

NATIVE STATES
AND
POST-WAR REFORMS

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His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Baron Chelmsford,

P. C., G. M. S. I., G. C. M. G., G. M. I. E.,

The Viceroy and Governor General of India,

&

To,

The Right Hon'ble Edwin Samuel Montagu, M. P.,

The Secretary of State for India.

May it Please Your Excellency,

SIR,

I the undersigned beg to submit this note containing suggestions about the reforms pertaining to Native States after the termination of the war. Your Excellency has acknowledged in glowing terms the services rendered by Native States in the present war. The ruling chiefs and princes have risen to the full height of their imperial responsibilities and the Government of His Majesty has shown its appreciation by selecting one of the illustrious ruling chiefs to take part in the deliberations of the Imperial War Cabinet.

2. In the changed circumstances and after the undoubted assurances of their unshaken and unshakable allegiance and their splendid loyalty, the ruling chiefs and princes deserve to be elevated to the position of equal partnership in

the Empire. With a
ventured to suggest

I have

- (a) a reorganisation of the armies of Native States;
- (b) the providing of facilities for enlistment in the regular army;
- (c) the establishment of military colleges; and
- (d) the creation of a Council of Defence to control their armies.

3. This change in the position of the ruling chiefs and princes, it is respectfully submitted, will have necessarily and as a matter of logical sequence, to be followed by considerable freedom of action being allowed to those princes, and I have suggested in the accompanying note that the restrictions under which the ruling chiefs and princes are at present labouring may be relaxed or removed, and a corresponding reform be introduced into the political and diplomatic service of Government.

4. The recent announcement of the goal of British administration by you, Sir, has evoked feelings of deep rejoicings even in Native States. The spread of education, the growing influence of the press in British India and the example of representative institutions in British India have awakened a self-consciousness in the subjects of Native States and the declaration of the policy of His Majesty's Government has kindled new hopes and aspirations in their minds. The sentiments expressed by the representatives of Indian princes in the recent Chiefs' Conference about the policy of Your Excellency's Government and the constitutional reforms which are in contemplation show the spirit in which this noble announcement is hailed by the ruling chiefs and princes of Native States.

5. Your Excellency has expressed a desire to discuss questions affecting the ruling princes, their States and their subjects. Your Excellency has also encouraged the ruling chiefs and princes to formulate their proposals for a constitutional chamber to represent the interests of Native States in matters of Imperial and joint concern and has held out hopes of an informal discussion of this subject with you, Sir, at the close of your stay in this country. I have taken the liberty to suggest in this behalf a scheme of provincial and imperial conferences of ruling chiefs and have tentatively defined the scope of the duties and functions which may be assigned to them.

6. The subjects of Native States hardly possess any constitutional rights, such as are enjoyed by British subjects. They are not associated with the administration and there are no self-governing institutions in these States. The press does not wield any appreciable influence in the territories administered by the ruling chiefs and princes. Your Excellency's desire to discuss the questions pertaining to the subjects of Native States, it is respectfully submitted, cannot be adequately fulfilled unless some constitutional machinery is provided which will enable them to voice their feelings and sentiments. I crave permission to place the scheme of imperial and provincial conferences of the subjects of Native States, which in my humble opinion is calculated to secure this object. I have also ventured to suggest the creation of a post of an Indian political secretary with the view that he may interpret the wishes of Native States and bring to bear his intimate knowledge of the situation in the disposal of business.

7. In submitting these suggestions, I beg to assure Your Excellency and you, Sir, that my whole solicitude has been to respect the treaty rights and engagements so highly

prized by the ruling chiefs and I have suggested a scheme which will ensure the happiness and contentment of the subjects of Native States without violating in any the least degree the spirit of these treaties and which will lead to the development and growth of reform from within and will eventually bless the Native States with constitutional government.

8. I have submitted a memorandum of the chief points of this scheme, which is attached hereto as Appendix A.

9. The sagacious and courageous statesmanship and broad-minded sympathies of Your Excellency and of you, Sir, have inspired confidence in me to submit this scheme. The desire to serve in my own humble way the interests of one-fourth of the population of my countrymen in Native States is my only excuse. I, therefore, pray that Your Excellency and you, Sir, will be pleased to take into your earnest consideration these suggestions affecting an integral portion of the population of this country at a time when Your Excellency and you, Sir, are engaged in finding a solution of the question of constitutional reform in British India.

I beg to remain,
Your Excellency's and your
most obedient servant,
G. R. ABHYANKER.

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In view of the valuable services rendered with unstinted liberality and passionate devotion by the ruling chiefs and princes and the people of Native States, it would not be unfair to expect that in the readjustment of the Empire, which is bound to take place after the war is over, they would receive adequate recognition. It is needless to state that the vast sums of money, which have been contributed by the Native States of India towards the prosecution of the war and the relief of the distress caused by it, have come from the pockets of the subjects of these States. A scheme of post-war reforms must include the betterment of the status both of the princes and the peoples of the Native States. A decoration to one ruling prince, a grant of personal salute to another or the conferring of hereditary distinctions on a third would be looked upon as simply puerile. The Native States of India have shared the burdens and borne the sacrifices as cheerfully and as willingly as the other partners of the Empire. Constitutional reformers must, therefore, necessarily include Native States in their proposals of imperial reconstruction. Ruling chiefs and princes must be recognised as equal in dignity to other partners in the Empire and the subjects of Native States must also feel a consciousness that they are an important part of the imperial fabric. But in order to have a correct appreciation of any suggestions made in this direction, it is necessary to bear in mind the present condition of ruling princes and their subjects in Native States. To an average man in British India, a ruling prince, by reason of his splen-

dour and wealth, his pomp and dignity, his historical associations, and a sense of traditional loyalty entertained towards him and regard for him as a relic of ancient greatness, is an object of reverent curiosity. He is ignorant of the constitutional position of a ruling chief in the hierarchy of the Empire. The subjects of Native States are to him a matter of supreme indifference. They have no *locus standi* in the political associations and Conferences, Congresses and Councils and even in the press. It would not, therefore, be improper to succinctly trace their present position in broad outlines. The disabilities under which the ruling princes and subjects of Native States are at present labouring, may be divided into two classes :—

- (A) Disabilities imposed by the Suzerain power from a sense of self-preservation, stability and permanence of British rule.
- (B) Disabilities which are the result of a sense of duty on the part of the paramount power towards the feudatory states. These duties are of fourfold character. (1) Those relating to a head of a Native State—namely a ruling prince or chief, (2) Those relating to the corporate body—namely the State itself, (3) Those relating to the relations between a State and a State, and, (4) Those relating to subjects of Native States.

This subject has been exhaustively dealt with by such an imperialist of the orthodox school as Sir William Lee-Warner in his book the “ Protected princes of India ”.

Present Position

How the policy of British Government towards the Native States changed from time to time is a matter of history with which we are not at present concerned. From the policy of the ring fence to the policy of subordinate isolation, from the grasping policy of annexation to the policy of preservation and non-intervention, and the ultimate condition of subordinate union, the evolution of Native

States during these various stages is an interesting spectacle. But it is not relevant to our purpose. Suffice it to say that all the seven hundred Native States of India acknowledge unequivocally and undoubtedly the paramount supremacy of the British Crown. They owe unswerving allegiance to the King-Emperor of India and so far as matters of war, peace, external relations, and questions of foreign policy are concerned, the British Government is the controller of their destinies. In their internal affairs they are guaranteed quasi-independence. They are called sovereigns. Many writers on jurisprudence have taxed their brains to exactly define their position as "sovereign states" under the international law.

The relations of these Native States have been regulated by treaties and engagements which are nearly a century old. Great changes have taken place in the evolution of the body politic during this period. Much water has run under the bridges during this time. British rule has become deep-rooted and has become ingrained in the life of the peoples. Peace and order in this country for over a century have entirely changed the aspect of this country and India is connected by strong ties of vested interests to the British Crown. The present titanic struggle has brought home convictions and taught lessons which would have been difficult for any experience to inculcate in ordinary circumstances. This gigantic war has shown that it is impossible for any sovereignty to prosper without the assistance of strong, well-equipped and mighty allies. The experience of the last three years has conclusively demonstrated that if there is one power more than another under whose protecting wings it would be safe to live and prosper, it is that of the British Crown. The old treaty relations, therefore, which were concluded under circumstances when order was being evolved out of disorder, when the loyalty of several states was not entirely assured, when the vestiges of old rule were not completely effaced, require considerable

modifications in the light of present day experience and the trend of political currents at this juncture.

First set of disabilities

Under the first set of disabilities, the Native States have given a blank cheque to the paramount power against their resources in the event of serious necessity; whilst as in ordinary times, some of them have undertaken, to limit their own armaments in times of peace, to pay the cost of the subsidiary forces and to maintain imperial service troops. The armies of a Native State are not to exceed in time of peace what is required for the maintenance of the reasonable dignity of the chief and enforcement of internal order. The Native States are forbidden to recruit foreign soldiers. They are prevented from maintaining fortifications. They are restricted in the manufacture and traffic of arms and ammunitions. They are not allowed to keep arms of precision and canons. The ports in the Native States are controlled by the paramount power. No foreign vessel is allowed to enter into them without the consent of the British Government. These obligations were imposed avowedly with the object of bringing about political settlement and bringing about the disarming of the people. The policy of 'mistrust' about the fidelity of Native States was mainly responsible for these obligations, as also the danger which was apprehended from the efficiency of armies in the Native States. The central idea at this time was to disband the military forces of the Native States. The idea of organising and utilising these indigenous forces in a general scheme of the defence of the Empire was never entertained. The same policy dictated a set of obligations, of the grant of rights of passage and occupation of forts to the imperial army, of rights of cantonment, of assistance in the matter of supplies, and the extradition of deserters. They also include the rights of the paramount power over the lines of communications between the forces of Imperial army scattered over the Empire and the control over the rail-

way system, the telegraph system and postal communications. As a Suzerain power, these rights were exercised for the maintenance of the imperial army. A third set of obligations deprived the Native States of their rights of negotiation and communication with one another. In all inter-statal disputes, they were bound to submit to the settlement which the paramount power may dictate. They have undertaken not to employ Europeans without the consent of the British Government, and have parted with the jurisdiction over them. It was thought at one time that if the Native States were allowed to confer with one another it may lead to a confederacy of Native States which may embarrass the safety of the established Government. The restriction about the employment of foreigners was imposed with a view to prevent these chiefs from acquiring efficiency and strength by the use of foreign knowledge, foreign culture and foreign skill.

A review of this first set of disabilities will clearly convey how illogical it is to maintain the same policy and to keep intact the treaty obligations which were justified by circumstances existing at the commencement of British rule. The whole policy has altered, the angle of vision has entirely changed now. The object at the time of the treaties was the political settlement of the country. The present policy is one of active co-operation and participation in a scheme of general defence. Distrust has given place to confidence and aloofness to active sympathy. Germs of disaffection and disintegration have died out. The awakening of the sense of common nationality, common danger, common rights, and common disabilities have cemented the ties of union. The closer association and personal contact with His Majesty the King-Emperor have generated sympathies more abiding and enduring than ties of blood, and there is a touch of personal note which is struck in the relations of Native States and the Suzerain power.

The suggestions, therefore, which I wish to make with regard to the removal of the first set of disabilities in the

altered conditions of present times are to the following effect :—

Reorganisation of Armies

(1) The armies of Native States, which are now in a moribund condition and are termed 'irregular', should be thoroughly reformed. These armies about the year 1880 were 3,49,833 men with 4,237 guns. A writer in the *London Times* bitterly complained about the vastness of these armies and the potentiality of their threatening the peace of the country. He advocated that these armies should be gradually reduced and disbanded. The policy, which was since then actively pursued, has resulted in an appreciable reduction of their numbers. In a publication styled 'Native States of India' and published in 1890, the strength of the armies of Native States is given as below:—

2,41,063	Foot-soldiers.
64,172	Cavalry.
9,390	Artillery Men.
5,252	Guns.

In a Memorandum on Native States in India published by the Government of India in 1911, the strength of this army is given as below :—

Regular troops.		Irregular troops.		Imperial Service troops.	
Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
10526	86295	7519	43166	17028	15508

It will thus appear that about the year 1880 the total strength of the Native States army was roughly 3,50,000; while in 1911 it was roughly 1,80,000. There has been

a reduction of nearly 50 per cent. during a period of over 30 years.

But even these armies are thoroughly ineffective for fighting purposes. Mr. Sydney Low in his admirable book "A Vision of India" has graphically described the condition of this army. "We have always permitted the Native States to keep up armies of all sorts. But it was our policy that these armies should be ineffective for fighting purposes. The princes might have a limited number of men in buckram or in red or khaki coats or in mail armour to play with; but we could not afford to let these troops be made efficient enough to become dangerous. Consequently we have refused to allow the feudatories to have their regiments drilled by European officers. We do not permit them to possess batteries of breach-loading artillery and we forbid the purchase of good modern rifles. The forces of Native States were paraded for the Prince of Wales's inspections as he passed through, and some of them made a very brilliant appearance, for we exercise no veto upon the sarratorial fancies of the Maharaja and if His Highness chooses to clothe his horde of military retainers armed with smooth bore musket and old Enfield carbines, in uniforms of Canary yellow or blue and silver, with old French dragoon helmets, we do not offer any objection. His subjects like the show and are pleased to see these obsolete warriors facing about and presenting arms while Colonel Gopal Singh or Major Mahamadkhan gives the word of command in what is supposed to be the English language. But to a young prince of spirit the whole affair must doubtless seem silly and theatrical and perhaps no more than a proof of humiliation and dependence. A man sprung from generations of war-like ancestors, who won their way and held it by the sword, must chafe at the restriction which binds him down to an army of stage supers and provides no worthy profession for the cadets and collateral branches of his royal house". No further comment is needed on the condition of the armies in the

Native States. They are a heavy burden to the States. The expenditure is thoroughly wasted. The armies serve no purpose at all. They do not even keep up the martial spirit of the subjects of the States and the whole concern is an unmeaning farce. If, on the other hand, abandoning the policy hitherto pursued, the Native Chiefs are allowed to train their armies in an efficient manner, if they are furnished with arms of precision, if they are drilled and disciplined in the European fashion, they will be a tower of strength in an hour of danger to the Empire. These armies can be mobilised for active service in any part of the world and would do credit to themselves and to the Empire. If, at the present juncture, the armies of Native States had been in a fighting condition, they would have relieved the anxieties of Government to a considerable extent. The first and foremost reform, therefore, which is necessary to be undertaken, is a thorough reorganisation of the armies of Native States so as to turn them into fighting units. The ruling chiefs and princes are styled comrades in arms. Their position in the Empire was declared by responsible ministers at the time of the assumption by Queen Victoria of the title of Empress of India as "civil councillors and military generals of the Empress." But unless these princes command armies disciplined, trained and armed in modern fashion, how can they be able to discharge their duties which they owe to the Empire? For what purpose is this large portion of the income of Native States squandered in maintaining an empty show? If, therefore, the money spent by the Native States in this connection is properly utilised in giving efficient training and discipline to their armies, it will give proper recompense to the States and to the subjects whose money is being thus recklessly wasted. If the term 'partners of the Empire', as applied to the ruling chiefs and princes, has any serious meaning, they must be allowed to convert their irregular troops into efficient fighting units.

This alone will justify that talk of confidence and changed angle of vision. Some 21 Native States are allowed to maintain Imperial Service Troops. Their total strength in cavalry and infantry comes approximately to 32,000. These troops are disciplined in the modern fashion. They have taken part in the actual fighting in the present war. Their services have been honourably mentioned during the present crisis on more occasions than one. If, therefore, the Native States are allowed to convert all their regular and irregular troops into Imperial Service Troops, and if they are allowed to be trained in the ways of modern warfare and armed with present day weapons, how usefully and effectively would they serve the Empire? How materially, this force, if it had been properly maintained, would have added to the strength of the Empire as a whole, it is needless to speculate. The want of man-power is bitterly realised. And if wiser counsels had prevailed 30 years before, if the lessons of the Afgan War had been kept in mind, the forces of Native States would have unquestionably inspired immense confidence in the Government of India about its military preparedness at the present juncture.

The observations of an eminent Indian statesman deserve to be constantly borne in mind in this connection :—" For centuries past India has reconciled herself to the existence within its midst, of a foreign paramount power, provided that power left free scope in the shape of Native States for the ambition and independent action of the native races and provided also that the paramount power displayed by its acts complete freedom from a conceited exclusiveness in religious and political matters. The history of the Mahomedan Empire in Hindustan under the first 5 monarchs of the House of Timur, affords the best illustration of this peculiar national temperament. As long as the princes of Rajasthan lost not an iota of their authority, they loyally entered the service of the imperial court at Delhi, and as long as by their connection with the imperial court, they added to their

former dignities that of being also the Arkani Doulant i. e. the pillars of the then greatest monarchy on earth, they ensured the empire of India its proper limits. This wise and liberal policy of Akabar and Shahajahan was stupidly abandoned by Aurangazeb, who attempted to revert to the narrow, crooked and intolerent methods of Islam as interpreted by the so-called orthodox Mullas and shattered the empire to pieces in the ill-considered attempts to centralise or rather brutalise power. The whole history of the Mogal Empire in Hindusthan points to a moral, which our Government should certainly lay to heart. " The history of British India for over a period of 100 years does not supply a single instance when a Native State has betrayed the confidence reposed in it, by raising a standard of revolt, against the paramount power. In the most trying and provoking times of the mutiny, the great Native States of India loyally stood by the paramount power and voluntarily helped the British troops in restoring peace and order. The loyalty of the Native States in the Afgan troubles and the spontaneous assistance, which Native States rendered to the paramount power at that time, need not be recapitulated. It is, therefore, highly impolitic to paralyse these forces of Native States by keeping them in a moribund condition and not allowing them any scope for active service. The present strength of the irregular armies maintained by the Native States is 150 thousand strong. It is equal to the Indian troops now employed in the regular British army. Why should not Government try to utilise these vast forces instead of making extraordinary efforts to enlist recruits and form reserve depots ? Would these armies of Native States not serve as ' reserves. ' ? If we make a liberal allowance for the ineffective section of this army, at least $\frac{2}{3}$ of them aggregating to one lac may be useful for active service. They have got some crude training and they are in the military line. A few months' drill and discipline under expert officers would turn these

vast forces into fighting units and can be requisitioned into active service. No one can yet predict the duration of the war. It is impossible to say when it will end. Why should not a portion of that zeal and enthusiasm now displayed by Government for recruits and reserves be devoted to reorganise these vast armies already maintained and utilise them at the present juncture? The cost of their maintenance is already borne by the Native States. If the extra cost of training, discipline, equipment of proper arms and the cost of transport to the various theatres of war is borne by Government, the native chiefs would very willingly lend these troops for the service of the Empire. But all this means transparent sincerity and genuine confidence in the loyalty of the ruling chiefs and princes. Of what avail would the talk of partnership in the Empire and comradeship in arms, be, if the paramount power is not prepared to repose confidence in the ruling chiefs and princes at this critical moment, when the safety of the whole empire is seriously involved? There was a tradition current among the Marathas that the great Madhaorao Peshawa was once asked why he did not fortify Poona, his capital city. He is reported to have said in reply that he had living walls and bastions in his great Sardars Shindya, Holkar and others and that he trusted more to living than to dead defences. How often history repeats itself! Exactly similar in spirit is the glowing encomium bestowed upon the ruling chiefs and princes by His Excellency Lord Chelmsford at the recent banquet given by the ruling chiefs at Delhi "The onslaught of our enemies may have delayed the new Delhi of brick and stone which His Majesty the King-Emperor desired to raise here, but in an assemblage such as is gathered together in Delhi to-night, do we not all feel that the war is laying foundations for the King's city far solid and more durable than the work of man's hands?"

