hours of work for men and women, bad sanitation and absence of safety measures—abuses which we are now trying painfully to correct.

§23. **Need for uniformity of labour legislation.**—In recent years there has been a spate of labour legislation in the various provinces under the stimulus supplied by the inauguration of provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act (1935) and the

¹ Report, p. 237.

² See §1.

advent of Congress ministries. This has brought into prominence the lack of uniformity of labour laws and the inconsistency in the labour policies of the several Provincial Governments. Such disparity is bound to affect adversely the industrial development of the country, especially in the more advanced provinces. This question was considered at the first conference of Labour Ministers held in 1940. The conference decided that the Central Government should draft legislation on four important subjects (industrial disputes, holidays with pay, collection of industrial and labour statistics, and an amendment of the Payment of Wages Act), for consideration by the provinces and by the next Conference of Labour Ministers.

§24. **Beginnings of factory legislation in India.**—We may now briefly review the history of factory legislation in India. The progress made by the Bombay cotton mill industry aroused the jealousy of the Lancashire manufacturers, and in 1874 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce sent a deputation to the Secretary of State for India to urge the application of the British Factory Law to India. The result was the appointment of a Factory Commission by the Government of Bombay in 1875, of which the first Factory Act (1881) was the outcome. Its main provisions were as follows :

The employment of children below the age of seven was prohibited. Between that age and twelve, they were not to work for more than nine hours a day. An hour's daily rest and four holidays in the month were prescribed for children. No relief, however, was given to women and adult male labour. The Act applied to factories employing not less than a hundred persons and using power. Local Governments were to appoint Inspectors of Factories.

Agitation to amend the first Factory Act began almost immediately after its passing. Again pressure from Lancashire resulted in the Secretary of State moving in favour of the expeditious adoption of more rigorous legislation, and the second Factory Act of 1891 was passed. Its provisions applied to all establishments using power and employing not less than fifty persons. But the local Governments were to have power to extend it to others employing not less than twenty persons. The lower and upper age-limits for children were raised to nine and fourteen respectively. Their hours of work were limited to seven in any one day and had to be between the hours of 5 a.m. and 8 p.m. Restrictions were placed on the employment of women. They were not to work in factories before 5 a.m. and after 8 p.m., except in places where an approved system of shifts existed. Their hours of work

were limited to eleven in one day entitling them to a total rest of one and a half hours. Men workers were to enjoy an interval of half an hour's rest between 12 noon and 2 p.m. and a weekly day of rest. There were also certain provisions which secured better ventilation and cleanliness and aimed at preventing overcrowding in factories.

§25. **Factory Act of 1911.**—Excessive hours of work in Bombay mills, made possible by the increasing use of electric lights, and also in some Calcutta jute mills, the usual agitation on the part of Lancashire manufacturers, the agitation by the press in India and the lead given by some employers of labour led to the appointment of a commission which reported in 1908.¹ This was followed by the passing of the Factory Act of 1911 which brought within its scope seasonal factories working for less than four months in the year. It made the possession of an age certificate compulsory. The hours of work for children in textile factories were reduced to six per day. The Act restricted the employment of women by night, allowing it only in the case of cotton ginning and pressing factories. For the first time the hours of adult male workers were restricted by law, the limit being twelve hours per day in the case of textile factories alone, as recommended by Dr Nair, who was the only member of the Factory Commission of 1908 to plead for the direct limitation of hours for adults. Furthermore, in all textile factories, except those working with an approved system of shifts, no person was to be employed before 5 a.m. or after 7 p.m.—the new limits laid down generally for the employment of women and children. Lastly, more extensive provisions relating to health and safety were introduced and factory inspection was made more effective.

§26. **Factories Act of 1922.**—The war of 1914-18 had important effects on factory administration and ultimately on the Factory Act. There was a considerable extension of industrial activity in India and the number of factories and of persons employed rose by about twenty-five per cent between 1914 and 1919. Factories had to be exempted from many provisions of the Factory Act and there was a fall in the average number of inspections. But the most important effect was produced on the workers. The increased demand for labour strengthened their position, while the rising prices and profits and the general unrest which followed the war led to increased consciousness of power and a strong disinclination to accept disagreeable conditions. Thus for the first time in India the desire of the operatives became a potent

¹ A. G. Clow, *Indian Factory Legislation*. pp. 39-45.

force in securing improved conditions and more drastic legislation.

The acceptance by India of her obligations, arising from the conventions adopted by the International Labour Conference at Washington in 1919, necessitated further changes in factory legislation. By the Factories Act of 1922, all power-using factories employing not less than twenty persons became subject to factory legislation. Option was given to the local Governments to extend it to factories employing not less than ten persons whether power was used or not. The minimum age of employment for children was raised to twelve and the upper limit to fifteen. Children between these ages were not to work for more than six hours a day in any factory. Children and women were not to be employed in any factory before 5.30 a.m. and after 7 p.m. The hours of work for adults were limited to sixty in a week and eleven in any day, a week consisting of not more than six days. Liberal rest intervals were also secured to all classes of workers. The Act provided for a rest period of an hour after every six hours, though this might be split up into two half-hours at the request of the employees, provided not more than five hours' continuous work was done. The system of inspection was further improved by the appointment of more whole-time inspectors with good technical qualifications, in the principal industrial centres. Lastly, provisions regarding safety and health were further extended, the local Governments being given power to fix standards of ventilation and artificial humidification.

§27. Factories Act of 1934.—The Factories Act of 1922 was amended in 1923, 1926 and 1931. Certain administrative difficulties were thus removed and a few improvements of a minor character were introduced. A new consolidating Act was passed in 1934 on the recommendation of the Labour Commission and brought into force from 1 January 1935. This Act

- (i) Draws a distinction between seasonal and perennial factories.
- (ii) Introduces a third group of adolescents (over fifteen and under seventeen years of age to be deemed as children if not certified as fit for adult employment).
- (iii) The existing maximum limits of eleven hours per day and sixty hours per week continue to apply in the case of seasonal factories but are reduced to ten and fifty-four respectively in the case of perennial factories subject to certain exceptions. For children the maximum hours everywhere are five per day.
- (iv) The principle of 'spreadover' is introduced for the first time, that is the period of the number of *consecutive* hours of work

is limited to thirteen in the case of adults and seven and a half in the case of children.

(v) The existing provisions with regard to control of artificial humidification are expanded. The Act also gives power to local Governments to authorize an inspector to call upon managers of factories to carry out specific measures for increasing the cooling power of the air where necessary.

(vi) Certain provisions are made with regard to welfare, such as adequate shelters for rest in factories, rooms reserved for the use of children of female workers, first aid appliances, etc.

(vii) Power is given to local Governments to make rules prescribing fitness and preventing the employment of children not certified as fit.

(viii) Inspectors are authorized to require managers to remedy any inadequacy or defect in the construction of a factory likely to be dangerous to workers.

(ix) Limits are imposed on the amount of overtime that can be worked and payment for overtime is regulated.

§28. **The Bombay Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (1939).**—This new piece of labour legislation initiated by the Congress ministry of Bombay, which has thus given a lead to other provinces, is intended to make provision for the regulation of hours of work in shops, commercial establishments, restaurants, theatres and other establishments. The need for this legislation was revealed by the result of an inquiry conducted by the Labour Office, Bombay, in 1938. The Act tries to check the old abuses of long hours, ranging from 11 to 15 a day, and totally inadequate provision for holidays and rest intervals, without at the same time overlooking the requirements of commerce and the consumer.¹ So far as shops are concerned the maximum hours of work are fixed at 9½ per day; half an hour's rest after five hours of work is prescribed, and a weekly holiday is made compulsory. Similar legislation is contemplated in the United Provinces.

§29. **The Tea Districts Emigrant Labour Act (1932).**—Plantation labour is closely allied to industrial labour, but raises special problems of its own, in particular in the methods of recruitment, especially for the tea gardens in Assam. Recruitment and other matters relating to plantation labour are at present governed by the Tea Districts Emigrant Labour Act. This Act, passed in 1932 and based on the recommendations of the Labour

¹ *Bombay Government Gazette*, 31 January 1939.

Commission, extends to the whole of British India including the Santhal Parganas and repeals the Assam Labour and Emigration Act, 1901, and the subsequent amending Acts. The Act of 1901 was intended to regulate the system of indentured labour for tea plantations in that province introduced in the thirties of the last century. The Amending Act of 1915 abolished the system of recruitment by licensed contractors which was introduced by the former Act. Thereafter recruitment could only take place through the agents of the official Labour Board. The first object of the Act of 1932 is to make it possible, on the one hand, to exercise all the control over the recruitment and forwarding of assisted emigrants to the Assam tea gardens that may be justified and required by the interests of emigrants and potential emigrants; and, on the other hand, to ensure that no restrictions are imposed which are not justified. Local Governments are empowered, subject to the control of the Government of India, to impose control over the forwarding of assisted emigrants or over both their recruitment and their forwarding as occasion may dictate. Employers are prevented from recruiting otherwise than by means of certificated garden *sirdars* or licensed recruiters. It is made unlawful to assist persons under the age of sixteen to emigrate unless they are accompanied by their parents or guardians. With regard to the question of repatriation, every emigrant labourer on the expiry of a period of three years from the date of his entry into Assam, will have the right of repatriation as against the employer employing him at such expiry. It will also be possible to claim repatriation within three years in the event of the emigrant failing in health, not being provided with suitable work, or having his wages unjustly withheld or for any other sufficient cause.

Provision is made for the appointment of a Controller of Emigrants with some staff and possibly one or more Deputy Controllers for supervising the general administration of the system which the Act seeks to establish; and the charges are to be met from an annual cess called the Emigrant Labour Cess which is to be levied at such rate not exceeding Rs. 9 per emigrant as the Governor-General-in-Council may, by a notification in the *Gazette of India*, determine for each year of levy.

It is understood that the Government of India are contemplating the appointment of a Committee to inquire into wages and conditions of employment of Indian labour employed in tea gardens in Assam.¹

¹ *Indian Year Book*, 1940-41, p. 544.

§30. **Labour legislation for mines.**—Labour regulation was much tardier in coming in the case of the mining industries than in that of the textiles. In 1901, the first Indian Mines Act was passed and inspectors were appointed. In view of the recommendations of the Washington Conference and the large numbers employed in the rapidly developing mining industry, revised legislation was passed in 1923. It enlarged the definition of a mine, limited the hours of work to sixty per week for workers above ground, and fifty-four for workers underground. A week was not to consist of more than six days. No child was allowed to work below ground and a child was defined as a person under the age of thirteen years. No restriction was placed on the employment of women underground. In view of the fact that forty-five per cent of the labour employed below ground was composed of women, sudden and absolute prohibition would have caused serious dislocation in one of the basic industries of the country. On the other hand, the need for reform was equally clear. In exercise of the power given by the Act of 1901 and renewed in 1923, the Government of India framed during 1929 regulations whose effect was to exclude women from underground workings forthwith, except in exempted mines, that is except in coal-mines in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces, and salt-mines in the Punjab. In these exempted mines exclusion was to be gradual, so that after 1 July 1939 women were to be entirely excluded from underground workings.

The Indian Mines Act of 1923 did not place any statutory restrictions on the daily hours of work. In March 1928, therefore, the Legislature passed an amending Act under which no mine was allowed to work for more than twelve hours out of twenty-four through the same set of workmen. Owners were required to put up notices outside the offices stating the hours of work and shifts of workmen. The following are some of the changes introduced by the amending Act of 1935, which is based on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Labour, and is influenced by the Draft Convention adopted by the 15th session of the International Labour Conference.

No person is allowed in a mine on more than six days in any one week.¹ A person employed above ground in a mine is not allowed to work for more than fifty-four hours in any week or for more than ten hours in any day. The periods of work of any such person are so arranged that along with his intervals

¹ In 1938 the total number of all mines which came under the Indian Mines Act was 1,953. The number of persons employed was 306,260 (223,984 below ground and in open workings and 82,276 above ground).

for rest, they are not in any day to spread over more than twelve hours, and that he is not to work for more than six hours before he has had an interval for rest of at least one hour. A person employed below ground in a mine is not allowed to work for more than nine hours in any day. Work of the same kind is not to be carried on below ground in any mine for a period spreading over more than nine hours in any day except by a system of relays so arranged that the periods of work for each relay are not spread over more than nine hours. The employment of children under fifteen years of age in any mine is prohibited.

In addition to the Mines Acts, conditions of employment in mines are regulated also by the appointment of Mines Boards of Health which look after the health of the labour force. A Board is empowered to compel the owners of mines within the mining settlement area to provide housing, water-supply, sanitary facilities and medical help.

§31. **Labour legislation for railways.**—All railway workshops come under the administration of the Factories Act of 1922. The Indian railways employ nearly a quarter of a million workers in other occupations for which, until recently, no provisions regarding control of hours of work, etc. were made, in spite of the ratification by the Government of India of the Washington (1919) and Geneva (1921) Conventions in their application to railways in British India. The problem was beset with many difficulties which were overcome by the Indian Railway (Amendment) Act of 1930 which gave effect to the Government's statutory obligations under the International Labour Conventions. A railway servant must not be employed for more than sixty hours a week on the average in any month. A railway servant whose employment is essentially intermittent cannot be employed for more than eighty-four hours in any week. Temporary exemptions of railway servants from the above provisions may be made (i) in case of emergency involving serious interference with the ordinary working of the railway and (ii) in cases of exceptional pressure of work, overtime being paid only in the latter class of cases. A weekly rest of a full twenty-four hours is prescribed, subject to temporary exemptions as above. Compensatory periods of rest for the period forgone must be granted. The Governor-General-in-Council may appoint persons to be supervisors of railway labour to inspect railways in order to determine if the provisions of the Act are duly observed.

§32. **Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923 (as subsequently amended).**—The right of the worker to be insured at the expense of the industry for all accidents in the course of the worker's

regular employment and as a result of the risks taken in that employment, has received legal recognition in most Western countries. The progress of the idea of compensation for accidents has been slow in India. As far back as 1884, workers in Bombay made a demand for the introduction of compensation. Although a certain number of enlightened employers instituted a system of compensation for their work-people, the practice was by no means generally adopted. Prior to the Act of 1923, an employer could be sued under the Fatal Accidents Act of 1885 in case of death arising from an accident. But this Act was seldom invoked. Further, with regard to the general question of employer's liability the position in India was vague.

The principle of the Act of 1923 was that compensation should ordinarily be given to workmen who had sustained injuries by accidents arising out of and in the course of employment, compensation being also given in certain circumstances for diseases. Although the measure followed in general principles the legislation in force elsewhere, it also struck a certain distinctive note and was adapted to meet the peculiarities of industrial life in India. The scope of the Act, which was originally limited, was considerably widened by amending Acts passed in 1926, 1929, 1931 and 1933. This was made necessary partly by the ratification by the Government of India of the draft convention regarding workmen's compensation for occupational diseases adopted by the Seventh International Labour Conference (1925) and partly by the recommendations made by the Royal Commission on Labour in 1931. The Act of 1923 was an experimental measure and has now been replaced by the amending Act of 1933. Certain minor amendments of a technical character were effected in the year 1939.

The Act of 1933 covers railways ; tramways ; factories ; mines ; seamen ; docks ; persons employed in the construction, demolition or repairs to certain buildings ; or of roads, bridges, tunnels ; marine works ; operations relating to telegraph, telephone, or overhead electric lines ; blasting operations or excavations ; boat services ; lighthouse ; tea, coffee, rubber or cinchona plantations ; electricity or gas generating stations ; cinematograph workers ; salaried motor drivers ; and underground sewage workers. In all cases persons employed in an administrative or clerical capacity and those whose monthly earnings exceed Rs. 300 are excluded. The Act covers over seven million industrial workers in the country.

The amount of compensation payable depends on the average monthly earnings of an injured or deceased workman. The amounts of compensation payable in the case of an injured workman

whose monthly wages are not more than Rs. 10 are Rs. 500 for death ; Rs. 700 for permanent total, and half the monthly wages for temporary, disablement. For a workman whose monthly wages are between Rs. 50 and Rs. 60, the corresponding figures are Rs. 1,800, Rs. 2,520 and Rs. 15 respectively. The maxima for persons earning over Rs. 200 per month are Rs. 4,000, Rs. 5,600 and Rs. 30 per month respectively. In the case of minors the amounts of compensation for death and for permanent total disablement are at a uniform rate of Rs. 200 and Rs. 1,200 respectively, and half the monthly wage for temporary disablement. No compensation is payable in respect of a waiting period of seven days following that on which the injury was caused.¹

The dependants to whom the amount of compensation is payable are firstly those who are actually dependants such as a wife or a minor child ; and secondly those who may or may not be in that position such as a husband, a parent other than a widowed mother, etc. Provision is made for enabling the interests of dependants in cases of fatal accidents to be better safeguarded, by ensuring that such accidents should be brought to the notice of commissioners, appointed under the Act by Provincial Governments.

The general administration of the Act and the settlement of disputes thereunder are entrusted to these commissioners, who have been given wide powers. The procedure is simple and opportunities for appeals restricted. For the success of a measure like this rapid inquiry made by medical men capable of forming estimates of the injuries received along with the enlistment by the State of impartial judges to see that the worker gets the benefit that is due to him are necessary. The migratory habits of the industrial worker, his ignorance of the financial relief to which he is entitled under the Act, lack of qualified men properly to put up the workmen's case for compensation are some of the factors which render the operation of a measure of this kind difficult in India. It is interesting to note that since the enactment of legislation regarding workmen's compensation in India, the total amount of compensation paid amounted to over Rs. 1,38 lakhs in 248,402 cases up to December 1937.

§93. **Social insurance.**—The principle of social insurance for the protection of the industrial worker against the hardships arising from sickness, unemployment and old age has long been recognized in industrial countries like the United Kingdom and Germany. International labour organizations have also lent their support

¹ *Indian Year Book*, 1937-8, p. 532.

to social insurance by adopting from time to time conventions regarding all these matters. Some of these questions have been receiving the attention of the Government of India and other parties concerned, particularly since the Tenth International Labour Conference (1927) adopted a Convention in respect of sickness insurance of industrial, agricultural, and domestic workers. The Congress ministry in Bombay visualized the development of a comprehensive system of social insurance and had under consideration the feasibility of legislation for the grant of leave with pay during periods of sickness, in the hope that it would pave the way for sickness insurance.¹

There are considerable difficulties, administrative, financial and otherwise, in the way of the introduction and enforcement of social insurance in India. The requisite statistical and actuarial basis for the various forms of social insurance are totally lacking at present. As regards agricultural labour, it is casual in nature and there is absence of qualified medical men in the districts. So far as the industrial worker in the Bombay province is concerned the Government of Bombay have already set in motion the machinery of the Labour Department for the collection of material which within a reasonable distance of time should enable the Government to decide what can be done to frame sound and workable schemes conforming to Indian conditions. While this move is welcome it is necessary to bear in mind two considerations. In the first place, the capacity of industry to bear additional burdens thus imposed on it must be duly considered; and in the second place, the social insurance schemes must be based on a contributory basis as in other countries, the employers, the workers and the State all bearing their fair share of the burden. It is also desirable that such action as is taken in these matters should be on an all-India basis, lest industries in one province should be penalized while those in other provinces or Indian States escape.

§34. History of industrial disputes in India.—On the whole, before 1917 strikes were rare in India. In 1905 there were several strikes in Bombay owing to the introduction of electricity and excessively long hours of work. It was, however, during the war of 1914-18 that the strike came to be regarded as an ordinary weapon of industrial warfare. The economic upheaval and the general feeling of unrest created by the war, the increase in the cost of living due to rise in prices, and the spread of class consciousness have produced a large crop of strikes since 1917. The position became

¹ *Labour Gazette* (Bombay), August 1937, p. 923.

specially acute in 1919-20, when a great strike occurred in Bombay involving 150,000 cotton mill workmen. Among the contributory causes of these strikes have been long hours of work ; bad housing ; lack of provision, till recently, for compensation for injuries received ; the ill-treatment of the workers by foremen ; the sympathy of one group of strikers for others, and so on. We shall notice in a later section how the trade union movement originated during this period.

During the period 1920-39 the number of industrial disputes every year has varied from 118 in 1932 to 406 in 1939. The largest number of disputes have been in cotton and woollen mills and for that reason in the Bombay province. In Bombay city itself the influence of communistic ideas has latterly been a powerful factor making for the growth of labour unrest.

The strike situation was very serious in 1919-21 owing to the economic distress and high prices induced by the war. With the gradual restoration of normal conditions and a fall in the cost of living, the strike fever appeared for some time to be subsiding. The increased wages granted during the war remained as they were for some time after it, in spite of a fall in prices, thus securing some increase in the real wages of labour. The depression which followed the post-war boom, however, led to a movement on the part of employers of labour to stop paying war bonuses or to decrease wages, causing a fresh outburst of strikes at industrial centres like Bombay and Ahmedabad. The years 1926 and 1927 were comparatively quiet. The year 1928, however, saw a recrudescence of industrial unrest, and the outbreak of several big strikes all over the country, e.g. the big strike in Bombay cotton mills in October 1928, following an attempt on the part of the millowners to introduce rationalization and new methods of work. The intensification of these strikes as well as the unusually prolonged duration of some of them was attributed to Russian communistic influences and the secret help derived from the same quarter. A prolonged strike in the Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur and strikes on several railways, threatened or actual, and accompanied, in the case of the E.I.R. and S.I.R. strikes, by considerable violence, were a feature of the year 1928.

In the year 1929 the industrial strife of the previous year persisted and communist influences were evident. There was again a general strike in the cotton mill industry in Bombay. These stormy years were followed by a comparative calm throughout the country.

The economic depression (1929-33), particularly in the cotton-mill industry, ushered in a period of wage-cuts and this resulted in

a number of short-lived strikes. The Bombay Government caused a Departmental Inquiry into the question of wage-cuts in the Presidency. The report of this inquiry was published in June 1934 and the semi-general strike which had been declared in Bombay mills while the inquiry was in progress, was called off almost simultaneously. The most important result of this inquiry was the passing by the Government of Bombay of a Trade Disputes Conciliation Act which is reviewed in §37 below. For a period of nearly three years after the passing of the Act there was little industrial strife in the cotton mill industry in the Bombay city. The year 1937 was marked by a recrudescence of labour troubles in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Cawnpore, Madras and other industrial centres in India caused partly by the demand for higher wages and restoration of wage-cuts on the ground of industrial and business recovery, and partly by communist activity in labour circles. The acute discontent in the ranks of workers, in spite of the ameliorative legislation of previous years, is reflected in a large number of strikes in 1937 and 1938, when there were as many as 379 and 399 industrial disputes respectively as compared with an annual average of 147 strikes during the thirteen years 1924-36. It was in 1937 and 1938 that the Congress Governments instituted labour inquiries either confined to textile labour as in Bombay (1937) or the Central Provinces (1938), or of a general character as in the the United Provinces (1937) and Bihar (1938).

§35. *Industrial disputes during the war (1939-?)*.—The total number of disputes in the year 1939 was 406, the highest number so far recorded.¹ One of the causes which accounts for the intensified industrial strife, which continued in the year 1940, is the demand for dearness allowances put forward by workers in the various industrial centres to neutralize the rise in the cost of living following the outbreak of war in September 1939. Unlike during the war of 1914-18, the workers acted promptly in making a demand for higher wages. The initial months of the war were marked by a wave of profiteering in the country, which was brought under check by measures of price control adopted by the several Provincial Governments (see ch. ix). It was realized that a certain measure of relief to the workers was necessary and the Governments concerned soon got into touch with the representatives of the employers and the employees with the object of securing agreement on the extent of relief to be granted, thus preventing subversive propaganda among the workers. In Bombay, the discussions on the question of dearness allowances so far as

¹ *Labour Gazette* (Bombay), June 1940, p. 896.

the textile industries were concerned had to be conducted under the procedure laid down by the new Bombay Industrial Disputes Act passed in 1938. While a strike was averted in Ahmedabad, where the parties agreed to refer the matter to the arbitration of the Industrial Court, in Bombay the Girni Kamgar Union called a strike in March, 1940, which failed as the Millowners' Association, who had accepted the recommendation of the Board of Conciliation in favour of the grant of a dearness allowance at a flat rate of two annas per day, carried on a counter-propaganda. There were similar disputes in other provinces.¹ At present (October 1940) the claim of the railway workers for a dearness allowance is being considered by a Court of Enquiry set up under the Trade Disputes Act (1929).

The foregoing survey shows that industrial relations constitute one of the main problems facing Indian industry; and that further progress requires a proper and early solution of this problem.

§36. **Prevention of industrial disputes.**— Before dealing with the machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes *after* they have broken out, a few words might be said regarding the methods of preventing them. The first essential is the creation of sound organizations both of employers and employees. The employers are for the most part sufficiently well organized in India, but not so the workers. The formation of sound trade unions of the workers is the first step in the evolution of any means, preventive as well as curative, of strikes and lock-outs. Efficient organizations on either side, competent to speak for their respective sides, will tend to prevent the occurrence of sporadic strikes and lock-outs and the formulation of grievances after rather than before going on strike—features which are peculiar characteristics of strikes in India. A permanent Arbitration Board has been established for the settlement of disputes in the textile industry in Ahmedabad. The Bombay Industrial Disputes Committee of 1922 recommended the formation of Works Committees or Shop Committees on the lines of the Whitley Committees in England. On these committees the workers would be represented along with the employers and would be responsible for the fixing and observance of conditions under which work is to be carried on. It may be mentioned that such committees have already been established by some enlightened employers like Tatas, and by the Government in their capacity as employers. The Labour Commission also recommend the formation of Works Committees which, they think,

¹ *Indian Year Book* 1940-1, pp. 530-38.

are capable of playing a useful part in the Indian industrial system (*L.C.R.*, 342-3).

We may now proceed to discuss the arbitration and conciliation methods for settling industrial disputes. The numerous disputes during the period after the termination of the war of 1914-18 clearly showed the necessity of suitable machinery for investigating and settling them. The Government of Madras were the first to take steps in this direction by setting up courts of inquiry to deal with individual disputes as they arose. The Committees appointed by the Bengal Government (1921) and the Bombay Government (1922) did valuable spade work and made a number of detailed recommendations regarding the machinery to be set up for preventing and settling disputes. The Government of India held that the subject was one for all-India legislation. This, however, was held to be premature until the Trade Union Bill had been passed. The Trade Union Bill became law in 1926 and came into force the next year. The Trade Disputes Act, which was passed in 1929 and was to remain in force for a period of five years only in the first instance, was made permanent in 1934.

§37. Trade disputes legislation.—(i) *The Trade Disputes Act of 1929.*—The Act closely follows the English legislation on the subject and does not provide for *compulsory* arbitration. As in England, public opinion is regarded as the decisive factor in settling disputes and the underlying idea is to help the clear framing and discussion of the issues by an impartial tribunal, so that a well-informed public opinion may be formed. The Act provides for the setting up of Courts of Inquiry and Conciliation Boards.

(a) *Nature of inquiry.*—The Provincial Government or the Governor-General-in-Council, where the employer is the head of a department under the Governor-General-in-Council or a railway company, is authorized to appoint, for prevention or settlement of a dispute, a Court of Inquiry or Board of Conciliation, as the case may be, where both parties to the dispute apply, whether separately or conjointly, provided the persons applying represent the majority of each party.¹ (b) *Constitution of the Court of Inquiry.*—The Court of Inquiry consists of an independent chairman and such other independent persons as the appointing authority may think fit or it may consist of one independent person. (c) *Board of Conciliation.*—The Board of Conciliation has a different constitution and consists of a chairman and two or four other members

¹ The Labour Commission recommend that the possibility of establishing permanent courts in place of *ad hoc* tribunals under the Act should be examined (*L.C.R.*, 346).

as the appointing authority thinks fit or it may consist of one independent person. The chairman is an independent person and the other members may be either independent persons, or persons appointed in equal numbers to represent the parties to the dispute on the recommendations of the parties concerned.

(d) Procedure.—The duty of such a Board is to endeavour to bring about a settlement after investigation of the merits of the dispute and to do all such things as it may think fit to induce the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement and give them reasonable time for doing so. In case of failure to bring about a settlement, the Board is to send a full report to the appointing authority setting forth the proceedings and the steps taken by the Board for the settlement of the dispute together with its findings and recommendations. The appointing authority is to publish the report, final or interim, as soon after its receipt as possible.

(e) Strikes in public utility services.—The provisions in the second part of the Act regarding public utility services are among the most important in the whole Act. A public utility service means (1) any railway service so declared for the purposes of the Act by the Governor-General-in-Council; (2) any postal, telegraph or telephone service; (3) any business or undertaking which supplies light or water to the public; and (4) any system of public conservancy or sanitation. Special penalties are laid down for employees, employed on monthly wages, in such services in the event of their going on strike in breach of contract without having given to their employer, within one month before so striking, not less than fourteen days' previous notice. Employers carrying on such public utility services are made liable to be punished (the fine being heavier) for locking-out their employees without a similar notice. Abettors of an offence, as defined above, are left to be dealt with under the ordinary Criminal Amendment Law.

(f) Illegal strikes.—There are also special provisions in respect of illegal strikes on the lines of the British Trade Disputes Act of 1927. A strike or lock-out is to be regarded as illegal which (1) has any object apart from the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the parties to the disputes are engaged; and (2) is designed or calculated to inflict severe hardship upon the community, and thereby to compel the Government to take or abstain from taking any particular course of action. Any sums collected or applied in direct support of such strikes are illegal. Sympathetic strikes are declared illegal by defining a trade dispute within an industry as one which is between the employers and the employees of that industry with regard to the employment in that industry alone. The trade union

privileges of members are protected from being invaded on the ground of a refusal to join such illegal strikes.

The Act presupposes organization on the part of the employers and the employees, and, as already suggested, is intended to promote such organization to check sporadic strikes and arbitrary lock-outs and to help the formulation of grievances before and not after a strike is declared. Sympathetic strikes are by implication illegal under the Act. This has been criticized by labour leaders as giving the Government the power to declare any big strike illegal, but on the other hand, a general strike like the triple strike in England (1926) may be a real menace to the community. Like many other provisions of law, therefore, this particular provision cannot be demurred to merely because it is liable to be abused. A more valid criticism would be to point out that, since the strikes that have occurred in India so far bear no parallel to the big general strike in Great Britain, there is no particular necessity, under the present circumstances, for such a provision. It has also been argued that the clauses regarding illegal strikes interfere with the fundamental human rights of the workmen and further that they will tend to choke the trade union movement in India, which is still in its infancy, and will create distrust in the mind of the workers. The view is held by some critics that the portions of the Act dealing with strikes in public utility services and illegal strikes were unnecessary. Sudden strikes in social security services, such as the supply of water, light and sanitation, are already illegal and punishable under the Penal Code. Strikes in ordinary public utility services (as distinguished from security services) such as postal, telegraph or telephone service, or even railway service, however, need not be dealt with severely.¹

During the period of eight years between the passing of the Act and the introduction of provincial autonomy, the Trade Disputes Act was made use of on only five occasions. Since August 1937, when Congress ministries assumed power, the Act has been put into force more frequently, especially in the province of Madras. In Bombay, however, it has been used only on two occasions, in 1929 and 1940. The procedure in connexion with the appointment of the Court of Enquiry and Boards of Conciliation under the Act has been found to be cumbrous and

¹ A Bill to amend and widen the scope of the Trade Disputes Act (1929) was recently (April 1938) passed by the Central Legislature. It alters the definition of an illegal strike; includes within the list of utility services any inland steam vessel and tramway service which Government may notify and any undertaking which supplies power to the public; and provides for the appointment of conciliation officers with certain powers by those Provincial Governments which desire to appoint them.

inconclusive in character, and these defects led the Government of Bombay to pass provincial legislation in 1934 (see iv below).

(ii) The Labour Commission recommended that every Provincial Government should have an officer or officers to undertake conciliation. The Commissioner of Labour in Madras, the Director of Industries in the Punjab, the Director of Statistics, and Deputy Commissioners and the Director of Industries in the Central Provinces have accordingly been given powers as conciliation officers.

(iii) *The Bombay Trade Disputes Conciliation Act (1934)* provided for the appointment of the Commissioner of Labour as ex-officio chief conciliator and also for the appointment of a Labour Officer, special conciliators and assistant conciliators. A Labour Officer was appointed in 1934 to guard the interests of the workers. The Millowners' Association also appointed a Labour Officer of its own to represent mill managements in proceedings with the Government Labour Officer and the chief conciliator.¹ It was claimed for this Act that it had succeeded in practically eliminating industrial strife in textile mills in Bombay city. After three years of comparative industrial peace, however, there has been since the middle of 1937, as previously stated, a recrudescence of labour trouble in Bombay as also in other textile centres.

(iv) *The Bombay Industrial Disputes Act (1938)*.—It was realized by the Congress ministry in Bombay that there was nothing in the Act of 1934 making it obligatory on the parties to a trade dispute to endeavour to obtain a settlement of it by conciliation before resorting to a strike or lock-out. The object of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, which was placed upon the statute book in the year 1938 and which supplants the earlier Act of 1934, is to ensure that the machinery of conciliation and arbitration provided for by it shall be fully exhausted before a strike or lock-out can be declared.

The main provisions of the new Act, which had a stormy passage in the legislature, may now be briefly reviewed.

The Act provides for the registration of unions which have been recognized by the employers concerned or which fulfil certain requirements as regards membership. Registration confers various rights on the unions in connexion with representations on behalf of the workers. Labour Officers and Conciliators may be appointed for different areas or industries in the province, and machinery is set up to ensure that the grievances of workers or any alteration in their conditions of service are fully considered. Strikes and

¹ Similar Labour Officers have since been appointed in Bengal, the United Provinces, Madras and Bihar.

lock-outs are therefore made illegal until the whole of the machinery for discussion and negotiation provided for by the Act has been made use of. The right to declare a strike or lock-out must be exercised within a period of two months after the completion of conciliation proceedings. Conciliation will start to function immediately a dispute is likely to occur, because the Act provides that an employer or a workman who desires to make a change in wages or hours or other conditions of employment must give notice of his intention to do so to the prescribed authorities, and no change can be effected until the machinery of the Act has functioned to the fullest extent.

In areas and in industries where the workmen concerned are members of a recognized union the conduct of all negotiations is left to the employers and to the recognized union. In cases where there are no recognized unions, directly elected representatives of the workers concerned or the Labour Officer will conduct the preliminary discussions on behalf of the workmen. If agreements are reached during these discussions such agreements will be registered. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, a trade dispute will be considered to have occurred and the official conciliator will step in and endeavour to bring about a settlement of the dispute. If the conciliator fails, or if Government otherwise orders, a Board of Conciliation may be appointed.

In industries and centres where employers and unions have agreed to refer disputes to arbitration, the official machinery will not be brought into operation in the earlier stages and may or may not operate in the later ones. However, all agreements and awards arrived at are to be registered.

A Registrar has been appointed under the Act whose duties include the registration of unions and the determination of their eligibility, recording of agreements and awards and other notices and reports provided for in the Act.

In one important particular the Act breaks entirely fresh ground, for it makes provision for the setting up of an Industrial Court presided over by a High Court Judge or a lawyer qualified to be a High Court Judge. This court is to act as a tribunal for voluntary arbitration on matters submitted to it by the parties to a dispute. It will also function as a court of final appeal in numerous cases arising out of the working of the Act. The court is to be the tribunal that is to decide whether or not a strike or lock-out is illegal, and all questions of interpretation of agreements and awards will come before it. Such a court has already been established under the Act.

The Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938 is the most advanced

and outstanding piece of labour legislation in this country. The Act has been criticized as being unduly drastic and hostile to the free right of the workers to declare a strike. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the smooth progress of industry requires harmony between labour and capital. The new Act does not take away the right to strike, but only requires postponement of its use until peaceful methods for securing the settlement of a trade dispute have been fully utilized. It is significant of the changed attitude of labour to the Act that the All-India Trade Union Congress in its recent session (1940) welcomed the Bombay Act in the interests of the workers.

'Another criticism of the Act is that it does nothing to recognize the value of an internal organization for overcoming the psychological differences that hamper the co-operation of the work-people', as the basic idea underlying the Act has been the introduction of collective bargaining between the whole body of employers in a local centre and the whole group of organized workers in that area.¹ The working of the Act should be carefully observed in order to remove its defects. The Act itself as a whole may be welcomed as a step forward in the evolution of industrial relations in India.²

§38. Trade union movement in India.—Already in 1918 trade unions were organized in Madras under the leadership of Mr B. P. Wadia. From Madras the trade union movement spread to Bombay. The industrial unrest, which may be said to have commenced in 1917, resulted in the creation of a number of labour organizations. These were, however, temporary in character and dissolved into thin air as soon as their immediate object, whether it was increase of wages or any other thing, was fulfilled. They were 'little more than strike committees consisting of a few officers and perhaps a few paying members'.³ This situation, has, however, been gradually improving, and the remarkable growth in the number of trade unions, especially in 1921, shows that the movement has come to stay. It experienced a slight set-back in the year 1923 owing to an improvement in the economic condition of the workers and the consequent diminution in the number of strikes. In the initial stages of the movement the presence of actual economic distress was practically the only bond among the workers, which tended to weaken when conditions were more favourable.

¹ See *Indian Journal of Economics*, Conference Number, 1940, article on Industrial Disputes and Legislation by P. S. Lokanathan.

² In August 1939 the Government of the United Provinces drafted a Bill similar to the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act (1938).

³ See Hurst, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

Latterly the movement has shown distinct signs of recovery and may be further expected to gain in strength owing to the protective influence of the Trade Union Act of 1926. Moreover, the trade union movement in India has almost from its inception had the advantage of an all-India organization like the All-India Trade Union Congress which has been holding annual sessions since 1920.¹ The creation of the International Labour Office hastened the establishment of a central trade union organization in India. The presence of its representatives at the annual Labour Conferences at Geneva has brought the Indian movement into direct touch with the movement in the Western world.

The All-India Trade Union Congress has now (1940) a total number of 191 Unions with 354,541 members affiliated to it. The total number of registered trade unions under the Trade Union Act of 1926 (see below) was nearly 700 in September 1939. During the same month the total membership of these 700 Unions was considerably over half a million.² The percentage of female workers was very small, being less than 4 per cent of the total membership. Not all these unions, however, are equal in strength and vitality. About half of them are organizations either of Government servants or of persons connected with Government employment. Trade unionism has met with comparatively greater success among railway and postal employees, but on the whole it is weak in the great organized textile and mining industries. The Ahmedabad Textile Labour Union is, however, the biggest and best organized trade union in India.

§39. Difficulties of the movement in India.—The special difficulty of the trade union movement is, in the first place, the floating

¹ In 1929, there occurred a serious split in the ranks of the Trade Union Congress and there came into existence three distinct groups, viz. the communist group, the liberal group and the rest. In 1935 a Joint Committee of the two principal organizations, viz. the All-India Trade Union Congress and the National Trades Union Federation (1933) was formed with a view to promoting unity, which has only recently been achieved, owing to fundamental differences in outlook and methods. It is a happy augury for Indian labour that the unification of the Indian Trade Union movement was effected at the joint session of the two bodies in April 1938. The Trade Union Federation was absorbed into the Trade Union Congress at the last session of the Congress held in 1940 thus completing the unity. There are a number of other all-India associations like, the All-India Postal and R.M.S. Association, the National Federation of Textile Labour in India, etc.

² Messrs Purcell and Hallsworth, British Trade Union delegates to India, calculated that there were in all 25,266,109 persons in the organizable groups of workers (including 21,676,107 agricultural field and farm labourers, but excluding domestic servants and Postal and Government office employees) in the various industries in India. See *Report on Labour Conditions in India* (British Trade Union Congress Delegation 1928), p. 15.

character of the labour population (see §3). In the second place, the labour force in industrial centres like Bombay and Calcutta is a heterogeneous mass of men speaking a variety of languages and, therefore, not feeling intimately drawn to each other. Where, however, the proportion of emigrant labour is small, as in Ahmedabad, the trade unions are much stronger than elsewhere. Thirdly, many labourers dislike the idea of regular contributions and union discipline, and this accounts for the small percentage of men enrolled in any establishment. Even a small contribution is again felt as a burden owing to the great poverty of the average worker. Fourthly, the majority of the workers are illiterate and are, therefore, unable to find leaders from their own ranks. This accounts for a special feature of the trade union movement in India, namely that it has been largely led by men from the middle classes,¹ professional lawyers and others who have not in all cases distinguished between political and economic considerations. Moreover, their interests are divided amongst many unions and their knowledge of technicalities is very slight. Another handicap is the absence of a true democratic ideal, which is so essential for effective trade unionism. Lastly, successful trade unionism depends on at least a temporary acceptance of the existing social order with a view to gaining as much for labour as possible.² If working-class leaders are frankly out to destroy the present capitalistic order of society their influence must weaken the trade union movement. According to many competent observers this points to one of the principal reasons of the weakness of the movement in Bombay as contrasted with the striking success it has achieved in a centre like Ahmedabad. The representation given to labour in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies under the Government of India Act (1935) through special constituencies comprising registered Trade Unions is, however, expected not only to promote registration of new unions, but also to ensure maintenance of proper books of account and registers of members.

§40. **Trade Union Act of 1926.**—A decision of the Madras High Court at the end of 1920, giving an injunction restraining trade union officials or organizers from influencing labourers to break

¹ 'As in the early days of British trade unionism, when it had to rely largely upon men like Robert Owen, Francis Place, and later, Kingsley, Ludlow and Frederic Harrison, so too the Indian movement in its corresponding stage is almost wholly dependent upon the lawyer or "pleader" class for its union presidents and secretaries.'—*Report on Labour Conditions in India* (British Trade Union Congress Delegation 1928). For some interesting comments on this subject see *L.C.R.*, 324-5, 328-9.

² Ahmad Mukhtar, *Trade Unionism and Labour Disputes in India*.

their contracts with their employers by striking to obtain increased wages, revealed the necessity of legislation for the registration and protection of Indian trade unions. Mr N. M. Joshi, the Labour Member, first brought the question before the Assembly in March 1921 and his persistent efforts in this connexion finally bore fruit when the Trade Union Act passed in 1926 came into force on 15 June 1927. The Act defines the legal position of Indian trade unions in definite and precise terms. The registration of trade unions is optional, but the Act confers certain valuable privileges on the registered bodies denied to those that choose to remain unregistered. The registered trade union is required to define its name and the objects for which it is established. It must keep a list of its members and provide for a regular annual audit of its funds which must be spent on certain specified objects calculated to promote the obvious interests of the members. Not less than one-half of the office-bearers of a registered trade union must be persons employed in the industry concerned. As against these restrictions, the Act grants immunity from criminal liability to all trade union officials acting in furtherance of all legitimate objects of the union. Nor are they liable to be indicted for conspiracy. The Act provides that (i) no suit shall be maintainable in any civil court against any officer or member of a registered union in respect of any act done by him in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute on the ground only that such act induces some other persons to break a contract of employment or is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person or his right to dispose of his capital or labour as he wills; and that (ii) no suit shall be maintainable in any civil court against a registered trade union in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute by any person acting on behalf of a trade union, provided it is proved that such person acted without the knowledge of or contrary to express instructions given by the executive of the trade union. A registered trade union may create a fund for the promotion of the civil and political interests of its members, the contributions however being on a strictly voluntary basis.

INDUSTRIAL WELFARE ¹

§41. **Nature of welfare work.**—Welfare work has been variously defined. One definition confines it to the voluntary efforts on the part of employers to provide the best conditions of employment in their own factories. A definition more generally accepted

¹ On this subject read *L.C.R.*, ch. xiv.

includes within the scope of welfare work 'all efforts which have for their object the improvement of the health, safety and general well-being and the industrial efficiency of the worker'.¹

These efforts may be made by employers of labour, or the State, or the employees themselves, or by social agencies. From one point of view, these activities may be regarded as humanistic, aiming at the welfare of the industrial population. From the narrower and purely utilitarian point of view, so-called 'welfare work' may be regarded as 'efficiency work' having a direct favourable reaction on the physical contentment and efficiency of the operatives and thus helping to counteract the migratory tendencies of Indian labour. Welfare work may also be considered as a means of developing a sense of responsibility and dignity amongst an illiterate class of workers, making them good citizens.

§42. Divisions of welfare work.—Welfare work falls into two broad classes: (i) activities inside the factory, or intra-mural welfare work, and (ii) activities outside the factory, or extra-mural work. As regards intra-mural work for improving conditions of work inside the factory, an account of what has already been done by the State and, to a smaller extent, by employers, has been given earlier in the chapter.

In the past, welfare work, especially in regard to the proper utilization of leisure time, has received little attention at the hands of employers of labour, and such efforts as have been made have mostly taken the form of providing medical aid, minor educational facilities and housing. It is, however, receiving increasing attention at the present time, owing to the serious growth of industrial unrest. The Social Service League of Bombay was able, in 1918, to induce two enlightened mill agents to entrust to it the organization and management of two workmen's institutes for the benefit of operatives working in mills under the agencies of Currimbhoy Ebrahim & Sons and Tata & Sons. In 1922 an All-India Industrial Welfare Conference was held in Bombay. It discussed several interesting problems connected with welfare work and was able to effect some co-ordination of work carried on by various agencies at the different centres. The All-India Trade Union Congress has also been directing its attention to welfare work for some time past. In May 1926 the Government of India asked all the Provincial Governments to collect full information with regard to the steps taken and efforts made to ameliorate the conditions under which the workers live when not actually employed. This inquiry was undertaken in response to a recommendation adopted

¹ Presidential Address, All-India Industrial Welfare Conference, 1922.

by the Sixth Session of the International Labour Conference requesting the various Governments concerned to supply the International Labour Office with up-to-date information regarding the use of the worker's spare time.

Besides the interest shown by some of the more enlightened employers in Bombay, several employers of labour at the other industrial centres have also instituted welfare schemes for the benefit of their operatives in Madras, Nagpur, Jamshedpur, and Cawnpore. The welfare work carried on by the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras for several years past is well known. At Nagpur the Empress Mills have entrusted the task of looking after the welfare of their employees to the Y. M. C. A. The Board of Directors of the Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur have put forward the claim that 'the attitude of the company from its earliest days towards labour and its provision of housing, education, welfare, water-supply, drainage, hospital, and other public services on a scale unexcelled in India, have met with the approval of public men of all shades of thought'. At Cawnpore, the British India Corporation have provided for a Welfare Superintendent to manage the two settlements that have been built to house their workers. So also some of the municipalities, like the Bombay Corporation, Port Trust and public utility services, especially railways, have taken certain steps to promote the welfare of their employees. Lastly, several social service agencies, such as the Bombay Social Service League started by the Servants of India Society, and similar leagues in Madras and Bengal, the Seva Sadan Society, the Bombay Presidency Women's Council, the Maternity and Infant Welfare Association, the Y.M.C.A., the Depressed Classes Mission Society, and missionary societies, are all playing a useful part in the organization of welfare work both by helping employers of labour and by independent efforts.

With the advent of provincial autonomy in India the Provincial Governments have taken active measures to supplement the welfare and recreational activities undertaken by employers and other agencies mentioned above, by initiating large welfare schemes of their own. The Government of Bombay have, for instance, opened welfare centres in the industrial areas in Bombay and other cities in the province.¹

The Cawnpore Labour Enquiry Committee in their Report (par. §1) urge the establishment of a Welfare Council containing the representatives of various institutions interested in this work.

¹ *Indian Year Book*, 1940-1, p. 559.

§43. *Items of welfare work.*— (i) *Education.*—The unsatisfactory position regarding the education of industrial workers has already been noticed.¹ Some enlightened employers of labour like the Tatas have arranged for the education of the children and adult operatives in day and night schools. The Social Service League of Bombay and the Y. M. C. A. have also done much to promote the education of the industrial workers in schools as well as by provision of reading rooms and libraries. (ii) *Medical aid.*—The provision of facilities for medical attendance appears to be fairly general in the large and important factories in India, though it is rare to find the needs of female workers met by the appointment of special lady doctors. (iii) *Maternity benefits.*—In the interests of women workers and their children Western countries have introduced maternity benefits and prohibition of employment of women for some period before and after child-birth. The fact that women workers in India are also domestic drudges makes similar arrangements here all the more important. The Washington International Labour Conference of 1919 adopted a draft convention concerning the employment of women before and after child-birth. While India was not expected to ratify the convention immediately, the Government of India were invited to make a study of the question, including the grant of maternity benefits, and to report to the next Conference. The inquiries in connexion with the report submitted showed that such schemes had been instituted only by very few employers of labour. The reporting Provincial Governments, however, expressed their willingness to encourage the institution of further voluntary schemes. Additional inquiries made by the Government of India in June 1924, in conformity with the suggestion of the Assembly, showed that, in the three big organized industries of Bengal, namely jute, tea and coal, there were several definite schemes of maternity benefits. In the tea gardens in Assam, and the Assam Railways and Trading Company, in the mines of Bihar and Orissa, in the factories of Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces, there are a large number of these schemes in operation, under which several concessions are allowed, such as grant of leave for varying periods during pregnancy, supply of free milk and feeding bottles, etc. Over and above all this, Bombay has a growing number of maternity homes. In her final report, Dr Barnes, the lady doctor appointed by the Bombay Government in connexion with maternity benefits to women workers, gives interesting details regarding the maternity allowances granted by the Tata group of mills. Two

¹ See ch. i, §13.

months' wages are given as allowance (one month before and one month after confinement) to a woman worker with a service of at least eleven months to her credit, on production of a certificate from a lady doctor regarding the completion of eight months of pregnancy and on her giving an undertaking not to work for a wage anywhere else.

In 1924 Mr N. M. Joshi introduced, in the September session of the Assembly, a Bill to regulate the employment, some time before and after confinement, of women in factories and mines, and on estates to which the Assam Labour and Emigration Act of 1901 applied, and to make provision for the payment of maternity benefits. It provided for the grant of leave six weeks before and after confinement and of maternity allowances by local Governments from a maternity benefit fund subscribed to by employers of labour. The Bill was rejected by the Assembly on the ground that it was too much in advance of public opinion in India. Similar legislation was, however, passed for Bombay in the form of the Bombay Maternity Act (1929). It applies in the first instance to certain selected cities in the province but can be extended to other places by the Government. The Act, as amended in 1934, prohibits the employment of a woman during four weeks immediately following the day of delivery, and makes it illegal for her to work in any factory during this period. Maternity benefit at the rate of eight annas a day for the actual period of absence not exceeding four weeks before confinement and four weeks immediately after confinement, can be claimed by a woman from her employer provided she has been employed in his factory for not less than nine months immediately preceding the date on which she notifies her intention to absent herself from work owing to approaching confinement within one month next following. If, however, she works in any factory during the period of leave granted her, she forfeits her claim to the maternity benefit. In 1938 the Act was extended to women employed in all industrial concerns in the province. The Report of the Factory Inspector, Bombay, shows that the Act is having a restrictive effect on the employment of women. A Maternity Benefit Act of limited application was also passed in the Central Provinces in 1930. The Madras Maternity Benefit Act (1935) closely follows the provisions of the Bombay Act. Legislation of this type, however, requires to be passed on an all-India basis so that employers in all the provinces are equally made subject to the obligations imposed by it. (iv) *Recreation*.—The value of recreation hardly needs to be specially stressed. Anything should be welcome that adds a little colour to the life of the worker, which for the most

part is set in grey. It is also most important to induce the worker to utilize his spare time so that he is kept away from the liquor shop and the bucket-shop and generally to increase the attractions of industrial work in the towns and make him less reluctant to settle down permanently at the industrial centres. In this connexion, the activities of the Social Service League, Bombay, which has organized a Working Men's Institute at Parel, and of some enlightened employers like Tatas and the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras, deserve special mention; the Government of Bombay also deserve to be congratulated on their welfare centres. As a result of such activities provision is made for outdoor sports and indoor games, entertainments, such as cinema shows, magic lantern lectures, musical concerts, dramatic performances, wrestling matches, etc. (v) *Housing*.—This question has already been fully discussed earlier in the chapter.¹ (vi) *Co-operative Societies*.—The work done by co-operative societies for industrial workers has already been alluded to in the chapter on the co-operative movement.² (vii) *Grain and cloth shops*.—Some mills maintain shops where cheap grain and cloth are sold to the workmen, thus preventing them from being swindled by the *bania*, though the more elastic credit given by the *bania* offers a great temptation to the workers to make their purchases from him, a tendency fostered by the degeneration of some of the mill shops into 'truck' shops. The only satisfactory solution lies in the organization of co-operative stores. (viii) *Teashops and canteens*.—There is a very meagre provision of teashops and canteens though there is an imperative need for proper facilities for obtaining good and wholesome tea and cooked food. There are only a few canteens of the type which made considerable progress in England under the stress of production during the last war. Caste difficulties and the conservatism of women have acted as great obstacles. It is important, however, to make every effort to overcome these difficulties in order to improve the health and the sobriety of the workman.

The most recent amendment of the Factories Act noticed above (§27) contains several provisions in connexion with welfare, for example maintenance of adequate shelters for rest, reservation of rooms for the use of children of women employed in factories employing more than fifty women, provision of first-aid appliances, etc. Not only does welfare work require to be greatly extended

¹ §§13-14.

² See vol. I, ch. x.

in India but it should also be controlled more and more by the workers themselves. At present it is largely controlled by employers, and this impinges upon trade union organization and its activities. The selection of leading workers to associate with the management of welfare committees is scarcely a satisfactory arrangement as it tends to detach them from the general body of workers.¹

¹ See *Report on Labour Conditions in India* (British Trade Union 'Congress Delegation 1928), p. 12.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NATIONAL DIVIDEND

§1. **Estimates of national dividend in India: Dadabhai Naoroji's estimate.**—Various estimates have been made from time to time of the national income of India, and although they have varied widely, even the most optimistic of them have but served to emphasize the fact that the inhabitants of this country are beset with a poverty for which there is no parallel in modern times in the countries of Western Europe.

We shall now proceed to notice briefly the results of the principal estimates of the national income of India made by different writers so far. The first serious attempt in the direction was that of Dr Dadabhai Naoroji in his well-known book, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*. This estimate is based on official figures relating to the years 1867-70. Dr Naoroji explains the principles he followed in these words:—'I have taken the largest one or two kinds of produce of a province to represent all its produce. I have taken the whole cultivated area of each district, the produce per acre, and the price of the produce; and simple multiplication and addition will give you both the quantity and value of the total produce. From it, also, you can get the correct average of produce per acre, and of prices for the whole produce.' Working on this basis he arrives at the figure of £277,000,000 as the value of the gross agricultural produce. From this he deducts six per cent for seed. The balance left amounts to £260,000,000. Next, £17,000,000 is taken as the value of salt, opium, coal, and profits of commerce. The value of manufactures is put down at £15,000,000. An equal amount is allowed for the annual produce of stock, fish, milk, meat, etc. and £30,000,000 is further added for any contingency. All these items add up to £340,000,000, and taking the population at 170,000,000, the *per capita* income for British India comes to 40s. or Rs. 20 per head. Dr Naoroji then proceeds to show on the basis of jail dietaries and rations for emigrant coolies, etc. that this is less than the Rs. 34 or so which is required for bare subsistence, and he comes to this conclusion:—'Even for such food and clothing as a criminal obtains, there is hardly enough of production even in a good season, leaving alone all little luxuries, all social and religious wants, all expenses on occasions of joy and sorrow, and any provision for a bad season. . . . Such appears to be the condition of the masses of India. They do not get enough to

provide the bare necessities of life.'¹ 'As the balance of income every year available for the use of the people of India did not suffice for the wants of the year, the capital wealth of the country was being drawn upon, and the country went on becoming poorer and poorer and more and more weakened in its capacities of production.'

Dr V. K. R. V. Rao considers that Dr Naoroji's figures in respect of meat, milk, fish and industry are definitely underestimates. The value of the output of meat, milk, and fish is about 25 per cent of the value of agricultural produce. On this basis the income from this source would be 65 million instead of 15 million pounds. The proportion of population supported by industry is much above 6 per cent of the agricultural population and it is reasonable to suppose that the income per head of industrial workers is greater than that of the agricultural population. The income from manufactures should therefore have been put down at about 60 million pounds rather than 15 million pounds. A further addition is necessary in connexion with transport, public force and administration, professions and domestic servants. After all these corrections the figure for national income will be found to increase from Rs. 20 to somewhere between Rs. 23 and Rs. 24.²

§2. National Income between 1875 and 1911.—The next inquiry to be noticed after that of Dr Naoroji was undertaken in 1882 by Earl Cromer (then Major Evelyn Baring) and Sir (then Mr) David Barbour, and their results were as follows:—³

Agricultural income	Rs. 350,00,00,000
Non-agricultural income	Rs. 175,00,00,000
Total income	Rs. 525,00,00,000

Divided amongst 194,539,000 people, which was the figure for the population at that time, the average amount per head came to Rs. 27.

We may next notice Digby's estimate which proceeded on the assumption that the Government land revenue bears a definite relation to the outturn, and the percentage between the total outturn and the land revenue was taken at a varying figure as

¹ op. cit., p. 31.

² See V. K. R. V. Rao, *India's National Income, 1925-29*, pp. 17-22.

³ See W. Digby, *Prosperous India*, p. 366.

arrived at by Romesh Chundra Dutt and used by him in his *Open Letters to Lord Curzon*. The percentages were as follows :—

In Bengal	5 to 6 per cent
„ the N.-W. Provinces	8 „ „
„ the Punjab	10 „ „
„ Madras	12 to 31 „ „ say 20
„ Bombay	20 to 33 „ „ say 25

Digby's calculation yielded the following results :—

Agricultural income for 1898-9	Rs. 285,00,00,000 £189,000,000
Non-agricultural income (half above)	„ Rs. 143,00,00,000 £ 95,000,000
Total	Rs. 428,00,00,000 £284,000,000

Divided among 24,50,00,000 people, which, according to the calculations of the Government of India, was the probable figure for the population, the average income would on this basis be Rs. 17-8-5. The census of 1901, however, returned only 23,10,00,000 as the total population. On this basis the *per capita* income would be Rs. 18-8-11, in a good year. For the famine year 1899-1900, Digby calculated it would be as low as Rs. 12-6-0.

Lord Curzon, in reply to this and other similar statements, worked out his own estimate on the basis of the figures collected for the Famine Commission of 1898, giving the latest estimate of the value of agricultural income in India, which was placed at Rs. 450,00,00,000. The calculations of 1880 had shown the average agricultural income to be Rs. 18 per head and, taking the figures of the latest census for the same area as was covered by the earlier computation, it was found that the agricultural income had increased to Rs. 20 per head. Assuming that the non-agricultural income had also increased in the same ratio, the average income would come to Rs. 30 per head in 1900 as against Rs. 27 in 1880. Lord Curzon admitted that the data were not incontrovertible, but he pleaded that the figures of 1880 were also to a certain extent conjectural and that, if one set of figures was to be used in argument, so equally might the other. He also admitted that the advance in economic position revealed by the calculations was not in itself 'very brilliant or gratifying'. But at the same time they showed that the movement was in a forward and not in a retrograde direction.

Digby now again returned to the charge and re-examined the question in order to show that Lord Curzon's estimate erred too much on the side of optimism. As regards agricultural income he

adopted the same old plan of deducing it from the land revenue. But in the case of the non-agricultural income, instead of assuming it to be half of the agricultural income, he examined a large number of items and came to the conclusion that the total income of the country was £259,000,000 which, divided among a population of 226,000,000 people, gave Rs. 17·4 as the average income per head.¹

F. J. Atkinson wrote a paper in 1902 entitled 'A Statistical Review of the Income and Wealth of British India', which was read before the Royal Statistical Society in London. He divided the total population into three classes: (i) agricultural, (ii) non-agricultural (poorer), (iii) Non-agricultural (well-to-do). The income of class (i) was calculated on the basis of statistics of area, yield and prices. The income of class (ii) was obtained by multiplying the number of different kinds of earners by wages appropriate to each. For class (iii) civil estimates for Government officials and income-tax returns for the professional classes were used. On this basis Atkinson estimated that the *per capita* income was Rs. 30·5 in 1875 and Rs. 39·5 in 1895. No allowance was made for seed, wastage and depreciation. The number of those gainfully occupied as well as the period during which they were occupied was overstated, and certain extraordinary additions, such as the income of mendicants, were made. The final result was therefore a considerable overestimate and Dr Rao finds it necessary to correct Atkinson's figure of Rs. 39·5 to Rs. 31·5.²

§3. Wadia and Joshi's estimate.—P. A. Wadia and G. N. Joshi have worked out an estimate of the national income of India with reference to the year 1913-14.³ We may briefly indicate the results of their inquiry. The agricultural production is put down at Rs. 1,072,99,93,282, from which is deducted 20 per cent as the amount invested or set apart for seeds, manure, etc. This gives a net figure of Rs. 858,39,94,626. As regards mineral production the gross value is calculated at Rs. 14,40,95,000, from which 20 per cent is again deducted for depreciation in value and the working cost so far as it affects wages (mineral production having been included in the value of manufactures estimated at a later stage of the calculation). We thus get a net valuation of Rs. 11,52,76,000. Next follows the valuation of various products, such as hides and skins, manures, wool, silk, poultry

¹ Digby's estimate like Dr Naoroji's does not take account of the value of services.

² V. K. R. V. Rao, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-36.

³ *The Wealth of India*, pp. 97-112.

products, on the assumption that exports of these products amount to 80 per cent of the total production. To this is added the value of the products of fisheries calculated at 4 annas per head for 275 days for 865,000 persons engaged in fisheries. The final addition is in connexion with the valuation of products worked by artisans, and earnings of labourers engaged in trade and transport, at 4 annas per head per day for 310 days for 18,000,000 persons. All this works out at a total of Rs. 154,29,58,750. The next item dealt with is the produce of the live-stock. The figures taken in this connexion relate to the year 1917-18 and it is assumed that the difference between the number of cattle in this year and that in 1913-14 could not be appreciable. The total annual value of all the cattle is estimated at Rs. 349,05,11,518, from which the value of the services of cattle for agricultural purposes is deducted to prevent duplicate reckoning, seeing that these services are already included in the value of agricultural production as given above. As regards the added value of manufactures, this is arrived at by taking it to be one-fifth or 20 per cent of the gross total of raw materials (Rs. 204,76,65,000). This gives us the figure of Rs. 40,95,33,000. The authors proceed to make various deductions from the total gross income arrived at by the method described above, and they give the following statement showing the various sums to be deducted from the aggregate national income in 1913-14 :—

1. Home charges	£20,000,000
2. Investment of foreign capital on behalf of the Government	8,000,000
3. Profits on foreign capital invested in India	39,000,000
4. Investment of new foreign capital in India	5,000,000 ¹
5. Remittances of money from India on private account by Government officers, European employees in banks, joint-stock companies, etc.	10,000,000
	<hr/>
	£82,000,000
	<hr/>
	= Rs. 123,00,00,000

The following table thus sums up the results of Wadia and Joshi's estimate.

¹ The authors of the Bowley-Robertson Report point out that the value of this item has been deducted twice instead of once.

Total Annual Income or National Dividend of British India in 1913-14

	Total valuation (in rupees)
1. Agricultural production	858,39,94,626
2. Mineral production	11,52,76,000
3. Miscellaneous products and earnings of artisans, etc.	154,29,58,750
4. Produce of live-stock	145,10,34,634
5. Manufactures	40,95,33,000
Total net valuation	1,210,27,97,010
Deduct for home charges, etc.	123,00,00,000
Net annual income	1,087,27,97,010

Dividing this net income by the total population of British India, namely 245,189,716, we get as the annual income per head Rs. 44-5-6 or £2-19-1.

The population of British India according to the census of 1911 was 244,189,716. To this has been added 1,000,000 as representing the possible increase in numbers in three years.

§4. **Shah and Khambatta's estimate.**—Shah and Khambatta's estimate is summarized in the following table.¹

Items	Pre-war period 1900-14	War and post-war period 1914-22	Whole period 1900-22	Year 1921-2
	(Crores of rupees)			
Agricultural produce	1014·8	1686·5	1257·1	2155·8
Deduct for seeds	20	35	25	58
Net agricultural produce	994·8	1651·5	1232·1	2097·8
Forest wealth	10	20	14	28
Fisheries	1·2	2·5	1·9	3·2
Manufactures	80	150	106	186
Mineral wealth	10	21·6	14	28·7
Buildings, etc.	10	16·4	12	20·3
Total ...	1106	1862	1380	2364

This gives the *per capita* gross income of

{ Rs. 36 for 1900-14
Rs. 58½ for 1914-22
Rs. 44½ for 1900-22
Rs. 74 for 1921-2

¹ Shah and Khambatta, *The Wealth and Taxable Capacity of India*, pp. 199-200.

Making an adjustment with reference to the change in the level of prices, the income is stated at the pre-war average price-level as amounting to Rs. 36 per head for the pre-war period, and Rs. 38.2 for the war and the post-war periods. From the gross income the authors make a number of deductions on account of home charges, etc. and come to the conclusion that this 'drain' takes about Rs. 7 away from the *per capita* income for 1921-2, reducing it to Rs. 67. Dr Rao calculates that Rs. 7 would have to be added to this *per capita* figure in view of (i) the non-inclusion of services and of (ii) clear underestimates under the headings of 'live-stock', 'manufactures and handicrafts' and 'transport and trade'.

§5. Findlay Shirras's estimate.—In the estimate made by G. Findlay Shirras for the years 1920-1 and 1921-2, he puts the agricultural income for the former year at 171,494 lakhs of rupees and for the latter at 198,341 lakhs of rupees, and the non-agricultural income at 883 crores of rupees. On this basis the *per capita* income comes to Rs. 107 for 1921, and Rs. 116 for 1922. Shirras points out that, in all the inquiries between 1881 and 1911, it had been assumed that the gross income of agriculturists and non-agriculturists was distributed between the two classes in proportion to their numbers. This worked satisfactorily enough so long as the country was industrialized only to a small degree. But during the previous few years rapid changes had taken place, and some additional allowance was therefore necessary in order to arrive at the total non-agricultural income,¹ and the addition of Rs. 75 crores appeared to meet the requirements of the case, giving the total of Rs. 883 crores. One of the obvious criticisms of Shirras's estimate is that, contrary to the usual practice, he makes no deductions on account of seed in computing the agricultural income. It should further be noted that the non-agricultural income is about 40 per cent of the agricultural income in Shirras's estimate, whereas it is only about 10 per cent in Shah and Khambatta's estimate and about 30 per cent in that of Wadia and Joshi. This disparity is due, among other things, to the difference in the treatment of the service utilities. Shah and Khambatta exclude the services from their computation, whereas Shirras includes them.

§6. Y. K. R. V. Rao's estimate.—The latest estimate is that by Dr V. K. R. V. Rao for the year 1931-2. According to Dr Rao the net income of British India in the year 1931-2 was between say Rs. 16,000 millions and Rs. 18,000 millions or a *per capita*

¹ *The Science of Public Finance* (second edition), pp. 138-45.

income of Rs. 65 with a margin of error of + or - 6 per cent. The details are given below :—

Description	Value in millions of rupees	Margin of error, percentage
Value of Agricultural output	5,927	—
Value of Live-stock products	2,683	± 10
Value of Fishing and Hunting	120	± 20
Value of Forest products	92	—
Value of Mineral produce	180	—
Incomes assessed to income-tax	2,161	—
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in industry	2,100	± 17
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in service of the state, Railways, Posts and Telegraphs	590	—
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in Trade	1,233	± 15
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in Professions and Liberal Arts	416	± 15
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in Transport other than Railways, Posts and Telegraphs	283	± 20
Incomes not assessed to income-tax of workers engaged in Domestic Services	325	± 20
Miscellaneous items	780	± 10
Grand Total	16,890	± 6

Dr Rao claims greater accuracy for his as compared to previous estimates on the ground that he has supplemented the available statistical material by a number of *ad hoc* inquiries in respect of 'output of meat and milk, incomes of persons engaged in industry, service of local authorities, domestic service, etc.'¹

§7. **Difficulties of Interpretation and comparison.**—In comparing these results the reader must bear in mind several cautions. The first is that they relate to different dates and, before a comparative analysis is made of the economic condition of the people as between one date and another, the difference in prices at the two dates must be taken into account. Thus, Rs. 45 in 1913-14 would be equivalent to Rs. 81 in 1921-2 on the assumption of an 80 per cent rise of prices. Another fact to be remembered is that the area covered by the computations is not in every case the same. For instance, Shah and Khambatta include not only British India but also the Indian States, and if a comparison is to be instituted between their estimate and another one which is limited to British India, we should probably have to raise the *per capita* figure of Shah and Khambatta somewhat, assuming that British

¹ V. K. R. V. Rao, *The National Income of British India, 1931-32*, p. 4 and pp. 185-6.

India is slightly richer and economically more advanced than the Indian States taken as a whole. We must further allow for the difference in the methods adopted in the inquiries. We have already seen, for example, that Shirras does not make any deductions, whereas the other estimates make them to a smaller or greater extent. Again, we must remember that there is a difference of treatment arising from divergent views as to the constituent elements in the national dividend. As we have seen above, Shirras's estimate includes the incomes of the professional classes,¹ while they are deliberately excluded in some of the other estimates. In order to institute profitable comparisons between the results of inquiries relating to two different periods, we must not take the actual figures as they are given, but as they would have been if the methods adopted had been identical. Another point to notice is that, generally speaking, the later valuations are on a more scientific and careful basis; and as Shirras points out, if the old methods were followed in preference to his more elaborate method, the values of agricultural produce and non-agricultural income in his estimates would be appreciably lower.

Care is also necessary in drawing inferences about economic welfare from the *per capita* income. Here it is important to consider not only the average income per head but also the composition of the national income. In the case of India, for instance, an inquiry as to how much of the national income is in the form of food-stuffs would be specially pertinent. For, if the supply of an absolute necessary of life is disclosed to be insufficient, additions to the national income in other forms cannot be regarded as of the same order of importance as food-stuffs. Again, if services are included in the computation, the semi-political question whether some of the services are not overvalued in India cannot be ignored.

Lastly in considering the result of any particular inquiry we must take into account the spirit and purpose underlying it. Most of the investigations referred to above have been admittedly informed by a spirit of political controversy. Not infrequently we find the course of the investigation interrupted by road-side notices that the particular valuation is a deliberate underestimate or overestimate, as the case may be. The curious thing, however, is that the pretended underestimates almost invariably give us a higher figure than the pretended overestimates, because liberal concessions granted to rival disputants 'for the sake of argument'

¹ Shirras does not explicitly include services in his main estimate, but he checks his figures for non-agricultural income by a table in which the valuation of services is included.

in one direction are more than made up for by quietly taking liberties the effect of which is to swing the pendulum violently in the opposite direction.

In spite of the discrepancies in the result obtained by the different investigators, one fact which clearly stands out from all of them is the intense poverty of India. Even as regards a prime necessity of life, such as food, the fact is beyond dispute, that a distressingly large number of the people are in a semi-starved condition.¹

Sometimes, however, the picture of extreme poverty gets over-drawn by people arguing as if the *per capita* income were the income of an average family. We should be making the opposite mistake of supposing that the condition of the masses is better than it really is, if we did not remember that the national income is very unevenly distributed. Some people enjoy very much more than the average income and some very much less. The learned professions and the bigger landowners, for instance, enjoy a very much higher income than the cultivators or industrial labourers. The petty traders and shopkeepers have incomes of a medium size. Among the *urban classes*, probably half of the total income belongs to one-tenth of the people. Among those with incomes exceeding Rs. 2,000 a year, 38 per cent have only 17 per cent of the total income, while about 1 per cent possess 10 per cent of the total income. The inequality of distribution is equally evident among the *agricultural classes* and is indicated, among other things, by the distribution of agricultural holdings. For instance in Bombay, out of 22 lakhs of registered holders of land, 10 lakhs have each a holding below 5 acres in size, i.e. 48 per cent of the landholders possess only 9 per cent of the cultivated land, while 1 per cent of the landholders possess 16 per cent of the total land. There is also the large class of landless agricultural labourers whose economic position is definitely lower than that of the holders of land.²

The result of this calculation is that more than a third of the wealth of the country is enjoyed by about one per cent of the population, or, allowing for the dependants, about 5 per cent at most; that slightly more than another third, about 35 per cent of the annual wealth produced in the country, is absorbed by another third of the population, allowing for the dependants; while 60 per cent of the people of British India enjoy among

¹ See vol. I, ch. iii, §32. C. N. Vakil and S. K. Muranjan support the view that the food-supply is not only inadequate, but that the inadequacy is progressively on the increase (*Currency and Prices in India*, p. 363).

² V. K. R. V. Rao. *The National Income of British India, 1931-32*, p. 189.

them about 30 per cent of the total wealth produced in the country.

It should also be remembered that the *per capita* income varies from province to province.¹ It would be larger in those provinces which grow commercial crops and which are relatively more industrialized, such as Bombay, Bihar, the Punjab, Assam, the Central Provinces and Berar, whereas Sind, Orissa, the United Provinces and Madras are relatively poorer provinces.

§8. *International comparisons.*—International comparisons cannot be based merely on a consideration of the *per capita* income of the countries under comparison. Sir Robert Griffen drew attention to the dangers of making these comparisons without introducing the necessary qualifications and of assuming 'that figures called by the same names in different countries have exactly the same values'. Figures of the income per head do not tell us much about the economic well-being of the people of one country as compared to people belonging to another, unless we allow for such factors as differences in standards of living, habits and customs. As Sir Josiah Stamp points out: 'In the countries to be compared, men must care for the same objects in a similar way, and their scale of relative values must be akin. To the extent to which countries diverge in this respect, the comparison will be invalid.'² The same income per head, for example, would obviously have an entirely different significance in two countries so wide apart from each other as India and England, because the scale of values is different, not only owing to difference in taste but also because external conditions impose different standards of requirements. Broadly speaking, owing to the warmer climate of India, an appreciably smaller expenditure is required on food, clothing, fuel and housing than in England. We must also not lose sight of the fact that 'a great part of the population of India is little concerned with a money economy, since it lives on local produce that never passes through a market'. However, when every allowance is made for these factors, the

¹ See Vakil and Muranjan, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-7.

² Cf. 'It is very doubtful whether numerical comparison can be safely made between two countries; neither housing, clothing nor food are comparable. The importance of that part of income which is not wages varies greatly, and many things must be bought in one country which are unnecessary or are home-made, home-grown, or obtained freely in another. Nor should we compare industrial classes, such as workmen engaged in building, engineering or printing, in different countries, since methods and conditions of work vary enormously, unless we make very broad allowances for the possible effects of such variation.'—A. L. Bowley, *The Nature and Purpose of the Measurement of Social Phenomena*, quoted in *Economic Inquiry Committee Report*, p. 117.

following figures¹ are sufficiently eloquent and show the tremendous distance between India and some other countries as regards economic prosperity.

Country	Year	£ per capita income	Country	Year	£ per capita income
British India ...	1931	5	Germany ...	1925	39
United Kingdom	1931	76	Italy ...	1927	24
Australia ...	1924	98	Egypt ...	1928	21
United States ...	1932	89	Japan ...	1925	14
France ...	1928	41	Bulgaria ...	1932	9
Denmark ...	1927	55	U.S.S.R. (Russia)	1925	10

It is clear that most of the countries mentioned in the table above are far ahead of India and we seem to come within the same 'universe of discourse' only when we leave the more progressive countries alone and seek comparison with some of the backward countries of Eastern Europe like Bulgaria or with Soviet Russia in the throes of transformation.

§9. **Intensive inquiries.**—Besides intensive village and regional inquiries made by individual investigators, such as Dr Mann in Bombay and Dr Slater in Madras, a number of surveys have recently been conducted under the auspices of the Rural and Urban Sections of the Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab. A

¹ See Shirras, *Poverty and Kindred Economic Problems in India* (third edition), pp. 44-5.

The Simon Commission remark that even if the most optimistic estimates (Rs. 107 in 1920-1, and Rs. 116 in 1921-2 according to Shirras) are accepted, the result is that the average income of India per head in 1922 was equivalent, at the prevailing rate of exchange, to less than £8, while the corresponding figure for Great Britain was £95. 'The contrast remains startling even after allowing for the difference between the range of needs to be satisfied.'—*Simon Commission Report*, vol. I, par. 374.

The Central Banking Inquiry Committee point out that 'the income of the agricultural population when separately assessed will be much smaller. From the reports of the provincial committees and other published statistical information the total gross value of the annual agricultural produce would work out to about Rs. 1,200 crores on the basis of the 1928 price-levels. On this basis and taking into consideration the probable income from certain subsidiary occupations estimated at 20 per cent of the agricultural income, and ignoring the rise in population in the last decade and the fall in prices since 1928, the average income of an agriculturist in British India does not work out at a higher figure than about Rs. 42 or a little over £3 a year.'—*Report*, p. 39.

few years ago the Indian Central Cotton Committee carried out eight investigations into the finance and marketing of cultivators' cotton, which were the first intensive inquiries of the sort recommended by the Indian Economic Inquiry Committee and which contain information of the utmost importance.¹ All these investigations generally corroborate the conclusions as stated above about the economic condition of the people.

§10. Is Indian poverty on the decline?—Granting the existence of appalling poverty as an indisputable fact, the question whether it is increasing or diminishing, or whether there is no movement either way, has been variously answered. Wadia and Joshi hold that, during the twenty years between 1895 and 1914, the condition of the population did not undergo any change. The more common view, however, is that there was a real, if a very slow, amelioration in the condition of the people and that this progress has on the whole been maintained. That the people are getting more and more discontented is true, but as European experience shows, this is quite compatible with a great betterment in the economic position of the masses. With increasing wealth there generally comes an increase in the consciousness of poverty. A people may be so brutalized by extreme poverty as to lose all consciousness of it. But a little relief from poverty is commonly followed by a desire for still further relief. Modern economic advance has been accompanied by a great multiplication of human wants and the modes of satisfying them, so that poverty has come to mean not so much the inability to satisfy a few primal wants as the inability to share in the new known goods of each period. Although the masses are better fed, better clothed, and better housed today in Western countries than fifty years ago, they are more discontented with their state than ever before. According to some observers, a similar change has come over the spirit of the people in India, and this is one of the results of a decided improvement in their economic condition. People are at present much better able to resist famines than in the past. The various estimates of national income we have set out above, in spite of their imperfections, do, on the whole, succeed in conveying an impression of gradual improvement. This impression is strengthened by such admitted tendencies as the growing independence of spirit displayed by agricultural as well as industrial labour. Again, there are on the whole good grounds for inferring that the *per capita* consumption of food as well as of cloth is gradually increasing. The official view in this country is that

¹ See *General Report on Eight Investigations into Finance and Marketing of Cultivators' Cotton*, 1928.

the amelioration is unquestionable, and the reasons generally advanced in support of it are well exemplified in the following quotation: 'So far as ordinary tests can be applied, the average Indian landholder, trader, ryot, or handicraftsman is better off than he was fifty years ago. He consumes more salt, more sugar, more tobacco, and far more imported luxuries and conveniences than he did a generation back. Where house-to-house inquiries have been made, it has been found that the average villager eats more food and has a better house than his father, that, to a considerable extent, brass and other metal vessels have taken the place of the coarse earthenware vessels of earlier times, and that his family possesses more clothes than formerly.'¹ The truth of this picture has been challenged by non-official observers and some of its details especially have been regarded as open to doubt. For example, the statement that the average villager eats more food has not been universally accepted. Indeed, there are reasons to suppose that in the villages, especially in those in the vicinity of towns, the dietary of the average villager has deteriorated and he is worse nourished than before. The average consumption of milk products, which occupies such an important position in a predominantly vegetarian diet, has distinctly fallen off. There does not seem to have occurred the addition of any substitute which can be regarded as of equal nutritional value (though it may be granted that the diet of the people has tended to become more varied owing to improved transport and communications). But even assuming that there has been some increase in the wealth of the country it cannot be compared for a moment with the amazing advance achieved by Western countries like England in recent times—an advance reflected in the fall of pauperism, decrease of death-rate and poverty diseases, increase of wages, shortening of hours of labour, spread and improvement of education, increase in the means of recreation, better housing and sanitation, etc. There are indeed great inequalities in the distribution of wealth in the West, but there can be no question about the wide diffusion of economic well-being. The cheapness and plenty of the good things of life together with the universal rise of incomes have brought within the reach of the masses many commodities and modes of enjoyment which were formerly the monopolies of the very rich and have resulted in what Vicomte D'Avenel calls '*le nivellement des jouissances*' (the levelling-up of enjoyments).²

¹ *Results of Indian Administration in the Past Fifty Years*, Cd. 4956, 1909, p. 26, quoted by L. C. A. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, 1763-1914*, vol. I, p. 275.

² Georges D'Avenel, *Découvertes d'Histoire Sociale*, pp. 295-318.

§11. **Need for better statistics.**—In pronouncing judgements on the various problems concerning the economic condition of the people in India it is found that nothing more than a halting, uncertain attitude is possible in the present circumstances for lack of precise statistical information. On everything else besides the obvious fact of extreme poverty we are left more or less in the dark. The collection of reliable statistical data will make our information more precise and minimize the large number of conjectural assumptions which are now unavoidable in every inquiry. It will also make possible a correct diagnosis of the numerous economic and social ills from which the country is suffering, and will be of great assistance in tackling the day-to-day problems of administration. The Indian Economic Inquiry Committee (1925) quote the following apposite remarks of *The (London) Times* in this connexion. Speaking of the Empire Statistics Conference, which sat in January and February 1921, it said : ' In Germany before the war the Statistical Bureaux were ceaselessly employed in working on everything that illuminated the future of the German people ; and in the era which is now opening there can be little doubt that the nation which studies the drift of events as it is revealed by statistical analysis will be infinitely better equipped to take advantage of its opportunities than another which perhaps trusts only to the methods of empiricism.'¹ The statistics at present collected are often unco-ordinated and without expert direction and are generally a by-product of administration meant more for departmental use than for the purpose of affording information to the public about important social and economic activities.

It is indeed true that in India the collection of statistics is attended with extraordinary difficulties. In the first place, the huge size of the country makes the enterprise expensive and difficult to carry out. Secondly, the population is scattered in rural areas and not concentrated in big cities and towns. Thirdly, the existence of illiteracy makes the co-operation of the public in the work of gathering statistical data a practical impossibility. In Great Britain and the Dominions, the statistics of production, wages and prices are usually collected by distributing schedules to private individuals who are required to fill them up within a given time and return them. This is both a more accurate as well as a less expensive method than that of engaging a specially paid staff. Much assistance is also derived from the co-operation of a number of private associations, the like of which are almost

¹ *Economic Inquiry Committee Report*, p. 4.

entirely absent in India. Absence of organized enterprise and the existence of numerous small unorganized undertakings further make statistical work extraordinarily difficult.¹ However, although we cannot hope immediately to attain to the standard of equipment usual in Western countries, there can be no doubt that the present position in this regard in India admits of very considerable improvement.

§12. **The Bowley-Robertson Inquiry.**—In November 1933 the Government of India engaged the services of Professor A. L. Bowley of the London School of Economics and Mr D. H. Robertson, Lecturer in Economics at Cambridge, to advise them on the question of obtaining more accurate and detailed statistics and the practicability of carrying out a Census of Production. Associated with these two experts were three Indian economists, and the combined labours of these gentlemen have resulted in a valuable Report published in 1934 entitled *A Scheme for an Economic Census of India* of which the following is a brief summary.

§13. (i) **Organization of statistics.**—A permanent economic staff, directly attached to the Economic Committee of the Governor-General's Executive Council, should be established. The staff should consist of four members. The senior member should act as secretary to the Economic Committee of the Council, to whom he would be responsible for the organization of the whole work of economic intelligence. Thus he would have the duty of preparing reports on urgent questions as they arose from time to time, and for this purpose would need to organize the supply of current information on economic and commercial events abroad as well as at home. But it would also be his duty to be thinking further ahead, and to take the initiative in planning inquiries of a broader and more fundamental kind.

Two of the other members of the staff would be trained economists, while the third would be the Director of Statistics. So far as possible the staff would function as a staff and not as individuals, but since the field of economics is so wide that no one man can cultivate the whole, the senior member and the two economic intelligence officers would divide the territory for exploration between them in accordance with their respective bent and capacities. It would be natural, for instance, that one of them should specialize in the study of the means of promoting the expansion (or, if that be the policy, the orderly contraction) of India's foreign trade, and the operation of tariffs and trade agreements. It is important that the two economic intelligence

¹ See Professor Burnett-Hurst's Note of Dissent, *Economic Inquiry Committee Report*, pp. 21-2.

officers should work under conditions of the utmost freedom which is compatible with membership of a civil service. The whole staff would maintain the closest possible contact with certain other officers of the Government, including both some whose duties are primarily administrative and some whose duties are primarily technical, and advisory. It would be within their competence to recommend to the Economic Committee of the Council the *ad hoc* engagement of external technical experts for the purpose of reporting on the economic potentialities of particular areas or of particular branches or processes of production.

The Director of Statistics, while being a member of, and the principal organ of information for, the permanent-economic staff, should have his own peculiar duties, in the discharge of which he would enjoy a considerable degree of independence. These would include (a) the conduct of the population census, (b) the conduct of the census of production, (c) the co-ordination of central statistics, and (d) the co-ordination of provincial statistics. To assist him in these duties the existing Statistics Branch of the Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics would be transferred to his control and some addition to its permanent numbers would be required. The Commercial Intelligence Branch of this Department, which is mainly engaged in dealing with the inquiries of the commercial world, would become a branch of the Department of Commerce.

The census of production should be quinquennial; and while the main census of population continues to be decennial, a supplementary census with an abbreviated schedule of inquiries, mainly devoted to numbers, age, sex and occupation, should be taken in the middle of the decennium. The censuses of population and production should be as nearly synchronous as the requirements of tabulation permit. Preparation for the censuses and analysis of their results would provide nearly continuous work for a special section of the permanent statistical staff, which would expand into a larger organization on the occasion of the taking of the decennial population census.

The Director of Statistics should have power to consult with those responsible for the preparation of statistics in all Departments, with a view to arranging for uniformity of classification, and for the furnishing of statistics needed for general purposes, without prejudice to the assembling of other data necessary for departmental use. He should be responsible for the publication of the Statistical Abstract.

There should be in each major province a whole-time statistician, as nearly independent of departmental control as administrative

requirements permit, but making his services available to all departments, passing all their statistics under his review, conducting the population census under the direction of the central Director of Statistics, and co-operating with the latter in every possible way. Pending the establishment of such officers everywhere, it will be for the Director to establish such contact as he can in each province with whoever most nearly fills the bill, with a view to promoting uniformity in the provincial statistics and thus facilitating their assembly into all-India totals.

§14. (ii) **The measurement of national income.**—The authors of the Report remark that the materials at present available for estimating the national income and wealth of India are very defective, that the various estimates attempted so far are in any case out of date and that the problem now requires to be approached afresh *ab initio*.

The national income is the money measure of the aggregate of goods and services accruing to the inhabitants of a country during a year, including net increments to, or excluding net decrements from, their individual or collective wealth. It is probably best to ignore catastrophic decrements of wealth, such as might be caused by an earthquake or a severe epidemic of cattle plague.

As is well known, there are two methods of calculation, the first consisting in an evaluation of the goods and services accruing, the second in a summation of individual incomes. The two methods do not furnish a check on one another over the whole field; thus the services of Cabinet Ministers must be held to be worth the amount of their salaries, since there is no other way of evaluating them. In the case of India it seems unlikely that the first (census-of-production) method will ever be applicable over the whole even of the industrial field: and special caution in combining the results of the two methods may be necessary.

The first (census-of-production) method involves

- (a) evaluating the net output of the various branches of 'productive' enterprises, agriculture, mining, industry, etc., at the point of production, being careful to avoid double counting (for example counting *both* the output of wheat *and* the labour of the cattle employed in raising it).
- (b) adding the value added to home-produced goods and to imports by transporting and merchanting agencies in the country.
- (c) adding excises on home-produced goods.

- (d) deducting the value of exports (f. o. b.), including gold and silver.
- (e) adding the value of imports (c. i. f.), including gold and silver.
- (f) adding customs duties on imports.
- (g) deducting the value of goods, whether home-produced or imported, which are used for the purposes of maintaining fixed capital, or stocks of raw and finished goods intact.
- (h) adding the value of personal services of all kinds.
- (i) adding the annual rental value of houses, whether rented or lived in by the owners.
- (j) adding the increments in the holdings of balances and securities abroad, whether by individuals or the Government, or deducting the decrement in such holdings: and or deducting the increment in the holdings of balances and securities in the country by residents abroad, or adding the decrement of such holdings.

Some of these processes call for further comment.

- (a) That part of the product of agriculture, etc.—in India very large—which is consumed by the producer or bartered locally for services should be valued, like the rest of the outturn, at its price at the point of production, not at the retail price which consumers in distant markets pay, and which includes costs of handling, etc. which are not incurred on the home-consumed outturn.
- (c), (f) This is necessary, because the total we are in search of is the aggregate of exchange-values *to the consumer*.
- (d), (e), (j) It is easily seen that if the Government of India raise a loan in London for railway construction, the securities imported form part of the real income of the English investors, just as an import of Indian tea would do. The reverse side of the same truth is that the increment of capital wealth in India, which is included in the evaluation of production or of imports, is balanced by a capital liability to foreigners, and must be deducted to arrive at the net income. The same considerations apply to changes in the ownership of bank balances, at home and abroad, and—in the case of India very important—to increases

or decreases in the stock of precious metals, which for this purpose may be visualized as foreign securities.

- (h) (1) Strictly speaking, it may be argued that only those services of Government servants should be included which confer direct utility—protection, amenity of life, etc.—as distinct from assisting to augment production, the value of the latter having already been included, like other costs of production, in the sale value of the product under (a). The subtleties to which this complication leads do not seem worth pursuing here ; in what follows it will be assumed for simplicity that the services of *all* Government servants confer direct utility and form part of the real national income : deductions can be made to taste by those who please. These services should be valued at a sum which includes the pension rights accruing during the year to those who render them.
- (2) In India the distinction between charitable gifts, which are not part of income, and the payment for services of a customary or religious nature is peculiarly indefinite ; and the line drawn is bound to be somewhat arbitrary.

The census-of-production method above described is the more fundamental of the two methods of evaluating the national income. In order that the results of the second (census-of-incomes) method may tally with it, certain precautions in following this second method must be observed.

- (a) All self-consumed produce and receipts in kind must be included in the individual's income, valued at their selling value at the point of production. So must the annual value of houses lived in by the owners.
- (b) All interest payments, even on loans incurred for consumption purposes, must be deducted before entering the individual's income.
- (c) Apart from this, the incomes of all individuals in the country, including interest on Government loans and pensions of ex-Government servants, should be entered gross, that is before payment of direct taxation (including land revenue). The incomes of Government servants should be entered inclusive of pension rights accruing during the year. To the total so reached should be added the undistributed profits of companies and the net profits of Government enterprises. From the total so reached should be deducted

the sum required to pay the interest on Government loans other than for productive enterprises, and the pensions of ex-Government servants, whether due at home or abroad.

- (d) Rather oddly, receipts from customs and excise, stamp duties and local rates—that is all taxes which are of the nature of business costs—must be added to the total so far reached, for the latter is the aggregate of exchange-values accruing to producers, while the true national income, as calculated on the census-of-production method, is the aggregate of exchange-values accruing to consumers. Unless therefore this addition is made, discrepancy will arise.

The suggestions which are made below relate to the estimate of the broader sections of the national income; the various adjustments indicated above would have their place in a final calculation.

The authors do not recommend at present any estimate of national wealth as a whole. There are two methods followed elsewhere, neither of which is appropriate to India. The first is to capitalize the yield of all income-bearing property, including goodwill, assigning appropriate numbers of years' purchase to the rent of land and houses, dividends, interest, etc. and sometimes to add estimates of property publicly owned such as docks, railways, Government buildings, etc. The second is to use the statistics of property passing at death, obtained at probate, etc., and with the help of life tables to deduce the total value of property. This procedure is impossible in India since there are virtually no taxes on inheritance. As regards the first method there is certainly not enough information for the valuation of most of the important classes of individual property; and though the value of railways could be estimated, that of roads, of some irrigation works and of many other results of public expenditure defies measurement.

Though they cannot expect to measure, with any precision that would justify the attempt, the *total* of wealth, it may be possible to give some indications of its *change*, by series of estimates relating to public expenditure on permanent work, to investment of new capital and to other expenditure of the nature of capital outlay.

The investigation proposed for the purpose of estimating the national income is primarily on the basis of production, but as in similar estimates in all countries a minor part depends on individual incomes. In India the proportion to be thus estimated is probably greater in the towns, but much smaller in the aggregate than in

Western countries. Partly owing to difference in the nature of the products and partly because different methods of investigation are necessary, rural income is distinguished from urban income.

For rural income they advocate an estimate of the quantity and value of all produce and services arising from the land or rendered in the villages, by the method of intensive surveys in selected villages.

For urban income they recommend in the first instance surveys of the larger towns on the method which has been successfully followed elsewhere. This is based on a sample inquiry of the personnel and occupations of families, and an estimate of their incomes partly by personal statements, partly by investigation of wages and salaries current in the towns. For incomes over Rs. 2,000, income-tax statistics can afford valuable help.

They have recommended also an intermediate urban population census. These three inquiries would be supplemented by a census of production applied to factories using power, mines and some other industries. This would to a considerable extent overlap the urban survey and to a less extent the rural survey. But it is of considerable importance in itself and is calculated to furnish a more accurate account of part of the whole field than the other surveys. It is believed that when all the materials are assembled, means can be found to eliminate duplication by estimating the part of the income included both in the urban or rural surveys and the census of production, or by other methods.

It would remain to estimate, on the basis of population and of the results of the main surveys, the income of the smaller towns. Additional estimates may be needed for the tea plantations and any other special areas not included in the rural survey.

All the investigations should be extended to the Indian States so far as they are willing and able to co-operate. For areas not so included estimates will be necessary by the use of agricultural statistics.

These proposals will result in fairly precise estimates for large and definite sections of the income of the population and of the produce of the area of India. When these are established effort will be necessary to diminish the region of guesswork and to increase that of ascertained fact.

§15. (iii) **Census of production.**—The census of production would be imposed (as in Great Britain) by a special Act of the Central Legislature, making communication of the facts demanded compulsory. It would be conducted by the Director of Statistics, the executive arrangements presumably being made through the Department of Industries and Labour. It appears to be necessary

to limit its scope, so far as English and American methods are followed, to the larger establishments; and the natural line which suggests itself is that drawn in the Factory Act, namely the employment of twenty or more persons combined with the use of mechanical power. It would not seem desirable to extend it automatically to those smaller establishments to which, for special reasons of no great statistical significance, provincial Governments have used their powers of extending the Factory Act. But on the one hand there may be *some* classes of small workshop to which the census could advantageously be extended, while on the other there are certainly some large non-mechanical establishments, for example in building and constructing, brick-making and carpet manufacture, which ought to be brought within its scope. So also should the railways and all establishments under the Mines Act.

The average number of operatives employed in factories in British India (excluding Burma) in 1932 was 1,330,000; though this forms only a small proportion of persons engaged in industry, this group is of special importance in relation to export, and for this and other reasons quite properly special attention has been given and should continue to be given to its study. It is to be remembered, however, that the progress of factory industry is to some extent at the expense of cottage industry, and it is of the greatest importance to bring the two in statistical relation to each other. There seems to be no possibility at present of making any exact estimates. The execution of the proposed rural and urban surveys will provide some data; accurate estimates of the crops of cotton, sugar and other agricultural products which are manufactured both in houses, etc., and in factories, are capable of giving more complete information. There is also a possibility of tabulating the census material relating to occupations in such a way as to show the whole numbers engaged in such occupations, so that when used in conjunction with the factory statistics some idea of the relative importance of the two organizations of industry could be obtained. The 1931 census of population in fact shows, as might be expected, that the numbers engaged in industry in British India as a whole are very much greater than those accounted for by the factory statistics. (While there is no immediate possibility of comparing the numbers in, or output of, factories with those in similar cottage industries, it may be possible to obtain some annual data which would show their relative growth or decrease, when the whole of the survey now suggested is complete.)

A rural survey.—It is desired, as part of the survey of Indian income and resources, to obtain information in numerical form of the income (in cash or kind) derived from the land, and its

distribution among owners, occupiers, labourers, etc. together with other items of village income.

It is impracticable to make direct investigation into the circumstances of each of the half-million villages in British India in any reasonably short time, even if the expense could be met or a sufficient number of investigators found. It is, therefore, necessary to proceed by sampling.

Although financial exigencies do not permit immediate effect being given to all these recommendations which, it is estimated, will cost Rs. 30,00,000, it may be hoped that it will be possible in the near future to carry out a census of production which is essential for formulating correct economic policies. This hope has been strengthened by the appointment in 1937 of Dr T. E. Gregory of the London School of Economics as Economic Adviser to the Government of India.

§16. **Some errors of consumption as aggravating causes of Indian poverty.**—Whatever tends to reduce the productivity of the people must be regarded as a cause of poverty. But besides low production unwise consumption may also act as a drag on economic progress. Intelligent consumption or 'rational destruction of utilities' requires 'reflection, intelligence and imagination'.¹ Apart from the economic ruin which extravagant expenditure may bring on the possessors of great wealth, senseless expenditure on such luxuries as do not add anything to the fulness and richness of life is also injurious to the community, because it diverts so much capital and labour from the production of necessaries. Nor are the rich alone guilty of harmful extravagance. In most countries the poorest classes are, by reason of their very poverty, the most reckless and extravagant. The opposite vice of niggardliness masquerading as thrift characterizes some sections of the people, particularly members of the middle classes, and certain communities like the *marwaris*, who often stint themselves and save where they ought to spend freely. It has been observed that regard for 'a fuller life in the present for the earner and a greater tendency to leave the succeeding generation, provided that it is well trained and equipped with personal capital, to look to its own welfare, [is] replacing the older view, which inculcated a slow accumulation of savings in order that the children might start

¹ cf. 'To spend money well is a harder task than to earn money well. In earning, the task is generally prescribed, but in spending, the spender takes the initiative. It is no longer passive obedience, but a good will that is required.'—J. S. Nicholson, *Principles of Political Economy*, vol. III, p. 436.

with a better equipment of material capital'.¹ This attitude is partly due to a real change in the psychology of the people, one of the many significant results of the last war. But it is probably also due to some extent to the great rise in prices which took place after 1919. The incomes of the middle classes did not rise in proportion to the rise in prices, and consequently the savings that they might have been able to make with economy and self-denial ceased to appear worth while owing to the reduced purchasing power of money. Indications are not wanting that a similar change, though on a smaller scale, is taking place in India in the attitude of the middle classes, whose standard of living has visibly risen during recent times. To some extent, this change ought to be welcome because real thrift often consists not in saving money but in spending it on an increase of well-being in the present, so as to make it promote well-being in the future. ²The unduly timid frugalities of some people and the reckless improvidence of others are alike censurable as impairing the economic strength of the nation. It is not possible here to deal in detail with the problem of consumption in India in all its aspects. There is, however, no doubt about the general truth of the contention that the evil of poverty in India, though mainly due to low production, is further aggravated by ill-regulated consumption, and we propose to dwell here more particularly on one form of unwise consumption which has recently excited much attention. It is scarcely necessary to point out that there is a vital relation between physical efficiency and diet. As the German proverb has it, 'A man is what he eats' (*Man ist was er isst*). The dietary adopted by people in most of the provinces in India has so far been controlled by local circumstances and depended on the kind of food that can be grown on the spot. The consequence of this has been that the staple food of the people in some of the provinces is lacking in important nutrient substances. The differences in the physical efficiency of Indian races, such as the Sikhs, the Gurkhas, the Marathas, the Kanarese, the Bengalis and the Madrasis may be chiefly attributed to the differences in their staple diet, and have now been 'definitely correlated with differences in the biological value of foods which necessity, habit, or religious prejudice has forced them to use'. The researches of Lt.-Col. R. McCarrison and others in malnutrition as a cause of physical inefficiency and ill-health are very instructive and have shown the relative nutritional values of the national diets in India. They point out that rice, which is the

¹ W. H. Coates on the 'Report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (1927), Vol. XC, Part II, p. 356.

chief food of many people in India, especially in Madras and Bengal, is fundamentally a poor diet, deficient in important organic salts, and one which does not furnish the undefined constituents of food called vitamins, whose importance has been revealed by modern investigations. The wheat- and meat-eating people like the Sikhs, Pathans and Gurkhas have a much better physique than the rice-eating Bengalis and Madrasis. The addition of wheat, milk, butter, meat, etc. greatly improves the rice-eater's diet, as in the case of the Marathas who take principally millets, such as *jawar* and *bajra*, and sometimes wheat and also milk. The daily use of unsuitable food insidiously undermines the constitution and this is a matter of far greater importance than is commonly realized. The problem of malnutrition is distinct from the problem of poverty, because diet is not simply a matter of securing an adequate quantity of food, but of achieving a correct balance of the constituents for the maintenance of health and vigour. As the Agricultural Commission point out, malnutrition and starvation are not the same. 'Actually, a person suffering from malnutrition may be consuming more than his system can utilize, and more than he would normally consume if the diet were properly constituted. Deficiency diseases result from the absence of some essential elements in the diet. Their occurrence is, therefore, no indication of poverty,¹ and consequent scarcity of food. A dietary conducing to malnutrition may cost more than a well-balanced dietary which promotes health.'²

Widespread propaganda on the basis of authoritative investigations ought to be useful in enlightening people as to how better value could be got from properly selected food in terms of physical well-being without involving additional expenditure. The 'eastern drowsiness' and listlessness which characterize the Indian labourer are often largely due to the factor of food, which is not only insufficient but also unbalanced, and it is with the latter aspect that we are just now concerned. About twenty-five years ago investigations into the jail dietaries of Bengal and the United Provinces were made by Col. McCay, which showed that diet is an all-important factor, influencing physical development and the general well-being of the people. He considered that the inferior

¹ Dr Slater calls attention to the fact that 'in some respects the rise in the standard of living has brought physical disadvantage. Thus for example, rice-mills have multiplied, saving housewives the laborious toil—but perhaps healthful exercise—of husking the paddy by pounding; but also robbing the rice of much of its nutritive value, the vitamins in the outermost layer of the grain being removed with the husk by the machinery.'—Introductory note to Pillai, *Economic Conditions in India*, p. xiv.

² *Agricultural Commission Report*, pp. 494-5.

physique and vigour of the Bengali was most probably due to deficiency of protein in his diet, 'while the inclusion of wheat in gradually increasing proportions as one passes north from Bihar and Orissa and the United Provinces to the Punjab, has led to a marked physical change in the population'.¹ The improvement in communications and transport ought to help in remedying the deficiencies in the diet of a particular province by the importation of the requisite food-stuffs from other provinces. All this, however, assumes a change in the nature of the demand for food-stuffs on the part of the people concerned, and this is a question of education and enlightenment on dietetic matters. Col. McCarrison's researches at Coonoor, and the publicity which they have received at the hands of the Royal Agricultural Commission, have aroused considerable interest in the country on the question of evolving a scientific diet suited to the different climatic conditions in the country and the different occupations pursued by the people. One of the measures suggested by the Agricultural Commission for bringing about an improvement in the general health of the people is the development and conservation of the fish resources of the country—a task in which they invite the Government, Local Boards and the rural community in general to participate in an active manner, since the addition of fish offers the best chance of enriching the diet of a primarily rice-eating people.² Large sections of the people have no religious or other objections to the consumption of fish and full advantage should be taken of this fact.

Recently the growing habit of tea-drinking has been causing some uneasiness to dietetic reformers. The habit is especially prevalent in the province of Bombay. There was a time when it was a fashion on the part of writers and reformers even in England to decry what was called 'the vice of tea-drinking', and declamations against 'tea-bibbers' were common.³ But the working classes there have persisted in its use in spite of all opposition and declamation until tea has become an important item among their necessities of life. Public opinion with regard to tea-drinking has

¹ *Agricultural Commission Report*, p. 493.

² *ibid.*, pp. 411-17. The Commission also suggest that a Central Institute of Human Nutrition should be established, with which the research, also to be organized by the Provincial Governments, should be co-ordinated. They further recommend a closer collaboration between research on animal nutrition and that on human nutrition, and also between all these investigations in India with similar investigations in other parts of the Empire. 'The problems are so vast that all the staff and material available should be mobilized to assist in their solution.'

³ Helen Bosanquet, *The Standard of Life*, p. 30.

also taken a right-about turn, and tea-sipping instead of being regarded as a vice has now come to be 'a sign of domesticity and temperance'. Tea-drinking is generally advocated as a substitute and remedy for drunkenness. Another novel advocacy of tea is to be found in Dr Slater's *Some South Indian Villages* (p. 232), where he remarks that the Indian peasant is very poor in one particular commodity, which he does not properly appreciate, and that is good drink. 'The great mass of people drink filthy water, water drawn from rivers and irrigation channels and containing every kind of impurity, and from stagnant tanks which are also little better guarded.' Dr Slater believes that 'one of the greatest benefits which could be conferred upon India at the present time would be to popularize the use of tea, the cheapest of all boiled-water drinks'. And he commends the efforts made by the managers of the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras to popularize tea in the schools, for half-timers and children of mill-hands. But the uses of tea as avoiding the dangers of drinking impure water may be regarded as problematic, because these dangers are not eliminated so long as some water at least continues to be used for drinking purposes not to speak of the evils of tea-drinking itself. The more effective way would be to ensure the supply of pure water. Indeed, as offering an alternative to alcohol, teashops must undoubtedly be regarded as a boon. At the same time there can be no doubt that excessive tea-drinking is harmful to the constitution in a hot climate, specially when inferior brands are used, as in most teashops in India. Some steps seem to be necessary in order to ensure that reasonably good tea is sold in these teashops, instead of the vile decoction generally served, though after all the most effective remedy would be an improvement in the taste of the people themselves. For the rest, we have already admitted that teashops have a distinct role to perform in the task of checking the growing evil of drunkenness and at the same time providing a comparatively harmless stimulant, the need for which, in the case of people who have to undergo exhausting physical labour, cannot be ignored.¹

¹ Coffee-drinking, which is widespread in South India, gives rise to similar reflections. Expenditure on alcoholic drinks and the policy to be pursued with regard to it will be referred to later (see ch. xi). Other well-known instances of misdirected consumption which will readily occur to the student of Indian Economics are the unduly heavy expenditure on marriages, funerals, and gold and silver ornaments (see ch. x, §64).

CHAPTER V

TRANSPORT

§1. **Importance of transport.**—The importance of transport from the economic, military, administrative, cultural, and social points of view is hardly in need of special emphasis. Throughout the whole history of India difficulties of communication have been a predominant factor in determining political and economic development. These difficulties have been removed in modern times to a certain extent by railway, telegraph, motor, and other forms of communication. But they still constitute a great obstacle to the advance of modern industry. The expenditure involved in equipping the country with an up-to-date system of transport at all adequate to its requirements would be enormous. India is a subcontinent, the distances to be traversed are tremendous and the natural obstacles to be overcome in passing from one region to another are formidable, while even within a restricted area, internal communication often breaks down altogether in the rainy season. Again, India is less fortunate than other countries, like England, in respect of waterways, which historically have played a very important part in facilitating commerce in many countries, especially before the advent of railways.

The means of communication in India were comparatively very defective till as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, and were reminiscent of England in the middle of the eighteenth century, though, owing to the more favourable climatic conditions, the roads were better in India than in England. The railways of course had yet to come, and the few trunk roads constructed by Indian rulers, especially in northern India by the Moguls, were thoroughly inadequate even for the very moderate needs of the country in those days.¹ Many of the so-called roads were mere tracks cut by village carts across the face of the country, and wheeled traffic was for the most part impossible during the rainy season. Pack animals led by caravans or *labans* were the only means of access to many parts of the interior. Moreover, the roads were unsafe, being infested by highwaymen like the Thugs and the Pindharis. There were no navigable canals to speak of though a few regions such as those along the Ganges and the Indus—which were then great natural highways of commerce—

¹ See W. H. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, pp. 166-7.

and the coastal districts were more fortunately situated in this respect than others. On the whole, the state of communications in northern India with its vast plains easily traversable in the dry season, its navigable rivers and a few 'made' roads, was much more satisfactory than in the peninsula with its rugged mountainous territory and poor facilities for water transport except on the two coasts.

We have already discussed the economic and social effects of the imperfect means of communication and dwelt on the isolation and the self-sufficiency of the village and the prevalence of local economy with all its attendant handicaps in respect of markets and division of labour; the immobility of labour and the conservatism of the people; and the violent dislocation of the otherwise smooth routine of economic life in times of scarcity and famine.¹ A veritable economic and social revolution has, however, been wrought by the modern improvements in communication and transport, dating from the time of Lord Dalhousie, who initiated a vigorous public works policy. In this chapter we shall give a short account of the various efforts made in this connexion and also review recent attempts at establishing industries in India for supplying her with her own means of transport, such as locomotives, automobiles, ships and aeroplanes.

We may for the sake of convenient treatment divide the subject into its four main sub-divisions: (i) railways; (ii) roads; (iii) waterways; and (iv) air transport.

RAILWAYS

§2. **Diversity of relations between the State and the railways.**²—A special feature of the Indian railway system is the diversity of relations between the State and the railways in respect of ownership and control. Of the important lines situated in British India, or in which the Government of India are interested, four are owned and worked by the State (the North-Western Railway, Eastern Bengal Railway, East Indian Railway, with which has been amalgamated the Oudh & Rohilkund Railway from 1 July 1929, and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway),³ five are owned by the State but worked on its behalf by companies enjoying a guarantee of interest from the Government

¹ See vol. I, ch. v.

² See *Report on Indian Railways* (1938-9), vol. I, Appendix B.

³ The Burma Railways were separated from the Indian State Railways with effect from 1 April 1937 following the separation of Burma from British India.

(the Bombay, Baroda & Central India, Madras & Southern Mahratta, Assam-Bengal, Bengal-Nagpur, and South Indian railways); two important lines (the Bengal & North-Western and Rohilkhand & Kumaon) and many others of less importance are the property of private companies, some being worked by the owning companies, and some by the State or by the companies that work State-owned systems; several minor lines are the property of the District Boards or enjoy a guarantee of interest granted by such Boards. There are also certain Indian State lines like H. E. H. The Nizam's State Railway (which before 1930 was the property of a company and was known as the Nizam's Guaranteed State Railway). Of the total route mileage of Indian railways amounting to 41,134 miles on 31 March 1939, the State owned 29,764 miles or about 72 per cent, and directly managed 17,158 miles or about 42 per cent of the total mileage open at that time.

§3. **Main periods of railway history.**—It is necessary to review the history of Indian railways and the many changes in Government railway policy in the course of it, in order to understand this perplexing diversity of conditions in regard to the agency by which the railways are managed and of the relations of the Government with the various classes of companies.

Ten more or less well-defined periods in the history of Indian railways may be distinguished: (i) 1844-69: the old guarantee system; (ii) 1869-79: State construction and management; (iii) 1879-1900: the new guarantee system; (iv) 1900-14: rapid extension and development, and commencement of railway profits; (v) 1914-21: breakdown of the railway system under the stress of conditions created by the war of 1914-18; (vi) 1921-5: the Acworth Committee and the overhauling of railway policy on the basis of direct management and control by the State; (vii) 1924-5-1929-30: the Separation Convention, period of prosperity; (viii) 1930-1-1935-6: depression; (ix) 1936-9: partial recovery and Railway Inquiry; and (x) 1939 onwards: Indian railways during the present war.

§4. **The old guarantee system (1844-69).**—The first proposals for the construction of railways were made in 1844 and contemplated the construction of lines by railway companies incorporated in England and enjoying a guarantee by the East India Company of a specified return. Accordingly, contracts were made for the construction of two small railway lines near Calcutta and Bombay with the East Indian Railway Company and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company respectively. It was, however, Lord Dalhousie's famous Minute on the subject in 1853 that gave a

decisive turn to the Government policy in this direction. In this Minute, Lord Dalhousie urged the creation of a system of trunk lines connecting the interior of each Presidency with its principal port and connecting the different Presidencies with one another. He emphasized the great social, political and commercial benefits which he expected from railways both to India and England. One of the results which Lord Dalhousie contemplated with satisfaction from rapid railway construction by British companies was a more extensive employment of English capital and enterprise in Indian trade and manufactures. He preferred the agency of companies, under the supervision and control of the Government, to direct construction by the Government, because he thought that the conduct of commercial undertakings did not fall within the proper functions of the Government, especially in India, where it was necessary to discourage the people's habit of dependence on the Government for everything.

In accordance with Dalhousie's plan, contracts were entered into with eight companies between 1854 and 1860 for constructing and managing railways in different parts of India. A fresh stimulus to railway construction was given by the experience during the Mutiny period, when movements of troops and material were seriously impeded owing to defective transport. The main features of the contracts with the early guaranteed companies were as follows :—(i) free grant of land ; (ii) a guaranteed rate of interest, ranging from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 per cent and payable at 22d. per rupee ; (iii) utilization of half the surplus profits earned by the companies to repay the Government any sums by which they might have had previously to make good the guarantee of interest, the remainder belonging to the shareholders ; (iv) reservation of certain powers of supervision and control by the Government in practically all matters of importance except the choice of staff ; and (v) option to the Government to purchase the lines after twenty-five or fifty years on terms calculated to be the equivalent of the companies' interest therein.

This system, however, proved to be a great drain on the resources of the State and a burden on the taxpayer in India. For the companies were unable to earn their five per cent and called upon the Government to make good the deficiency. The deficit in the railway budget amounted to Rs. 1,66,50,000 by 1869. This was attributed by several critics like Lord Lawrence, who in his Minute in 1867 had strongly condemned the guarantee system, to the extravagance of the companies who had no incentive for

economy of construction under the guarantee system.¹ The Acworth Railway Committee, however, have expressed the opinion that the formation of English-domiciled companies was the only wise course for the time, in view of the urgent need for railways in India, and the shyness of Indian capital making it necessary to offer special attractions to British capital for this purpose. However, others have questioned the wisdom of this policy and denied that English capital could have been attracted only by the inducement of a guaranteed rate of profits. For example, it was put in evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of 1872 by William Thornton that unguaranteed capital would have gone into India for the construction of railways, had it not been for the guarantee. England had an immense amount of capital which had no scope for remunerative investment at home, and which, therefore, was seeking outlets in South America and other countries, and it was not conceivable that it would persistently have neglected India.² It also remains an unproven assumption that the rate of interest that was actually guaranteed was in point of fact necessary. This contention is strengthened by the later experience of the Government when they were, without much difficulty, able to enter into contracts under the revised guarantee system on terms much less favourable to the companies in respect of the guaranteed rate of interest and other concessions. We may also point out that while the Government showed their active interest in the promotion of railways, they did not exert themselves to build up any of the industries required to supply the materials demanded by the railways and this made them all the more expensive.

§5. **State construction and management (1869-79).**—The Government of India were not prepared to continue the old guarantee system, their objections being the extravagance of the companies, the absence of effective Government control over them, the inconvenience to the Government of a guaranteed rate of interest on the capital of the companies, and the remoteness of the prospect of securing a share of the surplus profits to themselves. Two important changes were consequently made. In the case of some of the more important railway companies, like the Great Indian Peninsula, the arrangements regarding the distribution of surplus profits were altered so as to enable the Government to claim unconditionally half the surplus profits for each half-year,

¹ See R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age*, pp. 355-6.

² *ibid.*, p. 390.

the Government relinquishing their right to purchase the lines at the end of the first twenty-five years from the dates of the respective contracts. An even more important change in policy—remarkable for the sixties when *laissez-faire* ideas held the field—occurred when the Secretary of State decided that, so far as capital for new lines in India was concerned, the State should secure for itself the full benefit of its own credit and of the cheaper methods of construction, etc. which it was expected it would be able to use. Accordingly, for several years after 1869, the capital expenditure was chiefly incurred direct by the Government, and no fresh contracts with guaranteed companies were made. It was decided to borrow annually amounts up to two million pounds for constructing lines to be managed by the State, and a new cheaper gauge, namely the metre gauge, was adopted. A vigorous programme of railway construction then followed with satisfactory results so far as the costs were concerned. But the main difficulty was in respect of continuous and adequate provision of funds. In the first place, the Sind and the Punjab lines (later known as the North-Western) had to be converted from metre to broad gauge for strategic reasons. In the second place, the financial difficulties of the Government were increased by the inroads which the falling rupee was making on the exchequer, by the famines between 1874 and 1879, and by the Frontier War with Afghanistan. Moreover, the Famine Commission of 1880 held that 5,000 additional miles of railway were urgently needed and that the country could not be held safe from famines until the Indian railway mileage had aggregated 20,000. The Government were thus forced to the conclusion that the State alone could not find sufficient funds for pushing ahead with railway construction as fast as the Famine Commission recommended, and decided again to take the help of capital borrowed by private companies.

§6. **The new guarantee system (1879-1900).**—Thus by the early eighties the current of thought in favour of State management had spent its main force, and a new period in railway history was ushered in when the Government decided again to utilize the agency of guaranteed companies with certain modifications of the old terms, and contracts were made with the new guaranteed companies, such as the Bengal-Nagpur, and the Madras & Southern Mahratta railway companies. The chief differentiating features of the new guarantee system were as follows:—(i) the lines constructed by the companies were declared to be the property of the Secretary of State for India, who had the right to determine the contracts at the end of approximately twenty-five

years after their respective dates, or at subsequent intervals of ten years, on repaying at par the capital provided by the companies; (ii) interest was guaranteed on the capital raised by the companies at a lower rate, the most usual rate being $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; (iii) the Government retained a much larger share (usually three-fifths) of the surplus profits for their own benefit.

Thus the lines constructed under the new system by the companies were from the beginning the property of the Government, though the companies were given a certain guaranteed rate of interest on the portion of the capital raised by them and were allowed to manage the lines when completed.

Similarly, when the contracts with the old guarantee companies expired, the Government in most cases exercised their right of terminating them, though the method of making use of this right differed in different cases. In some cases, for example the Eastern Bengal, the Oudh & Rohilkhand and the Sind-Punjab railways, the lines were purchased and transferred to State management. In other cases, like the East Indian and the Great Indian Peninsula, the lines were acquired by the State, but were handed over again for management to the same companies under revised contracts. So also, when the contracts with the new guarantee companies expired, though arrangements were made for the continuance of management by the original companies, the Government secured more favourable financial conditions by various methods, such as reduction in the companies' share of capital and in the rate of interest guaranteed, and further modification of the clauses relating to the division of surplus profits.

In the meanwhile branch line companies were formed and Indian States were also invited to undertake railway construction in their territories. As recommended by the Acworth Committee, however, the Government decided in 1925 to find the necessary capital themselves for branch and feeder lines.

§7. **The present position.**—The existing arrangements between the Government and the guaranteed companies may be conveniently summed up at this stage. The State has now come to be the owner of the bulk of the trunk lines. The greater part of the capital has become its property, either through having been originally supplied by it or through the acquisition by the Government of the companies' interests on the termination of the old contracts. The capital originally contributed by the companies has thus come to be only a small proportion of the total cost of the existing system. When funds are required for further capital expenditure the Government have the option of either themselves providing them

or of calling on the companies to do so. The management of the railways, except in a few cases,¹ has been left to the companies, though they are subject to Government control, exercised, since 1905, through the Railway Board created in that year, with regard to matters like the standard of repairs, rolling stock, public safety, co-ordination of the railway systems, train services, rates and fares, etc. The Government have also the power of appointing a Government Director to the boards of the companies. All these contracts (except one fixed for a term of twenty-five years) are terminable at the option of the Secretary of State at specified dates on payment of the companies' capital at par. The last of these contracts to expire will be the one with the Bengal-Nagpur Railway, which terminates in 1950.

§8. Rapid extension and development of railways and commencement of railway profits, 1900-14.—The main features of this period were the rapid development of railways as part of a new and much more vigorous policy of national development affecting almost every branch of economic life. The railways attained to the dignity of a separate department in 1905, when the Railway Branch of the Public Works Department was abolished, and a Railway Board consisting of a president and two members was established at the head of the railway system under the Department of Commerce and Industry. A fresh impetus was given in 1908, when the Mackay Committee on Railway Finance laid down for the future a standard of £12,500,000 as the annual programme for capital expenditure on railways, though it was to be subject to periodical revision. Although the Government were neither able to attain the standard recommended by the Mackay Committee nor allowed to adhere over a series of years to any uniform rate, they spent sums considerably larger than had been the case in previous years. The railway mileage in this period increased from 24,752 in 1900 to 34,656 in 1913-14, and the capital outlay, from Rs. 329·53 crores to Rs. 495·09 crores.

Another notable characteristic of this period was the commencement of railway profits in 1900. The unprofitable character of railways approximately till that date was due to uneconomical construction and management by the old guarantee companies, the construction of unremunerative strategic lines, like the North-Western Railway, and those constructed for the purpose of famine relief, and the absence of traffic to make a success of this new means of transport, which could not at once quite fit in with

¹ The recent transfer of some of the railways to State management marks the beginning of a new policy to be described later.

the existing economic organization of the country. The losses to the State during the first forty years of the existence of the railways amounted to Rs. 58 crores. After that the railways began to yield a net return to the State on the capital outlay at charge, thanks to the general economic development of the country, and especially of the Punjab and Sind under their irrigation works—which have enabled even the Frontier Railway, for a long time regarded as the Cinderella of Indian railways, to pay its way—and the renewal of the original contracts with the guaranteed companies under terms more favourable to the Government. The gain to the State was small for the first ten years after 1900, but by 1924 the total gain had accumulated to Rs. 103 crores. Railway profits, however, are subject to remarkable variation from year to year, depending as they do on the agricultural position and the course of the internal and external trade of the country. The adoption of the recommendations of the Acworth Committee, and the retrenchment carried out as suggested by the Inchcape Committee (1922-3), placed Indian railways in a sounder financial position than before. On the capital at charge of the State, the percentage of net earnings (gross receipts minus working expenses), before deducting interest on capital at charge, has varied as follows during recent years.

Year	Percentage	Year	Percentage
1913-14	5.0	1930-1	3.5 ¹
1916-17	6.5	1931-2	3.0
1918-19	7.5	1932-3	2.9
1921-2	2.6	1933-4	3.1
1923-4	5.2	1934-5	3.4
1925-6	5.3	1935-6	3.5
1927-8	5.3	1936-7	4.1
1928-9	5.2	1937-8	4.2
1929-30	4.5	1938-9	4.2

The Retrenchment Committee laid down that a five and a half per cent net return on the capital outlay should be aimed at by the railways. Regarding the railway profits declared by the Government, Mr Chandrika Prasad observes: 'In declaring surplus profits on the railways, especially during recent years, the ordinary commercial principle of allowing for depreciation on stock has not been applied.' He contends that the profits declared

¹ Owing mainly to the adverse effects of the trade depression the railways sustained heavy net losses after paying interest charges from 1930-1 to 1936-7 (both years inclusive). For further particulars see §15 below.

must be subjected to considerable discount on this account. This position was upheld by the Acworth Committee, who strongly recommended that each railway should make adequate provision annually for the maintenance and the renewal of its permanent way and rolling stock. The question of the financial results of the working of railways is further dealt with in §§13-17 below.

§9. **Breakdown of the railway system (1914-21).**—This period is characterized by the utter breakdown and rapid deterioration of the railways, partly because of the strain to which they were subjected by the necessity of having to provide for the large movements of troops and materials at a time when a part of the rolling stock, staff, etc. was required for the construction and working of the military railways in Mesopotamia and other theatres of war, and partly because of the general financial embarrassment of the Government, who were compelled seriously to curtail the annual programme of capital expenditure on railways. To add to all this, it was extremely difficult to obtain any railway material from England during this period. Not only had the fresh extension of railways to be practically held up but even the existing lines could not be maintained in good condition. The Acworth Committee give in the following terms a picture of the breakdown of the railway system under the stress of war conditions: 'There are scores of bridges with girders unfit to carry train loads up to modern requirements; there are many miles of rails, hundreds of engines, and thousands of wagons, whose rightful date for renewal is long overpast.' It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that loud complaints were made by the public and the trading community about the great inconvenience to passenger and goods traffic. Public opinion was becoming steadily hostile to the management of the bulk of the State railways by English domiciled companies and demanded that the State should take over the management wherever possible. The stronger position of Indian railways and their superior capacity to handle the greatly increased traffic during the present war are dealt with later (§20).

§10. **The Acworth Committee.**—It was also being increasingly realized that the Railway Board, as it was constituted, was not able to take the initiative in laying down railway policy and failed to exercise effective control over the railway administration, especially in regard to fares and rates, being overloaded with routine, trammelled by unnecessary restrictions and handicapped by its ignorance of local conditions and inadequate provision for technical and inspecting staff. So also the need for a fresh lead was felt in respect of the future policy of railway finance. All

these questions were, therefore, referred to a special committee appointed in November 1920, and presided over by a railway expert from England, the late Sir William Acworth. The immediate cause of the appointment of the committee, however, was the question as to the action to be taken in connexion with the East Indian Railway, State-owned but managed by the East Indian Railway Company, whose contract with the Government was terminable in December 1919. As a temporary measure the old contract was extended to the end of 1924, and the general questions arising out of the discussion regarding the respective merits and demerits of various possible systems of management were referred to the Acworth Committee. After a comprehensive inquiry the Committee issued their Report in the following year, embodying their findings on several questions of importance which we shall now proceed to review. We shall, however, first deal with the State versus Company management controversy.

§11. *Case for State management in India.*—On theoretical grounds the case against railway management by the State may be conceded to be overwhelmingly strong.¹ But when we come to consider, with reference to any particular country, whether it ought to adopt company or State management, simple appeal to theory is of little use. Actually, historical causes rather than theoretical considerations have determined any particular system in operation, and different countries are prospering more or less under different systems. The Government undertake railway business for various reasons, either political, or in order to make up for the lack of private enterprise, or again, in order to secure for the people cheaper rates, better facilities and more impartial treatment of the various interests. All these reasons have been more or less powerful in India in strengthening the case for State management. Moreover, company management in the true sense of the word is impracticable in this country, and, therefore, as the Majority Report of the Acworth Committee points out, the whole reference to foreign countries and the relatively greater success achieved by company management elsewhere is irrelevant. State ownership already exists for the most part in this country and also direct State management to some extent, as in the case of the North-Western Railway and Eastern Bengal Railway, to which have been added recently the East Indian (1924) and the Great Indian Peninsula (1925). Most of the State-owned railways were, however, managed until lately by companies with a London domicile, and even today nearly forty per cent of the

¹ Consult on this subject W. M. Acworth, *State Railway Ownership*.

State-owned railways are managed by companies. But the opinion that the management of all the railways should be taken over by the State is gaining steadily in strength and vehemence. It has been supported by the Majority of the Acworth Committee and non-official Indian public opinion generally. There is a general consensus of opinion that, in any case, management by companies, at least in the present form—that is to say, by companies with a London domicile—has got to go. The Acworth Committee, however, were divided as to whether the alternative should be State management, or management by companies with an Indian domicile. The majority, headed by Sir William Acworth the Chairman, pronounced definitely in favour of the former alternative. The case for State management in India may be put as follows.¹

Though a company investing its own money, managing its own property and judging its officials by their success in producing results in the shape of dividends usually conducts business with more enterprise, economy and flexibility than are common in businesses directly managed by the State, the English companies managing State Railways in India have long ceased to be companies in this sense. The property entrusted to their management is not their own and their financial stake in it is comparatively very small.² Such a system has never worked satisfactorily in the past and cannot be made to do so in the future. The management is only nominally entrusted to the companies, for the Government, feeling themselves to be the real owners, have left really no initiative in the hands of the companies. Important matters like the creation of appointments, etc. are largely controlled by the Government. Thus the companies cannot and do not manage the undertaking, and cannot break new ground in any direction except with the sanction of the Government. The Government do not feel an obligation to take any initiative themselves. Nor can they stir up the companies, if the latter are

¹ cf. *Acworth Committee Report*, pars. 210-39.

² In this connexion, the following figures will be found interesting. The total capital outlay at charge on all railways, including those under construction, amounted to Rs. 852.59 crores at the end of March 1940. Out of this, Rs. 758.62 crores was capital at charge on State-owned railways, including premia paid in the purchase of companies' lines. The remainder, Rs. 93.97 crores, represented capital raised by Indian States, companies and District Boards. By far the greater portion of this amount, namely Rs. 729.72 crores, is Government capital and only one-twentyfifth, or Rs. 28.89 crores, is owned by companies. The figures include Rs. 38.82 crores on account of capital expenditure to the end of March 1940 on strategic lines. See *Report on Indian Railways* (1939-40), vol. I, par. 33.

supine. In short, it is a system under which a progressive company is hampered by meticulous Government control over every detail of expenditure, and under which, on the other hand, the utmost wisdom on the part of the Government is not able to prevent injuries caused by the unwise and unprogressive policy of a company's board, both to the revenues of the State and the economic development of the country. As regards the proposal put forward by the Minority, that the management should be transferred from English to Indian companies, the first objection is that the Indian companies would have only a minority interest in the undertaking. The State would remain the predominant partner, appoint one-half of the directors and nominate the Chairman and so retain its control. The division of responsibility between the Government and the Board of Directors would still continue, and the executive officers, with a divided allegiance to a Board of Directors which appointed and paid them, and to the Government which stood behind the directors, could not do the best work of which they were capable. Competent business men would refuse to join the Board if they found their power limited by Government control and Government regulations, and this seems inevitable under the plan advocated by the Minority. A mere change in the domicile of the company, therefore, would not improve matters, as companies substantially independent of Government cannot be formed in India, and without such independence the advantages of private enterprise could not be gained. Indian domiciled companies, again, would not be able to be of much assistance in raising the necessary funds for railway construction. The Government would always have to take the larger share of this work on themselves, and they would find this task much easier under a system of State management than under company management. Company management, whatever the domicile, would be unpopular in India. From the financial, economic and political point of view money required for Indian railways should henceforward be raised in India itself as far as possible and these loans will be more readily subscribed to by the public if the Government themselves take over the management of the railways. Again, if resort to external loans is necessary, the credit of the Government of India and the Secretary of State as the greatest bankers of the country is an asset of inestimable value. One of the most important arguments in favour of State management in this country is the generally accepted view that company management has shown itself wilfully negligent of national interests, whether by the manipulation of routes and rates for the benefit of European

interests and to the detriment of Indian manufactures and Indian commerce, or by refusing a fair field to Indian talent in the railway services, especially in the higher grades. These evils would have a greater chance of being remedied under State management. Another advantage expected from State management is the economy in the expenses of working the railways. At present the State has to pay not only interest on the company's share of the capital but a share in the profits as well, which under State management would accrue to the Government treasury instead of going to absentee companies in London, or to private companies with an Indian domicile, supposing such were started. Actual experience of State management in India has shown that it does not in any way compare unfavourably with company management. Nor does there seem to be any truth in the contention that such success as has been achieved by State management in India is due to the existence side by side of railways worked by companies and to the healthy emulation caused thereby. A serious disadvantage of the present system comes from the fact that the vested interests of the railways in the different parts of the country control not merely the carriage of goods and passengers, but also the construction of new lines, trunk or feeder, and the connexions of two or more different lines. Spheres of influence have come into existence and form an obstacle in the way of proper railway development. Under State management this evil would be avoided, and lines would be constructed as demanded by the real interests of the country. Again, under State management, the convenience of traders and passengers would be much better attended to than is the case at present.¹ The companies have been charged with making the maximum amount of profits their sole object, and there is great dissatisfaction in India on account of their alleged neglect of trade interests and the interests of passengers, more particularly of the third-class passengers. The grievances of the public have a much greater chance of being speedily and effectively redressed under State management. The boards of the railway companies situated in London have been generally insensible to such representations from Indian interests as happen to reach them. On the other hand, European merchants being better organized and better represented in England can make their voice more easily heard. Such a state of things cannot be regarded as conducive to the rapid development of our commerce and industry. Apart from

¹ As Mr N. B. Mehta points out, the lack of inter-railway competition and of a vigilant public opinion has made State control almost a moral obligation in India. See *Indian Railways : Rates and Regulations*, p. 81.

racial prepossessions, control exercised from a distance of 6,000 miles is bound to be highly inconvenient, because it unduly fetters the railway executive on the spot.

Point was lent to this controversy when the contracts with the Great Indian Peninsula and East Indian Railways were due to expire in 1924-5. In February 1923, the matter came up before the Assembly. The feeling of Indian non-official members was decidedly in favour of whole-hearted State management, with the consequence that the simple motion for taking these two railways under State management was passed. They were accordingly taken over by the Government for direct management. The Burma Railways also passed under State management from January 1929. Reference has already been made to the purchase of the Southern Punjab Railway by the State in 1930. It is worked by the North-Western, a State-owned and State-managed railway. In view of the strength of public opinion and its unmistakable preference for State management, the probabilities are that all the railways in course of time will come under Government management.

This view is confirmed by the recent decision, after some hesitation, of the Government of India to take over two company-managed lines (the B. B. & C. I. and the Assam-Bengal Railways) with effect from 1 January 1942. Accordingly the necessary year's notice has been given. The Railway Board is further examining the question of purchasing two other company-managed railways (the Bengal & North-Western and the Rohilkhand & Kumaon) on the expiry of their contracts on 31 December 1942.

§12. **Separation of railway finance from general finance.**—One of the recent changes of outstanding importance vitally affecting the efficiency of railways is the separation of railway finance from general finance. The Acworth Committee urged the adoption of this step on various grounds. In the first place it would remove the element of uncertainty in the annual Budget estimates due to the inclusion therein of railway profits. These vary according to the character of the season and trade conditions, with the result that the estimates might be out by several crores of rupees. The case for separation was seen to be even stronger from the railway standpoint. The dependence of the railways on the exigencies of the General Budget and the financial position of the country prevents them from being run on a commercial basis. The arrangement which assumed that the railway concern goes out of business on 31 March every year and begins life afresh at the beginning of each official year was obviously detrimental to the railways. The separation of the two budgets was

calculated not only to enable the railways to be conducted as a business undertaking, but also to free the Government from the many difficulties and uncertainties of the old system. In view of the importance of the subject a resolution was brought before the Legislative Assembly in September 1921, when a Joint Committee of the two houses was appointed to investigate the question. The committee declared immediate separation to be outside practical politics. They were, however, impressed with the necessity of rehabilitating the existing railway lines, which had been utterly neglected during the war period, and recommended a guaranteed programme of Rs. 150 crores to be distributed over a period of five years and to be spent upon the improvement and completion of the existing lines, and provision of better amenities for third-class passengers. The Assembly endorsed this recommendation (1924) and it was also induced to accept the scheme for separating railway finances from general finances on the condition of ensuring to the latter a definite ascertainable annual contribution from railways, which was to be the first charge on their net receipts. This contribution was settled upon the basis of one per cent on the capital at charge of commercial lines, excluding capital contributed by companies and Indian States, at the end of the penultimate financial year, plus one-fifth of the surplus profits in that year, interest on capital at charge of strategic lines and loss in working being deducted. The Legislative Assembly stipulated that if, after payment of the contribution so fixed, the amount available for transfer to the Railway Reserve should exceed Rs. 3 crores, one-third of the excess should be paid to the general revenues. This Railway Reserve was to be used to secure the payment of the annual contribution, to provide, if necessary, for arrears of depreciation and for writing down capital, and generally to strengthen the financial position of the railways. It was expected that by this arrangement the Indian taxpayer would be assured of a regular contribution in relief of taxation from his investments in railways, while the task of maintaining a continuous financial policy and of distinguishing between a temporary and permanent surplus or deficit in accounts would be immensely facilitated. The first separate railway budget under this scheme was presented to the Assembly in March 1925. (The financial results of the Separation Convention are reviewed in §§14-16 below.)

§13. **Railway Budget.**—The subjoined table gives the principal heads of revenue and expenditure included in the Railway Budget.

RAILWAY BUDGET FOR 1940-1¹

In crores of rupees

HEADS OF REVENUE		HEADS OF EXPENDITURE	
(A) State Railways—		(A) State Railways—	
(a) Commercial Lines—		(a) Commercial Lines—	
Gross Receipts ...	106.86 ²	Interest—	
<i>Deduct—</i>		On Government capital at charge ...	26.56
Working expenses of State Railways ...	67.28 ³	On capital contributed by Indian States and Companies ...	0.97
Surplus profits paid to Indian States and Railway Companies ...	0.41		
Payments to worked lines ...	2.66	Total interest, commercial lines ...	27.53
Net Receipts ...	36.51	(b) Strategic Lines—	
(b) Strategic Lines—		Interest on Capital at charge ...	1.29
Gross Receipts ...	1.32	Total Interest ...	28.82
<i>Deduct—</i>		(B) Subsidised Companies—	
Working expenses ..	1.98	Land and subsidy ...	0.13
Net Receipts ...	—0.66	(C) Miscellaneous Railway Expenditure ...	0.58
Total Receipts, Commercial and Strategic Lines ...	35.85	(D) Payments to General Revenues—Contribution⁴ ...	4.41
(B) Subsidised Companies—		Deficiency in contribution in 1939-40 ...	0.90
Government's share of surplus profits ...	0.13	Surplus Railway Revenue transferred to Railway Reserve Fund ...	2.98
(C) Miscellaneous Railway Receipts—			
(a) Commercial lines—			
Interest on Depreciation and Reserve Fund balances ...	1.42		
Dividend on investments in branch lines and other miscellaneous receipts ...	0.31		
(b) Strategic lines—			
Interest on Depreciation Fund balances ...	0.11		
Total Receipts ...	37.82		
(D) Withdrawal of sums deposited on account of Railway Depreciation Fund ...			
	...		
Total ...	37.82	Total ...	37.82

¹ See *Central Budget for 1940-41*, pp. 34-5.

² Includes Rs. 5.18 crores earnings of worked lines.

³ Includes Rs. 2.61 crores working expenses of worked lines.

⁴ See note on p. 180.

