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ON THE GOVERNMENT  
OF  
DEPENDENCIES

*SIR G. C. LEWIS*

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AN ESSAY  
ON THE GOVERNMENT  
OF  
DEPENDENCIES

BY  
SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, K.C.B.

(ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN 1841)

EDITED  
*WITH AN INTRODUCTION*

BY  
C. P. LUCAS, B.A.  
OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND THE COLONIAL OFFICE, LONDON

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## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

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ANY Editorial additions to the book now republished by the Delegates of the Clarendon Press have been made with the view of bringing it up to date. Exactly fifty years have passed since it was written, and those years have been singularly rich in colonial history. They have been rich also in producing standard works on various subjects referred to in the text. Sir G. Lewis had not before him Grote's or Curtius' histories of Greece, Mommsen's History of Rome, Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law, or many other great books. Still those which he had remain almost unrivalled; and any one, who wishes to study colonies and dependencies in themselves and in their relations to the mother country, can find no better authorities than Aristotle's Politics, many passages in which bear directly or indirectly on the subject, and which have lately been elucidated for English readers by the Master of Balliol and Professor Newman; the chapter on colonies in Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations'; and Heeren's 'Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies,'

together with his 'Historical Researches, Asiatic and African Nations.' To this small list should be added Merivale's 'Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies,' delivered in 1839-41, and reissued with additional notes in 1861, and Sir Charles Dilke's late exhaustive work on the 'Problems of Greater Britain.'

The 'Government of Dependencies' embodies a mass of historical information and political wisdom, put together in the clearest, simplest, and most impartial form by a man who was at once a practical statesman and a political philosopher. It deserves to be a text-book in the history and philosophy schools at the Universities, and it should be carefully studied by all who are interested in the great questions of the British empire.

The Author was very prolific in notes and references; those which have now been added are enclosed in brackets, and three short Appendices will be found at the end of the text.

C. P. LUCAS.

*July, 1891.*

## INTRODUCTION.

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SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS was born in 1806. He died in 1863, at the age of 57. He held at different times various high offices of State, including the posts of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, and Secretary of State for War, but he was never Secretary of State for the Colonies. He published his *Essay on the Government of Dependencies* in 1841,—exactly fifty years ago, his object being, as he tells us in his preface, to explain ‘the nature of the political relation of supremacy and dependence,’ and, by thereby improving the relations between dominant and dependent communities, to eliminate if possible one source of friction between peoples and to diminish the chances of war. He prefixes to his *Essay* an ‘*Inquiry into the powers of a sovereign Government*’ which is separate from the main body of the book. He then defines a dependency; gives instances of dependencies both ancient and modern alike; considers why a territory should be governed as a dependency, how dependencies can be acquired, how they can be governed, and how they can be lost; and discusses the respective advantages and disadvantages of owning a dependency on the one hand and of being a dependency on the other.

INTROD.

Sir G. C.  
Lewis.

The  
‘*Government of Dependencies.*’

In the present introduction it is proposed to sketch very shortly and simply the principal political and social changes which have taken place in the British Empire since this book was written; and then, re-stating in a slightly different form the problems with which the author deals, to ask, (1) Whether the so-called British Colonies at the present day

Scope of  
the Intro-  
duction.



INTROD. are dependencies in the sense in which Sir George Lewis  
 → defines the term? (2) What advantages, if any, do Great  
 Britain and her Colonies mutually derive from the relation  
 which exists between them? And (3) if the relation is on  
 the whole advantageous, how can it be best maintained?

*Date at  
 which the  
 book was  
 published.*

In May 1841, the date appended to the preface of this  
 book, the fourth year of Queen Victoria's reign was drawing  
 to a close, and little had as yet happened to foreshadow the  
 wars and revolutions, the political, social, and scientific  
 movements, which were in the next fifty years to change the  
 whole face of the world. In that very month Peel carried a  
 vote of want of confidence in the Melbourne administration,  
 and in the following September he formed the great ministry  
 which was to expire in giving birth to Free Trade. How  
 different was the map of Europe from that to which we have  
 now for some years been accustomed, may be gathered in  
 part from references contained in the book itself. The  
 writer mentions (p. 57) a king in France, Louis Philippe,  
 and (p. 64) a Neapolitan Monarchy not yet broken up by  
 Garibaldi; he speaks (p. 212) of Lombardy as an Austrian  
 province; and he quotes (p. 159) the Ionian Islands as  
 being nominally a British dependency and really under the  
 protection of the British Crown.

*Tendencies  
 of modern  
 history  
 since 1841.*

With the French Revolution of 1848 began the recasting  
 of Europe. The Crimean war, the war between France and  
 Austria in 1859, the Danish war of 1864, the war between  
 Prussia and Austria in 1866, the great Franco-German war  
 of 1870, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 are among the  
 most prominent episodes in the continental history of the  
 last fifty years. The main results have been the consolida-  
 tion of Italy and Germany, and the recognition of the claims  
 of race and nationality in the south-east of Europe.

In the civilised parts of the world the tendency of latter  
 days has been to unite and hold together large areas under  
 one government, and to map out those areas according to  
 the bounds fixed by nature. In Europe, Germany has been  
 confederated into an Empire and Italy has become one  
 nation; while in the New World, the bond of the United

States has been kept unbroken in spite of the strain of Civil War, and the Canadian provinces have, like the great neighbouring republic, acquired a federal constitution and been peacefully made a Dominion. INTROD. ———

The world in past times tried both small and large communities, but the small states were usually too municipal to develop into great nations, and the large empires were usually too artificial and too regardless of natural limits to become one whole. So the town communities of ancient times and the middle ages, with the one exception of Rome, ended as they began, and the military empires usually broke up when individual rulers died. It is the difficult work of the latest phase of history to try, with the help of railways and telegraphs, to reap the advantages and to avoid the defects of both systems. It is for the good of the world to be divided into few areas, within each of which there may be uniformity of law and government. But such divisions can only be permanent, if they are mapped out, however imperfectly, according to geography and race; and, when the areas are large, it is necessary to give limited self-government to the provinces, in order at once to relieve the strain at the centre and to retain some of the vigorous local life which gave such force to the city republics; while a representative instead of a despotic government is required, to ensure that the wants of all the provinces are made known first-hand by their own spokesmen, and to adapt a system which was born in a despotic age to a time of democratic equality<sup>1</sup>.

Nature fortunately gave to the British Isles such obvious boundaries, that they have been spared the perpetual melting down and recasting processes to which continental countries have been subjected. From the days of the Tudors the home territory has remained the same. The advantage of the Straits of Dover has been not only to give security to Great Britain against foreign invasion, but perhaps still more to *The expansion of Great Britain.*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. what the author says, p. 133: 'The chief advantage of representative institutions is, that they render it possible for a popular government to act directly upon a large territory, and thus enable it to avoid the recurrence to a system of dependencies.'

INTROD. prevent any wrong-headed British ruler or minister from  
 --- trying to enlarge her boundaries by annexing her neighbours' lands. Strong healthy nations, like healthy human beings, must grow. They can grow in two ways—either by simply enlarging their limits at home, or by taking possession of distant and less civilised parts of the world. From the first kind of development Great Britain has been debarred; hence has come her great success as a ruling and colonising nation in the far East and far West.

The record of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain in the last fifty years is a wonderful record, a tale of war and peace, of change, of enlargement, of unparalleled growth.

*Territorial changes in the British Empire since 1841.*

1. *In Europe.*

The first point to notice is, the actual additions to or subtractions from the empire during the period in question.

In 1841 the British dependencies in Europe (excluding the Channel Islands as being part of the mother country) were Heligoland in the North Sea, and Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean. Heligoland, which the English took from the Danes in 1807, was on the 9th of August, 1890, transferred to Germany, off whose coasts the island lies; and the Ionian Islands were in 1864 handed over to Greece, the country to which their past traditions and their geographical position alike assigned them. On the other hand, Cyprus, half in Europe, half in Asia, half Greek, half Turkish, is now in British keeping, having been by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878 acquired on a kind of long loan from the Turks; and the two Mediterranean strongholds of Gibraltar and Malta still make good to Great Britain her high road to India.

2. *In Asia. The Red Sea dependencies.*

The British possessions in the Mediterranean are outposts of the Empire. In Asia the Empire itself may be said to begin. Aden, taken in 1839, was the first addition to the British dominions made during the present reign. It guards the mouth of the Red Sea as Gibraltar guards the entrance of the Mediterranean, but, unlike Gibraltar, it has become the centre of a group of British dependencies and protectorates. The twenty-one square miles of rocky peninsula, which Great Britain owned here in 1841, have since increased to seventy;

the little island of Perim in the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb has been occupied since 1857; and in 1854 the Kuria Muria Islands to the east of Aden, along the south coast of Arabia, were taken over from the Sultan of Muscat as being valuable for their guano deposits. Behind Aden a British protectorate now extends over a considerable area of Arabian soil, the Somali districts on the opposite coast of Africa are also included within the range of British influence, and in 1886 the island of Socotra was formally placed under the protection of Great Britain.

The Anglo-Indian Empire, of which Aden is, politically speaking, part, has been almost entirely recast during the last half century. The beginning was in war and disaster, for in November 1841 the British agent at Kabul was murdered, and there followed the terrible retreat and annihilation of the English force, of which one survivor alone reached Jelalabad. In a few months Generals Nott and Pollock brought retribution to Kabul; and, when the Afghan campaign had closed, there began a long series of annexations in India, the latest of which has been the acquisition of Upper Burma. In 1843 Sir Charles Napier conquered Sind. In 1845 the first Sikh war broke out; and, after the victory of Gujerat had ended the second war in 1849, Lord Dalhousie proclaimed the Punjab to be a British province. The annexation of Lower Burma, of the Central Provinces, and of Oudh followed with various other smaller additions of territory; and when, after eight years' rule, Lord Dalhousie made way for Lord Canning on the eve of the Indian Mutiny, he handed over to his successor the government of a widely extended dominion.

The end of the Mutiny was the end also of the great East India Company. In 1858 India passed into the direct keeping of the Crown, and the President of the Board of Control became the Secretary of State for India. The change was emphasised and the importance of the new Crown Colony more clearly marked when twenty years later, in 1877, Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India. The years which followed the Mutiny have been in India

INTROD.



INTROD. more fruitful in organisation and development than in acquisition of new territory; but wars with the Afghans on the North West frontier in 1878-80 proved that the fighting age is not yet past, and the taking of Mandalay, together with the deposition of King Theebaw in 1885-6, added a new province to that Eastern Empire, the possession of which has more than all else besides taught Englishmen how to rule.

*Ceylon.* Nearly joined to the great Indian peninsula, the island of Ceylon has nevertheless, except for the first few years of British occupation, always been administered by the Colonial Office as a separate Crown Colony. The short Kandyan rebellion of 1848 is the only disturbance which has troubled its history during the half century under review, and years of peace, though not always of financial prosperity, have given leisure for schemes of improvement and industrial enterprise.

*The Malay Indies.* Among the outlying parts of the Indian Empire were the settlements in the Straits of Malacca, and a book has yet to be written giving due prominence to the wonderful progress of British rule and British influence in the Malay Indies.

While the nations of Europe were still striving for the mastery in the South of Asia, Great Britain and the Netherlands were rival claimants for the rich heritage of Portugal in the East Indian Archipelago; but the Netherlanders had been beforehand with the English, and history and geographical attraction so shaped the course of events as to leave the coasts of the continent to the latter nation and the Spice Islands to the Dutch. Accordingly, after Malacca had been finally ceded by the Dutch in 1825, the three settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, all on or off the coast of the Malay peninsula, represented the whole of the British possessions in the Malay seas. They were subsequently grouped together under one government; and, as years went on, Singapore became, in virtue of its geographical position, the leading settlement, justifying the foresight of Sir Stamford Raffles, who had selected this barren island at the turning point of Southern Asia to be a future nucleus of British trade. In 1867 the Straits Settlements, as they were thereafter called, were severed from India, and con-

stituted a separate Crown Colony; around them there rose a group of protectorates; and, after the Perak outbreak of 1875-6, the system of British Residencies in the Native States was steadily strengthened and extended. Meanwhile in 1841, the date at which this review begins, Mr. James Brooke obtained the cession of a part of Borneo and became Raja of Sarawak, which his family still rules at the present day. One result of his enterprise was the acquisition by the British Crown in 1846 of the little island of Labuan off the mouth of the Brunei river, the governor of which is now also the governor of the territory owned by the British North Borneo Company. The charter of that Company dates from 1881, and its territory includes the northern peninsula of Borneo, ceded to Sir Alfred Dent in 1877-8 by the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu.

INTROD.

In the Malay peninsula, at the present day, Great Britain owns the islands of Singapore and Penang, and the territories of Malacca, the Dindings, and Province Wellesley; she controls by British Residents the states of Perak, Selangor, Sungei-Ujong, the Negri Sembilan, and Pahang; while the Sultan of Johor, though an independent ruler, is under British protection. In Borneo, a British protectorate has been formally proclaimed over the territory of the British North Borneo Company, the Sultanate of Brunei, and the State of Sarawak. In short, round Singapore as a centre, there is fast growing up on the old lines of companies and protectorates a new East Indian Empire. It should be added that the little group of the Cocos Islands, far off in the Indian sea, half way between Asia and Australia, has since 1886 been annexed to the Straits Settlements, and that the Governor of Singapore is also governor of another tiny dependency in the distant ocean which bears the name of Christmas Island.

British factories in China date back from the seventeenth century, but it was not until this same fruitful year 1841 that Great Britain obtained a permanent foot-hold in Chinese territory. In the January of that year the first Chinese war ended with the cession of the small island of Hong Kong off the mouth of the Canton River; and, after a second war with

Hong  
Kong.

INTROD. China and the Convention of Peking in 1860, the opposite  
 ←→ mainland promontory of Kowloon was added to the colony.

Hong Kong has this year kept its jubilee as a British possession, and its wonderful growth in wealth and population would be by itself a sufficient text for a lesson on the last fifty years of British rule, telling how its advantages have attracted numbers of a suspicious but keen-sighted people to settle in an island, which half a century ago was but the barren home of a few fishermen.

The revenue is nearly forty times what it was in the beginnings of the colony, a population of some 7500 has grown to nearly 200,000, and according to tonnage returns Hong Kong is now said to be the third port in the British Empire, if not in the world. It is interesting as having been till 1887<sup>1</sup> the only part of China proper which was ever ceded to a foreign power; its settlement is a striking illustration of the way in which the English have colonised waste places of the world, though not in this case with their own race; and its possession reminds us that, as in respect of her Indian possessions Great Britain has been called a Mohammedan power, so by virtue of the number of Chinese whom she governs she may also lay claim to be considered a Chinese power. There is no government outside China, except the Siamese, which has as many Chinese subjects under its rule and protection as the government of Great Britain. In Hong Kong, in Borneo, in the Malay peninsula, in British Columbia, in Australia, and to a less degree in other parts of the Empire, numbers of Chinese are living and thriving under the British flag, and, but for the restrictions imposed upon Chinese immigration by the Colonial governments, those numbers would be greater still. The Chinese connexion is now an important factor in the British Empire, and it is one which has come into being in the last fifty years.

Hong Kong is the present limit of the British possessions in the far East, for the little naval station established in 1885 at Port Hamilton off the end of the Korean peninsula was in a short time again dismantled and abandoned.

<sup>1</sup> See the note to p. 93 of the text, on Macao.

The English have gone to Asia to rule and to trade. In Africa they are not only rulers and traders, but, in the temperate South, colonisers also. The islands round Africa have undergone but little change since Sir G. Lewis wrote his book, except that in Mauritius Indian immigrants, the systematic importation of whom began in 1842, have with extraordinary rapidity outnumbered the African race, and that the late Anglo-German agreement has left British influence undisputed at Zanzibar.

INTROD.

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3. In  
Africa.  
The  
African  
Islands.

On the West Coast of Africa the area of the Empire has been ever growing, taking in as part of British territory or as under British protection fresh square miles of unhealthy land and additional thousands of savage tribes. On the Gambia the limits are little altered; but further to the south, a long stretch of coast, including British Sherbro, has been added to the Colony of Sierra Leone. On the Gold Coast, fifty years ago, the English held isolated forts intermixed with Dutch and Danish trading stations. The Danes sold their forts and transferred their protectorate to Great Britain in 1850; the Dutch, by the convention of 1872, made over all their rights to the English; the Ashanti war of 1873-4 brought to terms the troublesome ruler of Coomassie; and the total area of the British colony and protectorate is now estimated to cover some 39,000 square miles. To the east of the Gold Coast, the town of Lagos was ceded to Great Britain by its native owner in 1861, and the colony and protectorate, which are the source of a rich trade to Liverpool merchants, now comprise over 1000 square miles. Adjoining Lagos on the south-east is the Niger protectorate, including the whole basin of the lower Niger, and estimated to cover an area of some 400,000 square miles. The protectorate was assumed in 1884, and in 1886 the Royal Niger Company, by whom the district is administered, received its charter from the Crown. Beyond the mouths of the Niger, again, in the angle of the Gulf of Guinea, is the Oil Rivers Protectorate, which has been placed under consular jurisdiction.

The West  
Coast.

It is impossible in a few lines to give any adequate sketch of the advance of British influence and colonisation in South

South  
Africa.



INTROD. Africa in the last fifty years. Nor has that advance been  
 → always steady and unchecked, but more than once steps have  
 been retraced and work undone. There have been Kaffir wars, Zulu wars, and Boer wars; the South African Republic has been taken and given up; conventions have been signed and modified; and the whole story has been a complicated series of dissolving views. Yet, through it all, the British line has moved forward in stumbling fashion from the coast to the interior, colony ending in protectorate, and protectorate shading off into sphere of British influence.

In 1841 the British possessions in South Africa consisted of the Cape Colony with an estimated area of 110,000 square miles, and an estimated population of 147,000 or 1½ to a square mile. Natal had been occupied by British troops in the previous year, but was not proclaimed a colony till 1843. At the present day the Cape Colony alone is credited with an area of 218,000 square miles, and a population of one and a half million. It includes Griqualand West with the diamond mines of Kimberley on the north, and the isolated port of Walfisch Bay on the western coast, while, on the east, it has gradually absorbed various native districts, and borders on Basutoland which is British territory though no longer under the colonial government. North of the Diamond Fields, the new colony of British Bechuanaland stretches away to the interior; beyond it is the British protectorate; and beyond the protectorate again the territory within the sphere of British influence now crosses the Zambesi and passes through the centre of Africa up to Lake Tanganyika<sup>1</sup>. This great stretch of territory comprises the land where Livingstone worked and died, and forms the sphere of operations of the British South Africa Company, whose charter dates from October 1889.

