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
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S 2151

Report of the Punjab Hindu Sabha Deputation on the dacoities committed against Hindus in February and March 1915 in certain parts of South-Western Districts of the Punjab.

We, the undersigned members of the Punjab Hindu Sabha, having been deputed by the Sabha to make enquiries on the spot regarding dacoities committed against the Hindu population of certain parts of the South-Western Districts of the Punjab, have the honour to state as follows:-

We began our enquiry at Jhang on 5th September 1915 and continued it in almost all the villages in which dacoities were committed in the Jhang District and in one village named Baqarpur in the Multan District. In order to explain our report fully we annex herewith the following statements as appendices:-

1. A statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each raided village. (Appendix A.)
2. A map showing the situation of the raided villages of Jhang district in the Ilaga locally known as Kachhi which lies between the Thal on the West and the Jhelum River on the north and east and the boundary of the Multan and Muzafargarh districts on the south. (Appendix B.)
3. A rough plan of 117 houses and shops burnt by the dacoits in the town of Ahmadpur Sial, Tehsil Shorkot, District Jhang, with a list of the names of the owners or occupiers of the same. (Appendix C.)
4. A statement giving some of the transactions of sale and advances of loan of wheat by Hindu Sahukars and shopkeepers of Ahmadpur to the Muhammadan Zamindars during the quarter immediately preceding the dacoities as instances of the dealings between Hindus and Muhammadans immediately before the dacoities in the raided area in Jhang District. (Appendix D.)
5. A statement of some transactions of the sale of wheat by Muhammadan Zamindars to Hindu shopkeepers at Ahmedpur during the same period as instances of such dealings between Hindus and Muhammadans of the raided area immediately before the dacoities. (Appendix E.)
6. A copy of the Punjab Hindu Sabha Representation dated the 18th May 1915 to His Honour the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab in connection with the lawlessness of which the Hindu subjects of His Majesty the King Emperor have been the victims in certain parts of the South-Western districts of the Punjab. (Appendix F.)
7. A copy of the Punjab Government communique, published in the *Tribune*, dated 11th June 1915. (Appendix G.)
8. A copy of letter No. 635 S. Home from A. B. Kettlewell, Esquire, I.C.S., Additional Secretary to Government, Punjab, addressed to the President, Punjab Hindu Sabha, Lahore, in reply to the Sabha's representations to His Honour the Lieutenant Governor (Appendix H.)

Though we had occasion to visit the affected villages more than 6 months after the occurrence of the dacoities the local inspection of the burnt houses, shops, places of worship, the remnants of burnt batis, title deeds and religious books, and of the extensive diggings in the houses and shops looted as well as marks of injuries on persons and of the disfigured faces of some Hindu women and children caused by forcibly tearing of ornaments from their persons, specially ears and noses, fully corroborated the statements of victims and eye-witnesses of the dacoities whom we had the advantage of seeing and examining on the spot during our tour.

That the dacoits were exclusively local Muhammadan Zamindars, their tenants and Kamins; that the victims were exclusively Hindus; that the houses of Mohammadans were marked by red flags before the dacoities began; that the number of dacoits amounted to thousands; that the dacoits were often accompanied with camels, ponies, and donkeys to carry away the looted property; that the dacoities were continued at the same time in different villages in an extensive area in broad-day-light; that all Muhammadan houses were saved and almost all Hindu houses of the villages raided were looted; that the dacoities were in some cases accompanied with incendiarism, and not only private houses, shops, account books and title deeds were burnt but sacrileges were committed on their religious books, Dharamsalas and temples, that Patwari's papers were also burnt in some villages; all these facts are in themselves more than enough to indicate the nature of these dacoities which in our humble opinion were entirely due to mischievous designs of some persons interested in the loot and in spreading false rumours about the war, but not in any sense to any sort of insult, ill-treatment, misconduct or oppression on the part of the Hindus towards the Muhammadans, as has been suggested in some quarters nor to any alleged scarcity of grain and poverty of the Muhammadan agriculturists. These conditions did not exist, in our humble opinion, in the raided areas of Jhang and Multan districts in which we had the advantage of making personal enquiries on the spot.

It is true that the price of wheat at the time when these raids took place was high but not so high as in other parts of the Province nor higher than what it is at present. Most of the raided villages lie on or near the river bank towards the west where the two rivers (Jhelum and Chenab) jointly run and possess the richest and most productive of the barani and chahi lands in the Jhang District. The population of this part, with the exception of a few Hindu shopkeepers, consists mainly of Muhammadan land-holders, Muhammadan cultivators and Muhammadan agricultural Kamins whose prosperity depends more on the out-turn of the crops than on the prices of the same, while the high prices in the affected area where the crops had been good for several successive harvests benefitted the Zemindar and his cultivator and Kamin more than the shopkeeper. The dacoities began just at the time when the agriculturists had not yet exhausted their grain of *Rabi* (1914) and had recently harvested their *Kharif* crop both of which had been exceptionally good in the Ilqa of Kachhi on account of timely rains and floods in the year of 1914, and the prospects of the standing

Rabi crop of 1915 were also very bright. The main *Kharif* products of this part of the country are *mash*, *mungi*, *mōth* and *til* seeds which fetch better prices in the market than wheat, and can easily be sold for cash or bartered for wheat. They had also harvested a good crop of *Jowar Bajra* and *Mandwa* which were still in store with them for their use. It is not correct that any scarcity of grain was felt during the first quarter of 1915 in the dacoited areas, specially among the agricultural classes and their Kamins. The affected area of Jhang District being far from Railway communication, separated by two rivers, the Ravi and the Chenab, from one side and the Chenab and Jhelum from the other, and at a distance of more than 20 miles from Abdul Hakim or Jhang the nearest Railway Stations, with rough and difficult paths the rates were more favourable there than in places near the Railway Stations. During the course of our enquiries on the spot we have inspected some of the *bahis* that had escaped burning and find that wheat was being sold for cash and exchanged for *mash* and *til* and advanced by Hindu shopkeepers to Muhammadans on loan throughout the quarter immediately preceding the commencement of the dacoities. It also appears that during the quarter immediately preceding the dacoities Muhammadan Zamindars sold wheat and other grain to Hindus, which shows that Muhammadans had grain in excess of their usual requirements. The fact that the Zamindars of the dacoited areas paid their revenue instalments for *Rabi* and *Kharif* 1914 and *Rabi* 1915, without any difficulty and that no applications for loan were made during the quarter immediately preceding the dacoities to the agricultural banks which are open to all the Zamindars and charge very moderate rates of interest; that no application was made to the Revenue authorities for Takavi, or for suspension or remission of land revenue during the last 10 years, go against the theory of grain scarcity in the Kachhi Ilaqa of Jhang district or of the refusal by the Hindus to advance money or grain on loan or to sell grain to Muhammadans in that Ilaqa. We have not been able to find any previous complaints of a serious nature as to oppressions of any sort on the part of one community against the other in that Ilaqa. The relations between the Hindus and Muhammadans in the dacoited area of that Ilaqa seem to have all along been friendly before these dacoities, and the Hindu Sahukars of the affected area do not generally appear to have invested their money in any Post Office, or in any Bank, The Hindu Sahukar's money appears to have been mainly invested either with the local Mohammadan Zemindars at a low rate of interest ranging from 6 to 12 per cent per annum or in the jewellery of their females or kept hoarded in iron safes or buried under ground. This low rate of interest in the affected areas between the Shahukar and the Zemindar clearly shows on the one hand that the Hindus of the affected area though in a helpless minority are pecuniarily well off, and, on the other, that the Mohammadan Zemindars owning very rich and productive lands are also in good circumstances and have always maintained their credit with the local Hindu Sahukars and have not ousted the latter by their dealings with the Agricultural Banks. It is not correct that the rate of interest exacted by Jhang money lenders is considerably higher than the rates prevailing in other neighbouring Districts of the Province. During our tour we took an opportunity of examining the accounts which had escaped burning in different villages and we were amazed to find that the rate of interest charged to Muham-

muhammadan Zemindars by the Hindu Sahukars was extremely low as noted above in comparison with the rate of interest prevailing in the other parts of the Province between the Sahukars and the Zemindars, There is no truth in the assertion made in some quarters that the Hindus of the raided locality of Jhang district had stopped giving loans to the Jats (Muhammadan agriculturists) and suspended business and wanted their female folks to sign bonds in Ahmedpur, and that this attitude of Hindus directly provoked the first out-break of the dacoities at Ahmedpur. As a matter of fact as is clear from appendices D and E the Hindus of Ahmedpur did not stop giving loans and advancing and selling grain to Jats (Muhammadan agriculturists), nor there was any scarcity of grain much less famine amongst the Muhammadan agriculturists of the raided villages in Jhang district where these unfortunate dacoities began. The rise of prices of grain, far from injuriously affecting the agriculturist, naturally and directly benefitted him, as there had not been any failure of harvests nor export of grain from the raided area at the time and thus there was no occasion to the Hindus for an undue advantage of the situation or to the Jat (Muhammadan agriculturist) for revenge against the Hindus. Equally senseless is the assertion made in some quarters that in the south-western districts of the Punjab the Muhammadan agricultural tribes have always to live at the mercy of the Hindus. The position is obviously the reverse. The sudden failure of many banks in the Province has also been unjustifiably set up in some quarters as contributory to the causes for these dacoities without suggesting what amounts these agriculturists who had never dealt with such banks had lost by bank failures.

The assertion in some quarters that the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, and the Insolvency Act of 1917 contributed to any extent to the cause of these dacoities is also incorrect. Both these legislative enactments have been in force for a considerable number of years in these as well as other districts of the Punjab and there is no reason to suppose that they have had any special and oppressive effect in this particular tract of the raided area different from that in the rest of the Province.

The suggestion that the passions of Muhammadan Sials were excited by one Nihal Chand or by any one else demanding from a Muhammadan Sial Zamindar the services of his unmarried daughter in lieu of grain advance is also not correct and is set up by certain interested persons who are attempting to minimise the nature and the mischief of these dacoities and to shift the blame on to the Hindus for every evil cause or effect of the dacoities. The persons who suggest this alleged demand by Nihal Chand as a justification for the Muhammadan raids and excesses on the Hindu neighbours have, curiously enough, not given out, so far as we are aware, the name of the Muhammadan Sial who was thus insulted. One would expect that Nihal Chand, if he were the original cause of all this wholesale depredation would be the first person to be victimised by the Sials. It is extremely strange that though almost all the Hindu shops and many Hindu houses in Ahmedpur were set on fire, Nihal Chand's Chaubara in the bazar was saved and none of his houses or shops were burnt. Equally wrong is the suggestion that the Hindus themselves burnt their own houses in Ahmadpur for plague dis-infection purposes and is, like other

theories against the Hindus, expected to give them no consolation in their extreme distress.

Our enquiries also show that the theory that Hindu Shahukars and shopkeepers in the affected area of Ilaqa Kachhi in Jhang District had withdrawn to a large extent their money from the Post Office Saving Banks is not correct. This class of people does not appear to have been in the habit of depositing or investing their money in the Post Office or with any Bank. The Hindu shopkeepers and Shahukars as well as their Muhammadan customers in this Ilaqa seem to be still so backward that they do not generally appear to have as yet realized even the great advantages and convenience of dealing in currency notes, and dealing with Banks, but, in our humble opinion, there is absolutely no foundation for the assertion which is made in certain quarters that the Hindu Shopkeepers of the raided area in Jhang District were inspired by any political ideas, that they largely withdrew their Postal Saving Bank's Deposits that they shewed any reluctance to negotiate Government Currency Notes or evinced a want of confidence in the stability of the administration.