§14. **Financial results of the railways under the Separation Convention (1924-5—1929-30, period of prosperity).**—The financial results of the working of railways with which the Government of India are directly concerned for the period from 1924-5 to 1940-1 are given in the table on page 181 and serve to illustrate the financial working of the Separation Convention of 1924. Taking the first twelve years of this period (1924-5 to 1935-6) it is found that the first six years were years of prosperity and the last six were years of adversity. Taking the period as a whole the total surplus revenue earned in the first six years amounted to Rs. 52,64 lakhs, whilst in the second six years the deficiency amounted to Rs. 41,63 lakhs. During this long period of varying fortune there was a net surplus of Rs. 11,01 lakhs or rather less than one crore of rupees per annum after meeting working expenses, providing for depreciation and paying interest in full on borrowed capital.¹ The total contributions to the general revenues during the period of prosperity, 1924-5 to 1929-30, amounted to Rs. 42 crores, or an average of Rs. 3 crores for the whole period dating from the Separation Convention. During the same period a balance of Rs. 4½ crores was accumulated in the Depreciation Fund.

§15. **Indian railways during the depression (1930-1—1935-6).**—The fortunes of the railways underwent a radical change for the

(Footnote continued from p. 179)

* Contribution due from Railways to General Revenues in 1940-1 (based on actuals of 1938-9).

		(In thousands of rupees)
(1)	One per cent on capital of Rs. 6,91,23,20 at charge, commercial lines	6,91,23
(2)	One-fifth of surplus (receipts minus charges such as working expenses, interest payments, land and subsidy, etc., and contribution at one per cent on the capital at charge)	—
	Total contribution from railway revenues	6,91,23
(3)	Deduct—Loss on strategic lines borne by railway revenues: (i) Interest on capital = Rs. 1,32,28 + (ii) Loss in working = Rs. 49,80 + (iii) Interest on the amount of loss in working met from Depreciation Reserve Fund of commercial lines = Rs. 67.89	2,49,97
	Net payment due from railways to general revenues	4,41,26

See *Railway Budget for 1940-41*, p. 37.

¹ *Railway Member's Budget Speech*, Central Budget for 1935-6, par. 17.

(COMMERCIAL AND STRATEGIC LINES TOGETHER)

Figures in lakhs of rupees

	1924-5	1927-8	1928-9	1929-30	1930-1	1931-2	1932-3	1933-4	1934-5	1935-6	1936-7	1937-8 ²	1938-9 ²	1939-40 ¹ Revised Estimate	1940-1 ¹ Budget Estimate
Mileage { State-owned Worked lines	27,002 5,847	28,086 5,812	29,111 5,843	30,878 4,733	31,197 4,873	31,642 4,866	31,644 4,613	31,619 4,634	31,619 4,634	31,732 4,578	31,729 4,398	29,764 4,084	29,725 4,083	29,725 4,114	29,089 4,114
Gross traffic receipts { State-owned Worked lines	Rs. 1,00,13 7,34	Rs. 1,03,43 7,18	Rs. 1,03,73 7,27	Rs. 1,02,70 6,47	Rs. 95,10 4,99	Rs. 86,63 5,07	Rs. 84,43 4,86	Rs. 86,63 5,13	Rs. 90,20 5,28	Rs. 90,65 5,37	Rs. 95,49 5,53	Rs. 95,01 5,45	Rs. 94,48 5,14	Rs. 97,30 5,00	Rs. 1,03,00 5,10
Operating expenses { State-owned Worked lines	Rs. 51,65 3,70	Rs. 53,06 3,53	Rs. 54,22 3,63	Rs. 55,59 3,30	Rs. 54,39 2,66	Rs. 49,31 2,63	Rs. 49,08 2,49	Rs. 49,50 2,60	Rs. 50,27 2,66	Rs. 50,87 2,68	Rs. 50,23 2,66	Rs. 50,37 2,64	Rs. 51,48 2,53	Rs. 52,76 2,56	Rs. 53,98 2,62
Depreciation Fund ...	10,35	11,38	12,00	12,59	13,07	13,46	13,77	13,56	13,72	13,25	13,15	12,57	12,56	12,59	12,66
Payments to worked lines ...	3,64	3,65	3,64	3,17	2,33	2,44	2,37	2,53	2,62	2,69	2,87	2,81	2,61	2,44	2,57
Net traffic receipts (State lines) ...	38,13	38,99	37,51	34,52	27,64	23,86	21,58	23,57	26,21	26,53	32,11	32,07	30,44	31,95	36,36
Net miscellaneous receipts after deducting miscellaneous charges and surplus profits payable to Companies ...	- 1,07	- 87	- 37	- 2	- 11	1	1,10	1,05	53	86	- 9	- 5	23	58	75
Net revenue ...	37,06	38,12	37,14	34,50	27,53	23,87	22,68	24,62	26,74	27,39	32,02	32,02	30,67	32,53	37,11
Interest charges ...	23,90	27,27	29,33	30,46	32,72	33,07	32,91	32,58	31,80	31,39	30,81	29,26	29,30	28,92	28,92
Surplus ...	13,16	10,85	7,81	4,04	- 5,19	- 9,20	- 10,23	- 7,96	- 5,06	- 4,00	1,21	2,76	1,37	3,61	8,29
Paid as contribution to general revenue ...	6,78	6,28	5,23	6,12	5,74	2,76	1,37	3,61	5,31
Transferred to Railway Reserve ...	6,38	4,57	2,58	- 2,08	- 10,93	- 4,95	2,98

¹ Central Budget for 1940-41, p. 41.

² Excluding Burma Railways.

Note 1.—The balance of the loss in 1931-2 and the total loss in the following years to 1938-9 have been met by temporary borrowings from the Depreciation Fund.

Note 2.—Credits for material released from works not charged to revenue were taken in reduction of operating expenses, up to 1931-2. From 1932-3 onwards they have been added to receipts and are included in net miscellaneous receipts. From 1936-7 they are taken in reduction of expenditure met from the Depreciation Fund. The amounts involved are as follows: in 1932-3 and 1933-4, 119 lakhs each; in 1934-5, 90 lakhs; and in 1935-6, 110 lakhs.

Note 3.—Working expenses were reduced in 1930-1 by 166 lakhs by a credit from the Depreciation Fund for correction of past accounting adjustments: and in 1924-5 by 179 lakhs by certain abnormal refunds of expenditure in previous years.

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worse in the year 1930-1. That year ushered in an era of deficits which were mainly the result of the adverse effects of world depression and the drop in commodity prices, dwindling of wheat exports, the disturbed condition of India in recent years, damage caused by floods and earthquakes, the acute rail-road competition,¹ intensified river and sea competition, and increase in working expenses due among other factors to the greater response to the demands of labour. It has also been pointed out that the tariff policy, not only of India, but of practically all other countries in the world, many of which were in the past our best customers, has adversely affected the earning capacity of the railways.

Owing to these successive deficits the railways failed to make any contribution to general revenues after 1931-2. The accumulated arrears of contribution due under the Separation Convention during the years from 1931-2 to 1936-7 amounted to Rs. 30.74 crores. This figure has since risen, to Rs. 36¼ crores at the end of the year 1939-40. During the same period the railways not only practically depleted their general reserves but also borrowed from the Depreciation Fund to the extent of Rs. 31.34 crores, in order to meet their obligations regarding interest charges. The utter impossibility of repaying so large a liability of nearly Rs. 62 crores out of future surpluses within a measurable distance of time led to the moving of an official resolution in the Central Assembly during the Budget discussions in February 1937 in favour of cancellation of the entire amount and starting the next financial year with a clean slate. Such a wholesale repudiation of a large debt, however, created a stir in orthodox financial circles both in the Legislature and outside. Meanwhile with the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy under the new Constitution, claims for increased resources were becoming insistent. But as under the existing Separation Convention, loans from the Depreciation Fund were a first charge on future surpluses and there was also thereafter the undischarged liability to general revenues, the latter would have had to wait long before they were entitled to receive any contribution from the railways. The escape from this dilemma was found in another resolution that was moved by the Finance Member at the Simla Session (1937) proposing a moratorium of three years for the repayment of the liabilities.² Thus while orthodoxy, at any rate in principle, was re-established

¹ The Wedgwood Inquiry Committee (1937) estimate the loss of railway traffic due to road competition in the neighbourhood of Rs. 4½ crores per annum. *Report of the Indian Railway Inquiry Committee*, par. 169.

² See *Central Budget for 1938-9*, pp. 19 and 42. The moratorium has been extended up to 31 March 1942.

by the decision not to write off the liabilities of the railways, the moratorium resolution made it possible to permit the appropriation of the surplus of net railway receipts over the interest charges, which had begun to show itself from the year 1936-7, for immediately resuming the contribution to general revenues without making good the heavy liabilities of nearly Rs. 62 crores. This course of action has also enabled the Central Government to make a limited assignment of the income-tax to the Provinces in the years 1937-8, 1938-9 and 1939-40 under the Niemeyer Award (see ch. xi). At the same time it is doubtful whether the railways will be able to redeem the undischarged liability even in the course of a generation.

§16. **Partial recovery (1936-9).**—Anyway it is a matter of genuine satisfaction that the State Railways after six years of disquieting deficits have begun to pay their way and show a surplus of net receipts over the interest charges and appropriations to the Depreciation Fund. This welcome improvement of the financial position of the railways became evident during 1936-7 partly owing to the recovery of trade and prices and partly owing to retrenchment in expenditure. The recovery, however, contained an unstable element, in so far as it was due partially to the world's rearmament programme. Under the influence of the partial economic recovery the railways turned the corner and their financial results presented a welcome contrast to the earlier dismal record of deficits. The small budget (revised estimates) surplus of Rs. 15 lakhs for 1936-7 turned out to be an underestimate, and the final result was a surplus of Rs. 1¼ crores, which under the Convention then in force was utilized to repay part of the debt to the Depreciation Fund. Similarly, whereas the railway budget for 1937-8 estimated a surplus of Rs. 15 lakhs, the actual surplus was Rs. 2¾ crores after making full contribution to the Depreciation Fund and meeting the interest charges. This surplus was credited to the general revenues under the moratorium resolution (1937) referred to above. There was a certain amount of deterioration in the year 1938-9, seeing that as against an estimated net surplus of Rs. 2.56 crores, the surplus realized was only Rs. 1.37 crores, the main reason for this being the increase in expenditure, caused by a rise in the price of coal and by the offer of improved facilities to the public of the kind suggested by the Railway Enquiry Committee in order to increase earnings. The financial results for the year 1939-40 showed a distinct improvement, the net surplus realized being Rs. 4.33 crores as against the budget estimate of Rs. 2.13 crores and the revised estimate of Rs. 3.61 crores. This was due to the coming

of war in September 1939. The clouded international situation during the earlier part of the year contributed to a considerable holding of stocks in certain commodities and there was a fall both in passenger and goods traffic earnings. Since the declaration of war, however, there has been a marked change especially in the goods traffic earnings, and later in passenger earnings with an initial improvement in the economic condition of the people. The transfer of traffic from sea to rail routes further assisted the financial position of the railways as did the increase in fares and rates introduced from 1 March 1940.

§17. **The Railway Budgets for 1940-1 and 1941-2.**—A marked feature of the Railway Budget for 1940-1 was an increase of one anna in the rupee in fares exceeding a rupee (i.e. for distances beyond 50 miles) and an increase of 2 annas in the rupee or 12½ per cent on most commodities, complete exception being made in the case of food grains, fodder, manures, etc., and partial exception in the case of coal. The official justification for the increase in fares and rates was, firstly, that there were big uncertainties both on the revenue and expenditure side, secondly that there was an undischarged liability of 90 lakhs towards the general revenues for the year 1939-40, and finally that a policy of prudence required the railways to take advantage of times when the demand for their services was brisk so as to lay by a reserve for absorbing the shock of diminished earnings when the demand fell off. The Budget (1940-1) provided for a total surplus of Rs. 8·29 crores after meeting expenses and interest charges. The revised estimates place the surplus at Rs. 14·59 crores, which, if realized, will be the highest attained in any one year since the separation of railway finances. This large surplus was in part the result of last year's increases in freight and fares, and in part of the actual and expected improvement in traffic. Of this amount about Rs. 10 crores will be credited to the general revenues. The Railway Budget for 1941-2 provides for a surplus of close on Rs. 12 crores.¹ The increase in fares and rates was characterized by the business community as an unnecessary tax on business and the travelling public at a time when there were already heavy burdens on trade and industry and when the war had not so far brought prosperity to the railway passenger.

§18. **The (Wedgwood) Railway Inquiry Committee (1936-7).**—The very serious deterioration in the financial condition of the

¹ Sir Andrew Clow's speech in introducing the Railway Budget for 1941-2.

railways before the recent partial recovery raised a storm of criticism regarding railway policy and administration throughout the country and created a persistent demand for a searching inquiry into their affairs. Sir Otto Niemeyer, the financial expert who came out to India in January 1936, put in a strong plea for a thorough-going overhaul of railway expenditure and the early establishment of effective co-ordination between the various modes of transport in his Report on Financial Settlement between the Central Government and Provinces under the new Constitution (1935). His Report¹ imparted a new urgency to the problem of financial re-organization of railways by making the assignment of a half share of the income-tax by the Central Government to the Provinces dependent upon the Railways paying their way and resuming their contribution to general revenues. The Public Accounts Committee of the Legislative Assembly strongly endorsed Sir Otto Niemeyer's suggestion in its Report issued from Delhi in September 1936, and recommended the early appointment of an expert to survey the whole field of railway finance. Eventually, instead of appointing an expert, it was thought necessary to appoint a Committee of three experts, and accordingly the Indian Railway Enquiry Committee was appointed in October 1936 with Sir Ralph L. Wedgwood, Chief General Manager, London & North-Eastern Railway, as Chairman.

§19. **Recommendations of the Wedgwood Committee.**— The Report of the Committee, published in June 1937, contains many valuable suggestions concerning almost every aspect of railway working for improving efficiency and effecting economy. It may be added that the Wedgwood Committee reaffirmed the majority of the recommendations of the Pope Committee, which inaugurated a detailed analysis of every important activity of railway operation with a view to carrying out economies and attaining better efficiency, in the course of the years 1932-4. On certain major topics, there was considerable opposition to the Wedgwood Report. In the first place, the Committee's proposal to abandon the system of contributions to the general revenues in order to place them on a sound financial plane and to provide for possible railway deficits in lean years² raised a storm of protest in the

¹ *Indian Financial Enquiry (Niemeyer) Report*, par. 31, published in April 1936. (See ch. xi.)

² In this connexion it should be noted that the Wedgwood Committee urged the need for an adequate Depreciation Fund and considered that a normal balance of Rs. 30 crores—the actual (1937) balance in the Fund being

Central Legislature and the provinces, as going back on the Niemeyer formula which made additional resources for Provincial Governments contingent on the resumption of railway contributions to general revenues. Sir Sultan Ahmed, the Railway Member, disarmed the opposition by emphasizing the Government's anxiety scrupulously to honour the pledges made under the Niemeyer Award, and by reassuring the Central Assembly that assistance would be extended to the provinces out of railway surpluses. In the second place, the reference by the Wedgwood Committee to the necessity for the continued recruitment of Europeans as supervisors in the railway workshops and officers in the commercial departments created deep political resentment, which was however allayed by the assurance of the Government that there would be no departure from the policy of progressive Indianization of the railways. In the third place, the Committee's remarks on the Federal Statutory Authority for Railways (see §25)—on which there had been a sharp cleavage of opinion in India—were deemed to be outside the scope of the terms of reference.¹ The recommendations of the Wedgwood Committee regarding revision of rates and fares, and rail-road co-ordination, are dealt with in later sections.

The Committee rightly urge the importance of the railways increasing their popularity and improving their relations with the public, and to this end recommend closer liaison with the Press through a press liaison officer and a Railway Information Office. The Committee do not favour large amalgamations of railways as a general policy lest they should result in unwieldy administrations.²

§20. *Indian railways during the present war.*—One of the results of the present war has been the increased traffic which the railways have been called upon to handle, and it is clear that so long as it lasts it will continue to make abnormal demands on their transport capacity. The railways are better equipped to face the situation than during the last war (see §9 *ante*) thanks to the period of prosperity that followed it. Large sums have been spent upon new constructions, on improvement in working methods, on more powerful locomotives, etc. In his speech on the Railway Budget for 1940-1, Sir Guthrie Russell, Chief Commissioner for Railways, estimated that the railways could,

only Rs. 14 crores—would not be excessive. In addition the railways should build up a general reserve fund to serve as an equalization fund for the payment of interest charges and amortization of capital. (*Report*, pars. 206 and 210-11.)

¹ *Capital* (Supplement, December 1937), p. 26.

² *Indian Railway Enquiry Report*, chs. xii and xiii.

with their existing capacity, if the necessity arose, absorb all the coastwise traffic, except coal.¹ Even so, as Mr C. A. Muirhead pointed out in his presidential address at the 42nd session of the Indian Railway Conference, more equipment would probably be needed to bear the additional freight flowing from India's rapid industrial expansion and the assumption of her new role as the arsenal for the Eastern group of Empire countries. Other handicaps the railways have to face are the depletion of supervising staff, consequent on the release of the railway personnel for military service, and the dismantling of branch lines for shipment overseas.

It is unfortunate that on account of war an immediate start could not be made on the production of broad-gauge locomotives at the Kancharapara (E.I.R.) railway workshops, which are required for production of munitions of war. There are, however, grounds for satisfaction in that the scheme for their manufacture, recommended by two expert railway officers, has been practically approved.² We have already examined the effects of the present war on Indian railway finance.

War Transport Board.—Reference may be made here to the recent (1939) establishment of the War Transport Board, which is presided over by the Chief Commissioner for Railways and which consists of the representatives of the Railways Department, the Quarter-master General, the Commerce Department, the Defence Co-ordination Department, the Finance Department, and the Shipping Controller of India. The new Board is responsible for ensuring, as far as possible, supply of transport sufficient to carry all essential traffic and to see that the various forms of transport are co-ordinated to achieve the utmost economy.

SOME PROBLEMS OF RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION

§21. *Railway rates policy.*—It has been a longstanding Indian grievance that the railway rates in this country have been based solely on considerations of pecuniary advantage to the railways, and, what is much worse, they have been manipulated so as to help European merchants and hinder the development of Indian industries and enterprise. This complaint was voiced by Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1915, as also by a number of witnesses before the Industrial and Fiscal

¹ *Railway Budget for 1940-41*, par. 2.

² Metre-gauge locomotives are being manufactured in the railway workshops of the B.B. & C.I. Railway at Ajmer.

Commissions and the Acworth Committee. One of the specific charges in this connexion is that the rates are framed so as to encourage traffic to and from the ports at the expense of internal traffic, thus encouraging the export of raw materials and the import of foreign manufactures.¹ Indian business men and industrialists complain that they have often to pay rates which they consider unfair, both on the raw materials which they have to obtain from other parts of India and on the manufactured articles which they dispatch to various markets. The 'block rates' system² has also aroused much discontent as leading to an artificial diversion of traffic inconvenient to industry and trade. An incidental effect of the railway rates policy in the past has been the congestion of industries in the port towns, which is responsible for many of their present difficulties. For example, the serious labour difficulties are to no small extent due to the concentration of the industries in centres situated far away from the interior. The adverse effect of the railway rates policy on water transport in India is referred to in a later section.

As the Fiscal Commission admit, the complaints regarding the unfair treatment meted out to Indian industries were not entirely without foundation. In practice the railways have enjoyed full discretion in manipulating the rates within the limits sanctioned by the Railway Board and of putting particular commodities into particular classes.³ The Industrial Commission, after carefully going into the question, made recommendations in favour of the rating of the internal traffic as nearly as possible on a basis of equality with traffic of the same class and over similar distances to and from the ports, so as to encourage the transformation of the raw materials into the most finished state possible before export. They also recommended that consignments travelling over more than one line should be charged a single sum based on the total distance. The Fiscal Commission

¹ See *Fiscal Commission Report*, par. 127.

² 'Block rates' mean higher mileage charges for short lengths imposed on traffic moving from a station, near a junction with another system, towards the junction in order to travel a much longer distance over that other system, with the object of retaining traffic on the line on which it originates and preventing or 'blocking' it from passing off, after only a short lead, on to a rival route.

³ Professor K. T. Shah holds that 'being originally very costly in construction, and still more costly in operation, (and owing) to their being constructed and maintained without reference to the economic conditions of India, the Railway Rates have been fixed without regard to the nature of the traffic and its effects upon Indian Trade and Industry.'—*Trade, Tariffs and Transport in India*, p. 397.

endorsed these recommendations, and held that, within the limitations laid down by their predecessors, special rates should be granted for a term of years to new industries, and even to others if they could make out a proper case for special treatment. The Agricultural Commission, who examined the question of railway rates policy in its bearing on agricultural development, suggested a closer co-ordination between the Agricultural Departments and the railways, and recommended the grant of concession rates on the transport of fertilizers, fuel, fodder, milch cattle, etc. They further suggested a re-examination of rates on raw material for, and transport of, agricultural machinery and implements.¹ Some of these recommendations were accepted by the Government of India in April 1930. Agricultural implements have been reclassified with the object of removing anomalies. The rates for carriage of live-stock have been examined and reductions have been made. The Wedgwood Committee note the criticism that the structure of Indian railway rates is cumbrous and illogical and calls for drastic simplification. They recommend that the Railway Board should inquire into the system of charging at scheduled rates with a view to simplification.²

As recommended by the Acworth Committee, a Rates Advisory Committee consisting of a President, one member representing the commercial interests and another representing the railways, was appointed in 1926 to investigate and make recommendations to the Government on the following subjects: (i) complaints of undue preference, (ii) complaints that rates are unreasonable in themselves, (iii) complaints or disputes in respect of terminals, and complaints that railway companies do not fulfil their obligations to provide reasonable facilities to trade, (iv) the reasonableness or otherwise of any conditions as to the packing of articles specially liable to damage, or liable to cause damage, (v) complaints in respect of conditions as to packing attached to a rate. The Committee's constitutional position is only that of an advisory body, whose findings may or may not be accepted by the Government. As recommended by the Wedgwood Inquiry Committee the procedure of the Committee has recently (1940) been simplified and made more expeditious. Instead of the present Advisory Committee, however, it is desirable that there should be a body with mandatory powers, like the Railway Rates Tribunal in Great Britain or the Inter-State Commerce Commission in the U.S.A.

¹ *Agricultural Commission Report*, pp. 377-9.

² *Indian Railway Inquiry Committee Report*, par. 127.

§22. **Reorganization of the Railway Board.**—The Acworth Committee suggested a reorganization of the Railway Board so as to make it a satisfactory agency through which the Government of India could exercise effective supervision over the whole railway system in the country. The reorganized Railway Board consists of a Chief Commissioner, a Financial Commissioner and three members.¹ Instead of the Acworth Committee's recommendation of three territorial divisions with a Commissioner in charge of each, the plan of dividing the work on the basis of subjects has been adopted. One member deals with technical subjects, and another with general administration, personnel and traffic subjects, the Financial Commissioner representing the Finance Department on the Board and dealing with all financial questions. The Board is assisted by five Directors (for Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Traffic, Finance, and Establishments) who relieve the Chief Commissioner and the members of much current work, enabling them to devote their attention to large questions of railway policy, to tour over the various railway systems and to maintain personal touch with local Governments to a greater extent than was previously possible.

§23. **Railway Advisory Committees.**—The Committee recommended the establishment of Central and Local Advisory Councils to give the Indian public a voice in railway management. Accordingly all State-owned railways now possess Advisory Committees. There is also a Committee of the Central Legislature consisting of representatives from the Assembly and the Council of State.

§24. **Indianization, etc.**—Both the Acworth Committee and the Lee Commission (1923) recommended the extension of facilities for training Indians for the superior railway services, a standard of seventy-five per cent of such posts being laid down by the latter body. The Government have accepted this recommendation and accordingly the Railway Board has already taken steps to extend training facilities, which are an essential preliminary to the Indianization of the railway services. The Government of India recently (August 1937) reaffirmed the policy of Indianization of railway services in the course of the debate on the Wedgwood Committee's Report (see §19 above).

The Acworth Committee also made recommendations for meeting a number of popular grievances. The Government have taken certain steps to this end, such as adding to the rolling

¹ The post of one member is held in abeyance. For some criticisms and suggestions of the present railway administration see *Indian Railway Inquiry Committee Report* (1937), pars. 78-90.

stock, extending platform and waiting-room accommodation, erecting new stations, providing better water-supply, appointing Controlling Passenger Superintendents, etc. The third-class passenger contributes the largest amount to the railway earnings from passenger traffic; and, apart from other considerations, it may be good business to increase the attractions of travel for him.

§25. **Federal railway authority.**—By the Government of India Act of 1935 it is provided that, while the Federal Government and Legislature should exercise a general control over railway policy, the actual administration of railways in India (including those worked by companies) should be placed in the hands of a statutory railway authority which is to be the executive authority of the Federation in respect of the regulation, construction, maintenance and operation of railways. The railway authority is to act on business principles consistently with due regard paid to the interests of agriculture, industry, commerce and the general public. In the discharge of its functions it is to be guided by such instructions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the Federal Government.

Not less than three-sevenths of the members of the authority are to be persons appointed by the Governor-General in his discretion, who is also to appoint one of the members as President.

The authority is to establish, maintain and control a fund (to be called the Railway Fund), and moneys received by the authority, whether on revenue or capital account, in discharge of their functions and all moneys provided out of the revenues of the Federation to enable the authority to discharge its functions will be paid into this fund and all its expenditure will be defrayed out of the fund.

The Governor-General may from time to time appoint a Railway Rates Committee to give advice to the authority in connexion with any dispute between persons using a railway and the authority as to rates and traffic facilities which he may require the authority to refer to the Committee.

A Bill or amendment making provision for regulating the rates or fares to be charged on any railways cannot be introduced or moved in either Chamber of the Federal Legislature except on the recommendation of the Governor-General.

The Governor-General is empowered to make rules requiring the authority and any Federated State to give notice in such cases as the rules may prescribe of any proposal for constructing a railway or for altering the alignment or gauge of a railway and to deposit plans.

Any objections on the part of the authority or a Federated State on the ground that the carrying out of the proposal will result in unfair or uneconomic competition with a Federal railway or a State railway must be referred by the Governor-General to a Railway Tribunal which is to consist of a President (appointed from among the judges of the Federal Court by the Governor-General after consultation with the Chief Justice of India) and two other persons selected to act in each case by the Governor-General from a panel of eight persons with railway, administrative or business experience.

An appeal will lie to the Federal Court from any decision of the Railway Tribunal on a question of law.¹

These provisions of the Government of India Act (1935) regarding the Federal Railway Authority have met with considerable opposition on the ground that they considerably detract from the legislative and popular control over railway policy and administration. This also explains the adverse criticism of the recommendations recently (1937) made by the Wedgwood Committee with a view to the avoidance of political and administrative interference with the Federal Railway Authority.²

§26. Economic effects of railways.³—The advantages of railways (as of other means of annihilating distance) from the national, social and cultural point of view are obvious and need not be dwelt upon here. Efficient administration, as well as military defence, internal and external, also requires a properly developed system of railway communications. The economic effects of railways are most important. Famine relief in a country like India necessarily depends on an efficient railway system for quick conveyance of food-stuffs to the affected areas. Further, railways give a powerful impetus to the general economic advance of a country; bring about an equalization of prices throughout the country as well as their conformity with world prices; create new employment, and make possible a more even distribution of the population. They are an essential adjunct to the internal and external trade of the country and it is easy to show how passenger and goods traffic have grown with the extension of railways.

The railways have stimulated the agricultural producer in India by widening his markets. The rapid industrialization of the country largely hinges on a satisfactory railway development, facilitating the transport of coal and raw materials as well as the distribution of finished goods. Railways also stimulate

¹ See *Government of India Act (1935)*, §§181-99.

² *Report of the Indian Railway Inquiry Committee*, pars. 215-21.

³ See §1 of this chapter.

engineering industries and are intimately connected with the progress of telegraphic and postal communications. The effect of railways on the forests has been on the whole beneficial. Railway transport facilities and the demand for railway sleepers have greatly encouraged timber-growing. The growth of towns and port development are also rendered possible by railways. The invaluable assistance which railways can render in conducting various publicity campaigns for the improvement of sanitation as well as for the introduction of reform in agricultural practice has already been referred to.¹ Lastly, Government revenues benefit both directly and indirectly from the railways: directly, because the Government share in the profits from the railways, and indirectly, because they increase the total wealth of the country and consequently the taxable capacity of the people.

Railways, however, have not been an unmixed boon in India. We have already spoken of the part which railway construction has played in hastening the destruction of indigenous industries and in bringing about the one-sided economic development of the country, under which its exports consist almost entirely of raw materials, and its imports of manufactured articles. As regards the help derived from railways in the matter of organizing effective famine relief, we must not ignore the fact that there is another side to the picture. Railways have increased the ruralization of the country by contributing to the decline of the indigenous industries, and this has rendered large numbers of people, especially artisans like weavers, more susceptible to famine than they used to be. Thus if the railways have facilitated the work of famine relief, they may be said, on the other hand, to have increased the volume of this work. In the earlier days of railway development, the fuel requirements of railways led to the reckless destruction of forests until the Government took the necessary steps to check this process. Railway development in this country has also meant the introduction of foreign capital and foreign investment, and this, as we have already seen, has brought certain disadvantages along with some advantages.

§27. **Need for further railway development.**—Most of these adverse effects, however, are properly attributed not to railway construction as such but to the manner in which it was brought about and the undue haste that was displayed in connexion with it. It is of the greatest importance that, subject to proper safeguards, railway development should be pushed as fast as possible, in order

¹ See vol. I, ch. viii, §2.

to expedite the industrial and commercial progress of the country. That India is poorly provided with railways can be seen from the fact that, while Europe (excluding Russia) covers 1,660,000 sq. miles and has 190,000 miles of railways, India contains 1,803,000 sq. miles of country and has but 39,712 miles of railways (1928).¹

Particularly when judged by the standard of population, India is much worse provided with railway facilities than are many other countries. It would of course be absurd to contrast the railway mileage of agricultural India, with her vast mountain ranges, great river estuaries, wide-spreading deserts and barren places, with that of a highly industrialized, compact country like England, whose every square mile, almost, is made to contribute something to the national income. Further, it must be remembered that the need for communications in India can most effectively and cheaply be met in many cases by mechanized road transport and water carriage in preference to railways. But even after allowing for all this, there is undoubtedly a great deal of work which still remains to be done by way of extension of railways. It is also important that every possible effort should be made to raise the required capital in India, if only to keep within bounds the further growth of foreign capital in the country. Lastly, it is essential that railway industries should be developed and fostered along with railway construction. This is a matter which has so far been almost entirely neglected. The danger of India's dependence on outside supplies for railway materials and even for ordinary repairs was fully disclosed during the war of 1914-18. It is urged, therefore, that steps should be taken to put an end to this dependence. Otherwise also, in the general interests of industrialization, the case for indigenous railway industries is clear.

ROAD TRANSPORT

§28. **Recent road history.**—The unsatisfactory state of road transport in India about the middle of the last century has already been alluded to. The East India Company, being mainly a commercial corporation, neglected an important duty of a civilized Government in that it took little interest in road-making. The limited progress that was made was due to the initiative taken by individual administrators like Lord William Bentinck, who revived the idea of a highway connecting the north of India with Bengal,

¹ Speech of the President, Indian Railway Conference, 1928. The position has not materially changed since then.

resulting in the construction of the Grand Trunk Road linking Peshawar with Delhi and Calcutta. The little importance attached by the Company to the road needs of the civil population is shown by the fact that roads were then placed in charge of Provincial Military Boards instead of being entrusted to a special Public Works Department.

India, however, entered upon a new epoch of road-making during the time of Lord Dalhousie, who, in addition to his active interest in the promotion of railways, also initiated a more vigorous road policy, and for this purpose, over and above the central Public Works Department, there were created in 1855 similar departments in each province replacing the old Military Boards. A second factor which has promoted road development during the last eighty-five years has been the influence of railways. As railway construction proceeded apace it became increasingly necessary to build roads to feed the railways rather than to compete with them, 'leading to a demand, which remains today far from being completely satisfied, for bridged and metalled roads at right angles to the railways and giving access to them in all the seasons of the year'.¹ It is necessary, however, to point out that the extension of railways and the intimate financial interest of the Government in their profitable working has led to a certain neglect of roads, especially of trunk roads where they run parallel to the railways.² The progressive policy of Lord Mayo and Lord Ripon with regard to local self-government, under which local control over local affairs was provided, acted to some extent as a stimulus to road development. The total effect of all these factors is reflected in a considerable activity in road-building during the last eighty years or so. 'The Grand Trunk Road has been extended from the Ganges valley to Peshawar, good metalled arterial and district roads have been driven over the plains and through the hills of every part of India, and thousands of miles of serviceable *kachcha* or non-metalled roads and useful bridle-tracks have been made. There can be no question that every district in India has immensely increased the amount of wheeled transport within its limits, even during the past two or three decades, and the extent of this expansion is a measure of the growth of India's road-system and of its economic value to her people.'³

§29. **The main features of India's road system.**—There exist at present four great trunk roads stretching across the country, with

¹ *Agricultural Commission Report*, p. 370.

² See *Road Development Committee Report*, par. 17.

³ *India in 1926-7*, p. 261.

which most of the important subsidiary roads are linked. The most famous of the trunk roads is the ancient marching route for armies, known as the Grand Trunk Road, which stretches right across the northern part of the country from Khyber to Calcutta; the other three connect Calcutta with Madras, Madras with Bombay and Bombay with Delhi. These four main roads accounted for about 5,000 out of the 82,299 miles of metalled roads in British India in 1936-7.¹ Southern India is most favoured both as regards the number and the satisfactory character of its subsidiary roads. The worst-served regions are Rajputana, Sind, parts of the Punjab, Orissa and Bengal. Aridity, sparseness of population, unbridged and unbridgeable waterways, difficulties of the ground and lack of suitable road materials are some of the obstacles that have prevented more rapid progress. Besides metalled roads there is a very large mileage of *kachcha* (unmetalled) roads in British India, being 231,882 miles in 1936-7, some of which provide quite good going for motor traffic during the dry weather.

On the whole, however, the total mileage of 314,181 of metalled (82,299) and unmetalled (231,882) roads in 1936-7² must be regarded as meagre considering the continental dimensions of the country. It would be reasonable to say that India's road system even before the advent of motor transport was altogether insufficient for her needs.

This deficiency³ of roads is keenly felt in rural areas in respect of smaller feeder roads connecting with trunk roads or the railway line, and many a village continues to be inaccessible and is denied facilities of communication.

Apart from the inadequate equipment of the country in the matter of roads and, at any rate until recently, the lack of system and continuity in the road programme, another unsatisfactory feature is the fact that existing roads have been allowed to deteriorate in recent years. This deterioration has been most marked in the case of roads maintained by local bodies. Their poor resources have been mainly responsible for this state of affairs. We must, however, reckon with a new factor in the situation, namely the astonishing rapidity with which motor

¹ The Government have recently sanctioned the construction of a through trunk road from Bombay to Ahmedabad.

² Out of the total road mileage (314,181 in 1936-7) in British India, 46,827 miles of roads were maintained by the Public Works Department, 18,433 by municipalities and 248,921 by District and Local Boards. See *Statistical Abstract for British India* (1937-8), Table No. 223.

³ The Agricultural Commission (1928) point out that while there are 80 miles of roads per 100 sq. miles of area in the U.S.A., there are only 20 miles of roads per 100 sq. miles of area in India (*Report*, par. 299).

traffic both of private cars and especially of the public motor omnibus has sprung up all over India in recent years, thus creating an entirely new range of problems of road construction and maintenance. It is true that the motor lorry has scarcely affected the use of the bullock-cart for the conveyance of agricultural produce and manufactured articles, even over long distances, owing, *inter alia*, to the difficulties presented by the hopeless condition of many roads and the presence of many unbridged rivers even on the arterial roads, and the competition of railways. But as these difficulties are overcome, we may expect a considerable part of the goods traffic to be captured by mechanized transport, especially in view of the improvements that are taking place in the trucks. This development is especially likely in hill tracts, where railway construction would not be economical, but a motorable road is possible. In the vicinity of large towns, again, motor transport has another opportunity in respect of carriage of perishable goods.

§90. **Need for more roads.**—We need hardly stress the importance of good road communications in a continental country with predominant agricultural interests and with its industries struggling to develop. As the Agricultural Commission remark: 'Transportation is an integral part of marketing, and modern commercial development tends everywhere to enhance the value and importance of good road communication.' India has a large volume of internal and external trade capable of considerable expansion in the future. Also, the provision of good communications is the surest way of stimulating agricultural production and raising the standard of life in rural areas. Incidentally it will lessen the constant strain on the health and stamina of draught animals and increase their efficiency. Again, roads will be of particular assistance for the development of industries connected with the preparation of agricultural produce for export or internal consumption. They will also facilitate the decentralization of industries—the undue concentration of which at present is a source of many of their difficulties, especially in connexion with labour-supply and housing. They will bring within the bounds of possibility the establishment of 'garden factories', and thus evolve the form of industrialism most suited to the needs of the Indian worker, who thrives best in a rural environment. The example of foreign countries should serve both as an encouragement and a warning. The United States and Denmark owe not a little of their prosperity to their excellent system of communications and mechanized transport. On the other hand, the blighting influence of poor communications is illustrated by

Russia, which, in spite of great agricultural resources, has been at times scarcely able to feed the population in her towns and industrial areas, while the wheat has been rotting in her rich southern fields. Lastly, the large forest wealth of India can only be exploited effectively with the help of suitable road transport.

§31. **Roads versus railways.**—Though a considerable expansion of railways has been planned for the near future, it is hardly likely that for many years to come this vast country will be provided adequately with railways as judged by its needs and the standards attained in many foreign countries. In order to open up the hinterland and link it with the large industrial centres and ports, reliance will have to be placed to a very great extent on roads. A network of arterial and feeder roads is what the country requires. No doubt the construction of roads involves heavy initial expenditure and further expenditure for maintenance and repairs from year to year. The railways are, however, an even more costly form of inland transport, at any rate, for local traffic. For relatively lighter traffic and for short distances the road is probably more suitable, especially as it can be constructed almost anywhere at a considerably lower cost than a railway.¹ At the same time it must be remembered that conditions of weather in India, often alternating between extreme dryness for many months of the year and continuous and heavy rainfall concentrated in a short period, render the maintenance of roads capable of carrying heavy motor traffic extremely expensive, and the advantage here would probably be on the side of railways. Generally speaking, however, road transport will be cheaper than railway transport, as it does not require stations, sheds, signals, sidings, etc.; nor does it involve any loss of time at the termini with their special charges; nor encounter problems of carrying half-empty wagons, and of allowing a good deal of rolling stock to remain idle, and so forth. It has, however, been pointed out that the cheapness of road transport is in some measure due to the fact that the heavy cost of maintaining roads suitable for mechanized transport has to be borne at present mostly by the general taxpayer, while the railways themselves have to pay for the whole cost and upkeep of their permanent way. But even if motor traffic is made to bear a substantial part of the charge of maintaining the roadways, road transport will generally retain the advantage of greater cheapness. This applies, as already stated, to lighter traffic and

¹ In days to come the aeroplane will have no rival for the quick transport over thousands of miles of light and valuable goods.

short journeys. On the other hand, the railways will hold their own and will be a more convenient and economical form of transport for heavy loads and longer distances, owing, among other things, to their much smaller running charges. Over a certain part of the field, roads and railways are alternative and competitive. Over another not insignificant part, however, they are complementary and mutually helpful. This point has been well put thus. 'The road system links up the cultivator's holding with the local markets and the nearest railway station, while the railway provides the connecting links between the area of production and consumers at a distance, and between the manufacturer in the town and the cultivator who purchases his ploughs, his fertilizers, or his cloth. Without good roads and sufficient roads, no railway can collect for transport enough produce to render its operations possible, while the best of roads cannot place the producer of crops in touch with the consumer.'¹ There is therefore no reason to suppose that the national investment of some Rs. 800 crores in railways is likely to be jeopardized by the extension of road communications. In fact, as the Railway Board's *Memorandum to the Road Development Committee* points out, railways in India have always been acutely conscious of the lack of roads to feed them. No doubt, a certain amount of competition between railways and roads cannot be avoided, and the railways in India are feeling the pressure of this competition, not only in the neighbourhood of large cities and suburbs, but also in other parts of the country where motor services run parallel to or short-circuit railway routes, as between Poona and Ahmednagar. The general policy adopted by the railway administration is to afford to the public an equal or better service than road transport can give, while taking full advantage of the additional business brought to railways by such motor transport as can act as feeder or distributor. Motor services have often been started because the railways have failed to meet the public demand in some way or other. Their competition has thus been sometimes advantageous from the public point of view in so far as it has forced the railways to attend better to the needs of the public.

§32. Counter-measures to meet road competition.—Among the methods of meeting road competition are railway omnibus services such, for example, as those run by the East Indian Railway, sentinel coaches and shuttle trains, time-table adjustments, cheap return tickets, third-class zone season tickets, quotation of special

¹ *Agricultural Commission Report*, par. 312.

terms for marriage parties, special trains at concession rates, greater publicity for railway services, facilities and charges.¹ The Wedgwood Committee recommend a series of counter-measures for dealing with road competition.² As regards passenger traffic, they favour faster passenger trains, better connexions, more intensive services, and improved amenities for lower-class passengers. They deprecate any wholesale reduction of fares to meet road competition. Fares should only be reduced locally to meet specific cases of diversion or threats of diversion. Indian railways should do more to develop traffic through booking agencies. It may be noted here that the commercial side of railway administration is being strengthened in recent years as recommended by the Wedgwood Committee. As regards goods traffic, the Committee recommend faster goods trains, more expeditious handling of goods, simplification of clerical formalities, development of collection and delivery services, use of containers and of railway-owned refrigerator trucks, etc. As modern conditions demand quicker transit, it is desirable for railways to sacrifice full wagon loads or train loads in the interest of better service. A general reduction of rates to meet road competition would involve the railways in a heavy loss of revenue. The railways should, therefore, continue their policy of judicious reductions in individual rates.³

§33. **Transport co-ordination policy.**—While it may thus be difficult to arrange for a policy of co-ordination between the two forms of transport, it is possible to adjust new programmes of road and railway extension in such a way that roads may serve rather as feeders of the railways than competitors for such traffic as the railway is capable of handling more efficiently and economically, and to avoid in India the senseless and wasteful competition between rail and motor traffic that is today taking place in many European countries. Funds available for capital expenditure on transport should be largely devoted to the construction of roads in such a way as not to duplicate existing transport facilities, precedence being given to the construction and development of non-competitive roads in areas with little or no transport facilities. Careful co-ordination is necessary to ensure the allocation to each different form of transport service of work for which it is best suited. The Mitchell-Kirkness Report recommends

¹ *Report of the Railway Board on Indian Railways (1939-40)*, pars. 62-4.

² For particulars regarding the action taken by the Government of India on the various recommendations contained in the Report of the Wedgwood Committee see *Railway Budgets*, (1938-9) pars. 8-10 and (1939-40) pars. 9-17.

³ *Indian Railway Enquiry Report*, pars. 169-89. See also §34 below.

for this purpose the creation of a Central Advisory Board of Communications in the provinces and Divisional Committees in the Commissioners' Divisions. This Report was the result of an inquiry which was conducted during 1932-3 by a small committee of two officers, Mr K. G. Mitchell, Road Engineer with the Government of India and Mr L. H. Kirkness, Officer on Special Duty with the Railway Board, into existing road and railway competition. Their Report suggests a better control of motor transport as one of the methods of making this competition fair.¹ The Road-Rail Conference which was convened, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Mitchell-Kirkness Committee, at Simla in April 1933 adopted resolutions relating to questions concerning the co-ordination of effort between the various authorities responsible for the development and control of the different forms of transport so as to reduce uneconomic competition between them. Among other methods the Conference favoured the removal of the statutory embargo on certain railways operating road motor services, the grant of monopolies of road transport services with a view to developing rural services, and the creation of machinery at the centre and in the provinces designed to secure the co-ordination proposed. The Railway Act was accordingly amended in September 1933, empowering railways to run motor services in conjunction with rail transport. A Transport Advisory Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of roads in the various provinces or their representatives, with one or two Council advisers, has also been recently (1935) formed. Its function is to arrive at a considered statement of road policy which might be generally acted upon by the provinces for the furtherance of the co-ordinated development of road, rail, and other forms of transport—a purpose of the very highest importance for the economic development of the country.² The establishment in November 1937 of the new Department of Communications in charge of a Member (of the Executive Council of the Governor-General-in-Council) for Communications, as recommended by the Road Development Committee, has rendered easier the adoption of a policy of transport co-ordination in the country. The new Department has taken over railways, posts and telegraphs, civil aviation, broadcasting, meteorology, roads, ports and inland navigation.

§34. **Wedgwood Committee on rail-road co-ordination.**—The Wedgwood Committee recently (1937) examined the question of

¹ See *Mitchell-Kirkness Report*, p. 24.

² For an instructive discussion of the question of co-ordination see S. K. Guha, *Problems of Transport Co-ordination in India*.

the co-ordination of rail and road transport. The Committee find that regulation of road transport by Provincial Governments is inadequate and that conditions are chaotic. The policy hitherto followed by the Provincial Governments encourages an unorganized and inefficient type of road transport whose competition will cripple the railways without providing a trustworthy service on the roads; whilst on the other hand, the control exercised by the Central Government on the expenditure on roads from the Road Fund (see §§38-40 below) can only be made effective by delaying or restricting the provision of an adequate road system, which is a public need of the first order quite irrespective of the railways. In this way, a continuance of the present policy seems certain to give India the worst of both worlds—unprosperous railways and inadequate roads.¹ Effective co-ordination can only be brought about by operating both road and rail transport as public services. The committee do not agree with the view expressed by critics of the railways that regulation of road transport is advocated merely for the sake of protecting the railways. Proper regulation of road transport is necessary not only in the interest of safety but also to guide its own development along sound and economic lines. It is also desirable that the railways should be protected against unfair and uneconomic inroads by a new competitor. The regulation of roads should be carried out by Provincial Governments in accordance with uniform principles enacted by the Central Government. No restrictions, however, should be imposed on road transport which would unfairly hamper its development. Measures of regulation should be common to buses and lorries in the interest of public safety. Licenses should be issued in accordance with public need so as to avoid excessive provision and maldistribution of road transport facilities. Passenger services should be regulated by a system of route-licensing, and time-tables and fares should be fixed. The Committee recommend a system of regional licensing for goods vehicles and suggest statutory provision in order that goods rates may be regulated at some future date. The same system of regulation should be applied to private lorries as to public lorries. Police control for enforcing provincial rules should be strengthened and the provinces should aim at uniformity in the taxation of motor vehicles.

The Wedgwood Committee strongly recommend participation in road transport by railways and to this end propose that railways should have full powers to run road services, to invest money in

¹ *Report*, par. 138.

or enter into working agreements with road transport undertakings and to arrange road transport services through contractors. The railways should immediately examine the possibility of passenger and road services and place their proposals both as regards competitive and feeder services before the Provincial Governments. The State-owned railways in India are gradually implementing these recommendations. Finally the Committee urge the importance of voluntary co-ordination between railways and the more responsible elements in the road transport industry.¹

§35. **Regulation of road motor traffic.**—In the light of the recent report of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Committee, the Wedgwood Committee, and consultations held with the various Provincial Governments, as well as the third (1937) Transport Advisory Council, the Central Legislature enacted the Motor Vehicles Act in 1939. It supersedes the earlier Act of 1914 which was found inadequate to deal with the rapid growth of motor transport. The new Act came into force on 1 July 1939.

The Act has two main aspects, (i) regulating and (ii) co-ordinating. Its general scheme is that control of transport vehicles carrying passengers or goods for hire or otherwise should be in the hands of regional transport authorities constituted for specified areas within the province, and that for the purpose of co-ordination, hearing appeals, etc., there should also be constituted a provincial transport authority for the whole province. A person who has any financial interest in any transport undertaking cannot be appointed, or continue as, a member of any such transport authority. All motor vehicles must be covered by a permit issued by the regional transport authority of an area, and the holder should be required to observe certain well-recognized conditions, such as satisfactory maintenance of the vehicle, the observance of prescribed speed limits, and the avoidance of overcrowding the vehicle or overworking the drivers.² The constitution of the provincial authority is permissive. It may be required for purposes of co-ordination, or to settle differences between regional authorities, or to increase control over through routes.

In granting permits for motor buses and taxis the transport authorities are required to bear in mind certain general guiding principles, viz. public necessity and convenience, the prevention of uneconomic competition, and the suitability of the roads to carry

¹ *Indian Railway Inquiry Committee Report*, pars. 135-67.

² Their hours of work are restricted to 9 in one day, and 54 in the week. Provision has been made for a minimum rest interval of half an hour after five hours of work.

the forms of transport seeking permits. In the case of public goods traffic, the principle adopted is that, while the transport of perishable goods by road over short distances, in order to avoid the delay and damage caused by terminal transshipment, should not be interfered with, long-distance traffic should be left primarily to railways. The necessary control over road transport is vested with the Provincial Governments. It is provided that a route-permit holder, in return for the security given to him against unreasonable competition, should maintain a regular service, i.e. have the responsibility of a public utility company. Power is to be given to the regulating authorities to fix minimum and maximum rates for traffic on the roads.

A notable feature of the Act—and the one which has caused the most acute controversy—is the provision relating to compulsory insurance of motor vehicles in respect of third party risks. This provision, which is to come into operation on 1 July 1943, may be welcomed in view of the numerous motor accidents on roads in this country. It is essential for enforcing the social responsibility of public carriers.

It is provided that motor licenses should be valid throughout British India, without detriment to the right of a province to fix its own motor taxation. Applicants for new licenses would be required to pass a special prescribed test.

Although some of the features of the new Act have given rise to controversy it is non-contentious in principle and has been rightly described as a 'highway code'. There is a welcome and growing recognition of the necessity of evolving order out of chaos and of devising measures for the safety and convenience of the public and of the development of a co-ordinated system of transport.

§36. Indian Road Development Committee.—The rapid extension of motor traffic in India in recent years¹ has led to a growing realization on the part of the Imperial and the Provincial Governments of the necessity of a comprehensive road programme to co-ordinate local programmes and evolve a common policy. Road Boards have already been established in Bombay, Madras, the Punjab, and the United Provinces. These Boards are mainly advisory, except in the Punjab, where the Board is also entrusted with the distribution of grants-in-aid from provincial funds. In November 1927, the Government of India appointed the Road Development Committee, consisting of fourteen members of the Central Legislature and presided over by Mr M. R. Jayakar.

¹ The total number of all classes of motor vehicles running in British India up to the end of March 1939 was 159,245 (including 39,922 heavy motor vehicles (lorries, buses, etc.). *Review of the Trade of India* (1938-9), p. 101.

The Committee were asked to make recommendations on (i) the desirability of developing the road system of India ; (ii) the means by which such development could most suitably be financed ; and (iii) the co-ordination of road development and research and road construction by the formation of a Central Road Board, with due regard to the distribution of central and provincial functions.

§37. **Road finance.**—As the Indian Road Development Committee observe, 'road development in India is passing beyond the financial capacity of Local Governments and local bodies, and is becoming a national interest, which may, to some extent, be a proper charge on central revenues'. The central revenues benefit from the development of roads, not only through enhanced railway receipts, but also through customs and excise receipts from motors and motor spirit, which are rapidly expanding. A well-balanced scheme of motor taxation should include duty on motor spirit, vehicle taxation, and license fees for vehicles plying for hire ; and the proceeds should be spent on road development. It has been suggested that a reclassification of roads should be made so as to transfer some of the local roads to the category of arterial roads, and thus reduce the burden on local bodies and enable them to devote more attention to feeder roads and roads of purely local importance. As the Road Committee point out, the iniquity of causing the smaller units of government to bear all the cost of main-road improvements seems to be recognized all over the world. The local bodies also require more liberal financial assistance from provincial funds. The adoption of the above recommendations made by the Road Committee would indirectly benefit village roads by the release of provincial revenues and local funds, which are now being spent on main roads to meet the requirements of motor transport. The Road Committee also favour contributions by the railway administration towards the construction and maintenance of feeder roads. The Committee deprecate the levy of road tolls on any traffic (except tolls on bridges where a definite service is provided to replace a ferry or a bad river-crossing) as being obstructive to a rapid form of road transport and as causing harassment to traffic of all kinds. They should be replaced, where necessary, by a less vexatious form of taxation. The Agricultural Commission recommend the revival of the old system of corporate labour of the village community which may receive financial assistance from the Government, provided it is prepared to do its part of the job.

It remains to consider how far road development may properly be financed from loans. The Agricultural Commission express the view that the policy of road development would be much

better carried out if, instead of relying solely on current revenues, loans were raised for financing road programmes. They hold that in view of the quasi-permanent character of the roads and the works connected with them, the annual amount required for the amortization of provincial loans raised for this purpose should not be a heavy charge on the resources of a province for the upkeep of local village roads.¹ The Road Committee hold that the propriety of raising such loans must be decided by each local Government for itself according to its circumstances. They deprecate large schemes of road expansion financed by loans, for the service of which provincial revenue might be mortgaged for long periods while other departments of the Government which may not be less important may be starved. They recommend that only construction or reconstruction should be financed from loans; that loans should be for short periods; that there should be revenue clearly in sight to cover not only the interest and sinking fund charges, but also the cost of maintaining the road when constructed, and that construction from loans should preferably be confined to the more permanent parts of a project such as a bridge, the life of which can be estimated with fair accuracy for the calculation of the sinking fund, while the cost of maintenance is small. The Road-Rail Conference of 1933 recommended that a comprehensive plan should be drawn up with a view to examining the possibility of development of both main and subsidiary roads from loan funds within the limit of the resources available for maintenance. The Hon. Mr R. H. Parker, presiding over the twelfth annual general meeting of the Indian Roads and Transport Development Association, Ltd., held in Bombay in June 1940, advocated a new road policy with proper financial arrangements for the provision of roads and their maintenance. He indicated the contrast between the methods of financing railways and roads. Whereas the railways had been built and equipped out of borrowed money or share capital, roads had in the main been built out of revenue. It was really impracticable to make adequate provision for roads except by using borrowed monies for the purpose. (See however §40 below.)

§38. **The new road policy.**—In accordance with the principal recommendation of the Road Committee, the Indian Finance Act of March 1929 introduced an increase in the import and excise duties on motor spirit from 4 to 6 annas per gallon (from which an additional revenue of Rs. 94 lakhs was received in the year 1929-30). Sir B. N. Mitra tabled a resolution in the Assembly

¹ *Agricultural Commission Report*, par. 306.

on 11 September 1929, in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 70 to 79 of the Road Committee's discussions. The principal features of the Convention embodied in the above resolution are as follows:—(i) To ensure some continuity in road programmes, the increased duties on motor spirit shall be maintained for a period of five years in the first instance. (ii) The proceeds of the additional duty during the same period shall be allotted as a block grant for expenditure on road development to be credited to a separate road development account, the unexpended balances of which shall not lapse at the end of the financial year. (iii) The annual grant shall be divided as follows:—(a) The Government of India shall retain ten per cent as reserve for two years ending 31 March 1931, and the position shall be reviewed thereafter. From this reserve special grants may be made, where for some reason there is need for special aid, for example for projects beyond the resources of local Governments or those that concern more than one province or State, or a bridge over a river on a provincial or State boundary. (b) Out of the remainder (1) an apportionment shall be made among the provinces in the ratio which the consumption of petrol in each province bears to the total consumption in India in the preceding calendar year; (2) the balance representing the consumption of petrol in minor provinces, administrations and Indian States shall be allotted as a lump sum to the Government of India. (iv) Grants shall be made to each province for expenditure on such schemes as are approved by the Governor-General-in-Council with the advice of the Standing Committee for Roads. (v) A Standing Committee for Roads shall be constituted every year, consisting of certain elected and nominated members of both the Houses of the Indian Legislature, under the chairmanship of the member of the Governor-General's Executive Council in charge of the department that deals with roads. This Committee shall advise the Governor-General-in-Council on all matters relating to roads including central research on roads, and any action to be taken by the Government of India on the proceedings of the periodical road conferences. (vi) All proposals for expenditure from the annual grant or its accumulated balance shall be submitted for approval to the Finance Sub-Committee, consisting of the Chairman of the Standing Committee for Roads and of its members who are also members of the Legislative Assembly.

This Convention was adopted by the Assembly at the Delhi Session (February-March 1930) for a period of five years.

As recommended by the Road Committee a certain amount of co-ordination between the Centre and the Provinces is being

effected through periodical road conferences of representatives of the Government of India and local Governments, who meet from time to time to exchange views on matters of common concern. In accordance with the Committee's recommendation a Road Engineer to the Government of India, who also acts as secretary to the Road Conference, has been appointed.

§39. **Financial position of the road account.**—The total revenue during the first five years of the Road Development Account amounted to Rs. 518 lakhs. The revenue actually credited to the account (up to 30 September 1933) before the close of the year was some Rs. 460 lakhs. After deducting 10 per cent for the reserve, the balance available for distribution was Rs. 414 lakhs. Of this Rs. 344 lakhs was distributed to the ten Governors' provinces, the individual shares varying from Rs. 75 lakhs for Bombay and Rs. 60 lakhs for Madras and Bengal, to about Rs. 9 lakhs for Assam and Rs. 8 lakhs for the North-West Frontier Province. The expenditure in the nine provinces excluding Burma was about Rs. 192 lakhs. In addition to this, on account of the prevailing financial position, five Provincial Governments were permitted to borrow about Rs. 55 lakhs from their share in the account. The unspent balance (about Rs. 97 lakhs) was carried forward. The appropriations to the Road Fund were Rs. 159 lakhs in 1934-5, Rs. 129 lakhs in 1935-6, Rs. 140 lakhs in 1936-7, Rs. 141 lakhs in 1937-8, Rs. 156 lakhs in 1938-9, and Rs. 161 lakhs in 1939-40.¹ The balance to the credit of the Road Fund amounted to Rs. 307 lakhs on 1 April 1940.

§40. **New road resolutions.**—(i) The probationary five years for which the road account was first instituted came to an end in 1933-4. As recommended by the Road-Rail Conference after consultations with Provincial Governments, a new resolution governing the road account was adopted by the Central Legislature in April 1934, which placed the account on a more or less permanent basis. It increased the reserve at the disposal of the Government of India from ten to fifteen per cent so as to enable them to deal more liberally with the less developed provinces. It provided for the service of loans for road development and in special cases for the maintenance of roads constructed from this account or from loans as admissible charges on the account.²

(ii) On the recommendation of the Transport Advisory Council a new Road Resolution regarding the allocation of grants from the Road Fund to the Provinces was passed in February 1937

¹ *Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India (1930-40).*

² *India in 1933-4*, p. 111.

by the Central Assembly. The main changes are as follows :
(a) The shares allocated for expenditure in the Governors' Provinces will in future be retained by the Governor-General-in-Council until they are actually required for expenditure in order to ensure prompt utilization of the money placed at the disposal of the provinces. (b) The Central Government has been empowered to resume the whole or any part of the sums which the Central Government might hold for expenditure in any province if the province delays without reasonable cause to utilize its share in the Road Fund for the purpose of road development. (c) But the most important change is effected by the clause which authorizes the Governor-General-in-Council to resume the share of a province if it fails to take such steps as he might recommend for the regulation and control of motor vehicles. This last provision has given rise to acute controversy and is resented by the provinces as amounting to unwarranted interference in their road policy by the Central Government, in order to protect the budgetary position of the railways. Sir Frank Noyce, speaking on behalf of the Central Government, argued that the object of the resolution was to secure a balanced system of communications. (d) The provision in the earlier resolution allowing the use of the Road Fund for defraying the charges on road loan was discontinued (without prejudice to the existing commitments) with a view to the impending inauguration of Provincial Autonomy.

Although this latest resolution on the Road Fund indicates the possibility of a clash between the Central Government and the provinces, no great friction need necessarily occur since under the ingenious financial scheme of Sir Otto Niemeyer for assignment of a share of the income-tax by the Government of India to the Provincial Governments, the provinces are interested in the solvency of the railways and in taking measures for not allowing motor transport seriously to damage railway earnings. (See ch. xi.) As already stated the necessary legislation for regulating road motor transport has already been placed on the statute book.

§41. **Proposed automobile factory for Bombay.**—We may conclude our treatment of Road Transport with a brief review of recent proposals for the establishment of the automobile industry in India. The growing volume of road motor transport and the needs of India's army for its own motor transport make it necessary as well as desirable for India to establish local motor manufacture and thus start an industry of great economic and national importance. India imported 29,083 motor vehicles and accessories valued at Rs. 8 crores in 1937. Sir M. Visvesvaraya was the first to advocate the local manufacture of motor cars in

India in 1936. The question was taken up by the National Planning Committee, which approved of his scheme in 1938. More recently (July 1940) it came into prominence in consequence of this scheme receiving the enthusiastic support of Mr Walchand Hirachand, the well-known shipping magnate and industrialist from Bombay, and other business men. It was proposed to float a joint-stock company with a capital of Rs. 2¼ crores and to start the factory at Matunga—a suburb of Bombay—under the technical advice of the Chrysler Corporation of America. The factory was designed to turn out 20,000 cars annually.

The automobile industry can command several advantages. India has a vast potential market. She has skilled labour, iron and steel, leather and other necessary raw materials. Government control of imports, high import duty and marine insurance rates, expensive freight charges and a favourable exchange (rupee-dollar) ratio will protect the new industry. The Government of India could further encourage the new industry by making their purchases for the army requirements from the proposed company, granting suitable tariff concessions in respect of imports of parts and raw materials, etc.

At the same time there are certain difficulties at this juncture which were stressed in a *communiqué* issued on 18 December 1940 by the Government of India. In the first place, it is very difficult to bring to India the various essentials required for automobile production, such as machinery and technicians. Moreover as there are already several assembly plants in the country, the Government's assistance can only be justified for an enterprise which deals with the manufacture as distinct from the assembly of the automobile. The only project placed before the Government is confined to the assembly of imported parts in the first instance, and later to partial manufacture. It is unfortunate that while the Government of India appreciate the wisdom of proceeding by stages, they feel that they are not in a position to extend the requisite help to the industry, owing to the needs of their own ammunition factories in respect of imports of machinery and technical personnel.¹ These difficulties must be overcome in order that this vital industry should be established in the country before long.

Apart from its value for the defence of the country, its establishment is calculated to confer substantial benefits. It will save an annual bill of Rs. 8 crores for imports of motor vehicles and accessories. It will spread mechanical skill of the highest order

¹ *Indian Finance* (Eastern Group Number), 1940, pp. 69-76.

among Indian workmen and facilitate the establishment of high-class machine industries indispensable for developing the manufacture of locomotives and of armaments and aeroplanes urgently needed for the country's defence. Lastly when the automobile industry is established there will come into existence several subsidiary industries.

WATER TRANSPORT

§42. (i) **Inland waterways.**—With reference to India the discussion of the subject of water transport may conveniently fall under two broad divisions: (i) inland waterways, and (ii) marine transport.

India is not favoured by nature to the same extent as England with rivers which serve the purpose of natural waterways. We have already noted the contrast in this respect between the rivers in northern India and those of the peninsula.¹ It is stated that there are about 26,000 miles of navigable waterways in connexion with the great river systems of northern India. The Indus, and its tributaries the Chenab and the Sutlej, the Ganges, and the Hooghly and the Brahmaputra, are navigable by steamers all the year round, or for the greater part of the year, for hundreds of miles above their mouths or above the heads of navigable canals traversing their deltas.

The rivers in the peninsula do not, however, lend themselves to navigation. According to seasons they either flow in torrents or are reduced to mere strings of pools amidst a wilderness of sand or deep gorges, making navigation impracticable. The rocky beds and swift floods of some of the rivers, like the Nerbada and Tapti, are insuperable obstacles to navigation. The Mahanadi, the Godavari and the Kistna are indeed navigable in their upper reaches, but the traffic on them is not very considerable.

In addition to these somewhat restricted facilities for river traffic in the country, there are all round the coast innumerable small rivers, creeks and backwaters affording facilities for water transport which are fully utilized by small indigenous craft; but outside the zone of such operations inland navigation is practically confined to the deltas and valleys of the great rivers which form the natural waterways of the country.

Inland navigation was largely resorted to in the old days and there was a considerable volume of river traffic in the time of the Mauryan and the Mogul empires. For example, the Ganges was the great natural highway of commerce, and on its banks

¹ Vol. I, ch. ii, §10.

flourished towns like Mirzapur, which was a great centre of trade between central India and Bengal. Since the advent of railways, however, inland navigation has received a set-back. As the Industrial Commission point out: 'In the absence of a representative specially charged with their interests (that is, those of the existing waterways) the vested interests of the railways have prevented waterways in India from receiving the attention that has been given to them in other countries with such satisfactory results.'¹ The Acworth Committee also repeat the view that waterways have suffered by unfair competition on the part of the railways, and they cite the case of the river port of Broach in Bombay and the Buckingham Canal in Madras in support of their contention.

At one time there was a good deal of agitation in favour of navigable canals.² Sir Arthur Cotton, 'the architect of the magnificent Kaveri and Godavari works', prepared an ambitious scheme of navigable canals, which was put before a Parliamentary Committee in 1872. He contended that water-carriage facilities were more suitable for India and less expensive than railways—which then seemed to have failed miserably—and had the further advantage that they could sometimes be combined with irrigation. The scheme was suffered to be dropped, however, because of the heavy expenditure (£30 million) it entailed, and even more because it was difficult for Englishmen to understand the value of canals in India, as experience in their own country seemed to decide the case in favour of railways. The opposition on the part of the railways in India was another factor.

The construction of navigable canals, either in conjunction with irrigation or for transport pure and simple, did indeed appear particularly attractive at a time when the railways were a losing concern. Much of the enthusiasm for it, however, was lost with the turn in the tide and the commencement of railway profits at the beginning of the present century. There are only a few navigable canals today, such as the Ganges Canal from Hardwar to Cawnpore, and the Buckingham Canal parallel to the east coast in Madras. The numerous irrigation canals are for the most part not suitable as waterways. The two types of canal cannot often be well combined together. Generally speaking, navigation cannot be maintained during the season of short supply of water without detriment to irrigation. Irrigation canals are moreover usually shallow and circuitous in their course and pass through sparsely populated rural regions to serve the needs

¹ *Industrial Commission Report*, par. 279.

² See Dutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-77.

of cultivation. Canals for navigation must, on the other hand, pass through industrial and commercial centres in order to attract a sufficient volume of business. Conditions are, however, more favourable in the deltaic tracts of Bengal, Orissa, Sind and Madras.

In spite of the physical limitations imposed upon inland navigation in India there still appears to be some room for improvement in the existing waterways. The Industrial Commission recommend that the Government of India should take up the question and see to it that the railway and waterway administrations work together harmoniously for those parts of the country which are served by both, and that the proposal of forming a Waterways Trust should receive careful consideration.¹ Inland waterways, properly developed, would relieve congestion in the railway system and serve the needs of small-scale transport in the country. It may also be possible to adapt at least some of the irrigation canals to the needs of navigation.² Regulation, development and control of the rivers and waterways through provincial and inter-provincial commissions for the benefit of agriculture and industry has recently been suggested by the National Planning Committee (1938).³

§43. (ii) **Marine transport.**—As regards external water transport, although India does not possess the advantages of England with her indented coastline and natural harbours, she occupies a maritime position of considerable importance. As S. N. Haji remarks: 'A country set like a pendant among the vast continents of the Old World, with a coastline of over 4,000 miles and with a productiveness of numerous articles of great use, unsurpassed elsewhere, is by nature meant to be a seafaring country. Her ports are adequate in size and numbers to meet the various requirements of her products.'⁴

Perhaps the picture is drawn here in excessively bright colours and does not give sufficient weight to India's deficiency of natural harbours. At the same time, as already pointed out, she may well aspire to become one of the principal carriers of the world on account of her extensive seaboard and her favourable position in respect of the rest of the world. Till about the beginning of the

¹ *Industrial Commission Report*, par. 279.

² Mr Neogy moved in the Assembly in January 1930 the consideration of a Bill to amend the Inland Steam Vessels Act. The amended Act, as passed by the Assembly and accepted by the Government, seeks to develop Indian inland water transport by fixing maximum and minimum rates.

³ *National Planning Committee*, Series No. I, p. 14.

⁴ *Economics of Shipping*, pp. 365-6.

nineteenth century, India could be spoken of as a great seafaring country. 'Ship-building was in so excellent a condition in India that ships could be (and were) built which sailed to the Thames in company with British-built ships and under the convoy of British frigates. The Governor-General in 1800, reporting to his masters in Leadenhall Street, London, said: "The port of Calcutta contains about 10,000 tons of shipping, built in India, of a description calculated for the conveyance of cargoes to England." The teakwood vessels of Bombay are greatly superior to the "oaken" walls of old England.'¹

Speaking of the period at the death of Akbar, Moreland points out that the great bulk of the commerce in the Indian seas was carried in ships built in India, and that India had also great passenger ships much larger than any in contemporary Europe with the exception of the ships built by the Portuguese.

The introduction of iron-built ships, however, deprived India of her differential advantage in respect of plentiful supplies of excellent timber. The rapid improvement in naval architecture and the introduction of mechanized sea transport, the jealousy of the British shipping interests and the operation of the British Navigation Acts, which were applied to India as she came more and more under British control, may be regarded as the chief causes which led to the decay of Indian shipping.²

§4f. *The difficulties of Indian enterprise in shipping.*—We may now proceed to indicate the position held by Indians in the coastwise and the oceanic trade of India. The total value of our coastal trade in 1937-8 (after the separation of Burma from British India) amounted to Rs. 87 crores. This value, and the tonnage engaged in the coasting trade of India, are capable of extension if harbour facilities are improved and the co-operation of railways ensured. The growth of an Indian mercantile marine controlled predominantly by Indians ought to stimulate the coastwise trade, as also the present Government policy of improving harbour facilities, evidenced by the development at Vizagapatam and Cochin.

The total value of the sea-borne trade of India in merchandise and treasure was estimated at Rs. 639·85 crores for the post-war average. It has seriously declined in recent years as we have already seen owing to the economic depression. Its total value in 1939-40 amounted to only Rs. 429·46 crores. The total tonnage of entries and clearances of vessels into and from the maritime provinces of India amounted to 22,100,000 in the year 1938-9.

¹ Digby, *Prosperous India*, pp. 85-6.

² See Digby, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-9 and Malaviya's *Minute of Dissent to the Industrial Commission Report*, pp. 299-300.

In spite of this big volume of trade the Indian share in it is not appreciable. It has been estimated that the share of Indians in the coasting trade amounts to only 25 per cent, and in the oceanic trade to about 4 per cent. In 1938-9 the percentage share of British vessels engaged in the foreign sea-borne trade which entered at ports in British India was 66 of the total tonnage. The British Indian share was only 3.6 per cent, foreign 29.8 per cent and indigenous craft 0.6 per cent. The corresponding shares of vessels which cleared at ports in British India were 66.6, 3.4, 29.3 and 0.7 per cent respectively.

All this means the loss of a highly remunerative branch of business to the country. The total shipping earnings have been estimated at Rs. 57 crores, of which 50 crores is carried away by foreign steamship companies (9 crores in coastal traffic, 38 crores in sea-borne traffic and 3 crores in passenger business).¹

The partial monopoly of the coastal trade which is controlled by a 'Conference' of a few large British navigation companies has created a very uncomfortable position for Indian shippers as well as shipowners. As the substantial profits of over twenty per cent on the paid-up capital earned by these companies, at any rate between 1901 and 1925, show, fairly high freight rates are being charged to the shippers, which ultimately have to be borne by the Indian consumers. Moreover, as the Fiscal Commission point out, the great disparities of rates between the charges on goods shipped from one Indian port to another and those on goods conveyed between India and foreign countries handicap Indian goods in transmission in comparison with goods from and to foreign countries, and neutralize the natural protection which an industry might expect to receive in its own country by reason of the distance of foreign manufacturing centres.² But even more serious evils of this foreign control of the coasting trade of India are those connected with the organized and successful attempts made by this Conference to suppress indigenous shipping enterprise in its infancy by methods which may be held to result in unfair or cut-throat competition. The two most important grievances of Indian shipowners are: (i) the deferred rebate system³ and (ii) rate wars.⁴

¹ See Haji, *Economics of Shipping*, pp. 317-32, 375.

² *Fiscal Commission Report*, par. 31.

³ For a fuller description of this system and shipping rings see Haji, *op. cit.*, ch. v.

⁴ It will be recalled that there was in recent years (1938-9) an uneconomic 'rate war' between the Bombay Steam Navigation Company, and the Indian Companies controlled by the Scindia Steam Navigation Company.

§45. **Deferred rebate, rate wars, etc.**—The deferred rebate system has been explained thus: 'The shipping companies issue a notice or circular to shippers informing them that, if at the end of a certain period (usually four or six months) they have not shipped goods by any vessels other than those dispatched by members of the Conference, they will be credited with a sum equivalent to a certain part (usually ten per cent) of the aggregate freights paid on their shipments during that period, and that this sum will be paid over to them, if at the end of a further period (usually four or six months) they have continued to confine their shipments to vessels belonging to members of the Conference. The sum so paid is known as a deferred rebate.'¹ This system is designed to ensure the continued 'loyalty' of the shipper to the Conference, and deprives him of all freedom with regard to the shipping of his goods. It also places a powerful weapon in the hands of the Conference for throttling any indigenous shipping enterprise. The Fiscal Commission strongly recommend legislation on the lines followed in other countries against this system. It is not a valid objection against this to point out that the deferred rebate system acts equally powerfully against new competitors of every nationality and not only against those of India. The point is that it hurts Indian shipping seriously. Besides, competitors of other than Indian nationality can usually count on support from their own Government in the form of subsidies and direct bounties for ship-building; their coastal trade also is generally reserved for them.

As regards the British shipping companies, they already occupy a position of substantial, practically unchallenged, supremacy and some of them are further helped by Government patronage in India in respect of mail subsidies and the carriage of Government stores. No such Government assistance has been extended to indigenous shipping. In addition to the deferred rebate system the foreign shipping rings also use another weapon, namely heavily underselling the Indian competitors with a view ultimately to raising the rates to a higher level than before, after the rivals have been ousted. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that attempts made by Indian enterprise during the last forty years to enter into the promising field of shipping have, generally speaking, ended in irretrievable failure, and most of the companies formed for the purpose have been driven to liquidation. Another handicap under which Indian shipping enterprise is said to labour is the unfair treatment meted out to Indian shipping companies

¹ Haji, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

by European insurance companies, who, it is alleged, put into the second class even those Indian ships that are regarded as first-class risks by experts in London, solely on the ground of their Indian ownership.

Other disadvantages of the foreign monopoly in shipping may be briefly noticed. The foreign shipping companies often neglect the comfort of the deck passengers on coastal ships, and their grievances have formed the subject of inquiries by several Committees. Also, though the crews of the coastal and ocean-going steamers are largely Indian in composition, the number of Indians occupying the higher posts is negligible, and very few of the foreign shipping companies have hitherto shown any readiness to entertain Indian apprentices and afford facilities to them for qualifying as executive officers and engineers on the ships.

§46. **The position of the Indian ship-building industry.**—The Indian ship-building industry is in no better position than Indian shipping. It is stated that the number of ships of a hundred tons gross or over built in the world in the ten years previous to the war of 1914-18 was nearly 17,000, their total gross tonnage being something over 28,000,000. These figures will have to be considerably increased to arrive at the total tonnage of the same description built to date. The total contribution of India, before and after the last war, amounted to only twenty-two ships.¹ Competition with non-Indian ship-builders is only practicable at present for small vessels owing to the cost of bringing out such vessels to India, which is large in proportion to their price. Elsewhere the foreign ship-building yards hold undisputed sway. There are no suitable ship-building yards in India for large ships, and the few repairs shops that exist are controlled by non-Indians. (See, however, § 52.)

§47. **The need for an Indian mercantile marine.**—The arguments advanced in favour of extending special protection to these industries aim at showing that they satisfy the conditions laid down under the policy of discriminate protection. Thus it is argued that India possesses undoubted facilities for shipping and ship-building, also that elsewhere, for example in Japan, the United States and Germany, State intervention has been the prime factor responsible for endowing these countries with powerful mercantile marines within a remarkably short period. Even England's maritime greatness is often attributed in part to the protection derived from the Navigation Acts, which were in operation for

¹ For the various forms of State aid to indigenous shipping and ship-building in other countries, see Haji's pamphlet, *State-Aid to National Shipping*.

well-nigh two centuries before they were repealed towards the middle of the last century. Lastly, the collapse of most of the attempts made by Indian shipping enterprise to contest foreign monopoly, even in home waters, has been naturally offered as a convincing argument for determined State intervention.

The great need for a mercantile marine in India is easily proved. Apart from the removal of the handicaps already mentioned under which Indian shipowners, shippers and passengers are labouring at present, there are several other positive advantages to be considered. The value of a mercantile marine as a naval auxiliary and a second line of defence in times of war is universally recognized, and as India has now laid the foundation of her own Royal Indian Navy she cannot afford to neglect this aspect of the question.¹ Again, India's coastal and foreign sea-borne trade is sufficiently large in volume to keep an Indian mercantile marine busy. Her dependence on foreign shipping companies—the inconvenience of which has been brought home particularly during the war of 1914-18 and the present war—is an element of weakness in her economic position as also in that of the Empire at large. Moreover, the proper development of a mercantile marine will open new avenues of employment to Indians. Navigation, marine engineering and insurance are highly remunerative branches of business, but today their doors are practically barred and bolted against Indians. The argument that Indians have no aptitude or liking for a sea-going career is unconvincing and is belied by India's record in the past. It is also unfair to urge it since little chance has so far been given to Indians to prove their fitness. And it is significant that the Mercantile Marine Committee do not anticipate any difficulty in getting educated men of good character as apprentices to the sea if the prospect of ultimate promotion as officers in the mercantile marine is held out to them.

§48. The Mercantile Marine Committee (1923).—In response to the persistent agitation in favour of an Indian mercantile marine, the Government at last made a move in the matter, and appointed the Indian Mercantile Marine Committee in February 1923, to consider and report what measures were necessary for the promotion of the Indian shipping and ship-building industries. The main recommendations of the Committee may be summed up as follows :—

(i) In order to provide for both the training and future

¹ See Memorandum submitted to the Imperial Conference on the subject of Indian Shipping in relation to the Empire Maritime Conference by the Indian National Steamship Owners' Association, Bombay (1937), pp. 4-5.

employment of the officers indispensable for the formation of an Indian mercantile marine, a training ship should be established at Bombay by the Government. (The Government accepted this recommendation and the Royal Indian Marine vessel 'Dufferin', refitted so as to enable her to take in cadets, is now being utilized as a training ship for officers and engineers of the Indian mercantile marine.¹) (ii) For the training of marine engineers provision should be made at the colleges of engineering, and facilities should be given for further experience at sea. (iii) The coastal trade should be reserved for ships which are to arrange for eventual Indianization as regards ownership and controlling interest. This is to be effected by the introduction of a system of licenses or permits as in Australia. The following qualifications should be laid down for eligibility for a license to a shipping company :—(a) that it is registered in India, (b) that it is owned and managed by an individual Indian or by a joint-stock company (public or private), which is registered in India with a rupee capital and with a majority of Indians on its directorate and a majority of its shares held by Indians; and (c) that the management of such a company is predominantly in the hands of Indians. (iv) In course of time other conditions should be laid down, for example, that the officers and crews should be entirely Indian, and that the ships applying for licenses should have been built in India. Also, from a certain date to be specified by the Government, all ships should be required to give an undertaking regarding the employment of Indian apprentices and the gradual Indianization of their officers' and engineers' posts. The licensing authority may also be vested with power to take such steps, with the approval of the Government of India, as may be considered advisable to deal with deferred rates, rate wars or any other conditions which act as an undue restraint on trade. (v) Arrangements should be made by the Government of India to purchase one of the existing British lines operating on the coast as a going concern and appoint directors to control it, the majority of whom should be Indians. Eventually the ownership of vessels in this line should be transferred to approved Indian owners with a view to the concern ultimately being placed in the hands of Indian companies. (vi) The question of granting navigation bounties to purely Indian shipping companies in respect of overseas trade to other countries should be favourably considered as soon as a sufficient number of trained Indian officers are available

¹ The Government had spent Rs. 25 lakhs up to March 1939 on the *Dufferin* since her installation.

and Indian shipowners have proved efficient in managing and running coastal steamers. (vii) In case the license system recommended by the Committee is found to be inconsistent with the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1884, resort should be had to a system of bounties on navigation to all Indian-owned and Indian-managed ships, and the grant to them of mail contracts and preference for the carrying of Government stores. (viii) Calcutta should be developed as a centre of self-propelled ship-building, being most suitable owing to its vicinity to coal- and steel-producing districts and the greater experience than any other centre which it commands. (See however §52 below.) The Committee recommend that protection should be given to the industry in the form of construction bounties so as to make up the difference between the minimum cost of production in India and abroad, subject to a maximum of twenty-five per cent of the price abroad. (ix) The establishment of a ship-building yard by an Indian company may be aided by the Government by (a) cheap loans and assistance in acquiring a suitable site; (b) extension of Government and Port Trust patronage on certain terms regarding the cost, and (c) legal provision that when such a suitable ship-building yard is completed and established, all ships seeking a license on the coast should also be required to have been built in India. (x) Expert assistance from abroad for ship-building should be invoked to start with. India must, however, establish schools and colleges in the country itself for the study of naval architecture as in England. In this matter she must follow Japan and the United States, and Indians should be sent to Britain to take instruction in the schools and shipyards there, so as to enable them to become teachers and leaders in the industry after they return. In the meantime the colleges of engineering should be strengthened and provide for additional post-graduate courses in naval architecture.

§49. **The Bill for reserving coastal traffic for Indian shipping.**— Except for the establishment of the training ship 'Dufferin', the Government failed to give effect to any of the other important recommendations of the Mercantile Marine Committee. (See however §52 below.) Therefore, in the September session of 1928, Mr Haji moved his Bill in the Assembly for the reservation of coastal traffic. This made provision for seventy-five per cent of the stock to be vested in British India nationals. In the case of a joint-stock company, corporation or association, the chairman of the board of directors, and not less than seventy-five per cent of the number of members of the managing firm, and of the directors of the board were to be British Indian subjects. The Bill

further laid down that seventy-five per cent of the voting power was to be vested in British Indian subjects. It provided for a system of licenses to be issued by the Governor-General-in-Council for engaging in the coasting trade of India. A five-year period was laid down in the Bill for the gradual reservation of the coastal traffic in the manner above indicated.

The principle of reservation of coastal traffic contained in the Bill has been adopted by practically all nations aspiring to develop their own mercantile marine, and India naturally desires to take a leaf out of their book in this matter. Too much importance should not be attached to the argument that the Bill involved racial discrimination, because this type of discrimination has come to be regarded as falling within the range of those permissible actions to which a nation has a moral right to resort, although they may be inconvenient to others. While, like every other measure of protection, the reservation of the coastal traffic for Indian ships is bound to be expensive for a time to the country, its justification is the familiar one, namely the confident expectation that protection will before long be unnecessary.

Regarding the treatment of existing vested interests, leaving aside the drastic step of expropriation, one of two methods might be adopted. Either the existing lines might be bought over by the Government with a view ultimately to handing them over to Indian companies, or they might be offered the option of undertaking gradually to Indianize themselves within a period of five years or so, so as to make them eligible for operating on the coast. The period proposed in the Bill was five years. This provision has been objected to as involving expropriation.¹ Expropriation, however, means deprivation of ownership without adequate compensation, and it may be asked whether it is not too strong a word for withdrawal of trading facilities from a foreign carrier who has been allowed to enjoy them so far as a matter of grace, and who cannot now claim them as a matter of right.

The Coastal Reservation Bill emerged from the Select Committee in April 1929 with certain alterations. Before the Bill could proceed further, the Indian Shipping Conference met at Delhi in January 1930 under the Presidency of the Viceroy, and was attended by the representatives of British and Indian companies engaged in the coastal trade of India. It was not, however, able to reach any agreement owing to fundamental differences between the representatives of British and Indian interests. The

¹ See Sir George Rainy's Minute of Dissent to the Select Committee Report.

Government of India took upon themselves the responsibility of determining the future course of action. They subsequently declared that they could not move in the matter until the whole question of discriminatory legislation and the commercial relations between India and Great Britain, which was then before the Round Table Conference, had been decided. The Committee of the whole Round Table Conference included the following paragraph in the Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee (1931): 'At the instance of the British commercial community the principle was generally agreed to that there should be no discrimination between the rights of the British mercantile community, firms and companies, trading in India, and the rights of India-born subjects, and that an appropriate convention based on reciprocity should be entered into for the purpose of regulating these rights.'¹

§50. **The Bill for the abolition of the deferred rebates system.**—Mr Haji also introduced in the Delhi Session of the Assembly (February 1929) a Bill for the abolition of the deferred rebates system in Indian coastal shipping, intended to be complementary to the Coastal Reservation Bill. While this Bill was designed to keep shipping earnings in India, the Deferred Rebates Abolition Bill would ensure a fair distribution of business among the Indian shipping companies once coastal trade was reserved. The abolition of deferred rebates would mean the end of monopolistic shipping combinations whether composed of non-Indian companies or Indian companies or both, and would inaugurate a new era, in which, so far as the coasting trade of India was concerned, an opening would be provided for the entry of new Indian companies by doing away with the existing shipping monopoly. Sir George Rainy, the Commerce Member, criticized the Bill on the ground that it did nothing to stop the rate war and that the deferred rebates system had been helpful in ensuring a regular service, stability of freights and equality between large and small shippers. He suggested that, as in the case of the Straits Settlements, an arrangement should be devised whereby the shippers would be free to leave the Conference once in three years without loss of rebate. The Commerce Member also urged that the Bill should wait at least till the House had decided one way or the other on the Coastal Reservation Bill.

Legislation of the type discussed in this and the previous section will hereafter have to reckon with the provisions with respect to discrimination in the Government of India Act of 1935, which

¹ *Indian Round Table Conference Sub-Committee's Report*, p. 49.

we have already summarized (see vol. I, ch. xiii). Under these provisions it will not be possible to discriminate against British steamship companies operating in coastal waters (see sections 113 and 115 of the Government of India Act, 1935).

§51. **Recent attempts at regulation of coastal traffic.**—Recently (September 1937) a non-official Coastal Traffic Bill, introduced in the Central Assembly by Sir A. H. Ghuznavi, was referred to the Select Committee.¹ As the mover pointed out, his Bill did not discriminate between British and Indian shipping. Its object was to regulate unfair competition in coastal waters in the shape of rate-cutting or the grant of rebates—a handicap which acts as a deterrent against Indian capital being invested in coastal shipping.² The Bill as redrafted by the Select Committee (1938) empowered the Central Government to deal with unfair competitive methods in coastal waters, after making inquiries, by fixing the minimum rates of fare and freight for the carriage of passengers and goods. Charging of rates lower than those fixed by the Central Government was made a penal offence. The Government of India were opposed to the Bill on the ground that it was unnecessary and impracticable. Its enactment might be followed by a shipping company mania. On the other hand, they were prepared to regulate coastal shipping within limits. It is understood that they first propose to clear the ground by repealing the old Act of 1850, which threw the coastal waters of India open to the shipping of all nations and then to take powers to regulate coastal shipping. This move is specially directed against the increased intrusion of Japanese and to a lesser extent of German shipping (before the war) in the coastal trade of India.

The Council of State recently (March 1939) passed a resolution asking the Government to take more active steps for the expansion and protection of the Indian mercantile marine. Mr P. N. Saprú, the mover of the resolution, regretted that the Government had done nothing for Indian shipping when striking a fresh (1939) trade agreement with Great Britain.³ Among the steps recommended by Mr Saprú to achieve the end in view were reservation of

¹ A similar Bill moved by Mr P. N. Saprú in the Council of State was rejected by that body about the same time.

² For the views of the Indian Shipping Companies on this Bill see *Representation of the Indian Shipping Companies on Sir Abdul H. Ghuznavi's Bill*. They urged the incorporation in the Bill of a scheme of licensing tonnage plying on the Indian coast with a view to healthy and steady development of Indian shipping.

³ For further particulars regarding this aspect of the problem see *Indian Shipping and the proposed Indo-British Trade Agreement (1939)* published by the Indian National Steamship-Owners' Association.

coastal trade for Indian shipping concerns, granting of subsidy and fixation of maximum and minimum rates of freight. Mr Dow, the Commerce Secretary, pointed out that it was no use for Government to fix rates, as it was difficult, indeed impossible, to enforce them and ensure that they were not altered in some way or the other. He regretted that there was no hope of Government granting any subsidy to the Indian shipping concerns, nor could Government reserve coastal traffic for them under the provisions of the 1935 Constitution Act.

§52. **Ship-building yard at Vizagapatam.**—We have already (see §48 *ante*) referred to the recommendation of the Mercantile Marine Committee in favour of a ship-building yard being built by an Indian company with the assistance of the Government. The present war has emphasized the importance of every maritime country building its own ships in its own yards. Thanks to the initiative taken by Mr Walchand Hirachand, steps have been taken for the establishment of an Indian ship-building yard. Earlier negotiations for a shipyard at Calcutta having fallen through, a suitable site has been secured at Vizagapatam, which possesses certain advantages over Calcutta and Bombay in respect of a suitable rock-bed, cheap labour, and local material, both stone and timber. It is proposed to build steel vessels ranging from 8,000 to 12,000 tons. The Government of India have given facilities for dredging, railways and power-supply, and imports of machinery, personnel, etc. The work of constructing ship-building berths has already been started by the Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. The Government of India will be well advised to expedite the scheme by all possible means including the grant of suitable bounties for the building of ships in this country. The industry is expected to employ from 3,000 to 4,000 men including skilled workers, will be Indian-managed, Indian-controlled and Indian-financed. It will in short prove a valuable national asset.¹

AIR TRANSPORT

§53. **Civil aviation.**—Since the war of 1914-18 civil aviation has made rapid progress, particularly in Western countries, and has initiated a far-reaching revolution in the transport system of the world.

Interest in civil aviation in India was aroused by the inauguration of a postal air mail service between Karachi and Bombay largely on the initiative of Lord Lloyd, Governor of

¹ 'The Resources of India,' Supplement to the *Times of India*, 25 October 1940, p. 24.

Bombay (1918-23). The inauguration of the French and Dutch air services across India, the regular weekly Imperial Airways service between England and Karachi (until its suspension after the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940), the introduction of the Empire Mail scheme and the general increase of civil aviation in all parts of the world, have stimulated both the Government and the public. India has become a party to the International Air Convention, and the Government of India have appointed a Director and Deputy-Director of Civil Aviation, and a Chief Inspector of Aircraft. Private enterprise has also come forward, and there are at present ten Aero Clubs in India for imparting instruction in aviation. There is considerable interest in civil aviation in the country, but the high cost of training is an obstacle in the way of that interest taking practical shape. We therefore welcome the recent (1939) policy adopted by the Government of India in favour of granting subsidies to the Flying Clubs in India for a period of three years with a view to reducing the cost of training. Apart from the assistance given to pilots for advanced training, the Government have instituted civil aviation scholarships. There are similar scholarships awarded by private bodies such as the Ratan and Dorabji Tata Trusts and the public airways companies. The Meteorological Department has also made better meteorological arrangements for aviation. There are at present (1941) three companies operating scheduled air lines in India: (i) Tata Sons Ltd. (Aviation Department) Bombay (1932), (ii) Indian National Airways Ltd., New Delhi (1934) and (iii) The Air Services of India Ltd., New Delhi. There is also the Indian Gliding Association at Bombay which was established in 1931.

There is a growing organization of the trunk air lines in India; and there are now regular internal services for mails and passengers between some of the principal towns, e.g. Karachi-Colombo, Karachi-Lahore-Delhi, Bombay-Delhi, Karachi-Calcutta, Bombay-Kathiawar, Bombay-Kolhapur, etc. Air navigation is controlled by the Indian Aircraft Act of 1934. The value of aviation to business does not yet appear to be properly appreciated in India, but the prospects are not altogether discouraging.¹

§54. **The Indian Air Force.**—The war has greatly increased the urgency of developing aviation in India and has led the Government to take more interest in it. Even before the declaration of war, the Indian Air Force was started on a small scale in 1932 after the first batch of Indian cadets had been trained at Cranwell. Schemes of expansion were put into force

¹ *Indian Year Book* (1940-1), pp. 598-605.

immediately after the outbreak of the war and the existing training facilities greatly enlarged. There is great enthusiasm for air service in India, and young Indians are taking to flying. But the imperious limitation imposed by the more urgent demand for machines in England and in the Middle East stands in the way of expanding India's air force as speedily as her army.

§55. **Aircraft factory at Bangalore.**—The war has thus greatly increased the importance of developing the production of aircraft in India itself and it is gratifying that the first Indian aeroplane is expected to come off the production line before the end of July 1941. The credit for taking the initiative in this case also goes to Mr Walchand Hirachand. Already a joint-stock company, the Hindusthan Aircraft Company Ltd., with an authorized capital of Rs. 4 crores has been registered in Mysore State. The factory is to be set up at Bangalore under the direction of an American expert. The choice of Bangalore has been largely prompted by the availability of cheap electrical power and high-grade steel from the Bhadravati Iron and Steel Works. The factory will be largely equipped with American plant and machinery capable of turning out both civil and military aircraft, the latter being given preference to meet India's immediate war requirements. The Government of India, it is understood, have agreed to assist the new company to get the required machinery and to purchase, in the first instance, 50 planes a year from them. The Mysore Government are showing a keen interest in the enterprise and have assured all reasonable help including the supply of electric power at a cheap rate. It is not easy to exaggerate the benefits to the nation following in the wake of the establishment of this new industry. It will save money which otherwise would be exported, provide employment for thousands, create new markets for new materials and help to set up several ancillary and subsidiary industries, particularly connected with engineering. The aluminium industry is also expected to receive a big stimulus from the progress made by aircraft manufacture in India. The peacetime potentialities of the new industry are promising, having regard to the rapid growth of commercial flying in India and the grant of protection after the war in pursuance of the assurance given by the Commerce Member.

The last war contributed to the expansion of industries—like the cotton textile industry—turning out consumers' goods. The developments in regard to the manufacture of ships, 'planes and, possibly, cars in India, indicate that the present war bids fair to encourage the establishment of 'key' or basic industries in the country.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRADE OF INDIA

This chapter deals with the trade of India, and for the sake of convenient treatment, the subject may be divided into its main branches as follows :— (i) external trade consisting of (a) sea-borne trade, (b) entrepôt trade, (c) trans-frontier trade ; and (ii) internal trade, including inland and coastal trade.

EXTERNAL TRADE

§1. **An historical retrospect.**—The early history of Indian trade may be dismissed briefly, our primary concern being with its development in the modern period since the middle of the last century. There is ample evidence of India's trade relations in ancient times with distant lands. As long ago as 3000 B.C., India had trading connexions with Babylon. Egyptian mummies, belonging to 2000 B.C. are supposed to have been found wrapped in Indian muslin of the finest quality. 'There was a very large consumption of Indian manufactures in Rome. This is confirmed by the elder Pliny who complained that vast sums of money were annually absorbed by commerce in India. The muslins of Dacca were known to the Greeks under the name of *Gangetika*.'¹ Among other countries with whom India traded were China, Persia, and Arabia. The trade of India, as indeed all ancient trade, was in rare and costly commodities of comparatively great value in small bulk, in contrast with the present-day trade characterized by transport over large distances of cheap and bulky commodities catering for the needs of the masses. The principal articles of export were textile manufactures, metalware, ivory, perfumes, dye-stuffs, spices, etc. and the imports consisted of minerals, of which there was a deficiency in India, such as brass, tin, lead, and also wines, horses, etc. There was a net import of a large quantity of gold which suggests an excess of exports over imports—a feature which has all along characterized India's trade with other nations. There was also a certain amount of entrepôt trade chiefly in silks and porcelain previously imported from China, in pearls from Ceylon, in precious stones from the Indian archipelago. This entrepôt trade may be taken as a token of India's possession of a fleet of merchantmen.

During the Mohammedan period, which may be said to have commenced from the eleventh century, certain new influences came

¹ Malaviya's *Minute of Dissent to the Industrial Commission Report*, p. 295.

to act upon the foreign trade of India. The early Mohammedan period being more unsettled than the preceding Hindu period must have adversely affected India's trade development. On the other hand, the communications established with India through the north-west frontier stimulated the overland trade of India. As Moreland points out, there were two regular routes on the frontier, from Lahore to Kabul, and from Multan to Kandahar. 'Kabul was a large commercial centre, and a meeting-place for merchants from India, Persia and countries to the north, while it lay on the route from India to the main caravan road between western China and Europe; Kandahar is the doorway from India to the greater part of Persia, and both routes carried a considerable volume of traffic when judged by standards appropriate to the conditions prevailing at the time.'¹ Moreover, the means of transport in the Mogul period were more satisfactory than before. There were a number of fairly good roads. Again, the river-systems of the country, especially in the north, were fully made use of for the purpose of trade, and there was also a brisk commerce on the coastline of India. Moreover, the patronage of the Mogul courts imparted a considerable stimulus to Indian industries, particularly to those which produced luxury goods. The shipping trade was largely controlled by the Moslems, especially on the Malabar coast, and, to a lesser extent, in the Gulf of Cambay and the Coromandel coast, which later came to be largely in the hands of the Banias and Chettiers. Malabar was the great entrepôt for almost the whole trade of the Indian seas coming from the Far East and the Red Sea, Calicut being the principal port for this trade. During the Mohammedan period the general course of trade remained unchanged and 'Gibbon's mordant aphorism "that the objects of oriental traffic were splendid and trifling", is in substance as applicable to the sixteenth as to the second century'.² The imports were principally gold, for coinage and display; horses were imported in large numbers; and metals, such as copper, tin, zinc, lead and quicksilver; also luxuries like amber and precious stones. In payment for these imports India sent out her various textile fabrics, dye-stuffs like indigo, opium and other drugs, pepper and a few minor spices, etc.

Towards the end of the fifteenth century came the epoch-making changes in the trade routes owing to the discovery of an all-sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope, which established the fateful contact between the East and the West. Till then the direct

¹ *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 219.

² *ibid.*, p. 196.

trade with Europe had passed on the Indian Ocean as far as Aden, was then unloaded in the Gulf of Suez and carried by land and water to the Mediterranean coast. It was thence taken up by the Italian traders of Venice and Genoa, who sent it further west by sea, or to Antwerp by land over the Alps and then down the Rhine, at that period the chief distributor for western Europe. It was the prospect of annexing the large profits of this trade which largely inspired the Portuguese quest for a sea route to India. As we have already said it was the linens and calicoes, the jewels and embroideries, woollen and silk manufactures, and not the raw materials, which attracted traders from western European countries, from Portugal, Holland, England and France, to India and supplied the basis for the lucrative trade of the East India Company, securing for it the virtual monopoly of trade with the East owing to the elimination of the competition of the French after the Seven Years' War. There was at one time considerable opposition in England to the trade of the Company with India, since Indian imports of calicoes and spices, for which there was an insatiable demand in England, had to be paid for by an export of specie to India,¹ which was a poor market for the English woollens. This agitation became so keen towards the end of the seventeenth century that, from that time onwards, the use of Indian textiles was penalized in England either by complete prohibition, or heavy import duties. We have already stated that the commercial instincts of the East India Company led it at first to encourage Indian industries, on which its export trade depended, but that the pressure of the vested interests in England led to a reversal of this policy in the eighteenth century, and India came to be looked upon primarily as a valuable source of raw materials necessary to develop the manufactures of England, which were rapidly expanding during the period of the Industrial Revolution. We have also referred to the various causes of the decay of the indigenous industries of India and traced the process of ruralization during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

All this did not fail to exercise a far-reaching influence both on the direction and the nature of India's foreign trade. The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable change in the character of the trade between India and England. Henceforward, India began to receive those very commodities as

¹ The acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal and the vicious system of investments (purchasing goods for export out of the Indian revenues) considerably reduced the export of bullion to India and lessened the opposition to the Indian trade.

imports which had hitherto bulked so largely in her export trade, namely, cotton manufactures and sugar. The Lancashire cotton industry had so developed that by the middle of the century imports of cotton piece-goods represented about half the total imports of foreign merchandise into India.¹

§2. *India's trade from 1864-5 onwards.*—The year 1869, when the Suez Canal was thrown open for navigation, marks for all practical purposes the beginning of the modern period in the history of India's trade. The most striking characteristic of this period is the steady growth in the volume of the export and import trade.² The figures on p. 231, giving the value of merchandise (including Government transactions) during the last twelve years with quinquennial averages for the past seventy years, are of interest in this connexion.³ It should be noted that as a result of the separation of Burma from British India, the trade statistics from 1937-8 onwards given in the tables in this chapter include the trade of British India with Burma and *exclude* the direct trade of Burma with foreign countries.

The figures show that exports increased from an average annual value of Rs. 55·86 crores for five years of trade during 1864-5 to 1868-9 to 353·51 crores, which was the quinquennial average for the period 1924-5 to 1928-9. During the same period imports rose in value from 31·7 to 251 crores.⁴

The chief causes of this growth may now be briefly indicated. The establishment of peace and order with the practical completion of the British conquest of India by the middle of the last century supplied the much-needed security of life and property for the development of commerce. Improved means of communication also opened up the country far and wide for trade. The part played by the railways and roads has already been noticed in the last chapter, to which may be added the influence of the development of telegraphic and postal communications. The most important single cause was the opening of the Suez Canal, which brought India nearer to England by about 3,000 miles. The canal rehabilitated the Mediterranean route to the East and gave new opportunities to countries facing the Mediterranean, such as France, Austria and Italy. The utility of this route was immensely improved by the laying of the submarine cables between Bombay and Suez.

¹ C. W. E. Cotton, *Handbook of Commercial Information for India*, p. 95.

² The causes of the decline in the value of India's foreign trade in recent years of economic depression are explained below.

³ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 204.

⁴ See also *The Economic Resources of the Empire*, edited by W. Worswick, article by H. A. F. Lindsay, the Indian Trade Commissioner.

In lakhs of rupees

	Imports	Exports	Total
Quinquennial average.			
1864-5 to 1868-9	31,70	55,86	87,56
1869-70 to 1873-4	33,04	56,25	89,29
1874-5 to 1878-9	38,36	60,32	98,68
1879-80 to 1883-4	50,16	79,08	1,29,24
1884-5 to 1888-9	61,51	88,64	1,50,15
1889-90 to 1893-4	70,78	1,04,99	1,75,77
1894-5 to 1898-9	73,67	1,07,53	1,81,20
1899-1900 to 1903-4	84,68	1,24,92	2,09,60
1904-5 to 1908-9	1,19,85	1,65,44	2,85,29
1909-10 to 1913-14	1,51,67	2,24,23	3,75,90
1914-15 to 1918-19	1,59,25	2,25,83	3,85,08
1919-20 to 1923-4	2,07,05	3,06,38	5,13,43
1924-5 to 1928-9	2,51,02	3,53,51	6,04,53
1929-30 to 1933-4	1,61,14	1,98,60	3,59,74
In the year			
1928-9	2,63,40	3,39,15	6,02,55
1929-30	2,49,71	3,18,99	5,68,70
1930-1	1,73,06	2,26,50	3,99,56
1931-2	1,30,64	1,61,20	2,91,84
1932-3	1,35,02	1,36,07	2,71,09
1933-4	1,17,30	1,51,17	2,68,47
1934-5	1,34,58	1,55,50	2,90,08
1935-6 ¹	1,36,77	1,64,60	3,01,37
1936-7 ¹	1,27,72	2,02,49	3,30,21
1937-8	1,77,22	1,89,77	3,66,99
1938-9	1,55,51	1,69,97	3,25,48
1939-40	1,68,95	2,13,08	3,82,03

This, together with the great improvement in naval architecture and the rapid growth of mercantile marine fostered by various countries, gave a great fillip to India's trade with distant lands and permanently revolutionized its volume and character. The greater part of India's exports came to consist of articles of considerable bulk and comparatively low value, which could now be transhipped cheaply over thousands of miles so as to satisfy the growing international demand for them. Food-stuffs like wheat, rice and tea, and raw materials such as cotton, jute, oil-seeds, hides and skins came to be exported in ever increasing quantities,² and they

¹ The following trade statistics for the years 1935-6 and 1936-7 adjusted so as to represent British India *excluding* Burma would be found useful for comparison. The total value of imports amounted to Rs. 1,52,01 lakhs and Rs. 1,44,08 lakhs in 1935-6 and 1936-7 respectively. The corresponding figures for exports were Rs. 1,54,54 lakhs and Rs. 1,92,41 lakhs.

² The agricultural policy of the Government in India was then largely inspired by the idea of stimulating the export of Indian agricultural produce, and the big irrigation schemes undertaken in the Punjab, the United Provinces and Sind were to a large extent in furtherance of this policy.

were paid for by the imports of manufactures, such as cotton piece-goods, machinery, hardware, railway materials, glasware, etc., from England, and later from other countries like Germany, the United States and Japan, where striking developments in manufacturing industry were taking place. The numerous internal customs barriers and transit duties which had so long impeded trade were swept away by 1853. The principle of free trade which had carried all before it in England about the middle of the last century was applied unhesitatingly to India. Almost all the export duties were abolished by 1874, and the discrimination in favour of British against foreign shipping was removed. Free trade, however, scored its greatest victory when, under pressure from Lancashire, all import duties with a few trifling exceptions were swept away in 1882.¹

Though the Company's trade monopoly was abolished in 1813 and full freedom was given to all nationalities to establish commercial relations with India, and though all foreign countries were gradually placed on a footing of equality with England in respect of shipping, etc., the British people continued to be in practically monopolistic possession of the field until recently. The investment of British capital in Indian railways and other undertakings and the management of the railways by British companies, British control of shipping and banking, the establishment of trade organizations in the country, such as the British export houses and the European (British) Chambers of Commerce, and the power of directing the fiscal policy of the country, were the principal factors which gave Britain the upper hand.

§3. **The struggle for the Indian market.**—This supremacy began to be gradually undermined in the closing decade of the last century. Germany was the first power to challenge it and was later followed by Japan, whose interest in the trade with India was specially quickened after the Russo-Japanese War. The object of these powers was primarily to push the sale of their manufactures in India. But the organization created for this purpose also served to stimulate Indian exports of raw materials and food-stuffs, which these countries required for their own industries. The principal methods adopted for this purpose were: (i) the development of national shipping services, (ii) the establishment of branches of national banks, such as the German Deutsche Asiatische Bank and the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank, which offered special credit facilities to their nationals, and (iii) the establishment of foreign

¹ It is true that the import duties had to be reimposed for revenue purposes in 1894, but they were maintained at the general low rate of five per cent *ad valorem*.

commercial houses at the principal centres of trade, like Bombay and Calcutta. This activity had the full sympathy and support of the Governments concerned, and their consulates in India did yeoman service in fostering their country's trade with India. The United States, however, was for a long time content to deal with India through London, and her efforts to promote direct trade relations were until after the outbreak of the war not so conscious and determined as those of Germany and Japan.

§4. **The position before the war of 1914-18 summarized.**—The combined effect of all the factors noticed above was seen in an enormous growth of the export and import trade of India, though the figures given show that the growth did not take place at a uniform pace throughout the period reviewed. Up to 1873, there was a heavy increase in exports, especially between 1864 and 1869 owing to the American Civil War, which led to large exports of cotton at high prices from India, while it checked the imports of piece-goods into the country owing to the difficulties of England in obtaining the usual supply of raw cotton. Between 1873 and the end of the century trade development was comparatively slow.¹ The violent oscillations in the value of the rupee introduced an element of uncertainty and speculation in the foreign trade with gold standard countries and served to check its normal growth. Moreover, the famine of 1876-8 and the two others which occurred at the end of the century, and the repeated visitations of plague, which first appeared in Bombay in 1896, aggravated the situation. Lastly, while the successful stabilization of the rupee at 1s. 4d. between 1898 and 1914 smoothed the course of India's trade with gold standard countries, the appreciation of the rupee contributed, to some extent, as we have already seen, to the loss of trade in textiles with Japan and China.

The first fourteen years of the new century witnessed a remarkable expansion of the foreign trade of India, especially after 1905. The largest increase was revealed by the five years preceding the war of 1914-18 for which the average was Rs. 224.23 crores for exports, and 151.67 for imports, as against Rs. 124.92 crores for exports and 84.68 for imports during the five years from 1899-1900 to 1903-04. During these years the rupee was almost stable, public works such as railways and irrigation were being pushed

¹ R. M. Joshi shows (*Indian Export Trade*, p. 8) that between 1834 and 1855 exports rose from 8 to 23 crores of rupees, and between 1855 and 1873 from 23 to 60 crores. Between 1873 and 1893, the rise was only from 60 to 100; then till 1899 there was practically no rise at all; and it was only between 1899 and 1914 that there was the striking rise from 100 to 203 crores of rupees.

forward with vigour, there were no serious famines such as those at the end of the previous century, and the virulence of plague was decreasing. Moreover, as already stated, Germany and Japan, and to a lesser extent the United States, were making organized efforts to push their trade, which was fast expanding under the stimulus of the economic transformation which they were undergoing, bringing them into line with England as industrial nations.

§5. *Effects of the war of 1914-18 on India's trade.*—The following tables¹ bring out the effects of the war of 1914-18 on India's trade.

TABLE I

Value (in millions of pounds) of the overseas trade in total merchandise

	1913-14	1914-15	1915-16	1916-17	1917-18	1918-19
Imports	127.5	96.5	92.1	106.8	109.6	125.7
Exports	166	121.4	133	167.9	163.3	170.2

TABLE II

Value (in millions of pounds) of the overseas trade (total merchandise calculated at the prices current in 1913-14)

	1913-14	1914-15	1915-16	1916-17	1917-18	1918-19
Imports	127.5	95.6	73.1	62.8	51.9	46.9
Exports	166	119	129.1	140.9	130.6	113.5

Table I above shows that both the branches of foreign trade received a set-back on the outbreak of war in August 1914 and that, while the value of the exports recovered from 1916-17 onwards, that of imports lagged behind the pre-war year even so late as in 1918-19. Table II, which allows for the rise in war-time prices, shows that there was a far more serious reduction in the volume of trade, especially of the import trade, which declined continuously throughout the war years. We may now briefly examine the

¹ See S. G. Panandikar, *The Economic Consequences of the War*, pp. 44-5.

causes which brought about this state of affairs. The war led to a complete cessation of trade with the enemy countries. At the same time the trade with the allied countries, like Great Britain, France, and Belgium, could not be maintained at the pre-war level owing to their preoccupation with the war. Trade with neutral countries was subjected to restrictions calculated to prevent munitions of war from India reaching Germany through such countries and to make Indian supplies solely available for the Allies. A more distressing factor was the sharp rise in freights as a result of the disappearance of enemy tonnage from the high seas and the pressure of war requirements on the remainder available. This factor largely discounted the advantage which India might otherwise have derived from the great demand in Europe for her commodities. The dislocation in the foreign exchanges and the insecurity on the sea were also factors which disturbed the course of trade.¹ The country, however, soon began to adapt itself to war conditions. Large quantities of sandbags for trench warfare and hides for the manufacture of boots for the soldiers were required, and this greatly stimulated the exports. The export trade would have shown an even larger increase had it not been for the difficulties regarding export finance arising from the curtailment of the sale of Council Bills, and from Government control. Though the import trade did not experience the same revival, the gap caused in the Indian market was partly filled up by increased imports from the United States and Japan, who fully exploited the situation so created to their own advantage. Thus the war affected Indian trade more adversely than the trade of some other countries like Japan.

One welcome feature, however, of India's foreign trade during the war of 1914-18 was the increase in the exports of manufactures, whose percentage to the total export trade rose from 22.4 per cent in 1913-14 to 36.6 per cent in 1918-19, though much larger increases were recorded in the case of other countries like Canada. The artificial stimulus given by the war to Indian industries like cotton, jute, leather, steel and iron has already been noticed, and this accounts for the increase in the exports of manufactures, which, however, might have been much higher if India had been fully prepared to take advantage of the temporary disappearance of foreign competition in her markets.

§6. **Post-war trade from 1919-20 to 1939-40.**—The figures below may serve as an introduction to a discussion of the post-war developments in trade.

¹ Similar difficulties have to be reckoned with during the present war.

The early post-war period was characterized by a trade boom caused by the removal of many of the war-time prohibitions on exports, as well as a gradual resumption of commercial intercourse with enemy countries accompanied by an improvement in the freight position. There was also a brisk demand for Indian

Value (in crores of rupees) of sea-borne trade in total merchandise (including Government stores)¹

Year	Imports	Exports	Net Exports	Year	Imports	Exports	Net exports ²
1919-20	221.70	336.02	+ 114.32	1931-2	130.04	161.20	+ 31.16
1920-1	347.56	267.76	- 79.80	1932-3	135.02	136.07	+ 1.05
1921-2	282.59	248.65	- 33.94	1933-4	117.30	151.17	+ 33.87
1922-3	246.19	316.07	+ 69.88	1934-5	134.58	155.50	+ 20.92
1923-4	237.18	363.37	+ 126.19	1935-6	136.77	164.60	+ 28.83
1924-5	253.37	400.24	+ 146.87		152.01	154.54	+ 2.53
1925-6	236.00	386.82	+ 150.82	1936-7	127.72	202.49	+ 74.77
1926-7	240.82	311.05	+ 70.23		144.08	192.41	+ 48.33
1927-8	261.53	330.26	+ 68.73	1937-8	177.22	180.77	+ 12.55
1928-9	263.40	339.15	+ 75.75	1938-9	155.51	169.97	+ 14.46
1929-30	249.71	318.99	+ 69.28	1939-40	168.95	213.08	+ 44.13
1930-1	173.06	226.50	+ 53.44				

produce on the part of the Western countries for the reorganization of their industries. The revival of trade, especially on the side of exports, would have been even more striking but for the railway congestion in India, high prices, labour troubles, unstable foreign exchanges, the rise in the exchange value of the rupee and the continuation of the restrictions on the export of cereals owing to the failure of the monsoon in 1918-19. Even as it was, however, the pace of the post-war boom was too fast and it was inevitable that before long it should be succeeded by a slump, indications of which were clearly apparent in the latter part of the year 1920-1. The export trade was the first to be affected. The markets of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, who were all among India's best customers, were glutted with Indian produce, and there was a considerable slackening of the demand on their part. The countries

¹ Figures from 1937-8 relate to British India *excluding* Burma. The second figures for the years 1935-6 and 1936-7 have been adjusted so as to represent British India *excluding* Burma for facilitating comparison.

² The net exports (excess of exports over imports) of private merchandise (sea-borne trade), *excluding* Government stores, for the last ten years were as follows: Rs. 61 crores in 1930-1, Rs. 34 crores in 1931-2, Rs. 3.5 crores in 1932-3, Rs. 34.41 crores in 1933-4, Rs. 23.42 crores in 1934-5, Rs. 29.86 crores in 1935-6, Rs. 77.13 crores in 1936-7, Rs. 15.42 crores in 1937-8, Rs. 16.88 crores in 1938-9 and Rs. 47.81 crores in 1939-40.

of central Europe, which had been a valuable market for Indian exports during the period before 1914, no doubt badly wanted Indian products, but could not buy them owing to their shattered resources and reduced purchasing power. The unsatisfactory rains of 1920 in India and the high prices of food-stuffs necessitated the continuance of the embargo on the export of food-stuffs. There was also a severe crisis in Japan which checked the exports of Indian cotton to that country. The ill-fated attempts of the Government to stabilize the exchange value of the rupee at 2s. (gold),¹ further paralysed the already weak export trade. The import trade, on the other hand, expanded rapidly. India's import requirements had been starved during the war and orders had been placed for machinery and other manufactured goods during the war and after the Armistice for delivery at the discretion of the manufacturers, and these now began to pour into the country. The high exchange also gave a powerful stimulus to the import trade and orders were placed for immense quantities of foreign manufactured goods. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that there was a heavy balance of trade against India, to the extent of Rs. 79·80 crores in 1920-1, which continued into the next year when it amounted to Rs. 33·94 crores.

After the year 1922-3 a recovery was discernible. And at least so far as the import trade was concerned, the trend towards the restoration of normal conditions was continuously in evidence till the year 1929-30. The conditions which favoured the progress towards gradual recovery were the progressive stabilization of the European currencies, the improvement in the credit position of the central European countries, and the apparent settlement of the reparations question by means of the Dawes Scheme in 1924.

§7. **India's trade during the world economic depression.**—A downward trend of trade started in October 1929, after the Wall Street collapse, and afterwards spread to most other countries all over the world. The main causes of this trade depression, which dominated India's foreign trade during the years 1929-30 to 1933-4, may be summed up as follows :—(i) overproduction in the case of both raw materials and manufactured products, but particularly in the case of the former ; (ii) monetary causes, especially the concentration of gold in America and France resulting in a depletion of the reserves of the Central Banks in other countries and the consequent deflationary policy followed by these banks until the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931 by Great Britain, whose example was followed by India and a large

¹ See ch. vii.

number of countries ; (iii) political unrest in many quarters of the globe, notably in India, China and South America and subsequently in other countries. Restrictions on trade in the shape of tariffs, quotas, exchange control, etc., which became numerous during the era of exchange instability ushered in by the widespread abandonment of the gold standard, further adversely affected world trade. All these factors gave a setback to the foreign trade of India—a fact clearly brought out by the table on page 236. The fall in the value of exports was mainly due to the disastrous fall in the prices of agricultural raw materials¹ and the decline in the foreign demand for India's staple exports. The fall in the value of imports was largely the result of the reduced purchasing power of the consumers in India, the tense political situation in the country and the extension of home production of cotton textiles and sugar stimulated by the policy of discriminate protection India has followed since 1924.

The fall in the case of exports was naturally far greater than in the case of imports owing to the fact that the prices of agricultural commodities and raw materials, which form the bulk of India's exports, fell to a much greater extent than the prices of manufactured goods which form the bulk of Indian imports. Had it not been for the enormous quantity of gold exported from India after Great Britain went off the gold standard, the balance of trade in favour of India would have dwindled to a negligible figure indeed.² The slump in the export trade was at its worst in 1932-3, when the value of the exports dropped to Rs. 136 crores, and the visible balance of trade in merchandise was only about Rs. 3 crores, the smallest figure on record. The worst phase of the world depression came to an end in 1932, and the early months of 1933 had seen a considerable revival of business activity in several countries under the stimulus of devaluation and cheap money conditions. At the same time the prevalent urge towards economic nationalism, under the influence of which each country was trying to reserve its markets for its own nationals, and the failure of the World Economic and Monetary Conference, held in London (1933), owing to the hostile attitude of the United States of America towards the stabilization of world currencies, handicapped recovery of world trade.

The great American experiment of socialization of finance and industry, undertaken in the Recovery Plan of President Roosevelt, while it exercised a certain beneficial influence on world prices, obscured the beginning of a genuine rise in world prices of

¹ See ch. ix.

² See §26 and also ch. viii.

commodities by the greater speculative rise based on the prospect of inflation in America. The period of dollar uncertainty probably enhanced the difficulties in the path of increased international trade. Nevertheless, on the whole, there were feeble indications in the year 1933-4 that the corner was about to be turned and that at least some recovery had at last been made from the depression. In 1933-4 Indian conditions generally showed some progress towards recovery so far as the export trade and the visible balance of trade were concerned, although agricultural conditions remained much the same.

§8. **World economic recovery and India's trade.**—The years 1934-5, 1935-6 and 1936-7 were marked by further progress in the process of economic recovery. In the earlier stages, the improvement was confined to particular countries or industries, but in 1936 the world appeared to have definitely emerged from the paralysing conditions of the great depression. The gradual depletion of stocks of primary commodities since 1934, the restriction schemes for regulation of production of various commodities adopted on a voluntary basis by some of the chief producers, the collapse of the gold bloc under the leadership of France, and the devaluation of the erstwhile gold currencies in September 1936, brought about a rise in the prices of many commodities. The rise became striking during the first half of 1937, owing to the influence of an additional factor, namely the heavy government expenditure on armaments in many countries, which gave a great stimulus to the heavy industries, and had an exhilarating effect on the general economic situation. Conditions of international trade were, however, no freer than at the bottom of the depression when such devices as high import tariffs, quotas, clearing agreements, and other measures regulating trade were adopted by several countries, notably by Germany and Italy. In fact, the increasing tendency towards bilateralism has been a marked feature of world trade during recent years.¹

India followed the general world trend towards recovery, although owing to her special conditions, her course of recovery was somewhat different from that of other countries. In spite of rapid industrialization of recent years, she still remains predominantly an agricultural country, and the economic welfare of the people depends largely on agricultural conditions in India as well as abroad. The depression which started in 1929 hit agricultural countries like India with special severity, owing to the unprecedented fall in the prices of primary produce. The improvement in

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1936-7)*, pp. 1-2.

agricultural prices began somewhat earlier, but it was only during 1936-7 that there was an appreciable advance in the prices of India's agricultural products. (See also ch. ix.) This marked improvement was chiefly the result of a general recovery in the demand for primary commodities and raw materials. The gradual rectification of the disparity between the industrial and agricultural prices, which was particularly marked after the middle of 1936, had a beneficial effect on the economic conditions of agricultural countries like India. India's trade, especially her export trade, in consequence made a considerable recovery, especially in 1936-7 when it recorded an advance of nearly Rs. 36 crores over the previous year's total. In the same year the trade balance in private merchandise in favour of India, which had sunk low to Rs. 3 crores in 1932-3, mounted to Rs. 78 crores.

§9. India's trade during the 'recession' period (1937-8 to 1938-9).—With the advent of the business 'recession', which occurred in the United States of America about April 1937 and which gathered momentum as the year wore on, the economic recovery of the world received an unexpected setback. The sudden reversal of the upward trend in business conditions was caused by the inevitable pricking of the bubble of speculation which was aggravated by a feeling of nervousness regarding future shortage of raw materials combined with other factors, such as the gold scare in the United States, the warning uttered by President Roosevelt that prices were rising too high and too fast, the restrictions placed on credit facilities by Banks, and relaxation of restriction schemes under boom conditions. With the reversal of boom in the world markets for primary commodities, prices fell sharply and remained low till the middle of June 1938.

Fortunately the recession did not culminate in a major depression as in 1929 and appeared to be receding from June 1938. It had spent its force by the end of 1938, and in the early part of 1939 business activity was rising moderately. This is explained partly by the adoption of policies of monetary expansion and of increased public expenditure all over the world, especially in the United States, and partly by the high expenditure on armaments, which helped to maintain economic activity. At the same time, the shadow-war thus engendered deepened the feeling of nervousness and uncertainty regarding the future, and this hampered economic recovery in the period preceding the outbreak of the present war.

The economic, 'recession' and the reversal of the commodity boom in the world markets in 1937 did not fail to affect adversely prices and agricultural conditions in India. The prices of most

Indian staple products declined very sharply, and this meant a shrinkage in the income of the agriculturist (see also ch. ix). The downward trend in India was accentuated by the prolonged Sino-Japanese activities which seriously curtailed the trading capacity of India's principal customer for cotton. The overseas trade of India in 1937-8 compared with the previous year showed an extension in imports and was accompanied by a decrease in exports with the result that the net exports of private merchandise from India (excluding Burma) declined from Rs. 51 crores in 1936-7 to Rs. 17.56 crores. It is well known that imports lag behind exports in the case of Indian trade, and the larger increase in the volume of India's total exports, after the trade recovery started in the year 1936, led to the larger imports in the year 1937-8. The figures for the year 1938-9 clearly bring out the effects of the 'recession' on the foreign trade of India. The total value of India's foreign trade in private merchandise declined from Rs. 363 crores in 1936-7 to Rs. 322 crores in 1938-9 mainly in consequence of the 'recession' of business activity and the consequent shrinkage in the world trade. The fall of as much as Rs. 41 crores in exports was in part the result of the depressed condition of the primary markets of the world and in part of the reduced purchase of Indian cotton by Japan. The fall in imports was caused by the smaller purchasing power in the hands of the agriculturist. The larger decrease in imports in 1938-9 improved the trade balance by a couple of crores as compared with the previous year.

§10. *India's foreign trade during the war period (September 1939 onward).*—The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 changed the Indian trade position. Commodity prices in India no doubt had shown a slight recovery in the first five months of 1939-40, but with the exception of a few commodities like jute, sugar and tea, the prices of agricultural produce in general remained at a low level up to August 1939. During the same period the foreign trade position in regard to many staple articles of export was satisfactory as compared with the previous year, but its effect was largely nullified by the growing tension in the international sphere and the consequent deterioration in industrial conditions. The situation was radically altered by the outbreak of war in September 1939, and the whole outlook was transformed from pessimism into optimism.

The following table compares the foreign trade of India for the five months preceding and the seven months following the war, with corresponding periods of 1938-39.¹ The total value of

¹ *Report on Currency and Finance for the year 1939-40, par. 8.*

the foreign trade of India in private merchandise in 1939-40 amounted to Rs. 378 crores, as compared with Rs. 322 crores in

In crores of rupees

Year	April to August			September to March		
	Imports	Exports	Balance of Trade	Imports	Exports	Balance of Trade
1938-9	59.59	66.17	6.56	92.21	103.06	10.85
1939-40	70.10	77.13	7.03	94.62	136.50	41.88
Percentage change	17.6	16.6	6.8	2.6	32.4	28.0

the preceding year and Rs. 363 crores in 1937-8. Thus the total trade of India was the largest in the last three years. The total exports rose by 26 per cent from Rs. 169.35 crores to Rs. 213.62 crores, mainly owing to the heavy demand created by the war for various kinds of raw materials and foodstuffs and partly owing to rises in prices, though the shortage of shipping prevented the country from reaping the full benefits of the situation. It is worth while noting that the increased off-take of Indian goods by the Allied and Empire countries more than made up the losses due to the cessation of trade with enemy countries. Exports of Indian merchandise showed an increase under jute manufactures, raw jute, cotton, wool and tea. On the other hand, exports of grain, pulses, flour and oil-seeds declined. The improvement in the export trade was made up of a rise of about 20 per cent in the price level and 4 per cent in quantum.

The total value of imports rose by 8.51 per cent to Rs. 164.72 crores as against 152 crores in 1938-9. Most of the items showed increases, of which oils recorded the largest amount. On the other hand, imports of machinery and iron and steel declined. Import prices increased by 6.4 per cent, and the quantum by 2 per cent. The increased pressure on productive capacity in the Western countries, the cessation of trade with the enemy countries, higher insurance costs, and shipping difficulties necessarily caused a dislocation of the import trade. The increase in the value was, therefore, remarkable, although it was mainly due to rise in prices. In respect of the balance of trade the position was distinctly satisfactory, as shown by the increase of the favourable balance of trade from Rs. 17.41 crores in 1938-9 to Rs. 48.91 crores in 1939-40.

Thus in spite of the abnormal conditions created by the war, India was able to enjoy more satisfactory trading conditions during the year 1939-40 than in the preceding two years.¹

§11. *War-time trade restrictions.*—The export and import trade of India since the declaration of war in September 1939 have been subjected to certain restrictions. Soon after the declaration of the war, the Central Government imposed restrictions on the export trade in a large variety of articles. Trading with the enemy countries was prohibited. Steps were also taken to see that supplies did not reach the enemy by indirect channels and to conserve supplies of all essential articles for the requirements of India and the allied countries. With this object in view an elaborate system of export restrictions and licenses was introduced.² Export licenses were issued for some articles by the Department of Supply and for others by the Export Trade Controller.

Restrictions were also imposed on imports of as many as 68 items in May 1940 with a view to conserving foreign exchange and lessening the pressure on the limited tonnage available. Most of these are luxury goods, including commodities of everyday use, and the restrictions have incidentally stimulated many small and struggling industries to manufacture substitute or alternative goods.

§12. *India's foreign trade from April 1940 to January 1941.*—The foreign trade of India during the first nine months of the financial year 1940-1 may now be briefly reviewed. Total exports for the nine months ending December 1940 amounted to Rs. 144·02 crores as against Rs. 139·33 crores in the corresponding months of the preceding year. Total imports during the same period amounted to Rs. 116·0 crores as compared with Rs. 118·0 crores in the corresponding period of the preceding year.

Exports during the nine months ending December 1940 showed decreases under jute, raw ; cotton, raw and waste ; hides and skins, raw or undressed ; and seeds ; amounting to Rs. 5,16 lakhs, Rs. 2,93 lakhs, Rs. 2,93 lakhs, Rs. 61 lakhs and Rs. 27 lakhs respectively. On the other hand, jute manufactures registered a substantial increase of Rs. 5,83 lakhs. Tea and grain, pulse and flour also showed increases of Rs. 58 lakhs and Rs. 23 lakhs, respectively. The greater intake by the Empire countries, the United States and South American countries partially compensated for the loss of the export trade with the Continental markets (see §13 below).

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, pars. 92-3.

² For further particulars see *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, Appendix.

Imports during the nine months ending December 1940 showed significant increases under oils ; cotton, raw and waste ; chemicals ; drugs and medicines ; dyes and colours ; iron and steel manufactures thereof, and other yarns and textile fabrics. The three groups to register substantial decreases were sugar, machinery and cotton yarns and manufactures, which declined by Rs. 2,95 lakhs, Rs. 2,22 lakhs and Rs. 1,77 lakhs respectively.

The total balance of trade in merchandise for the nine months ending December 1940 was in favour of India to the extent of Rs. 35,51 lakhs as against Rs. 28,21 lakhs during the same months of 1939. Taking India and Burma as one unit, the favourable trade balance amounted to Rs. 53,95 lakhs and 49,64 lakhs respectively.¹

India's foreign trade improved substantially in January 1941. Exports amounting to Rs. 19.70 crores were the highest for any month during the current financial year, while imports totalled Rs. 14.71 crores, indicating a small recovery in arrivals of foreign goods. As compared, however, with the first month of 1940, imports and exports showed a decline of Rs. 1.72 and Rs. 3.55 crores respectively. The decline in exports may be attributed partly to the loss of the Continental markets, and partly to reduced shipments of jute, raw and manufactured, and of raw cotton, which were in demand a year ago.

§13. *Loss of Continental export markets.*—Apart from the adverse effects produced by the war-time trade restrictions and limited tonnage, the export trade of India has received a further setback by the closing of the Continental markets following the occupation of the greater part of the European Continent by Germany in April, May and June, 1940. The loss thus entailed has been estimated at over Rs. 30 crores annually. In terms of commodities India has lost half of her export trade in oil-seeds, raw jute, and cotton waste, over a third in raw cotton, one-third in cotton manufactures, coffee, oilcakes, manures and raw hides.²

General concern is felt about the adverse reactions of the loss of this trade on the rural economy of the country, and several measures have been suggested or adopted to deal with the problem of dealing with the surplus primary commodities. These measures fall under three main heads: (i) measures for finding alternative export markets; (ii) measures for stimulating internal consumption,

¹ *Monthly Survey of Business Conditions in India (December 1940)*, pp. 541-2.

² For further particulars regarding the various commodities affected see *Report on Prospects of Indian Trade with the United States of America*, by T. E. Gregory and Sir David Meek, par. 33.

and (iii) other measures, such as Government purchases, crop restriction schemes, etc.

§14. **Gregory-Meek mission.**¹—A notable step taken by the Government of India to revive the export trade was the deputation in July 1940 of Dr T. E. Gregory and Sir David Meek to visit the United States of America on a trade mission. In their Report, which was published in January 1941, the authors frankly admit that it is not possible for India to find in the United States an effective substitute market for the entirety of the lost European markets.² Most of our former large exports to Europe, notably jute, groundnuts, cotton, oilcakes, wheat, raw hides and skins cannot be shipped in bulk to the United States. America has surplus cotton of her own, grows wheat and groundnuts, increasingly substitutes cotton and paper goods for jute, manufactures her own oilcakes, and tans most of her own hides and skins.³ Another handicap is the growth of inter-American trade promoted at the recent Havana Pan-American Conference to offset Axis ambitions in South America. Unfortunately, many South American raw materials—such as Argentine linseed, groundnuts, oilcakes, and seeds—compete directly with India's. There are only one or two bright spots in this picture. The armament drive should increase the demand for products for Government stock-pile purposes and for armament manufactures. In this connexion manganese ore and mica are of particular significance to India. Other articles belonging to this category are rubber, coconut shell char, etc.

The Report does not suggest that the potentialities of the United States as a market for Indian goods are confined either to munition raw materials or to certain staple Indian products. On the contrary, the authors of the Report attach much importance to the cultivation of the American consumer-market for finished and semi-finished goods. This is, however, a fickle and strenuous market and calls for vigilance, initiative, personal contacts, and publicity campaigns on the part of Indian manufacturers. Indeed, the Report rightly observes that publicity must be encouraged even to retain the existing markets, particularly for jute, which has to reckon with increasing competition of substitutes.

§15. **Export Advisory Council, and other measures.**—The Gregory-Meek Report makes it abundantly clear that India must explore non-American markets to compensate for the loss of the Continental markets. We must for instance seek to expand Indo-

¹ §§14-15 should be read with §§40-1.

² *Report*, par. 67.

³ *Times of India*, 9 January 1941.

British trade as far as possible and also stimulate our exports to non-Empire countries like Japan, China, Arabia, and Africa. To some extent the loss of markets made inaccessible by the war has been made up by inter-Imperial trade (see §22 below) and, to a smaller extent, by trade with a few non-Empire countries, e.g. increased exports of cotton piece-goods to Africa, Arabia, etc. In this connexion we welcome the establishment of the Export Advisory Council in May 1940, under Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, Commerce Member, as Chairman, and Sir H. P. Mody as Vice-Chairman, and composed of twenty other members representing different trades and industries. Its functions can be summed up under four heads; first, to take up the discussion of export difficulties arising out of the war; secondly, to make suggestions relating to the expansion of the exports of staples and discovery of alternative markets; thirdly, to promote the expansion of Indian manufactures; and lastly, to discuss facilities which can be afforded to unofficial trade delegations from India to countries overseas. Although the Council has done some useful work, it requires to be greatly extended to meet the trade situation created by the war.

It is obvious that the process of finding alternative markets has its limitations, and attempts must be made side by side to deal with the situation created by the war by quickening the industrialization of the country and finding alternative uses in order to increase the internal consumption of raw materials like cotton and oilseeds which have lost foreign markets. The general stimulus given by the war to the industrial development of India, as also the specific efforts of the Scientific and Industrial Research Board (see ch. ii) are therefore to be warmly welcomed. In the case of cotton, this aspect of the problem has been rightly stressed by the Indian Central Cotton Committee at its recent (January, 1941) session in Bombay.

Crop-planning or crop-restriction schemes have been suggested, but it is by no means easy to enforce this remedy in the conditions of Indian agriculture. We may suggest for the consideration of the Government, purchase and storage of agricultural staples within the limits of their financial resources, both on their own behalf as also on behalf of Great Britain, of some of the Indian agricultural staples on the lines of recent purchases of Egyptian cotton and of wool clip in New Zealand and South Africa by the British Government.

§16. The quantum of trade of India.—To illustrate the variations in the quantum of trade the values of imports and

exports of merchandise on the basis of India proper (excluding Burma), for the last five years and for 1927-8, the base year, have been compiled and are given in the table below. These statistics, although necessarily approximate, afford a rough measure of the course of India's trade.

Year	Quantum of ¹	
	Exports	Imports
	Rs. (crores)	Rs. (crores)
1927-8	291.9 (100.0)	254.7 (100.0)
1935-6	261.0 (89.4)	232.6 (91.3)
1936-7	320.7 (109.9)	219.4 (86.1)
1937-8	301.0 (103.1)	243.7 (95.7)
1938-9	295.5 (102.2)	226.0 (88.7)
1939-40	309.1 (105.9)	230.5 (90.5)

The above statistics of the quantum of trade have an additional interest during the year 1939-40 in view of the wide fluctuations in prices which took place after September 1939. These figures show that India's exports and imports were higher in 1939-40 not merely in value but also in volume. The index relating to the quantum of exports was 105.9 in 1939-40 as compared with 102.2 in 1938-9. Similarly the index showing the quantum of imports was 90.5 in 1939-40 as against 88.7 in 1938-9.

§17. **Characteristics of India's sea-borne trade.**—We may now proceed to examine the principal characteristics of India's sea-borne trade. Tables I and II below show the comparative importance of the principal articles imported into and exported from British India respectively. They also serve to illustrate numerically the

¹ Figures in brackets stand for Index Numbers. *Review of the Trade of India* (1939-40), p. 98.

TABLE I (Imports)¹

The following table shows the comparative importance of the principal articles exported from British India in 1939-40 and two previous years.

In lakhs of rupees

	1937-8	1938-9	1939-40	Percentage on total imports of merchandise in 1939-40
Cotton and cotton goods ...	27,68	22,66	22,10	13'37
Grain, pulse and flour ...	12,17	13,76	21,81	13'19
Oils ...	18,70	15,62	18,62	11'27
Machinery and mill-work ...	17,15	19,05	14,67	8'88
Metals and ores ...	13,39	10,87	10,87	6'58
Vehicles ...	8,92	6,68	6,87	4'16
Instruments, apparatus and appliances ...	6,13	5,85	5,58	3'37
Artificial silk ...	4,87	2,24	4,59	2'78
Chemicals ...	3,33	3,05	4,52	2'73
Dyeing and tanning substances	3,94	3,11	3,61	2'18
Paper and pasteboard ...	4,15	3,23	3,46	2'09
Sugar ...	19	46	3,32	2'01
Wood and timber ...	2,98	2,87	2,70	1'63
Provisions and oilman's stores	2,60	2,48	2,63	1'59
Drugs and medicines ...	2,36	2,21	2,61	1'58
Spices ...	1,83	2,63	2,55	1'54
Hardware ...	3,31	2,57	2,27	1'37
Liquors ...	2,30	2,11	2,19	1'33
Wool, raw and manufactured	4,15	2,82	2,16	1'31
Silk, raw and manufactured	2,86	1,94	1,82	1'10
Rubber manufactures ...	1,89	1,41	1,48	0'90
Manures ...	80	1,05	1,25	0'76
Fruits and vegetables ...	1,58	1,34	1,21	0'74
Tobacco ...	85	1,05	1,17	0'71
Paints and painters' materials ...	1,02	89	1,03	0'62
Glass and glassware ...	1,52	1,25	1,02	0'62
Precious stones and pearls, unset	1,24	1,15	88	0'53
Tea chests ...	72	90	83	0'50
Stationery ...	81	67	65	0'39
Toilet requisites ...	68	66	65	0'39
Salt ...	56	38	62	0'38
Building and engineering materials ...	70	62	57	0'34
Books, printed, etc. ...	62	59	54	0'32
Belting for machinery ...	60	49	53	0'32
Arms, ammunition and military stores ...	1,28	50	49	0'30
Haberdashery and millinery ...	64	47	43	0'26
Apparel ...	68	48	38	0'23
Bobbins ...	43	38	38	0'23
Clocks and watches and parts	52	43	36	0'22
Earthenware and porcelain ...	48	39	36	0'22
Toys and requisites for games	44	37	33	0'20
All other articles ...	13,62	10,65	11,16	6'76
Total value ...	173,79	152,33	165,27	100

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 106.