*The East  
Coast of  
Africa.*

On the Eastern side of Africa British Empire extends unbroken along the coast from Cape Town to beyond Sordwana Point; in May, 1887, 9000 square miles of Zululand were declared to be British territory, and other additions have since been made. Higher up on the same coast the

<sup>1</sup> Since the above was written, British protection has been extended over the greater part of the 'sphere of British influence.'

important island of Zanzibar, with the sister island of Pemba, is now under the direct and exclusive protection of Great Britain. Immediately north of Pemba, the Uмба river forms the southern boundary of another great sphere of British influence, stretching far inland to the Victoria and Albert Nyanzas. Here trade and administration are in the hands of the Imperial British East Africa Company, incorporated in September 1888. West of Cape Guardafui, at the 49th parallel of latitude, begins the Somali protectorate to which reference has already been made; and the passage of the Red Sea brings Englishmen past Suakim to the Suez Canal and to Egypt, which, if not a dependency of Great Britain, is, at least, a land where British influence is paramount at the present time<sup>1</sup>.

INTROD.

In the Southern Sea, the work done by the English race since 1841 has on the whole consisted more in filling up and populating already acquired territory than in extending the limits of the Empire. Yet here too the annexations have been very considerable. In 1874 the Fiji Islands were ceded to Great Britain and constituted a colony, and in 1881 the small island of Rotumah which lies to the north of Fiji was added to it. At the end of 1884, a British protectorate was definitely proclaimed over the south eastern part of New Guinea and the adjoining islands, which was afterwards converted into direct sovereignty; and, by the arrangement with Germany, 88,000 square miles of that great island have been recognised as part of the British dominions. Another agreement was subsequently made, establishing a line of demarcation between British and German spheres of influence in the Western Pacific, and a large number of small groups of islands, the list of which is too long to be given, have been in consequence declared to be British possessions or within the sphere of British influence<sup>2</sup>.

4. In  
Australia.

<sup>1</sup> The *Times* of the 4th of November, 1890, quotes the 'Mouvement Géographique' on the partition of Africa. It assigns to British Africa, in 1890, 1,909,445 square miles, as against 279,165 in 1876. Mr. Ravenstein, in the *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1891, gives 2,462,436 square miles, as the area of British Africa.

<sup>2</sup> The line of demarcation is shown in a Parliamentary paper of 1886,

INTROD.

5. *In  
America.*

America is the one part of the world where, as regards extent of territory, Great Britain stands in almost exactly the same position in 1891 as she did in 1841. The Ashburton treaty of 1842, the Oregon boundary treaty of 1846, and the Washington treaty of 1871 with the consequent San Juan award, finally settled the boundary line between Canada and the United States; and here there have been no new worlds to conquer or annex, though years of emigration have been gradually making the great land of the North West British in fact, as it already was in name. Nor is there any change to be recorded in the number of the West Indian dependencies of Great Britain, except that in 1859 the Bay Islands, so well known in West Indian history, were made over to the Republic of Honduras; and the continent of South America remains as, with the exception of British Guiana, it has always been, outside the limits of British colonisation.

*General  
summary.*

Summing up the territorial changes which have taken place in the British Empire during the last fifty years, it may be said that in Europe Great Britain has ceded rather more than she has annexed, that in America the limits of her dominions have remained almost unchanged, but that in Asia, Africa, and Australasia the boundaries of the Empire have been widely extended. So vague are some of the boundary lines, and so little known are some of the vast territories now brought under British rule or included in the sphere of British influence, that it is almost impossible to state the gain in square miles, but some idea of the extent of the annexation may be gathered from a recent estimate of 'the territorial expansion of the British Empire<sup>1</sup>,' during the ten years 1879-89, framed before the late Anglo-German and Anglo-Portuguese partitions of Africa. That estimate gives the increase of British territory throughout the world in the ten years in question as in round numbers 1,250,000 square miles, being about one third of the area of Europe; and this

Western Pacific No. 1. c-4656. For a list of the islands see the Colonial Office list.

<sup>1</sup> See an address to the 'Philosophical Society of Glasgow,' delivered by Thomas Muir, LL.D., on the 11th December, 1889.

is exclusive of more recent gains, as well as of the numerous acquisitions made between 1841 and 1879. A policy of annexation has been forced upon Great Britain during the last half century, and has certainly not been lightly entered into by her government or her people; but the result has been the same, as if she had been simply bent upon wholesale aggrandisement, and she has to face the future weighted with new dependencies many in number and vast in extent.

INTROD.

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The dependencies of any country, which has the good or bad fortune to own dependencies, fall into two great classes; dependencies which it rules, and dependencies which it also settles; lands where the climate forbids European settlement or which are sufficiently peopled already by coloured races, and new homes for emigrants from an old country, where population is wanted, where the soil and climate bid the incomers be fruitful and multiply; colonies in the true sense of the word.

*Distinction between tropical dependencies and colonies proper.*

Before 1841, the places where Europeans can live and thrive had been already annexed, and the preceding sketch has shown that the chief acquisitions made by Great Britain during the past fifty years have been almost entirely dependencies of the first class, in the tropical lands of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific.

*Recent annexations have been in the former class.*

So far as annexation is concerned, the British dominions seemed to have been rounded off when the nations of Europe settled up their accounts after the battle of Waterloo. After a century and a half of fighting Great Britain was, in spite of the loss of the United States, left with an enormous Empire. Her rulers were well aware of its extent and of the responsibilities which it involved, and were accordingly reluctant to increase it; while public opinion was slowly becoming opposed to further war and aggrandisement, as adding to the national burdens and postponing much needed reforms at home. What then were the causes which have been so fruitful in again enlarging the number and size of the British dependencies?

*Causes of annexations.*

In the first place, the same spirit of energy and restlessness, which made the English a colonising race, was certain sooner

*General causes.*

INTROD. or later to find new openings; and as men went to and fro  
 →→→ on the face of the earth, as explorers opened up new lands,  
 1. *British* and as steam and electricity made movement easier, there  
*enterprise.* came, as in old days, the adventurer, the missionary, and the  
 trader, dragging the government in their train.

2. *Contact* In the second place, wherever a civilised nation is side by  
*with less* side with uncivilised races, wherever an organised system  
*civilised* borders on disorganisation, there is sure to be direct or  
*races.* indirect annexation, whether it be by Russians in Central  
 Asia, or by English in India, Burma, and the Malay Indies.

*Special* But, over and above these tendencies of general application,  
*causes.* there are three special causes which have operated mainly in  
 the last twenty years.

1. *German* Two classes of people in history have been concerned in  
*competi-* colonisation. One class has founded colonies and annexed  
*tion.* territories, the other class has sent out emigrants to lands  
 which have been already appropriated by a foreign nation,  
 and have not attempted to any great extent to acquire colonial  
 possessions of their own. The former class includes the  
 great colonising peoples of modern history, the Spaniards,  
 the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English. In  
 the latter class are the Swedes and Norwegians, whose  
 emigrants pour over to the United States, and the Italians<sup>1</sup>,  
 who send so many colonists year by year to the Argentine  
 Republic; while the Jews on the one hand and the Chinese  
 on the other are also, in their own way, instances of races  
 content to live under foreign governments and not ambitious  
 to found separate communities. Till quite lately, the Germans  
 belonged exclusively to this second class, and the strength of  
 the German element in the United States at the present day  
 is living witness to the numbers of Germans who have been  
 ready to settle in a new country, but under another govern-  
 ment than their own. The great colonial struggle of the  
 eighteenth century was gradually narrowed down to a  
 competition between France and Great Britain, and no one  
 writing fifty years ago, with its story still comparatively fresh,

<sup>1</sup> The Italians, however, like the Germans, though in a less degree, are now tending to a policy of foreign or colonial annexation.

could well foresee that a new time would come for colonising and acquiring dependencies beyond the seas, in which the Germans, one of the most continental of nations, would play a prominent part. Yet at the present day Germany is fast becoming an important colonial power, and her newly acquired dependencies, if not likely to be homes for the German race, have at least given their government a right to speak and be heard on partitions and demarcations of distant lands.

INTROD.



Spain became a colonising nation as soon as she was consolidated at home, and the discovery and conquest of America followed on the union of Arragon and Castille. The union of the Netherlands, so hardly won, led to a Dutch colonial empire of unbounded riches and vast extent. Similarly the confederation of Germany, the outcome of successful wars in Europe, has been followed by looking for and finding dominion abroad; for the acquisition of foreign dependencies is like opening the safety-valve to a nation which has lately been made one, and which is carried forward with the rush of newborn strength and life.

Looking at the late partition of Africa, or at the parallel case of New Guinea, it is obvious that Great Britain has moved on mainly because Germany has moved on. The new British annexations in Africa have been made not so much because there was a strong desire in England to take more of Africa, as because, if it had not been taken by the English, it might or would have been by the Germans. Among nations, as among men, competition is the law of life; and as in Asia and America Great Britain competed with the Netherlands and France, so in Africa and the Pacific lately she has found a new competitor in Germany, and has literally extended herself in consequence.

The second of the three special causes for the late enlargement of the British Empire is to be found in the fact that in that Empire, to an extent to which there is no parallel in history, an old country is linked to young countries, to self-governing colonies, which wish to move faster than their mother, and which do not feel the ties and restraints imposed

*a. Pressure  
by self-  
governing  
colonies.*

INTROD. upon a leading European nation. In South Africa this cause  
 --- has had its effect, but perhaps the best illustration of its  
 working is to be found in the case of New Guinea. The  
 colonial government of Queensland forced the hand of the  
 Imperial Government by annexing New Guinea, with a view  
 to forestalling annexation by another power. The action  
 was at the time disallowed, but Germany moved forward,  
 and in no long time the feeling of the colonists, combined with  
 the action of the foreign government, led to the annexation of  
 a great part of the island. This was a case in which the  
 Mother Country did not wish to annex, but her colonies did;  
 and thus, in deference to colonial wishes and colonial in-  
 terests, a large province was added to the British Empire.  
 In the eighth chapter of his book Sir George Lewis deals  
 with the disadvantages arising to the dominant country from  
 the possession of a dependency, and among them he specifies  
 that dependencies 'tend to involve the dominant country in  
 wars',<sup>1</sup> in consequence of their liability to being invaded.  
 Had he lived, it would have been interesting to read his  
 comments on a state of things, in which the nominal depen-  
 dency, so far from being invaded, was rather playing the part  
 of annexationist, and, so far from passively obeying and  
 thankfully receiving, was boldly dictating to the mother  
 country and indulging in unsparing criticism of her policy  
 as being too timid and half-hearted.

3. *Revival  
 of Char-  
 tered Com-  
 panies.*

The third and last special cause or feature of the new for-  
 ward policy is the regeneration of the system of chartered  
 companies. It is at once cause and effect. It is an effect of  
 a fresh outburst of colonial enterprise; and it is a cause of  
 moving further along the path of annexation, by giving to  
 that enterprise cohesion, organisation, and a definite plan.  
 In all the history of colonisation there is no more interesting  
 point to be noticed than this revival. The East India Com-  
 pany had but lately passed out of existence. The Hudson's  
 Bay Company had ceded its territorial rights. The age of  
 great chartered companies seemed wholly gone; they had  
 played a great part in history, and, having played their part,

<sup>1</sup> P. 242.

had become gradually absorbed by their respective governments ; yet in these last days, as if to emphasise the fact that a new era of colonial annexation has dawned, the trade and administration of great territories is being once more taken in hand by companies of merchants.

In Borneo, the British North Borneo Company rule 31,000 square miles, and their governor administers under the Colonial office the little colony of Labuan ; in Africa, the Niger Company, the South Africa, and the East Africa Companies have extensive powers over extensive districts. Why has the day of these chartered companies come again ? The answer will be found in threatened or actual competition in lands unoccupied by Europeans. In the general scramble for the remaining waste places of the world, the English, true to their instincts and their traditions, have fallen back on the semi-private agencies which on the whole worked so well for them in the past ; and it now seems as though the old story of the East India Company was, in a modified form and on a smaller scale, to be re-enacted in more than one part of the world. By those who believe that Great Britain should keep moving forward in the interests of the world in general as much as in her own, the revival of chartered companies will be taken as a healthy sign. It is one of the best features of the English that they like, if possible, to keep the government in the background, and not to have their work cut and dried beforehand. Let colony shade into protectorate, and protectorate into sphere of influence ; and, as skirmishers in front of the main body of organised British possessions, let trading companies go on and do their work, to be absorbed hereafter in the fulness of time.

Adam Smith expressed an opinion that ' the government of an exclusive company of merchants is perhaps the worst of all governments for any country whatever<sup>1</sup>, ' but he wrote in an age widely different from the present. The essence of the old charters was monopoly of trade, the new charters on the contrary contain clauses specially prohibiting such monopoly. With steamers, telegraphs, and newspapers, everything is

<sup>1</sup> *Wealth of Nations*, ch. vii. Pt. II.



INTROD. now known, and public opinion is quickly roused and strongly  
 felt. The chances of abuse are minimised, the chances of  
 doing good work are at least as great as they ever were. On  
 the whole it may be said that the second birth of chartered  
 companies is one of the most hopeful, as it is one of the most  
 unexpected, signs of the times.

So far it has been seen that of late years Great Britain has entered on a new era of colonial annexation; that the competition of Germany and the pressure of her own colonies have been important factors in urging her forward; and that, in widening the limits of their trade, influence, and empire, the English have instinctively again adopted the old, long-tried, and late discarded method of working by means of chartered companies.

*Coloured  
 colonisation  
 in the  
 tropical  
 British de-  
 pendencies.*

Annexation, however, with its causes and its methods, is not the only point of interest to be noticed in connexion with the tropical dependencies of Great Britain during the past half century. A nation can colonise in two ways; it can settle a land either mainly with its own race, or mainly, if not entirely, with some other foreign race, and this second mode of colonisation is apt to be left out of sight by writers on colonial subjects. The transplantation of peoples was common in the era of Oriental despotisms, the Jewish captivity being the most familiar instance, but in a less direct and less wholesale form the same process is known to modern history. When the Europeans found out the New World, they colonised it not only with their own races but also with Africans, and one important aspect of the slave-trade is to regard it as a species of colonisation. In this work, England, the great carrying nation, took a leading part, and the result of her efforts has been the predominance of the African element in the southern states of North America and in the West Indian Islands. When Lewis wrote, slavery had only very recently become a thing of the past, and the importation of free East Indian labour into the plantation colonies had hardly begun; yet the result of coolie immigration has been that, at the present time, more than two-thirds of the population of Mauritius are East Indians, and about one-third of that of

British Guiana and Trinidad respectively, while there is an appreciable Indian element in other colonies also. Thus the fifty years just past have seen Great Britain colonising some of her tropical colonies with Asiatics, as she formerly did with Africans. But this is not all; apart from the operation of a definite system, such as that of indentured immigration, it has been seen that, in the case of the Chinese, colonisation by a coloured race has been taking place on a large scale in countries under British rule or British protection. It is true, no doubt, that the Chinese would have come to the Malay peninsula, for instance, whether the English were ruling it or not, but it is safe to say that they would not have come in such numbers, had it not been for the attraction of making money under a stable government. In many parts of that peninsula they now outnumber the Malays, and the indirect result of British influence being predominant in the south of Asia has been to promote the colonisation of its coasts and islands by the great people of the far East.

INTROD.



Let us now turn to consider the changes which have taken place in Canada, Australasia, and the Cape Colony—those parts of the world which are colonies in the truest sense, which have been made British in whole or part, and which are not merely ruled by the British Government, or traded to by British subjects, or settled by coloured races who have taken advantage of British protection.

*The great  
British  
colonies.*

The emigration statistics of Great Britain begin with the year 1815. Between that year and the end of 1889, 12,500,000 people left English ports for places outside Europe. These figures include foreigners as well as British subjects, for it will be borne in mind that the main stream of emigration from Europe to the West and South has always passed through Great Britain, and it is only quite lately that any appreciable number of emigrants have been carried out directly from continental ports.

*Emigra-  
tion Statis-  
tics.*

Of these 12,500,000, little more than 1,000,000 emigrated between 1815 and 1840 inclusively, whereas nearly 11,500,000 went out between 1841 and 1889. The yearly average for the years 1815-40 was 41,000, for the years 1841-89 nearly

INTROD. 233,000, or between five and six times as many. Before  
 →→→ 1841, there was only one year (1832) when the number of emigrants exceeded 100,000. Since 1841, there have been fourteen years when the limit of 300,000 was passed, viz. 1851-4, 1873, 1880-4, 1886-9; and the limit of 400,000 has been once exceeded, viz. in 1882.

Up to 1840 more emigrants went to British North America than to the United States; but, after that date, the latter country took the vastly greater proportion, nearly 8,000,000 going to the United States as against about 1,500,000 each to British North America and the Australasian colonies.

We read with wondering interest of the movements of races and tribes in old days, of waves of peoples flooding one land and another. Yet it passes almost unnoticed that, for the last half century, some 230,000 human beings have been yearly going through or moving out of England, not to neighbouring territories but to continents beyond the seas. For present purposes, the main point to be noted is, that it was not until after Sir G. Cornwall Lewis had written his book, that the strong tide of emigration began to flow. Between 1841 and 1851 came the Irish famine and the discovery of gold in California and Australia, with a consequent increase of emigration from the United Kingdom; and, though there was a falling off again in the number of emigrants between the years 1855 and 1862—the years of the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, and the outbreak of the American Civil War—the decline was only temporary, and in 1882 the volume of emigration was larger than it had ever been. This then was a factor which the author had not before him when he wrote. He could hardly have foreseen the rapid growth in population of some at any rate of the British colonies. He could hardly have guessed that New South Wales, which in 1842 had a population of only 149,000, would, in fifty years' time, though Victoria and Queensland had been in the meantime carved out of it, contain 1,250,000 colonists, or that New Zealand, which was not a British colony at all before 1840, would at the end of 1889 have a population of over 600,000.

But, if Sir G. Lewis had seen the figures above quoted, the

point on which he would probably have most insisted, would have been, that the bulk of the emigrants have gone not to British dependencies at all, but to a country which, though a British colony, is now no longer a British dependency even in name; and, in discussing in his sixth chapter whether the advantage, which a dominant country is supposed to derive from a dependency as affording facilities for emigration, 'arises from the settlement being a dependency or would not arise although it were independent<sup>1</sup>,' he would no doubt have emphasised the fact that, for every British emigrant who has gone to a province of the British Empire in the last fifty years, two or three have emigrated to the United States.

Lord Durham's celebrated mission to Canada in the year 1838, and the report which he issued upon his return in 1839, was the beginning of a new era in the colonial policy of Great Britain. It led to the grant of self-government in its widest sense to the large colonies, and it sowed the seeds of confederation. Its immediate result was the Union of the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840-1 under responsible government, and it bore full fruit when, in 1867, these two provinces, since known as Ontario and Quebec, were with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick formed into the Canadian Dominion. The charter of the Hudson's Bay Company was shortly afterwards surrendered to the Crown; and, upon the suppression of the insurrection in the Red River settlement, that settlement was in 1870 constituted a province and incorporated with the Dominion under the name of Manitoba. British Columbia entered the confederation in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873. The North-West territories were constituted a separate unit under the Dominion Government in 1878; and now Newfoundland<sup>2</sup> alone remains outside the great federation of British provinces, which stretches across the North American continent from sea to sea, and whose area is hardly inferior to that of Europe.