As to the main causes of the failure of the prosecutions in majority of the cases it is not correct (as has been alleged) that Hindus did not report about the dacoities promptly nor that they did not help the Police in their investigations. As a matter of fact the Hindus, being cognizant of their helplessness and weakness against their Muhammadan neighbours, cried for help as soon as they apprehended the danger of dacoities and reported the dacoities to the police as soon as the way to the Thana or to any other authority was safe from danger. It was in the month of January 1915 that plague broke out at Garh Maharaja which is a small town on the west bank of the Chenab and is about 35 miles from Jhang and has a Police Station. The people had mostly evacuated the town on that account, and bad characters considered it an opportune time to make depredations on the town and were encouraged in their misdeeds by the apathy and indifference of the local Police who practically took no notice of the thefts committed. In some cases the Garh Maharaja Police actually refused to record reports and even went to the extent of prohibiting complainants from coming near them for fear lest they might spread the plague. In January 1915 detailed petitions were sent by the Hindus of Garh Maharaja to the Deputy Commissioner who referred the matter to the Tahsildar. The latter, however, treated the matter lightly and took no action. For at least one month no effectual action having been taken to stop the thefts at Garh Moharaja or to arrest the offenders who enjoyed full freedom to deal with the stolen property in the town itself; the people of the adjoining villages were also encouraged to make depredations on the town, and dacoities began to be committed in Garh Maharaja on a bigger scale and in open broad-daylight, and camels and donkeys were also employed by the dacoits to carry away the looted property from the houses and shops of the Hindus in Garh Maharaja. It was at this time that plague broke out at Ahmadpur which was a very wealthy Hindu town and presented great attraction to the lawless people of the neighbourhood. The Hindus, apprehending lest depredations of Garh Maharaja might be repeated at Ahmadpur, called a meeting of the town to devise measures for the protection of their houses and shops. The result was that some steps were taken to guard the shops at night time

and representations were submitted by the Hindus to the Deputy Commissioner of Jhang and to the Tahsildar of Shorkot on 18th February 1915 praying that the town of Ahmadpur be protected against imminent danger of dacoities. On 20th February 1915, a respectable Hindu of Ahmadpur presented to the Deputy Commissioner at Jhang a petition signed by 12 Hindus, praying for protection against apprehended dacoities. Personal representations were also made to the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police at Jhang on the 20th February 1915 (before dacoities began at Ahmadpur) by several respectable Hindu gentlemen including Rai Sahib Girdhari Lal, Honourary Magistrate.

The miscreants, who were already encouraged by the immunity from punishment which they had so far enjoyed in the broad-day dacoities committed at Garh Maharaja, now began to attract large numbers to join them and it was on the night of the 21st February 1915 that 60 or 70 of them entered the town of Ahmadpur and began a regular plunder upon which a scuffle ensued in which several Hindus were wounded and the shops of Isher Das Saluja and Raushan Das Kubba were looted and burnt. Such an open and bold raid by a large number of people in the night, and the fact that red flags were hoisted on the Muhammadan houses to mark them out in order to save them from plunder was only a prelude to other more serious and extensive dacoities against the Hindus. On the morning of 22nd February, Pandit Labhu Ram, Sub-Assistant Surgeon, L. Har Bhagwan, Sub-Post Master, Haji Ahmad, Teacher, Sobha, Chankidar, Thakar Das, Patwari, Gurmukh Ram, retired Forest Darogha, Panju Ram, Compounder, and Kewal Ram, who was wounded by the dacoits in the scuffle of the preceding night, approached the Tahsildar who was putting up at Basti Muhammed Mir Ali about 2 miles from Ahmadpur and detailed to him the occurrences of the preceding night and prayed to him to take measures to protect the town but the Tahsildar took no effective steps in the matter and returned to Shorkot. The result was that big Zemindars who had not openly upto that time taken any part in the dacoities now threw in their lot with the raiders and took their own tenants and Kamins under their lead to mercilessly plunder the property of the Hindus. On 23rd February, the Hindus sent telegraphic messages to the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. A respectable gentleman of Rahsidpur says that on 28th February 1915 he was robbed by the dacoits and he went to make a report in the Police Station, Athara Hazari, but the constables did not allow him to go in and to have his report recorded, saying that he had come from a plague infected area and should not come near them. He then went to the Deputy Commissioner and presented his application to him on the 1st March 1915 but it was returned to him without any remark. He then took that very application to the Commissioner at Multan on 2nd March 1915 but there also the application was given back to him with a direction to go to the police. In the same way another respectable person of Berwala states that he approached the police on 1st March 1915 but no help was given. On 2nd March he wired details of the dacoities to His Honour the Lieutenant Governor. He stated the details also before the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner on 3rd March 1915 but both these officers said that they had no police with them.

From our enquiry it appears that the failure of prosecutions in the majority of cases is due, not to any fault of the Hindu victims of the dacoities, but to the failure of the police promptly to record reports, to make house searches in respect of the looted property and to make enquiries in most cases and to secure all available evidence. In some cases the police did not arrive for enquiry for weeks and the culprits got time to dispose of or conceal the dacoited property and to destroy or tamper with the evidence against them. During the dacoities some murders were also committed but no police assistance being given for several days the corpses were burnt by the relatives of the murdered persons in despair of any prospects of police investigation. Even in villages where police arrived in time to detect the offenders they did not admittedly engage themselves in taking evidence or in making regular investigations and searches, as according to them their whole attention and energy were directed in arresting suspected persons without recording necessary evidence against them. On the morning of the 22nd February 1915, just after the first dacoity at Ahmadpur on the preceding night many Hindus, finding that the local police and the Tahsildar could not help them and that the town was being looted, began to migrate to near wells with whatever valuables they could carry; but on the same evening a very large number of dacoits believed to be some thousands, entered the town and attacked the abadis on the wells at the same time and plundered everything that could be found in the town, as well as what was being carried by those who were on their way to the wells or had been brought by those who had reached there. Only about 70 Hindu families who had obtained shelter in the District Board Dispensary of Ahmedpur were saved. Pandit Labhu Ram, Sub-Assistant Surgeon and Compounder Panju Ram of the Dispensary, deserve appreciation for their services to helpless Hindus at such a critical time. In our humble opinion reliable evidence is still available to obtain conviction of some persons in cases where the prosecutions have been withdrawn or a *nolle prosequi* entered. We cannot at any rate refrain from noting that without encouragement from the conduct of some of the influential Muhammadan Zemindars of the locality, the raiders who were local Zemindars could not possibly have succeeded so extensively in their raids or in disposing of the dacoited property and in evading the penalty of law.

The Hindus in some quarters are blamed for giving no help to the police in their investigations but the blame in our humble opinion is unjustified and without foundation. The police considered identification evidence of the Hindu victims of the dacoities quite sufficient to secure conviction of the accused in these dacoity cases and omitted to make searches of the houses of accused for the stolen property which was expected to provide corroborative evidence against the accused but which the police, notwithstanding the victims' earnest requests, refused to conduct.

A very large number of Hindu families have left their villages on account of future danger to their person and property, as will appear from Appendix A. annexed hereto, while those who are still in the villages have not yet resumed their business freely and have not yet permanently re-settled in their homes and restarted their business. Some of those who had left their homes and many of these who

(8)

were still in the villages appeared before us and we have fully assured them that our mighty and benign Government had taken strong measures for their future protection and safety and that there was no apprehension of any recurrence of the dacoities in future. We have encouraged them to resume their business and to settle down with full confidence in the strength and justice of British Government. It is hoped that they are fully assured of their safety and protection but they require help in getting their debts duly acknowledged by the debtors and in realising the rent of their lands held by them in mortgage or as owners and cultivated by Muhammadan tenants who are still withholding rents in the majority of cases. If Hindus who are reduced to utter poverty are to sue for every item of debt of which entries have been lost or burnt or for rents of their lands it will be another catastrophe for them. They do not possess sufficient means to pay even Court-fee for all those suits. The one way to meet this difficulty is to appoint a combined deputation of respectable and influential Muhammadans and Hindus to visit the raided villages in order to restore friendly relations between Hindus and Muhammadans and to enquire about the debts, the entries relating to which have been burnt and to persuade the debtors to make fresh entries of those debts in favour of the creditors which may be proved to their satisfaction or which may be admitted by the debtors. On the private intervention of such an influential deputation it is quite possible that the debtors and the creditors may be reconciled, brought to terms and persuaded to resume their old friendly relations, and that some of the debts may be acknowledged by the debtors without recourse to law Courts. A prayer may also be made to the Supreme Government to remit as a special case, under Section 35 of the Court Fees Act, Court fee in suits for realisation of debts by Hindus who have been looted in that part of the country.

In the end we wish to take this opportunity of expressing our hearty thanks to Mr. P. J. Rust, I. C. S., Deputy Commissioner Jhang, for the courtesy with which he received us on our visit to him at Jhang and for his having provided us with every facility during our tour in the disturbed area.

SOHAN LAL,
FAKIR CHAND,
M. BAHADUR CHAND.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each Sabha Deputation during their

1	2	3		4	5		6	7	8	9
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
1	Ahmadpur Sial, Tehsil Shorkot, (District Jhang) Thana Garh Mahareja.	2097	3330	This, because breaking at night, and small dacoities began from middle of February, big dacoities from the 21st to the 25th of February 1915, day and night continuously carried on.	500	About 128	<p><i>I.—Deaths.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mahesh Dass goldsmith 2. Latha Ram. " <p><i>II.—Serious injuries.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lal Bai wife of Gossin Amar Lal Brahman. 2. Bhagwan Devi widow of Mahesh Das goldsmith. 3. Kewal Ram Chhabra. 4. Gela Ram Kubba. 5. Isher Das Saloji. 6. Roshan Dass Kubba. 7. Sobha Chaukidar. 8. Ram Rattan Goldsmith. 9. Ganpat Nijhawan (got injury in the head.) 	Rspees ten lakhs.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dharmala of Bhai Jiwan Fing burnt partly. 2. Hindu private temples one of Charanjit Lal Trikha and one of Jawala Dass. Rama Nand Mohla partly burnt and images broken. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Receipts of debts forcibly extorted by dacoits from Hindus Howara Ram and others. 2. Bahis of Shukara burnt, destroyed or taken away. 3. Some deeds and bonds taken away or burnt. 4. Registers of Inkam Chand, Vij, deed writer, burnt. 5. Three bonds executed one in favour of Chanan Ram Rawal and two in favour of Khurana kept in deposit with Hakam Chand, deed writer, torn into pieces. 6. Bonds for Rs. 2,500, cash Rs. 50, some utensils and boxes, belonging to George A. S. School were looted and taken away. 7. Three iron safes broken.

A—continued.

