


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SPEECH

OF

CAPTAIN EASTWICK

ON THE

SINDE QUESTION,

THE INDIA BILL OF 1858,

ETC.

REVISED AND CORRECTED.

LONDON:

SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.

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A S P E E C H

DELIVERED AT

A COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK
ON 26TH JANUARY, 1844.

THE AMEERS OF SINDE.

East India House, January 26th, 1844.

A SPECIAL General Court of Proprietors of East India Stock, was held this day at the Company's House in Leadenhall Street, to consider certain resolutions on the subject of the recent annexation of Sindé to the British territories. The Minutes of the last Court having been read, the Chairman (MR. J. COTTON) said this Court had been specially summoned, at the desire of nine proprietors, to consider certain resolutions regarding the recent proceedings in Sindé. After some preliminary discussion, whether the question should be postponed, the Clerk, at the command of the Chairman, read the following Requisition:—

“ To the Honourable the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

“ HONOURABLE SIR,—We, the undersigned Proprietors of East India Stock, request that a Special General Court may be convened at the earliest period, to take into consideration the following resolutions proposed to be submitted to them:—

“ 1. That, from the printed papers recently laid before the Proprietors, on the subject of Scinde, it is the opinion of this Court that the proceedings of the Government of India, which ended in the dethronement, exile, and imprisonment of the Ameers, and the seizure of their country and private property, were uncalled for, impolitic, and unjust.

“ 9. That this Court does, therefore, most earnestly recommend to the Court of Directors the immediate adoption of such steps, by representation to Her Majesty’s Government, or otherwise, as may cause all practicable reparation to be made for the injustice already committed, and enforce the abandonment of a line of policy inconsistent with good faith, and subversive of the interests of the British rule in India.

“ We have the honour to be,

“ Honourable Sir,

“ Your obedient servants,

“ J. SULLIVAN.

“ WM. J. EASTWICK.

“ JOSEPH HUME.

“ CHARLES FORBES.

“ HARFORD JONES BRYDGES.

“ JOHN POYNDER.

“ ARTHUR J. LEWIS.

“ A. HOGG.

“ *London, January 16, 1844.*”

“ THOMAS MARRIOTT.”

MR. SULLIVAN then rose to bring forward the question. CAPTAIN EASTWICK seconded the motion, and said :—

I rise to second the motion. It is with great diffidence I venture to trespass upon the attention of this Court. I am not in the habit of addressing public assemblies, and I feel the difficulty I shall have in expressing my sentiments; I feel also, what is of far greater consequence, how perfectly incapable I am of doing justice to the cause I have undertaken. I can assure the Court, the effort is a very painful one to me. But holding, as I do, such strong opinions on the impolicy and injustice of our late proceedings in Sindé, and having had an especial interest in marking the progress of our relations with the native States on the banks of the Indus, I deem it my imperative duty, as a friend to the natives of India, as an enemy to

oppression, and as a Christian, to protest most solemnly against those proceedings, and to prevent any attempt that may be made, to draw the attention of this Court, and the public at large, to a line of policy, so repugnant to my notions of justice, and, in my opinion, so discreditable to the British name. In the discussion of this question, in the discharge of what I conceive to be a public duty, I should wish to avoid every expression that might tend to excite angry feelings; I should wish especially to keep clear of that party spirit, which, losing sight of fixed and immutable principles, looks only to criminate persons; at the same time I should wish to speak unreservedly, and state the conclusions I have come to, derived from personal experience, and from a careful and attentive perusal of the documents recently laid before the Proprietors.

After the able and eloquent address of my Honorable Friend, it will not be necessary for me to occupy the time of the Court by entering minutely into the whole case. It will be sufficient if I state my reasons for giving him my support, and at the same time advert to any particular points, that may appear to me not to have been sufficiently noticed. Agreeing as I do, generally, in the observations that have fallen from my Honorable Friend, and in the Resolutions proposed, recognizing most fully and cordially the necessity of bringing this question before the Court, in order that the facts may be given to the public in a tangible and authentic form, there are yet marked points of difference in our view of the case, and to some of these I will take the liberty of alluding. We

differ, especially, in our view of the circumstances which led to the treaty entered into by the British Government with the Sinde State on the 20th April, 1838, and we differ also in our view of the policy rendered imperative by the conduct of the Ameers immediately subsequent to that treaty. With the permission of the Court, I will take a brief review of the events of this period. The Papers before the Proprietors commence earlier, but it will not be necessary to do more than allude to the treaties of 1809, 1820, 1832, and 1834. The last, a commercial treaty with Meer Morad Ali Khan, the sole surviving brother of the Talpoor dynasty. We have then, that is in 1834, the British and Sindian Governments on terms of amicable relation, and it will be my endeavour to prove that overtures to a closer alliance were made by the British Government, with a view to preserve the Sinde State from a great and impending danger, the danger of Sikh aggression, at the same time looking to the strengthening our political relations on the Indus, and the throwing open that river to the commercial world.

The Ameers themselves sought the protection of the British Government, and were anxious and willing to form a new treaty, based upon mutual advantage. With reference to their subsequent conduct, this is an important point to bear in mind.

It is well known that the aggressions of Runjeet Sing on all the neighbouring States, except those under British protection, were unceasing. Year after year he had seized portions of territory bordering on Sinde, and in 1836 by making a demand on the Ameers for

twelve lacs of rupees, by taking possession of one of their fortresses, and advancing a claim to Shikarpore, he showed too plainly his desire of fastenng a quarrel on the Ameers, which could only end in the subjugation of their country. His propositions to Lord William Bentinck at the meeting at Roopur in 1831, and his conversations with Sir Alexander Burnes, in 1832, prove that he had long entertained the project of annexing Sindé to his dominions; and no one, I imagine, acquainted with the relative power of the two States will dispute his being able to do so, if the Ameers had been left to themselves. But the British Government interfered, and hence the Treaty of the 20th of April, 1838. A reference to the printed official papers of 1836, and 1837, will show that the British Government had no wish to force the connexion, that "Noor Mahomed himself invited the British Representative," and not only agreed to all the stipulations, but offered to cede a portion of Shikarpore to pay the expenses, and expressed his hope that a British force might be sent to Sindé to protect him from Sikh aggression, and strengthen his rule against internal enemies.

It would be useless to take up the time of the Court by reading numerous extracts. But let Noor Mahomed speak for himself in an interview with Sir Henry Pottinger, recorded in the 38th paragraph of the letter of December the 10th, 1836.

It must be recollected that at this period, Noor Mahomed was the acknowledged head of the Sindé State, and spoke the collective voice of the Government. Sir H. Pottinger writes, "Noor Mahomed

told me he had agreed to all I had proposed, and would religiously abide by his stipulations, that should it be found necessary to send an army to Sinde, he would pay whatever portion of expense the Governor-General chose to name." (A little farther on we find) "that he (Noor Mahomed) felt assured our interposition and power would soon tranquillize the countries to the northward, that it would be an act of grace, that would redound to the fame of the Governor-General, and bring blessings on his administration."

Surely no language can be more clear and unequivocal. Had Noor Mahomed acted up to these professions, had he fulfilled, as he was bound to do, the stipulations of this Treaty, he might have sat down under the protection of British power, secure from foreign and domestic enemies. It is quite evident, from the whole tenor of the Instructions of the then Governor-General, that at that period there was no desire of territorial aggrandizement, no sinister designs against the Sinde State. But, by the characteristic delay of Asiatics, these negotiations were protracted from 1836 to 1838. Noor Mahomed was relieved from the impending danger of Sikh aggression, and was in no hurry to ratify his engagements. In the meantime, the aspect of political affairs on the north-western frontier had changed; a combination of Mussulman powers, hostile to British interests, had been entered into, and a counter-movement was deemed imperative, to arrest the course of intrigue, and provide for the security of the British Empire in India. I am not called upon to discuss the wisdom

of the measures adopted, I only state the fact, as evincing the belief of those intrusted with the responsibility of governing India, that a great crisis had arrived.

I think no one will dispute, that believing in such a crisis, believing in the paramount necessity of the proposed counter-movement, it was the duty of the Governor-General to look to all the subordinate arrangements requisite to ensure the success of that movement. It was to be expected also, of all States in amicable relation with the British Government, that they should afford their aid in such a crisis. The Rao of Kutch, the Ameer of Bahawulpore, and other chieftains, came forward to the utmost extent of their ability. But, even if active co-operation be deemed too much to expect of Native States, surely we had a right to insist, that those in friendly relations with us should at all events remain passive, and not choose this crisis to open a correspondence with the hostile powers, to profess allegiance to the head of the hostile combination, thus throwing their weight into the scale against us, and encouraging the advance of our enemies by the belief, that they would be received with open arms even by States bound to us by treaties. But to invite our enemies, was not the only indication of the hostile feelings of a Government for whose preservation we had so recently interfered, and who had expressed so deep a sense of the obligation. Every obstacle was thrown in the way of the advance of the British army, letters were written forbidding their subjects to assist us. They refused to fulfil the engagements of the treaty they had just concluded.

Our ally, Shah Shuja, was menaced and insulted, the British representative was treated with the grossest indignity, and even threatened with assassination; his assistant, the bearer of a treaty, was driven from their capital; our stores of grain were plundered, and every step taken, short of actual hostilities, to obstruct and counteract the objects of the British Government.

In confirmation of the intrigue with Persia, I beg to direct the attention of the Court to letter No. 10, of the Resident in Sind, dated August 13th, 1838. We there find, that when the ratified treaty of the 20th April, 1838, reached Hyderabad, the Ameers were on the point of despatching letters to the King of Persia, that Meer Sobdar immediately withdrew from his share in the transaction, stating that "British friendship was sufficient for him." Nothing can mark the character of this measure more strongly; and from the concluding paragraph of the same despatch, it is quite clear, that the Ameers were aware that the powers to the north-west had assumed an attitude of hostility towards the British Government.

At the next page we find the letter to the King of Persia. There can be no doubt of the authenticity of this letter. Noor Mahomed admits the fact of writing, and a copy was obtained from the very man who wrote it; and considering, as I said before, that the King of Persia was at the head of a hostile combination against us, but one construction can be placed upon such a proceeding: but we do not require the evidence of the letter. Noor Mahomed openly threatens to invite the King of Persia to his aid, having at this very moment in his palace, an emissary from the

Persian camp, said to be related to the royal family of Persia. Nor is this the only proof of his hostile disposition; he writes to the Khyrpore Ameers to deter them from befriending us, and says that he is ready for peace or war.

With such unequivocal proofs of the hostile feeling of the Ameers, it appears to me, but one course was open to the Governor-General;—to impose such conditions on these Princes as would secure British interests from present injury, and afford a reasonable prospect of future tranquillity. Hence the treaty of the 11th March, 1839. Up to this period, Sinde was tributary to Cabul; but henceforth it was released from all claims for tribute, and guaranteed from foreign aggression on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Objections have been made to many points of this treaty, as pressing too hard upon the Ameers; but that they were not greatly dissatisfied may be judged by the results. The tone of hostility was dropped, the line of demarcation between the two States was broken down, and even the Belooche chieftains bore witness to our moderation and good faith. I will take the liberty of quoting a few passages from Sir Henry Pottinger's despatch of 7th March, 1839. Speaking of Meer Noor Mahomed, Sir Henry Pottinger writes:—"The tone of his Highness's conversation was most friendly and becoming; he assured me he had seen his mistake in his demeanour towards the British Government, that he trusted his future conduct would prove the faithfulness with which he unequivocally professed his submission to the Governor-General. He had now cause to comprehend our

power, as well as our good faith and forbearance." In another paragraph, we find that "the Belooche chiefs candidly allowed that our procedure has been guided by the strictest adherence to our good faith." If we turn to Major Outram's affecting narrative of the closing scene of Noor Mahomed's life, contained in his despatch of 6th December, 1840, when the dying Prince could have no motives for concealing or misrepresenting his sentiments, it is quite clear that that chieftain was sensible of his former folly, and acknowledged the benefits of the British alliance. "My friendship for the British is known to God, my conscience is clear before God," are the last solemn asseverations of the dying Ameer. And Major Outram writes, "His Highness, hailing me as his brother, put his arms round me, and held me in his embrace a few minutes, until I laid him quietly down. So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exertion quite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards before he could speak; when beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer Khan, and youngest son Meer Houssein Ali, to the bedside, he then took a hand of each, and placed them in mine, saying, 'You are their Father and Brother, you will protect them.'" Will the people of England believe that this unhappy boy, Houssein Ali, thus confided to the fostering care of the British Government, has been dethroned, exiled, imprisoned, and plundered of his private property, without even a charge being brought against him? All that we find is, that when his subordinate officers are accused of a breach of treaty, he immediately takes measures to prevent a recurrence of their misconduct.

I will add one more reference; it is to Meer Nusseer Khan's letter to Sir Charles Napier in 1842. It is a remarkable passage, and completely confirms the view I have taken of the whole of these transactions. Both Meer Noor Mahomed and Meer Nusseer Khan have expressed the same sentiments, in my private interviews with them. Meer Nusseer writes: "The British Government is aware that we were once the independent sovereigns of this country, and were on a footing of friendship with the English. When Sir A. Burnes requested permission to travel through our dominions, the late Meer Morad Ali Khan refused his consent, but the indulgence was at length granted at my intercession, as I hoped to obtain a return for the favour some day or other. Subsequently I and Meer Noor Mahomed Khan saw the advantage of seeking the protection of the wisest and most powerful nation on the face of the earth, *and therefore urged Sir Henry Pottinger, during two whole years, to come into the country*, after which, we finally succeeded in introducing a British force; our sole object in all this, was to secure to ourselves peace and quiet, and in furtherance of it we cheerfully gave up money for the construction of cantonments, and even consented to the payment of tribute. We were then perfectly happy and contented."

This is the construction put upon these events by the party principally concerned. What better evidence can be obtained?

In my mind, it sufficiently vindicates the British Government from the charge of forcing their alliance on the Ameers in 1838. It is clear these princes,

following out the dictates of their own judgment, sought to connect themselves with a stronger power, as a means of self-preservation. Partly to obtain a better bargain, and to save the pride of their more ignorant retainers, and partly owing to the unsettled state of political affairs to the north-west, and to their own suspicious dispositions, they, unfortunately for themselves, adopted the tortuous and insincere course which led to the treaty of 1839. After that treaty was concluded, their rule depended upon British support, and a new era commenced in Sind. It is most unfair to confound the two periods, and to bring forward, in defence of the late proceedings against the Ameers, their conduct previous to the treaty of the 11th March, 1839.

I could add much more on this part of the case; there are many points that require elucidation, but I will not trespass on the time of the Court. I will only make one more remark, that whatever the opinion of Lord Auckland's policy, it can afford no ground of justification for Lord Ellenborough's harsh measures. If Lord Auckland behaved ill towards the Ameers, surely that was no reason why Lord Ellenborough should behave worse? on the contrary, it was a reason for treating these unhappy princes with greater consideration.

During the three years that succeeded the ratification of the treaty of 1839, all the authorities unite in praising the conduct of the Sind chieftains. Throughout that eventful period which was characterized by disasters to our arms unparalleled in our Indian annals, the Ameers remained faithful to their engage-

ments; at a season when, if they had nourished any hostile designs, they might have cut off all support of our troops to the north-west, and placed in jeopardy the very existence of the British force in Candahar.

Captain Postans, who then held responsible employment in Upper Sinde, bears unequivocal testimony to their good faith, and to the ameliorated state of the country. He writes: "A most satisfactory state of tranquillity pervaded the country. Our steamers were allowed to navigate the river, not only unimpeded, but with every assistance." Again: "During the violence of the Brahoes, at Kelat, large bodies of our troops were pushed through the Sindhian territories in every direction, without the slightest interruption on the part of the Ameers: who, on the contrary, rendered us all the cordial assistance in their power, by furnishing guides and supplies. Had the conduct of these chiefs been otherwise, our interests would have suffered severely; but in justice to them it must be recorded, that they fully made up, on this occasion, for their former hollow professions and want of faith, by a cordial co-operation." I could quote also, if time permitted, numerous passages from the Blue Book to prove the good conduct of the Ameers; and I speak also from personal experience. One would have imagined that such conduct, during a most critical state of affairs, would have earned the Ameers some consideration; one would have imagined that such real services would have weighed something in the balance against alleged intrigues. But the curse of India is the constant succession of rulers;

measures adopted by one Governor-General, are overturned by the next. Services rendered under one administration, are forgotten or overlooked by the succeeding one. Such was the state of Sindé during the years 1839, 1840, and 1841; and it will be as well here to take a review of the political question, whether it was more desirable that that country should remain under its former rulers, or be subjected to our direct control.

It is my decided opinion that the annexation of Sindé to our already over-grown Eastern Empire, is a great error, politically and financially. By the treaty of 1839, we gained every object we could desire. We prevented Sindé from falling into the hands of any power hostile to British interests; we obtained the right of locating troops in any position we might deem most eligible; we opened the Indus to the commercial world. By our command of steam, if an emergency should occur we could pour into the country, at the shortest warning, any amount of military stores, and any number of troops; and having secured the good offices of the chiefs by a firm but conciliatory line of conduct, we could confidently reckon on all the resources of their territories being placed at our disposal, as was proved during the Brahoe and Affghan operations. Having withdrawn from the countries beyond the Indus, in course of time we might have so reduced the number of our troops in Sindé, that they would have proved no burden to the finances of India; while, at the same time, our political relations and responsibilities would have been contracted to a narrower sphere—an object of paramount importance, in

the opinion of those who have paid attention to this subject. How stands the case at present? By an act of gross oppression we have become the sovereigns of Sindé, and on us devolves all the responsibility of governing the country—a country inhabited by wild and warlike tribes, who have little to lose; and whose motto is, like that of the Affghans, “We are content with discord, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master.” As in Affghanistan, we must maintain our rule by our cannon and bayonets. It is true that we have not the same difficulties to contend against. We are nearer our communications, and Sindé presents no natural obstacles to the march of armies. There will be no fear of a scarcity of supplies. There will be no intense cold to destroy hundreds in one fatal night.

But there is an enemy not less to be dreaded—a pestilential climate, which has already laid many a gallant soldier low, and will, I fear, continue to do so. When I was in Hyderabad, in 1839, scarcely a single individual attached to the Residency escaped fever. The regiments at Tatta were totally disorganized from the same cause. We learned, a few months ago, that fifty European soldiers perished in a few days from the intense heat. I witnessed similar fatal results to a detachment of Europeans in Upper Sindé. It is said, our rule will be acceptable to the people: I feel convinced this is a grievous error. Sevenths of the population are bigoted Mussulmans, who hate us with an intensity not to be described. There is no country where the Syeds exercise such influence: our coming must completely destroy

their immunities and privileges. They will never cease to excite the tribes against us ; and these tribes, inured from their infancy to scenes of rapine, will merge their private animosities to unite against the common foe ; while the hosts of idle retainers of the late chieftains, deprived of their means of subsistence, will naturally swell the ranks of the disaffected. Although unable to withstand a disciplined army in the field, these tribes are yet formidable for desultory mischief. To keep them in check, and collect the revenue, it will require our military force to be always on such a footing, that the burden on our finances will be enormous. We must recollect, also, that service in these distant countries is most distasteful to our native troops. Let us beware how we push too far the patience of our gallant and devoted native army.

I find Captain Postans estimates the revenues of Sindé at forty lacs of rupees. Speaking from my own experience, I should consider this estimate too high ; but, granting the fact, we must not forget that the greater part was always paid in kind ; and, moreover, that we have made over a large portion to that arch-traitor, Ali Morad. Now, Captain Postans also estimates the military expenditure of the current year at eighty lacs of rupees ; and I feel assured that a long period must elapse before we can much reduce our military force. These two facts require no comment.

But, it will be said, there are commercial advantages. The markets of Central Asia will be thrown open to British enterprise. Our proceedings during the last few years have destroyed British influence

throughout Central Asia. Where we had friends, we have now bitter enemies. By overturning the existing governments, we have let loose all the bad passions of these turbulent tribes, and caused scenes of horror and desolation fearful to contemplate. There was formerly security to the merchant, there is now none. It will be long ere things subside into their usual channel. As to compelling trade by the sword and bayonet, the idea is absurd, not to mention its wickedness.

One word on the river Indus. We already possessed the free navigation of the Indus, and the power of selecting emporia for our merchandise; so that, in this respect, we have gained nothing by our late acquisition. It is merely a pretence to enlist the mercantile community on the side of injustice.

And now we have arrived at the point where we may investigate the grounds that have led to the transfer of Sindé to British authority.

I am not one of those who lay claim to impartiality, because I condemn the policy of my own country. I am proud of my birthright as an Englishman, but I wish to be just to all men. It is only by integrity and justice, under Providence, that England has been raised to such an eminence of glory. I have no desire to exalt the character of the Ameers, or to create any morbid sympathy in their favour. I am not blind to their faults, or the faults of their government; but this I think it right to state, that my first impressions were far more unfavourable against them, than those I entertained on a longer residence in Sindé. The question is not one of good or bad

government. Few, I imagine, here present, will contend that bad government gives another nation the right to interfere and overturn it. The question is, the breach or observance of a solemn treaty. And here I may distinctly state my opinion, that if it were proved that the Ameers of Sindé were guilty of infractions of the treaty, we had a right to enforce that treaty. We had a right to impose more stringent, and strictly defined conditions, to prevent such violations for the future.

But a careful and deliberate inquiry ought to have preceded any stringent measures. The various cases of infraction of treaty ought to have been brought to the notice of the Ameers. If no satisfactory explanation was afforded, the Ameers ought to have been distinctly warned; the innocent separated from the guilty; and then, if any one persisted in breaking his engagements, we should have been justified in exacting the penalty.

There could be no pretence here, that great national interests would be injured by a little delay. There was no immediate nor pressing danger to the State, no possible reason why political expediency should supersede the common course of justice. Again, if the Ameers were guilty of treasonable intrigues against the British Government, they deserved to be punished. But, it was due to them, and due to ourselves, to proceed with deliberation. Charges are not crimes, proof is required. The Ameers ought to have had the opportunity of answering these charges. The treasonable letters ought to have been shown to them. They ought not to have been condemned un-

heard; I will not say on *ex parte* evidence, because there was no evidence at all. I repeat, there was no political necessity to justify a departure from rules held sacred by every Englishman.

But to proceed. A perusal of the Blue Book (which, I may remark, is completely *ex parte*, the best case that can be made out for the Government. If the Ameers had a Blue Book of their own, it would tell a different tale; I could help them, from my own knowledge, to many a palliating circumstance). A perusal of the Blue Book affords a mass of assertion, and vague accounts of intrigues in various quarters, to which all who know any thing of the manner in which reports are raised in India, will attach but little weight.

The manufacture of these stories, for gullible political officers, is a regular trade. If such absurd rumours were listened to, no native prince would be safe. The British Government would be involved in continual warfare, until every native State was overturned. I speak advisedly on these points. As Political Agent in Upper Sinde, I had repeated opportunities of testing the value of the bazaar reports of Shikarpore. In the voluminous items of intelligence given in the Blue Book, I can recognize the names of many worthless characters; and from a careful analysis of the whole affair, I feel persuaded that the greatest part of these informants were in the pay of Ali Morad, who fabricated these stories to effect the ruin of his elder brother, Meer Roostum. How admirably he succeeded, is unhappily too well known. But we are saved the trouble of entering upon these

intrigues, as the justification of the Governor-General's measures is brought within a small compass by his own letters. It seems, however, that Major Outram attached a certain weight to these intrigues, and taking also into consideration the alleged infractions of the treaty, and the altered state of our political relations to the north-west, Major Outram proposed a revision of the treaty of 1839, relinquishing the money payments in exchange for territory; which arrangement, he writes, might be carried into effect without much difficulty. It must be confessed, that Major Outram's language regarding these intrigues is very strong, and calculated to create an unfavourable impression against the Ameers in the mind of Lord Ellenborough. But this is no justification of Lord Ellenborough's harsh and arbitrary measures. Placed in the responsible situation of Governor-General of India, invested with the solemn functions of a judge, it was the duty of Lord Ellenborough to have waited calmly until the charges against the Ameers, and the evidence in support of these charges, were laid before him. He would then have seen on what foundation Major Outram's strong language was based.

We find the charges and the evidence stated at length in two memorandums, with their accompaniments, submitted for the information of Sir Charles Napier. My honourable friend has sufficiently exposed the puerile absurdity of most of these charges. I shall come to them presently. We must first see what answer Lord Ellenborough returns to Major Outram's proposition: "He does not see any necessity for precipitate negotiations." This was on the 10th July,

1842. In August, the Governor-General writes to the Secret Committee, "That he had no intention to press on the Ameers any hasty change in their present relations." But, a few days afterwards, the appointment of Sir Charles Napier takes place, and the sentiments of the Governor-General, without any apparent reason, undergo a most material alteration.

In speaking of that distinguished officer, Sir Charles Napier, whose very name is interwoven with recollections of England's glory, I should wish to disclaim any intention of disrespect. I am not one to speak lightly of constituted authorities. I appeal to all those under whom I have served during my residence in India. I appeal to the testimonials I have received. I entertain the highest admiration of Sir Charles Napier's military talents; I appreciate his great services to his country; I believe him to be incapable of committing a wilful injustice.

But, as an independent man, giving an independent opinion to the best of my humble judgment, I am bound to say, that I consider his ignorance of the languages, manners, and habits of the people with whom he had to deal, his want of experience in native character and political life in India, and above all, his total want of sympathy with the unfortunate Ameers, were the main causes of the fatal results of these negotiations.

I think no one act of the present Governor-General is more to be condemned, than, on the eve of difficult and complicated negotiations, thus sweeping away all the machinery by which the intercourse between the two States had been carried on for a lengthened period. It was not only unwise, but most unjust to the Ameers,

and calculated to instil into their minds the greatest distrust and suspicion. But Lord Ellenborough goes still further: he most unnecessarily, in my opinion, gives unlimited power to Sir Charles Napier, and writes that he will abide by his decisions; thereby removing all check upon Sir Charles Napier's proceedings.