The Australasian colonies have taken their present form and shape since 1841. Some of them had no separate exist-

INTROD.

*The self-governing provinces.*  
1. Canada.

2. *The Australasian colonies.*

<sup>1</sup> P. 225.

<sup>2</sup> Newfoundland received responsible government in 1855.

INTROD. — ence at that date, none of them enjoyed responsible government. Transportation of convicts to Australia was not finally abandoned before 1867, although, when Sir G. Lewis wrote, public opinion in this country had already been roused against the system by Archbishop Whately and others, and he was able to note that the number of transported convicts had lately been diminished, and to express a hope that before many years the mother country would make adequate provision for keeping her criminals at home<sup>1</sup>.

New South Wales is, as is well known, the scene of the first British settlement in Australasia, dating from 1788. It was a settlement formed not by British adventurers but by the British Government, with the view at once of disposing of the surplus criminal population of the mother country, and of making good British claims to the lands in the Southern seas. In 1803 a detachment of convicts was sent to Tasmania from New South Wales, and that island was made a separate dependency in 1825. In 1829 the colony of Western Australia was founded. In 1836 a settlement was formed at Adelaide, intended to be the scene of scientific colonisation on the lines laid down by Gibbon Wakefield. In 1840 New Zealand was formally ceded to Great Britain and declared to be a British colony. Victoria was cut out of New South Wales in 1851, Queensland in 1859; and by 1860 each of these Australasian colonies, with the single exception of Western Australia, was given responsible government. The act for giving similar institutions to Western Australia was passed last year by the Imperial Parliament, and has been lately carried into effect; and, with the hearty consent and co-operation of the mother country, these great and growing communities, which already have a federal council<sup>2</sup>, are rapidly moving along the road to complete confederation.

<sup>1</sup> P. 232.

<sup>2</sup> New South Wales and New Zealand have never been represented on the federal council. The bill for 'the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia,' which has been drafted by the Australasian Federation Convention, proposes to repeal the Federal Council Act. While this note is being written, the bill is awaiting reference to the various colonial legislatures concerned.

It has already been seen that the development of British rule and colonisation in South Africa is of very modern date. Similarly responsible government in the Cape Colony is of later growth than in Canada or Australasia, dating only from 1872, rather less than twenty years ago. Of the other British possessions in South Africa, Natal is one of the colonies which at present have representative institutions without also possessing responsible government<sup>1</sup>, while British Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Zululand, are governed directly by the Crown as represented by the High Commissioner for South Africa or the Governor of Natal. South Africa is in short at present a congeries of British provinces, in different stages of dependence, intermixed with protected territories and independent states, the Cape Colony alone standing on the same footing with regard to the mother country as Canada and the Australasian colonies.

INTROD.

3. *South Africa.*

The grant of self-government to the large colonies, as well as the confederation movement, is of later date than that at which Sir George Lewis wrote his book. It is true that he speaks of England as 'nearly the only country which in modern times has given its dependencies popular institutions<sup>2</sup>,' but here he is referring to the old American and West Indian colonies of Great Britain, the most important of which are now incorporated in the United States. It was ever a time-honoured principle of British colonisation that Englishmen, who went out to settle in a new country, carried with them their rights of British citizenship and so much of the law of the mother country as was applicable to the new circumstances in which they found themselves placed. In the words of the Corcyræans, 'they went out on the footing of equality with, not of slavery to, those who were left behind<sup>3</sup>.' 'The early English colonies,' says Lewis, 'were in practice

*The principle of self-government has always been recognised in British colonisation.*

<sup>1</sup> A bill for the grant of responsible government to Natal has been passed by the colonial legislature, reserved for the signification of the Queen's pleasure; and, while this book is in the press, it is under the consideration of her Majesty's advisers.

<sup>2</sup> P. 289.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. i. 34, ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δουλοῖ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τοῖς λεηπομένους εἶναι ἐπέμικονται, quoted by Sir G. Lewis in the note to p. 107.

INTROD. nearly independent of the mother country except as to their external commercial relations<sup>1</sup>. 'In everything except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs their own way is complete,' writes Adam Smith, noting also that the colonies were more democratic than the mother country, and that some of them, as Connecticut and Rhode Island, even elected their governors<sup>2</sup>. The mainspring of early British colonisation was the reproducing of Great Britain, not the forming of dependencies of the British government; and this principle was at times boldly and well asserted by the colonists. When the Barbadians were called upon to submit to the government of the Commonwealth, they replied, that they had not gone out to be subjected to the will and command of those that stay at home. Englishmen living in Barbados had the same rights as Englishmen living in England, and, as Englishmen living in Barbados did not interfere with Englishmen living in England, it was no business of the home section of Englishmen to interfere with the colonial section. They were not represented in the English parliament, the English parliament therefore could not exercise authority over them except by their own free will. They were not a dependency, they were a second England, a colony<sup>3</sup>. Thus the seeds of the modern system of responsible government in the great British colonies were sown in the distant past, and the idea of an empire containing within its limits a number of self-governing communities was old and familiar; but there is one great and vital difference between colonial self-government in past centuries and colonial self-government in the present.

*The difference between self-government in the past and in the present*

At the time when British statesmen were inclining themselves to give free institutions to the colonies, the doctrine of Free Trade was becoming a fundamental principle of British politics at home, and its application fundamentally modified the relations between the mother country and the colonies.

<sup>1</sup> P. 159.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. vii. Pt. II, on 'causes of the prosperity of new colonies.' He, however, writes of the colonial assemblies as not having full control of the executive.

<sup>3</sup> See the Editor's 'Historical Geography of the British Colonies,' Pt. II, West Indies, § 2, ch. v. Cf. Note G. to this book, p. 348 below.

In past times, as the passages which have just been quoted show, however free were the institutions of a British colony, it was never doubted that the mother country should enjoy a monopoly of the trade; and, when a more liberal commercial policy began to gain ground, it took the form, as Lewis notices<sup>1</sup>, of levying lower duties in the mother country upon the imports of the colonies than upon those of foreign nations. In one form or another, till the last fifty years, it was taken without question that the trade between the mother country and her colonies should be on a different footing from that of their trade with the rest of the world. Lord Durham, when pleading in his report for the gift of self-government to the colonies, reserved to the mother country the regulation of the commercial policy of the empire. 'The constitution of the form of government,' he wrote, 'the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations, and the disposal of the public lands, are the only points on which the mother country requires a control<sup>2</sup>.' Even Sir George Lewis, while seeing the faults of the system, seems to have taken the alternative to be absolute separation of the colonies, and, as far as can be judged from his book, never contemplated that colonies, whose commercial relations with the mother country were precisely the same as those of foreign nations, could still remain part of the empire.

The present colonial system of Great Britain is the result of facing an old difficulty in an old way, modified by a new school of thought in the mother country, and by the experience of a great failure in the past. Fifty years ago English statesmen were confronted with the question how to govern their great dependency, Canada. At a much longer distance from home, they saw the Australasian settlements beginning to show the restiveness of manhood, and declining to be considered any longer as a place of deposit for the refuse of Great Britain. They had two great facts before

INTROD.

—→  
*consists  
 in the fact  
 that the  
 colonies  
 now within  
 limits  
 manage  
 their own  
 commerci-  
 cal policy.*

<sup>1</sup> P. 221.

<sup>2</sup> 'Report and Despatches of the Earl of Durham,' published by Ridgways, 1839, p. 207.



INTROD. them ; that the places of settlement were far removed from the mother country, and therefore could not be governed directly ; and that these distant countries were settled by Europeans, in Australia entirely by Englishmen. They turned, as Englishmen fortunately do turn, to past experience ; they found, in so doing, that the old English colonies had thriven under self-government, and that, the greatest of them were lost for ever by the action of the mother country in imposing taxes on the colonists, instead of leaving them to tax themselves. They were themselves year by year more imbued with the free, self-reliant doctrines, of the so-called Manchester School ; and they determined, in following the old course, to apply these new doctrines. They saw that they must incur one of two dangers ; either, by giving self-government, they must run the risk of peaceful separation ; or, by refusing it or giving it in a half-hearted way, they must run the risk of a second war of colonial independence.

They wisely chose the former alternative ; they cut away questions of taxation and commercial restriction, as having been fatal in the past. They allowed the colonies 'to form habits of practical independence<sup>1</sup>,' leaving time to decide whether the good-will born of their policy would counteract the tendency to absolute separation.

*Colonial self-government was designed for distant dependencies.*

*And for colonies where the bulk of the population is European.*

Those who care to study the history of this question in all its bearings, will bear in mind that it has been one of dealing with distant dependencies, with communities too far removed to be under the immediate control of the supreme government ; and that, therefore, it does not follow that a similar course of reasoning applies, for instance, to the case of Ireland. They will bear in mind, too, that neither in Canada nor in Australasia (with the exception of New Zealand) has there been in the present century any question of complication, arising from the presence of a numerous coloured race. In the West Indian slave-holding colonies, self-government meant oligarchy not democracy ; and, wherever the question arises of giving popular institutions to a dependency in which the Europeans are not the majority, to reason from the

<sup>1</sup> P. 307.

example of such a country as Australia is false and misleading. The ground of self-government is, that those who are in the colony are on the same level in physique and intelligence with those who are in the mother country, and that, being on the spot, they are best able to take care of themselves. Where the colonists are few among many of inferior race, it does not at all follow that they are best able to take care of that race; and if, in Lewis's words, a dominant country 'is bound morally not to throw off a helpless dependency',<sup>1</sup> it is equally bound not lightly to hand over the charge of a native population to a local government, in which that population may either be not at all or very inadequately represented.

INTROD.

It has been pointed out that the grant of responsible government of late years was based on past experience, and was in part a revival of an old system. So far the action taken was peculiarly English, turning, as has been noticed in the case of the revival of chartered companies, to old and tried methods. But English policy, as a rule, results in a compromise, not always of a satisfactory nature; and here is the most striking feature in the new colonial system, that it has been carried out so boldly and generously to its logical conclusion. It is difficult to find a parallel in history, for the grant of self-government means the grant of virtual independence; and in the past, as Adam Smith points out, 'No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it'.<sup>2</sup> The explanation of a policy, so foreign in this respect to the English cast of mind, is to be found in the already noted coincidence in time, of the free-trade question at home and the colonial question abroad. The British government moved as far as it did along the path which it took in regard to the colonies, because that path was parallel to its course in commercial matters. If the free-trade feeling had not been so strong in England, her colonial policy would have been more half-hearted. If the doctrine of the whole world being one market, in which men should buy where they can buy cheapest,

*Extent to which self-government has been carried in the colonies.*

<sup>1</sup> P. 326.

<sup>2</sup> Wealth of Nations, ch. vii. Pt. III.

INTROD. and sell where they can sell dearest, had not been so well  
 →→→ taught and so well understood, the British colonies might yet  
 have been weighted by commercial restrictions, and might  
 yet have wanted one of the main elements of self-govern-  
 ment. As it was, the gift of responsible government was,  
 except in matters of foreign policy, full and unfettered; and,  
 moving still in the same direction, British statesmen and the  
 British people have welcomed and furthered the confedera-  
 tion movement, which is the outcome of free institutions and  
 the coping-stone of the system of self-governing colonies.

*Develop-  
 ment of  
 colonial  
 federation  
 in the  
 British  
 empire.  
 Conditions  
 necessary  
 for its  
 success.*

Colonial federation, the linking together of a group of  
 neighbouring provinces, must be carefully distinguished from  
 Imperial Federation, to which reference will be made later  
 on; but the causes which lead to either kind of federation  
 are the same, community of interest, community of race,  
 language, and religion, and sense of common danger.  
 Similarly, the obstacles are the same in either case, differ-  
 ences of interest, race, and language, distance and difficulty  
 of communication, and the absence of pressure from without.  
 In the British Empire, the chief instance of successfully accom-  
 plished colonial federation is the Canadian Dominion. In the  
 Australasian colonies, federation, though rapidly approaching  
 completion, is not yet complete. In South Africa, where the  
 problem is more complicated than either in North America  
 or in Australasia, only the first steps are at present being  
 taken in the form of a proposed Customs Union for all the  
 South African States<sup>1</sup>.

*Com-  
 parison in  
 this respect  
 of  
 1. British  
 North  
 America.*

In Canada, Quebec and Ontario are separate in race,  
 language, and religion. One is French and Roman Catholic,  
 the other is English and Protestant. Outside these two  
 provinces, there is a long stretch of continent from Nova  
 Scotia on the Atlantic side to British Columbia on the  
 Pacific, crossed by the great dividing range of the Rocky  
 Mountains. There were therefore serious obstacles to the  
 union of so large and varied a territory. On the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> At present the Cape, the Orange Free State, Bechuanaland, and Basu-  
 toland, form a Customs Union. Natal and the South African Republic have  
 not yet joined it.

there is good water communication between the provinces; the uninhabited and uninhabitable part of the Dominion lies away to the North, and does not, as in Australia, cut off one colony from another; and the Canadian Pacific Railway is a connecting link between East and West, its construction having been a condition on which British Columbia entered the Dominion. Most of all, Canada is one of those countries which have 'a long and vulnerable frontier confining on the territories of other independent states'.<sup>1</sup> The neighbourhood of the great American Republic was a powerful lever to the federation of British North America; the formation of the Dominion was really the alternative to the provinces being absorbed piecemeal in the United States; and the instinct of self-preservation led here as elsewhere to union and strength.

In Australasia there is identity of race, language, and religion to a greater extent than in Canada; but the various provinces concerned are more cut off from each other, on the one hand, by the great stretch of waterless desert, which lies between the east and west of Australia, on the other, by the sea which lies between Australia and New Zealand. Nor is the pressure from without so strong in this part of the empire as it was and is in British North America. Yet here too the comparative nearness of French and German dependencies has been instrumental in drawing the British colonies closer together; the doctrine of Australasia for the Australasians is to some extent superseding the rivalry between the separate provinces; and the advantage of having one tariff, one immigration policy, and one system of defence for the whole group, is more and more coming home to the minds of the colonists. Further, in Australia the labour party is perhaps stronger than it is anywhere else in the world, and it seems likely that community of feeling and interest among Australasian workmen may press on Australasian unity, if only with a view to more effective restriction of imported labour.

To complete South African federation the obstacles are many and great. Here, as has been noted, account must be taken of independent states, such as the Orange Free State

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 242, 3.

INTROD. and the South African Republic, as well as of British colonies standing on different levels and in different stages of dependence on the mother country. Here, not only are there two distinct races of colonists as in Canada, but there is also a large native population, not dying out before the white man, as has been the case with the North American Indians, the New Zealand Maories, and the Australian aborigines. Here, too, the want of communication between one district and another is still badly felt; and there are no well defined natural limits, marking out clearly and distinctly the area over which federation should extend, and beyond which it should not be attempted. South African Union is therefore likely to be a work of time, and the wayward course of South African policy has shown that attempts to hurry it on prematurely are worse than useless.

*General attitude of the mother country towards the self-governing colonies.*

It is not, however, the purpose of this Introduction to discuss the future prospects of federation in the different groups of British colonies, but simply to note the growth of the movement as one of the main features of colonial history during the last fifty years, and, from the point of view of the Government of Dependencies, to emphasise the extent to which it has been fostered by the mother country. If England had been jealous of her colonies, she would not have given them self-government, still less would she have tried to promote Canadian, Australasian, or South African Union. Her policy has, on the contrary, been to do everything which can make her colonies stronger and better able to stand alone; for if New South Wales, for instance, gained strength and independence by being given self-government, how much stronger and more independent would be an united Australia. In welcoming the prospect of Australian union, Great Britain has acted at once consistently and generously; consistently, for federation is self-government 'writ large'; generously, for it means conferring fresh power on nominal dependencies.

Speakers and writers on colonial subjects often speak and write, as if the British colonies owed nothing to the mother country, as if they had thriven in spite of her policy, not on account of it. Such a view is not only not correct, but the

very reverse of the truth. If the record of the British connexion with Australia be read aright, and fully and fairly studied, it is not too much to say that no nation at any time in the history of the world ever dealt so well by her children, as Great Britain has by the Australians. Australia, as has been already pointed out, was occupied in the first instance not by voluntary British emigrants, but by the direct action of the British government. The New England colonies were founded by men who owed nothing to the Home Government, who emigrated to be out of its reach, and who therefore could lay a just claim to the country in which they settled; but it was the action of the state, not of individuals, which decided that Australia should be British, and the Englishmen who went out settled in a territory which pre-eminently belonged to the whole community of Englishmen. They had in equity no title to the exclusive possession of the lands of the Southern continent against their countrymen who stayed at home, yet the whole of the continent has now been handed over to them by the British nation. In the early days of the settlement, again, it was an advantage to be supplied with forced labour, for free labour could not be obtained; and, when the colonists seriously objected to the system of transportation, it was abandoned by the mother country. Rights of self-government were given, as soon as the colonial communities seemed sufficiently strong in numbers to stand alone, yet at the same time those communities were kept secure under the protection of the British fleet, without being in any way taxed towards its cost. At the time that the United States broke off from the British Empire, it was fiercely charged against the mother country, that she had neglected her colonies when poor and weak, and tried to bleed them when they became rich and prosperous. No such charge can be brought against the later colonial policy of Great Britain. She has protected and fostered her colonies in their time of youth and weakness; and, when come to manhood, she has given them all or almost all that could possibly be given. It is difficult to imagine in what respect these colonies could have been more generously treated, and Englishmen may

INTROD.

As shown  
in the  
case of  
Australia.

INTROD.

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*Change in  
 feeling of  
 late years  
 in Great  
 Britain  
 towards  
 the colonies.*

sometimes wonder that such scant justice has been done to a singularly largeminded and liberal policy.

It is curious to note the change in tone and feeling towards colonies and dependencies, since Lewis wrote his book. Arguing from the past, he seems to contemplate the danger of a dominant country oppressing its dependencies, and the necessity of providing safeguards against such oppression. Shortly after he wrote, the policy of self-government was given full play, and then the cry arose that the mother country did not care about her colonies and wished to get rid of them. This cry is now dying out, in the face of the active sympathy shown at home with colonial movements; and at the present time it may safely be said, with regard at any rate to the self-governing colonies of Great Britain, that there is, on the whole, at least as much danger of the mother country being neglected as any of these so-called dependencies, and more danger of her being the oppressed than the oppressor. In England, the present age is one in which the spirit of humanity is carried almost to an extreme. Generous sympathy with weakness and suffering in any form goes out so far, that it is almost considered a virtue to be weak and a crime to be strong. Whenever there is a point at issue between a small community and a great one, it seems to be assumed that the latter must be in the wrong; and, as their own nation is strong, Englishmen are inclined to take it for granted, that, whenever friction arises between Great Britain and a small foreign power or between the mother country and one of her colonies or dependencies, the fault must be on the side of the British government. They do not consider that strength in a race or nation implies merit, physical, moral, or intellectual; and that a mode of reasoning which invariably condemns the stronger party, may be generous, but is certainly untrue alike to history and to common sense. Actual oppression was the danger of the past, fancied oppression is rather the danger of the present; and a nation, which wishes to do solid and lasting work in the world, must not be afraid of realising and occasionally asserting its strength.