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Seated up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
	Nil.	Nil.	<p>Pandit Labhu Ram, Sub-Assst. Surgeon and Parju Ram, compounder, District Board Dispensary, who gave shelter to some 70 Hindu families who were all saved from molestation, deserve appreciation of services.</p> <p>2. Hindus resisted dacoits attack on the night of 21st February and were wounded.</p>	None.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ahmadpur. 2. Basti Miani. 3. Basti Hassanwali. 4. Namdar Sial. 5. Wagha. 6. Ranjit Kot. 7. Isewala. 8. Kot Mapal. 9. Garh Maharaja. 10. Charyari. 11. Chadbar. 12. Ahmadwala. 13. Dawand (Samand). 14. Sadkana Mirali. 15. Saupal. 16. Faqir Syal. 17. Jhendir Niazi Wala. 18. Lalera. 19. Bakhu sargava. 20. Chak Naurang Shah 	94	1545	823	2138

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabha Deputation during

1	2	3		4		5		6	7	8	9
Serial number.	Name of village.	Population		Duration of dacoities.		Number of houses and shops.		Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.	Looted.	Burnt.						
9	Basti Bohirwali, Dakbli, Samandawana, Tehsil Shorkot, District Jhang, Thana Garh Mabaraja.	565	1406	The 23rd. February 1915 after sunset to the 24th February 1915, before sunrise.		33	16	<p><i>Persons injured.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Khema Ram (got injuries, on head and nose.) 2. Khema Ram Chugh's wife (got ears torn off.) 3. His daughter-in-law (had ear cut off) 4. His son (since died of injuries). 5. Ganda Ram's wife 6. The daughter of Khema Ram. 7. Ganda Ram's daughter 8. Latha son of Wasanda (injured on head and shoulder). 9. Maya Ram Chhabra's wife (since died of injuries) had her ears torn. 10. Tirth Ram's wife Ganesh Devi (Brahman of Ahmadpur Sial) had her ear cut off. 11. Tirah Ram's sister-in-law Lal Bai (had her ears cut off) of Ahmedpur. 12. Niamat Ram Dhingra's wife <i>Mst.</i> Khem Bai had ear cut 13. Teju Ram son of Asa Ram got injuries on leg and shoulders. 14. Vasindha Ram son of Sadhu Ram received injuries on head and got bone of 3rd finger of right hand broken. 15. Navak Ram son of Tulesa injured on head. 	Sixty thousand, (60,000).	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Granth Sahib of the local Dharmasala taken away and thrown into the field, the clothings and the coverings of Granth Sahib taken away. 2. Fire set to local Dharmasala. 	Some Bahis burnt

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab their tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
15	None.	None.	None. Hindus defended bravely and were severely injured, but were eventually overtaken by superior numbers of dacoits.	None.	1. Chadhar. 2. Wagha. 3. Samandwana. 4. Sadhana. 5. Ahmadpur.	20	1411	617	1881

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each Sabha Deputation during their

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of dacoities.	5 Number of houses and shops		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
3	Isawalla, Tehsil Shorkot, District Jhang, Thana Garh Maharaja.	192	1006	From the 23rd February 1915 evening to the 24th February 1915.	9	9	None.	Twentyfive thousand (25,000).	None.	1. Bahis burnt. 2. Receipts for debts extorted. 3. Iron safe broken.
4	Basi Balawal, Dinkhli, Isawala, Thana Garh Maharaja, Tehsil Shorkot, District Jhang.	100	250	The 23rd February 1915, night.	...	1	5 persons received injuries.	Six thousand, (6,000).	None.	1. Bahis burnt. 2. Deeds and bonds taken away by the Dacoits
5	Garh Maharaja, Tehsil Shorkot, Thana Garh Maharaja.	934	1887	From the beginning of January 1915 till the end of February 1915.	200	6	None.	Forty thousand, (40,000).	None.	1. Bahis burnt. 2. Iron safes broken.

A—continued.

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Seated up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
5	89 35	None None	None.	None	1. Isewalla. 2. Chadhar. 3. Balawal.	6	804	148	859
5	20	None	None. Hindus resisted the dacoit's attack, and were injured, but were over taken by superior numbers.	None	1. Kulachi. 2. Isewala. 3. Balawal.	7	Included in No. 3		
None	11 22 21 54	8 Nil. Nil. 8	None.	None	1. Garh Maharaja. 2. Adjoining villages.	31	1287	467	1417

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabba Deputation during

1	2	3		4	5		6	7	8	9
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
Serial number.	Name of village.	Population		Duration of dacoities.	Number of houses and shops.		Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
6	Mir ewala, Tahsil Shorkot, Thana Garh Maharaja.					None.		No.	None.	None.
7	Doulhana, Tahsil Shorkot, Thana Garh Maharaja.	184	821	From the 27th February evening to the 28th February 1915, morning.		13	<p><i>Persons injured.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jaawant received injuries on the head and got his ear cut off. 2. Chaina Ram. 3. Wazir Chand Patwari. 4. Dayal Ram. 5. Jodha Ram. 	Fifty thousand 50,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One Granth Sahib of local Dharmasala burnt in the street. 2. Hindu idols broken in the Thakardawana. 3. Jes Ram's idol pedestal thrown off. 4. One cow burnt 5. Local dharmasala set on fire. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bahis burnt and taken away 2. Patwari's some records burnt.
8	Basai Khatris Lakhli Pir Abdul Rehman Thana Garh Maharaja.						Hira Ram Chug is said to have been murdered and looted at 115 Karna distance from Basti. Carcase not found.			
9	Kot Bahadur Tehsil Shorkot, Thana Garh Maharaja.	91	223	From the 20th February 1915, 9 p. m. to the same night before sunrise.		20	<p>Persons who received injuries :-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ghumman Ram (injured in the head). 2. Duni Chand. 3. Girdhari Brahman. 4. Dayal (injured in the forehead). 	Twenty thousand 20,000.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coverings and clothings of the Granth Sahib taken away by the dacoits from the local Dharmasala of Bhai Wasti Ram. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bahi's burnt. 2. Patwari's papers burnt and destroyed. (Lal Kitab and Khassa Girdawri.

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab their tour in September 1915.

10		11		12	13	14	15	16		
Number of families who have left home on account of danger.		Number of accused.		Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	Number of persons examined by the Deputation	Area of land harvested.		
		sent up for trial	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
No.	No.	No.		Khan Mohamed Zaildar.	None	The dacoits attempted to loot but Hindus resisted and repulsed the raiders, because of opportune arrival and help of Zaildar and of two constables with guns.				
1	140	8	None	Hindus resisted the dacoit's first attack but were overwhelmed by superior numbers of the dacoits, and were severely injured.	None	1. Mad R jwana 2. Jhok. 3. Basti Galkala. 4. Sialkot. 5. Mahmud Kote. 7. Godara. 8. K'aranwala. 9. Daulus a. 10. Jaivand.	33	980	247	841
4	9	4	None	Note. Hindus bravely defended themselves and resisted the first attack; but were overwhelmed by superior number of dacoits and received injuries.	None	1. Madd. 2. Jhok Galkala. 3. Duri Gundal. 4. Kot Bahatur. 5. Dagri. 6. Mir Mohammad Jhandhir.	17	147	70	149

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each Sabha Deputation during their

1	2	3		4	5		6	7	8	9
Serial number.	Name of village	Population		Duration of dacoities.	Number of houses and shops		Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
10	Basti Sadiq Mohd. Jhandir Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaja.	15	100	The 24th February night.	3	None.	None.	Eight thousand 8,000.	None	Account books taken away.
11	Sewa Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaja.	60	103	The 24th February whole night.	5	None.	1. Isha Das Pasrija ...	Sixteen thousand 16,000.	None.	
12	Neso Kara Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaja.	492	106	From the 27th February night to the 28th February morning.	100	13	1. Rikbia Ram received injuries on left shoulder. 2. Basakhi Kam received injuries 3. Jhangi Ram received grievous hurt.	One lac Rs. 100,000.	1. One Granth Sahib burnt and two Granth Sahib thrown out 2. Bhagvad Gita and other Hindu religious books burnt. 3. One cow burnt.	1. Chetan Dass Patwaris papers burnt.
13	Basti Naurang, Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaja.	44	204	From the 27th February 10 a. m. to the evening of the same day.	15	None.	1. Aya Ram severely injured in the defence.	Four thousand Rs. 4,000.	Coverings and Clothings of Granth Sahib taken away and thrown into the street.	1. Bahia burnt. 2. Receipts extorted from Kbem Chand and Daya Ram.

A—continued

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
1	44	None	None ... Hindus resisted the dacoits, attack but were overwhelmed by superior number of dacoits.	None	1. Basti Sadiq Mohd. Jhandir. 2. Kacha Kambira. 3. Chak Naurang Shah. 4. Kund Sargana. 5. Mirali.	1			
1		Muhammadan Chowkidar of the village convicted.	None ... Hindus resisted but were overwhelmed by superior number and received injuries.	None	1. Sewa. 2. Garh Maharaja. 3. Burji Wala.	5	96	26	68
		35	None ... Hindu resisted, but were overwhelmed by superior number dacoits and of received injuries.	None	1. Neko Kara. 2. Adjoining villages.	86	869	294	311
None—Immediate report to the Thana and telegram to Deputy Commissioner immediately after the dacoity was over. Personal representation to D. I. G. at Shorkot.									
None	142	5	None ... Hindus resisted, but were overwhelmed by superior number of dacoits and received injuries.	None	1. Islam wala. 2. Basti Naurang. 3. Binda Gondal. 4. Dini S'al. 5. Five Brahman bad mashes of Islampur.	8	303	196	236
Note pursued entered as regards all but 21 of whom 10 are absconding									

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabha Deputation during

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of dacoities.	5 Number of houses and shops.		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether an religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
14	Basti Bahmani Lakhi, Islampur Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaja.	139	606	The 27th February 1915, from morning till the whole night.	23	2	1. Two Hindus Karm Chand and Motri suffered grievous hurt. 2. 38 Hindus suffered simple hurts. 3. One dacoit was killed on the spot by the Hindus in the fight. 4. Bhai Ram Rakia injured.	Thirty five thousand Re. 35,000.	1. Granth Sahib thrown out, its covering taken away, from the Dharmsala of Panjn Ram.	Bahis destroyed.
15	Islampur Farez Tahsil Shorkot Thana Garh Maharaj	205	738	The 27th February 1915, from 9 A.M.	25	One	1. Dayal Khatri injured 2. Pharyya 3 Mahant Ram's arm broken. 4. Dial Ram's mother got her arm dislocated. 5. Jawa's Das was threatened to death and given injuries on the head and left thumb 6. Ramditta Mal received injuries. 7. Several ladies threatened to death for extorting information of wealth and given personal injuries. 8. Ganga Ram Khalu injured.	Sixteen thousand. Re. 16,000	Hindu religious books burnt.	Bahis burnt and two iron safes broken.
16	Dagri, Tahsil Shorkot, Thana, Garh Maharaja.	86	589	The 27th February night to the 28th February night.	20	5	1. Bhai Sain Dass Mahant of Dharamsala injured. 2. Charan Das.	Thirty five thousand including the Bahi accounts.	1. Two Granth Sahib burnt. 2. One Granth Sahib thrown into the field. 3. Hindu temple of Ladhia Ram burnt & idols broken. 4. Hindu religious books burnt.	1. Bahi's burnt. 2. Iron safe broken.

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab the Toors in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
5	37 23		5. None ... Hindus bravely fought with the dacoits. Several of whom were wounded and one dacoit Abu ad Hasla was killed on the spot one constable arrived in time to help the Hindus in the fight and was injured.	None	1. Kot mapal. 2. Bulla. 3. Islam wala. 4. Necokara. 5. Kotmurana.	9	689	354	619
10	203 39		6. None ... Hindus resisted the dacoits attack and wounded Bbawls dacoit and some Hindus were also wounded in the fight.	None	1. Haveli Mohangir. 2. Kot Rustum. 3. Islampur Nasheb. 4. Basti. 5. Islampur Fraz. 6. Kot murad. 7. Binda Gondal. 8. Reti Sial. 9. Islamwala.	16	Included No. 14.		
8	150 70		9. 1. Hussain S h a h Sayad. 2. Mahram Bloch. 3. Jalal Bloch.	None.	1. Dagri. 2. Fatehpur. 3. Islampur. 4. Sahibke. 5. Bulla. 6. Mir Mohd. Walla. 7. Madd. 8. Kot Babadur.	13	608	311	760

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabha Deputation during

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of dacoities.	5 Number of houses and shops.		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
17	Hassu Balel, Tahsil shorkot, Thana Garh Maharja.	635	131	27th February 19.5 afternoon to the 1st March 1915.	140	2	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tikaya Ram suspended in a well with his head downward to extort information of concealed wealth. 2. Wali Ram beaten severely and threatened to death. 3. Ramkrishan Brahmchari died of injuries. 4. Jinda Ram vij died of injuries one week after. 5. Dasaundha died of injuries within one week. 6. Bawa Ram Prasad, died of injuries. 7. Two women's ornaments forcibly snatched away from their persons. One of them was the mother of Tikaya Ram mentioned above. 8. Gurdita Ram's son beaten with sticks. 9. Ram Chand s/o Uttam Chand received injury on left arm. 10. Lala Maya Dass Teacher injured. 11. Nera Ram S/o Kala Ram severely injured. 12. Bhai Gopal Singh received injuries. 13. Jinda Ram S/o Sawaya Ram received injuries 	Rs. 2,50,000.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One Granth Sahib of Bha Gopal Singh torn to pieces. 2. Images of Hindu gods in temple of Shirdas broken. 3. Hindu religious books in temples of Karan Chand and Chandra Das burnt. 4. Some papers of patwari Mayadas burnt or taken away. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bahis burnt. 2. Iron safes broken and taken away. 3. L. Maya Das Bach Post-Master's cash box broken.