If these noble sentiments are translated into real acts by training the vast armies of Native States into real fight-

ing units, India need not be afraid of any foreign enemy however formidable and however resourceful he may happen to be. The Viceroy very candidly stated that the ruling chiefs and princes have identified themselves so absolutely and whole-heartedly with the cause of the empire that their loyalty is no empty formula and that they have redeemed their pledges by placing their swords and their resources at the service of their sovereign. Is it, therefore unfair to expect that this recommendation would be favourably considered by the authorities concerned?

Enlistment

The second suggestion is that in view of the readiness and willingness of the subjects of Native States in contributing largely towards the prosecution of the war and the relief of distress caused by it and the proofs of deep and abiding loyalty given by them under the present conditions, they should be allowed to enlist as volunteers and enter the regular army. There are many disabilities under which they are labouring. Some of the subjects of Native States were not allowed to enlist in the Indian Defence Force on the ground that they belonged to the Native States. If these restrictions are removed, it would materially facilitate recruitment in the army and will help the solution of the question of man-power of the empire.

Military Colleges

The third suggestion, which it is necessary to make, is that Indian Sandhursts should be established to train the cadets of the Native States for military posts. Lord Curzon on one occasion said, "it is for this reason that by permission of His Majesty the King, I have founded the institution known as the 'Imperial Cadet Corps' where we give military education to the pick of the Indian aristocracy and which will eventuate as time goes on in the bestowal, for the first time, of commissions as British officers upon Indian Chiefs, Nobles and gentlemen". It is nearly seventeen years since the institution was started; and

during this period only 11 cadets were fortunate enough to receive the King's Commissions. The language of the commission contains such ambiguous expressions that it has stultified the objects with which these commissions were granted. The commission contained these words—' We do hereby command all Native officers and soldiers and other persons belonging to the said Native land forces to obey you as their superior officers.' These so-called Native land forces have never existed as a matter of fact. These cadets were, therefore, never employed in the regular Indian Army and they have been attached to Imperial Service Troops or to the personal staff of general officers. They have never been entrusted with regimental duties in the regular Indian army. In reply to a question by the late Mr. Gokhale, as to when these cadets would be entrusted with regimental duties, Lord Kitchener, who was then Commander-in-Chief in India, said "it is impossible to state what the prospects of these cadets are in the active services." And experience has shown during this long period that these Indian commissioned officers have been "homeless wanderers on the unattached list". The wording of the commission has been interpreted by the Commander-in-Chief to mean that however senior in service an Indian officer may be, he is always to rank as junior to all British officers in the regiments. In 1905 when the first commissions were announced, the *Times of India* wrote "hitherto Native officers' commissions have invariably ranked junior to British and under no circumstances could a Native officer command British troops. This no longer holds good, and the important change that the new departure portends will be watched with interest by many besides those directly concerned". No one could have watched the progress of the experiment without regret as the disability complained of was not removed for the next twelve years. The recent announcement in Parliament by the Secretary of State for India, regarding the grant of com-

commissions to Indian officers of the Imperial Cadet Corps, is of promises made to the ear and broken to the heart. I have ventured to suggest that military colleges should be established to train the Indian princes and the scions of Indian aristocracy in military science. The military correspondent of the *Times* recently advocated the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst for the general army, and the recommendation applies with special force to the training of the ruling chiefs. If, as suggested by me, the armies of the Native States are thoroughly re-organised and are made efficient fighting units, they would provide ample opportunity for these cadets to get suitable appointments worthy of their position, rank, heredity and education. The present strength of the irregular army maintained by the Native States is 150 thousand strong. If properly trained, they would require at least 6000 officers. This will also relieve many States from the anxiety of providing suitable occupation for the collaterals of the ruling princes and the aristocracy and noble families in the States. The field of employment would be widened to such an extent under these circumstances, that there would not be the slightest reason for members of the Indian aristocracy to encroach upon the rights of British Indian subjects in the matter of these commissions. Discipline and training in these colleges would open careers to members of Indian nobility, awaken in them ambitions of military prowess, and kindle in them the traditional martial spirit which once distinguished their ancestors and adorned their lineage and enable them to maintain the glory of their family, the renown of their Emperor and the honour of their country.

Council of Defence

The fourth suggestion I wish to make is that a Council of defence should be created for supervising and controlling the armies of Native States. As a matter of fact the ruling princes and chiefs have no international existence. The

foreign relations are governed by the paramount power. There is no necessity for them to maintain any armies. The paramount power has undertaken to maintain internal peace and to secure them from foreign aggression. In spite of this, the armies of Native States have continued to exist for over a century, even after the Native States were reduced to the position of vassals and had lost all international existence. The question principally is, what use to make of these armies and how to turn to the best advantage the enormous sums of money which are spent in maintaining these forces. It is evident, that the functions of these armies are purely imperial, in that they are to be at the service of the empire. Their control therefore must ultimately vest in the paramount power. The strength of these armies, the question of giving them training and discipline, their mobilisation must be determined by imperial considerations. It is therefore suggested that a Council should be formed consisting of the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the Staff and the head of the Army Department and three ruling chiefs elected by the imperial Council of chiefs with the Viceroy at its head. This Council will determine all questions, pertaining to the efficiency of these armies and the use which is to be made of the same in the service of the Empire. The presence of Indian princes will enable them to place their point of view before responsible officers of the Empire. The subordination of the armies of Native States would remove all the apprehensions about these armies becoming a source of danger, in case they are drilled, disciplined and armed in modern fashion. These armies would certainly be maintained from the resources of the Native States, they would be officered by the cadets in Native States and would be under the direct command of the respective rulers of the several States. But they would be serving under the directions of this Council and would be subordinate to it in all military affairs. There

will be 3 members representing the Indian Civil Service in this proposed Council. The 3 Indian members, if we suppose that the Viceroy's Council would be so reformed as suggested by the joint scheme of the Congress and the Moslem League, will represent the views of British Indian subjects. The three ruling princes will represent the Native States. With the 3 military experts and the 3 European members of the Council and the Viceroy, this Council of Defence will ever contain a preponderating British element. The Council of Defence would be thoroughly representative and would be responsible to the paramount power. It will therefore be always alive to the needs of the Empire and would shape its policy in accordance with the same. The creation of a Council of Defence is deliberately suggested, with a view that there should not be the slightest room for any apprehension on the score that the armies of Native States, when reorganised, armed, trained and disciplined may be dangerous to the safety of the British Indian Empire. The supreme power of control over the armies of Native States is vested in the Council of Defence for the same purpose. If these safeguards are found to be insufficient, the ruling chiefs and princes would very willingly accept any further restrictions that may be deemed necessary after mature consideration of this subject. This Council, therefore, would enable the ruling chiefs and princes to adequately discharge the burdens of the defence of the empire and thus co-ordinate the armies of the Native States to the Imperial army. The various political officers should carry out the behests of this Council of Defence and convey its instructions to the ruling chiefs and princes. The association of the ruling chiefs and princes and the members of the aristocracy with the armies in each state would create *esprit de corps* in these troops and make them active and willing partners in a scheme of general defence.

Reform of the Political Service

The fifth suggestion which I have to make is about the reform of the political and diplomatic service. One of

the serious disabilities under which all ruling chiefs and princes are labouring is that they have no liberty to communicate with one another without the medium of political officers. The system of appointing political agents and residents is an anachronism in the present day. At the time when British rule was not completely established, these officers were purposely appointed to overawe the native chiefs and their armies. The loyalty of the Native States was considered to be of a doubtful character. British rule had not become so permanent and stable as it has become to-day. The absence of means of communications, the non-existence of the network of railways, posts and telegraphs, created insurmountable difficulties in the path of empire-building in those times. Native States had not reconciled themselves to the new order of things. The consciousness of subjection was rankling in their hearts. The humiliation of lost glory and independence was only too fresh in their minds. It was, therefore, quite indispensable at that time to maintain a large staff of political officers to keep the Native States in check, to secretly watch their tendencies and vigilantly take note of any intrigue that may be in progress at that time. The officers then chosen for this service were purely military officers and they were assisted by British troops in their work. But the situation is now entirely changed. British rule has become a settled fact. Its roots are deeply embedded in the soil. Means of communication have annihilated distance and have brought about the unification of the whole Empire. New generations of ruling chiefs and princes have sprung up from whom the past is entirely obliterated. They are brought up with the traditions of the present rule and are imbued with the solidarity of the paramount power. The allegiance of the Native States is established beyond the shadow of doubt. Community of interests has been completely demonstrated by trying circumstances like the present war. Peace and order reign supreme in the land

and the overawing influence of military officers is not only undesirable but positively irksome.

As time went on these political officers had no military duties to discharge. The only function that has remained is one of espionage. They are *functus officio*. Their only duty now is to watch the administration in Native States. They do not take any initiative in any matters of State interest. They hear all complaints against the Native rule. They maintain stolid indifference about the well-being of the subjects of Native States. Their interference with the rule in Native States knows no laws or fixed principles. They do not care to set aside anomalies under the pretext of the non-intervention policy. They exercise their extraordinary powers of revision and correction, whenever it suits the individual freaks and fancies of any political officer. This exercise of discretion varies, as in the old days of English equity courts, with the foot of each officer. The subjects cannot depend on them for ultimate redress of their grievances nor can the ruling princes depend on them for sincere and outspoken advice. Their commands under the name of advice are to be implicitly obeyed. They simply submit secret reports about the machinations, supposed or real, in the Native State and the whimsical character of the autocratic ruler. This naturally deteriorates the service as a whole and the system has since then become thoroughly objectionable. Petty interferences with the liberties of ruling princes, intolerance of the communications of ruling chiefs, *intense* and vexatious pinpricking have become the order of the day, so far as the political officers are concerned. The evil effects of this system have been severely criticised by various writers. One of the Viceroys characterised the political agents as "dangerous officials." A shrewd Indian writer has pertinently observed in his "Letters to an Indian Raja"--"it has been remarked by some one that the political officers are intended to be mentors of native princes, but that system is calculated

sometimes to make them their tormentors." Mr. Joseph Challey in his "Problems of British India" has very clearly described the condition of the political officers, under whose guardianship, though of a benevolent character, the individuality of native chiefs and princes is entirely destroyed. He says "the political officers, who reside at these Courts, are their masters. That this may not be true in the case of the Nizam who has 11 million subjects nor perhaps in the state of Mysore with its 5 millions. The opposition of rulers of this calibre would be inconvenient and they consequently escape from the annoying control of the political despots. But elsewhere the attitude of political officer while ordinarily differential in form (though even that is sometimes lacking) is the attitude of a servant who directs his nominal master, haughty, impolite, impertinent and ironical. And what, say the observers I am quoting, are these political officers save spies whose words will be believed by the English in the face of all out-side denial. Once they have pronounced judgment on any matter, how can the chief appeal against it save by the difficult and exceptional method of a letter to the Viceroy or a complaint to the Government?" Mr. Sidney Low has also very trenchant remarks to make—"the political is not always the most tactful of human beings. The department has to fall back on a military man who has taken to civil employment or it selects a possibly second grade member of the bureaucracy. He may be fussy or pretentious or pompous or merely ignorant and idle. There are political officers to whom most of these epithets could be justifiably applied. When such an individual has to manage subtle intriguing and irritable Native princeling, at once proud, sensitive and suspicious, the machinery is not likely to work with smoothness. At the best it does run easily. The more we educate and Europeanise the native gentlemen, the less do they like being held in leading strings. The Raja feels that his brain is at least equal to that of a middle-aged, middle-class

colonel and is quite aware that this diplomatist is no body in particular when he goes back to his own country." The system therefore that has imposed such officers upon the native chiefs has created very great discontent. No doubt in the case of high political appointments selected by the India office able men are appointed. But the appointments of provincial Governments are, as remarked by Mr. Low, of the type described above. The system itself has grown antiquated. It has left no room for work of a responsible character to its officers. Their duties are merely those of spies as observed above by the disinterested French writer. The system has destroyed all individuality and originality in the native princes. It thwarts all attempts, on the part of native chiefs to improve by the association with their brother chiefs or with what is best in British India. The native chiefs are not permitted by these inquisitorial officers to assimilate what is enlightened and progressive in the free life of British India. All initiative on their part is sedulously discouraged and all their attempts to follow in the liberal footsteps of the Imperial power are looked upon with distrust and suspicion and treated with scant courtesy. Political officers are not at all held responsible for the good government of the Native States under their charge and this irresponsible position inevitably causes embarrassment to the chiefs. It does not help them in bettering their position. The working of this department is shrouded in mystery. Their reports are not open, their criticism cannot be publicly answered; they have the final word in all controversy and they are the keepers of conscience of the rulers so far as the Native States are concerned. No doubt there are some capable officers of high mental calibre and broad sympathies who outside this anomalous system would have made distinguished administrators. The chief complaint is not with the individuals, but with the system as a whole.

The most urgent reform therefore in this connection is that the political agents and residents should be entirely

deprived of their power of interference in the internal administration of the Native States. The powers of superintendence and correction which they at present arbitrarily enjoy, should be taken away from them and they should have absolutely nothing to do with the internal administration of the States. The sovereignty, though of an extremely limited character, which has been guaranteed to these Native States should be allowed to exist in its real form. The political Agents and residents should be the representatives of the Crown and should regulate only such relations as relate to the external affairs of the states.

Cardinal assumptions

It may perhaps be contended that in advocating the re-organization of the armies in Native States, the establishment of military colleges for military training and the withdrawal of powers of the political officers, is being created a new danger to the peace of the Empire. Native States, so liberalised from the thralldom of the political officers, so equipped with efficient army and so trained in military warfare, would be a threatening menace to British India. I have however made these suggestions on two cardinal assumptions. One of them is that responsible government is to be established in British India in the near future. Self-government or Home-rule has been declared to be the goal of British Indian politics. If Self-government on colonial lines is established in British India, all objections about the alien character of the rule would altogether disappear. Under a system of Self-government or Home-rule, the Government of the country would be thoroughly national. A consummation of this character so devoutly to be wished, would make it almost impossible to imagine any danger from the Native States. There would be no conflict of interests between the Government of India proper and the Native States in the event of an indigenous rule being established in British India. There is a community of civilisation, castes,

creeds, religious traditions and historical associations between the subjects of British India and Native States in India. Both of them are part and parcel of the same entity. It is therefore improbable, in the nature of circumstances, that any danger may be contemplated, from the new development of the Native States as sketched above. Even supposing that there is a possibility of this danger, of what avail would be the united strength of the Native States, in opposition to the mighty power of the renovated British India? The Native States are only one fourth of the whole of India. How could one-fourth dare to measure its strength with the $\frac{3}{4}$ of this vast Indian empire? The resources of the British empire are far too great and in the altered circumstances, with the consciousness of self-governing status, the danger from Native States need not even be dreamt of. One-fourth of India will always stand by the $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Indian Empire and supplement its strength in every possible emergency. The second assumption which I have made is, that responsible government would also be established in Native States in India along with British India. The subjects of Native States are as much fitted to bear the weight of self-government as their brethren in British India. The subjects of Native States, by their traditions and experience, are conversant with self-rule and they would acquit themselves of their responsibilities, if entrusted with self-governing powers to the same extent as their fellow subjects in British India would do. When, therefore, it is advocated that the Ruling chiefs and princes should be made independent of the political department in internal affairs, it is advocated in the same breath that the subjects in Native States should be endowed with the blessings of self-rule. If Home-rule or responsible rule in the real sense of the word is established in Native States, what necessity would there remain for any subject of a Native State to ventilate his grievances to any power outside the State? The possibility of making complaints against the rule of a Native prince or chief to a

foreign agency would altogether disappear. Responsible government means and does include the redress of all grievances of subjects enjoying that rule. The position of a native prince or chief would be akin to that of the British monarch, under a system of responsible government, if it is introduced into the States. And in such an eventuality no sane person would ever advocate the necessity of maintaining the institution of political agents and residents to overawe the ruling chiefs and princes. Self-government will liberate both princes and people from the annoying interference of despotic agencies and bring harmony and complete unity in the relations of the rulers and the ruled in the Native States.

A tentative measure

If, however, in the process of assimilation of Self-governing institutions, any delay would become inevitable by reason of different degrees of civilisation prevailing in 700 Native States and by reason of the unwillingness of autocratic rulers to part with powers, in favour of their subjects, the following suggestion deserves to be immediately adopted. Instead of political agents and residents exercising extraordinary powers of revision and correction, these powers should be delegated to one of the judges of the supreme Court of judicature in each province in which Native State is situated. In the case of Native States under the direct control of the Government of India, a special bench of 2 or 3 judges of the position and status of His Majesty's High Court Judges should be established. All complaints of revenue and judicial character or any claim against the ruler, for which the subjects of Native States seek redress at the hands of a political officer, should be referred to this tribunal. The disposal of such complaints by a high court judge, endowed with special powers of wide latitude, would give complete satisfaction to all the subjects in Native States. Such a judge would be above all intrigues and

would not be amenable to any influence. He would possess requisite knowledge which would enable him to dispose of all cases with a due regard to the rights of the States, to the laws and customs prevailing in these States and the rights of the subjects concerned. He will deal even-handed justice to prince and pauper alike. The bugbear of prestige would not frighten his judgement. The presence of such a court would lead to various indirect advantages. The laws in Native States would approximate more and more to those prevailing in British India. It will reform the judicial service in all the Native States. It will put a stop to all the anomalies, procrastination and the vagaries of autocratic rule prevailing in Native States. The creation of such Courts would not be derogatory to the dignity of ruling chiefs and princes. Even under the present condition a Court of redress and a Court of revision does exist. But instead of the arbitrary mandates of the political Courts, what objection would there be if the same work is done by an agency more competent, more respected and more honourable? Any self-respecting prince would prefer the decision in revision of a High-Court Judge, to the command in the name of advice, given to him by a military autocrat. Even the political officers would feel considerably relieved by such a change. To many of these Lieutenants and colonels, the work of hearing revisional applications is extremely irksome and against their grain. If they are saved from the forensic inflictions of pleaders and counsels and the harassment caused by legal subtleties and an imposing array of cases, they would think their lot very enviable. If such a proposal entails any extra cost it will be very cheerfully borne by the ruling princes and their subjects. This however is a proposal suggested as a tentative measure until full autonomous rights are conferred on the subjects of Native States and responsible Government is established in them. If however the old order of things is to be maintained intact, if the ruling chiefs and princes are to continue unbridled in their autocratic rule, if the

subjects of Native States are not to get any effective voice in the administration, if responsible Government is not to be dreamt of, it is needless to add that the political officers should not be divested of their powers of interference in the administration of Native States. Though it is seldom that these powers are used in favour of the subjects, the existence of these powers exercises a restraining influence over them in their despotic career.