The somewhat wrong-headed sentiment which prevails nowadays is due to the fact, that the present age in Great Britain is an age of transition. The time of democracy has come, but is as yet hardly recognised. Cries are still raised which have lost their meaning; men are still fighting for rights which have already been assured; and government is rendered uncertain, because the public do not quite know where they stand. On the other hand, the democracy, which has come into being in the self-governing colonies, is a democracy of which writers and thinkers of the type of Sir G. Lewis had little idea. They pictured to themselves communities where there would be equal rights, universal freedom, and general toleration, far different from the aggressive and protectionist democracies, which have arisen, for instance, in the Australasian colonies. They seem never to have really foreseen the results of labour becoming the dominant force in a state, or to have anticipated a time when Trades' Unions would dictate the policy of a country, and when, in an English speaking community, the evils of class government would bid fair to be revived in an intensified form. The great and growing strength of the labour party is an entirely new factor in politics, new in the last fifty years, and it has at present reached its fullest development in some of the British colonies. A notable feature in the history of Greece was, that many of the Greek colonies grew more rapidly than the mother cities. Less cramped in space, less tied by exclusive laws and customs, more mixed in their populations, the Greek towns in Asia Minor, Italy, and Sicily outstripped the towns in Greece itself. The children came to full strength before the parent states; Miletus grew faster than Athens, and Syracuse than Corinth. As regards political and social questions, something of the same kind has happened in the case of the colonies of Great Britain. Unfettered by the past, they have moved faster than the mother country, and new ideas and principles have developed more rapidly in these young communities than in the Old World. Even the evil of an abnormal growth of towns, as compared with the rural population, has, in spite of

INTROD.

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*Democracy  
 in Great  
 Britain  
 and the  
 colonies  
 contrasted.*



INTROD. possessing unlimited land for settlement, perpetuated itself  
 →→→ in the colonies. It may well be doubted whether the quick rate of progress is on the whole a gain, and whether, on the other hand, the absence of training is not a serious drawback. For the Australasian colonies are untrained communities. They have not had to work their way slowly to greatness. They have not been called upon to repel foreign invasion; nor (except in New Zealand) to defend their lives and homes against the raids of powerful tribes of natives; nor, again, to earn their liberties by struggles prolonged through generations. As, in the old legend, Pallas sprang full armed from her father's head, so these colonies have come to manhood all at once, and have almost been born full-grown democracies. Youth and the absence of training breed self-assertion; and, while the gradual development of democracy at home makes the policy of the mother country to her children and her neighbours err on the side of deference and hesitation, the quick full growth of raw, assured, untutored democracy in the colonies has given them a masterful and over-confident bearing.

*Effect of scientific inventions during the last fifty years.*

The rapid spread of democracy in the last fifty years has been due mainly to the progress of science. The passing and repealing of laws has had an infinitesimal effect in making society more democratic, when compared with the work done by inventors and engineers. The development of printing, and the introduction of railways, steamers, and telegraphs have made it impossible to perpetuate old ideas and to keep up old distinctions. Classes and peoples have been jostled up against each other, men have run to and fro and knowledge has been increased. As regards the British empire, this is the last and the greatest difference to note between the present time and the date when the 'Government of Dependencies' was published. The first regular steamer between England and America ran in 1838, only three years before the publication of the book; the charter of the P. & O. Company dates from 1840; the first steamer from England to Australia did not run till 1852. The first submarine cable between Great Britain and America was only laid in 1858, and not successfully laid till 1866. Direct

telegraphic communication with Australia dates from 1872, with New Zealand from 1876, with South Africa from 1879. The completion of the Suez Canal dates from 1869. Thus the whole system of communication between Great Britain and her colonies has been revolutionised since Lewis wrote. Apart from the effect which steam and electricity have had upon the minds and manners of men, it is obvious that the quickening of communication between one country and another must radically change the relations between them. Distance is really the main fact with which the 'Government of Dependencies' deals. 'Every government,' says the writer, 'must have a power of communicating rapidly with its subjects; and, consequently, a territory which lies at a considerable distance from the seat of the supreme government, must be placed under a subordinate government, and be governed as a dependency'<sup>1</sup>; and again, 'Where a supreme government is prevented by distance (or by any other cause) from communicating rapidly with any of its territories, it is necessary that the distant territory should be governed as a dependency.'<sup>2</sup> He quotes Burke to the same effect; and, though he allows that 'the idea of distance, with reference to the government of a dependency, is relative'<sup>3</sup>, and notes the counterbalancing influence of modern inventions for quickening communication, he lays down that the point is soon reached, at which it becomes impossible to govern without interposing a subordinate government<sup>4</sup>. Nowadays, it is not so easy to say, that a point is soon reached at which nature has set a limit to scientific invention. There are before our eyes untold forces at work, perpetually diminishing the distance between countries, and it is impossible to say where the limit, if there be any limit, will be placed. Modern science is a fact which vitiates all comparisons between past and present times, and makes all calculations as to the future uncertain. The ships which carried the first settlers to Australia, a hundred years ago, in 1787-8, took eight months on the voyage, stopping at Rio Janeiro and the Cape; whereas,

<sup>1</sup> P. 85.<sup>2</sup> P. 85.<sup>3</sup> P. 293.<sup>4</sup> P. 181.

INTROD. at the present time, a steamer from London reaches Sydney  
 ——— in six to seven weeks. Burke<sup>1</sup> enlarged upon the 3000  
 miles of ocean lying between Great Britain and her North  
 American colonies—upon the months which passed between  
 the giving of an order by the supreme government at home,  
 and its execution in the dependency. He ridiculed the idea  
 of having American representatives in the British parliament,  
 because the writs of election sent out from England would  
 take six, ten, or twenty weeks to reach the different colonies ;  
 and, when all was ready, the voyage home would take six  
 weeks more. Yet now the passage from Liverpool to New  
 York takes barely a week, and a message is sent in a few  
 minutes. This transformation has taken place almost en-  
 tirely in the last fifty years. How is it possible to predict  
 what the next fifty years will bring forth? It can only be  
 said that, in all probability, communication will year by year  
 grow cheaper, more rapid, and more constant, and that the  
 great centralising tendency will be more and more felt.  
 Distance is relative to an extent of which Lewis can have  
 formed little idea, and generalisations on political questions  
 will have to be perpetually recast with the ever-changing  
 meaning of space and time.

Having seen how far the conditions of the British empire  
 in our own day differ from those which existed when  
 Lewis wrote, let us now try to find an answer to the three  
 questions suggested at the beginning of this Introduction.

*Question 1.  
 How far  
 are the  
 British  
 colonies  
 dependen-  
 cies in the  
 true sense  
 of the  
 word ?*

The first is, whether the so-called British colonies, at the  
 present day, are dependencies in the sense in which Lewis  
 defines the term, viz. as 'a part of an independent political  
 community which is immediately subject to a subordinate  
 government?.' The Crown Colonies and India are certainly  
 dependencies ; but the question is, whether the governments,  
 to which the self-governing colonies are immediately sub-  
 ject, are subordinate to the government of Great Britain.  
 Nominally no doubt they are subordinate. Their foreign  
 policy is controlled by the Imperial government, their con-

<sup>1</sup> See below note 2 to p. 181, and see also note (P).

<sup>2</sup> P. 71.

stitutions depend on Imperial Statute, their governors are appointed from home, their laws can be annulled by the veto of the Crown, and their legislation is void so far as it conflicts with such laws of the British parliament as apply to the colonies. But let us look away from constitutional forms to actual facts, and ask, with regard to Canada or the Australasian colonies or the Cape, where does the real power lie? In England or in the colony? The answer is undoubted. It lies in the colony. 'If the government of the dominant country,' says Lewis, 'substantially govern the dependency, the representative body (in the dependency) cannot substantially govern it; and conversely, if the dependency be substantially governed by the representative body, it cannot be substantially governed by the government of the dominant country. A self-governing dependency (supposing the dependency not to be virtually independent) is a contradiction in terms<sup>1</sup>.' There is no question that in the Canadian Dominion, or in New South Wales, or in the Cape, the representative body substantially governs the colony, therefore the British government does not substantially govern it. The self-governing colonies of Great Britain then are not dependencies<sup>2</sup>. But, if they are not dependencies, in what class of communities are they comprised? The term colonies is too wide; in the strict sense it would include also the United States, which are nominally as well as really independent, for, as Lewis shows, a colony 'may be either an independent or a dependent community<sup>3</sup>,' and the United States are a colony of Great Britain, just as Corcyra, though an independent state, was a colony of Corinth, or Tarentum of Sparta. The chief difference between the Canadian

<sup>1</sup> P. 289.

<sup>2</sup> The passage quoted from Lord Durham's report on p. xxxi, shows that, in the event of self-government being granted to a colony, he thought four points should be reserved for the control of the mother country, viz. the form of constitution, foreign policy, the regulation of trade, and the disposal of public lands. Great Britain has now abandoned control over trade and public lands, in the case of the self-governing colonies; and some, at any rate, of these colonies can, as Professor Dicey points out in his *Law of the Constitution* (Lecture III), legally alter their constitution within limits.

<sup>3</sup> P. 171.

INTROD. Dominion and the United States, in relation to Great Britain, is, that Great Britain controls the foreign policy of the former country, not of the latter. In Lewis' phrase<sup>1</sup>, Canada is related amicably to every foreign country with which Great Britain is at peace, and she is related hostilely to every foreign country with which Great Britain is at war. This control is exercised with the consent of Canada, not in despite of the wishes of her people; and, when a question arises, which specially touches Canadian interests, the Dominion Government has its say as representing the Canadian people, and Canadian delegates have been present at International conferences. The fact, therefore, that the foreign policy of the empire is left in charge of the Imperial Foreign Office, does not vitiate the conclusion that Canada is substantially governed by the Dominion Parliament, not by the government of Great Britain; but, inasmuch as foreign policy is ordinarily left to the mother country, and as the sanction of that policy lies in the strength of the British fleet, the colonies, whose relations to foreign countries are determined by the policy, and who are safeguarded by the fleet, are really in the position of independent but protected states. In a word, the British empire may be said to consist, partly of dependencies which are not colonies, such as India; partly of dependencies, which are colonies, such as Barbados or the Bermudas; partly of colonies, such as Canada, which are not dependencies but protected states. This division, it may be added, very nearly coincides with the classification of colonies, given in the Colonial Regulations, into Crown Colonies, colonies possessing representative institutions but not responsible government, and colonies possessing both representative institutions and responsible government.

*Question 2.*  
*What advantages or disadvantages accrue to Great Britain and her*

The second question to be considered is—what advantages, if any, do Great Britain and her colonies mutually derive from the relation which exists between them?

The term colonies, it should be said, is here used in its popular and unscientific sense, as including all the foreign and colonial possessions of Great Britain.

<sup>1</sup> P. 296.

Lewis devotes four chapters of his book to the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the dominant country from its supremacy over a dependency, and to a dependency from its dependence on the dominant country; and though, as has been shown, the British empire includes territories which are not properly speaking dependencies, a short review of what he says may help to suggest an answer to the question. Let us look at it first from the point of view of the dominant country. The author sums up the advantages derived by the dominant country from its supremacy over a dependency, under the following heads :

1. Tribute or revenue paid by the dependency.
2. Assistance for military or naval purposes furnished by the dependency.
3. Advantages to the dominant country from its trade with a dependency.
4. Facilities afforded by dependencies to the dominant country for the emigration of its surplus population, and for an advantageous employment of its capital.
5. Transportation of convicts to a dependency.
6. Glory of possessing dependencies.

INTROD.  
 ———  
*colonies from their present relation ?*

(a) *The case of Great Britain.*

The counterbalancing disadvantages he sums up as follows :

1. Expensiveness of the dependency to the mother country.
2. Commercial restrictions caused by the dependency.
3. Wars caused by dependencies.
4. Political corruption caused by dependencies.

Now, substituting Great Britain for dominant country and colonies for dependencies, how far does the enumeration of advantages and disadvantages hold good? It will be more convenient to take the disadvantages first. The second in the list, the disadvantage arising from commercial restrictions, has disappeared. No 'commercial privileges by discriminating duties and other similar regulations'<sup>1</sup> are now granted by Great Britain to her colonies in their trade with the mother country, and such privileges are hardly likely to be revived, although the revival has lately been advocated in some quarters. The fourth disadvantage has also practically

*Disadvantages.*

<sup>1</sup> P. 242.

INTROD. disappeared. It is true that, in filling up appointments abroad, merit is from time to time, as it always will be, to some slight extent subordinated to party politics ; but the system of official patronage is year by year contracted rather than extended. The Civil Service is recruited by open competition in India and some of the large Crown colonies. In the self-governing colonies the governors alone are appointed from England ; and, as the recent case of Queensland shows<sup>1</sup>, the wishes of the colonists, whether well-founded or not, are respected in making the appointments. In a word, it cannot be seriously maintained, that the standard of public life at home suffers from the fact, that a certain number of posts in the smaller colonies are still in the gift of the Secretary of State.

The first disadvantage, the expensiveness of colonies, still exists. Some are directly helped by parliamentary grants, as, for instance, Cyprus and British Bechuanaland ; but such grants are very much more restricted in number and amount than they once were, and the sum of £300,000 nearly covers the charge on the Imperial estimates for the staff of the Colonial Office, colonial services, pensions, and subsidies to telegraph companies.

There remain the charges for mail contracts, and for the army and navy. The mail contracts are a foreign as well as a colonial charge, for, if there were not a British colony at Hong Kong, there would no doubt be still a British mail service to China ; the vote, however, would of course be much smaller if Great Britain had no colonial possessions. As regards the army, no Imperial troops are now required for her self-governing colonies, except where there are Imperial stations, as at Cape Town or Halifax. India, again, pays the whole cost of the troops, whether Indian or English, employed within her borders, just as she pays also the whole cost of

<sup>1</sup> In 1889. See the Parliamentary Paper, c. 5828, 'correspondence respecting the appointment of Governor in colonies under responsible government.' A claim made by some of the Australian colonies, that the colonial ministry should be consulted before a governor is finally appointed, was not admitted by the Imperial Government.

her civil establishment, including even the India office in London; and the smaller colonies, excepting purely military posts such as Gibraltar, contribute to the cost of their own garrisons and their defences. The burden of the navy falls more exclusively on the mother country; yet here too there is a set off, as the Australasian colonies, for instance, now contribute to the increased strength of the Naval squadron on the Australian station; and further, it is not easy to estimate how far Great Britain could afford to diminish the strength of her navy, even if she had no foreign or colonial possessions. To make the British islands secure against foreign invasion, to protect British trade in all parts of the world, in a word, to keep Great Britain going as a nation, it would always be necessary to have a powerful navy; and it is therefore hardly fair to state as roundly as is usually stated, that the cost of the Imperial navy is due to the fact, that the colonies of Great Britain are so many and so widely spread.

The third disadvantage, the liability to be involved in war by the possession of colonies, still exists; but the liability is probably less than it was, and it will be shown later that the possession of colonies is, on the other hand, in the case of Great Britain to some extent a safeguard against war. To prove that the liability is less than it was, the following arguments may be adduced. As Lewis<sup>1</sup> points out, dependencies are likely to involve the dominant country in war, either by themselves revolting against her, or by inducing a foreign country to attack her through her dependencies; and foreign countries are likely to be tempted to invasion, where the dependencies are difficult of defence, either on account of distance, or on account of their frontier being 'long and vulnerable'<sup>2</sup> as against a neighbouring power. Now it is absurd to suppose, that there will ever be any occasion of armed revolt on the part of the self-governing colonies against the mother country. There may be peaceful separation, but the time for an appeal to arms is happily past and gone. Of the other dependencies, the only case in which serious revolt is conceivable is India; and here the safeguards against it, in just

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 242-4.<sup>2</sup> P. 242.



INTROD. government on the one hand, and improved communication on the other, coupled with the knowledge dearly bought by past experience, grow on the whole stronger instead of weaker. As regards the danger of foreign invasion, it has been seen that the element of distance is being year by year eliminated, and year by year the local defences are being strengthened. There remains the case of the long and vulnerable frontier, and this consideration really only arises in regard to Canada and India. In Canada actually, and in India prospectively, there is a powerful nation on the border of an integral part of the British dominions; but in Canada, where the danger is most imminent, the foreign nation is an English people, with whom it is almost as difficult to imagine that Great Britain can go to war as with Canada herself; and in India, in the first place the Russians are not yet lining the frontier, in the second place the frontier is being rapidly made less and less vulnerable, and in the third place the danger of Russian invasion is at least as likely to promote Indian union under the present order of things, and Indian loyalty to the British government, as to stimulate discontent and revolt.

It has been said that in the case of Canada and India alone the danger of the foreign enemy on the frontier arises. This does not leave out of sight the cases where, in Africa and elsewhere, British protectorates march with French and Germany. No doubt, if the English had no lot or part in Africa, no friction could arise in Africa between Great Britain and France or Germany; but almost the same reasoning might be applied to all trade and all communication between countries. Two great European powers, which have roughly agreed on lines of demarcation between protectorates or spheres of influence in far-off lands, are not likely nowadays to go beyond blue books of correspondence in adjusting boundary questions; for there comes a point after all when, if armies and peoples are not actually watching each other on two sides of a river, common sense, helped by the cooling slowness of diplomacy, puts war out of the question.

*Advantages.*

Let us now look at the credit side of the account, the advantages which arise from owning a colony, as enu-

merated by Sir George Lewis. The first is deriving tribute from it. Now it is true that Great Britain does not derive 'any direct tribute or revenue'<sup>1</sup> from her colonies; she does not regard them as feeding the Imperial Exchequer, which is the view from which the Dutch have regarded their East Indian possessions; but, on the other hand, Lewis' dictum that 'the notion of deriving a tribute from dependencies, or even of making them defray all the expenses incurred by the supreme government on their account, is now generally abandoned,' certainly does not hold good at the present day<sup>2</sup>. The view, that the colonies should refund as far as possible the expenses incurred by the mother country on their behalf, is much more strongly held now than it was fifty years ago. While the whole cost of the India office in London is defrayed from Indian revenues, while India contributes to the cost of the British embassy in Persia and of the consular establishments in China, it is difficult to say that she pays no tribute to England; and when the Australians are beginning to contribute towards the naval strength of the empire, the analogy of the confederacy of Delos under the headship of Athens is at once suggested. 'The general policy of England,' says Lewis, 'has been, not to compel her dependencies to contribute to defraying the expense of the general government'<sup>3</sup>. This should now be re-written as follows. 'The general policy of England is to invite her self-governing colonies, and to compel her dependencies, to contribute to defraying the general expenses of the British empire.'