TABLE II (Exports)¹

The following table shows the comparative importance of the principal articles exported from British India in 1939-40 and two previous years.

In lakhs of rupees

	1937-8	1938-9	1939-40	Percentage on total exports of merchandise in 1939-40
{ Jute, raw	14,72	13,40	19,73	9.70
{ Jute manufactures	29,08	26,26	48,69	23.93
{ Cotton, raw and waste	29,77	24,67	31,04	15.26
{ Cotton manufactures	9,29	7,12	8,58	4.22
Tea	24,39	23,29	26,08	12.82
Seeds	14,19	15,09	11,90	5.85
Leather	7,25	5,28	7,69	3.78
Metals and ores	6,13	4,91	6,45	3.17
Grain, pulse and flour	9,49	7,74	5,07	2.49
Hides and skins, raw	5,04	3,85	4,09	2.01
Wool, raw and manufactured	3,72	3,85	4,04	1.99
Tobacco	2,00	2,76	2,53	1.24
Fruits and vegetables	2,08	2,27	2,37	1.16
Oilcakes	2,43	3,01	2,03	1.00
Coal and coke	99	1,36	1,93	0.95
Lac	1,62	1,27	1,89	0.93
Mica	1,48	1,14	1,73	0.85
Oils	1,01	1,03	1,37	0.68
Coir	1,04	96	1,28	0.63
Spices	93	79	1,08	0.53
Rubber, raw	84	72	94	0.46
Hemp, raw	75	72	86	0.42
Coffee	55	75	73	0.36
Dyeing and tanning substances	67	59	71	0.35
Provisions and oilman's stores	63	59	71	0.35
Fish (excluding canned fish)	69	69	70	0.34
Manures	69	37	48	0.24
Bristles	32	26	39	0.19
Drugs and medicines	28	28	33	0.16
Paraffin wax	51	36	33	0.16
Building and engineering materials other than of iron, steel or wood	18	15	31	0.15
Bones for manufacturing purposes	44	24	23	0.11
Wood and timber	30	27	21	0.10
Saltpetre	11	11	17	0.08
Apparel	16	13	15	0.07
Fibre for brushes and brooms	20	16	13	0.07
Cordage and rope	9	8	11	0.05
Sugar	40	24	8	0.04
Animals, living	9	8	8	0.04
Silk, raw and manufactured	7	4	8	0.04
Fodder, bran and pollards	9	9	5	0.02
Tallow, stearine and wax	4	3	3	0.02
Horns, tips, etc.	4	2	1	0.01
All other articles	6,15	5,78	6,07	2.98
Total value	180,92	162,79	203,44	100

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 139.

oft-repeated statement that the bulk of the exports from India consist of food-stuffs and raw materials and the bulk of the imports, of manufactured articles. We have already explained above how this characteristic of India's present-day trade stands in marked contrast with her foreign trade up to the opening decades of the last century, and also the process of the transition from the one to the other. We have also discussed the question relating to the policy to be followed with regard to the export of food-stuffs and raw materials from the country.¹ Similarly, in the preceding chapters hardly a single opportunity has been lost of insisting with all possible emphasis on the desirability of rapid industrial development in the country so as greatly to reduce our present dependence on foreign manufactures.

Even long before the war of 1914-18, a slight improvement in this direction had taken place and the percentage of exports of manufactures to the total exports had shown a tendency to increase gradually, though the bulk of the exports, then as now, were in the form of raw materials and food-stuffs. During the period covered by the war of 1914-18, for reasons already explained, this percentage showed an appreciable increase which was not fully maintained in the post-war years. The present war, by accelerating the industrialization of the country, has considerably strengthened the tendency for the percentage of exports of manufactures to total exports to increase.

Another characteristic of India's foreign trade is that while the imports consist of a wide range of articles, the export trade is restricted to a comparatively few great staples like raw cotton, jute, oil-seeds and food grains.

The third noteworthy feature is that Great Britain holds a predominant position in our foreign trade, especially on the import side (see §§ 19-23 below). On the export side, while she is the most important single customer, the aggregate of that trade is more evenly divided between a number of countries. Lastly India's foreign trade normally shows an excess of exports over imports, i.e. a favourable balance of trade. (See §27 for an explanation of this feature.)

In spite of some improvement, however, it is clear that the salient features of the trade of India remain essentially as described above.

§18. Broad analysis of imports and exports (1938-9 and 1939-40): (1) Imports.—It will be seen from Table I above that cotton and cotton goods still hold the place of honour on the

¹ See vol. I, ch. vi.

import side, though the percentage proportion to total imports has appreciably fallen from the quinquennial pre-war (1909-14) average of 36 per cent to 13.37 per cent in 1939-40. In Chapter II we have explained the causes of the very appreciable decline in the imports of cotton piece-goods. The total value of imports of cotton manufactures in 1939-40 dropped to Rs. 14.05 lakhs from the preceding year's figure of Rs. 14.15 lakhs. While imports of piece-goods registered a decline, imports of cotton twist and yarn advanced in quantity from 36 million lb. in 1938-9 to 41 million lb. in 1939-40, or by 14 per cent, the corresponding increase in value being from Rs. 2.93 lakhs to Rs. 3.52 lakhs, or by 20 per cent. Of the total imports of yarn Japan supplied 66 per cent, as against 58 per cent in the preceding year, while the shares of China and the United Kingdom dropped from 29 and 13 per cent to 26 and 7 per cent respectively. Imports of cotton piece-goods totalled 579 million yards in 1939-40, and showed a decrease of 68 million yards or 11 per cent as compared with the preceding year. The value of these imports declined by 6 per cent from Rs. 10.27 lakhs to Rs. 9.65 lakhs. The United Kingdom sustained heavy losses in each of the main classes of piece-goods. Imports of raw cotton dropped from 96,000 tons valued at Rs. 8.51 lakhs in 1938-9 to 84,000 tons valued at Rs. 8.05 lakhs in 1939-40. The decline in imports of raw cotton was due to the recession in the cotton mill industry in the earlier part of 1939-40 and the increase in the import duty on raw cotton. This import is necessitated by home production of yarn of higher counts, for which the finer long-staple cotton has to be imported.

Next in importance to the imports of cotton and cotton manufactures are grain, pulse and flour; oils; machinery and mill-work; and metals and ores. With the separation of Burma India has become a rice-importing country more than an exporting one, and this partly explains the greatly increased importance of the item of grain, pulse and flour in the import list. Likewise the same factor explains the important position held by oils in India's import trade, e.g. India imported 112 million gallons of kerosene or 58 per cent of the total imports in 1939-40 as compared with 114 million gallons or 63 per cent in 1938-9. Burma also supplies a large quantity of motor spirit to India. Oils of all kinds were imported in larger quantities in 1939-40 as a result of the increased industrial activity in the country. Imports of certain classes of machinery from the United States showed a marked increase during the year, but those from other countries fell off heavily. Thus the total imports of machinery were reduced by Rs. 4.35 lakhs, at a time when the country required larger

imports to meet the needs of industrial expansion. Imports of metals and ores were valued at Rs. 10,87 lakhs. Iron and steel contributed Rs. 6,09 lakhs as compared to Rs. 6,68 lakhs in 1938-9. The decline was mainly due to increased domestic requirements of the United Kingdom and the Continental producers. The imports of other metals such as aluminium, brass, copper, lead, tin, zinc and German silver, were valued at Rs. 4,73 lakhs in 1939-40 as compared to Rs. 4,15 lakhs in 1938-9. The imports of vehicles were valued at Rs. 6,87 lakhs as compared to Rs. 6,68 lakhs, the increase being the result of large imports of carriages, motor omnibuses, aircraft and parts of mechanically propelled vehicles. There was a set-back in the imports of instruments and apparatus which were valued at Rs. 5,58 lakhs in 1939-40 as compared with Rs. 5,85 lakhs in the previous year. Imports of artificial silk yarn and piece-goods swelled to Rs. 4,59 lakhs as compared with Rs. 2,24 lakhs owing to increased arrivals from Japan. The increase in the imports of chemicals and dyes and colours by Rs. 1,88 lakhs and Rs. 64 lakhs respectively is noteworthy in view of the apprehension felt in the first few months of the war on account of the temporary shortage of these articles. The United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan and the United States largely filled up the gap left by Germany. The increase of Rs. 23 lakhs under paper, pasteboard, etc., took place mainly before the outbreak of the war, the imports since September 1939 being lower both in quantity and value than in the corresponding period of the preceding year. The increased imports of sugar were necessitated by the short crop of 1938-9. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that our imports of sugar, which not long ago held the second place (i.e. to piece-goods), now occupy a subordinate place in the import trade, owing to the rapid expansion of the home industry following the grant of protection in 1931-2. (See vol. I, ch. vi.) Other articles of some importance in the import list are wood and timber (valued at Rs. 2,87 lakhs in 1938-9 and Rs. 2,70 lakhs in 1939-40); provisions and oilman's stores (valued at Rs. 2,48 lakhs and 2,63 lakhs); drugs and medicines; spices; hardware; liquors; wool, raw and manufactured: silk, raw and manufactured; and rubber manufactures.

(ii) **Exports.**— On the export side, as Table II above shows, jute and cotton are the most important commodities. The total exports of raw jute and manufactured jute during the year 1939-40 amounted to 1,651,000 tons as compared with 1,647,000 tons in 1938-9, showing an increase of 4,000 tons or 0.2 per cent. There was, however, a greater increase in the value of these shipments, which advanced from Rs. 39,66 lakhs to Rs. 68,42 lakhs or by

73 per cent. These two items were the first among all the articles of exports to reap the benefit of war conditions, and between them accounted for more than 70 per cent of the increase in the total value of the export trade. The demand for raw jute and jute manufactures would have been considerably higher than it was but for the fact that the continuous stream of Government orders for sand bags during the first three months of the war gave rise to hectic speculation, and prices were pushed to levels which had an injurious effect on the overseas demand. The high prices increased the tendency to resort to substitutes for jute such as cotton bags, especially in the United States of America.

The next most important article in our export trade is cotton. Shipments of raw cotton from British India advanced from 2,703,000 bales to 2,948,000 bales in 1939-40, or an increase of 9 per cent. The value of the exports rose by 26 per cent from Rs. 23,86 lakhs to Rs. 30,11 lakhs. Japan, the best customer of Indian raw cotton, reduced her takings from 1,211,000 bales to 1,056,000 bales in 1939-40. There were, however, increased shipments of Indian cotton to China, the United Kingdom, France and the United States. On the other hand shipments to Belgium, Germany, and Italy declined appreciably. The exports of Indian piece-goods bear only a very small proportion to the total Indian mill production. Thus in 1939-40, 221 million yards of cotton piece-goods were exported, while the mill production in the country was 4,012 million yards. The exports in 1939-40 improved by 25 per cent from 177 million yards to 221 million yards, the corresponding increase in value being from Rs. 4,79 lakhs to Rs. 6,11 lakhs, or 28 per cent. Of the total exports of piece-goods, 50 per cent went to Burma. Other important customers were Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Egypt, East Africa and Arabia. Exports of cotton twist and yarn amounted to 37 million lb. in quantity and were valued at Rs. 1,79 lakhs in 1939-40.

Tea ranks as the next most important article in our export trade. Exports of tea rose in quantity from 348 million lb. in 1938-9 to 357 million lb. in 1939-40, or by 3 per cent, the corresponding increase in value being from Rs. 23,29 lakhs to Rs. 26,08 lakhs, or 12 per cent. The total quantity exported in 1939-40 represented 79 per cent of the total production as compared with 77 per cent in 1938-9. Of the total exports the United Kingdom took 80 per cent as compared with 87 per cent in the preceding year. During the last four months of the year 1939-40, exports of tea from India showed a considerable advance as compared with the corresponding period of the previous year, which was mainly

due to the increase in the export quota to 95 per cent shortly after the outbreak of the war and increased demand from the United Kingdom and other markets.

Oil-seeds occupied the fourth place among Indian exports in 1939-40. The total exports of oil-seeds, consisting largely of groundnuts and linseed, from British India declined by 29 per cent in quantity and 21 per cent in value, and amounted to 849,000 tons valued at Rs. 11,84 lakhs as compared with 1,199,000 tons valued at Rs. 15,06 lakhs in 1938-9. Supplies were generally normal, but the war brought about dislocation of trade with the European markets on which they were mainly dependent.

There was an increase in the exports of tanned hides and skins in the year 1939-40, which totalled 31,90 tons valued at Rs. 6,98 lakhs as against 20,200 tons valued at Rs. 4,76 lakhs in the previous year. As a result of the war demands, exports of tanned cow hides showed a marked increase, as also exports of tanned buffalo and other hides, and tanned goat and sheep skins, the United Kingdom having considerably increased its purchases. Exports of raw hides and skins declined by 10 per cent in quantity from 35,300 tons in 1938-9 to 31,700 tons in 1939-40, but due to a rise in prices, the value advanced by 7 per cent from Rs. 3,81 lakhs to Rs. 4,06 lakhs. The United Kingdom absorbed 34 per cent of the exports of raw cow hides as against 8 per cent in the preceding year. Shipments to other countries such as Italy, Germany and France recorded decreases.

There was an increase in the exports of metals and ores, the total shipments of which amounted to 1,545,000 tons valued at 6,45 lakhs in 1939-40 as compared with 1,509,000 tons valued at Rs. 4,91 lakhs in the preceding year. Exports of manganese ore, representing 46 per cent of the total quantity shipped in 1939-40, rose from 456,000 tons to 719,000 tons or an increase of 58 per cent over 1938-9. The United Kingdom was as usual the largest purchaser; Japan came next, other purchasing countries being the United States of America, Belgium, France and Italy. Exports of pig iron totalled 569,000 tons valued at Rs. 2,84 lakhs in 1939-40 as compared with 514,000 tons valued at Rs. 2,56 lakhs in 1938-9. Japan took the largest quantity and was followed by the United Kingdom.

The total exports of grain, pulse and flour declined from 742,000 tons in 1938-9 to 408,000 in 1939-40, or by 45 per cent in quantity, the corresponding fall in value being from Rs. 7,74 lakhs to Rs. 5,07 lakhs, or by 34 per cent. All the principal classes of food grains (rice, wheat, pulse, barley, etc.) participated in this decline, which was most noticeable in the case of exports of

wheat. As previously pointed out, despite large production in India, considerable quantities are imported into the country mostly from Burma. Exports, which formed only 1 per cent (262,000 tons) of Indian production, are destined chiefly for Ceylon, Arabia, and certain African territories having a large Indian population. Exports of wheat from India shrank from 279,000 tons in 1938-9 to 7,800 tons in the year 1939-40 as supplies in Europe were sufficient to meet her demand. Exports of wheat were confined to nearer markets, Burma alone taking 3,500 tons as against 4,600 tons in 1938-9. Other articles of export of some importance were wool, raw and manufactured; tobacco, fruits and vegetables; oil-cakes; coal and coke; lac; mica; oils; coir; spices; rubber, raw; hemp, raw; and coffee.

§19. **The direction of India's trade.**—The table on p. 256 shows the percentage shares of foreign countries in India's total trade and serves to bring out the effect of the separation of Burma on the distribution of India's overseas trade.

These figures show that on the import side the United Kingdom, and Europe generally, dominate the situation, especially before the war of 1914-18; while a feature of the distribution of the export trade has always been the large number of countries participating in it, though the United Kingdom is still the biggest single customer for Indian exports. The causes of the predominance of the United Kingdom in India's trade have already been indicated, as also the successful attempts made by Germany and Japan to establish direct trade relations with India in the period before the war of 1914-18 and by the United States during and since that war. We may now discuss the principal tendencies regarding the direction of India's trade as revealed by the above figures, before, during and after the war of 1914-18.

§20. **Distribution of India's trade before 1914.**—During the period before the war of 1914-18, there was a tendency for both the import and export trade to be diverted from the United Kingdom to other countries. As regards the distribution of imports, the United Kingdom supplied at the close of the last century as much as 69 per cent of the Indian imports. The share of Germany was only 2.4 per cent and that of the United States 1.7 per cent, Japan being nowhere with her 0.6 per cent. By 1913-14 we notice that a remarkable change had taken place. While the share of the United Kingdom had come down to 64.1 per cent, the German share had increased to 6.9 per cent and those of Japan and the United States to 2.6 per cent each. Thus Germany occupied the second place next to the United Kingdom in 1913-14. The increase in the trade with Germany was attributed partly to the special

TABLE I.—Percentage share of the principal countries in India's total foreign trade in merchandise only

Countries	Pre-war average ¹			War average ¹			Post-war average ¹			1938-9			1939-40		
	Imports	Exports including re-exports	Total	Imports	Exports including re-exports	Total	Imports	Exports including re-exports	Total	Imports	Exports including re-exports	Total	Imports	Exports including re-exports	Total
BRITISH EMPIRE—															
United Kingdom ...	62.8	25.1	40.0	56.5	31.1	41.2	57.6	24.2	39.5	30.5	34.3	32.5	25.2	35.1	30.8
Burma	16.0	6.6	11.0	19.0	6.3	11.8
Ceylon ...	0.5	3.7	2.4	1.1	4.3	3.0	0.7	4.8	2.5	0.8	3.2	2.0	0.9	3.1	2.2
Straits Settlements ...	2.1	3.4	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.8	1.9	2.7	2.3	2.7	1.3	2.0	2.9	1.3	2.0
Australia ...	0.7	1.4	1.1	0.8	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.4	2.6	2.1
Hongkong ...	0.7	4.1	2.7	0.9	2.0	1.6	0.7	2.3	1.6	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
Mauritius and depend- encies ...	1.8	0.6	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.8	2.2	3.1	2.7	...	0.5	0.3	...	0.4	0.2
Total (including other British Possessions)	69.7	41.1	52.3	65.4	51.7	57.1	65.2	41.4	52.3	58.1	53.6	55.7	56.3	55.9	56.1
FOREIGN COUNTRIES—															
Japan ...	2.5	7.5	5.5	10.4	11.2	10.9	6.9	13.3	10.4	10.1	8.8	9.4	11.7	6.6	8.8
United States of America ...	3.1	7.5	5.8	7.0	11.9	9.9	8.5	12.0	10.4	6.4	8.4	7.5	9.0	12.7	11.1
Java ...	6.4	1.3	3.3	7.8	1.1	3.8	6.8	1.0	3.7	0.3	0.4	0.4	2.0	0.7	1.3
France ...	1.5	6.6	4.6	1.3	4.5	3.2	0.9	4.8	3.0	0.9	3.7	2.4	0.9	3.7	2.5
Italy ...	1.0	3.2	2.3	1.2	3.9	2.8	1.0	3.2	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.0	1.1
China (excluding Hong- kong and Macao)...	1.1	3.9	2.8	1.3	2.0	1.7	1.2	3.6	2.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.6	4.0	2.9
Iran ...	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	1.2	0.7	1.3	1.0	2.3	0.5	1.3	1.9	0.4	1.1
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics ...	0.1	0.9	0.6	0.1	1.2	0.8	0.1	...	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Netherlands ...	0.9	1.5	1.3	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.9	1.5	0.9	0.9	2.2	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.1
Belgium ...	1.9	5.3	3.9	0.3	0.5	0.4	1.8	3.7	2.9	1.9	2.5	2.2	1.5	1.5	1.5
Germany ...	6.4	9.8	8.5	0.7	0.9	0.8	2.8	4.9	4.0	8.5	5.0	6.6	4.0	1.4	2.5
Austria ² ...	2.2	3.5	2.9	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	...	0.2	0.1
Total (including other foreign countries)	30.3	58.9	47.7	34.6	48.3	42.9	34.8	58.6	47.7	41.9	46.4	44.3	43.7	44.1	43.9

Note.—As a result of the separation of Burma the trade statistics from 1937-8 given in this table include the trade of British India with Burma and exclude the direct trade of Burma with foreign countries.

¹ 'Pre-war average' means the average of the five years 1909-10 to 1913-14, 'war average' the average of the five years 1914-15 to 1918-19, and 'post-war average' the average of the five years 1919-20 to 1923-4.

technical skill which she had developed in certain lines, partly to the displacement of the expensive British goods by cheaper substitutes more readily absorbed by the Indian bazaars, and partly to the careful study which the Germans devoted to the needs and tastes of Indian customers. The share of Belgium, which supplied 3·9 per cent of the imports in 1903-4, was reduced to 2·3 per cent, while Java on account of her increased exports of sugar to India shot ahead and occupied the third place, contributing 5·8 per cent of the total imports in 1913-14.

The export trade showed a similar tendency towards diversion from the United Kingdom in the period before the war of 1914-18. At the beginning of the present century, roughly speaking 29 per cent of the exports went to the United Kingdom, 25 per cent to continental Europe, 24 per cent to the Far East and 7 per cent to the United States and the remaining 15 per cent to other countries. By 1914, the United Kingdom's share was reduced to 24 per cent, that of continental Europe rose to 29 per cent, the Far East took only 17 per cent, owing to the fall in the exports of opium and yarn, the share of the United States rose to 9 per cent, and that of other countries to 21 per cent. It will thus be seen that during this period continental Europe gained what the United Kingdom lost. The loss in the eastern market was made good by the gain in those of other minor countries. Turning to individual countries we find that, apart from the United Kingdom which was the biggest individual buyer of Indian goods, Germany which was third in the list in 1900 rose to the second place in 1914. Japan showed a similar improvement in her buying capacity, and advanced from the sixth place to the third as a buyer of Indian goods. China, on the other hand, lost the second place which she had occupied in 1900 and ranked sixth in 1914.¹

§21. *Distribution of India's trade during the war period (1914-18).*—During the period covered by the war of 1914-18, while the pre-war tendency of the import trade to move away from the United Kingdom gained in strength, the United Kingdom lost further ground in the Indian market owing to her preoccupation with the war, the control of the Home Government on her exports and the restrictive effects of high prices. And her share in the import trade came down from 64·1 per cent in 1913-14 to 45·5 per cent in 1918-19. Taking the whole war period, her share declined from the pre-war average of 62·8 per cent to the war average of 56·5 per cent. This, coupled with Germany's exit from the Indian market, created a gap in the import trade, a

¹ See R. M. Joshi, *Indian Export Trade*, pp. 159-60.

portion of which was rapidly filled up by Japan and the United States. Iron and steel and hardware previously supplied by the United Kingdom had now to be imported from these countries; while glassware, cotton piece-goods, paper, etc., had to be imported from Japan, and dye-stuffs from the United States. Both these countries made special efforts to study the requirements of the Indian market as Germany had done in the pre-war period, and extended their commercial organization in the country, which in the case of Japan included the establishment of retail stores in the principal Indian towns. The Japanese exchange banks in India also extended special financial facilities to the importers.

On the export side, the tendency was for a temporary reversion of the trade to the United Kingdom and the British Empire as a result of the war-time purchases and special measures taken to facilitate them, including restrictions on trade with neutral countries and the grant of credit facilities to some of the Dominions. All this was reflected in an increase in the share of the United Kingdom in the export trade from 23.4 per cent in 1913-14 to 29.2 per cent in 1918-19. The shares of the United Kingdom and the British Empire as a whole increased from the pre-war average of 25.1 per cent and 41.1 per cent to 31.1 per cent and 51.7 per cent (war average) respectively. Germany of course disappeared altogether as a buyer from the Indian market. The shares of France and Belgium were also reduced on account of the occupation of their territories by Germany. Japan and the United States, on the other hand, increased their share from 9.2 per cent and 8.9 per cent in 1913-14 to 12.1 and 13.8 per cent respectively in 1918-19. This increase was due to several factors, such as the privileged position held by these two countries as allies who, moreover, were removed far away from the theatres of war; their increased export trade with India establishing credits for them; and the conscious efforts made by both to develop direct trading relations with India. There was also a general reduction in the demand for Indian produce for normal industrial activity elsewhere. Thus, on the whole, during the war period (1914-18) India had to sell her produce in a restricted market, and, though she received higher prices for it than before the war, the prices she had to pay for her imports were far higher.

§22. *Tendencies of India's foreign trade after the war of 1914-18.*¹—After a temporary and partial recovery on the import side in the early post-war period, the United Kingdom again experienced a setback, and the progressive decrease in its share in import

¹ See also Vera Anstey, *Trade of the Indian Ocean*, pp. 74-9.

trade was accentuated, especially in 1930-1 and 1931-2, by the political situation in India. In the latter year her share declined to 35.5 per cent. The United Kingdom has had again to experience the competition of foreign countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States in the Indian market. The growing industrialization of India has also contributed to this result. Another explanation of the setback to the import trade of Great Britain with India may be found in the fact that until 1936-7 Great Britain bought much less from, than she sold to, India, whereas Japan, Germany and the United States usually bought more heavily from India and thus were enabled to sell much. Between 1932-3 and 1933-4 there was an improvement in the position of Great Britain, her share having risen to 41.7 per cent in 1933-4 owing largely to her favourable position in the Indian market under the Ottawa preferences introduced with effect from 1 January 1933. The percentage share of the United Kingdom has been steadily on the decline in recent years, being 38.4 in 1936-7, 30.5 in 1938-9 and only 25.2 in 1939-40. The marked decline in 1939-40 was due largely to the preoccupation of Great Britain in the war which was declared in September 1939. Burma contributed as much as 19 per cent in 1938-9 as compared to 14.9 in 1937-8, i.e. the first year after its separation from British India.

Japan and the United States naturally lost part of the ground captured by them during the war of 1914-18, Japan receiving a special setback owing to the commercial crisis of 1920-1. Another cause which has affected the imports from both countries may be traced to the reappearance of old rivals and the restoration of more normal conditions of competition in the Indian markets. Japan increased her share during the years 1933-4 to 1936-7. The proportion received from Japan showed decreases in 1937-8 and 1938-9, owing mainly to her preoccupation with the war in China. There was, however, a limited recovery in 1939-40. In the same year a larger proportion than in 1938-9 was received also from the United States, China and Java. The share of Germany, during the post-war years, especially after 1922-3, showed a remarkable recovery. Naturally enough her share declined from 8.5 per cent in 1938-9 to 4.0 per cent in 1939-40. Belgium and Italy also recorded decreases, while the shares of France and the Netherlands remained practically unchanged.

On the export side there was a definite tendency towards diversion, as was to be expected after the war of 1914-18, away from the United Kingdom as shown by the decline in her share from the war average of 31.1 per cent to the post-war average of 24.2 per cent. There was a gradual rise however, and the share

of the United Kingdom in the export trade has considerably improved in recent years, as is shown by the fact that her share increased from 21·4 per cent in 1928-9 to 32·2 per cent in 1936-7, 34·3 per cent in 1938-9 and 35·1 per cent in 1939-40, the increase in the latter year being stimulated by the present war. Indeed, the usual excess of imports over exports in the case of the United Kingdom was transformed in the year 1936-7 into a favourable balance of Rs. 18 crores, which further improved to Rs. 33 crores in 1939-40. Japan showed a striking improvement in her relative position in the export trade, her percentage share advancing by 7·2 to 15·7 per cent in 1934-5 due to the large shipments to that country of raw cotton, metals and ores, gunny bags and shellac. In recent years India has exported less goods to Japan, whose trade is now largely regulated by exchange control. Her share in 1939-40 amounted to only 6·9 per cent. The share of the U.S.A. in exports, which had shown a decrease in 1938-9, improved to 12 per cent in 1939-40. Among the principal European countries, while France advanced her share in exports, the remaining four countries—the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Italy—reduced their participation in 1939-40 as compared to earlier years.

To sum up the general trend of the developments of India's foreign trade during the period after the war of 1914-18, the pre-war tendency of a diversion of both the export and the import trade from the United Kingdom, re-asserted itself more forcibly than ever, especially on the side of imports, until 1931-2. After that, we have pointed out that there was recovery in its share especially in the export trade of India. The recovery has been partially lost in the case of import trade in recent years. The tendency of decline in the import trade and of recovery in the export trade has been accentuated during the present war period. Japan and the United States are the most formidable competitors of England in the Indian market. Germany had almost regained her former position in respect of imports before the declaration of the present war. Her participation in our export trade was, however, smaller even before the present war, which led to a further contraction of exports in 1939-40. All these nations command an excellent commercial organization for pushing their trade with India; and in this respect they have stolen a march upon the United Kingdom, which is now, however, awakening to the necessity of following in their footsteps. The Ottawa preferences, introduced at the beginning of the year 1933, are to some extent helping her to recover her position in India's foreign trade although the growing industrialization of the country under the ægis of

protection must necessarily make recovery in this respect difficult, if not impossible. The present war has, however, given a setback to this recovery.

§23. **Direction of trade in commodities.**—Tables II and III below indicate the direction and variations of India's trade in some of the more important commodities on the import and export side respectively. The main features regarding the direction of India's trade, most of which are clearly revealed by these tables, may be thus summed up :—

(i) *Imports.*—It will be observed from table II that the United Kingdom is threatened with competition in almost every line, including those which have hitherto been regarded as preponderantly British. Though the United Kingdom is still the principal supplier of cotton manufactures to India, her share steadily decreased from 71·3 per cent in 1928-9 to 32·1 per cent in 1939-40, as against 90·1 per cent in 1913-14; and that of Japan increased from 18·3 per cent, in 1928-9, to 55·0 per cent during the same period as against 1·8 per cent in 1913-14. In artificial silk, Japan dominated the supplies, her share being 83 per cent in 1939-40 as compared with 66 per cent in 1938-9. The participation of Italy dropped to 12 per cent from 25 per cent in the preceding year. The United Kingdom has lost ground during the years following the war of 1914-18 in the supply of iron and steel, machinery and hardware to the United States, Germany, Belgium and even Japan, though she is the largest single supplier, especially of iron and steel, and machinery. In iron and steel the shares of the United Kingdom and Germany declined from 55·8 and 11·5 in 1938-9 to 45·8 and 6·9 in 1939-40, while the proportion derived from the United States of America, France, Luxemburg, Belgium and Japan showed increases. Under machinery, the United Kingdom and the United States of America contributed 61 and 17 per cent of the total trade, their respective percentages in the preceding year being 59 and 11. On the other hand, the shares of Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Japan recorded declines. In the case of hardware the decrease in the share of Germany was offset by increased participation of the United States and Japan, while the share of the United Kingdom remained almost steady at 38 per cent.

Burma had a predominant share in the supplies of mineral oils and was responsible for 48 per cent of the total imports in 1939-40 against 52 per cent in the preceding year. There were also decreases in the supplies from Iran, and those from the U.S.S.R. were practically stopped, while the Bahrein Islands, the United States and Borneo and Sumatra increased their shares.

TABLE III—Direction of India's trade: EXPORTS (Percentage)¹
Dots (...) indicate that the trade is either nil or insignificant.

Country	Tea		Jute (raw)		Jute manufactures		Cotton (raw)		Hides and Skins (raw and tanned)		Oilseeds		Food grains	
	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40	1913-4	1939-40
United Kingdom	72.4	80.9	38.0	37.2	6.3	24.9	3.5	17.4	25.9	69.1	22.2	37.2	26.7	7.9
Canada	4.3	7.0	...	0.5	...	3.6
Australia	3.1	0.9	...	0.5	10.6	7.5
United States	0.7	3.1	11.9	10.2	41.5	22.8	...	3.9	24.3	20.1	1.2	3.0
Germany	0.2	21.8	4.6	14.6	1.5	20.3	1.1	16.0	6.4	7.8	1.0
Japan	2.2	0.5	0.1	47.2	35.7
France	9.9	14.5	...	0.2	...	8.7	...	2.2	31.4	12.2
Italy	5.5	5.1	7.7	1.5	5.3	1.0	5.0	2.4
Belgium	0.5	5.0	...	0.4	10.3	2.1	...	0.3	16.0	5.5
Ceylon	1.6	2.5	0.1	...	0.2	...	0.1	...	0.7	11.5	28.0
U.S.S.R.	11.1	0.1
Iran, Arabia, etc.	1.2	2.6	0.3	0.6	...	0.2	5.6	13.4
Java	2.5
Argentine Republic	1.8	10.4	6.5
China	1.7	22.2
Spain	2.8	3.0	0.4	2.8	0.1
Netherlands	0.7	3.3	0.3	1.0	13.8	6.8	0.4
Straits Settlements	0.2	...	1.0	6.7	5.3
Sumatra and Java	0.1	...	0.1	1.0	...
Egypt	0.5	0.2	...	0.2	2.1	2.3
Union of South Africa	0.2	1.7	3.8
Thailand	1.6	2.0
Percentage of total trade represented by countries shown	94.9	97.7	90.4	84.9	77.2	77.0	85.0	94.3	81.9	95.2	92.8	83.5	69.6	56.0
Total value of trade (crores of rupees)	15.0	23.29	30.8	19.73	28.2	48.69	41.0	30.11	15.9	11.04	25.6	11.84	45.1	5.07

¹ Review of the Trade of India (1936-7), pp. 133-4, and (1939-40), p. 174. Figures for 1913-14 relate to exports from India including Burma. Those for 1939-40 exclude Burma.

In motor vehicles the United Kingdom lost by about 7 per cent, but the U.S.A. and Canada improved their position from 39 and 13 per cent to 48 and 18 per cent respectively. The shares of Germany and Italy recorded declines.

(ii) *Exports.*—On the export side, the United Kingdom is by far the largest single customer for Indian tea, taking 80.9 per cent of the total exports in 1939-40 as compared with 87.4 per cent in 1938-9; Canada's share improved from 4.2 per cent in 1938-9 to 7.0 per cent in 1939-40. The share of the U.S.A. improved from 2.0 per cent to 3.1 per cent. Direct trade in tea with the U.S.S.R. is now insignificant, though Russia absorbed 11 per cent of the total exports of tea in 1913. In raw jute, a marked increase was noticeable in the proportion of exports of raw jute to the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, which absorbed 37 per cent, 15 per cent and 10 per cent as compared with 26 per cent, 11 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively; while Germany, Belgium and Italy participated to a lesser extent in this trade. In the case of jute manufactures, America was the principal outlet until 1938-9, but her relative share fell from 26.4 in 1938-9 to 22.8 per cent in 1939-40, while that of the United Kingdom increased from 10.4 per cent to 24.9 per cent. The share of Argentina declined from 10.2 to 6.5. There were slight variations in the shares of Australia and Java. Canada, the Union of South Africa and Japan are other customers for Indian jute manufactures. In raw cotton Japan is the heaviest buyer and accounted for 36 per cent of the total value of the exports in 1939-40 as against 47 per cent in 1938-9, while the share of China advanced from 7 per cent to 22 per cent. The relative share of the United Kingdom increased from 14.9 per cent in 1938-9 to 17.4 per cent in 1939-40. France and the United States of America took more, but Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands reduced their purchases. In food grains, Ceylon is the best customer for Indian rice, and accounted for 28.0 per cent of the total value of food grains exported in 1939-40 as compared with 19.3 in 1938-9. The United Kingdom, Straits Settlements, China, Iran, Arabia, and Asiatic Turkey are other large customers for Indian food grains. The United Kingdom curtailed her purchases. In oil-seeds, France used to take more groundnuts from India than any other country. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are other principal countries which import oil-seeds from India. All the principal European countries with the exception of the United Kingdom and Belgium reduced their shares. The United States participated to a greater extent. In hides and skins the United Kingdom and the United States are

the largest buyers. The share of the United Kingdom rose from 59 per cent in 1938-9 to 69 per cent in 1939-40, and the share of the United States from 15.7 per cent to 20.1 per cent. There was a marked decrease in the share of Germany, which fell from 4.7 per cent to 1.1 per cent. Before the war of 1914-18, Germany was one of the best purchasers of Indian hides. The shares of France and Italy also declined appreciably.

§24. **Indo-Burma trade.**—Prior to April 1937, Indo-Burma trade was treated as coasting trade (see §37 below). With the separation of the two countries from 1 April 1937, the trade of the one with the other is considered as foreign trade. The trade relations between the two countries were, until the recent conclusion of the Trade Agreement (April 1941), governed by the India and Burma (Trade Regulation) Order, 1937. The aggregate value of the trade between the two countries during 1939-40 amounted to Rs. 44.85 lakhs as compared with Rs. 35.45 lakhs in 1938-9. India's principal imports from Burma consist of rice (Rs. 16.65 lakhs), mineral oils (Rs. 7.91 lakhs) and teak wood (Rs. 1.95 lakhs). These together represented 87 per cent of the total imports from Burma in 1939-40. Imports of vegetables were valued at Rs. 31 lakhs.

On the export side, cotton and jute manufactures are the most important items which taken together accounted for Rs. 5.92 lakhs or 48 per cent of the total exports of Indian merchandise (Rs. 12.30 lakhs) to Burma in 1939-40. Among other items of exports to Burma mention may be made of iron and steel (Rs. 88 lakhs); tea (Rs. 21 lakhs); and sugar (Rs. 2 lakhs).

§25. **Entrepôt (re-exports) trade of India.**—The entrepôt trade of a country consists of the re-exports of articles previously imported, the country in question serving merely as a convenient distributing centre. From very early times India has had a certain amount of entrepôt trade, principally by reason of her geographical situation. Being situated in the centre of the Eastern hemisphere she is a convenient halting-place for the trade between the Far East and the West. Thus in the old times, 'this section of trade consisted chiefly of the import of silk goods and porcelain from China, pearls from Ceylon, precious stones and spices from the islands of the Eastern Archipelago—all for purposes of re-export to countries of the west; Venetian glass and the like from countries of the west to be re-exported to the east'.¹ In more recent times India's entrepôt trade was seen steadily to expand till a short while ago, showing an increase from Rs. 5.80 crores in 1882-3 to Rs. 18.04 crores in 1920-1. Since the latter year, however, it has fallen, and

¹ K. T. Shah, *Trade, Tariffs and Transport in India*, p. 92.

amounted to Rs. 13½ crores in 1924-5, Rs. 10½ crores in 1925-6, Rs. 9½ crores in 1927-8, Rs. 7 crores in 1929-30, Rs. 4·65 crores in 1931-2, and Rs. 3·22 crores in 1932-3. In 1933-4 the re-export trade in foreign merchandise improved slightly from Rs. 3·22 crores to Rs. 3·42 crores. The years 1934-5 and 1935-6 saw a further expansion, the value of re-exports having risen to Rs. 3·55 crores and Rs. 3·76 crores respectively. It showed a noticeable increase in the year 1937-8 when it amounted to Rs. 8·28 crores. It once again declined to Rs. 6·42 crores in 1938-9 but advanced to Rs. 9·64 crores in 1939-40, an increase of 50 per cent. The percentage shares of the principal countries in the re-export trade of India in the year 1939-40 were as follows:—United Kingdom 30 per cent; United States 28 per cent; Burma 12 per cent; Ceylon 4 per cent; and Arabia and Iraq 3 per cent each. As usual the bulk of the re-export trade passed through Bombay, which accounted for 73 per cent; Bengal came next with 15 per cent, while Sind had 11 per cent. Re-exports of skins (raw), wool (raw), foreign sugar (mostly of Java origin), cotton piece-goods, instruments, spices and chemicals showed increases on the one hand, and re-exports of silk manufactures, metals and ores, apparel, vegetables and hardware recorded decreases in the year 1939-40.

From the above list it will be seen that the re-export trade is mainly in manufactured articles imported from the Western countries, especially cotton textiles which are taken by Iran, Muscat and East Africa. The principal articles exported to Western countries are raw skins and wool which are imported across the land frontiers of India, the bulk of which goes to the United Kingdom. A certain amount of fur skins from Iran are exported from Bombay, which also re-exports pearls previously imported from the Bahrein Islands, Muscat, etc.

Though India will always act as a distributing centre to a certain extent, particularly for those Asiatic countries which have no seaboard of their own and to which the Indian ports afford the nearest approach for maintaining trade relations with other countries, the prospects of the entrepôt trade of India are not bright in view of the growing tendency towards the establishment of direct trade relations among the various countries, lessening their dependence on India as an entrepôt.

§26. Balance of trade and balance of payment (accounts).—A large surplus of exports over imports of private merchandise used to be a normal and much-noticed feature of India's foreign trade. Occasionally India has experienced what is called an adverse balance of trade, that is to say, there has been an excess of imports of

merchandise over exports, for example in the years 1920-1 and 1921-2 (see §6 above). The normal excess of exports over imports (the so-called favourable balance of trade) was liquidated partly by importation of precious metals—gold and silver—and partly by payment of interest and other Home charges, which may be described as India's invisible imports (see §27 below). India's average credit balance in merchandise was Rs. 78 crores in the five pre-war years, 1909-10 to 1913-14, Rs. 76 crores during the five war years, and Rs. 53 crores during the five post-war years ending 1923-4. During the next quinquennium ending 1928-9 the average rose to Rs. 113 crores, but it dropped to a low figure of Rs. 43 crores during the five years ending 1933-4. The year 1932-3 was the least favourable, the credit balance dropping to a little over Rs. 3 crores. In 1933-4 the balance in favour of India rose to Rs. 35 crores. But the following year (1934-5) saw a deterioration of the position, the balance dropping to Rs. 23½ crores. In 1935-6 it rose to Rs. 30½ crores and in the following year (1936-7) was more than doubled, being Rs. 77¾ crores. In 1937-8 the surplus of India's (excluding Burma) exports over imports of private merchandise declined to Rs. 16 crores as compared with Rs. 51 in the preceding year. The figures for India including Burma were respectively Rs. 43 crores and 77¾ crores. The decline was due to the decrease in exports accompanied by increase in imports. The greater decline in imports than in exports in 1938-9 under the influence of the 'recession', which also affected the trade position in 1937-8, resulted in a betterment of the trade balance, which stood at about Rs. 17½ crores as compared with Rs. 16 crores in the previous year. The trade balance position substantially improved in the year 1939-40, when mainly as a result of the war there was an increase of Rs. 44 crores in exports as against an increase of Rs. 13 crores in imports. Thus the surplus of exports over imports was nearly Rs. 48 crores as compared with about Rs. 17½ crores in 1938-9.

The trade depression of 1929-33, the restrictions on the free movement of goods, the changes in the volume and character of international trade, and the business recession of 1937-8 have had an adverse influence on India's balance of trade. The separation of Burma from British India from 1937-8 has also reduced the favourable trade balance of India. While in itself a low credit balance need not cause perturbation, the matter is of significance in the case of India, which has large overseas obligations to meet. The alleviating circumstance in this connexion has been the exports of gold from India which first came into evidence

in 1931.¹ The change in India's position from a gold-importing country to a gold-exporting country has been one of the most important factors affecting her international trade account. The normal absorption of the precious metals was first checked in 1931-2, when there was a net export of gold to the value of Rs. 58 crores. In 1932-3 and 1933-4 there were net exports to the value of Rs. 65½ and Rs. 57 crores respectively. In 1934-5 the net exports amounted in value to Rs. 52½ crores. The exports of gold declined to Rs. 37 1/3 in 1935-6, to Rs. 28 crores in 1936-7, Rs. 16 1/3 crores in 1937-8, and Rs. 13 crores in 1938-9. It will be seen that with an increase in the favourable balance of trade in merchandise there was a contraction in the export of gold. In the year 1939-40, however, the net exports of gold increased to Rs. 34 2/3 crores, although the trade balance showed an improvement. This was due mainly to the sharp increase in the world price of gold owing to conditions created by the war. In the same year the net imports of silver rose from Rs. 1·75 crores in 1938-9 to Rs. 4·74 crores in 1939-40. The visible balance of trade, as measured by statistics of private merchandise and treasure, was in favour of India to the extent of Rs. 79 crores in 1939-40 as compared with Rs. 29 crores in 1938-9 and Rs. 30 crores in 1937-8. The total value of gold exported from India since England went off the gold standard on 20 September 1931, amounted to Rs. 351·40 crores at the end of December 1939.²

In a proper balance of accounts or payments there must be an exact equivalence between exports and imports, and this will be seen to be established, if we could take into account not only the visible items, that is to say those items which are recorded in the customs returns or in other published statistics, but also the invisible items, that is to say those items which are not thus recorded.

§27. **Credit and debit items in India's balance sheet.**—We shall now consider what items have to be taken into account for a complete international balance sheet and how India stands with regard to each of them :³

(i) Imports and exports of merchandise. Under this head, as we have already seen, India is a creditor country. (ii) With regard to treasure, however, India until recently (1930-1) used to import more than she exported and therefore she was a debtor on this account. Since 1931-2, as pointed out above, the situation has

¹ This unusual phenomenon of the large exports of gold in recent years is examined in chapter viii.

² Figures since 1 January 1940 are not available.

³ See Morison, *The Economic Transition in India*, ch. viii.

been reversed and she has been exporting large amounts of gold, which makes her a creditor on this account. (iii) Loans offered or received from abroad. While a loan is being carried out, the nation which contracts the debt is the creditor and the nation which advances the loan is the debtor. Under this head India was until recently a creditor country as she has had to raise large loans in England from time to time. (iv) The annual interest on capital already invested has the opposite effect, making the borrowing country a debtor and the lending country the creditor, and as India has to make annual remittances of interest on the loans she has contracted she is a debtor under this head. (v) The repayment

<i>Credit</i>	<i>Debit</i>
1. Exports of merchandise.	1. Imports of treasure. ¹
2. Loans raised abroad.	2. Interest on loans raised abroad.
3. Remittances by foreigners to India for the support of schools and missions and for the relief of famines and other charitable purposes.	3. Repayments of loans previously incurred.
4. Tourists' expenses.	4. Remittances abroad by European merchants, lawyers, Government officers, etc.
	5. Profits of foreign banks and insurance companies and freight charges paid to foreign shipping companies.
	6. Expenditure on Government account abroad in connexion with furlough pay, pensions, stores, bullion, etc., purchased for the Government of India (Home Charges).
	7. Remittances to Indian students abroad.

of the loan itself also makes the borrowing country the debtor and the lending country the creditor. And as India is constantly paying off portions of her foreign debt in addition to paying the interest year after year, she is under this head a debtor country. The repayment of the loan may take the form of Indians purchasing the rupee paper held in England or of conversion of sterling debt into rupee debt, thus bringing the debt home.² The effect of this is the same, that India's

¹ Since 1931-2, as already explained, India has become a creditor country with regard to transactions in treasure, and the item 'Exports of treasure' should be included on the credit side of her account.

² See ch. xi.

foreign obligations are lessened so far. (vi) The earnings of Indians living abroad and of foreigners residing in India, so far as they are remitted in each case to their native country by the parties concerned. In the former case India is a creditor and in the latter she is a debtor. But on the whole, under this head India is a debtor. The remittances abroad of European merchants and business men, bankers and Government officials far outweigh the remittances to this country of Indian merchants and coolies residing outside India. (vii) The profits of foreign banks and shipping and insurance companies. India's payments under the head of banking profits, shipping freights and premiums of insurance, are not precisely calculated but must aggregate to a very large sum representing India's indebtedness to that extent. (viii) The remittances of money by foreigners for benevolent purposes to a country or donations sent abroad by the country make it a creditor in the former case and a debtor in the latter. Under this head India is a creditor country, because she receives more money from Europe and America for the support of missions and missionary schools in India as well as in the form of occasional subscriptions raised abroad for the relief of famines in India and other calamities, than she sends to foreign countries for similar purposes. (ix) The expenditure of a nation's Government abroad will make it a debtor to that extent, and, conversely, the expenditure of other Governments in a country will make it so far a creditor.¹ On this account India is normally a debtor as she has to spend large amounts of money in England by way of furlough pay and pensions of European officers who have served in India, and for the purchase of stores, etc. She has also to pay the English Government for various kinds of expenditure incurred by the latter for India. All this expenditure on Government account in England is included under the Home Charges. (x) The payment of tributes or indemnities obviously makes the paying country debtor and the receiving country creditor. As India neither pays nor receives a tribute or indemnity, this heading has to be altogether ignored. (xi) The expenditure of foreign tourists in India and Indian tourists abroad. Under this head India is a creditor because the number of foreigners visiting India for sight-seeing is far greater than the number of Indians visiting foreign countries. (xii) On the other hand, India is a debtor to the extent of the remittances for

¹ For example, the large recoverable expenditure the Government of India incurred on behalf of the British Government during the war of 1914-18 and again in the present war.

the education of Indian students abroad. The amount thus spent is about a crore of rupees every year, and there is every prospect of its increasing in the future.

For a complete balance sheet, therefore, we should have to reckon in all these items, and if that could be done the two sides of the account must balance each other.

In the statement on p. 269, on the right-hand side we have India's debit items, that is, those on account of which India has to pay more money abroad than she receives; and on the left-hand side we have the credit items, that is, those on account of which more money is owing to India from foreign countries than she owes to foreign countries.

§28. **India's visible balance of payments (accounts).**— The statement on p. 272,¹ although it excludes Government stores and Government treasure, goes a few steps further than the balance of trade in merchandise and treasure, towards the construction of a complete balance of payments (accounts), by including the transfer of funds from and to India through the Government.

The statement shows in detail the items entering into India's visible balance of payments. The detailed figures work up to a plus or minus balance (the sign + representing net export and the sign — representing net import) for each of the three main heads of classification, namely, (i) private imports and exports of merchandise, (ii) private imports and exports of treasure, and (iii) remittances through the Government—all leading up to a plus or minus total.

The visible balance of accounts finally left here must be taken to represent the net effect of the invisible items that enter into India's balance of accounts, such as shipping services, private remittances, exports and imports of capital, insurance, tourists' expenditure, etc. These have not been included in the statement as the figures cannot be estimated accurately. It will be seen from the table that gold exports in recent years have largely taken the place of the excess of exports of merchandise over imports and have thus helped to maintain the favourable visible balance of trade which is essential to enable India to meet her obligations abroad (i.e. her invisible imports).²

¹ Taken from the *Review of the Trade of India* (1939-40), p. 201.

² For further particulars regarding the balance of payments for India the reader is referred to the publication *Balance of Payments* of the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations. An attempt is made here by the Government of India to go beyond the figures relating to the Balance of Trade and Movement of Treasure published in the annual *Review of the Trade of India*. The Balance of Payments is shown separately for (a) goods, services

INDIA'S VISIBLE BALANCE OF ACCOUNTS (PAYMENTS) ¹

(The sign + means net exports and the sign - net imports)

In lakhs of rupees

	Pre-war average	War average	1932-3	1936-7	1937-8	1938-9	1939-40
Exports of Indian merchandise (private) ...	+2,19,50	+2,15,97	+1,32,27	+1,96,13	+1,80,93	+1,62,79	+2,03,44
Re-exports of foreign merchandise (private) ...	+4,62	+8,14	+3,22	+6,24	+8,28	+6,42	+9,64
Imports of foreign merchandise (private) ...	-1,45,85	-1,47,80	-1,32,27(a)	-1,24,60(a)	-1,73,33	-1,51,79	-1,64,75
Balance of trade in merchandise ² ...	+78,27	+76,31	+3,22	+77,77	+15,88	+17,42	+48,33
Gold (private) ³ ...	-28,87	-7,81	+65,52	+27,85	+16,34	+13,06	+34,67
Silver (private) ³ ...	-7,21	-2,99	-73	-13,59	-2,26	-1,75	-4,74
Currency Notes (private)	+14	+24	+28	+58	+34
Balance of transactions in treasure (private)...	-36,08	-10,80	+64,93	+14,50	+14,36	+11,89	+30,27
Total visible balance of trade ...	+42,49	+65,51	+68,15	+92,27	+30,24	+29,31	+78,60
Gold earmarked on account of purchases abroad	10,19	-1,36
Purchase of sterling by the Reserve Bank of India ⁴ ...	-41,35	-34,96	-48,18	-70,87	-29,51	-32,64	-94,57
Sales of sterling by the Reserve Bank of India ⁴ ...	+5	+5,50
Transfers of Government securities ...	-87	-38	-13	-18	-11	-8	-2,11
Interest drafts on India in respect of Government of India securities ...	-44	-30	-32	-29	-28	-28	-20
Balance of remittance of funds ...	-42,61	-30,14	-48,63	-71,34	-29,90	-33,00	-96,88

(a) Exclusive of the value of railway materials imported direct by State Railways working under the company management, which was not paid for in the ordinary way and was not, therefore, taken into account in arriving at the balance of trade.

¹ Figures relating to imports and exports for the years prior to 1937-8 relate to British India including Burma. Those for 1937-8 and subsequent years exclude Burma.

² The balance of trade in merchandise in favour of India including Burma was Rs. 43,19 lakhs in 1937-8; Rs. 43,21 lakhs in 1938-9 and Rs. 77,06 lakhs in 1939-40. On the other hand, the balance of trade in merchandise in favour of India excluding Burma amounted to Rs. 51.19 crores in 1936-7.

³ Excludes transactions which do not enter into the balance of trade.

⁴ Figures for years prior to 1923-4 represent Council Bills and T.T. paid in India. From 1925-6 figures relate entirely to sterling purchases.

§29. The 'drain' defined.—India's habitual excess of exports over imports has given rise to the 'drain' theory. For all the outgoings represented by this excess of exports, India of course receives some kind of return, and they can all be accounted for, as we have already seen, by various items of receipt. However, as the Spanish proverb has it, 'the accounts are all right but the treasury is empty'. The real point is not whether some kind of return is received, but whether the return is in every way satisfactory.

§30. The Home Charges.—India's excess of exports over imports is largely accounted for by what are called the Home Charges.

The following figures show the great growth of the Home Charges between 1859-60 and 1933-4.¹

Gross Sterling Expenditure in England

Year	Amount	Year	Amount	Year	Amount
	£		£		£
1859-60	5,042,945	1913-14	20,311,673	1928-9	29,744,993
1869-70	7,677,850	1918-19	23,629,495	1929-30	31,558,715
1879-80	14,543,277	1922-3	31,860,179	1930-1	31,423,147
1889-90	14,848,923	1924-5	31,888,776	1931-2	30,899,333
1899-1900	16,392,864	1926-7	29,507,472	1932-3	29,556,401
1909-10	19,122,916	1927-8	28,864,765	1933-4	28,862,177

We will exclude from the present discussion the payment on account of stores purchased on behalf of India in England, because

and gold (current items) and (b) capital items. Under the former head are included the following: 1. Merchandise. 2. Interest and Dividends on long-term and short-term capital. 3. Other services, such as port fees; commissions, insurance, brokerage; post, telegraph and telephone; tourists, diplomatic expenditure, remittances of emigrants and immigrants, etc.; reparations in cash and other Government receipts and expenditure. 4. Gold (coin and bullion). The Capital items include long-term and short-term operations of the Government of India (including municipal issues). Unfortunately no information is available concerning private assets and liabilities abroad. It is very desirable that the Government of India should make fuller and more accurate figures available (as in the case of figures published by the British Board of Trade in the United Kingdom) and include them in the annual *Review of the Trade of India* for general information.

¹ Figures up to 1918-19 have been taken from Shah, *Sixty Years of Indian Finance* (second edition), pp. 187-8, and those for subsequent years from the *Statistical Abstract, 1926-7 and 1933-4*.

the stores are a material equivalent and figure in the returns for imports. We have already seen that it is an arguable point whether these purchases of Government stores could not be effected more cheaply and whether a larger reliance on the Indian market for their supply is not feasible. But in the 'drain' controversy we are concerned with that part of India's debits in any given year for which (i) *in that year* no equivalent, material or immaterial, is received, as well as (ii) that part, for which the equivalent received in that year is *immaterial*, i.e. not in the form of material goods or money.

§31. **Payments in connexion with foreign loans.**—One of the most important items in the Home Charges is interest on debt which has arisen in consequence of Government borrowings in England for financing railways, irrigation works, etc. The various questions relating to the employment of foreign capital in this country have already been discussed,¹ and it should now no longer be necessary to emphasize that borrowing money from abroad is not necessarily an evil, but that, on the contrary, foreign loans are often to be regarded as 'highly satisfactory incidents of economic development'. Many countries which are rich in national resources but poor in capital find it necessary and profitable to borrow from other countries, and some of the debtor countries like Canada are amongst the most prosperous in the world and are getting more and more prosperous with the help of foreign capital. It is obviously absurd to describe the interest on these loans as a 'drain', and since it is the interest on foreign debt that figures most prominently in the Home Charges as well as in the rest of India's disbursements abroad, Sir Theodore Morison proposes to substitute the colourless expression, 'foreign payments' or 'net foreign payments' for the misleading word 'drain', which suggests that these payments are harmful to the country. He argues that this part of India's indebtedness at any rate cannot be regarded as a drain on the country's resources caused by her political connexion with England. For even if she had been outside the Empire it would have been necessary for her to raise these loans for the purpose of developing her resources. The fact that these debts are incurred in England has nothing whatever to do with India's political subjection to England. The debts are raised in London because London happens to be the cheapest money market in the world. It is further contended that the political connexion with England, far from being a handicap to India, is of distinct advantage to her in this respect, because it has raised India's credit abroad and has enabled

¹ See vol. I, ch. xiii.

her to borrow on more advantageous terms than would have been possible otherwise. The English Government does not directly guarantee India's credit, but the British Government in India has, by ensuring a stable administration and by promoting the economic development of the country, improved her credit abroad. We must decline to be drawn into the purely hypothetical question as to whether an independent India would have been able to obtain loans on terms not very different from those on which she borrows at present. We must limit ourselves to what is rather than to what might have been, and what we are called upon to declare in the present discussion is whether, with better management, the actual burden of the debt, both as regards principal and interest, could not have been appreciably reduced. In this connexion we shall restrict ourselves to the consideration of the most representative as well as the most important of our borrowings, namely those for railway construction in this country. The various issues that would be relevant are, whether all the railways that have been built were required in the best interests of the country, and whether in some cases the need for transport facilities could not have been met more cheaply by other modes of transport such as roads and canals; whether to some extent the expenditure on railways was not at the sacrifice of other more deserving claimants for public funds like irrigation works; whether the inducements offered to foreign capital in the shape of guaranteed rates of interest were not excessive; and whether the railway system was worked as efficiently and cheaply as possible with a consistent regard for national interests. All these questions have already been discussed and we need merely repeat here that in all these respects mistakes have been committed, and so far our payments in connexion with these loans cannot be said to be compensated fully by economic equivalents. We may admit that the railways have been on the whole 'the harbingers of economic prosperity' in India and that the actual advantages, direct as well as indirect, more than outweigh the cost of the construction. But the real point at issue is whether these great benefits from railways have not been secured at a needlessly heavy cost.

Payments in the form of interest and profits on the foreign capital which has sought investment in this country without Government intervention and mediation do not appear under the Home Charges, but they account for a substantial portion of our excess of exports. Here again the question resolves itself into a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of foreign capital in India, and we can only refer the reader to the relevant sections

where this subject has been treated.¹ We had there occasion to note that along with some great and undoubted advantages, certain serious disadvantages have resulted from the unrestricted admission of foreign capital, and therefore the statement that 'India illustrates in its most obvious form the advantage of borrowing foreign capital',² cannot be accepted without reservation.

§32. **Civil and military services.**—We now come to that part of our payments which is made in respect of civil and military services. Here the question whether we get an adequate return for our payments will depend upon the manner in which we answer the following questions. Is the European agency employed in this country indispensable, and if so to what extent? Whether the salaries that are at present deemed to be necessary to attract the requisite type of European in the various branches of public service are not too high, and whether the process of Indianization has gone as far as it might, without endangering efficiency or bringing in its train other serious disadvantages? These questions will be answered differently by different people. But there is no doubt whatever that on all these accounts India's expenditure is much higher than it need be. The demand for the substitution of an Indian for a European agency wherever possible is not based merely on the ground of its relative cheapness. There are other considerations which are equally important. For example, there is the consideration that the experience of the Indian officer, unlike that of the European officer, is not lost to the country on his retirement. Further the relative inferiority of the Indian, wherever it must be taken as established, can in many cases be accounted for by the lack of adequate opportunity given to the Indian. What is more important than anything else, however, is that it is the Indian's birthright to be preferred in civil and military employment in his own country, even where he is slightly inferior to the European, and much more so when he is quite as fit.

In connexion with the military charges, another question, apart from that of Indianization, is whether the strength of the army at present maintained in India is not above her real requirements. The non-official opinion is that the army is bigger than is required for purposes of Indian defence. On the other side, however, it is contended that, even supposing the expenditure on the army in India is larger than it need be from the purely Indian point of view, India is on the whole a gainer. For she spends only a small

¹ See vol. I, ch. xiii, §§15-22.

² Morison, *Economic Transition in India*, p. 218.

sum on her own navy which was recently constituted.¹ She largely depends on the British navy for protecting her from invasion. If India were called upon to look after her own naval defence she would have to spend a very much larger amount on her navy. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the British Navy is not maintained entirely for the purpose of guarding India's shores from invasion. Australia, for example, benefits perhaps even more than India from the British Navy. Nor is she asked to maintain an army of a strength beyond her actual requirements for Imperial uses. The principle according to which the strength of the Indian army ought to be determined is that of making it just adequate for the defence of the country, and this furnishes the only test to be applied in deciding whether the military expenditure of India so far as it is due to the size of the army alone is excessive or not.² If the Indian Army is meant purely for the purpose of securing freedom for the country from external aggression, its size, personnel and organization are matters which must be determined on other principles than if it is meant for Imperial purposes. The Assembly repudiated the suggestion underlying the Report of the Esher Committee of 1919 that the Indian Army is to be regarded as part of the total armed forces of the Empire. Actually, however, the army has been frequently used for Imperial purposes, and the contention that, if it is intended to persist in this policy, part of India's military expenditure should be borne by England, does not appear to be unreasonable.³

§33. Profits of bankers, and of shipping and insurance companies.—Other services than those noticed above for which also India has to make a payment abroad and which are not exhibited under the Home Charges are those of foreign bankers, European shipping and insurance companies, etc. It is one of the cherished aspirations of the Indian people to be able before long to do much of this work for themselves. To say that this is a commendable ambition is not to forget the fact that even wealthy countries sometimes find it advantageous to buy such services from foreign nations. For example, the United States used to be largely indebted, at least before 1914, to the principal European Powers for marine transport service, banking, insurance, and other financial and commercial services. But the plea that India should learn to rely on herself in these matters is based on the idea that, by so doing, she

¹ See ch. xi.

² See ch. xi for detailed criticism of the defence expenditure.

³ This principle has recently been partially accepted by the British Government. See ch. xi.

will certainly reap great economic and other advantages, while lessening the magnitude of the 'drain'.

§34. **Some basic assumptions of the 'drain' controversy.**—As a set-off against the various losses incurred by India on account of the 'drain' it is sometimes urged that, after all, England has conferred on India the inestimable boon of peace and has made possible an orderly development of the country in all directions and that, therefore, India's losses due to the 'drain' are as dust in the balance when weighed against these blessings. On this plea, however, it would be possible to justify every kind of Government extravagance and unfairness. The advantages to India of the British connexion such as they are are not capable of being precisely measured. They should not therefore be dragged into a discussion which is occupied with more definite and calculable, though perhaps less fundamental, matters; just as we should also refuse to consider as a part of this controversy, the incalculable, though none the less real, advantages which England derives from India. We may be able to compute roughly the advantages which her business men derive from the scope which India offers for their activities and enterprise. But by what calculus shall we estimate the gain to England from the enormous increase in her international prestige owing to her possession of India; or how shall we attempt to fix the value, in terms of pounds, shillings and pence, of the glow of pride and power which Englishmen feel when they contemplate this magnificent empire; or of the value of India to England as an unrivalled field for the training of her soldiers, statesmen and administrators? The question of the drain, if it is going to lead to any useful conclusions, must leave out of consideration all impalpable elements.

The analysis undertaken in connexion with the drain theory is useful as indicating various directions of urgent reform,¹ and points to the existence of a number of real grievances. It does not, however, furnish anything like a complete explanation of Indian poverty. The first Indian thinker to see the necessity of emphasizing many other more important causes was Ranade, who was a path-breaker in this as in so many other matters. Later writers have perhaps not always shown Ranade's insight and his exquisite sense of proportion.²

§35. **Land frontier trade.**—India has an extensive land frontier (about 6,000 miles) on the north-west and north-east, considerably

¹ We welcome in this connexion the scheme of repatriation of sterling debt which was recently (1941) carried out on a substantial scale: see ch. xi.

² See also D. A. Shah, *The Indian Point of View in Economics*, p. 12.

exceeding her sea-coast in length. But at many points it offers great difficulties for commerce owing to obstacles such as dense and impenetrable forests and inaccessible mountains. As there are very few openings or passes, like the Bolan Pass on the north-west frontier, communication with trans-frontier countries is difficult. In our historical survey of India's foreign trade we have already drawn attention to the ancient character of her land frontier trade, which was fairly brisk during the Mogul period. In more recent times, the position in respect of trans-frontier communications has been considerably improved, especially on the north-west frontier. Though the principal motive in laying out the frontier railway was strategic, it is also serving as an artery of commerce. The principal trans-frontier countries with which India has trading connexions are Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, Nepal and Tibet. The course of the land frontier trade during the years ending 1924-5 is summed up in the following table : the figures include trade across the Burmese frontier, with the Shan States, Western China and Siam.

In crores of rupees

	1916-17	1918-19	1920-1	1924-5	
Imports	12·81	15·96	18·16	23·08	Discontinued from April 1925
Exports	10·34	14·87	15·81	18·73	
Total land trade	23·15	30·83	33·97	41·81	

These figures, while they are insignificant in comparison with the total annual sea-borne trade of India, yet reveal a steady progress, which is likely to be quicker with further improvements in trans-frontier communications.

(i) *Trade at stations adjacent to the land frontier routes.*—The existing system of registration of the frontier trade of India falls under two classes : (i) Trade at stations adjacent to the land frontier routes, and (ii) Indo-Afghan Trade. Under the first only the traffic in selected commodities at certain railway stations adjacent to the more important trade routes across the frontier is registered. It may, however, be assumed that a high percentage of the traffic recorded relates to frontier trade. The principal commodities at present imported from the trans-frontier countries are food-stuffs such as wheat, grain, pulse, and rice ; fruits ; raw wool ; raw jute and silk, etc. By far the most important exports are cotton goods, foreign and Indian ; cotton yarn ; grain and pulse ; sugar ; raw

cotton ; iron and steel (including hardware and cutlery) ; petroleum ; leather manufactures ; silk goods ; tea ; salt ; tobacco, etc.¹

(ii) *Indo-Afghan trade*.—Separate statistics of trade between India and Afghanistan, which are available since 1937-8, are registered at Thal, Chaman and Torkham. One of the principal features of the Indo-Afghan trade is the existence of a large volume of transit trade through India. The aggregate value of this trade including transit trade, amounted to Rs. 6,66 lakhs in 1939-40 as compared with Rs. 4,64 lakhs in 1938-9. The principal items of imports into India from Afghanistan are skins and furs, fruits, nuts and vegetables, which together accounted for 85 per cent of the imports in 1939-40. Almost the entire quantity of skins and furs is intended for export to foreign countries. Similarly, a large quantity of fruits and nuts is ultimately sent abroad. Among the principal articles of exports to Afghanistan, living animals, boots and shoes, leather and cement were mostly of Indian origin, while there was keen foreign competition in such commodities as iron and steel, cotton manufactures and tea. In regard to exports of instruments, apparatus, appliances and parts thereof, machinery and mill-work, and sugar, India had only a small share. It would be manifestly to the advantage of India to develop this branch of her external trade to the utmost possible extent, especially as, with the progress of the manufacturing industries in India, the importance of nursing trans-frontier markets will be greater than ever before.

§36. *International trade and economic prosperity*.—The aggregate volume of India's trade is sufficiently large to entitle her to the fifth place among the countries of the world.² The great increase in India's foreign trade in modern times owing to the extension of facilities of railway and steamer transport must not, however, be regarded as a sign of industrial pre-eminence as in the case of the industrially advanced countries of the world, but at most as a necessary preliminary to it.³ If India develops her own manufactures, this may result, at least in the beginning, in a considerable diminution of her foreign trade, as she will herself be producing the manufactures which she at present imports from abroad. It may, however, happen that in the future her manufactures

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 197.

² In *per capita* trade, India stands very nearly at the bottom. It is obvious that in the case of a large country like India, with a high population, a much more considerable increase in the volume of the total trade is required to show a given amount of growth per head than in the small countries. It may be added that generally speaking it will be found that international exchange is of far greater importance to small than to big nations (see §38 below).

³ See vol. I, ch. v, 'Economic Transition in India'.

will develop to such an extent that, after replacing foreign manufactures in the home market, they will overflow her boundaries and spread in the outside world. In fact India's case may be cited in illustration of the uncertain connexion between foreign trade and economic prosperity. While her first step forward in economic progress has been accompanied by a considerable extension, her next step will probably be marked by a decline of her international commerce, and the final stage in her economic evolution may again be characterized by an increase in her foreign trade.¹

INTERNAL TRADE

§37. (1) **Coasting trade.**— We have already indicated the present position and the future importance to India of her coastal trade in our discussion of the proposal to reserve the coastal trade for Indian shipping. The coastal trade may be regarded as a part of the inland trade of the country, though it also includes a small amount of foreign trade.²

The following table shows the value of private merchandise (Indian and foreign) imported into and exported from the several

Coasting Trade (In thousands of rupees)³

	1918-19		1935-6		1937-8	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Bengal ...	14,16,28	11,46,70	15,03,60	9,93,93	8,58,21	5,41,01
Orissa ...	24,33 ⁴	10,67 ⁴	9,99	12,92	13,24	9,24
Bombay ...	38,60,35	21,34,04	18,54,75	22,28,72	14,40,54	20,46,96
Sind ...	8,09,05	6,02,73	9,03,27	8,52,96	8,55,48	9,80,84
Madras ...	9,52,06	8,58,06	21,30,05	9,33,07	10,83,65	7,87,23
Burma ...	16,95,11	20,22,48	9,93,52	34,09,35
Total ...	87,57,18	67,74,68	73,95,18	84,30,95	42,51,12	43,65,28

maritime provinces of British India from and to Indian ports (British and foreign).

Including the value of the exports and imports of Government stores and of treasure, the total coastal trade was valued at

¹ On this point read A. Marshall, *Industry and Trade*, p. 25.

² Figures relating to imports and exports for the years prior to 1937-8 relate to British India including Burma. In 1937-8 out of the total value of private merchandise imports, viz. Rs. 42.51 crores, Indian merchandise was valued at Rs. 37.56 crores and foreign merchandise at Rs. 4.95 crores; and similarly, out of a total value of exports of Rs. 43.65 crores, Indian merchandise was valued at Rs. 37.15 crores and foreign merchandise at Rs. 6.50 crores.

³ See *Statistical Abstract for British India (1937-8)*, Table No. 265.

⁴ Includes Bihar.

Rs. 1,66,59 lakhs, Rs. 1,61,84 lakhs and Rs. 87,02 lakhs in 1918-19, 1935-6 and 1937-8 respectively.

As previously pointed out, with the separation of Burma from British India from 1 April 1937, the trade between the two countries, which in pre-separation days was treated as coasting trade, is considered as foreign trade. This accounts for the big decline in value of coasting trade in 1937-8.

The total foreign and coastwise trade (imports and exports) of the eight principal ports of India in 1937-8 was as follows.

Total Trade of Eight Principal Ports (In lakhs of rupees)¹

	Foreign		Coasting		Total	
	Pre-war average (1909-14)	1937-8	Pre-war average	1937-8	Pre-war average	1937-8
Bombay ...	1,13,15	1,13,13	32,30	37,02	1,45,45	1,50,15
Calcutta ...	1,41,06	1,29,03	18,72	13,89	1,59,78	1,42,92
Rangoon ...	29,93	...	19,03	...	48,96	...
Karachi ...	38,87	43,48	9,00	18,36	47,87	61,84
Madras ...	16,80	30,63	2,81	3,41	19,61	34,04
Cochin ...	2,72	11,11	3,56	4,21	6,28	15,32
Tuticorin ...	5,56	5,37	1,67	4,67	7,23	10,04
Chittagong ...	5,71	9,66	1,76	74	7,47	10,40

These figures show that Bombay, Calcutta and Rangoon (before the separation of Burma) to a very large extent, and Karachi and Madras to a smaller extent, account for the bulk of the total foreign and coastal trade of India.²

To ensure the fullest possible development of the coastal trade in India, a comprehensive programme of port development, the building up of an Indian mercantile marine and a proper co-ordination between coastal and railway traffic are necessary, but these are topics on which we have already expatiated at considerable length.³

§38. (1f) *Inland trade.*—India, like America, but unlike the United Kingdom, is more vitally interested in her internal than in her external trade. This is not surprising in view of the continental dimensions of the country, her teeming population, her diversity of physical and climatic conditions and her vast and varied natural resources. In modern times the extension of improved

¹ These figures include all foreign and coasting trade, except Government stores, in merchandise. Figures prior to 1937-8 relate to British India including Burma. See *Statistical Abstract for British India (1937-8)*, Table No. 251.

² For an interesting account of the trade of the principal ports see Vera Anstey, *Trade of the Indian Ocean*, pp. 79-85.

³ See ch. v.

means of communication and transport has added greatly to the volume of the internal trade, and this process will be quickened by a general economic advance and the progress of organization, which will increase the scope for exchange between town and country.

The great importance of the internal trade of India is insufficiently appreciated. The imposing figures of the exports of cotton, jute, rice, wheat, oil-seeds, etc., represent only a moderate proportion of India's total production, of which some idea has already been given; though of course it is true that not all that remains after export is offered for sale, for a part is directly consumed by the producers, as in the case of the peasant proprietors who consume a large portion of the food-stuffs raised by them. The great importance to India of her internal trade is brought out by the consideration that, 'if India's total agricultural produce is taken into account, calculations show that for every acre of land producing goods, whether grain, oil-seeds, fibres, tea, etc. for export, eleven acres are cultivated for local consumption'.¹ To the agricultural production which remains in the country for internal consumption and exchange must be added the non-agricultural produce, such as mineral production and manufactures, of which only a small percentage is exported abroad.

No accurate and reliable statistics are available regarding the volume and the value of the inland trade of the country. Fairly satisfactory data are available regarding the coastal trade, the bulk of which, as said above, may be regarded as part of the internal or the inter-provincial trade of the country. But so far as the inland trade proper goes, scarcely any information beyond the statistics of the goods traffic of railways was available for some years. Until 1923 the Department of Statistics used to publish the compilation *Inland Trade (Rail and River-borne) of India* annually, and all the provinces used to issue similar publications. These gave the import and export trade in staple articles of each of the five or six blocks into which every province was divided; and the imports and exports of eighteen bigger blocks forming the trade divisions of India as a whole. The figures related to quantity only; the figures of value, given in a few cases, were admittedly very rough. The internal trade returns were defective in other respects also. Trade within a block was not recorded; there was obvious evasion on railways; and trade by road, which is not negligible, was not taken into account.² However in spite of their defects these statistics were of some utility, and it was unfortunate

¹ See Worswick, *The Economic Resources of the British Empire*, p. 145.

² *Economic Enquiry Committee Report*, p. 13.

that, except in one or two provinces, they were discontinued, as was also the publication *Inland Trade (Rail and River-borne)* in 1923 on the recommendation of the Retrenchment Committee. The Economic Enquiry Committee rightly pressed for the revival of the publication of the internal trade returns, and for their improvement so as to bring them into line with the more up-to-date statistics of the same kind maintained by countries like the United States. It is gratifying that the Government of India have since April 1933 revived the publication of these statistics, by issuing *Accounts relating to the Inland (Rail and River-borne) Trade of India*, every month, offering a summary view of the inland trade of India during each month together with running totals from the beginning of the official year. The new series, which is published by the Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, retains in essentials the form of the older publication. The statistics are given relating to the inland trade of India carried by the railways and the steamer services, and represent the movement of trade into and from a province, taken as a whole, or a chief port or ports, the trade of which is registered separately from that of the trade of the province in which such port or ports may be situated. The trade dealt with in these accounts falls into one or other of the following categories: (a) the trade of a province with other provinces, (b) the trade of a chief port with the province in which it is situated, and (c) the trade of a chief port with other provinces. Goods carried from one station to another within the same province or principal trade block are not registered for the purpose of these accounts. For the purpose of registration of these statistics the country is divided into 18 principal blocks as follows: (a) 9 blocks representing British provinces, (b) 4 representing the principal port towns, viz. Calcutta, Bombay, the Madras seaports and Karachi, and (c) 5 representing Indian States. The statistics relate to quantities and denominations only, and figures of value are not given.¹ The net weights are given uniformly in standard maunds of 82 2/7 lb. The statistics in the new series are thus characterized by the same defects as in the case of the older one.

¹ As the railway and steamer invoices show only the figures of quantity, the statistics in the above accounts relate to quantities only. Owing to the great disparity between the prices for the same commodity in the different parts of the country it is not possible to work out the corresponding figures of value; and past experience shows that on whatever basis values are assigned, these are in most cases only a very vague approximation to the truth and should more often than not afford no basis for working out a true and correct balance of trade for the different provinces involved. See *Accounts relating to the Inland (Rail and River-borne) Trade of India*, for March 1940, pp. 1-3.

Table I¹ below shows the quantity of inland trade in certain important articles from 1933-4.

TABLE I
(In thousand maunds)

	1933-4	1934-5	1935-6	1936-7	1937-8	1938-9	1939-40
Coal and coke ...	345,964	378,184	386,792	397,864	464,286	449,854	496,513
Cotton, raw ...	20,516	21,474	23,574	29,207	19,185	19,538	20,712
Cotton piece-goods ...	9,441	9,898	10,132	10,521	11,190	11,077	11,294
Grain, pulse and flour	107,103	125,270	115,333	129,235	131,900	131,272	143,356
Hides and skins, raw	2,691	2,432	2,506	3,157	2,970	2,679	3,383
Jute, raw ...	32,077	25,390	29,034	38,225	32,574	31,497	32,767
Gunny bags and cloth	4,478	4,267	4,511	5,152	5,336	5,218	5,484
Iron and steel, bars, sheets, girders and other commercial forms of iron ...	30,392	33,826	40,504	39,318	38,655	41,894	41,986
Oil-seeds ...	46,650	39,311	35,697	43,777	39,646	50,063	43,775
Sugar (including gur, rab, etc.) ...	29,152	27,915	31,261	40,391	39,485	38,076	28,949
Total ...	628,464 (100)	667,967 (106)	679,344 (108)	736,847 (117)	785,227 (125)	781,168 (124)	828,219 (132)

The above table shows that the quantity of inland trade recorded a considerable increase in volume during the year 1939-40. All commodities for which figures are recorded shared in this increase, except oil-seeds and sugar. On the whole, the internal trade activity was distinctly better during the year 1939-40 than at any time in the preceding six years.

The condition of internal trade can also be judged to some extent by the statistics of railway earnings and traffic published by the Railway Board. Table II below shows these figures from 1928-9.

The gross earnings of State Railways during 1939-40 exceeded the total for the previous year by Rs. 4 crores and were higher than in any year since 1929-30. Similarly, the total number of wagons loaded in 1939-40 was the highest recorded in the last twelve years. The principal factor which accounts for the remarkable improvement in railway traffic in 1939-40 is the increase in the internal trade activity following the outbreak of the war.

In the absence of full and dependable statistics relating to inland trade, no precise idea can be formed of its dimensions and of its relative importance as compared to the foreign trade of the country. According to *Inland Trade of India for 1920-1*, the total inland trade was estimated at nearly Rs. 1,500 crores,

¹ *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 99.

thus giving a proportion of $2\frac{1}{2} : 1$ between the domestic trade and the foreign trade.¹ Such figures as are available, however,

TABLE II
Gross earnings and total wagons loaded from 1928-9 to 1939-40

Year	Gross Earnings State-owned Railways (Excluding Burma Railways)	Total wagons loaded ²
	Rs.(crores)	(000)
1928-9	99.61	6,993
1929-30	97.53	6,898
1930-1	90.40	6,632
1931-2	82.54	6,098
1932-3	82.11	5,996
1933-4	84.64	6,489
1934-5	87.24	6,850
1935-6	88.36	6,962
1936-7	92.04	6,900
1937-8	94.85	7,161
1938-9	94.36	7,225
1939-40	98.44	7,509

leave no doubt regarding the small volume of the inland trade in relation to the size and the population of the country. With a fuller development of the economic resources of the country the volume of internal trade is bound to increase to many times its present size. It is also necessary to follow a policy of systematic development of the inland trade of the country having regard to the uncertain character of the external trade and the big drop in our export trade. The revival of our external trade will, of course, stimulate the internal trade. It is, however, desirable to bring about its extension apart from its connexion with the external trade.

§89. **Principal trade centres of India.**³— We may now fittingly conclude this chapter with a brief description of the principal trade centres of India, and follow it by a few words about commercial intelligence and trade organizations. In an account of the trade centres of India mention may first be made of the four principal harbours of India, namely, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, and Madras. Calcutta and Bombay are not only the principal ports but also the most important industrial centres of India. Bombay is further the chief distributing centre for western India

¹ K. T. Shah holds that this is an underestimate, and places the value of the inland trade of India at Rs. 2,500 crores. *Trade, Tariffs and Transport*, p. 122.

² These include Burma Railway figures up to 1935-6.

³ See Cotton, *Handbook of Commercial Information for India* (third edition), pp. 62-113; also vol. I, ch. ii.

for the large volume of imports of cotton manufactures. The trade of Bombay is preponderantly in Indian hands as contrasted with Calcutta, where it is largely under the control of Europeans. Karachi is the centre of the wheat trade. Madras also is a considerable trade and industrial centre but not comparable in importance to Bombay or to Calcutta. Apart from these four principal ports,¹ other big trade centres are Cawnpore, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Agra, Lahore, Benares, Lucknow, Nagpur, etc. Cawnpore, which is an important railway junction in the United Provinces, holds a central position, being situated half-way between Bombay and Calcutta, and is a convenient distributing centre for foreign and local goods. Delhi, now the capital of India, is the junction of nine railway lines and an important clearing house for the Punjab and the western districts of the United Provinces, particularly in cotton, silk and woollen piece-goods. Ahmedabad is, next to Bombay, the most important centre in the Bombay province. Amritsar in the Punjab has not only a large entrepôt trade in piece-goods, but also does a large business in skins and hides ; it is also well known for its carpet industry. Agra has considerable manufacturing industries connected with carpets, durries, embroideries and stone work, and is a collecting centre for the better qualities of hides. Lahore is the chief trading centre for the agricultural produce of the Punjab. Benares is mainly of interest as a considerable centre of the silk-weaving industry. Lucknow is commercially of interest as a distributing and collecting centre for the rich agricultural produce of Oudh. Nagpur derives its commercial importance from its weaving mills, cotton-ginning and pressing factories, and the extensive manganese deposits in its neighbourhood. In addition to these centres of trade, mention may be made of Jubbulpore, Mirzapur, Madura, Gwalior, Dacca, Srinagar, Sholapur, Amraoti, Hyderabad (Deccan), Allahabad, Jaipur, Baroda, Bangalore and Mysore.

§40. **Commercial intelligence and trade organization.**²—The collection, careful analysis and judicious distribution of commercial and industrial intelligence has now come to be a necessary function of governments in civilized countries in view of the international competition in industry and commerce. Not a little of the prosperity of countries like Germany, Japan and the United States is owing to their excellent system of commercial intelligence. Trade commissioners are appointed and consuls stationed in foreign countries, their main duty being to supply information about foreign markets

¹ Besides these principal ports there are others of some importance in Kathiawar: Bedi in the State of Navanagar, Okha (in Baroda State), Porbunder and Bhavnagar.

² §§40 and 41 should be read with §§14-15.

to their respective countries. India is insufficiently equipped in all these respects. Though the Commercial Intelligence Department came into existence as far back as 1905, it was put in evidence before the Industrial Commission that there was no clearly defined channel through which information on commercial matters in the possession of the Government could be communicated, either publicly or to individual applicants.¹ The Commission made several useful recommendations in this connexion, including the establishment of Indian trade agencies in other countries such as East Africa and Mesopotamia. The position today is somewhat more satisfactory than it was a few years ago. The Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, which was reorganized in 1922, now forms a connecting link between the commercial public and the Government of India. It embraces two distinct classes of work : (i) collection and dissemination of information bearing on overseas trade which may be of use to Indian firms and (ii) the compilation and publication of statistics of all-India importance relating to trade, industry and so on. The Department² answers trade inquiries, effects trade introductions and publishes in the *Indian Trade Journal* (the weekly organ of the Department) statistics and other information of commercial value. It keeps in touch with trade developments of interest to India. In the United Kingdom, through the medium of the Indian Trade Commissioner in London, who since 1926 has been assisted by the Trade Publicity Officer, opportunities as they present themselves in England for commercial publicity are utilized in India's interest. This step has led to some useful results. The Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics also works in close co-operation with the Directors of Industries and other Government Departments in India, with the Indian Trade Commissioners in London and other centres (see below), with His Majesty's Trade Commissioners in India and the Dominions and with Consular Officers in the various parts of the world so as to stimulate the overseas demand for Indian produce and manufactures.³ The High Commissioner for India in London, whose office was created in 1920, has been saddled with much miscellaneous agency and financial work, of which the purchase of Government stores is the most important. He is

¹ *Industrial Commission Report*, par. 180.

² A Central Statistical Research Bureau for the continuous analysis and interpretation of economic and statistical facts and phenomena was established in 1933 under the Director-General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics. It is now placed in charge of the Economic Adviser to the Government of India appointed in 1937.

³ See *India in 1927-8*, pp. 208-9 and *The Indian Year Book* (1940-1), p. 753.

therefore not in a position to be of much use for promoting Indian commercial interests abroad.

The organization described above is chiefly concerned with making known abroad information regarding the possibilities of Indian markets for foreign goods. It is equally necessary, however, to supplement it by a similar organization for the purpose of making available in India information regarding foreign markets for Indian goods. New ground was broken in this direction by the Trade Mission which was deputed in 1928 by the Government of India in pursuance of a suggestion made by the Textile Tariff Board (1926) to explore the potentialities of certain export markets for Indian textile goods.¹ The Report submitted by the Trade Mission suggested the appointment of three Trade Commissioners for India to be stationed at Alexandria, Mombasa and Durban. The establishment of Indian trade agencies and of an independent Indian consular service, as in the case of the self-governing Dominions, would be well justified as helping to develop trade relations with foreign countries on lines most beneficial to India. In January 1930 the Government of India outlined a scheme which contemplated the appointment of six Trade Commissioners, one each at Hamburg, Milan, New York, Durban, Mombasa and Alexandria. Accordingly an Indian Trade Commissioner was appointed at Hamburg in 1930. In 1935, a similar appointment was made at Milan. In 1937 an Indian Trade Commissioner opened his office at Osaka in Japan. Towards the end of December 1937 provision was made for an Indian Trade Commissioner for East Africa at Mombasa. In June 1938 a new Indian Trade Commissioner opened his office in New York. A Trade Commissioner has been appointed at Alexandria. There is also an Indian Trade Agent at Kabul for Afghanistan.

The Hon. Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar, Commerce Member to the Government of India, during the course of the debate on the Budget for 1941-2 informed the Assembly that Trade Commissioners were to be appointed to Canada and South America, making eight in all, and that others might follow. He foreshadowed the constitution of a self-contained consular service for India. In this connexion we welcome the emphasis placed by the Meek-Gregory Report on the importance of better salesmanship in canvassing Indian goods abroad.² We fully endorse also two useful suggestions made at their recent (March, 1941) session by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry: first, that the

¹ See *ante*, p. 37, and *India in 1928-9*, p. 198.

² *Report on Prospects of Indian Trade with the United States of America*, par. 67.

Government of India should organize trade missions consisting of Indian business men with the necessary technical staff to visit the various parts of the British Empire and neighbouring countries with a view to studying the conditions of their import trade; and secondly that they should constitute a comprehensive export organization for the supervision and control of the quality and specifications of Indian exports, the necessary funds for financing its activities being raised by means of a small export cess.

§41. **Commercial organization in India.**—The most important and the best organized non-official commercial organizations in India are those formed by European merchants, such as the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and the various Chambers of Commerce at Calcutta (1834), Bombay (1836), Madras (1836), Cawnpore, Karachi, Lahore and other principal centres. Their membership, except in Bombay, is preponderatingly European, though open to Indians also. This is but the natural outcome of the earlier start made by European traders in establishing commercial connexions between India and the West. In addition to the Chambers of Commerce there are also associations representing particular branches of trade, such as jute mills and cotton mills; and also those representing wholesale traders in the principal cities. Hitherto the Indian commercial community have suffered from lack of suitable organization for obtaining redress for their legitimate grievances, and it is a welcome sign of the times that Indian merchants are waking up to the necessity of organizing themselves. There are now several purely Indian associations, such as the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, which is the oldest (1887) organization of the Indian mercantile community, the Indian Merchants' Chamber and Bureau, Bombay (1907), the Southern India Chamber of Commerce, Madras (1909), the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Lahore (1912), the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta (1925), the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Bombay (1927), and the Merchants' Chamber of the United Provinces (1932). There is also an All-India Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.¹ All these organizations can be of immense service in focussing commercial opinion in India and giving a lead to the Government in regard to problems affecting the commercial and industrial development of the country.²

¹ For an instructive and comprehensive account of the several Chambers of Commerce and Commercial Associations in India, see Cotton, *op. cit.*, part iv.

² It may be noted here that some of the important Chambers of Commerce have been given representation on both the Central and Provincial legislative bodies.

CHAPTER VII

CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE—PART I¹

§1. **Indian currency in the pre-British era.**—Since Akbar's time the currency in northern India had come to consist of the gold mohur and the silver rupee, which both weighed 175 grains troy. There was no fixed legal ratio between them, though each of the coins bore a fixed ratio to the *dam*, the copper coin of the Mogul Empire.² In southern India, which never came completely under the dominion of the Moguls, gold was the principal currency. Under Hindu rule, preference was generally given to gold, while the Mohammedans showed a predilection in favour of silver. When the Mogul Empire broke up, a large number of independent states arose on its ruins, and many of them signalized their independence by striking a special coin, this being regarded as a mark of sovereignty. Though the old denominations were generally retained, there was every degree of variation as regards weight and fineness. So that when the East India Company came upon the scene, it found that the currency position was characterized by a bewildering multiplicity and variety of coins of gold and silver. It has been calculated that as many as 994 different coins made of gold or silver and of varying weight and fineness were current.³ The services of professional shroffs (appraisers) had constantly to be requisitioned to ascertain the value of the coins held by the people. The East India Company found its commercial transactions seriously hampered by this chaotic condition of the currency, and thus began the series of experiments in currency organization in India, whose history it is our purpose to narrate in this chapter.

§2. **The first period (1801-35).**—The history of Indian currency in the nineteenth century may be divided into four periods: (i) 1801-35; (ii) 1835-74; (iii) 1874-93; and (iv) 1893-1900.⁴

The first attempt of the East India Company at evolving order out of the prevailing confusion in currency resulted in a

¹ This chapter will be mainly concerned with the history of the Indian currency and exchange system up to the appointment of the Hilton-Young Commission in 1925. The next chapter will deal with the various criticisms of that system and with its reconstruction on the lines suggested by the Hilton-Young Commission, and subsequent developments including the effects of the present war on the Indian currency system.

² B. R. Ambedkar, *The Problem of the Rupee*, p. 3.

³ H. D. Macleod, *Indian Currency*, p. 13.

⁴ Findlay Shirras, *Indian Finance and Banking*, p. 93.

simultaneous issue of both gold and silver coins with the Company's stamp, and with a definite legal ratio, weight and fineness. But owing to the fluctuations in the market value of the two metals it was found impossible to maintain the ratio. Under the official ratio, gold was undervalued and was therefore displaced by silver. About this time Lord Liverpool published in England his famous *Treatise on the Coins of the Realm*, which enunciated the principle that only one metal should be the standard and unlimited legal tender, though other metals might also be coined and allowed to circulate at their market value. The Directors of the East India Company, seeking a way out of the currency muddle in India and influenced by Lord Liverpool's work, selected silver to function as the only standard in India. However, in 1806, in a dispatch to the Governments of Bengal and Madras, they took care to mention that their intention was by no means to drive gold out of circulation where it was the general measure of value. The Company tried to keep the ratio fixed between the rupee and the gold mohur, but the latter came to be undervalued, and disappeared from circulation. The recommendations of the Directors in 1806 had allowed discretion to the Indian authorities as regards the time and manner of giving effect to them, and they were not acted upon immediately. In 1818, however, the silver rupee of 180 grains, 11 $\frac{1}{12}$ th fine, was substituted for the gold pagoda in the Madras Presidency. The coinage of gold pagodas in Madras was stopped, but, for the convenience of the public, it was announced that gold coins would be issued, and would be paid and received by all the public offices at such rates as might be determined by proclamation from time to time, the first rate chosen being 15 : 1.

In the meanwhile, the Bombay rupee had been made identical with the Madras rupee in 1823, and the last step was taken in 1835, when the Indian rupee in its present form and size was issued, being the same in regard to weight and fineness¹ as the Madras rupee of 1818, and was made sole legal tender of payment throughout the territories of the East India Company. Mints were opened to its free coinage, and the Indian system came to be one of silver monometallism, instead of the bimetallic or parallel standard system which had prevailed so far. The value of the silver bullion in the rupee and its legal value were identical. This Act remained in force up to 1893.

§8. **The second period (1835-74).**—The Act of 1835, however, authorized the coinage of gold mohurs and of five-, ten-, and

¹ See, however, ch. viii, §35.

thirty-rupee gold pieces at market value, if required by the public. In 1841, a proclamation was issued authorizing the public treasuries freely to receive the gold mohurs at their face value, that is to say, at the rate of 15 : 1, in payment of public dues. In 1848 and 1849, owing to the Australian and Californian gold discoveries, the price of gold fell in terms of silver. Gold was overvalued in the official ratio of 15 : 1, and the holders of gold coins availed themselves of the opportunity to obtain a larger price in silver than they could obtain in the market. People began to pay their public dues in the depreciated gold coins rather than in rupees, much to the embarrassment of the Government. Lord Dalhousie's Government, therefore, withdrew the proclamation of 1841, and gold was thus definitely demonetized. These steps led to a great stringency in the money market, which was particularly felt owing to the expansion of trade. After 1850 the production of silver was less than was the demand for it. Also a large proportion of silver rupees were being abstracted from circulation and being put to non-monetary uses. 'The Mint was pitted against the smelting pot, and the coin produced by so much patience and skill by the one was rapidly reduced into bangles by the other.'¹ There were no credit media to speak of to relieve the monetary stringency, and banking was yet in an undeveloped condition. In these circumstances people began to have recourse to their own remedy, as was pointed out by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce in a memorial to the Government of India praying for a gold currency, in which it was said that 'there is an increasing tendency to the creation of a gold ingot currency, by the natives of this country, as a rude remedy for the defects of the existing silver one', and 'that gold bars, stamped with the mark of Bombay banks, are for this purpose circulated in several parts of the country'.² The American cotton famine brought fancy prices in gold to Indian cotton exporters, and gold was imported on a very large scale. There arose, therefore, a demand supported influentially by the three Chambers of Commerce for the introduction of a gold currency. In November 1864, therefore, the Government of India issued a notification by which sovereigns and half-sovereigns were to be accepted at Government treasuries at the rate of Rs. 10 and Rs. 5 respectively, and the Government of India were to pay sovereigns and half-sovereigns to their creditors when convenient, and if the latter desired to receive them in payment. In 1866 the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce again urged the

¹ Cassels quoted by Ambedkar, *The Problem of the Rupee*, p. 34.

² Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

adoption of a gold currency, and the Government of India appointed the Mansfield Commission, which was the first of the committees and commissions which have sat from time to time to deliberate upon the problem of Indian currency and have ladled out conflicting panaceas to cure the currency ills of the country. The Mansfield Commission recommended that (i) gold coins of 15, 10, and 5 rupees should be issued, as they were likely to be preferred by the people to notes of like values, and as the introduction of the gold currency would pave the way for the establishment of currency notes; and that (ii) the currency should consist of gold, silver and paper. In 1868, a notification was issued by which the rate for the receipt of sovereigns and half-sovereigns was raised from Rs. 10 and Rs. 5 to Rs. 10-8 and Rs. 5-4 respectively, as the former rate was out of harmony with the market rate and failed to attract gold to the public treasuries. In taking these steps, without any explicit reference to the Mansfield Commission, the Government showed their desire ultimately to make gold legal tender, but they wished to make sure of the fact as to the relative value of gold and silver in India before stereotyping the results by law and finally committing themselves to the legal tender of gold. In 1872 Sir Richard Temple submitted a note to the Government of India suggesting that a gold standard and currency was what was really wanted in India, and that a Commission should be appointed to decide definitely what should be the rating of gold and silver. The Council of the Governor-General were, however, not unanimous, and the second period in the currency history of India came to an end with the decision of the Government of India in 1874 not to accept the proposal.

§4. **The third period (1874-93).**—By 1874 a great change had begun in the monetary status of silver. Germany demonetized silver in 1873. Sweden, Denmark and Norway followed in 1874, closing their mints to the free coinage of silver. The countries of the Latin Union had to fall into line, with the result that huge quantities of silver were thrown on the market. There was also an enormous increase of output of silver from new mines and owing to improved processes. The demand for gold, on the other hand, was increasing owing to its introduction as the only standard in Europe and the United States, and to the general expansion of trade, while the supply was declining. Gold and silver became in their relation to each other simply commodities with no connecting monetary link. The depreciated metal began to flow on a huge scale into silver standard countries, and India more than ever became a sink for silver, which, as it came in, was largely coined into rupees by the Indian mints. This heavy coinage was one of

the causes which set up a decided tendency towards a rise of prices in India, though the phenomenon became much more marked after 1900. From 58*d.* per ounce in 1875, the price of silver fell to 52½*d.* in 1879; 43*d.* in 1888; 37½*d.* in 1892; and 27*d.* in 1899.

With the depreciation of silver the exchange value of the rupee in terms of the sovereign, that is to say, its gold value, began to move down, and fell from about 2*s.* in 1871, to about 1*s.* 2*d.* in 1892. This is, however, anticipating matters to some extent. By way of picking up the thread of the narrative we have to notice that from 1874 up to 1878, the agitation for reform in India was directed chiefly to the closing down of the mints for the free coinage of silver, with a view ultimately to the adoption of the gold standard. In 1876, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the Calcutta Trade Association sent a memorial to the Governor-General requesting the temporary suspension of compulsory coinage of silver by the Indian mints. The Government, however, refused to grant this request, being of the opinion that, without the substitution of gold as a standard, no such step was possible, and that they were not able to adopt the gold standard under the prevailing circumstances, which were still unsettled; and lastly, that the uncertainty in the situation was caused not only by the depreciation of silver but also by the appreciation of gold. In 1878, however, the Government of India themselves proposed to the Secretary of State that definite steps should be taken in the direction of a gold standard with a gold currency, and that, in the meanwhile, the cost of the rupee should be increased to the public in India by charging an additional seigniorage in order to establish a definite relation between the gold coins and the rupee, which might, if necessary, be altered from time to time. The Secretary of State referred this proposal to a Committee, which opposed the scheme on various grounds, and advised, with a somewhat pontifical air, that 'it was better to sit still than to have recourse, under the influence of panic, to crude legislation the result of which cannot be foretold and the effect of which cannot be measured'. As an alternative to a gold standard, the Government of India pathetically clung for a long time to international bimetallism, with a devotion worthy of a Mrs Micawber, when practically every other nation was deserting it. Between 1867 and 1899, there were no less than four International Monetary Conferences held to propose remedies for the currency difficulties in the different European countries and the United States. India was throughout inclined in favour of international bimetallism mainly because of her faith in its special use for herself as a means of rehabilitating silver in the currencies of the world, which, she

hoped, would raise the price of silver and thus extricate her from her exchange difficulties. But the scheme fell through chiefly because of the opposition of England and the general desire on the part of the other European nations to adopt the gold standard in imitation of England, which led them to take up an attitude of hostility to the introduction of bimetallism in the silver-using countries. They feared that the demand for gold which this would cause on the part of the silver-using countries would raise the price of gold to inconvenient heights and embarrass the countries of Europe, which were intent upon the establishment of their currencies on a stable gold monometallic basis.

§5. **The fourth period (1893-1900).**—In the meanwhile, the continued fall in the value of silver and the decision of the United States to repeal the Sherman Act, under which that Government was required to purchase 54 million ounces of silver for annual coinage, made the position of silver and therefore the position of the Indian rupee more precarious than ever. In these circumstances, the Government of India again approached the Secretary of State in 1892 with the proposal to close the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver with the object of eventually introducing the gold standard, if the International Monetary Conference then sitting at Brussels failed to arrive at any conclusion in favour of international action. Accordingly, in 1892, the Herschell Committee was appointed to consider the currency and exchange situation with special reference to the above proposal of the Government of India. While the Herschell Committee was still sitting, the Brussels Conference ended in a fiasco. The Herschell Committee had to suggest a remedy for the following principal defects of the Indian currency system as it then existed: (i) the financial difficulties of the Government of India caused by silver monometallism and the falling rates of exchange with the gold standard countries; (ii) the evil effects of the fall in exchange on the people of India and her commerce; (iii) the difficulties caused by the fall in exchange to European officials in India.

§6. (1) **The financial difficulties of the Government of India.**¹—The difficulties of the Government came principally from the fact that they had to remit yearly a very large sum to England in discharge of their gold obligations, viz. the Home Charges. The gold value of the rupee determined the actual incidence of this charge in India and, as we have seen, this value had been constantly falling ever since 1874, and there was every prospect of its further fall. The inconvenience to the Government of this state of affairs

¹ See *Herschell Committee Report*, pars. 3-6.

was well described by Sir David Barbour, the Finance Member of the Governor-General's Council from 1888 to 1893, as follows: 'The immediate cause of our financial difficulties, and the cause which, by comparison and for the time being, dwarfs all others, is the fall in the gold value of silver, which has added to the Indian expenditure in two years more than four crores of rupees. If that fall could be stayed and the rate of exchange with England fixed permanently at even its present low figure, the difficulty of dealing with the present deficit would be comparatively light. . . . Our financial position for the coming year is at the mercy of the exchange, and of those who have it in their power to affect in any way the price of silver. If we budget for the present deficit of Rs. 15,95,100 and exchange rises one penny, we shall have a surplus; if it falls a penny, we shall have a deficit of more than three crores; if we impose taxation to the extent of one and a half crores of rupees, a turn of the wheel may require us to impose further taxation of not less magnitude; another turn, and we may find that no taxation at all was required.'

§7. (ii) **Effect of fall in exchange on the people of India.**¹—

The increased number of rupees which the Government were required to find for meeting their sterling obligations meant more taxation in terms of rupees. This of course did not necessarily involve a permanent increase of the burden of taxation, for in course of time adjustment would have taken place by a rise in silver prices in India, so that a larger number of rupees would have meant the same quantity of produce, and it is the quantity of produce and not the number of tokens representing it, that is the proper measure of the burden. A certain time, however, must elapse before the adjustment is completed, and in the meanwhile the Indian ryot would have to pay more in terms of produce. The Herschell Committee proceeded to point out that although the burden upon the people as a whole might not eventually be greater on account of the fall in exchange, there was likely to be a transfer of burdens from one class to another. Owing to the fall in exchange, the burden of those who paid a fixed land revenue under a permanent settlement had been lightened, and so had the burden of those whose land revenue had not been recently resettled. On the other hand, the increased salt tax pressed upon the people at large, and rendered more heavy the taxation of those who had suffered from the higher rupee prices due to the fall in the gold value of silver.

Leaving out of account temporary gains and losses to exports

¹ See *Herschell Committee Report*, pars. 32-4.

and imports¹ respectively, an important argument against letting things alone was that about 74 per cent of the total imports of India came from gold-using countries, while 26 per cent only came from silver-using countries. Intimate financial and commercial relations had thus been established with gold standard countries, and a constant fall in the value of the rupee must of necessity seriously embarrass India's foreign trade and have the result of introducing an unhealthy element of speculation into it. Further, even if the falling rupee conferred a temporary benefit on the employer in India, this was at the expense of the wage-earner, because wages rise more slowly than prices. Thus, considering the benefit to India as a whole, it could not be said that a continuous fall in exchange was an advantage.

In view of the difficulties caused both to Government finance and to the commercial community, it would be difficult to find much fault with the Government's anxiety to give up the silver standard in favour of the gold standard. The alternative method of increasing taxation, especially taxation in the form in which it would not have been unpopular, namely, by means of import duties, and of severe retrenchment in public expenditure, was no doubt not absolutely impossible. But given the prospect of constant fluctuations in the value of the rupee, continuous resort to taxation and economy would have been extraordinarily difficult and unsettling in its effect.

§8. *Fall in exchange and foreign capital.*—The influence of a heavy fall in exchange was tending greatly to check the investment of British capital in India and the development of the country, which largely depended upon such investment. For, 'London is the lending market, and London thinks in gold'. The uncertainty as regards the interest on the investment and the prospect of the diminution which the invested capital might suffer, if it were desired to retransfer it to England, impeded the flow of British capital into India. Foreign firms were also finding a difficulty, owing to the falling exchange, in procuring the services of European servants, required for conducting their undertakings in India. The difficulty in attracting foreign capital to the country also had a prejudicial reaction on the finances of local bodies in India.

§9. (iii) *Position of European officials.*—The Indian Government were also faced with difficulties as regards their own officers, who began to put forward claims for compensation for the loss which

¹ On this point consult E. W. Kemmerer, *Modern Currency Reforms*, pp. 27-8.

they sustained owing to the fall in exchange. They received their salaries in rupees, and to remit a given amount in terms of sterling to England for the support of their families and the education of their children, they had to spend a larger and larger portion of their income than before. This had led to serious discontent among them.

§10. **Recommendations of the Herschell Committee.**—Having convinced themselves that the existing monetary system was in urgent need of reform, the Herschell Committee proceeded to suggest remedies. Bimetallism was now out of the question. But instead of demonetization of silver and the establishment of a gold standard currency, a sort of limping standard was recommended, under which there was to be no free mintage either of gold or of silver, and the rupee was to continue to be unlimited legal tender, gold being used only partially for currency purposes during the period of transition, at the end of which further steps were to be taken to introduce a full-fledged gold standard.

§11. **The Government's action on the Report.**—The Government of India approved of the Report, and in 1893 an Act was passed to amend the Coinage Act of 1870, and the Indian Paper Currency Act of 1882. It provided for the immediate closure of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver, though the Indian Government were allowed to retain power to coin rupees on their own account. There were also three administrative Notifications issued at the same time. The first provided for giving rupees in exchange for gold coin and bullion presented at the Indian mints, at the rate of 16*d.* to the rupee. The second Notification authorized the receipt of gold sovereigns and half-sovereigns in payment of public dues at the same rate. By the third Notification provision was made for currency notes being issued from the Paper Currency Offices, in exchange for gold coin or bullion, at the same rate.

The object of these provisions was, first, to force up the exchange value of the rupee, or rather to arrest its further fall; secondly, to encourage the import of foreign capital; thirdly, to familiarize the people with the use of the gold sovereign; and lastly, to discourage the import of silver. The general idea was to take the first steps towards the eventual introduction of the gold standard, and to link India with gold-standard countries immediately. It was thought that a period of transition was necessary before the actual establishment of the gold standard.

§12. **Circumstances leading to the appointment of the Fowler Committee (1898).**—The currency position from 1893 onwards was avowedly transitional and provisional, and some definite action still remained to be taken. This was hastened by the representations

of the commercial community, who were inconvenienced by the famishing of the money market through the closing of the mints and the temporary suspension of the sale of Council Bills, resulting in very high rates of discount. In the meanwhile, the rupee had been gradually gaining in exchange value,¹ and the time seemed to have arrived to place the Indian currency on a gold basis. This led to the appointment of the Fowler Committee in 1898.

§13. **The Lindsay scheme.**—Among the proposals before the Committee special mention must be made of the scheme put forward by A. M. Lindsay, Deputy Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bengal. The importance of this scheme is due to its close resemblance to the plan which was in fact introduced later on. It suggested the raising in London of a long-period loan of £10 millions to be kept there as the Gold Standard Reserve. The arrangement of 1893 was intended to prevent the rise of the rupee above 1s. 4d. by making it binding on the Government to give rupees in exchange for gold or gold sovereigns. Lindsay's aim was to supplement this plan by making arrangements to give sterling in exchange for rupees so as to prevent the fall of the rupee below 1s. 4d. It was therefore proposed that the Government of India should sell in India sterling drafts on London for not less than £1,000 at the rate of 1s. 3¾d. per rupee, which were to be met from the reserve in London.

In London, rupee drafts were to be sold to applicants for not less than Rs. 15,000 at the rate of 1s. 4 1/16d. per rupee, and these were to be met at Calcutta and Bombay. If an excess of rupees accumulated in India as the result of selling sterling drafts, and consequently the reserve in London was unduly depleted, the excess of rupees was to be sold as bullion and the proceeds credited to the reserve in London. If, however, the stock of rupees in India was inadequate, silver was to be purchased out of the gold reserve in London and sent to India to be coined into rupees. The essence of this plan was that the rupee was to be the circulating medium in India, and gold was not to be legal tender. The Fowler Committee turned down the scheme, as they feared that its adoption would check that flow of capital to India upon which her economic prosperity so largely depended, and they objected that, if the system was made permanent in India, it would base India's gold standard for all time on a few millions of gold in London, with a liability to pay in terms of gold in London for rupees received in India to an indefinite extent.

¹ In 1894 the average exchange value of the rupee was 1s. 1½d. By 1898 it had risen to nearly 1s. 4d.

§14. **Recommendations of the Fowler Committee.**—The Fowler Committee concluded that the ideal to be aimed at was the 'effective establishment in India of a gold standard and currency based on the principles of the free inflow and outflow of gold', and with this end in view made the following proposals: (i) The Indian mints should be thrown open to the coinage of gold sovereigns and half-sovereigns. The mints should remain closed to the free coinage of silver as already decided in 1893, 'until the proportion of the gold in the currency is found to exceed the requirements of the public'. (ii) The exchange rate was to be finally fixed at 1s. 4d. per rupee, as this was the rate that had already been established, and, prices having been adjusted to it, it would be easier to maintain than any other ratio. (iii) The rupee might continue to be unlimited legal tender. (iv) The Government should continue to give rupees in exchange for gold, though they should not bind themselves to give gold in exchange for rupees, because the undertaking of such an obligation would be inconvenient and make them liable to sudden demands for gold, to meet which it might sometimes be necessary to raise sterling loans at a heavy cost. (v) To secure the convertibility of the rupees into sovereigns, the profits on any future silver coinage undertaken by the Government should be credited to a gold fund to be kept 'as a special reserve, entirely apart from the Paper Currency Reserve and the ordinary treasury balances'. For although no legal obligation to convert rupees into gold was to be imposed on the Government, it would be an advantage if they could pay out gold when their reserves permitted and the people were willing to accept it. (vi) The Government should be prepared to make gold available, particularly for export when the balance of trade went against India. The Committee expected this gold to come from the gold reserves generally and especially from the gold fund proposed by it, but eventually also from circulation, which would become saturated with a large amount of gold as the result of the full introduction of a gold standard and gold currency.

In short, the Fowler Committee held that a fixed exchange could only be secured and guaranteed by an effective gold standard. The Committee accepted as their model the limping standard adopted by the Latin Union and the United States, under which both gold and silver were unlimited legal tender with a fixed legal ratio, and mints were open only to the free coinage of gold. The recommendations of the Fowler Committee were accepted almost entirely by the Government of India, and the Act of the year 1899 made sovereigns and half-sovereigns legal tender

throughout India at the ratio recommended by the Fowler Committee.

Negotiations were also set on foot for starting a gold mint in India, but they proved abortive on account of the opposition of the British Treasury.

A Gold Standard Reserve was formed in 1900 out of the profits of the coinage of rupees on Government account, which was resumed for the first time after 1893.

§15. Remedies adopted in relief of monetary stringency.—(i) *Circulation of gold*.—After the above action had been taken in faithful compliance with the Fowler Committee's recommendations, Government policy soon broke loose from its moorings and drifted aimlessly until it landed into the patchwork of improvisations called the Gold Exchange Standard. The Fowler Committee had recommended that fresh coinage of rupees should not be undertaken until the proportion of the gold in the currency was found to exceed the requirements of the public. The Government, however, were forced to resume coinage under the pressure of a number of circumstances. The closing of the mints had resulted in a stringency which was felt keenly as trade expanded and population increased. As a temporary measure for meeting the situation, Act II of 1898 had already been passed, by which 'the proceeds of the Secretary of State's sales of Council Bills could be set aside at the Bank of England in gold as part of the Indian Paper Currency Reserve. /The Government of India could issue notes against the gold so set aside, and with them could meet *pro tanto* the Secretary of State's drafts, without reducing their treasury balances'.¹ This had the effect of adding to the drain on the stock of rupees with the Government of India. In order both to familiarize the people with gold coin and to obviate the necessity of fresh coinage of rupees, the Government made an active attempt in 1899 and 1900 to introduce sovereigns into circulation by instructing post offices, paper currency offices, district treasuries and railways to encourage receipts and payments in the form of gold coin. Many of the gold coins thus issued, however, were soon returned to the Government who chose, rather

¹ As Kemmerer points out, this measure was practically an adoption of the Lindsay Plan by the Government (only however to reject it a year afterwards on the recommendation of the Fowler Committee). For it meant 'the sale of exchange in London by the Secretary of State on the Paper Currency Reserve in India, [at rates representing practically the gold-export point for London, with the primary object of realizing currency to meet monetary demands in India]'. Kemmerer, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

too readily, to regard this as a failure of the experiment to induce people to use sovereigns as the medium of exchange.

(ii) *Issue of notes and rupees.*—However that may be, the Government felt themselves forced to resume coinage on a large scale in 1900. The silver required for this purpose was purchased with the gold in the Paper Currency Reserve in London. We have already referred to Act II of 1898 by which the receipts from the sales of the Secretary of State's Council Bills were set apart in the Paper Currency Chest, and notes were issued in India against them. This was intended to be a purely temporary arrangement, and the Act provided that the gold so set apart was to be held by the Secretary of State in London, 'until he shall transmit the same in gold coin or gold bullion to India, or until the Government of India shall appropriate and set apart in India as a part of the Currency Reserve an amount of coin of the Government of India equal in value to such notes'. This Act was extended in the first instance to two and a half years, and again by two years more in 1900, when the Secretary of State was authorized to use the gold so received by him for the purchase of silver bullion to be sent to India to be coined into rupees, and to treat such bullion in transit and in process of coinage as part of the Paper Currency Reserve. The Reserve in London was thus made to serve three distinct purposes. (a) It provided funds in London for the purchase of silver for coinage whenever necessary. (b) It could be used to support the Indian exchange, whenever India had an unfavourable balance of trade and it was impossible or disadvantageous to sell Council Bills. The Secretary of State would, in these circumstances, use the gold in the Paper Currency Reserve to meet his expenses and an equivalent amount would be transferred to the Paper Currency Reserve in India.¹ (c) And lastly, it was a fund into which payments might be made by the Secretary of State whenever he sold Council Bills in excess of his requirements in order to prevent exchange from rising unduly high and inducing an undesirable shipment of gold to India. Against these payments notes would be issued in India.

In 1902 these provisions were made permanent. In 1905, £5 millions, that had accumulated in the Reserve in India, were shipped to London to be held in the Paper Currency Chest of earmarked gold (not to be used for ordinary expenses) at the Bank of England, and a stated part of the Currency Reserve was invested in sterling securities. Since 1906 a substantial part of the Paper Currency Reserve came to be maintained in the form of gold.

¹ See p. 277.

§16. **The Gold Standard Reserve.**—In the year 1900, the Government of India proposed the constitution of a Gold Reserve to be kept in India as desired by the Fowler Committee. They proposed further that the Paper Currency Reserve should gradually revert to its original position and should be used only for the encashment of currency notes and further that it should consist principally of rupees and securities. The Gold Reserve, on the other hand, should consist chiefly of gold. The Secretary of State, however, decided against this. He preferred to have the gold located in London and invested in sterling securities. He held that, since London was the place in which the Reserve would have to be applied on the occasion of the emergency against which it was being created, London would be the best place in which to keep it. In this manner, instead of being used primarily as a gold redemption fund and for the maintenance of the exchange parity of the rupee, the Gold Reserve came to be regarded merely as part of the total surplus Government funds and as a kind of 'secondary reserve'. The work of maintaining the parity of the rupee fell chiefly on the Paper Currency Reserve and the sale of Council Bills in London, 'with the result that the three funds, namely, the Paper Currency Reserve, the Gold Reserve, and the Secretary of State's balances, soon found their functions confused, the properly fiscal function of the last fund and the properly monetary function of the other two being sadly mixed'.

According to the plan insisted upon by the Secretary of State, the profits from the coinage of rupees were remitted to London for investment, and this was effected by gold being withdrawn from the Paper Currency Reserve in London in exchange for the fresh rupees coined in India. In 1906 the difficulty in meeting the demand for rupees led to the formation in India of a special Rupee Reserve outside the Paper Currency Reserve, called the Silver Branch of the Gold Standard Reserve.¹ The Rupee Reserve was intended to prevent the exchange from rising above 1s. 4d., which necessitated the keeping open of an unlimited offer of rupees in exchange for sovereigns at this rate in India. The Notification of 1893 which had authorized the issue of rupees or notes against the tender of gold as distinguished from the British gold coin was withdrawn. In the meanwhile, the practice of shipping to London gold accumulated in the various reserves in India was found to be needlessly expensive, and, therefore, the practice of selling Council Drafts was extended beyond its original purpose after the year

¹ The Gold Reserve came to be known as the Gold Standard Reserve from this date.

1904, when the Secretary of State announced his intention of offering Council Bills for sale without limit of amount at the price of 1s. 4½*d.* If the cash balances in India were inadequate for this purpose, the demand was to be met by withdrawing rupees from the Paper Currency Reserve in India, an equivalent amount of gold being credited to the Paper Currency Chest in London. The price of 1s. 4½*d.* not being found prohibitive at all times of the export of sovereigns to India, which accumulated with the Indian Government, it was decided to offer Telegraphic Transfers against sovereigns in transit from Egypt and Australia to India, the rate for the Transfers being between 1s. 4*d.* and 1s. 4 1/32*d.* (that is, lower than that for the Council Bills),¹ so as to make it worth the while of the owner of such sovereigns to divert them from India to London.

In June 1907, the Mackay Committee on Indian Railway Finance recommended that one million sovereigns out of the profits on the coinage of rupees in 1907 should be spent on railways. The Secretary of State went beyond the Committee and decided to spend on railways in the future one-half of any profit on the coinage of rupees, until the Gold Standard Reserve reached £20 millions, apparently contemplating the diversion of the whole of the profits to the railways after the maximum had been reached. The Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of State that the portion of the Gold Standard Reserve in the form of sterling securities should be allowed to accumulate up to £20 millions before any such diversion was effected. The Secretary of State, disapproving, adhered to his decision, which, however, he had to reverse completely in 1909, owing to the exchange crisis of 1907-8.

§17. The crisis of 1907-8.—On account of a partial failure of crops in some parts and the outbreak of actual famine in others, Indian exports declined. In Europe also, after a period of prosperity, which reached its culmination in 1907, a decline set in, leading to unemployment and slack business. The purchasing capacity of Europe was thus impaired and the situation was aggravated by the general monetary stringency caused by a financial crisis in New York. While Indian exports of jute, wheat, cotton, etc., fell off, the imports rose, at least in the case of one commodity, namely silver, owing to a heavy fall in its price. All these factors contributed to the weakening of the Indian exchange. The stock of sovereigns began to diminish rapidly, and the Exchange Banks urged the sale of Telegraphic Transfers on London. This was

¹ For a detailed explanation of the working of this system see J. M. Keynes, *Indian Currency and Finance*, pp. 114-18.

refused by the Government, who, however, gave gold on certain conditions (not more than £10,000 to any one individual on any one day) from the Paper Currency Reserve. The situation growing worse, the Secretary of State advised the Government to offer Telegraphic Transfers or Reverse Councils on London at the rate of 1s. 3 29/32d. per rupee, and himself released gold from the Paper Currency Reserve in London, against a transfer of rupees to it from the treasuries in India. He had also to float a sterling loan of £4 1/3 millions to keep up his finances, as no Council Bills could then be sold. He met the demand for the encashment of the Reverse Councils by selling the sterling securities in the Gold Standard Reserve in the market, even although they had depreciated in value. These measures brought about an improvement, and next year exchange was steady at 1s. 4d., the revival of the export trade from India coming to the rescue.

§18. **Gold Standard or Gold Exchange Standard?**—In meeting the crisis the Government had taken certain steps in a somewhat subconscious and tentative manner in the direction of the Gold Exchange Standard. Gold was at first given freely in exchange for rupees for internal use, whereas considerable reluctance was displayed in providing gold for private export abroad. This showed that the Government had not yet clearly thought out and definitely adopted the Gold Exchange Standard system. But the subsequent sale of Reverse Councils established a precedent, which brought the Indian currency system appreciably nearer the Lindsay Plan. The practice of paying out rupees and notes in India against deposits of gold in the Paper Currency Reserve in London had already been in vogue for some time, and in 1904 the Secretary of State had declared his willingness to keep the tap turned on indefinitely and sell the Council Bills to an unlimited amount at a fixed rate. In 1907-8 the sale of Reverse Councils, providing for the conversion of rupees into sterling for international purposes, may be said to have put the coping-stone to the edifice of the Gold Exchange Standard.

All the same, however, the Government of India had not yet formally accepted the whole gospel of the Gold Exchange Standard, and for some time after the crisis of 1907-8, we find them occupied in putting forward proposals which diverged in important particulars from the Gold Exchange Standard system as it came to be established eventually. For example, they had not yet reconciled themselves completely to the location of the Gold Reserve in London and had not quite made up their mind about preventing the circulation of gold as a currency medium in India.

The steps taken in order to meet the crisis had resulted in a

serious depletion of the Government's gold resources. In London, the sovereigns in the Currency Chest were reduced from £7 millions to £1½ millions, while in India the whole stock of gold was exhausted.¹ The Government were thus impressed with the necessity of enlarging the Gold Reserve so as to enable them to meet such crises with greater equanimity in the future. In 1909, they proposed to the Secretary of State that £25 millions should be regarded as the minimum necessary for safety, and that, until this figure was reached, no portion of it should be diverted for capital expenditure on railways. They also recommended that the Gold Standard Reserve should be maintained in a more liquid form.

✓ The Secretary of State replied that £25 millions both in the Gold Standard Reserve and the Paper Currency Reserve together would, in his judgement, be the proper standard, and that so long as this combined total was not reached, no diversions would be made from the Gold Standard Reserve, and that the question might be reconsidered thereafter.

He did not wholly agree to the other proposal about maintaining the Reserve in a liquid form, but decided to keep £1 million of the Gold Standard Reserve liquid by allowing this amount to be lent for short periods on approved securities to approved borrowers in London, and to invest the rest in high-class securities with a near date of redemption, or in Consols and other approved stock.

In 1912, in deference to the wishes of the Government of India and in view of public criticism in India, the Secretary of State decided that £25 millions should be the standard for the Gold Standard Reserve, and that £5 millions in gold should be earmarked as deposit in the Bank of England.²

In taking the various steps described above, the Government had almost in spite of themselves steadily deviated from the strait and narrow path of the gold standard recommended by the Fowler Committee, and by a succession of opportunist measures were finally led into the scheme propounded by Lindsay. The system as it developed had not been thought of in 1893 and was opposed by both the Government and the Fowler Committee in 1899, nor is it possible to point to any single date at which it may be said to have been deliberately adopted.

Proposals for gold coinage and a gold mint were revived at the instance of the late Sir Vitthaldas Thackersey, who moved a resolution to that effect in 1912 in the Imperial Legislative Council.

¹ See H. F. Howard, *India and the Gold Standard*, p. 35.

² See Findlay Shirras, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

Negotiations in this connexion lasted for about a year, when it was decided to refer this question along with others to a Currency Commission which was contemplated.

§19. **The mechanism of the Gold Exchange Standard.**—Mr J. M. Keynes, one of the ablest exponents of the system, the evolution of which has been traced above, and which remained in full operation from 1898-9 to 1915-16, summarizes and explains its main features as follows: '(1) The rupee is unlimited legal tender and, so far as the law provides, inconvertible. (2) The sovereign is unlimited legal tender at £1 to 15 rupees and is convertible at this rate, so long as the Notification issued in 1893 is not withdrawn, i.e. the Government can be required to give 15 rupees in exchange for £1. (3) As a matter of administrative practice, the Government are, as a rule, willing to give sovereigns for rupees at this rate; but the practice is sometimes suspended and large quantities of gold cannot always be obtained in India by tendering rupees. (4) As a matter of administrative practice, the Government will sell in Calcutta, in return for rupees tendered there, bills payable in London at a rate not more unfavourable than 1s. 3 29/32d. per rupee.

'The fourth of these provisions is the vital one for supporting the sterling value of the rupee; and although the Government have given no binding undertaking to maintain it, a failure to do so might fairly be held to involve an utter breakdown of their system.

'Thus the second provision prevents the sterling value of the rupee from rising above 1s. 4d. by more than the cost of remitting sovereigns to India, and the fourth provision prevents it from falling below 1s. 3 29/32d. This means in practice that the extreme limits of variation of the sterling value of the rupee are 1s. 4 1/8d. and 1s. 3 29/32d.'¹

It was claimed for the Gold Exchange Standard that, while it was much cheaper than a gold standard and a gold currency, it ensured all the advantages of the latter. In India it is obvious that the principal object of the system was the maintenance of the rupee at par with gold. When exchange showed signs of weakness, the Government were expected to come out as sellers of sterling (Reverse Councils), and when the rupee was tending to appreciate, to come out as sellers of the local currency (Council

¹ *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7. Elsewhere (p. 20), Mr Keynes describes the essentials of the Gold Exchange Standard as 'the use of a local currency mainly not of gold, some degree of unwillingness to supply gold locally in exchange for the local currency, but a high degree of willingness to sell foreign exchange for payment in local currency at a certain maximum rate; and to use foreign credits in order to do this'.

Bills). And the effectiveness of such Government interference depended upon the adequacy of the gold and rupee reserves.

§20. **Council Drafts system.**—The system of Reverse Councils and Council Bills was an important part of the Gold Exchange Standard system during the pre-war period. But the Government had never bound themselves by law to sell Reverse Councils or sterling bills, and, moreover, occasions for selling them were comparatively rare. But, as we have already seen, the system of Council Drafts (Council Bills and Telegraphic Transfers) was the fly-wheel of the machinery for the management of Indian currency, exchange, and finance.

The practice of drawing funds from India by the sale of bills of exchange on India dated from the time of the East India Company.¹ Up to 1893, however, the sale of Council Drafts was, as a rule, limited by the actual requirements of the Secretary of State for meeting the Home Charges. The system enabled the Secretary of State to obtain funds at as favourable a rate as possible. It was also convenient to trade as providing a ready means of settling a large part of debts due to India from foreigners on account of India's surplus of exports over imports. In fact it was the existence of this surplus in normal times which made the system of Council Drafts possible and profitable.

For some years after 1893, a negative use, so to say, was made of the system for forcing up the exchange value of the rupee by a temporary cessation of the sale of Council Drafts. This had the effect of making the rupee less freely available and tended to raise its price in terms of sterling.

We have already seen how, in 1898, after the rupee had at last risen to 1s. 4d., Act II of 1898 authorized the sale of Council Drafts against gold set aside at the Bank of England as part of the Indian Paper Currency Reserve, and notes of corresponding value were issued in India to meet the Council Drafts. The object was not merely to draw funds from India to meet the Home Charges, but quickly to expand the currency in times of monetary stringency in India, as an alternative to the shipment of sovereigns to India on private account, when the Government of India had no surplus treasury balances with which to meet Council Drafts.

A further step was taken when gold accumulated in London, and, representing the proceeds of the sale of Council Drafts against the issue of notes in India, was regarded as available for the purchase of silver for coinage in India. Since 1904, as already seen, an offer to sell Council Bills was kept standing. A similar train

¹ The following account is slightly abridged from the *Chamberlain Commission Report*, pars. 170-6.

of events resulted in the issue by the Secretary of State, as occasion required, of notifications offering to sell Council Drafts against sovereigns in transit from Australia or Egypt to India, the motive being to avoid the expense and the waste involved in the shipment of sovereigns first to India and then to London for the purchase of silver, sovereigns beyond a particular limit not being required in India.

In 1909 and 1910, Council Drafts were freely sold to obtain gold in London in place of the large quantities of rupees, which had accumulated in the Gold Standard Reserve in India through the sale of Reverse Councils in London during the crisis. The effect of this was to bring the Gold Standard Reserve Fund back to London.

Profits on the mintage of rupees, which necessarily first took the form of rupees, were converted into sterling in London, the rupees which represented the profits being issued in India to meet the Council Drafts sold in London.

The consideration affecting Council Drafts¹ thus came to be very much wider than the mere question of putting the Secretary of State in funds for paying the Home Charges. To this purpose was added that of securing the convenience of trade and that of so manipulating the disposition and location of the resources of the Government as to give the fullest effect to Government policy in matters of currency, exchange and finance.

§21. **The Chamberlain Commission.**—In view of the persistent and severe criticism of the Government's currency and exchange policy, a Commission was appointed in April 1913 with Mr (later Sir) Austen Chamberlain as its Chairman, and it reported in February 1914. Its conclusions and recommendations were as follows :

(i) The establishment of the exchange value of the rupee on a stable basis was a matter of the first importance to India. (ii) The measures adopted for the maintenance of the exchange value of the rupee had been necessarily and rightly rather supplementary to, than in all respects directly in pursuance of, the recommendations of the Committee of 1898. (iii) The crisis of 1907-8 was the only occasion upon which they had been severely tested, and they were found to work satisfactorily then. Owing to lack of experience in working the machinery and the absence of any plans fully worked out in advance for dealing with such a crisis, the Government did at first make mistakes. For example, the India Office seemed to believe that the sole, or at least the main, purpose of the Gold

¹ Replaced since 1923-4 by the system of purchase of sterling in India, which is discussed in the next chapter (§37).

Standard Reserve was to meet the requirements of the Secretary of State in London, when Council Bills could not be sold, while the Government of India made the mistake of refusing to give gold from the Paper Currency Reserve for export, though allowing their gold to be drained away for internal use. Both the authorities failed to realize that the principal use of a gold reserve is that it should be freely available for foreign remittances whenever the exchange falls below specie point. These mistakes, however, were very quickly rectified in practice, and the steps taken to restore and maintain exchange proved adequate. (iv) The history of the previous fifteen years showed that gold currency in active circulation was not an essential condition of the gold standard, which had been firmly secured without this condition. (v) It would not be to India's advantage to encourage an increased use of gold in the internal circulation. (vi) The people of India neither desired nor needed any considerable amount of gold for circulation as currency, and the currency most generally suitable for the internal needs of India consisted of rupees and notes. (vii) A mint for the coinage of gold was not needed for purposes of currency or exchange, but if Indian sentiment genuinely demanded it, and the Government of India were prepared to incur the expense, there was no objection in principle to its establishment either from the Indian or the Imperial standpoint, provided that the coin minted was the sovereign (or the half-sovereign); it was pre-eminently a question in which Indian sentiment should prevail. (viii) If a mint for the coinage of gold was not established, refined gold should be received at the Bombay mint in exchange for currency. (ix) The Government should aim at giving the people the form of currency which they demand, whether rupees, notes or gold, but the use of notes should be encouraged. (x) This internal currency should be supported for exchange purposes by a thoroughly adequate reserve of gold and sterling. (xi) No limit should be fixed to the amount up to which the Gold Standard Reserve was to be accumulated. Reliance ought to be placed on the Paper Currency Reserve for the support of exchange only in so far and so long as the Gold Standard Reserve was not adequate to support the burden by itself. (xii) The profits on the coinage of rupees should, for some time at least, continue to be credited exclusively to the Reserve. (xiii) A much larger proportion of the Reserve should be held in actual gold. By an exchange of assets between this Reserve and the Paper Currency Reserve, a total of about £10 millions in gold could at once be secured. This total should be raised, as opportunity offered, to £15 millions, and thereafter the authorities should aim at keeping one-half of the total Reserve in actual gold. While it was

unnecessary and wasteful to hold the whole of the Gold Reserve in gold, the loss from enforced realization of securities in a time of crisis should be guarded against by maintaining a sufficient amount in liquid form. (xiv) The Indian branch of the Gold Standard Reserve should be abolished as it had given rise to much criticism, and was responsible for much confusion and doubt as to the efficiency of the Reserve. (xv) The proper place for the location of the whole of the Gold Standard Reserve was London. (xvi) The Government should definitely undertake to sell bills in India on London at the rate of 1s. 3 29/32d. per rupee whenever called upon to do so.¹

The Commission thus gave its most unstinted approval to the nondescript currency system, which had been evolved more or less fortuitously. The Government had not always felt very comfortable under it, and responsible officials still spoke occasionally as if they regarded the Gold Exchange Standard, under which India found itself, as merely a wayside inn, the real destination being a gold standard with its usual accompaniment of a gold currency.²

In 1912, the Government of India, in sympathetic response to the agitation in the country in favour of a gold mint in Bombay which culminated in Sir Vithaldas's resolution referred to above, addressed the Secretary of State on the subject urging him not to turn a deaf ear to the popular demand for a gold coinage. The Chamberlain Commission, however, attempted to give a new turn altogether to the Government's thoughts. They practically assured them that, without knowing it, they had put India into the forefront of nations in currency matters by adopting the Gold Exchange Standard system.

Before the Government had had enough time to consider and give effect to the various recommendations of the Chamberlain Commission, the war intervened and created an altogether novel set of conditions and raised new problems which we now proceed to discuss.

¹ *Chamberlain Commission Report*, par. 223.

² Sir James Meston, speaking in the budget debate of 1910, used the following words: 'We have linked India with the gold countries of the world. We have reached a gold exchange standard, which we are steadily developing and improving. The next and final step is a true gold currency. That, I have every hope, will come in time, but we cannot force it. The backwardness of our banking arrangements, the habits and suspicions of the people, the infancy of co-operation—all stand in the way. But the final step will come when the country is ripe for it. I trust that it will not long be delayed; for when it comes, it will obliterate all the mistakes, all the inconveniences, all the artificialities, of our present position.'

EFFECTS OF THE WAR OF 1914-18 ON INDIAN CURRENCY¹

§22. **The first period (August 1914 to autumn 1915).**—The effects may be considered under two main periods: (i) The first period extends from the outbreak of war in August 1914 to autumn 1915. This was a period of dislocation involving a general weakening of the currency and exchange position.

(ii) The second period falls between autumn 1915 and the end of 1919. This may be considered as a period of revival and was characterized by great vigour in production. It witnessed a very large rise in the exchange and an unprecedented rise in the gold price of silver, which was particularly pronounced towards the end of the period.

The outbreak of the war dealt a rude shock to public confidence and caused a general dislocation of trade and business. The principal symptoms of this were a weakening of the exchange, withdrawals of Savings Bank deposits, a demand for the encashment of notes, and a run on the Indian gold stocks.

The Government met the situation by prompt measures which helped the early restoration of confidence. The weakening of exchange was met by offering Reverse Councils, which were sold to the extent of about £8 millions up to February 1915, when the demand for Council Bills revived, and apart from short spells of weakness, Indian exchange remained strong throughout the second period, there being a very large demand for Council Bills, the whole of which could not be met.

A large amount—Rs. 6 crores out of a total of Rs. 24½ crores—was withdrawn from the Savings Bank deposits in the first two months of the war. The net withdrawals amounted to Rs. 8 crores, till the tide turned in 1915-16. The demands were freely met, and this proved useful in restoring confidence and attracting back the deposits, which again rose to Rs. 18 crores by the end of 1918-19 (i.e. Rs. 6½ crores less than the original amount).

The demand for the encashment of notes was also freely met, notes of the value of Rs. 10 crores being returned to the Treasuries up to March 1915. But from that time onwards there was a steady increase in the note circulation.

Lastly, there was a run on the Indian gold stock, which took the form of a keen demand for gold in exchange for notes. Precautions against the internal use of the gold so acquired proving useless, the

¹ This account is largely based upon the *Report of the Babington Smith Committee, 1920*. The effects of the present war on Indian currency are reviewed in the next chapter.

issue of gold to private persons was altogether stopped, and notes were paid after that in silver coin only.

All these embarrassing symptoms disappeared by the end of the first period. The Government on the whole may be said to have faced the situation boldly and successfully. Public confidence was restored by the assurance given to the banking and commercial community of adequate and continuous facilities for remittance abroad and by the readiness with which the Government encashed currency notes as they were presented.

§28. **The second period (autumn 1915 to the end of 1919).**—After the first shock of the war had passed away, the currency mechanism worked smoothly for some time, and it was not till the end of 1916 that acute complications arose. There was a rapid rise in the price of silver and an increasing difficulty of obtaining it to meet the heavy demands for silver coins in India.

In the first place there was a heavy excess of exports over imports, and the balance of trade, which was at the outset of the war unfavourable to India, became now embarrassingly favourable. Although the export trade had at first suffered on account of the war, it made a steady recovery, thanks to the insistent demand for India's exports on the part of the Allies for the prosecution of the war. The import trade, on the other hand, suffered more, as we have already seen.¹ The result was that there remained a large excess of exports over imports to be liquidated.

To make the situation still more difficult, the Government of India had to incur heavy (recoverable) expenditure on behalf of His Majesty's Government. From 1914 to December 1919, £240 millions had to be so spent on military equipment in the eastern theatres of the war and to meet civil expenditure in occupied territory. In addition to this, arrangements had to be made for the financing of purchases in India, on behalf of some of the Dominions and Colonies and also for the African importers of Indian produce.