I will commence with Sir Charles Napier's first letter to the Ameers, dated September 25th, 1842. It must be remembered that in a subsequent letter, of the 17th October, he distinctly records his opinion that "only a fair pretext was wanting to coerce the Ameers." I ask any candid person to read that letter, and state whether a pretext was likely to be long wanting. I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that if the principles expressed there were acted upon, not only every native Government in India might be subverted, but every Government on the face of the earth. I will not stop to analyze the string of assumptions on which Sir Charles Napier builds his conclusions. To overlook the wrongs inflicted on individuals, on the general principle of benefiting the masses, is no new doctrine. This was the doctrine of the French Republicans; this was the doctrine of the Spanish adventurers in the New World, who marked their path with rapine and murder, and still regarded themselves as the soldiers of the church, the armed messengers of the gospel of peace. Thus we, under the specious plea of ameliorating the condition of society, and advancing civilization, are privileged to carry misery home to every hearth, and bring each independent nation under the yoke of our all-grasping rule. But, I would beg to direct attention, for one

moment, to the document appended to this letter. It professes to be an equitable exchange between tribute and territory ; and the account winds up with a balance in favour of the Ameers of 33,856 rupees. Honourable Proprietors will be astonished to learn that of the 13 lacs 28,000 rupees charged against the Ameers, on which interest is calculated, upwards of eight lacs are an overcharge ; and the sum of one lac of rupees annual tribute set down against the name of Meer Nusseer of Khyrpore, is not due by that prince, as an engagement from Sir A. Burnes exempted Meer Mobarick and his heirs from annual tribute, according to the Governor-General's decision, contained in a letter, dated February 8th, 1841. I would refer also to a letter, dated April 21st, 1842, from Major Outram, which will explain the overcharge with respect to the seven lacs of rupees, said to be due, on account of Shah Shuja. Honourable Proprietors will then be able to test the fairness of this exchange of land for money.

But let us turn to the cause of offence, and breach of treaty, alleged against the Ameers, as put forward by Sir C. Napier, in his first letter to these princes, dated 25th September, 1842. The first complaint is : "Your Highnesses have prohibited the inhabitants of Kurachee to settle in the Bazaar." Now, I contend the Ameers had a perfect right so to do. By the fifth article of the Treaty of the 11th March, 1839, they were absolute rulers in their respective principalities, and the British Government was precluded from interfering with their subjects. It was never intended that our cantonments should thrive at

the expense of their towns, and draw away all the inhabitants, who would naturally flock to where they would be relieved from all taxes. If such were the case, how could the Ameers, as they very justly ask, realize their revenues, and pay their tribute? We first impose a tribute, we then take from these unhappy princes the means of paying it, and then punish them for not paying. It was distinctly stated by Sir Henry Pottinger, in his Instructions to me, that the cantonments were to be nothing more than the Bazaar, to which the Ameer had consented in the agreements of 1836.

The second complaint of Sir Charles Napier is, "That your Highnesses have ordered every thing landed at the Bunder, in the first instance, to be taken to the Customhouse, and taxed." Here, again, I contend that their Highnesses were perfectly right. If we turn to the notification of Sir Henry Pottinger alluded to in his letter of the 25th November, 1839, we find "that duties will be levied on all goods landed at Kurachee, save *boná fide* government stores and supplies."

Now this order of the Ameers applied to goods sold by Naomull, a merchant of Kurachee, and could have nothing to do with government stores and supplies. If any previous permission had been granted to Naomull, the Ameers had a right to revoke it. It is quite clear to me that neither Sir Charles Napier nor the political agent understood the treaty in this limited sense. But one fact speaks clearly to Sir Henry Pottinger's version of this article: I know that he directed duties to be paid on all his own goods and

supplies that came from Bombay to Kurachee. To my mind, this completely justifies the Ameers.

The third complaint of Sir Charles Napier is, "That your Highnesses levy tolls on the boats belonging to the subjects of Sindé." It is my opinion that in this instance the Ameers were wrong. But the subject had been often mooted, and the Ameers had been, at one time, supported in their view by the native agent at Hyderabad. A reference to the correspondence will show that even Major Outram considered the point doubtful; and notwithstanding the decision of the late Governor-General, so late as June 21st, 1842, I find in Major Outram's sketch of a new treaty, he inserts an article providing for the abolition of tolls on the Indus, which, he writes in the margin, are "assumed to have been previously relinquished;" thereby implying that a misapprehension existed, and that there were grounds for discussion. Now, this is the very point to which I am anxious to draw particular attention.

If misapprehension did exist, if there were grounds for discussion, and I think I have shown that even the Ameers of Lower Sindé were not altogether in the wrong, the Ameers of Upper Sindé were decidedly right, as they had given no specific pledge on the subject. If such was the state of the case, what was the course to be pursued? Surely we were not justified in proceeding at once to the infliction of the severest penalties, by the confiscation of the territories of these princes, and the abrogation of their rights as independent sovereigns. The weakness of the internal government in these States renders it probable that

many of these complaints were owing to the misconduct of the subordinate officers of the Ameers; in many instances, probably, the complainants themselves were in fault, and trusted to the ignorance of British functionaries to escape detection. I could relate many barefaced attempts to elude the Customhouse duties, by fraudulent Persian papers. But, what is the practice amongst European nations, when misconstruction of the clauses of a treaty exists? Do the strongest and most powerful take the law into their own hands, and cut the Gordian knot—Napier fashion—with the sword? In the case of the Boundary dispute with America, what would have been thought of England, (granting that we had the power,) if we had not only taken forcible possession of the disputed territory, but confiscated several American towns, those most eligibly situated for our own commercial purposes, because the Americans had the audacity to raise a question on the subject? I fear to take up the time of the Court by entering into too many details; but while on this subject, I beg for one instant to direct attention to Sir Charles Napier's letter, of the 26th November, to Meer Roostum—one of the most unjustifiable productions I ever read.

The case is this:—A kardar of Meer Roostum levies toll on a boat. According to Sir Charles Napier, this is an infraction of the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of the 25th November, 1838. Let us read Article VIII. It runs thus:—"In order to improve, by every means possible, the growing intercourse by the river Indus, Meer Roostum Khan promises all co-operation, *with the other powers*, in any measures

which may be hereafter thought necessary for extending and facilitating the commerce and navigation of the Indus." Now, if we refer to the commentary of Sir Alexander Burnes, who concluded this Treaty, on this very Article, we find that Meer Roostum was never given to understand that the tolls were to be relinquished; and I would ask, is this general declaration (which in the Persian translation is probably still more general,) sufficient to entitle the British representative to denounce Meer Roostum as an enemy, if he does not consider himself bound to all the specific measures subsequently entered into with the other powers? Major Outram, in his letter of October 14th, distinctly informs Sir Charles Napier, that there was no document or record, in the Office, pledging the Upper Sinde Ameers to any specific measures regarding the tolls on the Indus; and until that was the case, whatever may have been written by political agents, as the result of private conversations, I think Meer Roostum was perfectly justified in refusing to resign so large a portion of his revenue. Not so Lord Ellenborough, who decides that the agreements of the Ameers of Hyderabad were to bind the Ameers of Khyrpore: forgetting that this very Treaty, of the 24th December, emancipated Khyrpore from the control of Hyderabad. Why does not Lord Ellenborough refer "to the other powers on the Indus?"—the Khan of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah of the Sikhs? Because they were still permitted to exact tolls, and it would tell against his decision. Surely Meer Roostum had every right to quote their practice in his own favour. In my opinion, Sir Charles Na-

pier was decidedly wrong : but what is his next step ? He demands that the kardar, one of Meer Roostum's subjects, shall be sent a prisoner to him, that he may determine his punishment. This is a gross infraction of the treaty, as were many other acts of the gallant General ; but Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier seem to consider, as my honourable friend very justly said, that treaties are only made to bind one party. The whole conduct of Sir Charles Napier brings to my mind very strongly a passage in Mr. Elphinstone's History of India, relating to Aurungzebe, and the North-eastern Affghans. It runs thus : " But from the numerous small communities, and the weakness of the internal government even in the large ones, there must often have been acts of aggression by individuals which required forbearance on the part of the royal officers. As Aurungzebe was very jealous of his authority, and as he knew nothing of the structure of society among the Affghans, it is not unlikely that he suspected the chiefs of countenancing these irregularities underhand." Now this applies exactly to Sir Charles Napier, and led to the same lamentable result—an unjust and unnecessary war.

But the question does not depend upon these transactions. It would be unnecessary to enter so much into detail, except to show the arbitrary and unjustifiable nature of the whole of these proceedings, and at the same time expose the untenable ground on which the charges of infraction of treaty, contained in the two memorandums, submitted to Sir Charles Napier, are founded. Lord Ellenborough himself was, no doubt, aware that misconstruction of the clause of a

Treaty is no ground for penal measures, and he, therefore, rests his justification on the alleged treasonable correspondence. The whole case, therefore, against the Ameers is made to depend on three distinct propositions, which we find in Sir Charles Napier's letter of the 17th of November, of which Lord Ellenborough approves. And here I would remark, that my honourable friend has so ably dissected and rebutted the evidence in support of these charges, and has so completely exposed the injustice of depriving sovereign princes of their thrones and of their liberty on such questionable grounds, that I need not do more than cursorily touch upon the principal points, both to connect the subject, and to bring them to the recollection of the Proprietors.

The three propositions are these—1st. Is the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan to Beeburuck Boogtie, an authentic letter, or a forgery? 2nd. Is the letter of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, to the Maharajah Shere Sing, an authentic letter, or a forgery? 3rd. Did Futih Mahomed Ghoree, confidential agent of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, assist in the escape of Mahomed Shureef?

Sir Charles Napier considers the authenticity of the letter from Meer Nusseer Khan to Beeburuck Boogtie, to depend entirely on the authenticity of the seal; after failing in his comparison with the seals in the office, and falling back, on this most ingenious solution of the difficulty, that the Ameer employed two seals. He obtains the cover of another letter on which is a similar seal, and some writing of Choatham, Meer Nusseer Khan's confidential Moonshee, and this

carries conviction to his mind. This is what he calls "securing firm moral ground." Was there ever such a perversion of language? To any one experienced in native courts it would be ludicrous (if such frightful consequences were not involved,) to contemplate Sir Charles Napier, gravely sitting down to measure the seal with a pair of compasses, and on this comparison proposing to found his right to enforce measures likely to entail war. The forgery of seals in Asiatic durbars is of every-day occurrence. In the records of this very book, we find that Major Outram's seal was successfully forged by one of the agents of the Hyderabad Court. In the notes of conference, the Ameer alludes to this circumstance. What does Major Outram add? "The hand-writing was also ascertained to be that of one of your confidential scribes." Meer Nusseer Khan replies, "I solemnly deny that it was written by my authority. Why was not the paper shown to me?" I as solemnly assert, that I believe Meer Nusseer Khan spoke the truth. The venality of these confidential scribes is notorious. They are paid for furnishing intelligence of the Durbar proceedings. But it is a well known fact that seals are not used on such occasions, letters are not even written; messages are sent by confidential agents. I find Nao-mull confirms my statement as to the absence of seals; and in the very letter accompanying the memorandum, dated October 20th, Lieut. Mylne writes, "I am unable to produce documentary proof in support of my assertion. Of late his Highness has not often trusted the committal of his ideas to paper, but has despatched trusty messengers furnished with creden-

tials." But the internal evidence of the letter is sufficient to condemn it. The events alluded to took place months previous to the alleged date; and there is one expression, which in my mind stamps it as a forgery: Nusseer Khan is made to call Beeburuck Boogtie "an especial servant." Now, I speak from personal experience on this point. Beeburuck Boogtie is a petty chieftain of a tribe inhabiting the hills to the north of Shikarpore, and quite out of the influence of the Hyderabad durbar. He is nominally subject to the Khan of Kelat, but in reality independent. Surely such a trumpery affair, granting the truth of it, is not to be placed on the same footing as a correspondence with a Government. But why was the letter not shown to the Ameer? Is this system, of condemning unheard, to continue? *Is there to be for ever one law for Englishmen, and another for the natives of India?* We proceed to the letter alleged to have been written by Meer Roostum to Shere Sing. We find that Major Outram, writing to the Envoy at Lahore, states that he obtained this letter through a party inimical to Meer Roostum, and that he has doubts of its authenticity. The Envoy at Lahore, Mr. Clerk, than whom no man in India was more capable of giving a sound opinion, also doubts its authenticity. It is referred to Captain Postans, and he writes, "The seal is certainly that of Meer Roostum, under the title he employs while corresponding with the Khalsah Government, and the hand-writing is like that of several letters in my office. I should have no hesitation in considering it *a genuine production of Meer Futih Mahomed Ghoree*, and in

all probability written by himself, or one of his sons."

In another letter Captain Postans states, that Futih Mahomed "uses Meer Roostum's seal to his own purposes." There is not a particle of evidence, except the assertion of Lieutenant Brown, affecting Meer Roostum. But Sir Charles Napier solves the difficulty by making Meer Roostum responsible for the acts of his minister, and Lord Ellenborough confirms this decision. Is it possible to conceive any doctrine more unjust? If it can be proved that the minister acted under direct instructions from the prince, if he was an accredited agent, then the prince is answerable, surely not otherwise. What was the proper course to be pursued by the British representative? To bring the charges against the minister; if they were proved, to demand that he should be dismissed from his office, or banished the country, according to the nature of the offence. Will any man maintain, that, without any further inquiry, we were justified in confiscating the territory of the Ameer,—that Ameer who had evinced his devotion to us on so many critical occasions? But the internal evidence against the authenticity of this letter is still more strong than in the case of the former one.

Lord Ellenborough incorrectly charges Meer Roostum with "endeavouring to commence a correspondence, with a view to hostile proceedings against the British Government, with its most faithful and most esteemed ally and friend Maharajah Shere Sing."

But this letter is not the commencement of a correspondence; it must have been one of a series of trea-

sonable letters, as it alludes to a treaty already concluded, and thereby compromises our most faithful and esteemed ally and friend, Maharajah Shere Sing. In the state of our relations with the Sikhs, it is most improbable that such a correspondence ever took place; and Lieutenant Leckie, in his letter of the 3rd of May, officially reports, *that a man named Suckoo Mull, carried on a wholesale trade in forged letters, between the Sikhs and the Ameers.* I feel convinced this letter emanated from the same workshop.

I need not enter upon the third charge, as I hold that Meer Roostum was not compromised by the acts of his minister; but my honourable friend has exposed the absurdity of the charge of compassing the escape of a state prisoner, who, in broad day, walks down to a boat, and embarks, with his followers and property, unquestioned and unmolested.

We have now done with the grounds put forward by Lord Ellenborough, to justify the employment of a "preponderating force," in case the new treaties were not acceptable to the Ameers. Let us turn to the treaties themselves; and here, as time presses, I will only advert to one or two points. A comparison between the treaty proposed by Major Outram, and that of Lord Ellenborough, will show the harsh nature of the Governor-General's new conditions. There is a mistaken impression abroad, that the selfishness of the Ameers, with respect to their hunting preserves, was their chief cause of objection to these new treaties. This is quite unfounded. The real causes of the outbreak were the confiscation of the jagheers of the Belooche chieftains, and the impolitic measures

of Sir Charles Napier, in Upper Sindh; for which, however, Lord Ellenborough is responsible, as they met with his approval. A great deal of unmerited obloquy has been heaped on the Ameers, on account of these hunting preserves.

Sir Henry Pottinger, with his usual wisdom and good feeling, places this question on its proper footing, in his despatch of the 10th December, 1836. One fact, also, ought always to be borne in mind, that there were thousands of acres of waste land in Sindh, equally eligible for cultivation as the hunting preserves.

But, we find by Lord Ellenborough's treaty, that the whole of the country between Subzulkote and Rohree was ceded in perpetuity to the Newab of Bahawalpore. Now as this is contrary to all Lord Ellenborough's instructions, and expressed intentions, I conceive it must have been a mistake. Lord Ellenborough proposed to bestow, on Bhawal Khan, two districts formerly wrested from his father, Subzulkote and Bhoongbara, but nothing more; he states this distinctly, in a subsequent letter of the 13th December. The districts of Subzulkote and Bhoongbara were worth about a lac and forty thousand rupees. The districts actually ceded to Bhawal Khan, by the treaty, were valued at more than six lacs of rupees, amongst which are absorbed the perpetual jagheers of many Belooche chieftains. Was it likely that they would submit to such wholesale plunder, because their chief had fallen under the displeasure of the Governor-General? We see here an instance of the recklessness of these proceedings. I find, in another part of the Blue Book, that Sir Charles Napier was not aware

that we had a ratified treaty with the principal Ameer of the third division of Sinde, Mere Shere Mahomed. He does not know that Shere Mahomed has possessions on the Indus; in fact, he knows nothing about him. It was not very probable that he could offer any suggestions in correction of the errors of the Governor-General. Truly, it was the blind leading the blind. Alas! for the poor natives of India, turned over to the tender mercies of such rulers. I need not comment on the disregard of Mussulman prejudices, evinced in the article regarding coining money. It is right to state that, from a despatch of Lord Ellenborough, dated February 9th, 1843, in answer to a representation of Sir Charles Napier, regarding the district between Bhoongbara and Rohree, there is reason to believe, had such a representation been made earlier, the Governor-General would have consented to a modification of the measure, but the mischief was already done.

And now these treaties, such as they are, are sent to the Ameers, and these unfortunate princes, overawed by the "preponderating force," express their willingness to accept them. It is impossible to read the letters of Meer Roostum, and Meer Nusseer Khan, without feelings of the deepest sorrow, shame, and indignation. Meanwhile occurs the episode of the succession to the Turban, into which I have not time to enter fully. Ali Morad, the most designing of the Upper Sinde Ameers, completely hoodwinks Sir Charles Napier, and succeeds in effecting the ruin of his elder brother, Meer Roostum. That old and venerable chieftain, bewildered with the menacing

and insulting letters of the British representative, and by the artful insinuations of his brother, expresses his wish to throw himself into the hands of Sir Charles Napier. Does this look like a desire to resort to force? Is this a proof of his contumacy, and hostile feeling to the British Government? What is the answer of Sir Charles Napier? He recommends Meer Roostum to seek refuge with his worst enemy, Ali Morad. A recommendation, under such circumstances, was, of course, a command. What is the result? The slightest knowledge of native Princes might have foretold. Ali Morad takes advantage of the opportunity, to practise on the fears of the helpless old man, who, by force or fraud is induced to resign the Turban, and is then persuaded to fly. The most remarkable feature of the case is, the conviction of Sir Charles Napier, that while trampling on all the dearest rights of these wild Belooches, and transferring the power of the state, from an aged and justly beloved chieftain to one who was an object of detestation, he had hit on the only expedient for ensuring a permanently peaceful state of affairs in Upper Sindh. But he is not satisfied to await the result of his own experiment. On the 23rd of December, we find, that he reports, that "all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh, have agreed to the terms of the proposed treaties." He has already committed one overt act of hostility, in taking possession of the territory between Subzulkote and Rohree.

In his letter of the 14th of December, he writes, "I have, therefore, told the Ameers that I shall occupy their territory, in obedience to my orders."

Now, he had not the shadow of a title to take forcible possession of the territory of the Ameers, until the new treaties were ratified and exchanged. But he is not yet content. He sends the Ameers orders to disperse their troops. By what right, except that of might, did he take this step? Was there any article in the treaty that forbade the Ameers to assemble troops? After his repeated aggressions, were they to trust to his forbearance? This is not sufficient; he hits upon another expedient, to drive these unhappy princes to desperation. He marches upon Emamghur, a fort situated in the desert, belonging to Meer Mahomed Khan; to prove, as he states in his letter of December 27th, that "neither their deserts, nor their negotiations, can protect them from British troops." And Lord Ellenborough compliments him on his "decision and enterprise;" and, again, "entertains the hope that the new treaties will be carried into effect without bloodshed." Truly a pretty pair of pacificators!

After the exploit at Emamghur, Sir Charles, on the 22nd of January, 1843, continues his threatening march on Hyderabad. Blind to the colour these repeated aggressions must wear in the eyes of the Ameers—blind to the suspicions they were calculated to awaken—he still presses on in hostile array towards the capital. On the 8th and 9th of February, Major Outram meets the Ameers in Durbar. No thinking man can read those notes of conference without the deepest humiliation. On the 12th, the Ameers sign the treaty under a protest. In the meantime, Sir Charles Napier had crossed the frontier. The Belooches, hearing this, flocked to the capital. The

wrongs of their old and venerable chief, Meer Roostum, the invasion of their rights, and the series of unjust and impolitic arrangements for the benefit of Ali Morad, were the chief causes of the excitement. The Ameers required some pledge of redress on these points. Major Outram could give none. He is told that the Ameers had lost all control over their Belooches. He is warned to depart; but, regardless of danger, he still remains firm at his post.

On the 15th, the third day after the treaty was signed, the Residency is attacked by the Belooche soldiery. None of the Ameers, except Meer Shadad, were present. After a gallant defence of four hours, Major Outram retires. He rejoins Sir Charles Napier, who, on the 17th, attacks the Belooche army at Meeanee, and gains a decisive victory. The results are the captivity of the Ameers, and the annexation of Sind to our Indian Empire. Thus closes the last act of this sad drama. In a military point of view, probably few achievements in India have been more brilliant; looking at it morally, a more disgraceful act never stained the history of our country. From the first step to the final scene, the same reckless injustice predominates. No distinction is made between the Ameers who were alleged to be guilty, and those who were known to be innocent. Meer Sobdar, whose whole career has been one of scrupulous fidelity, to whom Lord Ellenborough, in the very last treaty, had assigned territory as a reward for his good conduct, shares the hard fate of Meer Nusseer and Meer Roostum; is dethroned, exiled, and imprisoned. It must not be forgotten that each chief was perfectly inde-

pendent of all the others, responsible for his own acts, and guaranteed in his possessions and rights by a separate treaty.

Before I conclude, I would advert to two points, which catch the eye at the first glance, and, with superficial observers, divert the attention from the glaring injustice of the previous proceedings. Lord Ellenborough has artfully brought these points prominently to notice, in his proclamation of March 5th, 1843. He writes, "The Governor-General cannot forgive a treacherous attack upon a representative of the British Government, nor can he forgive hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty."

Now, both these assertions distort the facts. The treaty was signed on the 12th, incorrectly stated by Lord Ellenborough the 14th. The attack on Major Outram took place on the 15th. In the intermediate days, Major Outram was distinctly warned that the Ameers could not control the Belooches. They had already saved his life once, and the lives of his escort, on their return from the conference.

In 1839, I was placed in exactly the same position. Aware of the weakness of the internal government of Sindé, and the inability of the Ameers to protect me, I thought it my duty to withdraw in order to avoid collision. If I had been attacked, after having been warned, could I have called the attack treacherous? Certainly not. Does Major Outram designate it as a treacherous act? He does not. Let him be summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, and answer for himself.

The Ameers had not the power to prevent this attack. We have no right to judge them according to our European notions of a Government. They were simply the heads of one of the principal tribes, the Talpoors, and the recognized channel of communication with foreign powers; but they had not even the jurisdiction of life and death, amongst some of the other powerful tribes,—the Lagharees for instance,—they ruled through the Belooche chiefs. They could influence and persuade, but they could not restrain, nor enforce obedience, when opposed to Belooche prejudices. Captain Postans states, and I can confirm the statement, that the meanest Belooche will, at times, unhesitatingly beard the Ameers in public Durbar.

I feel convinced that the Ameers were not only not favourable to this attack, but exerted all their influence to prevent it, otherwise Major Outram must have been crushed. Will any man assert that the same troops who maintained such a desperate struggle at Meeanee, against Sir Charles Napier's whole army, could not have destroyed a detachment of one hundred men?

And now let us turn to the charge of "hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty." The whole conduct of the Ameers shows that their preparations were strictly defensive, that they had not the least notion of aggressive measures. Lord Ellenborough himself writes, on the 14th of November—"The designs of the Ameers would seem, by the intelligence transmitted, to be of a *defensive character only*." We must recollect, that this is

written after the assembly of a "preponderating force" at Sukkur; after the Ameers were aware of the provisions of the new treaty, and after it had been officially reported, that the Ameers had been informed "that the English meditated treachery."

None but the most obstinately prejudiced, or the wilfully blind, could accuse these unhappy princes of a desire of hostile aggression. It is against all the evidence: it is against all probability. Is it to be believed that the Ameers would have stood our staunch friends in the day of defeat and adversity, to break with us at the moment when our armies were returning flushed with victory? Is it credible, that with the experience of our recent successes in Affghanistan, they would rush headlong into so unequal a contest? I would refer the Court to a most admirable letter of Sir Henry Pottinger, dated 20th June, 1839. It is too long to quote, but bears remarkably on this point.

The Ameers knew their inability to cope with us in the field; they depended upon our sense of justice. What does Meer Nusseer Khan write;—" *I know that the kings of England never sanction injustice.*" In all their letters, in every conversation, they refer to the treaty of 1839. Meer Nusseer calls it a Wall or Bund. On signing the new treaty, they express their determination *to petition* the Governor-General.

Let us read Meer Roostum's letter to Sir Charles Napier; a more affecting document it never fell to my lot to peruse:—He writes, "God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or fighting; we have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me, and my poste-

riety, by the British Government, under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependant of theirs, and have thought myself secure. I have always attended to the least wish of the British officers; and now that my territory is being taken from me, I am at a loss to find out the reason of so harsh a measure. I have committed no fault. If any is alleged against me, let me hear what it is, and I shall be prepared with an answer. I feel strong in the possession of that treaty, and I trust to the consideration of the British still. If without any fault of mine you choose to seize my territory by force, I shall not oppose you, but I shall consent to and observe the provisions of the new treaty. *However, I am now and shall continue to be a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands.*" My very blood boils with indignation, when I contemplate the wrongs of this old and venerable chieftain. When Political Agent in Upper Sinde, he treated me as a father does a son. I have sat with him in his inmost apartments, and heard him express his satisfaction that he had secured the friendship of the British Government. There was nothing that he would not have done to show his devotion and good feeling. He proved it in a thousand instances: and what is his reward? He is hurled from his throne, torn from his wife and family, and sent to die in a prison in a foreign land.