I have so far dealt with the disabilities of the first class. I have suggested such remedies as I thought proper for the removal of the same.

Second set of disabilities

I shall now deal with the second set of disabilities mentioned above. These disabilities have been imposed from a sense of sovereign duties towards the Native States. The successions to the Gadis in Native States are regulated by the paramount power. During the minority of a prince, the management of a Native State is taken over by the British Government and the form of administration is also determined by it. The education to be imparted to a minor chief depends entirely on the discretion of the same power. The power of a Chief to alienate property and to encumber it beyond his lifetime is also limited. He is not allowed to own properties in British India without permission of the paramount power. His right to own private property is doubted. His power of bequeathing property is also restricted. He has to apply for leave to travel abroad and he can not communicate with his brother chiefs or carry on any negotiations with them. The grant of honours and decorations, the right to settle precedence are the prerogatives of the Crown. The acceptance of foreign orders and honours are subject to the approval of the Crown. The right to receive representatives of Native States and the right to accredit agents to the courts of Native States are controlled by the paramount power. All these disabilities relate to the head of a Native State—namely—a Ruling Prince or a Chief. As regards the corporate body, namely the State itself, there are various

limitations imposed by the sovereign power. The right of dividing and sub-dividing any State belongs to the Suzerain power. The spirit of British legislation exercises immense influence on the laws of the State. Religious toleration, the accepted creed of the paramount power is to be implicitly followed by a protected State. Laws of natural justice are required to be enforced in Native States. The jurisdiction over European British subjects, even though residing within the territory of a Native State vests in the paramount power. The extradition of offenders is ordained by the same power. The right to suppress inhuman practices and offences against public morality are dictated by the same power. In the matter of currency, the gauge of railways, tariffs, tolls, patents and copyrights, the policy of the paramount power generally dominates. As regards disputes between State & State the decision entirely rests with the paramount power and such cases are generally adjudicated by political officers. The paramount power has undertaken to suppress any rebellion of the subjects in a State against the ruling prince. The paramount power reserves to itself the right to interfere in the affairs of Native States only when there is gross misgovernment, continued over a long series of years. This is probably the only condition which seems to have been imposed upon the rulers of Native States in favour of their subjects. There does not however appear any converse condition enjoining good administration in Native States on pain of deposition. The paramount power which protects the ruling princes from any rebellion or internal disorder is inclined to assist the people only when they have suffered long under a gross misrule. This implies such an imperfect sense of duty on the part of the paramount power towards the helpless subjects of the Native States, weighed down under the double despotism of their autocratic rulers and their still more autocratic overlords, that, it is, to say the least of it, thoroughly unworthy of the enlightened rule of Great Britain. The subjects of Native States who have to bear all the burdens of the union of Native States with

the paramount power, have no *locus standi* whatsoever in the political machinery of the Empire. They have no voice and they have no hope of redress until their grievances become intolerable.

Necessity of Redress

If we consider the several disabilities, it is imperative for the paramount power to know the feelings of the Native States concerned. As regards the succession to the Gadi of a Native State, more especially when there is a dispute about it, public opinion in the State must have an opportunity of being heard, before the matter is finally decided. Government must be able to justify its action in the light of any criticism that may be passed. Similarly any inquiry about the maladministration of a ruling Chief deserves to be conducted openly and before a tribunal properly constituted. If the meanest British subject has the right to be tried in open courts, why should the same privilege be not conceded to a ruling prince. Why should his decision entirely rest in the hands of executive officers, whose judgements are likely to be coloured by the prepossessions of the man on the spot, who by his very position and the frailty of human nature is bound to take sides. If the humblest of his Majesty's subjects has the right to approach the impartial tribunal of the Privy Council why should not a ruling chief claim the right to be tried by a court, about whose impartiality he has not any just reason to complain. Similarly about the divisions and sub-divisions of jurisdictions in petty States, those who are subjected to this rule ought to be given just and fair hearing, Same considerations exist in the case of exchange of territories. The question of jurisdiction of the paramount power over European British subjects residing in Native States has been a source of bitter discontent. Why should not the ruling chiefs and their subjects have an opportunity of openly expressing the injustice which they suffer by reason of this high handed prerogative of the Crown. Disputes between State and State are "investigated secretly by the Political Agent

through whom all communications pass between the Government and the disputants, and upon whose confidentially expressed opinions the ultimate decision is based. Such a course of proceedings is open to grave abuses and considerations of general policy are confessedly allowed to weigh no less than the intrinsic merits of the case in decisions, the reasons for which are seldom made public." In all matters referred to above, the decision of the paramount power is based upon a "hole and corner" system. The remarks made by Sir David Wedderburn in 1878 hold good even at the present time. "It would not be difficult to multiply the statements of hardships suffered by protected Chiefs at the hands of Government, but it is of the very nature of the political system that such statements should be mere *ex parte* complaints. As we have not access to the confidential reports of the Government agents whether or not injustice has been committed in any particular case, we cannot certainly know. But we know that all proper means were not adopted for arriving at a conclusion. Even with the best intentions and utmost care mistakes and mis-carriages of justice will occur. But the real evil of the secret system is that under it Government never can obtain credit for having made honest mistakes and the worst of motives are attributed by those who feel themselves aggrieved. Indeed one cannot help feeling astonished at the moderation of the Government, who acting as prosecutor and judge, are able to confiscate the property of an accused person without having to assign publicly any reason for so doing. Edmund Burke in one of his memorable speeches recommended, as a means of reforming Indian abuses, combination of three things, a Government by law, trial by jury, publicity in every executive and judicial concern. The experience of over a century and half confirms thoroughly this recommendation. What is at present needed in the administration of Native States is the publicity in every judicial and executive measure of the political department. A most difficult and responsible duty devolves on the so called politicals

to whom has been entrusted hitherto a conduct of peculiar relations subsisting between British Government and the Native chiefs. These politicals are called upon to act as administrators, as diplomatists and as judges controlling with greater or less authority, some 800 chiefs with some 5,50,00,000 people. Aply and faithfully their arduous duties have been discharged and no body of public servants can boast of more distinguished names than the politicals, most of whom are soldiers, but who have rather laboured to preserve peace and maintain good faith than to promote a policy of aggrandizement and annexation. Had it been otherwise, had our Indian political system been carried out by less worthy agents, it could hardly have survived until now. Nevertheless the interests of justice would be safer even in the hands of inferior men conducting their inquiries in the light of day, than they can be in those of 1st class officers working without a sense of responsibility to public opinion. Open justice should be our main stay on native territory, as well as our own province and we have nothing to fear from publicity even in the political department. A secret system affords opportunities for intrigue, corruption and chicanery." No greater admirer could be found of the politicals than Sir David, but even he has to admit that the secret system of the political department should be changed and a machinery should be established, which will dispose of all questions connected with protected states in the light of day.

The remedy

The remedy for removing these disabilities is to liberalize the administrations in the Native States by giving them a position in the constitution of the Empire. This question has been under consideration for a long time and it bristles with many difficulties. There was a considerable misunderstanding on this subject. The idea of giving some voice to the Native States in the administration of British India was strongly opposed and keenly resented. There was some justification for this attitude. No Native State

ever desired to meddle with the affairs of British Indian administration. There has been considerable clearing of the ground in this connection since last year's Imperial conference. It has been made definitely clear and unambiguous that Native States in India are not anxious to interfere with British India. All they claim is that matters affecting Native States should be discussed and settled in a constitutional manner and under a machinery in which they should have an effective voice. The position of Native States and their growing importance in the Body-politic has been reiterated on various occasions by eminent British statesmen. The *Times of India* has very justly observed "The Native States of India represent one third of the area of the land and one fourth of population. We could not get rid of them if we would. No one outside a lunatic asylum would suggest that the attempt should be made. Time and again, those who speak with highest authority have emphasised their place in the governance of India. Lord Curzon spoke of them as pillars of the Empire. In another notable pronouncement that great Viceroy expressed his belief in them, as living factors in the administration. Lord Minto extended the principle of state responsibility for good administration. Lord Hardinge established relations of altogether remarkable confidence and trust between himself and principal Chiefs. During this war the Native States have risen to the height of their Imperial responsibilities. In acknowledging their great and voluntary services, Lord Chelmsford said "In this war Your Highnesses have stood forth as true pillars of the Empire, and both by personal service in the field and lavish contributions in men, money and material, you have earned a place in the hearts of the British people, which will remain for all time." Yet the fact remains that having this immense stake in the Indian Empire and having done so much to justify it, the Native States are still without organic connection with the polity of India." Various attempts to create an organic connection of the Native

States with British India were made from Lord Lytton's time but the difficulties in the solution have been so considerable that every time the efforts to give tangible shape to the idea had to be abandoned.

Chiefs' Conferences

It is therefore suggested that Conferences of Ruling Chiefs should be formed in all the provinces and there should be one Imperial Conference of the Chiefs. The present arrangement of grouping the Native States, will have to be considerably modified to suit this idea. The Native States under the direct supervision of the Government of India will have to be reclassified for this purpose. Important Native States, at whose courts special Residents are stationed, will have to remain as before under the direct control of the Government of India such as Baroda, Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. The States under the Political agencies situated in Kabul, Baluchistan and North-West frontier will have to be under the Government of the Punjab. Those in Tibet will have to be included within Bengal. The Rajputana and Central India States should be taken away from the Government of India. Bengal including Eastern Bengal and Assam should have a Provincial conference of the Chiefs situated in that presidency. Bombay should have a provincial conference of Chiefs situated in that Presidency. Madras also should have one. Central Provinces, United Provinces, Punjab and Burma should each have a provincial conference of Chiefs. Rajputana should have a provincial conference, as also Central India. In all there will be nine provincial conferences of Chiefs. Of course to make this scheme effective, it will be necessary to reclassify several States, on the basis of their financial condition, territorial extent, strategic and military importance, advance of education and civilization, historical importance and associations, culture of the ruling prince, progressive condition of the people, efficiency of administration and the services rendered to the Empire. Such of them as deserve

to be elevated to the position and honour of direct relations with the Government of India should be promoted to that class. The number also of the Native States, who shall be invited to the provincial conferences of the Chiefs will have to be settled, after a due regard to the importance of each State, its fitness and the necessity of its inclusion in the conference. Each provincial conference should consist of the ruling princes of such Native States as may be selected by the head of the province. It should be presided over by the head of the province in all the seven provinces. The Provincial conference of Rajputana States should be presided over by the Agent to the Governor-General, so also the provincial conference of Central Indian States should be presided over by the Agent to the Governor-General. Each provincial conference should consist of a few officials whose presence may be necessary, for information and guidance, in the conduct of business, with the Political Secretary as an *ex-officio* member. The object in suggesting the creation of these conferences is to give to the various ruling princes, who may be its members, an opportunity to voice their feelings. Each conference should have in it a substantial number of ruling princes and it should not in any way fetter the liberty of the ruling princes, by the inclusion of the political officers in the conference. Each provincial conference should send its representatives to the Imperial conference by a system of election. The number of members to be elected by each provincial conference will have to be determined, with a due regard to the importance of the Native States in each province and their number.

The Imperial Conference of Chiefs should consist of the chiefs of those States which have direct political relations with the Government of India and of the elected representatives of the nine Provincial Conferences of chiefs. The number of members of this conference should not exceed 50. The Imperial conference should be presided over by the Viceroy, who should be assisted by the Political Secretary and by such other officers as may be necessary for an efficient discharge of duties of this Conference.

One Sided Reform

The creation of the conferences of ruling chiefs and princes would be an altogether one sided reform. A Native State consists of a ruling chief and his subjects. The subjects of Native States have no voice in the administration of their State. They have no control over the finances, the services or the laws to be made applicable to their State. They cannot shape in any manner the general policy of the State. Administration in a Native State means roughly a machinery of collecting taxes from the subjects, who have no voice whatsoever. It has been characterised by a writer as 'an apparatus of rent-collection.' There are no self-governing institutions wielding substantial power in any of the Native States. Local self-government also is in a most backward condition. The people have no control of any kind, over the Executive of a State. The Judiciary is not independent. The press is in its infancy and does not influence in the slightest degree the administration of a Native State. The Chief or the ruling prince is all in all, virtually above all laws and above any criticism so far as subjects are concerned. If he is educated and well behaved it is a benevolent autocracy. If he is vicious or uneducated or imbecile or has morbid tastes, it is despotism of other than a benevolent character. But it is despotism in any case. The spirit of progress and enlightenment which is perceptible in British India, has not been able to leave its impress on the Native States in spite of the example of British Government being before them for over a century. Of recent years there have been some attempts to introduce representative institutions in some Native States. But all these are very feeble attempts. They are imitations or mere shadows of real representative institutions. Mr. Lovat Fraser States that "the assemblies already convoked in one or two States are mere shams and were never intended to be otherwise." The liberties which the subjects of British India at present enjoy, in the matter of Local-Self-government, Legislative Councils and Executive Councils are not extend-

ed to the subjects, of even the foremost and the so-called most 'enlightened' Native States in India. And for such a state of things there is absolutely no justification. An alien Government may plead excuse, if it is found to be reluctant to share its powers with its subjects ; for it is not familiar with the hopes and aspirations, with sentiments and feelings, with faults and prejudices of its subject population. Vested rights and self interest are great impediments in the way of liberalising the administration. The growth therefore, of democratic institutions and responsible Government is bound to be rather slow under an alien rule. The spread of education and an awakening among the subjects, will alone hasten the grant of self-governing institutions to the subjects at the hands of an alien bureaucracy. But no such considerations exist in the case of the autocratic Native Chiefs and Princes. They are familiar with the hopes and aspirations, with the sentiments and feelings of their own subjects. There is no room for conflict of interests between a ruling chief and his subjects. There are no vested rights that stand in the way of subjects of Native States and the grant of autonomous powers to them. And yet, in spite of these most favourable circumstances, what do we find in the Native States of India? Notwithstanding the fine sentiments of liberty and popular rights, which are occasionally voiced by some ruling chiefs, what are the hard facts? Is there even one single ruling chief or prince who is prepared to introduce real self governing institutions in his State? How many of the ruling chiefs are ready to have their privy purse separated from the resources of their own States? How many of them are disposed to hand over the entire control of the finances of their States to the elected representatives of their subjects? How many would choose to be guided by ministers, elected by the representatives of their subjects and enjoying their confidence? How many would view with favour even the mere idea of a responsible government in their States? How many would bear the

scathing criticism of their administration to their face, as is levelled in the Legislative Councils in the presence of the bureaucracy against their administration? How many would tolerate severe rebuke for their faults at the hands of the press in their own territories? How many have fostered the growth of newspapers in their own States? The existence of a healthy, vigorous, dogged and an influential press is almost unknown in Native States. What opening is there of a legitimate character for the subjects of Native States to ventilate their grievances without incurring the wrath of their rulers or without exposing themselves to the risk of personal ruin? What safe-guards exist at present for the protection of property and person against the rapacity and greed of an autocratic chief? Under these circumstances how can the ruling chiefs and princes expect the subjects to repose implicit confidence in them as their leaders? The ambition to become partners in the governance of the Empire is no doubt noble but it has its own responsibilities. These responsibilities include an earnest desire to move with the spirit of the times, willingness to decentralise power, readiness to bear sacrifices for the betterment of the subjects consigned to their charge, and an anxious solicitude to widen the sphere of liberties of their subjects. Unless the ruling chiefs and princes discharge these obligations satisfactorily, their claim to this exalted position would be untenable. Example is better than precept. Until therefore the native chiefs and princes by their own free will introduce self-governing institutions in the territories under their charge they cannot justly lay claim to a constitutional position in the Empire. The spirit of reform, progress and enlightenment which has been the hallmark of Britain's rule must be consciously in evidence in Native States, before they can boast of partnership in the Empire. The population of Native States is equal to one-fourth of that of the whole of India. The solicitude which is displayed by the British statesmen, by the British

public, and by the Government of His Majesty the King Emperor is not for the purpose of upholding the autocratic rule of 700 ruling chiefs and princes. The desire to ameliorate and better the condition of the dumb, helpless and unrepresented mass of these Native States, is at the bottom of the anxious consideration which is bestowed on the administration of the Native States by the Paramount Power. The paramount power should impose a condition upon every Ruling Prince or Chief, desirous to obtain a seat in the constitutional Chamber or in the Conference of Chiefs, to bring up his administration to the level of British India and an undertaking to faithfully accept and carry out the policy of His Majesty's Government recently declared. *Noblesse oblige* must exercise its sway on the ruling chiefs and princes. If they aspire for this honour of association with the suzerain power as partners of the Empire, they must, by their own examples as evidenced by their rule, show that they are alive to their responsibilities and are anxious to develop self-governing institutions with a view to establish ultimately responsible government in their States.

Condition of Subjects

The helpless condition of the subjects of Native States is undoubtedly very pitiable ; but under the despotic rule of their own chiefs and princes who are protected in their autocratic career by the strength of the paramount power, it has become quite intolerable. A writer in the '*Karnatak*' has very graphically narrated the present condition. "There is no life, no real wakeful, purposeful, energetic and progressive life in States. Once famed for refuge of art and literature, they are now conspicuous for their intellectual inanition and soullessness. Among the greatest names of Modern India not even one can be claimed by Native States as its own. Our greatest politicians, public workers, historians, scientists, lawyers, orators, social reformers all belong to some part or other of British India. Three decades

ago when there was a keen rivalry between natives and outsiders for distinction in practical state-craft and when men had to act in the light of their own independent judgment and had no precedent to follow, the States were able to produce some first rate administrators and statesmen. But the conditions have changed now, and the Diwan of to-day is generally either a glorified clerk or a fussy amateur or a hardened British bureaucrat. The most promising young men are absorbed into the offices of Government where however their intelligence withers away. There is no scope for its flowering, and little talent is left in States for public works and literary pursuits." "In the Native States nobody is serious or takes his roll seriously, with the exception of few enthusiasts who provoke smiles. Everybody is playing a part. Administration, the army, the secretariat are all comedy ; no body cares for results or troubles himself about anything but appearance and the pay which it brings" is another very epigrammatical description of the present state of things given by Mr. Chailley. The so-called enlightenment and progress is nothing but an unreality and is created by, interested advertisement. The writer in the '*Karnatak*' has also very rightly pointed out the remedy for the cure of this evil. "This intellectual and moral bankruptcy will become a thing of the past only, when the people are lifted out of their torpor and listlessness, by their growing sense of their own human value and importance. Their abject and self-oblivious dependence on the all powerful *Sarkar* should make for a burning and aggressive self-consciousness, and then alone their faculties would be set free to manifest themselves of thought and of enterprise. The individual will cease to think that he is nobody in the State, and begin to feel that he has something to fight for, something to preserve, something to keep a vigil about. For has it not been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. This political awakening is the necessary pre-condition of all true progress and it should therefore be the first duty of every patriot, to try

to rid the people of their present moral insensibility, mis-called contentment, and low self-satisfaction, mistaken for blessedness and to generate in them that divine discontent and that upward aspiration which is the mother of all manly idealism and effort. One way to achieve that end is to throw political responsibility on the shoulders of the people themselves and to force their pace as it were, on the path of progress." This is indeed a very correct exposition of the remedies that deserve to be adopted for the re-generation of the vast population whose destinies are at present controlled by 700 autocratic rulers. It would be well if they remember the prophetic words of Sir T. Madhavrao, that if unqualified personal and arbitrary rule continues in Native States they must inevitably collapse one after another, the event being only a question of time.