The combined effect of these factors was to create a heavy demand for Indian currency. The decrease in the imports of precious metals on account of the restrictions placed on their export by foreign Governments further added to the ticklishness of the situation. As the pre-war methods of liquidating the favourable balance were not available, the Government had to provide some sort of a substitute to prevent the paralysis of the export trade so vitally necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. They had, therefore, to sell Council Bills in London on a very large scale by way of providing means of remittance to pay for Indian exports.

¹ Ch. vi, §5.

To meet these Bills it became necessary to undertake extensive coinage of rupees. This was a task which presented almost insuperable difficulties as various circumstances conspired to send up the price of silver to undreamt-of heights.

§24. **Rise in the price of silver.**—The principal factor which dominated the currency situation was the extraordinary rise in the price of silver. There was a great shortage of the supply of the white metal as compared with its pre-war level of production, owing to internal disturbances in Mexico, and a great increase in its cost of production. On the other hand, there was an unusually keen world demand for the metal mainly for currency, on account of the shortage of gold and the almost universal anxiety on the part of belligerent and neutral Governments to conserve their supplies of it. The heaviest demand came from India and China. We have already seen that the burden of liquidating the favourable balance of trade and finding purchasing power for the expenditure on behalf of the British War Office was mainly thrown on the Government of India and took the form of large demands for the local currency, especially for rupees. The demand was further accentuated by the melting of rupees (notwithstanding its prohibition by law), when the intrinsic value of the coin exceeded its face value in the course of the great rise in the price of silver. Another factor which operated in the same direction was the influence of the dollar-sterling or the New York-London exchange. When in March 1919 the sterling-dollar exchange was decontrolled, it made a further move against England, in response to economic forces which were now left unfettered, reaching eventually as low a limit as \$3.40 : £1 sterling.

Now the chief payment for silver purchased for India by the Secretary of State had to be made to America in terms of dollars, and the progressive depreciation of sterling raised the London sterling price and was bound to raise the rupee price of silver also, unless the rupee was given a correspondingly higher sterling value.

Having explained the causes of the rise of silver, let us now follow its meteoric flight. In 1915 the highest price of silver was 27 pence per ounce. In 1916, a maximum of 37 pence was reached. In August 1917, it exceeded 43 pence per ounce (which was the bullion par of the rupee, i.e. the price at which the exchange value of the rupee at 1s. 4d. was equivalent to its bullion or intrinsic value). In September 1917 the price rose to 55 pence. The United States, Great Britain and Canada, however, came to the rescue, all of them instituting a control over the trade in silver and prohibiting its export except under a license and later on except at a specified price. These measures resulted in the price of silver being kept

within the limits of 41 and 49 pence per ounce. But in May 1919, the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew this control and a further rise in the price of silver occurred. In the same month it reached 58 pence per ounce, after which it continued its upward career throughout the year, reaching the level of 78 pence in December. The highest point was attained in February 1920, when the London quotation rose to 89 pence per ounce.

§25. **Measures taken by the Government.**—(i) *Government control of exchange.*—After the country had lived down the first shock of the war, the demand for Council Bills revived with the revival of the export trade. It was fairly normal till October 1916, after which it rapidly increased owing to the rising favourable balance which, we saw, could not be liquidated by the normal method of free imports of specie. This resulted in the depletion of the rupee reserves in India, endangering the convertibility of the notes. In December 1916, therefore, restrictions were imposed on the sale of Council Bills, and the sale of Intermediate Councils was stopped, with the result that there was a divergence between the market rate of exchange and the Government rate. This was detrimental to the export trade, which it was essential to maintain uninterrupted for the successful conduct of the war. Therefore, certain measures of control were instituted by the Government, exchange being fixed at 1s. 4¼d. in January 1917. The sale of Council Bills was confined to some selected banks and firms, and these were required to do business with third parties at the prescribed rates, applying their resources mainly to certain selected articles of export of importance to the Allies. With the co-operation of the banks assisted by these control measures, further fluctuations in the exchange were prevented for some time.

(ii) *Raising of exchange rate.*—Very soon, however, it was found that these measures were not of substantial use in maintaining exchange stability owing to the remarkable rise in the price of silver on which we have dwelt above. The Government could not go on selling rupees to the public at 16 pence when the cost of manufacturing a rupee became 18 pence, 20 pence and so on, with the successive rises in the price of silver. The Government did not entertain the suggestion made by some people in India that this loss should be debited to the Gold Standard Reserve, since it was meant for the very purpose of maintaining exchange stability. They denied that the Reserve was intended for such use and determined to shift this loss on to those who wanted rupees from them.

In pursuance of this policy, exchange was raised to 1s. 5d.

in August 1917, and shortly afterwards the Secretary of State announced his intention to base the rates of exchange on the sterling price of silver, raising them as the latter rose.¹ The result is shown in the following figures.

Changes in the Rates of Exchange

Date	Exchange in Sterling	Date	Exchange in Sterling
3 January 1917	... 1s. 4½d.	12 August 1919	... 1s. 10d.
28 August 1917	... 1s. 5d.	15 September 1919	... 2s. 0d.
12 April 1918	... 1s. 6d.	22 November 1919	... 2s. 2d.
13 May 1919	... 1s. 8d.	12 December 1919	... 2s. 4d.

The market rate and, later on, the rates for the sale of the Reverse Councils, when these were sold from February 1920 onwards, were in the period from January to March 1920, 2s. 6d., 2s. 8d., 2s. 10d. and 2s. 11d., the highest rate being reached in the early months of 1920.

(iii) *Purchase of silver.*—Special measures had to be taken to increase the supply of currency, silver being purchased for the purpose from February 1916. To remove competition from private purchasers in India, the Government prohibited the import of silver on private account from September 1917. In 1918, as the result of negotiations with the Government of the United States, the latter passed the Pittman Act which authorized the sale of the silver in the reserve. The Government of India thus purchased 200 million ounces of pure silver at 101½ cents per ounce fine.

(iv) *Conservation and economy of silver.*—Further measures were taken for the conservation and economy of silver. Currency legislation was passed in June 1917, prohibiting the melting and export of gold and silver coins. Notes of the denomination of 1 and 2½ rupees were issued in December 1917. In January 1918, for the first time, nickel coins of the denomination of 2 annas, 4 annas and 8 annas were issued and made legal tender up to one

¹ This announcement was equivalent to declaring the restoration of the silver standard in India like the one that was in existence before 1873. From 1873 to 1893, the measure of value in India was fluctuating with changes in the gold prices of silver. The gold price of 165 grains of silver at any moment was the measure of value for the exchange of goods in India. The same was true now in view of the conditions described above. . . .—Vakil and Muranjan, *Currency and Prices in India*, p. 112.

rupee. From June 1917, the Government acquired gold imported on private account at a price based on the sterling exchange value of the rupee, irrespective of the premium on gold. Notes were issued against gold so acquired, and gold mohurs and sovereigns were coined and issued as currency to supplement the silver currency. When the restrictions on the export of gold from America were removed in June 1919 and the gold markets of South Africa and Australia became free, more gold was imported into the country and acquired by the Government. To encourage its import, they raised the acquisition price so as to include the premium on gold as compared with sterling. Gold so obtained was sold to the public fortnightly from August 1919 with the object of lowering the premium on it.

(v) *Inflation of paper currency.*—Relief was also sought in an increase of the note issue without the usual metallic backing. Further, restrictions were placed on its convertibility, such as suspension of the extra-legal facilities for conversion. Another remedy resorted to was a limitation of daily issues of rupees to single tenderers of notes.

(vi) *Financial measures.*—The ordinary and the capital expenditure were kept as low as possible, and additional taxation was imposed to increase the Government's purchasing power. Further, large rupee loans were floated in India bringing in Rs. 130 crores in three years (1917, 1918 and 1919), a phenomenal figure as compared with the pre-war figures and expectations. Short-term Treasury Bills of from three to twelve months' duration were also issued in considerable quantities from October 1917.

All these measures materially assisted the meeting of the heavy demands for remittances to India and the direct demands for currency there.

§26. **The Babington Smith Committee.**—The war had broken out while the recommendations of the Chamberlain Commission were still under consideration, and, as we have just seen, the events of the war years had raised a crop of fresh problems and new difficulties. The Secretary of State, therefore, appointed, on 30 May 1919, another expert committee under the presidency of Sir Henry Babington Smith.

As the Smith Committee remark: 'For the current operations of trade, stability [of exchange] is an important facility rather than an essential condition.' But the evils of instability are intensified if the movements of exchange are brought about not by economic causes, but by administrative acts. The possibility of official intervention makes it difficult for the commercial community to provide against the risks of fluctuation. Stability of exchange,

therefore, is particularly important in an unautomatic currency system like that of India.

The question whether the exchange should be stabilized at the old level or somewhere near the new level which it had reached, was decided by the Committee in favour of the latter alternative, on the ground that it would shorten the period of uncertainty and prevent economic dislocation and social discontent (see §27). The following is a summary of the main recommendations of the Committee.¹

(i) The rupee, unchanged in weight and fineness, should remain unlimited legal tender. (ii) It should have a fixed exchange value which should be expressed in terms of gold at the rate of one rupee for 11·30016 grains of fine gold, i.e. one-tenth of the gold contents of the sovereign. (iii) That the sovereign previously rated by law at fifteen rupees should be made legal tender in India at the revised ratio of ten rupees to one sovereign. (iv) The import and export of gold should be freed from Government control as soon as the change in the statutory rate to Rs. 10 had been effected, and a gold mint at Bombay should be opened for the coinage into sovereigns of gold tendered by the public. (v) The Notification of the Government undertaking to give rupees for sovereigns should be withdrawn. (vi) The prohibition of the private import and export of silver should be removed and the import duty on silver should be repealed unless the fiscal position demanded its retention. (vii) The Gold Standard Reserve should contain a considerable proportion of gold and the aim should be to hold the remainder of the Reserve in securities issued by Governments within the British Empire (other than the Government of India) maturing within twelve months. A portion of the gold held in the Reserve, not exceeding one-half, should be held in India.

The recommendation to fix the exchange value of the rupee at 2s. gold was qualified by the following remark :

'If, contrary to expectation, a great and rapid fall in world prices were to take place and if the costs of production in India fail to adjust themselves with equal rapidity to the lower level of prices, then it might be necessary to consider the problem afresh.'

§27. **The Committee's case for the high rate.**—The principal reason for the high rate recommended by the Committee was their expectation that, for a long time to come, the price of silver would continue to be high, and they thought that, if the exchange value

¹ The summary has been taken from Appendix 3 to the *Report of the Hilton-Young Commission on Indian Currency, 1925-6*, but the recommendations with regard to the constitution and location of the Paper Currency Reserve have been omitted here.

of the rupee was fixed at a figure not lower than 2s. gold, the rupee would be once more established as a token coin, and the maintenance of a satisfactory monetary circulation would be assured.

A consideration of the general economic effects of a high rate of exchange also led them to prefer it. A low rate would mean high prices which would entail great hardship on the poorer classes and on those who had fixed incomes, and would promote great unrest and discontent.

Although the rise in the rate would stimulate imports and discourage exports, these effects were transitory in character and would disappear when wages and other elements of cost had adjusted themselves to the new rate of exchange. The export trade would no doubt suffer temporarily, but less than was feared by some people, because the demand for Indian goods abroad was very keen owing to the world shortage of raw materials and food-stuffs. Besides, the high rate of exchange and the general cheapening of the imports would bring substantial advantages to the Indian producer. It would tend to keep down the cost of imported stores and machinery in terms of rupees, and by reducing the cost of living in India it would lower wages or at least check their further advance.

Lastly, Government finances would stand to gain enormously from the high level of exchange, and the annual saving in respect of the sterling obligations would amount to Rs. 12½ crores, if the old ratio of 1s. 4d. was abandoned in favour of the new one of 2s. gold. There would of course be a loss involved in the revaluation in terms of rupees of the sterling investments and of the gold in London. But the whole of this loss would be wiped out in the course of three years by the savings effected in connexion with the Home Charges. And after this had been done, a considerable surplus revenue would remain and would be available for employment in further economic development of the country or in reducing taxation.

In recommending that the rupee should be fixed in relation to gold rather than to sterling, the Committee were influenced by the consideration that it was very desirable to stabilize the rupee as early as possible at a level which would ensure its remaining a token coin, and remove the necessity of further increase in its value to meet successive advances in the sterling price of silver occasioned by a progressive depreciation of sterling. They also argued that by linking the rupee with gold, at least one disturbing cause of exchange fluctuation would be eliminated, since any rise in the sterling price of silver would be counterbalanced by a similar automatic rise in the sterling value of the rupee. Moreover, if

the rupee and the sovereign were both to remain legal tender in India and available for circulation, it was necessary that the relation of the rupee to the sovereign should be fixed, since two coins cannot remain in circulation and at the same time stand in variable relation to one another.

§28. **Sir Dadiba Dalal's minute of dissent.**—The late Sir Dadiba Merwanjee Dalal wrote a stimulating and spirited minute of dissent differing from his colleagues in practically all their conclusions.

With reference to the Government's action in raising the rate of exchange in response to the rise in the price of silver, he refused to believe that the professed reason for this was the true or the only reason;—for apparently the Government intended to maintain the rate at a higher level even if the price of silver should fall. In his opinion the rise in the price of silver could have been prevented by removing the embargo on the export of silver after the war had ended, and it was after the war that the greater part of the rise in exchange was brought into force. India could easily have spared the silver for export; such exports would have been profitable to her, and they could have prevented the great rise in the price of silver. It was mainly because the export of silver from India was prohibited, and India was made a potential buyer instead of a seller, that the silver markets were inflamed and the price rose.

Sir Dadiba Dalal was entirely opposed to the rise in the rate of exchange, because he thought its consequences to India would be disastrous. It would seriously disturb the relations between creditor and debtor, cause dislocation and a setback to several Indian industries, and vast continuous losses on the exports of Indian produce, and turn India's balance of trade against her. A fixed high level of exchange would also cause enormous losses in the rupee value of the invested reserves in sterling securities and of gold held as part of the metallic reserves against the note-issue. Further, if the sovereigns held by the public were to be redeemed at the statutory rate of Rs. 15 to the sovereign, this would further entail a colossal loss.

An alteration of the ratio is at all times highly objectionable. The legal standard for money payments should be, and usually is, regarded as less open to repeal or modification than perhaps any other legislative act. It gives the people rights as to the kind of money they may demand in exchange for their labour or goods, rights which cannot be removed or modified without inflicting widespread injury and risking the gravest discontent.

The break in the standard may have been justifiable during the war, but when the war was over, the people's rights in the standard

money of the country should have been protected from further modification. If the choice was between a certain amount of inconvenience to trade and abandonment of the legal standard, the former alternative should have been unhesitatingly chosen. It was for trade to accommodate itself to the standard rather than the other way about.

The high price of silver was entirely artificial, and the removal of the embargo on its export combined with a refusal to raise the rate of exchange (and so far make the sale of silver unprofitable) would lower it. But even otherwise the Government could meet the situation by stopping the coinage of fresh rupees, of which the country had already more than enough, and by not selling Council Bills beyond the requirements of the Secretary of State.

There was no advantage in making the rate of exchange follow the price of silver. With the ruling high prices of silver, there was no longer any economy in using it instead of gold.

§29. **Government action on the Report.**¹—The Government accepted the Committee's recommendations and took the following steps to put them into force :

(i) *Control of exchange.*—In January 1920 the demand for Council Drafts had ceased and a strong demand for Reverse Councils had set in. During January the drafts had been sold at a rate based on the rate of 2s. 4d., which had been fixed for the sale of Council Bills. But in compliance with the Committee's recommendation, the Government notified that Council Drafts and Telegraphic Transfers would be offered for sale weekly by competitive tender with no fixed minimum rate ; and that, in future, Reverse Drafts and Telegraphic Transfers would be offered in India, when occasion so required, at a rate based on the sterling equivalent of the price of 11.30016 grains of fine gold as measured by the prevailing sterling-dollar exchange, less a reduction representing the cost of remitting gold.

(ii) *Change in the legal tender value of the sovereign.*—The internal ratio of one sovereign for Rs. 10 could not be made effective so long as gold bullion continued to command a high premium over the price indicated by the ratio recommended by the Committee. We have already seen how, as far back as 1917, the Government had started the compulsory acquisition of gold imported on private account and how they had begun from September 1919 their series of fortnightly sales of gold with a view to reducing the

¹ See *Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance* (1925), vol. II, Appendix 3 ; also H. Stanley Jevons, *Money, Banking and Exchange in India*, ch. xv.

premium on it. Gold, however, still commanded a high premium over the price recommended by the Smith Committee. In February 1920, the Government announced that, during the next six months, a minimum of 15 million tolas of fine gold would be sold; but this original programme was extended by further sales in August and September. After selling a large quantity at an average rate of Rs. 22 per tola, the gold sales were stopped in October 1920 and the price of gold, which had been controlled to some extent by the Government sales, again went up. This part of the Government's policy must therefore be pronounced a failure.

By Ordinance No. III of 21 June 1920, sovereigns and half-sovereigns ceased to be legal tender in payment or on account, but provision was made for their acceptance by the Government at the ratio of Rs. 15 during a moratorium of 21 days, on the expiry of which the restrictions on imports of British gold coin were also withdrawn. The sovereigns and half-sovereigns tendered at the currency offices and treasuries in the 21 days during which the moratorium continued amounted to about £2½ millions.

The Currency Committee's recommendation that the sovereign should be made legal tender in India at Rs. 10 instead of Rs. 15 was given effect to by the Indian Coinage (Amendment) Act, No. XXXVI of 1920. This Act restored the legal-tender character of the sovereign and half-sovereign which had been suspended by Ordinance No. III of 21 June 1920. The rate fixed by the new Act was Rs. 10 to the sovereign and instructions were accordingly issued to treasuries and currency offices that sovereigns and half-sovereigns, if presented, should be received at the rate of Rs. 10 and Rs. 5 respectively, but that they should not be issued. As the market price of the sovereign continued to be above Rs. 10, it never functioned as currency at the new ratio. It was therefore thought unnecessary to open a gold mint in Bombay.

(iii) *Abolition of war-time restrictions.*—In February 1920 the prohibition on the import of silver (but not on export) was removed, and also the import duty of four annas per ounce which had been levied was abolished. Similarly, the war-time notifications which had been issued prohibiting the use of gold and silver coin otherwise than as currency, or dealing in them at a premium, were also cancelled. The fall in the price of silver and the return of silver coin from circulation, which commenced in May 1920, made possible the abolition of the remaining war-time restrictions on the movements of precious metals. On 21 June the restrictions on the import of gold bullion and foreign coin were removed. A few days later restrictions on the use of silver for making payments on behalf of the Government were withdrawn, and treasury officers

were instructed that payments should in future be made in the form of currency desired by the payee. Steps were also taken in the direction of renewing the extra-legal facilities (for conversion of notes into rupees) which had been temporarily withdrawn. The treasury officers, for example, were instructed as far as possible to give silver in exchange for notes if presented in reasonably small quantities. In short, so far as silver was concerned, full effect was given to the recommendations of the Currency Committee before the end of 1920.

The measures taken with reference to the reconstitution of the Paper Currency Reserve will be referred to later on (§38).

§30. Sale of Reverse Councils.—We must now recount in greater detail the Government's attempt to maintain the new ratio of 2s. gold and the ghastly failure with which it met. On the date of the publication of the Smith Committee's Report the American cross-rate¹ had reached the low level of £1 : \$3.65. It was obvious that the existing rate of the rupee-sterling exchange must rise very considerably, if the Government were determined to keep the value of the rupee at 2s. gold. Indian exporters in these circumstances were anxious to discount their export bills as quickly as possible in order to save themselves from the expected rise of exchange. But this rush of the exporters to turn their bills into rupees was itself bound to send up the sterling value of the rupee, which, accordingly, rose to 2s. 8½*d.* within three days of the announcement of the 2s. gold ratio. Another fall in the American cross-rate caused a further rise in the rate of exchange, which stood at the unprecedented figure of 2s. 10¼*d.* on 11 February 1920. After this, however, a reaction set in. The rush of the exporters to discount their bills had abated. The demand for sterling on the other hand became more and more intense owing to the Government's decision about the ratio. Commercial firms and private persons hastened to make their remittances to England, which in the ordinary course of things would have waited for several months, in order to take advantage of the abnormally high rate of exchange.

As a result of the huge profits made during the war of 1914-18 by certain sections of the people, there was a heavy boom of company flotations and this meant orders on an unusually large scale for foreign plant and machinery, of which the cost was remitted in advance in order to make the best of the high rate of exchange so long as it lasted. There was also a good deal of speculation in

¹ 'The rate of exchange between London and New York is spoken of in India as "the American cross-rate" or as the "New York cross-rate". A cross-rate is the rate of exchange between any two places outside of one's own country.'—Stanley Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 217 n.

exchange, as it was easy to make handsome profits by the simple process of first turning rupees into sterling when the rate was high, and then translating sterling back into rupees when the exchange came down, as the speculator hoped and anticipated it would.

This heavy demand for sterling made for a rise in its value, that is, a fall in the value of the rupee. The divergence between the market and the official rate which thus arose and which at times amounted to as much as 3*d.* or 4*d.* further stimulated the demand for the Reverse Councils.

By far the most important cause, however, responsible for the sagging of the exchange was the tendency towards the adverse balance of trade referred to above as having commenced in January 1920. This tendency gathered momentum with every month that passed. The Government at first started selling Reverse Councils at rates based on 2*s.* 8*d.* sterling on 5 February. The rate was raised to 2*s.* 10 27/32*d.* on 12 February, but thereafter it decreased as sterling appreciated. By the end of June, the balance of trade had begun to turn strongly against India, with the result that the market rates of exchange had not merely departed from the parity of gold, but had fallen below the parity of 2*s.* sterling. After this the Government tried to maintain the rate at 2*s.* sterling. Consequently at the sale of 24 June and subsequent sales the rate adopted for Immediate Telegraphic Transfers was 1*s.* 11 19/32*d.* The reason advanced was that this represented the rate which would ultimately hold when sterling returned to parity with gold. But in reality it meant that the Government had given up hope of giving effect to the 2*s.* gold rate recommended by the Smith Committee, which thus had mounted, shone, evaporated and fallen—all within the brief space of less than six months. The market rate of exchange continued to fall without the Government being able to arrest its downward career. They were compelled to reduce their own rates following the market rate, and the only principle that was adopted was to keep the official rate at a somewhat higher level than the market rate. But this could not last indefinitely, and the Government finally abandoned their attempt to regulate the exchange. At the end of September 1920, the sales of Reverse Councils since the beginning of the year had amounted to £55,382,000. The Reverse Councils were paid in London out of the proceeds from the sale of sterling securities and Treasury Bills belonging to the Paper Currency Reserve. These securities and bills had been bought at the rate of Rs. 15 to the pound, but they were sold at rates ranging from Rs. 7 to Rs. 10. The difference between the selling and buying price measured an aggregate loss of Rs. 35 crores to the Indian exchequer.

Apart from the heavy losses suffered by the Indian exchequer in connexion with the sale of the Reverse Councils, the eventual collapse of the exchange was ruinous to business in more ways than one. A very considerable deflation of money had occurred as the result of the sale of the Reverse Councils. The note circulation between 1 February and 16 September 1920 had been reduced from Rs. 185 crores to Rs. 158 crores by the process of cancelling the notes received by the Government in payment for Reverse Councils. This very substantial withdrawal of currency had proved ineffective for maintaining exchange owing to the abnormal activity of the import trade and the absence of any support from exports. But it caused an acute monetary stringency, and was responsible for a fall in the level of prices. Both these circumstances together greatly enhanced the difficulties of business men, who were compelled to sell off their stocks at ruinously low prices.

The heaviest loss, however, was due to the fact that the commercial community had relied on the Government maintaining the exchange at the high rate chosen by them. Goods had been ordered in the confident expectation that exchange would remain high, but the exchange had fallen heavily by the time they arrived. This meant nothing less than bankruptcy to many importers whose reliance on Governmental ability to keep the exchange at the desired high level was so complete that they had failed to take the usual precaution of covering their exchange.

§31. **Government policy examined.**—All this, however, may fairly be taken as proving that many sagacious and hard-headed business men did not regard the maintenance of the high rate as an impossible task, whatever they may have thought about its advisability.

The Government themselves had no doubt in their mind about the practicability of maintaining the ratio at 2s. gold, being reassured on this point by the majority report of the Babington Smith Committee. It is true that Sir Dadiba Dalal in his able dissenting minute had argued strongly against the high ratio and dwelt at length on the evils sure to follow from it. But he does not seem to have laid any particular emphasis on the *impossibility* of maintaining the ratio for any length of time.

It is, however, a very strange phenomenon that the feeling about the impracticability of maintaining the new ratio was not as common as it might have been expected to be. When the Government set out to give effect to the recommendations of the Babington Smith Committee, there were several facts before them which might have given them pause in initiating such a revolutionary change in the currency standard. For example, in August 1920, when the altered ratio was to have come into effect, gold was

selling at Rs. 23¼ per tola, whereas according to the new ratio the price of gold ought to have been Rs. 15-14-0. In view of such a great disparity it should have been clear that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the ratio of 2s. gold. Again, the price of silver itself had gone down to about 44d. per ounce and therefore the danger of rupees being melted down had practically disappeared. Moreover, even if a certain amount of melting had taken place this would not have mattered much considering the vast volume of rupees in circulation.¹

The Babington Smith Committee had entirely misread the situation when they put the rise of silver in the forefront of causes explaining the rise in the Indian exchange. The most important cause of the rise in the sterling value of the rupee was the greater rise in sterling prices as compared to the rise in rupee prices. According to the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine, the rate of exchange had to move up in sympathy so as to bring about equilibrium. The same doctrine explained the subsequent fall in the exchange which was due to the more rapid decline of world prices (or sterling prices) since 1920 than the Indian prices. This turned the tables against the rupee, causing a fall in its sterling value during, and for some years after, 1920, before it began to appreciate again and ultimately reached 1s. 6d.² The 2s. gold rate meant a considerable overvaluation of the rupee in comparison with its purchasing power parity with gold at the time, and the attempt to give a fixed gold value to the rupee was premature, as the value of gold itself was undergoing the most violent variations and the conditions of international trade were still extremely unstable.³

The high price of silver was partly the result of the depreciation of the rupee as well as of sterling in terms of commodities in general. Even supposing, however, that the rise in the price of silver had been the chief cause of the rise in the exchange, the former was largely speculative. The tremendous range of variation

¹ See Ambedkar, op. cit., p. 207.

² 'The rise in the price of silver was really a mere coincidence due to a large extent to speculation. In ignoring the significance of the rapidly altering price-levels and fixing its attention merely upon the speculative prices of silver, lay the fundamental error of the Smith Committee's Report on Indian Currency. In linking the rupee to gold at 2s., it overlooked the real character of the rise which had taken place and underestimated the deflation which would have become necessary to maintain that rate. Its surmises regarding the probable course of prices in other countries were perhaps the most ridiculous examples of economic prophecy to be met with in history.'—Vakil and Muranjan, op. cit., pp. 340-1.

³ See Gustav Cassel's Memorandum, *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, vol. III, Appendix 92.

in its prices should have served as a warning that the rise was without an element of permanence and stability.

The gravamen of the charge against the Government was not so much that they shaped their policy in the beginning in accordance with the advice of an expert Committee, but that having seen the palpable futility of the efforts to make the 2s. gold rate effective, they still persisted in the sale of Reverse Councils. By the end of June 1920, it was fairly clear that the task which the Government had taken upon themselves was an impossible one, and it would have been a courageous and wise step frankly to have acknowledged defeat at an early stage. As it was, however, they persevered in their ill-advised attempt to bolster up the exchange, dissipating their huge gold resources in the process and causing tremendous disturbance in the industrial and commercial world. Thus as Sir Stanley Reed put it, 'a policy which was avowedly adopted to secure fixity of exchange produced the greatest fluctuations in the exchanges of a solvent country and widespread disturbance of trade, heavy losses to the Government, and brought hundreds of big traders to the verge of bankruptcy'.¹

§32. *The policy of masterly inactivity (1921-5).*—After the failure of the attempt to stabilize exchange, the Government had to be content for some time with watching, in a spirit of patient expectancy, the course of events as they unfolded themselves, without taking any decisive action.

In the year 1921, the balance of trade was still against India. The depressed condition of the export trade was due to a rapid fall of world prices in terms of gold and the still more rapid fall of sterling prices owing to the steps taken by England to bring sterling back to gold parity. Under these circumstances, the expected happened and the sterling value of the rupee fell steadily. In the course of the year 1921, the Government had contracted the currency to the extent of Rs. 31,58,000. This, however, was not enough to arrest the downward course of exchange, which was driven to as low a level as 1s. 3d. The contraction of currency was continued further in 1921-2 and 1922-3 by the transfer of sterling securities held in London to the Secretary of State's cash balance and by the discharge of Indian Treasury Bills held in the reserve. With a view to preventing the further fall of the rupee the Secretary of State had also discontinued the sale of Council Drafts.

In 1922-3 the export trade of India showed a revival owing to good harvests and an improvement in the purchasing capacity

¹ Quoted by B. E. Dadachanji, *History of Indian Currency and Exchange*, p. 137.

of the European countries. The joint result of the contraction of currency and the revival of exports was to raise the exchange value of the rupee slowly but steadily. In September 1923 the rupee was equivalent to about 1s. 3½*d.* gold, and the pre-war ratio of 1s. 4*d.* could have been easily restored without adversely affecting any interest whatsoever, as was unsuccessfully urged by the Indian Merchants' Chamber. The Government, however, were apparently trying to take the ratio up to 1s. 6*d.*, and the rupee as a matter of fact reached the level of 1s. 6*d.* sterling in October 1924. The Government's action after this was directed towards preventing the rise of the rupee much beyond this point. In order to achieve this result, the method of purchase of sterling required for Government remittances and, when necessary, in excess of this requirement, was freely used, and fresh currency was issued against these purchases, thus incidentally relieving to some extent the monetary stringency occasioned by the Government policy of deflation. The exchange value of the rupee reached 1s. 6*d.* gold in April 1925, and remained—or, as the critics of Government put it, was held—there until 21 September 1931.¹

The end of the policy of masterly inactivity was now in sight. The Government of India in response to repeated requests from various quarters promised an inquiry into the currency situation early in 1925 through an authoritative committee before the end of the year, by which time they anticipated that the world conditions would become sufficiently stable. On 25 August 1925 a Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Exchange was appointed under the presidency of Lt.-Commander Hilton-Young.

Before considering the deliberations and decisions of the Commission, we shall turn aside to give an account of the evolution of the Indian Paper Currency system, which perhaps has already been delayed too long.

INDIAN PAPER CURRENCY

§33. **Early history.**—Under the Acts of 1809, 1840 and 1843 the Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay and Madras were authorized to issue notes payable to the bearer on demand subject to certain regulations as to maximum issue and reserves. But their circulation was restricted within narrow bounds, being practically confined to the three Presidency towns. In 1860 James Wilson, the first Finance Member of India, worked out a scheme for a Government Paper Currency and the abolition of the right of note-issue enjoyed by the Presidency banks. Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary

¹ See ch. viii.

of State for India, laid down the following principles on the lines of the English Bank Charter Act of 1844 :

The function of note-issue should be entirely separated from that of banking, as was also suggested by Wilson, and, second, as Sir Charles Wood put it, 'the amount of notes issued on Government securities should be maintained at a fixed sum, within the limit of the smallest amount which experience has proved to be necessary for the monetary transactions of the country, and that any further amount of notes should be issued on coin or bullion'.¹ Accordingly, the Paper Currency Act of 1861 was passed. Unlike England, India was at first divided into three circles of issue, with headquarters at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The number of circles subsequently grew, and settled down to seven in 1910, the four additional circles being Rangoon, Karachi, Cawnpore and Lahore. Notes were issued of the denominations of Rs. 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1,000 and 10,000. A note of smaller denomination, viz. the five-rupee note, was introduced in 1891. They were to be issued to the public without limit in exchange for rupees or British gold coins, and in exchange for gold bullion on the requisition of the Controller of Currency. They were declared unlimited legal tender both at the Government Treasuries and in private transactions, but within their respective circle of issue.

A reserve was formed in bullion and coin to the full value of the notes issued with the exception of a certain small portion invested in the Government of India Rupee Securities as a guarantee of their convertibility.

The notes could be encashed as of right only at the head office of the circle of issue. At the same time Government Treasuries cashed notes of other circles for bona-fide travellers and for the railway companies. Payment of Government dues could be made in the currency notes of any circle.

§84. **Restrictions as to encashment and legal tender.**—India is a vast country, and the conditions of trade cause large movements of money from one part of the country to another at different times of the year. The first use of notes would therefore be for remittance in a more convenient way than by sending specie. The Government would have been obliged to send cash from place to place if they had not restricted the legal tender quality of the notes to the circle of issue. If, on the other hand, the notes had been made universal legal tender but only encashable at Presidency towns, there would undoubtedly have been a premium on coin at certain times of the year which would have impaired the popularity of the notes.

¹ See Keynes, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

The Circle system, however, greatly restricted the normal expansion and popularity of notes, and the first step was therefore taken in 1903 to abolish it, when the five-rupee note was made universal legal tender except in Burma, this restriction being removed in 1909. In 1910, notes of the denomination of Rs. 10 and 50 were similarly universalized, and power was taken to universalize notes of higher denomination by executive order. In 1911 accordingly, the Rs. 100-note was universalized. The Chamberlain Commission recommended the universalization of the Rs. 500-note also. This process of universalization led to a rapid expansion of the total circulation of notes. Extra-legal facilities for encashment of notes had been provided at the Government Treasuries in various places, and the Presidency Banks undertook further to extend such facilities at their head offices and branches. The period of the war of 1914-18 arrested any further development in this direction, as there were difficulties in getting enough rupees coined and the uncovered note issue also increased. The Babington Smith Committee recommended the abolition of war-time restrictions and further extension of extra-legal facilities for the encashment of notes as essential for making them more popular, and accordingly they have been revived. The Rs. 500- and Rs. 1,000-notes were made universal legal tender during 1931-2.¹

§35. **Paper Currency Reserve.**—The Act of 1861 provided for a fixed maximum fiduciary issue in the form of Government securities up to four crores of rupees. The limit was changed from time to time by special Acts: to six crores in 1871; in 1890 to eight crores; in 1897 to ten crores; and in 1905 to twelve crores. Up to this time the securities were the rupee securities of the Government of India held in India, but the Act of 1905 authorized the holding of sterling securities in England up to two crores. Since 1905, part of the invested portion of the reserve thus came to be held in the form of sterling securities.² In 1911, the maximum reserve in securities was fixed at fourteen crores, four crores of which was to be in sterling securities.

As already pointed out, up to 1898, the whole of the Paper Currency Reserve, except a fixed fiduciary portion, was held in silver coin in India. In 1898, the Gold Note Act authorized the Government to hold any part of the metallic portion of the reserve in gold coin. The Act of 1900 gave authority to hold part of this gold coin in London. The Act of 1905 gave the Government full power to hold the metallic portion of the reserve, or any part of

¹ *Report of the Controller of Currency (1931-2)*, par. 60.

² *Ante*, §15.

it, either in London or in India, and in gold coin or bullion, or in rupees or silver bullion, with the proviso that all coined rupees were to be held in India only.

As pointed out above, except for a fixed maximum fiduciary issue, which was raised from time to time, the whole of the rest was held either in gold and silver bullion or coin. With the gradual expansion of the note issue, an ever-diminishing proportion came to be invested as a result of this practice. On the other hand, a growing proportion came to be held in a liquid form, sometimes as much as 80 to 85 per cent. This was due to a deliberate change of policy and to the use of the liquid part of the reserve for a new purpose, namely, that of supporting exchange whenever necessary. In fact, as we have already seen, this was considered as the first line of defence of the currency system as a whole.

The result of the policy was that a superlatively safe reserve was held for ensuring the convertibility of the notes, but at the cost of economy. This could have been avoided by increasing the invested portion, the best way of doing which was to make cash bear a certain percentage of or proportion to the total issue of notes. In this way also the frequent resort to legislation to raise the fiduciary limit could have been avoided.

§36. **Composition of the Paper Currency Reserve criticized.**—The following table¹ gives an idea of the composition and location of the Paper Currency Reserve in the period before the war of 1914-18.

In lakhs of rupees

Last day of March	Total note circulation	Composition and location of the Reserve						Percentage of Securities to total Reserve
		Silver		Gold		Securities (purchase price)		
		India	India	England	India	England	Total	
1862-71 (average) ...	7,63	4,80	3	...	2,80	...	2,80	37
1872-81 " ...	11,82	5,98	5,84	...	5,84	49
1882-91 " ...	15,74	9,64	6,10	...	6,10	39
1892-1901 " ...	27,29	15,74	2,32	23	9,00	...	9,00	33
1902-11 " ...	43,82	19,45	9,15	4,02	10,00	1,20	11,20	26
1912 ...	61,36	15,48	23,33	8,55	10,00	4,00	14,00	23
1913 ...	68,98	16,45	29,38	9,15	10,00	4,00	14,00	20
1914 ...	66,12	20,53	22,44	9,15	10,00	4,00	14,00	21

¹ See Findlay Shirras, *Indian Finance and Banking*, p. 256.

The main criticism against the composition of the Paper Currency Reserve before 1914 was against (i) the unduly large metallic reserve; (ii) the impossibility of increasing the fixed fiduciary reserve except by special resort to legislation; and (iii) investment of part of the Paper Currency Reserve in sterling securities in England.

(i) and (ii) made the system generally inelastic. As regards (iii), the practice was sought to be justified on the ground that the sterling securities were useful for maintaining the exchange value of the rupee and that they possessed the additional advantage of not being liable to depreciation in the event of an internal crisis in India. As against this it was argued that the maintenance of the exchange value of the rupee was not the proper function of the Paper Currency Reserve, that even sterling securities were liable to depreciation in the event of a crisis in England and that public confidence in the note issue could only be secured by holding the whole of the reserve in India.¹

The function of note issue was entirely dissociated from the function of banking and there was nothing like a central bank and therefore no Government banker. There was the Reserve Treasury system, under which public funds were locked up in special Government Treasuries (except for small amounts confided to the Presidency Banks), bringing about a stringency in the money market during the busy season of the year.

The internal currency was absolutely inelastic for special and general purposes, and there was no provision for its temporary expansion except by importing funds from abroad either by the purchase of Council Bills or import of sovereigns. Similar defects have been overcome in other countries by the use of deposits and cheques, as in England and the United States, or by special temporary issue of paper currency against commercial bills of exchange, and lastly by placing Government funds at the disposal of a central bank.

The first method, namely that of cheques and deposits, is not even today much in use in India except at the few big commercial centres. The second was suggested by the Smith Committee and has been accepted. The third was also adopted by abolishing the Reserve Treasuries and placing the Government funds with the Imperial Bank of India which acted between 1921 and 1935 (before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank) as the Government bank. In order to remedy the general inelasticity two methods were

¹ See next chapter for further criticism of the location of the Paper Currency Reserve.

suggested by the Chamberlain Commission and the Smith Committee respectively. The former recommended that the fiduciary reserve should be fixed at the amount of notes held by the Government in the Reserve Treasuries plus one-third of the net circulation (i.e. gross circulation *minus* the amount held in Reserve Treasuries). The principle is that the fiduciary issue should not exceed a maximum percentage of the total issue. The Smith Committee suggested that the metallic portion should not fall below a minimum percentage of the total issue; the proportion suggested being 40 per cent, although they held that it would be desirable to maintain a substantial margin above the statutory minimum, especially in the busy season. In either case, the fiduciary reserve would increase automatically with the increase of circulation without frequent resort to legislation. The system would thus be more economical and less rigid. As we shall see later, the Government accepted the Smith Committee's suggestion in 1920, although they adopted a higher percentage for the metallic reserve, viz. 50 per cent.¹

§37. **Effects of the war of 1914-18 on the paper currency.**—We saw above how, on the outbreak of war in 1914, there was at the outset a general feeling of panic which led to a severe run on the Paper Currency Offices, notes of the value of ten crores being returned within the first eight months of the war. As already remarked, however, there was a gradual revival of confidence and a steady increase in the note circulation. The effects of the war on the paper currency from March 1915 onwards may be summarized as follows :

- (i) Inflation of paper currency caused by the great demand for currency, which could not all be met by a fresh issue of rupees. The causes of this abnormal demand have already been discussed.
- (ii) As the result of successive Acts the fiduciary reserve increased tremendously, as is shown by the following table.

In crores of rupees

Acts	Permanent investments	Permissible temporary investments	Total
Act VII of 1911 (pre-War)	14	...	14
Act V of 1915	14	6	20
Act IX of 1916	14	12	26
Act XI of 1917	14	36	50
Act XIX of 1917	14	48	62
Act V of 1918	14	72	86
Act II of 1919	14	86	100
Act XXVI of 1919	20	100	120

¹ See §38.

These Acts were supplemented by Ordinances issued by the Governor-General. This striking expansion of the invested reserve was necessitated by the difficulty which the Government experienced in finding enough coin to be held in the reserve. Also recoveries of the war expenditure in India incurred on behalf of England were made in London by the Secretary of State, and it being considered inadvisable in the Imperial interest to hold these proceeds in gold earmarked for the Paper Currency Reserve in London, the alternative of investing them in British Treasury Bills or short-term sterling securities was adopted,¹ although a part was invested in Indian Treasury Bills as well. (iii) The fall in the metallic reserve from 78·9 per cent in 1914, to 35·8 per cent in 1919. (iv) New notes of the low denomination of Re. 1 and Rs. 2½ were issued in December 1917 and January 1918 respectively as a measure of economizing silver, apparently in imitation of the issue of £1 and 10s. notes in England in the war period. The public did not at first take kindly to them. But the one-rupee note made steady headway and its circulation on 31 March 1919 amounted to Rs. 10,50 lakhs as compared with Rs. 1,84 lakhs in the case of the other note.² (v) The abolition of extra-legal facilities³ for encashment owing to the scarcity of rupees, the notes thus running to a discount of as much as nineteen per cent in some places—particularly the new notes of smaller denominations. (vi) The import of 200 million ounces of American silver released under the Pittman Act to meet the Paper Currency crisis of April 1918.

The subjoined table brings out clearly the effects of the war on the composition and location of the Paper Currency Reserve.⁴

¹ The investment in the British Treasury Bills was partly dictated by the consideration that, being short-dated, there was small danger of their depreciating. The other sterling securities, on the other hand, were depreciating to a considerable extent as a result of the war.

² The Government of India decided to discontinue the issue of Re. 1 and Rs. 2½ notes definitely from 1 January 1926. Their place was taken partly by silver rupees and partly by Rs. 10 notes. See, however, the next chapter.

³ As has already been mentioned, these facilities were restored in 1920-1 and have since been extended by the multiplication of the branches of the Imperial Bank which provide for the encashment of notes as a matter of public convenience.

⁴ See Shirras, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

In lakhs of rupees

Last day of March	Total note circulation	Composition and location of the Reserve							Percentage of securities to Total Reserve
		Silver	Gold			Securities (purchase price)			
		India	India	England	Total	India	England	Total	
1914 ...	66.12	20.53	22.44	9.15	31.59	10.00	4.00	14.00	21
1915 ...	61.63	32.34	7.64	7.65	15.29	10.00	4.00	14.00	23
1916 ...	67.73	23.57	12.24	11.92	24.16	10.00	10.00	20.00	29
1917 ...	86.37	19.21	12.00	6.67	18.67	10.00	38.49	48.49	56
1918 ...	99.79	10.79	26.85	67	27.52	10.00	51.48	61.48	62
1919 ...	153.46	37.39	17.37	12	17.49	16.08	82.50	98.58	65
1920 ...	174.52	39.80	47.70	86.86	50

§88. **Reconstitution of the Paper Currency Reserve.**—In September 1919, by the temporary amendment of the Paper Currency Act, the maximum limit to which the Currency Reserve could be invested was raised to Rs. 120 crores, out of which Rs. 100 crores had to be British Treasury Bills.

In March 1920, a temporary Act for six months was passed which permitted the retention of the invested portion of the reserve at Rs. 120 crores. But it abolished the restrictions as to the locale of the investments and their sterling or rupee character. This was necessitated by the then existing demand for remittances to London and the impossibility of meeting it from the Secretary of State's cash balances. The continued demand was therefore to be met by the disposal of the sterling securities held in the Paper Currency Reserve in London. This, however, involved, under the existing law, the withdrawal and cancellation of currency notes in India to the extent of the rupee value at which the sterling securities were held in the reserve, i.e. at the rate of Rs. 15 to £1.

In order to place the paper currency system on a satisfactory basis in the light of the criticism to which it was subjected by the Chamberlain Commission and the Smith Committee, and the experiences gained during the war, it was felt necessary to pass new legislation to replace the temporary Act of March 1920.

Consequently, the Indian Paper Currency Amendment Act¹ became law on 1 October 1920. The provisions of this Act fall under two classes, permanent and transitory.

(i) *Permanent provisions* :²

(a) The metallic reserve was to be at least 50 per cent of the total reserve. The reasons for accepting a higher percentage than that suggested by the Smith Committee, which was only 40 per cent, were the necessity of encashing the notes without question in a country like India, and the necessity of holding sufficient coin in the reserve to finance the movements of the crops during the busy season, when notes are generally presented for encashment on a very large scale.

(b) With the exception of Rs. 20 crores worth of securities held in India, the remainder was to be held in England in short-term securities not exceeding a period of 12 months, as suggested by the Smith Committee.

(c) The Controller of Currency was authorized to issue notes up to an amount of Rs. 5 crores against inland discounted bills of exchange maturing within 90 days of their issue. This extra issue was to take the form of a loan to the Imperial Bank which was to pay 8 per cent interest to the Government and deposit accepted bills of exchange with the latter. (The limit of 5 crores was raised to 12 crores by the Indian Paper Currency Amendment Act of 1923.)³ The provision regarding the fifty per cent statutory metallic reserve was irrespective of this extra issue, which was not to be considered for the purpose of fixing the metallic reserve.

(d) The Secretary of State was not to hold more than five million pounds in gold bullion in London.

(ii) *Transitory provisions* :

Owing to the difficulty caused by the necessity of revaluing the gold and the sterling securities of the reserve on the basis of Rs. 10 to the sovereign instead of Rs. 15, certain transitory provisions became necessary pending the final attainment of the

¹ This is usually referred to as the Paper Currency Act of 1923, which was a Consolidating Act.

² These provisions are practically identical with the recommendations of the Smith Committee.

³ Of the 12 crores the first 4 crores could be issued when the Bank rate was 6 per cent, the next 4 crores when it was 7 per cent, and the last 4 crores when it was 8 per cent. The procedure was revised in September 1924, when the following regulations were issued :

(i) No loan shall be made unless the Bank rate rises to 6 per cent.

(ii) The entire amount outstanding at any time shall bear interest at the Bank rate subject to a minimum of 6 per cent for the first 4 crores and of 7 per cent for the subsequent 8 crores.

permanent provisions. With revaluation on the 10-rupee basis the metallic portion of the reserve would have been less than fifty per cent. It was therefore provided that the invested portion might, for the time being, be fixed at Rs. 85 crores.¹ Another difficulty was about filling up the gap caused by the revaluation of the gold and sterling securities at two-thirds of their former value. This was solved by authorizing the Government of India to create rupee securities of their own hand (*ad hoc* securities, as they were called) and issue them to the Paper Currency Reserve. As these created securities would exceed the limit on rupee securities laid down by the Act, it was provided that the excess should be reduced by gradually replacing them with sterling securities. But as there were no funds immediately available to purchase a large quantity of sterling securities, it was provided that the interest derived from the securities in the Paper Currency Reserve as by law, and profits on the fresh coinage of rupees, and interest on the Gold Standard Reserve when that exceeded £40 millions (which it did on 30 September 1921), and lastly, interest on commercial bills of exchange deposited with the Controller of Currency as security for the temporary issue, should be paid into the Paper Currency Reserve to reduce such of the created rupee securities as were above the permissible figure of Rs. 12 crores. The permanent provisions of the Act would thus be eventually carried into effect. On account, however, of the unsatisfactory financial position, Finance Acts of subsequent years allowed these sources of income to be diverted to revenue, except in 1921-2, when the excess in the Gold Standard Reserve was used for the extinction of the *ad hoc* securities.

On 1 April 1927, the gold and the sterling securities held in the Paper Currency Reserve, which since 1920 had been valued at Rs. 10 to the sovereign, were re-valued at the rate of Rs. 13-1-3 to the sovereign in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Currency Act, 1927, which came into force on that date. The result of this was an increase of Rs. 930 lakhs in the holding of gold and sterling securities, which was set off by cancelling the same amount of Indian Treasury Bills, the holding of which was reduced from Rs. 49,77 lakhs to Rs. 40,47 lakhs.²

¹ As a remedy for monetary stringency, this limit was raised to Rs. 100 crores by the Amending Act of February 1925, which also laid down that the total amount of created securities of the Government of India was not to exceed Rs. 50 crores.

² For the recommendations of the Hilton-Young Commission regarding the paper currency, and the effects of the present war on it, see the next chapter. The transfer of the note issue function to the Reserve Bank of India and the new arrangements regarding the reserve held against notes with effect from 1 April 1935, under the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934), are dealt with in ch. x.

§ 89. The composition and location of the Paper Currency Reserve between 31 March 1925 and 1935.¹

In crores of rupees

On 31 March	Gross circulation	Silver coin in India	Gold coin and bullion in India	Silver bullion under coinage	Securities		Internal Bills of Exchange	Percentage of securities to total reserve
					Rupee in India	Sterling in England		
1925	184.1	70.2	22.3	6.7	57.1	20.1	8.0	40.8
1926	193.3	77.2	22.3	7.6	57.1	29.0	...	44.6
1927	184.1	95.9	22.3	8.5	49.7	5.5	2.0	31.1
1928	184.8	98.7	29.7	7.6	37.9	3.7	7.0	26.4
1929	188.0	94.9	32.2	4.9	43.2	10.6	2.0	28.7
1930	177.2	108.1	32.2	2.8	33.8	0.1	...	19.1
1931	160.8	117.8	25.8	6.9	10.2	6.3
1932	178.1	102.0	5.2	9.2	57.9	...	3.8	32.4
1933	176.9	96.3	26.0	15.5	39.1	22.1
1934	177.2	86.5	41.5	11.5	29.5	8.2	...	21.2
1935	186.1	77.2	41.6	13.1	35.9	18.3	...	29.1

The above table reveals certain striking changes in the Paper Currency Reserve between the years 1925 and 1935. Firstly there was a very appreciable decline in the gross circulation of notes in the years 1929-30 and 1930-1 owing to the contraction of currency largely in consequence of the superfluity of cash following the general fall in the prices of commodities which commenced in the latter part of the year 1929-30 in the wake of the Wall Street collapse in New York. Another factor was the tendency towards exchange weakness due partly to the fall in the prices of the great staples of export trade and partly to the tendency towards the transfer of capital abroad in view of the uncertainty of the political situation in India and the speculation regarding reversion to the old statutory ratio of 1s. 4d. This increased the difficulties of making remittances to the Secretary of State to meet the Home Charges, and goes far to explain the total disappearance, by 1931, of sterling securities in the Paper Currency Reserve, since these securities had to be transferred to the Secretary of State against corresponding contraction of notes in India.² The big drop in the holdings of rupee securities in 1930-1 is explained by further contraction of currency in 1930-1 against these securities. The decrease in the amount of gold in the reserve in the same year was caused by the payment of Rs. 8½ crores of gold into the Indian branch of the Gold Standard Reserve

¹ See *Reports of the Controller of Currency*, from 1924-5 to 1934-5. The figures of the composition and location of the Currency Reserve subsequent to 1. April 1935 are given in ch. x.

² See also next chapter, § 20.

against withdrawal of sterling securities of the value of £6·2 million forming part of that reserve in England, in aid of the Home Treasury balances and to meet sales of sterling at the statutory rate of 1s. 5 49/64d. between November 1930 and February 1931 in response to the public demand which was influenced by the exchange speculation referred to above and the political situation in the country. Another remarkable change in the composition of the Paper Currency Reserve was the increase in the holdings of silver coin in the reserve owing to reasons explained below.¹ This increase would have been greater but for the removal of some quantity of silver for sale as recommended by the Hilton-Young Commission.

The total amount of silver sold by the Government of India from the commencement of their operations in 1927 up to 31 March 1935 amounted to 228,182,255 fine ounces. The sale proceeds were invested in sterling securities which were transferred to the Gold Standard Reserve against an opposite transfer of gold from that Reserve to the Paper Currency Reserve, an equivalent amount of rupee securities in the Paper Currency Reserve being simultaneously cancelled. The surplus balance obtained by sterling purchases in excess of the current requirements of the Secretary of State was utilized in the same way. These transactions involved an increase in the gold holdings of the Paper Currency Reserve,² and a corresponding reduction in the balance of rupee securities. The sale of silver also involved a reduction in the holdings of silver coin and bullion in the Paper Currency Reserve. In 1933-4 and in the following years the surplus Home Treasury balances and sale proceeds of silver were utilized in purchasing sterling securities and thus adding to the sterling assets of the Paper Currency Reserve—a welcome strengthening of the position on the eve of the transfer of Government currency activities to the Reserve Bank.³

Following the sale and export of gold on private account from India which commenced towards the end of September 1931, there was an appreciable increase in the amount of gross circulation of notes, which stood at Rs. 186·1 crores on 31 March 1935 and at Rs. 214·70 crores on 31 December 1937. This expansion of

¹ See §40.

² The gold holdings of the Government of India on 31 March 1935—on the eve of their transfer to the Reserve Bank—amounted to Rs. 44·42 crores, of which 41·55 crores was in the Paper Currency Reserve and 2·87 crores in the Gold Standard Reserve valued at the statutory parity (i.e. Re. 1=8·47 grains of gold). Their actual market value on that date was approximately Rs. 76 crores.

³ See ch. x. *Reports of the Controller of Currency* (1933-4), par. 39 and (1934-5), par. 31.

currency was attributed partly to the upward trend of prices before the recession of 1937 set in, and to the public demand for currency to serve as a substitute for the gold in hoards, of which about Rs. 308 crores was exported up to the end of December 1937 mainly under the stimulus of the high rupee prices of gold following the fixing of the rupee to sterling at 1s. 6d. after Britain went off the Gold Standard on 20 September 1931.¹

§40. Note circulation and currency absorption.—In this section it is proposed to discuss three main questions : (i) Gross and active circulation of notes ; (ii) Character of the note circulation ; and (iii) Absorption of various forms of currency.

(i) *Gross and active circulation of notes.*—When we speak of the circulation of the paper currency, we must be clear as to whether we are referring to gross or active circulation.

(a) By gross circulation is meant the value of all notes that have been issued and have not been paid off. (b) Active circulation since 1 April 1935, when the note issue function was taken over by the Reserve Bank of India, has meant the amount of notes issued less those held in its Banking Department.

The following table illustrates the growth of average gross and active circulation of paper currency between 1904-5 and 1936-7.

TABLE I

In crores of rupees

Year	Gross	Active	Year	Gross	Active
1904-5	39.2	28.1	1929-30	183.1	163.0
1909-10	49.6	37.2	1931-2	163.6	152.6
1913-14	65.5	46.6	1933-4	178.1	157.4
1914-15	64.0	45.4	1935-6	192.2	163.0
1917-18	101.7	71.8	1936-7	202.0	176.0
1919-20	171.6	151.1	1937-8	211.8	186.1
1923-4	179.0	156.9	1938-9	210.6	182.3
1927-8	180.1	162.6	1939-40	227.7	208.9

The welcome increase in active circulation in recent years shows the increasing use of notes in the country and is indicative of business recovery. The increase in 1939-40 in consequence of the conditions created by the war is explained in the next chapter.

(ii) *Character of the note circulation.*—The following statement indicates the relative popularity of the different denominations of notes on 31 December 1936 and 1939 and 31 March in preceding

¹ See next chapter for further explanation (§§23 and 30) and ch. x for subsequent figures of note circulation.

years. For the purpose of this statement Rs. 10,000-notes are excluded as they hardly enter into ordinary circulation at all, being used as a convenient means of effecting large transfers between the Imperial Bank and Government currency chests.

TABLE II

Period	Percentage to gross circulation of the circulation of notes for									
	Re. 1	Rs. 2-8	Rs. 5	Rs. 10	Rs. 20	Rs. 50	Rs. 100	Rs. 500	Rs. 1,000	Total
1913-14	3.2	34.9	0.2	3.5	35.0	5.2	18.0	100
1918-19 ...	7.8	1.4	6.8	34.8	...	3.6	32.5	1.9	11.2	100
1921-2 ...	6.2	0.2	10.0	36.3	...	2.5	34.2	1.3	9.3	100
1923-4 ...	6.6	...	9.3	33.4	...	1.8	40.5	0.9	7.5	100
1926-7 ...	0.3	...	9.9	43.7	...	1.3	36.1	0.7	8.0	100
1928-9 ...	0.2	...	13.2	41.4	...	1.1	36.5	0.6	7.0	100
1931-2 ...	0.2	...	13.2	41.1	...	0.9	37.3	0.4	6.9	100
1933-4 ...	0.2	...	12.9	40.2	...	0.8	38.8	0.4	6.7	100
1934-5 ...	0.2	...	13.5	39.5	...	0.7	35.5	0.3	10.3	100
1936 ¹ ...	0.2	...	16.5	40.2	...	0.8	35.9	0.2	6.2	100
1939 ...	0.1	...	19.4	41.9	...	0.4	32.1	0.2	5.9	100

This table shows that the Rs. 10- and Rs. 100-notes are by far the most popular. The old pattern Rs. 50-note declined in its popularity owing to its large size and its superficial resemblance to the old pattern Rs. 10-note. The Rs. 2½-note was never popular and its issue along with that of the old Re. 1-note issued during the last war was discontinued, as already stated, from 1 January 1926. The Rs. 20-note was pushed out of existence by the Rs. 10-note on the one hand and the Rs. 100-note on the other and ceased to be issued with effect from 1910. A new pattern note of Rs. 50 denomination, of a considerably smaller size, was introduced during the year 1930-1, but its issue has had no effect on the proportion of the note circulation as yet. In view of the fact that the circulation of Rs. 50- and Rs. 500-notes is negligible the Reserve Bank of India has recently (1938) decided not to issue its own notes of these denominations, though Government of India notes of these denominations will continue to be legal tender. Figures relating to the new Re. 1-note issued during the present war (July 1940) are not yet available.

(iii) *Absorption of various forms of currency.*—The following

¹ As on 31 December.

statement¹ shows the average annual absorption of currency notes and rupee coin :

TABLE III

In lakhs of rupees

	Rupees	Notes	Total
Average for five years 1909-10 to 1913-14	8,77	3,01	11,78
Average for five years 1914-15 to 1918-19	22,08	16,72	38,40
1919-20	20,09	20,20	40,29
1920-1	-25,68	-5,90	-31,58
1923-4	7,62	7,96	15,58
1925-6	-8,11	1,16	-6,95
1926-7	-19,76	-3,40	-23,16
1927-8	-3,71	10,22	6,51
1928-9	-3,03	3,66	63
1929-30	-21,71	-18,80	-40,51
1930-1	-21,58	-11,37	-32,95
1931-2	3,93	17,24	21,17
1932-3	-7,56	-14,83	-22,39
1933-4	-30	13,54	13,24
1934-5	-3,21	-32	-35,53
1935-6	-9,46	1,82	-7,64
1936-7	-2,49	25,53	23,04
1937-8	-6,52	-8,23	-14,75
1938-9	-12,60	2,98	-9,62
1939-40	10,08	49,45	59,53
Average for 21 years 1919-20 to 1939-40	-5,74	5,00	-74

The above table shows striking changes in the relative popularity of the various forms and absorption of currency before, during and after the war of 1914-18. The war-time expansion of currency on a large scale in the form of both rupees and notes due to factors

¹ Sovereigns and half-sovereigns have been omitted in the above statement. From 1 April 1927 they ceased to be legal tender and from 1914 they did not function as currency. Since the Reserve Bank assumed the management of currency on 1 April 1935, the figures for absorption or return of currency are arrived at in the following manner. The absorption or return of currency is the variation in the totals of notes in circulation as shown in the returns of the Issue Department of the Bank. Notes in circulation thus now include amounts held in Government treasuries as well as notes in circulation among the public. The absorption or return of rupee coin means the decline or rise respectively in the amount of the rupee coin held in the Issue Department of the Bank. For the method of calculating the absorption of currency before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank see the old annual *Reports of the Controller of Currency*.—*Report on Currency and Finance, 1935-6*, par. 47 and 1939-40, par. 50 (published by the Reserve Bank of India).

already examined is brought out by the figures. The large contraction of currency in 1920-1 represents the effects of the adverse balance of trade and the sale of Reverse Councils. The twenty years that followed the last war were with few exceptions a period of return of silver rupees from hoards on the one hand and the replacement of coin by notes to some extent on the other. One of the causes for the return of rupees from hoards was the substitution of gold bullion for rupees in hoards as a store of value under the influence of the considerable drop in its price in India below the level prevalent before the war of 1914-18, prior to the rapid rise in the rupee price of gold in consequence of India going off the gold standard with effect from 21 September 1931. (See next chapter.) The increasing popularity of notes, the spread of banking facilities and the freer acceptance of bearer cheques have decreased the demand for rupees. The practice of privately railing rupees has been declining rapidly. The drop in the years of the economic depression (1929-33), in the prices of certain staples of trade like cotton and jute, and the general trade depression, were responsible for the lessened consumption of coined rupees and notes. The currency policy of the Government in these years was criticized on the ground that there was excessive contraction of currency (e.g., in 1929-30 and 1930-1) which created a shortage of money in the country, producing a fall in prices and inconveniencing trade. Sir George Schuster, however, pointed out that the reduction in the volume of currency was a sequel to the fall in world prices and had not been carried to an excessive extent.¹ With the upward trend of prices and partial economic recovery the absorption of note currency increased, although partially set off by a return of silver coin. We have already referred to the public demand for note currency to serve as a substitute for the gold in hoards sold and exported. The total amount of currency absorbed in 1936-7 amounted to Rs. 23·04 crores. The economic recession was responsible for a net return of currency to the extent of Rs. 14·75 crores in 1937-8 and Rs. 9·62 crores in 1938-9. The total amount of currency absorbed in 1939-40 amounted to Rs. 59·53 crores. The addition was made up of an absorption of Rs. 10·08 crores of rupee coin and Rs. 49·45 crores of notes. This is the largest absorption of currency recorded in any year excepting the year 1918-19, when it amounted to Rs. 94·20 crores, and is traceable to the increased trade activity in India and the rise in prices that followed the outbreak of the war in September 1939. Not since 1919-20 was there an absorption of rupee coin larger

¹ *Central Budget for 1931-2*, pp. 28-9; and see also ch. viii, §20.

than in 1939-40. This was, to some extent, due to brisker trade and bumper crops, but was also, in part, due to a tendency to hoard coin and preference for metal in the conditions created by the present war. This tendency gathered momentum in subsequent months owing to the growing tension of the war situation and it had to be checked by the issue of Government of India one-rupee notes in July 1940. (See the next chapter.)

The study of the absorption of currency month by month reveals the fact that currency is absorbed generally in the busy season from November to June and returns to currency offices and treasuries in the slack season from July to October.¹

¹ See also ch. x.

CHAPTER VIII

CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE—PART II

THE HILTON-YOUNG COMMISSION AT WORK

The report of the Hilton-Young Commission was published on 4 August 1926. The recommendations of the Commission fall conveniently under the following three heads: (i) Choice of a Monetary Standard; (ii) The Ratio of the Stabilization of the Rupee; and (iii) Creation of a Reserve or Central Bank of India. The first two of these subjects will be considered in this chapter and the third will be dealt with in the chapter on Banking and Credit.

§1. Defects of the gold exchange standard.—Before propounding their own scheme of a monetary standard for India, the Commission indicated the following defects of the system as it existed:¹

(i) The system was far from simple, and the basis of the stability of the rupee not readily intelligible to the uninstructed public.² The currency consisted of two tokens, rupees and rupee-notes, in circulation, with the unnecessary excrescence of a third full-valued coin (sovereign), which did not circulate at all. One form of token currency (rupees) into which there was an unlimited obligation to convert the other (rupee-notes), was highly expensive and was liable to vanish if the price of silver rose above a certain level, when it ceased to be a token coin.

(ii) There was a cumbrous duplication of the reserves, namely, the Gold Standard and Paper Currency and Banking Reserves, with an antiquated and dangerous division of responsibility for the control of currency and credit policy, which in other countries is centralized in and fixed upon a central bank. In India, the

¹ See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, par. 21.

² The basis was not only not readily intelligible, but it had also other faults. Mr Denning, Controller of Currency, wrote: 'The system did not provide for the automatic stabilization of the rupee. The legal obligation to give rupees in exchange for sovereigns would have prevented the rate of exchange rising above the upper gold point, even if the Government had not been prepared to meet fully the demand for Council Bills at 1s. 4½d., but there was no statutory safeguard against a fall in the rate of exchange below the lower gold point. In practice, such a fall in the rate of exchange was prevented by the sale of Reverse Councils, but Government were under no statutory obligation to take such action.' See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, vol. II, Appendix.

Government controlled the currency, and the credit situation, so far as it was controlled at all, was controlled by the Imperial Bank.

(iii) The system did not secure automatic expansion and contraction of currency. Such movements were too wholly dependent on the will of the currency authority, that is, of the Government. The system did not automatically enforce contraction of internal currency concurrently with the depletion of the reserves.¹

Similarly, with regard to expansion, on occasions the obligation to buy sterling had been discharged by the Government without any corresponding expansion of currency. The purchases had in the first instance been made against Treasury balances and the currency expansion had been left to be effected at the discretion of the Government.

(iv) Lastly, the system lacked elasticity. The utility of the provision for elasticity made on the recommendation of the Smith Committee was affected by the methods of financing Indian trade. These are based on a system of cash credits or the advance of money against demand promissory notes. There is, therefore, a shortage of genuine inland trade bills as cover against the seasonal increase of currency. The Government had, therefore, to announce in September 1924 that, as far as might be necessary, they would use their powers to issue currency against Treasury Bills deposited in the Paper Currency Reserve in London.

Other points of criticism not prominently brought out by the Hilton-Young Commission Report but already sufficiently familiar to currency controversialists may conveniently be brought together here.

§2. Reserves and balances.— We have already seen how reserves and balances created for a particular purpose were indiscriminately utilized for all sorts of purposes. The utilization of the reserves and balances was never governed by a consistent policy, with the result that they were sometimes treated separately and at other times mixed up, thus causing a great deal of confusion.

The position as regards the composition of the Gold Standard Reserve was unsatisfactory. It was mainly invested in long-term

¹ As Mr Denning points out in his Memorandum to the Commission, the provision for the automatic contraction of currency was particularly defective.

² In so far as the sterling value of the Reverse Councils sold was obtained by realizing sterling securities in the Paper Currency Reserve, the currency was contracted, but Government could arrange, by borrowing from the Gold Standard Reserve, to meet sterling payments on account of Reverse Councils without affecting the amount of currency in circulation.³ See *Currency Commission Report*, vol. II, Appendix.

securities and a very small part of it was held in a liquid form. The Chamberlain Commission recommended that a large proportion of it should be held in a liquid form¹ and in easily realizable securities and that the silver branch of the Gold Standard Reserve should be abolished. The latter suggestion was carried out by the Government, but the other recommendations could not be given effect to owing to the outbreak of the war in August 1914. During that war almost the whole of the reserve was held in securities in London, and British War Bonds and Treasury Bills were purchased. The recommendation that the securities should be easily realizable was carried out by investment in short-term securities.

The Smith Committee recommended that it was desirable to hold a considerable proportion of the reserve in gold. They also recommended that the securities should be short-term securities issued by the Government within the British Empire other than the Government of India.

The position of the Gold Standard Reserve, before its amalgamation with the Paper Currency Reserve and transfer to the Reserve Bank of India with effect from 1 April 1935,² was that it was largely held in London mainly in short-term paper of various kinds, as shown by the following figures.

*Details of the balance of the Gold Standard Reserve on 31 March 1935:*³

In England—	£
Estimated value on 31 March 1935 of the sterling securities of the nominal value of £36,480,000 ..	37,845,529
Gold	2,152,334
Cash at the Bank of England	2,137
Total ..	40,000,000

Most of the Gold Standard Reserve and a part of the Paper Currency Reserve was placed in London. The Chamberlain Commission justified the location of the Gold Standard Reserve in London on the ground that London was the clearing house and the loan market of the world. Further, India's principal customer was the United Kingdom, and London was the chief place where money was required both for the expenditure of the Secretary of State on India's behalf and for the payment of India's commercial obligations to England and the world in general. If the reserve

¹ See ch. vii, §21.

² See §27 below and ch. x.

³ For further details of investments, see *Report of the Controller of Currency (1935-6)*, Statement xvii.

were kept in India, it would have to be shipped to London, involving unnecessary delay and expenditure. Also there was no short-loan market in India, and the location of the reserve there would be wasteful because it would be unable to earn any interest. Again, the practice of holding foreign bills followed by the Central Banks in certain European countries provided an analogy to the Indian system of holding the reserve in London.

These complicated arrangements regarding the location of the reserve were possibly primarily intended for meeting situations of exchange weakness caused by an unfavourable balance of trade. In view of the fact, however, that an unfavourable balance of trade is an abnormal phenomenon in the case of India (occurring about once every ten years) it was not necessary to maintain such elaborate standing arrangements to meet what is after all a rare contingency.

The Secretary of State could have easily put himself in funds for meeting his expenditure without the reserve being kept in London for this purpose. And clearly the main object of the reserve was not the convenience of the Secretary of State in this respect.

As regards the absence of a short-loan market in India, it was not true that there was no scope for short-term investment in this country, as the experience during the war of 1914-18 and after has proved. In any case, interest could not be considered to be the decisive factor in determining the location of the reserve.

Other countries, even if they have an unfavourable trade balance as the normal feature of their international trade, do not usually maintain a reserve at foreign centres. There is no such reserve, for example, kept by any foreign country in India itself on the ground that year after year it has to make payments to India in settlement of trade obligations.

With regard to the Paper Currency Reserve, it was an anomalous position that the reserve intended for securing the convertibility of the notes circulating in one country should, instead of being kept there, be to any extent located at another place 6,000 miles away, thus impairing the confidence in the note issue. One of the reasons given for this practice was that London was the cheapest and best organized market for silver, for the purchase of which it was convenient to hold ample funds in hand. But if England, not being a producer of silver, is yet the best market for silver, there was no reason why an equally efficient market for the metal could not have been developed in India if the Government had consistently made their purchases in the country itself. Instead of making any attempts in these directions, the Government may be said to have

actually impeded the development by the imposition of an import duty on silver. Again, even supposing purchases were to be made in London, there was no particular harm in transferring funds from India when they were actually wanted instead of holding them there in advance. The inconvenience and additional expense would have been well worth while as tending to allay popular suspicion and discontent. It would also seem that in circumstances of urgency, arrangements could have been made for raising the necessary funds in England, for example, with the assistance of the Bank of England, pending the transfer of money from India. Lastly, the secrecy in which the dealings in connexion with the purchases of silver were shrouded naturally led to much adverse criticism.

§3. Management of remittances.—As we have already seen, the sale of Council Drafts by the Secretary of State was the machinery employed for drawing funds from India to London. The complaint in this connexion was that unnecessarily large amounts were transferred from India to London by this method, especially since 1904. This was defended on the ground that it enabled the Secretary of State to strengthen his financial position. No explanation was, however, offered why such strengthening was needed. Similarly, it was said that it was desirable that the Secretary of State should avail himself of exceptionally profitable rates for the Council Bills whenever they could be obtained. Here again the assumption is tacitly made that the question whether the funds were required was of subordinate importance. It was often claimed that by drawing more money than was immediately required for his expenditure the Secretary of State made possible an avoidance or reduction of debt. But these excessive drawings encouraged the policy of surplus budgets in India. Instead of the avoidance or reduction of debts, remission of taxation in India would have been a more worthy object to pursue.¹ Besides, it was noticed that even when the Secretary of State's cash balances were ample, large floating loans were raised in London.

The superfluous money which accumulated in the hands of the Secretary of State in this manner was loaned out in London at very low rates of interest to 'approved' borrowers, of whom a list was maintained by the Secretary of State. Complaints were common that, a good deal of favouritism was shown in the administration of these loans, and colour was lent to these complaints by the fact that the members on the Finance Committee of the Secretary of State's Council were often themselves directors

¹ See ch. xi.

and business men who were interested in selecting the recipients for these loans.

Another practice that was objected to was that the Council Bills were often sold at rates below the specie import point even when there was no urgent necessity for funds in London.

One of the principal justifications urged for the sale of Council Bills beyond the requirements of the Secretary of State was that it was a great help to the foreign trade of India. But the trade was fully capable of looking after itself and would have had no difficulty in finding alternative means of financing itself, as in fact it had done with sufficient ease whenever the sales of Council Bills happened to be curtailed. There was thus no overwhelming reason why the Government should have gone out of their way to assist trade. All that they need have done was to make gold freely available for export whenever required.

The Council Bill system had all the appearance of an elaborate device for diverting the flow of gold from India and saving London the inconvenience and cost of finding it for India, 'while acting as a receptacle for as much of India's gold as possible—not to hold but to use'.¹

In his memorandum to the Babington Smith Committee, Sir Stanley Reed pleaded forcefully for an abolition of the control over the Indian exchanges exercised by the Secretary of State. He urged that the Government of India, and to no less a degree the Secretary of State, were suspect in the eyes of a large section of the Indian community. The Secretary of State, he pointed out, operated 6,000 miles from the great Indian financial centres. 'He was surrounded by, and naturally amenable to, interests not Indian in their ideas and aims. He acted in secret, and it was frequently impossible to obtain any information in India of the groundwork of measures which, however wise and expedient in themselves, were not understood and were liable to perversion in India. The political disadvantages of such complete powers being exercised in secret so far from the people vitally affected by them could not be easily exaggerated.'

The real objection to the Indian system was not that it was managed—for in most civilized countries management in some form or other is essential—but that it was ill managed. In the words of Professor Nicholson, 'it is a bad thing for a country when the masses of the people begin to feel that something is wrong with the currency', and, whatever the inherent excellences of the gold exchange standard, it certainly had made the people of India

¹ See *Indian Currency and Finance* ('Times of India' Press, 1913), p. 57.

think that something was very wrong with their currency system.

§4. *Inflation of currency and rise of prices.*—The Hilton-Young Commission, as we saw, pointed out that the Indian system was unautomatic and was especially defective on the side of contractibility of superfluous currency. One of the inevitable results of this was an inflation of currency and an excessive upward movement of Indian prices.¹ As Professor Nicholson pointed out in his criticism of the Report of the Chamberlain Commission, since the convertibility of the rupee was partial and often suspended, it was unavoidable that in course of time, if new additions continued to be made, the cumulative effect must come into operation, causing a general rise in prices.

With the best intentions in the world, the Government were liable to grave errors of judgement in ascertaining the currency requirements of the country.² The demand for rupees often appeared to be quite sound and necessary without its really being so, and misjudgements were particularly easy as the rupees once issued to the public went up-country and did not come back quickly.

§5. *A haphazard and expensive system.*—The gold exchange standard in India had resulted from a series of administrative notifications not consistently informed by any deliberately adopted ideal. Many of the practices that had come into vogue as integral parts of the system had no legal validity. As the late Sir Dadiba Dalal remarked in his Minute of Dissent (pars. 59-60), the system as a whole was never clearly and explicitly defined, and this had a general unsettling effect.

The gold exchange standard was often commended for its cheapness relatively to a gold standard proper. But if we allow their proper value to all its disadvantages as detailed above, it would be excusable if we concluded that the cheapness of the system was very dearly bought indeed!

¹ See ch. ix.

² 'Here in India, Government has been attempting too much; it has taken upon itself the whole task of providing the necessary supply of currency, and adjusting it to varying needs of different occasions—a task not completely entrusted even to a banking institution in any other great country of the world—a task beyond its ability and one that exposes it to undesirable pressure. . . . In fact since the closing of the mints the Indian currency system has been managed at the whim of the latest official sent out from England. One man could come along and stuff the currency, the next would starve it. There has been no plan at all . . . but always some fresh experiment advised—a gold mint, prohibitive duties on silver bullion—anything or everything.' Moreton Frewen's evidence before the Chamberlain Commission. See also H. L. Chabiani, *Studies in Indian Currency and Exchange*, pp. 93-4.

The system had also failed to destroy the hoarding habit and teach the people to appreciate the benefits of economical forms of currency.

§6. *Internal versus external stability.*—In order to be quite fair to the gold exchange standard, we must count its successes as well as its failures. One of the achievements with which it has been credited has been that it gave the country a long period of exchange stability. Of course it broke down utterly during the war of 1914-18 but so did almost every other currency in the world. And on the whole, the gold exchange standard succeeded in keeping the foreign exchanges more stable than under the silver standard. We must, however, hasten to add that not all its critics are inclined to admit even so much. They point out that even if the war period is excluded from consideration, the system could not be said to have stood the test proposed for it. The only time that it was put to the proof before the war was during the crisis of 1907-8, and then it was kept standing only with the help of outside supports. The Government had to give an undertaking to borrow, if necessary, to maintain the standard, and were compelled to increase taxation in order to lay down gold. It was therefore only a fair-weather system, which threatened to collapse at the least sign of a storm. However, even if we admit that prolonged stability of exchanges was one of its positive achievements, we must put against this the internal instability of prices with a general tendency towards a rise which it occasioned. Most economists agree that stability of internal prices is far more important than stability of the foreign exchanges.

These imperfections of the system had created much distrust, which had been further intensified by too much being left to executive action and by the absence of statutory regulation of the duties of the Government as the currency authority. A substantial measure of external stability had been attained in the past. But what was lacking was the certainty and simplicity so necessary to ensure confidence in the currency system and to wean the uninstructed public from hoarding and the disinclination to investment.

§7. *Proposals for reform.*—The Commission examined certain alternative proposals for reform, viz. (i) an improved sterling exchange standard, (ii) a gold exchange standard, and (iii) a gold standard, with or without a gold currency.

They rejected the sterling exchange standard as well as the gold exchange standard on the ground that, however improved, they would both always remain at the mercy of the price of silver, any rise in which above the melting point of the rupee would

involve the disappearance of the coin. Besides, under any exchange standard, the note would be internally convertible into silver rupees only and not into gold. The sterling-exchange standard would be open to the further objection that, under it, any heavy depreciation of sterling was likely to cause much dislocation in exchange and internal prices.

Moreover, the system would lack the simplicity which was premised as essential to secure public confidence. The mechanism of the exchange standard was too refined and the right of convertibility was too abstract and one of no direct concern to the general public for the existing conditions in India. The backing for the token currency was too intangible and invisible. Further, the suspicion in the public mind regarding the possibility of manipulation of the mechanism of an exchange standard to the detriment of Indian interests would be a fatal obstacle to the smooth working of that system. Indian public opinion would only have confidence in gold as a solid enough backing for the country's currency. It required some link, not only real but conspicuously visible, between the currency of the country and gold. Thus the establishment of a true gold standard was indicated as the proper goal of Indian currency policy.

A GOLD STANDARD FOR INDIA

§8. **Finance Department's scheme.**¹—Under a scheme for a gold currency standard submitted to the Commission by Sir Basil Blackett and other officials of the Finance Department of the Government of India, it was proposed that the silver rupee should cease to be legal tender except for small amounts, say up to Rs. 50, after a period of ten years, during which time it would be convertible into gold currency. The ideal ultimately to be reached was the system then in force in Great Britain under which the note was the sole full legal tender in circulation, and the gold value of the pound sterling was stabilized by the statutory obligation imposed upon the Bank of England to buy and sell gold at rates corresponding roughly to the par of exchange.

The Commission rejected the scheme on various grounds, their principal objections to it being that the large demand for gold by India would unsettle the world's currency and credit mechanism, and that the sale of the demonetized silver would have adverse reactions on the world's silver market and the silver hoards in India.²

¹ See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, vol. II, Appendixes 5-7.

² See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, pars. 35-52.

§9. **The gold bullion standard.**—The Commission argued that it was possible to have a true gold standard without putting gold into circulation. They proposed 'that the ordinary medium of circulation in India should remain, as at present, the currency note and the silver rupee, and that the stability of the currency in terms of gold should be secured by making the currency directly convertible into gold for all purposes, but that gold should not circulate as money. It *must* not circulate at first and *need* not circulate ever'. (Par. 54.)

The chief reason, according to the Commission, against putting gold into circulation is that, the larger the amount of such gold in circulation, the smaller the gold reserves and the greater the inelasticity of the credit structure based on them. They endorsed the view of the Chamberlain Commission that gold in circulation is of doubtful value for the support of exchange. The Commission also urged that the gold bullion standard promised to set up almost immediately a full gold standard and dispensed with any period of transition contemplated in the other schemes. While providing for the gradual strengthening of the gold reserves at a rate which would not have any unsettling effects on world conditions, the scheme was capable of adjusting itself to any future decision in favour of a gold currency, which it was impossible to introduce all at once, but for which the door would be left open. The Commission's own view was that it would be unwise to contemplate the introduction of a gold currency under any conditions, and they expressed the hope that India would, in course of time, come to look upon it as an obsolete and outworn ideal. The war had taught the European nations to dispense with the expensive luxury of a gold currency. The restoration of the gold standard in England in 1925 had been effected without the reintroduction of gold into circulation, so that what was practically adopted was the gold bullion standard. Indeed, according to some high authorities, gold in circulation was coming to be regarded as a sign of a backward civilization. Under the Commission's scheme the obligation to be imposed by statute on the currency authority was : to buy and sell gold without limit at rates determined with reference to a fixed gold parity of the rupee but in quantities of not less than 400 fine ounces, no limitation being imposed as to the purpose for which the gold was required, so as to ensure the stability of the gold value of the rupee and the stability of exchange within the gold points corresponding to the selected parity. Gold was thus to be made the real standard of value. The rupee was to be linked to gold and not to sterling or any other currency or group of currencies. While the system was an absolute gold standard and

not an exchange standard as hitherto, because rupees and notes were to be convertible into gold bars for *any* purpose, the compensatory mechanism of the exchanges was preserved, as gold bars are not currency. The currency would be expanded when notes or rupees were issued by the currency authority in exchange for gold bars, and contracted when it gave gold bars for notes and rupees.

The conversion of rupees into gold bars and not coin, the demonetization of the sovereign (proposed in order that the existing hoards of gold coins might be prevented from entering into circulation) and the system of gold savings certificates proposed by the Commission would all tend to rob the hoards of their power of disturbing internal prices and money rates.

§10. **Buying and selling rates for gold.**—Buying and selling rates for gold, fixed with reference only to the par value of the rupee and without reference to the costs of importation or to any deviation in the value of the currency from its gold parity, would make the currency authority the cheapest market for gold. This would not only destroy the gold bullion market in India, but would also saddle the currency authority with the work of selling gold for non-monetary uses, which does not properly belong to it. In order to free it from this obligation, the Commission recommended that the selling prices of gold should be fixed at such rates as would make possible the replenishment of the stock of gold without loss by importation from London.¹

The Commission proposed the removal of the legal tender quality of the sovereign so long as the amount of gold in the reserves was not big enough for the introduction of a gold currency, and so long as no definite decision in favour of a gold currency was taken. Otherwise, the gold from the reserves might pass into circulation, preventing any contraction in the currency and counteracting the compensatory effect of the exchanges.

* §11. **Convertibility of notes.**—The Commission recommended that the existing anomaly in the Indian currency system due to the

¹ The par value of the rupee as proposed by the Commission was 1s. 6d. (8.47 grains of fine gold) or Rs. 13.37 for £1. The par value of a tola of gold at this rate was Rs. 21.3.10. The Commission proposed as many as three different selling rates for gold, based on London as the gold centre for India: (i) When the T.T. rate on London was at or above the upper gold point (1s. 6 13/64d.), the selling rate for delivery in Bombay was to be the same as the buying rate, viz. Rs. 21.3.10 per tola of fine gold.

When the T.T. rate on London was below the upper gold point, the selling rate (ii) for delivery in London was to be Rs. 21.7.9 (allowing for cost of transport to London); (iii) while for delivery in Bombay it was to be Rs. 21.11.9 (allowing for twice the cost of transport). See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, p. 95.

obligation of the Government to convert one form of note, namely the note printed on paper, into another form, namely the rupee, which is merely a note printed on silver, must be removed, to rid the system of the threat involved in a rise in the price of silver. Of course, the promise of converting the existing notes into rupees must be kept. But no obligation for conversion into silver rupees should attach to the new notes. It was, however, essential that facilities for the free exchange of notes for rupees should be provided, so long as the people desired to obtain metallic rupees, in order to inspire public confidence and ensure the popularity of the note issue.

The Commission proposed the re-issue of the one-rupee note with full legal tender power and, like the other notes of the new status, not legally convertible into silver rupees. This would help in popularizing the use of notes and offering a way out, in case the price of silver should ever again rise above the rupee-melting point.

In view of the withdrawal of the existing legal right of convertibility of notes into rupees, it was necessary to impose a statutory obligation on the currency authority to convert all notes, excepting the one-rupee note, on demand into legal tender money, that is, into notes of smaller denominations or silver rupees *at the option of the currency authority*, though all reasonable demands of the public for metallic currency should be met in practice.

§12. Unification and composition of the reserves.—The Commission recommended that the paper currency and gold standard reserves should be combined into one currency reserve so as to ensure the efficiency of its working and make it simpler and more intelligible to the public.

As regards the new reserve, the Commission recommended that : (i) The composition and proportion of the reserve should be laid down by statute so as to ensure automatic expansion and contraction of currency and the compensatory effect of the exchange. (ii) The proportional reserve system should be adopted, and gold and gold securities should form not less than 40 per cent of the reserve. The currency authority should strive to work up to a reserve ratio of 50 to 60 per cent. The gold holding should be raised to 20 per cent of the reserve as soon as possible, and 25 per cent within ten years. During this period no favourable opportunity of fortifying the gold holding should be allowed to escape unutilized. Of the gold holding at least one-half should be held in India. (iii) The silver holding in the reserve should be very substantially reduced during a transitional period of ten years. (iv) The balance of the reserve should be held in self-liquidating trade bills and Government of India securities. The 'created

securities' should be replaced by marketable securities within ten years. (v) Rs. 50 crores might be regarded as the approximate liability in respect of the contractibility of the rupee circulation. An amount equal to one-fifth of the face value of any increase or decrease in the number of silver rupees in issue should be added to or subtracted from this liability, and the balance of profit or loss should accrue to or be borne by the Government revenues.

The Commission urged that the fortification of the gold reserves in the manner described above would involve the minimum risk and expense and was necessary (i) to enable the currency authority to discharge its obligation to sell gold in exchange for currency and in view of the new status of the notes which were convertible into gold; (ii) to enable the Government to encash the gold certificates in case they proved to be popular; and (iii) to facilitate the introduction of a gold currency if it was decided to have it.

In the opinion of the Commission, silver reserves were out of place in a gold standard system, but the peculiar position of the rupee, due to the fact that it forms a large proportion of the total circulation, and the considerable seasonal ebb-and-flow in this form of currency, made it necessary to hold a part of the reserve in silver. The one-rupee note would reduce the quantity of rupees required, and therefore the silver holding in the reserve should be lessened in the period of transition, from Rs. 85 crores (on 30 April 1926), to Rs. 25 crores.

The Commission recommended that the rupee securities of the Government of India held in the reserves should be limited to an amount equal to so much of the circulation as was unlikely to be withdrawn, plus such further amount as could be easily realized without disturbing the Government's credit, because such securities are less desirable as assets than trade bills, which, unlike the former, possess the quality of automatically expanding and contracting currency in accordance with the needs of the country, independently of the will and judgement of the currency authority. Moreover, a larger holding of Government securities would make their realization, in case of need, difficult. The new arrangements for the issue of paper currency and the position of the Currency Reserve since the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India (April, 1935) are reviewed in chapter x.

GOLD BULLION VERSUS GOLD CURRENCY STANDARD

§13. Critique of the gold bullion standard.—The Commission claimed for the gold bullion standard which they advocated that it made gold the sole standard of value and ensured the absolute convertibility of the internal currency into gold for all purposes.

though it so arranged matters that, while gold was to be always available in exchange for currency in India, gold would remain in the central reserves for use in supporting the exchange value of the currency, but would not go into circulation.¹ The latter object was to be fulfilled by the demonetization of the sovereign and the sale by the currency authority of gold in the form of bars. Its purchase from the same authority by the public for non-currency purposes was to be guarded against by offering gold in quantities of not less than 400 ounces (or 1,065 tolas) at a time and at a rate inclusive of the cost of importing gold from London to Bombay.

The convertibility of legal tender currency into gold bars may be good enough for banks and bankers, but for the masses it was quite inadequate and unintelligible. Also the minimum limit of 400 ounces was excessive and was calculated to impede the convertibility into gold so much as to make it unreal. The demonetization of the sovereign and half-sovereign was widely criticized as a definitely retrograde step, since even under the exchange standard before the war of 1914-18, a considerable number of sovereigns, estimated at £6,000,000, were in the hands of the public. Even in England, under the new currency arrangements of 1925, the sovereign was not demonetized.

§14. **Case for a gold currency standard in India.**—The Commission's scheme of the gold bullion standard was obviously influenced by the analogy of the English system. The restoration of the gold standard in the form of a bullion standard in England in 1925, it is said, marks a considerable advance in the world's currency evolution towards the ideal system of an international exchange standard as recommended by the Geneva Conference in 1922, under which the internal currency would consist of inconvertible paper, and gold would be available only for liquidating foreign debts. But what suits an advanced nation like England may not suit a backward country like India. The exact type of a gold standard to be adopted by any given country will of course depend on its special conditions. In India conditions in 1926 pointed to a gold standard with its usual concomitant of a gold currency. Under those conditions in India a gold currency could not be regarded as an unnecessary luxury or a mere matter of traditional etiquette associated with the gold standard. This is why almost all Indian witnesses, and some European witnesses of unquestioned competence, like Dr Cannan and Dr Gregory,² strongly urged on the

¹ Sir Basil Blackett's speech at Delhi, 23 November 1926.

² See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, Appendixes 80 and 81.

Hilton-Young Commission the need for the adoption of a gold currency standard. Sir Basil Blackett himself expressed the view that before India could think of any ideal system she would probably have to pass first through the stage of having gold coin available, into which all other forms of currency would be convertible at will. The simplicity and intelligibility, which the Commission admit as being indispensable requisites of any currency system that could be regarded as satisfactory for India, cannot be said to be the distinguishing features of the gold bullion standard as recommended by them.

§15. **Other objections to the Commission's proposals.**—The buying and selling rates of gold proposed by the Commission were also subjected to unfavourable comment. The regulation of the rates in such a manner that the currency authority will buy gold when it is cheapest and sell it when it is dearest in the market will have the effect of making the buying and selling transactions rare in India. This applies especially to the sale of gold by the currency authority. The public will buy only when the purchase is necessary for export purposes. Further, the offer to sell gold at a more favourable rate in London than in Bombay, proposed by the Commission when exchange was below the upper gold point, would encourage, or perhaps was intended to encourage, the delivery of gold in London. This was objected to as perpetuating one of the evils of the gold exchange standard.¹ In this connexion we may refer to the Commission's recommendation that 'of the (Reserve) bank's holding of gold coin or bullion, at least one-half shall be held in the bank's custody in India, while the remaining half may be held outside India in the custody of its branches or agencies or deposited in other banks earmarked for the bank's account. Gold in any mint or transit belonging to the bank shall be counted as part of its reserves' (par. 145). The large holding of gold securities recommended by the Commission meant that our reserve to that extent would be invested abroad. In view of the suspicion and distrust which the practice of holding reserves in London has engendered, special care was necessary not to propose any arrangements which would involve the location of Indian money in London.

Although we hold that India would have done well to have adopted the gold currency standard in 1926-7 we must admit that in view of the widespread breakdown of the gold standard since September 1931, the absence of the requisite conditions for the

¹ See P. B. Junnarkar, *An Examination of the Currency Commission's Report*, p. 55.

successful operation of this type of standard and its uncertain future, the thought of taking any immediate steps in the direction of a gold currency standard or even the gold bullion standard must for the moment be abandoned. Even if we succeed in evolving in the near future a moderately satisfactory gold bullion standard when world conditions are favourable for a return to the gold standard, we shall have reason to congratulate ourselves.

The Commission did a valuable service to India by recommending that the exchange standard, which had been the cause of so much discontent, should be definitely scrapped, and that the official control over currency and exchange should disappear utterly and for ever. But the unsatisfactory gold bullion standard, which they proposed as an effective remedy for all the evils of the exchange standard, did not excite any enthusiasm in the minds of the Indian people. A genuine type of gold bullion standard suited to Indian conditions would have been more acceptable failing the full-fledged gold currency standard at the time the Commission's recommendations were made (1926). The question of the monetary standard in operation in India today (1941) and the future monetary standard of India are dealt with later in the chapter.

STABILIZATION OF THE RUPEE

§16. **Need for stabilization.**—The restoration of the gold standard in England and the recovery of sterling in terms of gold (April 1925), the return in the Dominions and other countries to a gold basis and the comparative stability attained by world prices seemed to the Commission to warrant the belief that the time was fully ripe for the stabilization of the rupee. In order to obviate all uncertainty regarding the future of the exchange as well as to put a stop to all discretionary variations in the rate of exchange, immediate stabilization was essential. It was also desired by an influential section of the public as early as September 1923¹ (when the rupee was very near 1s. 4d. gold) for the sake of putting an end to the artificial situation created by the retention on the statute book of the fictitious 2s. gold ratio.

§17. **The ratio of stabilization.**—The Commission recommended that the rupee should be stabilized in relation to gold at a rate corresponding to an exchange rate of 1s. 6d. for the rupee, thus giving it the value of 8·47 grains of gold. They thought that at that rate prices in India had already attained a substantial measure of adjustment with those in the world at large, and that any change

¹ See ch. vii, §32.

in it would mean a difficult period of adjustment and widespread economic disturbance.

The Commission argued that when exchange and prices had been steady over a considerable period, there was justification for assuming that wages were in adjustment unless there were clear indications to the contrary. The statistics of foreign trade appeared to strengthen the assumption. As regards contracts, the Commission argued that the bulk of the contracts were short-term and were therefore not affected by the higher ratio.

As regards the contention that the 1s. 4d. rate was the 'natural' rate for the rupee, the Commission argued that the only rate which could be properly regarded as natural was the figure at which prices were in adjustment with the existing volume of currency and in equilibrium with external prices. And from this point of view 1s. 6d. appeared to them to be clearly the 'natural' rate in the existing circumstances. If, on the other hand, by natural rate was meant that rate which would establish itself in the absence of statutory enactment or executive action to anchor the rupee at a particular point, on this supposition there would be such extensive fluctuations in the rate of exchange in a country like India with its wide seasonal fluctuations of trade, that it would be impossible to distinguish any particular rate as 'natural'.

Even if the view that prices and wages had been substantially adjusted to the 1s. 6d. rate were challenged, it could not be seriously contended that they were in any way adjusted to the rate of 1s. 4d. because that rate had never been effective sufficiently long during the preceding eight years or so. In so far as adjustment had taken place at all, it must have been to the higher rate of 1s. 6d. The reversion to 1s. 4d. in these circumstances was bound to produce a general rise of prices to the extent of 12½ per cent, a change which would press severely on consumers in general and especially on the poorer paid members of the literate classes. It would also result in an arbitrary reduction of the real wages of labour for which there was no justification in equity or in expediency. The finances of the Government, central as well as provincial, would be seriously upset by a reversion to 1s. 4d., which would further postpone indefinitely the long and loudly called-for abolition of provincial contributions.

§18. *Minute of dissent.*—Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas in his Minute of Dissent, pointed out how the Government had made up their mind to raise the exchange to 1s. 6d. and had surprised the Commission with a *fait accompli* so as to prejudice both their inquiry and finding. He showed how the Government threw away the opportunity in September and October 1924 of stabilizing the

rupee at the pre-war rate of 1s. 4d. and used the fictitious ratio of 2s. gold on the statute book as a potent weapon for rigging up the exchange—a procedure which involved serious contraction of currency.

His main conclusions were as follows :

(i) No adjustment in wages had taken place and none was likely without a struggle. (ii) Until adjustment was complete, the 1s. 6d. ratio presented the foreign manufacturer with an effective, though indirect, bounty of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, which would place a heavy strain on Indian industries. (iii) A change in the ratio would mean an additional burden of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the large bulk of the debtor class who were mainly agriculturists. The debt being an old one of long standing, it was natural to assume that it was mostly contracted on a 1s. 4d. basis. (iv) The adverse effect on public finances of a reversion to 1s. 4d. had been exaggerated. (v) The adverse effects of 1s. 4d. on a small section (about 21 per cent) of the population consisting of the poorly paid members of the literate classes must be allowed less weight than the suffering which the higher ratio would entail in the case of the remaining 79 per cent of the total population. As to labour, the existing rate of wages was sufficiently high to cover a possible rise in prices caused by the adoption of 1s. 4d. In any case there was the compensating advantage of a continuity of employment due to the fact that the lower ratio would ensure greater prosperity to industry and agriculture, while the higher ratio was sure to injure both. (vi) The ratio of 1s. 4d. prevalent before the war of 1914-18 was disturbed as a result of the war in common with the ratios of other countries of the world. But other countries had invariably striven to restore their pre-war ratios. Even if it were granted that the disturbance involved in either case was equal, the decision should still be in favour of 1s. 4d.

§19. **The ratio controversy examined.**—The Majority Report and the Dissenting Minute together provided a complete armoury from which combatants on either side drew their weapons in the fierce controversy which raged round the question of the ratio. However plausible the arguments may look at first sight, on a closer scrutiny it is possible to detect several flaws in the reasoning employed by the advocates as well as the opponents of the new ratio.

(i) *Criticism of the Majority's arguments.*—The Majority begin by pointing out that the index numbers, on which they base their arguments regarding the price adjustments to the 1s. 6d. ratio, are by no means an infallible guide.¹ But by the time they finish their

¹ See *Hilton-Young Commission Report*, pars. 178-9.

calculations based on these admittedly imperfect index numbers, they somehow succeed in attaining an absolute conviction that substantial adjustment had undoubtedly taken place, and they work themselves up to an almost apostolic fervour in favour of 1s. 6d., forgetful of their own warning about the unreliability of the index numbers. (Sir Purshotamdas also lays himself open to a similar criticism when, from the same statistical material as employed by the Majority, he obtains a precisely opposite conclusion and shows an equally unwarranted and unquestioning faith in the accuracy of his results.)

No statistical evidence is adduced by the Majority to show that wages were in adjustment with the ratio, except in the case of the jute industry. As regards long-term contracts, the Commission argue that the 1s. 6d. rate did not constitute a hardship, because, for example, in the case of the land revenue settlements, the real incidence of land revenue had been materially lightened owing to the very great rise in prices since 1914. They argue against the concealed reduction of the wages of the millhands by manipulation of exchange, and, for the sake of consistency, they should have regarded the concealed increase in the land revenue assessment as one of the valid points against the 1s. 6d. ratio.

The Majority, while rightly admitting that the influence of the ratio on Government finances must not be regarded as a decisive factor, were nevertheless not able to resist the temptation of exploiting the argument for all it was worth and more.

The Majority objected to a reversion to 1s. 4d. on the ground that it would entail undeserved suffering for the poorer paid literate classes. Considering that these classes had suffered more than any others by the recent rise in prices and that much of the burden arising from the extension of the new policy of protection which had been recently initiated was sure to fall on them, it may be argued that there was *prima facie* a good case for any step tending to promote the interest of the middle and the lower middle classes. But the general rise of prices to the extent of 12½ per cent, feared by the Majority as certain to result from the reduction of the ratio to 1s. 4d., assumed what really had not been proved, namely, that prices had already completely adjusted themselves to 1s. 6d. Further, even taking complete adjustment for granted, there were reasons for hoping that the full rise of 12½ per cent would not have actually manifested itself because it would have been counteracted to some extent by the unmistakable tendency of the world prices to fall.

The strongest point made by the Majority was that the higher rate had enjoyed an unbroken existence for over a year and that

therefore presumably a good deal of adjustment had already taken place. Even here, however, it may well be objected that the period of 'over a year' was not long enough for substantial adjustment, and that the presumption was against, rather than in favour of, such adjustment having taken place.¹

(ii) *Critical examination of the case for 1s. 4d.*—It can equally well be shown that the champions of 1s. 4d. did not always use arguments which were entirely unexceptionable. For example, they laid much stress on the excessive deflation of currency indulged in by the Government in order to maintain the ratio at 1s. 6d. But if the deflation was as great as it was made out to be, it must have substantially brought down the general level of prices. To admit a considerable fall of prices, however, was to admit a more or less complete adjustment to the higher ratio.

The opponents of the higher ratio dwelt on the increase in the burden of rural indebtedness caused by it, but they did not take into account certain compensating advantages accruing to the agriculturist from cheaper implements and, in general, a decreased cost of production. They also failed to take cognizance of the fact that a good deal of the agricultural debt is incurred in kind and not in money, and that part of it also consists of short-period obligations.²

By far the strongest argument in favour of the old ratio was that stabilization at 1s. 6d. appeared like wanton tampering with the standard of value. Even if we choose the most favourable ground for the advocates of 1s. 6d. and assume that economic disturbance would have been greater under 1s. 4d., the evils proceeding from this disturbance would have been more readily acquiesced in by the people. As it was, the departure from the old ratio vastly increased the number of currency malcontents and presented critics of the Government with a fresh grievance, so that the new ratio has taken its rank along with the drain theory as an all-sufficient explanation for every conceivable evil.

The economic historian of the future will certainly not record the period that has passed since the new ratio was made effective as among the most prosperous in the annals of this country, and

¹ In his Minute of Dissent (par. 80) Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas has referred to the view of Mr J. M. Keynes that, in a country like the United Kingdom, about two years is the necessary period for readjustment to a ten per cent variation in exchange and that, if this is the case in a country the bulk of whose trade is external, the period required must be undoubtedly longer in a country like India whose internal trade is much greater in volume than her foreign trade.

² See J. C. Coyajee, *India's Currency, Exchange and Banking Problems*, p. 10.

the fact that the country passed through very difficult times during the period of the economic depression (1929-33) and the recession (1937-8) added to the vehemence with which the Government's exchange policy was attacked. It may be argued that industry and commerce would have been in an even worse plight, if the country had gone back to the old ratio. This, however, takes for granted that more than 50 per cent of the transition to the 1s. 6d. ratio had been accomplished, which is precisely what requires to be proved. We have already suggested above that the evidence adduced in support of the Commission's view that the major part of the adjustment was already over, when they began their deliberations, is far from convincing. We have gone further and argued that even if the reversion to 1s. 4d. had meant slightly greater disturbance—and this is the utmost that need be conceded by anyone impartially weighing all the evidence produced—it would have been worth while risking it for the sake of the old standard. It should, however, be quite clear that the longer the period during which the new rate¹ is maintained, the stronger the presumption that conditions have settled down to it in a preponderant degree and the weaker the case for restoring the old ratio.²

§20. **Subsequent developments of the ratio controversy (April 1927 to September 1931).**—Owing to the crisis which blew over from America in the autumn of 1929, prices of commodities and securities collapsed throughout the world, and Indian securities shared the common fate. The natural nervousness of the investors in these circumstances showed itself in reluctance to invest and the phenomenon of the flight of capital from the rupee. This tendency was further emphasized by the strong political agitation in India. The world economic depression was marked by a steep fall of prices, especially in the case of agricultural countries like India whose exports of raw materials were badly hit.

In these circumstances the Government found themselves compelled to take special financial measures to maintain the exchange at 1s. 6d., such as currency contraction, the issue of Treasury Bills to Exchange Banks and other purchasers so as to control credit in the interest of the firmness of exchange, raising the bank rate of the Imperial Bank of India, etc.

The opponents of the 1s. 6d. ratio argued that since so much management and manipulation was found necessary to maintain it till as late as 1931, with perhaps the exception of 1928, long after

¹ The new rate (1s. 6d.) was placed upon the statute book by the Indian Currency Act of March, 1927. See §22 below.

² See, however §§23, 26 and 28 below.

the new ratio was put upon the statute book (in March 1927), conditions had not become adjusted to it and it was still desirable to go back to the old ratio of 1s. 4d. Another circumstance interpreted as showing the unsuitability of the ratio was the difficulty experienced by the Government in securing the necessary sterling funds for remittance to London in the years 1929-30 and 1930-1. Between November 1930 and March 1931 the situation became even worse. Not only were the Government unable to purchase sterling, but they had actually to sell sterling to the extent of £5.6 millions to meet the demand that had arisen. Later again they had to sell Reverse Councils of the value of £14 million between June and 19 September 1931 in support of the rupee.

It is impossible to single out the new ratio as a factor of prime importance in explanation of the slump during the world depression. Allowing for a certain necessary time-lag we should expect that any economic dislocation that may have been due to the ratio would have shown itself at its worst in the years nearest to the time when it was established and that it ought to be less and less serious as we travel further and further away from this point.

A radical change in circumstances may of course at any moment call for an alteration in the ratio, however thoroughly well adjusted it may have been at one time. And certain circumstances have arisen since England left the Gold Standard in September 1931 in view of which it is possible to contend that a reconsideration of the matter has again become necessary.¹ From a strictly *economic* point of view, however, the question can no longer be regarded as that of a choice between 1s. 6d. and 1s. 4d. A possible abandonment of the present ratio need not necessarily mean a reversion to the old ratio of 1s. 4d. We should be quite prepared to find that if a thorough and unbiassed review of the position indicates the necessity of changing the present ratio (namely 1s. 6d. sterling), it might also indicate some ratio other than 1s. 4d. as the most suitable in the altered circumstances.

§21. **The Government accept the Hilton-Young Commission Report.**—On 16 January 1927, the Government published three Bills embodying the Commission's recommendations. These were (i) a Bill to establish a gold standard currency for British India and constitute a Reserve Bank of India, (ii) a Bill to amend the Imperial Bank Act, 1920, and (iii) a Bill further to amend the Coinage Act of 1906 and the Paper Currency Act of 1923 for certain purposes, and to lay upon the Government certain obligations in regard to the purchase of gold and the sale of gold (later altered to sterling)

¹ See §§ 23 and 28 below.

exchange. The first two Bills will be referred to in our chapter on Banking. Here we are concerned with the third Bill which was moved in the Assembly by Sir Basil Blackett on 7 March 1927. The Finance Member explained the principle of the Currency Bill, which was that the time had arrived to stabilize the rupee and that the Bill proposed for the first time in Indian financial history to impose a statutory liability on the Currency Authority to maintain the rupee at the ratio thus fixed. Before the war there had been no statutory provision for preventing the rupee from falling below a fixed ratio of gold, so that the link between the rupee and gold was imperfect. Sir Basil Blackett pointed out that the Bill was no more than a transitional measure intended to be operative only during the period between its passing and the time when the Gold Standard and Reserve Bank Act should come into operation. The Bill was bitterly opposed at every stage, but finally passed by a narrow majority, with one or two minor amendments, after a great and memorable fight. The Council of State passed it without any amendment. The Indian Currency Bill thus became law and came into operation from 1 April 1927.

§22. **The Currency Act of March, 1927.**—The new Act established the ratio of 1s. 6d. by enacting that the Government would purchase gold in unlimited quantities at the Bombay Mint at the price of Rs. 21-3-10 per tola¹ of fine gold in the form of bars containing not less than 40 tolas (15 oz.). Holders of legal tender currency (silver rupees and paper notes) were entitled to obtain on application to the Controller of the Currency, Calcutta, or the Deputy Controller of the Currency, Bombay, either gold at the Bombay Mint or, at the option of the Government, sterling for immediate delivery in London, provided they demanded and paid for an amount of gold or sterling of not less value than 1,065 tolas (400 oz.) of fine gold at the rate of Rs. 21-3-10 per tola of fine gold.² Sterling was to be sold at the same price after allowing for the normal cost of transport from Bombay to London. A rate of 1s. 5 49/64d. was notified as the Government selling rate for sterling to meet these obligations.³ On 1 April 1927, when the Indian Currency Act of 1927 came into force, conditions governing acceptance of gold at the Bombay Mint were published.

By the same Act sovereigns and half-sovereigns ceased to be legal tender in India,⁴ but an obligation was placed on the

¹ The parity of the exchange was thus 8.47 grains of fine gold per rupee.

² See Dr L. C. Jain, *Monetary Problems of India*, p. 34.

³ *Report of the Controller of Currency (1926-7)*, p. 3.

⁴ It may be pointed out here that the British Gold Standard Act of 1925 did not demonetize gold coins, although the right of free coinage was withdrawn.

Government to receive these coins at all currency offices and treasuries at bullion value reckoned at Rs. 21-3-10 per tola of fine gold, that is, Rs. 13-5-4 per full-weight sovereign. In spite of the fact that these coins ceased to be legal tender there was an appreciable import of sovereigns into India. The Currency Act of 1927 established what may be called a Gold Bullion *cum* Sterling Exchange Standard in India. Since the Government had the option of giving sterling and not gold, strictly speaking the standard thus established was a Sterling Exchange Standard although in practice it worked as a Gold Exchange Standard until 20 September 1931, sterling till then being at par with gold. (See §23 below.) 'If the Government chose to exercise the other option open to them of offering gold in exchange for rupees, India would have had, in point of fact, if not in law, a gold standard. Thus the standard of 1927, though a sterling exchange standard, was capable of becoming a gold standard, and certainly indicated that the gold standard was the ideal of the Government.'¹ The sterling exchange standard of 1927 was, of course, superior to the earlier exchange standard since it established a statutory gold parity for the rupee and imposed a statutory obligation on the Government to buy gold and sell gold or sterling at fixed rates. In other respects, however, it still had all those deficiencies which we have already pointed out (see §§1-6).

§23. **Divorce between sterling and gold and its reactions in India.—**

The monetary standard established by the Act of 1927 did not have a fair chance of being converted into a genuine gold (bullion) standard owing to the dramatic developments which the world currency and exchange situation underwent in consequence of the breakdown of the gold standard in Great Britain and several other countries of the world. Great Britain left the gold standard with effect from 21 September 1931. This led to certain important and inevitable reactions on the Indian currency and exchange system. As we have already seen, the Currency Act of 1927 laid upon the currency authority, i.e. the Government, the obligation to buy gold, and sell gold or sterling at its option. The Government thus bought gold and sold sterling at the lower gold point until 19 September 1931. On the 20th came the announcement of Britain having gone off the gold standard. On the 21st the Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance suspending the operation of the obligation to sell gold or sterling, which was widely interpreted in India as implying that the Government were

¹ Jain, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

no longer prepared to hold the rupee on to any particular ratio. On the same day, however, the Secretary of State announced his decision to maintain the rupee at 1s. 6d. sterling. On 24 September the Governor-General promulgated yet another Ordinance, called the Gold and Sterling Sales Regulation Ordinance, repealing the previous one and thus technically restoring the provisions of the Currency Act of 1927 but seeking in practice to exercise an effective control over the sale of sterling, and thus introducing a controlled sterling exchange standard. Under the terms of the new Ordinance, sterling was to be sold not to all and sundry but only to recognized banks, which were expected to realize their responsibilities in the matter. It was to be sold at the rate previously in force, i.e. 1s. 5 49/64d. per rupee, for financing normal trade requirements and contracts completed before 21 September, and for reasonable personal and domestic purposes. It was not to be sold for financing imports of bullion or speculative exchange transactions. These precautions were taken in order to avoid undue strain on the Government's gold and sterling resources and to prevent the flight of capital from India. This control was to be exercised through the agency of the Imperial Bank. The rupee, being linked to sterling, inevitably shared in the depreciation and fluctuations of the latter in relation to gold and to currencies still based on gold, such as the dollar and the franc. The rise in the value of gold in terms of sterling as reflected in the sterling-dollar cross-rate meant a corresponding rise in its value in terms of rupees. The price of gold in the bullion market, which was Rs. 21-13-3 per tola towards the end of August 1931, rose to as much as Rs. 29-2-0 in December 1931.¹ The stimulus of high prices and partly also the prevailing economic distress in rural areas induced people to sell their gold. About Rs. 50 crores worth of gold was thus exported from India between the end of September 1931 and the end of February 1932. This enormous export of commercial gold had a favourable reaction on India's balance of trade. The supply of sterling created against the gold exports came to be in excess of the demand for it, and rendered restrictions on the sale of sterling by the Government superfluous. This enabled the Government to repeal the Gold and Sterling Sales Regulation Ordinance on 31 January 1932. Thus technically the Currency Act of 1927 was fully restored, but that did not make any difference

¹ In subsequent years the price of gold rose still higher, being Rs. 36-13-3 per tola on 7 March 1935—the highest recorded price since the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain. *Annual Market Review* (Premchand Roychand & Sons), 1935, p. 80. For the subsequent course of the price of gold see footnote on p. 373.

in practice. The Secretary of State's declaration that the rupee should be maintained at 1s. 6d. sterling actually remained in force, and India's standard continued to be the sterling exchange standard. The present situation and the future monetary standard of India are dealt with below.¹

This phase of the Government's currency and exchange policy gave rise to acute controversy. Apart from the resentment caused in the country by the fact that the Secretary of State had made a vital announcement of a new currency policy without consulting the Indian legislature, the criticism levelled against the Government fell under two heads: (i) the linking of the rupee to sterling at 1s. 6d. and (ii) the uncontrolled export of gold from India.

§24. **The linking of the rupee to sterling at 1s. 6d.**—The following were the main arguments advanced in support of the policy adopted by the Government. (i) The choice for the Government was between achieving comparative stability by linking the rupee with sterling and risking complete instability by allowing the rupee to drift, without any attempt to regulate its exchange value. The former of these alternatives was clearly to be preferred. (ii) Though the Hilton-Young Commission had voted against linking the rupee to sterling, this advice, though sound enough in normal times, could not be followed in an emergency situation such as this was. India had annually £32 million sterling obligations and a sterling loan of £15 millions was maturing early in 1932. The difficulties in raising the necessary funds for these purposes would have been almost insuperable unless the rupee was linked to sterling. Without a stable sterling rupee the Indian Budget would become a gamble in exchange. (iii) So long as India remained a debtor country the risk of leaving the rupee alone and thus taking a sudden leap into the unknown was much greater than in the case of creditor countries like England. (iv) India's trade with England and other countries on a sterling basis represented no inconsiderable proportion of her total international trade. It was, therefore, advisable, if possible, to secure a stable basis at least for this trade. (v) There would be a welcome, although temporary, stimulus to the export trade of India with the gold standard countries owing to the depreciation of the rupee in relation to gold. (vi) It did not lie in the mouth of those critics of the Government who were anxious to stabilize the rupee at a lower value than 1s. 6d. to complain when the rupee at the current cross-rate was worth considerably less than 1s. 4d. gold.

¹ See §§26-7 and 36.

The main arguments on the other side were as follows: (i) By linking the rupee to sterling India was being made to share in the fluctuations of sterling, which reflect economic conditions in England and not in India. By leaving the rupee alone, on the other hand, there would also be instability no doubt but this would reflect conditions in India itself. India was thus deprived of the freedom to adopt a rate of exchange suitable to her own requirements in respect of foreign trade and the internal price level. (ii) Against the advantage to exports to gold standard countries like the U.S.A., we must put the disadvantage to imports from such countries, as also the fact that the linking of the rupee to sterling constituted a form of Imperial Preference granted to England. (iii) There was the danger that the Government's attempt to stabilize the rupee even at the lower gold value of 1s. 6d. might involve the dissipation of the remaining gold reserves of the country. (This danger was not however serious owing to the arrangements made by the Government to conserve them, such as the restrictions on the sale of sterling to the public.) (iv) It was also argued, for example, by Mr (now Sir) R. K. Shanmukham Chetty in the Assembly, that one of the logical implications of the policy of linking the rupee to sterling was to bring the rupee automatically back to gold when conditions were propitious for the linking of sterling to gold, irrespective of the economic conditions in India. (It may be pointed out, however, that the preamble to the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934 makes it clear that the sterling exchange standard is a provisional one pending the restoration of normal monetary conditions in the world, when the Reserve Bank is to put forward proposals for a permanent monetary standard for India.) (v) Finally it was argued that though the rupee depreciated in terms of gold it continued to be overvalued in sterling at 1s. 6d., while the yen and other currencies were devaluated in sterling. India was thus placed at a disadvantage.

§25. **The export of gold from India.**—The Government have been criticized for allowing the free export of gold,¹ which has reached enormous dimensions. The total amount of gold exported from India since Great Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931 amounted to Rs. 351·40 crores at the end of January 1940. This has been widely interpreted to mean the wastage of India's gold resources, the wreckage of the indigenous banking system, and a drain on the accumulated savings of generations. It has been pointed out that the adventitious aid of gold exports has concealed

¹ See §32 below for measures of control of gold exports during the present war.

the overvaluation of the rupee at 1s. 6d. It has been alleged that the uncontrolled export of gold makes it impossible for the country ever to reach the goal of the gold standard. It is feared that it will not be easy for India to buy back the gold she is now exporting on an unprecedented scale. It is further pointed out that almost every other country in the world is sitting tight on its gold and is trying to add to its stock of gold whenever possible. Finally, it is contended that the gold that has been exported is 'distress gold', and that the people are living on their capital—a process which cannot continue indefinitely. There has been a good deal of agitation in the country in favour of either complete prohibition of the gold exports or the levy of an export duty. It has been further proposed that the Government (or the Reserve Bank of India) should themselves purchase this gold at a price regulated by the dollar- and franc-sterling cross-rates and thus strengthen their gold reserves.¹

In support of the Government's policy,² however, it is argued that the gold that has been sold is not currency gold but commercial gold, a commodity serving as a store of value. It was sold because the owners were realizing a profit on it.³ It was also sold because many people found themselves compelled to turn their assets into ready cash for meeting their obligations. The fact that distress prevailed was deplorable. But obviously the interest of the distressed person lay in unrestricted freedom being allowed to him in disposing of his gold in the dearest market. It should further be borne in mind that gold in the hands of private persons cannot be obtained by the Government for any purpose unless the price offered is sufficiently attractive to the owners. It is further argued that the gold that has been exported was only a fraction of

¹ cf. Sir M. Visvesvaraya, *Planned Economy for India*, p. 184.

² Sir James Grigg during the course of his Budget Speech (1935) expressed the Government's point of view as follows: 'I cannot share the views which attribute to gold exports some abstruse monetary significance nor do I find in them an indication that India is being driven by distress to part with her last reserves. Indeed, I can see no sufficient reason for placing them in a different category from exports of any other commodity of which India has a surplus, and I, therefore, find no cause for regret or alarm in the fact that India is still able to obtain so handsome a profit from the reserves of gold which had been accumulated in previous years.'—*Central Budget for 1935-6*, par. 23.

³ The market price of gold in India before the outbreak of the war in September 1939 varied round about Rs. 37 per tola. After the declaration of war it shot up following the fall in the sterling-dollar rate to Rs. 43-8-0 per tola on 16 September 1939, the highest price recorded in recent years. Thereafter it steadied at about Rs. 42 per tola. As a result of the worsening of the war situation the price of gold touched the unprecedented level of Rs. 48-8-0 on 25 May 1940. The price in December 1940 was Rs. 42 per tola.

the total store of gold in India, which had been estimated at £750 million.¹ As the price of gold falls (the present prospects are otherwise), the metal will be bought back again since there is no reason to suppose that the well-known hunger for gold of people in this country will disappear suddenly. In the meantime it is oiling the wheels of trade and helping productive enterprises. It has had a favourable effect on the balance of trade and has converted inert metal into live currency. It has produced a welcome effect also on the Government's financial position so far as the sterling remittances to the Secretary of State and the strengthening of the sterling reserves are concerned. Further it has seemed to keep the rupee-sterling exchange stable at 1s. 6d. and has greatly improved the position of India's credit in the city of London and the world. The exports of gold have brought about an increase in the note circulation, holdings of postal cash certificates, postal savings deposits and bank deposits, have generally created cheap money conditions in the money market and have assisted business recovery in the country.

The offer to buy gold in unlimited quantities by the Reserve Bank of India on behalf of the Government of India would mean that it would be speculating in gold, as the buying rate would have to be fixed with reference to the fluctuating dollar-sterling cross-rate.² It can, indeed, be justly complained that the Government and the Reserve Bank of India have failed to make the special effort that was expected of them to fortify their gold reserves in pursuance of the recommendations of the Hilton-Young Commission. As regards the suggestion for a duty on gold export, as Sir James Grigg pointed out (1936) in the Assembly, the burden would fall on the ultimate seller of gold, who was the agriculturist. The Government should not try to restrict the free sale of gold unless there are very strong reasons to fear that the policy of non-intervention will, come in the way of equipping the Reserve Bank of India with adequate gold reserves having regard to the country's present and future requirements.³ At the same time an intensive

¹ It has been suggested that to a debtor country like India with an annual bill abroad variously estimated at between Rs. 50 crores and Rs. 70 crores, a major portion of the gold imports in the past appear to be a luxury and represent a liability looking at them as an item in the balance of payments. Thus viewed, the existing outflow of gold could be regarded as a deferred squaring of accounts. *The Times of India*, 7 January 1936.

² This rate has, however, been officially pegged at \$4.02 during the present war. At the same time there is a limited free sterling market in New York where the cross-rate between sterling and dollar fluctuates.

³ See, however, §§32 and 37 below indicating the control of gold exports during the present war and the special conditions created by the war, which require a strengthening of the gold reserves held by the Reserve Bank as the currency authority of the country.

effort should be made to revive our export trade and to improve the favourable balance of trade.¹

§26. **The present monetary standard in India.**—We have already pointed out how the rupee was linked to sterling in September 1931 and how the Indian monetary system came to be once again worked as a sterling exchange standard, although technically the Currency Act of March 1927 still remained on the statute book. The whole question of a suitable monetary standard and ratio once again became the storm-centre of an acute controversy in connexion with the nature of the exchange obligations to be imposed upon the proposed Reserve Bank of India. The London Committee on the Reserve Bank Legislation stated in its Report (August 1933): 'The questions which arise in connexion with the exchange obligations to be imposed on the Bank present special difficulty in existing circumstances. In the present state of monetary disorganization throughout the world, it is impossible to incorporate in the (Reserve Bank) Bill provisions which would be necessarily suitable when monetary systems generally have been re-cast and stabilized. In these circumstances we consider that the only sound course for India is to remain on the sterling standard. On this basis the exchange obligations incorporated in the Bill must necessarily be in accord with the rupee-sterling ratio existing at the time when the Bill is introduced. This statement does not, however, imply any expression of opinion on the part of the Committee on the merits or demerits of the present ratio. The ratio provisions in the Bill are designed to make it clear that there will not be any change in the *de facto* situation by the mere coming into operation of the Reserve Bank Act. . . . We are all agreed that it should, in any case, be made clear in the preamble (to the Act) that the whole question of the monetary standard best suited to India will have to be reviewed when the international situation has clarified itself and become sufficiently stable to make it possible to frame more permanent provisions' (par. 19). As the Committee themselves admitted, a considerable majority of Indian delegates felt it their duty to record their view that a suitable exchange ratio was one of the essential factors for the successful working of the Reserve Bank. They pointed out that considerable changes had occurred in the currency bases and policies of almost all the countries of the world in the last few years. In their view it was for the Government of India and the Legislature to examine these and

¹ For a very illuminating discussion of the two sides of the gold export controversy in India see articles by Professor B. R. Shenoy and Professor B. P. Adarkar in the *Indian Journal of Economics*, July 1935 and January 1936.

all other relevant considerations with a view to ensuring that the minimum possible strain was placed on the currency system of India. Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas in a separate note put forward a strong plea for the review of the ratio before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank and held up the example of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, who had devaluated their currencies with a view to raising prices and improving their balances of trade. He referred to the strong and strengthening opinion in India that a lowering of the existing ratio of 1s. 6d. would give much relief to the cultivator. There was a similar cleavage of opinion among the members of the Joint Select Committee to whom the Reserve Bank Bill was referred in September 1933. The majority approved of the London Committee's recommendation of continuing the *status quo* and leaving the question of permanent measures to the future. When the Reserve Bank Bill, as reported upon by the Select Committee, came before the Assembly in November 1933, several amendments relating to the ratio clauses were tabled by members. Those seeking to leave the rupee to itself were not moved. Mr Raju's amendment prescribing a ratio of 1s. 4d. failed, as did another amendment that the ratio to be maintained by the Bank should be given to it by the Governor-General subject to the vote of the Central Legislature. While the Bill was on the anvil of the Legislature a country-wide agitation against the 1s. 6d. ratio was carried on by the Indian Currency League.

§27. **The exchange obligations of the Reserve Bank of India as the new currency authority.**—The ratio clauses (40 and 41) as finally embodied in the Act (1934) gave effect to the recommendations of the Majority of the London Committee on Reserve Bank Legislation. The Reserve Bank is required to maintain the existing ratio (1s. 6d. sterling) between fixed upper and lower points as though the rupee was on a gold basis. By clause 40, the Bank is required to sell sterling to any person who makes a demand in that behalf at its office in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras or Rangoon and pays the purchase price in legal tender currency, for immediate delivery in London, at a rate not below 1s. 5 49/64d. for a rupee. This provision is intended to prevent the rupee from falling below 1s. 5 49/64d., which corresponds to the lower point of the rupee (i.e. 1s. 6d. minus the cost of laying down in London this amount of sterling). On the other hand, clause 41 makes it necessary for the Bank to buy sterling from any person who makes a demand in that behalf at its office in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras or Rangoon, for immediate delivery in London, at a rate not higher than 1s. 6 3/16d. for a rupee, which corresponds to the upper point

of the rupee (viz. 1s. 6d. plus the cost of importing this amount of sterling from London to Bombay). It has also been laid down that no person shall be entitled to demand to buy or sell an amount of sterling less than ten thousand pounds.

The Reserve Bank Act thus legalized the existing ratio and provisionally established in India a sterling exchange standard of an improved type, in so far as there is a definite statutory parity prescribed for the rupee and an obligation under law imposed upon the Reserve Bank to maintain the rupee at this parity. So also the two separate Currency Reserves have been abolished and the Reserve Bank of India has been appointed as the new currency authority to issue notes, hold the Currency Reserve and work the currency system, thus replacing the Government who had so far taken upon themselves monetary duties.¹ Nevertheless even this improved sterling exchange standard is open to some of the criticisms pointed out earlier in the chapter (§§1-6). The preamble to the Reserve Bank Act incorporates, however, the suggestion of the London Committee that the question of the monetary standard best suited to India should be considered when the international monetary situation had become sufficiently clear to make it possible to frame permanent measures. Clause 55 of the Act requires the Bank to report its views (in the contingency contemplated above) to the Governor-General-in-Council regarding a suitable permanent basis for the Indian monetary system and to frame measures for the future monetary standard of India.

§28. **Pros and cons of devaluation.**²—It is superfluous to add that this arrangement has failed to give satisfaction to the currency critics of the Government and the advocates of devaluation among the ranks of the Indian business community. (See also §26.) For example, Mr Manu Subedar, President of the Indian Merchants Chamber and Bureau, Bombay, in welcoming Sir James Grigg the Finance Member in August 1935, suggested a review of the ratio with a view to raising prices and giving relief to the cultivator. The Finance Member in his characteristic candid way replied that he would be no party to any 'monkeying' with the present ratio. While welcoming a healthy rise in the prices of primary products in India, he pointed out that the effect of a lowering of the ratio would be to leave agricultural prices where they were—or even to lower them—and to raise the prices of manufactured articles. Owing to the existing disparity between agricultural and other

¹ See ch. x.

² For a detailed and critical treatment of the controversy regarding devaluation see B. N. Adarkar, *Devaluation of the Rupee* (1937).

prices, such a result would lead to a further worsening of the position of the cultivator. Apart from this, a lowering of the ratio would in the opinion of the Finance Member make the budgetary problems of India, already sufficiently difficult, quite insoluble. (The Budget surpluses of the last few years preceding the war (1939) do not quite support this contention.) Moreover, cheap and plentiful money, which already exists and which is the normal and recognized means of raising prices, has in India tended to create unhealthy speculative conditions, and this seems to indicate that for an agricultural country cheap money is not in itself sufficient to raise prices. In the view of the Finance Member there was needed in addition a general agreement among the nations of the world to stabilize their currencies and to reduce the restraints upon international trade. The controversy regarding devaluation of the rupee flared up early in October 1936, owing to the reactions in India caused by the devaluation of the franc and the other currencies of the gold bloc countries towards the end of September 1936. Advocates of devaluation raised the issue on the floor of the Legislative Assembly by moving a motion of adjournment on 8 October 1936, which was defeated by the casting vote of the President.¹

In favour of devaluation it was argued that a realignment of Indian currency was essential in view of the devaluation of the franc and other currencies, that the rupee was overvalued even at 15. 6d. sterling, and that devaluation would not only raise prices of primary produce in India but also help her to revive her export trade and favourable trade balance, thus obviating the exports of gold. Devaluation of the rupee, it was pointed out, would give relief to the farmer debtor, would stimulate the industrial development of the country and generally assist business recovery.

On the other hand, Sir James Grigg and other opponents of devaluation argued that devaluation of her currency by India at that juncture would constitute a breach of the Tripartite monetary agreement (1936) signed by the U.K., the U.S.A., and France, and would adversely affect the prospects of world stabilization of currencies. India's action in devaluing the rupee would provoke retaliation elsewhere and revive the currency war. There was no need for devaluing the rupee further since it had already been devalued by about 40 per cent in relation to gold by being linked to sterling, enabling India to share in the economic recovery of

¹ This motion moved by Mr A. Ayyangar related to the failure of the Government of India to revise the Indian currency and exchange policy in view of the devaluation of their currencies by France, Italy and other European countries. *Legislative Assembly Debates* (8 October 1936).

the sterling area. The rupee could not be said to be overvalued since it did not show any of the symptoms of an overvalued currency, viz. budget deficits, high money rates, loss of gold from currency reserve, falling trade balances and deflation of currency. Devaluation of European currencies did not much affect India and in any case she was armed under the Indian Tariff Act (1894) to protect her industries against dumping caused by depreciation of foreign currencies. As regards the much-desired revival of our export trade, devaluation was likely to worsen the present situation by provoking retaliation. The real trouble lay in aggressive economic nationalism abroad and restrictions on trade, and therefore the proper solution was to promote international goodwill, peace and stabilization of currencies. Lastly, it was pointed out that it would be unwise for India to indulge in devaluation and thereby upset the delicate fabric of the Otto Niemeyer (Financial) Award on the eve of provincial autonomy under the new constitution.

§29. **Recent (1938) attempt at devaluation of the rupee.**—During the year 1938 there was a good deal of agitation in India for an alteration in the rupee ratio. The weakening of the exchange value of the rupee, following a decline in the exports of merchandise and gold as a result of the economic recession of 1937-8, served as an added plea for the revival of the devaluation movement. The exchange rate touched the statutory lower point of 1s. 5 49/64d. in the first week of June. The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress took up the question of the revision of the rupee ratio. The Government of India were, however, opposed to any alteration in the statutory ratio, and in a *communiqué* issued on 6 June 1938 declared that they were satisfied that the maintenance of the present value of the rupee was required in the interests of India and that the gold and sterling assets available for this purpose with the Reserve Bank (and the Government of India) were more than ample. Nevertheless the movement for devaluation for some time gathered force and an unsuccessful attempt was made by some non-official members of the Central Legislative Assembly in September 1938 to secure the appointment of a Committee to report on the whole question of the rupee ratio and to determine a permanent basis for the Indian monetary system.

Following an improvement in the balance of trade the rupee exchange remained on the whole steady until the close of the year, the rate varying between 1s. 5 13/16d. and 1s. 5 15/16d. In the month of December, however, forward exchange rates weakened, the fall being further aggravated by speculation; and the Government of India issued another press *communiqué* (16 December 1938)

repeating their decision to maintain the exchange at the existing statutory rate. With the revival of the seasonal activity in the export markets and the firmness in the money rates the exchange rates steadied and improved to *1s. 5 31/32d.* in March 1939. Except for a temporary sagging tendency in May 1939, the exchange rates remained steady until the outbreak of the war in September 1939.¹ The present war entirely changed the outlook ; and the quick outflow of India's produce and Indian gold after 3 September created problems of exchange management antithetical to those of a year ago. The rupee, which was said to be overvalued in 1938, was considered undervalued after the Allies' declaration of war on Germany.²

§30. **Effects of the war (1939-?) on Indian currency and exchange.**³— Before referring to the considerations which must be reckoned with while indicating the future monetary standard of India, we may review the effects which the present war, which was declared in September 1939, has so far produced on the Indian currency and exchange system.

The initial effects of the war on Indian economy, despite the inevitable dislocation it entailed in many spheres, were on the whole beneficial to the country ; production, prices and foreign trade received a stimulus, and the prospects of the agriculturist generally improved. The Indian currency and the financial system withstood the strain remarkably well ; confidence in the paper currency was generally maintained despite the increased demand in certain centres for the conversion of notes into coin, and after an initial fall due to uncertainty, bank deposits and security prices generally recovered. The rupee-sterling exchange tightened in consequence of the war, as is shown by the fact that *1s. 6d.* after a long time materialized as the rate for December-February (1940) T.T. The Reserve Bank of India has also been successful in purchasing large quantities of sterling for Home treasury requirements and generally for strengthening the external assets of the currency reserve (see §32 below and ch. x). This stands in marked contrast with the weakening of the rupee-sterling exchange on the outbreak of the war of 1914-18 and the sale of sterling by Government in order to prop up the rupee ratio.

¹ See *Reports on Currency and Exchange*, 1938-9 (par. 27) and 1939-40 (par. 23).

² See *Annual Market Review* (1939), p. 18. See also §30.

³ See *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India* (February 1940, pp. 14, 23-4; August 1940, pp. 11-12, 18), and the *Report on Currency and Finance* (1939-40), pars. 23-4.

While the rupee remained firm in relation to sterling it depreciated in relation to the dollar, yen and the Continental currencies (the exchange quotations for leading Continental currencies have disappeared owing to their being occupied or surrounded by Germany) following the slump in the pound. With the pegging of sterling to the dollar at 4·02, the rupee-dollar exchange has been steady round about Rs. 332 per 100 dollars. In response to the increased trade activity and rise in commodity prices, which followed the outbreak of the war, the Reserve Bank of India expanded currency both in the form of bank notes and rupee coin to the extent of Rs. 48 crores between September and the end of December 1939. The active average circulation of notes increased from Rs. 186·06 crores in September 1939 to Rs. 237·29 crores in June 1940. This was effected against large purchases of sterling and considerable purchases of Treasury Bills by the Reserve Bank. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the rupee-sterling exchange was very steady during this period.

§31. **Exchange control.**—On the outbreak of the war, the Central Government delegated to the Reserve Bank the authority under the Defence of India Ordinance to administer the regulations relating to the control of dealings in coin, bullion, securities and foreign exchange.

All dealings in foreign exchange were required to be transacted through authorized dealers, and the Exchange Banks and certain Indian joint-stock banks were licensed as such. No restrictions were placed on the purchase and sale of Empire currencies with certain exceptions, while the purchase and sale of non-Empire currencies was restricted to genuine trade purposes, travelling expenses and personal remittances. The policy of exchange control was to ensure that all foreign exchange transactions in India were done on the basis of the rates quoted by the London Exchange Control combined with the current rupee rates for sterling. Control was also established over the purchase of securities from foreigners, and export of securities could not be done without the previous permission of the Reserve Bank. These measures were intended to prevent export of capital from India and to check speculation in exchange, which is generally encouraged by war conditions.

The exchange control regulations were gradually tightened as the need arose. An important development was the institution on 9 March 1940 of a scheme for the control of foreign exchange proceeds of exports to the hard currency countries (e.g. United States of America) in accordance with the Empire scheme formulated by the British Government. The object of the scheme was to obtain control of the foreign currency proceeds of the exports, and

also to see that the full proceeds of the exports were received at control rates (e.g. rupee-dollar rate). This has given rise to some dissatisfaction among the business community. In general, measures of exchange control, while inevitable during the war, have had a certain degree of adverse reaction on exports and commodity prices.

In May 1940, the Government introduced a system of licensing imports for the purpose of conserving foreign exchange and ensuring that no goods, whose entry into the country was banned, were paid for prior to arrival.

§32. Restrictions on export and import of gold.—With regard to gold no restrictions were placed on its transfer within British India, while imports and exports were permitted only on the authority of a licence granted by the Reserve Bank. Licences for import were generally given, while those for export were also granted provided that the gold was consigned to the Bank of England or, if consigned to America, the relative dollar proceeds were sold to the Federal Reserve Bank on behalf of the Bank of England. The general implication of the regulations is to discourage gold transactions as between India and countries other than the United Kingdom. The exigencies of the war demand the conserving of all gold resources for the use of India and Great Britain.

It would appear that the war has stimulated export of gold from India, which, including purchases made by the Reserve Bank in India on behalf of its foreign constituents, exceeded Rs. 42 crores during the ten months ending 31 January 1940.

While the sterling securities in the Issue Department of the Reserve Bank of India increased from Rs. 59.50 crores on 1 September 1939 to Rs. 131.50 crores on 1 September 1940, no addition has been effected in the stock of gold held by the Reserve Bank of India.¹ This has provoked a certain amount of criticism of the policy followed by the Reserve Bank. *Indian Finance*, for example, has suggested that the Government of India, like the Governments of other countries, should prohibit the export of gold from India during the war and that the Reserve Bank should be enabled to raise the proportion of the gold cover held against notes by purchasing gold both in the United States of America and India.