I am one of those who believe that retribution awaits the guilty even in this world; and it is my solemn conviction that some great calamity will overtake this country, if such monstrous acts of injustice are sanctioned and upheld.

But I have shown what Meer Roostum writes: what does he do? He offers to throw himself into the hands of the British representative. Is it possible to show more plainly his submission and his reliance on the British Government; his confidence in British faith, and strict observance of treaties: that confidence which has done more to raise up our wonderful empire in the East, than all the exploits of British valour?

Notwithstanding Sir Charles Napier's repeated acts of hostility, notwithstanding his threatening and aggressive march on Hyderabad, all those who know Sindé, must be aware that the Ameers could have no intention of proceeding to extremities. If they had meditated hostilities, they would have sent away their wives and families; they would have concealed their treasures; they would have called in all their levies, especially Meer Shere Mahomed, who was considered the bravest of their warriors, and who, on the prospect of hostilities with Lord Keane's army in 1839, brought his coffin and shroud to Hyderabad. And, if conscious of guilt, they would never have surrendered themselves immediately after the battle of Meeanee. I repeat, it is only those determined to convict, against all evidence; it is only those prepared to trample upon all obligations, that will pronounce judgment against the unfortunate Ameers of Sindé.

On the 4th of last April, I happened to be in the House of Commons, when a noble Lord, an honour to his country, gave utterance to the following sentiments. I quote from memory, but the words made a deep impression upon me at the time, and found a

responsive echo in my breast:—"England (he said), with one arm resting on the East, and the other on the West, is in too many instances trampling under foot all moral and religious obligations. If such is to be the course of our future policy, if our superiority in arts, in arms, in science, and in strength, is to be turned to the injury and not to the advantage of mankind, I would much prefer that we should shrink within the proportions of our public virtue, and descend to the limits of a third-rate power."* While these words rang in my ears, I cast a rapid glance at the events which, within a brief space of time, have thrown such a fearful interest over our Eastern empire. I called to mind our wild king-making crusade to Affghanistan, its reckless expenditure of treasure, its vast amount of human misery, its last fatal catastrophe. I called to mind the numberless tragic episodes that arose out of that ill-fated expedition,—a dynasty overturned at Kelat; the aged Chieftain slain in defence of his capital: an usurper seated on the throne by the force of British bayonets; he again driven into exile by an indignant people, and the son of the slaughtered chief resuming his hereditary rights. I called to mind the hardships and sufferings of our gallant and devoted native army, our detachments, surrounded by an overwhelming superiority of numbers, cut up in detail by their fierce and warlike enemies—the disastrous fields of Kujjuk, Surtof, and Nufoosk, where men found a soldier's grave

* Speech of Lord Ashley, on the suppression of the opium trade, 4th April, 1843.—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. lxxviii., 3rd Series, p. 406.

whose names are unknown to fame, but who yet deserved well of their country.

It is painful to reflect on the gallant lives thus uselessly sacrificed ; on the misery caused to hundreds of English families. And if we have suffered misery, we have inflicted a hundred times greater : that may be a consolation to some, but to me it only conveys deeper shame and sorrow. War is at all times a great evil, but an unnecessary and unjust war it is fearful to contemplate, *and fearful the responsibility of those who throw their sanction over a crime of such magnitude.*

No wonder, then, that my mind turned with some sort of satisfaction to the reflection, that these execrable wars were at an end, that a new era was dawning on Hindostan, and that, profiting by experience, we should direct all our energies to the maintenance of peace, and to the moral and physical advancement of the millions over whom we are permitted, by a gracious Providence, to preside. Little did I imagine that the very next mail would bring accounts of an act of aggression to which our Indian annals, unhappily so fertile in such acts, can afford no parallel. Little did I imagine that the very man who had denounced the Affghan expedition as a crime, who had gone out of his way to mark his total dissent from the policy of his predecessor, who had so recently put forth to the world that memorable declaration, that, "content with the limits that nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace." Little did I think that

the author of this declaration, without even the plea of an imaginary or real danger to the State, with all the aggravation of ingratitude for services rendered during a season of unwonted trial, would have grasped at frivolous and flimsy pretexts to goad a barbarous but brave people to desperation, and again to let loose all the horrors and calamities of war.

It is my conscientious conviction, that if the thinking part of this Christian nation, that if the independent portion of the public press—to which we owe the preservation of our own liberties—could once be roused to the consideration of this question, such a storm of indignation would burst forth, that no Minister would be hardy enough to refuse a full and searching inquiry. The time is past, at all events in this free country, when the follies and passions of an individual can plunge the nation into all the calamities of war. Is it then to be permitted that the servants of the East India Company shall wantonly have recourse to such an extreme arbitrament? Is there to be no end of these wars of aggression? and no voice raised in their condemnation? If the Ministry of this country, oppressed with business, are unable or unwilling to grapple with Indian questions,—if the Great Council of the kingdom have neither leisure nor inclination to enter upon an inquiry involving the rights of justice and humanity,—involving the good name and good faith of the British nation, it is easy to predict that these acts of tyranny and aggression will continue, that one iniquity will only lead to another; and, to use the emphatic words of the unfortunate Ameers of Sindé, applied to their own case, “There will be no

justice for the natives of India, until the Almighty sits on the judgment-seat.”

I repeat, this is no party movement; it is a step beyond the petty squabbles of political intrigue; it is an appeal to those loftier principles which alone ought to guide the councils of a great and enlightened Christian Government. Every Englishman shares the responsibility of these acts; and we especially, as the intermediate body between the British public and the natives of India, bound as we are to that country by so many ties of friendship and gratitude,—are We also to remain silent, and to make no effort to awaken public attention to questions of such overwhelming national importance? I, for one, could not reconcile silence to my conscience. I believe it to be the duty of every Member of this Court to record his opinion against a line of policy that reflects so much discredit on the British name, and entails so much misery upon our fellow-creatures. In this belief I second the motion, and call upon every independent man now present to support it.

NOTE.

[*Extract from Speech of Lord Howick on Vote of Thanks to Sir Charles Napier and the Army of Sind, February 12th, 1844.*]

“When he found his opinion supported by Sir Henry Pottinger, by Major Outram, and by Lieutenant Eastwick, he could not doubt but that there must be good grounds for entertaining that opinion. He found Lieutenant Eastwick, in the speech which he had lately published,—a speech which he thought equally creditable to him for the ability it displayed, and for the high tone of moral sentiment which was embodied in it—he said, he found in that speech the following words in confirmation of his view of the question:—

“‘As an independent man giving an independent opinion to the best of my humble judgment, I am bound to say that I consider his (meaning Sir Charles Napier’s) ignorance of the language, the manners, and the habits of the people with whom he had to deal, his want of experience in native character and political life in India, and, above all, his total want of sympathy with the unfortunate Ameers, were the main causes of the fatal result of these negotiations.’

“Such was the opinion of Lieutenant Eastwick; and he (Lord Howick) confessed that it was an opinion in which he entirely participated.”—*Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*, vol. lxxiii., 3rd Series, pp. 538, 539.

A S P E E C H

DELIVERED AT

A COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK
ON 23RD MARCH, 1853.

THE SINDE QUESTION.

AT a Quarterly General Court of the Proprietors of East India Stock held March 23, 1853, at the Company's House, in Leadenhall Street, Sir J. W. Hogg, Bart., M.P., in the chair, the minutes of the last Quarterly General Court were read and confirmed, and the SECRETARY read the heads of the accounts and papers laid on the table, agreeably to the by-laws.

COLONEL DICKINSON rose to move for certain papers concerning the Ameers of Sind.

The CHAIRMAN said there was no notice on the paper, but this being a Quarterly Court, the Honourable Proprietor had a right to make his observations.

COLONEL DICKINSON said that the subject to which the papers which he was desirous of obtaining related, had come under the consideration of the Court some years ago. They related to the conduct of Meer Ali Morad in Sind towards the late Meer Roostum of Kyrpoor, and the sons of Roostum, and were a continuation of the documents relating to the investigation into the conduct of Ali Morad, and also a copy of Sir George Clerk's Minute or Report, dated April 24, 1848. Mr. M. CLARK seconded the motion.

CAPTAIN EASTWICK said :—

I think the Honourable Proprietor who has brought forward this motion is entitled to the thanks of the Court. I shall very gladly give him my humble support, both on the general ground of advocating publicity, which I consider a vital principle in the promotion of good government, and also with refer-

ence to the particular object he has in view. It has always appeared to me of very great importance that official and authentic documents connected with events in India, should on all occasions, when practicable, be given to the public, in order that the public mind should be instructed on Indian affairs, and means should be afforded to Parliament, and to the nation at large, of forming sound and accurate opinions on the details of our Indian administration. India has of late years been brought very close to us; yet few will deny that, except on particular occasions—as at the present crisis—an unaccountable apathy and indifference prevail with regard to Indian affairs. One of the chief causes is the difficulty of obtaining authentic information, and the consequent ignorance on Indian subjects. Now I quite concur with a thoughtful and judicious writer on Colonial affairs, that whatever tends to diminish this “ignorance and indifference will tend to the promotion of good government,” and that therefore “it is the duty of all those public departments in the dominant country which are specially intrusted with the care of dependencies, to provide for the publication of statistical and other information respecting their condition at stated intervals, and in a commodious form.”* This principle has of late years attracted more of the attention of the Indian authorities, both at home and abroad. The establishment of a Statistical Department in the East India House, and the course pursued by the enlightened Governor of the North-west

* *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, by Sir George Cornwall Lewis, chapter ix, page 255.

Provinces, are steps in the right direction. But I should be glad to see the principle more fully recognized, and more extensively carried out in practice. I should be glad to see a system organized for the diffusion of the valuable information collected in the Statistical Department, more especially the information relating to the great measures of improvement, moral and physical, which have already been carried out, and are still in progress, in all parts of India. I feel convinced the public advantage would far outweigh the expense, and the result would be a beneficial impulse to our administration in India, and a greater appreciation of it in this country. In the government of the East India Company, as in all other governments on the face of the globe, there are no doubt grievous defects and shortcomings, which every friend of India and of mankind must deplore. But notwithstanding all that has been recently said and written, I am one of those who believe that British rule has conferred substantial blessings on the people of India; and that the government of the East India Company, if judged by impartial minds, making due allowance for the difficulties inherent in the state of society in that country, the character of the instruments with which the machinery of government is to be worked, and the drawbacks attendant on the progressive increase of our dominions, will be found to have fulfilled its mission, and not be deemed unworthy of the confidence of the British nation. But with reference to the particular motion before the Court, asking for the official despatches and proceedings connected with the case of Ali Morad, sub-

sequent to the Minute of the Governor-General, dated 27th February, 1851, and also for the Report of Sir George Clerk, I cannot see any valid reason why any one of these documents should be withheld. If it were merely on the ground of the enormous drain on the finances of India caused by the annexation of Sindé, the public interests require, and the Proprietors have a right to demand, that every document connected with this important question should be submitted for their consideration. When we find, by the official statements recently printed that, up to the year 1848, Sindé has cost the Imperial Treasury no less a sum than two millions five hundred thousand pounds sterling; when we find that, so late as the 1st June, 1852, the official estimate of the continued cost of this province, in excess of revenue, and exclusive of the pay of the regular troops belonging to the Sindé Division of the Army amounts to at least 20 lacs of rupees annually,—I do think my Honourable Friend is perfectly justified in drawing the attention of the Court to so serious an expenditure of the public money. There is one document included in his motion, the production of which I consider of peculiar importance,—the Report of Sir George Clerk, on the occasion of his visit to Sindé in 1848, in which he gives an account of the state of the province at that period, and the financial results of its acquisition up to that date. Now it is a remarkable fact that we are to this moment very much in the dark with respect to Sindé at that period. During the whole of Sir Charles Napier's administration, not only political matters, but all the details

of the internal administration of that province—fiscal, judicial, and financial—were kept in the Secret Department; and not only was the expenditure in the Secret Department, but greater powers over the public purse were granted the Governor of Sindé than to the Governors of Bombay or Madras, or to any other public functionary, as far as I can understand, holding the position of Sir Charles Napier. And when it is recollected that, during the whole of this period, the excess of expenditure over revenue was very great,—that there was an annual deficit in the years 1843-44, 44-45, 45-46 and 46-47 amounting in the aggregate in round numbers to upwards of a million and three-quarters sterling;* and when, on the other hand, it was stated as the opinion of the ablest collector at that time, that “in five years the revenue of Sindé would reach a million sterling,”† and Sir Charles Napier himself reported, that Sindé was no burden on the finances of India, but on the contrary, added to its resources, not only by the excess of revenue over expenditure, but also with reference to the location of the troops,—I say, when such glaring discrepancies exist, I do think a case is made out for the production of all the documents that can throw light upon the subject. I have no hesitation in expressing my own opinion—and this

* See Appendix No. III.

† The general opinion of all persons conversant with the revenue of Sindé is, that it will increase in a great extent. The ablest collector thinks it will reach a million sterling in five years, and the cost of the Government need not increase at all.—*The Conquest of Sindé*, by Major-General W. Napier, Part II., Page 531, Appendix No. IX.

is a point of importance with reference to the subject now under discussion before the Committee on Indian affairs—that making every allowance for the embarrassment and disorganisation consequent on the acquisition of a newly conquered province, if after a proper time had elapsed the details of internal administration in Sindh, and the financial expenditure, had been placed under the strict control and supervision of the home authorities, as is the case with all other portions of our Indian territories, many wasteful and ill-advised experiments would have been checked, and a great saving of the public money effected. But irrespective of financial considerations, all those who take an interest in this question are aware, that publications and statements have been put forth under the authority of great names, professing to give a history of the events in Sindh, which officers of the highest reputation, of unblemished integrity, and of large experience in Indian affairs, officers like Colonel Outram, Major Jacob, and others, most competent to give an opinion, having themselves borne a prominent part in these transactions,—pronounce to be full of mistakes and exaggerations, to use the mildest terms; more especially with reference to the unfortunate Ameers, whose characters have been traduced and calumniated, in the teeth of the most unimpeachable testimony.* On this subject I speak advisedly. I personally knew the Ameers, with some of them I was on terms of personal intimacy, and I can truly say, the more I knew of them, the higher opinion I formed

* Here refer to Appendix, No. I.

of their many amiable qualities. I admit, there were stories in circulation to their prejudice; and when I first went to Sindh I was surrounded by a Hindoo clique, who would not have scrupled to make any assertions, more especially if they had perceived any unfavourable bias in my mind against the Ameers. And I do not deny that, from what I had read and what I had heard, I was inclined to judge harshly of the Ameers. When, however, I had opportunities of knowing the mild and benevolent qualities of Meer Roostum Khan, when I became acquainted with Meer Sobdar, and his son Futih Ali, it would have required a large amount of credulity and prejudice to have given credence to the stories circulated against them. Unfortunately, those functionaries who are unable to speak the native languages are precluded from direct and confidential intercourse with the native princes and chieftains with whom they have to deal, and they are therefore almost entirely dependent for information on their native subordinates, who too often mislead them, and plunge them into errors, which they themselves would be the first to deprecate. But I ask, when these errors are manifest, does not our duty to the natives of India demand that they should be exposed? Should they not be held up as beacons to others? Does not the cause of truth, and the cause of good government, demand that every document bearing the stamp of official responsibility should be produced, in order that a right judgment should be formed, and great public principles established. On this ground alone, if there were no other, I would support the motion of my Honourable

Friend, and every motion having for its object the production of papers calculated to throw light on this painful case. But there is another and more practical reason, to which I wish to direct the attention of the Court. In consequence of the recent remarkable disclosures in Upper Sinde, it is very generally admitted by the authorities that the ruin of the unfortunate Ameers was owing to the treachery of their relative, Meer Ali Morad; and had Ali Morad's character been known then, as it is known now, no war in Sinde would have taken place. The late President of the Board of Control, Lord Broughton, expresses himself without reserve on this point. In his speech in the House of Lords, on the 29th March, 1852, he says that "he (Lord Broughton) did not believe that if the then Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough) had been cognizant as he now was of the misdeeds of Ali Morad, that the war would have taken place; he did not wish to open the question, but he felt as confident as of his own existence, that had that Noble Earl known as much then as he knew now of Ali Morad, the conquest of Sinde would not have taken place, certainly not under the circumstances under which it had taken place. This man had been the cause of the shedding of a great deal of blood. He had been guilty of one of the basest of crimes, of defrauding one of his nearest relatives, and of betraying the cause of his own countrymen; and more than that, though it was not a crime of so deep a stain, of cheating the very Power, and the very persons, who had raised him to his station, placed him on his ill-gotten throne, and maintained

him there. He did not know how there could be blacker guilt, or how there could possibly be a greater combination of offences." And yet the man thus characterized, is only mulcted of the lands and revenue of which he had defrauded his unhappy relative. He is permitted to retain his hereditary patrimony, and is not even made to pay back the revenues he has for so many years been illegally enjoying; while the unfortunate victims of his treachery are still permitted to languish in undeserved exile, and no steps are taken to afford even partial reparation to those who have been so grievously injured. We take good care to assert our own rights, but we will not move a finger to assist those whom we have helped to wrong; for it was only through the countenance of our power that Ali Morad was enabled to carry through his iniquitous schemes. We oblige him to disgorge his plunder, but instead of restoring it to the rightful owners, we take it for ourselves. Is it possible to believe that, if these facts were thoroughly known and understood that such injustice would be tolerated; and are not the friends of the Ameers justified in using their best endeavours to place before the public every document that can throw light on such transactions? Every document that we obtain makes the case stronger. Since last Quarterly Court, the Blue Book has appeared containing the Minute of Mr. Willoughby, marked, as Lord Dalhousie says, "with all that research, extensive knowledge of public affairs, and distinguished ability, which are the characteristics of every important document that issues from Mr. Willoughby's hands." And Lord Dal-

house himself writes, "I am earnest in my desire that we should show mercy to the fallen, and use the means at our disposal to raise out of their present unquestionable misery the members of a family once royal, long our faithful friends, now so crushed and poverty-stricken." Two years have elapsed since these touching words were written, and we do not yet know what steps have been taken to wipe out this stain from the British name. Nine years ago, shortly after the intelligence of the conquest of Sindh reached this country, in concert with some other Proprietors, of larger Indian experience than myself, I raised my humble voice against an act of aggression which we considered unjust and impolitic, and calculated to bring discredit on the British rule in India, and which one of India's most eminent statesmen has pronounced to be "the most unprincipled and disgraceful act that has ever stained the annals of our empire in India." At that time, I was necessarily ignorant of many of the circumstances that have since transpired; I formed my judgment on the statements in the published Blue Books, on my own experience in Sindh, and on my intimate personal knowledge of the characters and objects of the principal personages in this sad political drama. For the credit of the British reputation in India, for the honour of my country, I should rejoice if I could now publicly state that maturer reflection, and a more thorough acquaintance with the facts of the case, had induced me to modify if not altogether to change my previously expressed opinions; but I regret to say that all that I have since heard, and all that I have since read, all

that has come before me privately and in my official capacity, has only served to strengthen my former convictions, and to sharpen my sense of the intolerable wrong that has been committed, and my shame and indignation that no steps have been taken to afford even partial reparation to those who have been so grievously injured. I am happy to think that the Court of Directors have, from the commencement, advocated the cause of the unfortunate Ameers, but alas! hitherto advocated it in vain. I trust the Court will pardon me for entering, at such length, on this painful question, but it is so seldom there is an opportunity of publicly expressing our sentiments, that I hope I may be permitted to touch briefly upon one or two prominent points; and before I do so I would solemnly disclaim any feelings of a personal nature, more especially with reference to the gallant and distinguished General, against whose political acts in Sinde I have felt it to be my duty on all occasions, publicly and privately, to protest. I recognise to the fullest extent his high military reputation, his energy and self-denial, and devotion to the service of his country; but I feel bound to repeat my opinion, that as a statesman and diplomatist, he signally failed in Sinde: and had the powers he wielded been placed in the hands of a Pottinger, a Clerk, a Lawrence, or an Outram, or any of those political officers whose deeds reflect such lustre on the Indian services, the wishes of the Government might have been carried out without bloodshed, and without that indelible stain which must now for ever tarnish the British name in connection with the transactions in Sinde.

I mentioned just now that one of my chief reasons for supporting the present motion was the amount of misrepresentation abroad calculated to mislead the public mind. One of the fallacies most industriously propagated is the altogether unfounded statement that the conquest of Sindh was the inevitable consequence of the war in Afghanistan, the "tail of the Afghan storm," as it is termed; that the policy pursued by Lord Auckland, in 1838-39, left Lord Ellenborough no alternative, in 1842-43, but to destroy the Ameers, and annex their country. I altogether deny this proposition. The two events are totally distinct and separate. They must stand or fall on their own merits. I maintain that Lord Ellenborough's government is alone responsible for the ruin of the Ameers, and for the spoliation of their country; and for the consummation of that disastrous policy which, not to mention its gross injustice, has entailed such a heavy burden on the finances of India. It is quite true that the expedition to Cabul, and the selection of Sindh as the base of military operations, entailed the necessity of a change in our political relations with the Ameers. It is quite true that they were, at first, unwilling to enter into these relations, coupled as they were with several unpalatable conditions; that they evinced a decidedly hostile feeling, and in fact proceeded to overt acts that would have justified hostilities on our part; but all this occurred before the treaty of the 11th March, 1839. After that treaty was concluded, by which, be it recollected, the Ameers were guaranteed in their respective territories, and taken under British protec-

tion, a change came over their feelings and conduct and, with the exception of one or two of their body, they evinced the greatest desire to cultivate our alliance, and to act up to their engagements. Now this is a most important point in the justification of these unfortunate princes. Their enemies endeavour to mystify the public mind, by confounding the two periods before and after the treaty of 1839. They quote the conduct of the Ameers before the treaty of 1839, when they were undoubtedly hostile, as proofs of their hostility at a subsequent period, when their cordiality and good faith were equally manifest. Sir Charles Napier writes, "Everybody knows that the Ameers were in deadly hostility to us from first to last, and if they do not know it, their ignorance is pitiable." Now I cannot imagine an assertion more opposed to all the evidence, or more at variance with the facts of the case. Sir Henry Pottinger declares positively, that "the Ameers punctually fulfilled their engagements," and extracts from his Reports, too numerous to quote, would prove that his evidence is strongly in their favour. I myself held temporary charge of our political relations with Sindé on the departure of Sir Henry Pottinger, and I can bear the most positive testimony to the general desire of the Ameers to act in good faith and carry out the wishes of the British Government. Colonel Outram succeeded to the permanent appointment; and under his able administration, during a crisis of unusual delicacy and difficulty, the whole resources of Sindé were placed at the disposal of the British troops, and the greatest services were rendered. On this point I will

quote the opinion of Mr. Elphinstone, the highest authority on all matters connected with India, who writes, " We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute on Sinda, we made open war on the Brahoes of Kelat, killed their chiefs, and took their capital, and on these two powers all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures would have been difficult, even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram's management, as to obtain their cordial co-operation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Afghanistan. Our movements in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us. Had they been disposed for more open enmity, General England's detachment could neither have retired or advanced as it did; and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the oppositions and privations he must have suffered in such case. Advance towards Cabul he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through Sinda and the Kelat country." Captain Postans records his sense of the value of the services of the Ameers and their cordial co-operation. All the other political officers, and even the letters of Government, speak the same language. So late as the 24th January, 1842, Colonel Outram is directed by the Government of India to convey to the Ameers their acknowledgments for the friendly feeling evinced by them, and their sense of the liberality of their administration. I

have omitted to allude to a remarkable and affecting incident connected with the death of Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, who evinced his implicit confidence in the British Resident (Colonel Outram), by confiding to him his two sons; adding in that solemn hour, when there cannot be a doubt he gave utterance to the real sentiments of his heart, "My friendship for the British is known to God; my conscience is clear before God." And yet in the teeth of this array of evidence Sir Charles Napier has the hardihood to assert, that "Everybody knows that the Ameers were in deadly hostility to us from first to last; and if they do not know it, their ignorance is pitiable." All those most competent to give an opinion declare, that throughout the crisis of our unparalleled disasters in Afghanistan, the Ameers rendered us most valuable services; and that, with one or two exceptions, during the whole period from 1839 to 1842, their conduct was marked by good faith and cordiality. At the same time there were various discussions regarding the interpretation of articles of the treaty: of some of which, I maintain, the Ameers took the correct view, in others, they were wrong, but all the points were susceptible of easy settlement by friendly negotiation—bearing in mind Sir John Malcolm's golden maxim, "that where the interpretation of a treaty was doubtful, the leaning should invariably be rather to the expectations originally raised in the weaker party, than to the interests of the stronger party." There were also intrigues, and rumours of intrigues; as there always have been and always will be, when a native state is first brought into close connection with the