Conferences of the Subjects

For the reasons stated above the conference of ruling chiefs alone, would not be really representative of Native States. They would not represent the subjects of Native States. There is no identity of interests between the subjects and their rulers. Unless the subjects of Native States have a responsible voice in the administration, the chiefs or ruling princes cannot claim to represent the opinions of their subjects. They would be simply representing their own individual views and no civilized government would like to rely upon the opinions of a few hundred autocrats in considering problems affecting the welfare of one-fourth of the population of this vast continent. The exigencies of this situation therefore lead to the advocacy of a bicameral system so far as the Native States are concerned. We therefore propose that side by side with the conferences of chiefs there should be conferences both provincial and Imperial of the subjects of Native States. Along with provincial conferences of chiefs there should be conferences of the subjects of Native States, for the same areas. The election of subjects to these conferences shall have to be based on some

qualifications of education, property and status. These conferences should be presided over by the same heads of Governments and should be assisted by the same officials as in the case of provincial conferences of chiefs. There should also be an Imperial conference of the subjects of Native States. It should consist of such subjects as may be elected on the basis of some franchise to be determined by the paramount power from the States under the direct control of the Government of India and also of those elected by the nine provincial conferences. The Imperial Conference of subjects should like the Imperial Conference of chiefs be presided over by the Viceroy and assisted by the same officials.

Treaty rights

The creation of the conferences of subjects of Native States and their incorporation in the constitutions may perhaps be resented on the ground that it will interfere with the treaties and engagements so highly prized by the ruling chiefs. Last year at the Chiefs' Conference, a novel doctrine was propounded by His Highness the Maharaja Gaikwad to this effect "we do not desire to encroach upon the affairs of British India, any more than we want anybody outside our States to interfere with the affairs of our own States and ourselves." This proposition has been reiterated since then, by prominent ruling chiefs and also seems to have been countenanced by the representatives of the paramount power. So far as the interference in the affairs of the Native States is concerned, this proposition, when fully analysed, means that the Ruling Chiefs and Princes do not like any one to interfere in their relations with their own subjects. They want to be the sole arbiters of the destinies of their own people. This proposition presupposes that the ruling chiefs and their subjects are unfettered by any kind of limitations. It further assumes that the rights of the subjects and the Princes are adjusted

by circumstances existing in every State ; that there are no external considerations which in any way circumscribe the liberties either of the ruling chiefs or their subjects. But this is not a fact. The paramount power has guaranteed the chiefs and princes complete protection from any internal rebellion and the continuance of their houses. The ruling chiefs, therefore, enjoy special protection and special privileges as against their own subjects. The subjects are not free to carry on a constitutional struggle and they cannot square their accounts with their chiefs in an undisturbed manner. The guarantee given by the supreme Government to the chiefs thus operates to the advantage of the rulers and to the prejudice of the ruled. The supreme Government is altogether independent of them both and is the most dominant and powerful of them all. If we take a hypothetical case and suppose that the subjects of a Native State depose their ruler, because he does not maintain good administration and if they do this without recourse to violence or breach of peace, would the paramount power leave the parties alone? Would they quietly look on this spectacle without in any way interfering with the parties? The reply to this would be an emphatic negative. If there be any violence or breach of peace, the paramount power may interfere on the ground that the general peace of the country may be disturbed. But if a bloodless revolution is brought about, would the paramount power be an indifferent on—looker of such a phenomenon? We have no shadow of doubt that it will come down upon the subjects with all their mighty power, crush them and restore the unhappy chief to his exalted position. This guarantee and this assurance reign supreme in the consciousness of every ruling chief in all his dealings and conduct towards his subjects. When, therefore, the paramount power so powerfully dictates and controls the relations between the ruling chiefs and their subjects, how can the ruling princes resent the interference

of the same dominant power, in their internal administration, for the betterment of their subjects. The chiefs always start with the presumption that they will receive support at the hands of the sovereign power in any conflict with their subjects, who do not enjoy any guarantees to safe-guard their interests. If the chiefs are so jealous of any interference in their internal affairs, they should be equally zealous and equally prepared to forego the special guarantee which they enjoy at the hands of the paramount power in opposition to their own subjects. If they desire to enjoy complete freedom from interference they must be prepared to rule without in any way invoking the help of the paramount power.

When the Native chiefs claim from the paramount power freedom from interference in their internal affairs, it naturally leads to the supposition that the parties to this understanding are in a position of perfect equality with each other. But can it, for a moment, be contended that the feudatory Native States and the suzerain British Government stand in this position of equality. The paramount power has enjoined in all its treaties with the chiefs and princes that they would maintain good government in their States. It has also asserted its right of interfering in the internal administration of Native States. Whenever there is gross mis-rule or incapacity to effect necessary reforms or the necessity of protecting the welfare of suffering millions, the paramount power has exercised this right on several occasions. Mr. Tupper, in his 'Indian Protectorate' has stated that so long as a ruling chief preserves peace and so long as there is reasonable security afforded to life and property and justice, administered with tolerable fairness, there is no desire to interfere on the part of the paramount power. Mr. Tupper has given certain tests when interference in the internal administration becomes imperative on the part of the paramount power. "There may, of course, be cases where the inertness of the central authority and its

callousness to the welfare of all, except the army, the court, and the priestly classes may be gradually bringing about serious mis-government. There may be no out-cry, no wide-spread discontent, no glaring iniquity but either from the idleness and incapacity of the chief or from his jealousy of other authority, there may be a complete block of business. It may be impossible to get any long and intricate case decided, because the chief either will not or cannot deal with it himself and will not allow it to be dealt with by his subordinates. There may be a slipshod style of work in all departments. The administration of justice may be slow, careless, often corrupt. At the capital we may see a veneer of civilization and a number of officials with high sounding titles of State, but five miles away from it there may be complete neglect of the most elementary requisites of efficient administration and no money may be spent on any object that is not religious or military or directly remunerative. If to neglect and suspicion be added avarice, if there be deliberate attempt to break the tenures of large classes of the peasantry, if taxes are laid upon the peasants heavier than they can bear, if without trial men are seized and imprisoned, their property confiscated, the time is at hand when forbearance towards the chief becomes a wrong to his people and when remonstrance, if unheeded, must give way to direct measures of reforms". All these incidents entirely bear on good administration in a Native State. Mr. Tupper has summed up the situation in one sentence 'the best limit to British interposition is the effectual one of good government'. The paramount power, therefore, is empowered to secure good government in Native States. No doubt it is true that it has neither deposed any ruling chief for not maintaining good administration nor has it shown its displeasure by any open act of a penal character. The suzerain power has connived at Native States even when they have failed to maintain good government. There may be obvious reasons of political expedi-

ency or diplomacy for this halting attitude. The general tendency of the paramount power is to wait till there is gross misrule. Until that point is reached, a chief is not 'pulled up' as is remarked by Sir Thomas Holderness in his 'Peoples and Problems of India'. Whether such an attitude is just and proper, it is not necessary to discuss. So far, therefore, as the abstract question of principle is involved and so far as the actual practice is concerned, the treaties and engagements clearly empower the paramount power to exercise the rights of interference in the internal administration of a Native State on the ground of good government and in the interests of the subjects concerned. The claim, therefore, of the ruling princes and chiefs for complete freedom and non-intervention in their domestic affairs, is not tenable under the treaties and engagements which they so highly respect. Such a claim would be valid only in the case of real sovereign powers. The native princes enjoy not the full rights of sovereignty but only the limited rights of semi-soveriegnty with special guarantees and privileges in their favour.

The obligation of Native States to maintain good Government has been enunciated by eminent Indian Viceroy from time to time. Lord Ripon on one occasion said "it is well-known and should be everywhere understood that the British Government always entertains not only a desire for the honour and advantage of the Chiefs but also a deep solicitude for their subjects and that we measure the greatness of a State and the degree of its prosperity not so much by the brilliancy of its court or even by the power and perfection of its army as by the happiness and contentment of the people." Lord Curzon has very emphatically described the duties of princes and chiefs in this connection :—"It is obvious that they must keep pace with the age. They cannot dandle behind and act as a drag upon an inevitable progress. They are links in the chain of Imperial administration. It would never do for the

British links to be strong and the Native links weak or *vice versa*. As the chain goes on lengthening and the strain put upon every part of it increases so is uniformity of quality and fibre essential. Otherwise the unsound links will snap. I, therefore, think and I lose no opportunity of impressing upon the Indian chiefs that a very clear and positive duty devolves upon them. It is not limited to the perpetuation of their dynasties or the maintenance of their *Raj*. They must not rest with keeping things going in their time. Their duty is one not of passive acceptance of an established place in the imperial system but of active and vigorous co-operation in the discharge of its onerous responsibilities. When wrong things go on in British India, the light of public criticism beats fiercely upon the offending person or spot. Native States have no right to claim any immunity from the same process." Lord Minto also has laid down the following dictum:—"but in guaranteeing their internal independence and in undertaking their protection against external aggressions, it naturally follows that the Imperial Government has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for the general soundness of their administration and could not consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of misrule." Thus the express stipulations of the treaties and the pronouncements of British statesmen; clearly establish the right of the paramount power to interfere in the internal administration of States to ensure good government for the benefit of the subjects of them.

The objection on the score of interference with the treaty rights is raised by States only when the paramount power wants to encroach upon proprietary rights or to assert certain claims which were not in existence or to throw burdens which were not previously borne by the Native States. It is only when the paramount power is actuated by such selfish motives that the cry of 'treaty rights being in danger' is generally raised and it is needless to state that under such circumstances it is perfectly justifiable. But when the paramount

power interferes in the interests of the subjects of Native States and when it is actuated by sentiments of enlightened statesmanship and broad-minded sympathies no valid objection could be taken as the motives are pure and noble.

Besides, how have the treaties been respected by both the parties to these engagements. The paramount power, whenever the exigencies of Imperial policy dictated, have twisted the wording of these treaties to suit their convenience. These treaties have never come in their way to carry out their policy throughout this long period of over a century. Mr. Cambell in his 'Modern India and its Government' has very frankly conceded this position. "It must be admitted that in our interference with the internal concerns of Native States we, do in practice go very much beyond the letter of original stipulations. But everything has shown the incompatibility of civil independence with military dependence and the force of concurring circumstances has driven us to interfere till there has grown up a prescription which settles and authorizes the practice." Mr. Campbell further advises to the following effect:—"This maintenance of forms long gone by, is false in fact, inconvenient in practice and disadvantageous in every way. It would be much better, formally to assume the feudal superiority of India and to interfere authoritatively in those things in which it is proper and expedient to interfere and to leave untouched those things which are judged proper, to be left to the inferior rulers. There would then be a uniform system and line of conduct, in stead of all the periphrasis and inconvenience of forcing some things, obtaining some things by influence and leaving some things done or undone which ought to be undone or done". This is really plain-speaking and it has correctly described the attitude of the dominant partner to the treaties. The history of the Imperial Service Troops clearly shows the respect which is given to these treaties by the paramount power. Various

Native States, which are now maintaining these troops, had standing armies of their own, lying in a most inefficient condition. Left to themselves, the chiefs and princes of these States would have turned their effete armies into Imperial Service Troops, instead of incurring additional burdens for the maintenance of these troops. Strict treaty rights ought to have induced the suzerain power not to accept the offers of these troops by the ruling chiefs. But there was the wish, the persuasion, and the encouragement of high officials of Government and the Native States immediately came forward to bear this outlay. And all this has been styled as the outcome of 'a generous and spontaneous impulse' of individual chiefs. What the meaning of 'spontaneous action' is in the language of diplomacy and political state-craft, it is needless to explain. Suffice it to say that the language of the treaties has been sufficiently elastic to suit Imperial ends. If we consider the claims put forward by the ruling chiefs and princes at the present day, they would never be countenanced by the strict words of treaty obligations. The ruling chiefs and princes are claiming a vote and voice at the annual meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet or War Conference that is to shape the Imperial policy. The expressions of intense delight at the selection of the Maharaja of Bikaner to represent the Indian Princes at the Imperial War Conference, show the great value which ruling princes and chiefs have set on the high honour conferred on one of their noble order. This is considered as the recognition of their claim to take part in the deliberations of the Council of the Empire in the matter of defence. What treaty supports such a claim? The ruling princes and chiefs are claiming the establishment of a constitutional chamber for themselves which may safe-guard their interests in matters of Imperial or joint concern. They claim to have a voice in shaping the policy of the Indian Government, in all matters which affect concurrently the interests

of British India and the Native States. What terms of the treaties, so far concluded with the Native States, would justify such a demand? They are now holding private communications with their brother chiefs to bring about reform of their status. They are going to confer together for this purpose. What treaties warrant such actions? The new consciousness which the ruling chiefs and princes are breathing and the new sense of self-assertion which they are manifesting and the new sense of responsibility which they entertain cannot find support in the treaties and engagements which have been antiquated. From the position of feudatories and vassals they want to be elevated to the position of equal partners of the Empire and the members of a federal union. The ruling chiefs and princes themselves by their conduct and aspirations do not want to be strictly confined to the limitations imposed by the time-worn treaties. These treaties are not a drag in their ways to claim larger rights for themselves. They only want to resort to them when their own rights are likely to be curtailed by the grant of self-governing powers to their subjects in their administrations. New ideas have sprung up, new situations have developed, new impulses are generated and the whole outlook of Indian public life has altered beyond recognition. Old relations, whether subsisting between the Indian Government and the Indian people or between the paramount power and the Native States or between the ruling princes and their subjects, must be modified, altered or even rescinded to suit the requirements of the new situation which has arisen. The terms of treaty rights must be liberally interpreted. It is not possible that any reference to existing ideas could be found in documents which were drawn up at a time, when these ideas never existed even in the imagination of the most enthusiastic visionaries in those times. Self-governing institutions, democratic ideals, association of the people with the administration and responsible government are ideas which never existed in this land when treaty rights

were concluded. *Vox populi: vox dei* was not a creed so religiously respected in Indian politics in those days. It is not, therefore, wise or prudent to require the sanctity of the treaty rights to every action, which is advocated in the interests of the peoples or princes of the Native States. The paramount power wants to elevate the princes to the position of equal partners of the Empire. They have given proofs of this by the selection of one of their illustrious member to the Imperial War Cabinet and by their willingness to consider the question of giving a constitutional position to them in the Empire. Treaty rights have never dissuaded the paramount power from taking this bold step. The undoubted consciousness of suzerain power has not prevented the Government from conferring these liberal privileges on their feudatories. Why should then Native chiefs alone cling to these treaties in not liberalising their administrations, when as a matter of fact, the paramount power, which is the dominant partner, has willingly extended concessions to the ruling chiefs and princes. His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner in his speech at the Chiefs' Conference remarked:—"We rejoice at the aspirations of our fellow countrymen in British India being thus further met by the sagacious act of British statesmanship." He observed that the ruling princes rejoiced at the further accession of strength that this pronouncement and the impending political changes will bring to His Imperial Majesty's Empire, by the enhanced loyalty, happiness and contentment of his Indian subjects. These sentiments clearly indicate that the Maharaja and those of his noble order, who are equally gifted, recognise the value of political concessions and grant of liberal rights to the subject population and the sure efficacy of such measures to ensure the happiness and contentment of the subject race. Is it too much to expect, that these foremost leaders of this noble order, would take a prominent part in initiating measures for associating their subjects with their administration and for establishing responsible govern-

ment in their own states. Such noble examples will give a great impetus to many enlightened chiefs to follow this path of progress and reform. The Maharaja himself, has admitted that no scheme for the progress of India can be regarded as satisfactory or complete, which does not take into consideration the territories of the Native States. The Maharaja insists that the scheme of reforms should include the Native States. How is the spirit of reform to permeate through the strata of Native States, unless the ruling chiefs follow in the footsteps of the paramount power and solemnly affirm their intentions to carry out this policy of reform with the same unequivocal candour as His Majesty's Government has so magnanimously and courageously done? If there is any lesson which the ruling chiefs and princes can learn from the recent announcement and from the readiness of the Secretary of State to come over this long distance at the sacrifice of time, convenience, and vital public interests, at this juncture, to confer with the leaders of Indian people, it is that they should give unreserved assurances in an open manner of their desire to implicitly follow the policy of His Majesty's Government. Such a step would be honourable to these aspiring partners of the Empire and would give intense satisfaction to the paramount power for the willing co-operation of these feudatories to help on this work of Indian regeneration from all sides.