The second advantage is assistance for military or naval purposes furnished by the colony. This advantage, which it is difficult to distinguish from tribute, if tribute means more than simply the payment of so much money, certainly exists at the present time. The most striking instance is the contingent of troops so generously sent by Australia to the Sudan; while, following Lewis' illustrations under this head, readers may be reminded that Indian troops served in the Egyptian war, that they garrison Aden<sup>4</sup>, and that several

<sup>1</sup> P. 206.<sup>2</sup> P. 212.<sup>3</sup> P. 208.<sup>4</sup> Aden, however, it is right to add, is treated as an integral part of India.

INTROD. of the British dependencies, such as Gibraltar and Malta, are appropriated, in whole or part, as Imperial military or naval stations.

The third advantage is trade with colonies. This advantage partly exists, partly has disappeared. It exists in the sense that, if India, or Singapore, or Hong Kong were owned by another European power, British trade would no doubt be seriously crippled by hostile tariffs. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that Great Britain derives any trade advantages from her connexion with the self-governing colonies, seeing that those colonies treat her commerce no better and no worse than that of foreign nations. It is impossible to prove that 'trade follows the flag'.<sup>1</sup> It is equally idle to try to prove Lewis' thesis, that 'the trade between England and the United States is probably far more profitable to the mother country, than it would have been, if they had remained in a state of dependence upon her',<sup>2</sup> supposing, that is to say, that the dependence were only the nominal dependence of a self-governing colony; but it may be taken as generally true, that 'the best customer which a nation can have is a thriving and industrious community, whether it be dependent or independent'.<sup>3</sup>

The fourth advantage is the facilities offered by colonies to the dominant country for the emigration of its surplus population, and for an advantageous employment of its capital. This advantage continues, but is not as marked as it was. In India, for instance, or the Malay Indies there is a field for employment of English men and English capital, which would be much restricted if these territories did not belong to Great Britain; but, if we turn to the so-called fields of emigration, the self-governing colonies with their temperate climates, we find that the governments of those colonies are now nearly as chary of encouraging emigration, as is the government of the United States; that, in spite of restrictions imposed by their government, the United States have proved infinitely more attractive to British emigrants

<sup>1</sup> See App. III.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 217-8.

<sup>3</sup> P. 217.

than any British colony; and that the mother country now retains no power whatever of disposing of the waste lands of Canada or Australasia. Nor does there seem much, if any, greater inducement for the investment of British capital in British colonies than in stable foreign countries, except in the case of the Crown Colonies. These latter colonies, being under Imperial control, are considered to be a specially secure field for investment; but it is difficult to suppose that, if they did not exist, British investors would not find other equally profitable, if somewhat less assured, fields of investment. It may be noted, in passing, that it has been sometimes considered a disadvantage, that the loans raised by the self-governing colonies are so largely held in Great Britain; for, if a financial crisis in one of these communities coincided with a time of friction between the colony and the mother country, the colony might be tempted to repudiate its debt simply by way of crippling the dominant country. Such a suggestion, however, is so utterly improbable, that it seems almost unfair to the colonies even to place it on paper.

The fifth advantage is the employment of a colony as a place to which convicted criminals may be transported. This advantage, if it can be called an advantage, has disappeared; but it may be observed that it is a fallacy to regard transportation simply as a means of disposing of criminals. The history of the American and West Indian colonies, as well as that of Australia, shows that, in past times, it was at least as much a method of colonisation, of finding settlers for a new country, and labour for colonist employers. The system was not ill suited to bygone days, and was not disadvantageous to colonies in their early stages. It has been given up in the British empire, as being no longer required, as out of harmony with the spirit of the time, and as having led to abuses; but it is a mistake to speak of it simply as an advantage to the mother country, for, to take only one instance, Russian transportation to Siberia has, with all its horrors, been a means of colonising that country, and to some extent developing its resources. The system in this case has probably done no good to the

INTROD. dominant country, but it has not been without advantage to  
 →→→ the dependency<sup>1</sup>.

So far it has been seen that, in the case of Great Britain, the disadvantages, which, according to this book, a dominant country suffers from owning foreign or colonial possessions, have either disappeared or been minimised; whereas, on the other hand, she still derives some very substantial benefits from her colonies. We now come to the sixth and last advantage specified by Lewis, 'the glory which a country is supposed to derive from an extensive colonial empire<sup>2</sup>.' He deals with the point in a few contemptuous sentences, but a little consideration will show that it cannot be so lightly disposed of, and that the advantage in question, if less outwardly substantial than the others and less easy to define, is nevertheless perhaps really the greatest of all. The glory of possessing colonies has a double side; it implies, at once, the sense of pride which such possession inspires in the people of the dominant country, and the credit which thereby attaches to the nation in the eyes of the world at large. It is a great thing for peoples, as for individual men and women, to win a position for themselves and to keep it when won. It means making the most of themselves, calling out all their energies, developing all their qualities, and handing on to posterity worthy traditions and strong characteristics. It is impossible to estimate in black and white the exact gain, which a community derives from the glory of owning colonies, but it is equally impossible to read history or to apply common sense without seeing that it is a gain. It is something for a nation to have a great past, like the Dutch; it is still more to have a great present, like the English; cut away from either nation the foreign and colonial element in their history, the planting of colonies, the winning and owning of dependencies, and it cannot be doubted that both the one and the other would have been a distinct loser in the matter of national character and the sense of national greatness. It is easier to show that the glory derived from colonial possessions, in the sense of the prestige which they give in the eyes of the world, is

<sup>1</sup> See note to p. 23a.

<sup>2</sup> P. 233.

an advantage to the dominant country. Lewis wrote his book with a view to trying to diminish the chances of war, 'the greatest calamity to which the civilised world is now exposed<sup>1</sup>.' At the present day, it is more and more the case, that rulers cannot make war unless they are backed by public opinion ; but the public opinion, which makes war or peace, is the opinion of a mass of very ill-informed men, who are guided at least as much by appearances as by actual facts. Consequently, the appearance of strength is a certain safeguard against invasion. But the possession of a colonial empire, whether a real source of strength or not, gives the appearance of strength, and therefore is a factor in preventing war. It is perfectly true, on the other hand, that the colonies and dependencies of a country may excite the cupidity of a foreign nation ; but if so, it is at most only a counterbalancing argument on the other side, and does not vitiate the accuracy of the statement that, so far as the possession of dependencies gives the appearance of strength, it is a gain to the dominant country. If Great Britain had no colonial possessions, foreign powers would probably be less chary of a war with her than they now are, even though she were, as a matter of fact, as strong as she is under existing conditions. On the other hand, Holland would hardly be less liable to being invaded by her continental neighbours than she is at present, even if she had no attractive East Indian islands for them to covet.

But, after all, it is a very idle task to sum up whether or not Great Britain derives advantages from her colonies. When the instincts of a nation have led them to emigrate, to colonise, and to annex, to argue that they should not have formed colonies and acquired dependencies, or that, having done so, they should if possible get rid of them, has as much sense, and no more, as to argue that it would be well for a boy not to become a man, or, having become a man, to go back as soon as possible to second childhood. It is as much as to say that it has been bad for the English to be English, and that English history for the last three hundred years has been a

<sup>1</sup> Preface, p. 6.

INTROD.



mistake. It cannot be a disadvantage for a nation to follow its natural bent, it cannot be good for it to stunt its energies and to refuse to follow the path which has been marked out for it in the world. Compare Great Britain with the Netherlands, or compare the past of the Netherlands with its present and with a possible future shorn of the Netherlands Indies, and it becomes impossible seriously to argue that trading and enterprising nations are better without colonies or dependencies. Nations do not live by bread alone ; and, if they did, it would be better for them to depend for their bread in the last resort upon those of their own household than upon strangers.

Before leaving the case of the dominant country, there is one more point to notice. Lewis says, the dominant country 'is bound morally not to throw off a helpless dependency, although the possession of it should promise no advantage to itself'.<sup>1</sup> It might be added that, in the great society of nations, honesty is the best policy ; and that, if it is immoral for a country to throw off a helpless dependency, it cannot be advantageous for it to do so. It would lose its national credit, and its subjects and foreign neighbours alike would cease to trust its word. This argument powerfully applies to the case of Great Britain. Many of her dependencies are helpless, in the sense of not being able to stand alone. Some are too small, some are too divided in race, or religion, or interest to do so. If released from dependence, on Great Britain, they would pass into the keeping of another power ; they would not be gainers by the change, and the country which threw them off would lose not only in trade, but also in self-esteem and in the confidence of others. The people, which puts its hand to the plough and looks back, is not fit, and is not deemed fit, to hold its place among the kingdoms of this world.

In his book on 'the English in the West Indies',<sup>2</sup> Mr. Froude writes of Dominica ;—'If I am asked the question, what use is Dominica to us ? I decline to measure it by its present or possible marketable value ; I answer simply that

<sup>1</sup> P. 326.<sup>2</sup> Ch. xi.

it is part of the dominions of the Queen. If we pinch a finger, the smart is felt in the brain. If we neglect a wound in the least important part of our persons, it may poison the system. Unless the blood of an organised body circulates freely through the extremities, the extremities mortify and drop off, and the dropping off of any colony of ours will not be to our honour and may be to our shame.' This is the true answer to the question whether the colonies are an advantage to Great Britain.

Now let us ask what advantages, if any, the colonies derive from their connexion with Great Britain.

Lewis enumerates the following advantages as being derived by a dependency from its dependence on the dominant country :

1. Protection by the dominant country.
2. Pecuniary assistance by the dominant country.
3. Commercial advantages.
4. Advantage sometimes arising to the dependency from the indifference of the dominant country about its interests.

He states the counterbalancing disadvantages as follows :

1. Peculiar liability of the laws of a dependency to technical objections.
2. Introduction of the laws, language, or religion of the dominant country into a dependency, without due regard to its position, circumstances, and interests.
3. Exclusion of natives of the dependency from offices in their own country.
4. Appointment of natives of the dominant country to offices in the dependency, without due regard for their qualifications.
5. Liability of the interests of the dependency to be sacrificed to the interests of parties at home.
6. Liability of the dependency to be involved in the wars of the dominant country.
7. Evils arising to a dependency from its subjection to two governments.

INTROD.

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(b) *The case of the colonies.*



INTROD.  
 ———  
 Advant-  
 ages.

Of the four advantages stated above, the first exists in all its fulness. There is no British possession which does not reap some benefit from being under the protection of the most ubiquitous fleet in the world. Even the strongest of the colonies, such as Canada, would lose something, if, as an independent country, it could no longer send out its ships to East or West under cover of the British flag; and if, when they touched at one or other of the many ocean strongholds of Great Britain, they could no longer have any right to be sheltered by its fortifications and relieved from its stores.

The second advantage, that of pecuniary assistance, also still exists, as has already been seen; though it has also been shown that Great Britain now spends less money directly on her colonies, and receives more tribute in one form or another from them, than used to be the case. This result follows from the fact that the colonies, having become more developed in course of years, are therefore more able to pay the whole or part of their expenses, and stand less in need of pecuniary assistance from the dominant country. Cyprus and British Bechuanaland, which were instanced as receiving parliamentary grants, are comparatively new acquisitions; and, as year by year goes on, the grants made to them are likely to diminish in amount, and in course of time to disappear. It is interesting to note, in passing, the case, which arises in the British empire, of one colony or dependency giving pecuniary assistance to a neighbouring dependency, with a view to its own ultimate benefit. Thus, the cost of the administration of British New Guinea has been, to the amount of £15,000 per annum, guaranteed by the colonies of Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria; while the government of the Straits Settlements has advanced sums to the protected Native states of the Malay peninsula, in order to enable them to make roads and develop their territories. In the former case, it has been to the special advantage of the Australian colonies that New Guinea should be under British control; and in the latter, it has been to the special advantage of Singapore and Penang to help in opening out the countries which are the feeders of their own trade.

The commercial advantages which the British colonies derive from their connexion with Great Britain, so far as they consist in the protection afforded to their trade by the dominant country against foreign aggression, come under the first head. The goods of the colonies, which are imported into the mother country, are not now favoured by any differential duties; on the other hand, the criticism that 'the interests of a dependency are, in its external commercial relations, usually sacrificed to those of the dominant state'<sup>1</sup> is wholly an anachronism as applied to the British empire. The self-governing colonies, over and above the protection of their trade, probably derive little commercial advantage from their British connexion, except so far as it may enable them to borrow more easily. On the other hand, the commerce of those weaker parts of the empire, which, if not dependencies of Great Britain, would be dependencies of some other power, is beyond question greatly benefited by their being attached to a free-trading nation. If India belonged to Russia, it would no doubt be given a monopoly of the Russian market as against the imports of foreign countries; but, on the other hand, its ports would in all probability be in great measure barred against foreign trade, and its commerce would suffer incalculable damage in consequence.

The fourth and last in Lewis' list of advantages, viz. that a colony sometimes gains from the indifference of the dominant country about its interests, is somewhat awkwardly stated, and is therefore difficult to discuss; but, as explained in the text<sup>2</sup>, it means that a small community may often gain from being overridden by a power outside and superior to local prejudices. This is a very real gain, as shown by the instance which he quotes, viz. the emancipation of the slaves in the British West Indies by the fiat of the mother country; but it is misleading to quote this as an instance of indifference to the interests of the dependency; it is rather, as he shows, care of the interests of the bulk of the population in the dependency as against those of the ruling oligarchy. In Jamaica, there were at the beginning of the present century

<sup>1</sup> P. 238.

<sup>2</sup> P. 239.

INTROD. some 300,000 slaves to 30,000 whites ; therefore, by insisting  
 → on emancipation and, what is more, by paying for it, Great  
 Britain, the dominant country, consulted the interests of ten  
 to one in the population of the island. Indifference must  
 therefore here be taken in the sense of impartiality not in  
 that of carelessness ; this was not a case to which Adam  
 Smith could have pointed, as illustrating the advantage to a  
 colony of being neglected by the mother country ; it rather  
 illustrates a point which is somewhat left out of sight in the  
 'Government of Dependencies,' that nearly all colonies or  
 dependencies have had two sections of inhabitants, a coloured  
 native race, and an incoming European race ; and that, where  
 this is the case, it is, or was in past days, an untold advantage  
 to the former, who are nearly always the numerical majority,  
 to have the protection of a supreme government outside and  
 beyond the limited local circle, able and at times willing to  
 override the class interests, which too often guide the de-  
 cisions of a colonial oligarchy.

*Disad-  
 vantages.*

The disadvantages, which a colony suffers from being  
 dependent, are said by Lewis to arise principally from the  
 'natural ignorance and indifference of the dominant country  
 about the position and interests of the dependency'.<sup>1</sup> It  
 must be the case, as he says, that the inhabitants of the  
 dominant state naturally care less for the concerns of a  
 territory in which they do not live, than for those of their  
 own country ; but, at the same time, it is obvious that greater  
 facility of communication, constant interchange of visits, and  
 multiplying of cheap books and newspapers dealing with the  
 colonies, have done much to dispel the ignorance, and to make  
 Englishmen care more for their kinsmen and fellow-subjects  
 beyond the seas. Even now, however, the scant attention paid  
 to the Indian budget in the House of Commons bears witness  
 to that spirit of indifference, which the author so justly  
 criticises ; while the half knowledge, which ordinarily prevails  
 upon colonial topics, proves at times more injurious even than  
 absolute ignorance.

The evils, which are enumerated as springing from this

<sup>1</sup> P. 246.

source, have now, to a great extent, ceased any longer to exist in the British empire. Nowadays, it can hardly be said that Great Britain introduces or is likely to introduce into her colonial possessions her laws, language, and religion, without due regard to the position and interests of the dependency. The French laws and language, and the Roman Catholic religion are in no way tabooed in lower Canada, for instance, or in Mauritius. The Roman Dutch law is still the basis of the legal system in the old Dutch colonies, the Cape, Ceylon, and British Guiana; and the lingering existence of state grants to Church of England chaplains in some of the colonies is the only remnant of any official preference for the religion of the mother country. At the same time, as Mr. Froude has warned us, it is still the tendency of Englishmen to imagine that English institutions are suited to all races and circumstances, to forget that the native is not as the European, and to allow, if not to invite, their dependencies to adopt forms of government too advanced for half-civilised peoples.

The evil of appointment of natives of the dominant country to offices in colonies without a due regard to their qualifications still exists, as has been said, but only in a very slight degree; and, in order to counteract it, the principle of open competition has been adopted in regard to India and the Eastern colonies. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice, that the introduction of this principle has tended to the perpetuation of another of the evils mentioned, viz. the exclusion of natives of the colony from offices in their own country. In considering this disadvantage, it must be borne in mind that most foreign or colonial possessions of European nations have two classes of native-born residents, a coloured race, and Europeans who have been born and bred in the colony, while a further class is formed by the intermixture of the two. Under the old Spanish system, one of the evils most complained of was that Spanish creoles, i. e. Spaniards born in America, were excluded from offices in favour of Spaniards sent out from Spain<sup>1</sup>. This last named evil practically does not exist in the British empire; for, where the English colonial element is strong, i. e. in the self-

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 148-9, note.

INTROD. governing colonies, the whole patronage, with the exception of  
—→— the appointment of governor, has been taken away from the home government and handed over to the colonies. In the case of India, on the other hand, it is mainly a question between Indians and Englishmen sent out from England ; and here the tendency of open competition, which gives no preference to either race, is as a matter of fact to exclude the native Indian. A reference to the reports of commissions on the subject will show the earnest attempts which have been made to modify the system, so as to prevent such exclusion ; but the broad fact remains that, if the most approved principle for selecting the best men is adopted in its entirety, it results in almost unadulterated European rule.

The liability of the interests of a colony to be sacrificed to the interests of parties at home still exists, and might be well illustrated from the recent history of South Africa. The more the popular assembly in the mother country, in which party spirit runs high, interferes with colonial administration, the more this evil is likely to be felt ; and it is no slight set-off to the advantages brought by telegraphic communication, that the submarine cable brings the colonies more within the vortex of party politics at home. Abuse of the Colonial Office is a very common theme with the English press ; but the mistakes which are abused are, in nine cases out of ten, the result of uncertainty produced by party government, and of the changes of policy insisted upon by the House of Commons, and by the very newspapers which criticise the results.