British Government. These intrigues, if left to themselves, would have perished of neglect. There were also treasonable letters, of questionable authenticity, furnished and probably concocted by interested parties. In my opinion, the substantial services rendered by the Ameers should have far outweighed these alleged offences. But, in the opinion of the Resident, they furnished ground for the revision of the treaty on equitable terms, the basis of which was to be a territorial cession by the Ameers in return for a fair equivalent in the shape of remission of annual tribute, and certain arrears due under former treaties. Such was the state of Sindh on the arrival of Sir Charles Napier, in the month of September 1842. Shortly afterwards he proceeded to Upper Sindh, and received charge of the chief civil and military authorities of the province. And here I would beg permission to take a rapid glance at the state of political affairs in India at that period. On the 1st of October, Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation announcing the pacific and conservative policy of his government. The brilliant achievements of Pollock and Nott had again attached the prestige of invincibility to British arms; and one of the ablest of India's statesmen observed, "that we stood on surer ground in all quarters than at any former period of our Indian history." About this time the memorable Address was issued by the Governor General to his brothers and friends, the princes and chieftains of India, amongst whom were of course included the Ameers of Sindh. They were told that "the insult of 800 years was avenged; that the victorious British army bore the gates of the temple

of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looked down on the ruins of Ghuznee." No doubt the Hindoo and Mahomedan princes of India duly appreciated this intelligence. Without, however, attaching too much weight to this characteristic rodomontade, which is chiefly remarkable as indicative of a want of sobriety of mind and judgment, happily rare amongst British statesmen, I think we have a right to conclude that the Governor General was satisfied with the general aspect of the political horizon, and that affairs were in that position that we could have afforded to treat with lenity the real or alleged offences of the weaker native states. What is the policy laid down by the ablest statesmen of India to be pursued towards those states? What do we find so often reiterated in the works of Malcolm, Monro, and Elphinstone? Is it to take every opportunity of crushing the native states? Is it that we should beat about on every side to find a pretext to coerce them? On the contrary, it is our interest as well as our duty to endeavour to preserve them, in order to postpone that period which must inevitably arrive sooner or later, when the whole of India will be brought under our direct rule. In accordance with this wise principle, Sir Henry Pottinger left on record his opinion, "that our policy was not to quarrel with Sinde; that we should not hastily take offence, but bear with the faults of its semi-barbarous rulers and population, on whom our example and intercourse must, in a few years, work a most salutary effect; and who, it is to be recollected, have for generations looked upon us as a nation of foreigners

grasping at conquest, with one guide to our actions, that of might being right." How far the views of Sir Charles Napier, with respect to the policy to be pursued towards Sindé, were calculated to disabuse the Sindians of this ancient prejudice may be gathered from a perusal of a remarkable essay, dated the 17th October, 1842; an essay remarkable alike for its logic and its morality. In it we find Sir Charles Napier writing, "I have maintained we only want a pretext to coerce the Ameers;" and no reasonable person will hesitate to admit that if the principles laid down in that essay were to meet with general acceptance, there would be little difficulty in the stronger powers finding pretexts to coerce the weaker. Accordingly, shortly afterwards, Sir Charles Napier declares, "They have given a pretext. They have broken treaties." If Sir Charles Napier had said, they have been charged with breaking treaties, he would have been nearer the mark, but he jumps to a conclusion. He finds the unfortunate Ameers guilty without ever giving them the opportunity of explaining or refuting the charges brought against them. In the same manner he decides that the people of Sindé hated their rulers. And among numberless other hasty conclusions, there is one to which I must allude: it concerns poor old Meer Roostum. Sir Charles Napier reports that Meer Roostum had been excused a lakh of rupees tribute for his former good conduct. "He appears as hostile as any of the other Ameers;" and then Sir Charles adds most unjustifiably, "and by no means to have merited our leniency." Thus setting aside the recorded opinions of all his predecessors, who had

borne uniform testimony to the good conduct of Meer Roostum ; Sir Charles, at this time, having been but a few weeks in Sinde, not knowing a word of the language, and receiving all his information second-hand. His own idea of the observance of treaties may be gathered from his announcement that "he would not be played off like a shuttlecock;" and told this was done by that Ameer, and that by another, and have a week's inquiry to find out who was responsible for an act of aggression—forgetting that the rights and possessions of each Ameer were guaranteed by separate treaty, and that each was only responsible for his own acts. One would have thought that it was a sufficient misfortune to those unfortunate princes that the chief authority in Sinde had fallen into the hands of one so ill fitted, by previous experience and habits of mind, to grapple with the intricacies of their case, and deal out impartial justice. Under ordinary circumstances there would have been an appeal to superior authority; the calm sagacity of a Hardinge, and the firm and enlightened statesmanship of a Dalhousie, would, as at a later period, have checked the impetuosity of the gallant General, and afforded time to reconsider the verdict. But the evil star of the Ameers was in the ascendant. Unfortunately Lord Ellenborough had abdicated the functions of a Governor General by writing to Sir Charles Napier that he would abide by his decision. It was a grave error, on the eve of difficult and complicated negotiations, to sweep away the machinery through which all the business in Sinde had hitherto been transacted; it was a still graver error, to remove all check upon Sir Charles Napier's proceedings. It

may be granted that when war is declared the General commanding should be unfettered and unrestrained, but it is more than doubtful how far it is just and wise to invest a General at the head of an army with the power of deciding the question of peace or war. An acute writer on the Sinda controversy has observed, that affairs in Upper Sinda were at this period in a singularly confused and intricate state. I admit that, seen at a distance through the misty atmosphere of garbled Blue-Books, or on the spot through the polluted medium of bribed native officials and venal Moonshes, there might have been difficulty in discerning the right path; but an experienced Indian political officer who could have dispensed with subordinates, and gone straight to the fountain-head, would have rallied all the well disposed around him, and soon disconcerted the machinations of Ali Morad and his accomplices. It must not be forgotten that it has since been proved, that the chief native officials were in the pay of Ali Morad. The first object of course would have been to have secured an interview with Meer Roostum, to have reassured and comforted him, and to have taken up the only position worthy of a British Representative, that of arbiter between the contending factions. It is now proved, and a most important point it is, that the assembling of the Belooche troops was to decide an intestine quarrel, and with no view of hostility towards the British Government. Meer Roostum's earnest desire to seek the mediation of the British General shows his entire confidence in British justice. He writes, "God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or

fighting. We have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me and my posterity by the British Government under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependant of theirs, and have thought myself secure. However, I am now, and shall continue to be, a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands." A lingering death in a foreign land, away from his home, his family and friends, his character traduced, and unrelenting harshness shown to his children, were the justice and kindly consideration accorded to an old and faithful ally by the conqueror of Sinde. It would occupy too much time to enter into the details which led to the final catastrophe. They have already been described in this Court on previous occasions. It is sufficient just to glance at the menacing proclamations, the insulting letters to Meer Roostum, such as never before were written by any British representative to a prince in alliance with us, the ill-advised recommendation to Meer Roostum to place himself in the power of Ali Morad, who was at that moment plotting his brother's ruin (a recommendation, under the circumstances, from the British General being equivalent to a command); the seizure of the rich districts of Subzulkote and Bhoongbara under pretence of a treaty which had never been executed, and the destruction of Emamghur while at peace with the Khyrpore state. War has not been declared, writes Sir Charles Napier, nor is it necessary to declare it. It was during the progress of these events, a few weeks previous to the battle of Meeanee, that Colonel Outram penned that solemn remonstrance. He writes to

Sir Charles Napier, "It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical, positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder." There could but be one result to these unjustifiable proceedings. If Sir Charles Napier supposed that by a system of intimidation he would bring on a pacific settlement, he was grievously mistaken. God forbid that I should impute to Sir Charles Napier, or to any British General, a desire to plunge into the horrors of war. I believe, in the words of his own affidavit, that "he never sought for fame at the expense of humanity; and that he always strove, to the utmost of his power, to mitigate the evils of war." But I equally believe that his appointment led to the conquest of Sind, which in other hands would have been averted. More than ten years have now elapsed since Sind became a British province. However I may lament the events that led to its acquisition, I concur with those who consider the act as now irrevocable. I believe that under British rule substantial benefits will be conferred upon it, and I should be the last person to advocate any measure calculated to embarrass or retard its progressive improvement. In advocating all practicable reparation to the surviving members of the Talpoor family, and even their return to Sind, under such restrictions as the authorities on the spot might advise, I have no apprehension of an untoward result. Meer Mahomed Houssein, eldest son of Meer Roostum Khan, since 1843 a peaceful fugi-

tive in the neighbouring states, writes recently, "I am an old man, and desire that I may be permitted to return to Sinde, and that a place of residence may be appointed for me there. There need be no fear of my entrance on traitorous schemes, for no one has power to resist the British. To go to India there is no objection in distress, but the name of being a prisoner we cannot bear." The late Commissioner in Sinde spoke most favourably of Mahomed Houssein, and saw no objection to his return to Sinde. With regard to those unfortunate princes who have dragged out a miserable existence under the iron rule of Ali Morad, in a worse condition than his menial servants, there can be no question that a provision should be made for them; and that they should be permitted to live under British protection. One word with respect to the wives of the dethroned Ameer: Sir Charles Napier declares, that he believes that these helpless women and their dependants carried off about three millions sterling in gold bars and jewellery. What does Colonel Outram say to this? and what did the unfortunate ladies themselves say in their petition to our Gracious Queen Victoria: "God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment, and through our separation from the Ameer we endure such distress and despair that life is distasteful to us."

Sir Charles Napier may believe that three millions sterling of gold bars and jewels could be carried, through the guards that surrounded the palace, by helpless women and their terrified dependants; and Sir William Napier may believe that the Ameer

“ chopped their children to death soon after birth, or suffocated them under cushions ; that they chastised their women with twisted brass wires, and committed other hellish deeds.” But it will be a mournful reflection to thoughtful minds that the lives and properties of thousands of their fellow-creatures should have been placed at the mercy of minds so constituted as to give credence to such wild and improbable stories. In reference to this subject, only a few months ago I heard from authority on which I can implicitly rely, that the aged widow of Meer Roostum was living in a reed hut into which, my informant said, he would not put one of his dogs ; and that this once royal lady derived her only means of subsistence from the miserable earnings of a few faithful followers who sold wood in the Bazar, and shared their scanty earnings with her who had once been the honoured wife of the ruler of Upper Sinde. Surely such a spectacle must cast an indelible stain upon the British name, once so famed for acts of clemency and liberality, even to their most implacable enemies. Surely if these facts were known, the public opinion of England, so keenly alive to the cry of oppression in every quarter of the globe, would not long permit such wrongs to remain unredressed ? In a calm and dignified narrative of the events which accompanied the dissolution of the National Assembly in France, published in the leading journal of this country, on the 11th of December, 1851,* there was this tribute to the honour and magnanimity of the British nation : “ As a witness of

* A letter written by Alexis De Tocqueville.—See *Memoir and Remains*, vol. ii., page 176.

these events, I wish to make them known to you in all sincerity, convinced as I am, that when Englishmen approve violence and oppression, it is because the truth is not set before them." England, under God's blessing, has risen to a proud pre-eminence among the nations of the world. If we look abroad we see her empire extending to the uttermost confines of the earth, and still day after day gathering new countries under her protecting wing. If we look at home, we see the vessel of the state gliding calmly and steadily through the storms and tempests that threaten to overwhelm the neighbouring governments. No wonder Englishmen regard their country with a sort of idolatry, and in their comparisons with other nations forget the blots upon their own escutcheon. However ungracious the task to direct attention to these blots, it is a wholesome one. It is imperative, not only for the good of the present generation, but for the judgment of posterity. There is no fear that any Englishman worthy of the name should bear too hardly on his country's failings; there is no fear that he will detract unjustly from the fame of those glorious spirits, whose names are enshrined in the imperishable annals of a nation's glory, and a nation's gratitude. But the cause of truth must not be sacrificed even at the shrine of love of country; and if we would preserve a severe standard of public virtue, we must exercise an impartial judgment, and do our duty in spite of obloquy and reproach.—With these views I support the motion, and earnestly pray that it may prove of some advantage to the cause of the oppressed Ameers of Sinde.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

The following statements, with respect to the characters of the Ameers, by British officers—many of whom held high and responsible political situations in Sinde, and all of whom were personally acquainted with those injured princes—were published some years ago, and have never been refuted.

Extract from a Letter from CAPTAIN FRENCH, Political Agent, Nimaur, late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Sinde.

It is very deplorable that General William Napier should have published to the world such charges against the ex-Ameers of Sinde. As far as my observations will enable me to speak, they are totally unfounded. I was in Sinde and Cutchee from the 6th September, 1840, to the 7th December, 1842, when I left for Ferozepoor, and during that period, or in fact until the appearance of the "Conquest of Sinde," on my word I never, as far as my memory will enable me to speak, heard of such doings by the Meers. Had such horrible atrocities ever been perpetrated, I think you will allow I must have heard of them; first, because, as you know, I amused myself by gathering some notes on Sinde; and, secondly, because the Ameers and their rule was a daily subject of conversation for many months of the above period, while I was at Sukkur, in every house there. Many officers had Sinde Moonshees; I had one, and some of the others, like myself, employed them probably more with a view of acquiring local knowledge than aught else. I have but to repeat, that until the appearance of the "Conquest of Sinde," I do not recollect ever having heard of these abominations; I don't believe a word of them, but they will be all believed at home.

(Signed) P. T. FRENCH.

From MAJOR WOODHOUSE, Commanding the 6th Regt. N.I.

Sattarah, 16th Sept., 1845.

In the latter end of 1820, Captain Sadlier, of H.M.'s Service, was sent by the Bombay Government as an Envoy to the Court of the Ameers of Hyderabad. The other members of the mission were W. Simson, Esq., and Dr. Hall, and I had the command of the escort. The mission disembarked at Kurra-chee, and from thence went to Hyderabad, where it remained about two months, and then returned to Bombay by the way of Luckput Bunder. During that time I did not hear anything which indicated any want of humanity on the part of the Ameers, or called in question their characters as rulers for justness and moderation. Had anything existed to militate against a favourable impression of their characters in these respects, it would in all

probability have become known to the mission; and I think I do not err in saying that every member of it left Sinde with a good opinion of the Ameers as men and rulers; and during the late field service in Sinde, no facts came to my knowledge to lead me to assign to them a lower standard of character than I was formerly ready to accede to them.

(Signed) F. R. WOODHOUSE.

From DR. HAWTHORN, Surgeon 3rd Regt. Light Cavalry.

17th August, 1845.

SIR,—I have much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the gentlemanly demeanour and strictly sober habits of the Ameers of Hyderabad, when they were in power in 1835–1836.

I resided at Hyderabad for a period of seven months, during which I was in professional attendance on His Highness the late Meer Noor Mahommed Khan. I had almost daily an opportunity of seeing the other Ameers, either in durbar or in their private dwellings, and frequently accompanied them on their hunting excursions. I never had any reason to suppose they were in the slightest degree addicted to intemperance: on the contrary, they had the greatest horror of any intoxicating liquor or drug, and would never take medicine without an assurance from me that it did not contain opium.

(Signed) H. P. HAWTHORN.

From CAPTAIN LECKIE, late Assistant Political Agent in Lower Sinde.

Sattarah, 2nd October, 1845.

My first introduction to the durbars of Upper and Lower Sinde was in the year 1830, when I accompanied the late Sir Alexander Burnes on a mission to Lahore. Subsequently I went to Hyderabad in October, 1838, and remained there until September, 1842, as assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger and yourself. During this time, I was frequently with the Ameers, both in open durbar and at private interviews, on business and in a friendly way. With one solitary exception, I never knew them deviate from their style and bearing, which was always frank and gentlemanly.

In their habits they were temperate, and I never saw them in any way excited. As parents they were kind, and took a pride in the education of their sons. They were beloved by their chiefs and dependants who were at Hyderabad, and in constant attendance on them.

(Signed) J. D. LECKIE.

From CAPTAIN HART, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, giving his opinion of the Ameers and their Government.*

A residence of three years in Sinde (1839–40–41) led me to the conclusion that the government of its Ameers had been judged by too high a standard. Compared with the rule of despotic states in Europe during the past century, their sway was mild; and although unrestrained in the exercise of absolute

* Author of the article on Slavery in Sinde, in the *United Service Magazine* for January, 1844.

power, their people were not subjected to harsher measures than are common to native governments in India. The aversion of the Ameers to shed blood was notorious. Property was generally secure, notwithstanding the absence of any regular police. Even the jealousy evinced for the preservation of their shikargahs never carried them the length of the extreme punishments once authorized by the forest laws of Britain.

The acknowledged fact, that crimes of any magnitude were rarely committed, spoke of itself for the condition of the lower classes; of food they had sufficient in quantity, and of clothing in quality, to satisfy their wants. Limited in Sind, as in other eastern countries, to securing a bare subsistence, the cultivators endured no hardships to which their Indian brethren are not liable; while the simplicity of the form of assessment freed them from numerous petty extortions of subordinates to which the latter are often exposed. The almost exclusive monopoly by the Hindoo population of the management of the revenue, proved that they did not consider the bigotry of their rulers as an intolerable burden. That trade was not, in all instances, depressed or obstructed, was shown by the transit of opium through Sind to the coast in preference to the route of the British provinces, as well as by the encouragement afforded to merchants by the remission of customs duties in proportion to the extent of their traffic.

Of the private characters of their rulers, the Sindians spoke favourably. They were said neither to indulge in spirituous liquors or to smoke; and violating the sanctity of a subject's dwelling in search of wealth, or tenants for their harems, were acts unheard of, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. HART.

From CAPTAIN GORDON, in charge of the ex-Ameers of Hyderabad,

Dum-Dum, 27th July, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th instant requesting my sentiments on certain charges preferred against the Ameers of Sind, in the second volume of a work recently published, entitled the "Conquest of Sind." I shall reply to your queries in the order in which they occur in your letter to my address; premising, that from my almost constant daily intercourse with the Ameers since they arrived in India, in April, 1843, I have had the best opportunities of judging of their character and habits.

I observe, therefore, in reply to your first query, that the Ameers are the most temperate of men, rigidly abstaining from wine, and every kind of liquor; while to smoking also they have a strong aversion, and cannot even endure the smell of tobacco; and it will not be supposed that their present habits of "total abstinence" in these respects are newly acquired, or different from those they have hitherto been accustomed to. In regard, therefore, to "smoking" and "drinking," the Ameers are examples to most of us who boast a higher civilization, and a more self-denying morality.

With regard to your second query, I am unable to conjecture on what grounds it has been asserted that the Ameers' memorials were written for them by persons at Bombay and not by the Ameers themselves. In my opinion, the memorials referred to are in no respect superior to the usual correspondence of the Ameers, who are quite as capable of representing their own case, and proposing and answering objections, as are educated men among ourselves; and this fact will not be disputed by any person who has

had opportunities of observing their good sense and shrewd and pertinent remarks on men and things. I am aware that an opinion is abroad that the Ameers are a set of "illiterate barbarians;" but this is not the case, for with one or two exceptions they are well acquainted with, and appreciate, the best Persian authors (in prose and verse), and the knowledge thus acquired from books, improved by their own sagacity and experience, has made them no mean judges of the motives which ordinarily govern men in their actions. After these observations, I need not obtrude my opinion that the Ameers were fully equal to write the petitions alluded to;—that they did write them, is my most firm conviction, and on this point I can scarcely be mistaken.

The Ameers solemnly deny the allegations referred to in your third query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas; and in justice to them I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Sindh and the neighbouring countries, I never once heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers; and had it prevailed it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers.

It was, I believe, the wish of the ex-Ameers that their ladies should not accompany them from Sindh; and since their arrival in India, they have always expressed the utmost repugnance to their removal, in the hope, no doubt, that they themselves would eventually be restored to their own country. This hope they still cherish, and while it lasts (although far less intensely than before) they will never sanction a proceeding which, as we are well aware, is so offensive to their ideas of female honour and decorum. The Ameers have always spoken to me of the removal of their ladies as a step to be resorted to only in the event of their "vakeels" returning unsuccessful from England, and they now perceive that their worst fears in this regard are likely to be realised.

(Signed) FORBES M. GORDON.

*From CAPTAIN WHITELOCK, late Assistant Political Agent,
Lower Sindh.*

Seroor, 10th Sept., 1845.

It would be absurd to draw any line of comparison between any of the princes of Asia and the enlightened and accomplished rulers of the more civilised parts of Europe. Among Eastern ones, however, the Ameers deservedly ranked high in the estimation of all the Europeans who had been on terms of intimacy with them. The Ameers, in common with all mankind, had faults and weaknesses, but in many respects their conduct was most exemplary. They religiously abstained from drinking wine, or intoxicating liquors of every description; nor did they use tobacco, with the solitary exception of taking snuff; and, moreover, they were not addicted to that almost universal practice among Mahomedans, of smoking tobacco. Their manners were mild and gentlemanly, their dispositions humane; and, as far as I could judge, their deportment towards their children, relations, and dependants was invariably kind and affectionate.

I have felt great surprise at the reports that have been circulated of the Ameers' ill-treatment of their wives and females; and I can conscientiously aver, that, during my residence in Sindh, I never heard such a thing hinted at, although it is well known that there was an influential clique among the Hindoos, who were ever too ready to prejudice the European officers against

the rulers of Sinde. I feel, however, thoroughly convinced that the Ameers were incapable of acting in so cowardly and despicable a manner. It is true that, with regard to women, there were amongst them one or two sensualists, and they of all persons were not likely to have acted towards them with harshness; yet, one of these, the late Meer Nusseer Khan, has been more particularly accused of treating them with great cruelty.

(Signed) C. R. WHITELOCK,

Captain, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Sinde.

From CAPTAIN POSTANS, 15th Regt. N. I., late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Sinde.

I had the strongest personal regard for all the late Ameers of Sinde. In my personal intercourse with them, they always left the most favourable impressions from their urbanity, amiability, and desire to please. As rulers, though I could point out many faults in their mode of government, these were the consequences of their confined views as to civil polity, but, on the whole, the bulk of their subjects were probably as happy and contented under their rule as could be desired. Their great failing was profusion, on the one hand, and avarice on the other, but they were merciful to a fault, and just, where they judged for themselves. As men, I consider them exemplary characters (taking into the case their education, and prejudices of birth and religion), and the devotion and respect evinced towards them, by their children and all about them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in their singularly-constituted families. I really doubt if it were possible to find in our own country so many families, each and every member of which had his own interests to support, living together so peaceably and affectionately.

They have, I hear, borne their reverses like men, patient under many misfortunes; and this is an additional proof that their minds were well regulated in prosperity.

(Signed) T. POSTANS,

Late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Sinde.

From DR. WINCHESTER, Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry, late Residency Surgeon at Hyderabad.

Bombay, 27th Sept., 1845.

During the two years I passed at the Residency in Lower Sinde, I had, as you are aware, daily intercourse with the different Ameers of Hyderabad. Previous to my nomination to Sinde I had been much associated with officers who had a personal knowledge of their Highnesses, from their official situation, and I was never prepared, from their conversation, to expect any thing unfavourable to the Ameers. Nor do I think from the latter end of 1844, when I first went to the province of Cutch, that I ever heard attributed to them, with one rumoured exception, and that regarding only one prince, any of those vices which have since been made so notorious. I most assuredly never heard any act of cruelty mentioned; on the contrary, I always thought the Ameers were lenient as rulers, and dispensers of criminal justice; and however oppressive their system of taxation might have been, it never was enforced by cruelty. The condition of the villages and inhabitants did not

mark that the population of Sinde was worse treated than the generality of Eastern countries. I have passed repeatedly, alone, unarmed, through great portions of Lower Sinde in 1839-40 and 41, and never met with insult; but, on the contrary, with civility and kindness.

In their habits, the Ameers were exceedingly simple, and in manners unaffected. Their food was plain; their drink was water, and except in the use of snuff, I never heard, or saw, any of them using tobacco or ardent spirits. They were free from the prejudices Mussulmans generally have towards Christians; and I never heard them affect to despise any other religion than the Hindoo, of which they had every contempt, on account of its idolatry.

No one ever hinted to me that the Ameers ill-treated their women. I repeatedly asked natives the manner in which women are obtained for their zenanas. I never heard of force being used; but that the women were very reconciled to their lot; being enriched by valuable presents of jewels, and insured a competence for life. When I have been within the precincts of the harem, I never beheld anything that could lead to the supposition of tyranny. H. H. Meer Nusseer Khan often solicited medicine for his females, as did the other Ameers, evincing, in the detail of their complaints, anxiety for their welfare; and I on one occasion was much struck with the conduct of Nusseer Khan towards a lady of his harem who was dangerously ill.

(Signed) JAMES W. WINCHESTER,
Civil Surgeon, Butnagherry.

*From DR. LEITH, Assistant Presidency Civil Surgeon, late Surgeon
to the Political Agency in Lower Sinde.*

Bombay, 20th Sept., 1845.

From December, 1841, to November of the following year, I resided at Hyderabad in medical charge of the Lower Sinde Political Agency; and it being the chief part of my duty to give medical attendance to the Ameers, or to any member of their families that might require it, I had, during that time, almost daily opportunities of seeing them either in durbar or in private. And being again appointed medical attendant to the Ameers, in April, 1843, when they were brought in captivity to Bombay, and from thence sent to Sasoor, I saw them during nearly two months under very greatly altered circumstances.

During my acquaintance with the Ameers, I remarked their great freedom from the vices usually prominent among Indian Mussulmans, and I was pleased with their affable and gentle manners and domestic habits, and also with the mild exercise of their power as rulers. The people generally seemed to love them; and from what I saw during my stay at Hyderabad, I could have expected the devotion they displayed a few months afterwards, in supporting their chiefs when fighting for their honour, their independence, and their territory. I never saw anything to give me the least suspicion that any of the Ameers used any intoxicating thing; nor did I ever, while in Sinde, hear even a rumour that they did so; and I think I must have known it if they had. The use of intoxicating substances I have heard several of them openly condemn: most of them used snuff, but none of them ever smoked tobacco or anything else. During the many opportunities of observation that my visits to the sick afforded me, I never saw or heard of any

conduct towards the members of their households but what was marked with kindness. During my residence at Hyderabad, I heard of but one severe punishment being inflicted; the criminal was a murderer, and the usual penalty of having his hands cut off by the executioner was inflicted; and in this case the Ameer showed great anxiety for the safety of the man's life after the amputation.

(Signed) A. H. LEITH.

From DR. PEART, Civil Surgeon, Poonah, and in charge of the ex-Ameers of Khyrpoor.