§33. Withdrawal of rupee coin and issue of one-rupee notes.—Although, as stated above, the Indian currency system withstood the strain of the war remarkably well, and confidence in the paper

¹ See chs. x and xi for the disposal of some of the sterling securities for repatriation of sterling debt.

currency was generally maintained, an adverse reaction set in in May and June 1940, following the worsening of the war situation in Europe, through the occupation of Holland, Belgium and part of France by Germany, the entry of Italy into the war and Japan's activities in the Far East. There was a heavy demand on the Reserve Bank for the encashment of notes into rupee coin. The withdrawals from the Bank, which had previously been made normally at an average of less than a crore a week, suddenly leapt to four and five crores. After the beginning of the war more than Rs. 43 crores of rupee coin was supplied by the Reserve Bank and hoarded till the end of July 1940, as is shown by the decline in the stock of rupee coin held in the Issue Department from Rs. 75.47 crores at the start of the war to Rs. 32 crores by 5 July 1940. Under these circumstances, the Government of India decided to modify the earlier policy of permitting free withdrawals, which, if continued, might lead to a serious breakdown later. It was physically impossible for the mints in India to produce coins at the rate at which they were disappearing into hoards, even though the silver stocks of the Government of India were ample. The Government, therefore, issued a Notification on 25 June 1940 penalizing the acquisition of rupee coin in excess of personal or business requirements. This naturally brought the inconvenience to a temporary head as the requisite machinery for the necessary scrutiny by the Reserve Bank could not be improvised at a moment's notice. For some time, rupee coins were quoted at a premium over currency notes, and acute shortage of rupee coins and small change was experienced. These difficulties were, however, soon overcome and the Reserve Bank was able to make arrangements for wider issue of small coin and for meeting reasonable demands for rupees. The issue of one-rupee notes through the Reserve Bank by the Government of India, which had been hesitating for some time, under an Ordinance issued on 24 July 1940, materially contributed to relieving the situation inasmuch as such notes would not be used for hoarding even by the most short-sighted or nervous hoarder and, therefore, remain in circulation as a medium of exchange. Moreover, the issue of the new notes also met a general demand for a medium of exchange smaller than the lowest Reserve Bank note (viz. Rs. 5). These notes, which are to be treated exactly as if they were a rupee coin issued under the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act (1906), are to be unlimited legal tender in British India. They do not, therefore, convey any promise to pay in rupee coin, unlike the one-rupee and 2½-rupee notes issued during the war of 1914-18.

§34. Reduction in the silver content of quarter- and half-rupees.—

Another measure adopted for conserving the silver resources of the country has been the lowering of the standard of fineness of the silver content of the four-anna piece and the half-rupee coin. The Central Legislature authorized the Government in April 1940 to reduce the silver content of the four-anna piece from eleven-twelfths to one-half, the idea being simply to make Government stocks of the metal do more service. A similar reduction in the silver content of the eight-anna piece was effected under an Ordinance issued by the Government of India on 26 July 1940, to amend the Indian Coinage Act (1906) for this purpose. The step was justified by the Government in view of the increasing demand for quarter- and half-rupee coins simultaneously with the rapid absorption of rupee coin for hoarding. It was felt that it would be extremely wasteful to turn out large quantities of half-rupees of the old fineness of eleven-twelfths silver. Half-rupees of the old fineness will, of course, continue to be legal tender.

§35. Issue of new rupees with reduced silver content.—The fineness of one-half silver and one-half alloy, recently adopted for half-rupees and quarter-rupees, has recently been extended to whole rupee coins under a Government *communiqué* issued on 22 December 1940. This measure has been necessitated by the increasing demand for rupee coin consequent on increased trade activities and their absorption in hoards, and the fact that the one-rupee notes already introduced are not entirely convenient or suitable for some rural areas. The *communiqué* points out that it is extremely wasteful to turn out large quantities of rupees of the present fineness of eleven-twelfths silver and one-twelfth alloy. A new security edge device has been adopted for the new rupees as a safeguard against counterfeiting. Apart from this, they are exactly similar in weight and general appearance to the old rupees except that they have a somewhat duller ring. They will bear the date 1940. This measure is calculated to relieve the scarcity of coin in circulation.

It may be added that the action taken by the Government cannot be described as debasement of currency. Sir Jeremy Raisman has rightly corrected the 'elementary misconception' that the fine metal content of a token coin should necessarily bear any particular relationship to its value. Indeed, the rupee is often described as a note printed on silver.

§36. Future monetary standard of India.—The question of the future monetary standard of India is attended by a twofold uncertainty. In the first place, no one can say definitely when the

international monetary situation will be sufficiently clarified to justify action on the part of the Reserve Bank of India being taken on the lines indicated in the Reserve Bank Act.

In the second place, even before the outbreak of war (1939) there was no consensus of opinion among the nations of the world as to the future monetary standard and no early possibility of an agreed measure of stabilization of world currencies.¹ While expert monetary opinion as expressed at the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in June 1933 appeared to favour the restoration of the gold standard, it was widely realized that the time was not opportune to do so. The hope of early world stabilization of currencies raised by the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of October 1936 was not realized; and in the present condition of international turmoil no one can safely predict when the requisite conditions for the successful operation of an international gold standard will be fulfilled. It is clear, therefore, that India cannot make up her mind today as to her future monetary standard and it will be necessary for her to mark time and wait upon future developments. The managed currency standard appears to be far too advanced a standard for India to adopt, although as the ultimate goal of her currency policy hardly any other better standard can be suggested. Subject to the restoration of reasonably normal world conditions, she must continue her quest for some suitable form of the gold standard and adopt it at the right psychological moment. Even those who uphold the existing sterling exchange standard in India are ready to admit that it is by no means an ideal standard as a permanent measure, the fundamental objection to it being that it makes a country's monetary system far too dependent upon the monetary policies of another country, when identical economic conditions in the two countries cannot be postulated. One thing amidst these uncertainties is clear, and that is that the Reserve Bank should spare no effort to build up and strengthen the country's gold (monetary) reserves, which are the one safe sheet-anchor of a currency system in the economic welter prevailing in the world.

§37. **Purchase of sterling.**—When describing the mechanism of Council Drafts attention was called to the recently started practice of Government purchase of sterling, which must be regarded as an important modification of the Council Bill system.² We have also made passing references to the employment of this new method for arresting the rise of exchange beyond a certain desired level.³ We may now conclude this chapter by a more detailed description

¹ See L. L. B. Angas, *Problems of Foreign Exchanges*, ch. xxi.

² *Ante*, ch. vii, §20.

³ *Ante*, ch. vii, §32.

of this new system, which was introduced in 1923-4. In that year, while the weekly sales of Council Bills continued as before the sales of Intermediates at higher rates were stopped and were replaced by the purchase of sterling in India from banks and private financial houses willing to sell their sterling resources in London for rupees offered to them in India. These purchases were conducted by the Government through the agency of the Imperial Bank. The system was further extended in 1924-5, when the purchase of sterling was resorted to as the principal method of remittance, the weekly sale of Council Bills being started only when a steady and continuous demand for Council Bills manifested itself. During the year 1925-6 there was no sale of Council Bills, and the system of Council Drafts has since then been entirely superseded by the novel method of sterling purchases in India.¹ The Hilton-Young Commission recommended the purchase of sterling by competitive public tender and the publication of the weekly returns of remittances. Accordingly, since April 1927, the system of purchase in India by public tender has been inaugurated. Tenders are received on one day each week, usually on Wednesday, simultaneously in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi, and particulars of the amounts allotted at each rate are published on the following day in each of these places. Between the days on which the tenders are received Intermediates are on offer at the offices of the Reserve Bank of India² at these places at a rate $1\frac{1}{32}d.$ above the highest rate accepted on the previous day on which the tenders were received. The weekly returns of remittances are also published.

The function of sterling purchases and the responsibility for remittances to the Secretary of State have been transferred to the Reserve Bank of India with effect from 1 April 1935. As in the case of Council Bills, the system of sterling purchase enables the Reserve Bank to take advantage of a firm or rising exchange and also to prevent the appreciation of the rupee above the point fixed by the Reserve Bank of India Act. (See §27.) The object underlying the new system is that the factors influencing the immediate course of exchange can be much more accurately and promptly judged in India and the purchases can be regulated much more satisfactorily with reference to the varying conditions of the market. The operations of Government remittances can be conducted so as to avoid violent fluctuations in the rate, with benefit both to trade and to the country in general. In the early part of 1924-5, as we have already seen, further rise of exchange was

¹ See McWatters, 'Historical Memorandum on Indian Currency', submitted to the Hilton-Young Commission. *Report*, vol. II, p. 2.

² Formerly at the Imperial Bank.

prevented by Government purchases of sterling when the exchange had reached 1s. 6d. This method suits the Exchange Banks very well, as they can sell sterling to the Reserve Bank of India against their London balances, which are increased by their purchases of Export Bills in India, and thus immediately replenish their funds in this country.¹

The disadvantages attendant upon this system are similar to those which were usually made a ground for criticizing the old Council Drafts system. For example, it is possible for the Reserve Bank unless it takes care to limit its purchases of sterling to the actual requirements of the Government, to increase their magnitude to such an extent as to prevent in a large measure the free flow of gold into India, or to acquire large sterling resources in London as during the present war (see chs. x and xi). Similarly, the rate of purchase may be regulated in such a manner as to produce the same effect. Another disadvantage that has been pointed out relates to the sale of sterling in India by the public tender system, which places foreign centres dealing with India at a disadvantage. Under the old system, because the Council Drafts were sold in London which was the world's financial centre, foreign countries could easily compete in the purchase of drafts on India. It is more difficult for the foreign demand for rupees to manifest itself equally effectively in India, and thus the Reserve Bank may not be able to obtain the best possible price for the rupee.² On a balance the new machinery of purchase of sterling in India is undoubtedly an advance on the Council Drafts system and is calculated to yield satisfactory results now that the Reserve Bank of India has taken charge of it.

¹ See ch. x.

² cf. Ramachandra Rao, 'Purchase of Sterling', *Mysore Economic Journal*, June 1928.

CHAPTER IX

PRICES IN INDIA

§1. Importance of the problem of prices.—Prices are an outward index of the movements taking place within the economic system ; and therefore problems connected with price movements are at once the most abstruse and the most important in the discussion of economic conditions in any country. The importance of understanding the nature and extent of price movements is clear from the fact that land revenue assessments are largely based on them in this country, and that a change in the purchasing power of the agriculturist following changes in the prices of agricultural staples affects not only his economic position, but also the entire economy of the country for good or ill. Price changes have also been associated with the Government's currency policy in India, and the question whether they indicate increasing prosperity or the reverse has been the subject of endless and acrimonious debate. An attempt will, therefore, be made in this chapter to measure the price movements in India in recent years and to ascertain their significance.

§2. A bird's-eye view of price movements since 1861.—The table opposite indicates the general course of prices in India since 1861 with 1873 as the basic year.¹ The general index number is based on the wholesale prices of 39 articles (28 exported and 11 imported articles), except in the case of food grains, namely, jowar, bajra, barley, ragi and gram—wholesale prices of these articles not being available before 1897.

The Government index numbers in column two of the table, taken from the publication *Index Numbers of Indian Prices*, are unweighted. The equal importance attached to the commodities prevents the index numbers from recording faithfully the nature and significance of the changes in the price level. India is an agricultural country and her agricultural production, which accounts for the bulk of her total production, consists of a few staple commodities like rice, wheat, cotton, jute, etc., while others are comparatively insignificant. Some articles like cotton cloth, cotton yarn, raw silk and coal have been allowed to exercise an undue

¹ The year 1873 was chosen as the basic year because of normal seasons and because it was since about that year that the depreciation of silver and the consequent depreciation of the rupee may be said to have started.

influence upon the final result, and the whole series of prices is dominated by imported goods and those in direct competition with them.¹ As the all-India index number, with 1873 as the base, is

Year ²	General index number for 39 articles (unweighted)	Weighted index number (100 articles) equated to 100 for 1873	Year	General index number for 39 articles (unweighted) ³	Weighted index number (100 articles) equated to 100 for 1873
1861	90	93	1924	221	257
1865	107	109	1926	216	260
1870	102	107	1927	202	...
1875	94	96	1928	201	...
1880	104	109	1929	203	...
1885	87	106	1930	171	...
1890	100	117	1931	127	...
1895	104	120	1932	126	...
1900	116	143	1933	121	...
1905	110	135	1934	119	...
1910	122	150	1935	127	...
1914	147	187	1936	125	...
1918	225	215	1937	136	...
1919	276	301	1938	132	...
1920	281	302	1939	142	...
1921	236	273	1940	163	...
1923	215	259	1941 (Feb.)	174	...

out of date, reference is usually made to the figures for the Bombay and Calcutta wholesale price indices (see §§6 and 15). The base year 1873 can no longer be regarded as suitable for comparison. So also the relative importance of commodities has very probably changed since the compilation of the series was first undertaken.

§3. Period from 1861 to 1893.—We indicate below the general character of the price movements between 1861 and 1893.⁴

¹ See Vakil and Muranjan, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

² See *Index Numbers of Indian Prices, 1861-1931* and its annual addenda. The weighted index numbers set out in the third and sixth columns of the above table were originally compiled by Mr F. J. Atkinson of the Indian Finance Department. The index numbers for the years subsequent to 1909 have been compiled by the Department of Statistics on the lines of his calculations.

³ Since 1937 one item in the list of imported articles has been dropped.

⁴ For a study of the general course of prices from 1825 to 1907, see G. V. Joshi, *Writings and Speeches*, pp. 596-600, and paper on Prices of Food Grains in Madras by P. J. Thomas, *Indian Journal of Economics*, (Conference Number) 1941.

(i) *Rising Prices (1861-6)*.—The American Civil War led to the prices of foodstuffs between 1876 and 1879 owing to a great influx of specie into India and extensive coinage of silver, which was followed by a considerable rise of prices. This episode of high prices showed clearly for the first time the influence of external factors on the price level in India.

(ii) *Falling Prices (1866-83)*.—Except for a sudden jump in the prices of foodstuffs between 1876 and 1879 owing to a great famine, prices were falling from 1866 to 1883. This general fall in the earlier years may be regarded as a reaction against the previous high prices, and in later years as a counterpart of the general downward movement of prices which began in Western countries from about 1874. It has been attributed to the slackening in the production of gold, the adoption of the gold standard by countries previously on a silver standard basis, the arrest of the expansion of the silver currency owing to the closure of the mints to its free coinage, the slowing down of the development of banking and the growing volume of trade under the stimulus of a decrease in the freight charges, and improvements in the arts of production.¹

(iii) *Rising Prices (1883-93)*.—The fall in prices in India was arrested earlier than in the gold standard countries of the West, as a result of the depreciation of the rupee. It must be noted, however, that though silver began to depreciate in terms of gold roughly after 1874, the general increase in the production of commodities led to a fall of prices until about 1883. After 1885, when the production of silver definitely outstripped the production of commodities, we enter upon an era of rising prices in India. This may be regarded as having continued right up to 1920, except for the brief interval 1893-9, when prices went down somewhat owing to the contraction of currency in India due to the closing of the mints, though the effect of this factor was a little obscured by the famines during this period. The rise in prices was the outcome mainly of the depreciation of silver and the heavy rupee coinage between 1881 and 1892.

§4. *The Prices Enquiry Committee (prices during 1890-1912)*.—In 1910 the Government of India appointed a committee (the Datta Committee) for finding out the causes of the continued rise of prices in India. The period chosen for investigation by this Committee was 1890 to 1912.²

During 1890-1912, there was a general rise in prices through-

¹ See Irving Fisher, *Purchasing Power of Money*, p. 142.

² K. L. Datta, *Report on the Enquiry into the Rise of Prices in India (1914)*, p. 29.

out India, which was specially marked after 1905. The rise in prices was specially marked in the case of hides and skins, food grains (pulses and cereals), building materials, and oil-seeds, all of which rose 40 per cent or more above the level of the basic period. Cotton and jute rose about 33 and 31 per cent respectively, while other articles of food, metals, and other raw and manufactured articles rose by about 25 per cent. There was a moderate increase in country sugar; but, on the other hand, there was an appreciable decrease in the prices of tea and coffee, imported sugar, dyeing and tanning materials, especially indigo, coal, and shellac, as also a slight fall in the prices of other textiles. It is noteworthy that the rise in prices was greatest in India, as is shown by the fact that the level during the quinquennium 1907-11, as compared with the quinquennium 1894-8, showed an increase of 40 per cent, corresponding percentage rises being 21 for the United Kingdom, 38 for the United States, and 20 for Australia.

§5. *Causes of the rise of prices before the war of 1914-18.*—The Prices Enquiry Committee divided the causes into two classes, namely (i) causes peculiar to India, and (ii) causes not confined to India, that is, world factors; though they recognize that the two sets of causes reacted on each other.

(i) *Causes peculiar to India.*—According to the Committee the causes peculiar to India were (a) shortage in supply of agricultural products, particularly of food grains, and raw materials,¹ (b) increase in the demand for these commodities; (c) development of railways and other communications in India, and the lowering of the direct and indirect costs of transport in India itself and between Indian ports and foreign countries; (d) improvement in the general monetary and banking facilities and increase of credit; (e) increase in the volume of the circulating medium.

(ii) *World factors.*—The world factors were (a) shortage in the supply of and increase in the demand for staple commodities in the world's markets; (b) the increased gold supply from the world's mines; (c) the development of credit; (d) destructive wars, and increase of standing armies and navies in most of the Western countries and the United States, diverting capital and labour into unproductive channels and causing an increased demand for many classes of commodities. India was switched on to the currency gauge of the rest of the world owing to her abandonment of

¹ The shortage in the opinion of the Committee was due to (i) the growth of cultivation not keeping pace with the growth of population; (ii) unseasonable rainfall; (iii) the substitution of non-food for food crops; and (iv) the inferiority of the new lands taken up for cultivation.

the silver standard in 1893, and no doubt she shared in the price fluctuations in the rest of the world owing to these causes.

The analysis presented by the Committee is open to grave objection from the strictly scientific point of view and it undoubtedly committed a serious error in rejecting currency inflation as the main cause of the rise in prices. The rupee being no more than a note printed on silver and being inconvertible into gold, it was almost as easy to issue it to excess as inconvertible paper notes. That on occasions excessive rupee coinage did take place in this manner, for example in 1905-7, has been freely recognized even by Mr J. M. Keynes, one of the warmest admirers of the gold exchange standard in India, as the following passage in his book, *Indian Currency and Finance*, testifies:¹ 'The effects of heavy coinage are cumulative. The Indian authorities do not seem to have understood this. They were, to all appearances, influenced by the crude inductive argument that, because there was a heavy demand in 1905-6, it was likely that there would be an equally heavy demand in 1906-7; and, when there actually was a heavy demand in 1906-7, that this made it yet more likely that there would be a heavy demand in 1907-8. They framed their policy, that is to say, as though a community consumed currency with the same steady appetite with which some communities consume beer.'

The view that heavy coinage was mainly responsible for the rise in prices was voiced in the Imperial Legislative Council by the late Mr Gokhale in 1908 in the following words: 'The stock of rupees in existence in India before 1898 was estimated by Mr Harrison, the expert, at 130 crores. During the last ten years the Government have made a net addition to this stock of over 100 crores. . . . Such a sudden inflation is bound to result in a general rise in prices. . . . What is probably happening is this. The rupees issued by the Government in response to the demands of trade go into the interior and spread themselves among those from whom purchases are made. But they do not flow back quickly to centres of trade, or to banks, and thus new rupees have to be obtained for transactions for which the old rupees might have sufficed. Meanwhile, the melting of rupees having ceased (as a result of the token character of the rupee since the closing of the mints in 1893 and its artificial higher exchange value), every issue becomes a net addition to the volume of currency.'²

There is a striking parallelism between the general index

¹ p. 134.

² See *Speeches of Mr G. K. Gokhale*, p. 150.

number of prices and the estimated total of the currency for each of the years between 1903 and 1907, as the following table shows.

Year	General index nos. of prices	Estimated total of currency on the 1st of April of each year	Year	General index nos. of prices	Estimated total of currency on the 1st of April of each year
1903	100	100	1906	131	127
1904	102	110	1907	140	136 143 (Dec. 1)
1905	112	115			

Mr Datta, however, suggests that the parallelism is purely accidental. He urges that the average net coinage was much less during the period 1892-3 to 1911-12 than during 1874-5 to 1892-3. But he forgets that during the first period much of the coin was melted and there was scarcely any net addition to the currency from year to year, whereas during the second period melting ceased as one of the results of the closing of the mints, so that every rupee coined was a positive addition to the existing stock. Again, before 1893, the value of the rupee depended on the value of silver, and the latter depended on the changes in the supply of silver (assuming demand to remain constant). The annual additions to the supply by imports of silver were so small relatively to the total stock of silver in the country, that they could not cause any noticeable alteration in the value of the metal and therefore in the value of the rupee. But after 1893 the main factor determining the value of the rupee was the quantity of rupee coins (and not silver) in existence at any given time, and since the annual coinage added considerably to the number of rupees already in circulation, the effect on rupee prices was pronounced.¹

§6. Prices during the war of 1914-18 and the pre-depression period.—The tendency of prices to rise during the period before the war of 1914-18 manifested itself in an unprecedented degree during the years 1914-20, especially during the latter part of this period, owing to conditions created by the war. The rise in prices was, however, smaller in India than in some other countries, especially in those that were directly engaged in the war, as will be seen from the table on p. 394.

The higher rise of prices abroad would normally have been corrected by a rise in exports and decline in imports. The

¹ See Chabiani, *Studies in Indian Currency and Exchange*, pp. 67-8

consequent import of specie into India would have caused a rise in the internal prices until they equalled external prices. But the restrictions on the import of specie and exports of goods, as well as Government control of prices during war-time, prevented this adjustment. Indian producers were thus deprived of the benefits of higher prices.

Index numbers of wholesale prices in India and some foreign countries

Year	(a) India (Calcutta) 1914=100	U.K. 1913=100 (Board of Trade)	(b) U.S.A.	France 1913=100	Japan 1914=100
1913	...	100	100	100	...
1914	100	100	98	102	100
1915	112	127	101	140	97
1916	128	160	127	188	117
1917	145	206	177	262	149
1918	178	226	194	339	196
1919	196	242	206	356	236
1920	201	295	226	509	259
1921	178	182	147	345	200
1922	176	159	149	327	196
1923	172	159	154	419	199
1924	173	166	150	489	207
1925	159	159	159	550	202
1926	148	148	100	703	179
1927	148	141	95	617	170
1928	145	140	97	620	171

This was one of the reasons why they were unable to build up ampler reserves and were at a disadvantage as compared with the importers of competitive articles, when the war-time boom was followed by a depression. Again, in the absence of Government interference, exchange would have risen even earlier and more rapidly than it did and this would have stimulated imports and checked the relatively greater rise in the price of imports. India would have received better value for her exports and would have been better able to meet the cost of post-war reconstruction. The consideration, however, which prompted Government interference with exchange was that serious trade dislocation would have resulted at a very critical stage of the war if exchange had been left to itself entirely.¹

During the period of the war of 1914-18 the prices of practically all commodities in India, including the necessaries of life, showed

(a) See *Review of the Trade of India, 1927-8* and *Report of the Controller of Currency, 1927-8*, Statement I.

(b) 1913=100 up to 1925, afterwards 1926=100.

¹ See Anstey, *op. cit.*, pp. 457-8.

a very steep rise. By 1919, the prices of food grains had risen on an average by 93 per cent since the beginning of the war, while the increase in piece-goods was just under 190 per cent for imported goods and just over 60 per cent for Indian-made goods. We have already observed that the prices of the imported goods, such as cotton piece-goods, steel and iron, sugar, dye-stuffs, etc. in general, rose much more than those of the exported goods, and have also explained the causes of this disparity.¹ The shortage of production as well as the intense competitive demand of the belligerent countries for commodities of all kinds, together with the creation of a huge volume of credit and currency to finance the war, were responsible for the phenomenal increase of prices. These world conditions were bound, sooner or later, to react on India by increasing the demand for her products abroad as well as by adding to the cost of her imports. The restrictions imposed on exports by the shortage of tonnage and by Government control, however, checked the rise in prices in India to some extent.

§7. Inflation of currency.—We have already noticed that, for some time after the outbreak of the war of 1914-18, the balance of trade remained strongly in favour of India. At the same time there was a serious reduction in the imports of treasure, thus throwing upon the Government the whole of the responsibility of financing the export trade by issuing a large volume of additional currency in the form of rupees as well as currency notes. The expansion of currency of all kinds was very much greater relatively to the increase in the volume of business. The process of inflation was also helped by the methods of war finance adopted by the Government. In order to meet the heavy war expenditure they furnished themselves with the means of payment partly by raising taxation and loans and partly by the artificial creation of purchasing power. The Government possessing, as they did, the absolute monopoly of note issue, were able directly to provide themselves with the means of payment by watering the paper currency. The War Loans of the Government also inevitably led to inflation. Only a portion of these loans came out of the real savings of the people. The remainder took the form of bank credits or the creation of deposits, subject to cheques, which the banks opened in favour of the Government, on their own account or on behalf of their customers who wished to invest in the War Loans.² The short-term Treasury Bills which were issued by the Government of India for meeting the successive budget deficits were another source of inflation as the banks lent freely against their security and that of the War Bonds. Thus there was a very

¹ See above, ch. vi, §5.

² Panandikar, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-18.

large increase in the bank deposits (credits) as well as in their velocity (as shown by the bank clearings),¹ which supplied so much more buying power and thereby contributed to the rise of prices.²

One of the causes why the rise of prices in India was not so high as in other countries was that the extent of currency inflation was far less in India, though speaking absolutely it was considerable.³

There were other causes which aggravated the rise, such as the shortage of rolling-stock during the war years and widespread failure of the monsoon in India during the year 1918-19 and again in the latter part of 1920. Prices reached their highest limit in the year 1920, with the Calcutta index number at 201 as compared to 100 in 1914.

§8. *Effects of high prices.*—The Prices Enquiry Committee held that the high prices in India before the war of 1914-18 benefited the country as a whole. This view was then endorsed by the Government in their Resolution on the Report of the Committee (1914). The Committee argued that India, being a debtor country with large foreign obligations which she meets by the export of part of her produce, benefits when the prices of such produce rise, because then she is able to discharge her foreign obligations by the export of a smaller volume of commodities. But as against the high prices of exports we must set the increased prices of imports and the higher cost of production. In any case it is difficult to believe that a higher range of prices, especially when it is due to an inflation of currency, is by itself capable of conferring any permanent advantages on the country as a whole, sufficient to offset its well-known disadvantages. The late Hon'ble Mr G. V. Joshi expressed what after all is the sound view in this matter when he observed that 'a real increase of wealth and prosperity comes to nations as it does to individuals, not from any reckless piling up of coined rupees or again from any rise of prices . . . which . . . in India is almost invariably associated with crop failures and famine conditions, but only from an increase in industrial activity, energy and efficiency on the one side, and on the other, from increased productive employment of capital'.⁴ Rising prices do stimulate productive activity. But the process must be gradual and we can only know that it has been gradual if independent proof is forthcoming of the fact of increased prosperity. It is dangerous to suppose that if prices are rising, that in itself is sufficient proof that the nation is advancing in prosperity. For in that case material progress could be cheaply and effectively

¹ See also ch. x. ² See Findlay Shirras, *op. cit.*, pp. 232 and 410-11.

³ D. T. Jack, *Restoration of European Currencies*, p. 3.

⁴ See G. V. Joshi, *Speeches and Writings*, p. 610.

secured by deliberately raising the price level, say, by inflation. Mrs V. Anstey, in an interesting and thought-provoking chapter of her book, *The Economic Development of India*,¹ has attempted to derive certain conclusions regarding national prosperity from price- and wage-movements in India during the periods before 1914 and after 1918. She has argued that the results yielded by this method are more reliable than those based on the uncertain estimates of *per capita* income at various dates which we have discussed in chapter IV. It should, however, be noted that an examination of price changes cannot by itself give us any information as to whether there has been any progress or setback from the point of view of *wealth production*. It merely tells us in what manner the *distribution* of wealth amongst the various classes of people has been affected by any given alteration in the price level, and its conclusions as regards benefit or injury to the nation as a whole due to the price alterations are based on certain assumptions as to the relative importance to be attached to the welfare of the different classes. It is suggested, for example, that 'in India the bulk of the people belong to those classes which are benefited by a rise in prices', and that the debtor classes are on the whole more deserving, so that even when they benefit at the expense of the creditor classes there is nothing to regret in this because these latter consist mainly of moneylenders who are simply 'bloodsuckers'. It seems, however, an invidious procedure to classify certain sections of society as deserving and certain others as undeserving. A really sound notion of national progress implies the prosperity of all classes and not of some classes at the expense of others. Again, difficulty arises from the fact that many people are creditors at the same time that they are debtors. It also seems rather crude to indulge in sweeping condemnation of the whole creditor class. There are indeed good reasons for supposing that the period before the war of 1914-18 between the years 1900 and 1914 was on the whole a period of steady if slow economic progress in India. But we contend that it is not possible to establish this conclusion by interpreting price statistics alone.

Mrs Anstey holds that the price changes before the war of 1914-18 were of such a nature that they must at least have benefited the large body of cultivators in India ; because the rise in the articles of export, that is those which the cultivator sells, for example jute (43 per cent), hides and skins (59 per cent), oil-seeds (45 per cent), food grains (42 per cent), was far more pronounced than

¹ pp. 445 *et seq.*

the rise in the imports, that is articles which he purchases, for example cotton manufactures (25 per cent), metals (20 per cent), sugar (9 per cent), kerosene (no change), salt (which fell by 30 per cent even without allowing for the decrease in duty). A relative change in prices of this nature undoubtedly provides the conditions under which the cultivator may benefit, but there is no guarantee that the possible advantage will be always realized in practice. The profits of the cultivator are, for instance, liable to be intercepted by a variety of other interests, and special proof is required that this has not occurred to any considerable extent before we accept the advantage to the cultivator as established beyond doubt.

During the war of 1914-18 prices of imports rose more than the prices of exports. This had the result of increasing the expenditure of the cultivator relatively to his income, and is generally admitted to have injuriously affected the agricultural classes. Here then we have a refutation of the general proposition that a rise in prices must benefit the bulk of the people in India. Dr Mann's investigations into the economic conditions of a village in the Deccan about the year 1917, actually show that the consequences of a rise in prices may be positively harmful under certain conditions. Monetary instability causes 'a redistribution of the favours of fortune so as to frustrate design and disappoint expectation', and it destroys the atmosphere of security which is essential for the confident pursuit of economic activities. On these general grounds we must regard with suspicion any attempts to prove that large price fluctuations either in the one direction or the other are beneficial to the country as a whole.

§9. Effects on agriculturists.—It is often said that landholders and the village people in general must necessarily benefit by high prices for agricultural produce. It is, however, clear that only those who have a surplus to sell would benefit, and only in case the goods they have to purchase have not also risen in the same proportion as the goods they sell. Again, as already stated above, the gains of the agriculturists in India are intercepted to a very large extent by a numerous class of middlemen, and the high prices consequently do not result in any appreciable advance in the economic condition of the agriculturist. We must also take into account the fact that, while cultivators of their own land and of lands rented on long leases, depending on their own labour and having a surplus to sell, stand to gain by high prices, this does not hold good of those who have to make rent payments in kind or who have received advances repayable in grain, or again those who hold short-term leases of land or have to employ hired labour.

Moreover, both classes of cultivators have to reckon with increased expenses of production and higher prices of commodities like cloth, oil and other prime and conventional necessities of life.

§10. **Rural labourers.**—It is almost axiomatic that wage movements lag behind price changes, so that when prices rise there is a shorter or longer period of hardship which wage-earners must generally go through. In this connexion it is necessary to bear in mind that many petty cultivators in India are also wage-earners. According to Mr Datta, however, the wages of rural labour—agricultural labourers and village artisans—rose faster before the war of 1914-18 than the retail prices, and the rise was the greatest in rural areas, where the real wages of these classes showed an increase of 38 per cent.¹ Similarly, during the war and post-war period there was apparently a progressive adjustment of rural wages to prices, established after an interval of considerable suffering during the period of non-adjustment. 'Throughout the period under review (1921-2) unskilled agricultural labourers commanded such high wages that in certain parts of India cultivators found a more certain and profitable means of livelihood than agricultural work.' The fall in prices since 1921 further secured to the rural labourer some increase of real wages.²

A downward tendency has, however, been noticeable in wages since 1926, especially in the rural areas. This tendency was accelerated during the years of the economic depression (1929-33). There was in these years a sharp fall in rural wages, although this was offset by the cheapness of foodstuffs and other necessities of life (see §15 below).

§11. **Effects on rent receivers.**—Regarding the effects of a rise in prices on cash rents, a distinction is necessary between protected or privileged, and unprotected classes of tenants. In the former case, illustrated by the class of occupancy tenants, rents would naturally show a comparatively small rise; while in the second case the increases might be very considerable.³

§12. **Effects on industry.**—(i) *Handicrafts.*—We have already drawn attention to the condition of economic stagnation of persons engaged in indigenous handicrafts owing to the competition of machine-made goods. The rise in prices, if anything, increased the severity of this competition and made the position of the handicraftsmen even weaker than before.

¹ K. L. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

² *India in 1921-2*, p. 103.

³ It may be noticed that in recent years there has been an attempt on the part of the labouring and tenant classes to secure for themselves the advantages of collective bargaining by the formation of tenant unions and *kisan sabhas*, not to speak of recent legislative interference on their behalf.

(ii) *Capitalist manufacturers.*—The case of capitalist manufacturers is more complicated, for, generally speaking, the rise in prices is not immediately followed by a proportionate rise in all the costs of production including wages. Therefore, *prima facie*, this class should benefit at least in the beginning. The rise in prices during and after the war of 1914-18 no doubt brought the manufacturers immense profits. But these profits were mostly dissipated in the distribution of recklessly high dividends, instead of being utilized for strengthening the reserves. 'Full steam ahead and damn the consequences' seemed to be the motto of the mill-owners, and they had later to pay the penalty for this policy. The difficulties of the recent period of depression could not indeed have been avoided altogether by any amount of foresight, but the lack of foresight certainly added to them to an appreciable extent.

§13. *Labour in rural areas and cities.*—In the period before 1914, the nominal and real wages of the different classes of labourers rose, though the rise in real wages was not so high as in the rural areas, being 38 per cent in the rural areas and 28 per cent in the cities. The rapid rise of prices between 1917 and 1920 led to an epidemic of strikes, and in some cases there were even bread riots and looting of bazaars. After 1921, however, a definite improvement in the condition of industrial labour, both by an increase of wages and a progressive fall in the cost of living, took place. But the adverse position of industry in the recent years of depression resulted in lower wages, widespread unemployment and much suffering among the wage-earning classes. A partial improvement was effected in 1938 in consequence of restoration of wage cuts in Bombay and some other provinces (see ch. iii).

§14. *Effects on persons with fixed incomes.*—The worst sufferers from high prices are persons with fixed money incomes, like pensioners, clerks and, in general, the lower grades of state and commercial employees, or those dependent on income from securities and shares, and professional men who live upon customary fees. These classes, collectively styled as the middle classes, suffer greatly during periods of high prices owing to their fixed money earnings and the heavy increase in the cost of food, clothing, lighting, house rents, and the wages of such labour as they happen to employ. Their social status debars them from undertaking work of certain kinds, while the market in which they themselves compete for employment is chronically overstocked. Nor have they yet learnt the value of organization and collective bargaining.

§15. *Prices during the depression and post-depression periods.*—Prices in India having reached their maximum in 1920 began to decline from 1921, and for some time the process was more

rapid in the United Kingdom than in India, endangering the Government policy of stabilizing the rupee at 2s. gold. The sale of the Reverse Councils in 1920 and the consequent deflation of currency led to a fall of prices. Also, as a result of the adverse balance of trade in 1920-1 and 1921-2, there was an actual export of gold from India. Lastly, there was the influence of world forces on Indian prices, explaining the striking parallel downward movement in India, the United States and the United Kingdom until 1929. (See Table on p. 394 above.) The influence of the 1s. 6d. ratio in depressing Indian prices has already been dealt with and we need not say anything further here on that score.

The downward movement of prices was very appreciably accelerated during the period of the world economic depression which was ushered in by the Wall Street collapse in America (October 1929).¹ It was a phenomenon from which no part of the civilized world escaped as may be seen from the table below. The prices of primary products fell more than those of manufactured articles, and agricultural countries like India were more adversely affected thereby than industrial countries like the United Kingdom. The Calcutta wholesale price index number (July

Index numbers of wholesale prices in Calcutta and Bombay and some foreign countries

	India (Calcutta)		India (Bombay) ²		United Kingdom (Board of Trade)	United States of America	Canada	Australia (Melbourne)	Japan	France
	July 1914 = 100	1929 = 100	July 1914 = 100	1929 = 100						
	1929 = 100									
1929 Average	141	100.0	145	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930 "	116	82.3	126	86.9	87.5	90.7	90.6	88.5	82.4	88.4
1931 "	96	68.1	100	75.2	76.8	76.6	75.4	79.2	69.0	80.0
1932 "	91	64.5	100	75.2	74.9	68.0	69.8	78.3	73.3	68.2
1933 "	87	61.7	98	67.6	75.0	69.3	70.2	78.2	81.6	63.6
1934 "	89	63.1	95	65.5	77.1	78.7	74.9	81.6	80.8	60.0
1935 "	91	64.5	99	68.3	77.8	83.9	75.4	81.5	84.4	54.0
1936 "	91	64.5	96	66.2	82.7	84.8	78.0	85.6	89.9	65.5
1937 "	102	72.3	106	73.1	95.2	90.6	88.4	91.9	108.4	92.7
1937 August	105	74.5	106	73.1	97.5	91.8	89.5	95.4	107.0	96.2
1938 Average	95	67.6	101	69.7	88.8	82.5	82.2	92.2	114.3	104.1
1939 Jan.	96	68	100	69	85	81	77	94	118	110
1939 August	100	71	103	71	86	79	76	89	124	107

¹ See ch. vi, §7.

² *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 75.

1914=100) stood at 143 in September 1929. In September 1931 when Great Britain went off the gold standard, the index number stood at 91 (i.e. below the pre-war level). The rupee, which was then linked to sterling, reacted to the immediate consequences of sterling's departure from gold, and the price level improved to 98 in December of the year. This advantage was not maintained in 1932, which saw a steady decline to lower levels, the index number falling to 88 in December 1932 and 82 in March. But thereafter the price level steadied itself.

India in common with the rest of the world shared in the gradual economic recovery. There was a partial though slow and painful recovery of prices from April 1933 to August 1937. After reaching the bottom level in March 1933, the Calcutta index of prices moved up to 89 in December 1933. January 1934 saw an improvement by one point which was lost in the succeeding month, while in March there was a further fall to 88. During 1934 and 1935 the price level generally fluctuated within a margin of two points from this level, the changes being more often in the upward direction. January 1935 was, however, an exceptional month and saw a sharp rise by six points from 88 in the preceding month. This advance was only temporary and was due to a speculative rise in the price of cereals and oil-seeds. From 87 in March 1935, the index number rose to 93 in December 1935. Thereafter there was a relapse, and in April 1936 the index stood at 90. Later there was a limited recovery and the year closed at 94. Prices had moved up by as much as 11 points by August 1937, when the Calcutta index attained its maximum at 105. This rise was caused partially by the world-wide rearmament campaign and prevalence of boom conditions and speculation.

The process of partial recovery of prices received a setback following the recession in business conditions in the United States of America and other countries of the world about the middle of 1937. This had a depressing influence on prices in India. The Calcutta index steadily declined from August 1937 in sympathy with the general fall of prices in the world markets, and reached its lowest point of 94 in April 1938. It remained unchanged till June 1938. From July 1938 to January 1939 the index stood at 95. Thereafter a firmer tendency was noticeable and the index number rose by slow degrees to 101 in May 1939. The rise was mainly due to the firmness of sugar, tea, raw jute and jute manufactures. The index number declined to 100 in July, when almost all the markets in India were adversely affected by the uncertain political situation in Europe and the shadow of war. There was no change in August, though the portents of an

early outbreak of war had begun to appear in that month. Thus the Calcutta index stood just at the same level (100) as in the last pre-war year 1914.

It will be noticed from the table on page 401 that the price fall was greater in India than in other countries. For example the percentage decline in prices from the peak in 1929 to the lowest level reached during the depression was 44.3 in India as compared with 30.4 in the United Kingdom, 38 in the United States of America, 28.5 in Australia and 35.8 in Japan.¹ In the U.S.A., after the disastrous fall of prices up to March 1933, a welcome improvement was noticeable before the recent recession. In April 1935 there was a gain of about 8 points in the wholesale price level in that country due to the devaluation of the dollar as well as to the operation of the N.R.A. (National Recovery Administration) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. In Japan, which left the gold standard in 1931, the trend was definitely upward, especially from 1935. In France, which was the most important country in the gold bloc, the trend of prices was almost continuously downward, until the devaluation of the franc and virtual abandonment of the gold standard towards the end of September 1936. Since then prices considerably advanced in that country. It will be noticed that prices in India did not advance to the same extent as in other countries during the period of partial recovery. This is borne out by the fact that the highest point attained by the index number was about 75 (1929 = 100) in August 1937 as compared with 97.5 in the United Kingdom and 91.8 in the United States in the same month.

One serious aspect of the price fall in India was the disparity in the price levels of raw materials and manufactured articles. This is shown by the index numbers of prices for exported articles, comprising mostly raw materials,² and for imported articles, consisting mostly of manufactured articles. As compared with September 1929, there was in March 1933 a fall of 51 per cent (according to the Calcutta index) in the case of the exported articles, while in the case of imported articles the fall was only 27 per cent. This marked discrepancy entailed a deterioration in the terms of barter trade between agricultural countries like India and industrial countries. During the period of partial recovery of prices, especially since the middle of 1936 (when the prices of primary commodities recorded a considerable appreciation), there was a marked tendency for the prices of

¹ *World Economic Survey* (1932-3), p. 39.

² The prices of agricultural staples like rice, wheat, jute, oil-seeds and cotton fell disastrously, especially in the years 1930-3.

manufactured (imported) goods to adjust themselves more and more to the level of exported articles, as shown by the fact that the level of export prices was only 29 per cent below in March 1937, as compared with 25 per cent in the case of import prices (with 1929 as the base). Thus the difference between the two was reduced to four points. This had a beneficial effect on the economy of India, which is predominantly an agricultural and raw-material-producing country. The process of rectification of agricultural and industrial price movements was once again disturbed during the recession period. This confirms the thesis that the prices of primary commodities are more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than prices of finished goods.

§16. **Causes and effects of the fall of prices.**—The causes of the world-wide fall in commodity prices during the period of the Great Depression were monetary as well as non-monetary.¹ The total world-production of gold until recently did not keep pace with the demand, and the position was aggravated by maldistribution of the available supply, most of which was absorbed by the United States and France. This resulted in depleting the reserves of the central banks in other countries, forcing them to follow a policy of drastic deflation. The principal non-monetary cause was overproduction in comparison with the normal rate of consumption of raw materials as well as manufactured articles, but especially of raw materials. The political unrest in many parts of the globe, notably in India, China and South America, further aggravated the depression and fall in prices. We have already referred to the view that the overvaluation of the rupee at 1s. 6d. depressed prices in India. This factor, to the extent to which it operated, applied to the earlier period of non-adjustment rather than to the later period. It is obvious that world factors were far more to blame than the internal causes.

The economic recession which began in the United States of America in April 1937 and which was responsible for the reversal of the price trends in India in common with the rest of the world was caused by the inevitable collapse of speculation combined with other factors such as the gold scare in the United States of America, the warning uttered by President Roosevelt that prices were rising too high and too fast, the restrictions placed on credit facilities by banks and the relaxation of restriction schemes under boom conditions.² The downward trend in India

¹ See Paul Einzig, *The World Economic Crisis*, chs. vi and viii; and H. F. Fraser, *Great Britain and the Gold Standard*, ch. v.

² H. V. Hodson, *Slump and Recovery (1929-37)*, pp. 440-2.

was accentuated by the prolonged Sino-Japanese activities which seriously curtailed the trading capacity of India's principal customer for cotton.

The adverse effects of the fall in prices on the foreign trade of India and the balance of trade, as also on the inland trade, during the depression and recession periods have already been discussed (see ch. vi, §§9 and 26). The agriculturist was hard hit because his receipts dwindled owing to collapse of prices¹ while the incidence of his obligations in the shape of land revenue, rent, interest charges, etc., even when nominally unaltered, became more and more onerous. This seriously aggravated economic depression in the country by reducing the purchasing power of the agriculturist. It should be noted, however, that in spite of the fall in agricultural prices, our agricultural production did not contract as prices fell; in some cases even a tendency to increase in production was evident. In the Indian conditions, the agriculturist has to receive what price he can, and a vicious circle is set up whereby a decline in prices brings about some overproduction, and overproduction further depresses prices. The production of industrial raw materials like jute and rubber showed some amount of decrease. The economic blizzard also seriously affected public finance. Increased taxation, drastic retrenchment, deflation of currency, exports of gold and deficit budgets sum up the effects of the fall in prices on finance.²

The big drop in the purchasing power of the agriculturist and the heavy burden of taxation (e.g. the sharp increase in the income tax and the levy of surcharges) adversely affected the position of industry and the volume of employment (see also chs. xi and xii) though the depression was not so acutely felt there as in agriculture.³ All this shows that Indian economy is particularly sensitive

¹ Taking the eight provinces (Burma, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Madras, Bombay, Punjab, United Provinces, Central Provinces and Berar) together there was a fall of 53.6 per cent in the money value of agricultural produce in 1933-4 as compared with 1928-9. During the same period the value of the total production of the principal crops in these eight provinces declined from Rs. 1,021 crores to Rs. 474 crores. This indicates the big set-back to the purchasing power of the agriculturist.

² For a detailed study of the course of trade depression and the effects of the fall in prices on India the reader is referred to Brij Narain, *India in the Crisis*; Sir J. C. Coyajee, *The World Economic Depression*; K. T. Shah, *World Depression*; and paper on 'Price Trends in India during the last Decade and their Effects on Indian Economy' by S. G. Beri, *Indian Journal of Economics*, (Conference Number) 1941, pp. 735-45.

³ Although industrial prices, profits and share values declined, it is noteworthy that industrial production was on the up-grade owing to the operation of certain favourable factors, such as the swadeshi movement, the levy of

to a fall of prices owing to the predominantly agricultural character of the country and the disparity between the cyclical movements of agricultural and industrial prices. During the period of partial recovery (March 1933 to August 1937), there was a limited improvement in the economic situation in India. India like the rest of the world experienced a certain amount of unwelcome 'recession', as shown by the downward trend of prices of goods and securities and the lower level of industrial profits. But the recession itself appeared to be receding even before the outbreak of the present war which initiated a short period of rapid rise in prices.

§17. Prices during the war period (September 1939 onwards).¹—The outbreak of the war in September 1939 has introduced a new period in the history of Indian prices. The following two tables indicate the price trends and the wide variations in general prices in India and some foreign countries during the war period :

Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in India and some of the principal countries of the world²

	India				United Kingdom (Board of Trade)	United States of America	Canada	Australia (Melbourne)	Japan
	Calcutta		Bombay						
	July 1914 = 100	1929 = 100	July 1914 = 100	1929 = 100					
1939									
August	100	71	103	71	86	79	76	89	124
September	114	81	120	83	92	83	82	91	131
October	118	84	121	83	97	83	83	95	133
November	131	93	133	92	104	83	84	93	136
December	137	97	135	93	107	83	85	93	143
1940									
January	130	92	128	88	110	83	86	92	146
February	126	90	124	86	113	82	86	91	144
March	121	86	119	82	113	82	—	—	—

protective tariffs (e.g. on iron and steel, textiles, sugar, etc.), the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement, low money rates, and cheap imports of machinery and stores.

¹ For a detailed study of this topic see paper on 'Price Trends in India during the last Decade and their Effects on Indian Economy' by S. G. Beri, *Indian Journal of Economics*, (Conference Number) 1941, pp. 761-80.

² *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, p. 75.

*Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in Calcutta¹**April 1940 to May 1941*

July 1914 = 100

Month	Index Number	Month	Index Number	Month	Index Number
April ...	121	September ...	119	February ...	119
May ...	117	October ...	121	March ...	123
June ...	114	November ...	122	April ...	127
July ...	114	December ...	120	May ...	130
August ...	115	January (1941) ...	121		

The outbreak of the war was followed in India as in most other parts of the world by a general rise in commodity prices. The Calcutta index number of wholesale prices recorded a rise from 100 in August 1939 to 144 in September 1939, the first month of the war. The rise, which began with intense speculative activity in the jute market, communicated itself rapidly to cotton, cereals and other sections of the market, and the index number rose from 118 in October to 131 in November, during which month the commodity markets developed a strong bullish tendency. Speculation was rampant and prices attained a fresh peak at 137 in December, or 37 per cent above the pre-war level. Raw jute, jute manufactures, raw cotton, wheat, sugar and iron and steel were among the commodities which recorded the sharpest rise in the period. In January 1940, however, the upward trend appeared to be definitely reversed. Prices came down month by month during the first six months of the year 1940 to such an extent as adversely to affect economic conditions in the country. A considerable part of the rise (in prices which had followed the outbreak of the war in September 1939) was thus lost. The Calcutta index number, which had dropped to 130 in January 1940, declined further to 121 in March. With the worsening of the war situation in April and the loss of Continental markets there was a sharp downward trend of prices. The Calcutta index number revealed a steady fall and stood at 117 in May and 114 in June and July. Since July 1940 there has been a limited recovery of prices as is shown by the fact that the index number gradually moved up and stood at 122 in November 1940. It declined to 120 in December and regained one point in January 1941 when it stood at 121.

¹ *Statistical Summary* (Reserve Bank of India), May, 1941.

A comparison of the index numbers of wholesale prices (1929=100) for India, the United Kingdom and the United States of America during the period of the war reveals some important points of difference between the behaviour of prices in these three countries. After the outbreak of war till January 1940, prices rose at a much faster rate in India than in either the United Kingdom or the United States of America. After January 1940, the divergence between Indian and British prices became wider, because while Indian prices began to decline from that date, British prices continued their upward movement. The comparatively small rise in the United States is rather surprising and is partly explained by the appreciation of the dollar in terms of sterling.

The war, by raising the prices of staple agricultural commodities in India during the earlier period of the war, almost bridged the gap between agricultural and industrial prices; but since the slump in prices set in during the second half of the war period, the gap has again been widened to the disadvantage of export prices, as in the previous depression (1929-33) and recession (1937-39) periods. This brought about once again the worsening of barter terms of trade between India and the industrial countries.

§18. Causes of wide variations in the price level in India during the war period.—Although like interest rates, prices were under the control of the monetary authorities in most countries, some rise in prices was inevitable in view of the tremendous pressure of war requirements on the available resources. The extent of the rise, however, differed according to the circumstances of each country.

Following the outbreak of war, commodity prices in India took an upward trend owing to the belief that the intensification of economic warfare meant brighter prospects for Indian industries and agriculture. The acceleration of the export movement following the increased demand for Indian produce; the decline in imports owing to greatly increased insurance costs and difficulty of obtaining freight; domestic buying for profiteering and/or for providing for future shortage; holding back of supplies for high prices; speculative operations in the markets; and the general optimism as regards the future trend of commodity values as well as the volume of off-take, were the principal factors which account for the jump in prices during the first four months (September 1939 to December 1939) of the war period.

The sudden reversal of the upward trend of prices from January 1940 to June 1940 was due to the inevitable reaction to the spate of speculative activity during the first four months of the war:

the prompt institution of price control (see §20 below), fears of increased Government control of prices, the announcement of the Excess Profits Tax, and the virtual loss of the Continental markets to India. Underlying this reversal of the price trend were other contributory factors, such as freight difficulties, restrictions on exports, exchange control and the withdrawal of more than Rs. 40 crores of value from the credit structure of the country and its locking up in useless metals.¹

The partial recovery of commodity prices since August 1940 has been due to the resumption of Indian business activity after the unsettlement created from January to June 1940. Intensification of India's war effort with the assistance of the War Supply Department of the Government of India has been a bull factor for the market, as also the efforts now being made to harness India's economic resources to the task of making her a great centre for supplying the equipment for the military forces engaged in the war in the Near East.

§19. *Effects of the fluctuations in prices during the war period.*— Following the sharp rise in prices initiated by the war, high hopes were entertained regarding improvement in the prospects of the Indian agriculturist. It was thought that the cultivator would be able to wipe off his debts and make better profits after a prolonged and trying period of depression. It was hoped that the Co-operative Movement, which had been suffering from the incubus of heavy overdues, would be relieved of that burden and would thus receive a welcome stimulus. Actually the cultivator did not derive a substantial benefit even when prices were high during the first four months of the war as he had already parted with his produce. After the newly harvested crop came into the market it was only for a few weeks that commodity prices ruled high enough to confer any tangible benefit on the cultivator who was wise enough not to wait for still higher prices. The subsequent slump in prices has adversely affected the purchasing power of the agriculturists and led to a deterioration of the economic conditions in the rural areas as shown by the reduced domestic demand for industrial products like mill cloth. The limited revival of prices which is in evidence in recent months is therefore greatly to be welcomed. All the same, the present agricultural situation is causing considerable anxiety owing to the accumulation of stocks of raw materials like cotton, oil-seeds and jute; and the Government are being urged to take steps to deal with the problem

¹ See *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India, 1940.*

of surplus stocks and of finding alternative markets for Indian agricultural staples in lieu of those closed during the war.¹

§20. **Price control.**—In this connexion we may briefly review the price control measures and policy of the Central and Provincial Governments during the war period. On 8 September 1939, in exercise of the power conferred by the Defence of India Ordinance, the Central Government delegated to Provincial Governments its authority to control prices. The control of prices was limited to necessaries of life like foodstuffs, medical supplies, kerosene oil and cheap qualities of cotton cloth. The maximum price fixed for them was to be not less than 10 per cent above the price prevailing on 1 September 1939. Later in the same month the Central Government amended its original Notification so as to provide for increases in the cost of production or landing cost in the case of imports in calculating the maximum price. The prices of imported commodities other than medical supplies, salt and kerosene oil could not be regulated except with the previous permission of the Government of India. Wisely enough, price control was applicable to prices at each of the stages of the wholesale and retail trade. Several Provincial Governments accordingly initiated price control measures on the lines prescribed in the Government of India's Notifications.

The next step was to convene a Conference of representatives of Provinces and States to examine the working of the price control measures so far adopted and consider the lines of future action. The Conference, which met in October 1939, took the view that as agriculture in India had not yet fully recovered from the recent depression, it was undesirable to take further steps to check the rise in the prices of agricultural produce. In principle, they admitted the trader's right to fix his prices on the basis of 'replacement' cost. At the second Price Control Conference, held in New Delhi in January 1940, it was considered desirable to have a uniform administrative machinery in Provinces and States. It was also agreed that if and when control of prices in the wholesale markets became necessary, this task should be assumed by the Government of India, whilst the task of controlling prices in the secondary markets and at the retail stage should be left to the Provinces.²

¹ Other effects produced by the fluctuations in prices during the war period relate to the changes in the cost of living which led to numerous industrial disputes regarding the demand for dearness allowance (see ch. iii); the external and internal trade of the country (see ch. vi); currency (see ch. viii), banking (see ch. ix), and public finance (see ch. xi).

² *Review of the Trade of India (1939-40)*, pp. 77-8.

Under a subsequent Notification dated 25 May 1940 issued by the Government of India, the basis of price control was modified, being made more elastic than under the earlier arrangement. Provision for fixing the maximum price at a figure not less than 10 per cent above the ruling price at the same stage on 1 September 1939 was deleted. This is a welcome modification of the price control mechanism since pre-war prices can be a guide and a standard only for a limited period after the commencement of the war. The equity of price control is best secured by relating prices to costs and by providing that costs are determined by a careful scrutiny. The Provincial Governments were to exercise their powers in accordance with such instructions as might be issued to them from time to time by the Government. Their power was limited to controlling prices at which the articles specified in the schedule might be sold in a market other than the primary wholesale markets. A further Notification issued on 29 June 1940 empowered the Provincial Governments to prohibit the holding from sale, either generally or to specified classes of persons, goods kept for sale. Early in 1940, two Price Advisory Officers were appointed by the Government of India to watch the influence of speculation on prices especially in the future markets for jute and cloth in Calcutta and Bombay respectively. In certain Provinces, Provincial Controllers of Prices were appointed and district officers were authorized to act as Controllers of Prices. Among the various experiments tried by the Provincial Governments for controlling of prices mention may be made of the cheap grain shops opened in Bombay and Surat by the Government of Bombay.

§21. **Pros and cons of price control.**—The price control policy of the Government has been the subject of a long controversy in the country. In favour of price control it may be said that its prompt introduction was necessary to check the wild wave of profiteering which ran through the country during the first week of September 1939 and which was not justified as stocks were normal and the transport facilities were working smoothly. The Government felt called upon to regulate prices in the public interest so as to maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the community.

Some of the objections to price control taken by the business community have been met by the amendments of the earlier Notifications noticed above. Even so, price control has not met with the approval of the commercial community in India. Apart from objections of an administrative character, the most common objection taken against price control is that the Indian cultivator, who had suffered during the last decade from the depressed level

of agricultural prices; should not be denied an opportunity of reaping a just profit from his produce and of paying off his debts and improving his economic condition. The interest of the cultivator should not be subordinated to that of the consumers who constitute the vocal section of the public and who have reaped benefit from the low cost of living during the last decade. It is essentially a case of securing deferred justice to the cultivator and raising his purchasing power and earning capacity. The latter objective may be said to be the central problem of Indian economy today.

We fully endorse the opinion expressed by Dr T. E. Gregory, Economic Adviser to the Government of India, in his Memorandum on Prices, that a rise in the price of exportable produce should be welcome as it means more spending power which will benefit industry and render easier the collection of taxes by the State. It is only when the rise is so great as to lead to social discontent that the interests of the cultivator must give way to the paramount interest of the State in the successful prosecution of the war. Judging from the remarks made by the Commerce Secretary to the Government of India, on a Resolution moved in the Council of State in March 1940 (to the effect that no action should be taken to arrest the normal rise in the prices of agricultural produce), it appears that there is a welcome change in the attitude of the Government or, at any rate, hesitation to proceed with price control; and that it is not the policy of the Government to control prices of agricultural produce at the primary stage until prices have gone up to a legitimate extent. So far the Government of India have not thought it necessary to check the rise in agricultural prices.

CHAPTER X

BANKING AND CREDIT ¹

§1. **Constituents of the Indian money market.**—The money market and banking system of India comprise the following principal constituents : (i) The Reserve Bank of India ; (ii) The Imperial Bank of India (originally the Presidency Banks) ; (iii) The Exchange Banks (mostly European or foreign) ; (iv) The Indian Joint-Stock Banks on European lines ; (v) The Co-operative Banks ; (vi) The numerous and heterogeneous group of indigenous bankers and brokers, called by different names in different parts of the country, such as Shroffs, Multanis, Baniyas, Marwaris, Sahukars, Mahajans, and Chetties, whose operations are almost entirely confined to the interior of India. The Indian money market is usually divided into two parts : (i) The Reserve Bank, the Imperial Bank, the Exchange Banks, and the Indian joint-stock banks constitute the central part, which may be called the European money market. (ii) The money-lenders and indigenous bankers, together with loan offices (in Bengal) and nidhis and chit funds (in Madras), constitute the bazaar part of the indigenous money market. The Co-operative Banks occupy an intermediate position. Bombay and Calcutta may be said to constitute the national money markets, as distinguished from a number of small local money markets in the up-country areas. The money market in India thus consists of numerous sections which are loosely related to each other, and offers a marked contrast with the highly organized and close-knit London money market. This subject is further discussed in §§25-8.

In addition to these main types, there are the Postal Savings Banks, the Land Mortgage Banks, which have recently come into

¹ The most authoritative and exhaustive treatment of the subject of Indian banking and credit is available in the Reports and volumes of evidence of the various Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees and of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee, appointed in 1929-30 in response to persistent public demand for a comprehensive inquiry. Before submitting its own Report the Central Banking Enquiry Committee had to take into consideration the Reports of the Provincial Committees. It had also to consider the views of the specially requisitioned body of six foreign experts. The foreign experts wrote a separate Report which has been included in the Central Committee's Report. The Central Committee's Report (1931) is often referred to in this chapter as *C.B.R.*, the numbers indicating the paragraphs.

existence, and the Stock Exchanges, at Bombay, Calcutta, Madra and Lahore.

HISTORY OF INDIAN BANKING

§2. **Indigenous banking.**—Indian banking is as ancient as India's commerce. Perhaps India knew more about banking and knew it earlier than any other country in the world. The *Arthashastra* of Chanakya (about 300 B.C.) describes powerful guilds of merchant bankers who received deposits, advanced loans, and, in short carried on functions in many ways comparable to those of modern banks. Meadows Taylor in his *Student's Manual of the History of India* gives a flattering description of ancient Indian banking in the following words: 'The laws of Menoo disclose how thoroughly the science of banking was known 3,000 years ago. Then bankers understood and followed the fluctuations of money value: they kept account books, day-books and ledgers by single and double entry. They charged interest, simple and compound, they made insurances by sea and land, they granted bills of exchange, and in short they followed the practices of modern times which are little changed from ancient rules.'

The Mohammedan invasions of India initiated a period of disturbance and insecurity which were fatal to these old banking institutions. It was no longer safe for people to entrust to them their savings, which began consequently to be secreted in hoards. Individual bankers, however, continued to prosper and they usually combined commerce with banking. They advanced loans to the state, and many influential bankers' families were attached to one or other of the native courts. 'No royal court was complete without a state banker, who was often invested with the powers of a minister.' The history of the house of Jagat Seth, hereditary bankers of the Nabobs of Bengal, shows the important part played by these bankers in the politics of the country.¹ Even the East India Company had to rely on Indian bankers for loans and remittances, and they continued to wield a dominant influence as state financiers till the advent of the European Agency Houses. Besides the competition of these Agency Houses, towards the end of the eighteenth century several circumstances arose which were adverse to the continued prosperity of the indigenous bankers, for instance the establishment of European types of banks, such as the Presidency Banks, and the introduction of a uniform currency which hit the important money-changing part of their business. These bankers, however, managed to survive.

¹ See H. Sinha, *Early European Banking in India*, pp. 1-3.

Even now the indigenous banking system plays a very important part in the monetary organization of the country. The Indian banker¹ is to be found in every village, town and city in the country. 'The type ranges from the small village capitalist to the wealthy well-established private partnership, generally a family partnership, of merchant bankers which has agencies in and outside India. A special type is that of the Chetty community in Madras, where there exists something approaching to joint responsibility of the community as a whole.'² The Nattukottai Chetties of the Madura District of Madras are especially famous as traders and bankers, and their operations are almost world-wide in their scope. The banking business carried on by Indian shroffs and money-lenders must be enormous in the aggregate. The general standard of business morality among Indian bankers has been universally recognized to be very high. Indigenous Indian banking is not organized on the joint-stock basis. Generally also there is comparatively little capital from deposits, and withdrawals against deposits are in cash and not by cheques. There is no share capital, and the liability is single or, in the case of a partnership, joint, and it is unlimited. The Indian banking firm or shroff generally combines trade with the business of finance. Indian shroffs, unlike the English bankers of the eighteenth century, have never issued notes payable on demand, although legal prohibition to issue notes did not exist for a long time. The great difference between modern banking on European lines and the indigenous banking system arises from the growth of joint-stock banks in modern times and the universal use of the cheque as a means of remittance through the mechanism of clearing houses. In times gone by, the principal business of the shroffs was to change money, a function which was especially important when each petty state minted its own standard coin and the country was flooded with a large quantity of varied forms of metallic money. The shroffs also gave letters of credit, dealt in *hundis*, which are the indigenous analogue of cheques or internal bills of exchange, and occasionally helped the state in financing great undertakings.

§3. **Present position of indigenous banking.**—Even at the present time the shroff continues to play an important part in the financial

¹ The Central Banking Enquiry Committee gave the following definition: 'By indigenous bankers is meant all bankers other than the Imperial Bank of India, Exchange Banks, the Joint-Stock Banks and Co-operative Societies, and the expression includes any individual or private firm receiving deposits and dealing in *hundis* or lending money.'—Par. 107. Those who do not receive deposits fall under other indigenous credit agencies (e.g. the village money-lender).

² M. S. M. Gubbay, *Indigenous Banking in India*, pp. 11-12.

system of the country as an indispensable link between the Indian money market and the vast trading community. He finances the agriculturist, the petty artisan and the small trader, assists in the movement of crops to consuming areas or to the ports, and distributes all kinds of goods in the interior of the country. He sends his agents with specie by rail, when necessary, in the harvest season, or he buys bills on Government Treasuries, and, when in need of funds, discounts his bills with the Imperial Bank or other banks in the commercial towns.¹ The indigenous bankers are in some ways formidable competitors to the big joint-stock banks organized on modern lines. As they pay a higher rate of interest they sometimes attract deposits more readily than the bigger banks. They also lend on personal security, and, in general terms, their requirements with regard to security are more easy to satisfy than in the case of banks. They are also at an advantage because under the present conditions the modern type of banks in India can never hope to get into sufficiently close touch with the affairs of the vast trading community all over the country to enable them to grant accommodation directly to more than a few of the bigger traders. The Indian bankers, therefore, are in existing circumstances indispensable middlemen. The Babington Smith Committee describes in the following words the manner in which the indigenous financial agency comes into contact with the modern monetary organization: 'The people with whom the banks deal directly are for the most part large shroffs of good standing in the principal cities. These men operate with their own capital, and generally speaking, it is only when they have laid out all their available capital in purchasing the *hundis* of other and usually smaller shroffs that they come to the Presidency Banks. The shroffs, whose *hundis* the larger shroffs have purchased, have probably also similarly financed other and still smaller shroffs or *mahajans*, and so on, until we get down to the smallest flea of all, namely the village *bania* or grain-dealer or goldsmith. For instance, shroff A at Amritsar may purchase a bill drawn by a larger shroff at Lahore, who sells it to the Presidency Bank, which sends it to their Bombay agency for collection, or the bill may be a pure finance bill generally known as a hand bill as opposed to a "trade" bill, drawn against produce.'²

¹ See Shirras, *Indian Finance and Banking*, p. 241.

² *Hundis* are drawn to serve three distinct purposes: (i) for raising a loan (here the *hundi* corresponds to the finance bill or hand bill); (ii) for financing trade, when it corresponds to a bill of exchange (but *hundis*, unlike bills of exchange, are not always accompanied by documents of title like sale contracts,

The growth of modern banking has not materially affected the business of the shroff. On the other hand, he has good reason to welcome it as relieving him of much inconvenience, for example, as regards sending specie and obtaining accommodation. He buys the *hundis* drawn by the trading community, charging them a rate of discount above the bank rate, the difference constituting his profit.¹ Though some of the indigenous private banking firms are being converted into private banks conducted on modern lines and issuing cheques, most of them still follow their old traditional methods.

§4. Need for co-ordination between the old and new banking systems.— It is generally recognized that in order to mobilize effectively the capital resources of the country as well as to establish any kind of unitary control over its credit organization, the indigenous banking system must be brought into an organic relationship with the new joint-stock system. As Sir George Schuster pointed out in the course of his remarks on the Reserve Bank Bill (1933) in the Assembly: 'It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the part that the indigenous banker plays in the whole of the banking and credit machinery of India. I think it will be no exaggeration to say that his part of the organization represents, if anything, more than 90 per cent of the whole; and it is unfortunately true that the links between the whole of this system and the modern banking system of India, in spite of the development of rural co-operative societies and in spite of the opening of one hundred new branches by the Imperial Bank of India, are still rudimentary and incomplete. . . . Until the vast portion of India's banking and credit machinery, which is represented by the indigenous bankers, is put into gear with the relatively small machine of the modernized money market, with the Reserve Bank as its central control, it will be impossible for the Reserve Bank to exercise full control of currency and credit of India, which is understood as the function of a Central Bank in western countries; and it will be equally impossible for the masses of the people who populate the countryside of India to get the full benefits of credit and banking facilities on reasonable terms, which a well-organized system of banking ought to give.'

invoices, and warehouse receipts, and are usually without them); (iii) for remittance of money from one place to another, whether for purposes of trade or otherwise.

¹ The bazaar *hundi* rate of discount is as a rule 2 or 3 per cent above the bank rate in Calcutta, and about 1½ per cent in Bombay, where the competition amongst the shroffs is unusually keen.

The Central Banking Enquiry Committee made a series of recommendations with a view to bringing about a better co-ordination of the indigenous banking system with the general and especially the central banking organization of the country. They favoured the direct linking of the indigenous bankers with the Reserve Bank of India when it was established. They suggested certain conditions for the inclusion of indigenous bankers in the Bank's approved list, such as the limitation of their business to banking proper, having a certain suitable standard of owned capital (which should be lower than in the case of joint-stock banks), maintaining of account books in the usual manner and having them audited annually by recognized auditors, and making them available to the Reserve Bank for inspection and audit. Such bankers should, however, be exempted from the rule relating to compulsory deposits with the Reserve Bank (applicable to joint-stock banks) during the first five years of the working of the Reserve Bank, provided their deposits did not exceed five times their capital. Indigenous bankers scheduled to the Reserve Bank were to be given certain privileges, the principal ones being the rediscounting of their commercial paper by the Reserve Bank, remittance of funds¹ at the same rates as are charged to all joint-stock banks and extension of the benefits of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act.² (*C.B.R.*, 139-42.)

§5. Reserve Bank's scheme of linking indigenous bankers.—A statutory obligation was imposed on the Reserve Bank under clause 55 (1) (a) of the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934) to present a 'report at the earliest practicable date and in any case within three years to the Governor-General-in-Council with proposals, if it thinks fit, for legislation on the extension of the provisions of this Act relating to scheduled banks³ to persons and firms not being scheduled banks engaged in British India in the business of banking'. The Reserve Bank addressed a circular letter to all scheduled banks

¹ Recently (September 1940) facilities for the remittance of funds at special rates have been extended to the indigenous bankers by the Reserve Bank, provided the former fulfil the conditions prescribed by the Bank.

² The Central Banking Enquiry Committee made certain other recommendations regarding the indigenous bankers, for instance, that the Reserve Bank and the joint-stock banks should use such bankers as their agents for the collection of cheques and bills in the same manner as in the case of banks, that indigenous bankers on the approved list of the Reserve Bank should be allowed to affix against their names the designation 'Member of the Central Bankers' Association' when the latter was established, etc. They did not, however, favour compulsory licensing of indigenous bankers, being apprehensive that compulsory licensing would scare them away and discourage them from following banking pursuits. *C.B.R.*, 138 and 145.

³ See §51 below.

and representative indigenous bankers on 6 May 1937 with a view to eliciting their opinion on the possibilities of linking the indigenous banker with the Reserve Bank. In view of their great numbers and the highly personal and fluid character of their business, the Reserve Bank proposed to deal with the shroffs through some intermediate agency, e.g. scheduled banks, which would share the financial responsibility and undertake the detailed examination which was necessary if credit was to be accorded. Under this provisional scheme the shroffs were to get their bills and notes discounted with the scheduled banks, which in their turn were to be enabled to get these documents rediscounted with the Reserve Bank. At the same time, the Reserve Bank indicated the conditions subject to which it was prepared to establish a direct link with itself. Among other conditions, the indigenous bankers were required to organize themselves into self-contained legal entities with at least Rs. 5 lakhs of their own capital (as in the case of scheduled banks), to maintain the same deposits with the Reserve Bank as the scheduled banks, to segregate their banking from non-banking business, and to maintain properly audited accounts.

This provisional scheme, which preferred indirect linking and laid down very stringent conditions for direct linking, raised a storm of protest. It was alleged that the Bank had exaggerated the difficulties of direct linking and had disregarded the recommendations of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee and the wishes of the Central Legislature. In the light of the replies received from the Shroffs' Association and commercial organizations, Sir James Taylor, Governor of the Reserve Bank, issued a second draft scheme on 26 August 1937, for the direct linking of private bankers in accordance with the recommendations of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee and the regulations relating to banking companies incorporated in the Indian Companies Act as amended in 1936.¹ Briefly the Bank suggested that if the indigenous bankers were to come into practical relationship with itself, they would have to formalize their methods of banking on the lines approximating to joint-stock banks and in particular develop the deposit side of banking activities. Indigenous bankers with owned capital of at least Rs. 2 lakhs—which might be raised to Rs. 5 lakhs at the end of five years—would be entitled to apply for registration in the books of the Reserve Bank as private bankers. They must wind up their non-banking business within a reasonable time. They would not have to furnish compulsory deposits unless

¹ See §20.

their time and demand liabilities were five times and more in excess of their capital in the business. They must maintain proper books of accounts and have them audited by registered accountants. They must file with the Reserve Bank periodical statements of their affairs and must also in the interest of their depositors publish the returns prescribed for banking companies. Indigenous bankers satisfying these conditions would have the privilege of direct rediscount with the Reserve Bank against eligible paper, the right to secure advances against Government Paper, and remittance facilities similar to those for the scheduled banks.

The replies to this scheme received from the shroffs and commercial bodies show that generally the indigenous bankers disagree with the suggestions regarding taking of deposits and giving wide publicity to accounts. They are also not prepared to confine themselves to banking business. They thus desire the Reserve Bank's scheme to be so modified as to be incompatible with its main proposals. The Reserve Bank has therefore informed the Government of India that it cannot recommend any immediate legislation to amend the Reserve Bank Act in regard to the extension of its provisions relating to scheduled banks to the private bankers, though, as mentioned in the Bank's Statutory Report on Agricultural Credit (issued in December 1937) the offer made in its letter of 26 August 1937 is still open and the Bank will be prepared to take the matter up with the Government with a view to amending the Act, if the indigenous bankers are prepared to conform to its conditions or suggest any other practical alternative. In the meantime, the Reserve Bank is considering whether it would be possible to develop open-market operations in trade bills as this would give first-class indigenous bankers closer relationship without the necessity of making any radical changes in their present business methods.¹

It is very unfortunate that the deadlock so created between the Bank and indigenous bankers has not yet been overcome. The Reserve Bank must realize that modern banking standards cannot be immediately applied to the shroffs, and a certain temporary relaxation is necessary to enable them to come within its orbit. Ultimately, however, the shroffs must come into line with the scheduled banks as much in their own interest as in that of the Reserve Bank, which as the Central Bank of the country has to hold the balance even between the various constituents of the Indian banking system.

¹ *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India (1937)*, pp. 8-9 and *Statutory Report of the Reserve Bank on Agricultural Credit*, pp. 42-3.

As regards the hope of the Bank that the ultimate solution of this problem could be found in the development of an open bill market in which first-class bills are freely negotiated, as the Bank itself realizes there are many difficulties in the way. This question is fully discussed in §29 below.

§6. **Beginnings of modern banking.**¹—The European system of banking was first introduced into India by the Agency Houses of Calcutta, which started a banking side as an aid to the conduct of their business. In their capacity as bankers, the Agency Houses did business with the merchant princes in India and with the planters, advancing loans on mortgages of ships, indigo factories, etc. The European community in India and the English officers of the East India Company deposited their savings with them in preference to investment in public securities, owing to the attractive rates of interest offered by the Agency Houses. The Agency Houses came to grief as a result of engaging in speculative transactions, and the commercial crisis of 1829-32 put an end to them. The banks managed on European lines were thus not at first joint-stock banks, nor are they so exclusively at the present day. European firms like Cox or Grindlay, and navigation companies like the Peninsular and Oriental, have a banking side to their business. The first purely banking institution on European lines was the Bank of Hindostan, established in Calcutta by Messrs Alexander & Co. The bank disappeared in the crisis of 1829-32 when the firm of Messrs Alexander failed along with others. On their ruins arose the Union Bank, a joint-stock bank created by co-operation among all the leading Calcutta houses, but this also disappeared in 1848.²

§7. **The Presidency Banks.**—The foreign trade of the country was comparatively small in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, and the financing of the internal trade was looked after by the indigenous bankers already described. As trade gradually developed, the need for banks of the European type was experienced, added to which was the interest of the Company's Government in regard to their own banking business. In these circumstances the Bank of Bengal, the oldest and the most powerful of the Presidency Banks, was established at Calcutta in 1806 by a charter issued by the East India Company with a capital of Rs. 50 lakhs, 10 lakhs being contributed by the East India Company. The first Bank of Bombay was established in 1840

¹ For an interesting survey of the advent of modern banking see the *Times of India* Banking in India Supplement (21 April 1939).

² The subsequent progress of joint-stock banks in India is reviewed in §§14 and 18.

with a capital of Rs. 52 lakhs, three lakhs of which was subscribed by the Government. This bank came to grief in 1868 as a result of its participation in the wild share speculation caused by the civil war and cotton famine in America. A second Bank of Bombay was established in the same year with Rs. 1 crore as capital. The Bank of Madras was started in 1843 with a capital of Rs. 30 lakhs, three lakhs being subscribed by the East India Company.

The establishment of the three banks put an end to the possibility of the Bank of Bengal becoming a bank for all India, an idea which had been in the air for some time.

From the very beginning, the Presidency Banks had a close connexion with the Government of the country, which not only subscribed a part of their capital, but also had the right to nominate some of their Directors. Up to 1857 the offices of the Secretary and Treasurer were usually held by a Civil Servant of the East India Company. In return, the banks enjoyed some concessions, of which the monopoly of Government banking was the most important. The right of note issue had little practical value on account of several restrictions, such as that the total liabilities on demand were not to exceed three times the cash reserves at first and four times afterwards. From 1839 onwards even the total amount up to which the notes could be issued was fixed. In 1862, as we have already seen, the right of note issue was taken away, the Government having introduced their own paper currency. As a sort of compensation, the cash balances of the Government were placed with the Presidency Banks at the Presidency towns.

By the Presidency Banks Act of 1876, the Government withdrew their portion of the capital and relinquished the right of appointing Directors and Secretary and Treasurer. After this the Presidency Banks lost their official character but remained distinct from other banks, being governed by the special Act of 1876 and regarded by both the public and the Government as the most important constituents of the banking system of the country and as an integral part of the Indian treasury system. The bulk of their business was like that of any ordinary bank, namely receipt of deposits and discounting. But they acted as bankers to the Government to a limited extent. For instance, they managed the temporary public debt of the Government of India and enjoyed the privilege of using certain minimum Government balances. Although not state banks, they always had some connexion with the state, and under the special Act of 1876, the Government were entitled to audit their accounts, to call for information and to make it obligatory on them to publish weekly statements of their accounts. This

public control was intended to safeguard Government interests and ensure development of banking on sound lines in the country.

§8. **The Reserve Treasury system.**—Between 1863 and 1876 the whole of the Government balances at headquarters was kept with the Presidency Banks. But trouble having been experienced in getting the funds back from the Banks of Bengal and Bombay, the Government of India established their own treasuries (Reserve Treasuries) in 1876 at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The Government balances henceforward were held largely in these three Reserve Treasuries, only small amounts—just enough for safety and day-to-day requirements—being held in the district and taluka treasuries. Under the new arrangements which came into operation in 1876, the Government agreed to pay interest to the banks on the difference between the actual deposits and the minima fixed, in case the former fell short of the latter, but they gave no undertaking to keep any balances whatsoever with the banks. Actually the banks held cash balances generally in excess of the minima, though they were far from satisfied with this. A large amount of revenue flowed into Government Treasuries and remained locked up there, especially at a time when it was badly wanted by the money market. Broadly speaking, November to June is the busy season in India, and July to October is the slack season (except in Calcutta, where the busy season falls between July and October). The receipts of revenue are heaviest during the four months from January to April, so that the heavy revenue period synchronizes with the active business season. The Government had to maintain large working balances, as the receipts of revenue are very unevenly distributed throughout the year, whereas their expenditure proceeds at an even pace.¹ It was, however, generally felt that it was possible for the Government to extend greater assistance to the money market without endangering their own safety.

Various proposals were made from time to time that loans should be issued to the public for short terms from the Reserve Treasuries through the Presidency Banks. The Government of India proposed to the Secretary of State in 1898 that as part of the business management of the Treasury balances, money should be lent to the Presidency Banks at 1 per cent less than the declared minimum rate of interest during the months of January to May of each year. The Secretary of State accepted the proposal, subject to the condition that these loans should not be allowed to

¹ See P. K. Wattal, *The System of Financial Administration in British India*, pp. 200-2.

interfere with the Government disbursements in India and remittances to England, and that they should be made at the current bank rate. These conditions being too rigid, loans from the Government were rarely resorted to. During the war of 1914-18 the Government placed large funds—much in excess of the minima—at the disposal of the Presidency Banks in order to facilitate the investment by the public in the War Loans. The Reserve Treasury system was abolished in 1921, and the Government balances over and above those in the district and sub-treasuries were kept with the Imperial Bank at its head offices and its branches until the establishment of the Reserve Bank in 1935, when they were handed over to that bank.

§9. **Business and progress of Presidency Banks.**—The Presidency Banks were permitted to do certain kinds of business and prohibited from doing certain other kinds. Briefly, (i) the banks were excluded from dealing in foreign exchange (except as regards Ceylon in the case of the Bank of Madras); (ii) they were also prohibited from borrowing money abroad; and lastly, (iii) there were certain restrictions as to the amount of the advances and the period for which they were made, as well as the securities against which they could be made.

Turning to the business permitted to the banks, they could receive deposits and invest in Government and other specified securities of public bodies and corporations. They were allowed to draw and discount bills of exchange payable in India. They could advance funds against accepted bills of exchange and promissory notes, accept securities for safe custody, and buy and sell gold and silver and manage Government loans at the Presidency towns and the debt business of certain municipalities. Some of these restrictions were due to the jealousy of the East India Company, which first imposed them, especially those in regard to the raising of funds in London. The exclusion from foreign exchange business was due to the supposed uncertainties attendant on it.

All these restrictions and handicaps, however, did not prevent the Presidency Banks from prospering greatly. The restrictive provisions, while they hampered an even more rapid development than was actually achieved, conduced to the stability and strength of the banks. There was a steady growth in the amount of private deposits attracted by the banks especially in the period before the war of 1914-18. Unlike the joint-stock banks in India, the Presidency Banks exhibited a strong cash position, keeping on an average cash reserves much over 30 per cent of their liabilities. The Government always kept some balances with the

banks, which were usually in excess of the minima fixed, and, wherever they had branches, the banks also did some general banking business for the Government, for which they received a fixed remuneration. Further, the banks undertook to provide special facilities for the encashment of the currency notes at their branches in order to popularize them. This association of the banks with the Government added greatly to their prestige and stood them in good stead, since 'it attracted private deposits and banking business on profitable terms and helped them to acquire and maintain a position of pre-eminence in the banking system of India.

§10. **Exchange banks (Foreign banks).**—The Presidency Banks, as mentioned above, were prohibited from dealing in foreign exchange and from raising funds outside India. But both these matters assumed greater and greater importance with the expansion of the country's foreign trade, and there was ample room for another class of banks dealing principally with foreign exchange.

The Indian joint-stock banks rarely engaged in this business for lack of the necessary training and experience and the want of access to the London money market. Before 1914 the only important Indian joint-stock bank which had a branch in London, like the exchange banks, was the Indian Specie Bank, but its London branch was apparently opened in order to facilitate the bank's dealings abroad in silver and pearls. The Alliance Bank of Simla (liquidated in 1923) and the Tata Industrial Bank (amalgamated with the Central Bank of India in 1923) also did 'as much exchange business as any exchange bank in India during the first few years of its life'.¹ A few of the existing joint-stock banks do take some part in this business but have not yet developed it to any great extent.

The foreign exchange business is thus virtually a monopoly of the foreign banks. Indians have not so far been able to start exchange banks of their own owing to the competition of well-established non-Indian exchange banks, absence of branches in London and other foreign centres (which are essential for engaging in arbitrage and direct exchange transactions) and their limited financial resources. The principal difficulties in the way of establishing branches at foreign centres are (i) lack of large capital to command credit in the money markets of these centres; (ii) initial loss in working until the foreign branches become self-supporting; (iii) absence of a dependable staff trained in

¹ H. Sinha, *Early European Banking in India*, p. 220.

international exchange work ; (iv) hostility of foreign banks and (v) the existence of their head offices in India which would handicap Indian banks in keeping themselves in close touch with the international monetary conditions and securing import and export bills, and bills for collection. In 1936, the first Indian exchange bank (Central Exchange Bank of India) was opened in London by the late Sir Sorabji Pochkhanawala under the aegis of the Central Bank of India. It was amalgamated with Barclay's Bank, London, in 1938.

Owing to the predominance of England in the foreign trade of India and the fact that London was the financial centre of the world, the early exchange banks established in India were due to English enterprise and had their head offices in London. But later on, as the country was opened to every nationality, branches of the principal banks in some countries other than England were started. The disturbance in the course of Indian trade and the important position attained by some foreign countries, that had not counted for much before in the international trade of India, acted as a stimulus to foreign banks opening their branches here. So that although the exchange banks carrying on business in India are mostly branch agencies of banks having their head offices in London, the number of those with their head offices in Continental countries, in the Far East, and in the United States, has increased. The exchange banks can be classified as (i) those doing considerable business in India, and (ii) those which are merely agencies of large banks doing business all over Asia. Illustrations of the former are the National Bank of India and the Chartered Bank of India. Examples of the latter are the International Banking Corporation, the Bank of Taiwan and the Yokohama Specie Bank.

§11. **The business and present position of the exchange banks.—**Originally the business of the exchange banks was confined almost exclusively to the financing of the external trade of India. But in recent years most of them have also taken a considerable part in financing the internal trade at the places where their branches are situated. For example, the piece-goods trade in Delhi and Amritsar and the leather trade of Cawnpore are largely financed by them. They do a certain amount of business on the lines of any ordinary bank. But their main business in India is financing foreign trade by the purchase and discount of foreign bills of exchange. The import bills are negotiated in England and other foreign centres and are payable in India. But by far the greatest proportion of the bills in which the exchange banks deal are export bills drawn by Indian exporters against credits opened with the London banks or finance houses, by London importers. These bills, which are

drawn usually at three months' sight, are mostly documents on acceptance (D.A.) though a few are documents on payment, (D.P.). The D.P. bills are held by the London offices of the exchange banks until they are retired or paid on maturity. The D.A. bills are generally discounted or rediscounted immediately after acceptance. They are rediscounted in the United Kingdom by the English and Scotch joint-stock banks or by the Bank of England. In this way the exchange banks receive back in sterling the equivalent of what they paid in rupees in India. They may sometimes hold the bills till maturity in case trade is slack and there is no immediate demand for the employment of funds in India.¹ Thus the export trade of India is largely financed by the funds of the British banks. The facility of rediscounting bills in the London money market, where the rate of discount is usually lower than in India, is a great advantage, as the exchange banks buy far more export bills than they can possibly hold until maturity. The absence of this facility in the case of the Indian joint-stock banks makes it extremely difficult for them to compete with the foreign exchange banks whose large profits are protected by established and not easily assailable advantages.

The purchase of Indian export bills by the exchange banks means a transfer of their funds to London. To bring their funds back to India, the exchange banks were in the habit of freely purchasing Council Bills and Telegraphic Transfers in London, so long as this system lasted. Now they effect this transfer by selling sterling to the Reserve Bank of India (which is responsible for making sterling remittances to the Secretary of State) against their London balances. There are other methods also by means of which they increase their funds in India, for example, by cashing the import bills when they mature; by the sale of drafts, and by telegraphic transfers in India for Indian students and travellers abroad and other persons requiring money to be remitted from India; by buying rupee paper in London and selling it in India, and so on. In the last resort, when there is a strong favourable balance of trade, they import bars of gold and silver bullion and sovereigns from London, Egypt and Australia. In like manner, when the balance of payments is against India the exchange banks either send gold or silver out of India. Formerly they bought Reverse Councils if the Government of India made

¹ The bulk of the bills between India and Europe, the United States of America and the colonies are drawn in sterling while those between India and Japan are drawn in yen. Bills between India and China are drawn in rupees.

them available. Since the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India in April 1935, they can purchase sterling drafts from the Bank for delivery in London.

The import trade of India is financed either by sixty days' sight D.P. drafts drawn on Indian importers or by London banks' acceptance of 'House paper'. The former method is usually adopted in the case of imports by Indians. These drafts (which are drawn in sterling), after being discounted by the exchange banks in London, are sent to India for collection through the exchange banks, who present them on the importers for acceptance and payment. Importers can, however, obtain delivery of the goods before payment by executing trust receipts in favour of the exchange banks and holding the goods as their trustees until the final payment. The second method is available to European importing firms who have London houses of standing. The latter draw bills on the London offices of the exchange banks which undertake to accept these bills, and thereafter they can be readily discounted in the London money market. The accepting banks in London forward the relative documents to their branches in India for the collection of the proceeds of the goods in India, and these are sent to London before the bills mature or when they are paid. In the financing of the import trade of India the more active part is played by the head offices and branches of the exchange banks outside India. The share of the Indian branches in the business consists primarily in collecting the import bills at maturity, and in furnishing their branches with information as to the means and standing of the drawees of the bills. The import bills, unlike the export bills, are as a rule not rediscounted in India, and thus the import trade is financed to a much greater extent than the export trade by the funds of the exchange banks. In order to develop a discount market for import bills it is necessary that these should be drawn in rupees and should preferably be D.A. bills. These reforms would also serve to redress the legitimate grievances of Indian importers in this respect.

Keynes points out that there is *prima facie* some danger to the stability of the Indian financial system in the fact that its money market is largely financed by funds raised not permanently, but for short periods, in a far distant foreign centre.¹ However, the greater success of the exchange banks in recent years in attracting an increasing volume of funds in India itself, clearly brought out in the following table, has to that extent diminished their dependence on the London money market.

¹ See J. M. Keynes, *Indian Currency and Exchange*, p. 212.

Nevertheless, it is desirable in the interests of safety that the sums borrowed on relatively short notice either in England or in India

(In lakhs of rupees)

Year 31 Dec.	No. of Exchange Banks	Deposits (In India)	Year 31 Dec.	No. of Exchange Banks	Deposits (In India)
1870	3	52	1926	18	71,54
1890	5	7,53	1928	18	71,14
1900	8	10,50	1929	18	66,66
1910	11	24,79	1931	18	67,47
1913	12	31,03	1933	18	70,78
1918	10	61,85	1934	17	71,40
1920	15	74,80	1935	17	76,18
1921	17	75,19	1936	17	73,21
1923	18	68,44	1937	18	75,22

should not exceed the assets located there.¹ An adequate cash reserve to meet their deposit liabilities is also necessary. An important event in recent banking history in India is the entry into India of one of the English 'Big Five', which has been brought about by the acquisition of the business of Cox & Co. by Lloyds Bank.

The following table gives a general view of the position of the exchange banks as it stood on 31 December 1937.

No. of Banks	Paid-up capital	Reserve and Rest	Deposits		Cash Balances	
			Out of India	In India	Out of India	In India ²
A ³ 6	£(1,000) 7,019	£(1,000) 5,358	£(1,000) 38,655	Rs.(1,000) 33,68,33	£(1,000) 8,576	Rs.(1,000) 6,51,74
B ⁴ 12	59,342	56,593	1,081,994	39,52,68	215,578	4,06,31

§12. Restrictions on foreign banks.—The question of subjecting foreign banks to certain restrictions for safeguarding national interests is part of the general question of controlling foreign

¹ Keynes, op. cit., pp. 212-13.

² Including balances with the Reserve Bank of India.

³ A=banks doing a considerable portion of their business in India, i.e. having 25 per cent or more of their deposits in India.

⁴ B=banks which are merely agencies of large banking corporations doing the major portion of their business abroad, i.e. having less than 25 per cent of their deposits in India. See *Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India* (1937), p. 6.

capitalistic enterprise in this country. This we have already discussed,¹ and the case for restriction of foreign banking institutions, such as the existing exchange banks, is based on grounds with which we have already become familiar in the course of this general discussion. Foreign capital engaged in banking in India has laid itself open to the same kind of criticism from the national point of view as foreign capital engaged in other spheres and has prompted a similar demand for more or less strict regulation.

The share of Indians in the foreign trade of India is less than 15 per cent of the total of Rs. 600 crores.² There is thus a considerable loss in the shape of commission, brokerage, and insurance paid to non-Indians. It is believed that this preponderance of the non-Indian element in the foreign trade of India is due to the large facilities given by the non-Indian exchange banks to their nationals operating in India. Also, as we have already seen, these exchange banks have almost a monopoly of the financing of the foreign trade of India and it is complained that they use their monopolistic position to the prejudice of Indian merchants.³

Certain witnesses before the Central Banking Enquiry Committee urged the regulation of the operations of the exchange banks in view of the fact that they were not subject to any legal restrictions in India and were exempt even from the limited statutory obligations imposed on Indian joint-stock banks registered in India, with the result that no separate information was available regarding their Indian business. It has also been urged that while they draw deposits in India, there is no protection extended to the Indian depositor; and lastly control is advocated on broad national grounds as in other countries like Japan, with a view to supplying a corrective to the anti-Indian policy of the exchange banks and to removing the difficulties of Indian traders. (*C.B.R.*, 447.)

The Committee note that provision exists in the laws of various

¹ Vol. I, ch. xiii, §§15-18.

² Pre-depression figure.

³ It was alleged by several commercial bodies in India before the Central Banking Enquiry Committee that the exchange banks furnish unsatisfactory bank references regarding Indian commercial houses to exporters abroad, that Indian importers fail to obtain D.A. terms, that Indian importing firms are called upon to deposit 10 to 15 per cent of the value of goods with the exchange banks in order to get a confirmed letter of credit opened (which is not the case with foreign houses), that import bills are drawn in sterling and carry a fairly high rate (six per cent) of interest, that the exchange banks discriminate against Indian steamship and insurance companies, that they do not offer responsible posts to Indians, etc. See *C.B.R.*, 439-45. The Report suggests that the Government of India should arrange suitable conventions with the exchange banks to meet the various complaints.

countries for regulating foreign banks by means of licenses granted by some prescribed authority in the country and advocate the introduction of a similar system into India partly in the interests of depositors, partly for ensuring the grant of reciprocal treatment in foreign countries to Indian banks, and partly also for giving the Reserve Bank some control over the banks operating in this country. The Reserve Bank would be the most suitable authority for undertaking the task of scrutinizing applications from non-Indian banks and for granting licenses in approved cases. But the Committee hold that, in fairness to the banks already established, licenses should be freely granted to them. Every license should be in force for a stated period and should be renewed if the licensing authority is satisfied that the provisions of the Indian law applicable to the bank, and other conditions specified in the license, are complied with. The conditions of the license which non-Indian banks wishing to do banking business in India should be required to take out, should be as follows :

(i) Furnishing the Reserve Bank with annual statements showing the assets and liabilities relating to their Indian business, as prescribed by the Reserve Bank.

(ii) Submitting, at any rate for a few years to come, to the Reserve Bank periodic reports of Indian and non-Indian business handled by them.

(iii) Other conditions might be imposed on the basis of reciprocity. There are various restrictions imposed by the laws of foreign countries on non-national banks working there. The power to impose similar conditions in the licenses granted to non-Indian banks in India would enable the Government of India to accord reciprocal treatment to non-Indian banks. (C.B.R., 451.)

Mr Manu Subedar, however, holds that a system of licenses applicable to foreign banks *only* should be established with a view to reserving the field of banking in India for institutions registered in India. He proposes the following terms for the license :

(i) The licensed bank should not receive deposits in India from Indian-born persons or joint-stock companies registered in India. (ii) The licensed bank should confine its branches to the port areas only and no branch should be opened in the interior. (iii) Controlling interests, directly or indirectly, should not be acquired in Indian institutions in order to defeat the above provision or for any other motive. The existing branches of the foreign banks in the interior should be withdrawn within five years. (iv) Except the manager and one assistant in each branch

under him the whole staff should be Indian. (Minority Report, *C.B.R.*, 204.)¹

§13. **Opening of an Indian exchange bank.**—However much the present position may be improved by such restrictions on foreign banks, they will not remove a fundamental source of weakness due to the very small share taken by Indians both in the import and the export trade and in the provision of banking facilities for such trade. The Central Banking Committee suggest the following measures for enabling India to obtain her legitimate share in the spheres of both banking and trade. (*C.B.R.*, 481):

(i) Well-established Indian joint-stock banks should open foreign connexions useful to their clients. (*C.B.R.*, 482.)

(ii) On the establishment of the Reserve Bank and the simultaneous withdrawal of the restrictions now imposed on the transaction of foreign exchange business by the Imperial Bank of India, the latter should be induced to take an active share in the financing of India's foreign trade.

This recommendation has not so far been acted upon by the Government. No doubt the old restrictions on the transaction of foreign exchange business by the Imperial Bank of India have been removed since the establishment of the Reserve Bank on 1 April 1935: the former has also been appointed the sole agent of the latter; but no stipulations regarding foreign exchange business have been made nor any steps taken to secure the preponderance of the Indian element in the Imperial Bank on the lines recommended by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee. (*C.B.R.*, 483.)

(iii) If, however, the Reserve Bank finds it impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Imperial Bank or finds that within the stipulated period the Imperial Bank is unable to participate actively in the financing of India's foreign trade, the establishment of an Indian exchange bank is recommended. (*C.B.R.*, 485.)

Such a bank should have a capital of Rs. 3 crores subscribed in the first instance by joint-stock banks registered in India. If the share capital is not fully subscribed within a prescribed time, the balance should be supplied by the Government, which should arrange gradually to dispose of their holding later to the general public. So long as the Government hold more than 50 per cent

¹ Under the new Constitution established by the Government of India Act (1935), it will only be possible to impose the same restrictions on British banks operating in India as exist on Indian banks working in Great Britain, of which there are hardly any in existence. The basis of reciprocity, as Mr Manu Subedar points out, is thus altogether unsuitable in the matter of imposing restrictions on the exchange banks.

of the capital, they should have a predominating voice in the appointment of the directors. The question of entrusting the work connected with Government remittances to a department of the new bank working under the control of the Reserve Bank should be considered in consultation with the Reserve Bank subject to the stipulation that the new bank shall not be allowed to make a profit on such remittances purchased in the open market in its capacity as agent.¹

(iv) In conclusion, we may invite attention to the proposal of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee that joint banks controlled by Indians and non-Indians as equal partners should be established. This plan seems to be attractive. Since international trade is conducted between two parties it stands to reason that they should co-operate with one another in the financing of that trade.

§14. History of joint-stock banks.—The growing mass of internal commerce in India required organized banking of the modern type. Neither the Presidency Banks, which were semi-public institutions subject to various restrictions and which had branches only in a few large towns, nor the exchange banks, which were mainly preoccupied with foreign trade finance, were able to supply the need of the country in this respect. Until 1860, when the principle of limited liability was recognized for the first time in India, the progress of organized banking was slow. The financial crisis in Bombay caused by the cotton boom of 1865 and the fall in the exchange value of the rupee prevented substantial progress from being achieved. The earliest bank of this description was the Bank of Upper India (1863), which was followed by the Allahabad Bank in 1865, and some more banks, one of which was the Alliance Bank of Simla (1874) which went into liquidation in 1923. In 1870, seven such banks were in existence. In 1894 the number rose to fourteen. Most of them were, and continue to be, under European management. The first bank due to Indian enterprise was the Oudh Commercial Bank, started in 1881. In 1894 the Punjab National Bank was established, mainly through the efforts of Lalla Harkishen Lal, who was also responsible for the establishment of the People's Bank in 1901. The People's Bank made great strides and at the time of its liquidation in 1913 it had nearly 100 branches and its deposits were over Rs. 1¼ crores.² One of the results of the advent of swadeshi-ism in 1905 was a flood of new creations,

¹ In a Minute of Dissent signed by six members of the Committee (including Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas) it is urged that the state should forthwith start an exchange bank with a capital of Rs. 3 crores, all to be taken up by the state. (C.B.R., 30).

² See Thakur, *Organisation of Indian Banking*, pp. 31-2.

especially in western India, the United Provinces and the Punjab. It was to this epoch that the Bank of India, the Bank of Burma, the Indian Specie Bank, the Central Bank of India, the India Bank (Madras), the Punjab and Sind Bank, the Bank of Mysore, the Bank of Baroda and the Bombay Banking Company owed their origin.

§15. **Bank failures.**¹—In the first few years great progress was made by most of these banks, but the business of many of them was of so unsafe and speculative a character, and their cash reserves were so slender in proportion to their liabilities, that it was easy for a trained and gifted observer like Mr J. M. Keynes to predict speedy disaster, and Mr Keynes had the melancholy satisfaction of very soon seeing his prophecy come true.² The failure of the People's Bank on 20 September 1913 was followed by numerous other failures, including that of the Specie Bank in November 1913. In the course of the year 1913-14 as many as fifty-five banks went into liquidation. The boom during and after the war of 1914-18 gave another impetus to new flotations, and when the depression set in, a large number of failures took place. Eleven banks failed in 1915, thirteen in 1916 and sixteen in 1918. The years 1913-24 were a critical period for joint-stock banking in India. As many as 161 banks failed during this period, and the paid-up capital of these banks amounted to about Rs. 6¼ crores. Of the post-war failures, the most important was that of the Alliance Bank of Simla in 1923, which had far-reaching and disastrous consequences. In recent years³ the most outstanding case of bank failure was that of the Travancore National and Quilon Bank which went into liquidation in 1938. The closure of this bank, which was a scheduled bank (see §51) caused a banking crisis in South India

¹ For a very readable and lucid analysis of bank failures in India with special reference to some individual banks, see S. K. Muranjan, *Modern Banking in India*, ch. ix.

² J. M. Keynes wrote in 1913 on the eve of the bank failures in India: 'In the case of the smaller banks, dealing as they are with clients to whom banking is a new field and in a country where hoarding is still dominant, the cash balances seem, from available indications, to be hopelessly inadequate; and it is hard to doubt that in the next bad times they will go down like ninepins.'—*Indian Currency and Finance*, p. 225.

³ During the financial year 1938-9 as many as 64 banks went into liquidation or otherwise became defunct. They had an authorized capital of Rs. 1 crore and a subscribed capital of Rs. 23 lakhs. Their paid-up capital amounted to Rs. 18 lakhs, thus giving an average of Rs. 28,000 per bank. During the previous two years a similar number of banks with poor capital and reserves likewise failed. Such institutions are a distinct menace to the community. The proposed Banking Legislation (see §21 below) is intended to check this evil by ensuring the provision of an adequate capital structure for banking institutions.

at the end of June 1938, by 'creating nervousness among bank depositors as regards the position of other local banks, though other centres were fortunately unaffected. Even more serious than the direct loss sustained by the depositors, most of whom belonged to the middle classes, was the shock to public confidence, the setback to habits of investment, and the injury to industrial and commercial development.

§16. **Causes of the bank failures.**—The causes of the failures, particularly of those which occurred in 1913-14, were (i) slender percentage of cash to deposit liabilities, the average being 10 to 11 per cent; (ii) unbusiness-like rates of interest offered in order to attract deposits and thus to overcome meagre paid-up capital; (iii) absence of a proper proportion between the authorized and the subscribed capital, and between the subscribed and paid-up capital; (iv) absence of able managers and directors with the required knowledge of banking business and practice, and lack of proper supervision by the Board of Directors;¹ (v) fraudulent dealings on the part of some of the directors and managers; (vi) the gullibility of the depositors who were easily misled by the window-dressing of balance sheets and the payment of high dividends even from capital; (vii) lack of palliative remedial action such as the Government themselves or quasi-Government agencies might have supplied and (viii) absence of tradition of co-operation between the banks themselves.

Some critics foolishly hinted that the bank failures demonstrated the incapacity of Indians to conduct organized banking of the modern type. But it must not be forgotten that such failures were a common feature of the early history of joint-stock banking even in England and the United States, which are at the present time in the forefront in banking matters. Again, as Mr Doraswami remarks, 'the path of Indian bank failures is strewn with the wreckage of European manned institutions',² and he instances the failure of the first Bank of Bombay (1868) and the Arbuthnot Bank, to which we may add the more recent big failure of the Alliance Bank of Simla (1923). Although fraudulent manipulation was proved in some cases, the principal cause of the failures was lack of experience and knowledge. The failures enforced the lesson that banking is neither 'fool-proof' nor 'knave-proof', that it was necessary to minimize the risks of crisis by improving the

¹ 'It was a case of an army going into battle without any trained officers and without any orders from the General Staff.'—Findlay Shirras, *Indian Finance and Banking*, p. 336.

² See S. V. Doraswami, *Indian Finance, Currency and Banking*, p. iii.

banking machinery, by a careful selection of officers, directors and auditors, and adherence to sound banking methods.

The bank failures of 1913-14 had at least one good effect, that they removed the weak spots in Indian banking, although some deserving banks also failed along with many undeserving ones. They further demonstrated the necessity of a central bank like the Bank of England to guide the general banking policy in a time of crisis and to see to it that in normal times banking is conducted on sane and sound lines. This defect in the banking system of India may be said to have been removed by the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India in 1935 (see §42).

So far as the recent (1938) South Indian banking crisis is concerned, it revealed the necessity of the scheduled banks maintaining closer touch with the Reserve Bank so as to give it a clearer idea of their position and working and put it in a position to extend credit to deserving institutions without delay.¹ The crisis also revealed that one of the difficulties in the way of making advances to scheduled banks during such times was the absence of a sufficient quantity of rediscountable assets with them.² The bank failures of 1913-14 and of subsequent years also showed how necessary it was to make suitable provision for thorough instruction in the theory and practice of banking. Equally important with good banking laws and well-trained bankers is wide publicity, to enable the public to make a shrewd guess as to the position of a bank's affairs at any given time. Every opportunity must be given to those who wish to look closely into the affairs of a bank, and it is much to be desired that the number of wide-awake, intelligent and critical people willing and able to exercise a close supervision on the management of a bank should come to be far greater than it is. It is also essential that the banks themselves should develop high and honourable traditions and a sense of responsibility to the public.

§17. Importance of adequate cash reserves.—The maintenance of sufficient cash reserves is the very ABC of sound banking. But it is the experience of most countries that banks learn this salutary lesson only after a reckless disregard of it has actually caused a series of disasters. Indian joint-stock banking has already paid

¹ The South Indian banking crisis was the first banking crisis which the Reserve Bank had to handle. In view of the difficulties created by the crisis a circular letter was issued by the Reserve Bank to all the scheduled banks in September 1938 setting out the nature of relations between the Reserve Bank and the scheduled banks and laying down a policy for the guidance of such banks as might want accommodation from the Reserve Bank.

² *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India* (1938), p. 23.

very heavy school-fees in the shape of bank failures but seems to have at last learnt the lesson thoroughly, and the laudable desire to maintain strong reserves has been latterly more and more in evidence. The table below shows the manner in which the three main types of bank in India have interpreted their responsibilities in this connexion.

The percentages for the exchange banks have been calculated on their deposits and cash balances in India only.

Proportion per cent of cash to liabilities on deposits of the several classes of banks on 31 December

	1904	1908	1910	1913	1917	1920	1923	1929	1933	1935	1937
I. Imperial Bank of India ¹ ..	40	33	31	36	45	30	18	18	23	25	17
II. (a) Exchange Banks ² ...	29	17	16	19	40	30	19	15	12	15	19
(b) Exchange Banks ³ ...	34	27	21	17	160	58	27	10	6	19	10
III. (a) Joint-stock Banks ⁴ ...	12	15	11	18	25	23	17	14	15	23	17
(b) Joint-stock Banks ⁵	16	21	18	19	13	17	16	16

The above figures show that while the cash position was deteriorating all round in the pre-war period, it was on the whole more satisfactory in the case of the Presidency Banks, less so in the case of the exchange banks and least satisfactory in the case of the Indian joint-stock banks.

The lesson of the bank failures of 1913-14 seemed to have been taken to heart by all classes of banks, especially by the Indian joint-stock banks, judging by their improved cash position after 1913, though this was partly due to the panicky conditions created by the war of 1914-18, which required stronger cash reserves than normally. Naturally since the end of that war the cash position has been somewhat less strong than in the war period. The tendency, however, needs to be carefully watched and resisted, especially in the case of the smaller or non-scheduled banks (see §52). The matter is so important that the Bombay Banking Enquiry Committee suggested that banking agencies should be compelled by law, as in the United States of America, to maintain an adequate cash reserve. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee, however, did not favour this proposal. They were apprehensive that the statutory minimum might be regarded as the maximum by the management of the banks and that there were

¹ Before 1921, the Presidency Banks.

² Doing a considerable portion of their business in India.

³ Agencies of large banks doing business all over Asia.

⁴ Having capital and reserve of Rs. 5 lakhs and over.

⁵ Having capital and reserve of between Rs. 5 lakhs and 1 lakh.

many ways of evading legal requirements. The Committee preferred to leave the matter to the good sense and discretion of the banks themselves. (C.B.R., 706.) The amended (1936) Indian Companies Act, however, has made a provision for the keeping of minimum cash reserves (see §20 below) and the proposals for a Bank Act recently (1939) put forward by the Reserve Bank of India are designed to ensure an adequate degree of liquidity of the resources of banks (see §21 below).

§18. **Growth of joint-stock banking.**¹—The following statistics² give a general idea of the progress of joint-stock banking in India during the last sixty-seven years.

Capital, Reserve, Deposits and Cash Balances of the Principal Indian Joint-Stock Banks (in lakhs of rupees)

Class A.—Banks with Capital and Reserve of Rs. 5 lakhs and over.³

Year 31 Dec.	No. of Reporting Banks	Paid-up Capital	Reserve and Rest	Deposits	Cash Balances	Bills discounted and loans and advances	Government and other securities
1870	2	9.8	1.8	13	5
1880	3	18	3	63	16
1890	5	33	17	2,70	55
1900	9	82	45	8,07	1,19
1910	16	2,75	1,00	25,65	2,80
1913	18	2,31	1,32	22,59	4,00
1914	17	2,51	1,41	17,10	3,53
1918	19	4,36	1,65	40,59	9,48
1920	25	8,37	2,55	71,14	16,30
1921	27	9,38	3,00	76,89	15,65
1923	26	6,89	2,84	44,52	7,37
1929	33	7,87	3,67	62,72	9,05
1932	34	7,82	4,40	72,34	9,76
1933	34	7,78	4,55	71,68	10,92
1935	38	8,17	5,02	84,45	19,12(a)	42,21	...
1937	39	7,25	5,53	100,27	16,82(a)	55,07	37,61

Class B.—Banks with Capital and Reserve between Rs. 1 lakh, and Rs. 5 lakhs.

1913	23	39	11	1,51	24
1914	25	42	13	1,26	27
1918	28	48	14	1,55	36
1920	33	61	19	2,33	42
1921	38	77	23	3,26	43
1923	43	81	30	3,26	61
1929	45	75	40	3,58	45
1932	52	85	44	3,93	68
1933	55	87	43	4,75	82
1935	67	94	57	5,44	85	4,82	...
1937	112	1,48	74	8,39	1,31	7,62	1,05

¹ This section should be read with §§ 51-2 below.

² *Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India (1937)*, Table No. 6.

³ These Banks are scheduled to the Reserve Bank of India Act.

(a) Including balances with the Reserve Bank of India.

On 31 December 1937 there were 151 joint-stock banks in India having capital and reserve of one lakh and over. Their paid-up capital was Rs. 7.73 lakhs, reserve and rest Rs. 6.27 lakhs, deposits Rs. 108.66 lakhs, and cash balances Rs. 18.13 lakhs. Out of these, six banks between them accounted for by far the greater part of the deposits. Leaving aside the Banks of Mysore and Baroda which enjoy State patronage, the remaining four institutions are really the sole important instances in India of purely private enterprise engaged in joint-stock banking. These are the Bank of India, the Central Bank of India, the Punjab National Bank, and the Allahabad Bank (Calcutta).¹ Of these only the Central Bank of India and the Punjab National Bank are Indian-managed. As the table given above shows, (i) owing to the failures of 1913-14 banking received a setback; but (ii) beginning from 1915 there was a steady expansion of banking resources, especially of deposits, which reached the high figure of Rs. 80 crores in 1921—this expansion was partly due to the inflation of deposits during the war of 1914-18 and the post-war boom in banking company flotations. (iii) Between 1921 and 1923 there was a decline, especially marked in the year 1923 which was a black year for banks in the post-war period. (iv) Since then recovery has been noticeable. The economic depression did not on the whole adversely affect the deposit position of the banks, probably because of the lack of free investment of floating funds and of the transfer of a part of the proceeds of gold exports to banks. In recent years (1937-40) there has been considerable expansion of joint-stock banking, as is shown by the appreciable increase in deposits and the greatly increased activity in branch banking, especially in South India (see §66 below). Nevertheless the position of the joint-stock banks cannot be said to be very strong. Their difficulties have been enhanced by the competition of the Imperial Bank and its branches, the exchange banks and their branches in the interior, the co-operative banks, the Postal Savings Banks and the Cash Certificates system. The joint-stock banks have so far received little encouragement from the Government and public bodies. Since the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India in April 1935, the situation has undergone a change for the better. The bigger banks (scheduled to the Reserve Bank of India) are qualified to receive assistance and advice from the Reserve Bank of India. More recently (1938) even the smaller banks (non-scheduled) may receive the benefit of the advice of the Reserve Bank, provided they furnish the requisite information (see §§51-2 below).

¹ Gubbay, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

Two important events in the history of Indian joint-stock banks which occurred in 1923 deserve special notice. The first was that the Tata Industrial Bank, started in 1918, was merged in the Central Bank of India, which has established its position under capable Indian management as one of the leading joint-stock banks in the country. This constitutes an exception to the general tendency in Indian banking which is against such mergers or amalgamations.

The second event which dominated the banking situation in 1923 was the failure of the Alliance Bank of Simla. The Imperial Bank of India undertook to pay the depositors of the Alliance Bank 50 per cent of the amount due to them, on receiving a guarantee from the Government of India that they would meet the losses consequent upon the failure. The Government's justification for intervention was that the failure of such a bank would have been disastrous to other banks, and that, if the panic had not been averted by prompt action, Indian banking would have received another serious setback. The critics of the Government contrasted the attitude of zealous sympathy displayed by them as well as by the Imperial Bank towards the Alliance Bank with the indifference shown towards the Indian joint-stock banks which came into trouble in the crisis in 1913-14. If in future, however, the Government and now the Reserve Bank follow up this precedent by coming to the rescue, whenever necessary, of deserving banks, the bitterness of feeling engendered by this alleged partiality will disappear.

We have already noticed the recent (1938) failure of the Travancore National and Quilon Bank and the South Indian banking crisis which fortunately did not have adverse reactions on the position of Indian banking in other provinces. At the same time the failure of a scheduled bank caused considerable uneasiness in the country and prominently raised the question of the relations between the Reserve Bank and the scheduled banks on the one hand (§51) and on the other, of comprehensive banking legislation¹ (§21). The effects of the war of 1914-18 and of the present war on Indian banking are dealt with later in the chapter.

There is great scope for the expansion of joint-stock banks in the country under the guidance of the newly established Reserve Bank. The joint-stock banks can themselves learn much from their competitors on both sides. As the Central Banking Committee point out, they should combine the economical management

¹ For an instructive criticism of the part played by the Reserve Bank of India in the South Indian banking crisis and of its attitude towards the Travancore National and Quilon Bank see S. K. Muranjan, *Modern Banking in India*, pp. 285-8.

of the indigenous bankers with the efficiency and modern methods of the Western institutions. (*C.B.R.*, 568.)

§19. Regulation of banking.—In view of the alarming succession of bank failures described above, and for securing the development of banking on sound national lines, it is generally felt that purposeful regulation is necessary. The position in India in this respect until recently (1936) was unsatisfactory, the Government following the traditional policy of *laissez-faire*. The joint-stock banks were governed until 1936 by the Indian Companies Act of 1913 in common with other joint-stock companies, and only a few sections of this Act had a special bearing on joint-stock banking. Besides, all that the old Act required was the observance of a few formalities in the matter of the preparation of the balance sheet, and the form in which the statement of affairs was to be published twice a year.

The External Capital Committee received influential evidence in favour of a more active part being played by the Government in watching over the development of banks. The Committee did not, however, make any definite recommendations in the matter.

The Central Banking Enquiry Committee carefully reviewed the question and formulated a scheme of regulating joint-stock banks in India. They recommended that a special Bank Act be passed comprising the existing regulations embodied in the Indian Companies Act with certain modifications and additional provisions relating to (i) Organization; (ii) Management; (iii) Audit and Inspection; and (iv) Liquidation and Amalgamation.¹

§20. Special provisions relating to banking companies in the amended Indian Companies Act (1936).—After a delay of nearly five years the Government of India decided to incorporate special provisions relating to banking companies in their Indian Companies (Amendment) Bill, which became law in 1936. This course was adopted by the Government in preference to a special Bank Act on the ground that there was no immediate prospect of legislation dealing solely with this subject being undertaken. Moreover the major banks had already been dealt with partly in the Reserve Bank Act. The recommendations of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee were considered in drafting these new provisions, which are as follows:²

(i) A banking company has been defined as one which carries on as its principal business the accepting of deposits of money on current account or otherwise, subject to withdrawal by cheque, draft

¹ See *C.B.R.*, ch. xxv; also M. L. Tannan, *Regulation of Banks in India*.

² Act XXII (an Act further to amend the Indian Companies Act 1913, for certain purposes) of 1936, Part XA, sections 277F to 277N.

or order notwithstanding that it engages in addition in any or all of certain specified forms of business, such as lending of money, discounting bills, buying or selling foreign exchange, granting letters of credit, receiving valuables for safe custody, underwriting and dealing in stock, shares, debentures, etc., promoting or financing any business undertaking through syndicates or otherwise, undertaking and executing trusts. (ii) The activities of such banking companies are restricted to ordinary banking transactions by requiring the Memorandum of Association to make provision to this effect as a condition of registration under the Act. (iii) The employment of managing agents for the management of banking companies in future is prohibited. (iv) Certain minimum working capital before business is commenced is ensured by making necessary the issue of a certificate to the effect that working capital of Rs. 50,000 has been obtained by the allotment of share capital. (v) A banking company is not allowed to create any charge upon its unpaid capital. (vi) A Reserve Fund is made compulsory by requiring a transfer out of the annual profits, before any dividend is declared, of a sum not less than 20 per cent of such profits to the Reserve Fund until the Fund equals the paid-up capital. (vii) A minimum Cash Reserve of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the time liabilities and 5 per cent of the demand liabilities is to be maintained, and monthly statements of the amount so held and of the time and demand liabilities are to be filed with the Registrar by banking companies other than scheduled banks. (viii) A banking company is not allowed to form or hold shares in any subsidiary company except a subsidiary company of its own formed for the purpose of undertaking and executing trusts, or for undertaking the administration of estates, and for such purposes as are incidental to the business of accepting deposits. (ix) Provision has been made for a moratorium to save from liquidation a banking company in temporary difficulties by authorizing the Court on the application of a banking company to stay proceedings against such a company, provided the application is accompanied by a report made by the Registrar. The latter is entitled for the purpose to investigate the financial condition of the company at its cost.

While the new legislation marks a step forward in the direction of regulating banking in India, there is still a strong case for a separate Bank Act.

§21. Reserve Bank's proposals for an Indian Bank Act.— We therefore welcome the proposals recently (November 1939) submitted to the Government by the Reserve Bank for comprehensive banking legislation. The need for such legislation was clearly indicated by the banking crisis in South India in June 1938, which

exposed certain vital defects in the Indian banking system. Moreover, the definition of banking, as embodied in the Companies Act which was amended in 1936, has created considerable difficulties of interpretation particularly in respect of smaller institutions describing themselves as banks and yet refusing to comply with statutory provisions. Moreover, these banks have a meagre capital structure, preponderance of time deposits among liabilities and inadequate fluid resources in the form of cash and gilt-edged securities. As a result they are vulnerable to adverse conditions and are a positive danger to the credit structure of the country. The proposed Bank Act seeks to remedy these defects.

The proposals of the Reserve Bank are based on the general principle that the primary objective must be to safeguard the interest of the depositor, and thus ensure the economic development of the country by promoting the banking habit. They aim at establishing a network of properly run and financially sound banking institutions which will enable the Bank to co-ordinate the credit structure of the country and more fully utilize the powers of extending credit provided by the Reserve Bank Act.

The main features of the draft bank bill may be summarized as follows. In the first place, it tries to achieve a simpler and more restricted definition of banking and banking companies than the one given in section 277F of the Indian Companies Act.¹

Secondly, the proposed draft bill seeks to ensure that an institution calling itself a bank has sufficient capital to enable it to operate on a scale large enough to make it possible for it to make a reasonable working profit, even if it confines itself to proper banking business, and that banks with inadequate resources will not open branches in the larger towns where the needs of the public are already being reasonably well catered for. The amended Companies Act (1936) is not quite satisfactory in this respect, first because it exempts banks then in existence from the provision regarding a minimum capital of Rs. 50,000, and secondly because the capital so prescribed is too low. As already stated, the non-scheduled banks are operating on too meagre a capital structure. The position is still worse when banks with low capital open branches in large towns merely with a view to attracting deposits

¹ The difficulty of interpretation under the Companies Act (1936) is caused by the words 'principal business'. If there was a separate Bank Act it would be possible to remodel the definition by defining banking as 'accepting of deposits on current account or otherwise subject to withdrawal by cheque', and thereafter saying that a banking company was a company which did banking business.

at a high rate of interest. They spring up like mushrooms, with grandiose titles and prospectuses, and are liable to succumb to the slightest shock. It is clear that the community must be protected from this type of banking institution.

With a view to ensuring an adequate capital structure the bank bill prescribes (i) a minimum paid-up capital of Rs. 1 lakh before a banking company is permitted to commence business; (ii) a minimum capital of Rs. 5 lakhs, if the bank does business at Bombay or Calcutta, in respect of each such place, and (iii) a minimum paid-up capital of Rs. 2 lakhs if it does business at places with a population of one lakh, for each such place. No bank with a paid-up capital and reserve of less than Rs. 20 lakhs will be allowed to operate outside the province or State in which it has its principal place of business. The draft bill lays down an overriding minimum of Rs. 20 lakhs as paid-up capital.

Thirdly, in order to stop the scandal of issuing prospectuses with a very large authorized capital and then commencing business irrespective of the amount subscribed or paid-up in order to gull the unwary, the bill lays down that the subscribed capital shall not be less than 50 per cent of the authorized capital, and further that the paid-up capital shall not be less than 50 per cent of the subscribed capital. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee had also made a similar recommendation.

Fourthly, the bill contemplates certain moderate restrictions on bank investments in order to protect the depositors of banks, and to that end prescribes that not less than 30 per cent of their time and demand liabilities shall be held in the form of cash or unencumbered approved securities. This provision coupled with the existing provisions of the Companies Act relating to the reserve fund and cash reserve are intended to prevent overtrading on the part of such banks.

Fifthly, the draft bill seeks to protect British Indian depositors in the case of banks incorporated outside British India by requiring them to maintain 75 per cent of their British India liabilities in the form of assets in British India.

Lastly, profiting by the recent banking crisis in South India, the Reserve Bank has suggested important provisions in the bill for providing for expediting and simplifying the liquidation proceedings so that in the event of a bank failing the depositors may be paid off with minimum delay and litigation expenses.

It should be noted that the draft bill retains some of the provisions relating to banking companies in the Indian Companies Act, such as those relating to the maintenance of minimum cash reserves and reserve funds, prohibition of creating a charge on unpaid

capital and of employing managing agents, restrictions on the nature of subsidiary companies, etc. Every bank under the proposed Act will have to submit to the Reserve Bank on a fixed day in the year a return of the amount of its time and demand liabilities showing that its assets were not lower than 75 per cent of its liabilities.

The draft bill exempts Co-operative Banks registered under the Co-operative Societies Act of 1912 or any Provincial Co-operative Societies Act.

The Reserve Bank does not propose to include in the scope of the bank bill indigenous and private bankers for reasons already stated (see §5). If at a later stage, however, practical proposals emerge, it is prepared to fit them into the proposed measure.

The draft bill, which was circulated by the Government of India for the views of the public in January 1940, has received, as was to be expected, a mixed reception. While it has been welcomed, e.g. by banking circles in Bombay, as a step in the right direction and one calculated to put Indian banking on a sounder footing by protecting depositors, it has been criticized by staunch critics like Mr Manu Subedar. These criticisms may now be briefly reviewed.

First, the bill is regarded as unsatisfactory because it omits an important recommendation of both the Majority and Minority Reports of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee that every bank must work under a licence. Secondly, the draft bill excludes indigenous and private bankers. It is felt that the Reserve Bank authorities ought to have taken more energetic steps to bring indigenous bankers in line with modern banks. This is especially necessary, as the very restrictions on the capital of banking companies proposed in the bill must lead to the expansion of banking in private hands. Thirdly, the provisions regarding capital and reserves are considered to be too rigid by some and likely to create hardships especially for the smaller banks, while others favour the view that capital should have been linked up with deposits. Fourthly, it is generally believed that the proposed legislation will result in the amalgamation of a number of small banks started with insufficient capital, particularly in Bengal and Madras. This, however, would not be an altogether unwelcome result. Finally, it has been pointed out that the Reserve Bank of India itself should carry out liquidations so as to enable the restarting of banks, wherever possible, and to keep down the expenses and avoid the delays of liquidation proceedings.

It is unfortunate that the conditions created by the war militate

against an expeditious consideration and enactment of the proposed bank bill, which in spite of some of its defects and omissions, marks a great improvement over the halting provisions relating to banking companies in the Indian Companies Act as amended in 1936.

§22. **Clearing houses.**—The system of 'clearing houses' was introduced in England towards the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It made possible the easy adjustment of countless cross claims without actual use of cash or money. The existence of this system explains to a large extent the phenomenal development of the cheque system in England and other countries. For the greater success of this system, it is necessary that one of the member-banks of the clearing house should act as the settling bank or the 'bankers' bank', the other banks keeping a balance with it so that the settlement of cross claims is rendered more easy and complete.

The principal clearing houses in India are those of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Karachi, and Rangoon (before the separation of Burma on 1 April 1937). Clearing houses have also been established in Cawnpore, Lahore, Delhi, Simla, Ahmedabad and Colombo. The Imperial Bank of India had in view the establishment of more clearing houses, namely at Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. At many places where there is no clearing house, a system is in vogue of clearing accounts by giving cheques on the Imperial Bank in payment of balances due between the banks in the place. The Reserve Bank, the Imperial Bank, the exchange banks, the English banking and agency firms and the leading Indian joint-stock banks are most of them members of clearing houses. The Reserve Bank of India acts as the settling or bankers' bank. A representative of each member-bank attends the meeting of the clearing house on every business day at certain times. Since the members have usually an account with the Reserve Bank, the final balance left over after the cancellation of cross claims is usually settled by cheques and book entries, thus dispensing with cash in any form. Mr McDonald, the Managing Governor of the Imperial bank, suggested in his evidence before the Central Banking Committee that an Association of Clearing Banks should be incorporated. It should have its own rules and manage every clearing house in detail; it should have its own bankers, as should every member. In India these functions were, until the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India, largely performed by the Imperial Bank. There was thus confusion, and not infrequently other banks regarded their accounts with the Imperial Bank as being nothing more than a part of the clearing house and a means of settling their

differences in the clearing, and overlooked that in addition to the balance required to meet their clearing differences, their balances should have covered the work involved, as in the case of an ordinary constituent. The clearing house returns given below on the whole indicate a steady growth of trade and banking, except for the period of the economic depression. The use of the cheque is still in its infancy, being practically confined to the commercial towns. Nevertheless, the cheque is gradually finding its way even into the mofussil areas, and the tendency has been especially marked since the establishment of a number of branches by the Imperial Bank. The cheques issued by the co-operative banks are also familiarizing the public in the up-country districts with the new system.

The following figures show the growth of the cheque system.

Clearing House Returns—Total amount of cheques cleared
(In crores of rupees)

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1913	6,50	1932-3	16,19
1918-19	14,32	1933-4	16,41
1920-1	29,76	1934-5	17,33
1922-3	20,60	1935-6	18,43
1925-6	18,89	1936-7	19,32
1928-9	19,81	1937-8	20,51
1930-1	17,31	1938-9	19,75
1931-2	15,16	1939-40	23,19 ¹

To popularize and extend the clearing house system, more facilities must be given for the clearing of cheques of private firms up-country, and the privileges of the clearing house extended to registered private banks of suitable status. The use of cheques, although it is growing, is far from being commensurate with the vast size of the country and its population. One of the hindrances to the growth of the system is widespread illiteracy. Besides, in order to write a cheque, a person must not only be literate but must also know English. This is capable of being remedied if the joint-stock banks modify some of their methods and make use of the Indian languages in their transactions, particularly in respect of

¹ This amount, the highest since 1920-1, was distributed as follows (crores of rupees):

Calcutta 11,54, Bombay 8,84, Madras 1,00, Karachi 38, Rangoon 98, Cawnpore 14, Lahore 11, Delhi 20. *Report of the Reserve Bank on Currency and Finance (1939-40)*, statement xxxiv.

cheques, pass books and deposit receipts.¹ But the greatest hindrance is the deficiency of banking facilities.

The following are some of the suggestions made by the Bombay Banking Enquiry Committee to popularize the use of cheques : (i) Cheques should be accepted in payment of land revenue, local rates and taxes ; (ii) the Imperial Bank should revive the policy of charging low rates of exchange on up-country cheques ; and (iii) joint-stock banks and co-operative banks should allow moneys to be withdrawn from savings banks accounts by cheques.²

§23. **Postal Savings Banks, etc.**—Government Savings Banks were established in the Presidency towns between 1833 and 1835. In 1817 District Savings Banks were instituted in connexion with certain select district treasuries. The Post Office Savings Banks were opened in all parts of India in 1882 and 1883, and absorbed the District Savings Banks' business in 1886 and that of the Presidency Savings Banks in 1896. The Government Savings Banks are, therefore, at present a department of the postal administration. The Government do not maintain any specific cash reserve to meet their deposit liabilities, which constitute therefore an unfunded debt used for capital expenditure. The Postal Savings Banks provide the people of the middle and lower middle classes with a secure means of depositing their small savings, for which the general balances of the Government constitute a sufficient security. Agricultural and industrial workers appear to make a negligible use of these banks. In 1914, the Government offered increased facilities to depositors by raising the limit of the amount of the annual and total deposits permissible to an individual depositor as well as by helping the depositors in their investments in Government securities. This resulted in attracting large deposits, especially because public confidence in private banks had been badly shaken on account of the bank failures of 1913-14. The war of 1914-18 gave a temporary setback to Savings Banks deposits, but there was an improvement in the position in the post-war years, as can be seen from the table opposite.

The amount of deposits during the period before the war of 1914-18 has been exceeded since 1922-3 (when it was Rs. 23·19 crores), though the position is less satisfactory than it looks if we consider the period which saw a fall in the purchasing power of the rupee. The deposit balances in recent years have shown a large increase—a result attributed to the investment of part of the proceeds of the sales of gold. As in the case of the last war,

¹ The abolition of the stamp duty on cheques has encouraged their use.

² See *Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee*, pars. 303-6.

withdrawals in September 1939, when the present war was declared, were very heavy and amounted to Rs. 7.95 crores. But with the

The Growth of the Post Office Savings Banks Deposits

Year	No. of Banks at the end of the year	No. of Depositors	Total deposit balances with the Government (in crores of rupees)
1913-14	9,824	1,639,000	23.16
1914-15	10,161	1,644,074	14.89
1918-19	10,587	1,677,407	18.82
1923-4	10,535	2,039,314	24.78
1925-6	11,162	2,317,390	27.23
1928-9	12,684	2,020,832	34.49
1930-1	12,846	2,477,613	37.02
1932-3	12,690	2,736,645	43.45
1933-4	12,677	3,089,267	52.23
1935-6	12,926	3,541,553	67.25
1937-8 ¹	12,631	3,786,495	77.56

revival of confidence there was an improvement in subsequent months.

There is a considerable scope for the expansion of Post Office Savings Banks, seeing that there were in 1937-8 only 12,631 Savings Banks for nearly five lakhs of villages in British India, which shows that in the case of a vast number of villages the nearest Savings Bank is several miles away, making it highly inconvenient for the village folk to deposit their savings there. Recently (1941) the Post Offices have offered to receive special Defence Savings deposits at a higher rate of interest.

In recent years there have been several forms of investment open to the public which have come into competition with the Post Office Savings Banks. For example, the War Loans during the war of 1914-18 (and to some extent during the present war) attracted many people who would otherwise have deposited their money with the Post Office Savings Banks. Other competitors are the co-operative credit societies, the Imperial Bank and the exchange and joint-stock banks.

Among the suggestions made for making the Post Office Savings Banks more popular are the following: (i) a higher rate of interest on deposits, more in correspondence with rates obtainable elsewhere; (ii) a further relaxation of the restriction of the amount deposited annually and the limit on balances, subject to suitable

¹ The Post Office Savings Banks deposits amounted to Rs. 81.94 and 78.38 crores (exclusive of Burma) on 31 March 1938 and 1939, respectively. See *Statistical Abstract for British India (1937-8)*, Table No. 235 and *Report on Currency and Finance (1939-40)*, statement xviii.

precautions regarding sudden withdrawals ;¹ (iii) the acceptance of deposits in the form of cheques and also the allowing of withdrawals by means of cheques ; (iv) propaganda for opening new Savings Banks offices.

The Post Office comes into contact with the savings of the people in another way, namely through Cash Certificates. These certificates are issued in amounts of Rs. 10 or multiples of Rs. 10, Rs. 10,000 being the maximum limit for the face value of the total holdings by one person. They are payable after 5 years from the date of purchase and are issued at a discount, full interest, i.e. face value, being payable only at the end of five years. Since the time of the war of 1914-18 a Government Loan branch has also usually been tacked on to the Post Office. As regards the Post Office Cash Certificates the system is capable of being extended and further popularized so as to make it finance a considerable portion of the provincial capital expenditure. In 1930-1 the amount of the Postal Cash Certificates outstanding was Rs. 38.44 crores, whereas it was only Rs. 13.12 crores in 1924-5 and Rs. 8.88 crores in 1917-18, when the system was first introduced. Prior to 1934-5 the amount of Cash Certificates outstanding greatly increased, being Rs. 65.96 crores on 31 March 1935. This result has been attributed partly to higher rates of interest prior to 1934-5 during which year the yield was reduced twice in conformity with the lower yields of gilt-edged securities² and partly to the sale of gold at high prices and the investment of the proceeds in Cash Certificates. With the lowering of interest rates, there set in a tendency towards a decline in the value of new certificates, which was to some extent counteracted by a reduction in the interest rate on Post Office Savings Bank Deposits since December 1938. The total value of Cash Certificates outstanding on 31 March 1939 was Rs. 59.57 crores (excluding Rs. 0.59 crores in Burma). On the outbreak of the war in September 1939, repayments during that month were very large. At the same time sales of Cash Certificates showed a sharp decline. With the return of confidence the situation showed an improvement especially in respect of repayments. The total value of outstanding Cash Certificates amounted to Rs. 57.02 crores on 31 March 1940. In order further to popularize

¹ The amount that can be deposited into an account in a single year is limited to Rs. 750 and the total balance to Rs. 5,000. The minimum amount that can be deposited at any time is four annas, withdrawal being permitted only once a week. The rate of interest was reduced from 3 per cent to 2½ per cent in 1935, to 2 per cent in 1936 and to 1½ per cent in 1938.

² The present yield on Cash Certificates is 2½ per cent compound interest—a rate introduced in July 1936.

Cash Certificates, it has been suggested that, as it is not possible to open a post office in every village, the village *patel* and the accountant, who collect the land revenue, could conveniently undertake the business of Cash Certificates, which may also be accepted at their realizable value in payment of land revenue.¹ On the whole the system of Cash Certificates has abundantly justified itself. It is desirable however to avoid unfair competition with banks and bankers, by suitably adjusting the yield on Cash Certificates. Also in order to meet the grievance that there is at present too great a diversion of funds outside the districts, some of the money collected through post offices may be placed at the disposal of co-operative societies, or advanced as *takkavi*, to individuals.

§24. *Effects of the war of 1914-18 on Indian banking.*—One of the effects of the last war on Indian banking was a remarkable increase in bank deposits. The total bank deposits of all the banks (the Presidency Banks, joint-stock banks and the exchange banks)² amounted to Rs. 97·51 crores in 1913 and Rs. 1,63·62 crores in 1918.

The large war profits made by some of the industries, like the cotton-mill and jute-mill industries, naturally increased the cash deposited with the banks. In addition the banks gave credit, both to the Government and private individuals and bodies, in connexion with the issue of and investment in War Loans and Treasury Bills. The banks gave credit to the Government by themselves subscribing to the War Loans and the Treasury Bills, and the Government drew upon this credit by issuing cheques on the banks to its creditors from whom heavy purchases of war materials, etc., had been made. These cheques were in their turn carried to their accounts at the banks by the Government's creditors. The banks thus found that their deposits increased by the amount of their subscription to the Government loans. The banks helped private persons and bodies to invest in War Loans and Treasury Bills by opening deposit accounts with them. Thus both these sets of causes served to increase enormously the total amount of the deposits.

Another effect of the war was the worsening of the pre-war situation as regards the smallness of the capital of the banks in relation to the business transacted. This was due to the excessive anxiety of the banks to make larger and ever larger net profits by as rapid a turnover of their capital as possible.

Further, the war witnessed a very considerable growth in the

¹ See Wadia and Joshi, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

² In the case of the exchange banks, only the deposits in India are taken into account.

cash reserves of the banks, partly owing to the increase in the deposits and partly to the necessity felt by the banks to maintain stronger reserves as a safety measure under the abnormal war conditions and as a result of the banking crisis of 1913-14, the memory of which was still fresh and vivid. There was also a considerable increase in the investments of the banks, partly owing to the great activity of the export trade, but primarily as a result of the banks' investments in War Loans and Treasury Bills. The war brought higher dividends, tighter money and high bank rates, and a great increase in the amounts of cheques cleared. Lastly, the experiences of the war imparted greater urgency than ever to the question of a central bank, the need for which had already been clearly indicated by the crisis of 1913-14.¹

§25. **Characteristics and deficiencies of the Indian money market.**—The money market in India exhibits several characteristics and deficiencies, some of which are reviewed below. In the first place, as previously pointed out, the money market in India is divided into several segments which are loosely correlated to each other. Each sectional agency such as the Imperial Bank, the exchange banks, the joint-stock banks, the co-operative banks, the indigenous bankers, etc., limits itself to a particular class of business and remains virtually independent in its own sphere.² The relations between the various members of the money market are not very happy. Thus the joint-stock banks are jealous of the privileged position of the Imperial Bank, which until the establishment of the Reserve Bank performed to a limited degree the functions of a central bank. The exchange banks occupy a very strong position, and complaints are often heard that they are encroaching on the province of the joint-stock banks. Before their inclusion in the list of scheduled banks they were not amenable to any law or authority in India. The link between the co-operative and other banks is also very loose. But the most serious cleavage exists, as already shown, between organized banking institutions and indigenous banking. Even the latter or the bazaar part of the money market is not one compact entity, but is further subdivided, as, for example, in Bombay where there are separate Gujarati, Marwari and Multani bazaars, each with its own rate of interest. The absence of a genuine central bank until recently (April, 1935) aggravated the separatist and centrifugal

¹ The effects of the present war (1939-?) on Indian banking are reviewed later in the chapter (see §60).