The liability of a colony to be involved in the wars of the dominant country applies to the case of the British empire, but it is not as serious as it seems at first sight. The wars, in which Great Britain finds herself from time to time engaged, are almost exclusively local wars, affecting on each occasion one part only of her empire. It is impossible to maintain that Canada appreciably suffers, when the English in India are engaged in an Afghan or Burmese war ; or that an outbreak in South Africa is injurious to the Australasian colonies. But the important point is, whether the colonial possessions of Great Britain, through being attached to an European nation, are

likely at some future time to be involved in an European war. As to this, it may be said first, that the enjoyment of British protection must involve a certain counterbalancing risk; and secondly, that Great Britain, owing to her insular position, is less likely than any other European power to be dragged into a great European war. The self-governing colonies have it in their power at any time by separation at once to forego the risk and to forfeit the protection; while the other sections of the empire, except so far as they are, like the West Indies, within measurable distance of the United States, would, if not dependencies of Great Britain, be in all probability dependencies of one of the continental nations of Europe, and would therefore be infinitely more likely to be involved in war than they are at present.

INTROD.



The first and seventh in the list of disadvantages, the peculiar liability of the laws of a colony to technical objections, and the evils which accrue to a colony from its subjection to two Governments, still exist and must exist as long as there are any colonial possessions. But are these evils in practice really great? If they were, would there not be infinitely louder complaints from the British colonies, and infinitely greater friction than is really the case? Lewis speaks, for instance, of 'the enormous evil of appeals from courts in the dependency to courts in the dominant country'<sup>1</sup>; but what sign is there that appeals to the Privy Council are felt as an enormous evil by the colonists<sup>2</sup>? If it be considered, how complicated is the system of the British empire, and how various the elements of which it is composed, the conclusion is irresistible that, if the evils of a double government were really as great as they appear to be on paper, the

<sup>1</sup> P. 278.

<sup>2</sup> A very different view is taken in Todd's *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies*, ch. iv. Pt. I. p. 223, 'Even in the colonies which have been entrusted with the largest measure of local self-government, the right of appeal to the Privy Council continues to be regarded with the greatest respect and appreciation.' On the other hand, the bill lately drafted by the National Australasian Convention provides for a Supreme Court of Australia, beyond which appeals cannot be carried, except in cases where the Queen grants leave to appeal to herself on the ground that public interests are involved.

INTROD. machinery would certainly work much less smoothly than it  
 →→→ does, and probably would not work at all. Theory is one thing, practice is another; and in practice the colonies of Great Britain seem to thrive under the present *régime*, however faulty it may appear when judged by first principles.

All through Sir G. Lewis' book, dependence is assumed to be an evil; and no doubt it is an evil, in so far as it necessarily implies weakness; but, as a matter of fact, there are great counterbalancing advantages; and it may be fairly summed up that, while British protection is a distinct gain to all parts of the empire, some provinces are virtually independent and suffer the evils of dependence only in name, and others, which are really dependent, would be dependencies of some other power if Great Britain set them free, and would in most cases certainly not be gainers by the change.

It should be added that, as it is good for a strong nation to grow and expand and own colonial possessions, so it is good for a small community, as it is also a necessity in these days, to be connected with a great nation, to become part and parcel of a large system, instead of living a small, contracted, and isolated existence. Suppose it were possible that one of the smaller British dependencies could become and remain an independent community, would the magnifying of local interests, and the possible quickening of local life, make up for being cut off from the wider circle in which it had previously been included? It is not only for the good of the world in general, but for the good of the communities themselves, that, if small, they should throw in their lot with the great; and those peoples fare best which recognise the fact most fully. Union, as of the Scotch with the English, federation, as of the Canadian provinces, involves a certain loss of local freedom; to become a dependency involves a still greater loss; but, if a community is too weak to stand firmly alone, it will consult its true interests and find its true development in being held like a star in its course by the attraction and control of a stronger power.

As then the connexion between Great Britain and her

colonies is on the whole an advantage to the former, so also it is on the whole an advantage to the latter. How then, we ask in the last place, can this connexion be best maintained? INTROD.  
—+—

It is impossible to study the colonial history of Great Britain without coming to the conclusion, that the soundest policy is to leave events to shape themselves, and to shun any definite scheme however promising in principle, and however carefully worked out in details. The British empire has grown of itself; it has owed little or nothing to the foresight of soldiers or statesmen; it is the result of circumstances, of private adventure, and of national character; it is not the result of any constructive power on the part of the government. The French laid their plans and sketched out their future much better than the English, they have been and are far more logical and consistent, and in past days they fathered and watched over their colonies to a much greater extent than the English ever did. Yet the French on the whole failed, and the English on the whole succeeded. When, in the last century, the English government, with great show of reason, tried to interfere with the old North American Colonies, it failed ignominiously and lost those colonies; and one of the few successful cases of state interference in British colonial history has been the policy, which has restricted the possibility of future interference, and has placed the great colonies of late years more out of the reach of home control. There is little in the chronicles of the past to encourage any plan of reconstruction, and there is a great deal to show that to attempt any such plan would be most disastrous. If Great Britain is to retain her empire, it will be in the main by just, considerate, and sympathetic dealing towards her children and her subjects, leaving the rest to time and circumstance. Such a conclusion, however, will no doubt seem impotent in the eyes of those who hold that some scheme for more closely uniting the provinces of the empire ought to be tried; and, therefore, it is only right to notice, though far more briefly than it deserves, the scheme which, modified in one form or other, most approves itself at the present time, viz. ;—Imperial Federation.

The advocates of Imperial Federation have the great merit of

Question 3.  
*How can the connexion between the mother country and the colonies be best maintained?*



INTROD. starting with a recognition of facts, as regards one part at any  
 rate of the British empire. They recognise that the self-  
 governing colonies are not dependents but equals, and they  
 wish to bring about a system of federation which is based  
 upon and implies equality. Again, it must be allowed that the  
 idea of Imperial Federation is no new one, and it is one  
 which has to some extent been put into practice by other  
 nations. It was advocated by Adam Smith<sup>1</sup>, and criticised  
 by Burke, in passages which are quoted by Sir G. Lewis<sup>2</sup>.  
 Indeed, it was hinted at more than a century before Adam  
 Smith wrote, for, in 1652, after the conclusion of the Civil  
 War in Barbados, a proposal was made by Sir T. Modyford,  
 the ablest man in the island, that the Barbadians should  
 send two representatives to the Imperial parliament—the  
 parliament to which the colonists had refused to submit on  
 the distinct ground that they had no spokesman in it<sup>3</sup>. At  
 the present time, again, the French and Spanish parliaments  
 contain a certain number of representatives from their re-  
 spective colonies, though the colonies or dependencies, which  
 they represent, are hardly parallel to the great self-governing  
 provinces of the British empire. The basis then of Imperial  
 Federation is sound, and the principle justifies itself to some  
 very slight extent from past and contemporaneous history.

But now let us confine ourselves to the British empire at the  
 present time, and ask, who wants Imperial Federation and  
 why, and, if it is wanted, how it may conceivably be brought  
 about. Either the mother country wants it, or the colonies,  
 or both; and if either or both want it, they do so, either because  
 they are dissatisfied with the present conditions, or because  
 they think that those conditions cannot last. It can hardly  
 be said that either the mother country or the colonies are  
 seriously dissatisfied with the present conditions; there is no  
 deep-seated and well-defined evil, requiring a prompt, and

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to notice that Adam Smith went so far as to contemplate  
 the possibility of the removal of the seat of the empire to America, and that  
 he looked to Union rather than to Federation. See his chapter on Colonies,  
 Pt. III.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 290-1. Note P.

<sup>3</sup> See the Editor's 'Historical Geography of the British Colonies,' vol. ii.  
 § 2, ch. v.

definite, and radical cure. There is simply a feeling of uneasiness with regard to the future, that the two parties, being very slightly connected, will gradually drift apart, unless some stronger bond of union is substituted for the existing one. Great Britain does not want to lose her colonies, and it may be taken that, on the whole, the colonies recognise that the connexion with the mother country is beneficial, and do not wish to be quit of it. We have accordingly to provide not for the present but for the future; and, therefore, the one clear point is, that any steps to be taken should be very tentative and gradual, not only because they are intended to meet future, not present evils, but also because the existing tie is so slight that any sudden strain might snap it asunder. There are two further reasons for delay. The first is, in order to allow time for the working of science, which is constantly bringing countries nearer to each other. Sir George Lewis notes<sup>1</sup> that the main objection to the plan of Imperial Federation lies in the distance of the colonies from England, and reference has already been made to Burke's criticism of it from the same point of view. But the objection has already lost much of its force, and in a few years' time it will probably have lost still more; it is therefore well to wait as long as possible, trusting to the further development of scientific invention. The second reason is, in order to allow time for colonial confederation to be perfected, before attempting the wider scheme. At present, for instance, the population of the mother country is enormously out of proportion to that of any of the Australasian colonies; and, if the basis of the federal assembly were to be numerical representation, the representatives of any one of these colonies would be in a ludicrous minority; on the other hand, not only is the population of these young countries likely to increase very fast, but also United Australasia would send a much stronger contingent than any separate Australasian colony; thus, there would be more approach to numerical equality between the federating

<sup>1</sup> P. 293. The objection, however, applies rather to Imperial Union than to Imperial Federation.

INTROD. members than could possibly be the case at the present time.  
 →→→ At the same time, it would be obviously a much simpler task to form a federation between two parties, Great Britain and Australasia, than between Great Britain and seven distinct Australasian colonies. Let Australasia become like Canada a Dominion<sup>1</sup>, let South Africa be united, devise a West Indian federation, and then a scheme of federal union between the colonies and the mother country, if still surrounded with difficulties, will at least become more tangible than it is at present. The only really valid argument against delay is, that each successive generation in the colonies is less leavened by the men who came from England, and who remember it as their home. The force of tradition will undoubtedly become weaker year by year; but it would be fatal for this reason alone to hurry on Imperial Federation, for, if it comes, it will be brought about not so much by sentiment, though sentiment will no doubt have some weight, as by a conviction that it will produce actual material advantages.

Now, such a system, if at all perfected, would imply real Imperial control over the colonies, and the self-governing colonies would in consequence be on the whole less independent than they are at present. They would therefore require some substantial advantages as a set-off against this partial loss of freedom. The only important advantages, which they do not possess at present, are a direct voice in controlling the foreign policy of the empire, and (from their own point of view) a preference to foreign nations in the English market. The first might reasonably be admitted by the mother country, but the second would involve an abandonment on the part of Great Britain of free trade in favour of a great Zollverein, inclusive as regards the colonies, exclusive as regards the rest of the world. It is difficult to conceive that the majority of Englishmen could ever be brought to reverse a policy, which has been at once so beneficial to their country and so bright an example to other nations. 'The effect of

<sup>1</sup> Or, according to the proposal of the recent Convention, a 'Commonwealth.'

an Imperial Zollverein,' says Mr. Gladstone<sup>1</sup>, 'would be undoubtedly to some extent to enlarge our commerce with our colonies and dependencies, but then it would also infallibly be to contract our commerce with the rest of the world.' It would be in the opinion of many if not most people in England an injurious and retrograde measure as far as Great Britain is concerned, but it is useless to blink the fact that, unless she eventually pays this price, she is not likely to find her colonies ready to accept a scheme of Imperial Federation. There are no doubt not a few Englishmen, even at the present time, who would be prepared to revert to modified protection for the sake of conciliating the colonies ; but there are many more who prefer to put the difficulty out of sight as a distant contingency, and who, while agreeing that Imperial Federation can only mature very gradually, yet say that something can and should be done towards it. It remains therefore to consider whether, without devising or criticising a complete scheme, any preliminary steps can be taken.

A change in the direction of Federation would seem to involve what Lewis calls the embarrassments arising to the mother country from the representatives of the colonies in her own legislature<sup>2</sup>; but it is conceivable that a beginning might be made of recasting the British constitution, without exciting much notice or causing much alarm. The innovators in the cause of Federation would probably turn for guidance to the United States ; they would point to the Senate of that country, as an assembly in which all the states great and small have an equal representation, and as being the body which practically controls the foreign policy of the nation ; they would point in the second place to the English second chamber, as becoming out of date in its present form, and as likely to survive only if it be infused with a new and living element and be given some definite sphere of duty ; they would in the third place point to the Agents General of the self-governing colonies, as already holding the position of colonial representatives in this country, at present halfway between agents of provinces and ambassadors of foreign states ; and lastly, they would lay stress

<sup>1</sup> Speech at Dundee, 29th Oct., 1890.

<sup>2</sup> P. 294.

INTROD. on the necessity of giving the colonies, which are thus represented, a direct voice in regard to the foreign policy of the empire. Such a train of reasoning would suggest the introduction of the Agents General into the second Chamber, with a view to the gradual diminution or elimination of the hereditary element in that chamber, and the gradual increase in the number of colonial representatives; and it would suggest at the same time the entrusting, at a future time, to an assembly thus reconstituted the general control of the foreign affairs of the empire. A process of this kind, unlikely as it is, is probably less unlikely than the formation of a wholly new assembly in addition to the present Imperial Parliament; and it would have the advantage of making the beginnings of Imperial Federation without at first directly raising the fatal question of taxation. The colonies would in this initial stage still be taxed solely by their own assemblies, the United Kingdom would still be taxed solely by its own House of Commons, and the presence of colonial representatives in the Upper House would neither lessen the control of the colonies over their own resources, nor give to them a voice in disposing of the revenues of the mother country.

In conclusion, it may be noted that Imperial Federation has been touched upon only from the point of view of the self-governing colonies, whereas any complete scheme would presumably imply representation also of the subject dependencies, involving the further difficulty of federation between parties which are not even on an equal footing. Any plan in short is beset with difficulties, which would seem almost insuperable; and Imperial Federation is at present little more than a dream. But, if we are to dream of the future, at any rate let the vision be as rich and extensive as possible, and let it be ever borne in mind that British federation cannot be complete, without eventually including in its scope the greatest of British colonies,—the United States<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In regard to Imperial Federation, reference should be made to Pt. vii of Sir C. Dilke's *Problems of Greater Britain on the 'Future Relations between the Mother Country and the remainder of the Empire.'*

ON THE  
GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES

INTROD. members than could possibly be the case at the present time.  
 →→→ At the same time, it would be obviously a much simpler task to form a federation between two parties, Great Britain and Australasia, than between Great Britain and seven distinct Australasian colonies. Let Australasia become like Canada a Dominion<sup>1</sup>, let South Africa be united, devise a West Indian federation, and then a scheme of federal union between the colonies and the mother country, if still surrounded with difficulties, will at least become more tangible than it is at present. The only really valid argument against delay is, that each successive generation in the colonies is less leavened by the men who came from England, and who remember it as their home. The force of tradition will undoubtedly become weaker year by year; but it would be fatal for this reason alone to hurry on Imperial Federation, for, if it comes, it will be brought about not so much by sentiment, though sentiment will no doubt have some weight, as by a conviction that it will produce actual material advantages.

Now, such a system, if at all perfected, would imply real Imperial control over the colonies, and the self-governing colonies would in consequence be on the whole less independent than they are at present. They would therefore require some substantial advantages as a set-off against this partial loss of freedom. The only important advantages, which they do not possess at present, are a direct voice in controlling the foreign policy of the empire, and (from their own point of view) a preference to foreign nations in the English market. The first might reasonably be admitted by the mother country, but the second would involve an abandonment on the part of Great Britain of free trade in favour of a great Zollverein, inclusive as regards the colonies, exclusive as regards the rest of the world. It is difficult to conceive that the majority of Englishmen could ever be brought to reverse a policy, which has been at once so beneficial to their country and so bright an example to other nations. 'The effect of

<sup>1</sup> Or, according to the proposal of the recent Convention, a 'Commonwealth.'

an Imperial Zollverein,' says Mr. Gladstone<sup>1</sup>, 'would be undoubtedly to some extent to enlarge our commerce with our colonies and dependencies, but then it would also infallibly be to contract our commerce with the rest of the world.' It would be in the opinion of many if not most people in England an injurious and retrograde measure as far as Great Britain is concerned, but it is useless to blink the fact that, unless she eventually pays this price, she is not likely to find her colonies ready to accept a scheme of Imperial Federation. There are no doubt not a few Englishmen, even at the present time, who would be prepared to revert to modified protection for the sake of conciliating the colonies; but there are many more who prefer to put the difficulty out of sight as a distant contingency, and who, while agreeing that Imperial Federation can only mature very gradually, yet say that something can and should be done towards it. It remains therefore to consider whether, without devising or criticising a complete scheme, any preliminary steps can be taken.

A change in the direction of Federation would seem to involve what Lewis calls the embarrassments arising to the mother country from the representatives of the colonies in her own legislature<sup>2</sup>; but it is conceivable that a beginning might be made of recasting the British constitution, without exciting much notice or causing much alarm. The innovators in the cause of Federation would probably turn for guidance to the United States; they would point to the Senate of that country, as an assembly in which all the states great and small have an equal representation, and as being the body which practically controls the foreign policy of the nation; they would point in the second place to the English second chamber, as becoming out of date in its present form, and as likely to survive only if it be infused with a new and living element and be given some definite sphere of duty; they would in the third place point to the Agents General of the self-governing colonies, as already holding the position of colonial representatives in this country, at present halfway between agents of provinces and ambassadors of foreign states; and lastly, they would lay stress

<sup>1</sup> Speech at Dundee, 29th Oct., 1890.

<sup>2</sup> P. 294.



INTROD. on the necessity of giving the colonies, which are thus represented, a direct voice in regard to the foreign policy of the empire. Such a train of reasoning would suggest the introduction of the Agents General into the second Chamber, with a view to the gradual diminution or elimination of the hereditary element in that chamber, and the gradual increase in the number of colonial representatives; and it would suggest at the same time the entrusting, at a future time, to an assembly thus reconstituted the general control of the foreign affairs of the empire. A process of this kind, unlikely as it is, is probably less unlikely than the formation of a wholly new assembly in addition to the present Imperial Parliament; and it would have the advantage of making the beginnings of Imperial Federation without at first directly raising the fatal question of taxation. The colonies would in this initial stage still be taxed solely by their own assemblies, the United Kingdom would still be taxed solely by its own House of Commons, and the presence of colonial representatives in the Upper House would neither lessen the control of the colonies over their own resources, nor give to them a voice in disposing of the revenues of the mother country.

In conclusion, it may be noted that Imperial Federation has been touched upon only from the point of view of the self-governing colonies, whereas any complete scheme would presumably imply representation also of the subject dependencies, involving the further difficulty of federation between parties which are not even on an equal footing. Any plan in short is beset with difficulties, which would seem almost insuperable; and Imperial Federation is at present little more than a dream. But, if we are to dream of the future, at any rate let the vision be as rich and extensive as possible, and let it be ever borne in mind that British federation cannot be complete, without eventually including in its scope the greatest of British colonies,—the United States<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In regard to Imperial Federation, reference should be made to Pt. vii of Sir C. Dilke's *Problems of Greater Britain on the 'Future Relations between the Mother Country and the remainder of the Empire.'*

# GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES

‘Toute espèce de lumière ne vient à nous qu’avec le tems ; plus sa progression est lente, plus l’objet entraîné par le mouvement rapide qui éloigne ou rapproche tous les êtres est déjà loin du lieu où nous le voyons. Avant que nous ayons appris que les choses sont dans une situation déterminée, elles ont déjà changé plusieurs fois. Ainsi nous appercevons toujours les événemens trop tard, et la politique a toujours besoin de prévoir, pour ainsi dire, le présent.’—Turgot, *Œuvres*, tom. ii. p. 343.