What has been proposed in the present scheme is merely the creation of advisory bodies of the subjects of Native States. They are not clothed with any authority. They do not take away anything from the powers of ruling princes; their functions are simply to express their opinion on questions affecting their interests. It is not even suggested, that the resolutions of the conferences of subjects alone are to have a binding character upon the ruling chiefs and princes. No vested rights would be encroached upon by such conferences. They would not violate the spirit of any treaties. The right of petition and the right of expres-

sing opinions, about matters affecting their interests are the birth-rights of all subjects and we do not think that any objection to this proposal could be taken. The creation of the conferences of subjects would not immediately alter or actually affect the existing rights of any chief against his subjects. These conferences would only create a moral force, which it would be perfectly optional for each chief to obey according to his moral consciousness and his generous sympathies and noble impulses. If, therefore, the conferences succeed by their moral force, in inducing ruling chiefs and princes to follow into the footsteps of their overlords, would that in any way be considered as transgressing or infringing the sovereign rights of native chiefs in their internal administration? The bugbear, therefore, of the sacred and antiquated treaty rights being encroached upon need not frighten anybody in considering these proposals. It is in the interests of some people to draw a red herring in the shape of these treaties, to excite feelings and to pervert the vision. Some critics think that the native princes are incompetent and unfit to tackle administrative problems by reason of their want of education, culture, experience, and statesmanship and that they are not qualified to take an intelligent part in political discussions. They further believe that the ruling chiefs and princes are not the free agents and that they are under the subjection of the political officers. They fear that these princes have not sufficient nerve or moral fibre or intrepid courage to express their opinions boldly and openly. They are labouring under the apprehensions that the British Government in their solicitude to repay the obligations of the Native States would try to please them by giving the States a voice in the administration of British India and that such a result would retard all progress and would prove disastrous to the fulfilment of the aspirations so dearly cherished by the people in British India. This is principally the reason why the cry of treaty rights being in danger is raised at this juncture. But the fears of

The Goal

The creation of the conferences of subjects is further justified on some special grounds. The introduction and development of self-governing institutions and the establishment of responsible Government in Native States would never be accomplished, unless there is an authoritative machinery which would continuously work for this reform and try to bring pressure on the conferences of Chiefs by its watchfulness and by its constant hammering. The right honourable Mr. Montagu announced in Parliament that the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord is that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire and that Government have decided that substantial steps in this direction shall be taken as soon as possible. Lord Islington, the Under Secretary of State for India, in his Oxford address said that in any final scheme of Indian self-government provision must be made for the Native States. He however observed that the Native States must come into the scheme of their own free will. His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala representing the Indian chiefs and princes said the other day "We welcome in this note the statesmanlike announcement of the Secretary of State and we are happy that India has in the honoured president of this evening's function a Viceroy whose political mind understands the psychology of the Indian situation and who has by his acts given proof of a sympathetic policy. India has come to be grateful to His Excellency as well as to the Right Honourable Mr. Montagu. The times indeed in which we live are too sacred for mutual strife, too momentous for mutual aspersions. The times are new, the times are great and call us all to cross the bonds of commonplace, to take up the task and the burden of to-day, to set

forth in mutual trust with bright, brave, hopeful temper as comrades in the common cause of the Empire upon the road which India must tread unhesitating, unrelenting to join the goal." Noble sentiments, most eloquently expressed. I sincerely wish, these very sentiments pulsate the heart of every ruling prince and chief, who is called upon by Providence to wield the destinies of hundreds and thousands consigned to his care. How is it possible for each ruling prince to reach this goal? The Paramount Power cannot take any active step to force the ruling chiefs and princes to adopt this policy. The initiative in this case must come from the chiefs themselves. In the present state of things, ruling chiefs and princes are not very enthusiastic over this matter. Neither have they any ambition to move in this direction. Unless the conferences of the subjects of Native States are ushered into existence at an early date, it is impossible to achieve even the slightest progress in the direction so brilliantly outlined by the Maharaja of Patiala.

Special grounds

The creation of the conferences of subjects of Native States would afford facilities for giving expression to the aspirations and wishes of the people. The demand for autonomous institutions will come from within; it will be voiced by the subjects themselves; and as it grows in volume and intensity, it will act upon the conferences of ruling chiefs, and the chiefs under the pressure of the moral influence, will be obliged to adopt measures giving responsible Government to their subjects. The existence of these conferences will strengthen the ruling chiefs and princes in resisting any improper claims or in opposing any policy that may prejudicially affect the interests of Native States. Many chiefs and princes by reason of their weakness, incapacity, cowardice, consciousness of their defects, desire to propitiate the political officers.

Personal greed, hankering after honours, fear of the frowns of political officers, will not enable some of the chiefs to fearlessly oppose any unjust burdens that may be proposed to be imposed on them, in the name of co-operation. Some have not the courage to stand up against any policy which may injuriously affect the interests of their States. The conferences of the subjects of Native States would under these circumstances prove of immense use to the ruling chiefs themselves. By reason of their detachment, freedom from the shackles of the political department and the strong incentive of self-interest, the subjects would be in a position to faithfully and fearlessly safeguard the interests of the States.

Some Considerations

There are some considerations which should be borne in mind in this connection. A mixed conference of the subjects and princes would certainly be better and would render the whole machinery less complex. But the ruling chiefs and princes by reason of their sense of dignity, the natural distance which exists between them and the commoners in social position, by reason of the great inequality in their status, would not like to sit and rub shoulders with their subjects or with commoners in one and the same chamber. Sentiment is a great factor and plays a great part in human psychology. It cannot be altogether brushed aside in creating new institutions and in reconciling old order with new. It is therefore not possible, at least for a long time to come and until the levelling influences of democracy are in full swing, to expect a mixed conference of ruling chiefs and their subjects in one and the same chamber.

It is no doubt true, that the necessity of the conferences of subjects exists only so long as there is no identity of interests between the rulers and the ruled in Native States. When responsible Government will be established in Native States, when the voice of the people

would be respected, there would be complete harmony between the subjects and their rulers. It would not be possible then to imagine any divergence between their views. Ruling chiefs and princes can in those circumstances justly claim to represent their subjects and then they would be really called the representatives of their States. When such a state of things will be established, the conferences of the subjects of Native States would be superfluous and they may then safely be abolished. This contingency, however, is not within the range of political vision at the present moment. It is concealed in the womb of time. He would be a bold man who would predict the length of time that may have to lapse before this ideal will be reached.

It is likely that there may be a conflict of interests between the conferences of the subjects and the chiefs. But we do not think that it will be a serious obstacle. The main fight will be about the establishment of responsible Government of an autonomous type in Native States. The same unwillingness, and selfishness, which are at present exhibited by the alien bureaucracy in British India may be shown by the indigenous autocracy of the rulers of Native States. But the lessons⁴ in British India will be fresh in the minds of these rulers and they will be well-advised to extend the blessings of freedom to their subjects, who are of their kith and kin and who are passionately and devotedly attached to them. It may be, that some times, interested people may try to set up the ruling chiefs against the subjects or the subjects against the chiefs, but the folly of such a procedure will be so patent that its repetition need not be feared. The evil effects of such a suicidal policy will not take long to be detected. The growing consciousness of nationality, increasing influence of the press, higher sense of responsibility, the solidarity of political institutions and healthy development of public opinion, will discountenance all such efforts and resolutely set back any such mischievous tendencies.

The conference of subjects of Native States ought to have been created long ago by the ruling chiefs themselves. They would have acted wisely if they had created representative institutions and trained their subjects in them. The existence of vigorous public opinion in their own States would have strengthened the hands of the chiefs in any demands, that they would make. Even now, when the ruling chiefs and princes are trying to secure a constitutional position for themselves, if of their own accord and by a concerted action, they bring into existence provincial conferences of the subjects of their States and also an Imperial conference of the subjects, the necessity of creating these conferences by the paramount power would immediately cease. His Excellency the Viceroy has repeatedly stated in his two addresses before the two conferences of chiefs that they should themselves deal with questions pertaining to their selves, their states and their subjects. If therefore the ruling chiefs and princes want to speak authoritatively about their States, how can they claim to do this, without first ascertaining what the subjects have to say. The Native chiefs are agitating for a constitutional position for themselves; this agitation will succeed only when they will fortify themselves by the creation of the conferences of subjects as suggested above and thus creating a strong backing of public opinion. Any neglect or unwillingness on their part to voluntarily organise such conferences would be looked upon with suspicion and distrust and their efforts to secure a constitutional position, may meet with disappointment in the absence of such a concession on their part. It is, therefore, in the interests of the Native chiefs and princes themselves, to take an initiative, in organising the conferences of their subjects, as a condition precedent to the recognition of their claim for representation in the Imperial fabric. If such a consummation is happily realised, it would not be necessary for the paramount power to move in this matter. If however, the ruling chiefs and princes are indifferent to this

matter, if they deliberately omit to safeguard the interests of their subjects, by giving them a recognised channel of expressing their own views, the paramount power by reason of its ultimate responsibility for the good administration of Native States, would be justified in creating such bodies. And in such a case, it cannot be contended that the British Government have no right to interfere with the sovereign rights of ruling chiefs. Discretion is the better part of valour and political sagacity is the better part of autocratic obstinacy. I therefore fervently hope that the ruling princes and chiefs would be alive to the needs of the situation and the prevailing sentiment of the day. I have so far dealt with the several considerations that are pertinent in connection with the system of two chambers of Native States.

Some proposed Schemes

This question is engaging the attention of some writers at the present moment and they have made certain suggestions about the Chiefs' conference. It would not be out of place to examine these schemes at this stage. A writer in the '*Karnatak*' from whom I have quoted above, does not favour the idea of a Chief's conference and he suggests that instead of the conference of ruling chiefs, a conference of Diwans should be held. His chief objection to the conferences of the ruling chiefs to deliberate on state affairs is based on the royal status, personal prestige, competency and delicacy of the political position of the ruling princes. The talk of empty dignity and the divine origin of kings is very antiquated and unsuited and unacceptable in the modern times. Experience has clearly shown and the sittings of the two conferences at Delhi have unmistakably demonstrated that there are at least 40 ruling princes who can take an intelligent interest in the deliberations of such a body and who can actively and energetically participate in its work. The assemblage at Delhi was only of a limited number of chiefs specially invited. If all the 700 chiefs were invited, we would have seen

at least a pretty fair number of the ruling chiefs taking an intelligent and active part in such deliberations. Even if all could not deliver rhetorical speeches still all would have shown sufficient understanding, to appreciate what was going on before them. Even in Legislative Councils each and every member does not deliver a harangue. Some take part in the debate, some give their opinions and some are silent spectators. What reason is there to believe that in the provincial and imperial conferences of chiefs there will not be found a decent number who will not justify the existence of such bodies? Although many of the chiefs are not blessed with sufficient education and culture and personal fitness, what would prevent them from being prepared and equipped with the necessary information about the topics to be discussed in such conferences? They can, when required, equip themselves with such information as to be able to take an intelligent part in such conferences. To depend upon the Diwans for the opinions of ruling chiefs and to treat them as their representatives would be a serious mistake. After all what are these Diwans in Native States. In some Native States the right of appointing a Diwan rests directly or indirectly with the political department. In some the approval of political officers is necessary before a Diwan is selected. In some cases he is recommended by some high government official. He panders to the whims of the politicals and often becomes an encumbrance to the chief whose salary he enjoys. Sometimes a Diwan is the outcome of state intrigue and party politics, which are so rampant in many places. Sometimes a Diwan is thrust upon a Native State. Sometimes he is the creature of the favourite of a ruling prince. Sometimes he is chosen to be as a buffer between the ruling prince and the political department. In some States he is the holder of an hereditary Jahagir and is not expected to know anything about state-craft. In many States there are Diwans who have no education and

no qualifications whatsoever. In many places old pensioners in the British service are chosen to be Diwans who are spent-up forces and devoid of any energies. By reason of their advanced age and want of enthusiasm and vigour, it is impossible for such Diwans to initiate new measures, to handle large problems of administrative efficiency or to take a bold line of action in matters of public welfare. Being British pensioners they are apt to be guided by the frowns or smiles of a political officer. The ruling chiefs desire to take shelter behind their prestige, high position in British service and wide experience. These Diwans do not want to risk their position by giving unpalatable advice to their masters for fear of losing comfortable positions in their closing years. They make up their piles and walk away. Some ruling chiefs have a fancy for foreigners to become their Diwans. A Diwan, who is an outsider, brings in his train an influx of foreigners and all the evils akin to those of an absentee landlordism. The interests of the subjects are to him a matter of supreme indifference. He has no concern whatever with them. A ruling chief or prince cannot pull on with a spirited officer requisitioned into service by a State, unless he draws a pay far higher than what he deserves. He cannot afford to be a sychophant. Such spirited men are very few and far between and are rarely found occupying the position of Diwans of Native States. Some chiefs have a fascination for old fossils. Some Diwans are men of no credentials. Many are chosen by their masters to serve as convenient instruments to compass their own ends. They are mere figure-heads. Through their agency many a chief engineers schemes of oppression and high-handedness by keeping himself in the background. In many States capable Diwans by reason of the vexatious interference of their over-wise masters and want of freedom of action, recoil with disgust from the turmoil of the State and become indifferent on-lookers of the situation. Ruling chiefs for one reason.

or another have no liking for indigenous talents though such men are earnestly devoted to the welfare of the States.

The writer in the '*Karnatak*' has himself described that the Diwan of to-day 'is generally either a glorified clerk or a fussy amateur or a hardened British Indian bureaucrat'. I have also given a description of these Diwans all over the country. There are very few capable Diwans, out of all the Diwans of 700 Native States who, by their high character, great abilities fearless independence and commanding personality, would deserve respectful hearing and honourable association. The analogy of European ambassadors and ministers is entirely fallacious. These ambassadors and ministers are not the creatures of the sweet will of autocratic sovereigns. They are selected from the public life of every nation, the traditions of which are very distinguished and the responsibilities of which are equally great. If the choice were to be between a ruling prince and his Diwan one would certainly like to rely on the original rather than on this distorted copy. The ruling chiefs with all their shortcomings have the responsibility of their position on their shoulders and in serious affairs of state politics, it would always be wise and prudent to consult the responsible chiefs rather than their irresponsible Diwans. What purpose would such Diwans serve in any discussion with them about the problems of Native States? They would shuffle all responsibility for any definite view, on the ground, that they have no instructions. A consultation with the representatives of the paramount power, then another consultation with their own chiefs, then again a fresh consultation with them would be an unending waste of time. No serious business could ever be settled through such an irresponsible agency. The writer in the '*Karnatak*' seems to have been overpowered by the illustrious example of Sir M. Vishveshwar Ayya, the distinguished Diwan of Mysore. A pure, self-less and noble personal life, high attainments, ardent desire for the welfare

of the subjects, unbounded energy, self-sacrificing efforts, transparent sincerity, vast organising power, devotion to his master—these qualities have made the career of Sir Vishweshar Ayya so eminently conspicuous. If he had the same freedom of action and if the colour-bar had not come in his way he would have risen to the top-most place in the British service. Sir Vishweswar Ayya's own example clearly demonstrates the stunting and depressing effects of an alien rule. A man of his high attainments, noble qualities, extraordinary powers would have shone resplendently in any sphere of life, and in any free and civilised country. He is an exception and an honourable exception and no generalization could be made relying on his personality. In my opinion, therefore, the ruling chiefs and princes should themselves be the members of these conferences.

Another writer in the '*Times of India*' has suggested that there should be one legislative assembly consisting of members from Native States and other Presidencies, who should discuss and settle questions concerning the whole of India such as exports, imports, army and navy. This certainly pre-supposes that the functions of the Imperial Legislative Council should be confined only to imperial problems. This has been suggested by an eminent colonial writer Mr. Lionel Curtis. Even the Imperial Legislative Assembly will have to deal with matters of legislation, that may affect the whole of British India, but not the whole of India including the Native States in India—such as those relating to stamp, registration, court fees, laws of transfer of property, laws relating to negotiable instruments and wills and various other matters. On such questions it would be necessary to have recourse to the in and out clauses of the Second Irish Home-Rule Bill of Mr. Gladstone as is remarked by '*Justice*' in one of its issues. The whole procedure would be too cumbrous to adjust itself properly. The existence of separate conferences of Native States side by side with the Imperial and Provincial councils would solve the whole

difficulty without in any way encroaching upon or interfering with the rights of British citizens. Another writer styling himself "well-wisher" has also suggested a bicameral system consisting of two conferences—one of ruling princes and another called a board of ministers consisting of the Chief Ministers or other equally high representatives of all the larger Native States. This writer does not seem to include the non-official representatives of the Native States. If they are to be included it would be exactly on the lines on which I have based my suggestions. If however this second conference, is to be of a subsidiary and ancillary character, and to consist purely of officers of Native States, where is the need of creating such a body? The chiefs themselves will represent the official view. There is nothing to prevent the chiefs from consulting their own officers and the existence of such a body and its constitutional recognition would be meaningless. The writer further suggests that there should be a mixed commission of political officers and Diwans of Native States to obviate the possibility of all conflicts and differences of opinions. I have described the average character and calibre of these Diwans. They have always to propitiate the political officers and to remain in the good books of Government. A combination of these subordinates of Native States and political officers would in all probability fetter the liberties of Native States and cause considerable embarrassment to the ruling chiefs and princes. The scheme therefore is open to this grave objection. It also advocates the existence of two chambers.

The functions of these conferences.

I shall now deal with the functions of these conferences. The subjects to be discussed should be only those which concern the Native States. Before determining the form of Government, in the case of the minority of a ruling prince, subjects of Native States, whose interests are vitally affected by this form should have an opportunity to express

their opinion. The question of the education of ruling princes is of utmost importance both to the rulers and the ruled. The character of native rule depends mainly upon the education and the culture which is given to a prince in his boyhood. Whether the education is all-sided or whether it expands the vision of the young chief or confines him in narrow grooves, is a matter of vital concern to the subjects concerned. These conferences, therefore, should have a chance to express their views about the quality of the education and the manner in which it is to be imparted to the princes. The education as at present given to a Native Chief is one-sided. It does not develop his mind and equip him with necessary knowledge. Mr. Chailley has remarked very pertinently about the Chiefs Colleges as follows. "These institutions have however been far from achieving all that was expected of them. Whether it be that the minds of the pupils were not sufficiently developed or their work not sufficiently assiduous or whether in spite of the undisputed merits of some of the best known principals, that the teaching staff was inferior, the results obtained satisfied neither the parents of the pupils nor the Government of India. It was alleged that the pupils received no solid instruction and acquired no taste for reading beyond illustrated papers and that they were only enthusiastic over Polo, Foot-ball, Cricket, Lawn-tennis, Tent-pegging and other games. Also when they returned home they speedily forgot almost all that they have been previously taught." Is it not therefore desirable that the ruling chiefs and their subjects should have a voice in the making of the rulers who are to wield the destinies of the States? Questions about the rights of Native Chiefs to hold and acquire property, to alienate and will it away, should also be open to these two conferences. Many a time vested rights of properties of subjects are in dispute. The questions of public and private property often arise. The rights of a State as a corporate body are at stake. Many a time there is a conflict between the chief on the one hand and his State on the other. Broad

lines of policy can be laid out for guidance and for protecting the interests of all the parties concerned by a free discussion of these subjects in these conferences. Questions about giving compensation for lands acquired for railway purposes, the gauge of State Railways, the management of Railway Administration in Native States, the question of the conduct of irrigation canals through Native States, the facilities to be given to the subjects of Native States to make use of such canals, the reciprocity of the laws of extradition of offenders, execution of decrees of civil courts and insolvency, questions of jurisdiction in criminal cases, questions pertaining to patents and copy-right, the question of exchange of territories, the question of jurisdiction over European British subjects residing in Native States, the treatment accorded to the emigrants from Native States must necessarily find place in the discussion of these conferences as they are intimately connected with the welfare of Native States. Attempts to bring about uniformity of legislature in Native States and in British India can be accomplished only through the medium of these bodies. The policy of religious toleration and the regard for natural justice can find encouragement and acceptance, by the opportunities which these conferences will provide for the discussion of the same. The questions of the improvement of cattle, improvement of agriculture and industries, can be conveniently made to bear good results if they are thoroughly discussed from all points of view, by the chiefs and their subjects in these conferences. Native States afford a most convenient ground for the successful experiments of agricultural improvement, industrial development, expansion of education, co-operation and village sanitation. If after a thorough discussion in these conferences, the Native States adopt measures for the improvement of these departments they would be conferring a great boon on the whole of British India. Social legislation and the advisability of its introduction will be fit subjects for discussion in these conferences.