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab the toors in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation	16 Area of land harvested.		
	sent up for trial	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
50	346	9	None	None.	1. Tibba Gahli. 2. Hasu Balel. 3. Fatehpur Piratti. 4. B. du Sultan. 5. Kot Mapal. 6. Basti Naureng. 7. Pahar Juta. 8. Kot Rustam. 9. Qim Bharwana. 10. Nihang. 11. Budhuana. 12. Islampur Faraz. 13. Islampur Nasheb.	79	1002	419	934

1 All Hindu Houses looted except those of Tara Chand (Mukhtar in Am) Gurditta Ram and Mool Chand Hindu Servants of Nazar Hussain Zaildar who is the biggest Zimindar in the Ilaga.

2 Tara Chand Mukhtar-i-Am of Nazar Hussain stood surety to the dacoits in Rs. 1,000 for Wali Ram who was being tortured by dacoits for giving trace of his concealed wealth; and has realised Rs. 1,000 from Wali Ram in August 1915.

3 Tara Chand Mukhtar of Nazar Hussain was selected by Police as the sole complainant to conduct the case before the Special Tribunal.

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of Dacoities in Hindu Sabba Deputation during

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of Dacoities.	5 Number of Houses and shops.		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
18	Rodu-sitar, Thana Athara-Hezari Tahsil Shorkot.	335	1117	27th February 1915 evening to 1st March 1915.	40	1	<p><i>Persons uninjured.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ganpat Ram got arm bone broken. 2. Jinda Ram lost one eye. 3. Lal Chand received injuries. 4. Mohd. Yar Ghuman got injuries on the back. 	Rs. 50,000.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Granth Sahibs burnt. About 200 Hindu religious books burnt. 	Bahis burnt.
19 } 20 }	Laasharian, Thana Athara-Hezari, Tahsil Shorkot.	318	114	The 28th February 1915 to the 3rd March 1915	33	One.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tulsei Ram died next day of injuries received from dacoits. <i>Persons uninjured.</i> 2. Havi Chand Jhamb. 3. Jawaya Ram Jhamb. 4. Gurditta Jhamb. 5. Nihal Chand committed suicide by drowning himself in the well. 	Rs. 100,000.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Granth Sahib of local Dharma sala burnt. 	Bahis burnt.
21	Dargahish Thana Garh Maharaja Tahsil Shorkot.	195	791	27th February 1915 to 1st March 1915.	30	1	None ...	Rs. 65,000.	Coverings of Granth Sahib taken away.	Bahis and bonds burnt.
22	Basu Bakshi Dakuli Dhan Miani Thana Garh Maharaja.	139	606	1st March 1915, from morning day and night.	24	None.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Daulat Ram got left arm bone broken and injuries in the head 	Rs. 6,000	None ...	Bonds and Bahis taken away.

A—continued

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Seated up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
None ...	308	4	None ... The Hindus resisted the attack and repulsed 1st three attacks of the dacoits. In the fourth attack the number of dacoits having swelled to over 1,000 the Hindus were overwhelmed.	None.	1. Tibba Gohli. 2. Budhuana. 3. Rodu Sultan. 4. Isampur. 5. Kot Rustan. 6. Basti Naurang. 7. Taror. 8. Pahar Juta. 9. Lasharian.	30	1166	518	1061
5	182	10	None ... Hindus bravely resisted but were overtaken by overwhelming number.	None	1. Basti Sultan. 2. Dargabishah. 3. Lasharian. 4. Taror. 5. Pahar Juta. 6. Tibba Gahli. 7. Rodu Sultan. 8. Basti Naurang. 9. Kot Rustan. 10. Budhuana.	30	1129	542	1144
None ...	45		None ...	None.	1. Lasharian. 2. Dargabishah. 3. Rodu Sultan. 4. Basti Sultan. 5. Rashdpur. 6. Jabboana.	16	849	446	899
None ...	4	2	None ...	None.	1. Dargabishah. 2. Lasharian.	9	844	395	810

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabha Deputation during

1	2	3		4	5		6	7	8	9
		Hindus	Mohammedans		Looted.	Burnt.				
Serial number.	Name of village.	Population		Duration of dacoities.	Number of houses and sheeps.		Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
23	Wasawa, Tuana Athara Hazari, Tahsil Jhang.	120	334	28th February 1915, midnight to 1st March 1915, morning.	20	9	1. Dharma. 2. Chela. 3. Ganun. 4. Pars Ram. 5. Mansa Ram. 6. Mathra Brahman. 7. Women Motested.	Rs. 32,000	None ...	Bahis burnt.
24	Reshidpore, Thana Athara Hazari, Tahsil Jhang.	662	151	28th February 1915, whole night	52	None.	1. Dharma Ram forcibly taken away by dacoits to the river side to extort receipts of debts by threats of drowning. 2. Ghanisham and his son treated similarly.	Rs. 64,000	None ...	1. Bahis burnt. 2. Receipts extorted.
25	Kot Bahadur, Thana Athara Hazari, Tahsil Jhang.	102	188	1st March 1915, 10 A. M. to 2nd March 1915, day and night.	16	None.	1. Duna Brahman. 2. Anayat Arain, received injuries.	Rs. 20,000.	None ...	Bahis burnt.
26	Sidua, Tehsil Jhang, Thana Athara Hazari.	240	21	2nd March 1915, from morning to evening.	52	None	None ...	Rs. 20,000.	None ...	Some Bahis taken and burnt away.

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab the toors in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
20	89	1	Ahmad Bloch. Hindus defended themselves, wounded some dacoits but were eventually overcome by superior number of dacoits.	None.	1. Wasawa. 2. Dargahisbah. 3. Rashidpore. 4. U'ch.	8	501	256	585
None	64	7	Sawaya-Ram Zaildar saved some families by giving protection at his well by means of his gun.	One	1. Rashidpore. 2. Chakn. 3. Kot Bahadur of Athara Hazari.	19	1604	654	1670
12	25	17	1. Duna Brahman. 2. Ansyat Arain.	None	1. Rashidpore. 2. Kot Bahadur.	7	199	82	227
7	22	11	None	None	1. Sidha. 2. Kashkri. 3. Basti Omrana.	9	146	97	135

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each Sabha Deputation during their

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of dacoities.	5 Number of houses and shops		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether any religious buildings, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
27	Berwala, Dakhli Kotla Ahmed, Thane Athara Hazari Bahail Jhang.	296	295	1st March 1915, from sunset to midnight.	42	4	<i>Persons unjured</i> 1. Kanhya's mother. 2. Thakar. 3. Dhanna.	Rs. 60,000.	Hindu religious books burnt.	Bahis burnt.
28	Chautra, Athara Hazari Jhang.	100	76	2nd March 1915, Afternoon to evening.	45	None.	None ...	Rs. 20,000.	None ...	Some bahis burnt or taken away.
29	Alman, Loharan Athara Hazari Jhang.	64	326	2nd March 1915 who night.	50	None.	None ...	Two thousand and five hundred, Rs. 2,500.	None ...	1. Bahis burnt. 2. Receipt of debt extorted.
30	Dahal, Athara Hazari Jhang.	20	100	1st March 1915 to 2nd March 1915	4	None.	None ...	Rs. 3,500.	None ...	Bahis destroyed.
31	Kot Mal Dev, Athara Hazari, Jhang.	500	433	2nd March 1915, to 3rd March 1915.	None	None.	Some men were wounded. 1. Bishen Dass lamber- dar. 2. Ram Rakha. 3. Hushnak Rai and others.	Rs. 2,600 on wells.	None ...	None ...

A—continued.

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Seated up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
14	45	None Case withdrawn.	None ...	None	1. Dlabbi. 2. Bindu Khurd. 3. Omrana. 4. Kct Naul. 5. Kotla Ahmed.	3	395	134	894
11	22	11	None ...	None	1. Sidha. 2. Lashkri. 3. Basti Omrana.	7	115	48	120
...	45	12	None ...	None	1. Kharal. 2. Lurka. 3. Sarvana. 4. Kotla Baker Shah. 5. Munda Fyed. 6. Sarkana. 7. Bahadi.	5	204 91	98 34	220 100
19	13	9	None ...	None.	1. Dabal. 2. Fateh Shah. 3. Wasu Wastana.	3
None ...	51	9	B'shan Das Lambar-dar. Hindus fought bravely with dacoits one of whom named Zahid son of Nihal Baloch of Sheroana was killed at the spot and 3 dacoits. Severely wounded were carried away, of whom Kamala sor of Inayat Baloch of sheroana died within 3 days.	None.	1. Binda Pilkana. 2. Bahadi. 3. Basti Balochan. 4. Garhi Fateh Ullah. 5. Sheroana. 6. Dosa. 7. Turak.	3	415	182	443

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in Hindu Sabha Deputation during

1	2	3		4	5		6	7	8	9
		Hindus	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
32	Kotla Ahmasd Athara Hazari Jhang.	296	295	1st March 1915, the whole night.	13	3	1. Mt. Ishar Bai had her ears cut off. 2. Kanhya. 3. Mohan. 4. Thakar. 5. Dhanna.	Rs. 2,700.	Hindu religious books burnt.	Bahis burnt.
33	Loha Bhir, Athara Hazari Jhang.	402	433	2nd March 1915, whole night.	10	3	1. 4 males injured. 2. Many females had their ears and noses torn. 3. Mat. Bharavanwali wife of Bhaswan Dasa grossly insulted and had her ears torn.	Rs. 21,000.	None	1. Bahis burnt 2. Iron safe broken.
34	Kundal Sheruana Athara Hazari Jhang.	2	500	2nd March 1915 whole night.	1	None	None	Rs. 1,000.	None	Bonds and bahis taken away forcibly.
35	Turak Athara Hazari, Jhang.	25	100	2nd March 15 night.	2	None	None	Rs. 1,800 including debts.	None	None
36	Garhi Poteh Ulla Athara Hazari Jhang.	5	150	1st March 15.	1	None	None	Rs. 500.	None	None.

A—continued.

each of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab the toors in September 1915.

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which decoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
15	17	3	None	None.	1. Kotla Ahmad. 2. Kot Naulan. 3. Basti Omrana. 4. Dosa.		Included in No. 27.		
None ...	45	8	None	None.	1. Loha Bhir. 2. Kurbianwal. 3. Jhok Burhani. 4. Machiwal. 5. Chohan. 6. Dhorwan in Thal District Mianwali.	6	228	64	231
All left.	27		None	None.	1. Sheruana. 2. Turka. 3. Garhi Fatehulla.
None	4		None	None.	1. Turak. 2. Garhi Fatehulla. 3. Sheruana. 4. Khutiana.	2
8	3	None	None	None.	1. Sheruana.