² This criticism applies specially to the period before the establishment of the Reserve Bank.

tendencies; and although the Reserve Bank of India has already commenced work no revolutionary changes can be expected in the near future. Firstly, because the relation of the Reserve Bank to indigenous bankers has not yet been settled; and secondly because before a well-organized and close-knit money market is brought into existence a certain amount of time must necessarily elapse, in order that the influence of the new central banking structure, imperfect as it is, should permeate the credit organization of the country.¹

§26. **Confusion and chaos of money rates.**—An inevitable result of the sectional organization of the money market in India is the confusion and chaos of the money rates. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee cannot be said to be guilty of exaggeration when they say, 'The fact that a call rate² of $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, a *hundi* rate³ of 3 per cent, a bank rate⁴ of 4 per cent, a Bombay bazaar rate⁵ for bills of small traders of $6\frac{3}{4}$ per cent and a Calcutta bazaar rate for bills of small traders of 10 per cent can exist simultaneously indicates an extraordinary sluggishness in the movement of credit between the various markets'.⁶ This presents a marked contrast with the close relation between the various money rates in the London money market, all of which depend ultimately on the bank rate and promptly adjust themselves to changes in that rate. The old bank rate charged by the Imperial Bank, though quoted in financial journals along with the bank rates of the central banks of other countries, had a different and limited significance. Whereas the rates of the central banks usually denote the rates at which first-class trade bills can be discounted at the central bank, the

¹ Another defect of the Indian money market before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank of India was the dual control over the money market by the Government, which was the currency authority, and the Imperial Bank, which was the credit controlling agency to a limited degree. Further the Government dominated the money market by their currency and financial operations. The inauguration of the Reserve Bank, which is both the currency and credit controlling authority, has removed these two defects.

² The call or call money rate refers to the interest rate charged on surplus money seeking employment for a possibly minimum period of 24 hours.

³ The (Imperial Bank) *hundi* rate is the rate at which the Imperial Bank will discount first-class three months' bills.

⁴ The bank rate (old) refers to the rate at which the Imperial Bank, before the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India, was prepared to grant demand loans against Government securities. This is now known as the advance rate of the Imperial Bank. The basis of the bank rate as now quoted by the Reserve Bank is explained in §55 below.

⁵ The bazaar rates are those at which the bills (*hundis*) of small traders are discounted by the shroffs at Calcutta and Bombay.

⁶ See C.B.R., 579.

Imperial Bank rate was not a discount rate but a loan rate. The divided control over currency by the Government and credit by the Imperial Bank before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank made the confusion of rates worse confounded. Another characteristic of the money rates in India is the perceptible disparity in respect of them at the two principal centres, Bombay and Calcutta, leading to fluctuations in the prices of securities and reactions on trade movements. This is brought out by the table of money rates below.

Indian Money Rates per cent (1939-40)¹

On 1st of	Bank Rate	Call Money Rate		Imperial Bank Hundi Rate	Bazaar Bill Rate	
		Calcutta	Bombay		Calcutta (Range)	Bombay
April 1939 ...	3	2	2½	3	6-7	5½
May " ...	3	2	2	3	6-7	5½
June " ...	3	1½	2	3	6-7	5½
July " ...	3	½	½	3	6-7	5½
August " ...	3	½	½	3	6-7	5½
Sept. " ...	3	½	½	3	6-7	6
Oct. " ...	3	1	2	3	6-7	5½
Nov. " ...	3	½	½	3½	6-7	5½
Dec. " ...	3	1	1½	3½	6-7	6
Jan. 1940 ...	3	1½	2	3½	6-7	6½
Feb. " ...	3	1½	1½	3½	6-7	6½
March " ...	3	2	1½	3½	6-7	6½

We may now consider further the question of the relation between the old (Imperial) bank rate and the bazaar *hundi* rates.

We have already remarked that the indigenous banker finances the movement of crops during the busy season largely from his own resources. He is, however, ultimately dependent upon the Imperial and the other joint-stock banks for the additional funds he requires. Therefore in times of stringency the bazaar rate for first-class *hundis* follows the Imperial Bank rate. As we have seen, the shroffs who do the *hundi* discounting business charge higher rates than the bank rate, profiting by the difference between the two rates. Towards the beginning of the slack season the bank rate is generally higher than the *hundi* rate. When money is easy the correspondence between the two rates is less close than when it is tight, and the shroffs may disregard the bank rate and may underquote the bank.² It should be noted in connexion with the absence of complete harmony between the two rates that the shroffs

¹ See *Report on Currency and Finance (1939-40)*, Statement xxix.

² See Shirras, *Indian Finance and Banking*, pp. 341-2.

scarcely ever discount European paper and do not purchase foreign or sterling bills. 'Neither do they lend money on Government paper or similar securities, but confine their advances to the discount of *hundis*, to loans to cultivators and against gold or silver bullion.' The banks do not compete with the shroffs for the purchase of traders' *hundis* and therefore there is often little apparent relation between the shroff's rate and the bank rate. The shroff's reliance on banking funds is not sufficiently continuous or sufficiently great for the two rates to be closely similar. The operations of the shroffs still lie to a great extent outside the banking system of the country.

The natural link between the Indian money market or the bazaar, and the market controlled by banking institutions of the European type would be 'a steady supply of trade bills endorsed by reliable firms or discount houses which are in touch with both markets and are able to meet the needs at one end of the merchant who prefers the elastic methods of bazaar finance, and to take advantage at the other end of entry into the central money and discount markets'. (C.B.R., 581.)

The levelling down of the various money rates must be a matter of slow growth and development. 'The ultimate ideal must be the mobilization of the whole of the floating resources of the country into one large pool, into which bills can find their way with as little delay and with the intervention of as few intermediaries as possible.¹ The inauguration of the Reserve Bank and the expectation that it will promote the establishment of a bill market in India gives rise to the hope that the Bank will put an end to the chaos of money rates and exercise control over the various money rates prevailing in the money market (see §§28-9 below).

§27. **Seasonal monetary stringency.**—Another striking characteristic (incidentally referred to above) of the money market in India is the seasonal monetary stringency and high money rates during a part of the year. The year in India is divided into two more or less distinct periods: (i) November to June, which is the period of the busy season when money is required to move the crops from the up-country districts to the port towns and internal centres of consumption, and (ii) from July to October, which is the period of the slack season when the money returns to the financial centres in payment for bullion or other commodities. There are wide fluctuations of the money rates from one period of the year to another, and the spread between the maximum bank rate during the busy season and the minimum during the slack season is very

¹ C.B.R., 581.

striking. For instance, the highest bank rate in the year 1924 was 9 and the lowest 4, corresponding figures for 1928 being 7 and 5, for 1929, 8 and 5, for 1930, 7 and 5. During the years of depression the bank rate remained at a comparatively lower level and without any change during the whole year, for example, during 1933-4 and 1934-5 the bank rate remained unchanged at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This may be attributed to the general slackness in the trade demand, the prevailing low level of commodity prices, the release of frozen credit wrought by the sale of gold, and to some extent the feeling of ease caused by expansion of currency. The Reserve Bank of India was compelled to reduce the bank rate to 3 per cent with effect from 28 November 1935 under pressure of easy conditions and weight of money awaiting investment. It has since remained unaltered, in spite of the disturbing conditions created by the outbreak of the war in September 1939, thanks to the new technique of financing the war.¹

The bank rate² varies with the intensity of the demand for money, which again depends upon the nature of the harvest, the briskness of the demand for the great staples of agriculture (cotton, jute, wheat, rice, etc.), especially for export purposes, and the range of prices prevalent for them. We have already seen how the crops are financed in the earlier stages by the indigenous bankers and how a considerable volume of business is thus brought by them to the Imperial and other banks who discount and rediscount the shroffs' *hundis*. The demand for moving the crops³ occasions a seasonal stringency in the money market, further emphasized by the great demand for currency which comes at the same time in connexion with holidays, marriage ceremonies, etc. But apart from these causes accounting for seasonal stringency, there were other factors responsible for the normal high money rates in India before the economic depression. We have already spoken about the part which the Reserve Treasuries played in causing monetary stringency. The transfer of large cash balances to the Imperial Bank

¹ For further particulars regarding the effect of the war on money rates in India see §60.

² The old Imperial Bank rate varied inversely with the Government cash balances, which get depleted during the busy season, and begin to swell during the slack season.

³ In connexion with the movement of crops during the busy season the following five methods of inland remittance may be distinguished: (i) remittance by *hundis* or cheques; (ii) transfers through the Reserve and Imperial Banks; (iii) transfers through the Government treasuries; (iv) transfers of rupees by rail or road; and (v) remittances through the Post Office. See *Report on Currency and Finance (1939-40)*, statements xxxvi-viii for internal remittance statistics.

(now to the Reserve Bank) brought some relief to the money market. The Government monopoly of note-issue and its divorce from banking, until its transfer to the Reserve Bank of India in 1935, was responsible for a maladjustment between the supply of and demand for money. A limited degree of elasticity was imparted to the note-issue by the provision for the seasonal issue of currency up to Rs. 12 crores against inland bills of exchange, under the Paper Currency Act of 1923.¹ The monetary stringency was also attributed to the heavy borrowings of the Government in the money market since the war of 1914-18 which prevented the Imperial Bank from collecting sufficient surplus cash, and thus the money rates remained unduly high. The exchange policy of the Government, involving deflation or refusal to allow the normal increase in currency, also added to the monetary stringency from time to time. But from the nature of the case this cause comes into operation only occasionally. On the other hand, the purchase of sterling in India, arrangements for cheap inland remittances, and the starting of additional branches by the Imperial and other banks, have had the effect of lowering to some extent the pitch of money rates during the busy season. However, excluding the recent years of economic depression and cheap money, the normal rate for money in India is still far too high and acts as a discouragement to business activity. A fundamental reason for the high rate is the scarcity of capital, which is the direct result of the great poverty of the people. The income of the great majority of the people is so small that any saving is scarcely possible for them. Another reason is that a considerable amount of potential capital takes the form of hoards, which lie idle and sterile in the absence of adequate banking facilities to attract them into profitable investment. (The sale of large quantities of gold for export in recent years has lessened the force of this factor. It has also partially contributed to cheap money conditions and low interest rates.) These defects pointed to the need for a central banking agency which could spread the available resources more evenly over the different parts of the country and the different seasons of the year. Now that the Reserve Bank has been established, it is expected that the supply of additional note currency against eligible commercial paper will be facilitated and the question of penal rates of interest will not arise. But here the snag lies in the fact that there is scarcity of genuine commercial bills (paper) against which additional note currency can be issued (see next section).

¹ See ch. vii above.

§28. **Lack of a bill market.**—A well-organized bill market is an indispensable adjunct of an efficient money market and is essential for the smooth working of the credit mechanism. It is also necessary for linking up the various credit agencies ultimately and effectively to the central bank of a country. The present situation in India in this respect is most unsatisfactory. Inadequate development of the bill market is a weakness of the Indian banking system, and prejudicially affects the supply of credit. For instance, one of the difficulties in the way of the Reserve Bank of India making advances to scheduled banks (see §§45 and 51) is that the latter do not hold a sufficient quantity of rediscountable assets. This is not due to a lack of knowledge regarding the utility of the trade bill or unwillingness to make use of it. *Hundis*, which are the analogue of the Western bill of exchange, have been in use in this country from the twelfth century onwards, if not earlier. The scarcity of bills, which is clearly brought out by the very small proportion of their assets devoted to the purchase of bills by banks in India, may be attributed to the following reasons.¹ (i) In the first place, banks in India have to maintain a stronger liquid position than in Western countries, and therefore, a relatively very large portion of their assets is locked up in gilt-edged securities—a practice favoured so far by the attractive yield of Government securities. (ii) Secondly, before the inauguration of the Reserve Bank of India in April 1935 banks were not inclined to discount their bills with the Imperial Bank of India, as this was considered to be a sign of weakness by the market. (iii) Joint-stock banks preferred taking loans from the Imperial Bank on Government securities to offering bills for rediscounting because the latter was itself a competing commercial bank, and no bank would like to give away the secrets of its bill portfolio to a rival bank. Moreover, since the Imperial Bank discounted only bills approved by it at its discretion and did not lay down any standards in this respect, the joint-stock banks could not depend upon bills brought in by their customers. (iv) Another obstacle in the way of the development of a bill market in India is the defective grounding of the bazaar *hundi*, which is not readily acceptable to banks, who are at present compelled to insist on the personal security of the endorsing shroff, if he happens to be on the bank's list of approved shroffs. It is not clear on the face of a bazaar *hundi* whether it is a pure finance bill or a genuine trade bill, since it is not always

¹ For a detailed discussion of this problem see *C.B.R.*, chapter on The Banking System and the Money Market.

accompanied by documents like sale contracts, invoices, documents of title, etc., whereby the bill could be supported and connected with a particular lot of goods or produce. Other difficulties in the way of the free use of *hundis* are the baffling variety of languages in which the *hundis* are drawn, diversity of customs regarding days of grace, etc., widespread illiteracy of the masses, the heavy stamp duty on *mudati hundis* (usance bills), etc. (v) Another factor which prevents free development of the bill market in India is the system of cash credits which is greatly in vogue in inland trade finance in India. It offers certain advantages both to the lender and the borrower. For instance, the borrower has to pay interest on cash credit only to the extent that credits are used, and the bank can withdraw credit in the event of deterioration of the borrower's position. On the other hand there are certain advantages of bills, viz. liquidity to banks and the borrower's certainty of a definite amount of credit during the period of currency. The use of bills may be expected to be more popular, provided the banks take the initiative in the matter.

§29. Measures to promote a bill market.— The Central Banking Enquiry Committee have suggested various measures for the development of a bill market in India. (C.B.R., 593.) (i) The Reserve Bank of India should be prepared to buy or rediscount at its published rate—which should be the minimum rate—first-class trade bills and promissory notes arising out of bona fide commercial transactions and should at its discretion charge higher rates for demand loans against authorized securities. The joint-stock banks need not look upon the Reserve Bank as their rival and may be expected to avail themselves fully of the facilities of rediscounting commercial paper offered by it. It may be added that the Reserve Bank is authorized to discount eligible commercial paper, although so far it has not met with much success in stimulating the development of a bill market for India. (ii) Discounting charges should be reduced so as to facilitate use of bills, and a clearing house for bills should be established in all provincial capitals in order to secure charging one commission only. (iii) Warehouses should be established in various parts of India to encourage the use of bills, as this would tend to replace the pure finance (or accommodation) bills drawn by merchants and shroffs by documentary bills which would be readily discounted by banks. (iv) Until recently the high rate (18 pies per cent) of stamp duty on usance bills seriously militated against a greater use of bills. Complete abolition or appreciable reduction of this duty was strongly recommended by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee. It is gratifying to learn that on the recommendation (1938) of the Reserve Bank

of India, the stamp duty was reduced, with effect from 13 January 1940, to two annas for every one thousand rupees or part thereof, of the amount of usance bills payable not more than one year after date or sight. It is to be hoped that the reduction will encourage the growth of the bill market in the country.¹ (v) The Post Offices should stock printed bill forms in English and Indian languages in parallel. The noting of dishonour and protest by recognized associations of banks, shroffs and merchants should be validated to save inconvenience and trouble to the owner of the instrument. The customs governing *hundis* should be standardized with a view to promoting their circulation. Legislation may be resorted to, if necessary. (vi) Banks should take the initiative in creating bank acceptances,² which would be more readily negotiable than ordinary trade bills. In this connexion we welcome the efforts that are now being made by the Reserve Bank, which is actively investigating the possibility of creating a bill market by encouraging the formation of acceptance houses. (vii) A discount market should be established by the adoption of bill-broking as an integral part of the indigenous bankers' business and by the formation of discount houses under the aegis of the Reserve Bank by these bankers and their wealthy depositors.³ (viii) The use of bills should be extended in respect of advances granted to the ryots for the growing of crops, in financing the marketing of crops, financing of village bankers by shroffs, financing of the movement of goods from the port town to the interior, and finally in the financing of the foreign trade of the country.

The establishment of a well-organized bill market is essential for making our credit structure more elastic and efficient and to supply a corrective to seasonal stringency. The experience in the United States shows that the founding of a central banking organization is followed by the development of a bill market. One may expect a similar happy result here now that the Reserve Bank is established and is authorized to purchase, sell and rediscount bills of exchange (including rupee import bills) and promissory notes endorsed by a scheduled bank or a provincial co-operative bank, and to issue notes against the cover of such eligible paper in the busy season. (See also §§45 and 49.) The marketing surveys, which have recently been or are being conducted by central

¹ See *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India* (1939), p. 32.

² A banker's acceptance is a bill which the bank, under a prior arrangement with the purchaser of goods on credit, agrees to accept, the bill being drawn by the seller of goods.

³ See Draft scheme of the Reserve Bank of India for linking of Indigenous Bankers (26 August 1937).

and provincial marketing officers, under the supervision of the Marketing Adviser, may throw further light on the possibilities of extending the use of bills in India.

§30. **Utility of central banks.**—The International Financial Conference which met at Brussels in 1920 passed a resolution that 'in countries where there is no central bank of issue, one should be established'. Underlying this resolution is the idea that there is a close connexion between the maintenance of financial stability and a central banking organization. The advice embodied in this resolution has in the last few years been widely followed in European countries and the United States, till lately the home of decentralized banking.¹ In India the opinion had been gaining ground for a long time that a central bank was essential in the country for various reasons. By the force of circumstances the Government had come to take upon themselves important functions, such as note-issue, management of cash balances, regulation of foreign exchanges, etc., and it was felt that these functions were best performed by a central bank. Again, it was a great source of weakness that these functions should be divorced from banking proper. This divorce led to the keeping of two distinct reserves, namely, Government's reserves and bankers' reserves, with ill-defined relations between the two, and it made the monetary system highly inelastic. The absence of a central banking authority further led to a general lack of direction in the banking policy of the country. Though there was the 'multiple reserve' system in theory, that is to say, the various banks kept their own reserves, in practice these reserves were hardly adequate, and the danger was that in a crisis everyone would count upon everyone else. The bank failures of 1913-14 added to the strength of this argument. Other advantages of a central bank would be a moderation of the wide fluctuations of the bank rate and mitigation of its normal high level through an enlargement and co-ordination of the banking resources of the country. The central bank would also provide adequate rediscount facilities, so that the other banks would be in a position easily to liquefy their assets, a facility which would increase their credit. A central bank would further take over from Government officials the responsibility for a variety of financial and semi-financial duties for the discharge of which they were ill equipped. The absence of expert advice and experience in India had resulted in the centre of power in financial matters being shifted to the India Office and the India Council, which, however, were not adequately in touch with conditions in India.

¹ See Kisch and Elkin, *Central Banks*, p. 2.

The central bank would get over this difficulty by providing trained experience and advice on the spot, and it would also be useful as a buffer between the Secretary of State and public criticism. The manipulation of the discount rate so as to maintain currency stability is a function which falls peculiarly within the sphere of a central bank, which is further calculated to help a fuller, wider, and more effective use of the Government balances for commercial and industrial purposes. A central bank would also extend banking facilities by helping the smaller banks and arranging for a continuous reduction of remittance charges from one part of the country to another, to the great benefit of the commercial community. Another advantage is that the central bank would be an instrument for the wider diffusion of sound and reliable banking practice. Lastly, the maintenance of the stability of the purchasing power of money is being increasingly recognized to be a world problem requiring the co-operation of the principal countries of the world. This co-operation would be best attained if each country equipped itself with an efficient central bank.¹

§31. History of the proposal.—The idea of a central bank for India is more than a century old.² As early as 1836, a large body of merchants interested in the East Indies submitted to the Court of Directors a project for a great banking establishment for British India. The basis of the Bank of Bengal, it was urged, was too narrow for such a customer as the Government. The definite establishment of the three Presidency Banks put an end to the idea of turning the Bank of Bengal into a Bank of India. The scheme of constituting an all-India bank by the amalgamation of the Presidency Banks came to the front for the first time in 1867, when it was proposed by Mr Dickson, the Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bengal. No practical results, however, followed. Between 1898 and 1912 there was desultory discussion of the question. Mr J. M. Keynes, a member of the Chamberlain Commission, prepared an elaborate scheme for a central bank in collaboration with another member, Sir Ernest Cable. The essential features of this scheme were later incorporated in the Imperial Bank Act of 1920. The outbreak of the war of 1914-18 led to a postponement of the question till a more suitable opportunity offered itself for its reconsideration. The amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks seemed to be the only practicable basis for the creation of a central bank. The vast extent of their business,

¹ See Kisch and Elkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

² For a detailed history of all the proposals for general or state banks in India from 1773 onwards, see O. P. Gupta, *Central Banking in India (1773-1934)*.

their wide experience and established connexions, their long and constant association with the Government and the many uses to which they had been put by the Government, especially during the war (1914-18) made it impossible to leave them out of any project for a central bank. On the part of the Presidency Banks themselves also there was now a greater willingness—not to say eagerness—than had been shown before, to fall in with the scheme of amalgamation, on account of the fear that, if they did not consent to the plan, pressure of public opinion was likely to force the Government to create a brand-new state bank on purely official lines, and to sever their connexion with the Presidency Banks. Accordingly the Imperial Bank Act was passed in September 1920 and came into effect from 27 January 1921.

§32. Formation of the Imperial Bank.—As a basis for the amalgamation, the three Presidency Banks were taken over by the Imperial Bank as 'going concerns' with all their assets and liabilities. There was no provision fixing the location of the general head office. The Central Board was to meet at least once every year at every local head office. The Legislature apparently preferred to adopt this plan rather than undertake the delicate task of deciding between the claims of the three presidency towns. The capital basis of the Bank was widened by providing for a capital and reserve of Rs. 15 crores as against Rs. 7 crores which was the capital of the old three Presidency Banks put together.

The Imperial Bank is thus a private corporation like the Bank of England or the Bank of France, but it was until the recent (1935) establishment of the Reserve Bank of India also a State Bank in the restricted sense that it was specially created by a specific Act of the Indian Legislature and was assisted, controlled and supervised by the Indian Government within certain limits. The chief difference between the Imperial Bank and the Banks of England and France was in regard to its very limited functions as a State Bank.

§33. Constitution of the Imperial Bank.—The control of the Imperial Bank was entrusted to a Central Board of Governors with local boards at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. Two Managing Governors were appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council on the recommendation of the Central Board. The same authority nominated the Controller of Currency on the Central Board to be the guardian of the financial interests of the Government. The Governor-General-in-Council was entitled to issue instructions to the bank in respect of any matter which in his opinion vitally affected the financial policy or the safety of the Government balances.

The duties of the Central Board were to deal with matters of general policy, to exercise general powers of control over the local boards, to determine the distribution of funds and the fixation of the bank rate (which is now called the advance rate), and to be responsible for the weekly publication of the bank's accounts. The local boards on the other hand dealt with the ordinary day-to-day business in their respective territories. For the current general (central) management there was a smaller working body consisting of three members of the Central Board, of whom one was the Controller of Currency. A novel feature was that the bank was allowed by the Act to establish a London office. It was not, however, permitted to deal directly with the public in foreign exchange, though it might transact business in London on behalf of the Indian Government including the Secretary of State, public bodies, other banks and the old customers of the Presidency Banks.

§34. Functions of the Imperial Bank.—The Act of 1920 followed the old Presidency Banks Act of 1876 in defining absolutely the class of business in which the bank might engage, though the old restrictions were modified in some minor points, especially in regard to certain limited powers of access to the London money market and dealing in foreign exchange.

The functions allowed to the bank were : (i) investments in certain specified securities of the Government of India and United Kingdom, Port Trust Bonds, certain Municipal Corporation Bonds and those of State-aided railways and of District Boards ; (ii) advancing money against any of the above securities ; (iii) advancing money against accepted bills of exchange and promissory notes, against goods or documents of title thereto deposited with or assigned to the bank ; (iv) drawing, accepting, discounting and selling bills of exchange and other negotiable securities payable in India or Ceylon ; and, subject to the direction of the Governor-General-in-Council, the discounting, buying and selling of bills of exchange payable outside India for, from or to such banks as may be approved. The bank was allowed to draw bills of exchange and grant letters of credit for the use of parties whose estates were being administered by the bank and also for private constituents or customers for bona fide personal needs ; (v) borrowing funds in India and receiving deposits, receiving securities for safe custody and collecting interest thereupon, buying and selling gold and silver, etc. (vi) the London office was allowed to borrow money in England for the purpose of the bank's business upon the security of the bank's assets, but was not to open cash credits, keep cash accounts or receive deposits in London except from the former customers of the Presidency Banks. The Act provided for an

agreement between the bank and the Secretary of State for India to last for ten years, being terminable thereafter after one year's notice.

§35. Functions as a public institution.—The functions of the Imperial Bank as a Government bank were as follows :

(i) The bank undertook all the general banking business of the Indian Government, and accepted payments and made disbursements for the Government. It held all the treasury balances at headquarters and at its branches. (This involved the abolition of the Reserve Treasury System.) (ii) The bank managed the public debt in return for a specified remuneration. (iii) The bank was required to undertake to open 100 new branches, of which the Government of India might determine the location of one in four. Before January 1921, when the Imperial Bank Act came into force, the Presidency Banks had between them 59 branches. To these, 102 new branches were added by 31 March 1926, making a total of 161 branches. Of the new branches, 36 were in places where there was previously no other bank, while 61 of the remaining 66 were opened at places where there was a Government treasury. In all, 89 of the new branches were at places where there was a Government treasury. (iv) The bank was expected to give the public every facility for the transfer of money between its branches at reasonable rates approved by the Controller of Currency. The Government were to cease remittance of funds for the public between any two places where the Imperial Bank carried on business. (v) The London office of the bank, which was started in January 1921, took over a portion of the business of the Government of India which was previously in the hands of the Bank of England, for example, the current account of the High Commissioner for India.

§36. Business prohibited to the Imperial Bank.—(i) The restrictions as to dealing in foreign exchange and raising funds in London in their relaxed and modified form have been already noted. (ii) Loans or advances upon mortgage or otherwise, upon the primary security of immovable property, or the documents of title relating thereto, were expressly prohibited, but allowed against such a collateral (secondary) security if the main security was of the type noted (see §34 (i)). (iii) Loans or advances could not be made on the security of its own stock or shares. (iv) The amount which might be advanced to any individual or partnership or firm by way of discount or on any personal security was limited under by-laws sanctioned by the Government. (v) Loans or advances could not be granted for a longer period than six months. (vi) Discounts could not be made, or advances on personal security given, unless such discounts or advances carried with them the several

responsibilities of at least two persons or firms unconnected with each other in general partnership.

§37. **Points of criticism against the Imperial Bank.**—The Imperial Bank as constituted in 1921 was made the target of much adverse criticism. It was a private concern and especially open to suspicion on account of the strong representation of European interests on it which might limit the utility of the bank to Indian commercial and industrial interests. The Imperial Bank had merely perpetuated the old management, the old policies and the old traditions of the Presidency Banks. English management might be unsympathetic and unable to understand the needs of Indian merchants and industrialists. The agents at mofussil branches, being mostly non-Indians, might fail to understand the local needs of the people and no effort be made to cultivate intimate and friendly relations with shroffs. The bulk of the deposits collected by the branches of the bank were not invested locally but sent to headquarters. The Imperial Bank was further subjected to the criticism which had been raised against European-managed concerns in general, namely that they did not provide for the training of Indians.¹ The scheme of Indian apprentices has not been worked so as to give full satisfaction. The bank has indeed made a beginning in filling responsible posts by Indians, but has not gone nearly as far as it might in this direction. The Imperial Bank has also been freely charged with discriminating against Indian firms and Indian institutions and with showing undue partiality to European firms and European institutions. The representation of Indian interests by the nomination on the Central Board of four non-official Indians under the Act of 1920 was not considered sufficient, and the public demand was that they should be elected by the Assembly. The high dividends declared by the bank squared ill with the primary object for which the bank was constituted, namely the promotion of national welfare. (There was no arrangement for the division of profits between the bank and the state.)

(The control of the State over the bank under the Act of 1920 was not as effective as it should have been,) as the Controller of Currency was expected to interfere only when Government interests were at stake. The branch banking policy of the bank has not been very successful. Branches have sometimes been established at places where there were already sufficient banking facilities, and this has exposed existing banks to unfair competition at the hands of the Imperial Bank, especially before the establishment of the

¹ See vol. I, ch. xiii.

Reserve Bank in 1935, when the Imperial Bank had special privileges and large command of Government funds.

Another group of criticisms was on the score of the excessively limited functions assigned to the bank and the consequent impairment of its utility. The bank had little real resemblance to the central banks of Europe in relation to the banking and currency functions it performed for the Government. Only the cash balances of the Government and duties of a general banking nature were handed over to it. The paper currency, the gold standard reserve and the remittances to England to meet the Home Charges were still managed by the Government. Not having the power of note-issue, the Imperial Bank could not effectively control the money market through the bank rate, as do other great central banks.

The monopoly of the exchange banks and the Government in the field of foreign exchange under the Act of 1920 was left practically intact. The fact that the exchange banks had prospered so well shows that the risky character of the business had been greatly exaggerated. Another restriction imposed on the Imperial Bank was that it could not borrow without security or accept deposits outside India. This was no more than a concession to the jealousy of the exchange banks, which also explains the exclusion of the bank from foreign exchange business. Borrowing and receiving deposits abroad sometimes might be necessary to ease the situation in the Indian money market. Lastly, the Imperial Bank, though it was intended to be a co-ordinating agency, was far from being a bankers' bank in the strict sense of the term. The other banks did keep their reserves with it, but only to a very limited extent. The result was that the Indian money market remained practically as inorganic as it was before the Imperial Bank was brought into existence.

§38. **The Imperial Bank of India (Amendment) Act, 1934.—**

It was all along taken for granted that when the Reserve Bank should be established as the central bank of the country, it would be necessary to alter the constitution of the Imperial Bank with a view to freeing it from the restrictions imposed upon it on account of its hybrid nature and modifying the control of the Government over its operations. When therefore the Reserve Bank Bill was passed in 1934, the Imperial Bank of India Amendment Bill was also passed at the same time as the Imperial Bank of India Act (III of 1934).¹ The following are the main changes made by the amending Act:

(i) *Changes in the constitution of the bank.*—The Central

¹ See §40 below for the decision of the Government not to convert the Imperial Bank into a central bank.

Board consists of the following directors : (a) Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Local Boards established by the Act ; (b) One person elected from among themselves by the members of each Local Board established by the Act ; (c) A Managing Director to be appointed by the Central Board for five years, who may be continued by the Board for further periods not exceeding five years ; (d) Such number of persons not exceeding two and not being officers of the Government as may be nominated by the Governor-General-in-Council ; (e) A Deputy Managing Director to be appointed by the Central Board ; (f) Secretaries of the Local Boards ; (g) Such number of persons to represent any Local Board established hereafter under the Act as the Central Board may prescribe. The Directors specified in (e) and (f) are not entitled to vote at the meetings of the Central Board. The Deputy Managing Director is entitled to vote in the absence of the Managing Director. The Governor-General-in-Council is to nominate an officer of the Government to attend meetings of the Central Board, who is not, however, entitled to vote. Under the new Act the Controller of Currency ceased to be an *ex officio* member of the Board, and the number of persons nominated by the Governor-General is reduced to two. So also the Managing Director is to be directly appointed by the Board. Government control over the working of the bank is thus lessened.

(ii) The Imperial Bank of India, which ceases to be banker to the Government (this position is now occupied by the Reserve Bank), is authorized to enter into an agreement with the Reserve Bank of India to conduct Government business as the sole agent of the Reserve Bank. (This is more fully explained in §53 below.)

(iii) The old limitations imposed on the business of the London office of the bank have been removed. The bank is enabled to establish branches or agencies in India and foreign countries.

(iv) The Central Board is authorized to establish Local Boards without the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council. Similarly the bank is authorized to increase its capital without such sanction. The bank is now freed from the power of the Governor-General to issue instructions to it regarding matters affecting his financial policy or the safety of the Government balances.

(v) *Removal of some of the restrictions on the business transacted by the bank.*—The principal changes are as follows : The bank is now authorized to buy bills of exchange payable out of India, to borrow money out of India and to transact foreign exchange business. The period of advances and loans (as also of bills discounted) relating to the financing of seasonal agricultural

operations is extended from six to nine months. The bank is authorized to acquire and hold and generally deal with, any right, title or interest in any property moveable or immoveable, which may be the bank's security for any loan or advance or may be connected with such security. The bank is further authorized to advance and lend money, and open cash credits on the security of shares of the Reserve Bank, debentures or other securities for money issued under the authority of a municipal board or committee, or with the sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, on the debentures or other securities for money issued under the authority of a Ruling Prince or Chief, or on debentures of companies with limited liability subject to directions issued by the Central Board. The bank is empowered to make advances and open cash credits against goods which are hypothecated to the bank as security for such advances, loans or credits, if so authorized by special directions of the Central Board.

Some of the old restrictions [e.g. restrictions on land mortgage business, or on the period (with modifications already noticed) of the advances and loans, on the amount of the loans to individual borrowers, prohibition of loans on the security of the shares of the bank, etc.] still continue to operate. These are justified on the ground that the Imperial Bank has been given the privilege of being the sole agent of the Reserve Bank and will in that capacity conduct the Government's treasury business, and hold Government balances. Hence the need for a special Act to regulate the working of the Imperial Bank of India.

It remains to be seen how far the Imperial Bank, now that it is freed from some of the restrictions imposed by the old Act of 1920, extends its activities, especially in the direction of industrial finance and foreign exchange business. The Bank has established a separate foreign exchange department and is trying to expand its foreign exchange business. It is in a position of advantage in this respect, owing to its London branch, numerous branches in India, extensive business connexions, and large financial resources.

§39. **Financial position of the Imperial Bank.**—The tables on p. 470 between them give an idea of the nature of the heritage into which the Imperial Bank of India has entered, and afford a synoptic view of its resources and functions.

§40. **The question of the Reserve Bank: Case for a brand-new creation.**—The general case for a central bank has already been examined. Such a bank had been widely desired in India, not only on account of the improvement in banking and currency machinery which it promised, but also because 'the growing

(A) Capital Reserve, Deposits and Cash Balances of the Imperial Bank of India
(In lakhs of rupees)

Year 31 Dec.	Paid-up Capital	Reserve and Rest	Public Deposits	Private Deposits	Cash Balances	Investments (Government and other securities authorized under the Act)
1921	5.62	4.15	6.80	65.78	13.60	12.46
1923	5.63	4.55	8.57	74.20	15.01	12.18
1925	5.63	4.92	5.47	77.83	17.47	17.01
1927	5.63	5.24	7.20	72.07	10.89	18.59
1929	5.62	5.47	7.60	71.64	14.00	33.00
1931	5.62	5.14	8.32	63.86	11.04	30.27
1933	5.63	5.49	6.44	74.13	15.60	47.03
1935	5.63	5.76	— ¹	79.09	19.59 ²	46.88
1937	5.63	5.80	— ¹	81.08	13.43 ²	47.64

(B) Statement of Affairs of the Imperial Bank of India on
4 April 1941
(In thousands)

Assets	Rs.	Rs.	Liabilities	Rs.
Investments :—			Capital :—	
Government Securities ...	54,41,67	•	Authorized — 2,25,000 shares of Rs. 500 each ...	11,25,00
Other authorized invest- ments ...	1,10,74	55,52,41	Issued and subscribed — 2,25,000 shares of Rs. 500 each ...	
Advances :—			Called up — 75,000 shares of Rs. 500 each, fully paid ...	3,75,00
Loans ...	8,69,63		1,50,000 shares of Rs. 500 each, Rs. 125 paid ...	1,87,50
Cash credits and over- drafts ...	26,15,12	41,29,35	Reserve Liability of shareholders — Rs. 375 per share on 1,50,000 shares ...	5,62,50
Bills discounted and purchased ...	6,44,60		Reserve fund ...	
Liability of constituents for acceptances per contra ...		—	Fixed deposit, savings bank, current and other accounts ...	
Dead stock ...		1,81,68	Loans against securities per contra ...	
Sundries ...		67,99	Acceptances for constitu- ents ...	
Bullion ...		—	Sundries ...	
Cash :—				
In hand and with the Reserve Bank of India	9,05,04			
Balances with other Banks	1,28,45	10,33,49		
		1,09,64,92		1,09,64,92

¹ Public (Government) Deposits were transferred to the Reserve Bank of India on 1 April 1935.

² Includes balances with the Reserve Bank.

political consciousness of the country has led to the search for all national emblems, amongst which a Central State bank is one'.¹ The Imperial Bank was intended to serve as a State bank but we have already seen reasons for denying that it filled this position satisfactorily. It performed one or two functions of a true central bank, and there was much debate on the question whether it would not be desirable to turn it into a proper central bank ; but the objections to this step were various and overwhelming. In the first place, the Imperial Bank was a private corporation frankly out to earn money. The large number of branches which it had been compelled to start had forced it to become a commercial bank. Commercial banking, however, was incompatible with the position of a real central bank. It was also unfair that the Imperial Bank, with the advantages even greater than under the Act of 1920 which it would enjoy as a central bank, by holding the reserves of other banks and the balances of the Government, should be allowed to enter into competition with other banks not endowed with these privileges. The functions of a true banker's bank are protective and not competitive. Moreover, a large number of branches is not a help but a positive impediment to a bank of issue, which wants branches only at a few important places. If the Imperial Bank were to be converted into a central bank its charter would have to be radically altered so as to deprive it of its functions as a commercial bank. The Hilton-Young Commission also argued that the Imperial Bank had been playing a very useful role in the credit organization of the country, especially since 1920, by establishing branches in various parts of the country, and that it would be unwise to check this useful career by restricting the functions of the bank to those of a central bank. On the contrary, it would be desirable to free the Imperial Bank altogether from the restrictions imposed upon it under the Act of 1920—restrictions which clearly had their origin in the hybrid character of the functions originally assigned to it. With the withdrawal of its central banking functions it would be freer and more competent to perform its important task of spreading banking facilities in India. The Commission, therefore, favoured the establishment of a separate and entirely new central bank and proposed that the Imperial Bank should carry on important agency work for the Reserve Bank. This view was generally endorsed in the country. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee also favoured the creation of an altogether new Reserve Bank.

¹ P. Lovett, *The Mirror of Investment*, p. 19.

§41. **The Hilton-Young Commission's proposals.**—The Hilton-Young Commission proposed that the Reserve Bank should be a private shareholders' bank. The constitution which they suggested for the Reserve Bank was on the same lines as that of the Imperial Bank, and they considered that, having regard to the large area of the country and its diversity of local conditions, the system of local head offices in the chief business centres, managed by local boards elected by shareholders registered in the respective branch registers, would be the most appropriate. The central as well as the local boards should be independent of the Government and free from all political pressure, and a predominant majority of their members should derive their mandate from the shareholders of the bank by election, only a small minority on the board being nominated by the Government.

Detailed recommendations were made about the note-issue, composition and location of reserves, etc., some of which have already been mentioned.¹ So far as the gold and gold security reserve against notes was concerned, the Commission rejected the model set up by the English Bank Charter Act of 1844 as too rigid for Indian conditions in view of the poor development of the cheque currency. They recommended the Proportional Reserve system, under which the notes in active circulation are secured by a minimum percentage of gold or gold securities laid down by statute, which may be transgressed for a temporary period, on the payment of a tax on the deficiency, and with the consent of the Government.

§42. **Reserve Bank legislation.**—This scheme for a Reserve Bank was not destined to be implemented until as late as 1934 (April), when the Reserve Bank of India Bill—the third of its kind—became law and was placed upon the statute book. The first two bills proved to be still-born. The first Reserve Bank Bill was introduced by the Government in January 1927 and sought to give legislative effect to the scheme of a shareholders' bank as adumbrated by the Hilton-Young Commission. It raised a stormy controversy in the Legislative Assembly. The majority held the view that only a state bank would inspire confidence among the people of India and that a shareholders' bank was likely to involve the domination of the bank by large capitalists in big cities. The minority² took their stand on the widely accepted view that a shareholders' bank is preferable, and that a central bank should be regarded more as a large public trust than a department of State.³ It is true that State control is necessary to some extent

¹ *Ante*, ch. viii, §§11-12.

² See J. C. Coyajee, *The Reserve Bank of India*, p. 18.

³ See Kisch and Elkin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

because the State has its own interests to protect, and, moreover, must be in a position to prevent the bank from degenerating into a purely dividend-hunting concern and ceasing to be a true national institution. But the very fact of State ownership affords facile pretexts for undue interference on the part of the Government. All that was necessary was to keep for the State such specific and limited powers as are essential to safeguard the interest of the public without at the same time encroaching upon the independence of the Bank. It was not therefore desirable to allow members of legislatures to be directors of the Central Board, or even to take part in elections to the Board. It was necessary to eliminate political pressure and to see that the Bank did not become an effete institution kept in leading strings by the Government. While the Government accepted the State bank scheme of the majority, agreement could not be reached on the question of the Directorate. Thereupon the Bill was abandoned by the Government, who sought to introduce another Bill in January 1928 which reverted to the idea of a shareholders' bank.

The new Bill was ill-fated, and spectacular developments followed when in the Delhi session of the Assembly (1928), the President refused to call upon the Finance Member to move his Bill on the ground that he could not do so under rules of parliamentary procedure until the old Bill was formally withdrawn or had lapsed. The Government thereupon decided to proceed with the old Bill, the consideration of which they had abruptly postponed in September 1927. With this decision, all the old troubles revived and the opposition was too strong for the Government to be able to push through their proposals regarding the constitution of the board. They therefore announced, on 10 February 1928, that they had no intention of proceeding with the Bill in view of the temper displayed by the House, which seemed to preclude any sort of a workable compromise.

It appeared at one time as if the project would be suffered to lapse altogether. But it was prevented from meeting this fate, thanks to the strong emphasis laid on the early establishment of a Reserve Bank by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee in its Report published in 1931, and to the new importance with which this question came to be invested in consequence of the recommendation of the Federal Structure Sub-committee of the First Round Table Conference to the effect that early effort should be made to establish, on sure foundations and free from any political influence, a Reserve Bank with a view to ensuring confidence in the management of Indian credit and currency. The White Paper on the Indian Reforms, published early in 1933, made it a condition

that a Reserve Bank, free from political influence, should be set up by Indian legislation before introducing responsibility at the Centre as regards finance. The proposal was once again scrutinized by the London Committee on Reserve Bank Legislation in July 1933. The London Committee submitted its Report in August 1933, and the Reserve Bank of India Bill—the third of its kind—drafted in accordance with its recommendations, was introduced in the Legislature on 8 September 1933 and became law on receiving the assent of the Governor-General on 6 March, thus successfully negotiating the many difficult hurdles in its way.¹

§43. **The Reserve Bank of India Act (1934).**—It will be readily admitted that the Reserve Bank of India Act is the most comprehensive and important piece of banking legislation so far placed upon the statute book in India. The preamble to the Act states that it is expedient to start a Reserve Bank for India to regulate the issue of bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in British India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage. We shall now proceed to review the main provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act relating to the constitution and functions of the Bank.²

§44. **Constitution of the Reserve Bank.**—(i) *The bank is a shareholders' bank.* The original capital is Rs. 5 crores divided into shares of one hundred rupees each, fully paid up. Separate registers of shareholders are to be maintained at Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras and Rangoon. The nominal value of the shares originally assigned to the various registers was Rs. 140 lakhs to Bombay, 145 lakhs to Calcutta, 115 lakhs to Delhi, 70 lakhs to Madras and 30 lakhs to Rangoon. Owing to subsequent transfers the distribution of the shares has appreciably altered, and there is a marked tendency towards concentration and consequent sterilization of votes (especially in the case of the Bombay area), as is shown by the fact that the total number of shareholders has declined from 92,047 on 1 April 1935 to 56,057 on 30 June 1940. During the same period the average number of shares held by each shareholder has increased from 5·4 to 8·9. The Reserve Bank of India Act was therefore amended in March 1940, so as to restrict the tendency of the Bank's shares to become concentrated in fewer hands.

¹ For an interesting account of the Reserve Bank legislation the reader is referred to an article in the *Economic Journal* (June 1934), by G. Findlay Shirras.

² For a very interesting and instructive commentary on the various clauses of the Reserve Bank of India Act see A. Ramaiya, *The Reserve Bank of India Act*.

Under this amendment no person can be registered as a shareholder in respect of any additional shares acquired after 26 March 1940 by him, whether in his own name or jointly, so as to bring the total value to more than Rs. 20,000.¹ Each shareholder has one vote for every five shares subject to a maximum of 10 votes. Shares of the value of Rs. 2,20,000 are held by the Government for disposal at par to the Directors to obtain the minimum share qualification.

(ii) *Offices, branches and agencies.*—In pursuance of its obligations under the Act, the bank has established offices in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras and Rangoon and a branch in London. It may establish branches² or agencies in any other place in India and, with the consent of the Governor-General-in-Council, elsewhere.

(iii) *Management.*—The general superintendence and direction of the bank is entrusted to a Central Board of Directors which consists of 16 members as follows: (a) A Governor and two Deputy Governors to be appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council after considering the recommendations of the Central Board; (b) four Directors to be nominated by the Governor-General-in-Council; (c) eight Directors to be elected on behalf of the shareholders on the various registers, two each for Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and one each for Madras and Rangoon; (d) one Government official to be nominated by the Governor-General-in-Council. This official, as also the Deputy Governor, are not entitled to vote. The purpose of employing the Governor-General-in-Council to nominate four Directors is to redress deficiencies, if any, regarding the representation of some important elements in the economic life of the country, such as agricultural interests. A Local Board for each of the five areas consists of (a) five members elected by shareholders; (b) not more than three nominated by the Central Board with a view to securing the representation of territorial or economic interests not already represented, particularly agricultural interests. The elected members of the Local Board have to elect from among themselves one or two persons, as the case may be, to be Directors representing the shareholders on the register for the area for which the Board is constituted. The Local Board has to advise the Central Board on such matters as may be generally or specifically referred to it and has to perform such duties as the Central Board may by regulations delegate to it. The Local Boards are thus mainly advisory in their

¹ *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank* (August, 1940), p. 9.

² There are branches of the Banking Department at Cawnpore, Karachi and Lahore. The Issue Department has branches at these three places and also at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Rangoon.

nature. No Director and no member of a Local Board can also be a member of the Indian Legislature or of a local Legislature. It will be recalled that the first Reserve Bank Bill came to grief on this issue. No salaried Government official nor an employee of any bank nor a director of any bank other than a co-operative bank may be a Director or a member of a Local Board.

§45. **Business which the bank may transact.**—(i) The bank may accept deposits without interest, from the Government, local authorities, banks and any other person. This provision is intended to prevent the Reserve Bank from competing with other banks and is in accordance with central banking practice elsewhere; (ii) the purchase, sale and rediscount of bills of exchange and promissory notes, arising out of bona fide commercial transactions, bearing two or more good signatures, one of which must be that of a scheduled bank, and maturing within 90 days from the date of such purchase or rediscount, exclusive of days of grace. In the case of agricultural bills drawn or issued for financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops, the period allowed is nine months, and one of the two signatures has to be that of a scheduled or a provincial co-operative bank. Bills maturing within 90 days since date of purchase, bearing the signature of a scheduled bank, may also be purchased, sold or rediscounted if they are issued or drawn for holding or trading in Government securities; (iii) purchase from and sale to scheduled banks of sterling in amounts of not less than the equivalent of one lakh of rupees; (iv) purchase, sale and rediscount of bills of exchange drawn in or on any place in the United Kingdom provided such business is transacted with scheduled banks. The bank may keep balances with banks in the United Kingdom; (v) it may make loans and advances to States in India, local authorities, scheduled banks, or provincial co-operative banks, repayable either on demand or on the expiry of fixed periods not exceeding 90 days, against trustee securities, gold or silver, eligible paper, promissory notes of scheduled or co-operative banks supported by documents of titles to goods; (vi) the bank may make ways-and-means advances to the Governor-General-in-Council or Local Governments repayable within 90 days; (vii) purchase and sale of securities of the Government of India and the United Kingdom subject to certain maxima; (viii) the bank may act as agent to the Secretary of State or the Governor-General-in-Council, or Local Governments, or local authorities in the matter of purchase and sale of gold or silver, management of public debt, etc.; (ix) it may also make an agency agreement with central banks in other countries; (x) the bank is authorized to borrow money for a period not exceeding one month from scheduled banks or other central

banks; (xi) the bank is authorized to issue bank notes subject to conditions mentioned later; (xii) it may generally transact all business incidental to or consequential upon the exercise of its powers and duties; (xiii) it should be noted that the bank is authorized to purchase, sell and rediscount bills of exchange drawn on and payable in India in order to enable the bank to discount rupee import bills in the event of such bills coming into existence in the future, as contemplated by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee; (xiv) the bank is also authorized to conduct what are known as open-market operations, which have now become an integral part of central banking practice elsewhere. When, therefore, in the opinion of the Central Board it is necessary to regulate credit in the interests of Indian trade, commerce, industry and agriculture, the bank may purchase, sell, or discount eligible paper (bills of exchange and promissory notes) directly in the open market (without the signature of a scheduled or a co-operative bank) or it may make loans or advances, or purchase or sell sterling. The Committee of the Board or the Governor, to whom such authority may be delegated, can exercise such authority only on special occasions (not necessarily amounting to an emergency) and subject to prior consultation with the Central Board except in cases of special urgency. In every case the Central Board must be informed about the action so taken.

§46. Business which the bank may not transact.—The bank is prohibited from (i) engaging in trade or having a direct interest in any commercial or industrial undertaking (except by way of satisfaction of its claims); (ii) from purchasing its own shares, or the shares of any other bank, or any company, or from granting loans on such security; (iii) from advancing money on immoveable property or from owning such property (except for its own business premises, etc.); (iv) from allowing interest on deposits, and (v) from drawing or accepting bills payable otherwise than on demand. These prohibitions follow central banking legislation elsewhere and are intended to ensure the highest degree of liquidity of the assets of the Reserve Bank.

§47. Central banking functions.—The third chapter of the Reserve Bank Act deals with central banking functions.

In the first place, the bank has the obligation to transact Government business, viz. to receive moneys and to make payments, to carry out their exchange, remittance and other banking operations, including the management of public debt. These services are not to be rendered freely, but on terms embodied in agreements. The bank has the right to transact Government (Central and Provincial) business in India and is entitled to receive their cash balances for

deposit free of interest (except where the bank has no branches or agencies). The bank must also be entrusted with the issue of new loans.

§48. **Issue of bank notes.**—In the second place, the bank has the sole right of issuing bank notes in British India (and, for a period, currency notes of the Government of India supplied to it by the Governor-General-in-Council). The latter is not to issue any currency notes after this Chapter comes into force. The Issue Department is separated from the Banking Department on the model of the Bank of England, although the Indian Act prescribes the proportional method of holding reserves and not the English method of a fixed amount of fiduciary issue. The assets and liabilities of the Issue Department are to be kept distinct from those of the Banking Department. This arrangement, while it has the merit of presenting the accounts in the simplest possible form and of inspiring greater confidence in the note issue, has the defect of not showing the bank's liabilities as one comprehensive whole. The denominations of notes are to be 5, 10, 50, 100, 1,000 and 10,000 rupees unless otherwise directed by the Governor-General-in-Council on the recommendations of the Central Board. (Thus one-rupee notes may be issued later.) The bank notes are legal tender and are guaranteed by the Governor-General-in-Council in order to promote greater confidence in the note issue, as recommended by the Hilton-Young Commission. Reserve Bank of India notes were first issued to the public in India in January 1938, when supplies of Rs. 5 notes became available. Rs. 10 notes were issued in February and Rs. 100 and Rs. 1,000 notes in May 1938. The bank has decided not to issue notes of the denomination of Rs. 50 and Rs. 500 (apparently because their present circulation is negligible) though the Government of India notes of these denominations will continue to be legal tender. Although Burma has been separated from India with effect from 1 April 1937 the Reserve Bank continues to be responsible for the management of currency in Burma. Currency notes of the Government of Burma are now legal tender in Burma only as are also distinctive notes of the Reserve Bank intended for circulation in Burma only.

The assets of the Issue Department shall consist of not less than two-fifths of gold coin, gold bullion, or sterling securities, provided that the amount of gold shall not be less than Rs. 40 crores in value. Of the gold coin and gold bullion, not less than 17/20ths shall be held in British India. The remaining three-fifths of the assets may be held in rupee coin, Government of India rupee securities of any maturity, and such bills of exchange and promissory notes payable in British India as are eligible for purchase by the bank, provided

that the rupee securities shall not exceed one-fourth of the total amount of the assets or Rs. 50 crores, whichever amount is greater, or with the previous consent of the Governor-General-in-Council, such amount *plus* a sum of Rs. 10 crores. Gold is to be valued at its par value, i.e. 8·47512 grains of fine gold per rupee, rupee coin at its face value, and securities at market rate. Sterling securities are defined as balances at the credit of the Issue Department of the Bank of England, bills of exchange drawn on and payable in the United Kingdom within 90 days, and Government securities of the United Kingdom maturing within five years (the period may be exceeded for two years after the Act comes into force). It was also laid down that on the date of the transfer of note issue to the bank by the Government of India, and of the transfer of the Gold Standard and Paper Currency Reserves, the gold coin and bullion and sterling securities were not to be less than one-half of the whole amount transferred and the amount of the rupee coin was not to exceed Rs. 50 crores, any surplus over this amount being held by the Government in a separate account. Arrangements are made by which the bank and the Government can keep the rupee coin held in the assets at Rs. 50 crores or one-sixth of the total assets, whichever is greater. As in the case of the Federal Reserve and other central banks of the world following the proportional reserve system, the bank is authorized, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, for periods not exceeding thirty days in the first instance, which may, with like sanction, be extended from time to time by periods not exceeding 15 days, to hold as assets gold coin, gold bullion or sterling of less than two-fifths of the total assets. The bank is required to pay a tax on the deficiency during the period of suspension of assets requirements, at bank rate with an addition of 1 per cent per annum when such holding exceeds $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total assets, and of a further $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in respect of every further decrease of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent or part of such decrease, provided that the tax shall not in any event be payable at a rate less than 6 per cent per annum. The bank is placed under the obligation to supply different forms of currency. Thus it is required to issue rupee coin on demand in exchange for bank notes and currency notes of the Government of India, and shall issue currency notes or bank notes in exchange for coin which is legal tender. It must convert notes of five rupees or upwards into notes of lower value or other coins which are legal tender in such quantities as may in the opinion of the bank be required for circulation. The Governor-General-in-Council shall supply such coins to the bank on demand. Thus in view of the special conditions in India, bank notes have been allowed to retain the same

unlimited convertibility into silver rupees which is a privilege enjoyed by the existing Government currency notes. (See, however, ch. viii, §33.)

§49. Analysis of the recent statistics of the Issue Department.—

From the table on page 486 it will be seen that the total value of notes issued increased from Rs. 186.09 lakhs on 1 April 1935 (when the bank was established) to Rs. 274.88 lakhs on 4 April 1941. We have already (see chs. vii and viii) explained the big increase in the total value of notes issued, especially since the declaration of war in September 1939, when the total value of outstanding notes was Rs. 217.96 lakhs. The amount of gold coin and bullion held by the Issue Department of the bank has remained practically unchanged throughout at about Rs. 44.42 lakhs. The amount of sterling securities increased from Rs. 48.63 lakhs on 1 April 1935 to Rs. 140.50 lakhs in the week ended 28 February 1941, but thereafter declined to Rs. 104.76 lakhs¹ in the week ended 4 April, 1941. The bulk of the increase in sterling securities took place since the outbreak of the war in September 1939 for reasons already explained (see ch. viii). The subsequent decline in sterling securities in the Issue Department as also in the foreign balances in the Banking Department is accounted for by the use of these sterling securities for the redemption of the sterling debt of India under a scheme which was recently (February 1941) announced by the Government of India. The same factor explains the big increase in rupee securities in the Issue Department from Rs. 37.38 lakhs in September 1939 to Rs. 90.35 lakhs in the week ended 4 April 1941, the Reserve Bank of India Act being amended by an Ordinance to remove the limit on the holdings of rupee securities. The big drop in rupee coin during the war period has already been explained (see ch. viii, §33). The percentage of gold and sterling to total notes issued increased from 48.14 at the beginning of the present war to 69.27 per cent in the week ended 28 February 1941. It declined to 54.27 in the week ended 4 April 1941 in consequence of the use of some of the sterling securities for the repatriation of the sterling debt of India.¹

§50. Exchange obligations of the Reserve Bank.—The third central banking function relates to the obligation imposed upon the bank to sell sterling and buy sterling with a view to maintaining stability of the exchange value of the rupee with sterling (provisionally at 1s. 6d., pending decision on the best suited monetary standard for India when the international situation has become

¹ See also ch. viii and *Indian Finance*, 5 April 1941.

stable enough to frame permanent measures). We have already dealt with the obligations imposed on the bank by these 'Ratio clauses.' (see ch. viii, §27). The Reserve Bank Act thus aims at establishing the sterling exchange standard for the time being.

§51. **Scheduled banks.**¹—In the fourth place, every bank carrying on the business of banking in British India included in the second schedule² (i.e. having a paid-up capital and reserves of not less than Rs. 5 lakhs) is required to maintain with the Reserve Bank a balance the amount of which shall not be less than 5 per cent of its demand liabilities and 2 per cent of its time liabilities in India at the close of business on any day. This provision follows in principle §19 of the Federal Reserve Act of the U.S.A. and is intended primarily to enable the Reserve Bank of India to centralize the banking reserves of the country so as to be able to regulate and control the credit position in the country by controlling the total volume of bank money created by member banks. It also serves incidentally to make a partial provision for the liquidity and safety of the deposits of member banks who are also expected to keep in addition sufficient till money.³ Each scheduled bank must also send a weekly return both to the Reserve Bank and the Governor-General-in-Council showing its demand and time liabilities in India, the total amount of Government of India and bank notes held in India, the amounts held in rupee coin and subsidiary coin, the amount of advances made and bills discounted in India, and the balances held at the Reserve Bank. The table on p. 482 is illustrative of the consolidated position of the scheduled banks during the period commencing from the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India. This power of the bank to call for information is intended to give it efficient control of the credit system. Such returns may also be called for from provincial co-operative banks which have transactions with the Reserve Bank, although they are not compelled to keep any portion of their cash with the

¹ This and the following section should be read with §§14 and 18 *ante*.

² There were 61 such scheduled banks at the end of the year 1939 as compared with 57 in the previous year, and 50 in 1936. This shows that the advantages of contact with the central bank of the country are being increasingly recognized by joint-stock banks, and some of them increased their paid-up capital, apparently with the primary object of being included in the list of scheduled banks. This tendency may to a certain extent be attributed to a desire to secure the exemptions given to scheduled banks from the operation of the debt legislation in various provinces. *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India* (1937), p. 14, (1939) pp. 25-6 and (1940), p. 26.

³ See Ramaiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-21.

Scheduled Banks' Consolidated Position¹

(In lakhs of rupees)

Average of Friday figures	Demand liabilities in India and Burma ²	Time liabilities in India and Burma ²	Cash in India and Burma ²	Balances with Reserve Bank	Cash and Balances with Reserve Bank as percentage of demand and time liabilities	Advances in India and Burma ²	Bills discounted in India and Burma ²	Advances and discounts as percentage of demand and time liabilities
1935-6 (9 months July-March)	119.02	98.70	5.93	31.86	17.36	87.85	3.59	42.00
1936-7	128.62	101.35	6.02	26.25	14.03	95.27	4.73	43.48
1937-8	132.71 (5.91)	109.10 (5.05)	6.61 (24)	24.46	12.85	113.41 (5.26)	6.26 (28)	49.49
1938-9	130.01 (6.18)	107.86 (4.55)	6.65 (26)	15.95	9.50	115.78 (4.50)	4.84 (26)	50.71
1939-40	139.57 (7.00)	106.00 (4.08)	7.06 (35)	17.49	10.00	125.66 (4.40)	5.25 (28)	53.31
1940 March	145.69 (7.45)	109.64 (3.77)	6.73 (23)	16.06	8.93	153.77 (6.20)	6.39 (30)	62.73
1940 September	163.65 (7.65)	101.37 (3.58)	8.19 (40)	43.32	19.44	114.27 (3.87)	1.69 (10)	43.76
1941 Week ended 28 February	177.39 (8.93)	105.05 (3.79)	8.57 (55)	44.40	18.75	114.72 (5.58)	5.88 (17)	42.70

¹ Statistical Summary (Reserve Bank of India), February 1941, p. 4.² Burma figures shown in brackets.

Reserve Bank. The indigenous bankers, as previously pointed out, are not yet listed as scheduled bankers.

§52. **Non-scheduled banks.**—Besides scheduled banks there are operating in this country a large number of small banking and loan companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, especially in the province of Bengal. The number of such companies on 31 December 1938 was estimated at approximately 1,421 concerns which might be considered to be non-scheduled banks. Among them only 236 have a paid-up capital of Rs. 50,000. Up to the beginning of 1938 the Reserve Bank was receiving weekly returns and balance sheets from the scheduled banks alone. With the coming into force of the banking provisions of the Companies Act, as amended in 1936, it seemed desirable that as a central bank the Reserve Bank should obtain information regarding non-scheduled banks also. For this purpose the Companies Act was suitably amended in 1938. Of these non-scheduled banks a large number claim that they are not really banks within the meaning of section 277F of the Companies Act (see §20) and are therefore free from the obligation to submit the cash reserve returns prescribed by that Act. The returns received from 669 banks on 30 December 1939 indicate that the average percentage of cash to demand and time liabilities was only 6·9. The banking legislation proposed by the Reserve Bank seeks to ensure adequate liquid resources with banks.

In a circular addressed to non-scheduled banks with a paid-up capital of Rs. 50,000 or over, the Reserve Bank offered to help them with advice and guidance, provided they were willing to furnish information regarding their operations. The replies received so far have been encouraging, and it is to be hoped that such contacts between the Reserve Bank and non-scheduled banks will tend to the development of a sounder banking system in this country.¹

§53. **The Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank.**—The Reserve Bank has entered into an agreement with the Imperial Bank of India, subject to the approval of the Governor-General-in-Council, for a period of fifteen years. It will remain in force thereafter until terminated after five years' notice on either side, provided the Imperial Bank maintains a sound financial position. Under the agreement, the Imperial Bank is to be the sole agent of the Reserve Bank at all places in British India where there is a branch of the Imperial Bank of India in existence at the time the Reserve

¹ *Annual Reports of the Reserve Bank of India* (1938), pp. 23-4, (1939) pp. 28-9, (1940), p. 21, and *Memorandum on Non-scheduled Banks*, issued by the Reserve Bank in November 1939.

Bank Act comes into operation and where there is no branch of the Banking Department of the Reserve Bank. The latter is to pay the Imperial Bank for the first ten years a commission on the total of receipts and disbursements dealt with annually by the Imperial Bank on account of the Government. Later, the scale of commission will be revised. In consideration of the Imperial Bank of India maintaining the existing number of its branches, the Reserve Bank will pay to the former annually for the first five years Rs. 9 lakhs, for the next five years Rs. 6 lakhs, and for the next five years Rs. 4 lakhs. The Imperial Bank cannot open any branch in substitution for a branch existing at the time this agreement comes into force, without the approval of the Reserve Bank.

§54. **The Reserve Fund.**—A Reserve Fund has been created by the transfer to the bank of rupee securities of the value of Rs. 5 crores by the Governor-General-in-Council. The maintenance of an adequate Reserve Fund is essential for covering depreciation in the value of assets of the Reserve Bank and promoting general confidence in the solidity of the banking system. After the payment out of the net annual profits (after allowing for bad and doubtful debts, depreciation in assets, etc.) of a cumulative dividend at such rate—not exceeding 5 per cent¹ per annum—on the share capital as the Governor-General-in-Council shall fix at the time of the issue of shares, a portion of the surplus shall be allocated to the payment of an additional dividend on the scale set forth in the fourth schedule, subject to a maximum dividend of 6 per cent. The balance of the surplus profits shall be paid to the Governor-General-in-Council, provided that, if at any time the Reserve Fund is less than the share capital, not less than Rs. 50 lakhs, or the whole of the surplus if less than that amount, shall be allocated to the Reserve Fund. This limitation of profits to shareholders is essential as the bank must not become a dividend-hunting concern. It is also fair that the surplus profits should go to the State since they represent largely the profit of the Paper Currency and the old Gold Standard Reserves.

§55. **The bank rate, etc.**—The Reserve Bank shall make public from time to time the *standard rate* at which it is prepared to buy or rediscount bills of exchange or other commercial paper eligible for purchase under this Act. The bank has thus discretion to discount agricultural bills at concessional rates below the rate for discounting or rediscounting commercial paper. It should be noted that, unlike this provision of the Act, the practice of the Bank

¹ A cumulative dividend of 3½ per cent has been initially fixed, having regard to the prevailing low money rates.

of England is to fix the minimum rate at which it will discount bills of exchange for others than its customers. It is generally fixed above the open market rate.¹

§56. **The weekly return.**—The bank is required to make a weekly return to the Governor-General-in-Council of the account of the Issue and Banking Departments in the prescribed form (Fifth Schedule). It is to be published in the *Gazette of India*. Similarly a copy of the annual accounts is to be submitted to the same authority. It should be noted that the weekly statement of the central bank in each country is regarded as the key to the condition of the money market. The tables on pp. 486-7 present a statistical picture of the affairs of the Reserve Bank, in its Issue and Banking departments, since its inauguration.

§57. **Agricultural Credit Department.**—The bank was required to create a special Agricultural Credit Department, the functions of which are (i) to maintain an expert staff to study all questions of agricultural credit and be available for consultation by the Governor-General-in-Council, Local Governments, provincial co-operative banks, and other banking organizations, and (ii) to co-ordinate the operations of the bank in connexion with agricultural credit and its relations with provincial co-operative banks and any other bank or organizations engaged in the business of agricultural credit. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the need for such an organization in an essentially agricultural country like India. This provision follows in principle a similar provision in the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Act. The main difference, however, is that the functions of the Agricultural Credit Department are of a purely advisory character as compared with those of the Rural Credit Department of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which has separate funds of its own, partly contributed by the Treasury and partly by the bank.

At the earliest possible time and in any case within three years of its establishment the Reserve Bank was required to make a Report to the Governor-General-in-Council with proposals if it thought fit for legislation under clause 55 (1) (b) on the improvement of the machinery for dealing with agricultural finance, and for effecting a closer connexion between agricultural enterprise and the operations of the bank. As we have already seen (§§4, 5), under subclause (1) (a) of the same clause, the bank was required to make a report regarding the extension of credit facilities to indigenous bankers.

Accordingly Mr M. L. Darling was deputed to investigate into

¹ See W. F. Spalding, *The London Money Market*, pp. 89-90.

Issue Department¹
(In lakhs of Rupees)

	Notes held in Banking Department ²	Notes in circulation ²	Total ²	Gold coin and Bullion	Sterling Securities	Rupee coin	Rupee Securities	Percentage of Gold and Sterling Securities to total notes issued
1935-6 ...	27,54	164,11	191,65	44,42	62,13	55,52	29,58	55.60
1936-7 ...	25,70	175,95	201,65	44,42	69,63	64,01	23,62	56.55
1937-8 ...	25,64 (1)	186,14 (4,03)	211,78 (4,04)	44,42	79,90	60,24	27,22	58.70
1938-9 ...	28,22 (...)	182,36 (7,97)	210,58 (7,97)	44,42	66,88	67,10	32,18	52.85
1939-40 ...	18,89 (8)	208,86 (11,07)	227,75 (11,15)	44,42	78,32	67,59	37,42	53.89
1939 September ...	21,82 (10)	196,14 (10,08)	217,96 (10,18)	44,42	60,50	75,66	37,38	48.14
1940 March ...	11,74 (25)	241,19 (14,31)	252,93 (14,56)	44,42	113,50	56,66	38,35	62.44
1940 September ...	26,49 (19)	232,10 (12,22)	258,59 (12,41)	44,42	131,50	33,06	49,61	68.03
1941 week ended 28 Feb.	17,49 (36)	249,47 (17,18)	266,86 (17,54)	44,42	140,50	32,43	49,61	69.27
1941 week ended 4 April	11,34 (32)	263,54 (17,43)	274,88 (17,75)	44,42	104,76	35,35	90,35	54.27

¹ *Statistical Summary (Reserve Bank of India), April 1941, p. 2.*

² Burma notes are shown in brackets.

Banking Department¹
(In lakhs of Rupees)

	Deposits				Other liabilities	Notes and coin	Balances held abroad ²	Loans and advances to Government	Other loans and advances	Bills purchased and discounted	Investments	Other assets
	Government	Banks	Other	Total								
1935-6 ...	11,29	27,24	9	38,62	90	27,64	15,05	83	1	...	5,47	52
1936-7 ...	9,87	26,56	40	36,83	1,14	25,80	13,76	1,53	1	1	6,06	80
1937-8 ...	11,42	24,80	70	36,92	86	25,72	13,39	75	2	6	7,11	73
1938-9 ...	14,88	16,20	76	31,84	1,27	28,31	4,12	1,82	2	1,59	6,35	90
1939-40 ...	13,75	17,87	1,06	32,68	1,52	18,99	12,19	1,07	11	2,87	7,24	1,73
1939 September ...	12,94	19,90	1,17	34,01	2,01	21,95	13,01	85	4	1,10	6,40	2,67
1940 March ...	20,24	16,67	1,26	38,17	1,42	11,82	25,20	4	15	2,33	9,18	87
1940 September ...	13,87	43,63	1,73	59,23	1,66	26,64	32,53	93	...	1,39	8,36	1,04
1941 week ended 28 Feb. ...	32,03	45,26	1,37	78,66	4,62	17,59	67,18	...	5	5	7,07	1,34
1941 4 April ...	19,39	29,31	6,14	54,84	4,56	11,42	36,09	12,00	6	98	7,51	1,35

¹ Capital paid up Rs. 5 crores and Reserve Rs. 5 crores.

² Includes cash and short-term securities.

the working and present state of the co-operative banks and credit societies, and the part which indigénous bankers play in the rural economy of the country. His Report was completed in May 1935. The Report and the note containing proposals for the constitution of the Agricultural Credit Department were received by the Reserve Bank about the end of June 1935. The authorities of the bank, after examining and considering the proposals, decided to request the Local Governments through the Government of India to collect and furnish to the bank further particulars about co-operative banks, credit societies, and other agencies—e.g. indigénous bankers and moneylenders—engaged in the business of agricultural credit. Since a long time would be required to obtain detailed information as indicated above, the Bank submitted to the Government of India in December 1936, a preliminary Report on agricultural credit with a view to enabling the various parties concerned to proceed to a realistic examination of the question without further delay. This was followed by the Statutory Report by the end of 1937. This Report indicates the various directions in which improvements might be made to enable the existing credit agencies, more particularly the co-operative agency, to be of greater use to the agriculturist and the manner in which the Reserve Bank can render assistance.¹ As pointed out by the Reserve Bank, it was not to be expected that the bank would be able to put forward a final scheme within the short initial period of three years, and it is giving continuous attention to these important problems.²

§58. **Inauguration and working of the Reserve Bank of India.**—The Reserve Bank of India was officially inaugurated on 1 April 1935 and opened its offices at Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras and Rangoon. Later, arrangements were made for starting a London branch as provided for by the Act.

The successful inauguration of the Reserve Bank of India thus fulfils a long-cherished hope and aspiration. India has now come into line with the other civilized countries of the world, and the chain of Empire Banks (those of the Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India and Canada) is complete. The long and often provoking delays have been a blessing in disguise. In the first place, the frequent discussions that took place after 1925 served to familiarize the people with the principles on which a modern central bank is founded. In the second place, the Reserve Bank of India came into existence under better auspices, when the

¹ This question has been more fully discussed in vol. I, ch. x.

² See *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank (1937)*, also *Preliminary and Statutory Reports* issued by the Agricultural Credit Department of the Reserve Bank (1936 and 1937).

embers of the old political controversy of 1927-8 had died out and the reserve position strengthened. The External Reserve (i.e. gold and sterling securities) held in the Issue Department of the bank on its constitution exceeded 50 per cent. Since then, as already pointed out, the holding of sterling securities has very considerably increased. But the amount of gold and gold bullion has remained unchanged. Although the gold and sterling assets with the bank today are probably adequate to maintain the existing sterling exchange standard, the bank would be well advised to add to its gold reserve, and thus pave the way for the establishment in India of a gold standard in the future, when the international monetary situation is clarified and becomes stable.

§59. **The first six years of the Reserve Bank.**—The working of the Reserve Bank of India during the first six years of its existence largely justifies the claim that it has inaugurated a new era of financial stability, banking reform and extension and re-orientation of the money market. It has attained a remarkable measure of success in the orderly flotation of loans for Central and Provincial Governments at very low rates, in the making of remittances to the Secretary of State, in the sale of Treasury Bills and in maintaining the stability of the rupee. It gave valuable advice regarding the incorporation of new provisions relating to banking companies in the Indian Companies Act and has recently (1939) put forward useful proposals for the enactment of a Bank Act in India. It has offered valuable and cheap inland remittance facilities and contributed its mite to the lowering of money rates. It has also given an indirect stimulus to the extension of banking facilities in the country.

It has established useful contacts not only with the scheduled banks, which are officially member banks, but also with a large number of small non-scheduled banks. As the monetary and credit authority, it has skilfully steered clear of many difficulties during the present war and has thereby contributed to the stability of the money market. 'It is evident that the Reserve Bank is playing a great and effective part in the elimination of seasonal extremes in rates which cannot but have far-reaching consequences on the Indian economy of the future.'¹ It has also done useful work in connexion with the study of agricultural credit and the co-operative movement and has made many valuable suggestions for overcoming the various defects in the structure of rural credit.

It has not, however, so far fulfilled the principal anticipation, namely the development of a bill market in India, as shown by its

¹ S. K. Muranjan, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

paltry rediscounting of bills for scheduled and provincial co-operative banks. We have already referred to the difficulties of this problem and pointed out the efforts that are being made by the Reserve Bank to overcome them. We must also point out here that the Reserve Bank has not, so far, succeeded in linking up the indigenous bankers with itself. It is clear that unless this is done, the Reserve Bank can neither effectively stimulate the progress of the bill market nor unify the two main parts of the Indian money market.

Although the Reserve Bank, as it is constituted today, is not a perfect institution and leaves many things desired, it is capable of doing much good to the country. No good purpose is now served by raking up old controversies, and the best plan of action is to get the utmost out of the present bank and to strive steadily to improve it. There is not much exaggeration in the claim put forward by Sir George Schuster that India has been equipped with the mechanism for the control of currency and credit on the lines approved of by modern experience, and worthy of India's place among the civilizations of the world. There is, however, room for several improvements, which it may be hoped will be effected in the near future. In this age of planned economy a well-equipped, powerful and efficient central bank is a *sine qua non* for a well-ordered economic development of an economically backward country like India. It is clear, however, that a great deal will depend upon the traditions and conventions which the Bank will set up and the manner in which it will carry out its national trust.

§60. Indian banking during the present war (1939-?).¹—At the beginning of September 1939, owing to the outbreak of war in Europe, banks in India were called upon to meet hurried withdrawals induced by fears of what the war might bring, but the deposits soon began to return as the public realized the futility of panic and adjusted themselves to war conditions.² On the whole, the Indian banking system stood the first shock of the war well. Thereafter, owing to rapid expansion in advances to meet the increased demand for finance from the commodity markets, the stock exchange and the silver market as a result of the war and

¹ See *Report on Currency and Finance* (Reserve Bank of India), 1939-40, pars. 66, 74-5; *Annual Market Review* (1940), *Review of the Trade of India* (1939-40), pp. 84-5, *Annual Reports of the Reserve Bank of India* (Feb. 1940 and August 1940) and the *Resources of India Supplement* (*Times of India*, 25 October 1940), article by Mr B. L. Punjabi on 'Effects of the war on the Indian financial system'.

² The effects of the war on Post Office Savings Banks deposits and Cash Certificates have already been considered (see §23).

the higher prices prevailing, deposits showed an almost continuous increase, and by the end of the year 1939 the total demand and time liabilities of scheduled banks amounted to Rs. 251·33 crores, which were the highest recorded so far and which exceeded the corresponding figure for the previous year by Rs. 12·74 crores. A feature of the deposits was the decline in time deposits, which fell from Rs. 108·44 to Rs. 104·76 crores during the year owing presumably to the preference of depositors to keep their resources liquid. The total advances of scheduled banks amounted to Rs. 143·16 crores at the end of 1939, which were higher than those of the corresponding period of the previous year by Rs. 28·59 crores. This demand continued almost uninterruptedly until the end of March 1940, when the total advances and bills reached the figure of Rs. 163·10 crores, which was the highest recorded since the inception of the Reserve Bank. Likewise the demand and time liabilities touched the new high level of Rs. 263·07 crores on 3 May 1940.

With the intensification of hostilities and adverse war developments in May 1940 there set in a declining tendency following a certain amount of nervousness among bank depositors. The total demand and time liabilities fell by Rs. 11·38 crores in the months of May and June 1940. The aggregate advances of scheduled banks declined to Rs. 149·74 in June 1940. The scheduled banks on the whole had no difficulty in meeting the withdrawals, and in the case of some of them the Reserve Bank sanctioned appropriate limits for assistance. The position of non-scheduled banks in some provinces, which was already none too satisfactory before the war, seemed to have worsened. But on the whole, they appeared to have withstood the strain quite well. In recent months there has been recovery in the deposits, especially in the case of demand deposits.

Unlike, however, the war of 1914-18, the present war has not produced tight money and a high bank rate. A rigorous control over interest rates has been an essential feature of the new technique used for financing war expenditure, and its success has been abundantly proved by the way in which the monetary authorities in both Great Britain and India have been able to maintain cheap money in spite of the vastly increased scale of public expenditure and expectation of colossal borrowing by the Government.¹ Towards the end of August 1939, when the Bank of England's discount rate was raised from 2 to 4, it was feared that the monetary

¹ For an interesting review of money rates in India during the present war see *Annual Market Review* (1940), pp. 57-61.

authorities in India might take similar action and lenders might adopt a cautious attitude. The result was a slight rise in interest rates. But, with the lowering of the Bank of England rate to 2 per cent on 25 October, 1939 and the expansion of currency by the Reserve Bank (see ch. vii, §40 and viii, §30) against large purchases of sterling and of Treasury Bills, there has been no stringency in the money market and the bank rate has remained unchanged at 3 per cent.¹ The prevalence of low interest rates in the midst of the disturbing conditions of 1939-40 was one of the most encouraging features of the financial situation and may be taken as an index of the confidence of investors in the future of gilt-edged prices. All this shows that although the sudden shift from peace to war economy caused a temporary dislocation of the money market, unlike the last war, the present war has not had adverse effects on the money market.

The present war like the war of 1914-18 has had the result of strengthening the cash position of banks in India. This is shown by the fact that the percentage of cash in hand of the scheduled banks and their balances with the Reserve Bank and their total demand and time liabilities amounted to 9.41 at the end of March 1940 as compared with 7.12 at the close of March 1939. The publication of proposals of the Reserve Bank of India for a new Bank Act (see §21), seeking to regulate among other matters bank reserves, has also to some extent contributed to this result.

The increase in the clearing-house returns from Rs. 19,75 crores in 1938-9 to Rs. 23,19 crores in 1939-40 illustrates the welcome effect of the war on Indian banking.

While the adoption of exchange control and restrictions on export and imports have somewhat adversely affected the business of exchange banks and there has been an occasional feeling of nervousness among depositors, the Indian banking system has shown great vitality and been generally strengthened by the war.

§61. **Industrial finance.**²—One of the great lacunae in the Indian economic structure is the absence of a properly organized system of industrial finance. The banks in Germany have played a very important role in satisfying the financial requirements of industries.³

¹ The Imperial Bank of India Advance Rate was raised from 3 to 3½ per cent in January 1940. This rise in the Imperial Bank rate was due to the stringency in the money market caused by heavy purchases of silver and the seasonal demand for money by trade. There was no change, however, in the Reserve Bank rate and therefore the action taken by the Imperial Bank had a limited significance for the money market.

² This section is based on C.B.R., 385-419 and should be read together with vol. I, ch. xiii, §14.

³ See P. B. Whale, *Joint-Stock Banking in Germany*, pp. 36-66.

They provide the greater part of the initial capital for industries, which is subsequently placed among the investing public. In order to distribute the risk it is a very common plan for several banks to join together in a *Konsortium* and pledge themselves to accept a certain portion of the issue. This investment of banks in shares of industrial companies is, however, not a long-term investment as in the case of industrial banks proper, but is regarded as a safe investment of the bank's resources in first-class securities, which the banks expect to hold only for a short time. The banks themselves stand to benefit by these transactions since they are useful for acquiring business connexions and extending their influence. Industrial companies in Germany desirous of procuring new capital normally do so through banks with whom they are in permanent banking relations in the manner indicated above. It must, however, be remembered that the banks employ only a limited portion of their resources in industrial finance and that ordinary banking business constitutes their major activity.¹ The Central Banking Enquiry Committee declare themselves in favour of an attempt to eliminate the Managing Agency system and to depend for future development more on the establishment of direct friendly relations between industrial companies and commercial banks. They commend the adoption of the German system with suitable modifications, and suggest that a beginning in this direction might well be made by the Imperial Bank (after the Reserve Bank came into being) and the other commercial banks of established reputation. Besides much experience and wisdom, this class of business would require considerable owned capital and firm resistance against the temptation to speculate in the creation and sale of securities, and very few of the existing banks at present, possess these qualifications.² In spite of these limitations of the situation as it exists in India, considerable financial assistance is capable of being rendered to industries if the leading banks were to take a genuine and sympathetic interest in industries. With a view to creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence, while at the same time preventing entanglements incompatible with sound banking, the German model should be copied by banks in India. A useful

¹ For an interesting study of the methods of financing industries in Germany and other countries and their application to India the following recent books may be consulted: Dr P. S. Lokanathan, *Industrial Organisation in India* (1935), pp. 242-50, N. Das, *Banking and Industrial Finance in India* (1936), ch. xi, and S. K. Basu, *Industrial Finance in India* (1939), chapters ii-iii.

² Dr P. S. Lokanathan (*Industrial Organisation in India*, pp. 251-2) points out the difficulties in the way of the adaptation of Indian commercial banking to the mixed banking of the Continental type. It would certainly be unwise to ignore them.

liaison between themselves and the industries receiving their assistance could be established by appointing Managing Directors or Managers of banks as Directors of industrial concerns. The banks should also establish Local Advisory Committees to help them in assessing the financial position of their clients and to carry an assurance to the latter of fair and sympathetic treatment.

While valuable results may be expected from the co-operation of commercial banks as outlined above, the needs of industrial development are not likely to be adequately met by this method alone. Under the new constitution the development of industries within their respective territories is one of the functions which is vested in the Provincial Governments. For a satisfactory discharge of this function it may be useful to establish Provincial Industrial Corporations, with branches, if necessary, and working with capital initially or permanently supplied by the Provincial Government concerned. These corporations should aim particularly at assisting enterprises which are likely to be of benefit to the public, add to the productive power of the province and provide employment for its people.¹

The Industrial Corporation should obtain its share capital as far as possible from the public, the Government taking such portion as cannot be raised by public subscription. The share capital of the Corporation should be supplemented by debenture capital not exceeding, at the outset, twice the amount of the share capital. The Government might purchase (if necessary) a portion of debenture issues until a regular market is created for them, and also offer a limited guarantee of interest on debentures. The Industrial Corporation should specialize in the provision of long-term capital to industries, which should continue to obtain their working capital from existing institutions. The Corporation may take long-term deposits for not less than two years, loans from these deposits being given for a similar period. The Government should be entitled to be represented on the Board of Directors of the Industrial Corporation during the continuance of Government interest and liability.²

An All-India Industrial Corporation may also be established if desired by the Federal or Central Legislature. There are and will be certain industries of a national character, or so important that their development must be regarded as falling within the functions of the Federal or Central Government and not of the

¹ Dr Lokanathan points out the dangers of provincial banks being allowed to finance all kinds of industry and suggests that they should restrict themselves to the financing of public utility industries. *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

² *C.B.R.*, 402-7.

Provincial Governments. Further, the latter might themselves desire such an institution so as to establish direct connexion with the large spending departments of the Central Government as well as direct correlation for the industries as a whole with railway rates, customs, stores purchase and other policies of the Central Government. Pending the formation of an All-India Industrial Corporation, the Provincial Corporations might, for matters of common interest, combine into a Central Association. Legislation on the lines of the Madras State Aid to Industries Act should be enacted in other provinces to provide credit facilities to new and nascent modern industries, or cottage industries. Any Government assistance in regard to provision of capital under such legislation should be given through the Provincial Industrial Corporation where one has been established.

§62. **New scheme of industrial finance in the United Provinces.**—As pointed out in Chapter I, the Government of the United Provinces received the approval of the Provincial Legislature in June 1936 for their scheme for the flotation of a company as a state-aided private enterprise for industrial credit. The broad outline of the provisional scheme is as follows: The Credit Company may be called the Industrial Credit Company or Banking Corporation. Its subscribed capital may be about Rs. 30 lakhs, and its paid-up capital about Rs. 15 lakhs. It may supplement its own capital by raising long-term deposits and loans. It will also have the power of issuing debentures. The Company may have a Directorate of six or seven members, some of whom may be nominated. The Government's sanction may be necessary for the appointments of the manager and other superior staff. The Company may establish branches at important mofussil centres and may set up local committees at such centres. The Government's assistance may be given in the following forms: (i) dividend on paid-up capital may be guaranteed at a specified rate, (ii) interest on debentures issued with the Government's consent may be guaranteed at a specified percentage, (iii) subsidy towards the expenses of management. The maximum rate of interest normally chargeable to industrialists will be prescribed. The maximum rates of dividend may also be limited.

As previously pointed out, the scheme for the Marketing and Financing Company is linked to that of the Credit Company, the latter underwriting its capital of Rs. 5 lakhs. The Marketing Company will not only market the goods on a consignment basis and do general *arathia* (commission) work, but will also make small advances for raw materials or against finished goods left with the Company for sale. The Government's assistance to the

Company may take the form of an annual subsidy and contribution towards the cost of educative propaganda, publicity, advertisement, etc.

The scheme outlined above is the first notable attempt in India to place industrial finance on a sound footing with the help of the State and as such will be watched with great interest.

§63. **Bombay Committee's scheme of a Small Industries Bank.**¹—The Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee has recently (1940) suggested that a Small Industries Bank with a capital of Rs. 25 lakhs be promoted, for the financing of small-scale industries, by the Provincial Government. A minimum rate of dividend (say 4 per cent) should be guaranteed by the Government. The Government should be represented on the directorate of the bank and the services of Government technical experts should be made available to it for considering any scheme that may be put before it by small industrialists. The bank should ordinarily confine itself to making advances to existing concerns either for the purpose of working capital or for the purpose of extension and improvement of their capital equipment. The Committee express their preference for such a semi-official organization to Government agency for making loans to industrial units. The Committee rightly conclude that the difficulty of obtaining finance is even greater for small-scale concerns than for large organized industries, and only a separate industrial bank can solve their problem.

It is to be hoped that the difficulties created by the war or otherwise may soon be overcome and the proposed Small Industries Bank established in Bombay, and similar banks established in other provinces.

§64. **The hoarding habit.**—The habit of hoarding to which the Indian people are supposed to be addicted in an unusual degree has long been the subject of comment among European economists. The description of India as a bottomless sink of precious metals is well known. With reference to the supposed insatiable hunger of India for gold and silver, it has been picturesquely observed that 'the precious metals are taken out of the earth by one coloured race and put back into it by another coloured race'. It is likewise said that gold once passed into general consumption in India is permanently lost to the rest of the world. Until recently, Europe has contemplated the steady absorption of the precious metals by India with amused wonderment not unmixed with satisfaction. If India had not swallowed up the gold and silver, the output of which had been enormously increased owing

¹ *Report of the Bombay Economic and Industrial Survey Committee, par. 219.*

to the discoveries in recent times of new mines and improvements in the methods of extraction, a great derangement in the economic life of European countries would have been caused by a heavy rise in prices. But latterly Europe has been showing distinct signs of alarm and consternation at the prospect of the Indian 'sink' continuing to perform its age-long function with habitual thoroughness. In 1924-5, when England and other countries of Europe were struggling to stabilize their currencies, India, entirely unmindful of the needs of Europe, added no less than £50 millions worth of gold to her hoards, which was perfectly shocking.¹

The Indian hoards have been variously estimated. Probably the earliest estimate was that of H. D. Macleod, who was the first economist to get the Indian hoards on his brain. He tormented himself with the belief that the Indian hoards must be no less than £300 millions. Lord Curzon estimated them at Rs. 825 crores, while Arnold Wright, writing in the *Financial Review of Reviews*, December 1916, put them at £700 millions. Mr E. L. Price is inclined to accept a recent estimate of the American Trade Commissioner, namely £1,000 millions. Mr Francis Skrine thinks that even this is very much of an underestimate.² Sir James Grigg recently (September 1938) referred to a tentative estimate given in the annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements for 1934-5, according to which the gold hoarded in India from 1493 to 1930 amounted to at least Rs. 1,454 crores. So that, with every fresh calculator, the calculations have proceeded in a regular *crescendo* movement.

In complaining of India's consumption of gold and silver, European writers have often seemed to impute a double dose of original sin to the Indian people, and this apparent attempt 'to fasten on India an exceptional and invidious responsibility for the consumption of gold'³ has provoked heated retorts. Some of these retorts are of the *tu quoque* variety. It is not India alone, it is pointed out, that is addicted to the consumption of gold. The United States absorbed nearly £500,000,000 worth of gold from 1916-23⁴ and with two-thirds of the monetary gold supply concentrated in New York and Paris the passion for hoarding can

¹ This contention has lost much of its force owing to the export from India of over Rs. 351 crores worth of gold between September 1931 (when the rupee was linked to sterling at 1s. 6d.) and the end of January 1940. See *ante*, ch. viii, §25. On the other hand, considerable gold hoarding has been taking place in the U.S.A. and several European countries in recent years.

² See Gubbay, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 and 38.

³ Memorandum of Sir Stanley Reed to the Babington Smith Committee.

⁴ Wadia and Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 388-9.

scarcely be regarded as an Indian monopoly. A good deal of the gold in these centres is no doubt concentrated in the central banking reserves, and if a similar use of it has not been possible in India, is it not the faulty currency system (the gold exchange standard) which was prevalent for a long time in India that is at least partly answerable for this? Those who bewail the hoards of India generally forget that part of the gold absorbed by India is used for industrial and domestic purposes, and, as Sir Stanley Reed remarks: 'Every country in the world uses gold and silver for industrial and domestic purposes, and it induces a sense of angry injustice to find that the Indian demand for the precious metals for precisely the same purposes is perverted into senseless hoarding.' Considering that India has a population amounting to about a fifth of the total population of the world, her annual (pre-1914) consumption of about 20 per cent of the world's output of gold cannot be regarded as disproportionate or excessive.¹

And when once it is granted that the Indian demand for gold and silver is not abnormal, all things considered, this acquits India of any particular responsibility for hindering the currency stabilization in other countries. If India's legitimate demand for the precious metals is embarrassing to other countries, the latter must and will in course of time devise currency systems less dependent on gold than they have been in the past. It is also possible that India may in course of time take her share in any general world-wide movement for economizing the available supply of gold, but she resents the suggestion that she is in a special sense responsible for the scarcity felt by other countries.²

All that has been said above aims at showing that the amount of hoards in India, properly so called, is generally grossly exaggerated. It would, however, be flying in the face of facts to deny the existence of hoards altogether. India has undoubtedly been a very large absorber of gold for non-currency uses, and her

¹ It is sometimes urged in explanation and justification of the large imports of gold into India that they are after all due to India's favourable balance of trade, caused by the keen demand for her goods on the part of her foreign customers. This contention, however, appears to us to be of little value. It must be remembered that India is as anxious to sell, as foreign countries are anxious to buy, her goods, and if gold is sent to her in settlement of her trade balance it is because she prefers it to other commodities.

² As suggested above, the outcry at the present moment is principally against the United States and France, and their policy of sterilizing enormous quantities of the world's annual supply of gold in the vaults of their central banking institutions, instead of using the gold for increasing the volume of currency and credit.

present stocks of the metal immobilized by being hoarded must be very considerable.

It need scarcely be pointed out that this is by no means a sign of wealth and prosperity. The hoards are, for the most part, held in millions of scattered, individually insignificant amounts and, moreover, being turned away from productive uses, they are more properly regarded as a cause of poverty than as an index of prosperity.

It is a moot point whether it is permissible to regard gold and silver ornaments as constituting part of the hoards to the extent of their full value, though it is usual to assume them as such. But there seems to be no reason why jewellery worn for purposes of personal adornment should be looked upon as hoarding any more than gold used, let us say, for stopping teeth. Both are forms of consumption of wealth rather than of saving. It is no doubt true that when people in India turn gold and silver into ornaments, they generally do so with the double object of personal adornment and holding wealth in store against a rainy day.¹ All the same it is necessary to distinguish between the two motives, and the precious metals can be regarded as hoards only in so far as they are intended to be stores of value.

Whether the Indian people are not inordinately fond of ornaments and jewellery and whether they do not invest a disproportionate amount of their earnings in them is a question which falls into the same category as a similar doleful inquiry which may be made, for example, with reference to the English workman, asking whether he is not more fond of beer than is good for him and whether he would not benefit more by spending his money in other ways. Both are questions relating to intelligent and well-ordered consumption. The spread of the banking habit is no more a cure for misguided expenditure on ornaments than it is a cure for misguided expenditure on drink (though, of course, in so far as ornaments are regarded as substitutes for banks, provision of banking facilities will tend to diminish the investment in ornaments). The Indian peasant indeed often spends money on ornaments for himself and for his wife, when perhaps he ought to spend the money on a mosquito net or on more and better food. The use of gold and silver is in some cases forced by custom and plays an important part in social ceremonies sanctioned by religion.

¹ The Babington Smith Committee also call attention to the practical consideration that a woman, whether Hindu or Muslim, who possesses gold and silver ornaments, or coins converted into ornaments, is entitled to hold them as her personal property.

and tradition. These are regrettable facts, but to remedy them we must rely on the development of a better sense of values as well as on the softening of the rigour of social and religious custom through education and the progress of general enlightenment. But it must be clearly understood that this aspect of the matter is concerned with better or worse modes of consumption and expenditure and has nothing to do with hoarding proper, the underlying idea of which is saving.

When all the allowances suggested by the considerations advanced above are made, there still remains a certain residuum for which the proper name, it must be admitted, is hoarding. Having granted that the evil does exist to some extent we must now proceed to analyse its causes. We have more than once referred to the faulty system of currency as a contributory cause. But the principal cause is found in the numerous invasions to which India was subjected in the past and the continued misrule and insecurity of life and property from which she suffered. The habit that was contracted in times of insecurity has continued to survive in times of well-established peace and security. The present obstacles in the path of reform are the illiteracy of the population and the absence of adequate banking facilities. Recent reports of the Controller of Currency have been commenting with satisfaction on the welcome decline in the import of gold in the last few years. During 1926-7 and 1927-8, the average net imports of gold were only Rs. 1,875 lakhs as compared with an average of Rs. 2,815 lakhs for the five pre-war years (1909-14). In 1928-9 the net imports were Rs. 1,422 lakhs, which meant a drop of practically one-third when compared with the previous year. Since 1931 there has actually been, as already pointed out, a large net export of gold from India. This, together with the great success of recent Government loans, indicates a certain welcome increase in the investment habit; but only the fringe of the problem has, as yet, been touched, and for its complete solution we must look to widespread education and a much greater extension of banking facilities. The question of tempting the hoards into productive employment has latterly assumed a new importance. For though it may be true that the absence of a sound currency has encouraged the habit of hoarding, it is also true, on the other hand, that unless the hoards come out, it would be difficult for any currency system, however well devised, to function satisfactorily. For example, if hoarding persists, the control of currency and credit in the best possible way by the currency authority would present insuperable difficulties. The extension of banking, which is suggested as a cure for hoarding, is itself rendered difficult by

hoarding. For how can banks carry on, if people will not put their money into them? But the other question is equally pertinent; namely, how can people put money into a bank, if there is no bank to put it into? It is thus a case of action and reaction, and the only remedy is to create as many credit institutions as possible and as great a variety of them as possible to suit the different needs and tastes of the people, leaving education and continuous propaganda to do the rest.

§65. **Fighting the hoarding habit.**—Various suggestions have been made for improving the present banking organization and fighting the hoarding habit. Some of them taken individually may appear trifling, but the combined effect of all of them is bound to be very considerable. We shall mention some of these suggestions :

(i) The Post Office is a ubiquitous agency and it should be utilized to its utmost capacity for promoting the investment habit. The work it is already doing in this field has been noticed above and some improvements have been suggested. Other suggestions are that (a) the interest on Post Office five-years' cash certificates might be allowed to accrue after the first and each subsequent quarter instead of the fourth as at present; (b) the limit of the total amount of cash certificates in the case of joint holders, banks and co-operative societies may be raised from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000; (c) the Savings Bank pass books should be bilingual, one of the languages being English, and the other the principal language of the part of the province in which the head office of the issue is situated; deposits by means of cheques should be permitted, as well as operating on the Savings Banks accounts by cheques; (d) increased facilities should be afforded by the Post Office to investors for the purchase and sale of Government securities and for their safe custody.

(ii) According to the Hilton-Young Commission's suggestion, gold certificates should be introduced as soon as feasible.

(iii) The Bihar and Orissa Banking Committee recommend special Women's Cash Certificates which would be called Stridhan Certificates, and which would be issued to women only at perhaps a rate slightly higher than the current rate of interest.¹

(iv) The Government, as well as municipalities and local bodies, should make and accept payment by cheque as far as possible.

(v) National Savings Associations on the lines of those started

¹ Sir B. N. Mitra, speaking before a gathering of students at Bangalore, exhorted them to make their sisters understand that 'every ounce of precious metals they discarded would enable them to forge a link for the golden necklace of economic independence round the neck of their motherland'.

in England should be formed for promoting thrift and for familiarizing the small saver with safe and profitable modes of investment. §66. **Extension of banking facilities.**—Compared with other civilized countries, the number of banks in India is wholly inadequate to the real needs of the country. On 31 December 1937 there were only 587 head offices with 1409¹ branches of banks, including agencies, throughout the whole of India excluding Burma. There were in 1928 only 339 towns in the whole of India served by either a bank or branch or an agency of a bank. This number of 339 against the total number of 2,300 towns strongly emphasizes the need for speeding up the expansion and progress of commercial banking in this country.²

The following table³ gives an interesting comparison of banking facilities in different countries, in the pre-depression period.

*Banking offices in India and in Foreign Countries on 31
December 1924*

Name of Country	No. of Banking Offices	No. of Banking Offices per Million of Population	No. of Banking Offices per 2,700 sq. miles
United Kingdom ...	11,976	285	362
United States ...	30,000	256	20
Japan ...	7,465	92	80
Canada ...	4,883	448	3
India ...	596	2	1

Taking later figures we find the relative situation has remained much the same. For example, there were in the United States of America over 22,071 banking institutions in 1931 with capital and reserves amounting to Rs. 3,541 crores and deposits of Rs. 13,788 crores. The corresponding figures for the United Kingdom in 1932 were 12,557 institutions, Rs. 316 crores capital and Rs. 3,226 crores deposits. In India there were only 1,259 banking offices (including branches and agencies) in 1935. The total bank deposits in the same year were Rs. 2,45 crores, of which 76 crores were deposits in exchange banks. As Sir M. Visvesvaraya points out,

¹ These branches were distributed as follows: 7 offices and branches of the Banking Department of the Reserve Bank, 154 branches of the Imperial Bank, 88 of the Exchange Banks, and 1,160 of the Indian joint-stock banks. *Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India (1937)*, par. 14.

² *C.B.R.*, 569.

³ Presidential Address of Principal M. L. Tannan, Indian Economic Conference, Calcutta, 1927.

the average per capita banking deposits were in the United States Rs. 1,123 ; in Canada Rs. 804 ; in the United Kingdom Rs. 698 ; in Japan Rs. 215 and in India Rs. 6-4-0.¹

While it is clearly necessary to multiply banking institutions, it is also necessary to start diverse types of them. Joint-stock banking of the ordinary kind may not always be found to be suitable for Indian conditions. Other more suitable models which might be tried are furnished by the popular co-operative banks in Germany and Italy. These popular banks keep the shares as low as possible in order to encourage the small investor. Also the dividend is limited sometimes by law and sometimes by custom. Special terms are offered to poor investors as an encouragement to saving, and loans are advanced at low rates. Loans are also given on personal credit for objects approved of by the banks. Institutions of this kind are likely to flourish in India more than the usual kind of joint-stock banks.² It is now for the Reserve Bank of India wisely to guide banking progress in this country.

It is gratifying to learn from the last Annual Report of the Reserve Bank that branch banking is developing in India on an increasing scale. Between January 1936 and July 1940 the total number of branches, pay offices, etc., of the scheduled banks increased from 723 to 1,322. While this in itself is encouraging, it is obvious that much further progress in this direction will be necessary before India can have a network of joint-stock banks adequately covering the country.³

§67. **Institute of Bankers for India.**—As we have already seen, one of the reasons for the bank failures in 1913-14 was the generally prevalent ignorance of modern banking in India. The Indian Institute of Bankers, which was registered at Bombay under the Indian Companies Act on 20 April 1928, is calculated to remedy this defect in some measure. The main objects of the Institute are : (i) to support and protect the character, status and interests of persons engaged in or connected with the business of banking generally and especially in India, and consider all questions affecting them ; (ii) to encourage the study of the theory of banking and for that purpose to institute a scheme of examinations and grant of certificates, scholarships and prizes ; (iii) to spread information on banking and kindred subjects by means of lectures, discussions, periodicals, books, correspondence with public bodies

¹ Sir M. Visvesvaraya, *Planned Economy for India* (1934), p. 189.

² See Gubbay, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-32.

³ *Annual Reports of the Reserve Bank* (1937), pp. 15-16 and (June 1940), p. 21.

or individuals, etc.; (iv) to collect and circulate statistics and other information relating to the subject of banking in India.¹

The examinations held by the Institute have already become established. The Institute also conducts a journal. The lectures delivered under its auspices in Bombay and Calcutta have attracted large and appreciative audiences. The facilities for the study of banking, such as they are, are at present confined to the Presidency towns. As funds permit, the Institute should endeavour to extend them up-country by means of correspondence courses, branch libraries, local lectures and colleges. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee recommend that the Institute should make arrangements for University lectures and courses of instruction at different centres, in the subjects included in its curriculum.²

We fully endorse the view expressed at the last (1940) annual general meeting of the Institute of Bankers by Sir James Taylor, the President, that all would like to see the Institute develop as a medium of co-ordinating banking practice in India.

¹ See *Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Indian Institute of Bankers*, 1928.

² *C.B.R.*, 761.

CHAPTER XI

FINANCE AND TAXATION

§1. *Introductory observations.*—Before the war of 1914-18 there was only one budget for the whole of India, and the Provincial Governments had no independent powers of taxation. The Central Government was the only taxing authority (unless we also take into account the very limited powers of taxation enjoyed by local bodies). Since that war there has been almost complete separation of Provincial from Central finance, and the Indian financial system has been evolving on the lines of Federal finance. A considerable change has also been going on for the last half a century or so in the relative position of the different sources of revenue. In the course of this period the land revenue has lost its old overshadowing importance and other sources of revenue have come into greater prominence.¹ The financial system of India has been recently coming more and more into line with other modern systems, as shown by the increasing variety of her taxes and the growing reliance on direct taxes like income-tax. Another great change has been with regard to the position of railways in Indian finance, and we have already noticed their evolution from bloodsucker to milch-cow.² Opium, which not long ago used to make a brave show on the revenue side of the budget and was second in importance only to land revenue, has suffered almost a total eclipse as the result of India's great essay in philanthropic finance, and the small Budget revenue shown under this head since 1935 is derived from excise on opium sold for consumption in India.

¹ 'The land revenue which was the mainstay of the Government 40 years ago (1883-4), contributing 53·15 per cent of the whole receipts, now (1923-4) contributes only 20·75 per cent. On the other hand, customs has advanced from less than 3 per cent to over 24 per cent, and the income-tax from 1·32 per cent to 12·30 per cent. The share borne by excise (including salt duty) has fallen from 25·07 per cent to 21·67 per cent, partly owing to the reduction in the salt duty and partly no doubt to the drastic action taken in connexion with the intoxicants. The shares borne by stamp duties, including probate duties (about 10 per cent) and local taxation have been more consistent.'—*Report of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee*, par. 496. In calculating these percentages the Committee have not taken into account the total revenues of India, but only the total receipts under the heads of taxation, including therein also local taxation.

² The milch-cow ran dry during the years of depression, see ch. v, §15.

§2. **General statistics of revenue and expenditure (Central and Provincial).**—As a preliminary to the discussion of national finance we give below the principal heads of revenue and expenditure, Central and Provincial. Table I presents the Central (General) Budget of the Government of India for 1940-1 while Tables II and III relate to the main heads of revenue and expenditure respectively of the several Provincial Governments in the year 1939-40. They also show the relative importance of the various heads of revenue and expenditure in the different provinces.

§3. **Classification of Indian revenues.**—We may now proceed to consider Indian finance first on the revenue side and secondly on the expenditure side.

Indian revenues can be classified according to the authorities charged with the power of levying the taxes from which they are derived, as Provincial, Central and Local¹ (Revenues of Municipalities and Local Boards). Another classification as good as any other is the following:²

(i) *Land Revenue.*—We have already dealt with the question whether land revenue is a rent or a tax, and seen that there are more reasons for calling it a tax than a rent.³ If this view is accepted, land revenue would be a direct tax like income-tax. But since in this controversy absolute certitude is unattainable, it would perhaps be better to cut the Gordian knot by regarding land revenue as a class by itself. (ii) *Taxation Revenue.*—Under this head we have the usual sub-classes of direct taxes and indirect taxes. The income-tax and other assessed taxes and the land cesses included under provincial rates are instances of the former. The salt tax, excise, customs, stamps and registration are the principal indirect taxes in India. (iii) *Public monopolies.*—This head includes the revenue from forests and opium. (iv) *Commercial services.*—Railways, irrigation, public works, posts and telegraphs. (v) *Miscellaneous receipts.*—Payments from Indian States, departmental receipts, etc. (vi) Interest on loans given to local bodies, Provincial Governments and Indian States.

CENTRAL HEADS OF REVENUE

§4. **History of the customs tariff.** (A)—*Import Tariff in the period before the war of 1914-18.*—Until recently (1924), the Indian tariff had been on a scrupulously conscientious free trade basis. This

¹ For the principal sources of Local revenues see §§57-8 below.

² See K. T. Shah, *Sixty Years of Indian Finance* (second edition), pp. 214-15.

³ See vol. I, ch. xii, §30.

TABLE I

CENTRAL BUDGET (GENERAL) FOR 1940-1¹*In lakhs of rupees*

	1921-2 (Actuals)	1940-1 (Budget esti- mates)		1921-2 (Actuals)	1940-1 (Budget esti- mates)
REVENUE			EXPENDITURE		
<i>Principal Heads of revenue :—</i>			Direct demands on the revenues ...	5.27	4.07
Customs ...	} 34.41	37.86	Salt Works and other capital outlay charged to revenue	1
Central Excise Duties ...		11.44	Railways: Interest and miscellaneous charges (as per Railway Budget)	24.30	32.51
Corporation Tax ...	} 18.74	5.30	Irrigation ...	14	11
Taxes on Income other than Corporation Tax ...		14.20	Posts and Telegraphs ...	1.66	69
Salt ...	6.34	8.20	Debt services ...	16.00	12.11
Opium ...	3.07	47	Civil Administration ...	9.41	11.81
Other Heads ...	2.21	1.01	Currency, Mint and Exchange ...	1.07	62
Total ...	64.77	78.48	Civil Works ...	1.54	3.23
Railways ² (net receipts as per Railway Budget)	15.21 ²	37.82	Miscellaneous ...	5.59	3.66
Irrigation (net receipts) ...	6	1	Defence Services ...	77.88	59.40
Posts and Telegraphs ...	57	1.07	Extraordinary	41
Debt Services ...	1.11	61	Miscellaneous adjustments between the Central and Provincial Governments	3.05
Civil Administration ...	77	1.05	Total expenditure	1,42,86	1,31,68
Currency and Mint	4.37	1.24	Surplus	5
Civil Works ...	11	33	Grand Total ...	1,42,86	1,31,73
Miscellaneous ...	7.19	1.20			
Defence Services ...	8.07	5.89			
Provincial contributions and adjustments ...	12.98	...			
Extraordinary items	...	4.03			
Total revenue ...	1,15,21	1,31,73			
Deficit ...	27,65	...			
Grand Total ...	1,42,86	1,31,73			

¹ Central Budget (General) for 1940-1, pp. 24-5.² There was no separate Railway Budget till 1925-6. We have already dealt with Railway Finance in ch. v.

TABLE II¹
REVENUE OF THE SEVERAL PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF COORG FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1940
In lakhs of rupees

Heads of Revenue	Coorg	Madras	Bombay	Bengal	United Provinces	Punjab	Bihar	Central Provinces and Berar	Assam	North-West Frontier Province	Orissa	Sind	Total Provincial Governments
Principal Heads of Revenue—													
Customs	221·97	19·34	...	13·39	...	0·92	...	2,55·62
Taxes on Income other than Corporation Tax	41·85	55·80	55·80	41·85	22·32	33·70	13·95	6·41	2·79	5·58	5·58	2,85·63
Salt ²	P	P
Land Revenue ...	4·04	516·87	343·20	386·10	587·96	234·20	131·28	264·04	136·90	18·59	47·62	36·85	27,07·65
Provincial Excise ...	2·06	336·02	202·13	165·28	115·72	104·98	110·89	57·37	33·96	8·87	29·81	36·33	12,03·42
Stamps ...	0·48	174·26	138·93	256·44	130·10	74·55	105·04	37·80	17·63	7·05	19·12	17·16	9,78·56
Forest ...	3·27	44·83	38·61	23·98	52·66	25·40	8·36	50·44	17·46	5·22	6·53	7·76	2,84·51
Registration ...	0·06	32·96	13·76	27·32	8·91	8·50	13·28	5·25	2·00	0·69	2·38	2·07	1,17·19
Receipts under Motor Vehicles Acts ...	0·93	80·51	41·78	21·31	12·16	13·49	0·31	4·56	4·09	2·38	1·07	2·68	1,85·27
Other Taxes and Duties	79·28	194·03	46·61	50·91	11·43	2·11	8·57	2·38	1·14	P	6·66	4,03·12
Total ...	10·84	1306·58	1028·24	1204·81	1000·27	494·87	424·31	441·98	234·22	46·73	110·03	115·09	64,17·97
Railways	0·14	P	0·14
Irrigation ...	0·03	178·80	32·13	— P	195·75	508·70	18·94	7·45	P	13·81	2·37	88·72	10,46·70
Civil Administration ...	0·57	9·64	110·32	93·68	80·91	90·32	61·82	29·59	13·37	8·07	6·32	14·76	5,19·37
Debt Services ...	0·13	23·35	71·03	29·62	13·17	3·76	16·36	4·60	0·26	0·63	12·75	7·21	1,82·87
Civil Works & Miscellaneous ...	0·14	30·96	48·92	35·50	17·96	28·78	10·90	12·41	10·91	8·23	7·72	9·96	2,22·39
Electricity Schemes	12·99	P	10·87	— 0·02	1·90	25·74
Miscellaneous ...	0·04	21·32	20·20	25·77	18·82	28·31	13·68	12·35	4·53	3·23	2·67	2·92	1,53·84
Contributions ...	1·16	0·26	0·25	0·30	25·21	3·85	0·16	0·12	30·04	100·01	43·02	105·12	3,09·50
Extraordinary items	3·14	41·85	...	41·63	1·45	85·11	1,73·18
Total Ordinary Revenue ...	12·91	1665·90	1314·23	1431·67	1352·09	1211·09	547·60	508·50	293·33	182·61	187·88	428·87	91,38·68

¹ Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Central and Provincial Governments of India (1939-40), Table 5.

² Provincial Governments' share of additional import duties on foreign goods.

**EXPENDITURE OF THE SEVERAL PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF COORG FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1940**
In lakhs of rupees

Heads of Expenditure	Coorg	Madras	Bombay	Bengal	United Provinces	Punjab	Bihar	Central Provinces and Berar	Assam	North-West Frontier Province	Orissa	Sind	Total Provincial Governments
Direct Demands on the Revenue ...	2.71	2,10.17	1,67.81	1,04.65	1,58.30	85.06	38.27	64.52	48.58	8.51	18.21	28.26	7,35.05
Railway Revenue Account
Irrigation, etc., Revenue Account ...	0.06	1,26.96	53.39	38.97	1,15.09	1,58.26	16.02	6.03	0.60	4.58	13.75	1,70.67	7,04.38
Irrigation, etc., Capital outlay (within the Revenue Account)	1.30	0.16	0.16	1.30
Debt Services ...	0.07	38.66	1,25.30	17.15	66.78	17.46	6.21	25.40	4.12	1.82	1.26	5.17	1,97.16
Civil Administration— General administration ...	1.50	2,75.26	78.78	1,70.13	1,42.87	1,16.92	81.75	67.95	33.89	23.05	28.53	23.89	10,44.52
Administration of Justice ...	0.39	88.44	66.43	96.86	70.58	54.56	36.46	25.28	10.59	7.95	6.48	12.86	4,76.88
Police ...	0.70	1,63.26	1,50.31	2,28.28	1,75.49	1,27.46	81.55	59.27	32.86	37.42	22.26	41.70	11,20.56
Education ...	1.40	2,63.57	2,00.17	1,62.60	2,12.42	1,63.51	75.92	54.59	38.67	23.38	26.68	31.31	12,54.22
Medical ...	0.99	97.53	46.39	56.32	37.24	30.60	24.34	16.01	14.40	7.76	9.37	8.54	3,49.49
Public Health ...	0.21	27.30	28.10	39.39	23.65	18.01	12.29	5.08	8.21	1.59	2.60	2.66	1,69.09
Agriculture ...	0.12	19.81	11.99	21.64	67.92	36.62	10.73	10.19	6.30	2.41	2.41	9.67	1,99.81
Industries	26.00	7.65	20.22	22.19	18.80	10.51	3.06	2.78	0.25	2.66	0.91	1,15.03
Other departments	0.52	1,73.47	49.91	1,64.15	48.42	88.13	33.29	16.64	8.27	12.60	5.93	9.31	6,10.64
Total ...	5.83	10,34.64	6,39.73	8,59.59	8,00.78	6,54.61	3,66.84	2,58.07	1,55.97	1,16.41	1,06.92	1,40.85	51,40.24
Civil administration— Capital account within the Revenue Account	P	1.50	1.50
Miscellaneous ...	3.45	3,02.98	2,97.04	3,50.88	2,03.73	3,15.13	1,08.45	1,21.58	83.06	54.13	43.91	60.13	19,44.47
Total expenditure ...	12.12	16,37.39	12,83.27	13,71.24	13,44.52	11,95.60	5,35.79	4,75.60	2,92.33	1,87.11	1,84.05	4,05.08	89,24.10
Total Ordinary Revenue (see Table II) ...	12.91	16,65.90	13,14.23	14,31.67	13,52.09	12,11.09	5,47.60	5,08.50	2,93.33	1,82.61	1,87.88	4,28.87	91,38.68
Surplus (+), Deficit (-) of each Government	+0.79	+28.51	+30.06	+60.43	+7.57	+15.49	+11.81	+32.90	+1.00	-4.50	+3.83	+23.79	2,12.58

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¹ Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Central and Provincial Governments of India (1939-40), Table 6.

involved very moderate import duties. Before the Mutiny there was an import duty of 5 per cent on finished goods and $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on raw produce. Goods imported in foreign ships had to pay double the ordinary scale of duties till 1848. After that date the nationality of the shipping was ignored, though differential duties continued to be levied up to 1859 in accordance with the nationality of the goods, being double the ordinary rate on non-British goods. On account of the financial stringency which followed the Mutiny, this distinction was abolished and the general rate was raised to 10 per cent. It was reduced to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1864 and 5 per cent in 1875. And eventually in 1882 all customs duties were abolished under pressure from the British Government inspired by the Manchester interest and in spite of the opposition of the then Viceroy, Lord Northbrook.

Between 1882 and 1894 there were thus practically no import duties. But in 1894 owing to financial stringency caused by the falling rupee a 5 per cent *ad valorem* general import duty was imposed. Cotton yarn and piece-goods, and certain other goods, however, were excluded from the operation of the tariff.

Between 1899 and 1904, certain countervailing duties were imposed on bounty-fed sugar coming from Germany, Austria, Denmark and so forth. These were subsequently removed, the last duty of the kind being cancelled in 1912. Their only effect was to divert the import trade in sugar from Germany and Austria to other countries like Mauritius and Java where the system of bounties did not exist.

The only other important changes before the last war in the import tariff were effected in 1910-11, when, to compensate for the loss of the revenue from opium and to meet additional expenditure, higher import duties were levied on silver bullion or coin, and petroleum.

At the end of 1894 it was decided to levy a 5 per cent import duty on cotton fabrics and yarn, but to propitiate Manchester, a duty of 5 per cent was levied on yarns of 20 counts and above produced in Indian mills. This excise on yarn did not give full satisfaction to Lancashire, and therefore, in 1896, the import duty on cotton piece-goods was lowered to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and an excise duty at the same rate was placed on all Indian mill-woven cloth; cotton yarn, whether foreign or local, being altogether exempted from any duty.

This measure was bitterly resented in India. The excise duty seemed to injure India without benefiting Manchester. As was pointed out by Sir James Westland, 94 per cent of the cotton manufactures of India were outside the range of any competition

with Manchester, being of coarser qualities (24s. and under). Manchester had an absolute monopoly of the finer qualities of goods and the bulk of its trade consisted of piece-goods of counts about 30 or somewhat finer, and India could only produce goods of counts 26 or over in small quantities and under difficulties. Lastly, the reduction of the import duty from 5 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent would benefit the richer consumers of foreign cloth, while the home excise of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent would affect the poor consumer adversely. The case against the excise duty appeared unanswerable. But, as was wittily remarked by an Indian member of the Imperial Legislative Council, so long as Lancashire sent sixty members to Westminster, the British Government would always have sixty good reasons for maintaining the duty, and thus the duty remained, in spite of continued opposition on the part of the people, till it was finally abandoned in 1926.

(B) *Export Tariff before the war of 1914-18.*—The history of the export tariff in the pre-war period can be more briefly disposed of.

Until 1860, export duties were an integral feature of the early tariff policy and were levied generally at the rate of 3 per cent *ad valorem* on practically all exports. Though the duties were low and solely for revenue purposes, the principle of export duties was regarded as economically unsound and likely to do injury to the export trade by encouraging foreign competition. Accordingly a consistent policy of abolition was pursued from 1860 to 1880, so that at the latter date only the export duty on rice was allowed to remain. In 1903, a trifling duty was levied at the request of the Indian tea industry on the export of tea.¹

§5. *Customs tariff during the war (1914-18) and post-war period.*—Extensive changes in the customs tariff were introduced during the war and the post-war period which are briefly summarized below.

(A) *Import Duties.*—The general *ad valorem* duty was raised to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1916-17 (cotton piece-goods, however, were not raised to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent till 1917-18); to 11 per cent in 1921-2 (including cotton piece-goods); and to 15 per cent in 1922-3 (cotton goods remaining at 11 per cent). Railway materials were taxed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1916-17, and the tax was raised to 10 per cent in 1922-3. Iron and steel were raised from 1 per cent to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1916-17, and to 10 per cent in 1922-3. Sugar was increased from 5 to 10 per cent in 1916-17, and from 15 per cent to 25 per cent in 1922-3. Machinery and stores for cotton-spinning and weaving were taxed

¹ See vol. I, ch. vi, §7, 11(ii).

at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in 1921-2, but exempted later on. A high specific duty on matches at 12 annas per gross boxes was imposed in 1921-2 instead of the $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* duty. This duty was doubled in 1922-3. Luxury goods like motor cars, cinema films, watches, silk piece-goods, etc., were raised from $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 20 per cent in 1921-2 and 30 per cent in 1922-3. The duty on motor cars was reduced from 30 to 20 per cent and that on tyres was reduced from 30 to 15 per cent in 1927-8, in accordance with the recommendation of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, which stressed the importance of encouraging motor transport in India. The reduction in the duty left a wider margin for Provincial taxation on users of motor cars for the improvement and development of the Provincial systems of road communication. The tobacco duties were raised to 75 per cent *ad valorem* for cigars and cigarettes in 1922-3. In 1927-8 the duty on unmanufactured tobacco was raised from Re. 1 to Re. 1-8 per lb. A 5 per cent duty was imposed on foreign cotton yarn which had been free since 1893. We have already noticed the recent changes regarding foreign cotton yarn as also the raising of the revenue duty in 1930 on cotton piece-goods from 11 per cent to 15 per cent *ad valorem* and the imposition of an additional 5 per cent protective duty for three years on non-British goods.¹ A duty of one anna per gallon was put upon kerosene and petroleum, with a corresponding excise duty on the home products. The duty on imported liquors was increased in 1921-2 and again in 1922-3.

In 1930, the silver duty of 4 annas per oz. was re-imposed (it had been abolished in 1920). The Finance Act of 1930 introduced an all-round increase in the import duty on sugar.

The acute economic depression and heavy deficits in the Central Budget led to further heavy and extensive increases in the import duties to provide additional financial resources. For example, the Finance Act of 1931 (March) introduced (i) increases in the substantive rates, in the case of duties on liquors, sugar, silver, and cinema films and (ii) additional impositions of the nature of surcharges ranging from $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 15 per cent.

The Supplementary Finance Act of 1931 (November) effected further increases in the import duties on raw cotton, machinery, dyes, artificial silk yarn, silk piece-goods and electric bulbs, and levied a surcharge of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the existing rates on all customs imports including surcharges imposed by the preceding Finance Act. The results of these heavy increases were not altogether satisfactory

¹ See *ante*, ch. ii, §§9-14 for these and subsequent changes in the cotton textile duties.

and in certain cases a tendency towards diminishing returns was in evidence, i.e. a more than proportionate reduction in the volume of the import trade, though this was undoubtedly also due partly to the severe trade depression.

The Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Act of 1932 gave effect to the Ottawa Trade Agreement of July-August 1932. On the part of India this Agreement involved the grant to the United Kingdom of a $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent preference on certain classes of motor vehicles and a 10 per cent tariff preference on certain other classes of goods, there being a special arrangement for iron and steel goods. The Tariff Amendment Act made necessary changes in Schedule II to the Indian Tariff Act, 1894, with effect from 1 January 1933. The necessary preference was provided for either by raising the previous rate all round or partly by raising and partly by lowering it: the standard rate in no case went beyond 50 per cent *ad valorem*. The same Finance Act also reduced the import duty on silver by $2\frac{1}{2}$ annas, i.e. to 5 as.

The Finance Acts of 1934 and 1935 reduced the duty on silver to 5 as. and 2 as. per ounce respectively to discourage smuggling and to remove a possible obstacle to the revival of trade in the white metal. At the same time the excise duty on silver was reduced to correspond with the reduced import duty. But the Finance Act of 1937 increased as a revenue measure the import duty, and correspondingly also the excise duty on silver to 3 as. per ounce.¹

The import duty on raw cotton was enhanced from six pies to one anna per lb. by the Indian Finance Act of 1939. The increased revenue duty was resented by the mill-owners as calculated to handicap the production of finer cotton fabrics in Indian mills. It is expected, however, to encourage the growth of long-staple cotton in the country itself.

The Indian Tariff (Third Amendment) Act (May 1939) gave effect to changes consequent on the provisions of the new Indo-British Trade Agreement which replaced the Ottawa Agreement. On the part of India the new Agreement involved the grant to the United Kingdom of a $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent tariff preference on certain classes of motor vehicles and a 10 per cent preference on certain classes of goods.² We have already³ referred to the reduction in the import duties on British cotton piece-goods as part of the new Agreement.

¹ Changes in the protective duties on sugar are reviewed in vol. I, ch. vi. See also §7.

² For further particulars see ch. xiii.

³ See ch. ii. §14 *ante*.

The Finance Act of 1931 increased the import duty leviable on artificial silk yarn and thread from 3 to 5 as. per lb., as part of the additional taxation levied for financing a part of the increased expenditure caused by the war.

(B) *Export Duties.*—In 1916-17, two new export duties were levied on tea and jute. In the case of tea the export duty was fixed at Re. 1-8. This duty was abolished in 1927-8 but its abolition was accomplished by an increase in the income-tax assessment on the profits on the tea industry. In the case of jute, the export duty was fixed at Rs. 2-4 per bale of 400 lb., being approximately equivalent to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. Manufactured jute was charged at the rate of Rs. 10 per ton on sacking and Rs. 16 per ton on hessians. In 1917-18, the export duties on jutes were doubled. In October 1919, a 15 per cent *ad valorem* duty was levied on raw hides and skins as a measure of protection to the Indian tanning industry. The subsequent history of the duty and its reduction to 5 per cent have already been noticed.¹ The Finance Act of 1930 reduced the export duty on rice by one quarter, that is, from 3 annas to 2 annas 3 pies a maund, to meet the world fall in the price of rice and to put Burma on an equality with Siam—Burma's principal competitor in the trade—and as an act of justice and help to the Burmese cultivator.

The Finance Act of 1934 abolished the export duty on raw hides since the export trade in hides, especially with Germany, had been dwindling. The removal of the duty was expected to arrest this tendency. The Finance Act of the following year (1935) abolished the export duty on raw skins in order to assist the general revival of the export trade. The arguments in favour of retaining these duties in the interest of the Indian tanning and leather industries have already been noticed.²

Under the Agricultural Produce Cess Act of 1940 an export cess at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* is levied on certain specified articles (such as bones, butter, wheat, seeds, skins, tobacco, raw wool, etc.) which were not already subject to an export duty or cess, with a view to placing the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research in a more secure financial position.

The needs of finance during the war of 1914-18 and the post-war financial deficits called into existence a marked tendency of greater and greater reliance on customs duties. The growth of revenue (Receipts less Refunds and share of jute export duty

¹ *Ante*, ch. ii, §29.

² *ibid.*

assigned to provinces) from customs from 1913-14 to 1940-1 is shown below.¹

Growth of Customs Revenue

Year	Crores of rupees	Year	Crores of rupees
1913-14	11.13	1932-3	51.96
1918-19	18.18	1933-4	45.72
1921-2	34.41	1935-6	46.73
1922-3	41.35	1936-7	40.61 ²
1924-5	45.75	1937-8	43.11
1926-7	47.38	1938-9	40.51
1928-9	49.28	1939-40	45.88
1929-30	51.28	1940-1	39.16
1930-1	46.81	1940-1	37.75
1931-2	46.44	1941-2	34.75

It will be seen that the customs revenue has been adversely affected by the present war not only by the cessation of trade with enemy countries but also by the restrictions on imports and shortage of shipping.

All these changes effected under the stress of financial stringency have changed the nature of the customs duties and the position occupied by them in the Indian fiscal system. A high general duty, wide breaches in the principle of uniformity, a curtailed free list, special taxes on articles of luxury, and lastly, the imposition of new export duties, are among the more important features of the new tariff as contrasted with the pre-war tariff.

Till 1924 these changes in the tariff (except as regards the export duty on raw hides and skins) were governed by revenue considerations only. Some of the duties were, however, so high as to produce a definitely protective effect. We have already noted how this strengthened the case for a properly thought-out system of protection in place of the haphazard protection which had thus come to be introduced. Since the passing of the Steel Protection Act of 1924, several frankly protectionist duties have been imposed. As a result of the Ottawa Trade Agreement (1932) and the Indo-British Trade Agreement (1939), the Indian tariff has ceased to be a single-decker one and is characterized by tariff preferences for certain classes of goods imported from the United

¹ The revenue from Central Excise duties is shown separately since 1937-8 (see §7).

² Revenue attributable to Burma has been excluded. The customs revenue attributable to Burma in 1937-8, the first year of separation, was Rs. 4.26 crores.

Kingdom, the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, thus differentiating between imports from different countries.

An analysis of the figures of customs revenue in the period 1913-14 to 1924-5 by the Taxation Enquiry Committee indicated a certain amount of shifting of the burden from the richer classes to the general population.¹ The 25 per cent duty on sugar seems to have been chiefly responsible for this, as it had the effect of raising the price of country as well as imported sugar, and thus of increasing the burden of taxation on the poorest classes who are large consumers of both kinds. Such must also be the general effect of the increases of the duties on imports, not only of sugar but also of cotton goods and silver (1930 and 1931) and the increased excise on kerosene introduced by the Finance Act of 1930. The additional import duties and surcharges imposed by the Finance Acts of 1931 (March and November), as also the levy of excise duties on sugar and matches by the Finance Acts of 1934, 1940, and 1941 have had a similar tendency. The reduction in the import and excise duties on silver has, however, given limited relief to the consumer of silver in India.

According to a memorandum recently (1939) prepared under the general direction of Dr Gregory, Economic Adviser to the Government of India, the weight of import duties presses most heavily on goods of general consumption,² less severely on luxury goods, and least on capital goods and raw materials.³

§6. Abolition of the cotton excise duty.—Throughout all the successive increases on imported cotton goods, the excise duty, as will have been noticed, remained at the same old level of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This paved the way for a complete abolition of this hated impost. In March 1925 the Legislative Assembly passed a Resolution in favour of the abolition of the duty and refused the grant for the excise staff. The depressing situation of the Bombay cotton industry expedited the abolition of the duty. On 16 September 1925, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas' Resolution was passed in the Assembly, praying for the suspension of the duty. In November,

¹ See *Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee*, par. 145.

² See ch. i, §6 *ante*.

³ There appears to be a definite change in the nature of India's imports in recent years (say since 1926-7 onwards). The relative importance of goods of general consumption has diminished, imports of raw materials and capital goods have become more important, while luxuries have maintained a more or less stable position. See *The Burden of the Indian Tariff* by T. E. Gregory and W. R. Natu (Studies in Indian Economics issued by the Economic Adviser), pp. 45-6.

the Government issued an ordinance suspending the duty, which was finally abolished on 1 April 1926.

§7. Central excise duties on sugar and matches.¹—In the Budget Session of the Assembly (March 1934) two new excise duties were levied with effect from 1 April 1934. The Sugar (Excise Duty) Act, 1934, imposed on (i) *khandsari* sugar and (ii) all other sugar, except palmyra sugar produced in a factory in British India, an excise duty of (i) 10 as, per cwt. and (ii) Re. 1.5 per cwt. respectively. This new excise duty was justified on the ground that it was needed to fill the gap in the revenue caused by the greatly reduced imports of sugar in consequence of the grant of protection supplemented by the surcharge imposed by the Supplementary Budget of 1931. The development of the sugar industry in recent years, it was argued, had been very rapid and there was a danger of overproduction owing to the unhealthy but uncertain stimulus given by the surcharges, which were in excess of the protection required by the home industry. The excise duty was intended to counterbalance the surcharge and to replace the loss of revenue. On the other hand, the new excise duty was opposed by certain members of the Assembly on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Government's policy of protecting the home industry and that its imposition within two years of the adoption of that policy would handicap the progress of the Indian industry. In order to meet the deficiency of customs revenue caused by a further drop in sugar imports and textiles, the Indian Finance Act, 1937, raised the excise duty on *khandsari* sugar from 10 as. per cwt. to Re. 1.5 per cwt. and on sugar other than *khandsari* or palmyra, from Re. 1.5 per cwt. to Rs. 2 per cwt. This change involved a change in the import duty on sugar, which was fixed at the rate at which the excise was leviable on sugar other than *khandsari* or palmyra, plus Rs. 7.4 per cwt., the substantive protection to which the industry was entitled. The excise duty on *khandsari* sugar was reduced to Re. 1 per cwt. in pursuance of Clause 10 of the Sugar (Excise) Order, 1934.

The Indian Finance Act of 1940 raised the rate of the excise duty on sugar other than *khandsari* sugar from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per cwt., which automatically increased the import duty by the same

¹ The Central excise duties on kerosene, motor spirit and silver have already been noticed. There is also a Central excise duty on steel ingots and a small coal cess for assistance towards stowing under the Coal Mines Safety (Stowing) Act of 1939. The net total revenue from all the Central excise duties was Rs. 6.52 crores in 1936-7, Rs. 7.66 in 1937-8, Rs. 8.66 in 1938-9; Rs. 8.28 crores (Budget) and Rs. 6.13 crores (revised) in 1939-40, and Rs. 10.14 crores (Budget) in 1940-1.

amount.¹ The increase was effected as part of the programme of higher taxation in India's first war Budget (1940-1).

The Matches (Excise Duty) Act, 1934, imposed, on matches made in British India and sold in boxes or booklets containing on an average not more than eight, an excise duty of (i) Re. 1 per gross of boxes or booklets if the average number was 40 or less, (ii) Re. 1-8 if the average number was more than 40 but less than 60 and (iii) Rs. 2 if the average number was more than 60. The Act also revised the customs duties on imported matches in such a manner as to comprise rates which maintained the existing measure of protection to the Indian industry over and above the equivalent of the new excise duty. This was justified by Sir George Schuster on the ground that it was necessary to enable the Government of India to recoup their losses caused by granting a half share in the jute export duty to the jute-growing provinces (Bengal, Assam and Bihar). It was maintained that Bengal, which had been suffering from successive budget deficits since 1930, badly needed help from the Central Government, and that this policy was also in accordance with the recommendation of the White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms (1933). The proceeds of the match excise, as also of a similar duty imposed by Indian States, were to be credited to a common fund, the Indian States being given a share in proportion to the consumption of matches in their territory on a population basis. The purpose to which the duty was to be ultimately put, viz. to assist Bengal, evoked criticism from some provinces that they were being penalized for having managed their finances better than Bengal. The match excise duty 'has also created a precedent for refunds to Indian States of a tax levied by the Government of India on an article of universal consumption, which is bound to raise awkward issues in regard to the customs revenues'.²

The excise duty on matches was doubled and a corresponding increase in the import duty was effected in March 1941, in connexion with the new taxation scheme embodied in the Budget for 1941-2 as part of a plan for meeting the heavy deficit arising from the increased expenditure caused by the war.³

§8. History of income-tax.—Income-tax in India has a very long and chequered history. A general income-tax (from which

¹ The same Act raised the excise duty on motor spirit from 10 as. to 12 as. per gallon, and automatically increased the import duty by the same amount.

² See K. T. Shah, *Review of Indian Finance (1927-34)*, p. 36.

³ At the same time a new excise duty of 10 per cent *ad valorem* was levied on pneumatic tyres and tubes manufactured in India. Budget speech of the Finance Member (1941-2), par., 45.

agricultural incomes were not exempt) was first levied to meet the financial burdens of the Mutiny, for five years, at the end of which it ceased to operate in 1865. In 1867 another Act was passed imposing a license-tax on professions and trades, excluding agriculture, which continued to be levied till the end of 1872-3. No further taxation was imposed till 1877, when a license-tax was levied on traders and artisans to meet a portion of the Famine Insurance Grant, and Acts were passed in 1878 for this purpose for the United Provinces, the Punjab, Madras, Bengal and Bombay. These Acts remained in force until 1886. The license-tax of 1878 was, however, converted into a general income-tax by the Income-tax Act of 1886 applying to all India. Under this Act, all sources of non-agricultural income were taxed and were divided for this purpose into four classes: (i) salaries and pensions; (ii) profits of companies; (iii) interest on securities; and (iv) other sources. On all annual incomes between Rs. 500 and Rs. 2,000 derived from salaries and interest on securities, a tax of 4 pies in the rupee was levied; while on incomes over Rs. 2,000 and on all profits of companies the tax was 5 pies, there being no further gradation of the tax. Similar incomes derived from other sources were taxed at practically the same rates, charities and religious endowments being exempted. In 1903, the favourable condition of the finances permitted exemption from the tax of incomes between 500 and 1,000 rupees.

The yield of the income-tax before 1914 was very small, being only about Rs. 3 crores. The richer classes escaped too lightly and did not bear their legitimate share of the burden of taxation. As a result of the increases effected during and since the war of 1914-18 (see §9 below) the yield increased to over Rs. 22 crores in 1921-2. But after the rates were further raised in 1922 the country passed through a serious and prolonged industrial depression, and the yield of the tax decreased from Rs. 18.49 crores in 1923-4 to Rs. 15.42 crores in 1927-8. Later it slightly improved as a result of the substantial increases in the rates of income-tax and super-tax. But as a result of economic depression, the improvement fell short of the estimates and was not commensurate with the increases in the rates and the levy of surcharges. The yield of the income-tax (exclusive of the small share given to the Provinces) was Rs. 17.13 crores in 1933-4, 17.54 crores in 1934-5, 17.07 in 1935-6, and 15.34 in 1936-7. The separation of Burma from 1 April 1937 was responsible for a loss of Rs. 1.40 crores. The total income-tax revenue since that date was as follows:

In crores of rupees

Year	Taxes on Income other than the Corporation Tax	Corporation Tax	Total yield	Provincial share of Income-tax
1937-8	13.95	1.88	15.83	1.38
1938-9	15.24	2.04	17.28	1.50
1939-40	16.99	2.38	19.37	2.79
1940-1 (Budget)	17.20	5.30	22.50	3.73 (Revised)

The substantial increase in the yield of income-tax in recent years may be attributed to the Income-Tax (Amendment) Act of 1939, increased industrial activity, especially since the commencement of war, introduction of the Excess Profits Tax, and the imposition of surcharges in 1940. (See §10 below.)