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

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*THE* subjects comprised within the science of politics may be conveniently distributed under the three following main divisions:

1. *The nature and form of a sovereign government, and its relations with the persons directly subject to it.*

2. *The relations between the sovereign governments of independent communities; (viz., international law or morality).*

3. *The relations of a dominant and a dependent community; or, in other words, the relation of supremacy and dependence.*

*The first of these three subjects comprehends the nature, origin, and form of a sovereign government, and its relations with its immediate subjects constituting a single political community. The various departments of this extensive subject have been treated by a long series of writers, ancient and modern, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, and reaching to the present time.*

*The second subject, comprehending the relations between the sovereign governments of independent states, has been treated by a numerous class of modern writers, from Grotius downwards.*

*The third subject is the relation of supremacy and dependence: in other words, the relations between two political communities, of which one is dominant and the other dependent; both being governed by a common supreme govern-*

ment, the one directly and the other indirectly ; and the latter being governed directly by a subordinate government.

The third, although it coincides in some respects with the other two subjects, is nevertheless essentially distinguished from both of them. With the first, it comprehends a supreme government, but considers it only in its relations with a community which it rules indirectly, and not in its relations with its immediate subjects. With the second, it considers the relations of separate communities, but differs from it, in not considering the relations of independent communities.

The third subject has not hitherto, as far as I am aware, been professedly examined in a separate investigation. Whenever the subject has been considered by political writers, it has been considered only incidentally, and in combination with colonisation, foreign trade, and other questions belonging to the province of economical science. This incidental consideration of the subject, in combination with other matters having no essential affinity with it, has naturally thrown over it a general indistinctness and obscurity. Thus, for example, the idea of a dependency is by many writers confounded with that of a colony ; a confusion which renders it nearly impossible that a clear and precise conception of the political relation in question should be formed.

The following essay is intended to explain the third of the three subjects above adverted to, *vis.*, the nature of the political relation of supremacy and dependence, and to develop some of the principal consequences which that relation involves.

For the purpose of elucidating fully the ideas included in the notion of a subordinate government (upon which the definition of a dependency adopted in the ensuing pages is founded), I have prefixed to the essay an inquiry, in which I have attempted to explain the distinction between supreme and subordinate powers of government, together with some other

questions related to it. This preliminary inquiry is detached from the essay, and the latter may be read without it.

The essay itself falls into two parts. One part considers the ideas which the relation of supremacy and dependence necessarily implies, and without which it cannot be conceived to exist. The other part considers the advantages and disadvantages arising to the two related communities from their connexion with each other. The expediency or inexpediency of this connexion to each of the two communities is determined by facts which vary infinitely, and which cannot be comprehended in any general expression. Nevertheless there are certain leading facts which, though not universal, reappear with such steadiness and uniformity in different dependencies, that they serve to throw much light on the expediency of this relation to the related communities; and general inferences can be drawn from them, which will materially assist in determining how far the relation is expedient in any individual case.

Whatever advantages may belong severally to monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical institutions, it cannot be overlooked that the chief nations of Europe and America now keep nearly abreast in the march of civilisation, notwithstanding the diversity in the forms of their supreme governments. Moreover, it can scarcely be denied that the ulterior progress of these nations mainly depends upon the nature of the opinions prevailing among the bulk of the people; that where the public opinion is unenlightened, no political forms can be an effectual security against unwise and mischievous exercises of the powers of government; and that where the public opinion is enlightened, political forms lose a large portion of their meaning and importance.

One of the main obstacles to the formation of an enlightened public opinion, by a calm examination of important social facts and principles, as well as to the creation of habits of order, industry, and forethought, to the

*accumulation and diffusion of wealth, and to the gradual development of a healthier state of society, is produced by the occurrence of wars between civilised nations. Wars of this sort destroy wealth, divert labour from useful objects, disturb commerce and credit, arrest the progress of internal improvements, shake the confidence of men in one another and in their government, and paralyse the energy of the wise and good by making them despair of the cause of human advancement.*

*The only effectual security against the occurrence of such wars is to be found in an improved international morality, and a more faithful observance of its maxims. But though such wars are mainly to be prevented by an improvement in the relations of independent communities, they are also in some measure to be prevented by an improvement in the relations of dominant and dependent communities. If, therefore, the following essay should assist in explaining the nature of the relation between a dominant and a dependent community, in showing the extent of the advantages which the former community can derive from its supremacy, and in indicating the sources of the disputes likely to arise between them, it would tend to diminish the chances of the greatest calamity to which the civilised world is now exposed.*

*It might likewise contribute to the same end, by exhibiting the nature and extent of the political evils which are inherent in the condition of a dependency. If the inhabitants of dependencies were conscious that many of the inconveniences of their lot are not imputable to the neglect, or ignorance, or selfishness of their rulers, but are the necessary consequences of the form of their government, they would be inclined to submit patiently to inevitable ills, which a vain resistance to the authority of the dominant country cannot fail to aggravate.*

*London, May, 1841.*

# CONTENTS.

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INQUIRY INTO THE POWERS OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT . . . . .	PAGE 9
AN ESSAY ON THE GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES.	
CHAPTER I.	
DEFINITION OF A DEPENDENCY AND OF A SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT . . . . .	71
CHAPTER II.	
EXAMPLES OF DEPENDENCIES . . . . .	96
§ 1.—Dependencies of the Oriental Monarchies, and the Ancient Republics . . . . .	96
§ 2.—Dependencies of the European States in Modern Times . . . . .	134
CHAPTER III.	
ON THE MODES IN WHICH A DEPENDENCY MAY BE ACQUIRED	165
§ 1.—Acquisition by conquest or voluntary cession . . . . .	165
§ 2.—Acquisition by settlement . . . . .	167
CHAPTER IV.	
REASONS FOR GOVERNING A TERRITORY AS A DEPENDENCY . . . . .	178
CHAPTER V.	
SEPARATENESS OF A DEPENDENCY, AS ARISING FROM THE PECULIARITIES OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM . . . . .	186
CHAPTER VI.	
ADVANTAGES DERIVED BY THE DOMINANT COUNTRY FROM ITS SUPREMACY OVER A DEPENDENCY . . . . .	205



CHAPTER VII.	
ADVANTAGES DERIVED BY A DEPENDENCY FROM ITS DEPEND- ENCE ON THE DOMINANT COUNTRY . . . . .	PAGE 235
CHAPTER VIII.	
DISADVANTAGES ARISING TO THE DOMINANT COUNTRY FROM THE POSSESSION OF A DEPENDENCY . . . . .	241
CHAPTER IX.	
DISADVANTAGES ARISING TO A DEPENDENCY FROM ITS DE- PENDENCE ON THE DOMINANT COUNTRY . . . . .	246
CHAPTER X.	
THE RESPECTIVE INCONVENIENCES OF THE VARIOUS FORMS WHICH MAY BE GIVEN TO THE IMMEDIATE GOVERNMENT OF A DEPENDENCY . . . . .	279
CHAPTER XI.	
HOW A DEPENDENCY MAY CEASE TO EXIST AS SUCH, OR MAY LOSE ITS DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER . . . . .	316
—	
APPENDIX I.	
EXTENT TO WHICH LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER THE BRITISH COLONIES IS RETAINED BY THE MOTHER-COUNTRY . . .	331
APPENDIX II.	
IRELAND . . . . .	332
APPENDIX III.	
TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG . . . . .	336
—	
NOTES . . . . .	339
INDEX . . . . .	387

## INDEX.

- ABD-EL-KADIR**, 258 *n.*  
 Absolute and limited monarchy, distinction between, 39-41.  
 Acquisition by conquest or cession, 165.  
   — settlement, 167.  
**Aden**, x, xi, xlix and *n.*, 214 *n.*  
 Administrative powers defined, 17-20.  
**Admiralty**, 161 *n.*  
**Adriatic**, colonies in the, 143 and *n.*  
**Ægean Sea**, colonies in the, 109, 143, 165.  
**Æsymnetes**, 64.  
**Africa**, xv-xvii *et pass.*  
*Agentes in rebus*, 162.  
**Agents General**, lxxvii-viii, 294 *n.*, 337.  
**Albuquerque**, 379-82.  
**Algiers**, 84, 117, 238 and *n.*, 242, 258 and *n.*  
**Aliens**, acquisition of land by, 229 and *n.*  
*Alter ego*, 64.  
**Anglo-American colonies**, xxix, xxx, xlii, 44, 117, 153, 158, 167, 170, 175-6, 181, 208-11, 216, 225, 230-1, 244, 262, 270, 289 *n.*-92, 301, 308, 318, 321, 383, &c. *See also* Canada, and United States.  
*Awoukiau*, 106, 115 *n.*, 168 *n.* *See also* Greek colonies.  
**Appointments in dependencies**. *See* Patronage.  
**Arabia**, British dependencies in, xi.  
**Arbitrary**, meaning of, 21-49, 79-80.  
**Argentine Republic**, xx.  
**Argos**, 104 and *n.*  
**Aristotle**, 21 *n.*, 24 *n.*, 27-32, 38, 129 *n.*, 172 *n.*, 180-1 and *notes*, 340-1.  
**Assiento Contract**, 220 *n.*  
**Athens and her dependencies**, xxxix, xlix, 102-5, 109, 146, 166, 169 *n.*  
**Augustus Emperor**, 118, 353-4.  
**Australasian colonies**, xvii, xxvii-xxix, xxxi-xi, xliii, xlvii, xlix, li, lx, lxx-lxvi, 155, 167, 170, 181, 224 *n.*, 228, 231, 238, 262, &c.  
**Australian Federation**, xxviii and *n.*, xxxv, lxx-lxvi.  
**Austria**, 37, 91-2, 212 and *n.*, 267-8, 377-9.  
**Bab-El-Mandeb**, Straits of, xi.  
**Bahamas**, English law in, 190-2, 256.  
**Balearic Islands**, 110.  
**Barbados**, xxx, xliv, lxiv, 175, 230 *n.*, 233 *n.*, 237 *n.*, 294 *n.*  
**Basutoland**, xvi, xxix, 282 *n.*  
**Bay Islands**, xviii.  
**Belgium**, 140, 268.  
**Belize**, 94 *n.*  
**Bentham**, 45 *n.*, 58, 63 *n.*, 253, 339, 342.  
**Bermudas**, xliv, 214 *n.*, 230 *n.*, 276 *n.*, 348.  
**Black Sea**, colonies in the, 142-3.  
**Board of Control**, xi, 161.  
**Bohemia**, language in, 377-8.  
**Borneo**, xiii, xiv, xxiii.  
**Brazil**, 230 *n.*, 233 *n.*  
**British Bechuanaland**, xvi, xxix, xlvi, lvi, 89 *n.*, 282 *n.*  
   — Columbia, xiv, xxvii, xxxiv-xxxv.  
   — East Africa Company, xvii, xxiii.  
   — Guiana, xviii, xxv, lix, 158 *n.*, 199, 228 *n.*  
   — Honduras, 93 and *n.*  
   — New Guinea, xvii, lvi.  
   — North America, xxvi, xxxv, 176 *n.*, &c.  
   — North Borneo Company, xiii, xxiii.  
   — Sherbro, xv.  
   — South Africa Company, xvi, xxiii.  
**Brooke**, Raja, xiii.  
**Brunei**, xiii.  
**Buccaneers**, 220 and *n.*  
**Burke**, xli, lxiv, 74 *n.*, 181 *n.*, 293 *n.*, 383-5.  
**Burma**, xi.  
**Cadiz**, 216 *n.*  
**California**, xxvi.  
**Canada**, ix, xviii, xxvii, xxxi, xxxiv-

- xxxv, xliii, xlv, xlviii, li, 166, 176  
and *n.*, 224 *n.*, 242, 254 *n.*, 257,  
266, 294 *n.*, 298-9 *n.*, &c.  
Canada, constitution of, 305.  
— Lower, lix, 199-202, 253 *n.*  
— Upper, 175, 201.  
Canadian Pacific Railway, xxxv.  
Candia. *See* Crete.  
Canea, 145.  
Canton, xiii, 93-5, 143.  
Cape Colony, xvi, xxv, xxix, xliii,  
lix, 89 *n.*, 224 *n.*, 242, 294 *n.*, &c.  
Cape Town, xvi, xlv.  
Caracalla, Emperor, 129.  
Carolinas, 175.  
Carthage and her dependencies, 108-  
11, 132, 146, 166, 180-1, 206,  
214-5.  
Cartier, 233 *n.*  
Ceylon, xii, lix, 89 *n.*, 166, 175, 199.  
Channel Islands, x, 151, 153, 160  
and *n.*, 317.  
Charles the First, 153.  
— Second, 153-4, 177, 230.  
— Fifth of Spain, 295.  
— Ninth of France, 236 *n.*  
Chartered companies, revival of,  
xxii-xxiv.  
Chatham, Earl of, 216.  
China and Chinese, xiii, xiv, xxv,  
xlvi, xlix, 93-5, 143.  
Chios, 142 *n.*  
Christmas Island, xiii.  
Cicero, 122, 125.  
Cilicia, 122.  
Cinna, 131.  
Citizenship, admission to, 112-3,  
129-33, 172 *n.*, 181 *n.*, 266 *n.*, 354.  
Civil Service in colonies, xlv, lix, lx,  
265, 286-7 and *notes*.  
Claudius, Emperor, 132, 229.  
Cleruchia, 103 and *n.*, 109 *n.*, 117.  
Cocos Islands, xiii.  
Coloniæ Roman, 113-7, 129-30,  
133-4, 167-8, 170, 173, 213-4,  
354.  
Colonial agents, 294-5 and *n.*  
— Federation, xxxiv-vi.  
— Laws act of 1865, 155 *n.*, 331.  
— office, lx, 160-1, 294 *n.*, 311.  
Colony and dependency distin-  
guished, 171.  
— meaning of, 168-77.  
Coloured colonisation, xxiv-xxv.  
Columbus, 233 *n.*  
Commercial dependencies, 140-55.  
— monopolies, xlv, lvii, lxvi, 214-  
24, 242-3, 336, &c. *See also* Pro-  
tection.  
Communication between dominant  
country and dependency, xl-xlii,  
85, 178-85, &c. *See also* Distance,  
Posts, &c.  
Competition open, result of, xlv,  
lix, lx, 265 and *n.*  
Constantine, Emperor, 133.  
Constantinople, 93, 98-9, 141-4.  
Convention, 51.  
Corinth, xxxix, xliii.  
Corsica, 110.  
Council of Commerce, French, 149 *n.*,  
161 *n.*  
Council of the Indies, Spanish, 149,  
163 and *n.*  
Council consultative, for a depen-  
dency, 312-5.  
Creoles, lix.  
Crete, 117, 143-5.  
Cromwell, 117 *n.*, 154 *n.*, 233 *n.*  
Crown Agents for the colonies, 294 *n.*,  
— Colonies, xlv, xlv, li, 156-7,  
280 *n.*, 312 *n.*  
Cuba, 170.  
Customs Union, xxxiv and *n.*, lxvi,  
223-4 *n.*  
Cyprus, x, xlv, lvi, 84 *n.*, 108, 141 *n.*,  
143, 206 *n.*  
Cythera, 104 *n.*  
Dalhousie, Lord, xi, 264 *n.*  
Danes, the, and their colonies, xv, 150.  
Delegation, political, 50-4.  
Delos, confederacy of, xlix, 102.  
Demerara. *See* British Guiana.  
Democracy, colonial, xxxix, xl.  
Dependencies of dependencies, 88-9.  
Dependency defined, 71.  
Despotism, 32-3.  
Dictator, 64.  
Dindings, the, xiii.  
Distance a factor in the government  
of dependencies, xl-xlii, lxx, 85,  
108, 136, 153, 178-85, 293, 383-  
5, &c.  
Dominant country defined, 71.  
Dominica, liv, 189-90 *n.*, 195.  
Durham, Lord, and his report, xxvii,  
xxx, xliii *n.*, 32 *n.*, 48 *n.*, 80 *n.*,  
200 *n.*, 202 *n.*, 253 *n.*, 257, 266 *n.*,  
298-9 *notes*, 312 *n.*  
Dutch, the, and their colonies, xv,  
xx, xlix, lii, 42, 93, 150-1, 154,  
166, 181, 199, 200. *See also* Holland.  
East India Company, xi, xxii-xxiii,  
81 and *n.*, 154, 157 and *n.*, 161,  
167, 175 and *n.*, 199.  
Egypt, xvii, 165, 319 and *n.*  
Electoral or constituent body, 50-2.  
Emigrants' Information Office, 249 *n.*  
Emigration, l, 224-9.  
— statistics xxv-xxvii.