The British Government always fights shy of embarking on this legislation, for fear of interfering with the religious susceptibilities or the domestic life of its alien subjects. These fears have no place in these conferences. The subjects and the ruling princes have no conflict of interests in these matters. If opportunities are given, for the consideration of social legislation to these conferences, they would be pioneers of reform in this direction and would successfully pave the way for introducing similar legislation in British India. Preventive legislation about the spread of epidemics, for the relief of distress caused by famine flood or fire, may be dealt with by these conferences with advantage and may lead to the wider distribution of relief by mutual co-operation.

Measures of British legislation and policy, pertaining to excise, customs, salt and opium, fiscal laws affecting the commercial services such as railways, post and telegraph and currency should be open to discussion by these conferences. The Native States contribute *pro rata* of their population to the Indian Exchequer through these sources. I have given in the appendix two extracts from articles published long ago, about the direct and indirect taxes which Native States pay to British India. It is not necessary to reproduce them here. It will however appear from them, how the Native States are justly entitled to have a voice in settling the policies and laws of British India in connection with these matters. It would not be a question of interfering with the internal administration of British India. On the contrary these conferences will strengthen and supplement the opinion of British Indian subjects in these matters. By reason of the burden which the Native States bear, their claim to express an opinion is thoroughly justified. Sir Vishweshwar Ayya, the distinguished Diwan of Mysore, has referred to this question in his address to the Mysore Assembly. If these conferences are created they would afford full opportunity

to the Native States to express their views, as they bear a proportionate share of the burdens, without in any way interfering with the rights of British subjects. The Maharaja of Patalia has put the case of the Native States in a nutshell.

“It will be acknowledged that the manhood, the material resources, the intellectual energy, the courage and co-operation of the Indian States, have contributed not a little to the making and strength of the British Empire. Our soldiers fight to-day in the Empire's army for freedom, our States have their share in the up-building and strengthening of the English Government in the East. We are of the organic life of the Empire and we may reasonably claim to have a vote and a voice at the annual meetings of the Cabinet that is to shape the Imperial policy. For similar reasons we may well claim also to have a voice in shaping the policy of the Indian Government in all matters and they are many which affect concurrently, the interests of British India and the Indian States.”

It will appear that in all the topics referred to above, the ruling chiefs and their subjects are both equally interested. The ruling chiefs and princes have as much a right to discuss them as their subjects. The subjects have a larger stake in the disposal of these questions and they must have an effective voice in their settlement. The creation of the conferences of subjects would alone provide this opportunity and their creation, therefore, becomes indispensable, along with the conferences of ruling chiefs and princes. These conferences of chiefs and subjects would be able to act and react on each other. Both these chambers would be complements of each other and both together would represent Native States in a real sense.

These conferences will afford material for constituting courts, for the disposal of cases of a special character. The case of a disputed succession, can very well be settled by a court

-consisting of two representatives selected from the two conferences of the chiefs and subjects of the province from which such a case would come, presided over by a British judicial officer. Such a court would inspire confidence and would satisfy all the parties concerned. It will ensure an impartial, thorough and public inquiry of the disputed claim. It will not leave any room for ex-parte decision or arbitrary procedure, which generally characterises the disposal of such cases at the present time. Similarly a dispute between a State and a State can be very conveniently settled by a bench of two representatives of ruling chiefs who may be selected from the conference of the province where the disputing States are situated. Such representatives would be thoroughly competent to do justice to the case and the contending States would have the satisfaction of having their disputes settled by their own peers. The case of a ruler who is charged with mal-administration can be tried by a mixed commission, consisting of two representatives of the two conferences of chiefs and subjects and presided over by a British judicial officer. Such a court would be highly appropriate and would satisfy all the ends of justice. It will not be open to any objection and will guarantee an impartial verdict. There would be representatives of both the chiefs and subjects and being unconnected with the State or the ruling prince under trial, they would bring an open mind to bear on the situation. There is another class of cases in which the Native States who are aggrieved, have no court of redress. The claims which Native States have, against the paramount power, as regards boundaries, vested rights, properties claimed by lapse, payment of Nazarana and other haks, rights arising out of exchange of territories are decided by the executive officers of the political department. The Government in such cases is itself a party and takes upon itself the task of adjudicating the claim. In British India the humblest subject of His Majesty can sue the Secretary of State for India in a court of law. But even this privilege is denied to the civil 'councillor' and the 'noble

partner of the Empire.' Such cases can be very conveniently disposed by two representatives of the two conferences and two high judicial officers of British Government. Such a commission would be quite competent to dispose of these claims and would inspire that confidence for justice and fair play and the integrity of the tribunal which are *sine-quo-non* in the administration of justice. Thus these conferences would be a large recruiting ground for the constitution of special tribunals, necessary for the requirements of special cases. No such machinery at present exists. If this suggestion is accepted by the paramount power it would lead to the removal of an acute grievance which is bitterly resented and keenly felt by the Native States.

The Imperial conferences should discuss all the subjects which are open for discussion in the provincial conferences. The question of the defence of the Empire, the co-operation of Native States in all matters connected with this vital question, broad measures of policy to be adopted and followed in Native States and questions of all-India importance, about the rights and disabilities of Native States should be generally discussed in the Imperial conferences. The line of demarcation of these conferences should more or less be the same as that of the Provincial and Imperial councils in British India.

These bodies should be, at the outset, of an advisory character. Concurrent opinions of them both, should have a binding character subject to the veto of the Crown. Their functions should be solely limited to the discussion of questions affecting the Native States and such measures of the British Government as affect their interests and throw any obligations on them. The opinion of these bodies, about the improvement of the internal administration of Native States, about the advisability of giving them constitutions, about the introduction of responsible Government in them and about the development of self-governing institutions may be safely recommended to the Durbars of the Native States for imme-

mediate acceptance, without any hesitation on the score of interfering with the internal sovereignty of these States.

I have so far tried to define the duties of these conferences. Experience would alone determine, when these bodies are actually constituted, the exact extent of the scope and the jurisdiction of these conferences. It would be presumptuous to give a cut and dry scheme at the present moment. The creation of these conferences is a stage in the evolution of Native States and as all organisms assume shape according to their inherent strength, environments, power of resistance and power of assimilation, these bodies, would properly develop if suitable opportunities are provided for their growth and progress.

Deccan address

It is very interesting to note that the idea of a chiefs' conference was prominently stated in an address presented by the Sarvajanic Sabha of Poona and called the Deccan address to Her Majesty the late Queen Victoria in 1877 at Delhi. It expressed a hope that an "effort would be made to associate the great native princes in the practical work of administration of British India and that the system of keeping political agents and military camps in native territories, will give way to more cordial association of them in the councils of the Empire, through some organization of a recognized diet or assembly, where they could meet one another and the great officers and statesmen, who rule India and discuss all Imperial questions. The time has arrived for such a change. The paramount claims of British power are unquestioned. An Imperial Government cannot be imagined without a constitution, regulating its relations with dependent sovereigns. The germs of such an assembly already exist in many Darbar gatherings, which take place from time to time. It is only necessary to legalise what is now done informally and as a matter of favour. Questions regarding the policy of small frontier-wars with barbarous tribes, boundary disputes between Native States &

similar differences between British and non-British territory, the measures to be adopted with respect to rulers who misgovern their territories, questions of adoption, extradition, coinage and of Imperial legislation might be referred to such a council." The address very wisely predicted that "the assumption of the Imperial title may be signaled by the grant of new constitutional rights to the people of the country, thereby inaugurating a new era in the gradual development of the institutions of this country, elevating its people to the political and social status of the British nation, and teaching them gradually by example and encouragement and by actual exercise of responsible power, to be manly and self-sustained, prepared to welcome their connection with England as a providential arrangement, intended for their welfare and resolved to abide by it, through all troubles and trials of their mutual growth."

Forty years have elapsed since these memorable words were uttered. Has not this period of apprenticeship and leading strings been sufficient in the case of this vast country and after it has passed through troubles and trials of unprecedented magnitude, to claim responsible government both in British India and in Native States?

Indian Political Secretary.

The next suggestion is that a post of an Indian political secretary should be created in the secretariat of each provincial Government and in that of the Government of India. All work disposed of by the political department is based upon the reports of subordinate political officers. Government has not at present the advantage of knowing the views of the Native chiefs and their subjects in matters connected with them. There is not a single officer at present who can claim acquaintance with the trend of native feelings, with customs, traditions and sentiments of both the rulers and the ruled in the Native states. The decisions of Government, with all their solicitude to arrive at a correct conclu-

sion, are really speaking *ex-parte*. The other side of the shield is not seen by Government. The same reasons which have induced Government to make a breach in the ramparts of officialdom in admitting Indian members to the executive councils, apply with greater force to the case of the political department. The interests of one-fourth of the population are in its hands. It has no voice, no councils, no press, no independent judiciary to seek redress. Is it not therefore fair that there should be at least one member in the council of Government, who enjoying their confidence will represent faithfully the case from the point of view of Native States. The following observations of the Simla Correspondent of the *Bombay Chronicle* at the time when the post of a political secretary was being created deserve consideration. "Lord Hardinge is making a mistake by appointing a political secretary. It would have been better to provide the foreign office with a responsible minister outside the cabinet. This is only a question of time. I am afraid the political secretary will hardly satisfy anybody. What is urgently wanted is a better type of men for the political service.....The service though at present, good in many ways is by no means the best. Some of the old military men are good enough for the frontier work but they are not needed in Native States. A subaltern with no experience of civil administration is hardly of any use except as a dignified representative of the paramount power. The creation of the political secretary will not solve the problem of Native States. A better type of a political officer is the only thing required. The present day politicals are out of date. Quite a number of them are good ornaments in the courts of Native chiefs, but as friends and guides they are worse than useless". If not in the whole political service, at least at the fountain-head of the secretariat, there should be one officer who can lay claim to be a guide and friend of Native states, who cannot be a hidebound bureaucrat, pledged to keep up the traditional prestige of the service.

and who would impartially state both sides of the question before any matter is finally settled. I know of cases, such as the marriage of a chief, the custody of the person of his consort, the appointment of an European governess in the household of a ruling chief, grant of allowances to dowagers in ruling families, maintenance of religious and customary rites, disputes about honour and precedence, rights of subjects as against Native chiefs and many other delicate matters, in the disposal of which intense heart-burning, mortification and wounded susceptibilities have been the result. This was because the views of Native States were not authoritatively before Government and because there was no champion to advocate them in the council of Government at these times. The creation of such a post, which should be filled by a competent subject of Native States and which should be for a period of five years would be of immense use both to Government and to Native States. It would help Government in maintaining the traditions of even-handed justice to those who are under its care. It will inspire confidence and satisfaction in Native States on the ground that there will be at least one who will expound their views in the Council of the State. There is also another great advantage in making these appointments. Many a time the vagaries of the political officers require to be exposed. The scandals of the political agents acting as commission agents in some Native States have been before the public. The evil of official easements of the political department was severely criticised by the *'Times of India'* as "un-English". It once described that the political officer rides "his (Native Chief's) horses, drives his carriages, uses his cooks, shoots his big game, spends money right and left on improvements for his own luxury". How is it possible for Government to know these 'un-English' acts of their subordinates, unless there is one unconnected with the "caste prejudice" of service. Such 'un-English' acts are more visible in Native-

States than in British India, because the system itself is so irresponsible, that it is bound to create 'spoilt children' of English rule. A sagacious writer has observed, "Every one must expect to reap the consequences of his actions. None can be tyrannical and thoughtless, dishonest and indifferent to the real good of those under his charge, without being himself dragged and injuriously affected by the consequences of his conduct. Man cannot even tyrannise over women and children or even over dumb cattle without making himself in his turn a slave by the very force of his own actions. This is a universal principle and no crooked plans—never so cunningly devised—shall avail in any degree that may have been based in contravention of this divine law. No sane man can expect to reap anything but the whirlwind after having sown the wind and no one can expect to win confidence unless first he has given confidence. Viewed in the light of these natural truths, we are decidedly of opinion that the relations of the paramount power in India with the semi-independent Native States, as they have been hitherto carried on, by the political officers of the Government of India, whom I have advisedly called the 'spoilt children' of English rule must be re-adjusted, if the good will and gratitude of Native princes and their subjects is to be reckoned on, as an active factor in the defence of the Empire against a powerful European invader". The remedy I have suggested of appointing an Indian Political Secretary conversant with Native States affairs would go a long way in correcting many abuses that exist at present. As time goes on, the re-organisation of Native States would lead to a considerable development of work in the political department. If the conferences of ruling chiefs and subjects are created, the work of this department will grow in volume and in importance. In such a contingency it will be necessary to elevate the political secretary to the position of an Executive Council member or a responsible minister holding the portfolio of Native States. The arrangements of holding these conferen-

ces, the selection of subjects to be placed before them, the settlement of the number of their members and time of their sessions, the action to be taken on their recommendations should be relegated to this Councillor. He may not sit or vote in the ordinary legislative councils or take part in purely British Indian administration. At present the political secretary is the only highest officer under the head of government in charge of the political department. An addition of an Indian political secretary is suggested to suit the present requirements of the situation. It is needless to suggest that in making these appointments real merit would be given preference and toadies and jo-hukumwalas would not be selected, as their association with the Government is likely to bring them discredit and create unforeseen difficulties. The conferences of the subjects of Native States would enable the Government to choose the most conspicuous amongst them for these posts.

Constitution for Native States

The last suggestion which I have to make is that there should be a constitution for each Native State. By constitution, I do not mean, a written code of laws or a charter of popular liberties, for no constitution can have a binding character unless there is an authority or power to enforce it. I do not wish to propose a written constitution as was formulated for the United States of America. There is no constitution granted to British Indian subjects; but there are certain principles, certain institutions, certain pledges upon which the subject population can take their stand and defend their liberties. A distinguished writer has summarised these elements of constitution in a categorical manner. "The thorough and minute regulation and distribution of power between the higher and lower authorities in India and in England, the institution of councils and boards and corporations for deliberative purposes, the separation of civil and military, of the Executive and Judicial departments,

the necessity of legislative sanction for new taxes and new laws, the independence of the judges, the free right of petition, the toleration of all manners of opinions, and free expression of them within the limits of loyalty, the regular publication of State accounts, the equality before the law of all classes of subjects (and even of Government) the careful testing of qualifications for service in all branches, the settlement of the land and other revenues on fixed rules and the everyday increasing in-corporation and association of the people (we may now say in the Government) in legislation, in the administration of justice, and in the management of local affairs, these are all so many elements of our constitution, which we prize as the very breath of new life, that the Nation is breathing and lisping to learn." The first requisite in the administration of a Native State is that the Khasgi i.e. the privy purse should be separated from the revenues of the State. The civil list of the chief or ruling prince should be settled after due regard for past practice and present wants. A ruling prince or chief should not have the latitude to increase his private property, by a policy of oppression, high handed confiscations, and arbitrary forfeitures in order to make provision for his children, other than the heir apparent and to meet his unlimited liabilities. There should be in each State a representative assembly of the people, which should be elected by the subjects. The qualifications for voters and candidates should be similar to those pertaining to the election of members of provincial legislatures in British India. This assembly should have a substantial majority of elected members. It should have the power to frame and pass the State budget. It should legislate for the whole State. It should have the right to move resolutions on matters of general importance affecting the State. It should enjoy the right of interpellations and supplementary questions. It may perhaps be urged that it will be difficult to find sufficient number of enlightened public men to take part in these representative assemblies in the States. The spread of education in Native

States, the contact with their brethren in British India and the growing influence of the Press, have created consciousness of political existence amongst the subjects in all Native States. I therefore believe that it is possible to get an adequate number of men from amongst the population of every Native State, who will take an intelligent part in such assemblies and discharge their duties creditably. This objection is not a new one and is repeated every time, whenever political rights are to be conferred on the subject population. This same objection was raised at the time of the expansion of Legislative Councils in British India, but experience has shown that it was baseless and that the subjects in British India have acquitted themselves creditably in the discharge of new responsibilities which they were called upon to assume. Similar objections are even now urged about the fitness of British Indian subjects for Self-government. But these objections proceed from interested quarters and their hollowness has been exposed by prominent Indian leaders. The most liberal of English statesmen, the late Mr. Gladstone, has authoritatively laid down that it is the grant of liberty alone which fits men for liberty. Unless powers are conferred on the people how can they learn to exercise them. It is not therefore necessary to consider this objection at any length. There should be in every State an executive council half the strength of which, must consist of members elected by the representative assembly. The necessity of such a council is pre-eminent in a Native State. A large majority of the ruling chiefs and princes consists of illiterate, uneducated and uncultured men. They have no means of knowing the wishes of their subjects. The Press does not represent public opinion in Native States. The chiefs cannot get disinterested advice in their administration. It is only by the creation of an executive council that the welfare of the subjects can be secured and public interests can be effectively safeguarded. Even in the highly civilized and efficient

British administration, with intelligent heads of Provincial administrations and with British statesmen, brought up in the traditions of English public life, occupying the positions of Governors and Viceroys, the necessity of the existence of Council government is imperatively felt. Lord Hardinge very generously and candidly described the advantages of council rule in opposition to that of one-man government. "No body can reasonably contend that with the advance of civilization entailing the discussions and solution of new questions, of ever-increasing complexity arising every day, one man government is better than Council government. The principle of Executive Council for local governments, by which the local administrations are less dependent upon the personal equation and which ensures a great continuity of policy has already taken root in India and cannot now be eradicated." If Executive Councils are indispensable in British India how much more they are needed in backward Native States. A chief with an executive council and assisted by a Legislative council should form the Government of every State. This form of administration has proved successful in British India. Why should not the Native States try this experiment? This form was established without a paper constitution. It has been before the eyes of ruling chiefs and princes, living for years together, in close proximity with British India. The circumstances in British India do not in any way differ from those that exist in Native States. There is one additional advantage, that instead of an alien bureaucracy there is an indigenous autocracy of a ruler, for whom the subjects entertain unalloyed feelings of respect and deep loyalty. As regards the services in each State they should be entirely indigenous. The statesman-like advice which Lord Hardinge gave to an Indian prince cannot be too often repeated. "Build up within your own State a body of your own subjects, on whom you can rely to serve you. Take them young, educate them, select the best, fit them for high places and

when they are fit confer high places upon them. Give them responsibility, enlist their interests and sympathy in the work of administration and I confidently predict that you will not regret the step you have taken." These words deserve to be inscribed in letters of gold in the most conspicuous place of every Native State.