APPENDIX

Statement in tabular form about the important common features of dacoities in each Sabha Deputation during their

1 Serial number.	2 Name of village.	3 Population		4 Duration of dacoities.	5 Number of houses and shops		6 Number or names of persons who received injuries and names of those who died of injuries.	7 Approximate value of property looted or destroyed.	8 Whether any religious buildings, books, animals burnt or destroyed.	9 Whether any account books or title deeds destroyed or taken away.
		Hindus.	Mohammedans.		Looted.	Burnt.				
37	Bitsafi, Thana Messan, Tansil Jhang.	145	263	2nd March 15.		7	None		None	None.
38	Basti Sikandar, Dakhli Bakapur, Tahsil Kabirwala Dist. Multan Thana Sarai Sindh	40	40	25th February 1915, whole night.		33	1. Latha Ram. 2. Chankidar Isher Das's arm broken. 3. Ham Chand. 4. Manghu Ram. 5. Jaisa Ram 6. Ram Rakha. 7. Lathan Singh. 8. Sawan Ram. 9. Lal Chand 10. Tikaya Ram. 11. Salamat Rai.	Rs. 15,000.	None	Some old behis burnt and some taken away.
39	Kund Sargana Thana Sarai Sandpore, Tahsil Kabirwala Dist. Multan	27th February 1915, Night.			One.	Rs. 350.	None.	None.
40	Kund Sargana Thana Sarai Sandpore, Tahsil Kabirwala Dist. Multan	27th February 1915, Night.						
				2 Hindus of Almasadpur looted.						
							Bulaki Ham Khurana's house burnt.			

A—continued

of the villages raided in Jhang and Multan Districts which were inspected by the Punjab Hindu tour in September 1915:

10 Number of families who have left home on account of danger.	11 Number of accused.		12 Names of persons who gave shelter or rendered help to Hindu victims during dacoities.	13 Number of arms licences held by Hindus.	14 Villages to which dacoits are believed to belong.	15 Number of persons examined by the Deputation.	16 Area of land harvested.		
	Sent up for trial.	Convicted.					Rabbi 1914.	Kharif 1914.	Rabbi 1915.
4	None	None.	1. Bitafi. 2. Malla Kharara. 3. Basti of Walidad.	...	183	59	183
15	142	3	None. Hindus bravely defended themselves, repulsed two attacks of the dacoits but in the 3rd attack Moham- dans of the village joined with the dacoits and over- whelmed the Hindus.	None.	1. Pipal Mirali. 2. Basti Sikandar. 3. Fareedpur Sahib. 4. Langra. 5. Cooksonabad. 6. Faqir Sial.	20
None	14	13	None	...	None 1. Raipore. 2. Nandpore. 3. Pipal Mirali. 4. Mari Sakhi.

APPENDIX C.

List of the names of owners or occupiers of houses and shops burnt by dacoits in Ahmedpur Sial.

No.	Name of owner or tenant of the shop or house burnt.	No.	Name of owner or tenant of the shop or house burnt.
1	Shop of Hirá Ram Chug.	28	" " Ghan Sham Dass Chachra.
2	" " Pokhar Dass Kalra.	29	" " Tilok Chand Sachdev.
3	" " Bhagwan Dass Chug.	30	" " Bogha Ram mortgagor Dilbar Ram mortgagor.
4	" " Darghai & Asa Ram Chug.	31	Shop of Darbara Ram mortgagor, Jiwan Dass mortgagor.
5	" " Bhagat Ram Chand and L. Girdhari Lal (Elawadhi).	32	Shop of Salamat Ram Lulla.
6	" " Kam Kishan etc. Elawadhi.	33	" " Moti Ram Lulha.
7	" " Bela Ram Kalra.	34	" " Chanan Dass Gandh.
8	" " Paira Ram "	34 a	Dharamsala Bawa Jiwan Dass Faqir.
9	" " Moti Ram "	35	House of Howna Ram Lulla.
10	" " Rup Chand Gandh mortgagor, Sa'amat Ram mortgagor.	36	" " Ghan Sham Dass Rewri.
11	" " Howna Ram Lulla.	37	" " Noha Ram mortgagor Ghan Sham Rewri mortgagor.
12	" " Asa Ram Chug.	38	" " Bhoja Ram Soni.
13	" " Thakar Dass Lulla.	39	Shop of Kewal Ram Chhabra.
14	" " Moti Ram Lulha.	40	" " Ghan Sham Dhamija.
15	" " Karam Chand, and Maya Dass Chug.	41	" " Do.
16	" " Khota Ram Sachdev.	42	" " Do.
17	" " Utam Chand Elawadhi.	43	" " Do.
18	" " Darghai Ram Chug.	44	" " Bhagwan Dass goldsmith.
19	" " Maya Dass. "	45	" " Vij Khatri mortgagors, Tulia Ram mortgagor.
20	" " Karam Chand "	46	" " Munshi Sawaya Ram Narang.
21	House of Darghai Ram "	47	" " Noha Ram Narang.
22	Shop of Utam Chand mortgagor and Thakar Dass mortgagor.	48	" " Ram Lal Rikha Ram Sukhija.
23	Do. Do.	49	" " Ladha Ram goldsmith.
24	Shop of Kishna Ram goldsmith.	50	House of Mahesh Dass Duni Chand goldsmith.
25	" " Tilok Chand Sachdev	51	Do. Do.
26	" " Khota Ram mortgagor Lola Ram mortgagor.	52	" " Gurmukh Singh's widow, Mt. Sewi Bal-Kabra.
27	" " Jhangi Ram Sachdev	53	" " Jiwan Dass Batra.

No.	Name of owner or tenant of the shop or house burnt.	No.	Name of owner or tenant of the shop or house burnt.
53 a	House of Jiwan Das Batra.	80	Shop of Khota Ram & Sewa Ram mortgagors, Gurmukh Ram mortgagee.
53 b	" " Do.	81	" " Tola Ram Kubba.
54	" " Ram Jas Mohla.	82	" " Moti Ram Ahuja.
55	" " Hukam Chand Kubba	83	" " Mool Chand Khushia Ram Setia.
56	" " Do.	84	" " Duni Chand Kubba.
57	Shop of Noba Ram Chhabra.	85	" " Eawa Jiwan Dass Faqir Udasi.
58	" " Ghansham Das Makka mortgagor, Jiwan Dass mortgagee.	86	" " Do.
59	Shop of Ghan Sham Das mortgagor, Moti Ram mortgagee.	87	" " Do.
60	" " Bhanju Ram mortgagor, Jiwan Dass mortgagee.	88	" " Dilbar Ram Gandh.
61	" " Banju Ram Maya Das mortgagors, Jiwan Dass mortgagee.	89	" " Devi Ditta Ram with his brothers Kubba.
62	" " Tahla Ram Balkishan Chug.	90	" " Chowdhari Sadhoo Ram Chawla.
63	Thakurdwara of Charanjit Trikha.	91	" " Do. Do.
64	Shop of Kooop Chand Virmani.	92	Shop of Ditto Ram Nighawan
65	" " Do.	93	" " Danlat Ram Bhaloo Ram Virmani.
66	" " Lola Ram Gandh.	94	" " Piyara Ram Goldsmith
66a	" " Hukam Chand Girdhari Lal Trikha.	95	" " Pokhar Dass Makkar.
67	" " Gurditta Ram Taneja	96	" " Bhan Singh mortgagor, Khushia Ram mortgagee.
68	" " Lola Ram and Mool Chand.	97	" " Sadhoo Ram Chawla.
69	" " Ghan Sham Dass Chachra.	98	" " Do.
70	" " Ladha Ram Sahib Lal Chachra.	99	House of Khota Ram Kubba.
71	" " Chimna Ram, Teju Ram.	100	" " Mool Chand Klatri.
72	" " Jhangi Ram Kubba Mansa Ram Rewri.	101	" " Ganesh Dass Taneja.
73	" " Jhangi Ram Kubba.	102	" " Chaitoo Ram "
74	" " Hoti Ram Goldsmith.	103	" " Sewa Ram Kubba.
75	" " Ditto Ram Nighawan	104	" " Do.
76	" " Duni Chand Kubba.	105	" " Ghan Sham Kubba mortgagor, Jhangi Ram mortgagee.
77	" " Khan Chand Nighawan.	106	" " Mt. Kisban Bai widow of Ladha Ram Trikha
78	" " Duni Chand Kubba.	107	" " Dass Ram Chowdhari.
79	" " Jhangi Ram Kubba.	108	Thakardawara of Rama Nand and Jawala Dass.
		109	Shop of Godhoo Ram Narang.
		110	" " Do.
		111	" " Dharam Singh Chawla
		112	" " Do.
		113	" " Chowdhari Ghan Sham Gandh.
		114	" " Ganga Ram Gandh.
		115	House of Pharaya Ram "
		116	" " Do.
		117	" " Ja Rasmi.a Virmani.

APPENDIX D.