Poonah, 17th July, 1845.

Ex-Ameer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, with his youngest son, Ali Buksh, and his nephew, ex-Ameer Nusseer Khan, have been under my care since March, 1844, and I feel the greatest satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to their noble bearing under their misfortunes; and I can safely say, that since I have had the pleasure of knowing them, I have never observed anything whereby even the slightest shadow of a suspicion of intemperance or debauchery could be attributed to them; and I have had ample opportunities of judging, visiting them at all times. Ex-Ameer Meer Roostum Khan, now upwards of eighty years of age, is in full possession of his faculties—his memory is good, and he is most strict in his religious observances; his mode of living is abstemious, eating meat only once a day, and his sole beverage water or milk.

Respecting the memorials which have been forwarded to England since the ex-Ameers have been under my care, I can assure you most positively that they have never had the most trifling assistance in framing them; neither were they seen by, or their contents known to, any European, until after they had been placed in my hands for transmission to Government.

(Signed) J. H. PEART.

From CAPTAIN MYLNE, 6th Regiment, N. I., late Political Agent, Hyderabad.

Bombay, 18th January, 1845.

I hasten to reply as briefly as possible to your questions regarding the private character of the ex-Ameers of Lower Sindh, and most truly can I say that, as far as my own observation went, and as far as I could learn from others, very few indeed of the native Princes of India could so well stand the test of inquiry into their domestic life.

I had, as you know, many opportunities of seeing them: they had, in general, very short notice of my intention of waiting upon them, and my visits not being confined to mere formal interviews at the durbar, I had the better means of remarking the total absence of all marks of debauchery and symptoms of excess. I cannot recall to my recollection having ever heard, during the seven months of my being in charge of the agency, any accusation against them as being addicted to the common Mussulman vice of intemperance; and, kept informed as I was, through several sources, of their everyday life, it could hardly have failed of coming to my ears had there been anything approaching want of kindness or affection displayed by them to their families. But the manner in which they invariably alluded to their

households, and the grief expressed when any member of their families was in distress, convinced me that much attachment existed between them.

Need I say, that if there are any other points on which my opinion on the unhappy Ameers can be of any service, it will afford me much pleasure to give it?

CHAS. D. MYLNE.

Extract from "The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary," by
LIEUT.-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., Resident at Sattarah.*

To these convincing testimonials, I would add that of an officer long resident in Sinde, and intimately acquainted with its people: "My own knowledge," he writes, "that is, from personal intercourse, is nothing, but the unanimous testimony of all the natives who were in a position to know, shows that, with the sole exception, I believe, of Ali Moorad, the Meers of Sinde were sober and temperate to an extraordinary degree,—not only not drinking or using intoxicating liquors or drugs, but not even smoking a hookah."

On Sir Henry Pottinger I call to confirm the testimony thus rendered in their favour by every British officer who has had an opportunity of intimately knowing the Ameers. He can inform his countrymen that the documents now submitted to the reader are sober and literal statements of undeniable facts. * * * * Sir Alexander Burnes's eulogies of Meer Roostum, "the good old man," I have already placed before the reader.† And if, as I

* "The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary," by LIEUT.-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., Resident at Sattarah. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1846.

† I deeply regret that I have it not in my power to refer to Captain Del'Hoste's Journal, written in 1832, which, though buried in the Records of Government, I believe contains sketches of the characters of the Ameers. The following passage, extracted from Dr. James Burnes's book, will show how innocent were the preceding generation of Ameers of the foul charges brought against their sons:—

"The Ameers of Sinde are less sunk in sensuality and indulgence than Mahomedan princes in general. Meer Moorad Ali Khan asked me on one occasion whether I had any objection to his taking daroo, a word which I understood in its usual acceptation of ardent spirits; and I was proceeding to explain that it would be better to avoid all stimulants, and particularly wine, for the present, when he abruptly interrupted me, by begging that I would not use the name of the forbidden juice of the grape in the presence of a true believer. I found afterwards that his Highness only meant a pomegranate; and although this anecdote may give an impression of display before a large assembly, still I believe it is well ascertained that the Ameers never indulge in intoxicating drugs or liquors. They have been known to dismiss persons with disgrace from their presence, who have appeared before them redolent of wine; and Bahadoor Khan Cokur, a Beloochee chief of high birth, in the service of Meer Moorad Ali Khan, was suspended from his employments for a considerable time, from having been once seen in a state of intoxication. The Ameers universally objected to take medicine in the shape of tinctures, from the spirits they contained. There is not a hookah to be seen at their court, nor do any of the family ever eat opium. It were to be hoped that this temperance on the part of the rulers had had a proportionate effect on their subjects; but experience obliges me to declare that most of the soldiery, and many of the courtiers, are addicted to every species of indulgence that can either enervate the mind, or debilitate the body. The eating of opium is as common in Sinde as in Cutch; and I found no present more acceptable than a few bottles of brandy, and no annoyance more intolerable than incessant

confidently expect, I have satisfied my reader of the utter groundlessness of this charge of debauchery and drunkenness against the Ameers generally, and against the venerable Meer Roostum in particular, I may safely leave it to his judgment to determine what degree of credit is due to the monstrous and incredible stories narrated on the same authority as that which I have just proved to be so worthless. The Ameers have been accused of committing deeds exceeding in iniquity those ever invented in the most fabulous romance of ancient or modern days; such as, *chopping their own "offspring to pieces with their own hands, immediately after birth; but more frequently placing them under cushions, smoking, drinking, and jesting with each other about their hellish work while the children were being suffocated beneath them;" chastising their wives with "whips of twisted brass wires," for "what they deemed the poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children;" "hellish deeds, which rendered them objects for horror rather than sympathy."**

indirect applications to repair the ravages of unlawful disease, or to renew the powers wasted in luxury and debauch. The Ameers commence business about two hours before daybreak, when each holds a private levee to listen to complaints, and adjust the affairs relative to his peculiar province. It is on this occasion only that they wear turbans. About sunrise, they repair to their apartments to dress, and appear shortly afterwards in durbar, where the whole family regularly assemble, and where all State proceedings are transacted. The letters which have arrived during the night or preceding day, are then thrown before them in a heap, and the time is passed in reading or giving orders regarding them, and in conversation till ten or eleven o'clock, when they withdraw to their morning repast. At two o'clock they again show themselves abroad, and remain together till dark, when they separate for the night to their respective places of abode."

"Conquest of Sinde," page 348:—"Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, depicted the most noble and generous of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his zenana a whip expressly to correct the women; the last is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires! It is no fable! the usage is certain, &c." That the romancist who palmed off on his too credulous countrymen the arrant nonsense (out-Heroding the famed Munchausen) of Fitzgerald of the "tempestuous hand," should write such trash, excites but little wonder. But it is surprising, and derogates not a little from the respect due to the collective wisdom of the nation, that the absurd fable should have been listened to in Parliament.

It must have astonished all English gentlemen in India conversant with the mild ways of Mahomedan gentlemen towards the inmates of their harems—(subjected to no other hardships than that of voluntary seclusion, which they themselves consider as disgraceful to infringe as would an English female regard a reflection cast on her chastity)—to see so wantonly libellous and utterly absurd an accusation gravely uttered by a British Senator in the presence of the Parliament of England. The report of the debate given by Hansard states, that *sensation* was caused by this climax to all the misrepresentation and mystification palmed on the House on that occasion, but the nature of that sensation is not described: for the honour of my countrymen I trust that it was the sensation of *indignation* at the unblushing assurance of Mr. Roebuck in presuming to attempt to impose such trash on the representatives of our nation. Of all the Ameers, Nusseer—the courteous, refined, and even chivalrous Nusseer—was the last on whom the romancist should have attempted to cast this stigma. Nusseer! who would as soon have given pain to a woman as would Mr. Roebuck or General Napier dream of inflicting the same barbarous cruelty on their own daughters. Poor Nusseer is now no more. It has pleased God to summon him whither the malice of his persecutors can no longer pursue him; where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest. He was mercifully removed ere the atrocious calumnies of General

Such are the statements put forth as *History*, and as worthy of the belief of the most civilized portion of the globe! They can only be accounted for, by some heartless wag having practised on the credulity and too ready ear of

William Napier could add another drop of bitterness to the overflowing cup of his misfortunes. *Requiescat in pace*. His nephew, Meer Hoossein Ali, indignantly replied as follows to the charges, as preposterous as they are malignant, of the historian:—"Whatever stories the General has written concerning our ladies, we could reply to them by as bad and worse words about him; but it is not our custom to write evil about any one, or call him bad names, agreeably to the saying, the man of wisdom will not call him a respectable man who uses the names of respectable men with disdain. (Persian proverb.) Sir Charles Napier has described the killing of children by the Ameers; but in reply we say, thousands of woes to him who wrote such a thing, for we are neither guilty of that, nor know anything about it. This is only an unfounded charge and a false calumny. Let it be asked, how can a man be so inhuman as to cut to pieces a young child, and in consequence expose himself to the fire of hell and the curse of God? Regarding the brass whip which the General has written about, it is all a lie, like the rest of his accusations; because a whip is for horses and not for women. There is no matter if the General has got it (the whip with which it was alleged Meer Nusseer chastised his women) in his possession to show to the people, for we also can produce not only a brass whip but hundreds of iron whips." And thus the young Ameer concludes his humble attempt to defend the memory of his father, and to uphold the character of his brethren, all that remained to them:—"Sir Charles Napier calumniates the Ameers, because he knows that he has injured them very sadly; and, by calling the Ameers monsters, he hopes to draw off the sympathy of people from their sorrowful misfortunes; but he will fail in his design even in this world; and on the day of judgment, when the Beloochees, who were innocently murdered by the General in the battles of Meanee and Dubba, shall rise against him,—on such a day, where will he find refuge from the accusations and complaints of those whose characters he has blackened by his calumnies?"

A brass whip—by no means a great rarity in the East—is found in the women's apartments, and the logical inference is, that it was designed for their backs! By a parity of reasoning, the valuable firearms, swords, jewels, and treasures, found in the zenanas, may be concluded to have been collected by the ladies, who, addicted like their lords to intrigue, were meditating a "revolt of the Harem!" Alas, poor England! if your senators are at the mercy of Mr. Roebuck, and your rising generation are dependent for Eastern facts on the imagination of General William Napier! England of all nations is most interested in obtaining correct information regarding India; Englishmen are of all Europeans the most ignorant, and the most easily imposed on, in all that concern it!

To prove how cruelly the Ameers treated their ladies, the historian tells us, that "when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested;" and we are told that they "sought and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood." The reader of the foregoing pages will not be surprised when I tell him that THIS IS A PURE UNMITIGATED FICTION; though he will probably be amused at the hardihood of the fabrication. The ladies did not accompany their lords, because to have done so would have been an acknowledgment that all hope of the Ameers was abandoned. The treatment of the captive Ameers, the indignities to which they were exposed, the undefined horror entertained by all Asiatics of transportation across the "black water" (sea), and the incertitude as to the final disposal of the captive princes when in the country of those who had evinced such a recklessness of justice, truth, and mercy,—were enough to deter even affectionate wives from voluntarily accompanying their husbands at first. But it was not their husbands' wish that their wives should accompany them. UP TO MY LAST ACCOUNTS—JULY 1845—THE AMEERS' LADIES, SO FAR FROM HAVING "RETURNED TO THE

Sir Charles Napier (to hear anything to the disadvantage of his victims), who forthwith transmitted what may have been intended as a bad joke and fiction, to him who was to become the annalist of the Conquest of Sind.

Translation of the PETITION of the Wives of the dethroned Ameers of Sind, transmitted through their accredited Envoys, to Her Majesty QUEEN VICTORIA.

May the shadow of Queen Victoria increase, the pure, and the magnificent as Balkis (Queen of Sheba).

It is almost two years since Sir Charles Napier came to Hydrabad, in Sind, with an army and artillery, and plundered our habitations of all our

HOMES OF THEIR CHILDHOOD," WERE STILL LIVING IN A TANDA (A WALLED VILLAGE) ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HYDRABAD ! What says Dr. Peart, in charge of the Khytpoor Ameers, and Captain Gordon, in charge of those of Lower Sind, on this subject ? The former writes :—

"In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Sind is quite insurmountable ; and when I have proposed it to them, their reply has always been, '*As long as we are prisoners, this is no place for our wives and children, to make them prisoners also.*' I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure, by so doing, I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow."

The latter, thus :—"The Ameers solemnly deny the allegation referred to in your second query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas, and in justice I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Sind and the neighbouring countries, I never heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and had it prevailed, it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers. IT WAS, I BELIEVE, THE WISH OF THE EX-AMEERS, THAT THEIR LADIES SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM SINDE, AND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA, THEY HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE GREATEST REPUGNANCE TO THEIR REMOVAL, IN THE HOPE, NO DOUBT, THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS HOPE THEY STILL CHERISH, AND WHILE IT LASTS (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS INTENSELY THAN BEFORE) THEY WILL NEVER SANCTION A PROCEEDING WHICH, AS WE ARE WELL AWARE, IS SO OFFENSIVE TO THEIR IDEAS OF FEMALE HONOUR AND DECORUM. THE AMEERS HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN TO ME OF THE REMOVAL OF THEIR LADIES, AS A STEP TO BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THEIR VAKEELS RETURNING UNSUCCESSFUL FROM ENGLAND, AND THEY WILL NOW PERCEIVE THAT THEIR WORST FEARS IN THIS REGARD ARE LIKELY TO BE REALIZED." This, be it remembered, is the testimony of two high-minded English gentlemen, writing simultaneously from the eastern and western extremities of India, daily associating with the Ameers, and acquainted with all their thoughts. They cannot be supposed to be discontented "at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred from plundering the Sind revenues, under the names of collectors," &c. They are gentlemen whose words have never been doubted, nor their honour called in question ; with no interest in the matter save that of Englishmen jealous for the honour of their country. And what is opposed to them ? The assertions of one whom I have proved to be as reckless of truth as he is ignorant of what he pretends to discuss—the champion of a brother whose policy is unjustifiable, and only to be extenuated by proving its victims monsters more horrible than it had hitherto entered into the mind of man to conceive !

money, ornaments, jewels, and of everything of value. And at the same time he took from us the Ameers and our children, and sent them to Hindostan as captives. We helpless women, devoid of power, were, when Sir Charles Napier arrived, seated in our houses. What manner of custom is this, that he should enter our dwellings, and plunder us of our valuables, leaving us not sufficient for our support? Two years have elapsed since he tore us from our houses, and native city, and compelled us to dwell outside the town of Hyderabad, in huts, like the destitute. God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment; and through our separation from the Ameers, we endure such distress and despair, that life is distasteful to us. That one should die when God wills it, is no calamity; but we endure with each successive day the torment of a new death; wherefore we cherish the hope, that you yourself being a Queen, as we were once, will sympathize with us, and will take compassion upon us, and cause restoration of those things of which Sir Charles Napier has robbed us; and since our hearts are lacerated with grief at being separated from the Ameers, and from our sons—by which, indeed, we are brought to the brink of despair—you will remove this cause of distress, otherwise we should reckon it the greatest favour to put an end to our existence. May your days be lengthened!

Signatures of the Begums of—

MEER KURM ALI KHAN.
 MEER NOOR MAHOMED KHAN.
 MEER MAHOMED NUSSEER KHAN.
 MEER SOBDAH KHAN.
 MEER MEER MAHOMED KHAN.

Written on the 27th of the month Shuwal, 1260,
 at Hyderabad, in Sinde.

*Translation of a Paper given to LORD ASHLEY by the VAKEELS of the
 Ameers of Sinde.*

August, 1845.

We, Akhund Habibullah, Diwan Mitharam, and Diwan Dyaram, the accredited Envoys of the Ameers of Sinde, solemnly declare that we have never, on any occasion, acquiesced in the truth of the charges against our masters the Ameers. We believe, and we affirm it in the most solemn manner, that the letter said to have been written to Bibarak Bugti by Mir Muhammad Nasir Khan, was a forgery. We believe, before God, that the Ameers are wholly innocent of the charges brought against them.

Signatures of—

AKHUND HABIBULLAH.
 DIWAN MITHARAM.
 DIWAN DYARAM.

19, Harley Street, 15th August, 1845.

Extract of a letter from LIEUT.-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., formerly Commissioner in Sindh, to LIEUT.-GEN. SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B., dated 26th January, 1843 (a few weeks previous to the battle of Meanee).

"It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical; positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a murder."*

Extract of a letter from the Right Honourable SIR HENRY POTTINGER, BART., G.C.B., formerly resident in Sindh, read in the House of Commons, by LORD ASHLEY, in February, 1844.

"Your letter brought our happy and merry days in Sindh vividly to my mind, and I lamented, on reading it, if possible more deeply than I had done over the 'fallen estate' of my old friends the Ameers, whose case I have all along said, and ever shall say, under all circumstances, and in all society and places where I may hear it alluded to, is the most unprincipled and disgraceful that has ever stained the annals of our empire in India. No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it has left on our good faith and honour; and as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures connected with that devoted country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment, and express my sentiments on the subject. I was in hopes that some influential voice would have been raised in England against the tyranny and spoliation that had taken place; but the intelligence by the last mail—that of July—holds forth no such prospect; and all that I can now hope is, that the author of all this cruelty and misery may meet with his deserts hereafter. I shall only add, that I shall esteem it a favour if you will let my opinions be known wherever you hear the affair mentioned, and that you cannot use too strong language in expressing my disgust and sorrow on the occasion."

* Vide "The Conquest of Sindh, a Commentary," page 290, Part 1st.

APPENDIX No. 2.

GENERAL ABSTRACT VIEW of the TOTAL REVENUES and CHARGES of the PROVINCE of SINDE, for the Years 1859-60, and as Estimated for the Years 1860-61.

REVENUES AND RECEIPTS.	1859-60.	Estimate. 1860-61.	EXPENDITURE.	1859-60.	Estimate. 1860-61.
	£	£		£	£
Land Revenue	344,702	314,803	Repayments, Allowances, Refunds, and Drawbacks	96	3,060
Sayer Revenue	15,590	21,603	Charges of Collection and other Payments in the Realization of the Revenues, viz.:		
Miscellaneous Receipts in the Revenue Department	772	603	Land and Sayer	82,040	71,630
Income Tax	26,000	Income Tax	1,900
Customs	46,091	45,000	Customs	2,283	3,360
Post-Office Collections	15,241	15,500	Post Office	22,525	29,695
Marine Receipts, Lighthouse, Anchorage, and Pilotage Dues	5,350	7,250	Allowances and Assignments payable out of the Revenues, in accordance with Treaties or other Engagements	39,254	39,690
Judicial Receipts	14,255	9,215	Allowances to Enamdars, &c., including Charitable Grants	49,460	51,169
Interest on Advances, &c.460	610	Total of the direct Claims and Demands upon the Revenues, including Charges of Collection	195,658	200,504
Miscellaneous Receipts in the Civil and Political Departments	1,789	2,082	Charges of the Civil and Political Establishments, including Contingent Charges	37,278	33,657
Miscellaneous Receipts in the Public Works Department	11,400	8,480	Judicial and Police Charges	118,331	121,173
Miscellaneous Receipts in the Military Department	44	...	Buildings, Roads, and other Public Works, including Repairs and Military Buildings	171,776	240,500
	£455,700	£451,196	Military Charges	289,187	257,200
			Marine Charges	65,813	67,000
				£878,043	£920,034

Calcutta, March 20, 1861.

India Office, May 14, 1861.

C. HUGH LUSHINGTON,
Secretary to the Government of India.
GEORGE FRIEND, Accountant-General.

APPENDIX No. 3.

EAST INDIA (SINDE, &c.) REVENUES.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated July 18th, 1861; for "Return, showing the Gross and Net Revenue of the Province of Sinde, during the several years since the Annexation of the Territory to Her Majesty's Dominions in India, with the Annual charges incurred for Civil Administration, Public Works, and the actual Cost of the Troops located in the Province up to the latest date."

YEARS.	SINDE.				
	REVENUE.		CHARGES.		
	Gross.	Net.	Civil Administration.	Public Works.	Actual Cost of Troops.
	£	£	£	£	£
1843-44 ...	*93,794		103,288	...	*663,010
1844-45 ...	274,072		169,826	...	390,293
1845-46 ...	280,082		278,712	...	370,610
1846-47 ...	269,187		601,241	...	26,743
1847-48 ...	303,023		523,146	...	10,605
1848-49 ...	292,351		483,050	24,811	
1849-50 ...	286,102		566,433	28,493	
1850-51 ...	276,401		427,267	33,489	} See note †
1851-52 ...	239,914		444,924	65,274	
1852-53 ...	256,126		523,765	27,214	
1853-54 ...	245,309		541,363	27,079	
1854-55 ...	325,637	194,395	88,513	74,348	185,184
1855-56 ...	309,422	127,572	98,786	54,439	182,141
1856-57 ...	361,044	163,868	100,356	69,492	164,882
1857-58 ...	426,957	233,557	124,859	169,580	208,218
1858-59 ...	431,451	232,995	149,921	171,251	241,099
1859-60 ...	455,700	260,042	155,609	171,776	289,187

* The gross and net revenues for Sinde cannot be given separately for the early years since annexation up to 1854-55.

† The military charges for these years cannot be distinguished from the general charges of civil administration.

‡ The charges for Public Works for Sinde are given collectively in the accounts received from India.

CHAS. C. PRINSEP,
Assistant Statistical Reporter.

India Office, August 1, 1861.

APPENDIX, No. 4.

ESTIMATES OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF INDIA
FOR 1862-63.(From the *Calcutta Government Gazette*, Nov. 13.)EXTRACTS from the Proceedings of the Government of India, in the
Financial Department, under date the 11th November, 1861.

* * * * *

6. The total income of India for the year, including receipts from all sources (except the two last on the list which are not income), is estimated at 41,33,01,000 rs., or nearly 41½ millions sterling; so that the home and imperial charges, which have no adequate provision of their own, in the shape of receipts, amount to about 30½ per cent., or about 5 annas in each rupee of the whole income.

7. It is necessary to bear this in mind, because a habit has of late years grown up of considering that every province which pays its own local charges, and has some surplus left, however small this may be, is a profitable possession, so far as income and expenditure are concerned; whereas a consideration of the above facts, and of the table whence they are deduced, will show that, unless a province has, after paying all local charges, military as well as civil, a surplus equal to about 30 per cent. of its total income, it cannot pay its rateable share of imperial charges, of the general Government, of the railways, post-office, and electric telegraph and marine, of the supply of stores and recruits from England, of the interest of the public debt, and various other charges which it is impossible to localize.

8. This, of course, is only generally true, and can only be applied, even generally, to the larger and more distinct divisions of the empire. An isolated possession like Aden cannot be expected to yield, in direct receipts of revenue, any return at all adequate to its value in a military, naval, or political point of view, and as a necessary link in our communication with Europe.

9. But as regards those great divisions of India, which have, in former times, maintained themselves as separate kingdoms, and which in size, population and importance equal many of the independent monarchies of modern Europe, it is very necessary that each Government or Administration should consider not only how far it pays all its own local expenses, but to what extent it con-

tributes the necessary quota towards those imperial expenses which admit of no localization.

* * * * *

22. Without going through similar details in each division of the Empire, the annexed table will show that the same remarks apply more or less to each of the other Governments and large divisions of the Empire, except Madras :—

	Receipts.		Disbursements.		30 per cent. on Receipts towards imperial and general charges.		Total of columns 3 and 4, being quota of charges to be provided for.		Difference between columns 2 and 5, being surplus or deficit.	
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Madras	6,61,30,000	4,40,47,450	1,98,39,000	6,38,86,450	22,43,550	surp.				
Bombay	6,90,10,000	4,09,72,675	2,07,00,300	6,16,72,975	73,28,025	surp.				
Sind	46,21,000	71,95,300	13,86,300	85,81,600	39,60,600	defic.				
East Settlement	14,09,000	15,80,800	4,22,700	20,03,500	5,94,500	defic.				
Oude	1,25,50,000	1,47,99,750	37,65,000	1,85,64,750	60,14,750	defic.				
Nagpore	36,86,000	57,15,550	11,05,800	68,21,350	31,35,350	defic.				
Pegu, Martaban, and Tenasserim	70,93,000	90,88,500	21,27,900	1,12,16,400	41,23,400	defic.				

24. The case of Bombay is more complicated. In the original Bombay Presidency there is an apparent surplus of nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ of a million, or including Sind, and after providing for the deficit of that province, the surplus would be about 3,37,000. But, as in Bengal, a share in the income from customs, salt, and opium collected in Bombay may be claimed as belonging to other provinces, and the expenditure, especially in the military and marine branches, is probably, to a still greater degree, for other than local purposes.

25. Except to show the urgent necessity for the strictest economy which, in many of its details, can be effectually and thoroughly enforced only by the local administration, there is no necessity for pursuing this comparison in the case of the smaller divisions of the Empire. It will be seen that Sind, Oude, Nagpore, the Burmese Provinces, and the Straits Settlements resemble the Punjaub in that none of them produce an income equivalent to their own merely local expenses. Between them they cause a deficit, taking imperial and local charges together, of about one and three quarters millions sterling, making, with the Punjaub deficit, a total of rather less than four millions, which have to be provided from the more productive divisions of the empire.

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C. H. LUSHINGTON,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Financial Department, 26th April, 1861.

A SPEECH

DELIVERED

ON THE OCCASION OF THE BANQUET AT MANCHESTER TO
SIR H. POTTINGER.

Reprinted from the "Times" of 23rd December, 1844.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S SERVICE.