- Empire defined, 73-4 and *n.*  
 Emporioræ, 143-4 *n.*, 215 *n.*  
 English dependencies, 151-9, &c.  
 Equity, 27-9.  
 Executive powers defined, 14-21,  
 339-40.  
 — separation of from legislative,  
 41-8, 339-40, 344-7.
- Factories on foreign soil, 93-5, 142-  
 3, 167, 215.  
 Falkland Islands, 230 *n.*  
 Famagusta, 141 *n.*  
 Federation, growth of, viii, ix,  
 xxxvi.  
 Feudal dependencies, 134-5.  
 Fiji, xvii.  
 Florida, 236 and *n.*  
 Fœderatæ civitates, 119 *n.*, 121 *n.*,  
 123 *n.*, 166 and *n.*  
 Formula of Roman province, 121,  
 203.  
 Free Trade, xxxiii-iv, lxvi, 223-4,  
 336-8, &c.  
 French, the, and their colonies, xx,  
 xlviii, lxiii-iv, 42, 57, 86, 88 *n.*,  
 89 *n.*, 93, 117, 135, 139-40, 150-1,  
 154, 166-7, 181, 199-200, 207,  
 236, 258, 264, 273 *n.*, 297, 337.  
 French Revolution, the, of 1848, viii.  
 Frobisher, 233 *n.*  
 Froude, Mr., liv, lix.
- Galata, 141-2, and *notes.*  
 Gambia, xv.  
 Genoa and her dependencies, 141-2.  
 Georgia, 175, 233 *n.*  
 German competition, xx-i, xxiv.  
 Gibraltar, x, xlvi, 1, 88 *n.*, 167, 214,  
 230 *n.*, 276 *n.*, 282 *n.*  
 Gladstone, Mr., xlvi, 270.  
 Gold Coast, xv.  
 Governors, appointment of, xlvi, lx,  
 273.  
 — Carthaginian, 111.  
 — English, 88-9, and *notes*, 158,  
 183, 275 *n.*, 280-3 *notes*, 301-5,  
 349.  
 — evils of changing, 283-4 and  
*notes*, 379-81.  
 — feudal, 134-5.  
 — French, 88 *n.*  
 — Greek, 102-4.  
 — military, 111, 118, 275-6, and *n.*,  
 284.  
 — Oriental, 88, 96-101, 184, 288.  
 — Portuguese, 379-83.  
 — powers of, 88, 282-4, and *notes*,  
 286, 288.  
 — Roman, 118-9, 122-3, 125-6,  
 133-4, 162, 273, 288, 348, 352-3.
- Governors, Spanish, 88, 136-7, 148.  
 — Venetian, 146.  
 Greece, kingdom of, x, 159 *n.*, 320.  
 Greek colonies, xxxix, 102-7, 111,  
 115, 117, 170, 172-3, 179, 225,  
 227, 262, 323.  
 — Empire, 93, 141-2, 144.  
 Griqualand West, xvi.  
 Guadeloupe, 89 *n.*  
 Guardafui Cape, xvii.  
 Guiana, 233 *n.*  
 Guinea, Gulf of, xv.
- Haliburton, Mr., 176, 192-3, 304-5,  
 385-6.  
 Halifax, xlvi, 304.  
 Hamilton Port, xiv.  
 Hanover, kingdom of, 90-1, 328.  
 Harmosts, or Spartan governors,  
 103.  
 Heligoland, x, 282 *n.*  
 Hindostan. *See* India.  
 Hobbes, 10 *n.*, 77 *n.*, 347-8, 352.  
 Holland, xxi, liii-iv, 42, 86, 90, 137-  
 40 and *n.*, 150 *n.*, 167, 177 *n.*, 200,  
 207, 268, 319, 323, &c. *See also*  
 Dutch.  
 Honduras, Republic of, xviii.  
 Hong Kong, xiii, xiv, xlvi, 1.  
 Hudson's Bay Company, xxii, xxvii.  
 Huguenots, 170 *n.*-1, 236 and *n.*  
 Hungary, 52 and *n.*, 91-2 and *n.*,  
 268, 377-9.
- Ignorance of colonial matters, lviii,  
 246-9.  
 Imperial Federation, lxiii-viii, 289-  
 94.  
 — Government, 74.  
 Imperium, meaning of, 75 *n.*  
 India, xi, xii, xlvi-1, 20 *n.*, 81 *n.*, 93,  
 97, 213, 255, 262-5.  
 Indian Mutiny, xi, xxvi, 264 *n.*  
 Indifference to interests of colonies,  
 lvii-viii, 238-9, 246-8.  
 Inquisitorial powers of government,  
 49, 69, 80.  
 Ionian Islands, viii, x, 141 *n.*, 159  
 and *n.*, 175, 199, 214, 267, 323 *n.*  
 Ireland, 91, 152-3, 155, 185 *n.*, 269  
*n.*, 282 *n.*, 292, 317, 326-30, 332-  
 6, 354-68.  
 Isle of Man, 151, 153, 160 and *n.*,  
 196 *n.*, 318.
- Jamaica, 89 and *n.*, 153 and *n.*, 166,  
 176, 220, 233 and *n.*, 271 *n.*, 303.  
 James the Second, 233 *n.*  
 Janissaries, 213 *n.*  
 Jews, 121, 125, 230 *n.*, 233 *n.*, 267.  
 Johor, xiii.

- Joseph the Second, 268, 378.  
 Judicial powers of government, 17-20.  
 Julian law, 129-31.  
 Jus Latii, 129.  
 Justinian, Emperor, 134.
- Kaffa, 142.  
 Kimberley, xvi.  
 King's governments, 302.  
 Kossuth, 92 n.  
 Kowloon, xiv.  
 Kuria Muria Islands, xi.
- Labuan, xliii, xxliii, 282 n.  
 Lagos, xv.  
 Lands, public, in colonies, xxxi, xliii n., li, 226-7 and n., 297.  
 Language, how far a bond of union, 269 and n., 336.  
 — inexpediency of changing in dependency, lix, 267-9, and *notes*, 377-9.  
 Las Casas, 163 n.  
 Law, change of, in dependency, lix, 252-67.  
 Law English, how far extended to colonies, 187-97, 200-2.  
 Law, government according to, 29-41, 284 n., 340-4.  
 Law, native, retained in dependency, lix, 112, 120, 198-200, 203, 267, 368-77.  
 Laws under peculiar circumstances of dependency, 197-8.  
 Legatus Cæsaris, 118.  
 Legibus solutus, meaning of, 38, 41 and *notes*.  
 Legislation, subordinate, 55-64.  
 — supreme, 55.  
 Legislative control over British colonies by the mother country, extent of, xxx, 92, 155-9, 198, 200-3, 331-2, 348-50, 368-77, 385-6.  
 Legislative functions of government, importance of, 21 and *note*.  
 — separation of, from executive. *See* Executive.  
 Lettres de cachet, 26.  
 Levant, the, 143-4.  
 Locke, 10 n., 19 n., 34 n., 42-3, 47, 62 n., 67 n., 342, 344-5.  
 Lombardy, viii, 169, 212 and n., 267.  
 Louis Philippe, viii, 57 n.
- Macao, 93 and n., 143.  
 Madras, 93 n.  
 Mail contracts, xlv. *See also* Posts.  
 Malacca, xii, xliii.  
 Malay Indies, xii-xiv, l, lvi.  
 Maldives, 89 n.
- Malta, x, l, 89 and n., 110, 165 n., 175, 199, 214, 237, 257, 276 n., 320, Mandalay, xii.  
 Manitoba, xxvii.  
 Mansfield, Lord, 156 n., 188, 196-7 n., 371.  
 Maryland, 175.  
 Massilia, 143 n., 181, 215 n.  
 Mauritius, xv, xxiv, lix, 89 n., 166, 175, 199, 200, 337.  
 Mediterranean, x, 108 n., 179, 229, 262, &c. *See also* Levant, &c.  
 Mehemet Ali, 319, n.  
 Metropolis, meaning of, 167 n.  
 Mexico, 100, 184 n.  
 Michael Palæologus, 141, 143.  
 Milan, Duchy of, 136-7.  
 Military colonies, 113-4 n., 116 and n., 155, 177 n., 213-4 and n., 276 n., &c.  
 Military governors. *See* Governors.  
 Mill, James, 97-8, 171-2.  
 Ministry of Marine, 161.  
 Minorca, 369-71.  
 Modyford, Sir T., lxiv.  
 Mongolian Kingdoms, 184.  
 Montesquieu, 32-3, 35 n., 42-4, 47, 67 n., 344-5.  
 Morea, the, 143, 146.  
 Municipal Institutions, importance of, in colonies, 312 and *note*.  
 Municipia, Roman, 112 and n.-14, 129-30, 134, 198, &c.
- Nantes, Revocation of Edict of, 171.  
 Naples, viii, 64 and n., 136-9, 295, 326 n.  
 Napoleon, 139-40.  
 Natal, xvi, xxix and n., xxxiv n.  
 Nationalization of land, 227 n.  
 Natives of dependency, exclusion of from office, lix-lx, 137, 270-5.  
 Native races in colonies, lviii, 281 n., 287 n.  
 Navigation Acts, 82 and n., 201.  
 Negri Sembilan, xliii.  
 Netherlands. *See* Holland.  
 New Brunswick, xxvii.  
 New England colonies, xxxvii, 153, 171, 174, &c.  
 Newfoundland, xxvii, 175-6 n.  
 New Guinea xvii, xxi-ii, lvi.  
 New South Wales, xxvi, xxviii and n., lvi, 183, 197, 294 n.  
 New Zealand, xxvi, xxviii, xxxii, xxxv, xli, 294 n.  
 Niger Company, xv, xxiii.  
 — Protectorate, xv.  
 Nova Scotia, xxvii, xxxiv, 176, 192-3, 304-5.

- Oil Rivers Protectorate, xv.  
 Oligarchy, official, in dependencies, 285-7  
 — unofficial, in dependencies, 287*n*.  
 Ontario, xxvii, xxxiv.  
 Orange Free State, xxxiv *n*., xxxv, 224 *n*.  
 Orders in Council, 56 and *n*, 331-2, &c.  
 Oriental monarchies, dependencies of, 96-101.  
 Ottoman Empire, 93, 98-9, 101 *n*., 282 *n*., 319 *n*., 320.  
 Oudh, xi, 264 *n*.  
 Pahang, xiii.  
 Parliamentary grants to British colonies, xlv, lvi, 237-8.  
 Patronage in dependencies, xlv, lix, 245, 272-5.  
 Peking, convention of, xiv, 95 *n*.  
 Pemba, xvii.  
 Penang, xii-xiii, lvi.  
 Perak, xiii.  
 Perim, xi.  
 Perinci, 104 and *n*., 105, 109.  
 Permanent settlement of Bengal, 255 and *n*.  
 Persia, British embassy in, xlix.  
 Persian Empire, 96-7, 100, 165, 184, 206, 213, 288.  
 Peru, 183 *n*., 207 *n*.  
 Philip the Second, 137.  
 Phœceans, 181.  
 Phœnician colonies, 107-8, 179, 181, 215.  
 Picton, governor, 391-7.  
 Plantation, meaning of, 174.  
 Poland, 268 *n*.  
 Portuguese and their colonies, xx, 93 and *n*., 143, 151, 154 and *n*., 162, 181, 207 *n*., 288 *n*., 223, 379-83.  
 Posts and Postage, 133, 182-4, 247 *n*.  
 Poyning's law, 152-3 *notes*, 282 *n*.  
 Prætor, 55, 118, 122, 348, &c.  
 Prince Edward Island, xxvii.  
 Privilegium, 24-5.  
 Procurator, 119 *n*.  
 Propontis, 143.  
 Protection, 223. *See also*, Commercial monopolies.  
 Provincæ, 176, 347-8.  
 Provincia, etymology of, 350-2.  
 Provincie Roman, 88, 117-34, 136, 162, 166, 172, 198, 203, 206, 213, 267, 273, 288, 348, 352-4.  
 Psephismata, 23-4, 28, 30-1.  
 Punjab, xi.  
 Puritans, 153.  
 Quebec, xxvii, xxxiv.  
 Queensland, xxvi, xxviii, xlvi, lvi, 294 *n*.  
 Questors, 124.  
 Raffles, Sir S., xii.  
 Railways, ix, 61 *n*., 128-9 *n*., 178 *n*.  
 Raynal, 215, 219 *n*., 273 *n*., 283-4 *n*.  
 Red River Settlement, xxvii.  
 Red Sea dependencies, x, xi.  
 Religion, interference with, in dependency, lix, 120, 137, 139, 269-70, &c.  
 Republics, ancient, 102, 179-81, 243, &c.  
 Responsible Government, xxvii-xxxiv, xliii-xliv, lxvi-lxviii, 48 *n*., 159 *n*., 222 *n*., 294-6 *notes*, 298-9 *notes*, &c.  
 Revolt of dependencies, 318-21.  
 Rhenish provinces, 185.  
 Rideau canal, 237.  
 Romans, 55, 111-34, 138, 162, 179-80, 184, 243, 317, 354. *See also* Colonie, Provincie, &c.  
 Rotumah, xvii.  
 St. Helena, 282 *n*., 312 *n*.  
 St. John, Order of, 320.  
 St. Lucia, 199.  
 Sarawak, xiii.  
 Sardinia, 110-1, 230.  
 Satraps. *See* Governors, Oriental.  
 Scientific inventions, effect of, xl-ii. *See also* Railways, &c.  
 Selangor, xiii.  
 Self-Government. *See* Responsible government.  
 Seville, 216 *n*.  
 Siberia, li.  
 Sicily, 108, 110 and *n*., 199, 326 *n*.  
 Sierra Leone, xv, 155 and *n*., 230 *n*.  
 Sind, xi.  
 Singapore, xii-xiii, l, lvi.  
 Slavery and slave-laws, xxiv, lvii-lviii, 36 and *n*., 155, 170, 193, 297, 231, 239-40, 262, 297.  
 Smith, Adam, xxiii, xxx, xxxiii, lxiv, 22 *n*., 207-14, 216-8, 220-2, 243, 248 *n*., 275 *n*., 289-94, 306, 322-3, &c.  
 Smuggling, 219-20.  
 Social War, 129-32, 317.  
 Somali Protectorate, xi, xvii.  
 Spidwana Point, xvi.  
 South African Republic. *See* Transvaal.  
 South Australia, xxviii, 270, 294 *n*.  
 Sovereign government, 9-70.  
 — extent of powers of, 10-13.  
 — powers of, how exercised, 13-50.

- Sovereign government, how delegated 50-70.
- Spain and Spaniards, xx-xxi, 42, 93, 220, 233 *n.*, 236.
- Spain, American dependencies of, 86, 88, 147-51, 163, 166, 170, 176, 181, 197, 199, 207, 216, 219 *n.*, 230, 244, 248 *n.*, 262, 319, 323.  
— European dependencies of, 90, 136-9, 295.
- Sparta and her dependencies, xliii, 103-4, 132, 146, 179.
- Specification, power of, 57-8.
- Steamers, xl-xlii, 247 *n.*, 293 *n.*
- Straits Settlements, xii, xiii, lvi.
- Suakim, xvii.
- Subordinate government defined, 72-3.  
— extent of powers of, 75-85.  
— how composed, 85-8.
- Subordinate legislation. *See* Legislation.
- Sudan, xlix, 213 *n.*
- Suez Canal, xvii, xli.
- Suffragium, 130.
- Sulu, Sultan of, xiii.
- Sungei Ujong, xiii.
- Supremacy of Crown. *See* Legislative control.
- Surat, 93 *n.*
- Sybaris 169 *n.*
- Sydney, xlii, 155, 175.
- Syria, 143.
- Tasmania, xxviii, 197, 294 *n.*
- Taxation of dependencies, lxxviii, 124-6, 145, 150, 206-12, 290-1.  
*See also* Tribute.
- Telegraphs, ix, xl-xli, lx, 178 *n.*, 278 *n.*, 293 *n.*
- Thurii, 169 and *n.*
- Trade with colonies, l, lvii, 214-24, 336-8, &c. *See also* Commercial monopolies.
- Trades' Unions in the colonies, xxxix.
- Transalpine Gauls, 132.
- Transportation, li, 197, 229-33.
- Transvaal, xvi, xxxiv *n.*, xxxvi, 266 *n.*, 323 *n.*
- Tribute, xlix, lvi, 84-5 and *notes*, 96-8, 102, 105, 109-11, 124, 135, 137-8, 206-12, 215.
- Tributum, 124 *n.*
- Trinidad, xxv, 166, 175, 199, 372.
- Turgot, 220 *n.*, 223.
- Turkey. *See* Ottoman Empire.
- Tyre, 108.
- Umba River, xvii.
- United States, viii, ix, xviii-xx, xxvi-xxvii, xxix, xxxv, xxxvii, xl-ii-xliv, l, lxi, lxxvii-lxxviii, 20 *n.*, 36, 41, 44, 51-2, 133, 168 *n.*, 218, 222, 224, 229 *n.*, 239, 296, 321, 323, 337-8, &c.
- Valletta, 258, 320.
- Van Diemen's Land. *See* Tasmania.
- Vectigal, 124 *n.*
- Venice and her dependencies, 142-6.
- Verres, 125.
- Viceroy. *See* Governors.  
— Irish, 317 and *n.*
- Victoria, xxvi, xxviii, lvi, 294 *n.*
- Vienna, 268.
- Virginia, 153, 170, 175, 233 *n.*, 348.
- Wakefield, Gibbon, xxviii, 226 *n.*
- Walfisch Bay, xvi.
- Washington, 321.
- Wellesley, Province, xiii.
- Western Australia, xxviii, 116 *n.*, 226 *n.*
- West Indies, 150-1, 153-4, 166, 175, 181, 220-1, 228, 239, 242, 289 *n.*, 297, 301-2, 348-50, 384.  
— Laws of British colonies in, 188-96.
- Written laws, 340-1.
- Zanzibar, xv, xvii.
- Zollverein, lxxi, 223 *n.* *See also*, Customs Union.
- Zululand, xvi, xxix, 282 *n.*

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## CHAPTER II.

### EXAMPLES OF DEPENDENCIES.

CHAP. II.      **HAVING** given in the preceding chapter a general definition of a dependency, I propose, before I proceed to a further illustration of the ideas involved in this word, to collect some examples of dependencies, for the purpose of exhibiting the principal forms under which the relation of a dominant and a dependent community has existed in different ages and countries.

#### § I. *Dependencies of the Oriental Monarchies, and the Ancient Republics.*

The system of governing by means of dependencies existed to a great extent in the ancient world; indeed, it was one of the main characteristics of the ancient governments, both monarchical and republican.

Depend-  
encies of  
oriental  
monar-  
chies.

The ancient monarchies of Asia were generally aggregates of nations which had once been independent, but had been reduced by conquest to dependence on a common superior. The obvious and rude contrivance for maintaining this dependence was for the ruler of the conquering tribe to place a governor in each subject community, who collected a revenue from the inhabitants, and having first defrayed from it the expenses of his own government, paid over the surplus, as a tribute, to his chief. This appears to have been the character of the Persian Empire and its



satrapies, as described by Herodotus<sup>1</sup>; and such, with only slight differences, has been the character of the Oriental governments at all times.

'The plan,' says Mr. Mill, 'according to which the power of the sovereign was exercised in the government of Hindostan, resembled that which has almost universally prevailed in the monarchies of Asia, and was a contrivance extremely simple and rude. In the more skilful governments of Europe, officers are appointed for the discharge of particular duties in the different provinces of the empire; some for the decision of causes, some for the control of violence, some for collecting the contingents of the subjects, for the expense of the state; while the powers of all centre immediately in the head of the government, and altogether act as connected and subordinate wheels in one complicated and artful machine. Among the less instructed and less civilised inhabitants of Asia, no other plan has ever occurred to the monarch, for the administration of his dominions, than simply to divide

<sup>1</sup> See Herod. iii. 89, sqq. Herodotus iii. 97, states that the territory of Persis, the district immediately subject to the king, was free from tribute, but that the inhabitants paid him gifts, or *benevolences*. Compare Heeren's *Ideen*, vol. i. Pt. I, on the internal constitution of the Persian Empire; who proves satisfactorily that the amounts of the tributes, which are stated by Herodotus, do not comprehend all that was paid by the provinces to the satraps, but only the sums which were payable by the satraps to the royal treasury.—See pp. 477–82, 496. Compare Xenoph. *Cyrop.* viii. 6. (The author makes frequent reference to Heeren, and it may be here said once for all, that Heeren's *Asiatic and African Nations* (translated into English) are invaluable for information as to the government of dependencies by the Persians, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, &c. Students may also be reminded that Grote has chapters dealing with these nations, while, for the Carthaginians, reference should also be made to Arnold's *History of Rome*, and Mommsen's *History of Rome*. See also, for the subject of this chapter generally, the editor's Introduction to a *Historical Geography of the British colonies*, chaps. v. and vi.)