Statement of cash and grain lent by Hindu Shahukars to Mohammedan Zamindars at Ahmedpur, District Jhang, during the quarter preceding the dacoities.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance.	Date in Hindi Sambat.	English Date.	Document.
1	Sulah, caste Daraj.	Tilok Chand Chandna.	Rs. 4 cash.	29th Magh 1971.	10-2-1915	Bahi.
2	Mohabbta Dhudiana.	Do.	Wheat 20 mds. 28 seers.	20th Magh 1971.	1-2-15.	Do.
3	Do.	Do.	Rs. 5-12-0 each	29th Magh 1971.	10-2-15.	Do.
4	Mohammed Dhalana.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds. 28 seers.	20th Magh 1971.	1-2-15.	Do.
5	Mohammeda Machhi.	Do.	Wheat 3 mds. 15 seers.	7th Phagan 1971.	18-2-15.	Do.
6	Murada Machhi.	Do.	Wheat 3 mds. 15 seers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
7	Ahn ed M chi	Do.	Wheat 3 mds. 15 seers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
8	Mohamme a Mochi.	Do.	Wheat 3 md. 15 seers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
	Alloo Moch.	Do.	Wheat 2 md. 1 seer.	Do.	Do.	Do.
10	Dad Ali Khanana	Tilok Chand Chandna.	Wheat, 9 mds	9th Phagan 1971.	20-2-15.	Do.
11	Mehr Mapal Sial Hakim.	Do.	Rs. 100 cash	Do.	Do.	Do.
12	Mehpal Dhalana.	Do.	Rs. 43 cash.	Do.	Do.	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi St.	English Date.	Document.
13	Sahib Din Jhakar.	Tilok Chand Chandna.	Wheat 7 mds 30 seers.	5th Chet 1971.	18-3-15.	Do.
14	Mst. Bakhan Gilni.	Jhangi Ram Ahuja.	Wheat Rs. 3-1-0	7th Phagan 1971.	18-2-15.	Do.
15	Pehlu s/o Ditta Machhi.	Do.	Wheat 6 mds 30 seers.	13th Magh 1971.	25-1-15.	Bond.
16	Sultana Machhi	Do.	Wheat 3 mds 28½ seers.	2nd Phagan 1971.	13-2-15.	Do.
17	Sultana Mirasi.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds 28 seers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
18	Ahmeda Gill	Do.	Wheat 4 mds 2 seers.	12th Phagan 1971.	27-11-14.	Do.
19	Ahmed s/o Mehr Sultan Sial.	Do.	Wheat 1 md.	Do.	Do.	Do.
20	Mehr Sultan Sial, Zildar, Ahmedpur.	Do.	Wheat and Bajra of Rs. 70	10th Magh 1971.	22-1-15.	Do.
21	Mohabbta Mirasi.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds 19 seers.	21st Magh 1971.	2-2-15.	Do.
22	Shamu. Hajam.	Jhangi Ram Ahuja.	Wheat 5 mds 7 seers	4th Magh 1971.	16-1-15.	Bond.
23	Mst. Behbai Dudhiani.	Bhawani Das Gand.	Rice and Gur of Rs. 8-8.	From 10th Poh to 9th Magh 1971.	24-12-14 to 21-1-15.	Bahi.
24	Hasna Mirasi	Do.	Rice and Gur of Rs. 4-8.	10th Poh 1971.	24-12-14.	Do.
25	Mst. Bhagan Mangan.	Do.	Rice of Rs. 2-8	26th Poh 1971.	9-1-15.	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi St.	English Date.	Document.
26	Murad Hajam	Bhawani Das Gand.	Rice and Gur of Rs. 7-8.	27th Poh 1971.	10-1-15.	Bahi
27	Bakhrha Toh.	Do.	Rice Rs. 2-2.	5th Magh 1971.	17-1-15.	Do.
28	Ahmda Toh.	Do.	Rice of Re. 1.	20th Magh 1971.	1-2-15.	Do.
29	Mohemmeda Gazar.	Do.	Rice of Ra. 2.	24th Magh 1971.	5-2-15.	Do.
30	Taj Din Qazi.	Do.	Rice of Ra. 5-10.	26th Magh 1971.	7-2-15.	Do.
31	Ramzan Dhobi.	Do.	Rice of Ra. 2-8.	28th Magh 1971.	9-2-15.	Do.
32	Pehlu Vabga.	Do.	Wheat 4 mds. 11 seers.	26th Katak 1971.	11-11-14.	Do.
33	Mubarak Shah Syed.	Do.	Rice of 8-15-0	9th Maghar.	24-11-14.	Do.
34	Makhna Chara.	Do.	Wheat of Re. 1.	10th Maghar 1971.	25-11-14.	Do.
35	Mokiman Dhobi.	Do.	Rice and Gur of 25-8-0.	17th Maghar 1971.	2-12-14.	Do.
36	Sultana Ali Khanana.	Do.	Barley 2 mds. 10 seers.	20th Maghar 1971.	5-12-14.	Do.
37	Dad Ali Khanana.	Do.	Rice, etc., of 4-12-0.	14th Poh 1971.	28-12-14.	Do.
38	Wahab Chadhar.	Do.	Rice, etc., of 4-8-0.	16th Poh 1971.	30-12-14.	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi St.	English Date.	Document.
39	Sardar Shah.	Bhawani Das Gand.	Wheat 3 mds. 37½ seers	29th Poh 1971.	12-1-15.	Bahi.
40	Ditta Dhobi	Do.	Rice of 2-2-0	3rd Phagan 1971.	14-2-15.	Do.
41	Mahni Vagha	Bela Ram Kalra.	Wheat 2 mds. 37 seers.	9th Maghar 1971.	21-11-14.	Soochar.
42	Waryam Janjiana.	Do.	Wheat 1 mds. 16½ seers	12th Maghar 1971.	27-11-14.	Do.
43	Ahmeda Ali Khanana.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds. 19 seers.	17th Maghar 1971.	2-12-14.	Do.
44	Gulab Ram Pahwa for Mohemmed Mirali.	Do.	Wheat 20 mds. 10 seers.	20th Maghar 1971.	5-12-14.	Soochar.
45	Mehr Mehpal Sial	Do.	Wheat 18 mds.	21st Maghar 1871.	6-12-14.	Do.
46	Mehr Murad Sial.	Do.	Wheat 13 mds. 20 seers.	26th Maghar 1971.	11-12-14.	Do.
47	Mohammed (Carpenter)	Do.	Wheat 5 mds. 11½ seers.	8th Poh 1971.	22-12-14.	Do.
48	Jalla Wagha	Do.	Wheat 2 mds. 14½ seer.	9th Poh 1971	23-12-14	Do.
49	Mohammed Mirali.	Do.	Wheat 18 mds. 27 seers	12th Poh 1971.	26-12-14.	Do.
50	Nura Burana	Do.	Wheat 2 mds. 23½ seers.	16th Poh 1971.	30-12-14.	Do.
51	Bakheba Wahga	Do.	Wheat 31½ seers.	18th Poh 1971.	1-1-15.	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi Sr.	English Date.	Document.
52	Murad Shah Qureshi.	Bela Ram Kalra.	Wheat 17 mds. 24½ seers.	26th Poh 1971.	9-1-15.	Soohar.
53	Murad Sial	Do.	Wheat of Rs 5.	17th Magh 1971.	29-1-15.	Do.
54	Azam Dawana.	Do.	Wheat 3 mds. 15 seers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
55	Azam Dawana.	Do.	Wheat 31½ seers.	18th Magh 1971.	30-1-15	Do.
56	Sultan Shah Qureshi.	Do.	Wheat 26 mds. 26½ seers.	25th Magh 1971.	6-2-15.	Do.
57	Sultan Kamira	Do.	Wheat 28 mds. 5 seers.	Do.	Do.	Bond.
58	Sultan Dhalana.	Munsa Ram Niglani.	Wheat 1 mds. 5 seers.	19th Katak 1971.	4-11-14	Soohar.
59	Ditta Dhallana.	Do.	Wheat 3 mds. 37½ seers.	21st Asoj 1971.	6-10-14.	Do.
60	Gulam Mohd S/o Sultan Sial	Do.	Wheat 13 mds 20 seers.	18th Bhadon 1971.	2-9-14.	Do.
61	Nura Kumbhar	Do.	Wheat 27 seers.	24th Maghar 1971.	9-12-14.	Do.
62	Rustam Dhalana.	Do.	Wheat 11 mds. 19 seers.	25th Maghar 1971	10-12-14.	Do.
63	Sultan Dhalana	Do.	Wheat 16 mds. 8 seers.	4th Poh 1971	18- 2-14.	Do.
64	Do.	Do.	Wheat 27 seers.	10th Poh 1971.	24-12-14	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi St.	English Date.	Document.
65	Sultan Dhalana.	Mansa Ram Niglani.	Wheat 1 md. 14 seers.	18th Poh 17.	1-1-15.	Soohar.
66	Jindwade Shah Sayed.	Do.	Wheat 9 seers.	4th Magh 1971.	16-1-15.	Do.
67	Sultan Dhalana.	Do.	Wheat 4 mds 11 seers.	8th Magh 1971.	20-1-15.	Do.
68	Sameila Dhalana.	Do.	Wheat 27 seers.	7th Phagan 1971.	18-2-15.	Do.
69	Shahamda Mohana.	Do.	Wheat and mash 27 seers.	9th Phagan 1971.	20-2-15.	Do.
70	Inayta Dhaiara.	Do.	27 seers Wheat and mash.	Do.	Do.	Do.
71	Dad Kharka.	Ram Kishan s/o Khushia Ram Kubba	Wheat 3 mds 28½ seers.	2nd Katak 1971.	18-10-14.	Bahi.
72	Bakhu Kumbbar.	Do.	Wheat 1 md. 25½ seers.	6th Katak 1971.	22-10-14.	Do.
73	Sultan Kharka.	Do.	Wheat 7 mds 28½ seers.	7th Katak 1971.	23-10-14.	Do.
74	Dad Kharka	Do.	Wheat 4 mds. 20 seers.	29th Katak 1971.	14-11-14.	Do.
75	Pahalwan Ladhiana.	Do.	Wheat 9 mds.	9th Maghar 1971.	24-11-14.	Do.
76	Hasan Ali Kamrana.	Do.	Wheat 1 md. 7½ seers.	27th Maghar 1971.	12-12-14.	Do.
77	Murad Kharka.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds. 12½ seers.	29th Maghar 1971.	14-12-14.	Do.

Serial No.	Name of Debtor.	Name of Creditor.	Cash or kind loan advance	Date in Hindi St.	English Date.	Document.
78	Sultan Kharka.	Ram Kishan s/o Kushi Ram Kubba	Wheat 33 mds. 30 seers.	29th Maghar 1971.	14-12-14.	Bond.
79	Bhawala Dhalana.	Neba Ram Chachra.	Wheat 3 mds 15 seers.	1st Poh 1971	15-12-14.	Bahi.
80	Azam Dhalana.	Do.	Wheat 9 mds.	Do.	Do.	Do.

APPENDIX E.

Statement of grain sold by Muhammadan Zamindars and Kamins to Hindu Shop keepers from October 1914 to January 1915.

Serial No.	Name of seller.	Name of purchaser.	Kind of grain and weight.	Price.	Hjndi date of sale.	English date of sale.	Rate per Maund
1	Hessu Chadhar of M. Chadhar.	Teju Ram Gangwani.	Wheat 12 mds. 5 seers.	Rs. 42 12 0	28th Katak 1971.	13-11-14	Rs. 3-8-6
2	Waryaman Vahga of M. Vahga.	Do.	Wheat 12 mds. 33 seers.	Rs. 57 0 0	11th Poh 1971.	25-12-14	Rs. 4-8-0
3	Palbu Vahga of M. Vahga	Do.	Wheat 9 Mds	Rs. 40 0 0	12th Poh 1971.	26-12-14.	Rs. 4-7-0
4	Khan Vahga of M. Vahga	Do.	Wheat 9 mds	Rs. 44 3 0	4th Magh 1971.	16-1-15	Rs. 4-14-6
5	Mohammad caste Merah M. Ranjittkot.	Jessa Ram Charaya.	Wheat 13 mds. 20 seers.	Rs. 44 4 0	20th Bha-don 1971.	4-9-14.	Rs. 3-4-0
6	Ahmed Sial of Ranjittkot.	Do.	Wheat 36 mds.	Rs. 131 0 0	Do.	Do.	Rs. 3-10-6
7	Ramzana Mochi.	Do.	Wheat 9 mds	Rs. 40 0 0	29th Katak	14-11-14.	Rs. 4-7-0
8	Jinda Mochi.	Do.	Wheat 9 mds.	Rs. 35 0 0	Do.	Do.	Rs. 3-14-0
9	Khan Vahga.	Jessa Ram Charaya.	Wheat 9 mds	Rs. 48 4 0	25th Poh 1971.	8-1-15.	Rs. 5-5-9
10	Do.	Do.	Wheat 13½ mds.	Rs. 71 0 0	Do.	Do.	Rs. 5-4-0
11	Zulfikar Sial of Gar Mahraja.	Tula Ram Ahooja.	Wheat 454 mds.	Rs. 1788 0 0	17th Poh 1971.	31-12-14.	Rs. 3-15-0
12	Sujawla Kubhar.	Do.	Wheat 22 mds. 20 seers	Rs. 65 8 0	Poh 1971.	December 1914.	Rs. 3-0-6

Serial No.	Name of seller.	Name of purchaser.	Kind of grain and weight	Price.	Hindi date of sale.	English date of sale.	Rate per Maund.
13	Murada Mochi.	Tula Ram Ahuja.	Wheat 22 mds. 20 seers.	Rs. 70 0 0	Poh 1971.	December 1914.	Rs. 3-2-0
14	Khera of Rangpur.	Do.	Unhusked rice 170 mds	Rs. 473 8 0	Do.	Do.	Rs. 2-12-6
15	Azmat Lohar	Do.	Wheat 1 md 23 seers.	Rs. 7 0 0	25th Pch 1971.	8-1-15.	Rs. 4 7-0
16	Inayat Dar-khan.	Do.	Wheat 4 mds. 29 seers.	Rs. 21 3 0	Do.	Do.	Rs. 4-7-0
17	Sujawla Lohar.	Do.,	Wheat 6 mds 13 seers.	Rs. 28 0 0	27th Poh 1971.	10-1-15.	Rs. 4-8-0
18	Bahadra Hajam.	Do.	Wheat 20 mds. 28 seers.	Rs. 92 0 0	28th Poh 1971.	11-1-15.	Rs. 4-7-0
19	Sial Surbana	Jbangi Ram Ahoja.	Wheat 234 mds.	Rs. 710 0 0	Rs. 3-0-8
20	Bakhsha Malah.	Do.	Wheat 9 mds 18 seers.	Rs. 44 0 0	Rs. 4-10-0
21	Gehna Mochi	Do.	Wheat 11 mds. 19 seer.	Rs. 35 8 0	Rs. 3-2-0
22	Bakhsha Rohar.	Do.	Wheat 2 mds 28 seers.	Rs. 10 0 0	Rs. 3-10-0
23	Sultana Mochi.	Do.	Wheat 8 mds 4 seers.	Rs. 36 0 0	Rs. 4-7-0
24	Shera Mosalli.	Do.	Wheat 6 mds 30 seers.	Rs. 30 0 0	Rs. 4-7-0
25	Bahab Lalera	Do.	Wheat 15 mds.	Rs. 63 12 0	Rs. 4-4-0