Mr. J. MACVICAR proposed the Indian Army and Navy.
CAPTAIN EASTWICK, in acknowledging the compliment, said :—

Mr. MAYOR and GENTLEMEN,—On the part of the naval and military services of the East India Company I beg to return my most grateful thanks for the flattering manner in which you have done them the honour to drink their health. When I look around me, and see the representatives of the wealth and intelligence of this great commercial city assembled to do honour to your distinguished guest, and when I recollect that that distinguished guest is one of the highest ornaments of the service of the East India Company (cheers), as a member of that service, and I am sure I speak the sentiments of every member of that service, I feel a pride and a pleasure no words of mine can express. (Cheers.) I have had the honour of serving under Sir Henry Pottinger's orders. I have had the honour of filling a confidential situation under his immediate control, on a scene, where, although

the sphere was more limited, and less exposed to the public eye, his labours were not less remarkable, nor less deserving the thanks and approbation of his fellow-countrymen. Gentlemen, I allude to Sinde. I have seen Sir H. Pottinger struggling against a pestilential climate in declining health, still firm at his post, while he thought he could do good service to his country, and displaying all those qualities which on a more extended theatre led to the successful results we are met here this evening to celebrate. (Cheers.) If we were to trace his early history, we should recognize the same qualities of mind and heart throughout his whole career. From the day when, in early youth, he traversed the inhospitable regions of Mekran and Beloochistan in the disguise of a Persian horse-dealer, and braved unknown trials and hardships, and certain death if discovered, to gain information for his Government of those hitherto untrodden countries, to the day, when by his able management he restored peace and order to the fertile province of Cutch, and converted a den of robbers and a scene of anarchy and confusion into one of the most prosperous and tranquil districts within British influence. (Cheers.) I have conversed with the Hindoo ruler of this province, and I have heard him call Sir Henry Pottinger his father, and I know that he offered as a slight testimony of respect and gratitude to educate Sir Henry Pottinger's sons. (Cheers.) These are the triumphs of civilization and enlightenment that reflect credit not only on the man, but on his country, power used, but not abused, power to do good to our fellow men, the first great object of a

Christian heart. (Cheers.) If we turn to Sindh we find Sir Henry Pottinger, by that wonderful influence which he exercises over every Asiatic with whom he is brought into contact, by that mixture of firmness and conciliation, which awes, but still inspires confidence, we find him overcoming every difficulty, and carrying out the wishes of his Government without an appeal to arms. One word of Sir Henry Pottinger would then have added a new province to our empire; one word of Sir Henry Pottinger, and the British flag would have waved on the walls of Hyderabad, but all honour to his moderation and forbearance, he preferred more moderate advantages gained by peace. (Cheers.) He preferred the humbler, in general opinion, but to my mind the far more glorious triumphs of peace, to the bloodstained trophies of successful war. (Cheers.) It is to men like these, to a Malcolm, a Monro, an Elphinstone, a Metcalfe, and a Pottinger, the East India Company owe their calm, sagacious, and equable administration. It is by men like these the germs of civilization are sown, to be developed in future ages, and prepare the way for that last and best result of all our successes and conquests, the supersession of base and degrading superstitions by the blessings of Christianity. (Cheers.) We are told, and it has been repeated often of late, that India has been won by the sword, and must be maintained by the sword, and those who propound this doctrine seem determined to carry it out. We hear of nothing but wars. We are not content with the wars that seek us, we seek them. We cross mountains and deserts to quarrel with those who wish to be our

friends. We grasp at frivolous and flimsy pretexts to add new provinces to our already overgrown empire. We carry out the uncontrollable principle to an unlimited extent ; but war is no more a necessity in Asia than in Europe. (Cheers.) England may rest contented with her past glories in the calm dignity of conscious power. Her sword will not rust by being kept too long in the scabbard, and if her rulers either in Asia or Europe lightly or wrongfully let loose the calamities of war, woe be to those from whom the offence cometh. (Cheers.) Gentlemen, if the millions which have been squandered in unnecessary wars had been expended in the internal improvement of India, they would have given a stimulus to trade, they would have opened up such new outlets, and such wide extended markets, that not only Manchester, but every portion of the British empire would have felt a new impulse in their commerce and manufactures. (Cheers.) Gentlemen, I do not deny that the military and naval services must be kept in a state of efficiency. There is no fear of their degenerating. A better, a more patient, more devoted soldier than the native sepoy does not exist. When we look to the prejudices he surmounts, the hardships he undergoes, the affection he evinces to his officers, no praise is too great. But the mainspring of the Indian services, the life and soul of the navy and army, are the British officers. They are the same in Europe and Asia. The same spirit that animated our forefathers at Cressy and Agincourt, at Trafalgar and Acre, animates those who fight their country's battles on the plains of Hindostan, or on the confines of China. Let us not forget

that the great captain of the age learned the art of war in the service of the East India Company, and although Napoleon in derision called him "the Sepoy General," the laurels of Assaye are not unworthy of binding the brow of the hero of Waterloo. (Cheers.) Gentlemen, British soldiers and British sailors carry British hearts wherever they are called upon to do their duty to their country. The meteor flag of England, which "has braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze," will still, under Providence, in a just cause, float onwards to victory. But may British soldiers remember, and especially those who lead and direct them, that "peace has her victories not less renowned than war," and that war under its most favourable aspect is the greatest curse that can afflict mankind. (Loud cheers.)

A S P E E C H

DELIVERED AT

A COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK
ON 23RD JUNE, 1858.

'SIR JAMES OUTRAM'S SERVICES.

A QUARTERLY General Court of Proprietors of India Stock was held on the 23rd June, 1858, at their house in Leadenhall-street, under the presidency of SIR F. CURRIE, Chairman of the Court of Directors.

The CHAIRMAN said, the Court of Directors had received a letter from the President of the Board of Control, stating that her Majesty had been pleased to confer the dignity of a baronetcy on Sir James Outram. This was the very last act of Lord Ellenborough before he left the Board; and as it was well known that that noble lord and Sir James Outram were not on the most intimate terms, it certainly reflected much credit on Lord Ellenborough, showing as it did that no unpleasant reminiscences prevented him from duly estimating the services of a valued public servant. Sir James Outram was one of their own officers, and his name did not come before the Court for the first time. His services in Persia were well known. It was altogether unnecessary for him to say anything upon that subject, and as his friend the deputy chairman had long known Sir James, having served under him, it would be a gratification to him to express the pleasure he had in seconding the resolution which he now begged to propose:—

“That, as a special mark of the high sense entertained by the East India Company of the services of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., in the course of his long and brilliant career, and more particularly those connected with the memorable defence of the Residency at Lucknow, the occupation and defence of the important post of Alumbagh, and the final conquest of Lucknow, under

the command of General Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B., and with the view of enabling him to maintain the dignity of a baronet, which her Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon him, Sir James Outram be granted an annuity of 1,000*l.* for the term of his natural life, commencing from the date of the final occupation of Lucknow."

Captain EASTWICK (Deputy-Chairman) said:—

I have peculiar satisfaction in seconding this motion. Having had the privilege of an intimate friendship with Sir James Outram for many years, having served with him in India, and having enjoyed ample opportunities of knowing and appreciating his great ability, his indomitable courage, and his untiring devotion to the public service, I most cordially unite in the proposition to confer upon him this special mark of the high sense entertained of his services by the East India Company, which has been awarded to only a few of their most distinguished servants, but which not one has more fairly earned than Sir James Outram. It is now nearly forty years since he landed in India, and from the earliest period of his long and brilliant career he gave promise of future eminence and distinction. He showed that he possessed in a remarkable degree two qualities which fit a man for high achievements. He relied firmly on his own convictions, and had the courage to act upon them without dread of responsibility. Whatever he had to do he did with all his might, not with eye-service as to men, but in singleness of purpose with sole reference to the public good: In 1819 he entered the Bombay army as a cadet, and was soon appointed adjutant of his corps. He saw service in the Myhee Caunta, Kattywar, and the Southern Mahratta country; but it was

not until 1825 that an opportunity was afforded him of displaying in an especial manner that quickness of perception, that readiness of resource, and that promptness in action which made him a marked man in his profession, and led to his selection for difficult and responsible employment. A rebel chief in Khandeish, with about 800 followers, had plundered the town of Untapore, and had taken refuge in the hill fort of Mullair. There he raised the standard of the Peishwa, adherents flocked to him, and in a short time the insurrection would have spread throughout the whole province. British troops were warned from every quarter, but Lieutenant Outram, with a small detachment of 200 Sepoys, having made a forced march of thirty-five miles, under cover of a false attack in front, escaladed the fort in the rear, killed the leader, and crushed the rebellion. Shortly after this brilliant exploit, Mr. Elphinstone, then Governor of Bombay, selected Lieutenant Outram to organize the Bheel corps. Khandeish at that period was a scene of anarchy, rapine, and disorder. The Bheels were a proscribed race, their hand against every man, and every man's hand against them. They were sunk in ignorance, debauchery, and crime, and it was thought by some in authority that their utter extermination could alone restore peace to the province. Mr. Elphinstone thought otherwise. He determined to make them "the guardians of the peace they had so long disturbed," and in Lieutenant Outram he found a fitting instrument. It would occupy too much time to trace the progress of an experiment alike honourable to our countryman and our country—suffice it to

state the results. In a few years Khandeish was pacified; not, however, without difficulties, which, as Sir John Malcolm wrote, "Lieutenant Outram's local influence and personal character could alone have overcome, affording an example of what may be done by officers who add to knowledge of their duty as soldiers an acquaintance with the habits, prejudices, and languages of the natives, and who, by conciliatory conduct to all ranks, secure their confidence, and are thus enabled to effect objects which by military force alone they could never accomplish." To relate the romantic adventures and hairbreadth escapes of Outram's Khandeish career would fill volumes. Foremost in every expedition of danger, whether in pursuit of the wild beasts of the forest or the still wilder gangs of plunderers, he seemed to these "Children of the Mist" to bear a charmed life. In an expedition to the Daung jungle, out of 13 officers who accompanied him he alone escaped the deadly fever. I may remark as a curious fact, that he is said to have owed his safety to the precaution of always sleeping with a covering of fine gauze over his head and face, to the irksomeness of which "fever guard" others would not submit. In the hot weather of 1831 most alarming atrocities were perpetrated by the Bheel tribes, and we learn from official documents that "Outram, with only 25 of his own Bheels, and a few district police and horse, apprehended 469 generally desperate characters, selected 158 of the most guilty for punishment, committed them for trial for 30 gang robberies, with such full and clear evidence, that all but eight were convicted and sentenced." Thus, by alternate

vigour and conciliation, now penetrating into their most secure fastnesses, and crushing with iron hand those who defied his authority, at another time throwing himself unarmed and unattended among his recent foes, sitting at their feasts, listening to their legends, joining in their games and hunting expeditions, he stole the hearts of those wild denizens of the forests, moulded them to his own ends, and gained new triumphs for progress and civilization. It is related of Washington, when travelling in the country of the Indians, that he was met by an aged chief who had come a long distance to pay him homage, telling him that at the battle of Monongahela (where Washington had been miraculously preserved, having had four bullets through his coat and two horses shot under him), he had aimed at him several times with his rifle, and had directed his young warriors to do the same, without effect, and that they had then desisted, believing that Washington was under the special guardianship of the Great Spirit, and was not destined to die in battle. We can recognize the hand of a special Providence reserving a great man for a great work on earth; but it is not difficult to imagine the magic influence that would attach to the name of Washington, connected with such an incident, in the minds of the untutored Indians. In the same manner the name of Outram became a household word amongst the Bheels; never was the power of an individual mind more strikingly exemplified, never did moral superiority of character achieve a greater triumph. There is no mean lesson in state-craft to be derived from the study of this portion of Sir James Outram's

career. In it lies the whole secret of the marvellous rise and progress of our Indian empire. It is simply the art of governing the natives, through themselves, by the force of individual mind, subjugating the wills and affections of the millions. From Clive and Hastings to Lawrence and Outram a succession of heroes and statesmen has grown up equal to this great work. Recent events have proved the race is not extinct, if we only give them fair play. But of late years we have more and more sought to crush individual thought and energy by check and counter check, by petty interference and jealous mistrust, and by a galling and repressive system of centralization. It is not thus we gained India, it is not thus we can hold it. Simplicity, promptness, and vigour in our administrative machinery, justice and moderation in our measures, based on real superiority of character, can alone enable a handful of Europeans to rule millions of Asiatics. But to return to Sir James Outram. The disturbed districts of the Myhee Caunta were the next scene of his labours; from thence, in 1838, he joined Lord Keane's force, and shared in the taking of Ghuzni, and all the operations in Affghanistan. His capture of a Ghazee standard, his adventurous pursuit of Dost Mahomed, and his dispersion of the rebel Ghilzie chiefs are well known. We next find him earning distinction as aide-de-camp to General Wiltshire at the siege of Khelat, and then follows one of those characteristic incidents which invest his career with almost romantic interest. After the fall of the fortress he undertook to carry the tidings through the heart of the enemy's country to the sea coast, distant

360 miles, which he traversed in native costume, on a sturdy little Affghan pony, in seven days and a-half, exposed to all kinds of dangers and privations on the road, and finally reached Sonmeeanee, escaping his pursuers by only a few hours. In 1840 Major Outram was appointed political agent in Lower Sinde. How he bore himself throughout those eventful years of mingled triumph and disaster let Sir Henry Lawrence and Mr. Elphinstone say. In the *Calcutta Review* for September, 1845, Sir Henry Lawrence writes: "In the year 1838, Outram carried to Affghanistan a character such as could not be paralleled by any officer of his standing in India. His services during the first Affghan war were second to those of no officer then and there employed; and had he remained in the Ghilzie country or at Khelat, many of our disasters might have been averted. But it is by his civil management, first of Lower Sinde and then of both the upper and lower provinces, and of all Beloochistan, that Outram has won our highest admiration. When the European inhabitants of Calcutta trembled for our Indian empire, when in the highest places men grew pale at the evil tidings from Affghanistan, Outram held his frontier post with a firm hand, a brave heart, and a cheerful tone, that ought to have been contagious. Vigilant, conciliatory, courageous, he managed with his handful of troops not only to prevent the Ameers from taking advantage of our disasters, but to induce them to aid in furnishing supplies and carriages for the relieving, then considered the retreating, army." And in a published letter of Mr. Elphinstone, dated the 7th of July, 1843,

to Mr. John Loch, after recapitulating Colonel Outram's claim to higher distinction than had been awarded to him, Mr. Elphinstone goes on to say:—"All this is written as if Colonel Outram was merely a military officer, who had distinguished himself in the Affghan campaign, and who now again shared with many others in the services lately performed in Sinde; but you are well aware how far this is from Colonel Outram's real position. Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy." If I know anything of Outram's inner heart, this recorded testimony of the greatest of Indian statesmen conveyed more real satisfaction to his mind than any commendation he may have received throughout his brilliant career. About this time Major Outram was presented with a sword by the community of Bombay, including the most eminent civil and military servants, "for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, and more especially his heroic defence of the British Residency at Hydrabad, in Sinde, on the 15th of February, 1843, against an army of 8,000 Belooches, with six guns." The venerable and pious Bishop of Bombay could not consistently join in the presentation of a sword, but "as a mark of respect, he sent Major Outram the Book of Common Prayer and Holy Bible, with the appropriate inscription, 'Thou hast covered my head in the day of battle.'" And, while on this subject, I may mention that the present Pope caused a gold medal to be struck and transmitted to Sir J.

Outram, "as a testimonial of gratitude for the kindness displayed by you to poor Catholics under your command, or stationed within your Residency." I state these facts as evidences of Outram's gentle and noble nature, of his large and liberal sympathies with his fellow-men, and of the universal estimation in which he is held by all classes. In 1843, Sir J. Outram came to England, but at the first rumour of war with the Sikhs, returned to India. No war at that time occurred, and he was employed in the Southern Mahratta country, where he earned the special approbation of Lord Hardinge, than whom no one was more capable of appreciating a good soldier. But I should trespass at too great length upon the indulgence of the Court if I attempted to enter into details regarding the varied and distinguished services of Sir James Outram in the high political appointments he held from 1843 to 1857. He was successively Resident at Sattara, at Baroda, at Aden, and at Lucknow. In 1856 he became the Governor-General's Agent and Chief Commissioner in Oude. At this period his health gave way under the burden of incessant toil. He came to England to recruit, and those friends who saw him bowed down by sickness and continual pain, which almost entirely deprived him of sleep, little thought that he would be spared to render still greater services to his country. But, like an old war-horse scenting the battle from afar, at the first sound of the trumpet of duty his stiffened limbs resumed their wonted energy, and he started to take command of the expeditionary force to Persia. How successfully he carried out the instructions of Govern-

ment in that brief campaign is well known. He returned to Calcutta at the height of the mutiny, to be intrusted by Lord Canning with an important command, where one of his first acts was, with characteristic nobleness of disposition, to refuse to rob the equally noble Havelock of the glory of relieving Lucknow. As a volunteer, he charged with the yeomanry cavalry, and wherever danger was thickest there he was to be found. After what has been already said, it is not necessary to enlarge on the prominent part he bore in the first advance to Lucknow, in the subsequent defence of the Residency, in the occupation and defence of the important post of Alumbagh, and in the final conquest of Lucknow. In the enumeration of his claims on the gratitude of his country, I cannot omit his wise and strenuous advocacy of a generous policy towards the landholders of Oude, on which alone could hopes of tranquillity be based. On these grounds I cordially second this motion. It will be valued by Sir James Outram, not for its pecuniary advantages—for his own sake and for his family's sake he has all his life cared too little for such considerations; as an instance I may mention that upon scruples of conscience he declined to appropriate to his own use his share of the Sinde prize money, but made over the whole amount (considerably more than 3,000*l.*) to charitable institutions. Colonel French, of the Bombay army, was his almoner on this occasion, and told me the circumstance; Sir J. Outram would never have alluded to it. It may, indeed, be said of Outram, in the glowing language of Macaulay, that, "proud of his honourable poverty, after leading

victorious armies, and after making and deposing kings, his name stands high in the list of warriors, and will be found inscribed in a better list—in the list of those who have done and suffered much for the happiness of mankind.” (Cheers.) Such men are rare, they deserve the highest rewards a grateful country can bestow upon them. No institutions, no political contrivances, can supply their place. It is alike the honour and interest of society to obtain their services in the administration of its affairs. (Loud cheers.)

A S P E E C H

DELIVERED AT

A COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK
ON 25TH AUGUST, 1858.

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE'S SERVICES.

A SPECIAL General Court of the East India Company was held on the 25th August, 1858, at their house in Leadenhall Street. SIR F. CURRIE, Chairman of the Court of Directors, in the Chair.

The minutes of the last Court having been read and confirmed,

The CHAIRMAN informed the Court that it had been specially convened for the purpose of submitting to the Proprietors a resolution unanimously agreed to by the Court of Directors granting to Sir John Lawrence an annuity of 2,000*l.*, to commence from the date when he may retire from the service.

The Hon. CHAIRMAN then moved the following resolution :—

“That in recognition of the eminent merits of Sir John Laird Mair Lawrence, G.C.B., whose prompt, vigorous, and judicious measures crushed an incipient mutiny in the Punjaub, and maintained the province in tranquillity during a year of almost universal convulsion, and who, by his extraordinary exertions, was enabled to equip troops, and to prepare munitions of war for distant operations, thus mainly contributing to the re-capture of Delhi, and to the subsequent successes which attended our arms, and in testimony of the high sense entertained by the East India Company, of his public character and conduct throughout a long and distinguished career, an annuity of 2,000*l.* be granted to him, the same to commence from the date when he may retire from the service.”

CAPTAIN EASTWICK, Deputy-Chairman, said—

I consider it a high distinction to be permitted to second this motion; but after what has fallen from the hon. Chairman, who has spoken from personal

knowledge, and who has had the privilege of watching the career of Sir John Lawrence, from the time he entered the service of which they are both such distinguished ornaments, it will not be necessary for me to trespass at any length on the attention of the Court. There can be no question of the claims and merits of Sir John Lawrence. The trumpet of his fame has given no uncertain sound. Amid the group of illustrious men who have been brought prominently before the eyes of the public during the late terrible convulsion in India, Sir John Lawrence, like Saul of old, stands from the shoulders and upward higher than any of his compeers. The public voice of India and the public voice of England have pronounced their verdict in language not to be mistaken (Hear, hear), and the only feeling is, if I err not, a feeling of surprise and disappointment, that earlier and more decided steps have not been taken, to mark the sense of the country with respect to the services of him, who is universally allowed to hold the foremost place among those, who by their wisdom, firmness, and heroic conduct, have, under God's blessing, preserved the British empire in India. (Cheers.) This Court has never been backward in testifying its sense of the merits of distinguished men in India. Many of those I see around me have themselves served with distinction in that country, many are still connected with India by ties of interest and ties of affection. It is natural that we should watch events more narrowly than the general public, and appreciate more keenly the merits or demerits of those who fill the highest posts in India. Names and places which convey no definite or distinct

idea to the mass of our countrymen are to us familiar as household words. We can understand from personal experience the difficulties of governing millions of Asiatics, differing in manners, language, and religion, as much as the nations of Europe differ from each other, by a mere handful of Englishmen. The wonder is, not that a storm should arise to shake our Indian empire to its foundation, but that such an empire should ever have been founded by such means, and should have grown up to such gigantic dimensions. We have seen the self-sacrificing labours of those who bear the heat and burden of the day in maintaining that empire, and we believe that the man who has fought his way to the highest eminence there, through a long career of honour and usefulness, who has restored peace and order to provinces, where anarchy and bloodshed reigned, who has reconciled warlike and hostile races to British sway, and placed the resources of a vast kingdom at the disposal of the British Government in the hour of her greatest need, has as fair a claim to the gratitude of his country, and as just a title to the highest honours of the State, as the proudest representative of hereditary wealth, or the most favoured partisan of a parliamentary leader. (Cheers.) Sir John Lawrence, from the earliest period of his service, was remarkable for that energy, industry, and self-reliance, which enable a man to stand by himself, and do his duty efficiently in every position in which he may be placed; but it is the latter portion of his career which chiefly entitles him to the consideration of this Court. The reputation he had acquired as an excellent officer, caused him to

be selected for employment in the Punjaub, when it was first brought under British rule; and it is on his administration of that province that his fame chiefly rests. In that great work he was associated with his ever-to-be-lamented brother, Sir Henry, the soldier-statesman, the friend of humanity, the Christian hero. (Hear, hear.) Under the two brothers and Montgomery was formed that school of public servants which has become famous throughout India—a galaxy of brilliant names, a list of glorious Englishmen, of which any country might feel justly proud. To my mind there is no single point in the administration of the Punjaub, which reflects greater lustre on Sir John Lawrence, and those associated with him, than the characters of the men who have been trained and given to the public service under their supervision. I have heard Sir John Lawrence characterized as a hard task-master. It has been said that he has no bowels of compassion. Work he must have—the tale of bricks with or without the straw. He never spared himself, nor was he inclined to spare others. Able and energetic officers met with every encouragement from him (hear, hear), but the idle and incapable—men who thought they had a vested interest in good situations—received no quarter at his hands. They were remorselessly shelved or driven away. Hence the successful results; and this principle lies at the root of all successful administration in India. If we wish to preserve our empire, to introduce the reforms which are absolutely requisite, selection for high employment must be the rule of the service. We can afford to pay mediocrities; we can afford to pension them, but we cannot

afford to intrust them with high and responsible employment. It will require moral courage, and honesty of purpose, and a strong will in high places to carry out this system ; but it must be done, and John Lawrence is one of the men that could do it. It was his implicit confidence in his subordinates that enabled him "not only resolutely to keep order in the Punjaub, but to hurl every available soldier, European and Sikh, against Delhi." On the 21st of October, 1857, he himself writes :—

"When I look back on the events of the last four months, I am lost in astonishment that any of us are alive; but for the mercy of God, we must have been ruined. Had the Sikhs joined against us, nothing, humanly speaking, could have saved us. No man could have hoped, much less foreseen, that they would have withstood the temptation to avenge their national independence."

It must not be supposed, because the danger passed away, because the bold policy of Sir John Lawrence was successful, that no danger from the Sikh nation existed. We learn from those on the spot that the question of the Sikhs being for us or against us trembled in the balance. No doubt the thought crossed the minds of many veteran warriors of the Khalsa race, but they were without leaders, an undying hatred of the Poorbeyas and Mahommedans burned in their hearts, the desire of plunder, and of wreaking vengeance on Delhi, the scene of so many atrocities against their forefathers, urged them; the associations connected with such names as Lawrence, Edwardes, Nicholson, Lake, and others, were a tower of strength to the English cause; and at this critical moment Sir John Lawrence threw open wider the

ranks of our service, and gave employment to all who would enlist. Amid the universal distrust of the natives of India, a weaker man would have hesitated to adopt so bold a measure, the tide might have turned, and the vessel of the State been stranded; but we all know the result of this move of Sir John Lawrence, and we have only now to take precautions against the returning Sikh wave. There was another formidable danger which menaced the Punjaub, and might well have induced caution in denuding the province of troops. It was to be expected that the turbulent Mahomedan tribes on the frontier would seize the opportunity for invasion, but no dread of responsibility for his own special charge could divert Sir John Lawrence from the far larger considerations of the safety of the empire. He saw that the recapture of Delhi was the turning-point of the struggle; and no man will say that without his extraordinary exertions, and the aid of the troops and munitions of war furnished from the Punjaub, Delhi would have fallen. It must not be forgotten that all the time Sir John Lawrence's own position was one of extreme anxiety and danger. He had only the newly-raised Sikh levies, and a diminished European force to keep in check thousands of disarmed mutinous sepoy. In speaking of Sir John Lawrence, I am aware how much he was indebted for the peace of the province to the vigilance and firmness of the heroic men who served under him; but details would occupy too much time. In order effectually to nip incipient mutiny in the bud measures of extreme severity were necessary on some occasions. We all know revolutions are not to be extinguished

with rose-water; but at this distance of time it is impossible to read of the wholesale destruction of human life without feelings of pain and sorrow. I will mention two facts, which will, I think, show that Sir John Lawrence himself only sanctioned such severe measures from imperious necessity. He had no desire to shed unnecessary blood, but acted on the principle of stern, solemn, retributive justice. (Hear, hear.) After the capture of Delhi, he was placed in charge of the districts of Delhi and Meerut, and his first act was to put a stop to civilians exercising the power of hanging criminals according to their own will and pleasure, and to establish a judicial commission to try all offenders. No act contributed more to the restoration of confidence among the natives, and to the tranquillity of the surrounding districts. We also know that Sir John Lawrence was from the first the opponent of blind, indiscriminate vengeance, and the strong advocate of an amnesty, to include all except the murderers in cold blood of our countrymen and countrywomen. These measures show that he knew how to temper mercy with justice, firmness with conciliation; that he could be, as the natives say, both "nurm," and "gurm," which is the only way to rule the natives of India. Time would not permit, and I have not attempted to enter into minute details of the various administrative measures which have either originated with Sir John Lawrence, or have been sanctioned and supported by him, and have exercised such a beneficial influence on the welfare and prosperity of the millions over whose destinies he has so long presided. But there is one important measure

to which I will briefly allude—I mean the Punjaub code (hear, hear), which I believe was chiefly drawn up by him, and owes to him its working efficiency. If there is any one point which has tended more than another to alienate the hearts of the people of India from our rule, it is the working of our civil courts of justice. With the purest and best intentions, we have utterly failed. In lieu of cheapness, promptitude, and simplicity, we have introduced bewildering technicalities, expensive forms, and endless delays. We have placed the unfortunate ryot within the grasp of his more designing countrymen. No doubt this state of things is chiefly owing to the instruments with which we have to work, to the natives themselves; but the sooner we imitate the simplicity of the Punjaub code, or an improved code—for improvements can be made even on the Punjaub code—the better for India. I think I have said sufficient to justify my vote. It was Mr. Canning who stated, that no monarchy in Europe had produced within a given time so many men of the first talents in civil and military life as India within the same period. I believe Mr. Canning spoke the truth. It is early responsibility, and the habit of dealing with great affairs, that develop the faculties of men, and bring out those characteristic qualities, moral and intellectual, which have made us what we are as a nation, and which hundreds of our countrymen who sit at home at ease, would display, if similar opportunities were afforded to them. Among the eminent statesmen India has produced, I believe few names will hold a more prominent place than that of Sir John Lawrence.