With such a constitution embodied in these institutions and based on fundamental principles and with the services so trained, the administration in Native States will tend to become responsible, and the subjects will have an effective voice in the machinery of the State. I do not for a moment suggest that the paramount power should impose such a constitution on each Native State by promulgating an Imperial edict. This would certainly be interfering with the freedom in internal administration vouchsafed to the ruling chiefs and princes and so highly cherished by them. The constitution, such as I have proposed, will be evolved out of the conferences of subjects of Native States and the chiefs. The subjects will suggest, formulate and demand the constitution in their conferences when they are created. Such demands when they would be earnestly and intensely voiced by the subjects of Native States would act upon the ruling chiefs and princes. The sincerity of the demand and the momentum it may gather would induce the chiefs and the princes to recognise its moral force. The voice of the people so potently and so authoritatively expressed would persuade the princes to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of their subjects and nothing short of the constitution I have sketched above, would be the natural outcome of such a process. 'The generous and spontaneous impulse' of individual ruling chiefs, the force of 'neighbourly example' in British India and the 'indirect cooperation' of the paramount power will exercise powerful influence in bringing about this desired result. If however, a ruling prince or chief chooses to be autocratic, self-willed and impervious to

public opinion, the provincial and Imperial conferences of the subjects of Native States shall exercise a deterrent effect upon such a despotic chief. The advice and the fear of censure of his own brother chiefs, as expressed in their conferences, would also have a chastening effect upon such an irresponsible ruler. The flagrant disregard of the opinion of subjects and the repeated defiance of their representatives would be a topic deserving consideration at the hands of the conferences of the chiefs and subjects. The conferences would thus be able to improve the tone of administration in Native States and would thus help, the ruling chiefs and princes to adopt a constitution for their States. "With an enlightened and educated chief, assisted by responsible and respected ministers, with a council of officers representing all departments and the leaders of non-official classes, with the land revenue and other sources of income settled on moderate and fixed principles, with a careful separation of the Khasgi from the State department, and a proper distribution of the civil and military, judicial and executive functions, in separate hands, carefully selected from amongst the subjects of the State after due examination, with written laws and annual publication of accounts, with a policy of conservation of the rights and distinctions of Sardars and privileged classes and of a strict regard to keep up their connection with the soil, with every care taken to associate people in the work of practical administration as local justices, Panchas, Jurors, Municipal and Taluka Councillors (and we may add executive councillors etc.,), what is there to prevent the Native States from becoming models to British India, for the quiet contentment of their subjects and the great scheme of self-education and progress in political emancipation, instead of as at present in too many cases, being the source of annoyance and trouble to their own people and the paramount power and the laughing stalk of the world for utter helplessness and the most depraved volup-

tuousness." These noble words were written by the most illustrious Indian, the late Mr. Ranade, some 35 years ago. How sad and disappointing it is, that during such a long period, there has not been an appreciable change in the condition of the majority of Native States? Even to-day Mr. Ranade's remarks can fittingly be applied to all the Native chiefs with very few exceptions. The times are fast changing. It is not possible to remain fixed to old moorings. Those chiefs would certainly be wise who would anticipate the times. There is neither wisdom nor even the saving grace, when power would be wrested from the hands of autocratic rulers, by forces which they may not control. I commend the sound advice of the veteran Madras leader Dr. Sir Subramania Aiyer to our Indian chiefs and princes.

"Real concessions towards popular Government by our Feudatory Rulers cannot but entitle them to the never ending gratitude of their subjects. For, such concessions verily involve laudable sacrifice of power and wealth, of authority and patronage and of other blandishments, an inordinate love for which, invariably makes men tyrants in every sphere of life, from the positions of the heads of families to those of kings and Emperors. Every Indian Potentate, who paves the way for the substitution of limited monarchical Government, of which the noblest example is the British Crown, in place of the more or less arbitrary rule, which now prevails in most of our Indian States, will certainly rank among the great harbingers of freedom to the Motherland. Surely he cannot show his patriotism in a more direct, tangible and useful form. Such a benefactor by investing infant institutions, like the Representative Assembly in Mysore, with real power, and by making them exercise it, thereby training their subjects in the glorious art of Self-Rule, will necessarily force the hand of British administrators to act similarly within their own territory. If not for setting such example, among others, for what else

were these States saved from annihilation which overtook certain few of their kind, at the ruthless hands of Lord Dalhousie, the all-absorbing Pro-Consul of annexation fame? Such preservation of the States was surely not for the mere delectation and enjoyment of this or that single individual, to whose solemn care, High Providence has, in its infinite wisdom, willed to entrust millions and millions of his fellow-men. Of what avail is the existence of such an individual, if his heart constantly moveth not, for the uplift of these fellow-men? And with what conscience can any such person think of annexing to his name, the noblest of Aryan titles, Raja, which, by its very etymology, imposes upon him, the solemn obligation of a constant endeavour to sweeten the lives of his *so-i-disant* subjects, unless he strives hard to faithfully discharge so noble a trust? If bearing all this in mind, our Feudatory Rulers will fail to fulfil their supreme function in this respect, one may venture to say, with all deference, that Destiny will know what to do with them. The lessons to be drawn from the recent Russian events must not be altogether lost upon our Chiefs and Princes. The protecting hand of the suzerain in future, cannot but come to be used not merely in preventing oppression and misrule, but also in the constructive work of carrying out and hastening the extension of popular government steadily on, till such goal is reached throughout this Land of the Rishis."

I, therefore, sincerely implore, all the ruling chiefs and princes to take a broad review of the whole situation and to reorganise their States in the light of the spirit of freedom and liberty which is resounding in the air. The subjects may be dumb, helpless, and backward, but their whispers and murmurs are reverberating in the distant corners of the world. All honour to the chiefs and princes, who of their own accord and freewill, will undertake to liberalize their administrations, try to give an effective voice to their subjects and to establish responsible

government in their own States. The war has changed the out-look of every thing. Prince and pauper alike, must read the signs of the times and profit by them.

Before concluding my remarks, I take this opportunity of requesting my fellow-brethren in Native States to give serious consideration to this subject and to form their opinions and express them during the sojourn of the Secretary of State for India in this country. The ruling chiefs and princes are invited to frame their proposals and His Excellency the Viceroy has assured them that they would be placed before the Right Hon'ble Mr. Montagu. The chosen leaders of the people in British India, who are devoting all their energies to voice their own proposals and their own schemes, have left the subject of Native States studiously alone. They do not wish in any way to meddle with this subject and are maintaining a *laissez faire* attitude. With due deference to them, it must be stated, that this is not a fair attitude to maintain. If they would not stand up for the rights of their brethren in Native States, who else would undertake the task? With the abject and helpless condition of public opinion in Native States and with the absence in them of any Press, representative of public interests, is it possible to expect that the case of the subjects of Native States would be properly represented before the authorities? Have they not a claim on Indian statesmen? The generous contributions made to various educational institutions, to the Universities, to literary undertakings and to industrial enterprises, the encouragement given to men of letters, the patronage so liberally extended to arts and sciences, the employment given to British Indian subjects, the active assistance given to many

political organizations and the monetary help given to many politicians and public workers all belonging to British India, by the Native States, entitle them to expect a helping hand of fellowship at this hour from Indian leaders in this matter, in which they of all others possess an expert knowledge. Indian statesmen are therefore bound to devise schemes to give effective representation to Native States in the coming readjustment. Nobody would ever suggest that they should do it to the prejudice of their own interests. But they are in duty bound to come forward and defend the rights of Native States along with their own, in the coming reconstruction. Indian leaders and their institutions have profited by the Native States and their brethren in the Native States are not sufficiently powerful to vindicate their own cause. I therefore equally and earnestly appeal to our Indian leaders, to devise proper measures for the inclusion of the Native States in a scheme of responsible Government for the whole of India.

I know this question of Native States is very delicate and thorny. On the one hand there is the policy of the paramount power based on considerations, which do not exist at the present time. There is also the reluctance on the part of Government to disturb existing arrangements. There is further the likelihood that the suzerain power may be exposed to the criticism of interfering with the vested rights of the ruling chiefs and princes in any attempt to bring about reform. On the other hand there are the treaty rights which the ruling chiefs and princes highly cherish, so far as they secure them freedom in the internal administration of their States. There are various disabilities for which

the ruling chiefs and princes keenly desire to seek redress and which they are unable to get, in the absence of any constitutional means for them to obtain this relief. The subjects of Native States have no voice and they are left in complete oblivion. They are entirely neglected in the body politic. The suggestions which I have made may appear strange and novel. But my only object in undertaking this task is to invite discussion about the scheme which I have ventured to propose. If I succeed in bringing this subject within the range of practical politics, I shall feel more than satisfied.

Appendices.

Appendix A.

Native States and Post-War Reforms.

Memorandum of the principal points of the proposed scheme.

The announcement made in the House of Commons of the goal of British Administration in India as the development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire, and the arrival of the Secretary of State for India to confer with men of all shades of opinions about the schemes of Post-War reforms have awakened intensely keen interest all over this vast continent. Lord Islington in his Oxford speech said that in any final scheme of Indian Self-Government, provision must be made for the Native States which in area and population cover one-third of the peninsula. He further observed that they must come into the scheme of their own free-will. How far this suggestion would be taken up by the Ruling Princes and Chiefs remains yet to be seen. However acting upon this suggestion and as one deeply interested in the welfare of the Native States, I beg to submit the following summary of a scheme which I wish to propose in this connection.

(1) The valuable services which the Native States have rendered during the present crisis and the unswerving and passionate loyalty which they have displayed, lead to the inevitable conclusion that the policy of distrust which characterised the relations of the paramount power towards the Native States should be relaxed and completely altered. The confidence reposed in the Native States has been enthusiastically and sincerely returned by them. The policy of keeping the armies of Native States in an effete and moribund condition deserves to be altogether abandoned.

The Imperial Service troops though very limited in number belonging to some of these Native States have acquitted themselves very creditably during the present war. If the armies, regular and irregular, at present employed by Native States are thoroughly reorganised, disciplined, drilled and armed in the modern fashion, they would be a tower of strength to the Empire. The resources of the Native States are now frittered away in keeping up a vain show. They would be turned to good account if they are spent in maintaining these forces in a fighting condition.

(2) The second suggestion is that in view of the readiness and willingness of the subjects of the Native States in contributing largely towards the prosecution of the war and the relief of distress caused by it and proofs of deep and abiding loyalty given by them under the present trying conditions, they should be allowed to enlist as volunteers and enter the regular army. This would materially facilitate recruitment in the army and will help the solution of the question of man power of the Empire.

(3) The third suggestion is that Military Colleges should be established to give training to cadets of Native States, to Collaterals of the Ruling Chiefs and Princes and to the members of the Indian aristocracy and gentry. If the armies of the Native States are reformed and are turned into fighting units, they would require a large number of officers. They would offer vast opportunities of military employments to the Ruling Cadets and the nobility in Native States. This reform will also relieve many Ruling Princes and Chiefs from the anxieties of finding suitable occupation to the members of their fraternity.

(4) The fourth suggestion is that a Council of Defence should be established consisting of the members of the Executive Council of the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the Staff, the Head of the Army Department, three Ruling Chiefs, with the Viceroy at its head. This Council should determine all questions about the strength, training, discipline and equipment of the forces of Native States. The armies of Native States officered by their nobility and commanded by their Ruling Princes are to serve

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ive States would
make it impossible for these forces to become a source of
danger to the Empire and threaten the peace of British India
at any time.

The above suggestions are made on the cardinal assumption viz. that responsible Government of an autonomous character would be soon established in British India. Self-Government or Home Rule would remove the alien character of British rule. The Government would become thoroughly national and in such an eventuality there would be no room for conflict of interests between Native States and British India.

(5) The fifth suggestion is that the Political and diplomatic service should be thoroughly revised. The institution of keeping Political Officers at the Courts of Native States to overawe their administrations has become out of date. The loyalty of Native States is completely assured. The elements of disaffection and strife have disappeared long ago. There is no necessity of keeping military officers any longer in these posts. The political officers are not responsible for the good administration of the Native States entrusted to their charge. They cannot interfere by reason of the non-intervention policy. They, however, have to hear complaints of all sorts against the Native rule. Their intervention knows no fixed rules based on any principle. Their position has become very anomalous. It is, therefore, suggested that the powers of revision, correction and advice now exercised by these officers in the internal administration of Native States and on the applications of the subjects of the Native States against their Rulers, should be taken away from them. Their duties should be limited to the external affairs of the States. This suggestion has been made on the assumption that responsible Government of an autonomous type should be established in Native States on the lines adopted in British India. If responsible Government is established in Native States, there would be absolutely no necessity for any subject of Native State to seek

redress for any grievance at the hands of a foreign agency like that of a political officer.

(6) The sixth suggestion is that if, by reason of the backward condition of some Native States and the unwillingness of Ruling Chiefs to establish responsible government in their States and the unavoidable delay in the assimilation of self-governing institutions, the present order of things is to continue any longer, a tentative measure is suggested for immediate adoption. The powers of supervision and correction now exercised by the political officers on the applications of the subjects of Native States against their Rulers should be handed over to a judge of the court of the highest judicature in every Province within whose territorial jurisdiction the Native States are situated. In the case of the Native States under the direct control of the Government of India, a Bench of two or three judges of the position and standing of High Court Judges should be established for the same purpose. This system will give entire satisfaction to the subjects of Native States. Ruling Princes and Chiefs would certainly accept, with greater alacrity, the decisions in revision of such Judges rather than the arbitrary commands in the name of advice of the political officers. The political officers also, who are generally military men, would welcome this change as a great relief.

(7) The seventh suggestion is about the formation of the Conferences of Ruling Chiefs and Princes and the subjects of Native States. The Ruling Chiefs, and Princes are not allowed to communicate with one another or to consult and deliberate on matters affecting their interests. They have no position in the constitution of the Empire. The subjects of the Native States have no *locus-standi* whatsoever in the administration of this country. It is therefore, suggested:—

(a) that an Imperial Conference of Ruling Chiefs and Princes should be established similar to the Imperial Legislative Council. All Chiefs, at whose Courts Political Residents are stationed like Baroda, Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore, Nepal,

Bhutan, Sikkim, should be included
such representatives as are elected by
Provincial Conferences of Ruling Chiefs.

- (b) There should be Provincial Conferences of Ruling Chiefs for United Bengal, for the Presidency of Bombay, for the Presidency of Madras, for Central Provinces, for the Punjab, for the United Provinces, for Central India, for Rajputana and for Burma, in all nine. The States now under the Government of India such as those of the North-West Frontier, Baluchistan and Afghanistan should be included in the Punjab for this purpose. Tibet may be included under United Bengal. Central India States and Rajputana should be separated from the Government of India for this purpose.

The Imperial Conference should be presided over by the Viceroy and should also include some officials selected by the Viceroy to assist in the deliberations. Out of the nine Provincial Conferences, seven should be presided over by the Heads of Provincial Governments and should include such officials appointed by these Heads of Provinces for the conduct of the business. The two Provincial Conferences of Central India and Rajputana should be presided over by the Agents to the Governor-General in those two Agencies. Subjects to be discussed by these Conferences should mainly relate to the Native States concerned. All questions about the defence of the Empire, about the co-operation of Native States in this connection, about the laws to be introduced in Native States should be considered by these Conferences. Measures of British Legislation and British policy, which affect the interests of the subjects of Native States along with those of British India, should also be submitted for the consideration of these Conferences. The Imperial Chiefs' Conference may be of considerable use in selecting members to the future Imperial War Conferences. The creation of Chiefs' Conferences would be an entirely one-sided reform. The Ruling Princes and Chiefs are thoroughly autocratic. In none of the Native States, self-governing

institutions of a genuine character are introduced. The subjects of Native States have no control over their revenues, over the services and they cannot in the smallest degree shape the policy or the laws of their States. There is, therefore, no identity of interests between the subjects of Native States and their Rulers. A Native State includes both its Ruling Chief and its subjects. Unless, therefore, the Chief is really a representative of the interests of his subjects, mere reliance on autocratic Rulers for the opinions of subjects concerned would be unjust and unfair. Unless responsible Government is established in Native States, the Ruling Chiefs cannot claim to represent their subjects. Solicitude, which is at present evinced for the well-being of one-fourth of the population of the whole of India by the Paramount Power, is not merely a regard for a few hundred autocrats, but implies the desire to better the status and position of this dumb, helpless and unrepresented mass. In a scheme, therefore, of self-government and responsible administration, the subjects of Native States must find a place. It is, therefore, proposed that along with the Chiefs conferences, there should be Conferences of the subjects of Native States for the same areas. The selection of subjects to these Conferences should depend upon some rules based on education, property and status. They should also be presided over like the Chiefs' Conference by the same authorities and should be assisted by the same officials. The topics to be discussed should also be identical. Subjects of Native States are as much interested and as much entitled as the Ruling Chiefs to discuss, for instance, questions like the forms of administration in a minority, the education that should be given to their Rulers, the improvement of agriculture and commerce, the reciprocity of Insolvency and Extradition Laws, the question of compensation of lands acquired for Railway purposes, the improvement of cattle and many others. These two chambers, one of the Ruling Princes and one of their subjects, would act and react on each other and would materially advance the interests of them both. Some very difficult and very delicate questions such as disputed successions, rights between State and State or the trial of a Chief for maladministration can

be conveniently decided by a mixed committee of both these Chambers presided over by a British Judicial Officer. The dispute about the rights of Native States against the Paramount Power may also be decided by a mixed commission consisting of two representatives of these Conferences and two high Judicial Officers of the British Government. This will greatly relieve the paramount Power of an amount of unpleasantness and awkwardness in handling these cases, The creation and development of self-governing institutions in Native States will never advance unless these popular Chambers of the subjects of Native States are created side by side with those of Ruling Princes. The creation of these popular Chambers in furtherance of these objects would save the Paramount Power from the criticism of interfering with the sovereignty of Native States and their Treaty obligations.

These bodies should at the outset be of an advisory character. Concurrent opinions of them both should have a binding character subject to the veto of the Crown. Their functions should be solely limited to the discussions of questions affecting the Native States only and such measures of the British Government as affect their interests and throw any obligations on them.

This bi-cameral system is suggested with the sole object of securing effective representation of the two component parts of the Native States ; viz. the Ruling Princes and their subjects in any organic union that may be brought about in the near future. There are four considerations to be borne in mind in judging of this bi-cameral system.

- (1) Ruling Princes, by reason of their notions of dignity, would not like to sit with the commoners of their State in one and the same Chamber. If this had been possible, it would not have been necessary to suggest two Chambers.
- (2) When Ruling Princes give responsible Government to their subjects, they would be really representatives of them and in such a contingency the Conferences of the subjects of Native States would become superfluous and may be abolished.

(3) These two organisations are intended to become the compliments of each other. They should not play in the hands of interested persons to stifle each other.

(4) If Native Princes want to pose as the leaders and spokesmen of their subjects, they should, of their own free-will and by a concerted action on their own part, bring into existence such bodies to ensure responsible hearing to their demands. If they take this initiative, it would not be necessary for the Paramount Power to create them. If, however, they fail to do this, they cannot claim to represent their subjects and the creation of these Conferences of subjects of Native States should become imperative.