§9. Changes in income-tax during and since the war of 1914-18 summarized :—

1916.—Scale of progression introduced in the ordinary income-tax.

1917.—A super-tax in addition to the ordinary income-tax on a progressive scale was introduced.

1918.—The machinery of income-tax was amended and improved.

1919.—(i) The free minimum income was raised from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000 a year. (ii) Excess War-profits-tax was levied for a year on incomes in excess of Rs. 30,000, agricultural incomes, incomes of professional classes and public servants being exempted.¹

1920.—Abolition of the Excess War-profits-tax. Amendment of the Super-tax Act in regard to profits of companies and registered firms.

1921.—The scale of progression both in the ordinary income-tax and the super-tax revised and raised.

1922, 1930, 1931 (March) and 1931 (November).—A further revision of both the kinds of taxes in an upward direction, including the levy of surcharges and the lowering of the free minimum income to Rs. 1,000 (November 1931).

1933, 1935 and 1936.—Reduction in the income-tax rates on smaller incomes and in the surcharges (1935-6) and the raising of the free minimum income to Rs. 2,000 (1936).

1939.—Adoption of the 'slab system' under the Income-Tax (Amendment) Act of 1939, and abolition of the surcharges.

¹ The Government claimed half of the excess profits, which were defined as the difference between the profits returned in 1918-19 and the average of the profits returned in the two pre-war years and the first two years of the war. Incomes below Rs. 30,000 were exempted from the tax.

The following changes have been made during the present war :
 1940 (March).—Introduction of the Excess Profits Tax.
 1940 (October).—Supplementary Budget—Levy of surcharges.
 1941 (March).—Raising of the surcharges and increase in the Excess Profits Tax.

*Rates of ordinary income-tax under the Indian Finance Act of 1939 (March)*¹

Based on the 'Slab' System

A. In the case of every individual, Hindu undivided family, unregistered firm and other associations of individuals not being a registered firm or a company—

	<i>Rate per rupee</i>
On the first Rs. 1,500 of total income	... Nil
On the next Rs. 3,500 of total income	... 9 pies
On the next Rs. 5,000 of total income	... 1 anna 3 pies
On the next Rs. 5,000 of total income	... 2 annas
On the Balance of total income	... 2 annas 6 pies

No tax is payable on incomes not exceeding Rs. 2,000 ; income-tax on incomes just above Rs. 2,000 is restricted to half the excess of the income above Rs. 2,000.

B. In the case of every company and registered firm, whatever its total income ; two annas and six pies in the rupee.

Rates of super-tax under the Finance Act of 1939 (March)

A. Assessees other than companies :—

	<i>Rate per Rupee</i>
On the first Rs. 25,000	... Nil
On the next ,, 10,000	... 1 anna
On the next ,, 20,000	... 2 annas
On the next ,, 70,000	... 3 annas
On the next ,, 75,000	... 4 annas
On the next ,, 1,50,000	... 5 annas
On the next ,, 1,50,000	... 6 annas
On the Balance of income	... 7 annas

B. In the case of every company on the whole of total income ; 1 anna in the rupee.

Thus exclusive of the surcharges recently levied, the total highest rate of income-tax and super-tax payable on incomes above Rs. 5 lakhs is 9 annas and 6 pies in the rupee.

§10. Changes in the income-tax during the present war (1939-).—The financial exigencies created by the war which was declared in September 1939 have been responsible so far for the following changes in the Indian income-tax system. In the first

¹ Central Budget for 1939-40, pp. 51-2

place, an Excess Profits Tax was introduced in March 1940 providing for a levy of 50 per cent on all abnormal war profits, above a taxable minimum of Rs. 30,000 earned since 1 September 1939, on the basis of a standard year which might be, at the assessee's option, any financial year between 1935-6 and 1939-40. Unlike during the war of 1914-18, the Excess Profits Tax was introduced in the early stage of the present war. The business community were opposed to it partly on the ground that they were deprived of an opportunity of making legitimate profits after having passed through a period of lean profits, and partly on the ground that the imposition of the new tax would have adverse effects on the industrial development of India. The tax was justified on the ground that it fell on those who benefited by the war.

In the second place the Supplementary Finance Act of November 1940 provided for the levy of a 25 per cent surcharge for Central purposes only on all taxes on income including super-tax and corporation tax.

Finally, the Finance Act of 1941 (March) raised the Excess Profits Tax from 50 to 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ per cent and increased the Central surcharges on income-tax and super-tax from 25 per cent to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent.¹ These increases were considered inevitable in the face of the grave emergency created by the war.

§11. **Reform of income-tax.**—Sir Walter Layton, the Financial Assessor on the Simon Commission (1930), pointed out various defects in the then existing income-tax system in India and suggested certain reforms.

Some of the reforms (e.g. steepening of the progression of income-tax) suggested by him were given effect to in the Budget for 1931-2. In October 1935 the Government of India took steps to conduct a comprehensive review of the Indian income-tax system and administration by a committee consisting of two British experts and one of the senior Income-Tax Commissioners. A Bill to amend the Indian Income-Tax Act on the lines recommended (1936) by the committee was recently (1939) passed by the Central Legislature. It substitutes the 'slab' system under which progressive rates are applied to successive slices of income for the former 'step' system under which the tax was charged at the same rate on the whole income. It adjusts the categories of income-tax payers so as to mulct the wealthy minority more while giving relief to the small man² and is expected to produce a larger yield. It prescribes compulsory returns of income and seeks to tax the aggregate income of husband and wife. It aims at preventing tax

¹ See Sir Jeremy Raisman's Budget (1941-2) speech, par. 44.

² *Indian Year Book* (1940-1), p. 808.

evasion by people and firms who logically ought to be taxed, but under the law as it stands, can manœuvre their incomes or parts of them outside the range of the tax collector's rake. A number of provisions affect the joint-stock companies, especially in relation to the changed system of depreciation allowances, etc. Although the new Act has not met with the full approval of the business community, it constitutes an appreciable improvement over the previous position and should as such be welcomed. It will be noted that even this Act (1939) does not provide for abatements of income-tax by way of family allowances. The main objection to granting such allowances is that they would apply to the vast majority of individual tax-payers in India and would therefore be very costly.

§12. Taxation of agricultural incomes.—Another aspect of the reform of the income-tax relates to the proposal to assess agricultural incomes to income-tax. Under the existing Income-Tax Act agricultural incomes are exempted apparently on the ground that they are assessed to Land Revenue. Sir Walter Layton, however, recommended that the exemption of agricultural incomes from income-tax should be removed by stages at specified dates.¹ The argument that land revenue is the counterpart of income-tax in other countries, and that to impose income-tax as well would be a form of double taxation, is not convincing, because land revenue cannot be increased in proportion to increased productivity even where there is temporary settlement, much less where there is permanent settlement. Frequent and substantial adjustments of land revenue assessments present serious political difficulties besides hitting the small holding equally with the large. An income-tax on agricultural incomes is not open to these objections. The present elaborate machinery for the maintenance of land records and for the administration and collection of land revenue could be effectively utilized for estimating agricultural profits. One of the advantages of the tax would be that, as a result of taking into account income from all sources—agricultural as well as non-agricultural—the non-agricultural incomes of people owning land would be subjected to a higher rate of income-tax. Incidentally, the change would check the present tendency for savings accumulated in industry to be invested in land in order to escape taxation.

¹ The Taxation Enquiry Committee point out that the inequality between the landholders of different classes is aggravated by the absence of an income-tax on agricultural incomes or a death duty, which serves in the more advanced countries to introduce an element of progression in the land tax.

As the income from all sources would have to be considered for determining the rate of assessment, the machinery of collection and administration would have to be Central and the rate would have to be fixed by the Central Government. But the yield could appropriately be assigned to the province where it was collected. In their Despatch on the Simon Commission Report, the Government of India argue that in spite of the theoretical objections to the exemption of agricultural incomes, it has the sanction of long tradition and that dealings in land have always been conducted on the assumption that it would remain. They also point out that most of the local Governments are definitely opposed to the removal of the exemption and regard it as unlikely that this reform should be put into effect in the near future (see *Despatch*, par. 62). It may be added that the Government of India Act (1935) empowers individual provinces, if they so desire, to impose a tax on agricultural incomes originating in the province concerned (see §43 below). It is interesting to note that the Assam Legislature recently (August 1939) passed by a narrow majority the Agricultural Income-Tax Bill sponsored by the Government.

§18. **Salt.**—The salt revenue was inherited by the British Government from its predecessors along with a large number of transit dues: these were abolished in 1843, and the salt duty was at the same time consolidated and raised. Before 1882 the rate of the duty varied from province to province. In that year it was made uniform at Rs. 2 per maund, but was raised to Rs. 2-8 in 1888 in the period of falling exchange. It continued at that level down to 1903, when easier finances permitted its being lowered to Rs. 2-4. It was further reduced to Re. 1-8 in 1905 and to Re. 1-0 in 1907, at which level it continued till 1916, when financial stringency caused by the war of 1914-18 led to an increase in the duty to Re. 1-4. In the budget of 1923, the Government's proposal to raise the duty to Rs. 2-8 was rejected by the Assembly but was carried through by certification by the Governor-General. In 1924, however, the Assembly exercised the option given to it by the Government in favour of reducing the salt tax to Re. 1-4 per maund as an alternative to reductions in the Provincial Contributions. The duty was raised to Re. 1-9 with effect from 30 September 1931 by the Supplementary Finance Act of 1931 which imposed a surcharge of 25 per cent on the existing rate.¹ An unsuccessful attempt was made to reduce the basic salt duty of Re. 1-4 to 12 annas (which would have meant a loss of Rs. 3½

¹ See vol. I, ch. ii, §38 for the additional (Protective) Import Duty on salt.

crores) by the Congress party in the Assembly in the Budget Session of 1935. The same party sought without success the complete abolition of the salt duty during the Budget Session of March 1936.

We have already indicated the different sources of salt in India and their relative importance (see vol. I, ch. ii, §38). There are two principal methods of levying the duty on the salt produced in the country. (i) The Government either manufacture the salt or obtain a monopoly of the supply, requiring private manufacturers to sell it only to the Government. It is then sold by the Government on payment of the duty. (ii) Secondly, as in Madras, the Government levy an excise duty and allow the manufacturer to sell the salt to private traders or the consumers. Government factories are in some cases leased to private individuals who manufacture and dispose of salt under a license from the Government. The total amount of salt consumed in India has varied in recent years between 5,10 and 5,40 lakhs of maunds. The yield from the salt tax was between Rs. 6 and 7 crores, which worked out at about 3½ annas per head per annum, before the imposition of a surcharge of 25 per cent on the customs and excise duties on salt under the Supplementary Finance Act of 1931. The revenue from salt estimated for 1940-1 was Rs. 8.20 crores.

§14. **Criticism of the salt tax.**—The salt duty, although it is ancient, is one of the most unpopular taxes in India. It has been justified on the ground that it affords the only means in a country like India of reaching the masses by direct taxation. It is an accepted maxim of statecraft that every citizen should contribute something, however little, to the expenditure of the State. This will help him to develop a sense of responsibility and prevent him from supporting wholesale and costly changes in a reckless fashion. To this, however, a reply may be made that there is already a direct tax, namely land revenue, which is paid by the large majority in India. In the case of those who do not pay land revenue, it is generally a safe inference that they are so indigent that the idea of taxing them should be given up in spite of any political principle to the contrary. The principal objection to the salt tax is that it is a tax on a necessary of life, and a restriction in its consumption has an undesirable effect on the physique of the people. The fact that successive reductions in the salt tax from 1903 onward were followed by a considerable increase of consumption suggests that it had been kept at an unwisely high level before. It is a regressive tax since it presses more heavily on the poor than on the rich; for a comparatively larger proportion of their income is spent by the poor on salt than by the rich. The salt tax is often defended on the ground that it is an old

tax, and that an old tax is no tax in the sense that from sheer habit people cease to think of it as a hardship. Essentially, however, the tax is undesirable and, though for practical reasons it may be impossible to abolish it immediately, this should be definitely recognized as the goal of public policy, and steady approaches should be made towards it. So long as the tax cannot be dispensed with, it should at least be maintained at as low a pitch as possible.¹ The existing machinery for collection makes it possible to secure additional revenue from this source with comparative ease, but an increase should not be thought of except in case of grave emergency, and should last only during such emergency.

§15. **Opium.**—As already hinted above, opium was until recently a very considerable source of revenue, and the occasional windfalls from this head were at one time notorious. With regard to the administrative aspect of opium revenue, the method of production and sale under Government monopoly was adopted in preference to heavy export duties, as being more satisfactory from the revenue point of view and as obviating the possibility of smuggling.

The revenue from opium until the end of 1935 was derived from three main sources: (i) the monopoly profits of the sale of opium manufactured in Government factories and intended for export to foreign countries; (ii) income from the export duty levied on the purchase of opium sent out from the Indian States of Rajputana and Central India; and (iii) profits of monopoly in the form of license fees or vendor's fees derived from the internal consumption of opium in British India. This revenue was credited to or shown under the revenue from excise, and that from the first two sources under opium proper.

In 1907, under pressure from Whitehall, the Government of India entered into an agreement with China, under which sales on Government account for export to China were stopped since 1914. It was said that in this manner British righteousness was satisfied at the cost of Indian revenues. It was also complained that China herself had failed to fulfil her part of the agreement and had been unable to decrease her own production of opium. All the same India perhaps ought to be satisfied that she has done her duty by China and should cease to regret the loss of revenue. At present (1941), the revenue from opium is very much lower than formerly, being less than half a crore of rupees as contrasted with the annual average of about Rs. 8 crores during the three years preceding 1913. It was announced by Lord Reading in

¹ Dr R. P. Paranjpye suggested 8 annas per maund as the normal rate of the tax. See *Taxation Enquiry Committee Report*, par. 168.

February 1926 that the Government intended to abolish all exports of opium in future except for strictly medicinal purposes in accordance with the instructions issued by the League of Nations. The Government of India further agreed to stop all exports of opium before 1935. Accordingly, as Sir James Grigg, Finance Member, pointed out in his Budget speech (1936-7), the revenue from exports of provision opium has ceased since the end of the year 1935. Now the receipts from opium are confined to opium sold for consumption in India; which is strictly regulated. Internal consumption is, however, still high according to the standard laid down by the League of Nations. Altogether opium as a source of income has faded into insignificance.

PROVINCIAL HEADS OF REVENUE

§16. **Land revenue.**—We have already dealt with land revenue in chapter xii of vol. I. The total amount of land revenue collected in British India amounted to Rs. 31·89 crores in 1936-7, as compared with Rs. 35·27 crores in 1927-8. The drop was caused by the depression in the rural areas. The separation of Burma with effect from 1 April 1937 was responsible for a further decline in the land revenue, which amounted to Rs. 27·25 crores in 1939-40.

§17. **Excise.**—The excise revenue in British India is derived from the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, hemp, drugs, opium and so on. It is levied in the form of a duty on manufacture, and fees for sale licenses. The major portion of the revenue is derived from country liquors. The system followed in regard to country liquor excise is that of granting by contract the right of wholesale supply for a district and selling by auction the right of retail sale. Two large distilleries in Bombay have been recently placed entirely under Government management, thus partly suppressing the contract distillery system. In 1861-2 the excise revenue was Rs. 1,78,61,570 and expenditure Rs. 13,53,470. In 1929-30 the revenue reached the high figure of Rs. 20,41,23,285 and the expenditure Rs. 2,19,18,391. Whether this astounding increase of net revenue is to be looked upon as an index of growing drunkenness was a matter of controversy. The Government explained it as being mainly the result of higher rates of excise duties, and a stricter control, though it was also suggested that some of the increase was due to the expansion of population and the greater prosperity of certain classes. In recent years, the excise revenue has considerably fallen owing to the economic depression and the introduction of partial prohibition in some provinces. The separation of Burma has also been responsible for the loss of about

a crore of revenue under excise. For example it yielded Rs. 15.37 crores in the year 1936-7 and Rs. 12.29 crores (exclusive of Burma) in 1939-40.

Public opinion in this country was seriously alarmed at what it regarded as an unmistakable sign of increase of drunkenness. Since the inauguration of the Reforms of 1921 the Legislatures in the various provinces have been bestirring themselves to grapple with the evil before it becomes even more serious than at present.

Although there is a general agreement that energetic and courageous action is necessary for suppressing the evil of drink, there is no such agreement as regards the means to be adopted for this purpose. Before the assumption of Provincial Governments by Congress Ministries the Government relied largely on the method of raising the price of liquor as high as possible, but not so high as to stimulate illicit production. Other steps taken to reduce the consumption of country spirit were rationing, reduction in the number of shops, lowering the limits of possession, reducing the strength of the drinks supplied, curtailing the hours of sale, etc. Non-official opinion was inclined towards the restriction of quantity and a strict regulation of the number of shops, together with the policy of local option and consultation of local opinion, in preference to high rates of excise duties. The Bombay Government adopted the policy of issuing fixed quantities annually on a progressively diminishing scale, so far as country liquor was concerned.

The advent of the Congress Ministries pledged to a policy of prohibition in July 1937 imparted a new urgency to this problem. Most of them launched a programme of prohibition varying in intensity according to local conditions and the capacity of each to bear the consequent financial and administrative strain. The Madras Ministry gave a bold lead by applying prohibition throughout a whole district (Salem). Bihar did likewise. Bombay introduced total prohibition in the town of Ahmedabad (July 1938) and the town and island of Bombay (August 1939). As already pointed out, certain legal and technical difficulties in the way of enforcing prohibition in Bombay have recently (1940) resulted in partial relaxation of the policy of prohibition adopted by the Congress Government.¹ Some provinces have chosen smaller areas, others are taking measures to restrict the sale of liquor by closure of shops, tightening up licensing control, and proclaiming 'dry' areas where there is to be no manufacture or sale of

¹ See ch. iii, §18.

liquor—which can, however, be brought in from outside and consumed.

It has to be borne in mind that any impatient and drastic measures will be attended with the double difficulty of immediate and heavy loss of revenue and excessive expenditure for preventive establishment to put down smuggling and illicit distillation. These difficulties will clearly be most stupendous if complete prohibition at one stroke were to be attempted. Another danger to be guarded against is that vice suppressed violently in one direction is apt to break out in another direction, and often in a very much worse form. Thus it is complained that attempts to reduce the consumption of country spirit have in some cases been attended with an increased consumption of foreign liquor, and that people have even taken to methyated spirit in place of country liquor. The suppression of the evil, in order to be completely successful, must come as the result of a general realization on the part of the people that drunkenness is a crime, and this is a matter of education. It should be remembered at the same time, however, that a wisely directed excise policy, besides decreasing the opportunities for indulgence and ensuring economic gain to the masses, will also exercise a definite educative influence on them. This is borne out by recent (1939) inquiries into the working of prohibition in Madras.¹ The argument that reform must come from within and not from without must not be pressed to the point of denying any utility to measures whose intention is to increase the difficulties of excessive indulgence in drink. Such measures are useful at least in the case of those who are not yet definitely addicted to the habit and who will be saved if they are kept out of temptation's way.

The practical statesman will bear in mind all these dangers and difficulties that are likely to obstruct the path of reform, and his policy will aim at achieving a happy commingling of daring and circumspection. He must honestly endeavour to relegate purely revenue considerations to a subordinate position and, in so far as this is done, we must expect a steady reduction in the revenue from excise hereafter. In recent years the revenue has in fact been stationary or actually diminishing in most of the provinces.

¹ See reports on the working of Prohibition in the Salem District where investigations were undertaken under the auspices of the Madras University (guided by Dr P. J. Thomas) and of the Annamalai University (guided by Dr B. V. N. Naidu). The Government of Bombay have recently (1940) appointed Central and Divisional Prohibition Research Boards to report on the results of prohibition in the province.

§18. **Other sources of revenue.**—(i) *Stamps.*—Stamp revenue is derived from judicial and commercial stamps. The former represents fees on plaints and other documents in Civil and Criminal Courts. The latter represents duties on commercial transactions recorded in writing, such as conveyances as to the transfer of property, lands, bills of exchange and so forth. The revenue from judicial stamps is held by some to be not taxation proper, being a payment for the services rendered by a costly department, namely the Judicial Department. The revenue from stamps in 1939-40 amounted to Rs. 10-14 crores in British India. It has tended to decline in recent years owing to decrease in litigation following Debt Relief Legislation in several provinces.

(ii) *Forests.*—The revenue under this head is derived mainly from the sale of timber and other produce, grazing fees and license fees for permission to cut wood and other produce. The revenue is variable according to market conditions. Its future prospects are bright if the forests are properly nursed and exploited. The Provincial Governments, to whom forests have been assigned, were making a large net profit of about Rs. 2½ crores per year until recent years of trade depression, when the net revenue fell heavily, being for example only Rs. 74-90 lakhs in 1933-4. The net annual revenue was only about Rs. 14 lakhs between 1864 and 1870. Large initial expenditure, however, is necessary for ensuring a still more substantial and steadily growing revenue from forests. The gross revenue from forests amounted to Rs. 3-01 crores in 1939-40 as compared with Rs. 4-40 in 1936-7, i.e. before the separation of Burma from British India.

(iii) *Registration.*—The revenue from registration is akin to judicial stamps revenue and is mainly derived from registration fees according to the value of the documents registered. Registration is compulsory in the case of certain documents relating to gift and transactions in immoveable property, and optional in the case of others. Registration fees may be looked upon as payments for service rendered, the advantage lying in the consistency of deliberation, the publicity enforced on the parties and the provision of a record by way of satisfactory proof which may either prevent litigation or simplify its disposal by courts. The total revenue from this source is small (Rs. 1-18 crores for British India in 1939-40).

(iv) *Scheduled Taxes.*—These are taxes which the provinces were empowered to impose under the Reforms (1921).¹ They

¹ These are included in the Provincial Legislative List under the Constitution of 1935, see §43 below.

have, however, not been much utilized, either because they are not very profitable or for other reasons. Betting and amusement taxes have been imposed in several provinces, e.g. Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces, Assam, etc. Their yield is inconsiderable, being only Rs. 53·84 lakhs in 1936-7.

§19. **New taxes under Provincial Autonomy.**—The introduction of Provincial Autonomy with effect from 1 April 1937 under the Government of India Act (1935) has been responsible for the levy of some new taxes in the provinces, which were empowered to impose them under the new constitution. The new taxation was designed to bridge the gulf between revenue and expenditure caused partly by the policy of prohibition adopted by the Congress Ministries and partly by the need for financing a programme of strengthening the social services. Among the new taxes introduced by the Provincial Governments mention may be made here of the sales taxes, the employment tax, and the immoveable property tax.

The Central Provinces Government were the first to exercise their power under the new constitution, by passing an Act (1938) imposing a tax on the retail sale of motor spirit and lubricants. Similar selective sales taxes have been imposed by other provinces, e.g. the United Provinces, Bihar, Assam, Bombay, etc. The Bombay Sales Tax Act (1939) also provides for a selective sales tax on retail sales of two commodities, motor spirit and mechanically manufactured cloth. The sales tax on cloth has not, however, been put into force owing to certain administrative difficulties. The Madras General Sales Tax Act (1939), unlike the sales taxes in the Central Provinces and Bombay, is a comprehensive Act, and covers nearly all goods. The tax is levied in Madras on net turnover after making the necessary deductions from the gross turnover. A similar general tax on the sale of goods has recently been imposed in Bengal by the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. A recent (1941) attempt at the levy of a sales tax in the Punjab has met with considerable opposition from the trading community.¹

Under the Employment Tax Bill passed in 1939 the United Provinces Government sought to levy a tax on the salaries of professional men on a graduated scale which in some cases amounted to as much as 10 per cent of the income of the taxpayer. Subsequently in conformity with an amendment of the Government of India Act, the tax had to be modified so as to limit the total amount payable in respect of any one person to Rs. 50 per annum

¹ Other commodities selected for sales taxation are electricity, tobacco, and articles of luxury such as motor cars, radio sets, etc.

(see p. 533). The Government of Bengal have recently (1939-40) levied an employment tax at the ungraduated rate of Rs. 30 per annum on all trades, professions, callings, and employments, the tax being payable by those who are assessable to income-tax.

A tax on immoveable property has been levied in Bombay and the Punjab. The Congress Ministry of Bombay decided in 1939 to levy a 10 per cent tax on rateable value on immoveable urban property in the cities of Bombay and Ahmedabad in order to meet the loss of excise revenue following the introduction of prohibition.

The levy of these new taxes has evoked intense local opposition on the one hand, and on the other, raised constitutional issues regarding their validity. We may now briefly review both these aspects.

The sales taxes have been criticized on the ground that they tend to raise the cost of living, bring about wage disturbances, restrict consumption, hamper production and interfere with trade and business. The principal justification for them is productivity, which has naturally enough appealed to the needy Provincial Governments. It may also be added that sales taxes became a feature of the fiscal systems of several countries of the world (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium, the United States of America and some of the self-governing Dominions) in the war (1914-18) and post-war years. Great Britain is the only important country which has not resorted to them, partly because of the popular feeling that they constitute a burden on business and partly because of the psychology of the taxpayer, who prefers direct to indirect taxes.¹

The Employment Tax raised a storm of protest in the United Provinces. It was considered as a form of double taxation and a demand was put forward that the least that could be done to set it right was to give relief of an equivalent amount in the income-tax payable to the Central Government.

The Urban Immoveable Property Tax in Bombay has also been subjected to strong criticisms and is considered as a drag on house-building enterprise.

Apart from the opposition they have evoked, the new taxes have given rise to constitutional issues regarding the tax-jurisdiction of the Central Government and the Provincial Governments respectively. For instance, the petrol tax levied by the Government of the Central Provinces was challenged before the Federal Court

¹ For an instructive exposition of the sales taxes in India and foreign countries the reader is referred to *The Madras General Sales Tax Act—A Study*, by B. V. N. Naidu and S. Thiruvengadathan and *Finance under Provincial Autonomy*, pp. 113-21, by C. N. Vakil and M. H. Patel.

by the Central Government on the plea that it encroached on the field of taxation (excise duties on production) reserved to them. The Federal Court decided in favour of the Provincial Government on the ground that while the Central Legislature had an exclusive power to impose duties on excisable articles before they became part of the general stock of the province (i.e. at the stage of manufacture or production), the Provincial Government had an exclusive power to impose a tax on sales thereafter. This favourable decision of the Federal Court has clarified the meaning of the provision 'taxes on the sale of goods' (see §43) and has thus opened a wide field of taxation for the provinces. At the same time, as the Chief Justice himself emphasized, there was an urgent need for mutual forbearance, lest the two taxing authorities should by the simultaneous exercise of their power in the realm of internal indirect taxation raise the price of the article taxed to a height at which consumption was seriously curtailed.

In the case of the Employment Tax the matter was decided by Parliament on the initiative taken by the Central Government and the Secretary of State. The amendment of the Government of India Act (1935) passed by Parliament in December 1939 definitely validates provincial laws relating to taxes on income in respect of professions, trades, callings and employment, but limits the total amount payable to Rs. 50 per head per annum. The limitation is justified on the ground that it was never intended that such provincial taxes should be so imposed as to constitute an income-tax and so trespass upon the Central field of revenues on the one hand, and on the other, to subject persons to unlimited taxation of their incomes by the Central and Provincial Governments.

The Urban Immoveable Property Tax was unsuccessfully challenged in the Bombay High Court.

All this clearly indicates the need for a clear demarcation of the limits of Central and Provincial spheres of taxation, having regard to the evolution of India's political structure on federal lines (see §43).

§20. **Public expenditure in India.**—The following classification of public expenditure in India may be adopted.¹ (i) *National Defence*: Expenditure on army, navy, air force, frontier or strategic railways, harbours and defence works; military operations such as frontier expeditions, etc.

(ii) *Maintenance of internal peace and order.*—(a) Expenditure on police, courts of justice, jails; (b) general administration;

¹ Shah, op. cit., pp. 44-6.

(c) expenses with regard to collection of revenue; (d) political charges including the expenses of the legislative machinery; foreign representation by consuls, ambassadors, etc.; (e) pensions, furlough allowances, etc.

(iii) *National Development*.—Expenditure for (a) moral and (b) material development. Under the former may be included expenditure on education, including scientific and miscellaneous departments, medical and sanitation charges; under the latter may be included expenses on railways, irrigation and public works, agriculture and famine charges, posts and telegraphs, interest on public debt. [The interest on unproductive or deadweight debt should strictly be included under (i) or (ii).]

§21. *Growth of public expenditure*.—The following table¹ shows the growth of public expenditure during the years 1858-9 to 1939-40.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN INDIA (CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL)
In crores of rupees

Year		Amount	Year		Amount
1858-9	...	50.19	1926-7	...	221.82
1870-1	...	49.39	1927-8	...	218.73
1880-1	...	52.64	1928-9	...	222.21
1890-1	...	51.98	1929-30	...	226.81
1898-9	...	58.29	1930-1	...	230.42
1899-1900	...	88.07	1931-2	...	220.09
1902-3	...	78.34	1932-3	...	209.55
1910-11	...	115.12	1933-4	...	205.27
1913-14	...	124.34	1935-6	...	209.76
1916-17	...	147.07	1936-7	...	211.18
1918-19	...	190.61	1937-8	...	205.58
1920-1	...	218.67	1938-9	...	207.47
1921-2	...	222.02	1939-40	...	214.52
1923-4	...	206.48	(Revised)		
1924-5	...	210.25	1940-1	...	222.84
1925-6	...	215.75	(Budget)		

§22. *Criticism of public expenditure in India*.—The figures given in the table above show a striking growth in public expenditure in India since the beginning of the present century, more especially since 1913-14 until the recent years of economic depression, which made a reduction of expenditure to some extent inevitable. As the late Mr Gokhale pointed out long ago, an increase in public expenditure need not necessarily be a matter

¹ See K. T. Shah, *Sixty Years of Indian Finance* (second edition), p. 46; *Simon Commission Report*, vol. II, par. 254; *Statistical Abstract for British India* (1937-8), Table No. 111; and *Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India* (1939-40), Tables No. 5 and 6.

for regret and alarm. 'Everything depends in this matter on the nature of the purposes for which the increase has been incurred and the results produced by such outlay of public money. While increased expenditure in other countries, under popular control . . . has helped to bring increased strength and security to the nations, and increased enlightenment and prosperity to the people, our continually increasing expenditure has, under autocratic management, defective constitutional control and inherent defects of alien domination, only helped to bring about constantly increasing exploitation of our resources, has retarded our national progress, weakened our natural defences and burdened us with undefined and indefinite financial liabilities. Compelled to meet the demands of a forward imperial frontier policy and the exigencies of conquest, imperial defence and constant borrowing for commercial enterprises, often undertaken in consequence of the pressure of English commercial classes, our Indian Government has little money to spare, with all its increase of taxation, for purposes of national education. . . .'¹ Mr Gokhale attributed a large part of the increase in public expenditure to the distrust and suspicion created by the Mutiny, which led to the wider employment of costly British services both in the civil and military branches.

The most serious growth in public expenditure was caused during and after the war of 1914-18. Our expenditure on military services was already high enough, namely Rs. 29·84 crores in 1913-14, but it rose by leaps and bounds to Rs. 66·72 crores in 1918-19, and Rs. 67·38 crores in 1920-1. Thereafter it was reduced, and stood at Rs. 54·92 crores in 1927-8. The military budget was stabilized in 1928-9 for four years at Rs. 55·1 crores (net).² The Inchcape Committee (1922-3) had recommended that the military expenditure should be brought down to a sum not exceeding Rs. 50 crores. The Simon Commission estimated that the army vote might drop to Rs. 52 crores when the present programme of army mechanization was ended and thereafter would fall still further so as to conform to the lower level of prices, provided there was no change in policy. Large reductions in defence expenditure were made in recent years (though to some extent by emergency measures of a temporary character), the net expenditure on defence after allowing for military receipts being Rs. 45·45 crores in 1936-7 ; Rs. 47·35 crores in 1937-8 ; Rs. 45·18 crores in 1938-9. This

¹ Written evidence of the late Mr G. K. Gokhale before the Welby Commission, 1897.

² The onset of the economic depression and financial stringency made it necessary to reduce the contract grant and to postpone the re-equipment programme.

substantial reduction was due to the fall in prices, revision of the pay to the British soldiers, contribution of Rs. 2 crores by the British Government towards Indian military expenditure in accordance with the findings of the Capitation Tribunal, postponement of equipment programme, retrenchment and army pay cut.¹ In 1938 the British Government agreed to contribute Rs. 80 lakhs towards the capital cost of mechanizing British cavalry and infantry units stationed in India. In the same year the British Government also agreed to forgo the annual contribution of £100,000 made by India towards her naval defence provided she undertook to maintain a sea-going fleet of not less than six modern escort vessels to be free to co-operate with the Royal Navy for the defence of India, and in addition to fulfil her responsibility for local defence of Indian ports.² This arrangement is to be welcomed as it will assist the development of the Royal Indian Navy.

§23. **Mounting defence expenditure during the war (1939-).**— The expenditure on Defence Services has shown a big increase following the outbreak of war in September 1939. The net Defence Budget for 1939-40 was estimated at Rs. 45.18 crores while the revised estimate amounted to Rs. 49.29 crores, corresponding figures for the year 1940-1 being Rs. 53.52 and 72.02 crores, of which Rs. 24.31 represented cost of war measures. The budget figure for the year 1941-2 has been placed at Rs. 84.13 crores, of which Rs. 35.40 crores stands for the cost of war measures.

Just before the outbreak of the war, the proposals of the Chatfield Committee for the modernization of the Army in India were accepted by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The Chatfield proposals also postulated the acceptance by the Government of India of joint responsibility for the external defence of India, and in accordance with this principle provided for the ear-marking of certain portions of the defence forces of India for purposes of external defence and a consequential increase of £500,000 in the amount of the annual (Garron) grant of £1½ million made by His Majesty's Government towards the cost of maintaining the defence services in India in peace. The capital outlay on modernizing the Army in India, which was estimated at Rs. 45.77 crores, was to have been provided by His Majesty's Government over a period of five years, three-fourths as a free gift to India and the balance of one-fourth as an advance to be

¹ Finance Member's Budget Speech, 1934-5.

² Finance Member's Budget Speech, 1938.

repaid on easy terms. The outbreak of the war necessitated a review of these calculations, as the programme of modernization had to be adapted to the needs of the situation which then arose, and to the rise in prices since the war. Moreover, in India itself heavy expenditure has had to be incurred in mobilizing to the full production, in increasing the manufacturing capacity of factories for the production of war stores of all kinds and in building up stocks. There has also been very substantial increase in the defence expenditure owing to the putting into force of various war measures, which are designed to place India in a state of preparedness against attack. In view of all these factors a fresh agreement was recently (1940) reached between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, under which the whole of the defence expenditure incurred by India will be apportioned between the two Governments on the following basis. India is to bear¹

- (i) a fixed annual sum representing the normal net effective costs of the Army in India under peace conditions (Rs. 36·77 crores) *plus*
- (ii) an addition to allow for rise in prices (Rs. 3·55 crores) *plus*
- (iii) the cost of such war measures as can be regarded as purely Indian liabilities by reason of their having been undertaken by India in her own interests (Rs. 35·40 crores), and
- (iv) a lump sum payment of one crore of rupees towards the extra cost of maintaining India's External Defence troops overseas (Rs. 8·41 crores).

Total (i-iv) = Rs. 84·13 crores. The total amount by which the net annual defence expenditure incurred in India during the war years will exceed the aggregate of items (i)-(iii) will be recovered from His Majesty's Government.²

The object of the new settlement, as stated by the Finance Member, is to limit India's financial liability in connexion with the war to such measures as are within her financial capacity. Indian opinion, however, is critical of the new arrangement and is inclined to the view that the growing burden of defence expenditure, especially the extra cost of maintaining Indian troops overseas, is very onerous for a poor country like India.

Putting together Provincial and Central expenditure, the army accounted for 32 per cent of the total expenditure in 1940-1 (the percentage would be much higher if the Central expenditure only were to be taken into account). The argument from percentages

¹ Figures shown in brackets against each item relate to the Defence Budget for 1941-2.

² Finance Member's Budget (1940-1) speech.

is not in itself conclusive as regards the question whether military expenditure is heavier than it ought to be. Safety being a matter of paramount concern from the economic and every other point of view, almost any sacrifice must be undergone in order to secure it. While all this is perfectly true, we must beware of making a fetish even of military efficiency. A very poor country like India must, within certain limits, be prepared to take risks for the sufficient reason that she cannot afford to aim at an absolutely perfect state of readiness to meet all conceivable contingencies. Complete national safety may be secured on these lines, but the burden on the people would be intolerable and the growth of nation-building departments would be arrested.

The methods of economy that have been suggested from time to time are reduction of the size of the army to the minimum required for strictly Indian purposes, and continuous and further acceleration of the process of Indianization so as to avoid expensive recruitment in England through the British War Office and heavy non-effective charges. The introduction of a short military service under the voluntary system has also been suggested instead of maintaining the army during times of peace practically on a war establishment.

§24. **Expenditure on civil administration.**—The enormous increase in the expenditure on civil administration has been another never-ending subject of criticism, the general complaint being that the Indian administration is one of the costliest in the world and that the scale of salaries and allowances given to the higher services, until recently manned largely by Europeans, is excessive. The Constitutional Reforms of 1919 and 1935 have further added to the costliness of the administration in a variety of ways. The increases in salaries, allowances and other concessions granted by the Lee Commission (1924) and estimated to add to the national expenditure to the extent of Rs. 1¼ crores annually, have been criticized as wholly unjustifiable on the ground that the original scales of pay were so high that no revision was called for in spite of the rise in prices. The subsequent fall in prices lends further point to this criticism. The real remedy is rapid Indianization with a reduction in the scale of salaries. The economies effected in this manner will not be attended with any fall in efficiency provided the principle of communal preferences is either abandoned or applied as sparingly as circumstances permit. If preferences have to be given to certain communities in public employment, certain minimum qualifications should be insisted upon, and, as far as possible, selections even within a given community should be governed by competitive tests.

It is thus of the greatest importance that there should be a rigorous pursuit of economy in all the branches of administration, and those in charge of public funds should realize, in a fuller measure than is usual, the fiduciary position which they occupy with regard to the taxpayer and display a more exact diligence in the manner in which these funds are administered. We must however add that it is equally necessary that the folly of unlimited and indiscriminate parsimony should be recognized and expenditure should be as liberal as possible on departments like education,¹ agriculture, industries, irrigation, and public health. For unless money is freely spent on them the economic uplift of the people cannot be achieved.

§25. **Burden of taxation.**—The Statistical Abstract for British India (1937-8) gives the following figures bearing on the burden of taxation per head in British India :

In lakhs of rupees

	1922-3	1927-8	1933-4	1935-6	1937-8 ⁴
Total taxation, Central and Provincial (including land revenue ²) ...	1,32,79	1,40,18	1,30,79	1,39,37	1,31,93
Payment per head based on Census population in 1931 ³ and assuming that the whole taxation is paid by the inhabitants of British India	Rs. AS. P. 5 4 5	Rs. AS. P. 5 5 0	Rs. AS. P. 4 10 10	Rs. AS. P. 4 14 3	Rs. AS. P. 4 12 11

Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, in his speech as a member of the commercial deputation on retrenchment, gave the following estimates of the incidence of taxation

1871	Rs. 1-13-9	1911	Rs. 2-11-3
1881	„ 2-2-3	1913	„ 2-14-5
1901	„ 2-6-6	1922	„ 6-1-8

According to these figures the nominal incidence of taxation

¹ In Great Britain, the expenditure per head on education is £2 15s. In British India it is less than ninepence. *Simon Commission Report*, vol. II, par. 238.

² We have already referred to the view of the Taxation Enquiry Committee that land revenue ought to be regarded as part of the burden of taxation. *Ante*, vol. I, ch. xii, §30.

³ Population figures for the intercensal period have been worked out on the assumption of a constant geometric rate of increase.

⁴ The incidence of taxation in recent years has probably increased appreciably owing to the additional Central taxation imposed for financing the war, and new provincial taxation since the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, even after allowing for increase of population.

in 1922 was more than double what it was in the period before the war of 1914-18. But whether this represents a real higher burden depends on the figures we adopt for the *per capita* incomes for the two periods.¹

It is sometimes argued that because the *per capita* incidence of taxation in India bears a lower ratio (8 per cent) to the income per head (Rs. 80), therefore the Indian burden of taxation is light as compared to countries like Great Britain where the proportion of national income absorbed by taxation amounts to more than 20 per cent. This is however a superficial view, because the lower proportion of a low national income may represent a very much heavier burden than a higher percentage of a high income. Another obvious point is that the relative pressure of taxation in different countries cannot be considered apart from the nature of the services rendered by the state to the people in return for the taxes it levies.

§26. **Distribution of the burden of taxation.**—The problem of the incidence of taxation is one of the most complicated in economic science and is rendered more so in India owing to lack of precise statistical information regarding the income *per capita* and the distribution of the national income. The Taxation Enquiry Committee were appointed in 1924 to examine the manner in which the burden of taxation was distributed and to consider *inter alia* whether the whole scheme of taxation, Central, Provincial and Local, was scientific and equitable. They selected a few typical classes of the population and offered certain tentative conclusions. The Committee found that the burden was oppressive on none of the classes, though its distribution was unequal. Some of them escaped their proper share of taxation, for example, the bigger landlords and the village trader.² Before 1914, taxation was very unevenly distributed between the different classes of the community. The poorer sections of the community bore the brunt of the burden in connexion with the land revenue, salt tax, excise duties, stamps, etc., while the richer sections were able to resist their just share of taxation. The changes in taxation, during and after that war, while they certainly increased the burden on the masses, partially removed this blot on the taxation system of the country and made the incidence somewhat more equitable by the introduction of a graduated income-tax and super-tax, the levy of special import duties on luxury articles, etc. A considerable degree of inequality, however, still persisted, as is illustrated

¹ *Ante*, ch. iv, §§1-6.

² See *Taxation Enquiry Committee Report*, pars. 478-92.

by the following figures worked out by Professor K. T. Shah with reference to the year 1923-4.¹

In crores of rupees

Head of Revenue	Amount of the tax burden borne by	
	the rich strata	the poor strata
Customs	20	21
Land Revenue and Irrigation	20½	21½
Income-tax	20	...
Excise	20
Salt	1½	7½
Forests and Registration	2	5
Stamps	6½	6½
Railways	33	60
Post Office	5	5½
Municipal Taxes	3	10
District Board Taxes	10
Total ...	111½	167

From this table Professor Shah concludes that 'economically the weaker and less able section bears pecuniarily the largest proportion of the tax-burdens of India. Allowing for some *quid pro quo* in some of the above items (Railways, Post Office, etc.), we may yet say that while the richer class pays Rs. 100 crores in revenue, the poorer pays Rs. 150, that is, in terms of wealth deduction; while from the average family income of Rs. 1,000 per annum and over, the tax deduction aggregates Rs. 100 crores out of a total of Rs. 600 crores of wealth enjoyed by less than a twenty-fifth of the population, the remainder of Rs. 150 crores is deducted from a total wealth of about Rs. 1,000 or 1,200 crores enjoyed by the 96 per cent of the remaining population. This distribution can scarcely be considered to be either economical or equitable'.

The Taxation Enquiry Committee made various proposals to redress the inequalities, such as higher rates of taxation for incomes ranging from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 25,000; reduction of the exemption limit for the super-tax to Rs. 30,000; a new rate of super-tax; reduction of the exemption limit in the case of a joint Hindu family to Rs. 60,000, etc.² They favoured the removal of the duties on kerosene and sugar as pressing disproportionately on the poorer sections of the community. As likely to be borne mostly

¹ See Shah and Khambatta, *Wealth and Taxable Capacity*, pp. 289-91, and Shah, *Sixty Years of Indian Finance* (second edition), pp. 373-4.

² These suggestions were largely carried out as a result of the Budget proposals for 1931-2.

by the richer classes, they suggested an excise duty on aerated waters, on cigarettes and pipe tobacco, licensing for country tobacco, increase in the license fees for firearms, etc.

Sir James Grigg, the Finance Member, welcoming the proposal, recently (March 1938) put forward in the Assembly for an inquiry by the Economic Adviser into incidence of taxation, remarked: 'I have no doubt that taxation in this country lets off the rich too lightly and presses the poor too heavily, and it would be very valuable to have that verified scientifically, and particularly to see the cost laid by the present policy [of protection] upon the consumer not for the purpose of Government services but for the purpose of subsidizing industry.' We have already (see §5 ante) referred to a recent (1939) study of the burden of the Indian Tariff under the general direction of the Economic Adviser to the Government of India. We hope that similar investigations into the incidence of other important taxes will shortly be undertaken by the Economic Adviser. The value of such studies in making tax adjustments with a view to attaining equity and justice can hardly be exaggerated.

§27. **Taxable capacity.**—In the words of Sir Josiah Stamp, 'taxable capacity or fund is measured by the difference between the two quantities—the total quantity of production and the total quantity of consumption'.¹ In the case of India the standard of consumption is very low, but, as we have seen, production also is very low, so that the difference between the two gives us a very small margin of taxable capacity. It is, however, impossible to estimate this margin with any precision. In discussing the national income of India we have already commented on the paucity and unreliability of the available statistical data, and this makes it possible for people to pick and choose their evidence and present a bright or gloomy picture, as may suit them, of the economic condition of the masses. For obvious reasons the same remarks apply to calculations of taxable capacity. However, we give the following calculation² rather as illustrating the method of computation than as a thoroughly dependable estimate of taxable capacity on which actual practical policy might be based.

The figures for taxable capacity and the balance of it still remaining untaxed which emerge from the calculation must not lead the reader to suppose that it gives the practical limit to which taxation could be increased, if necessary. Sir Walter Layton, however, observes in this connexion that 'though the population of

¹ Stamp, *Wealth and Taxable Capacity*, p. 114.

² Taken from Findlay Shirras, *The Science of Public Finance*, p. 146.

TAXABLE CAPACITY OF BRITISH INDIA
In lakhs of rupees

Details	1910-11 (Census 1911)	1920-1 (Census 1921, a distinctly bad year)	1921-2 (Good for agriculture, but year of trade depression)
1. Income :			
Agricultural	1412,00	1715,00	1983,00
Non-agricultural	530,00	883,00	883,00
Total income	1942,00	2598,00	2866,00
2. Allow for minimum consumption	1214,00	2220,00	2220,00
3. Allow for seed and manure ...	141,00	172,00	198,00
4. Allow for replacement of, and ordinary additions to, capital ...	25,00	45,00	55,00
5. Taxable capacity [1-(2+3+4)] ...	562,00	161,00	393,00
6. Tax revenue :			
Central and Provincial Govern- ments	79,83	130,15	135,30
Local bodies	7,17	11,64	11,64
Total	87,00	141,79	146,94
7. Expenditure on internal debt :			
Central and Provincial Govern- ments	5,61	21,04	24,27
Local bodies	1,70	2,34	2,34
Total	7,31	23,38	26,61
8. Effective taxation (6-7) ...	79,69	118,61	129,33
9. Balance (5-8)	482,31	42,39	272,64

India consists in the main of extremely poor people, it is at the same time a country in which there are large accumulations of wealth on which the burden of government rests very lightly. . . . The public revenues of India can be substantially increased without taxation becoming intolerable, provided its incidence is adjusted to the capacity of the taxpayers to pay and that heavy additional burdens are not put upon primary necessities'.¹ The present,

¹ Dr P. J. Thomas in a lecture (1936) on 'India's Financial Position' pointed out that while 'taxation in India was believed to be heavy, there were still sources on which tax-burdens fell lightly, and a reorganization of the tax basis might increase revenue and make the incidence more equitable. Even land revenue could be made to yield more by a reorganization of the basis of assessment and by a readjustment of the incidence as between the different crops and tracts. When the spending of money was controlled from Whitehall, there were difficulties in raising certain taxes, but with the grant of provincial autonomy a bolder taxing policy would be practicable. Fresh sources of taxation like succession duties and terminal taxes had been set apart in the Government of India Act (1935) for the use primarily of the provinces, and to this might be added tobacco and agricultural incomes. When these sources were tapped, there would be ample funds for a forward economic policy in the provinces'.

however, is scarcely the time for imposing additional burdens light-heartedly' as, apart from the recent depression, all classes have been affected by the additional war taxation.

§28. **Recent Indian finance.**—Owing to limitations of space it is impossible for us to enter into anything like a detailed history of Indian finance under the East India Company and the Crown. The confusion between the commercial and administrative accounts under the East India Company; the chronic deficits which characterized the administration of the Company; the financial burdens of the Mutiny; the appointment in course of time of a separate Finance Member; the gradual progress in financial decentralization; the embarrassments caused by famines, frontier wars and fall in exchange; the loan policy of the Government; the budget surpluses of the years before the war of 1914-18, roughly since the beginning of the present century—these are some of the topics belonging to the history of Indian finance. We shall have something to say on one or two of these in greater detail, but for the present we propose to take note of the principal happenings in the domain of Indian finance since the outbreak of the war of 1914-18.

The smooth course of India's pre-war finance and the era of budget surpluses came to an end abruptly with the outbreak of the war. Deficit budgets, drastic retrenchment, big reduction in the capital expenditure on railways and irrigation, increases in taxation under customs, income-tax, salt, and excise duties, and heavy borrowing in the Indian money market were the high lights of Indian finance during the war of 1914-18.

The subjoined tables give the total Revenue and Expenditure (gross) of the Central Government before and after the Reforms of 1919 and also relating to the first three years of the new constitution of 1935 introduced in April 1937.

TABLE I¹
In crores of rupees

Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus (+) Deficit (-)	Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus (+) Deficit (-)
1914-15	76·15	78·83	-2·68	1918-19	1,30·40	1,33·13	-5·73
1915-16	80·01	81·79	-1·78	1919-20	1,37·14	1,60·79	-23·65
1916-17	98·53	87·31	+11·22	1920-1	1,35·64	1,61·64	-26·00
1917-18	1,18·70	1,06·57	+12·13				

¹ These figures are exclusive of special items, such as transfers from and to the Revenue Reserve Fund and the appropriation of the balance at the credit of the German Liquidation Account.

TABLE II¹
In crores of rupees

Year	Revenue excluding transfer from Revenue Reserve Fund (1)	Expenditure excluding transfer to Revenue Reserve Fund and provision for Reduction or Avoidance of Debt and items shown in (3) (2)	Transfer to Earthquake and other Funds (3)	Balance of (1) minus (2) minus (3) (4)	Transfer to or from Revenue Reserve Fund (5)	Provision for Reduction or Avoidance of Debt (6)	Final Surplus (+) Deficit (-) (7)
1921-2 ...	1,15.21	1,38.4	...	-23.19	...	4.46	-27.65
1922-3 ...	1,21.41	1,31.88	...	-10.47	...	4.55	-15.02
1923-4 ...	1,33.17	1,27.16	...	+ 6.01	...	3.62	+ 2.39
1924-5 ...	1,38.04	1,28.58	...	+ 9.46	...	3.78	+ 5.68
1925-6 ...	1,33.33	1,25.05	...	+ 8.28	...	4.97	+ 3.31
1926-7 ...	1,31.70	1,23.77	...	+ 7.93	-2.96	4.97	...
1927-8 ...	1,25.04	1,22.22	...	+ 2.82	2.22	5.04	...
1928-9 ...	1,28.24	1,23.88	...	+ 4.36	0.74	5.42	- 0.32
1929-30 ...	1,32.69	1,26.68	...	+ 6.01	...	5.74	+ 0.27
1930-1 ...	1,24.60	1,30.04	...	- 5.44	...	6.14	-11.58
1931-2 ...	1,21.64	1,26.50	...	- 4.86	...	6.89	-11.75
1932-3 ...	1,26.40	1,18.01	...	+ 8.39	...	6.84	+ 1.55
1933-4 ...	1,20.37	1,14.65	2.7 ²	+ 3.00	...	3.00	...
1934-5 ...	1,25.10	1,17.14	4.80 ³	+ 3.36	...	3.00	+ 0.36
1935-6 ...	1,22.01	1,16.72	0.45 ⁴	+ 4.84	-1.84	3.00	...
1936-7 (Revised) ...	1,18.98	1,17.90	...	+ 1.08	...	3.00	- 1.92

TABLE III⁵
In crores of rupees

Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -
1936-7	119.21	121.00	-1.79
1937-8 ⁶	122.48	122.48	...
1938-9	121.07	121.71	-0.64
1939-40 (Revised)	123.97	123.97	...
1940-1 (Budget)	131.74	131.69	+0.05

¹ Central Budget for 1937-8, p. 75.

² Amount transferred to the Earthquake Fund; 0.63 out of this was utilized for debt redemption.

³ 2.82 for Rural Development, 0.25 for Tribal Areas in N.-W.F., 0.20 for Broadcasting, 0.93 for Civil Aviation and 0.40 for special grant to Road Fund.

⁴ Fund for capital outlay on buildings in Sind 0.17 and Orissa 0.27.

⁵ The figures in this table are inclusive of extraordinary items such as transfers from or to Revenue Reserve Fund, and appropriation for reduction or avoidance of debt. As stated in §35, a sum of Rs. 3 crores has been provided for the last item on the expenditure side.

⁶ Figures for 1937-8 are affected by changes due to the separation of Burma

During the period 1914-15 to 1918-19 the Central revenues showed a substantial increase from Rs. 76.1 crores to Rs. 130.04 crores and Central expenditure from Rs. 78.8 crores to Rs. 136.1 crores.

§29. **Deficit budgets.**—In contrast with the budget surpluses which especially characterized the period before 1914, there now set in a succession of deficit budgets in both Central and Provincial finance. In five years the aggregate deficit in the budgets of the Central Government alone amounted to nearly Rs. 100 crores. On the top of the additional expenditure due to the European war, there was also the trouble caused by the wanton invasion of India by Afghanistan, which cost the Indian exchequer several crores of rupees. Again, the cost of civil and especially of military administration went on increasing year after year. The expenses of railway operations also showed a heavy increase, and the railway receipts suffered owing to the trade depression which followed on the heels of a short-lived boom at the end of the war. Apart from diminished railway receipts there was the decreased yield from income-tax. The combined effect of all these factors was seen in the continuance of heavy deficits in spite of large increases in taxation between 1914 and 1922.

On the recommendations of the Retrenchment Committee¹ (1922-3), in 1923-4, a reduction of Rs. 6.6 crores in the non-military expenditure and Rs. 5.75 crores in military expenditure was effected. But this did not suffice to restore budget equilibrium and, as we have seen, the Viceroy felt compelled to double the salt tax from Rs. 1.4 to Rs. 2.8. In 1923-4 the tide turned and there was a temporary reversion to the old tendency of surplus budgets due to excessive caution in revenue estimates, the stabilization of the rupee at 1s. 6d., the retention of the high level of taxation previously introduced and the gradual recovery of trade and industry. These surpluses were utilized to abolish Provincial contributions and reduce the unproductive debt. Since 1927-8, however, budget equilibrium was again disturbed and, as the Finance Member pointed out in his budget statement for 1930-1, since the final remission of the Provincial contributions there had been a succession of deficit years, and the gap caused in the revenue by the remission of contributions had not been fully filled even if an allowance was made for the depressed trade conditions. The gap

and the Niemeyer Award (see §45). The net cost of the separation of Burma was Rs. 2.33 crores. Provincial Autonomy involved a total cost to the Centre of Rs. 1.85 crores.

¹ See *Report of the Retrenchment Committee*, part XI, par. 8.

was closed either by transfers from the Revenue Reserve Fund (which was thus completely exhausted) as in 1927-8 and 1928-9, or by the German reparations payment as in 1929-30. This fact, coupled with a fall in the contribution from the railways to the General Revenues, essential new services and demands involving Rs. 1.46 lakhs, created a deficit of Rs. 5.52 lakhs which was met partly by reduction in expenditure and partly by additional taxation imposed in 1930-1¹ (see §§5 and 9).

§30. Indian finance in the years of depression and after.—As the figures given below show, an acute financial crisis overtook the Central Budget (as indeed most of the Provincial Budgets) in 1930-3, owing mainly to the prolonged and severe economic depression and the heavy fall in prices. This led to serious deterioration of many of the important revenue heads, such as customs and taxes on income, and adversely affected the earnings of commercial departments like Railways and Posts and Telegraphs. The situation was for some time aggravated by special factors—internal disturbances and uncertainty caused by the prospect of fundamental constitutional changes.

We may now mention the outstanding features regarding Central finance during the depression period. The revised estimates for 1930-1 revealed a net deficit of Rs. 13.56 crores as against a final budgeted surplus of Rs. 86 lakhs. The deficit on the basis of 1930-1 figures of revenue and expenditure was expected to be Rs. 17.24 crores, which the Finance Member proposed to reduce, by retrenchment in military expenditure of Rs. 1.75 crores and 0.98 crores in civil expenditure, to 14.51 crores in 1931-2. The deficit was to be covered by 14.82 crores of taxes, of which Customs duties were calculated to yield 9.82 crores and income-tax 5 crores, thus providing for 31 lakhs of surplus. These calculations were very largely upset during the next six months, and an emergency arose from the fact that the previous (March 1931) Bill would not yield sufficient income to meet the Government's needs. To meet the emergency Sir George Schuster introduced a Supplementary Finance Bill in the Assembly in September 1931. It was to remain in force for a period of 18 months (till March 1933). The deficit for 1931-2 was expected to be Rs. 19.55 crores and for 1932-3 Rs. 19.50 crores. Thus a total deficit to Rs. 39.05 crores had to be repaired during a period of 18 months. This gulf was to be bridged to the extent of 1|3 by retrenchment and an emergency cut (10 per cent) in salaries, and to the extent of 2|3 by more than Rs. 22 crores of new taxation. The changes in taxation:

¹ See Budget Statements for 1929-30 and for 1930-1.

affecting customs duties and income-tax have already been noticed. A surcharge of $\frac{1}{4}$ on all existing excise duties, including salt, and increased postal rates (one anna three pies for a letter and nine pies for a card) were other measures of additional taxation.

The immediate object of the Supplementary Budget was thus fulfilled and the gap in the budget was not only filled up, but, as the actual figures for 1932-3 revealed, there was a surplus of Rs. 1,55 lakhs after providing nearly Rs. 7 crores for reduction of debt. This result was secured partly by retrenchment, but mainly by additional heavy taxation aggregating Rs. 42 crores in three years.

The Budget for 1933-4 restored half of the pay cut and the Budget for 1935-6 provided for the full restoration of the cut. This was criticized on the ground that the claims of the taxpayer and of trade and industry to obtain relief from the high level of taxation ought to have been considered first. The year 1933-4 showed a surplus of Rs. 2,72 crores after the reduced provision of Rs. 3 crores for debt reduction had been made. This surplus was largely transferred to the Earthquake Fund to finance relief measures in respect of the damage caused by the earthquake in Bihar and Orissa in 1934. The only relief the taxpayer secured was a reduction in the rate of income-tax from 4 pies to 2 pies on incomes between Rs. 1,000 and 1,499. On the other hand, the Budget for 1934-5 introduced new taxation (sugar and match excise duties). The sugar excise was intended to meet a deficit of Rs. 1,53 lakhs in the revenue. The export duty on raw hides was, however, abolished and the silver duty was reduced to 5 as. per ounce. The actual figures for 1934-5 showed a material improvement over the original forecast, and a surplus of Rs. 4.95 lakhs was realized. This non-recurring surplus was utilized for various objects including the grant of Rs. 2,81 lakhs to the Provincial Governments for constituting a Fund for the economic development and the improvement of rural areas. The Budget estimates for 1935-6, on the existing basis of taxation, showed a surplus of Rs. 1,50 lakhs which was available for tax reduction. The abolition of the export duty on raw skins reduced the surplus to Rs. 1,42 lakhs. In pursuance of their promise the Government provided for a reduction in the surcharge and the tax on small incomes by one-third. The actual figures showed a surplus of Rs. 2,29 lakhs as compared to a nominal surplus estimated at Rs. 5 lakhs, owing to trade recovery among other factors. This surplus was to be utilized for (i) building equipment in Sind (Rs. 17½ lakhs) and Orissa (Rs. 27½ lakhs) and for (ii) transferring to the Revenue Reserve Fund Rs. 1,84 lakhs for assisting the Central Budget in the first year of Provincial Autonomy.

The Budget for 1936-7 estimated a surplus of Rs. 2.05 lakhs, which was to be utilized (i) for giving the much-needed relief to the small income-tax payer by abolishing taxes on incomes below Rs. 2,000; (ii) for reduction by half of surcharges on income-tax and super-tax (see also §9); and (iii) for increasing the weight of a letter carried for one anna from half a tola to one tola; leaving on hand a small surplus balance of Rs. 6 lakhs. Owing, however, mainly to deterioration in revenue following trade depression, especially under customs and partially income-tax, the revised figures for 1936-7 showed a deficit of Rs. 1.92 lakhs (the actual deficit was later found to be Rs. 1.79 lakhs). To fill the gap in the revenue, sugar excise duties were raised as indicated in §7, and the duty on silver was increased to 3 as. per ounce by the Indian Finance Act of 1937. On the basis of this taxation a small surplus of Rs. 7 lakhs was estimated in the Budget for the year 1937-8. The revised estimates for 1937-8 showed a total improvement of Rs. 3.90 lakhs in revenue under customs and central excise duties owing mainly to trade recovery and increased railway earnings. On the other hand, there was an increase of Rs. 3.22 lakhs in expenditure, partly under Defence services mainly caused by the cost of operations in Waziristan and partly under other items. Thus the net improvement was only Rs. 68 lakhs. The Budget estimates had provided for a nominal surplus of Rs. 7 lakhs after the utilization of the whole of the Revenue Reserve Fund of Rs. 1.84 lakhs. The actual amount required for balancing the Budget was, however, only Rs. 78 lakhs.

The Budget for the year 1938-9 provided for a small surplus of Rs. 9 lakhs. It contained no proposals for additional taxation, nor any relief from existing taxation, including the remaining surcharges on income-tax and super-tax which undoubtedly weighed heavily on trade and business. The Finance Member in his 1938 Budget Speech claimed that it had been possible to provide the cost of the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, the separation of Burma (which caused a loss of Rs. 2.50 lakhs) and the expenditure on the Waziristan expedition; to make a start on the distribution of income-tax to the Provinces under the Niemeyer Award (see §§45 and 54); and at the same time to show balanced budgets both in 1937-8 and 1938-9 without the imposition of any new taxation. This was made possible by a steady improvement of trade conditions throughout 1937. This increased the revenues by Rs. 3.90 crores mainly from receipts from customs and railways as pointed out above. The revised estimates for 1938-9 showed a net deterioration of Rs. 2.92 lakhs in revenue, mainly because of a severe fall under customs under the influence of the trade 'recession'.

Under expenditure there was a net diminution of Rs. 18 lakhs. Thus instead of a surplus of 9 lakhs the result was a deficit of about Rs. 2,65 lakhs. In the event, however, the actual deficit turned out to be no more than Rs. 64 lakhs, due to an improvement of Rs. 1,51 lakhs in revenue and a reduction of Rs. 50 lakhs in expenditure.

§31. *Indian finance during the war (1939-)*.—On the existing basis of taxation the Budget estimates for 1939-40 had to provide for a gap of Rs. 50 lakhs. Trade recession still continued to affect the revenue position adversely, especially under customs; and in spite of the increased yield from income-tax under the newly introduced slab system and of economies under Interest and Defence, there remained a deficit of Rs. 50 lakhs to be covered. This was achieved by doubling the import duty on raw cotton.¹ The Finance Member was thus able to provide for a nominal surplus of Rs. 3 lakhs. Due to the outbreak of war in September 1939, however, the budgetary position underwent a striking change in subsequent months. In place of an anticipated surplus of Rs. 3 lakhs, the revised estimates disclosed a surplus of Rs. 91 lakhs, being the result of an increase of Rs. 5,08 lakhs in revenue under railways, income-tax, salt, currency, etc., as against an increase of Rs. 4,20 lakhs under expenditure, being mainly due to additional expenditure on defence in accordance with the agreement reached with His Majesty's Government (see §23). The final results for the year 1939-40 revealed a welcome surplus of Rs. 7,77 lakhs, making it possible to increase the amount transferred to the Revenue Reserve Fund by as much as Rs. 6,86 lakhs. This was the result of an improvement of Rs. 6,81 lakhs in revenue and a reduction of Rs. 5 lakhs in expenditure on the revenue side. Customs duties, after a sharp drop at the outbreak of the war, were abnormally high during the closing months of the year, mainly owing to the laying-in of stocks. The Railway earnings, income-tax, salt, currency and mint also showed further increases.

India's first War Budget (1940-1).—The first war Budget for a whole year indicated the necessity of finding new revenue to meet a prospective deficit of Rs. 7,16 lakhs, caused almost entirely by the additional requirements of Government owing to the war, in spite of greatly increased contribution from the railways. The Defence budget alone amounted to Rs. 52.52 crores. The deficit was reduced to Rs. 6,25 lakhs with the help of the surplus of Rs. 91 lakhs according to the revised estimates for 1939-40. The

¹ From 6 pies per lb. to an anna per lb.

Finance Member proposed to meet this deficit from additional taxation, direct and indirect, as follows: (i) Excess Profits Tax at the rate of 50 per cent on war profits (Rs. 3,00 lakhs), (ii) a rupee per cwt. more on sugar excise (Rs. 1,50 lakhs) and (iii) 2 annas more on motor spirit (Rs. 1,40 lakhs), thus leaving a nominal surplus of Rs. 5 lakhs in the 1940-1 Budget.¹ It will be recalled that the Railway Budget for the same year introduced increased fares by one anna in the rupee applicable to fares exceeding a rupee and increased rates on goods by 2 annas in the rupee. (See ch. v, §17.)

Supplementary Finance Act (November, 1940).—The greatly increased war expenditure, much in excess of the original estimate, called for fresh taxation proposals, which were embodied in a second Finance Bill introduced by Sir Jeremy Raisman on 5 November 1940. The position was that an increase in the Defence budget of at least Rs. 14½ crores and of Rs. 2½ crores in civil expenditure had to be provided for, and that against the extra balance of Rs. 7 crores available in the Revenue Reserve Fund had to be set off a drop of Rs. 3 crores in revenue in the year 1940-1. There was thus a prospective deficit of roughly Rs. 13 crores, which might easily expand to Rs. 15 crores. Besides, there were heavy commitments in regard to defence measures involving a recurring increase of Rs. 16 crores in a full year and a non-recurring expenditure of well over Rs. 30 crores to be spread over the next year or two. The new taxation proposals, which were placed upon the statute book in spite of the protest of the Legislative Assembly which rejected the supplementary Finance Bill, provided for a 25 per cent federal surcharge on all taxes on income, including super-tax and corporation tax, and an increase in the postal rates. At the same time the Finance Member sounded a note of warning that further increases in taxation would be necessary.

1941-2 Budget.—The latest Budget (1941-2) revealed a deficit of Rs. 8.42 crores in the year 1940-1 (revised estimates) and a prospective heavy deficit of Rs. 20.40 crores in 1941-2. The revised estimates for 1940-1, excluding the additional Rs. 6.86 crores available in the Revenue Reserve Fund, showed a net improvement of Rs. 4.21 crores compared with the Budget estimates. Against this, however, the revised estimate for expenditure showed a net increase of no less than Rs. 19.54 crores mostly in connexion with Defence Services and schemes connected with the war. Thus while the Budget estimates for 1940-1 provided for a nominal surplus of

¹ *Central (General) Budget for 1940-1*, pp. 20-1.

Rs. 5 lakhs, and in November the deficit was estimated at Rs. 13 crores, before taking into account the revenue from the fresh taxation then imposed, the deficit according to the revised estimates for the whole year 1940-1 amounted to Rs. 8.42 crores. The improvement was due to the additional revenue that since accrued, including the further payment of Rs. 2.81 crores from the Railways as a refund of arrears of contribution. The deficit of Rs. 8.42 crores was reduced to Rs. 5.43 crores by the use of Rs. 3 crores provided in the Budget for the reduction or avoidance of debt, and therefore the net addition to Government's indebtedness was only of the order of Rs. 5½ crores.

The prospective heavy deficit of Rs. 20.40 crores for the year 1941-2 arose from the big Defence Budget estimated at Rs. 84.13 crores and the increase in Civil estimates due to schemes connected with the war. It was proposed to meet this deficit by resorting to fresh taxation to the tune of Rs. 6.61 crores, and to borrow the other Rs. 13.85 crores. In the sphere of direct taxation, the new taxation proposals increased the Excess Profits Tax from 50 to 66 2/3 per cent (Rs. 2.50 crores) and raised the Central surcharge on income-tax and super-tax from 25 to 33 1/3 per cent (Rs. 0.90 crores). In the field of indirect taxation, the excise duty on matches was doubled, with a corresponding increase in the import duty (Rs. 1.50 crores). Besides this there were two other smaller proposals, namely, one to increase the import duty on artificial silk yarn from 3 as. per lb. to 5 as. per lb., and a new excise duty of 10 per cent *ad valorem* on pneumatic tyres and tubes manufactured in India (Rs. 35 lakhs).¹

Two different types of criticism of the manner in which the increased expenditure caused by the war is being financed in India may be noticed here. As Sir Jeremy Raisman pointed out in his Budget Speech (par. 46), there was a smaller and less vocal body of persons who felt that the contemporary contribution by taxation to the cost of the war was too little, while a large multitude doubtless felt that the increased cost of war should have been met either wholly or very largely by borrowing, having regard to the fact that taxation in India was already top-heavy and that expenditure on the scale involved in the prosecution of the war effort could scarcely be met out of taxation.² The several measures of war taxation have also been subjected to criticism. The Excess Profits Tax levied at the rate of 66 2/3 per cent and the 33 1/3

¹ *Budget Statement of the Finance Member for 1941-2*, pars. 44-5.

² 'In India the proportion of war expenditure financed through taxation as compared to borrowing is higher than in the United Kingdom.' *Annual Market Review* (1940), p. 25.

surcharge on taxes on income are regarded as handicaps on the industrial development of the country. The increases in railway rates and fares, and in the postal rates, have been criticized as hampering the growth of trade and industry. The increase in the petrol duty and the levy of the new excise on pneumatic tyres and tubes have been resented by the road interests. The incidence of the doubling of the excise duty on matches is calculated to fall not only on smokers, but also on the poorer sections of the community. It has, however, to be borne in mind that the war has produced to some extent additional taxable capacity in the country, and it is not unfair that a part of the additional requirements of the Government should be met by drawing on this capacity.

§32. **A review of the public debt in India.**—The origin of our public debt is to be traced to the wars of the East India Company which had steadily taken up the figure for national debt from £7 millions in 1792 to £59½ millions just before the Mutiny in 1856-7. In the following year the figure rose to £60 1|3 millions. The whole charge of the Mutiny was thrown on India so that the total public debt amounted in 1860 to over £100 millions. When the Company's rule was abolished in 1858, the Government of India not only assumed responsibility for the territorial and other debts of the Company but also for the payment of the dividend on the capital stock of £12 millions of the East India Company, until in 1874 the East India stock was redeemed. The debt inherited by the Government of India from the Company was purely unproductive. Since 1867, however, when the policy of constructing 'extraordinary public works' (or 'productive works' as they came to be called later on) like railways and irrigation, commenced, there has been a steady growth in the amount of productive or 'Public Works Debt' as distinguished from 'Ordinary Debt', as the unproductive debt came to be called from 1879. Additions to the former debt were made when the Government had to borrow for purchasing some of the railways from the companies or for making advances to them. In conformity with the recommendations made by the Select Committee of 1878 the surplus revenue of a particular year was not applied to the cancellation of debt but spent on productive works for which the Government would otherwise have been required to borrow. The reduction of the ordinary debt was thus automatically followed by an equivalent increase in the public works debt. By this process the ordinary debt would have been wiped off altogether by 1917 but for the huge addition to the debt for which the war was responsible. The late Mr Gokhale was a strong critic of the policy of utilizing the surplus revenue for reducing the ordinary debt and increasing the

productive debt. He contended that in view of the smallness of the unproductive debt, there was no need to liquidate it out of Government's ordinary surpluses, which ought to have been returned to the taxpayer by remission of taxation or, better still, spent on beneficial non-recurring expenditure, such as education, medical relief, etc., to be met from special Provincial reserves to which the Imperial Government might have made grants from their surpluses.

By far the greater portion of the public debt of India during the period before the war of 1914-18 was raised in England. The Government defended this policy on the ground that the difference between the rates of interest in India and in England was so considerable as to counterbalance any disadvantages attendant upon borrowing in England. They had also a very poor idea of the resources of the Indian money market, whose maximum lending capacity in any single year they put at not more than Rs. 5 crores. It was left to the war (1914-18) and the post-war period to prove that this was very much of an under-estimate. During this period the ordinary debt increased rapidly from Rs. 3.1 crores on 31 March 1916 to Rs. 257.70 crores on 31 March 1924. This was due to India's war contribution of £100 millions,¹ the expense on New Delhi and the post-war era of successive deficits in the budget of the Central Government. Successive War Loans were raised in India to meet some of these demands, as the English money market was fully taxed by the demands made on it by the English Government for war purposes, and the Government were able to get the unprecedented amount of Rs. 53 crores in 1917, and Rs. 57 crores in 1918. The strength of the Indian money market for Government loans, first revealed during the war period, has been largely maintained during the post-war years, and the Government now do most of their borrowing for productive purposes in the country itself. Apart from the large amounts raised by the War Loans, another welcome feature of these loans was the increase in the number of investors, thanks to effective advertisement and offer of increased facilities in regard to the administration of the Public Debt at Government treasuries and sub-treasuries. In this connexion special mention must be made of the Post Office branch of the War Loans and the Cash Certificates which have since secured a permanent place in the Government's loan policy.

¹ An additional war contribution of £45 millions was promised in 1918 in the event of the war being prolonged. But in 1919-20, in view of the heavy expenditure of £16 millions due to the Afghan war, the additional war contribution was substantially reduced.

Another innovation which owed its birth to the war of 1914-18 was the introduction of Treasury Bills, first issued in 1917 for meeting the Government's disbursements on behalf of the British War Office. They were again resorted to for financing the deficits in the post-war period, when the old bills were paid by issuing new bills. Ultimately the large outstanding amounts of Treasury Bills were reduced by discharging these bills from the proceeds of long-term loans—a questionable procedure from the point of view of sound finance. Since the year 1929-30 the issue of Treasury Bills has again become a normal feature of Central finance.

Mention may be made here of the Indian Defence Savings movement in connexion with the present war which was launched early in June 1940 with the issue of 3 per cent six-year Defence Bonds, ten-year Defence Savings Certificates and Interest-Free Bonds. The six-year Defence Bonds were the mainstay of the War Loan programme of the Government, and subscriptions to these totalled nearly Rs. 45 crores, 31½ crores being tendered in cash and the balance by conversion of the 5 per cent Loan (1940-3). As from 1 February 1941, a second 3 per cent Defence Loan with a longer currency and repayable at par was issued in place of the six-year Defence Bonds, which were closed on 25 January 1941. The results of these Defence Loans, the total receipts from which in a period of eight months amounted to over Rs. 50 crores, testify to India's financial credit. In addition to the Loans already described, a Defence Savings Provident Fund for all Government servants has been started, which makes it easy for these classes to make regular investments. More recently, a simple system of facilitating popular savings was introduced by means of a new scheme of Post Office Defence Savings Bank Accounts, the amounts in which will be repayable not on demand but a year after the end of the war. In order to encourage deposits of this kind, the rate of interest has been fixed at 1 per cent higher than the existing rate on ordinary Postal Savings Banks Account.¹

§33. **Rupee and sterling loans.**—The loans raised in India are called rupee loans or rupee debt, as they are subscribed in rupees and the interest and principal are paid in rupees. It must not, however, be supposed that the rupee loans are necessarily internal loans or even held wholly by Indians. The bulk of the rupee debt is held in India, but a certain portion is held by investors who live in England and receive their interest in that country. Again, the rupee debt held in India is divided between Indian and European investors. It has been suggested that all debt, whether

¹ *Budget Speech of the Finance Member (1941-2)*, par. 31.

rupee or sterling, whether held in India or England, should be considered as external if held by non-Indians, and internal if held by Indians.¹ Judged by this standard, the major portion of our debt is external.² It need scarcely be added that the policy should be to reduce the volume of the external debt as far as possible, because it creates all kinds of political difficulties and also complicates the Indian exchange problem. We therefore welcome the recent Government scheme of repatriation of the sterling debt of India. (See § 96 below.)

§34. The position of public debt in 1914 and 1941.³—The following statement shows the interest-bearing obligations of the Government of India, and serves to illustrate the remarks made above

	31 March 1914	1940-1 (Budget Estimate)
INTEREST-BEARING OBLIGATIONS		
<i>In India—</i>		
Rupee Loans	145·69	434·65
Treasury Bills	...	39·30
Total Public Debt—	145·69	473·95
<i>Other obligations—</i>		
Post Office Savings Banks	23·17	80·73
Cash Certificates	...	55·44
State Provident Funds, etc.	10·93	72·98
Depreciation and Reserve Funds	...	41·65
Provincial Balances	...	12·17
Other items
Total other obligations	34·10	267·97
Total in India	179·79	741·92
<i>In England⁴—</i>		
Sterling Loans	265·60	389·21
War contribution	...	20·62
Capital value of liabilities undergoing redemption by way of terminable Railway Annuities	105·90	42·12
India Bills
Service Funds, etc.	...	4·03
Total in England	371·50	455·98
Total interest-bearing obligations	551·29	1,197·90

¹ Gyan Chand, *Financial System of India*, p. 312.

² For an instructive treatment of the various items in the national debt of India (Rupee Loans, Sterling Loans, Terminable and non-Terminable Loans and Government Securities) see *Guide Book for Investors in Government of India Securities* (1921).

³ See *Central Budget for 1940-1*, p. 112.

⁴ Sterling obligations have been converted into rupees at 1s. 4d. to the rupee in 1914 and at 1s. 6d. in 1941 (i.e. since 1931).

regarding the growth of sterling and rupee debt, productive and unproductive debt and the changes during and since the war of 1914-18.

§35. Debt redemption.—In the period before the war of 1914-18, the public debt of India was being reduced in two ways. One of these has been already noticed, namely the utilization of surpluses for capital expenditure on railways, irrigation, etc., which enabled the Government to avoid borrowing and to reduce the unproductive debt to that extent. The second method was adopted to meet the liability incurred in connexion with the purchase of certain railways. A portion of this liability was and is being reduced under the statutory obligation of payment of railway annuities (issued in repayment of both principal and interest on loans). So also the India Stock for which the shareholders of railways were permitted to exchange their annuities and the securities of the original companies from which the railways were purchased, is being reduced from certain sinking funds shown under railway account. During the war of 1914-18 a sinking fund was established in connexion with the issue of the 5 per cent War Loan of 1917. The Government undertook to set aside $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the loan for the purchase and cancellation of the loan securities, so long as their market price was below the issue price. In addition to this, the Government have been making annual provision to the extent of nearly £500,000 to meet India's liability in respect of the unpaid portion of the war contribution. The Government have also made provision for the optional payment of an extra Rs. 80 lakhs voted since 1921-2 for an additional depreciation fund for the 5 per cent loan.

But the position so reached was largely the result of accident and the whole question of the redemption of public debt had never been reviewed in a scientific and systematic manner. A well-devised scheme for debt redemption is essential in order to maintain both the external and internal credit of the country unimpaired, so as to facilitate renewals of maturing debt and the raising of such new capital as may be required at reasonable rates of interest. A regular debt redemption scheme was accepted by the Assembly in December 1924 on the initiative of Sir Basil Blackett. In enunciating the principle of the scheme, Sir Basil Blackett suggested that the best way of arriving at a regular programme of debt redemption was to take the gross total of the debt, examine the capital assets held against it and fix the appropriate period within which it is desirable to amortize each category of debt. On this plan, the Finance Member announced a scheme on 9 December 1924, under which, for a period of five years in the first instance,

the annual provision for the reduction or avoidance of debt to be charged against annual revenues was fixed at Rs. 4 crores a year plus $\frac{1}{8}$ th of the excess of the debt outstanding at the end of each year over that outstanding on 31 March 1923, sterling debt being converted into rupees at Rs. 15 per £ for this purpose.¹ As Sir Basil Blackett made it clear, the provision for the sinking fund so proposed would operate not to reduce the net total debt as long as there is a considerable annual programme of new capital expenditure, but to reduce the unproductive portion of it. The amount thus provided becomes a contribution out of revenue towards productive capital expenditure. The provision, therefore, is better described as a contribution out of revenues for the reduction or avoidance of debt than as a sinking fund.

With effect from 1930, adequate provision was made for the first time to meet the accruing liability in respect of Cash Certificates, which were henceforward to be regarded as part of the Government's debt.

The Finance Member announced, in his Budget speech for 1930-1, that in view of the close interdependence of the Conventions regarding the Railways (providing for a certain fixed annual contribution to the general revenues, almost the whole of which is applied for the amortization of their capital) with the Convention as regards the debt redemption scheme, it was better to leave the latter provision untouched and to bring it under review at the time of the forthcoming general revision of finances. Accordingly it was decided that, for the time being, provision from the year 1930-1 onwards should be made on the same lines as before, except that sterling debt should be converted into rupees at Rs. 13 $\frac{1}{3}$ per £ instead of Rs. 15 per £.² Since 1933-4 the annual amount provided for the reduction or avoidance of debt has been reduced to a lump sum of Rs. 3 crores. This is justified on the ground that, since 60 per cent of the Government of India debt is attributable to the railways, it would be imposing too heavy a burden on the General Budget to revert to the Sinking Fund arrangements in force prior to 1933-4 before the railways had resumed the practice of making a contribution to the General Revenues.³ Although this condition has been fulfilled under special conditions in recent years (see ch. v, §16) the original debt redemption scheme remains suspended, and annually an appropriation of Rs. 3 crores is made for reduction or avoidance of debt.

¹ See *India's Parliament*, vol. X, p. 275.

² *Budget Statement for 1930-1*, pars. 25-6 and *Financial Secretary's Memorandum for 1931-2*, par. 32.

³ Finance Member's Budget speeches (1934-5, 1935-6).

§36. **Repatriation of sterling debt.**¹—In recent years a welcome process of repatriation of India's sterling debt has been in operation, and it has gathered momentum since the beginning of the war in September 1939. The desirability of repatriating sterling debt has been constantly before the Government and the Reserve Bank for the last four years. A beginning was made in 1937, but it had to be temporarily discontinued owing to the slackening of sterling remittances. With the increasing favourable balance of trade, especially since the beginning of the war, large sterling receipts in London on account of recoveries from His Majesty's Government for their share of war expenditure incurred by India as well as for large purchases for new materials and goods paid for in the first instance by the Government of India, the contribution towards the expenditure on defence modernization in accordance with the Report of the Chatfield Committee and sterling receipts for sales of silver in London on behalf of the Government of India, very substantial sterling resources became available for the repatriation of the sterling debt. These resources made it possible to reopen the former scheme by which the Reserve Bank was authorized to purchase India sterling non-terminable securities in the open market and to transfer the securities so purchased to the Government of India for cancellation. In their place, additional Rupee Paper of 3½ and 3 per cent non-terminable loans was created in accordance with the requirements of the market. A further scheme of repatriation of sterling was brought into force in February 1940, extending the option of transfer to rupee loans to holders of all India sterling loans and sanctioning the creation of rupee counterparts for six specified dated sterling loans. Under this scheme owners of sterling obligations could voluntarily convert their holdings from the books of the Bank of England into rupee counterparts registered in the books of any one of the Reserve Bank offices in India. Considerable open-market purchases were made in London by the Reserve Bank of India and the total so acquired amounted to £28½ million on 8 February 1941.

On this date an announcement was made of further operations for the compulsory acquisition and repatriation of India's terminable sterling debt amounting approximately to £90 million or Rs. 120 crores in co-operation with the British Government, which came to the help of the Government of India by issuing orders

¹ See *Central (General) Budget for 1938-9*, p. 7; for 1939-40, p. 10; for 1940-1, pp. 17-19. *Budget Statement for 1941-2*, pars. 33-40, *Annual Market Review (1940)*, pp. 29-30; and *Indian Finance (Eastern Group Number)*, p. 229.

under their special war powers compelling holders resident in the United Kingdom to sell their stocks to them for delivery to the Government of India at the market prices prevailing at the time of the order and thus dispensing with the expensive alternative of buying them in a rising market. A similar order was issued by the Government of India affecting holders of sterling stock resident in India. The machinery for financing this striking repatriation operation may now be briefly explained. There were two stages, first the Government of India bought the sterling from the Reserve Bank and secondly, the Government of India had to obtain rupees to pay for the sterling. The Reserve Bank of India utilized a portion of its large stock of sterling securities and balances in its Issue and Banking Departments, acquired since the commencement of war, for purchasing India's sterling debt.

According to a Press Communique issued by the Government of India on 28 April 1941, the total face value of the outstanding terminable loan on 8 February 1941, was approximately £84 million, and the market value a little over £89 million. Holdings of India sterling stock compulsorily acquired in the United Kingdom and India amounted to £59 million and £11 million respectively, making a total of £70 million in round figures. The balance of about £14 million represents stock held by non-residents outside the United Kingdom and British India. The Government of India have had to find rupee finance of the order of Rs. 88 crores for stock of the face value of Rs. 80 crores in round figures. Of this, for the time being, half has been paid for by the issue of rupee counterparts to the Reserve Bank and half from balances with the help of temporary ways-and-means advances from the Bank, which are being gradually liquidated.¹ The immediate object of this transaction was the substitution of sterling for rupee obligations, and the real gain to the country lies in the liquidation of external obligations and the consequential lessening of the strain upon the ultimate cash reserves of the country, i.e. on the holding of gold and other external assets, which tends to manifest itself when, in consequence of world events, the value of overseas trade declines.² There will be a reduction of £3 million

¹ The final adjustment was more recently (June 1941) affected by the conversion of the rupee counterparts into regular 3 per cent (new) Rupee Loans of the Government of India, the total amount so converted being Rs. 28.56 crores by the end of June 1941. See *Annual Report of the Reserve Bank (1941)*, p. 17.

² Taking the whole period since 1935, and including the amounts of sterling Railway annuities and debentures discharged each year and the transfer of India's liabilities in respect of sterling family pensions, the total reduction in India's sterling obligations exceeds Rs. 220 crores, of which about Rs. 145 crores have been repatriated since the beginning of the war.

a year in India's overseas obligations. 'Technically the debtor-creditor position between India and England was undesirably top-heavy. The approach to financial equality, which the redemption accelerates, makes for a healthy monetary position and by lessening India's indebtedness represents the financial complement to her industrial advance.'¹ Financially India's external position is considerably strengthened and this should make it possible for the Reserve Bank to hold a somewhat lower proportion of external assets than previously. Incidentally the conversion of sterling stock eventually into rupee securities is calculated to broaden the market for gilt-edge securities in India and supply the needs of investing institutions.

FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

§37. **Financial relations before the Reforms of 1919.**—From 1833 to 1871, all financial powers were in the hands of the Government of India, which controlled the smallest details of the Provincial expenditure. The whole of the revenues were paid to the account of the Government of India, and the Provincial Governments only got fixed contributions to meet their expenses. This led to extravagance, rigidity and friction in Provincial finance and uncertainty in Central finance. 'The distribution of the public income degenerated into something like a scramble, in which the most violent had the advantage with very little attention to reason. As local economy brought no local advantage, the stimulus to avoid waste was reduced to a minimum, and as no local growth of the income led to local means of improvements, the interest in developing the public revenues was also brought down to the lowest level' (Sir John Strachey). This system of 'barren uniformity and pedantic centralization' was found to be thoroughly unsuited to a continental country with great diversity of local conditions. Lord Mayo² was impressed with the necessity of some measure of financial decentralization to enlist greater interest and more animated co-operation on the part of the Provincial Governments in developing the public revenues and managing them with all possible economy. He initiated the system of 'Provincial Settlements' in 1871, under which certain heads of expenditure local in character were handed

¹ *The Times of India*, 18 February 1941.

² Dr Ambedkar divides the stages in the growth of financial decentralization, since Lord Mayo's reforms of 1871, according to the method of supply to the Provincial Governments adopted by the Government of India, namely, (a) Budget by Assignments (1871-2 to 1876-7); (b) Budget by Assigned Revenues (1877-8 to 1881-2); and (c) Budget by Shared Revenues (1882-3 to 1920-1). See B. R. Ambedkar, *Provincial Finance*, part II, chapters iv-vi.

over to the Provinces, such as Police, Education, Roads and Civil Works, Registration, Medicine and Jails. For the management of these departments the Provinces were given, in addition to the departmental receipts, annual fixed lump-sum grants, the deficiency being made good by local taxation if necessary.

Actual experience revealed various defects of this system. It failed to endow the Provinces with adequate revenues.¹ The system did not provide any real motive for economy in the Provinces, as the Provinces were empowered to supplement their income by additional taxation which, under existing arrangements, could only mean an increased burden on the poor.

In 1877, a further step in decentralization was taken by Lord Lytton with the help of his Finance Member, Sir John Strachey. Practically all the remaining heads of expenditure that were Provincial in character, such as Land Revenue, Excise, Stamps, General Administration, Law and Justice, were transferred to the Provinces. In addition to the departmental receipts and the old lump-sum grants, certain heads of revenue such as Excise, Stamps, Law and Justice, were made over to the Provincial Governments. Under this arrangement, the heads of revenue were divided into Central and Provincial. It was found, however, that fixed lump-sum grants were still necessary from year to year and they caused the usual annual bickerings. The Provinces moreover showed no enthusiasm in the collection of revenue in which they were not given a share. Assam and Burma, being backward Provinces, were not admitted to the scheme described above. Under a financial settlement effected in 1879, in addition to wholly Provincial revenues, Burma was given a share of the land revenue and also of the income from forests and the export duty on rice and salt, instead of a fixed assignment of money to meet the Provincial deficit. The same principle of shared or divided revenues was applied to the Province of Assam, which received a share of land revenue. This threefold division of revenues, namely (i) wholly Imperial, (ii) wholly Provincial, and (iii) jointly Imperial and Provincial, was later extended to other Provinces by Lord Ripon in 1882.²

In 1882 Lord Ripon, with the help of his Finance Member, Major Baring, introduced certain improvements in the Provincial settlements, which he made liable to revision every five years. He abolished the fixed lump-sum grants altogether and revised the allocation of the revenues as follows: (i) *Imperial heads*:—Opium, Salt, Customs, Commercial Undertakings, etc., (ii) *Provincial*

¹ See P. N. Banerjea, *Provincial Finance in India*, p. 74.

² See Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-8.

heads:—Civil Departments, Provincial Works and Provincial Rates, (iii) *Divided heads*:—Excise, Assessed Taxes, Stamps, Forest, Registration, etc. Instead of giving fixed grants to the Provinces to make up their deficit, a certain percentage of land revenue was made over to them, together with fixed cash assignments under the same head, which thus became an important head of adjustment. Settlements on these lines were made in 1887, 1892, and 1897 without any change of principle, though not without much controversy and Provincial discontent.

To remove the uncertainty and want of continuity of financial policy which characterized the quinquennial Provincial Settlements Lord Curzon made the settlements quasi-permanent in 1904, that is, liable to revision only if there was a substantive change in the original conditions or in the event of emergencies like war and famine.

The settlements were declared to be practically permanent in 1912 by Lord Hardinge's Government, and the allocation decided upon was as follows: On the revenue side the Central Government retained for its use all the revenues which could not be allocated or traced to any Province, these being called the Imperial Heads of Revenue, such as Opium, Railways, Customs, Salt, Mint and Exchange, Posts and Telegraphs, Military receipts, and tributes from Indian States. Of the remainder some were wholly Provincial, like Forest, Excise (in Bombay and Bengal), Registration, and the departmental receipts from such Provincial departments as Education, Law and Justice. Lastly, there was an important class of divided heads of revenue like Land Revenue, Income-Tax, Excise (except in Bombay and Bengal), Irrigation and Stamps. Receipts from these were divided between Imperial and Provincial Governments in stated proportions, generally equal, but determined separately for each Province. On the expenditure side a somewhat similar arrangement prevailed, and there was a special arrangement for the sharing of expenditure on famines. The pre-Reform system suffered from the following main defects: (i) The divided heads of revenue in which both the parties were interested were a source of constant interference on the part of the Central Government and hampered Provincial development. (ii) The occasional 'doles' given by the Central Government to the Provinces out of its surpluses had a dislocating influence on Provincial finance. (iii) Serious inter-Provincial financial inequalities were created. (iv) The Provincial Governments had no independent powers of taxation and borrowing. (v) Too detailed a control was exercised over the Provincial budgets and expenditure by the Central Government.

The Provinces, for example, could not budget for a deficit nor could they spend their balances freely.

§38. **Financial relations under the Reforms of 1919.**—After the Reforms the fiscal relations with the Central Government were radically changed. As the new policy of responsible government was to be tried in the Provinces, and as Provincial financial autonomy or financial devolution was recognized to be the keynote of the Reforms, it was deemed necessary to abolish the divided heads of revenue, in order to give effect to the new principle, and the new allocation of revenue and expenditure was as follows: (i) *Imperial Heads of Revenue*:—Opium, Salt, Customs, Income-Tax, Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, Military receipts; (ii) *Provincial Heads of Revenue*:—Land Revenue (including Irrigation), Stamps (judicial and commercial), Registration, Excise and Forests. Mainly as a result of the agitation carried on by the industrial Provinces of Bombay and Bengal against the complete loss of the revenue from income-tax, which was recommended to be an Imperial head of revenue by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and Meston Committee (see next section), it was finally settled to give to the Provinces a small share of the income-tax revenue, equal to three pies in the tax collection on every additional rupee of the income assessed over and above the amount of income assessed in the datum year 1920-1. As the Taxation Enquiry Committee has pointed out, this rule failed in its object and the whole system of dividing the income-tax on the basis of a datum line was unsound.¹

§39. **The Meston Award.**—The abolition of divided heads of revenue and the provincialization of some heads like Land Revenue and Stamps resulted in a Central deficit of Rs. 9,83 lakhs, which had to be provided for by a scheme of Provincial contributions to the Central exchequer. A Committee was appointed in 1920 under the chairmanship of Lord Meston to consider this and other allied questions, and its recommendations are known as the Meston Award. The Committee recommended the distribution of this burden by way of initial contributions in 1921-2, which were more or less arbitrarily fixed on the basis of the increased spending power of the Provinces. These were eventually to be supplanted by standard contributions based on the capacity of each Province to pay judged by such factors as population, income-tax receipts, consumption of salt and textiles, agricultural and industrial wealth, etc.² These recommendations with certain modifications suggested

¹ *Taxation Enquiry Committee Report*, par. 529.

² See *Report of the Financial Relations (Meston) Committee*, pars. 17 and 28 and *Simon Commission Report*, vol. I, par. 399.

by the Joint Parliamentary Committee were embodied in the Devolution Rules issued under the Government of India Act, 1919.

§40. **Abolition of Provincial contributions.**—The Meston Settlement did not please anybody and caused much Provincial discontent. For, while industrial Provinces like Bombay and Bengal could never reconcile themselves to the virtual loss of the income-tax revenue, agricultural Provinces like Madras, the Punjab and United Provinces resented what they considered their excessive initial contributions. The contributions were felt to be peculiarly burdensome when the Provincial Governments were faced with a series of heavy deficits in place of the comfortable surpluses which the Meston Committee had envisaged. The revenues assigned to them, such as land revenue, were inelastic and inadequate to meet occasional contingencies or even the expenses of normal development. There was thus an unceasing clamour for the abolition of the contributions. The gradual improvement in the finances of the Central Government made the extension of some relief possible in 1925-6 and again in 1926-7. In 1927-8, the entire amount of the outstanding contributions was remitted and finally relinquished in 1928-9.

§41. **Problem of federal finance in India.**—The final extinction of the Provincial contributions, however, did not end all controversy regarding the division of revenue between the Central and Provincial Governments. The main grievance of the Provinces, especially of the industrial Provinces like Bombay and Bengal, still remained, and this was that although its expenditure was, comparatively stationary, consisting mainly of the cost of the army and the interest on the public debt, the Central Government had taken for itself sources of revenue like income-tax and customs, which were expanding or were capable of expansion, and left for the Provinces inelastic and stagnant sources like land revenue and excise, although the needs of the Provincial Governments were rapidly expanding. The land revenue was already too heavy in some places and is in any case fixed for long terms. Moreover there is a great disinclination on the part of the people to submit to additional increases. And such increases are becoming more and more difficult to make owing to legislative and administrative restrictions being imposed on the executive. The excise revenue must also decline, as steps were being taken in response to a strong popular demand to introduce prohibition. In fact the Provinces complained that the process of decline was not as fast as they would have liked to see it. They hated the very touch of the tainted excise revenue, but were compelled, on pain of bankruptcy, to clasp it in what, until recently, threatened to be an eternal embrace. The

forest revenue required liberal capital outlay before it could be appreciably expanded. Stamps offered the only source of revenue which held out a promise of probable increase. The Provinces were responsible for nation-building departments such as education, medical relief, agriculture, etc., on which heavy outlay was essential. Famine expenditure had also been put on the shoulders of the Provincial Governments. The distribution of surplus revenue assigned to the Provinces under the Reforms was determined in a haphazard manner and bore no relation to the needs of the Provinces or to the total taxation derived from them, and this haphazard arrangement was founded upon the academic insistence on the theory of complete federal separation which has not been adopted in any other federal Government in the world.

The varying importance of the principal sources of revenue in the different Provinces, their unequal expansion in recent years, and lastly, the abolition of the contributions, which at first modified the effect of the new allocation of revenue, all served to emphasize Provincial inequalities.

The fundamental defect of the system, as pointed out by the Simon Commission Report, was that, while it professed to follow the theoretical ideal of federal finance, in practice it left inadequate resources to the Provincial Governments which, unlike the units of a federal state, did not possess full powers to determine the scale and nature of the expenditure of the Central Government. What was even more surprising was that the Government of India Act of 1919 left the residuary powers of taxation in the hands of the Central Government.

While the system gave a bare minimum to the more industrialized and commercial Provinces from which the Central Government collected large amounts of income-tax and customs, it yielded a substantial surplus to the agricultural Provinces which produced and retained for themselves a large amount of land revenue.

The Provinces benefited in a very unequal manner from the new allocation of revenues, which was arrived at without any attempt to establish an objective standard of fairness. Indeed as a result of the division of resources in 1920, all the Provinces received increased spending power. The benefit, however, was very unequally felt, and the abolition of the contributions accentuated the disparity in Provincial resources. The position when the Simon Commission reported (1930), however, was that, while all Provinces were faced with stagnation of revenues, future requirements everywhere were almost unlimited.¹

¹ *Simon Commission Report*, vol. II, pars. 260-1, and 263.

Besides arming the Provinces with adequate spending power, without which Provincial autonomy is a meaningless phrase, the Indian financial problem is largely one of harmonizing the distribution of functions with the allocation of the sources of revenue to the Provinces and the Centre respectively. The sources of revenue which, from the administrative point of view, fall naturally within the sphere of the Provincial Governments, should harmonize so far as their yield and elasticity are concerned with the functions assigned to these Governments, while those which are naturally Central sources should accord with the functions of the Central Government. The arrangements under the Meston Award were most defective from this point of view.¹

§42. **Recent inquiries into the problem of financial relations.**—The question of adjusting the financial relations between the Centre and the Provinces and evolving a workable system of federal finance was the subject of several inquiries prior to the enactment of the Government of India Act. To begin with Sir Walter Layton, the Financial Assessor on the Simon Commission, dealt with the problem very fully in his Report (1929) to the Commission. Later the Peel Sub-Committee (the Federal Finance Sub-Committee) of the Round Table Conference (1931) laid down the general principles of the financial arrangements under the new constitution. The Percy Committee (Federal Finance Committee) was able to report in 1932 in favour of the allocation of a substantial amount of income-tax receipts to the Provinces. The Joint Select (Parliamentary) Committee (1933-4) dealt with the question thoroughly and was called upon to face the problem of two new deficit Provinces of Sind and Orissa. The White Paper (1933) proposals were also considered by the Joint Select Committee before they submitted their own report.

The influence of all these previous investigations and especially of the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee is writ large on the financial provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935.

§43. **Division of financial resources between the Centre and Provinces under the Constitution of 1935.**²—The Government of India Act provides that while taxes and duties may be levied and collected by one authority, the proceeds may be allocated wholly or in part to others.³ It may therefore be useful to arrange the

¹ *Simon Commission Report*, vol. II, par. 240.

² The financial provisions of the Government of India Act are contained in Sections 137-44 of that Act.

³ For instance, duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land, such stamp duties as are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List and terminal taxes on goods and passengers shall be levied and collected

financial subjects according to whether they are under the legislative control of the Federal Government or of the Units.¹

The Federal Legislative list comprises the following subjects: Duties of customs, including export duties; duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India, except (i) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (ii) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; non-narcotic drugs; (iii) medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in (ii); Corporation tax; salt; taxes on income other than agricultural income; taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies; duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land; the rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, proxies and receipts; terminal taxes on goods and passengers carried by railway or air; taxes on railway fares and freights.

The Provincial Legislative list includes the following subjects: Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenue; duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the Province and countervailing duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India: (i) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (ii) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; non-narcotic drugs; (iii) medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in (ii); taxes on agricultural income; taxes on lands and buildings, hearths and windows; duties in respect of succession to agricultural land; taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by any Act of the Federal Legislature relating to mineral development; capitation taxes; taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; taxes on animals and boats; taxes on the sale of goods and advertisements; cesses on the entry of goods into a local area; taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling; the rates of

by the Federation, but the net proceeds shall be assigned to the Provinces. The Federal Legislature may however levy a surcharge on these duties for the benefit of the Centre. Or again, while taxes on income (excluding the Corporation tax) other than agricultural income shall be levied and collected by the Federation, a prescribed percentage of the net proceeds of such taxes shall be assigned to the Provinces (see §45). The Federal Legislature may increase the said taxes by a surcharge for federal purposes. Similarly, the whole or any part of the net proceeds of duties on salt, federal duties of excise and export duties which shall be levied and collected by the Federation may be distributed among the Provinces.

¹ See J. P. Eddy and F. H. Lawton, *India's New Constitution*, pp. 133-5.

stamp duty in respect of documents other than those specified in the provisions of the Federal Legislative List with regard to rates of stamp duty; dues on passengers and goods carried on inland waterways; tolls; fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any Court.²

§44. **Financial inquiry by Sir Otto Niemeyer.**—The Secretary of State appointed Sir Otto Niemeyer to conduct the financial inquiry contemplated under Sections 138, 140 and 142 of the Government of India Act. Sir Otto arrived in India in the middle of January 1936 and, after about three months' study of the material submitted to his examination, presented his Report, which was published on 30 April 1936. The Report indicated that it was possible to introduce Provincial Autonomy by April 1937, and the Federation about a year later.

§45. **Main recommendations of the Niemeyer Report.**—The central recommendation made by Sir Otto Niemeyer relates to the assignment of a fifty per cent share of the income-tax to the Provinces by the Centre. Sir Otto calculated the income-tax to yield Rs. 12 crores a year (exclusive of the tax collected in Burma, which is separated from British India under the new constitution). Half of this (Rs. 6 crores), assignable to the Provinces, was to be retained by the Centre for the first five years, during which the Centre should consolidate its position. In the course of the next five years, by six equal steps beginning from the sixth year from the introduction of provincial autonomy, but subject to Section 138(2) of the Government of India Act (1935), this revenue was to be made available to the Provinces gradually, so that after ten years the Provinces would be in the enjoyment of their full share of the income-tax. The income-tax was not to be thus relinquished, however, so long as the portion of the distributable sum remaining with the Centre together with any contribution from Railways aggregates to less than Rs. 13 crores. (See however §55 below.)

§46. **Assistance to Provinces.**—Sir Otto Niemeyer proposed immediate assistance from the beginning of provincial autonomy to certain Provinces, partly in the form of cash subventions, partly in the form of cancellation of the net (i.e. after offsetting certain balances) debt incurred prior to 1 April 1936, and partly in the form of the distribution of a further 12½ per cent of the jute tax. In the cases of Bengal, Bihar, Assam, the North-West Frontier

² We have already pointed out that there is good deal of overlapping regarding the sphere of Central and Provincial taxation and that a well-defined demarcation of the respective spheres of taxation is essential to avoid challenges in the courts of law. See §19 *ante*.

Province and Orissa, the entire net debt was cancelled, and in the case of the Central Provinces, all pre-1936 deficit debt plus approximately two crores of pre-1921 debt.

Annual cash subventions were as follows: United Provinces 25 lakhs for 5 years only; Assam 30 lakhs; Orissa 40 lakhs; North-West Frontier Province 100 lakhs subject to reconsideration after 5 years; Sind 105 lakhs to be reduced by stages after 10 years.

The total approximate annual relief in lakhs aimed at by Sir Otto Niemeyer was as follows: Bengal 75; Bihar 25; Central Provinces 15; Assam 45; North-West Frontier Province 110; Orissa 50; Sind 105; United Provinces 25. The extra recurrent cost to the Centre is Rs. 1,92 lakhs.

Orissa was to get a further non-recurrent grant of Rs. 19 lakhs and Sind of Rs. 5 lakhs.

Provincial share of income-tax.—The percentage division of the distributable portion of the income-tax between the Provinces was to be as follows:

Madras 15; Bombay 20; Bengal 20; United Provinces 15; the Punjab 8; Bihar 10; Central Provinces 5; Assam 2; North-West Frontier Province 1; Orissa 2; and Sind 2.

Sir Otto Niemeyer stated that substantial justice would be done by fixing the scale of distribution partly on residence and partly on population, paying to neither factor a rigidly pedantic deference, for which the actual data provide insufficient justification.

§47. *Principles of settlement.*—The following are salient extracts from the Report: 'Throughout the discussions leading up to the Government of India Act, it has been recognized that at the inauguration of provincial autonomy, each of the Provinces should be so equipped as to enjoy a reasonable prospect of maintaining financial equilibrium and, in particular, that the chronic state of deficit into which some of them had fallen should be brought to an end. My first object has accordingly been to examine the present and prospective financial position of the Provinces and to determine the extent to which special assistance would be needed in order to achieve the above aim. Next, it is necessary to consider how far the Central Government is in a position to render such assistance without jeopardizing its own solvency. Finally, I have had to look further into the future and to suggest to what extent and when it may be possible for the Centre to place additional resources at the disposal of the Provinces out of the proceeds of the taxes on income.'

'From the Provincial point of view, the desirability of attaining this final result is undeniable and the only question (though in itself a difficult question) is to determine an equitable basis of

distribution. From the Central point of view, on the other hand, it is clear that the financial stability and credit of India as a whole must remain the paramount consideration. Moreover, this is as essential to the Provinces and to the success of Provincial autonomy as it is to the Centre itself. Throughout my recommendations, I have kept the stability of the Central finances continuously in mind. Expenditure at the Centre cannot be expected, consistently with safety, to decrease much below the point to which it has now been reduced.

'Expenditure in the Provinces could obviously be increased with advantage on many heads. This is a question of degree and opportunity. The allocation at an early date of a share in taxes on income under Section 138 of the Government of India Act constitutes, for many Provinces, the main hope for the future expansion.

'On a general review of the existing tendencies, I should conclude that the budgetary prospects of India, given prudent management of her finances, justify the view that adequate arrangements can be made step by step to meet the financial implications of the new constitution. A change of constitutional and administrative arrangements cannot of course in a moment alter the general financial position or enable all conceivable financial desires to be met, but I see no reason why a cautious but steady advance should not be achieved.

§48. **Claims of Provinces.**—(i) 'I turn now more particularly to the prior question. The present position of the Provinces and their contrasted positions *inter se*, both of which fall under the objective of starting the Provinces on the occasion of autonomy on "an even keel". Various matters arise in this connexion. How far in actual fact is each Province now solvent and likely to remain solvent? This is a matter which cannot be judged on the position in one year only. How far, whatever may be its present position, has a Province administered its affairs, whether in taxation or in expenditure, with adequate firmness and how far has this or that Province, for whatever reason, been financially neglected in the past and thereby condemned to a lot from which others have escaped? It is obviously impossible to reconcile all the conflicting views and arguments on these issues. The recommendations I shall make represent, in my belief, an equitable settlement as between the various contestants and will, I hope, be accepted on that basis. I would only add here that in any country of the size of India there must inevitably be substantial differences in the standard of administrative needs and possibilities just as there

are in other areas of the same size in the rest of the world or, for that matter, even in smaller units.

'Certain further general comments may be made. Bombay has just received an annual relief to the extent of approximately 90 lakhs from the separation of Sind; Madras and Bihar approximately 20 lakhs and 8 lakhs respectively from the separation of Orissa. Madras, Bombay and the Punjab have certainly not the lowest administrative standards in India. Bengal is clearly on a low standard, while Bihar and Orissa has been generally recognized as the poorest Province in India. To a less extent, similar considerations apply to the Central Provinces. The position of the United Provinces is so far peculiar that while its ultimate future gives less reason for anxiety, its immediate difficulties are considerable.

(ii) *Sind*.—'Sind and Orissa, as newly instituted Provinces, have special problems of their own. The future of Sind and of the subvention as part of Sind finances is inseparably bound up with the financial future of the Lloyd Barrage. In all the circumstances and bearing in mind the necessarily conjectural nature of estimates for a period stretching so far into the future, I recommend that the Sind subvention should remain at 105 lakhs for a period of 10 years (i.e. till 1946-7 inclusive) and should then be diminished progressively until the whole Barrage debt is repaid, in about 40 years from funding in 1942.

(iii) *Orissa*.—'In view of the existing low standard of expenditure in Orissa and the large scope for expansion in the Province's own resources in the early future it is necessary to contemplate a somewhat higher normal scale of assistance. The total assistance which I propose should be given to Orissa is about 57 lakhs in the first year, 53 lakhs a year in the next four years and, thereafter, 50 lakhs a year.

(iv) *Assam*.—'Assam has been universally recognized as a deficit Province and must undoubtedly receive assistance. The Central Government now proposes to bear 7 lakhs of the cost of the remaining Assam force and to treat this payment separately from any assistance for Provincial needs proper. I think this is an equitable arrangement.

(v) *North-West Frontier Province*.—'After examining the past and prospective budgetary position of the Province, my recommendation is that the existing subsidy of 1 crore should be supplemented by approximately 10 lakhs per annum. In so far as this assistance may take the form of a subvention under Section 142, it should be fixed for a period of five years which should be subject to revision in the light of the then existing circumstances.

§49. **Claim of jute Provinces.**—‘The claim of the jute-producing Provinces to the whole or part of the jute export duty has already been recognized to the extent of 50 per cent by the Government of India Act. It will, however, be convenient that part of the assistance I contemplate should take the form of an increase in this figure and therefore I recommend that the percentage should be increased under Section 140 (2) of the Act to $62\frac{1}{2}$ on the estimated gross yield of the duty in 1936-7 at 380 lakhs. This increase of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent would mean in round figures the following additions to the resources of the Provinces concerned at a corresponding cost to the Central Government: Bengal 42 lakhs; Bihar $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs; Assam $2\frac{1}{4}$ lakhs; and Orissa rather over $\frac{1}{4}$ lakh.

‘Apart from the separation of Burma and this provision of 2 crores’ assistance for the Provinces which I have already recommended, the additional cost of the new federal institutions (probably something over half a crore) may be imminent, and provision may have to be made for financial adjustments in respect of the States under Section 147 of the Act, at a net ultimate annual cost now estimated at rather more than half a crore, though the full annual charge on this latter account will presumably not fall to be met in the early years. If, however, there is bound to be delay, the Provinces will no doubt recollect that they will be receiving from the Centre the amounts proposed above, in addition to what certain of them have already been receiving from the jute export duty and about Rs. $1\frac{1}{2}$ crores per annum for roads as well as certain grants (Rs. $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores) for rural purposes. Some of them have also received substantial assistance through being relieved of deficit areas.’

§50. **The Niemeyer Report adopted.**—As was to be expected, the publication of the Niemeyer Report raised an almost universal storm of protest in India. All the Provinces, except the Central Provinces, as a matter of course attacked the Niemeyer plan and complained about their treatment in lengthy dispatches addressed to the Secretary of State. The Government of India also sent a dispatch to the same authority summing up their views. The Provincial representations in regard to the Niemeyer Award present a rowdy scramble. Each Province is inevitably convinced of the strength of its own claims and demands greater assistance from the Centre. Above the clamour of the Provinces the Government of India’s dispatch shows how straitened its resources are bound to be by what it regards as the exceedingly, if not exclusively, generous help given by the Niemeyer plan to the Provinces. The Provincial comments are reviewed in §52 below. Lord Zetland in a dispatch (dated 20 May 1936) conveying to the Government of India the final judgement of His Majesty’s Government

upon the Niemeyer Report and the representations made by the Provincial Governments and the Government of India on that Report, entirely accepted Sir Otto Niemeyer's conclusions and proposed 1 April 1937 as the date for the commencement of provincial autonomy. Accordingly Orders-in-Council were issued on 27 May 1936, relating to the distribution of the revenues and the commencement of provincial autonomy. The Order-in-Council relating to the distribution of the revenues reproduces the Niemeyer Award without alteration. The latter thus became a *fait accompli*. The Orders-in-Council were placed before Parliament on 12 June 1936.

§51. **Some comments on the Niemeyer Award.**—The Taxation Enquiry Committee were asked seventeen years ago to prepare a theoretically correct scheme of distribution of taxes between the Centre and the Provinces. They pointed out, however, that there was no such thing as a theoretically perfect scheme. A study of the financial systems adopted in the different federations would show how little pure theory has to do with the actual arrangements adopted in them, which have been determined mainly by the special circumstances attending the formation of each federation. Facts as they exist at the moment have to be reckoned with and will influence decisions more than dogma. Sir Otto Niemeyer's recommendations are characterized by a spirit of realism and practicalness and scant regard for theory as such. This attitude comes out clearly whether we consider Sir Otto's treatment of the question of subventions or export duties or the distribution of the proceeds of the income-tax. The recommendations represent a compromise between a number of conflicting aims and view-points and it is therefore not surprising that hardly any of the interested parties feel completely satisfied with them. In fact, it is suggested as a fairly reliable test of the soundness of such arbitral awards that all the parties concerned should regard them with mild dissatisfaction. Friendly critics pleaded that none of the contestants were acutely dissatisfied and that the Report held out a reasonable prospect of financial equilibrium both at the Centre and in the Units.

§52. **Provincial grievances.**—As was to be expected, some of the beneficiaries from the subventions complained that they had been treated in a niggardly fashion when compared with others. Thus Orissa felt aggrieved that whereas the subvention in its case was only Rs. 50 lakhs, it was Rs. 105 lakhs in the case of Sind. It was also complained that since the distribution of benefits had been governed by considerations of the actual needs of every Province rather than its deserts, the assignment of revenues to the Provinces

was arbitrary and unjust. Those Provinces which had regulated their finances with economy and ability had come off worse than the spendthrift and incompetent Provinces. Bombay, for example, was aggrieved because due regard had not been paid to the years of painful thrift she had been forced to practise as a result of the inequitable Meston Award. She based her claim for a larger share of the income-tax on the additional ground that more than 25 per cent of the income-tax was realized in Bombay, and Bombay had to provide for many costly services for the benefit of her industrial population. Bombay further deplored that the distribution of the income-tax relief had been made entirely dependent upon the successful running of railways (see, however, §55 below), and pressed for the cancellation of the fictitious debt created in respect of unproductive irrigation works, financed from revenue and not from loans. The Government of Bombay protested that the relief to Bombay from separation from Sind was exaggerated. It was also argued on her behalf that if Bengal was to benefit from the jute export duty, she ought to benefit from the cotton duties. Similarly Madras felt she was entitled to more because, e.g., even on a population basis she should have got something like 24 per cent of the income-tax instead of the 20 per cent recommended. The Madras Government contrasted Provinces like Bengal which had taken least care in balancing their budgets with themselves, and complained that Bombay got too big a share of the income-tax. Bihar put in its claim as the poorest Province and wished the basis of distribution had been a population one. The Punjab complained that too much had been made of the relief secured by her through the separation of the North-West Frontier Province many years ago and that the gratuitous assumption had been made that if the Frontier Province had continued as a division of the Punjab, it would still have remained as a serious burden to the parent Province. The Punjab feared that under the Niemeyer recommendations, its receipts from the Centre would be less than they were in 1936 by about Rs. 5 lakhs per year. The United Provinces cast envious eyes at 'the big slices given to Bengal and Bombay' and urged that it ought to get more help from the Centre as well, at the expense of the industrial Provinces.

Some of the arguments on which the Provinces based their claims were theoretically unsound. For example, in dealing with the supposed rights to income-tax in relation to population or place of origin and with the question of the jute export duties, the Niemeyer Report hinted at the theoretical weakness of some of the usual arguments advanced in these connexions. The main point was whether, so long as the partners in the new political

experiment were assured of solid advantages from the Federation, it was wise on their part to insist on meticulous equality or strict distributive justice.

Some of the Provinces were no doubt guilty of improvidence and extravagance. Nevertheless all had to be made to start even as far as possible, and ideas of retributive justice were wholly out of place.

The Provinces which were in the habit of ordering their affairs with care and economy must seek consolation in the reflexion that at least in the future they will be allowed to enjoy the full benefit from their thrift and wise management and that virtue will at last be rewarded.

It is not suggested that some of the Provincial grievances are not well-founded and remediable. But it is almost impossible to make out an unanswerable case for revision. It is so easy to meet one set of clichés by another equally respectable!

One obvious fact which should be remembered is that to give more to one party means giving less to the others, that is the other Provinces or the Centre, and the need of the latter, especially of the Central Government at the present juncture, may be more urgent or it may be for the common interests of the nation that it should be adequately met.

§53. Central needs.—It is most important that the Provinces should be armed with adequate spending power for the service of the nation-building departments and it is perfectly true that the needs of the Central Government are comparatively speaking stationary and its resources may also be stationary. At the same time Sir Otto Niemeyer was right in insisting upon the stability and adequacy of Central finances as a fundamental necessity. The Centre must have enough money for its essential all-India purposes such as maintaining the credit of the country, defending the country from external aggression and internal commotions. It must also be remembered that without complete assurance of Central solvency the Indian States would be averse to joining the Federation, that under the new regime the Central Government will be required to incur a certain amount of extra expenditure, e.g. in connexion with the establishment of the Federal Court, that some of its resources are no longer so reliable as they used to be,¹ and lastly that although relatively to the Units its functions will always be narrow, they are likely to be wider in an absolute sense owing to the closer contact with the Provinces which modern improvements in

¹ For example, customs are likely to yield less because of the policy of protection; and the adverse effects of the war on the import trade, and the railways are an uncertain factor.

communication have made possible and the modern bias in favour of state intervention and central direction.

As Sir James Grigg pointed out in his 1938 Budget Statement, the Central Government had relinquished more than Rs. 20 crores of revenue to the Provinces since the war of 1914-18. Moreover in following a protective policy to the extent that had been done the Central Government had not found it easy to make up losses due to reduced import duty receipts.

The defence expenditure also has increased very greatly, however much we may deplore such a development, owing to the present war.

§54. **Concluding observations on the Niemeyer scheme.**—The success of Sir Otto's scheme, especially that part of it which was concerned with the sharing of the income-tax proceeds between the Centre and the Provinces, depended on the satisfactory working of the railways. The Provincial Governments were in their own interests required to co-operate with the Government of India in restoring the prosperity of railways and making them once more substantial contributors to the general revenues. (See, however, §55 below.) This involved the regulation of the Provincial road policy so that the roads should assist instead of competing with the railways. It also involved a 'thoroughgoing overhaul of railway expenditure' on the part of the Central Government and a proper co-ordination of the different forms of transport. (See ch. v.)

The realization of the Railway surplus in 1937-8 together with the suspension of railway liabilities and the improved revenue position of the Central Government enabled the assignment of income-tax to the Provinces under the Niemeyer Award to be begun with effect from the financial year 1937-8. On the basis of the revised estimates the amounts payable to the Provinces were as follows: Rs. 1,38 lakhs in 1937-8; Rs. 1,50 lakhs in 1938-9; Rs. 2,79 lakhs in 1939-40; and Rs. 3,73 lakhs in 1940-1. The share of the Provinces is expected to reach the figure of Rs. 4,46 lakhs in the year 1941-2.

Even Sir Otto Niemeyer did not expect the Provincial Governments to obtain any share in the income-tax until after five years from the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy.

In conclusion, we may welcome Sir Otto Niemeyer's proposals as an honest attempt on the part of an acknowledged financial expert to solve a difficult and complicated problem.

§55. **Alteration in the Niemeyer formula for assignment of Provincial shares of income-tax.**—Recently (February 1940) the Niemeyer formula for the assignment of their share of the income-tax

to the Provinces was amended by Parliament. Under the amended Order-in-Council (which came into effect from 1 April 1939), the Railway contribution has been altogether excluded from Central calculation of the sum available for the Provinces, and the Central share of the divisible pool has been fixed at the average of the last three years, namely Rs. $4\frac{1}{2}$ crores, for each of the three years 1939-40, 1940-1 and 1941-2; the balance being distributed to the Provinces. The justification for this alteration is the complete change in the financial situation brought about by the war, which has entailed heavy expenditure by the Central Government and adversely affected the customs revenue. It would therefore have been anomalous if the increased income-tax revenue, largely derived from the same war conditions, had entirely accrued to the Provinces as it would have done under the old formula, which also gave the Provinces the whole benefit from the increase in the Railway surplus, even though it was the result of increased rates and fares resorted to by the Central Government for its own needs and the increase in traffic due to war conditions. It is, however, presumed that the Provincial share of income-tax is not likely to be reduced under the new arrangement, as the Provinces will get the benefit of the improvement in the income-tax revenue under the new Income-Tax Act (1939) and that portion of the Excess Profits Tax which is not classed as Corporation Tax. The amendment was necessary in the interest of India as a whole and is by no means unfair to the Provinces.

§56. **Recent Provincial finance.**—The following two tables illustrate the financial position of the Provinces individually as well as in the aggregate.¹

Table I shows that the expenditure in the Provinces has risen substantially, the rise between 1923-4 and 1928-9 being no less than 22 per cent as compared with an increase of only 4 per cent in the revenue. The continued increase in Provincial expenditure was made possible by the remission of Provincial contributions the benefit of which, however, was confined to only a few of them. Between 1930-1 and 1934-5, while Provincial revenues received a setback owing to the severe economic depression, there was no corresponding reduction in expenditure, and a succession of deficit years was inevitable. The position improved in the next few years, at any rate in some of the Provinces.

Table II shows that since the introduction of Provincial Autonomy both the revenue and expenditure of the Provincial Governments have shown considerable increase. Provinces have

¹ See also Tables on pp. 508-9.

TABLE I¹
 TOTAL REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF PROVINCES
In crores of rupees

Year	Revenue	Contributions to Central Government	Retained Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -
1921-2	80.26	9.83	70.43	79.16	- 8.73
1922-3	84.94	9.20	75.74	77.23	- 1.49
1923-4	88.05	9.20	78.85	76.09	+ 2.76
1924-5	90.48	9.20	81.28	78.41	+ 2.87
1925-6	93.71	6.20	87.51	85.89	+ 1.62
1926-7	91.60	5.17	86.43	90.17	- 3.74
1927-8	93.29	...	93.29	91.50	+ 1.79
1928-9	91.49	...	91.49	92.91	- 1.42
1929-30	94.58	...	94.58	93.80	+ 0.78
1930-1	83.08	...	83.08	94.25	- 11.17
1931-2	83.18	...	83.18	86.70	- 3.52
1932-3	84.35	...	84.35	85.67	- 1.32
1933-4	82.85	...	82.85	85.90	- 3.05
1935-6	89.02	...	89.02	88.69	+ 0.33
1936-7	92.34	...	92.34	91.55	+ 0.79
1937-8	85.66	...	85.66	83.10	+ 2.56
1938-9	84.75	...	84.74	85.76	- 1.02
1939-40 (Revised)	89.42	...	89.42	90.55	- 1.13
1940-1 (Budget)	90.38	...	90.38	91.15	- 0.77

benefited by receipts from the Central Government on account of taxes on income as a result of the Niemeyer Award, the annual cash subventions to some Provinces, and the increased share in the jute export duty in favour of the jute-growing provinces (see §49 *ante*) under the same award. As already pointed out, new taxes, such as Sales Taxes, Employment Taxes, Urban Immoveable Property Taxes (as in Bombay), etc. have been resorted to by the Provinces partly to find additional revenue for the expansion of educational and generally nation-building departments, and partly to meet the gap in the revenue caused by the introduction of partial prohibition in some of the provinces. The Budget estimates for 1940-1 showed a smaller deficit than the revised estimates for 1939-40, due to increased land revenue receipts as a result of increased commodity prices following the outbreak of war and partly due to higher income-tax receipts under the Niemeyer Award.

¹ See *Simon Commission Report*, vol. II, par. 254; and *Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India* (1939-40). The figures for 1937-8 and the subsequent years are exclusive of Burma. The reader is referred to two recent publications for an instructive study of recent provincial finance: C. N. Vakil and M. H. Patel *Finance under Provincial Autonomy*, ch. v, and P. J. Thomas, *The Growth of Federal Finance in India*, pp. 426-8.

TABLE II
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETS¹

In lakhs of rupees

	Accounts 1937-8			Accounts 1938-9			Revised Estimates 1939-40			Budget Estimates 1940-1		
	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus + Deficit -
Madras	16,01	15,83	+ 18	16,13	16,10	+ 3	16,41	16,41	- ..	16,76	16,75	+ 1
Bombay	12,44	12,14	+ 30	12,45	12,80	- 35	13,02	13,03	- 1	12,83	12,82	+ 1
Bengal	13,01	11,83	+ 1,18	12,77	12,77	..	14,03	14,17	- 14	13,97	14,54	- 57
United Provinces	12,33	12,34	- 1	12,80	12,80	..	13,32	13,62	- 30	13,58	13,58	..
Punjab	11,98	11,47	+ 51	11,17	11,61	- 44	11,69	12,19	- 50	11,74	12,02	- 28
Bihar	5,03	4,95	+ 8	5,24	4,93	+ 31	5,46	5,50	- 4	5,50	5,46	+ 4
Central Provinces	4,54	4,66	- 12	4,27	4,71	- 44	4,87	4,84	+ 3	4,95	4,95	..
Assam	2,73	2,78	- 5	2,58	2,99	- 41	2,82	3,00	- 18	3,24	3,19	+ 5
North-West Frontier Province	1,82	1,79	+ 3	1,81	1,78	+ 3	1,85	1,88	- 3	1,86	1,86	..
Orissa	1,85	1,76	+ 9	1,82	1,81	+ 1	1,94	1,96	- 2	1,95	2,00	- 5
Sind	3,92	3,55	+ 37	3,70	3,46	+ 24	4,01	3,95	+ 6	4,00	3,98	+ 2
Total	85,66	83,10	+ 2,56	84,74	85,76	- 1,02	89,42	90,55	- 1,13	90,38	- 91,15	- 77

¹ Report on Currency and Finance (Reserve Bank of India), (1938-9) statement xi, and (1939-40) statement ix.

LOCAL FINANCE

§57. **Local (Rural) Boards.**—Since nearly 90 per cent of the population of British India lives in rural areas, far greater importance attaches to District and Sub-District Boards than to the municipalities which serve the numerically insignificant urban population. At one time Provincial Rates or surcharges on land used to be an important item in the Budget of the Central Government. Today, however, they form a substantial part of the revenues of District and Local Boards, representing a proportion of total income varying from 25 per cent in Bombay to 63 per cent in Bihar and Orissa (in 1922-3). They were originally started in Bombay and Madras between 1865 and 1869 and were levied on land chiefly for the construction and repair of roads, the upkeep of schools and dispensaries, village sanitation and other local expenditure. The principle was extended in pursuance of Lord Mayo's scheme of financial decentralization. In 1871 Acts were passed levying similar cesses in Bengal, the United Provinces, and the Punjab. In the Punjab and Oudh, cesses for roads, schools and the District post, assessed at the time of the land revenue settlement, were continued side by side with the new general cess. Similar settlement cesses were introduced in the Central Provinces, Burma and Assam, which were later replaced by a general cess. Between 1871 and 1905, there were added certain cesses for Imperial purposes. The Famine Insurance Fund was instituted in 1878, to which were added, in some Provinces, cesses for Provincial purposes, chiefly for the payment of village officers. The financial improvement in the position of the Government of India made possible the abolition in 1905-6 of all cesses levied for other than local purposes. In some cases, however, the effect of this reform was not to reduce the amount of the cesses levied, but to transfer the fund from Provincial to local purposes, the Provincial Government being compensated from the Imperial Treasury. Recently there has been a tendency in some Provinces either to increase the general rate or, as in Madras, to add new cesses for specific local purposes such as elementary education. The basis of these local cesses on land varies with the system of land revenue. Thus in the ryotwari areas of Bombay, Madras, the Central Provinces and Berar, and in the temporarily settled areas of Assam, the cess is levied on the basis of land revenue. In the United Provinces and the Punjab, on the other hand, the annual value is taken, with twice the land revenue as the basis. In the permanently settled areas either the rental value or the acreage is accepted as the basis. As regards the rates of the cesses,

they are left to the discretion of the local bodies, subject to certain maxima and minima laid down by the Provincial Legislatures. The land cesses are collected along with the land revenue but are largely administered by the local bodies. The limits vary from $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.¹ The land cess, although it is not proportioned to ability to pay, being levied at a flat rate, is everywhere recognized as an appropriate tax as it is applied for the benefit of the properties which gain by the activities of the Local Boards. We have already referred to the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Committee that the land revenue should be standardized at a low rate so as to leave a wider margin for local taxation.²

The subjoined table indicates the principal sources of revenue and items of expenditure and the aggregate revenue and expenditure of District and Local Boards in British India.³

In lakhs of rupees

INCOME (excluding balances)	1915-16	1936-7	EXPENDITURE	1915-16	1936-7
	Provincial rates ...	3.39		5.25	Education
Civil Works ...	1.43	2.27	Civil Works ...	4.16	4.20
Other sources ...	2.68	8.71	Sanitation, Hospitals, etc. ...	70	2.14
Total ...	7.50	16.23	Debt and Miscellaneous	1.32	3.61
Incidence per head	RS A P 0 5 1	RS A P 0 9 8	Total ...	8.00	16.22

The above table shows an increase of income from Rs. 7.50 lakhs in 1915-16 to Rs. 16.23 lakhs in 1936-7. But as this income has to be divided among 1,096 Boards, the poverty of an average Board stands out clearly.

§58. *Municipal finance.*—As may be seen from the table on p. 584, the main source of the income of municipalities is rates and taxes, which account for about two-thirds of the total municipal revenues.

¹ According to the Layton Report there is no longer any excuse for the retention of the maximum (which in some Provinces has been one anna in the rupee, and has remained unchanged for over fifty years) because (i) the land revenue no longer represents a very high proportion of the net produce, especially in the permanently settled Provinces, and (ii) all the other cesses on land have been abolished. See *Simon Commission Report*, par. 275.

² See vol. I, ch. xii, §37.

³ These figures represent the aggregate revenue and expenditure of 1,144 and 1,096 Boards (including Union Panchayats in Madras) in 1915-16 and 1937-8 respectively. See *Statistical Abstract for British India*, 1923-4 and 1937-8.

The remaining one-third is derived from municipal property, contributions out of Provincial revenues and miscellaneous sources. The taxes levied by the local authorities may be grouped under four heads: (i) Taxes on trade, for example octroi duties, terminal taxes, tolls, etc.; (ii) taxes on property, for example taxes on houses and their sites (and in rural areas the cess on land); (iii) taxes on persons, for example taxes on circumstances, professions, trades and callings, on pilgrims, on menials and domestic servants, etc.; and (iv) fees and licenses. Fees are either for specific services rendered by the municipality, such as scavenging fees, or are partly of the nature of luxury taxes and partly levied for purposes of regulation, such as licenses for music, vehicles, dogs and other animals, etc. There are also license fees for offensive and dangerous trades. The Taxation Enquiry Committee point out that considerable vigilance is necessary in respect of indirect taxes, such as taxes on trade taking the form of octroi, terminal taxes and tolls, so as to prevent undue interference with inter-Provincial traffic. Special objection is taken to the octroi and terminal taxes which offend against all the canons of taxation, and substitutes such as a tax on retail sales or profession taxes are suggested. At any rate a judicious modification of the present system of octroi duties is necessary. Another important suggestion of the Committee is in favour of increased assessment of town property which benefits largely from municipal activities. The machinery for collection and assessment, however, would have to be far more efficient for this purpose than it happens to be today. The heaviest items of expenditure, as the table on p. 584 shows, are public health and convenience, public works and education. The municipalities are often unable to meet their expenditure from ordinary revenues and have generally therefore to borrow money, either from the Government or in the open market, to carry out such large projects as water supply, drainage works, etc. The borrowings of the Bombay Municipality are the biggest, its loan liabilities on 31 March 1937 amounting to Rs. 15.65 crores.

Since the total income indicated in the table is distributed among as many as 812 municipalities, it is obvious that the average municipality in India must be very poor in resources. The Bombay Corporation alone has an income of about Rs. 3¼ crores, and the Calcutta Corporation an income of over Rs. 2 1/3 crores. While Bombay and Calcutta, however, stand head and shoulders above an average municipality in this country in point of the size of revenue they enjoy, they cannot stand comparison, for instance, with the city of Glasgow which, with a population approximately

In lakhs of rupees¹

	1915-16	1936-7		1915-16	1936-7
SOURCES OF INCOME			HEADS OF EXPENDITURE		
Municipal Rates and Taxes: Octroi ...	1,45	1,47	General Administration and collection charges ...	76	1,84
Taxes on houses and lands ...	1,87	5,27	Public Safety: Lighting ...	43.7	1,32
Tax on animals and vehicles ...	21	48	Police ...	0.4	1
Tax on professions and trades ...	18	32	Fire, etc. ...	9.1	17
Tolls on roads and ferries ...	17	30	Total ...	53.2	1,50
Water rate ...	97	2,26	Public Health and Convenience—		
Lighting rate ...	15	43	Water supply, drainage and conservancy ...	3,32	5,14
Conservancy rates ...	61	1,20	Hospitals and dispensaries and vaccination ...	50	98
Other taxes ...	19	1,92	Plague charges, markets, gardens and sanitary ...	50	94
Total rates and taxes	5,80	13,54	Public works ...	1,42	2,34
Realizations under special Acts ...	11	18	Public instruction ...	62	2,40
Grants from Government ...	84	94	Contributions for general purposes ...	27	74
Rent of lands, houses, etc. ...	23	54	Miscellaneous: Interest on loans ...	77	1,57
Fees ...	38	1,05	Other miscellaneous expenditure ...	43	1,29
Receipts from markets and slaughter houses ...	47	93	Total Expenditure	9,12.2	18,74
Other sources and miscellaneous ...	85	1,66	Extraordinary and Debt:	6,33.0	20,82
Total Income	8,67	18,94	Grand Total ...	15,45.2	39,56
Extraordinary and Debt:	6,44	23,06			
Grand Total ...	15,11	42,00			
Incidence per head	RS A P	RS A P			
(i) Rates and Taxes	3 5 9	5 14 2			
(ii) Total income, excluding Extraordinary and Debt	5 0 3	8 2 8			

equal to that of Calcutta, has twelve times the income of Calcutta. §59. Inadequate resources of local bodies.—It is not necessary here to trace the progress of local self-government in India since its inception in Lord Mayo's time. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the financial position in recent times of the local self-governing bodies—urban (municipalities) and rural (rural boards). With the inauguration of the Reforms and the transfer of Local Self-Government to ministers, the question of local finance

¹ These figures represent the aggregate revenue and expenditure of 714 and 812 municipalities in 1915-16 and 1936-7 respectively. See *Statistical Abstract for British India* (1937-8), Tables No. 35 and 36.

has come into increased prominence. Considering the devolution of powers to local bodies that has taken place and the wide range of functions assigned to the municipalities, rural boards and panchayats, such as Public Health, Education, etc., the resources of these bodies are at present utterly inadequate. It is impossible for them to introduce modern standards of administration unless they are put on an ampler financial basis.¹ Under the new constitutions (1919 and 1935), the local bodies are called upon to meet expenditure on services previously rendered gratis by Government servants belonging to the various departments. Also, in the first flush of enthusiasm the local bodies forgot that 'all undertakings depend upon finance',² and launched costly and ambitious schemes of education, medical relief, etc., which were beyond their powers. The financial difficulties thus caused have recently been met partly by retrenchment, partly by additional taxation and partly also by a more careful distribution of the available resources.

§60. **Causes of Inadequacy of resources.**—Apart from the general low taxable capacity of the people and their alleged unwillingness to tax themselves for local purposes, another important factor explaining the inadequacy of local resources is the unfair distribution of revenues between the Central, Provincial and local authorities. In England the bulk of the contribution from land goes to the local bodies, the Central Government receiving only a very small amount as land tax. In India, on the other hand, taxation of agricultural land has been a provincial fiscal source, and the principal source of revenue (local fund cess) of local boards is thus under provincial control. As the Provincial Governments themselves have not been provided with adequate sources of revenue, and yet have had to undertake several schemes of economic and social reform, they have been driven to levy new taxation, such as a tax on immoveable property as in Bombay or sales taxes or the entertainment tax, which should have been left to the local bodies. The Bombay Local Self-Government Committee, presided over by Professor V. G. Kale, in their recent (1940) Report rightly observe: 'The fiscal fields of the Provincial Government and of the local authorities are not clearly demarcated and the former has been exploiting potential sources of revenue,' which

¹ The poverty of our local bodies stands in marked contrast with the rich resources of similar bodies elsewhere. For example, as the Simon Commission point out, 'local rates of all kinds, urban as well as rural, produced in 1927-8 in British India about £12½ millions, which is only little more than the income from rates in that year of the London County Council alone'.—*Simon Commission Report*, vol. I, par. 377.