A SPEECH

DELIVERED AT

AN ADJOURNED SPECIAL COURT OF PROPRIETORS, HELD AT
THE INDIA HOUSE, ON THE 20TH OF JANUARY, 1858.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

The meeting was adjourned from the 13th instant.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Mangles, M.P.), in opening the proceedings, said:—I think it might perhaps be agreeable to the Court, that before proceeding with the debate, they should learn that we have received from her Majesty's Government an answer to the communication addressed to them by the Directors, and if they concur, I shall be happy to direct that the letters that have passed between the Court of Directors and the Government be read.

THE CLERK OF THE COURT then read the correspondence.

The CHAIRMAN then stated that the Court of Directors had prepared a petition to Parliament. If the Proprietors wished, the petition should be read. (Loud and general cries of "Read, read.")

The CLERK read the petition.

Mr. Jones, Sir Lawrence Peel, and Mr. Dickinson having spoken, CAPTAIN EASTWICK rose, and said,—

THE Honourable Proprietor who opened the debate with such an able and vigorous address, truly said that the admirable Petition which was read at the commencement of our proceedings this morning, had forestalled our arguments, and clothed them in language of force and precision which few could hope to equal; nevertheless, I trust I may be permitted to

offer a few observations on the important subject now under consideration.

I am very glad that this opportunity has been afforded us of expressing our sentiments, and I rejoice to think, from the large attendance of the Proprietors, that the gravity and magnitude of the question are fully appreciated. There is no doubt in my mind that if the Proprietors have anything to say, now is the time to make themselves heard throughout the country. I know it is the opinion of some, that we ought to have waited until the details of the measure which the Ministry intend to propose to Parliament are before us; but surely we know enough to justify us in taking our stand. We know that the basis of the proposed measure is the abolition of what is termed the double government, which is, in fact, the extinction of the balance of power, of every check upon the absolute will of the Minister, which forms the chief merit in the present system for the Government of India; that system, under which an insignificant mercantile factory has been converted into a magnificent empire; that system which has, for a period of more than seventy years, from time to time undergone the severest scrutiny and investigation, but still has been perpetuated by successive Parliaments. No one can deny that it is anomalous—that it has disadvantages which are likely to be exaggerated by superficial observers, and which can be increased by defective working; but with all its anomalies, with all its disadvantages, it has commended itself to the wisdom and approval of some of our greatest statesmen; and there must be counterbalancing advantages,

or it never would have passed untouched through so many searching ordeals. Four years have not elapsed since it was again renewed, and again ratified by Parliament, after due inquiry and investigation. It certainly, therefore, does seem a strong measure to propose to abolish it without any inquiry, without any investigation.

Let me not be misunderstood. I do not for a moment assert that no improvement can be made in the system. We live in an age of progress. We must advance, we cannot stand still. All our institutions must be adapted to our increasing intelligence and enlarged experience. Many of those who have thought most deeply on the subject feel strongly that our Government in India is still an experimental one. The late terrible events have demolished many theories, and overthrown many preconceived ideas; but if they have taught any lesson, it is more especially a lesson of caution and prudence in jumping hastily to conclusions about a country and people concerning whose habits, customs, and feelings, we have clearly much to learn.

There is no doubt that great and radical changes must take place in our system of administration in India, if we wish to preserve our empire. If it can be proved, after proper investigation, that the system of government at home has been the cause of the defects that have been made patent by the late troubles in India, or if it can be shown that there is not sufficient vigour, sufficient vitality, in the present system to carry out the changes which are absolutely required in India, then there ought to be no hesitation

in remodelling the system. All petty, personal, party interests fade into insignificance in comparison with so solemn, so momentous a question. But I suppose few will venture to assert that even if the management of affairs in India had been transferred to the Crown in 1854, the insurrection would have been averted; nor will it, I imagine, be maintained that if India were transferred to the Crown to-morrow, there would be any difference in the policy that would be pursued, either in putting down the rebellion, or in introducing reforms and improvements hereafter. The fact is, the policy of the East India Company is the policy of the Government; the Ministers of the country are responsible for it, and the country itself through their representatives in Parliament.

But the point which presses strongly upon my mind, and to which I would wish to draw the special attention of this Court, is the time that is selected for making an organic change in the constitution of the Government of India. Is this the proper time, I would ask, to introduce such an important change? In the midst of a tremendous convulsion, when in many provinces the land-marks of order are only just now reappearing above the waves of the deluge, when men's hearts are failing them for fear, and terror and alarm pervade the length and breadth of the land, is this a time to sweep away the name and form of a Government under which the empire has grown up, and which has always been associated in the minds of the natives of India with good fortune, prosperity, and victory? "Company ka-ikbal" has long been a household word throughout Hindostan. We know

with what tenacity the natives of India cling to old associations; but we do not know, in the present unhinged and excited state of men's minds, what effect a change may have upon them, which designing persons might represent only as a prelude to further change fraught with evil to the native community.

Among the causes of the late insurrection, the belief by the sepoys that the Government entertained designs hostile to their caste, was, without doubt, a prominent one. This belief was totally without foundation, and had probably been inculcated by designing persons who knew better; but the belief was genuine. I know that this has been disputed—that the greased cartridges were considered to have been a mere pretence. A leading member of the House of Commons stated, amid the cheers of the House, that “revolutions are not made with grease;” but those who know India, and the natives of India, and how caste is mixed up with their temporal, and believed to be mixed up with their eternal welfare, will not respond so readily to this profound philosophy. We must not measure Orientals by an European standard, or we shall assuredly fall into grievous error.* We are told that “when the Romans invaded

* The recent extraordinary infatuation of the Caffres, in killing all their cattle at the instance of one of their magicians, has in its points of resemblance to the madness which infected the sepoys. The sepoys, however, added treachery to their benefactors, and plunged into crimes from the contemplation of which the mind shrinks, and for which no earthly punishment can be considered adequate. Retribution stern, solemn, and unrelenting, must be exacted; justice must be satisfied; but vengeance—indiscriminate vengeance, founded upon a blind antagonism of race—is unworthy

Egypt, the inhabitants, without the least resistance, placed their lives and property at the mercy of the foreigner ; but " when a Roman soldier happened to kill a cat in the streets of Alexandria, the people rose upon him with ungovernable fury, and tore him limb from limb ; and the Roman general was obliged to overlook the outrage, from fear of the spread of the insurrection.* We all know of what essential service the Sikhs have been to us during the late troubles. Their glorious deeds at Arrah, at Delhi, and wherever danger was thickest, can never be forgotten. It is scarcely too much to say, that the Sikhs and Sir John Lawrence have saved our empire. We know that they have fewer prejudices than the natives of Hindostan, and that in their habits they are much more akin to Europeans. And yet one of the best officers in the Bengal army told me, that his Sikh regiment was on the verge of mutiny at the introduction of a new regimental cap, because it was feared there might be some leather in it. Suppose a

of our greatness as a nation, and wholly incompatible with our duties and responsibilities as Christians. An infinite and all-wise Creator works out His designs in a mysterious way, wholly beyond the comprehension of our finite understandings. His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are His ways our ways. As when the earth is bound by the icy chains of winter, all nature seems cold, blank, and lifeless, man could not know, except by experience, that in a brief space, under the genial influence of spring, the earth would again be covered with beauty. Even so this tremendous convulsion, which has brought horror and desolation to so many English hearths, may contain within itself the germs of future good for India, to be developed, if rightly used, in more rapid progress, and a wider extension, of civilization and Christianity.

* Essay XV., p. 126, *Bacon's Essays* with annotations, by Archbishop Whateley.

Commander-in-Chief fresh from Europe had issued an order that all the Sikh soldiers should wear leather caps,—it seems a trifling thing, and to the European mind almost incredible, but it might have driven them to frenzy; and with such inflammable materials as are always at hand in India, who can tell what fatal consequences might not have ensued? Yet the same profound philosophy would most probably have looked beyond such “small griefs,” and exclaimed, “Revolutions are not made with leather caps.”* Whatever our countrymen at home may think, the day has not yet arrived when a handful of Europeans can govern 200 millions of people in the teeth of their strongest feelings, and in defiance of their most deeply-rooted prejudices.

We have heard much of late in condemnation of the traditionary policy of the East India Company. What is this traditionary policy, but a necessary

* The account of “the mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind” at Athens, on the occasion of the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, as related in vol. vii., chap. lviii., 229 and following pages of “Grote’s History of Greece,” is eminently suggestive to the thoughtful mind in connection with any open forcible violation of the religious prejudices of the people of India. The historian truly says, “It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own; indeed the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of a different creed, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement;” but the effects are not the less grave. The historian subsequently writes—“Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Athens, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt, and so long remembered, as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the Gods.”

adaptation of means to ends, to time and circumstances founded on experience and knowledge of the people with whom we have to deal—a wise toleration and respect for the feelings and prejudices of the natives, which has ensured a calm and equable progress, and laid the foundation of greater strides in advance, that might have been jeopardized by rash and hasty measures? This policy is not a stationary nor a retrograde policy, but a policy of progress. It may, perhaps, have moved too slowly, but the principles are sound, and the only principles on which we can rule India. People talk as glibly of reconquering India, which, fortunately for us, has not revolted, as Mr. Cobden used to talk of crumpling up Russia; but Mr. Cobden has lived to find out his mistake, and Heaven forbid that this country should commit the fatal error of placing itself in direct antagonism to the people of India, under the supposition that we can carry everything by brute force and compulsion.

Without undervaluing in the smallest degree the undaunted courage, the marvellous endurance, the chivalrous self-devotion of British officers and soldiers, which have never shone more brightly than during the late troubles, and of which England may justly feel proud, we must never forget that it is chiefly through the assistance of the natives we have gained India, by them we have maintained it, and for them we ought to hold it. Notwithstanding all that has taken place, our mission is still the same—to elevate them in the scale of nations, to bring them more and more within the pale of civilization, and pave the way for the spread of that blessed Gospel, which we

are told by infallible wisdom, will, in God's own time, "cover the earth as the waters cover the sea."

We are continually taunted with having done so little for India; with having held the country for so many years, and impressed upon it so little of European civilization and improvement. Those who bring this charge against the Government of India, forget the progressive steps by which we have attained our present commanding position; that, in the first instance, we were there by sufferance; that we then had to struggle for existence, and that we had all our knowledge to acquire to enable us to legislate with effect for a people so different to ourselves. Fifty years in the life of an European nation are marked by great strides in advance, but fifty years in the life of an Asiatic nation are not so pregnant with great changes. Still, even tried by this test, the condition of India previous to this unhappy insurrection shone out in bright contrast with what it was a few years ago. It would occupy too much time to attempt a recapitulation of all the improvements and ameliorations that have been the consequences of British rule. A Memorandum has lately been prepared in the India House showing the improvements in the administration of India during the last thirty years, and its perusal will, I feel assured, afford to every candid and unprejudiced mind ample evidence of real and substantial progress. If all has not been achieved that could have been wished, much has been done, and there has been the earnest, honest desire to do more. There have been, no doubt, great and grievous failures. But under what Government have there not

been failures? Often those failures have led to ultimate success; many of those most condemned have been based upon the deliberate and recorded opinions of the most intelligent and distinguished servants of the Company, and have only served to show the difficulties with which we have to contend.

For these difficulties no allowances are made by the opponents of the East India Company. Every sort of exaggeration and misrepresentation is put forth to excite the public mind; until lately, scarcely a voice was raised in defence of the Company's administration, but the public are beginning to feel that this dark picture has a reverse side. No institution or Government which is always attacked and never defended can long be maintained. I must confess I have always considered it bad policy to hide our light under a bushel; and I have always thought that this Court might have been made the medium of exposing unfounded accusations, and of giving to the public sound and accurate information regarding the details of our administration in India. There is no greater security for good Government than public discussion; the public in general do not err wilfully, but through ignorance and want of information; and it is the bounden duty of those in office to furnish that information to the utmost extent, and in the freest manner compatible with the interests of the public service.

Amongst the topics which have tended to create the strongest prejudice against the East India Company in the public mind, there are two special ones, to which, if the Court will permit me, I will briefly

allude. These topics are the torture question and the religious question, the latter comprehending the question of education. Now I think late events in India have thrown a flood of light upon the question of torture. In the first place, it will now be clearly understood in England of what the natives of India are capable when left to themselves. It will be seen how broad is the line of demarcation between the native and European mind, and to what depths of fiendish cruelty the Asiatic can descend. Not that I would include all the natives of India in this category. I believe there are hundreds and thousands, nay millions, who look upon the barbarities which have been committed with equal horror with ourselves. I am proud to number amongst my friends many of the natives of India—friends of my youth, for whom I still entertain a high regard and esteem.

It will, I say, be understood of what cruelties the natives are capable, and it will be also understood in what impenetrable secrecy they can envelop their schemes and proceedings. This is a feature in the character of the Asiatic which the people of England cannot comprehend. It is with such instruments as these we have to work in carrying on the administration of India. I believe that there is no amount of tyranny and cruelty which is not at times inflicted on the ryots by the native servants of the Government; but they know very well that such acts are abhorrent to their European superiors, and are breaches of the law, and that they would be severely punished if detected. Cases, however, do still undoubtedly occur; and when it is recollected how limited the number of

European servants is in India, compared with the vast extent of territory and the swarming myriads of population they have to supervise, it is not to be wondered if such cases at times escape observation.

All those who know India are aware that the practice of torture has existed in India from time immemorial; it still exists in full vigour under native Governments (witness the late Sir William Sleeman's "Diary of a Tour through Oude"), and under our own; in spite of endeavours to put it down; and will exist until the light of civilization and Christianity dispels the thick darkness that broods over the land, and renders such practices as abhorrent to the native as they are to the European mind.

I have admitted torture exists, but it exists in spite of the East India Company. It is known to be a breach of the law, as much as murder and highway robbery. It is punished whenever detected; and the East India Company and their European servants might with equal justice be accused of being accessories to infanticide, suttee, or any of the other atrocities which have already disappeared, or are gradually disappearing, under British rule.

No unprejudiced man can read the Report of the Madras Torture Commissioners, dated April 16, 1855, without acquitting the East India Company and their servants. The Commissioners state that, of late years, "these practices have been steadily decreasing in severity and extent;" that "the service is entitled to the fullest credit for its disclaimer of all countenance of the cruel practices which prevail in the revenue as well as in the police department;"

that "we have seen nothing to impress us with the belief that the people at large entertain an idea that their maltreatment is countenanced or tolerated by the European officers of Government;" that "there is not a native public servant, from the highest to the lowest, who does not well know that these practices are held in abhorrence by his European superiors;" and that "the whole cry of the people which has come up before us is to save them from the cruelties of their fellow-natives, not from the effects of unkindness or indifference on the part of the European officers of Government."

I think this evidence is sufficient to show how unfounded are the accusations against the East India Company and their European servants, of sanctioning or conniving at practices which every Englishman must abhor, and which, if true, would disgrace us as men and as Christians in the eyes of the whole civilized world. Let the people of England recollect, before they accept as true, without evidence and without inquiry, these odious charges made against their countrymen in India, often by the disappointed and the factious, for political and party purposes, that the honour of their country and religion are alike at stake upon the truth or falsehood of such charges.

I now come to a more important question—the question how far the Government of India has fulfilled its duty as a Christian Government; and before I say one word I must state distinctly that I sympathize with my whole heart with the missionary movement. It is my solemn belief that God has given us that great country to promote the spread of His Gospel,

and that as we fulfil, or fall short of this end, so will our reward or punishment as a nation be; but I believe also that this end is not to be worked out by the influence of Government, still less by any arbitrary interference or compulsion, but by the power of reason and persuasion, by the progress of enlightenment, by the triumph of light over darkness, and by the grace of God descending upon the hearts of the benighted millions of Hindostan.

Holding these opinions, it would be impossible that I could have retained my seat in the Direction if one-fiftieth part of what is alleged against the Indian Government on this momentous subject were true. I believe that the greatest misapprehension exists throughout the country on this question.*

When I read that one Member of Parliament designates the Indian Government as "half-infidel, half-atheist," when I myself heard another Member of Parliament, in speaking of days long gone by, quote to a crowded meeting an apocryphal remark of one of the Directors of the East India Company, "that he would sooner see a band of devils enter India than a band of missionaries," as evidencing the opinions prevailing amongst the honourable body to which I belong, I do not wonder that misapprehension prevails. Now, I am not going to enter into controverted questions on which earnest, sincere men may conscien-

* "As an instance of accusations totally erroneous, I may mention the statement that the Koran is used in all Government schools in India. To any one acquainted with the composition of an Indian population, such a statement carries its own refutation along with it."—*Speech of the Rev. J. Murray Mitchell.*

tiously differ; my only object is very briefly to lay before the Court a few facts showing the course pursued by the Indian authorities at home and abroad, and the principles laid down to be carried into practice, as circumstances would permit.

I am dealing with present facts, not with old stories that have been dead and buried years ago. I should like to know what would be thought of a Member of Parliament if he were to bring a bill of indictment against the present Government, and include in it all the shortcomings of former governments for the last forty or fifty years; if he were to inflict upon the House long tirades against slavery, protection, and other errors of legislation which formerly found their advocates, but now are as exploded, in the minds of statesmen, as astrology or witchcraft. We have to deal with 1858, and not with 1808 or 1818. Will any one assert that there is any Government opposition to missionary efforts at the present moment? I think not.* The Chairman, the Deputy-Chairman,

* "At the commencement of the year 1852, there were labouring throughout India and Ceylon the agents of twenty-two missionary societies. These include 443 missionaries, of whom 48 are ordained natives, together with 698 native catechists. These agents reside at 313 missionary stations. There have been founded 333 native churches, containing 18,410 communicants, in a community of 112,191 native Christians. The missionaries maintain 1,347 vernacular day-schools, containing 47,504 boys, together with 93 boarding-schools, containing 2,414 Christian boys. They also superintend 126 superior English day-schools, and instruct therein 14,562 boys and young men. Female education embraces 347 day-schools for girls, containing 11,519 scholars, but hopes more from its 102 girls' boarding-schools, containing 2,779 Christian girls. The entire Bible has been translated into 10 languages, the New

my friend on my left (Mr. Willoughby) and other members of the Court, have been earnest and consistent supporters of missionary labours while in India. Is it likely that they would abandon the principles on which they have always acted, on their return to their native country? Since 1833, when the Court of Directors, in their Despatch of the 20th of February, laid down in great detail the principles which were in future to guide the Government of India in the question of idolatrous rites and ceremonies, has not each year seen an advance in the right direction, more especially of late years?*

Testament into 5 others, and separate Gospels into 4 others. Besides numerous works of Christians, 30, 40, and even 70 tracts have been prepared in these different languages, suitable for Hindoos and Mussulmans. Missionaries maintain in India 25 printing establishments. This vast missionary agency costs 190,000*l.* annually, of which *one-sixth*, 33,500*l.*, is contributed by *European Christians resident in the country.*"—*Extract from Statistics of Missions in India and Ceylon, by the Rev. Joseph Mullens, of Calcutta.*

* "Every one knows that thuggee, suttee, and infanticide have been suppressed. Slavery too has vanished from our territories, though it still exists in a fearful form in Travancore, a native state. The payment of pilgrim taxes into the Government treasury, the administration of oaths in the name of false gods, the official attendance of Government functionaries at heathen festivals, the direct management by Government of temple funds, these, and similar evils, have ceased. Nor is there any more of Government opposition to missionary efforts. Our missions receive perfect toleration, and we have asked no other boon."—*Speech of the Rev. J. Murray Mitchell, Free Church of Scotland Missionary, Edinburgh, 9th November, 1857.*

See also the just and elaborate eulogium of the venerable and pious Bishop of Calcutta, when preaching on the day of Humiliation, 24th July, 1857. "Things were better with them than they were formerly. All had been moving on in the right direction for more than fifty years past. Never was there a more just and beneficent

done—the severance is not yet complete; but is it fair and just to ignore all that has been done? Has the Crown colony of Ceylon outstripped the Indian Government in these matters? Have not the same difficulties been met with there as in India? It is not very long ago that “devil dancing for her Majesty’s service” was paid out of Government funds in Ceylon; but this and other evils have now been removed.*

Government than that of the British power in India. Peace and security for property have prevailed, commerce and all the Western improvements in medicine and the arts have been encouraged, every man stood equal before the laws, the administration of justice was pure, the taxes were of moderate weight. *Then as to Christianity, ministers of every name and class, missionaries from all the different societies, were protected and honoured, churches had been raised and native converts had been made in large numbers. Charitable designs to meet new forms of destitution were liberally supported. Christian education in all their missions, and national education not excluding Christianity, though not directly teaching it, was spreading throughout the country.*”

* The connection of the Government of Ceylon with the Buddhist religion, dates from the 2nd of March, 1815, when the Kandyan Provinces became British territory. By a Convention of that date Buddhism was declared “inviolable,” and “its rites, ministers, and places of worship were to be maintained and protected.” In 1818 another proclamation laid down certain rules with regard to priests, ceremonies, and processions, which practically mixed up the Ceylon Government with the Buddhists in all their worship and ceremonies, including the preservation of the Sacred Tooth. In 1832, or thereabouts, the aid given by Government was converted into a money payment by Sir R. Wilmot Horton, including a sum for “devil dancing,” which was performed, according to the official document, “for her Majesty’s service.” It was not until 1844 that Lord Stanley, then Colonial Secretary, sent out a despatch directing that the connection with the Buddhist religion should cease, that the annual money payment should be discontinued, if it could be done without a breach of faith, and that the allowance for “devil dancing” should be struck out of the estimates. In 1848 the insurrection broke out,

The Despatch of Feb. 20, 1833, ought to be republished for the information of the public. I should like to read some extracts, but it would occupy too much time. No one, I think, after its perusal will maintain that the principles laid down are at variance with the precepts or spirit of Christianity.* It has

which Lord Torrington ascribed chiefly to the measures of Government with regard to Buddhism. The custody of the Sacred Tooth, which was considered by the natives inseparably linked with the possession of political power, and the old system of appointments were resumed. Subsequently, various alterations took place. The Sacred Tooth was again given up, under the government of Sir George Anderson in 1852, but up to this moment the connection of the Government of Ceylon with Buddhism is not entirely severed. These facts are stated to show the difficulty of dealing with questions relating to the religious prejudices of the people; and that the administration of the Crown is equally open to accusations of this nature with the administration of the East India Company.

* Par. 8.—Respecting the degree of toleration due to the religion and worship of our Indian subjects, the sentiments of the Governor-General are essentially our own, although we might be disposed to qualify, in some degree, the terms in which he has expressed them.

Par. 9.—All religious rites and offices which are in this sense harmless, that they are not flagrantly opposed to rules of common humanity or decency, ought to be tolerated, however false the creed by which they are sanctioned. But they could not properly be said to be tolerated, if those who are engaged in them did not experience that ordinary degree of protection to which every citizen not offending against the laws is entitled at the hands of his rulers. A religious festival, attended by immense crowds, cannot be said to be tolerated, if the Government does not provide a police sufficient to enforce order, and to ensure the safety of individuals during the celebration. And, on the other hand, the providing of such a police is not an act of favour or friendship to the mode of worship, but one of simple justice to the worshippers.

Par. 10.—Beyond this civil protection, however, we do not see that the maxims of toleration enjoin us to proceed. It is not necessary that we should take part in the celebration of an idolatrous ceremony, or that we should assist in the preparations for it, or that

been followed up by other Despatches; and in 1840, an Act was passed in India to the same effect. In

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POONA.

we should afford to it such systematic support as shall accredit it in the eyes of the people, and prevent it from expiring through the effect of neglect or accident.