(8) The eighth suggestion is that there should be a Secretary to the Political Department holding appointment for a fixed period and selected from the subjects of Native States, in the Secretariat of each Provincial Government and one in the Secretariat of the Government of India. All matters disposed of in the Political Department in an executive capacity and affecting the interests of Native States should in the first place pass through the hands of this Officer, who should represent the views of the Ruling Chiefs and Princes and of their subjects. At present neither the Imperial Government nor the Provincial Government has the advantage of knowing the views of Native States from one, who can claim acquaintance with them. Government has simply to rely upon the *ex parte* reports of the Political Officers in deciding all questions disposed of by the Political Department. As time advances, the suggested reorganisation of the Native States would lead to a vast development of work of this Department, which would increase both in volume and in importance. The position of Political Secretary should, in these circumstances, be elevated to that of a member of the Executive Council holding the portfolio of Native States.

(9) The ninth suggestion is that there should be a constitution in each Native State. It should make it obligatory on each Ruling Prince to determine and separate his Khasgi

or Civil list from the income of the State ; it should enjoin the Chief to create a Representative Assembly for his State with powers analogous to those of the Provincial Council in British India. It should compel the Ruling Chief to constitute an Executive Council, half the members of which must be elected by the Representative Assembly of the State. The position of a Ruling Chief under these circumstances would be like that of the Head of a Province with a large Civil list and with a right to command the forces if they exist. The subjects shall have a responsible voice in the administration. Such a constitution would enure to the benefit of both the Rulers and the ruled in a Native State. The creation of the Conferences of the subjects of Native States and those of the Ruling Princes under the guidance the of Paramount Power would alone lead to this happy consummation.

Appendix B.

Extract from articles contributed by the present writer to the Mahratta.

I

Contributions of the Native States to the Indian Exchequer.

(30-10-1904.)

Since the Native States were incorporated into the British Empire the position of subordination has entailed enormous sacrifices on their part. The Native States have been termed the "partners of the Empire," but the partnership is like that of a giant and a dwarf, wherein the weaker side invariably goes to the wall. We will discuss the direct contribution made by the Native States to the Indian Exchequer. According to the census of 1901 the population of British India and the Native States is as follows :—

British India—23,15,60,664.

Native States—6,27,46,014.

The population of the Native States is a little over one-fourth of that of British India and as the blessings of peace are enjoyed by the Native States, it is argued that full 25 per cent, of the total military expenditure of the Indian Empire should be borne by the native states. There is no tax such as a Poll-tax or a War-tax levied in India, the proceeds of which are exclusively appropriated for the purpose of defraying the military expenditure. The enormous outlay on the military department in India is paid out of the general Revenues of the country which are solely derived from the various taxes imposed on the people. The incidence of some of these taxes which go to form the nucleus of the revenues of India falls

on the subjects of native states and the extent of this incidence will conclusively prove that more than 25 p. c. of the military expenditure of the country is borne directly by the subjects of the native states. In dealing with this subject the difficulty at the outset is about the sources of information on this point. All the official reports and Blue books deal with the aspect of incidence of taxation on the various provinces which constitute British India. But how the incidence of various taxes levied by the Indian Government falls upon the subjects of Native States is studiously ignored from all the official publications. The main outcome of the Indian protectorate is the removal of all restrictions on the freedom of trade. There are no Inter-state barriers of customs duties or transit duties which prevent the expansion of British trade and commerce freely into the territories administered by the Native States. Mr. (now Sir William) Lee-Warner who is a past-master in the art of diplomatic and mischievous writings says that the "union of the whole Empire has been consolidated in recent years by numerous engagements with the Chiefs for the removal of injurious restrictions on trade." The right of imposition of transit duties has been asserted by the British Government in its treaties with the Native States as an imperial prerogative. This important achievement of free trade has been instrumental in bringing to the Indian treasury a handsome quota of its enormous collections. The principal sources of the revenues of British India may be divided into two groups with regard to their incidence on the subjects of the Native States. The first group comprises the items of Land revenue, opium, stamp, registration, provincial rates, assessed taxes, and miscellaneous net receipts. The second group includes salt, excise, customs, forest, post and telegraph receipts, proceeds of railways and mint. The taxes included in the first group are collected from the subjects of British India alone. The Land-tax is paid by the ryots directly to the Government. The opium revenue is derived from the export trade of this drug and is not paid by the subjects either of British India or Native States. The Stamp and Registration duties are paid by those who have immediate interests in the transactions pertaining to British India and are paid almost

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British India—23,15,60,664.

Native States—6,27,46,014.

The population of the Native States is a little over one-fourth of that of British India and as the blessings of peace are enjoyed by the Native States, it is argued that full 25 per cent, of the total military expenditure of the Indian Empire should be borne by the native states. There is no tax such as a Poll-tax or a War-tax levied in India, the proceeds of which are exclusively appropriated for the purpose of defraying the military expenditure. The enormous outlay on the military department in India is paid out of the general Revenues of the country which are solely derived from the various taxes imposed on the people. The incidence of some of these taxes which go to form the nucleus of the revenues of India falls

on the subjects of native states and the extent of this incidence will conclusively prove that more than 25 p. c. of the military expenditure of the country is borne directly by the subjects of the native states. In dealing with this subject the difficulty at the outset is about the sources of information on this point. All the official reports and Blue books deal with the aspect of incidence of taxation on the various provinces which constitute British India. But how the incidence of various taxes levied by the Indian Government falls upon the subjects of Native States is studiously ignored from all the official publications. The main outcome of the Indian protectorate is the removal of all restrictions on the freedom of trade. There are no Inter-state barriers of customs duties or transit duties which prevent the expansion of British trade and commerce freely into the territories administered by the Native States. Mr. (now Sir William) Lee-Warner who is a past-master in the art of diplomatic and mischievous writings says that the "union of the whole Empire has been consolidated in recent years by numerous engagements with the Chiefs for the removal of injurious restrictions on trade." The right of imposition of transit duties has been asserted by the British Government in its treaties with the Native States as an imperial prerogative. This important achievement of free trade has been instrumental in bringing to the Indian treasury a handsome quota of its enormous collections. The principal sources of the revenues of British India may be divided into two groups with regard to their incidence on the subjects of the Native States. The first group comprises the items of Land revenue, opium, stamp, registration, provincial rates, assessed taxes, and miscellaneous net receipts. The second group includes salt, excise, customs, forest, post and telegraph receipts, proceeds of railways and mint. The taxes included in the first group are collected from the subjects of British India alone. The Land-tax is paid by the ryots directly to the Government. The opium revenue is derived from the export trade of this drug and is not paid by the subjects either of British India or Native States. The Stamp and Registration duties are paid by those who have immediate interests in the transactions pertaining to British India and are paid almost

by the subjects of the paramount power. The Provincial rates and assessed taxes are distributed over the area of British India alone. The incidence therefore of the first group of taxes does not at all fall upon the subjects of the Native States. But the incidence of taxes mentioned in the second group directly falls upon the subjects of the Native States and they pay rateably according to their numbers. The salt tax is a monopoly of the British Government. Only three native states, namely Travancore, Jodhpur and Mandi possess the sources of producing salt. The Sambhar Lake and the Didwana and Pachbadra sources of salt though belonging to the Jodhpur State are worked and leased by the Government of India. The Jodhpur State receives a fixed amount for its share of royalty but the production and manufacture of salt is entirely into the hands of the British Government. The manufacture of salt is prohibited on pain of penalty everywhere in India and the heavy duty levied upon this article of daily necessity falls into the coffers of the Indian Government. The subjects of the native states consume salt as their fellow brethren in British India and the incidence of this taxation is proportionately borne by them. The customs duties though paid immediately by third persons are necessarily borne by the subjects of the native states according to the doctrine of the "universal diffusion of taxes" which prevails in every country. The several articles which are taxed under this head such as arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors, petroleum, silver bullion are the monopolies of the British Government and British traders and the subjects of the native states indirectly pay the taxation in proportion to their number. The principal sources of revenues of this head are derived from import duties, on arms, ammunition, liquors, petroleum, cotton manufactures, countervailing duties on sugar, excise duty on cotton, &c.; all these articles by the introduction of free trade supply the wants of the subjects of the native states on whom the duty imposed upon these articles is saddled along with the proper cost. The excise revenue is made up of the license and distillery fees and duties on foreign liquors, country spirits, toddy, opium and its preparations, ganjya & other hemp drugs. Such of the native states as possess trees from which country liquor is produced have their Abkari

revenues farmed by the British Government and the native states receive a fixed amount for their share of royalty. The production and sale of all hemp drugs, that of opium and its preparations are the monopolies of the British Government. As the subjects of the native states consume these articles they contribute a proportionate share of the income derived from this source. The post office and the telegraph are the monopolies of the Imperial Power. The railways also are monopolised by the British Government. The subjects of the native States have manifold dealings with British India and bear the brunt of the taxation on this head. The subjects of the Native States travel through railways, carry on export and import trade through the medium of railway agencies; they use ordinary and service postage stamps, they remit money orders, registered articles and parcels to various persons living in British India and thus the taxes derived from these sources are distributed over them commensurate with their wants. The receipts derived from the mints are also borne by the Native States. With the exception of a few states the British Indian currency is the only legal tender in Native States. The British currency is also recognised as a legal tender in those few states which have their own currency system. But as the subjects of the Native States have wider dealings with the inhabitants of British India they prefer the universal legal tender to their limited currency. The effect of this system has been the gradual restriction of the State currency and the expansion of the British coinage. The forest revenue also is recovered by the sale of the forest produce such as teak Sandal Wool, Caontchone, Lac, Cutch, Gambler, Myrabolams and Cardamoms. The Native States with few exceptions have very little forest area at their disposal and they are obliged to make purchases of these articles and thus contribute to the income derived from these sources. It would therefore appear that free trade, free competition, imperial monopolies and prerogatives have made British India and the Native States, a world of perfect mobility where taxes are diffused over the entire extent and shifted to the individual according to his wants. And these considerations have totally removed the distinction between the sta-

tus of a Native State subject and British Indian subject so far as taxation is concerned. And as the wants of the various species of humanity are identical and as the distribution of taxation is unhindered in its course they all contribute to the revenues of British India. The following table will show the amount of revenues derived from the incidence of the taxes comprised in the second group and paid by the subjects of the Native States.

	Net Receipts.
Salt	5673991 £
Customs	3734517 £
Excise	4025770 £
Forest	1362227 £
Post office, Telegraph and Mint	158347 £
Railway Revenue account.....	846616 £
	Total... 15801468 £
A fourth share contributed by the Native States, } 3950367 £
Annual tributes from the Native States. } 556980 £
	Total... 4507347 £

The annual tributes recovered from the Native States have their origin in the subsidiary system which required the States to maintain at their expense troops for the protection of the British flag in India. The working of this system created various complications and ultimately it was abolished and the payment of annual tributes was made compulsory on the Native States. These tributes show the nature and extent of the obligation of participating in the defence which devolved on the States at that time. It has been asserted by certain writers that the tributes do not represent the pecuniary equivalent of the obligation of sharing in the defence but that they are a set off against claims relinquished by the East India Company. But none of them has tried to show what these claims are and what their nature is. A careful reading of the various treaties and engagements between the suzerain power and the Native States would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the annual tributes are the

substituted forms of the obligation of rendering service to the Empire. The subsidiary system also was based on the principles of feudal tenure and was introduced solely with a view to distribute the burden of the defence. Certain Native States agreed to contribute annual tributes and certain others ceded territories such as the Berars for adequately discharging their obligations in this respect.* The Native States, therefore, over and above, paying the expressed and stipulated quantum of the burden of defence are contributing incessantly a fourth share of the various taxes mentioned above

*Many Native States have ceded territories to the paramount power for the upkeep of the contingents and subsidiary forces which were gradually amalgamated into the regular British Army. They do not exist separately at the present time. The territories handed over by the Native States are incorporated into British Dominions. This arrangement was effected by the paramount power on the plea of efficiency of the army and administrative convenience. Whatever may be the reasons it was necessary in fairness to the Native States concerned to show the gross revenues of these territories under the head of tributes from Native States. Nearly 75 years have elapsed since these territories were taken from the Native States, the revenues have increased almost fourfold at the present time. The mention of this income under the head of tribute from Native States would enable the reader to know the contributions made by the Native States for the defence of the Empire. The studious omissions to state the income derived from such territories as coming from the Native States in the official accounts has led to a great injustice to the states concerned and has lent colour to the fallacious doctrine that Native States are not bearing their proper quota of the cost of maintaining the peace and order in this country the advantages of which the Native States do enjoy along with British India. The hollowness of this mischievous cry raised by Lord Curzon and echoed by the Agakhan was completely exposed at that time.

(Indirect Contributions.)

11-12-1916.

The extent and magnitude of the advantages derived from the Native States are not properly appreciated by persons living in the British Territory. We shall categorically review them in this article. The British Government levies fees on succession to the Native States. The imposition of this burden is regarded as the prerogative of the Crown. Certain Native States are by express treaty obligations exempted from paying *Nazarana*. But the greed of the Political Department knows no bounds. The words of the treaty are twisted and strained, unnatural constructions are put upon the phrases employed in the treaty to suit the conveniences of any particular occasion for the exaction of this form of tribute. The adoption of the present Chief of Jamkhandi in the Southern Maratta Jahagirs is a flagrant instance on this point. The adoption of the present Chief of Jamkhandi was performed according to the letter of the treaty by the late Chief. But after the demise of Appasaheb Jamkhandikar *Nazarana* has been extorted from the State during the minority administration without any justification what so ever. The installation of a Prince or Chief or the marriage ceremony of a Maharaja is always made the occasion of a gathering of exalted officers such as the Viceroy, Governor, Resident and other European officers and gentry in the State. These festive occasions afford a pretext for sumptuous banquets pleasant sports and felicitous gaieties of a diversified character. Nazars are presented on such occasions and no pains are spared to make the guests feel comfortable and quite at home. The ordinary globe-trotters and cold weather tourists from Europe always come with introductory letters to various Chiefs and Princes all over India and enjoy their unstinted hospitality. His Excellency Lord Amptill bore testimony to this in his speech at the Kashmir banquet. The Viceroy and the Governor, after the

work at the Secretariat and the worry of official red-tapism find relaxation in their usual visits to the Native States. Royalty is nowhere so highly entertained and magnificently welcomed as in the Native States in India. These States vie with one another in their receptions to an heir-apparent or a personage of royal blood. His Majesty the Emperor has retained a vivid impression of the costly and splendid reception given to him by the various Native Princes when he honoured them with his visit while in India. The Shikar enjoyed in the hunting excursions in Native States is very rare and entails a heavy drain on the resources of the Princes. The beating of the forest, the furnishing of camps in the wild jungles and the reception of the guest appreciably affect the resources of a State. The Princes and Chiefs in India are made to serve as a part of retinue in any triumphal procession of a Durbar such as that held at Delhi. The picturesque dresses, radiant jewellery, dashing equipage and the quaint followers of the Princes and Chiefs in India, all moving in an attitude of supplication and humility, produce an effect which only a master of ceremony like Lord Curzon can properly appreciate and utilize for the purpose of playing on the imagination of oriental races. These royal appendages are purposely attached to the present Darbars held by the representatives of the Crown to impress on the populace the idea of submission and unfettered conquest. The Native States in India contribute to various official and quasi-official schemes initiated by responsible officers in India. The Imperial Institute in London is a sorry spectacle of waste of subscriptions collected from the Native States. The Imperial Institute raised mainly from the funds of the Native States has very little to do with their well-being. The organizers of this institute betrayed the height of ingratitude when they lavishly spent their funds to entertain Colonial Premiers and representatives who were in no way connected with the interest of the Institute and did not even care to write to their patrons the Princes in India, who had assembled in London on the occasion of the Royal Jubilee. The Dufferin fund, the Victoria Memorial Fund and funds of this nature have received munificent help from the Native States. The Native States have also furthered the objects of charitable

institutions in the country. Universities, Colleges, Libraries, Museums, Public Parks and Dispensaries have received valuable contributions from Princes and Chiefs in India only for pleasing the Government. The votaries of officialdom and especially of those of an out-going Viceroy or a Governor count mainly on the support of the Native Princes for the erection of a statue of their favourite deities. In the world of sports, the Native States are to the front with their spontaneous (?) offers of pecuniary assistance. The various cups and prizes awarded to the successful winners of races show the nature of the support given by the Native States. The turf finds a great patron in a Prince or a Chief. The various Gymkhanas have in the list of their donors the various Princes and Chiefs who hardly participate in their advantages. Some of the Gymkhanas have not even the courtesy to admit those patrons into their sacred limits although they are not ashamed to receive help from them. The part played by the Native States in the coming Motor race would bring home the truth of our remarks. The capital of Scindia is to be the abode of coming festivities. The Maharaja is to play the host and receive the guests. The Native States have been used as pasture for various European companies who enjoy absolute monopoly in licenses, mining leases, and other facilities of exploitation. Certain European firms command the offers of some Native States for furnishing medical stores, stationery, furniture and sundry other articles required for consumption. A peripatetic juggler, a circus manager, a reciter or a vagrant for that matter with any sort of credentials in his pocket feeds fat on the resources of the Native States in his rambles throughout the country. All sorts of unqualified persons and worthless mediocrities backed by chits from influential officials find shelter in the Native States and there play pranks with an impudence which a certificated beggar alone can command. We have lately heard the scandal of some Political Agents serving the double function of commission agents to various States in India and this evil is no doubt rampant in many parts of India. Even the wives of certain officers profusely meddle with the affairs of a Prince or Chief and at times chaperon his spouse in private life. In a few instances, this evil be-

comes simply intolerable. The heaviest burden comes from the quarter of official 'easements' of the political department. The system of perquisites is every day violating the moral code even in the opinion of such Anglo-Indian papers as the "Times of India." The *Times*, no doubt, very pertinently remarks that the conduct of certain political officers living practically free at the expense of certain Native Princes and Chiefs is "un-English." It is really a gross abuse of power that the responsible officers drawing fat salaries should indulge in easements which are dishonourable to the instincts of a righteous and upright officer. The political officer "rides his horses, drives his carriages, uses his cooks, shoots his big game, spends money right and left on improvements for his own luxury." We may multiply instances by adding that he uses his *bungalow*, appropriates his furniture, commands his summer retreats, receives gifts, accepts presents and enjoys all things that go to make up his life highly epicurian. Are these not an indirect contribution to the Empire at large and is it too much to expect that the recipients of all these favours should at least possess some consciousness of the sources from which they flow. As the administration of British India is stereotyped, it hardly admits of any latitude for the enjoyment of the various advantages mentioned above. The Native States serve as centres of recreation and pleasure to European Officials and travel (and political week-enders) in India. They are the redeeming features of the routine administration and alleviate considerably the dulness and insipidity of the official life in this country. All these create burdens too large for the Native States and the fact deserves recognition.

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