

Dhananjayrao Gadgil Library



GIPE-PUNE-002992

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

OF

GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI.

AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION

BY

A. WERNER.

WITH A SUPPLEMENT BY

JESSIE WHITE MARIO.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

1849-1872.

London:

WALTER SMITH AND INNES,

(LATE MOZLEY),

31 & 32, BEDFORD STREET, STRAND, W.C.

1889.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

V52:5177^{1007,1}

B9.2

2992

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

SECOND PERIOD—*Continued.*

CHAPTER	PAGE
VIII. THE DEFENCE OF ROME	1
IX. RETREAT	22
X. EXILE	52
XI. RETURN TO POLITICAL LIFE	69
XII. IN CENTRAL ITALY	124

THIRD PERIOD.

I. THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN, MAY, 1860	142
II. THE FIFTH OF MAY, 1860	153
III. FROM QUARTO TO MARSALA	155
IV. CALATAFIMI, MAY 15, 1860	163
V. CALATAFIMI TO PALERMO	171
VI. ROSALINO PILO AND CORRAO	174
VII. CALATAFIMI TO PALERMO— <i>continued</i>	176
VIII. THE ATTACK ON PALERMO, MAY 27, 1860	181
IX. MILAZZO	192
X. THE FIGHT AT MILAZZO	197
XI. IN THE STRAIT OF MESSINA	204
XII. ON THE MAINLAND OF NAPLES	208
XIII. THE ATTACK ON REGGIO	210
XIV. ENTRY INTO NAPLES, SEPTEMBER 7, 1860	215
XV. PRELIMINARIES OF THE BATTLE OF THE VOLTURNO, OCTOBER 1, 1860	222
XVI. BATTLE OF THE VOLTURNO	225
XVII. BRONZETTI AT CASTEL MORONE, OCTOBER 1, 1860	236
XVIII. BATTLE OF CASERTA VECCHIA, OCTOBER 2, 1860	238

FOURTH PERIOD.

1860-1870.		PAGE
CHAPTER		
I.	THE ASPROMONTE CAMPAIGN, 1862	243
II.	THE CAMPAIGN IN THE TYROL	254
III.	VARIOUS ENGAGEMENTS	261
IV.	FIGHT AT BEZZECA, JULY 21	275
V.	AGRO ROMANO	283
VI.	FROM SARDINIA TO THE MAINLAND	289
VII.	THE ATTACK ON MONTEROTONDO	297
VIII.	MENTANA, NOVEMBER 3, 1867	303

FIFTH PERIOD.

I.	THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN	316
II.	FIGHTS AT LANTENAY AND AUTUN	328
III.	JANUARY 21-23, 1871	342
IV.	RETREAT—BORDEAUX—CAPRERA, 1871	356
APPENDIX	361

APPENDIX.

Civita Vecchia, July 15, 1875.

THE battle of Custoza, the plan of which is now before me, resembles all other ancient and modern battles won by genius being on one side. From Epaminondas, at Leuctra and Mantinea, to the Prussian generals in 1870, it has always been incontestable that the oblique order is the proper one; and when employed, it has always resulted in victory.

At Rosbach, Frederick II., by massing his forces, and by the swiftness of his manœuvring, took the French army in flank and utterly routed it.

At Mantua, Napoleon I., hearing that the Austrians were marching down, one column on either shore of Lake Garda, in order to defeat the two hostile corps separately, left his heavy artillery behind, marched with his entire army, and threw its full weight against one wing.

In America, Paz, knowing that Echague had his men drawn up in battle array behind a *cappūo* (clump of trees), presented a parallel line to the enemy, with orders, however to withdraw the rear ranks from the right, and reinforce the left. In this way, Echague's left found on the enemy's right only a few cavalry squadrons, who retreated at a gallop. Meanwhile Paz's left, reinforced by the best troops, defeated Echague's right, and thus obtained a splendid victory.

It grieves me to have to utter a panegyric on an

Austrian general, yet nevertheless, for the edification of our young men, who will perhaps have once more to engage in combat with foreign soldiers, I must relate the truth.

The Archduke Albert was the true and only general at the battle of Custoza. Taking advantage of the blunder we had been guilty of, in crossing the Mincio on our most extended line, between Mantua and Peschiera, he made a feint of attacking our right and centre, and, massing his three army-corps on our left, routed Durando's corps (which stood alone there) with the 80,000 men under his command.

Our centre and right, drawn off by some feigned cavalry charges, did not hear of the defeat of our left till too late; and, in consequence of the mistakes made from the very beginning of the campaign, six or seven splendid divisions had to retire, biting their lips with vexation because they could not fight.

I say, "mistakes made from the very beginning of the campaign;" and, indeed, such was the case. Why was the army divided into two—a blunder condemned in all ages? Perhaps to please the brilliant General Cialdini, to whom it was a matter of repugnance to obey General Lamarmora, the chief of staff? Why was not one division enough to threaten the passage of the Po, without employing on that service 90,000 of the best troops, who were of no use except to give a shameful appearance of retreat to the action of our gallant army?

I speak of our gallant army with pride. It is a real pain and grief to me that we should have lost those splendid generals—Govone, Bixio, Cugia, Sirtori, who achieved so much that day, at the head of our brave soldiers. Through them, if they had been decently supported, that battle-field would have been made glorious with hymns of triumph.

Young Officers—you who may yet perhaps have to face

powerful enemies on the battle-field. These are the blunders committed on our side: Cucchiari's whole corps, consisting of three divisions, and Bixio's division, with Prince Humbert's, Pianell's, and Cosenz's—seven divisions in all—took no part in the battle, while the enemy's three army-corps were fighting with our left, and shattering it to pieces. All this was owing to the Austrian general's sagacity. Besides the seven divisions which took no part in the engagement, more than thirty batteries of the reserve remained inactive, and withdrew from the field without firing a shot.

If employed in time, all these untouched forces would have been quite enough by themselves completely to disperse an enemy necessarily shaken and demoralized by a day's fighting.

END OF VOL. II.