Serial No.	Name of seller.	Name of purchaser.	Kind of grain and weight.	Price.	Hindi date of sale.	English date of sale.	Rate per Maund.
26	Jalla Gill.	Jhanji Ram Abocja.	Wheat 30 mds.	Rs. 180 0 0	Rs. 5-1-0
27	Charag Shah Syed.	Tilok Chand Chandna	Unhusked Rice (Dhan) 1604 mds. 15 seers.	Rs. 5,183	Rs. 3-3-9
28	Do.	Do.	Wheat 308 mds.	Rs. 1259	Rs. 4-1-6
29	Amit Dab.	Do.	Wheat 369 mds.	Rs. 1610	Rs. 4-7-9
30	Sada Sial of M. Jhadir	Do.	Wheat 198 mds.	Rs. 680 0 0	Rs. 3-7-0

VII.—APPENDIX F.

Copy of the Punjab Hindu Sabha representation, dated 18th May, 1915, addressed to Lt.-Col. E.C. Bayley Private Secretary to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in connection with the lawlessness in certain parts of the South-Western Districts of the Punjab.

Sir,

We are directed by the Punjab Hindu Sabha to address to you this communication in connection with the lawlessness of which the Hindu subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor have been the victims, in certain parts of the Punjab, with the request that you would be kind enough to lay this before His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for such action as he may deem proper.

The Sabha is very grateful to His Honour for having received a deputation consisting of prominent members of the Sabha in March last. The deputation laid before His Honour the heart-rending sufferings of the Hindus who had been plundered and maltreated, whose houses and shops had been burnt, who had suffered bodily injuries themselves, and whose women had been grossly insulted. His Honour was kind enough to listen to the tale of woes of the unfortunate victims with great sympathy and the steps, which he was pleased to take, soon restored confidence in the localities which were the scenes of unprecedented lawlessness.

Subsequent events have compelled the Sabha to again approach His Honour with this humble representation.

The Sabha for explaining the present serious situation begs leave to give a few extracts from the statement of Mr. Coatman, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Muzaffargarh District, made before the Special Tribunal at Multan for His Honour's special consideration, because they throw a flood of light on the magnitude and true character of the crimes that were recently committed in Multan Division on the helpless Hindu subjects of His Most Gracious Majesty the King Emperor.

Mr. Coatman says "The seed of disturbance was sown when Turkey threw in her lot with the foes of the British Empire." "A deep feeling of uneasiness took possession of the minds of the rank and file of the Mohammadan community." "These bands (of the Muzaffargarh people) went about plundering." "From all this it can be seen how critical was the state of things in Muzaffargarh and South Western Punjab in general at the beginning of the year." "The astonishing outbreak of lawlessness we have just witnessed." "The authority of Government was paralysed into the parts of the District affected." "I do not regard the dacoities as being due entirely or even mainly to economic stress and any presumed intransigent attitude adopted by local (Hindu) shopkeepers and money-lenders." "Until the starting of the rumour of the evacuation of India by the British such dacoities as happened were grain robberies pure and simple." "The above-mentioned grain dacoities were 4 in number and were well-spread over the whole district namely two in the Alipur Tahsil in the south, one in the Muzaffargarh Tahsil in the middle, and one in the Leiah Tahsil in the north." "On the 24th February 1915 began the dacoities proper with

disturbances in the Rangpur tract which ended on 28th February 1915. In the short space of time, ten dacoities were committed within the limit of the Police Station of Rangpur. Men of the Jhang District took part in most of them." "Undoubtedly these dacoities were due to the instigation and assistance of men from Jhang who had taken part in the Ahmedpur disturbances. Coincident with the above are the dacoities of the Leiah Tahsil, seven in number." "With the end of the Rangpur and Leiah cases there was a lull for about a week." Before the beginning of the disturbance in the Alipur Tahsil this was by far the worst outbreak in the whole district, about 30 cases occurring within the space of eight or nine days. It is in these cases that we find the dacoits describing themselves as subjects of the German Emperor and declaring that British Rule had ceased to exist in India." "On the night of March 13th, bands of dacoits assembled to loot Jatoi but when we left the town to encounter them, they retreated too rapidly for us and we lost them in the dark. They had spies and accomplices in Jatoi who kept them fully informed of my movements." "The first of the dacoities in Jhuggiwala occurred at about midnight of 11-12th March. About 200 men took part in this affair proclaiming themselves subjects of the German Emperor, who, they said, had given them permission to loot as they pleased." "A number of houses were looted and some were partly fired. In this first dacoity it seems likely that a certain amount of rape was committed." "The second dacoity (in Jhuggiwala) took place on the next night 12-13th March. The Hindus had made no report of this by the morning of the 13th when I went out to Jhuggiwala to enquire into the circumstances of the first dacoity, and it was not until I reached the village that I heard what had happened. *The Hindu portion of Jhuggiwala, after having been thoroughly looted was for the most part reduced to ashes. Wholesale rape had been committed on the Hindu women and many men had been roughly handled, one to such an extent that he died a few days later. The Hindus were still in a state of utter panic when I reached Jhuggiwala and at that time they told me freely of the terrible excesses that had been practised on their women. Later when they recovered their balance they declined for obvious reasons to speak of this side of the affair, with the result that there is no mention of it on the file of the case.*" "The most moderate estimate of the number of men who took part in dacoity must place them as 500." "There was a certain amount of organization in the affair." The amount of stolen property as given by the Hindus is between 70 and 80 thousand rupees. Probably the real amount of the stolen property is represented by one half of the stated amount." "Muzaffargarh is conterminous in the north with Jhang where the dacoities started."

The above statement leaves no doubt that the bands of offenders were only near neighbours of the victims who committed dacoity in open day-light in large numbers consisting sometimes of thousands. Under the circumstances the Sabha begs to submit that it would have been very easy to bring the charge home to the real culprits and inflict exemplary punishments on them but His Honour might have noticed that the results of trials that have already been gone through have not been what they were expected to be. In Baqarpur Case 139 accused were discharged or acquitted and only 3 (one Dhobi, one sweeper and one Mussalli) were convicted. *Nolle Prosequere* was entered by the prose-

ention in respect of all the accused in the Sheepy Dacoity case. In the case of Isawala Dacoity prosecution was withdrawn in respect of 52 accused and of the rest 30 were discharged, 10 only being charged and the conviction resulted in case of one accused only. The combined effect of wholesale discharges and acquittals in the above cases has been very disastrous and has rather intensified than removed the anxiety and alarm prevailing in the minds of the Hindus. Causes are again accumulating which are unsettling the minds of the Hindu subjects of His Most Gracious Majesty the King Emperor. The condition of the Hindus of Multan Division is rendered very insecure. They are actually being harassed and threatened by the men at whose hands they have already suffered and are in imminent danger of again being subjected to severe handling by the lawless element of those Districts. They consider that their religion, honour, lives and property are in greater danger now after the decision of the above cases than heretofore. Their sufferings have already been very terrible and it would be awful if lawlessness again breaks out in their midst.

The Sabha at this juncture cannot help submitting and bringing to the notice of His Honour that such failure of justice could not occur in these offences of the most serious nature in which admittedly hundreds and thousands of offenders had taken part openly if proper inquiries were made by independent persons. As to the nature of the Police inquiries and care shown in the conduct of the same, the Sabha again begs to invite His Honour's attention to another and still more significant part of the statement of Mr. Coatman in which he states that the dying statement of Lakh Ram recorded by the Naib Tahsildar, Alipur, is missing. "It was lost, I believe in the Deputy Commissioner's office. I learnt that the confessions of accused Nos. 138 and 139 were recorded by Deputy Commissioner, (they are also said to be missing)." "The investigation of the second Jhuggiwala Dacoity could not be started until 5 days later, because the Police were all engaged in patrolling the countryside."

It is for His Honour to judge whether the making away of a dying declaration of a victim of the dacoity and confessions of two accused from official records is or is not a part of an organized attempt to destroy evidence in dacoities in which according to Mr. Coatman, "There was a certain amount of organization." It appears that cases have been placed before the Tribunal without maturing them and procuring the best and convincing evidence. All the material available has not been brought on the file which may partly be due to the inadequacy of numbers or the incompetency of the officers or to the apathy or susceptibility of the lower ranks to racial feelings or external influence, which the Sabha leaves to His Honour to judge and enquire.

If investigation were put in more efficient and independent hands a number of approvers would be forthcoming but the fact that there is none in all these cases is very significant. A very critical situation has now been created because if the remaining prosecutions be rushed through in their present condition and result in a fiasco, as the others have done, then the fate of the Hindus in those parts is sealed for ever. It will be too hot for them to live in their houses. To drop the prosecutions will be

a better remedy to heal their wounds than to carry through such hopeless prosecutions. The Hindus fear that they are making more relentless enemies of them against whom they are making statements that are proving fruitless. To avoid these disastrous results the Sabha humbly suggests the following course to be adopted if it may appear possible to His Honour :—

1. That the cases as prepared be referred to the Government Advocate or Legal Remembrancer and if he is of opinion that convictions are likely to result on the materials already on the files then the cases may be placed for trial before the Tribunal; otherwise impartial and independent Police officers may be posted to procure more effective evidence and bring additional material on the files. The Sabha is assured there is no lack of reliable evidence to be found for proving these cases.

2. That having regard to the importance of the cases and magnitude of the work involved the conduct of prosecution in Court be further strengthened by the appointment of a Senior European Counsel.

3. That in view of the fact that unfortunate victims of dacoities who have already suffered terribly are likely to suffer more by being absent from their homes and by leaving their families unprotected when conducting their cases at Multan before the Special Tribunal and also because prosecution is seriously hampered owing to the trial being held far distant from the place of occurrence, the Tribunal may be asked to meet at the District headquarters for trying the cases of those districts and to see the villages affected if inspection be considered helpful in arriving at the truth, or if it be inconvenient to the Tribunal to do so, the cases may be made over to the ordinary Courts of the District concerned rather than they may be allowed to suffer for want of sufficient light.

The Sabha also begs to submit that in certain quarters efforts have been made to put a fanciful and entirely erroneous construction upon the nature and causes of the disturbances and the Sabha is afraid that the wrong view might influence the investigation and conduct of the trials in a serious way to the great prejudice of the prosecution. It has been alleged that the disturbances were grain riots caused by the refusal of the Hindus to accommodate the Muhammadans in the days of famine. The Sabha respectfully begs to urge that such organized dacoities conducted in the names of the German Emperor and the Sultan of Turkey and in utter disregard of law and order cannot be styled grain riots. The armies of dacoits that attacked villages after villages with the beat of drum and display of banners and pillaged and burnt houses and shops and kidnapped and raped helpless women were obviously acting under a strong organization in absolute defiance of the Government as if the Government had ceased to exist or their object was manifestly something more than the mere satisfaction of a grudge against the recalcitrant Banias. The Sabha fears that a wrong view and misapprehension of the real causes of the trouble is likely to mislead and handicap the authorities in applying the proper remedies to the case and is not calculated to preclude the possibility of a recrudescence of further lawlessness.