² Kautilya's dictum adopted as a motto by the Taxation Enquiry Committee.

should rightly belong to local bodies. The necessity for demarcating clearly the spheres of provincial and local finances appears to be urgent. One of the reasons for the financial weakness of the local bodies in India is that the local bodies have developed by the process of devolution of powers instead of the process of a federation of strong, semi-independent smaller units into larger political units. Another reason is that the jurisdictions of the local bodies are usually so extensive as to remove them from effective touch with taxpayers. Had it not been for this, the imposition of taxes on houses and persons by local bodies in the villages would have been easier. From this point of view, the restoration of the influence of the village panchayats and a limitation of the functions of the bodies at present operating would be desirable.

§61. **Improvement of resources.**—‘Though the recommendations of the Decentralization Commission and the introduction of the Reforms (1919) have led to considerable financial freedom being conferred upon local authorities, there has been no material change so far as the nature of the taxes imposed is concerned except that the taxes which may be levied without the sanction of the Government of India have been specified in the Scheduled Taxes Rules.¹ The Taxation Enquiry Committee made the following recommendations with a view to increasing the resources of the local bodies: (i) standardization of the land revenue at a low rate so as to give better scope for local taxation; (ii) transfer to local bodies of a share of the collection of Provincial Governments from ground rents in towns and from an increase in the rates of non-agricultural land; (iii) empowering municipalities to tax advertisements; (iv) extending the scope of taxes on entertainment and betting; and giving local bodies a substantial share of the proceeds; (v) extending and improving the administration of the taxes on circumstances, property and professions; (vi) reducing the import duty on motor cars and enabling the Provincial Governments to levy a provincial tax in lieu of tolls for distribution to local bodies; (vii) empowering local bodies in selected areas to levy a fee for the registration of marriages; and (viii) supplementing the resources of local authorities by subsidies which should be ordinarily restricted to services of national importance and granted in such

¹ The Scheduled Taxes which the local authorities can impose under these rules are tolls; taxes on land and land values; taxes on buildings; on vehicles or boats; on animals; on menials and domestic servants; octroi duties and terminal taxes; taxes on goods imported into or exported from a local area; taxes on trades, professions and callings; taxes on private markets; taxes for services rendered, for example, water rate and drainage tax; and fees for the use of markets and other public conveniences

a way as to enable the Provincial Government effectively to enforce efficiency.¹ The Bombay Local Self-Government Committee endorse most of these recommendations and make the following proposals for improving the financial resources of local bodies. Sources of municipal revenues could be increased by (i) a tax on the transfer of immoveable properties; (ii) an assignment of a share of non-agricultural assessment on building plots within municipal limits; (iii) taxes on marriages, adoptions and feasts; (iv) an assignment of the entertainment tax and of 50 per cent of the revenue derived from a surcharge on electricity. For rural local bodies the Committee recommend (i) an increase in the local fund cess from 1 anna to 1½ annas or even 2½ annas; (ii) the levy of a cess of 1½ annas on forest revenue derived from major forest produce and (iii) an assignment of 10 per cent of the land revenue. The Committee rightly point out that the method most suitable to local bodies lies in taxes and cesses levied upon the people for definite services rendered to them, e.g. a compulsory education cess.² Another way of increasing the resources of the local bodies is to extend the scope of municipal trading and enterprise so as to lessen the existing dependence on taxes. In view of the comparative inelasticity of the local taxes it is desirable to make use of non-taxation sources to a larger extent than at present. In Western countries, the scope of municipal domain—landed estates and especially industrial and trading domain—is on the increase and there are municipal tramways, waterworks, gas and electric works, burial grounds, bathing establishments, fisheries, docks, bakeries, theatres, inns and restaurants, mills, factories, dairies, etc. All these enterprises are apparently not only rendering effective service to the civic population but are also a substantial source of revenue for the municipalities.³ This aspect of local finance has been entirely neglected in India and it appears worth while for the local bodies to explore its possibilities so as to add to their slender resources and increase the amenities of civic life.

¹ *Taxation Enquiry Committee Report*, pars. 194-6.

² *Report of the Bombay Local Self-Government Committee (1940)*.

³ Shah and Bahadurji, *Functions and Finance of Indian Municipalities*, p. 434.

CHAPTER XII

UNEMPLOYMENT

§1. **Scope of the chapter.**—A permanent margin of unemployment among industrial workers is a feature of the economic system called into existence by the Industrial Revolution in Western countries. Certain palliatives, such as unemployment insurance allowances and poor relief funds, have come into use more or less in these countries, without however touching the fundamental cause of unemployment, namely, a maladjustment between production and consumption inseparable from the existing individualistic system of competitive production for world markets. Depression in industry after the war of 1914-18 created an unemployment situation of unprecedented magnitude. But though the evil has manifested itself on a scale unknown in the past, the phenomenon of industrial unemployment itself is sufficiently familiar in the West.

With us here in India, the problem of unemployment presents aspects which, while equally difficult to tackle, are somewhat different from those found in Western countries. In the first place, the vast majority of the population depends upon agriculture, and we have already seen that, in most parts of India, there is seasonal unemployment in agriculture for five to nine months in the year during the slack season; and we have discussed the question of suitable supplementary industries to keep the cultivator occupied during this period of enforced idleness. But a more serious aspect of the unemployment problem presents itself in connexion with the periodical occurrence of scarcity or famine, due to a partial or total failure of the monsoon, leading to a partial or complete stoppage of agricultural operations over wide areas, and disengaging a vast quantity of agricultural labour and of labour employed in industries subsidiary to agriculture. This is by far the most serious form of unemployment to which India is liable.

Turning to occupations and industries other than agriculture, we may distinguish between the manual or hard-handed workers, and the intellectual and clerical or soft-handed workers constituting the so-called educated middle class. Regarding the former category of industrial workers, it is clear that unemployment among them, though not unknown, does not as yet exist on the Western scale for the simple reason that our industrial development is not yet of an advanced character. Such organized industries

as we had were no doubt caught up in the world-wide depression of 1929-33, and there existed a good deal of industrial unemployment in India as in the case of the other industrial countries of the world. Owing to the closure of workshops and factories, or retrenchment in them, a number of operatives, skilled and unskilled, were without work. But in more normal times the complaint is rather that there is scarcity of industrial labour than that there is unemployment among its ranks. Moreover, unemployment when it does come has not the same terrors for the operatives in India as in the West, owing to the fact that most of our industrial labourers have predominant agricultural interests. Often indeed work in a factory is regarded as a second string to the bow and is taken up only during the slack agricultural season. Industrial unemployment in India differs from the corresponding phenomenon in the West not only as regards the scale but also as regards the nature of the problem it creates for the State. To a certain extent the problem is automatically solved in India by many of the unemployed returning to their villages. The distress is in this way merely *transferred* from the industrial to the rural areas, and not really remedied. But it at least largely disappears from sight so far as the industrial centres are concerned and one does not see as in Europe shoals of the unemployed walking the streets of our industrial cities in vain search of work.

As distinguished from unemployment among industrial workers in organized industries, there is some unemployment among cottage workers. In our chapter on the economic transition in India¹ and our discussion of the position of cottage industries,² a general idea has already been obtained as to the manner in which the different classes of artisans have been affected by the transition, and we have formed some notion of the hardship and distress which have been the portion of many of them, who, having lost their old occupations, have not found a satisfactory substitute for them.

Another species of unemployment which is comparatively a modern growth in India is middle class unemployment, affecting those who have attained a certain standard of education and who depend more or less exclusively upon non-manual or clerical occupations. This is a problem that has recently pushed itself very much to the forefront.

In this chapter we propose to concentrate attention on rural unemployment due to famines and middle class unemployment.

¹ Vol. I, ch. v.

² Ch. ii, §§41-8.

RURAL UNEMPLOYMENT : FAMINES AND FAMINE RELIEF

§2. **Responsibility for famines.**—The frequent occurrence of famines in the last quarter of the nineteenth century accompanied by a political awakening of the people gave these calamities a prominence which possibly they would not have attained otherwise. Indian publicists attributed their severity to the industrial, financial and land revenue policy of the Government. By the great majority of people, the British Government came to be regarded as the sole cause of famines, and this facile view of things was not disturbed by unimpeachable historical evidence of equally, if not more, severe famines in the pre-British days. This uncritical attitude elicited the cheap retort that famines were entirely due to failure of rains—a circumstance beyond the control of the British or any other Government. This, however, rather missed the point of the critics, who blamed the Government not for withholding rain but for causing the impoverishment of the people which made them incapable or resisting the effects of occasional scarcity. In this chapter, however, we are not concerned with locating the responsibility for Indian poverty but with the less contentious subject of the nature of Indian famines and the machinery devised to combat them.

§3. **Economic effects of famines.**—The economic effects of famines are bound to be disastrous in a preponderantly agricultural country like India. The heavy mortality due to sheer starvation, which used to be a regular feature of the famines in the old days, has ceased to characterize modern famines, though the epidemics which still follow in the wake of famines send up the mortality figures very greatly. There is a general lowering of the efficiency of the surviving people, and the suspension of cultivation involves a great economic loss to cultivators. Food famines are often accompanied by fodder famines, and the resulting loss of cattle further hampers agriculture. There is also an adverse reaction on trade and industry because of the reduction in the purchasing power of large numbers of people. Public finance is greatly disorganized and the Government is hit hard both on the side of revenue which inevitably shrinks and of expenditure which equally inevitably expands.

§4. **History of famine relief.**¹—It is wrong to suppose that in the pre-British days there were no famines at all or that they were less severe than in the present days. We read that in the famine of 1291 whole families drowned themselves as an escape from

¹ For a brief, but excellent, treatment of famines in India, see A. Loveday, *The History and Economics of Indian Famines*.

starvation, also that in the famine of 1555 people tried to live on the hides of dead beasts, and that the famine of 1630 actually led to cannibalism. In the face of these terrible records of well-authenticated facts, it is impossible to subscribe to the popular opinion that the British in some mysterious way brought famines with them to India. Famines on the contrary were more common in pre-British days while, owing to defective communications, the system of famine relief was inevitably less effective than at present. There were central granaries at the capitals which were originally maintained as war chests, but which in times of famines could be used to feed the starving poor. As communications were undeveloped, the village rather than the Central Government became the vital organization of society, and it was the surplus grain stored in the villages from which any relief could be expected. The efficacy of this arrangement depended on the intensity of the famine and its duration. The construction of public works like canals and tanks or the erection of temples, mosques, forts or palaces at public expense gave employment to a number of people and may have been useful in mitigating distress. Lastly, it may be believed that the kings occasionally attempted direct charity, which, however, from the nature of things could not have been anything but inadequate as a remedial measure. The present view as to the responsibility of the State in this matter is a very recent growth.

Coming to the British period, the most important famines during the regime of the East India Company between 1760 and 1857 were those of 1770, 1784, 1802, 1824 and 1837. Excepting the first in the list, these famines did not receive the same elaborate attention, either at the hands of the Government, or of the historians, as the famines of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The minds of people were preoccupied with other grave matters, such as the continuous wars, the widespread disorder caused by the sudden introduction of unfamiliar judicial and land revenue systems and a corrupt administration in the hands of ill-paid and inexperienced officials, unemployment on a large scale caused by the sudden demobilization of the troops of Indian princes, the depredations of the Pindaris, etc. The political and administrative preoccupations of the Company made it indifferent to the question of the economic regeneration of the people. Even if it had the opportunities, it is doubtful whether it would have had the will to do anything, because its whole outlook was vitiated by commercial considerations and it seemed to be more concerned with the dividends of its shareholders than with the lives of those from whom these dividends were drawn. The Company in the later years of

its existence acknowledged in a general way its obligations to the famine-stricken people; but it failed to evolve any systematic famine policy. Slipshod and spasmodic efforts were made to deal with famines by regulating prices and trade in corn, encouraging emigration and occasionally undertaking public works. But all this was mere tinkering with a vast problem.

It is to the period following the transfer of India to the Crown in 1858 that we must turn for the elaboration of a proper system of prevention, insurance and relief evolved through many experiments and failures. In this period fall several great famines such as that of north-west India in 1860, of Orissa in 1865, of Rajputana in 1868, of Bihar in 1873, of South India in 1876 and the two widespread famines of 1896 and 1899-1900 which affected various parts of India, including Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces. The Orissa famine of 1865 affected five crores of people and was responsible for a heavy mortality of ten lakhs. The Government were slow to take action in the beginning, though food was later poured in large quantities into the affected areas. The great loss of life in this famine led to an inquiry presided over by Sir John Campbell, and the Government announced their definite policy to save life at any cost. In the Bihar famine of 1873 the Government erred in the direction of indiscriminate charity and excessive expenditure. The great South India famine of 1876-8 involved a mortality of 52 lakhs. This led to the appointment of the first great Famine Commission presided over by Sir Richard Strachey, and on the measures taken by the Government of India at the instance of this Commission is based the subsequently elaborated machinery of famine relief. Among the steps taken by the Government may be mentioned the introduction in 1878 of a Famine Insurance Grant by which a sum of Rs. 1½ crores was provided in the annual budget of the Government of India to be spent on direct relief if there was a famine, and on the construction of public works of a protective nature if the year was normal; the extension of communications by the system of the 'new guaranteed railways'; the clear definition of the principles of famine relief as provision of work to the able-bodied at a wage sufficient to secure health but not ordinary comforts, and gratuitous relief to the infirm in their own villages or in poor-houses; assistance to the landowning classes by way of takkavi loans; and the suspension and remission of land revenue. Famine codes embodying these principles were made for every Province. These codes were put to a severe test during the famines of 1896-7 and 1899-1900 and were amended in the light of the experience then gained. The earlier of these famines was followed by the appointment of a

Commission presided over by Sir James Lyall, which made certain recommendations for the relief of special classes like weavers and hill tribes, proposed rules for the management of charitable funds, advocated a freer grant of gratuitous relief in villages, but disapproved of the extension of decentralized relief works. The second of these famines came too rapidly on the heels of the first to allow the Government time to consider these recommendations. In 1900 the Maharaja of Jaipur donated Rs. 16 lakhs to constitute the nucleus of the Indian Peoples' Famine Trust. In 1901 the last Famine Commission under Sir Antony Macdonell emphasized the importance of 'moral strategy' or 'putting heart into the people', that is, assisting the people by loans and other means immediately danger is scented, by the prompt and liberal distribution of *takkavi*, early suspension of land revenue, and a policy of 'prudent boldness' involving the preparation of a large and elastic plan of relief, constant vigilance and full enlistment of non-official help. The Commission further drew attention to the necessity of devising measures for tackling a fodder famine and of saving cattle. Lastly it recommended the starting of co-operative credit societies and the extension of State irrigation works of a protective character. The amended famine codes embodying these principles have well stood the test of subsequent famines, such as that of the United Provinces in 1907, of Ahmednagar in 1912, and the far more serious scarcity of 1918 and 1920, and these visitations of nature may now be said to have been brought more effectively under human control than ever before in the history of India.

§5. *Change in the nature of famines.*—One main cause why this satisfactory result has been brought about is that the nature of famines has entirely changed. The Special Commission of 1867 defined famine as 'suffering from hunger on the part of large classes of population', but the history of famines in India is largely a discovery of a change in the meaning of that word brought about by two main factors: first, the improved means of communication and transport by which deficiency in one part can be relieved by drawing upon the abundance in other parts; and secondly, the progressive perfection of the administrative organization dealing with famines.¹ We have now no such thing as a food famine, for although the rains may fail in one part, it is very rarely that this is not balanced by an exceptionally good monsoon somewhere else; and thus, taking the country as a whole, there is generally the usual quantity of food available.

¹ See Loveday, *op. cit.*

Since modern famines are not food famines but money famines, what the State is called upon to do is to provide work and wages on an adequate scale. At present a famine is more accurately described as a temporary dislocation of employment due to the failure of crops, than as widespread death from starvation. Famine relief therefore primarily consists in providing employment for those against whom nature has declared a temporary lock-out.³ When ordinary employment fails, the Government open relief works on which practically everyone who seeks employment gets it and is able to earn enough by way of wages to enable him to buy just sufficient food.

§6. **Classification of causes and remedies.**—The causes of famines may roughly be divided into two kinds: (i) immediate and direct causes like drought or the after-effects of drought; and (ii) remote but fundamental causes which have to do with the intense poverty of the people and their consequent inability to resist the slightest disturbance of the normal economic life. The first kind of causes can be met by the adoption of measures for the alleviation of distress or by making wise provision beforehand and remaining always in a state of preparedness to meet the calamity. Storage of grain and fodder and all insurance schemes are instances of previous preparedness. To deal with the second kind of causes we must dig deep down into the fundamentals of the question of Indian poverty. The solution of this tremendous problem has to be approached from many sides and involves the adoption of an all-round intensive programme of economic regeneration.

§7. **Direct causes and remedies.**—The chief direct cause of famines being deficiency or total failure of rains, it would be clearly an advantage if the probable character of the coming monsoon could be foretold. The Meteorological Department keeps a regular record of the weather conditions prevailing in the different parts of the country. It is supposed that these data and especially a scientific study of the conditions prevailing in the upper strata of the air are capable of furnishing sufficient clues for making successful forecasts about the monsoon. Excessive rains and floods are also causes of famines, but the damage due to these can generally be repaired with comparative ease. Locusts and other insect pests and various kinds of fungi are often responsible for failure of crops. Government mycologists and other experts are engaged in fighting these causes.

³ See Sir T. Morison, *Economic Transition in India*, p. 124.

§8. **Famine Insurance and Relief Funds.**—The precautionary measures against famine include the Famine Insurance Grant mentioned above. The Government of India used to allot funds out of this grant to the different provinces according to their needs. Before the Reforms famine relief had come to be a regular divided head of expenditure, the Central Government bearing two-thirds, and the Provincial Governments one-third, of the expenditure. But after the financial decentralization that followed the Reforms of 1919 each province was required to provide for its own famine insurance out of its revenues annually. The unspent grant formed part of the Central balances on which the Central Government paid interest. The balances of the fund could be spent on (i) relief of famine, (ii) construction of protective works for prevention of famines, and (iii) grant of loans to cultivators. A scale of the Famine Insurance Fund was laid down, and each Provincial Government was required to contribute from its resources a fixed sum every year for Famine Insurance in proportion to its liability to famine. Thus while Bombay, the Central, and United Provinces contributed to the Famine Insurance Fund Rs. 63·60, 47·26, and 39·60 lakhs respectively, Bihar and Orissa, Madras and the Punjab contributed Rs. 11·62, 6·61 and 3·81 lakhs respectively. The contribution of Bengal was Rs. 2·00 lakhs, and of Burma and Assam, only Rs. 0·67 and 0·10 lakhs respectively. The aggregate contribution to the Famine Insurance Fund was Rs. 175·27 lakhs annually.

The constitution of the Famine Insurance Fund underwent a radical change with effect from the financial year 1928-9. Under the new regulations, the Fund ceased to be an Insurance Fund. It was called the Famine Relief Fund and it provided as its main object for expenditure on famine relief proper; the word famine being held to cover famine due to drought or other natural calamities. Accordingly, the annual assignment from the revenue, as well as the balances till they exceeded a certain amount, were not expended save upon the relief of famine. Loans to cultivators are not granted from the new Famine Relief Fund direct, though the Fund may advance money for financing the Provincial Loan Account if and when its balance exceeds the prescribed minimum. The balances at the credit of the old Famine Insurance Fund on 31 March 1928 were transferred to the new Fund on 1 April 1928. In Burma and Assam, where no Famine Relief Fund had been created, the balances at the credit of the old Famine Insurance Fund were transferred to the general balances of the provinces. The additions to the Famine Relief Fund during the year 1939-40 amounted to Rs. 13·45 lakhs; the total withdrawals, to Rs. 24·29

lakhs; and the closing (gross) balance on 31 March 1940 was Rs. 3,07.67 lakhs.¹

The new Constitution under the Government of India Act, 1935, contains no provision for a separate Famine Relief Fund. From the institution of Provincial Autonomy on 1 April 1937 the balances at the credit of the Fund have been handed over to the provinces, and it has been left to Provincial Governments and their legislatures to take the measures hitherto prescribed for them.

Funds from the Indian Famine Trust are used to help the poor from the superior classes who cannot accept Government relief in the ordinary way. For meeting famines when they actually occur, however, the Government mainly rely on the relief organization which was evolved in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The increasing efficacy of this organization is attested by the comparative ease with which the people stood the strain of the severe famine conditions of 1918.

§9. **Description of relief measures.**—A brief description of this organization will give the reader an idea of the elaborateness of the machinery and of the minute care with which it has been perfected.² (i) Standing preparations are made on a large scale. Valuable information is gathered about climatic conditions, crops and prices, births and deaths; programmes of suitable relief works are kept ready and brought up to date; the country is mapped out into relief circles; and reserves of tools and plant are stocked. (ii) When rains fail, a careful look-out is kept for danger signals such as rise in prices, restlessness of the people, their aimless wandering, contraction of private charity, and increase in crime, especially petty thefts. (iii) The Government then take preliminary action and declare their general policy as based on moral strategy. Meetings are called at which Government policy is explained to the people, non-official help is enlisted, suspension of revenue is declared, and loans for agricultural improvements are made. Village inspection begins and preliminary lists of helpless persons are prepared. (iv) Then follows the first stage of actual relief. Test works are opened and, if considerable labour is attracted to them, they are converted into relief works on the principles laid down in the famine codes. (v) The next stage commences from December. Central relief camps are organized and gratuitous relief is given to the infirm in the villages. Poor-houses are opened in towns, and village kitchens are run for the benefit of

¹ See *Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India (1939-40)*, Table No. 92.

² See *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. III, pp. 477-81.

children. The distress reaches its climax in May when there is fear of an outbreak of cholera. (vi) The last stage begins with the advent of the rains. The large relief works are closed down and people are moved in batches to smaller relief works near their villages so as to prevent the spread of epidemics and to facilitate the restoration of normal agricultural conditions without needless delay. Local gratuitous relief is extended and liberal advances are made to cultivators for the purchase of cattle, ploughs and seed. When the principal autumn crop is ripe, the few remaining works are gradually closed down and gratuitous relief ceases. The famine is ordinarily at an end by the middle of October. All this time the medical staff is kept ready to deal with cholera and malaria, diseases which generally appear when the rains break out.

§10. **Ultimate causes and remedies.**—The great poverty of the people is the ultimate cause of famines, and throughout this book we have been considering one or other of the numerous features of Indian poverty, such as the excessive reliance of the population on agriculture—an industry dependent on an uncertain rainfall—the decay of old industries and the absence of new ones, and a peasantry steeped in indebtedness, living from hand to mouth, without any reserve to fall back upon in times of scarcity. The remedies for increasing the economic strength and staying power of the masses include a great variety of measures such as raising the credit of the cultivator and his standard of living; construction of direct and indirect protective works like irrigation canals, roads, and repairing wells; improvement in general administration—more especially land revenue administration with a reasonably light assessment and a sympathetically administered system of suspensions and remissions; a well thought-out and liberal forest policy; improvement of agriculture through the agency of the agricultural department, agricultural colleges, research institutes, etc.; the fullest utilization of the co-operative movement; development of large-scale industries and encouragement to cottage industries—in short, economic planning for the country in all its aspects.

MIDDLE CLASS UNEMPLOYMENT

§11. **The scope of the problem.**—The terms 'educated' and 'middle class' are in common use, but it is not easy to draw precise dividing lines between the educated and the uneducated, or between the middle class and the higher and lower classes. It is usual to include in the term 'educated middle class' such persons as are not well-to-do enough to dispense with earning their own living,

who follow non-manual occupations and have received some form of secondary or higher education. Sometimes, however, those who have at least completed the full vernacular or anglo-vernacular course are also regarded as coming within the definition of the 'educated class'.

§12. **The seriousness and extent of middle class unemployment.**—Middle class unemployment has in recent years assumed alarming dimensions and attracted widespread public attention, and Central and Provincial Legislatures, as well as semi-official bodies like the Universities, have of late interested themselves in this problem.¹ Between 1924 and 1928 a series of investigations through specially appointed committees were carried out in some of the British Indian Provinces (Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the Punjab) and also in some of the Indian States like Travancore. The most recent committees were those appointed by the United Provinces Government (1935, under the chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru), and by the Bihar Government (1937).²

The Reports of all these committees leave no doubt regarding the all-India character of the problem of unemployment among the middle classes.³ The Madras Committee point out that the proportion of educated men seeking employment to the demand for them is roughly two to one, and as the result of certain calculations about the annual output of schools and colleges and the proportion of vacancies occurring in the natural course of things, they conclude that the amount of unemployment is very distressing. The Punjab Committee (1927) after similar calculations found that, whereas the output of anglo-vernacular schools and colleges had more than doubled during the five years 1922-7, there had been nothing like a corresponding increase in the number of posts available in the Government Departments or in commercial and business firms. While the total number of applications received for a post which is advertised is by no means an accurate index of the extent of unemployment, for some of the applicants may be in possession of jobs and may yet desire to improve their prospects, it is nevertheless significant that two test advertisements in the Madras Presidency given at the instance of

¹ The Conference of Indian Universities held in 1930 considered the question, but had nothing more to suggest than that Universities should collect statistics regarding unemployment among their products.

² The Bombay Labour Office recently (1938) initiated a fresh inquiry into unemployment among university graduates.

³ An interesting review of the situation regarding middle class unemployment in the different provinces and Indian States and of the measures of relief, either adopted or contemplated, will be found in *Proceedings of the Ninth Industries Conference* (1937), *Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour*, No. 65.

the Madras Committee called forth 666 and 787 applications respectively. The first was a clerk's post in the P.W.D. carrying a salary of Rs. 35 per mensem, and the second was a clerk's post in a commercial firm on the same pay.

Unemployment on this scale is a more serious evil than is commonly recognized. Besides the individual suffering it causes to the unemployed, their disappointment and sense of injury produce a general demoralization which is cumulative in its effect from generation to generation. The existence of a large number of disgruntled young men is also dangerous to the political stability of the State. The point has been well put by the Sadler Commission: 'The existence and the steady increase of a sort of intellectual proletariat, not without reasonable grievances, forms a menace to good government especially in a country where . . . the small educated class is alone vocal. It must be an equal menace whatever form the government may assume. So long as the great mass of the nation's intelligent manhood is driven, in ever-increasing numbers, along the same, often unfruitful, course of study, which creates expectations that cannot be fulfilled, and actually unfits those who pursue it from undertaking many useful occupations necessary for the welfare of the country, any Government, however it may be constituted, whether it be bureaucratic or popular, must find its work hampered by an unceasing stream of criticism and a natural demand for relief which cannot possibly be met.' Again, the gospel of revolutionary socialism or communism finds willing devotees in young men who nurse a strong sense of personal injury against a scheme of things in which apparently they have no place.

§18. **Classes particularly affected.**—The Bombay Enquiry finds that numerically the most important section affected consists of young persons below 27 years of age, especially those whose training has been purely literary and who have proceeded to higher education through the anglo-vernacular course. As might be expected, unemployment is most acute among those who have not succeeded in passing the School-Leaving or Matriculation examination which is considered to be the minimum qualification for Government service, less so among matriculates and intermediates, and (comparatively) least of all among graduates with professional qualifications. In the teaching profession there is more unemployment among untrained than among trained teachers. As regards the legal profession, it is commonly agreed that it is much overstocked, and many junior members of the bar find it difficult to make a living. Similarly, the medical profession is overcrowded in the larger towns, though there is a paucity of medical men in

the villages and smaller towns, where the amenities of life are poor and the people not accustomed to pay regular cash fees for medical relief. The position of engineers is only slightly better. There are large numbers of persons who are fit and willing to be employed on the railways, but are not yet trained, and therefore fail to get employment. As regards banking and accountancy, while those who have received advanced special training or acquired experience do not remain without jobs, there are scores of others who have had no special training and who fail to get employment.

§14. **Causes of unemployment.**¹—(i) *Post-war economic depression and retrenchment.*—India, like the rest of the world, has been affected by the post-war economic depression. Large numbers of persons employed in the clerical and the combatant branches of the army were discharged on the cessation of the war of 1914-18 and it was not possible to absorb them elsewhere, as even the normal volume of employment offered by Government and semi-public bodies and business firms was not available. The axe of retrenchment was applied in all directions and even the old establishments were not fully maintained. The economic depression became particularly severe during the years 1929-34 and the middle classes along with others passed through a period of unexampled distress. A limited recovery has taken place since then.

(ii) *Defects of the educational system.*—Another alleged cause of unemployment is the lack of adjustment between the system of education now in force in the country and the needs of industrial progress. The opinion is widely held that our present system of education is such as to produce persons qualified almost exclusively for clerical occupations, and that it is regarded almost as an avenue to Government service.² Sir George Anderson, in his note prepared for the Punjab Committee, admits that 'in its very inception, it (the present system of education) was moulded with the special object of preparing boys for external examinations,

¹ The Bengal Committee suggest a classification of unemployment based on a distinction between a man who is unemployed through no fault of his own and another man who is unemployed because he is really unemployable in the type of available employment he seeks, frequently through causes over which he has no control. See *Report of the Bengal Unemployment Committee*, par. 2.

² 'Our high schools and colleges suffer not for want of vocational training but for their concentration on training of a definitely vocational but very limited type. Essentially practical and utilitarian, they have aimed at the production of Government officials, lawyers, doctors, and commercial clerks.'—A. Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 149.

the passing of which is for many only a snare and a delusion, and with the object of training boys for clerical vocations which are now proclaimed to be overstocked and which offer insufficient avenues of employment to large throngs of applicants', and he proceeds to describe the matriculate, whom he regards as the crux of the problem of unemployment, as 'a derelict, a wanderer on the face of the earth, unemployed because he is unemployable'.¹ The average educated Indian looks first to Government service as a means of livelihood and, failing that, to clerical work under some semi-official body, such as railways, municipal and other local bodies, port trusts and the like. A further charge made against the educational system is that it renders boys unfit for their ancestral occupation, as they cannot for a minute picture themselves stooping so low as to earn their living with their hands, and prefer being fifth-rate clerks after a smattering of education to earning a better income in the so-called manual occupations, including agriculture. The ranks of those who have traditional aversion to manual labour are thus swelled by the present system of education² which is 'sterilizing' and tends to 'diminish the intellectual energy of those who receive it and is in many cases a positive disadvantage to them'.³ The agricultural, artisan and backward classes themselves are trying more and more to send their children to schools and colleges with a view to Government service and the learned professions and thus promote themselves to the higher rungs of the social ladder. This fatal fascination exercised by literary and quasi-literary occupations, within whose range of influence even the classes who have had no tradition of 'letters' are being increasingly drawn, further emphasizes the prevailing unemployment among the educated classes. We must, however, add that while it is true enough that parents do not display the necessary vision and foresight in choosing occupations for their boys, this may to a certain extent be attributed to the absence of suitable and

¹ As the Bengal Committee observe, one great defect of the educational system is that it leads to one end only, namely, the M.A., M.Sc., or B.L. examination. 'It is like a bamboo, each joint being an examination and the diameter remaining practically the same size from the root to very near the top. It has no branches and the crowning top covers a very small area. What is required is a spreading tree with branches going off in as many directions as possible at definite points along the trunk, not all at the top.'—See *Report of the Bengal Unemployment Committee*, par. 29.

² This is indicated by the large proportion of the educated unemployed in Madras being sons of cultivators, as revealed by certain figures collected in connexion with the census of 1931.

³ Sir Philip Hartog's evidence before the Bengal Committee.

adequate facilities for practical education—agricultural, technical, industrial or commercial.

(iii) *Social causes*.—There are also certain social causes such as the caste system, early marriage, the joint-family system and communal inequalities, all of which 'operate powerfully though silently in determining as well as impeding the economic ambitions and fortunes of the educated men'.¹ For instance, caste fiat prevents educated men from taking to useful occupations which are regarded as undignified in the particular communities to which they belong. Early marriage not only interferes with adequate training but also places too early in life the responsibility of maintaining a family on the shoulders of young men. The joint-family system, while it makes the burden of this responsibility lighter and offers protection to the weak and the helpless,² leads to economic parasitism and cramps individual initiative and ambition. Unwillingness to move out of their abodes and seek their fortunes away from their homes, which is one of the results of the joint-family system, is another suggested cause of unemployment among the educated classes. On the other hand, according to the Madras Committee on middle class unemployment, this immobility is on the decrease and has little bearing on the bulk of unemployment, which is mainly the result of the supply of men being far in excess of the demand for them.³

(iv) *Economic backwardness*.—The most important cause of middle class unemployment is the very poor industrial development of the country and the paucity of openings available for educated young men. In England there are altogether about 16,000 occupations excluding the army, navy and the civil services. In India there are perhaps less than 40.⁴ The mere extension of the facilities for vocational and technical training, it must be remembered, does not fully meet the situation. It will no doubt speed up the development of industries but it will not by itself call them into existence unless special measures are adopted simultaneously for the promotion of industries to absorb the trained men. As the Bengal Committee (*Report*, par. 30) wisely

¹ *Madras Report*, p. 18; see also vol. I, ch. iv.

² The *Bombay Report* shows that 49·46 per cent of the total, or nearly half the unemployed persons in the Presidency, were supported by their relatives during the period of unemployment, 8·15 per cent maintained themselves on previous savings, 7·67 per cent by casual work, 4·91 per cent by income from real property. Cases in which the unemployed had to depend upon vicarious charity were comparatively few. See *op. cit.*, par. 94.

³ *Madras Report*, pp. 18 and 27.

⁴ See *Travancore Report*, par. 58.

remark, 'In an ideally balanced development technical training and economic progress should proceed forward together, each being stimulated in turn by the other. When one lags it should receive a stimulus and vice versa'. In the usual discussions about the causes of unemployment, sometimes exaggerated emphasis is placed on the excessively literary character of the present system of education in this country and on the presence of caste prejudices, to the neglect of other factors such as the under-development of the economic resources of India. This, as has been repeatedly pointed out, is at the basis of the poverty of the masses and, in the last analysis, dominates all species of unemployment.

§15. Remedies for unemployment.—*Employment Bureaux.*—The causes of unemployment being many and various, there can be no one sovereign remedy for it. In the first place, certain palliatives which have been put forward may be noticed. Employment bureaux run by universities, Government departments or private agency, have been suggested. Employment Boards have been established in the United Provinces and the Punjab, for bringing together employers and the unemployed (see §18 below). These would undoubtedly serve a useful purpose, if efficiently managed, so as to secure public confidence. We must, however, remember that they can at the most bring about a better adjustment between supply and demand, especially in the case of private business firms where people employed are not usually of sufficient qualifications. They cannot provide any corrective to the growing excess of supply of men in relation to the demand for them.

Migration or emigration has also been proposed as an antidote to unemployment, but since middle class unemployment is an all-India problem, migration within the country can hardly be regarded as a solution. It can only equalize the intensity of the problem in all parts of the country. As regards emigration, we have already argued elsewhere that, in the existing circumstances, not much relief can be expected from it.¹

§16. Statistical survey of unemployment.—The Government of India, in a circular issued to the Provincial Governments in May 1937, urged the collection of comprehensive statistical material as the first step towards the adoption of remedial measures dealing with middle class unemployment. The most hopeful line, it was pointed out, was to collect statistics of employment rather than unemployment, and in order to secure reliable statistics the Government of India consider that legislation is necessary. Such legislation should be central in order to ensure uniformity, and the

¹ See vol. I, ch. iii, §§31 and 38.

Government of India are prepared to promote it, provided the several Provincial Governments are ready to support the proposal. In the first instance it would probably be desirable to restrict the inquiry to an organized industry, that is, regulated factories, mines, and railways. Investigations may thereafter be extended to various commercial occupations and possibly less organized forms of employment. Such a survey would furnish a basis for estimating the needs of the various industries and commercial concerns for qualified men with different types of technical qualifications with a view to better correlation of supply and demand. Such statistics would also make it possible to form a general estimate of the potentialities of the absorption offered by industry and commerce for educated young men, whether their qualifications are technical or general, and thus to reach a position where the probable effects of different possible policies on unemployment can be gauged. Lastly, the statistics would help to meet the public need and demand for statistical material and would enable the subject to be viewed in the light of facts rather than conjectures. We strongly support this well-reasoned plea for an all-India survey of employment in India.¹

§17. **Other remedies.**—As stated above, unemployment of all grades and shades is in the final analysis the reflex action of economic backwardness, and everything that leads to the economic betterment of the country will obviously be a remedy for unemployment.² Material advance will not only create fresh avenues of employment for the middle class, but, by raising the general level of prosperity attained by the community, will increase the demand for the services of lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc. Further, with the increase in general prosperity coupled with the progressive Indianization of the superior civil and defence services, the scope for employment in the administrative services will expand; and, lastly, we may add that any comprehensive programme launched by the Government for bringing about the regeneration of the country will itself absorb immediately a certain number of the educated unemployed.

The Madras Committee declare that 'the principal remedy

¹ In this connexion attention may be invited to the Household Schedule issued with the recent (1941) census. The schedule provides for certain returns regarding employment, means of employment, unemployment, partial or total, and seasonal. When these returns are compiled in due course, valuable data should be available regarding the unemployment situation in the country.

² cf. 'The true remedy for unemployment amongst the middle classes, as indeed among other classes, is the rapid development of the resources of the country.'—*Proceedings of the Fifth Industries Conference* (1933), p. 124.

(at any rate so far as Madras is concerned) for the present unemployment should be the diversion of the educated middle class, especially those who own or occupy land, to agriculture', and to facilitate this diversion, the Committee desire that 'somehow or other the idea that the agriculturist is socially inferior to the clerk or lawyer, or the teacher, must be uprooted'.¹ The Bihar Unemployment Enquiry Committee in their Report (November 1937) express a similar view and hold that the question of diverting some educated young men to agriculture or, at least, preventing their migration to towns is very important for an essentially agricultural province like Bihar. We have already had occasion to comment on the tendency towards absentee landlordism and the drift of the educated classes from the villages to the towns. These evils must be checked and the middle classes induced to apply their brains to agriculture and help themselves and the country. There are already signs that the prejudice against agriculture and other manual occupations is disappearing under the sheer weight of economic necessity.

The proposal of the Madras Committee to establish 'farm colonies' is of considerable interest, but has its practical limitations. In the first place, barring provinces like the Punjab and Assam, there is not much good cultivable land available to grant to the educated unemployed, even if the superior claims of the village community and the depressed classes were to be ignored. Secondly, as the Madras Committee themselves admit, the temptation for middle class parents to send their children to schools and colleges with a view to Government service would increase if it became generally known that the Government would find land for the unemployed educated young men.

The majority of the Punjab Unemployment Committee suggest that one way of relieving unemployment is to provide facilities for higher education only for the markedly able, who, if poor, should be subsidized by the State, or for those who can pay its full cost (par. 19). We do not think that anything should be done deliberately to increase the cost of education or to limit the scope for higher education in the country, though we admit the necessity of somehow making parents realize that the present supply of men far exceeds the demand in Government service and the legal profession, and that it is necessary for them to think of other careers for their children. The Sapru Committee are also

¹ *Madras Report*, p. 25. The Bengal Committee also make a similar suggestion and recommend the amendment of the Agricultural Loans and Land Improvement Act so as to assist the *bhadralok* class in Bengal. See *Report of the Bengal Unemployment Committee*, par. 47.

against artificially restricting admission of students to the universities. There is more point in the suggestion of the Travancore Committee that the question of recruitment to all grades of Government service by means of competitive examinations should be seriously considered. Definite competitive tests and a stiffening of standards will weed out a large number of candidates and prevent the useless 'dissipation of energy involved in running about to secure recommendations or to cultivate patronage'. Those who fail in the competition will know that Government service is out of the question for them and this will impel them to do something else instead of hanging about indefinitely on the mere off-chance of obtaining an appointment some time. This will also raise educational standards and enable the services to get better recruits. We have already suggested that even if we admit the principle of communal representation in the services, it should be tempered by competitive recruitment. The subject of the reform of the educational system itself has already been discussed.¹

Lastly, it must be noted that side by side with the improvement of the educational system² there must also be a radical change in the social system and in the general outlook of the people. All obsolete ideas and practices which hamper economic (and political) progress must be fearlessly denounced, and sustained and strenuous efforts must be made to destroy them. For, as the Sadler Commission remark: 'The education of a people is not given by schools and colleges alone. Other influences blend with theirs, the spirit and temper of the community which they serve, the power exerted over its thoughts and character by prevalent aspirations and beliefs, the tone of its family life, the rules and restraints imposed by its social organization, the conditions under which its daily work for livelihood is done.'

¹ See vol. I, ch. viii, §2; and vol. II, ch. i, §§12-15. See also *Report on Vocational Education in India*, by A. Abbott and S. H. Wood (1937).

² The Government of Bengal have sanctioned a scheme which is calculated to provide vocational training in a number of small industries (such as manufacture of umbrellas, brass and bell-metal articles, cutlery goods, glazed pottery, washing soap, jute and woollen articles of common use) to the youths belonging to the *bhadralok* (middle) class. *Proceedings of the Fifth Industries Conference* (1933), pp. 123-4. See also the Bombay Government's scheme of Trade Apprenticeship for youths who have received education up to the pre-matriculation class (1937). We welcome the recent (1941) decision of the Government of Bombay in favour of conversion of some of its high schools into agricultural, technical or commercial high schools with a view to providing alternative vocational education for boys who have no aptitude for higher literary studies and are not able to proceed to the university after passing the matriculation examination. It is expected that it will be easier for pupils with technical education to obtain employment in industrial cities like Bombay.

§18. **The Sapru (Unemployment) Committee.**—We may here refer to some of the more important recommendations of the Sapru Committee on unemployment in the United Provinces as they have an obvious bearing on the unemployment situation in other provinces, and classify them as follows: (i) those which aim at increasing the demand for educated men; (ii) those which aim at avoiding excess of supply; and (iii) those which aim at a proper adjustment of supply to demand (actual or potential).

(i) Municipalities and District Boards should be compelled to employ qualified engineers and supervisors for the purpose of maintaining roads and buildings in an efficient condition.

The Government might with benefit provide more employment for qualified medical men by extending the scope of public medical relief, by attaching more private practitioners to public hospitals, by starting investigations conducted through qualified medical men into the efficacy of indigenous drugs, etc.

Municipalities and District Local Boards should be compelled to employ properly qualified medical officers for carrying out their duties in connexion with public health and sanitation.

The overcrowding of the legal profession may be remedied to some extent by the introduction of greater specialization of functions, e.g. some should specialize in drafting documents, others in arguing cases, etc.

The Government should consider the question of restoring, as finances permit, useful posts which have recently been retrenched on grounds of economy.

The rules regarding retirement of public servants at the age of 55 should be strictly enforced so as to give a chance of employment to new young recruits.

Large-scale and small-scale industries should be stimulated so that they might absorb an increasing number of our young men.

Vigorous steps should be taken to introduce compulsory primary education, without which no substantial economic progress is possible. This would also mean an increased demand for teachers, and would so far remedy the existing unemployment.

(ii) The High School examination should have two kinds of certificates—one certifying completion of the course of secondary education and qualifying for the subordinate branches of Government service and also for admission to industrial, commercial and agricultural schools, and the other qualifying for admission to Arts and Science colleges. In this manner many students who are really unfit for a university career in Arts and Science will be

diverted at the close of their secondary education, and this will reduce the number of unemployable graduates.

(iii) The facilities for practical training in the various technical educational institutions should be extended, and education in general should receive a more pronouncedly practical and, in the case of primary schools, a definitely rural, bias.

Medical practitioners should be encouraged, if necessary with the help of generous subsidies, to settle down in rural areas instead of congregating in the few big towns.

Steps should be taken to develop new professions like pharmacy, dentistry, accountancy, architecture, librarianship, insurance work, and journalism, and suitable training should be provided for qualifying for these careers.

An attempt should be made to induce agricultural graduates and diploma holders to make scientific farming a means of livelihood. The development of dairy farming would afford another possible avenue of employment for them.

Steps should be taken to bring qualified educated men into touch with commercial houses for employment. Regional vocational guidance authorities should be created for this purpose.

The Government should broadcast information regarding possible careers and bring into existence suitable machinery for giving sound advice to parents regarding the aptitudes of their boys and the choice of a suitable career for them.

Secondary schools should provide much more diversified courses of study than at present, and in the universities greater stress should be laid on scientific and vocational education.

An Appointments Board, more or less modelled on the Appointments Board at Cambridge, should be created for university graduates. It should consist of the Vice-Chancellors of the universities, certain heads of departments (e.g. Education, Industries and Agriculture) and some public men and European and Indian business men. Similarly a Board should be created to deal with the products of the secondary schools, medical and agricultural schools, and industrial schools. These Boards should be required to collect statistics of employment among graduates of universities and products of the secondary schools and intermediate colleges.

The Government of the United Provinces recently (October 1936) announced measures to implement the Sapru Committee's recommendations. These include (i) provision for practical training in industry and agriculture under almost commercial

conditions, (ii) state aid in the establishment and running of an industrial credit company and a company for marketing and small-scale finance; (iii) subsidies to rural medical practitioners; (iv) establishment of centres of agricultural improvement; and (v) a Provincial Employment Board composed of representatives of various interests. Additional taxation of Rs. 4 lakhs annually was voted by the U.P. Legislative Council for expenditure on these measures of unemployment relief.

CHAPTER XIII

INDO-BRITISH AND OTHER TRADE AGREEMENTS

§1. **Imperial preference.**—Before embarking on a discussion of the Indo-British and other trade agreements it is proposed to give here a brief account of the genesis, nature, objects and limitations of imperial preference with special reference to conditions in India.¹

There was a time when an influential section of public opinion in England regarded the overseas possessions as an extravagance for the mother country and injurious to the colonies themselves. The day of the 'Little Englanders' is, however, long past, and England now desires to draw the bonds of imperial connexion closer together. The Colonies on their part have been showing in an increasing measure their appreciation of the material, moral and political benefits of inclusion within the Empire and may be said to have taken the initiative in granting certain concessions to British goods, placing them in a favourable position relatively to the goods of other countries. Advocates of imperial preference believe that it will not only lead to a large intertwining of economic interests among the Empire countries, but also teach the Empire to take effective concerted action in dealing with the outside world.

It is well to recognize clearly certain important provisos to which all proposals in favour of imperial preference are generally taken to be subject. (i) The adoption of imperial preference should not involve any relaxation or modification of the policy of protection which any of the States may have introduced to foster its industries. India having gained the right of protecting herself even against the United Kingdom, imperial preference would mean in practice higher duties on imports from foreign countries than on those from the Empire countries.² (ii) The concessions granted to the Empire countries are to be *purely voluntary* on the part of the country granting them and not dictated either by the mother country or by binding resolutions passed at periodical Imperial Conferences. (iii) Lastly, the view

¹ For a detailed treatment of the subject see *Fiscal Commission Report*, ch. xiii.

² Before the war of 1914-18, imperial preference was favoured by some as the next best alternative to pure protection, which then seemed unattainable. See Sir Roger Lethbridge, *The Indian Offer of Imperial Preference*, p. 8.

is strongly held, especially in India, that no scheme of imperial preference should be such as to provoke international ill-will or to exclude the possibility of a closer economic unity and of friendly understandings with foreign countries.

§2. *History of the movement.*—The movement towards Empire trade consolidation may be said to have made a start in 1897, when Canada lowered her duties by one-eighth in favour of British goods. In 1898, the preference, fixed at one-fourth of the duty, was given to the United Kingdom unconditionally, but so far as the other Colonies were concerned, it was made conditional on favourable treatment granted by them to Canada. The Colonial Conference which met in 1902 adumbrated the policy of imperial preference as one of general application to all parts of the Empire, which were invited to fall into line with Canada. Accordingly, preferential duties in favour of Great Britain were introduced by New Zealand and South Africa (1903) and later by Australia (1907), and the United Kingdom was expected to reciprocate and grant preferences in return. England, however, was not then prepared to depart from her free trade policy. She mostly imported raw materials and food-stuffs, and her attitude was that her interests as a great exporter of manufactured articles demanded that she should obtain the food-stuffs and raw materials in the cheapest market. Especially in the matter of food-stuffs she was not prepared 'to put all her eggs into one Imperial basket'. In the circumstances, the United Kingdom was unable to take any part in the general movement for imperial preference. The self-governing Colonies, however, continued the policy they had begun, hoping that the mother country would find ways of joining in at some future date. Since 1920 the Dominions and Colonies have given extensive preferences to the United Kingdom, and by 1922, preferential tariffs were in operation in twenty-six British Colonies. Their tariffs thus came to consist of (i) revenue duties, (ii) protective duties and (iii) certain remissions of duty in respect of (i) and (ii) in favour of the United Kingdom, and in some cases also in favour of India and other Empire countries. There was also a limited free list of commodities taxed only when they came from outside the Empire. As a general rule preferences granted by the Dominions have primarily sought to benefit the United Kingdom, and they have been left to be extended to other parts of the Empire by special negotiations in each case. The approaches which England had made since 1915 towards protection enabled her to grant preferential reduction of duties on a limited number of articles of Empire origin. Great Britain's formal renunciation of a free trade in favour of a protectionist regime

with the enactment of the Import Duties Act in March 1932 is an event of first-rate importance from the point of view of imperial preference.

§3. Preference and protection compared.—In essence preference is a form of protection granted to the favoured country. The only important difference is that, under protection, the consumer's interests are sacrificed for the direct benefit of some industry in his own country, whereas under preference the benefit of the sacrifice goes to the producers in the country favoured.

Like protection, preference, besides imposing a burden on the consumer, may also involve a sacrifice of Government revenue even when it takes the form of raising existing duties against foreign goods while continuing to apply the old rate to the goods of the preferred country; for if prices are regulated by the higher rate, the difference between the higher and lower rate goes into the pockets of the favoured producers. The whole amount of the duty paid by the consumer does not find its way into the Government treasury.

Apart from its uses as an aid to the full development of Empire resources, imperial preference is also advocated as tending to make the Empire self-sufficient, just as national self-sufficiency is put forward as one of the aims of protection. As a closed economic system, however, the Empire would be a highly artificial organization and would impose unduly heavy sacrifices on some of its constituent members like India. Considering her economic position, India stands to gain by the freest possible development of her economic relations with a number of countries which happen to be outside the Empire. Imperial self-sufficiency again will not be of any appreciable benefit from the point of view of military safety, nor would it reduce the cost of defence. England glories in her far-flung Empire, but its far-flung character makes the maintenance of one of the biggest navies in the world a matter of vital importance whether for warding off an attack on her possessions or transporting essential goods from one part of the Empire to another.

§4. Indian attitude towards imperial preference.—As a member of the British Commonwealth, it might be urged, India ought to be interested in imperial preference in so far as its object is to increase the strength and solidarity of the Empire. She is, however, less fortunately situated in this respect than the self-governing Dominions. The Dominions having received the gift of self-government from the mother country are bound to her by ties of gratitude. As between themselves also their relations are cordial and not marred by any sense of grievance or injustice between

Dominion and Dominion. It must be frankly admitted that India's position is different. She feels that in her attempt to realize her political and economic aspirations, she has often been thwarted and depressed by England, and the anti-Indian legislation enforced by the Colonies against her has naturally embittered her feelings against them. And human nature being what it is, her will to promote the cause of imperial preference is bound to be largely paralyzed so long as she remains politically discontented; while to induce the Colonies to withdraw or substantially mitigate their anti-Asiatic legislation is patently a task of the greatest difficulty.

§5. **Economics of Imperial preference in relation to India.**—The following main facts must be borne in mind as being relevant to the question how far it will be within India's power to help England and other members of the Empire by preferences and what direct economic benefits are likely to accrue to herself by preferences granted to her.

(i) India's imports consist largely of manufactured articles and her exports of raw materials and food-stuffs. (ii) In the period before the war of 1914-18 about two-thirds of her total imports came from the British Empire, the United Kingdom contributing by far the largest share to the imports from the British Empire. (iii) Before the war of 1914-18 Indian exports went preponderantly to foreign countries, only about forty per cent of the total exports being absorbed by the British Empire. The exports to the United Kingdom amounted to about one-fourth of the total exports. (iv) During the post-war period, as the table on p. 256 shows, there has been a tendency towards a gradual relative decline of the importance of the United Kingdom and the British Empire in the trade of India both as regards exports and imports, but specially as regards imports. Between 1932-3 and 1933-4 there was an improvement in the position of Great Britain, her share in imports having risen to 41·7 per cent from 35·5 per cent in 1931-2. This recovery has been largely attributed to Great Britain's favourable position in the Indian market under the Ottawa Preferences. In recent years, however, the percentage share of the United Kingdom has been on the decline, being 38·4 in 1936-7, 30·5 in 1938-9 and 25·2 in 1939-40. The marked decline, as already explained, was due largely to the preoccupation of Great Britain in the war which was declared in September 1939. Her share in the export trade has, however, considerably improved in recent years (being for example, 21·4 per cent in 1928-9, 32·2 per cent in 1936-7, 34·3 per cent in 1938-9 and 35·1 per cent in 1939-40, the first year of the war), with the result that the usual

excess of merchandise imports over exports in the case of our trade with the United Kingdom was transformed in the year 1936-7 into a favourable balance of Rs. 13 crores.¹

With regard to the artificial stimulation of imports from the United Kingdom and other Empire countries, we must not forget that India is a poor country, and the protectionist policy on which she has embarked will require on the part of her population various kinds of sacrifice. The capacity of the country to bear further burdens on the score of imperial preference is strictly limited, and the actual concessions she may be in a position to grant are likely to appear insignificant.

In 1903 the Government of India expressed the view that 'from an economic standpoint India has something, but not perhaps very much, to offer to the Empire, that she has very little to gain in return, and that she has a great deal to lose or to risk'.² They feared that preference shown by India to Empire countries would be met by retaliatory measures against her on the part of foreign countries. No doubt the tendency at the present time is to regard inter-Imperial trade arrangements as strictly matters of domestic concern, and not as hostile acts aimed at foreign countries. However, whether we can safely regard the danger of retaliation as negligible will depend upon the spirit inspiring any particular action taken in furtherance of the policy of imperial preference, and the extent to which foreign nations are adversely affected by it. Her foreign markets are much too important for India to be lost or endangered through any ill-judged policy of imperial preference.

As imperial preference implies co-operation of free peoples and not dictation by any outside authority, it follows that all proposals towards imperial preference must receive the sanction of the Indian Legislature before being put into force. How far the Legislature will be allowed to exercise a decisive influence in shaping the tariff policy of the country under the new constitution depends on the manner in which the safeguards and the provisions in respect of discrimination³ are interpreted.

§6. *The Ottawa Agreement.*⁴—At the Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa during July-August, 1932, a series of Trade

¹ For a detailed treatment of this topic see ch. vi, §22.

² This view was repeated by India's representatives at the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923.

³ See vol. I, ch. xiii, §21.

⁴ See Press Notes issued by the Director of Public Information, *India and Ottawa and India's Foreign Trade Policy* (1936). The best statement of the case against Ottawa is to be found in D. R. Gadgil's *Imperial Preference for*

Agreements were concluded among the countries of the Empire on the basis of reciprocal exchange of preferences, and India found herself participating in just such a scheme of extensive imperial preferences to which she had all along shown a strong antipathy. We have already¹ reviewed the Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Act of 1932 (December) which gave effect to the tariff changes necessitated by the general trade agreement made between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on 20 August 1932. The tariff changes so effected came into force from 1 January 1933. A supplementary agreement regarding iron and steel was signed on 22 September. Both the agreements were ratified by the Indian Legislative Assembly. The Indo-British Agreement which was signed on 9 January 1935 was supplementary to the Ottawa Trade Agreement (1932) and was to be in force during the currency of the latter Agreement. This Agreement was, however, negatived by the Assembly (see §10 below). The Ottawa Trade Agreement could be terminated at any time after six months' notice of denunciation by either party. We propose here to state briefly the case for and against Ottawa, as this will give us an idea of the arguments and the passions behind the question of imperial preference as affecting India.

§7. *The case for Ottawa.*—The first phase of the recent economic crisis was characterized by a great decline in all prices, but a relatively heavier decline in the prices of raw materials. In consequence of this, India, along with other suppliers of raw materials, was particularly badly hit. In addition to this, her export trade was being subjected to growing competition in western markets. Virgin lands in many parts of the world—in Africa, South America, the Asiatic Archipelago, etc.—were being brought under cultivation, and their products began to be introduced to the world markets all the more easily because of the improved transport facilities.

In other countries also production was expanding, and foreign

India (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Publication No. 2), and the series of articles contributed by the same author to the *Servant of India* between 16 January 1936 and 12 March 1936. The reader is also referred to D. Ghosh, *Revision of Ottawa* (1936), and N. R. Sarkar, *Indo-British Trade Relations, Ottawa and After* (1937). A more recent (1939) work attempting a critical and exhaustive review of the Ottawa Trade Agreement is *India and Imperial Preference*, by B. K. Madan.

¹ See ch. xi, §5. We have also shown how what were virtually preferential duties in favour of the United Kingdom were incorporated in the scheme of protection granted to the Indian steel and iron and textile industries. See ch. ii, §§10 and 25.

exporters who before the war of 1914-18 were comparatively insignificant were now proving serious competitors: the force of the increased competition was keenly felt by some of our main exports like oil-seeds, textile fibres, food-grains, timber, etc. The position was further made difficult by the policy adopted by many of the European countries and the United States of America of stimulating the demand for the products of their own colonies in the tropical and sub-tropical regions. Another factor of ominous significance for countries like India was the rapid development of synthetic substitutes, which tended to reduce the demand for some of India's staples of export. Many countries, again, had embarked on a policy of economic isolationism which led to the erection of higher tariff walls, the imposition of 'contingents' and quotas, the institution of stringent foreign exchange controls and other restrictions on the free flow of international trade.

In the meanwhile (September 1931) Great Britain had abandoned the gold standard, and the currencies of India and of most of the other Empire countries were linked to sterling. By the Import Duties Act of 1932, referred to above, duties had been imposed in Great Britain on a wide range of articles covering nearly two-thirds of the total imports. Provision was, however, made for the exemption of Empire products from these duties pending negotiations with the Dominions and India for the conclusion of reciprocal tariff arrangements—negotiations which eventually issued in the Ottawa Agreement. In the opinion of its advocates, it was a wise step on the part of India to have entered into the Agreement, for failure to do so would have meant forfeiture of her access to the world's most stable and largest open market, namely the United Kingdom. As explained above, the normal outlets for India's exports were shrinking fast. Other countries like France and Germany were still struggling with currency difficulties. The countries belonging to the sterling group were on the other hand comparatively free from these difficulties, and trade with them was for that reason likely to be smooth and unhampered by exchange embarrassments. For all these reasons it was argued that India had acted in her best interests by deciding to participate in the Ottawa arrangements.

Reviewing the main features of India's export trade three years later (in 1936), the friends of the Ottawa Agreement were able to prove, to their own satisfaction, that India had reaped substantial benefits from the Agreement and urged its continuance for a further period.

It was pointed out that between 1932-3 and 1933-4 India's export trade to the United Kingdom increased by 28·2 per cent.

while her trade with other countries advanced by only 4 per cent. The increased demand for raw materials was no doubt partly responsible for this improvement. Further, the import trade figures of the United Kingdom for 1932 and 1933 showed an increase in imports from India more than proportionate to the increase in the total imports of raw materials, pointing to the conclusion that the preferences must have contributed largely to the expansion in India's exports in 1933-4.

The figures for 1934-5 revealed a certain slowing-down in the rate of improvement. But this was only to be expected as the stimulus of a preferential duty would normally be felt most markedly in the first year and the rate of development would show a progressive decline until the limit of expansion was reached. Moreover, in the later years certain special factors supervened causing a definite check in the trade with the United Kingdom in certain commodities like tea (of which the exports were restricted in accordance with an international agreement), while other special factors at the same time operated to expand India's trade with other countries. For example, there were abnormal purchases of Indian cotton by Japan to make up for the short purchases during the 1933 boycott of Indian cotton in that country.¹

It was argued that while the export of articles in the preferred group rose by about 10 per cent, the export of the non-preferred articles rose even higher, namely, by more than 18 per cent. This was interpreted by hostile critics as justifying the conclusion that the extension in the trade in the preferential items was due, not so much to the Agreement, as to the general increase in the demand for Indian goods in the United Kingdom caused by the revival of industrial activity, and further that in regard to the preferential items, the preferences granted by the United Kingdom were of little benefit to India.

This view, however, ignored several material facts. The *total* imports coming from all sources of the articles on the preferential list into the United Kingdom fell by about 22 per cent between 1931 and 1934. The imports from India thus increased in a market which was on the whole contracting, and therefore it was legitimate to infer that the special factor of imperial preference must have helped. The expansion in the non-preferential group was not surprising because this group comprised articles which had not to face any serious competition abroad and were for that reason not included in the preferential list. Again, in the case

¹ See §17 below.

of some of the important items in the non-preferential group, there were certain quite specially favourable influences (apart from industrial revival) accounting for the increase in their off-take. Thus the increase in the demand for cotton was largely due to the propaganda of the Lancashire Indian Cotton Committee. The increase in rubber was due to the restriction scheme; that in metals and ores to the renewed activity in the heavy industries (as distinguished from *general* industrial revival); that in lac, to speculative purchases by the London 'ring', which tried to operate a corner in shellac and pepper, and so on.

The contention of the critics of the Agreement that the increased exports to the United Kingdom represented merely a diversion of trade was met by pointing out that while the increase of exports to the United Kingdom could fairly be attributed to the Ottawa preferences, the decline in the exports to foreign countries was due to the policy of self-sufficiency followed by these countries for reasons entirely unconnected with Ottawa. In fact, it was precisely this policy of restriction and the consequent loss of trade from which both India and England suffered, which formed the principal justification for Ottawa. It was no doubt true that India had hitherto been able to sell about two-thirds of her exports to countries outside the British Empire. But that she was finding it more and more difficult to retain her hold on these foreign markets was not her fault. The system of preferences was a measure of self-defence adopted by India. Some of its consequences, e.g. a decline in India's import trade with foreign countries followed by a corresponding diminution of her exports to them, were no doubt deplorable. But they were not of India's seeking and were in the circumstances inevitable. One of the arguments against the Ottawa Pact was that it would lead to retaliation against India by her foreign customers. But the various restrictions on import trade imposed by foreign countries were universal in character and not specially discriminatory against India. They were inspired by certain new ideals of trade policy, and there is no evidence to show that they were the result of irritation due to the Ottawa Agreement.

§8. **The case against Ottawa.**—Those who opposed the Ottawa Pact did so mainly on the ground that it tended to deflect India's trade from its natural channels and to give it a deliberate twist so as to inflict serious damage on it. If the preferences decreased competition in the United Kingdom, they made it more severe in the other far more important foreign markets. An examination of the principal items of preference seemed to prove that only a few articles such as linseed, carpets, rugs and rice had derived

any positive benefit from the preference. Since the separation of Burma from India from 1 April 1937, some of the important commodities which enjoyed preference under the Ottawa Agreement (viz. rice, teakwood, pig-lead, and paraffin wax), either dropped out or were considerably reduced in importance in the possible scope of any fresh agreement with the United Kingdom.¹ In most other cases the vindication of the Ottawa arrangements was found to be either insufficient or wholly wanting. For some articles the preference granted was really not needed. For example, the tea trade was taking good care of itself through the Tea Restriction Scheme by which the main producers of tea, namely India, Ceylon and Java, had already come to an agreement amongst themselves. Even if India should lose some ground to Ceylon in the United Kingdom market, she might make that up by a corresponding gain in other markets under the scheme of fixation of total export quotas with reference to estimates of total world consumption. Preference, again, was unnecessary where the commodity in question already dominated the market in the United Kingdom, as in the case of jute manufactures, goat-skins, castor-seeds, lac, myrobalans and mica. In other cases the possibility of further expansion was slight for a variety of other reasons such as (i) the presence of other Empire competitors, e.g. Australia in tanned sheep-skins; British West Africa in groundnuts; Australia and Canada in pig-lead; Ceylon in coir-mats and spices; British East Africa in coffee. In some cases, the United Kingdom market was very small as compared to foreign markets, e.g. in groundnuts. Again, as regards certain articles, the total exports from India were too insignificant to make it worthwhile encouraging trade in them either by preference or otherwise, e.g. in rice, barley and tobacco.² Sometimes, the Indian commodity was not of the type wanted in the United Kingdom and hence could not benefit from the preference, e.g. Indian tobacco. Lastly, the effects of the preference might be largely cancelled by the competition of substitutes, as in the case of oil-seeds.

Another objection was that the preferences either caused a loss of revenue to the Government (i.e. in so far as trade was diverted from the higher to the lower duty) or to the consumer (i.e. in so far as the consumer was compelled to buy comparatively expensive goods instead of cheaper non-British goods). Neither the

¹ Article by B. K. Madan, 'Bilateralism and Indian Trade', *Indian Journal of Economics*, July 1938. See also §13 below.

² Sir Bryce Burt, however, called the tobacco trade 'the valuable trade of £9,000,000' in an Assembly debate.

Government nor the consumer in India was in a position to afford this sacrifice.

Imperial preference may suit the Colonies and Dominions whose trade with the United Kingdom is of a complementary character. England desires the primary products which the Dominions, especially Australia and Canada, have to offer, and, as it happens, they are able and willing to absorb a great many British manufactures. In both respects India's position is different. It is more advantageous and more feasible for her to find markets for her products elsewhere than in the United Kingdom, and her varied natural resources make it possible for her to think of self-sufficiency as a goal of her ambition, in fulfilment of which she desires protection against the competition of a number of British manufactured goods at present imported into India.

The post-war trend of India's foreign trade has been away from the Empire¹ and it is most important that she should make a systematic and determined endeavour to retain the foreign markets which absorb the greater part of her exports. Under present conditions the only method of achieving this is by entering into a series of bilateral agreements with foreign countries.² Ottawa (replaced by the new Indo-British Trade Agreement in 1939), however, has sadly reduced India's capacity for bargaining by tying her hands in respect of far too large a number of commodities, so that she finds she has hardly anything to offer to foreign countries in return for any concessions she may seek from them. It is not likely that these bilateral agreements with other countries will seriously affect India's exports to the United Kingdom. Most of our exports to the United Kingdom are raw materials which British industry is interested in admitting free of duty. Moreover, England is our main creditor, and payment can only be effected through our surplus of exports over imports. Until recently this surplus arose in connexion with our trade with foreign countries; and even today the bulk of it thus arises. England must either take the necessary measures to enable us to retain our foreign markets or open her own market to us to make up for whatever loss we may suffer by the shrinking of the foreign markets. Otherwise it will be impossible for India to meet her obligations in England. The drift of the argument is that we need not fear retaliation on the part of the United Kingdom even if we refuse to participate in inter-Imperial arrangements on the Ottawa model. Also retaliation on the part of England

¹ See ch. vi, §22.

² See §29 below.

would endanger her own considerable exports to India—worth more than Rs. 50 crores per year during the pre-war (1939) period.

Much capital was made by the supporters of the Ottawa Agreement out of the reversal of the balance of trade in recent years between India and the United Kingdom. Until 1935-6, India used to have a negative balance of trade with the United Kingdom in spite of the fact that this country has had to make large payments to England on account of 'invisible' imports such as the Home Charges, shipping freights, profits on foreign capital invested in India, etc. Since 1936-7 there has been a substantial export surplus in India's favour. It has therefore been suggested that India should accord a generous treatment to the United Kingdom in any future trade arrangements. We may, however, point out that so far as it is proper to consider the trade balance on the narrow basis of bilateralism, we must add to the imports of merchandise from the United Kingdom, our 'invisible' imports from that country. This is all the more necessary today since owing to the decline in triangular and multiangular trade, especially with European countries, we must have a larger export balance in merchandise with the United Kingdom. To some extent the operation of the Ottawa Agreement itself may be held responsible for this result, which therefore does not constitute a justification for liberal concessions to the United Kingdom. It has also been pointed out that a good portion of our exports to the United Kingdom is the product of British capital and enterprise in this country and the loss which might result from any restrictive action by the United Kingdom against India will adversely react on Great Britain herself.¹

An important cause of dissatisfaction with Ottawa was the feeling that the Indian Delegation (which did not include any responsible representatives of Indian commerce, industry and agriculture) failed to make full use of India's bargaining strength vis-à-vis Great Britain and gave away too much and received too little in return. The agreement was too hastily devised and enforced and was not based on any thorough inquiry by a competent body such as the Tariff Board, which should have applied tests similar to those implied in the policy of discriminate protection before recommending any Empire industry for preferential treatment in India.

The controversy with regard to the effects of tariff arrangements such as those embodied in the Ottawa Agreement is difficult to set

¹ See article by Dr V. K. R. V. Rao, 'The Indo-British Trade Agreement', *Indian Textile Journal* (April 1937).

out with precision. The course of international trade is governed by a variety of factors and it is impossible to assign definite consequences to any single factor or to attempt with any confidence a quantitative measurement of these consequences. In these circumstances, the only course to adopt is to state fairly the case on either side leaving the reader to form his own judgement on the question, and this is what we have tried to do above.

Before turning to the adverse verdict of the Assembly on the Ottawa Agreement and its sequel, we shall pass under review the Bombay-Lancashire Textile Agreement (1933) and the Supplementary Indo-British Agreement (1935).

§9. **The Bombay-Lancashire Textile Agreement (Mody-Lees Pact).**—At about the time (1933) the negotiations for the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement were in progress, following the conference between the representatives of the Indian and British cotton textile industries in Bombay in September 1933, an understanding was reached to which the respective parties were the Millowners' Association, Bombay, then presided over by Mr (now Sir) H. P. Mody and the British Textile Mission to India led by Sir William Clare Lees. This agreement, which is popularly called the Mody-Lees Pact, was to remain in force till 31 December 1935. There were sharp differences among the representatives of the Indian textile industry, and the attempt to secure a common front failed. It was, however, found possible for Lancashire to conclude an agreement with the Millowners' Association, Bombay. 'The Agreement—a precursor of the general understanding embodied in the supplementary Indo-British Agreement (see §10 below)—reiterated the right of India to protect the Indian industry even against the United Kingdom but recognized that a higher level of protection was needed against other countries than the United Kingdom.'¹

It provided for the stabilization of the position in regard to the tariff on imports of the United Kingdom piece-goods into India when the revenue position of the country made it possible for the Government of India to remove the general surcharge on all imports imposed in October 1931. A lower scale of duties on cotton yarns and artificial silk piece-goods imported into India from Lancashire was agreed to on the Indian side. This was incorporated in the Indian Tariff (Textile) Protection Act, 1924.² In so far as the Empire and other overseas markets were concerned, it was agreed that any advantages which might be arranged for British goods should be extended to Indian

¹ B. K. Madan, *India and Imperial Preference*, p. 162.

² See ch. II, §13.

goods, and that India should participate in any quota which might be allocated to the United Kingdom in markets in which India had no independent quota. In regard to raw cotton, an undertaking was given that the British Textile Mission would be prepared to recommend effective action being taken to popularize the use of the Indian raw material in the interests of the Indian cotton grower.

The Bombay-Lancashire Agreement was the first attempt to achieve by agreement the co-ordination of Indian and British interests, by what may be called imperial industrial co-operation. In the judgement of some people, the Agreement had abundantly justified itself. It had brought about a very considerable increase in the off-take of Indian cotton by Lancashire (thanks to the efforts of the Lancashire Cotton Committee to bring about an increased use of Indian cotton in Lancashire mills), and thus conferred much benefit on the Indian agriculturist. Lancashire had also frankly recognized the need for adequate protection to the Indian textile industry as against itself, and offered its good offices to promote the interests of the Indian textile industry in overseas and colonial markets.

On the other hand, the critics of the Agreement argued that it had not the support of the whole Indian textile industry and that, while India had conferred substantial and definite benefits (i.e. reductions in duties on cotton and artificial silk piece-goods) on Lancashire, the latter merely made certain promises without any definite commitments. The Agreement had meant the withdrawal of much of the protection previously enjoyed by the Indian industry. As to overseas markets, since the Bombay mills were unable to stand unaided even in the home market, they could hardly be expected to make much headway in the overseas markets even with the help and goodwill of Lancashire. Lastly, as regards the use of Indian cotton by Lancashire mills, the Agreement merely held out a vague promise and did not require Lancashire to buy a minimum quantity of Indian cotton as in the case of Japan.

§10. **The Supplementary Indo-British Trade Agreement (1935).**—The Bombay-Lancashire Agreement (1933) was followed up by the Indo-British Trade Agreement in 1934 (actually signed on 9 January 1935). This Agreement, as already stated, was supplementary to the Ottawa Trade Agreement (1932) and was to be in force during the currency of the latter Agreement.

In this Agreement the Government of India gave formal expression to the general principles governing the treatment of United Kingdom goods competing with the products of a protected

Indian industry.¹ The following were the principal undertakings on the part of the signatories :

It was recognized that while protection to an Indian industry might be necessary in the interest of the economic well-being of India, the conditions might be such that an Indian industry required a higher level of protection against foreign goods than against imports of United Kingdom origin.

The Government of India undertook to afford protection only to such industries as after due inquiry by the Tariff Board had established claims thereto in accordance with the policy of discriminate protection. The measure of protection to be afforded was not to exceed what was necessary to equate prices of imported goods to fair selling prices for similar goods produced in India, and subject to this condition, lower rates of duty whenever possible were to be imposed on goods of United Kingdom origin. The Government of India agreed to afford full opportunity to any industry concerned in the United Kingdom to state its case and answer cases presented by other interested parties before the Indian Tariff Board when the question of grant of protection to an industry was referred to that body. The Government of India further undertook that in the event of any radical change in the conditions affecting protected industries during the currency of the period of protection, they would on the request of His Majesty's Government, or of their own motion, cause an inquiry to be made as to the appropriateness of existing duties, and that in the case of such an inquiry full consideration would be given to any representation put forward by any interested industry in the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom Government on their side promised to consider the steps that might be taken to develop the import from India of raw or semi-manufactured materials used in the manufacture of articles which are subject to differential import duties in India. They also undertook to take further steps to stimulate the use of Indian cotton (in pursuance of Article 8 of the Ottawa Agreement and the Mody-Lees Pact) in all possible ways, including research, commercial investigation, market liaison, and industrial propaganda. They undertook to continue the privilege of duty-free entry of Indian pig-iron into the United Kingdom so long as the duties on articles of iron and steel imported from the United Kingdom into India were not less favourable than those provided for in the Iron and Steel Protection Act, 1934.

¹ B. N. Adarkar, *The History of the Indian Tariff, 1924-39*, p. 75.

The Supplementary Indo-British Trade Agreement had a hostile reception in the country. The business community felt aggrieved that commercial opinion in India had not been consulted. The Legislative Assembly, when called upon to take into consideration the new Agreement, passed a resolution for its termination (January 1935). The official defence put forward by Sir Joseph Bhore was that the Agreement was merely a formal statement of the principles and practices of discriminating protection which had from time to time received the approval of the Indian Legislature. There was no necessity to consult commercial opinion as no new departure of principle or practice was involved. The Fiscal Autonomy Convention was not changed, nor was the policy of discriminate protection. The Agreement was justified on the ground that while British interests did not desire to question the existing policy regarding discriminate protection, etc., they wished Indian policy to be defined and clarified so that there would be no misunderstanding thereafter. The Agreement, it was maintained, 'implemented implied promises given at Ottawa and the definite promises given to the Clare Lees Deputation'. The Agreement conferred on India material benefits regarding the increased consumption of Indian cotton and of raw and semi-raw materials, and the privilege of duty-free entry of Indian pig-iron into the United Kingdom. India was also promised a share in such facilities as might be granted to British cotton goods by the Colonies and Protectorates.

On the other hand, the representatives of non-official commercial opinion in India strongly criticized the Agreement on the ground that it whittled down the Fiscal Autonomy Convention, as also valuable principles of discriminate protection established since 1923. There was also absence of reciprocity, the Agreement being drawn more in the interest of the United Kingdom than of India. While India gave certain definite undertakings, the United Kingdom merely offered to consider various steps that might be taken to develop the use of Indian cotton, etc., and extended certain vague promises to India of little or no material use in the near future.

It was also argued that the Agreement enunciated principles far more dangerous than any quotas or reductions in the percentages of duties. It was not desirable to reopen the question of protection when once it had been granted for a definite period, especially at the instance of the United Kingdom. Such a policy was likely to be an impediment to the industrial development of India and to hamper the starting of new industries.

The Supplementary Indo-British Trade Agreement lapsed with

the expiry of the Ottawa Trade Agreement and it is gratifying that it has not since been renewed.

§11. **The Assembly's adverse verdict on the Ottawa Agreement.**— On 30 March 1936 the Indian Legislative Assembly turned down by a resolution the Ottawa Agreement and its sequel the Indo-British Trade Agreement (1935) and voted against their continuance. The following is the text of Mr M. A. Jinnah's amendment to the official resolution carried by the Assembly.

'This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General-in-Council that the Ottawa Agreement dated August 20, 1932, be terminated without delay and notice of denunciation be given in terms of Article 14 thereof; the Assembly further recommends that the Government of India should immediately examine the trend of the trade of India with various other important countries and the United Kingdom and investigate the possibility of entering into such bilateral trade treaties with them, whenever and wherever possible, to bring about expansion of the export trade of India in those markets and submit such treaty or treaties for the approval of the Assembly.'¹

The amendment was carried by 70 votes to 65. The Government of India being committed to abide by the decision of the Legislative Assembly, the six months' notice of termination of the Agreement was given on 13 May 1936 and the Agreement consequently was due to end on 13 November 1936. This period of notice afforded an opportunity of concluding a new agreement. Negotiations were set on foot between the British Government and the Government of India, who were assisted by a panel of non-official advisers led by Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas. A Commerce Department *communiqué* dated 20 October 1936 stated that pending the conclusion of a new agreement the two Governments agreed that the 1932 Agreement should continue in force subject to termination at three months' notice by either party, unless it was replaced by a new Agreement. Also that in the event of failure to conclude a new Agreement neither party should withdraw the existing preferences without prior consultation with the other party.

§12. **The new Indo-British Trade Agreement (1939).**—After protracted negotiations lasting for nearly two and a half years a new Agreement to replace both the Ottawa and the Supplementary Agreements was concluded in March 1939. These negotiations were unduly prolonged mainly because of the difficulty of securing an agreement on the question of the intake of Lancashire

¹ See also §29.

piece-goods by India against the off-take of Indian cotton. During the course of these negotiations a Lancashire Delegation visited India but failed to secure an agreed solution of the textile problem owing to the wide gulf between the view-points of the Delegation and the unofficial Indian advisers. Likewise the three visits of Sir Mahomed Zafrullah Khan, the Commerce Member, to London were of no avail. The Government of India, having failed to reach an agreement with the approval of the unofficial advisers, themselves pursued the negotiations with His Majesty's Government and a Trade Agreement was signed between the two Governments in London on 20 March 1939. On 27 March 1939 the Assembly rejected the official motion for the approval of the Trade Agreement by 59 votes to 47. A similar fate was in store for the official motion for leave to introduce a Bill to amend the Indian Tariff Act of 1934 to give effect to changes in the import tariff necessitated by the new Agreement. The Bill, after being approved by the Council of State, was again placed before the Assembly with the recommendations of the Governor-General, and was again rejected by the Assembly.¹ In view of the neutrality of the Muslim League members the Government chose to consider the Assembly's vote as political in its nature and therefore indecisive. The Governor-General thereupon certified the Bill, which became law on 18 April 1939. The new Agreement is to be in force until 31 March 1942, provided six months' notice before that shall have been given by either party, or until the expiry of six months from the date on which notice of termination is given.²

§13. **Main features of the new Agreement.**—Among the principal features of the new Agreement it is worth noting that the old principle that the mutual concessions should take the form of only a guaranteed margin of preference and not of actual rates of duties which are to be fixed according to the revenue needs of the respective Governments has been observed. It is also satisfactory to note that the Supplementary Agreement of 1935 is not renewed and India is thus free from the novel and awkward obligations to Great Britain in the matter of grant of protection to her industries (see §10). The new Agreement contains notable modifications of the Ottawa Agreement. While it keeps as large

¹ Fair consideration of the Agreement by the Assembly was prejudiced by the Budget (1939-40) proposal of the Government of India to double the import duty on cotton.

² See B. K. Madan, *India and Imperial Preference*, Postscript, pp. 222-49, and B. P. Adarkar, *The Indian Fiscal Policy*, pp. 559-62 for a detailed analysis and criticism of the new Indo-British Trade Agreement.

a proportion as possible of India's exports within the preferential field, much the same as under the Ottawa Agreement, the scope of preferences granted to the United Kingdom has been considerably narrowed by excluding articles included in the categories of food, drink and tobacco and raw materials or semi-manufactured goods which were entitled to preference under the old arrangement. Under the new Agreement the majority of the items relate to specialized products which are not at present manufactured in India (e.g. motor cars, cycles, etc.).

As regards other items (e.g. woollen carpets and rugs, drugs and medicines, etc.), the imports from the United Kingdom consist of special varieties which are at present produced in India only in negligible quantities. Certain preferential heads have been redefined so as to exclude in the interest of the Indian consumer a number of commodities which were formerly included in them. Thus, under the head of chemicals, drugs and medicine, several acids and chemical products have been removed from the scope of preference. A notable departure from the Ottawa Agreement is that while that Agreement left untouched commodities which enjoyed protection in India, the new Agreement incorporates the arrangement regarding the duties on Lancashire goods although officially the Indian textile industry is a protected industry. 'Thus now it is more a case of protection within preference than of preference within protection.'¹

India accords a preference of 10 per cent to a number of items of imports of British goods like chemicals, paints, remnants of piece-goods, woollen carpets, sewing machines; and 7½ per cent on motor cars, motor cycles and scooters, cycles and omnibuses, etc.

The United Kingdom on her side, apart from the continuance of the concession of free admission of certain Indian goods (such as lac, raw jute, mica slabs, myrobalans), grants the following main preferences: (i) a preference of 10 per cent *ad valorem* to bones, linseed, castor-seed, groundnuts, leather (undressed), coir yarn, soya-beans and spices, etc.; (ii) a preference of 15 per cent among other things to certain jute manufactures such as cordage, cables, ropes and twine, castor oil, rapeseed oil, linseed oil, groundnut oil, leather (dressed), paraffin wax; (iii) a preference of 20 per cent on coir mats and matting, cotton manufactures and certain jute manufactures like sacks and bags, and (iv) preferences at specific rates to magnesium chloride (1s. per cwt.); handmade knitted carpeting and floor rugs (4s. 6d. per sq. yard); coffee (9s. 4d. per cwt.); tea (2s. per lb.); rice (2½d. per lb.).

¹ B. P. Adarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 560.

As regards pig-iron, while it continues to enjoy free entry, the British Government reserves to itself the power to impose after 31 March 1941 a customs duty on imports of Indian pig-iron if after the expiry on that date¹ of the Iron and Steel Protection Act (1934), duties were applied to articles of iron and steel imported into India substantially less favourable to the United Kingdom than those provided for in that Act.

It may be noted that the separation of Burma from British India has been responsible for the abolition of some preferences (e.g. pig-lead, rice meal, etc.) and reduction in the value of others (e.g. teakwood, paraffin wax, rice and tobacco, manufactured).

A notable feature of the new Agreement relates to the Cotton Article (10) about reciprocal concessions in respect of the export of Indian raw cotton to the United Kingdom and the import of British cotton piece-goods into India. We have already fully explained in an earlier chapter² how under the new Agreement a sliding scale of duties is fixed for cotton piece-goods which is linked, on the one hand, with the export of Indian cotton to the United Kingdom, and on the other, with the imports of cotton piece-goods from the United Kingdom into India. This may indeed be regarded as the pivotal part of the Agreement.

As regards the Colonies, the new Agreement differs from the Ottawa Agreement in one important respect, viz. that provision has been made in the new Agreement for the negotiation of a separate trade treaty with Ceylon, which was to enjoy the Ottawa schedule of preferences for a period of six months after the Agreement came into operation.³ The schedule of mutual preferences between India and the Colonies remains practically unchanged with one or two exceptions.

§14. A critical review of the Indo-British Trade Agreement.⁴—

Generally speaking the new Agreement has failed to secure the approval not only of the Indian textile industry but of all the Indian commercial organizations in the country.

¹ The life of the Act has been extended by another year.

² Ch. ii, §14.

³ This period expired on 15 February 1940. Owing, however, to the difficulties experienced by the Government of India in securing a satisfactory solution of the problem of Indian immigrants in Ceylon the talks for a trade agreement between the two countries proved to be abortive. Neither country has so far taken advantage of the liberty to abolish existing preferences in favour of imports from the other country.

⁴ See *Annual Report of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry* (1939-40), vol. II, pp. 7-18 and *Annual Report of the Indian Chamber of Commerce* (1939), pp. 20-3.

In the first place, the Government's action in certifying the Bill to implement the new Agreement and disregarding the adverse verdict of the Assembly caused keen resentment, especially in view of the Government's previous adherence to the Assembly's decision when the Ottawa Agreement was denounced in 1936 and of the Fiscal Commission's recommendation to the effect that no preferences should be granted by India without the approval of the Indian Legislature (see however footnote 1 to p. 627).

In the second place, as the Committee of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce point out in their representation on the new Trade Agreement submitted to the Government of India, the framers of the Agreement ignored the position of India as a debtor country with heavy liabilities to the United Kingdom by way of large items of 'invisible' imports and the consequent need of maintaining an export surplus in the balance of trade accounts. The Government also ignored the recommendations which were made by the unofficial advisers in respect of the claims of Indian insurance companies, Indian banking companies and Indian shipping for obtaining protection against discriminatory action and for securing equal opportunities and a specific share in the carrying trade for Indian shipping. In evaluating the new Trade Agreement it is also necessary to allow for preferences granted to the United Kingdom under the Indian Steel Protection Act.¹

As regards the general preferences enjoyed by the United Kingdom in the Indian market, these are in excess of those recommended by the unofficial advisers and may preclude India from entering into any Trade Agreement with Continental countries, as India can offer them very little in exchange for her exports.

Then again, while the preferences which India receives in the market of the United Kingdom have mostly a negative insurance value, the preferences granted by her to the United Kingdom, though on a smaller trade value, are of real benefit to the latter in so far as these relate to heads of imports in which the keenest competition is met with by United Kingdom exporters. While the official estimate of the value of the Indian export trade enjoying preferences is Rs. 36.86 crores, as against Rs. 7.68 crores which is the value of the imports from the United Kingdom falling in the preferential category, the value of the Indian export trade to the United Kingdom enjoying effective preference (e.g. linseed, oilseed cake, woollen carpets and rugs) is according to the

¹ See *Indian Textile Journal* (April 1939), article on the Indo-British Trade Pact by Dr V. K. R. V. Rao.

unofficial advisers estimated at only Rs. 6 crores. It is misleading to include in this estimate the duty-free articles, as the United Kingdom cannot afford to impose any import duties on these articles (e.g. raw jute) as they are of the character of essential raw materials required in the manufacture of finished goods by important British industries. Further, while the preferences enjoyed by the United Kingdom relate to manufactured articles such as chemicals, paints, instruments and apparel, which are directly detrimental to the growth of indigenous industries, the United Kingdom grants preferences only to raw materials required for keeping her industries going and for her armament programme.

Turning to preferences granted to Indian exports, further points of criticism are the loss of preference on wheat (the withdrawal of the old preferences with a view to affording freer access for American wheat to the British market being justified on the ground that the wheat preference is of no practical significance to this country); the reduction of the preference on rice, the refusal of the British Government to withdraw the drawback facilities in respect of linseed utilized in the manufacture of linseed oil; the reduction of the preference on chrome leather; and the reduction in the margin of preference enjoyed by handmade Indian carpets.

The most persistent criticism has been levelled against the arrangement for linking up the export of Indian raw cotton to Lancashire with imports of British piece-goods in this country. The general criticism is that this arrangement ignores the recommendations of the unofficial advisers and that there is no adequate *quid pro quo* so far as India is concerned (see ch. ii, §14). It is pointed out, so far as the question of the purchase of an agreed quantity of raw cotton by the United Kingdom is concerned, that the stipulated quantities do not mean any special sacrifice on the part of the United Kingdom to absorb additional quantities of Indian cotton and thus give the promised relief to the Indian cotton grower, and fall short of the normal offtake of Indian cotton by the Lancashire cotton industry. On the other hand, India is asked to guarantee, with the aid of effective sanctions, the intake of United Kingdom cotton piece-goods far in excess of the actual quantity of Lancashire imports into India before the Agreement. Further no mention is made about the proportions of different varieties of Indian cotton in spite of the demand of the Indian cotton growers that at least 65 per cent of the offtake should be short-staple cotton. Then again, in spite of the declaration of the unofficial advisers that any further indirect taxation or burden put on the Indian cotton industry

would necessarily call for similar countervailing increases in the duty on imports of cloth, the import duty on long-staple cotton was doubled. This reduced the protection available to the Indian cotton mill industry, had an adverse effect on the handloom industry and prejudiced in advance the examination of the new trade proposals.

§15. **Concluding observations on the Indo-British Trade Agreement.**—It is by no means easy delicately to weigh the benefits and sacrifices involved in a bilateral trade agreement like the Indo-British Trade Agreement, and the task is rendered all the more difficult when economic issues are mixed up with political controversy. On a broad review of the new Agreement it must be said in fairness that in some ways the new Agreement marks a partial improvement over the Ottawa Agreement. So far as the mutual exchange of preferences is concerned, barring the Cotton Article, there may be said to be a fair deal on the whole. As regards, however, the arrangement for the linking of the intake of Lancashire piece-goods with the offtake of Indian cotton, the scales are heavily tipped in favour of Lancashire, having regard especially to the doubling of the duty on the import of raw cotton into India. While the terms offered by the unofficial advisers to Lancashire were not sufficiently attractive, it would have been a fair arrangement, if either of their recommendations¹ in respect of the export of Indian raw cotton or the import of Lancashire goods had been incorporated in the Agreement; thereby a more acceptable basis for settlement would have resulted.

As regards the Indo-British Trade Agreement as a whole, in these days of bilateral trade and restrictionist trade policy followed by nations, it becomes necessary to preserve as much of the trade as possible by exchange of special concessions. The failure to conclude an Agreement with Great Britain would not have meant mere reversion to the pre-Ottawa situation. With Great Britain definitely committed to a policy of Imperial Preference, India's position as an exporter in the world's first emporium for raw materials would have become in some ways vulnerable.² The insurance value of the Agreement—if not its limited positive

¹ The unofficial advisers proposed 200, 300 and 400 million yards respectively as the minimum, medium and maximum limits of imports of United Kingdom cotton piece-goods against 350, 425 and 500 million yards embodied in the Agreement. As regards raw cotton, the unofficial advisers demanded that the United Kingdom should guarantee a minimum intake of 650,000 bales with an objective figure of one million bales, while in the Agreement it is stipulated that the United Kingdom will import 500,000 bales in 1939, 550,000 in 1940 and 600,000 bales thereafter.

² See B. K. Madan, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

benefits—is its main justification, as it was of the Ottawa Agreement. At the same time, we once again reiterate the old (1936) plea of the Assembly in favour of the adoption by India of a comprehensive policy of bilateral trade agreements with various other important countries with which India has trading relations. §16. **Other Trade Agreements.**¹—We shall now review the other important trade agreements and consider in general the future of bilateral trade agreements so far as India is concerned. The trade agreements other than those entered into with the United Kingdom are : (i) The Indo-Japanese Trade Agreements of 1934, 1937 and 1940 (Provisional) and (ii) The Indo-Burma Trade Agreement (1941).

§17. **Genesis of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement (1934).**—

We have already² referred to the denunciation of the old Indo-Japanese Trade Convention of 1904 by the Government of India in April 1933. The continuous depreciation of the yen since the beginning of 1932 placed Japanese exports to India in a very favourable position towards the end of 1932-3. Indian mills were faced with a serious crisis and the Government of India had to intervene. The increase in the import duties to 50 per cent *ad valorem* with a minimum specific duty of 5¼ as. per lb. on plain grey non-British cotton piece-goods in August 1932 was insufficient to meet the Japanese competition, and the Indian textile industry continued to agitate for additional protection. His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Government of India were thereupon compelled to give the necessary six months' notice to the Government of Japan of their desire to abrogate the old Trade Convention (1904) under which Japan enjoyed the privilege of the most-favoured-nation treatment. So long as the trade convention of 1904 remained in force it was not possible for the Government of India to take any action against Japan alone under the Safeguarding of Industries Act, passed in April 1933 by the Indian Legislature, which empowered the Government to take tariff action whenever the trade and industry of the country was threatened by cheap

¹ See (i) *Report of the Millowners' Association, Bombay* (Annual).

(ii) *The Indian Textile Journal* 1933-4, 1934-5, July 1936, May 1937, May-September 1938, April-September 1940.

(iii) *Review of the Trade of India* (Annual).

(iv) *Indian Finance, Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement Supplement*, 15 July 1936.

(v) *Report of the Special Tariff Board on Textile Industry* (1936).

(vi) *Report of the Indian Merchants' Chamber* (Annual).

(vii) M. P. Gandhi, *The Indian Cotton Textile Industry* (Annual).

² See p. 38.

imports from foreign goods. The decision of the Government of India to denounce the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention led to a movement in Japan for the boycott of Indian cotton by way of reprisal. But the agreement between the Japanese spinners and raw cotton dealers not to accept Indian cotton was not definitely reached until after the promulgation in India of the tariff changes of June 1933, which announced an increase in the duty on foreign (including Japanese) cotton piece-goods to 75 per cent *ad valorem* with a minimum specific duty of 6¾ annas per lb. on plain greys. A Japanese delegation came to India and met the official and non-official representatives of the Government of India at Simla in October 1933. After negotiations lasting more than three months, an agreement was reached between the two sides. The Japanese boycott was withdrawn in January 1934 and at the same time the 75 per cent duty was reduced to 50 per cent by the Government of India. A new reciprocal commercial treaty was drawn up, and was signed in London on 12 July 1934, although the provisions relating to the regulation of imports of Japanese piece-goods had come into force earlier, i.e. on 8 January 1934.

§18. **Provisions of the Agreement (1934).**—The Agreement of 1934 with Japan consisted of two parts, the Convention and the Protocol. The Convention laid down in broad outline the trade relations between the two countries in future, and the Protocol specified the agreement reached regarding the importation of cotton piece-goods from Japan into India and the export of raw cotton from India to Japan. The Protocol without the Convention was to come to an end automatically on 31 March 1937, and the Convention would terminate on the same date, if denounced by either of the contracting parties by giving six months' notice.

The main provisions of the Convention were as follows: (i) Both the contracting parties agreed to extend to each other the most-favoured-nation treatment. (ii) At the same time both the parties had the right of imposing or modifying from time to time special customs duties on the imports from each other at such rates as might be necessary to correct the effect of any variation in the exchange value of the yen or the rupee in relation to the rupee or the yen respectively, subsequent to 31 December 1933. (iii) While both the parties reserved the right to make such changes in their customs tariffs as might be necessary for the protection of their own interests, they were agreeable, when requested to do so by either of them, to enter into negotiations with the object of reconciling as far as possible the interests of the two countries.

The principal articles of the Protocol were as follows: (i) The customs duties to be imposed on importation into India were not to exceed the following rates:

(a) *Plain greys*. 50 per cent *ad valorem* or $5\frac{1}{4}$ annas per lb., whichever is higher; (b) *Others*. 50 per cent *ad valorem*.

(ii) The Protocol prescribed a system of quotas for the imports of Japanese cloth into India and the export of raw cotton from India. Under this arrangement Japan was allowed to export to India in any cotton piece-goods year (i.e. the year beginning on 1 April) 325 million yards of cloth (exclusive of re-exports) provided she purchased one million cotton bales from India in any cotton year (i.e. the year beginning on 1 January). This was the basic quota. The largest quantity of cotton piece-goods that Japan could send to India was fixed at 400 million yards a year. For this purpose the basic allotment of 325 million yards was to be increased by $1\frac{1}{2}$ million yards for every 10,000 bales of the excess over 1 million bales taken in any cotton year.

(iii) The sub-allotment of the cotton piece-goods which might be sent to India in any year was divided into four categories as follows:

(a) Plain greys 45 per cent. (b) Bordered greys 13 per cent. (c) Bleached (white) goods 8 per cent. (d) Coloured (printed, dyed or woven) goods 34 per cent.

§19. **Working and results of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement (1934).**—The conclusion of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement of 1934 removed the ill-feeling prevailing in both the countries and brought relief to the cotton grower, the cotton merchant and, to a certain extent, to the mill-owner in India. The greatest gain from the Agreement was secured by the Indian cotton grower, who succeeded in exporting to Japan cotton in quantities appreciably larger than the quota fixed under the Agreement. The betterment of his economic position was also calculated to help the local textile industry since the masses are the largest consumers of local fabrics.

Japan also realized substantial advantages. In the first place, she secured the most-favoured-nation treatment. The reduction in the customs duty on Japanese exports of piece-goods to India from 75 per cent to 50 per cent, which, in the opinion of Indian mill-owners, gave inadequate protection to the industry, was also another big gain to Japan.

From the Indian standpoint the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement of 1934 was adversely criticized, and the feeling in the country was that India did not come off well in the bargain. The greatest dissatisfaction was expressed against the working of the

quota system. The non-official advisers to the Government of India in the Indo-Japanese trade parleys for the renewal of the Trade Agreement, which began in July 1936, declared that the quota arrangement had lent itself to a considerable amount of evasion. The Japanese as well as the Indian merchants in Japan promptly took advantage of the loopholes in the quota system, and thus frustrated its main object, namely the limitation of the amount of cloth coming from Japan. Fents¹ were outside the quota, and there developed a big trade in them in recent years. So also artificial silk goods were not included under the quota, and large quantities of them were imported into India from Japan. Another ingenious method adopted by Japanese exporters to circumvent the quota arrangement was to send made-up cotton goods such as shirts, dresses, skirts, etc., which have in recent years flooded the Indian market. It was also alleged that considerable quantities of Japanese piece-goods, re-exported from India to Afghanistan and Nepal, were smuggled back across the border into British Indian territory. Thus it was shown that Japanese exports to India had in spite of the Protocol increased, and thus defeated its agreed purpose. The linear yard basis had been abused, and cloth of greater width had been exported to India.

It was further pointed out that Japan had taken full advantage of the most-favoured-nation clause in the Agreement, and had dumped large quantities of cheap miscellaneous manufactured goods such as glassware, boots, shoes, hardware, woollen goods, cycles and umbrellas. This had adversely affected the position of a number of small nascent Indian industries and handicrafts. Customs statistics showed that the imports of miscellaneous Japanese products into India had in recent years risen by several crores of rupees, so that Japan's adverse balance of trade with India had been wiped out. Japanese purchases of Indian pig-iron, jute and oilseeds had considerably diminished. On the other hand, the range of goods imported from Japan, as also the quantities imported, had appreciably increased. It was, therefore, argued that a comprehensive trade agreement was necessary rather than an agreement restricted to the barter of raw cotton against cotton piece-goods.

As regards the large purchases of Indian cotton made by Japan in excess of what the Protocol contemplated, it was urged that Japan bought all this cotton because she wanted a cheap raw material. During 1934-5, the first complete year during the operation

¹ Fents are rejected cuttings of cloth pieces which are imported at smaller customs duty, being below the standard length.

of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement, she bought 2,010,600 bales of Indian cotton. Her average cotton takings from India for the previous ten years were a million and a half bales. It was, therefore, maintained by non-official commercial opinion in India that the minimum offtake of Indian cotton by Japan should be increased from 1 million to at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ million. It was argued that the cotton offtake of Japan would not diminish for some years unless the Japanese replaced cotton in their industries by staple fibre.

§20. **New Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement (1937).**—All these points of criticism against the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement of 1934 received a great deal of attention during the protracted negotiations which commenced in July 1936 for the renewal of the Trade Agreement of 1934 which was to expire on 31 March 1937. The non-official Indian advisers to the Commerce Department of the Government of India were united in their demands, unlike on the previous occasion in 1933. In the first place, it was recommended that while the agreement concerning the Japanese offtake of Indian cotton should continue as at present, there should be a substantial reduction (say by fifty million yards) in the quantities of Japanese cotton piece-goods imported into India. It was also urged that there should be a quota for fents and that it should not exceed an amount equal to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the general cotton piece-goods quota. It was further proposed that to check the growing imports of artificial silk piece-goods into India from Japan, these goods should be included in the general piece-goods quota. The same procedure should be adopted as regards made-up cotton-cloth garments. The quota should be fixed on the square-yard basis instead of the linear yard basis. A further recommendation was that low-grade Japanese yarn (that is, yarn of staples up to 50s) should be subject to a quota. Finally it was urged that under the new agreement there should be either quotas for imports of miscellaneous goods, or such higher specific import duties as would protect the small home industries of India.

The revised Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement came into force from 1 April 1937 and was to have effect until 31 March 1940.

As regards the Trade Convention the *status quo* was preserved and Japan was thus assured of the most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of three years.

The revised cotton Protocol was substantially the same as the old one except for a few modifications, some of which were necessitated by the separation of Burma from India from 1 April 1937. The annual basic import quota of Japanese piece-goods

was reduced from 325 million yards to 283 million yards against the purchase by Japan of Indian raw cotton of one million bales. The reduction was effected in view of the shrinkage of the Indian market following the separation of Burma from India. Similarly the maximum limit of imports of cotton piece-goods, which was conditional on Japan's taking $1\frac{1}{2}$ million bales of raw cotton from India, was reduced from 400 to 358 million yards.

In the new Protocol, the coloured piece-goods were sub-divided into the categories of (i) printed goods and (ii) dyed or woven goods, and the percentage quota apportioned to coloured piece-goods was increased from 34 to 37. The basic quota of cotton piece-goods was exclusive of the cotton fents, but Japan undertook to limit imports of cotton fents into India to 8,950,000 yards annually. The Government of India agreed that customs duties on cotton fents would not exceed 35 per cent *ad valorem*.

§21. A critical estimate of the revised Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement (1937).—The new Agreement with Japan, which came into force from 1 April 1937, was essentially a compromise and failed to satisfy the commercial community in Bombay as well as the Indian textile industry. It was felt that the Agreement fell short of the unanimous recommendations made by the non-official advisers to the Government of India and that it was not better than the old Agreement of 1934. The Government of India could have secured better terms, including protection of the minor industries, which had been suffering owing to Japanese competition. The Trade Convention had been continued on the existing basis without reference to the demand for protection against Japan put forward on behalf of the small indigenous industries. The *status quo* had thus been preserved in the general trade relationship between the two countries. The Agreement was to that extent a gain for Japan.

As regards the cotton Protocol, the main difference from the previous one was, as explained above, necessitated by the separation of Burma with whom Japan had already concluded an agreement under which the Burmese quota for Japanese piece-goods had been fixed at 42 million yards. The Indian quota had accordingly been reduced by an equivalent amount. It should be borne in mind, however, that Burma's requirements were estimated at about 70 million yards annually, when the basic quota of the old Protocol was fixed. Since the separate Burmese quota had been fixed at 42 million yards only, India would have to absorb 28 million extra yards, as her quota was reduced by 42 million yards only and not by 70 million yards as it ought to have been.

It was also unfortunate that cotton fents had not been included in the quota of cotton piece-goods, although it was some consolation that the maximum quantity of cotton fents that might be exported to India annually was limited to 8,950,000 yards, i.e. 2½ per cent of the quota of cotton piece-goods.

The exclusion of silk fents and artificial silk piece-goods from the scope of the Agreement was also adversely criticized. But the Indian mill industry and the indigenous silk industry were assisted by the Finance Department Notification (1937) prohibiting imports of artificial silk fents into India and the raising of the import duties on artificial silk piece-goods by an average of an anna per square yard.

Some of the suggestions made by the non-official advisers were not accepted; for example, no quota limitation was placed on the extraneous imports of made-up goods, towellings, cotton blankets, and re-exports over India's land frontiers to the neighbouring markets of Nepal and Afghanistan.

Disappointment was also felt that the Government of India did not take the opportunity offered by the Trade Agreement to check the intrusion of Japan into the coastal shipping trade of India and to ensure for India a fair share in the carrying trade between Japan and India.

In support of the new Indo-Japanese Agreement it may be said that the interests of the cotton grower had to be safeguarded first, and in view of the threat of Chinese cotton strengthened by the new five-year plan it was gratifying that the offtake of Indian cotton for three years had been stabilized.¹ In this connexion we should do well to remember that India at present needs an effective outlet for much of the cotton she grows. The Indian mills absorb roughly 50 per cent of the five million bales of cotton produced in the country. Although there is some scope for the expansion of the Indian cotton textile industry especially in view of the conditions created by the war which commenced in September 1939, and although Lancashire mills are using more Indian cotton than before, it cannot be denied that there will continue to be a substantial export surplus of Indian cotton. The Continental demand for Indian cotton even in normal times is not guaranteed and remains totally suspended at present (1941) owing to the loss of the Continental market. Even when it is revived the

¹ It should be noted, however, that owing to the Sino-Japanese hostilities and the difficulties experienced by Japan in commanding foreign exchange, she considerably reduced her purchases of Indian cotton, the figure of export from India being 1,359,092 bales of cotton in 1937-8 as compared with 2,426,049 bales in 1936-7.

Continent will not in any case absorb more than a small percentage of our cotton. Japan is today the largest single buyer of Indian cotton and therefore, to a certain extent, holds the key position. It is not altogether wise to assume that Japan must and will buy our cotton. She has alternative sources in America, China and Egypt. At the same time our position as sellers of cotton to Japan is not so weak that Japan can dictate terms to us.

On the whole, the Agreement of 1937 was not worse than the old one, and India's position was stronger under the revised Protocol. It was felt, however, that the Government of India could have utilized our bargaining power to the fullest extent in India's interests. Also it would have been very desirable if instead of a barter agreement of raw cotton against cotton piece-goods, a comprehensive trade agreement, including proper safeguards for the nascent small industries of India like glass and glassware, hosiery, soap, enamel ware, chemicals, etc., had been concluded with Japan. Owing to Japan's preoccupation with the Sino-Japanese war, the tension of the Japanese competition in the Indian market was temporarily somewhat relaxed. But recent trade trends indicate that Japan is carefully nursing the Indian market. (See §23 below.)

§22. Latest Indo-Japanese Trade Talks (Provisional Agreement, 1940).—Indo-Japanese trade negotiations for a revised Trade Pact and Protocol began at Simla towards the end of October 1939, and have not yet been finally concluded. The changing and uncertain currents of foreign trade, the drastic alterations of the existing Protocol proposed by Japan in her favour, the cotton requirement of the allied countries, the exchange position and the difficulty regarding the method by which India could ensure that raw materials shipped overseas did not ultimately find their way into enemy possessions have delayed the successful conclusion of a fresh trade agreement with Japan.

The Government of India decided in December 1939 not to give the necessary six months' notice of termination of the Trade Convention with Japan in view of the assurance they received that the Government of Japan had not the least intention to take advantage (by tolerating heavy shipments of Japanese goods to India) of an interval that may arise between the termination of the Protocol and the Convention in the event of serious delay in the negotiations.

On the expiry of the Protocol on 31 March 1940 the two Governments agreed that during the period intervening between expiry and the framing of a new Agreement they would take no action to prejudice each other's trade.

Since, however, the negotiations for a new Protocol could not be concluded in time the Government of India had to make a tentative arrangement whereby the maximum figure for Japanese cotton textile imports to India was raised to ~~400~~ million yards annually. The Japanese Government announced that if and when a new Protocol was drawn up shipments made on the provisional basis would be re-calculated and re-adjusted with retrospective effect from 1 April 1940. The rate of shipment, as the Commerce Member explained in the Assembly in April 1940, was as before to depend on the amount of imports of raw cotton: 400 million yards was the maximum figure corresponding to the old maximum of 358 million yards. This increase, even though provisional, was strongly criticized by textile interests in India. There was also a complaint that Japan had been evading the spirit of the Protocol by exporting cotton piece-goods through Japanese-controlled mills in North China, but had failed to take up $1\frac{1}{2}$ million bales of Indian cotton which alone would entitle her to export the maximum permissible under the category. The absence of limitations on different categories of piece-goods had resulted in increased imports of certain favourite categories from Japan to the detriment of the Indian textile industry.¹

§23. **Rival demands of the two parties.**—As regards the new Trade Agreement and Protocol which has not yet been finally concluded, the Government of India, responding to the proposals made by the non-official advisers and commercial bodies in India, would seem to have asked for (i) a guaranteed minimum offtake of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million bales of raw cotton annually and for a reduction of India's present intake of Japanese cotton piece-goods from 400 million linear yards to 350 million square yards annually; (ii) limitation of cotton yarn imports from Japan to the average of the last five years; (iii) the extension of the quota system to re-exports over land frontiers, commercial fents, hosiery, rayon cloth and sundry goods which compete with the products of a number of small industries in this country. The Indian business community is also very keen on securing to Indian shipping a considerable share of the trade between the two countries, under the new Trade Agreement with Japan.

On the other hand, the Japanese delegates appear to have pressed for a reduction of the import duties on Japanese cotton sheetings especially in view of the appreciation of the yen in terms of rupees since the war began, suitable alterations in the barter quota between cotton and cotton sheetings, a revision of

¹ See *Indian Textile Journal*, May 1940, p. 222.

the present cotton sheetings, reduction in the minimum offtake of raw cotton and increase of Japanese cotton piece-goods to India to 440 million yards. These rival demands indicate a wide gulf between the viewpoints of the two nations, and give some idea of the complexities of the issues involved. It is strongly felt in India that India should not yield to Japanese pressure as she is in a strong bargaining position, for in spite of Japanese efforts to grow cotton in North China and Manchukuo that country cannot dispense with our cotton. From the trends of trade between the two countries in recent years it would appear that while Japan buys only when and to the extent she must, she sells goods to India to the best of her capacity under existing conditions. This is indicated by the conversion in recent years of her adverse balance of trade with India into a favourable balance.

The prospects of concluding an early trade agreement with Japan appear at the moment to be very gloomy in view of the recent (July 1941) announcement by the British Government of the denunciation of the trade treaties with Japan, as their objects had not been attained. Accordingly the requisite six months' notice of termination of the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention of 1934 has been given to Japan.

§24. **New Indo-Burma Trade Agreement (1941).**—The trade relations between India and Burma after the separation of the latter as from 1 April 1937 were governed until the conclusion recently (April 1941) of a new Trade Agreement between the two countries, by the Indo-Burma Trade Regulation Order-in-Council. It provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in trade and tariff matters between the two countries. The Government of Burma, who found the free trade regime thus introduced unsuitable in view of their budget difficulties and need for customs revenue, gave notice on 1 April 1940 to terminate the Trade Regulation Order with effect from 1 April 1941. In the meantime negotiations for a new trade agreement were set on foot and after many hopes and fears resulted in an agreement acceptable to both parties.

The new Agreement, which was signed early in April 1941, puts an end to the old free trade regime, both the Governments being free to impose tariff duties, subject to the reciprocal concession that their general tariff rates would give margins of preference to goods of India and Burma as the case may be of 10 per cent against Empire and 15 per cent against foreign goods. Subject to these provisions, the contracting parties undertake to accord each other the most-favoured-Empire-nation treatment.

§25. **Exchange of concessions.**—The main features of the new Agreement are summed up below.

(i) *Concessions by Burma to India*: (a) Burma undertakes to accord free entry to some 77 articles such as canned fish, coal, raw cotton, cotton twist and pig-iron. (b) She undertakes not to tax certain goods at rates in excess of 5 per cent (e.g. potatoes, coconuts, chemicals, drugs and medicines, paints, woollen blankets, rugs, etc.). (c) She further undertakes not to tax certain goods (e.g. coffee, cigars, certain spices, toilet soap, boots, shoes, etc.) at rates in excess of 10 per cent. (d) Lastly certain goods when imported into Burma will be taxable at special rates not exceeding those shown below, e.g. betel nuts, 20 per cent; ale and beer at the rate of the excise duty; tobacco, one anna per pound; silk, artificial silk and mixed fabrics, 15 per cent, and so on.

(ii) *Concessions by India to Burma*: (a) India agrees that certain goods of Burmese origin (e.g. dyeing and tanning substances, gums, resins and lac, wood and timber, lacquered-ware, iron ore, aluminium, lead and zinc metals [other than iron and steel] etc.) shall be accorded free entry. (b) India further agrees that certain goods shall be dutiable at special rates, e.g. potatoes and onions, 5 per cent; coffee, 10 per cent; cigars, 10 per cent; tobacco (unmanufactured), one anna per pound. (c) Thirdly it has been found necessary to regulate separately the tariff treatment of Indian cotton piece-goods exported to Burma and of Burmese kerosene exported to India. As regards cotton piece-goods, while the Agreement provides for a margin of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent only, the Burma Government pledge themselves not to fix the duty on such goods at more than 10 per cent. Furthermore, the position of Indian textiles in Burma is strengthened by the retention of the quota on the Japanese goods at its present level. As regards kerosene, while the margin of preference is reduced to nine pies per gallon as against the former margin of eleven and a quarter pies, the Government of India obtain the right during the period of war to impose a surcharge equal to the entire margin of preference. The surcharge came into effect on 7 April 1941. (d) It was also found necessary, fourthly, to deal separately with exports of timber to India and of imports of sugar into Burma. The Burma Government undertook not to impose an export duty on timber during the period of the war. Should it do so after the war, the Government of India would be freed from the obligation to allow free entry. Burma undertakes to accord special privileges to sugar imported from India in so far as the local capacity to meet demand leaves a margin to be filled by imports. (e) Fifthly, rice and broken rice will be retained on the free list and no duty will be levied in India on

these commodities coming from Burma so long as they are allowed to be imported free of duty from other countries. In case a duty is imposed on broken rice a preference not in excess of 10 per cent on the amount of the duty will be granted to imports from Burma. (f) Sixthly, as regards exports from one country to the other which are liable to excise duty (e.g. motor spirit, matches, salt, sugar) it is provided in general that the rate of the customs duty shall correspond to the level of the excise duty ruling in the country of imports. As regards the duration of the Agreement, it is provided that it shall run for an indefinite period, subject to the right of either party to denounce it at six months' notice.

We welcome this new trade treaty between Burma and India giving each other neighbourly preferences, which will stabilize, and if possible increase, their exchange of goods to their mutual advantage. Such a trade pact is to be particularly welcomed in the present conditions of zonal rather than worldwide trading.

The Burmese farmer, the Indian manufacturer, the Indian consumer of rice and the finances of the Governments of both countries will be the principal beneficiaries under the new pact. While the Indian rice grower may feel dissatisfied with the free entry accorded to Burmese rice, which accounts for nearly half of our imports from Burma, he may take solace in the fact that he enjoys a margin created by the export duty. The new trade pact is also expected to ensure Burmese goodwill towards Indian immigrants.

§26. The new policy of bilateral trade agreements.—An outstanding feature of the history of recent commercial policy, especially since 1932, has been the increasing activity displayed by a number of trading countries, particularly in Europe, in the conclusion of short-term bilateral trade agreements. This offers a striking contrast to the old trade policy, based on the most-favoured-nation principle which was until recently widely in operation.

Of the many types of bilateral agreements the most common are: (i) Clearing and (ii) Compensation or Barter Agreements. The latter provide for the direct exchange of goods and thus obviate the necessity of devising means of payment. Such agreements may be entered into between two Governments or two private persons or firms in the two countries. The clearing agreements do not specify the particular commodities to be exchanged. They are designed mainly to regulate bilateral trade so as to produce as far as possible an exact balance of exports and

imports and to regulate foreign exchange.¹ It is no doubt still customary to insert the most-favoured-nation clause in such bilateral agreements; but the operation of the clause is rendered nugatory by the simultaneous inclusion of provisions relating to financial and quota arrangements, industrial undertakings, regional preferences, etc.

§27. **The movement for bilateral agreements in India.**—The business community in India viewed with great alarm the deterioration of India's trade balance in merchandise in recent years, particularly during the depression of 1929-33, owing to the imposition of various restrictions by India's foreign customers especially in Europe in the form of prohibitions, monopolies, quotas, exchange restrictions, license systems, etc. The general tendency to planned trade on the basis of trade treaties and the example of the United Kingdom herself in concluding such treaties strengthened the movement in India for a comprehensive policy of trade development through bilateral trade agreements. In the period before the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Government of India were urged to enter into bilateral agreements with all the important countries with which India had commercial relations, especially with Germany, Italy, Iran and Turkey, whose policies of regulated commercial exchange had particularly serious repercussions on India's export trade. The issue before the country was: should India abandon her traditional policy of the universal most-favoured-nation treatment in favour of a system of bilateral trade agreements? Point was lent to this controversy by the vote of the Legislative Assembly (March 1936) in favour of the termination of the Ottawa Agreement and the adoption of Mr Jinnah's amendment to the Government motion recommending that the Government should examine the trend of India's trade with a view to entering into bilateral trade treaties.²

§28. **The case against bilateral agreements.**—While the Government of India seemed thus to be committed to the policy of bilateral treaties, they were not convinced of the desirability of adopting such a policy. In their judgement nothing in the study of the world economic conditions in the past few years, or in India's existing circumstances, had shown that any departure from the accepted policy was necessary.³ It was urged that India's

¹ See *Press Note III on India's Foreign Trade Policy* (1936) issued by the Director of Information with the Government of India; also Paul Einzig, *Exchange Control*, pp. 151-2.

² See §11 above.

³ The grounds on which this conclusion was based have been set forth in the Press Notes issued in March 1936 by the Director of Information with the

export trade consisted mainly of comparatively few raw materials sent to the great world markets, and it was essential for her prosperity that she should have a favourable balance of trade and should have, to the greatest extent possible, free and unrestricted access to these markets. She could therefore ill afford to risk the closing of any door open to her by virtue of most-favoured-nation rights. Not only did bilateral trade agreements tend to produce immediate diminution of the total trade of the contracting parties, but the diversion of trade from its natural channels was also likely to inflict serious damage on third parties. The policy of preferring a favourable balance to an increase in the total volume of trade must lead to the extinction of all trade balances and the permanent shrinkage of international trade. India stood to lose rather than to gain by adopting a policy which at best would reduce her foreign trade to a balance of exports and imports. Restriction of imports, it was maintained, might be a regrettable necessity in the case of 'distress' countries like Germany, but the adoption of such a measure by reasonably prosperous countries like India would be sheer defeatism.

As regards bilateral agreements with countries like Germany,¹ Italy, Iran, Turkey, etc., it was necessary to bear in mind, in the first place, that India had normally a favourable balance of trade with these countries, i.e. she sold more to them than she bought from them. A country which was prepared to restrict its imports would always drive a hard bargain with another anxious to sell. Moreover, the exports of these countries to India would directly compete with the products of Indian industries. It must also be borne in mind that India no longer held a dominant position in the world's markets as a supplier of food and raw materials. For instance, Germany was obtaining large quantities of raw materials formerly bought from India from countries with whom clearing agreements had been made. Thus cotton was obtained from Brazil, Peru, Egypt and Turkey, hides and skins from South America, oil-seeds from the Argentine and the French Colonies, and so on. Allowance had also to be made for the fact that the uncertain character of the general economic conditions and of the currency situation in these countries would militate against sound bilateral agreements being made with them.

There were difficulties to be faced with other countries. For

Government of India regarding India's foreign trade policy. See also B. K. Madan's article, 'Bilateralism and Indian Trade', *Indian Journal of Economics* (July 1938), as also his *India and Imperial Preference*, pp. 199-200.

¹ This refers to the trade position before the outbreak of war in September 1939.

example, France was paying a great deal of attention to the encouragement of imports from her Colonies and had grown to like the milder and more delicate-flavoured China tea better than Indian tea. Again, the United States of America was still bent on its isolationist tactics and was concentrating on internal commerce and development rather than on foreign trade. Thus the chances of concluding successful bilateral agreements with these countries were very poor.

If a long view is taken, it must be remembered that India cannot isolate herself from the world and retain her present importance as a commercial unit. She must seek an outlet for her surplus produce in world markets, and her ultimate prosperity is dependent on the general prosperity of the world trading community. Her true interest therefore lies in the restoration of the free and unrestricted flow of international trade on which world prosperity depends.

§29. **The need for bilateral agreements.**—On the other side, however, it can be argued that the prospects for world recovery and restoration of freedom in international trade are at present far from bright. The present tendencies towards economic nationalism, self-sufficiency and bilaterism in trade are likely to be intensified rather than diminished in strength in the future. In these circumstances, India must fall in with the new policy of trade regulation in sheer self-defence, and she has already made a beginning in the Indo-British, Indo-Japanese¹ and Indo-Burma Trade Agreements.

Great Britain, Burma and Japan are no doubt three of our most important customers and it is highly desirable that we should have trade agreements with them on as advantageous terms as we can secure. We must, however, as suggested in the Assembly's Resolution denouncing the Ottawa Agreement in March 1936, cast our net wide and fully explore the possibilities of suitable bilateral agreements with other customers also, such as the United States of America, Turkey, Iran, Canada, Ireland, Australia, Ceylon, East Africa,² Afghanistan, Egypt and, after the present war is over, with Germany and Italy, and endeavour to secure some relief from the various restrictions to which our exports to some of these countries have in recent years (apart from the restrictions on trade imposed since the commencement

¹ See however §23 above.

² India has been importing most of the long-staple cotton from East Africa for weaving finer fabrics in her mills and she might as well negotiate for the allotment of a piece-goods quota in the East African market.

of the war in September 1939) been subjected.¹ An attitude of *laissez-faire* in this matter does not appear to be very helpful, and delay will only add to our troubles. It has been proposed by commercial bodies like the Indian Merchants' Chamber, Bombay, that in order to lay a suitable foundation for negotiating trade treaties, India should adopt a scheme for regulating her imports and exports with reference to those countries which have adopted restrictive measures. At the same time, she should throw her full weight in favour of all such attempts as may be made to remove the present restrictions on world trade and to restore to that trade, when the present world conflict is over, even a fraction of the freedom it enjoyed a few years ago.

¹ The Government of India recently (1938) concluded a provisional trade agreement with the South African Union on the basis of the most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of those commodities not eligible for preferential treatment in virtue of any one or other of the Ottawa series of Agreements. It has been the subject of criticism both in the Assembly and outside, the defence of the Government of India being that in the absence of the Agreement India's exports of piece-goods, etc., to South Africa would have been subject to higher duties under the new South African Tariff Act.

APPENDIX I

REPORT OF THE BOMBAY TEXTILE LABOUR ENQUIRY COMMITTEE (1940)

§1. **Main conclusions and recommendations.**¹—The final Report of the Textile Labour Enquiry Committee appointed by the Government of Bombay in April 1937 was submitted to the Government in July 1940 and was released for publication early in June 1941.²

The recommendations made by the Committee in their final Report cover a wide field and relate to various progressive measures for the benefit of the textile labour in the province as well as schemes for the better running of the industry. The main recommendations of the Committee are summarized below.

(i) *Living wage standard.* The evaluation of a living wage standard would not, in the opinion of the Committee, penalize in a special manner the textile industry in the province. Further, such evaluation need not necessarily be preceded by an all-India inquiry covering all industries. For a typical family of husband and wife and two children, the range of total expenditure for maintaining a living wage standard is estimated by the Committee between Rs. 50 and Rs. 55 for Bombay [Rs. 23 (food), Rs. 12 (rent) and Rs. 15 to 20 (other items)], Rs. 45 and Rs. 50 for Ahmedabad, the range for Sholapur being Rs. 3 to Rs. 5 less than for Ahmedabad. The Committee are not in favour of making any allowance for the earnings of the wife and for supplementary sources of earnings, if any. For the bulk of the workers in the industry earnings fall short of the living wage standard.

(ii) *Minimum wage.* Minimum wage-fixing machinery is today considered to be necessary for all industries where labour is unorganized or weakly organized. The Committee do not agree that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act (1938) dispenses with the need for a special machinery for fixing or revising minimum wage rates. It would not be sufficient to restrict the regulation to a single general minimum; all occupational grades in the industry must be covered and this can best be done through the machinery of the trade board. The Committee recommend the establishment of a trade board for the cotton textile industry of Bombay province on the lines of boards established under the British Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918. It should be composed of an equal number of representatives of employers and workers, and should also contain some independent persons. The main duty of the board should be to fix the minimum time and/or piece rates for as large a body of workers included in the industry as possible.

¹ See *Report of the Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee*, pp. 382-428, and *The Times of India*, 5 June 1941.

² See ch. ii, §§19-20.

(iii) *Standardization of wages.* The Committee agree that advantage should be taken of the adoption of schemes of standardization to reduce disparities. This should be achieved not by effecting cuts in the rates for any occupation but by a process of levelling-up when the standardization lists are framed. If a uniform standard is to be achieved for all the centres, it is essential that while applying it to the various centres proper allowance should be made for variations in the cost of living. The Committee hold that the existing level of wages is, at the level of the cost of living ruling in August 1939, suitable for times of normal trade. The Government should appoint a Standardization Committee for Bombay for the purpose of attending to the working out of the details of the scheme, watching its operation and making suitable adjustments in it.

(iv) *Automatic adjustment of wages.* It is neither desirable nor necessary to recommend the adoption of a sliding scale based on any cost of living index number in the cotton textile industry in this province. The Committee do not consider that a scheme of automatic adjustment of wages can be used as a means to attain a living wage standard. They do not, therefore, recommend that any attempt be made to set up arrangements for the automatic adjustment of wages in the cotton textile industry.

(v) *Working of shifts.* A night shift as a permanent and regulated feature may provide increased employment in any industry, but the spasmodic working of night shifts, while temporarily offering additional employment, ultimately aggravates the evil of unemployment by attracting to industrial centres an unduly large number of men. The Committee suggest that an All-India Industrial Council be established to examine, among other duties, the question of regulating night shifts for the whole country.

(vi) *Rationalization.* The Committee use the term rationalization as including efficiency schemes and urge that India must take the greatest advantage of all means and resources at its disposal which will enable it to stabilize the cotton textile industry and to face successfully the competition of other countries which have attained a high degree of efficiency in production. If the use of methods of rationalization reduces the cost of production, raises the wages of workers and cheapens cloth, the Committee have no doubt that India in general and the province of Bombay in particular stands in need of adopting such measures. An average textile worker in Bombay or Ahmedabad is capable of turning out as much and as good work as his compeer in industrially advanced countries, if he is properly looked after and trained and if there is co-operation between him and the management. No employer should be permitted to introduce any rationalization scheme and no worker should be permitted to go on strike on the proposed rationalization scheme until the matter is finally disposed of either by a representative Rationalization Committee, which should be established by the Government, or by the Industrial Court.

(vii) *Financial and industrial reorganization.* The Committee are of the opinion that in the existing circumstances of the cotton

textile industry better results are likely to be attained by economies accruing from close personal attention than from production or management on a larger scale. The formation of pools for certain specific purposes represents a more modest method of reorganization which has, within degrees, yielded satisfactory results. It is worth while examining whether, by extending the scope of joint action in the direction of joint purchases of stores, substantial economies cannot be secured in all centres of the industry. The division of markets on the basis of sources of supply, the allocation of the production of specialized sorts to specific units or centres, and a better joint organization of the export-markets for the common benefit of the industry should receive the earliest attention if unbridled competition is to be checked.

The Committee recommend the establishment of a fully representative All-India Industrial Council to deal with problems relating to the cotton textile industry in the various provinces and Indian States.

No statutory limitation of dividends is called for, although in a period of prosperity it is in the ultimate interest of the industry itself to husband its resources. The payment of remuneration to the Managing Agents as a percentage of the net profits is the most equitable of the three methods of remuneration in vogue and it tends to evoke the greatest measure of effort to secure profitable working.

(viii) *Welfare work and social legislation.* It would be highly desirable if a beginning were made in the province of Bombay for the creation of a composite institute of industrial hygiene, industrial psychology and industrial welfare. A well-planned housing programme, co-operative societies, education facilities, regular medical inspection, compulsory and contributory schemes of sickness and unemployment insurance, provident funds and the establishment of an employment bureau are recommended.

(ix) *Labour management and organization.* The Committee conclude that the safeguard of the workers' right to organize without intimidation and discrimination in order to protect and improve their standards of life is the essence of trade unionism ; and employers who wish to see the growth of a sound trade union movement in the province should refrain from doing anything that may deter workers from exercising their right of organization.

§2. *Some observations on the Committee's Report.*—As was to be expected, the Report of the Committee, which is framed on an ambitious pattern, received a mixed reception, having regard especially to the present war-time conditions. Turning first to the Government view of the Report, the Government of Bombay, explaining in a *Press Communiqué* the delay in releasing the Report, point out that the Committee's findings and recommendations, which would obviously entail a considerable outlay both by Government and industry, cover a wide field of subjects not all of which fall exclusively within the purview of a Provincial Government, as was shown by the deliberations of the two conferences of Labour Ministers summoned by the Government of India in 1940 and 1941, which considered problems like sickness insurance

and holidays with pay. Certain of the Committee's findings, such as those on the living wage standard and unemployment insurance, must under the present economic conditions in the country be considered as of purely theoretical value and academic interest. Some of the Committee's recommendations relating to such subjects as the establishment of committees for rationalization and standardization of wages, the formation of trade boards, etc., will have to be subjected to careful scrutiny before any action can be taken on them. Moreover, before the Committee's recommendations can be adopted it is necessary to achieve some agreement with other industrial provinces and States, since the adoption of higher standards in one province is likely to be a handicap to industry and employment in that province, having regard especially to the fact that Bombay is already ahead of other provinces in its labour legislation and welfare work. The Government of Bombay have promised to consider in detail certain recommendations of the Committee falling within their purview in consultation with the interests concerned.

The millowners of Bombay seem to be in agreement with the views of the Government of Bombay on the Report of the Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee. The abnormal conditions in the industry created by the war are considered unsuitable for implementing the vital recommendations of the Committee for some time. The millowners unanimously think that the proposals of the Committee, if accepted, will involve heavy expenditure which the industry is not in a position to bear, nor is it fair for the industry in the Bombay province alone to go ahead when other textile centres are lagging behind in respect of labour conditions. The war orders received by the industry constitute only a fraction of its total productive capacity, while the favourable factors, such as the absence of overseas competition, are of a temporary character not warranting fresh commitments of any long-range nature.

The spokesmen of labour, like Mr N. M. Joshi, think that while the Report of the Committee is encouraging, the views expressed by the Government and the millowners are most disappointing. While labour did not wish to offer a threat of any serious deadlock in the industry, the Government would not find contented labour in these hard times if they pursued the dilatory tactics foreshadowed in the *Communiqué*, unlike the British Labour Ministry which had given an assurance that the advance of social progress would not be hindered in England even during the war. As the industry is making war profits the present is an opportune time for the introduction of urgent reforms like standardization of wages, and other overdue reforms like sickness insurance and holidays with pay.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the Report of the Committee contains many useful recommendations which may form the basis of far-reaching legislation. While in the conditions created by the war, it may not make it possible fully to implement the various recommendations of the Committee, it should nevertheless be possible to make a beginning now in respect of some of these both because some of the reforms like sick leave with

pay are urgent and overdue, and the present moment when the war has brightened the prospects of the cotton textile industry is not altogether inopportune for adopting some measures for the betterment of labour.

APPENDIX II

SUPPLEMENTARY BANKING STATISTICS (1938-40)

The recent (July 1941) publication of *Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India and Burma for the years 1939 and 1940*, by the Reserve Bank of India, has made available statistics bearing on the position of Indian banking in recent years, and throwing further light on the effects of the war on the Indian banking system. In chapter X, 'Banking and Credit', statistics regarding certain classes of banks in India could be given only up to 1937, the latest year for which they were available until a few weeks ago. It is therefore proposed to add statistics for the three years 1938, 1939 and 1940 in this Appendix.

In the new publication referred to above, banks in India have been classified for the purpose of the statistical tables into (i) The Reserve Bank of India, which is the central bank of the country; (ii) The Scheduled Banks comprising (a) The Imperial Bank of India, which is the largest joint-stock bank in India, (b) the Exchange Banks and (c) other Scheduled Banks included in the second schedule to the Reserve Bank; (iii) Non-scheduled (Joint-stock) Banks; and (iv) Co-operative Banks.

TABLE I¹
Capital, Reserves, Deposits and Cash Balances of the Exchange Banks (see Table on p. 429)

As on 31 December	No. of Banks	Capital and Reserve		Deposits		Cash Balances		
		Paid-up capital	Reserve and Rest	Out of India and Burma	In India and Burma	Out of India and Burma	In India and Burma	
		£(1,000)	£(1,000)	£(1,000)	Rs. (1,000)	£(1,000)	Rs. (1,000)	
1938.	A ²	5	4,425	5,032	32,527	28,33,97	8,997	3,77,27
	B ²	13	63,540	58,519	1,186,233	38,86,45	250,576	2,67,14
1939	A ²	5	8,625	5,605	50,945	30,32,52	15,783	3,08,62
	B ²	14	60,884	50,151	1,473,962	43,75,30	451,602	4,30,14
1940	A ²	5	4,425	4,000	35,572	35,45,48	10,704	4,59,78
	B ²	15	64,994	55,267	1,515,000	50,11,99	588,973	11,93,50

¹ *Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India and Burma for the years 1939 and 1940*, Table No. 3. Statistics regarding Burma Banks for 1939 and 1940 have been included in this and other tables as the Reserve Bank is also the central bank for that country and the two banking systems are closely connected.

² See footnotes 3 and 4 to p. 429.

Latest available statistics up to April 1941 have already been given regarding the Reserve Bank of India (see pp. 486-7), the Imperial Bank of India (see p. 470) and the Scheduled Banks (see p. 482). Statistics relating to Co-operative Banks are given in Vol. I, ch. x, 'The Co-operative Movement in India'.

It is proposed here to give statistics for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 in the case of the Exchange Banks and the Indian joint-stock banks, and also certain general banking statistics which illustrate the effects of the war on Indian banking (see Tables I-IV).

TABLE II¹

Capital, Reserves, Deposits, Cash Balances and other particulars relating to the Principal Indian joint-stock banks, (excluding the Imperial Bank of India). (See Table on p. 438.)

Class A.—Banks having a paid-up capital and reserves of Rs. 5 lakhs and over.
(In lakhs of rupees)

As on 31 December	No. of Reporting Banks	Paid-up capital	Reserves	Deposits	Cash Balances	Bills dis- counted and loans and advances	Investments in Government and other securities
1938	43	7.48	5.65	98.08	14.00	52.21	41.71
1939 ²	51	8.26	5.31	1,00.73	16.72	57.86	83.95
1940 ³	58	9.09	5.57	1,13.58	26.26	54.44	45.20

Class B.—Banks having paid-up capital and reserves between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakhs.

1938	120	1.62	79	8.72	1.29	7.74	1.33
1939	119	1.58	75	9.27	1.37	8.55	2.14
1940	122	1.67	76	11.04	2.24	8.14	2.08

Class C.—Banks having paid-up capital and reserves between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 1 lakh.

1939	112	61	16	2.98	52	2.65	42
1940	121	65	19	2.86	59	2.59	44

Class D.—Banks having paid-up capital and reserves less than Rs. 50,000.

1939	4.00	62	14	2.63	38	2.86	23
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¹ Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India and Burma for the years 1939 and 1940, Table No. 4.

² Includes 39 scheduled and 12 non-scheduled banks.

³ Includes 41 scheduled and 17 non-scheduled banks.

TABLE III¹
Comparative position of the several classes of banks
(In lakhs of rupees)

Classification	Year	No. of Reporting Banks	Paid-up capital and reserve	Deposits	Cash Balances	Percentage of cash to deposits	Investments	Percentage of investments to deposits	Loans and advances	Percentage of loans and advances to deposits
1. Scheduled Banks.										
(a) Imperial Bank of India	1939	1	11.23	87.84	11.09	12.6	38.02	43.3	42.28	55.0
	1940	1	11.25	96.03	24.83	25.9	48.57	50.6	32.31	33.6
(b) Exchange Banks ...	1939	19	...	74.08(a)	7.39(a)	10.0
	1940	20	...	85.57(a)	16.53(a)	19.3
(c) Other scheduled banks	1939	39	11.94	93.74	16.12	17.2	36.51	38.9	52.58	56.1
	1940	41	12.67	1,06.10	25.02	23.6	42.45	40.0	48.95	46.1
2. Non-scheduled Banks										
(a) Banks having paid-up capital and reserves over Rs. 1 lakh ...	1939	131	3.95	16.26	1.98	12.2	4.59	28.2	14.13	86.9
	1940	139	4.42	18.92	3.48	18.4	4.83	25.5	13.63	72.0
(b) Banks having paid-up capital and reserves between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 1 lakh ...	1939	112	77	2,98	52	17.4	42	14.1	2.65	88.9
	1940	121	84	2,86	59	20.6	44	15.4	2.59	90.6
(c) Banks having paid-up capital and reserves below Rs. 50,000 ...	1939	400	76	2,63	38	14.4	23	8.7	2.86	108.7
3. Co-operative Banks										
(a) Banks having paid-up capital and reserves of over Rs. 5 lakhs ...	1939	43	5.35	22.92	2.93	8.9	18.34	80.0
	1940	41	5.48	22.94	1.90	8.3	18.91	82.4
(b) Banks having paid-up capital and reserves between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakhs ...	1939	261	5.34	15.86	1.06	6.7	14.45	91.1
	1940	277	5.68	16.14	1.27	7.9	14.63	90.6

¹ Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India and Burma for the years 1939 and 1940. Table No. 5.

TABLE IV

Branches of banks at the end of December 1940

Classification	No. of offices
Reserve Bank of India	8
Imperial Bank of India	390
Exchange Banks	101
Other Scheduled Banks	857
Non-scheduled Banks having capital and reserves of Rs. 50,000 or over	718
Total ...	2,074

Tables I-III bear ample testimony to the effects of the war on Indian Banking (see ch. x, §60) such as (i) large increase in deposits, (ii) lack of satisfactory and lucrative outlets for bank funds and (iii) high liquidity of assets.¹ The increase in the cash ratio at the end of 1940 is to be attributed partly to the desire of bankers to keep their position liquid in view of war conditions and partly to the slackness of demand for trade finance during the latter half of 1940 as a result of war developments.

The general impression left on the reader is that the Indian banking system has successfully withstood the onerous strain placed upon it by the conditions created by the war and the exigencies of financing it.

¹ *Commerce*, 9 August 1941, p. 157.

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