Par. 11.—The application of these principles to the subject before us is not very difficult. Although it is possible that the Hindoo rites, or, at least, those of Juggernath, are less liable than formerly to the charges of cruelty and open indecency, their essential character is of course not changed. They are at variance with the precepts and spirit of Christianity, and they seem opposed even to the plain injunctions of a natural religion. This, however, is not a reason for prohibiting them by law; and if they are not to be so prohibited, if they are to exist at all, they must receive from the civil power that measure of protection which it affords to any act, the doing or not doing of which it treats as a matter of indifference. To this extent, we entirely concur with Lord William Bentinck. On the other hand, we cannot conceive that a Government which believes those rites to be deeply founded in error, and to be productive, even in a civil view, of serious evil, is obliged, or is at liberty, to show to them any degree of positive sanction or encouragement.

Par. 62.—Finally, it may be convenient to recapitulate, in a brief series, the principal conclusions resulting from the preceding discussion. They are the following :—

First. That the interference of British functionaries in the interior management of native temples, in the customs, habits, and religious proceedings of their priests and attendants, in the arrangement of their ceremonies, rites, and festivals, and generally in the conduct of their interior economy, shall cease.

Secondly. That the pilgrim-tax shall everywhere be abolished.

Thirdly. That fines and offerings shall no longer be considered as sources of revenue by the British Government; and they shall, consequently, no longer be collected or received by the servants of the East India Company.

Fourthly. That no servant of the East India Company shall hereafter be engaged in the collection, or management, or custody of moneys in the nature of fines or offerings, under whatsoever name they may be known, or in whatever manner obtained, or whether furnished in cash or in kind.

Fifthly. That no servant of the East India Company shall here-

1843 an order was issued in Bombay directing the cessation of public works on the Sabbath day. This

after derive any emolument resulting from the above-mentioned or any similar sources.

Sixthly. That in all matters relating to their temples, their worship, their festivals, their religious practices, their ceremonial observances, our native subjects be left entirely to themselves.

Seventhly. That in every case in which it has been found necessary to form and keep up a police force, specially with a view to the peace and security of the pilgrims, or the worshippers, such police shall hereafter be maintained, and made available, out of the general revenues of the country.

Par. 63.—Much caution, and many gradations, may be necessary in acting on the conclusions at which we have arrived. Among other concomitant measures, such explanations should be given to the natives as shall satisfy them that, so far from abandoning the principles of a just toleration, the British Government is resolved to apply them with more scrupulous accuracy than ever; and that this proceeding is, in truth, no more than a recurrence to that state of real neutrality, from which we ought never to have departed.—*Extracts from Despatch of Court of Directors, No. 3 of 1833.*

“*Miscellaneous Revenue Department, 20th February, 1833.*”

“We more particularly desire, that the management of all temples, and other places of religious resort, together with the revenues derived therefrom, be resigned into the hands of the natives; and that the interference of the public authorities in the religious ceremonies of the people be regulated by the instructions conveyed in the 62nd paragraph of our despatch of 20th February, 1833.”—*Extract No. 9 of 1833, Revenue Department, dated 8th August, 1833.*

“G. O. 26TH JULY, 1836.

“*Head-Quarters, Choultry Plain.*”

“The Commander-in-Chief directs it to be strictly observed as a standing regulation of the service, that wherever the attendance of troops, either European or Native, may be necessary at any native festival, or similar occasion, the troops so employed are invariably to be kept in a collected body, as a military guard for the maintenance of order, and are not on any account to be permitted to join or take part in the procession or ceremony, nor to act as escorts either to persons or property.’

“That order (G. O. 26th July, 1836) very properly prohibited troops employed in preserving order at religious festivals, from

order was extended to Bengal in 1847 by Lord Hardinge; who at the same time stated, "I am convinced that much of the success of British rule in India is to be attributed, under Providence, to our forbearance in not interfering with the religious prejudices of the people, and that the difficulties experienced in Algeria might be traced to a very opposite system of government." *

taking any part in the procession or ceremonies. We think that the attendance of musicians, for the purpose of taking part in the ceremonies of any religion whatever, should be wholly voluntary; but we do not intend that any alteration should be made, in the practice which has hitherto regulated the appointment of escorts to natives of rank on their way to places of religious worship, as in that case it must be self-evident, that the honour is due to the individual, and not to the occasion."—*Extract from Despatch of Court of Directors, 8th August, 1838.*

* Mr. Elphinstone, and many of our most eminent Indian statesmen, have recorded solemn warnings to the same effect.

"I have left out of the account the dangers to which we should be exposed by any attempt to interfere with the religious prejudices of the natives. These are so obvious, that we may hope they will never be braved. The numbers, and physical force of the natives, are evidently incalculably greater than ours. Our strength consists in the want of energy and division of our enemies. There is but one talisman that, while it animated and united them all, would leave us without a single adherent; this talisman is the name of religion, a power so odious that it is astonishing our enemies have not more frequently and systematically employed it against us. I do not point out the danger now from any apprehension that Government will ever attempt to convert the natives, but to impress it with the consequences that would result from any suspicion that it was disposed to encourage such a project. While we enjoy the confidence of the natives, our boldest innovations are safe; but that once lost, our most cautious measures would involve us in danger. It would not then be necessary that we should go so far even as we do now; the most indifferent action would suffice to excite that fanatical spirit, the springs of which are as obscure as its effects are tremendous."—*Extract from the Report of Mr. Elphinstone, 1st October, 1819.*

Then, let me ask, is the Act passed in 1850, by which Christian converts are taken under the protection of the law, no evidence of the progress in asserting the prerogatives of a Christian Government?*

What did Lord Dalhousie state with reference to the conversion of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, in 1851? "If this resolution to abandon his present faith, and to profess Christianity, which his Highness declares to be an act long contemplated by him, should be only a sentiment or a freak, the lapse of a little time will serve to show that the desire his Highness has declared so steadily has been unreal. But if that desire should continue unabated, and the Maharajah should still seek for instruction in the truths of our faith at the hands of the Government, which is the sole guardian of his youth, and charged with the responsibility of acting in all respects as it believes to be best for his future good, I respectfully submit that this Government has before it only one path of duty. Whether his Highness's resolution to become a Christian has been the natural result of the peculiar circumstances into which the Maharajah's fate has thrown him, or whether the grace of God has planted it at once in the heart of the boy, I cannot in my conscience

* By this Act the principle, already laid down in a Bengal regulation of 1832, that change of religion should not involve loss of property or civil rights, was extended to the whole of the territories subject to the British Government of India. The religious and civil laws of the Hindoos have, in this point, been completely set aside, and converts to Christianity have been shielded, as far as laws can shield them, against temporal ill consequences from their change of faith.—*Mem. E. I. House.*

thwart it." Is it reasonable to suppose that the distinguished statesman who could record his opinion in these terms, thus publicly affirming a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith, would have consented to preside for so many years over a "half-infidel, half-atheist Government?"

There is only one other despatch to which I will allude, but it is a most important one, as showing the present principles of the Government of India—I mean the despatch of the 18th July, 1854, on the subject of education. I could quote many passages; but, not to occupy time, I will simply state that it recognizes "the noble exertions of Christians of all denominations to guide the natives of India in the way of religious truth," and directs the introduction of the grant-in-aid system throughout India, by which the Government affords liberal aid to all missionary schools which are willing to accept it, thereby directly promoting religious instruction and Bible reading.*

* Par. 84. "Considerable misapprehension appears to exist as to our views with respect to religious instruction in the Government institutions. Those institutions were founded for the benefit of the whole population of India; and in order to effect their object it was and is indispensable, that the education conveyed in them should be exclusively secular. The Bible is, we understand, placed in the libraries of the colleges and schools, and the pupils are able freely to consult it. This is as it should be; and moreover we have no desire to prevent, or to discourage, any explanations which the pupils may of their own free-will ask from their masters upon the subject of the Christian religion, provided that such information be given out of school hours. Such instruction being entirely voluntary on both sides, it is necessary, in order to prevent the slightest suspicion of an intention on our part to make use of the influence of Government for the purpose of proselytism, that no notice shall be taken of it by the inspectors in their periodical visits."

This has been carried out, and a more important step in advance it is impossible to conceive. It will, under God's blessing, greatly help on the evangelization of India, and it remains for the people of England to see its instructions honestly carried out.

I have thus brought forward a few facts, to show the principles which have been laid down by the authorities at home, and acted upon by the authorities abroad. It is a wide subject; I have merely touched upon it; time would not permit more at the present moment. I hope I have said enough to prove that there is another side of the question than that which has been generally represented on platforms and hustings. I hope the people of England will pause before they condemn their countrymen in India; I hope they will hear both sides, and look into the question. They are bound to do so, for, as I said before, the policy of the East India Company is the policy of England; Parliament and the country are responsible for it. Party spirit and faction may ring the changes on the double government and the absence of responsibility; but the Minister of the Crown, the President of the Board of Control, is as responsible for the affairs of India, as the Colonial Minister, or any other minister for his own department.

It is well known that the Court of Directors can do nothing without the sanction and concurrence of the Board of Control. Where, then, it will be asked, is the use of the Court of Directors? The answer is, that an independent body, which has the initiative in all business, and the right of discussion and remonstrance, and which possesses local knowledge and

experience, must exercise a salutary influence, and prove a wholesome check,* on the arbitrary will of the

* The Court of Directors have been frequently blamed for not oftener pushing their resistance to the Board of Control, in cases in which they disapprove of its policy, to the point of disobeying the law: for nothing less than this is involved in refusing to transmit to India the orders of the Board of Control, thus reducing the Board to the recourse of applying for a mandamus. But the case must be a very extreme one which would justify even private citizens, much more a constituted authority, in directly disobeying the law of their country, and the laws by which they hold all the powers they possess. The case of the iniquitous and unjust spoliation of Siude would have justified such a course; but this was decided in the Secret Department by Her Majesty's Ministers alone, without even the knowledge of the Court. In two instances only has the Court resorted to this extreme measure. One was in defence of the Government and people of Oude, against what the Court deemed an act of spoliation under the guise of settling antiquated pecuniary claims of individual British subjects. The other was for the protection of the Nizam and his subjects against a measure of a somewhat similar character. In one, or probably in both of these cases, if a mandamus had been granted, a majority of the Court of Directors had made up their minds to refuse obedience, and submit to imprisonment. But their resistance compelled a deliberate consideration of the subject by the entire Cabinet, and the objectionable mandates were withdrawn. It will be noticed that in both these instances the cause in which the Court successfully struggled was the defence of the native states of India against acts of injustice promoted by the Board of Control. In the debate on the claims of the bankers on Oude, the present Lord Ellenborough spoke to the following effect, in the House of Peers, in approval of the course pursued by the Court of Directors:—

“ There is another body of persons on whose behalf I wish to say a few words. The noble and learned lord on the woolsack did not throw any reflection on the Court of Directors; but the noble and learned lord opposite (Lord Plunket) did do so. My lords, I must say that the conduct of the Court of Directors, in this transaction, reflects great honour on them. It does not matter to them whether the recommendation of Mr. Grant be adopted or not, they are in no respect interested except as the guardians of the honour and good faith of the administration of India; as such, acting upon their

Minister of the Crown. Further than this, a permanent body, exempt from political bias and party spirit,*

responsibility, acting in the discharge of their duty to those who elected them, and the people of India, they are determined to resist the order of Mr. Grant. In so doing they deserve well of the people of India, and of those who intrusted them with the charge which they hold. I think it a subject of great congratulation to the country that the affairs of the Company are administered by gentlemen of independence."—*Lord Ellenborough's Speech in the House of Lords, 5th May, 1834.*

* "But there is another most important consideration in connection with the renewal of the Charter. By the interposition of the Company between the Government and the people of India, the latter are prevented from being exposed to all those continued vicissitudes of political feelings and parties to which they must have been subject, had they been under the direct dominion of the Crown of England. Had this been the case, I cannot help feeling that the state of political excitement which would be occasioned would have led to disastrous consequences; that mischiefs of all kinds would have ensued, and would have formed an insurmountable barrier to the advance and improvement of the people. I cannot conceive anything more disadvantageous to the people than their being made the sport of party passions and political feelings which take place in this country."—*Speech of Mr. Charles Grant, India Debate, 1833.*

"Sir, what we want is a body independent of the Crown, and no more than independent, which shall be neither the tool of the Ministry, nor of the Opposition. It is not easy, in a country like this to constitute such a body; none I have suggested would be such a body. The East India Company, strange as its constitution may appear, is such a body. Whatever charges may be brought against it, whether it does act rightly or wrongly, it does not act from political considerations."—*Speech of Mr. Macaulay, India Debate, 1833.*

"The Marquis of Lansdowne acknowledged the advantages that had resulted from the administration of the Company in keeping the interests of India excluded, in a greater degree than they otherwise could have been, from the several chances and changes of party in this country; and as an intervening body in the possession of patronage which would otherwise be scrambled for by the gladiators of Parliament."—*Speech of Marquis of Lansdowne, India Debate, 1833.*

preserves the continuity of the system of government, which would otherwise be liable to change with every changing Ministry.* What did Mr. Fox say, in days of old? "If the dispenser of the plan of governing India has not a greater stability in his situation than a British Ministry, what hope is there of the affairs being administered with advantage to the interests of India or to this country!" Did not a President of the Board of Control, in more recent times, declare, on occasion of the recall of Lord Heytesbury, "that he thought it better that the interests of India should suffer, than that the Minister of the day should be defeated?"

It is this balance of power, this system of check, analogous as it is to the three Estates of our own Constitution, which has induced our wisest statesmen

"The real dangers of British India will commence from the day when the party spirit of the British Parliament shall be brought to bear directly on its administration."—*Lord Metcalfe.*

"In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning on this subject is, that the British Government in India is a phenomenon, and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning on which these rules are founded."—*Letter of Duke of Wellington.*

* "We have not only had four different Presidents of the Board of Control within ten months, but we have also had as many as six different secretaries. . . . There is nothing like a continuous government in the Board of Control, and there is naturally a great indisposition on the part of any person coming casually into the office to attempt to grapple with a great question like the government of India."—*Speech of Mr. Bright, India Debate, 1853.*

"My own opinion is, that nothing would be more dangerous than to give the Crown the whole control of the thousands upon thousands of the population in that part of the British dominions."—*Speech of Lord John Russell, India Debate, 1853.*

to preserve the present system. If the period has arrived for remodelling it, for introducing a simpler form, let it be done with deliberation, after due inquiry and investigation; not in the present state of excited feeling at home and abroad, not under pretence that, after so many years of success, it has proved a failure.

To listen to the opponents of the Company, one would imagine that not a word had ever been spoken in favour of the system of double government, in support of the administration of the East India Company. I should like to quote opinions on the opposite side — opinions recorded by men like Mill* and

* “To communicate the whole of the impression made upon a mind which has taken a survey of the Government of India by the East India Company more completely through the whole field of its action than was ever taken before, and which has not spared to bring forward into the same light the unfavourable and the favourable points, it may be necessary to state, and this I conceive to be the most convenient occasion for stating, that, in regard to *intention*, I know no Government, either in past or present times, that can be placed equally high with that of the East India Company. That I can hardly point out an occasion in which the schemes they have adopted, and even the particular measures they pursued, were not by themselves considered as conducive to the welfare of the people whom they governed. That I know no Government which has on all occasions shown so much of a disposition to make sacrifices of its own interests to the interests of the people whom it governed, and which has, in fact, made so many and such important sacrifices; that if the East India Company have been so little successful in ameliorating the practical operation of their Government, it has been chiefly owing to the disadvantage of their situation, distant a voyage of several months from the scene of action, and to that imperfect knowledge which was common to them with almost all their countrymen. But that they have never erred so much as when, distrusting their own knowledge, they have followed the directions of men whom they unhappily thought wiser than them-

Macaulay,* of world-wide fame, and by eminent statesmen who long wielded the destinies of the empire.

selves, viz., practical statesmen and lawyers; and that, lastly, in the high and important point of the servants or subordinate agents of Government there is nothing in the world to be compared to the East India Company, whose servants, as a body, have not only exhibited a portion of talent, which forms a contrast with that of the ill-chosen instruments of other governments, but have, except in some remarkable instances, as that of the loan transactions with the Nabob of Arcot, maintained a virtue which, under the temptations of their situation, is worthy of the highest applause."—*Mill's British India*, vol. vi. page 17.

* "The power of the Company, though an anomaly, is in our time a beneficial anomaly."—*Macaulay's Essays*.

"I had the advantage of hearing a speech delivered by my right honourable friend himself (Mr. Macaulay) twenty years ago, and there is a passage in it equal in force and beauty to anything ever delivered in this House. Speaking of trying the system by its fruits, he said (not in these precise words, of course): 'Under this system you have had men administering the government of millions of subjects; you have had them leading victorious armies; you have had them in times of peace, and in days of conquest, you have had them administering the revenues of mighty provinces; you have had them residing at the courts of tributary kings; and yet those men have returned to their native country with little more than a scanty competency, and sometimes even in circumstances scarcely removed from want.' That was the boast of Malcolm; that is still the noble independent boast of Elphinstone. And again, I say, trying that system by its fruits, prune that tree, if you please; dig a trench round about it if you will; but I implore you to pause and to hesitate before you cut it down. I believe it to be sound at heart. I believe it to be a system, on the whole, of good government. It is not incapable of improvement. We have endeavoured to improve it."—*Speech of Sir James Graham, India Debate, 1853*.

"Is this system lightly to be set aside? Is this form of government to be hastily rejected? We have the advantage of the opinions of Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington in favour of that system of government. They never hesitated or doubted, amid all our difficulties, that those difficulties would be overcome; and if they were now alive, I am satisfied that they would counsel and

I will not weary the Court, but I hope to be permitted to read the opinion of one of our greatest men,

entreat you, as I now do, not hastily or rashly to tamper with such a system."—*Speech of Sir James Graham, India Debate, 1853.*

"Dr. Ballantyne assumed charge of the College in the beginning of 1846, and avowed as his object the formation of a class of Pundits, who, skilled in all that is taught in native schools, should also have their minds so tintured with European habits of feeling, as to be pre-eminent amongst their countrymen. In order to accomplish this object, he first himself mastered the Hindu philosophy; and he ascertained how much of truth there was in it, and where error commenced. He, at the same time, made available, to his Pundit pupils, the works of European philosophers, and showed, by the treatises of his own composition, how, advancing from the premises of Hindu philosophy, the correct conclusions of European Philosophy might be attained. In following this course, he acted in consonance with the whole character of our administration in this country. We have not swept over the country like a torrent, destroying all that it found, and leaving nothing but what itself deposited. Our course has rather been that of a gently swelling inundation, which leaves the former surface undisturbed, and spreads over it a richer mould, from which the vegetation may derive a new verdure, and the landscape possess a beauty which was unknown before. Such has been our course in the Civil Administration. In our systems of Police, of Civil and Criminal Justice, and of Revenue Management, we first examined the existing systems,—retained whatever of them we found to be right and just, and then engrafted on this basis new maxims derived from our own institutions. And thus we have succeeded in forming a system, which is generally admitted to have been easy in its operation, and happy in its effect.

"We are here met together this day, men of different races, and of different creeds. If any one section of this assembly had met to dedicate such a building as this to the education of their youth in their own peculiar tenets, they would have given a religious sanction to the act, and would have consecrated the deed by the ceremonial of their faith. But this we cannot do. Unhappily, human opinions, on the subject of religion, are so irreconcilable that we cannot concur in any one act of worship. The more necessary it is then, that each man, in his own breast, should offer up his prayer to the God whom he worships, that here morality may be rightly taught, and that here truth, in all its majesty, may prevail. This aspiration

who spoke from personal experience of India and its Government: I mean the Duke of Wellington. This

may have a different meaning, according to the wishes or belief of the persons who form it; but with many it will point to a new state of things, when a higher philosophy and a purer faith will pervade this land, not enforced by the arbitrary decrees of a persecuting government, not hypocritically professed to meet the wishes of a proselytizing government, but whilst the government is just and impartial, cordially adopted by a willing people, yielding to the irresistible arguments placed before them. Nor is it unreasonable to expect that such a change may take place. We cannot forget that to such a change we owe the present happy state of things in our own country; and even in this country, changes of the same nature have taken place. It is but a few days ago, that our friend, Major Kittoe, who is as distinguished for antiquarian research as he is for the architectural skill he has shown in this edifice, led a party to view the neighbouring ruins around Sárnáth. He there showed us the undoubted remains of another and a different system, which once prevailed in this land. He showed us its temples, its colleges, its hospitals, and its tombs, now perished and long buried under the earth. A few centuries have so utterly destroyed it, that it is now only known in this part of the country from the obscure allusions of Chinese travellers, the scarcely legible inscriptions on broken sculptures, and the imperfect traditions of a despised sect. And now there flourishes, here on the banks of the Ganges, another system, still vigorous, but already on its wane. And that system may pass away, and give place to another and a better one. From this place may this system spread throughout; nor is it vain to hope that the building in which we are assembled may be one instrument in the mighty change. When it is so, the highest aspirations of those who first designed and mainly promoted its erection, will be fully realized.

“Such is the assured hope and expectation of many here assembled, and there is a large section of the remainder, who share in the expectation, but cannot bring themselves at present to adopt it as their hope. But no undue means will be here employed to effect the end. No religious system will here be exclusively taught. This is a common arena, on which all can assemble, and where the common element of truth can be impartially acquired. Let all to whom the cause of truth is sacred, co-operate in promoting the objects of this building. To withdraw from the field will but show

opinion was given in 1833; but if so much could be said in praise of the Indian Government at that time by such a man, how much more could be said now? Though rather long, it seems to me peculiarly apposite at the present moment.

The Duke says, "I will not follow the noble Marquis who opened the debate into the consideration of whether a chartered company be the best or not calculated to carry on the Government or the trade of an empire like India: that is not the question to which I wish to apply myself. But whenever I hear of such discussions as this, I recall to my memory what I have seen in that country. I recall to my memory the history of that country for the last fifty or sixty years. I remember its days of misfortune, and its days of glory, and the situation in which it now stands. I remember that the Government have conducted the affairs of, I will not pretend to say how many millions of people—they have been calculated at 70,000,000, 80,000,000, 90,000,000, 100,000,000, but certainly of an immense population—a population returning an annual revenue of 20,000,000*l.* sterling; and that, notwithstanding all the wars in which the empire has been engaged, its debt at this moment amounts only to 40,000,000*l.*, being no more than the amount of two years' revenue. I do not say that such a debt is desirable; but at the same time I contend that it is a delusion on the people of this country, to tell them

that they are conscious of the weakness of their cause." — *Extracts from the Speech of the Hon. James Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor, N.W.P., at the opening of the Benares New College, on the 11th January, 1853.*

that that is a body unfit for Government and unfit for trade, which has administered the affairs of India with so much success for so many years, and which is at length to be put down—for I can use no other term—upon the ground that it is an institution calculated for the purpose neither of Government nor trade.”

Such was the deliberate opinion of the Duke of Wellington. I think the East India Company may well be proud of such testimony; and whatever the result of the ministerial measure, I believe this opinion will be ratified by the thoughtful and unprejudiced of this country, and of all other countries; and that, when some future Macaulay shall narrate the history of those great colonies and dependencies which have contributed so largely to the wealth and prosperity of the mother-country, the pages which tell of the rise and progress of our magnificent Eastern Empire, under the auspices of the East India Company, and of the brilliant deeds of their servants, will not be found unworthy of England's greatness and England's glory.

NOTES.

(A.)

It is not by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by giving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to that country. . . . A free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably fail. The only mode which has any chance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character It is of no avail to say that such a delegated body cannot have all the requisites of good government, above all, cannot have the complete and ever operative identity of interest with the governed, which it is so difficult to obtain even where the people to be ruled are in some degree qualified to look after their own affairs. Real good government is not compatible with the conditions of the case. There is but a choice of imperfections. The problem is so to construct the governing body, that under the difficulties of the position it shall have as much interest as possible in good government, and as little in bad. Now these conditions are best found in an intermediate body. A delegated administration has always this advantage over a direct one—that it has, at all events, no duties to perform, except to the governed. It has no interests to consider except theirs. Its own power of deriving profit from misgovernment may be reduced (in the latest constitution of the East India Company it was reduced) to a singularly small amount, and it can be kept entirely clear of bias from the individual or class interests of any one else. When the Home Government and Parliament are swayed by such partial influences in the exercise of the power reserved to them in the last resort, the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency before the imperial tribunal. The intermediate body, moreover, is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their country's

concerns, who have been trained to it in the place itself, and have made its administration the main occupation of their lives.

Furnished with these qualifications, and not being liable to lose their office from the accidents of home politics, they identify their character and consideration with their special trusts, and have a much more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer, than a member of a Cabinet, under a representative constitution, can possibly have in the good government of any country, except the one he serves. So far as the choice of those who carry on the management on the spot devolves upon this body, their appointment is kept out of the vortex of party and parliamentary jobbing, and freed from the influence of those motives to the abuse of patronage, for the reward of adherents, or to buy off those who would otherwise be opponents, which are always stronger with statesmen of average honesty, than a conscientious sense of the duty of appointing the fittest man. . . . It cannot be too often repeated, that in a country like India everything depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the agents of government. This truth is the cardinal principle of Indian administration.

(B.)

It has been the destiny of the Government of the East India Company to suggest the true theory of the government of a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and after having done this to perish. It would be a singular fortune if, at the end of two or three more generations, this speculative result should be the only remaining fruits of our ascendancy in India; if posterity should say of us, that having stumbled accidentally upon better arrangements than our wisdom would ever have devised, the first use we made of our awakened reason was to destroy them, and allow the good which had been in course of being realized to fall through, and be lost from ignorance of the principles on which it depended. *Dè meliora* : but if a fate so disgraceful to England and to civilization can be averted, it must be through far wider political conceptions than merely English or European practice can supply, and through

a much more profound study of Indian experience, and of the conditions of Indian Government, than either English politicians, or those who supply the English public with opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake.—*Considerations on Representative Government*, by J. S. MILL, pp. 332, 333, 334, 339.

THE END.