In the end the Sabha begs to submit that the Hindus who were victims of unparalleled lawlessness in the Multan Division are in a great

fear of being maltreated and looted again and their women being insulted. This feeling is not confined to this Division only but is spreading among the Hindus of the other Districts in the Punjab. The Sabha therefore prays that village defence parties be organized to assist and to work under the Police in maintaining peace and order in the areas which were affected or are threatened ; and that a certain number of respectable persons in every defence party may be allowed to possess fire arms and if necessary, to strengthen themselves by engaging paid men or volunteers from outside.

We have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servants,

(Sd.) RAM SARAN DAS.

(Sd.) MOHAN LAL.

(Sd.) SOHAN LAL.

(Sd.) HIRA LAL.

(Sd.) KRISHNA KISHORE.

(Sd.) GOPAL CHAND.

(Sd.) LAL CHAND KHOSLA.

Office-bearers.

(In behalf of the Sabha).

VIII.—APPENDIX G.

Copy of the Punjab Government Communique published in the Tribune dated 11th June 1915.

The following Press Communique has been issued by the Punjab Government:—

In connection with the memorial recently presented to the Punjab Government by the Punjab Hindu Sabha on the subject of the recent outbreak of lawlessness in the south-west Punjab, the Lieutenant Governor received a deputation of leading Hindu gentlemen at Simla on the 8th instant. The deputation represented that the large proportion of discharges and acquittals of accused in the dacoity cases committed in the Multan, Muzaffargarh and Jhang Districts had produced a feeling of insecurity among the Hindu Community. They asked that measures should be taken to ensure adequate protection to the peaceful inhabitants of the tracts affected by the recent disturbances and they put forward certain suggestions to secure this end. The deputation were informed in reply that Government were not at present in a position to discuss the reasons for the large number of acquittals and discharges as copies of the decisions in the majority of cases had not yet reached it, but, considering the great difficulties presented by most of the cases, the number of offenders brought to justice, though small as compared with the number engaged in the dacoities, was substantial. The results of the dacoity trials in the various courts up to the 5th June are as follows:—

Of 4,044 persons sent up for trial 420 have been convicted, 2,403 discharged or acquitted and 1,221 still remain under trial. The bulk of those convicted have been sentenced to substantial terms of imprisonment, averaging about five years. As regards executive action, Government fully realised the necessity of re-establishing order and preventing terrorism or further lawlessness. It had therefore already taken steps to ensure the preservation of peace and order in the Districts concerned. The Police in all three districts have been very materially strengthened. The Local officers have been instructed to issue freely arms—licenses for protective purposes to respectable persons and also to take security from all would-be disturbers of the public peace. Action under the Defence of India Act has already been taken for the removal of two rural notables of the Muzaffargarh District who are believed to have instigated lawlessness in their local areas, and further action on similar lines will be taken against village officers and other individuals whose complicity in the disturbance is suspected on reasonable grounds. At the same time enquiry is being made by the local officers into the conduct of certain officials who are said to have failed in the discharge of their duty during the disturbance. Liberal rewards have also been offered for the arrest of the more prominent among the absconders. Further proposals are under consideration for quartering a substantial body of punitive police under a Gazetted Officer in the recently disturbed areas and the cost of this measure will be borne by the offending inhabitants. The district staffs have been strengthened temporarily in two districts of Jhang and Muzaffargarh and with the large force of police which will shortly become available, the prospect of any recrudescence of lawlessness should be remote.

IX.—Appendix B.

Copy of letter No. 635 & Home from A.B. Kettlewell, Esquire, I.C.S., Additional Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the President, Punjab Hindu Sabha, Lahore, in reply to the Sabha's representations to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, Home Police, dated Simla the 12th of June 1915.

Sir,
In continuation of my letter No. 216-S, dated the 27th May 1915, acknowledging the receipt of the representation made by your Sabha on the subject of the recent disturbances in the South-West Punjab, I am directed to say that the Lieutenant-Governor has recently had the advantage of discussing the representations made with a deputation of leading Hindu gentlemen who waited on him on behalf of the Sabha.

2. The result of the discussion which took place has already been issued in the form of a communique, and has appeared in the Press of the Province. The Sabha will no doubt have observed that the Punjab Government has already taken and will continue to take executive action for the restoration and maintenance of peace and good order in the tracts affected by the recent disturbances and that many of their suggestions in this behalf have either been anticipated or will now be given effect to.

3. His Honour much appreciates the temperate and reasonable spirit in which the Sabha and its representatives at the discussion have approached this very difficult question and he trusts it has been made clear to them that, while the suddenness of the outbreak and its rapid spread took the local authorities by surprise and have facilitated the escape of many of the criminals from judicial punishment, Government is doing all that is possible to supplement the action of the Courts by executive measures to make those responsible for the dacoities realise the authority of the law and to restore confidence to the victims of the recent outrages.

4. With regard to the cases pending before the Courts the Lieutenant-Governor does not think that it is expedient at this stage to interfere in the manner suggested in your representation. Should fresh and reliable evidence be forthcoming in any serious case in which accused have been discharged or a *nolle prosequi* entered, further investigation will be made and steps taken to bring the real offenders to justice, but this is a question which will depend on a careful scrutiny of the facts in individual cases, and His Honour is not prepared to say at present that this course can be profitably adopted in any particular case.

5. The other matters dealt with in the Sabha's representation have already been discussed with the deputation, which waited on the Lieutenant-Governor, and the action taken or contemplated by Government has already been outlined in the communique referred to above.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd). A. B. KETTLEWELL,

Additional Secretary.

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PUNJAB GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNIQUE. (2)

In connection with the dacoities committed in some of the western districts in the Punjab, the following Press *communique* has been issued by the Punjab Government, being the substance of the striking speech delivered by His Honour at Jhang during His Honour's last visit to that town :—

On 3rd December a representative gathering of the leading Mahomedans and Hindus of the district and of the chief Government officials was convened at Jhang in connection with the disturbances of last spring and the measures to be taken to restore harmony and good relations between Hindus and Mahomedans. The Lieutenant-Governor, who was accompanied by Colonel P. Thompson, Commissioner of the Division, Major Angelo, Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Fitzgerald, Deputy Inspector-General, and Mr. Kettlewell, Additional Secretary, presided.

The Lieutenant-Governor in opening his remarks observed that this was his first visit to the Jhang district and it was a matter for regret that, while elsewhere, on tour, *e. g.*, at Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Ambala, Rohtak, Amritsar, he had been able to congratulate the people on their loyal behaviour during the present crisis, and on their active co-operation with Government officers in repressing disorder, reducing crime and in recruiting, here in Jhang he had to reproach the people and their leaders for their failure in these respects. Instead of helping Government they had taken advantage of the misery of their Hindu neighbours, stricken at the time with plague, and of the supposed weakness of Government to start a campaign of lawless dacoity, which, while bringing no profit to the criminals, had involved many Hindus in poverty and brought disgrace on the district. The whole district was, it is true, not implicated and the disturbance was mainly confined to the Shorkot Tahsil and the Massan Thana in Jhang. Even in Shorkot on the east of the river, where zaildars and *raises* like Fakir Muhammad Rashid, and elsewhere in the district where men like Kazi Maula Bakhsh of Chiniot and others had done their duty the disorder had not spread. In the thanas principally affected, Garh Maharaj, Athara Hāzari and Massan, the village officials, zaildars, safedposhes and headmen had not only, as a rule, failed in their duty, but had in many cases openly or secretly assisted the dacoits, while the local authorities and police had in some cases failed to act up to their responsibilities. In these cases executive action had either been taken or would be taken where judicial proceedings failed or were inapplicable. His Honour had now received all the reports and the judgments of tribunals and magistrates and had heard what officers and non-officials, including the delegates of the Hindu Sabha, had to say on the subject of these dacoities. He had summoned representatives of both sides from the affected area to explain to them the views of Government, to hear any representation they might wish to make and to impress on them the necessity in their own interest of doing everything possible to remove the bitterness created and to restore cordial relations between the two communities.

2. His Honour proposed to consider the question under the three aspects of (I) past events; (II) the present situation; and (III) future arrangements.

I.—Past Events.

3. His Honour sympathised deeply with the unfortunate victims of the 60 dacoities that had occurred. They were nearly all Hindus and their assailants nearly all Muhammadans. The mischief began with petty looting of grain in shops deserted on account of plague in Garh Maharaj and Ahmadpur; this was followed by the looting of occupied shops by night and led to open looting and dacoities by day culminating in incendiarism, the burning of account books and even in the destruction of patwari's papers and the pillaging of a Government Post Office. Fanatical acts, such as the burning of the *Granth Sahib* and the demolition of idols, also occurred; women were attacked and their ornaments forcibly removed, in one case a woman's ear being cut off by a sword. In a few cases lives were lost as a result of violence used, the whole outbreak being accompanied by wanton destruction of property. The Hindus as a rule were panic-stricken and did not defend themselves, though they might have done so in a few places, and especially in Ahmadpur, where they were very numerous. They did defend themselves successfully at Kot Maldeo, where two of the dacoits were killed in the attack and the rest hastily dispersed. In most cases, however, the Hindus were overwhelmed by superior numbers. In many they trusted to the protection of leading Mahomedans. In some such cases protection was given, in others it was promised by the lambardars, who broke their promises and joined the raiders; in others lambardars took advantage of the panic among the Hindus to extort money as the price of protection and then treacherously betrayed them and encouraged the dacoits. His Honour could not imagine any form of villainy blacker than this, and there was some satisfaction in knowing that the two chief offenders (Bakhsha lambardar of Bohrwala and Wahab lambardar of Isewala) had been convicted and received exemplary sentences. Cases also were not wanting in which the dacoits refused to be stopped even by supplications on the *Koran* and broke the asylum afforded by a well-known Mahomedan shrine. Force and fear were the only arrangements that appealed to them, and when a few men were killed or injured by the police or the Hindus in repelling attacks they quickly dispersed. This state of affairs continued for twelve days until the police had been strengthened and troops arrived.

4. In extenuation of the conduct of the dacoits it had been said that they were driven to despair by high prices and the withholding of credit by the banias. This was possibly one cause of the outbreak in its early stages at Garh Maharaj and Ahmadpur, but it entirely failed to account for many features appearing in these dacoities, or to explain the spread of the wave of lawlessness, in which thousands of people took part. If widespread distress were the cause why

were there few or no applications for suspensions of the revenue, *takavi* grants or other forms of assistance from Government? All these hundreds and thousands of persons, including the village headmen, who encouraged or joined in these offences, the *zaildars* who connived at them, and the few Hindus, who lent a hand in certain dacoities, could not have been poverty-stricken. Nor could poverty account for the wanton destruction and incendiarism that occurred, attacks on religious emblems or for some of the principal raiders posing as Germans. It was certainly not poverty that gave rise to the foolish rumour that British Raj had gone, because the courts and offices at Jhang were found closed on a Hindu holiday. No doubt poverty was a contributing cause in some cases, especially at the commencement, but there was much more than this in the shape of dishonesty, a desire to escape lawful obligations, ignorance, lawlessness on the part of the dacoits, connivance and neglect on the part of those who should have and could have restrained them. It was urged that the movement was not anti-British, but the reply to this, as had been pointed out by His Honour at Muzaffargarh, was that Government was responsible for the safety and protection of all its subjects, and that whoever interfered with any of these was the enemy of Government and would be dealt with as such.

5. The next point was on what classes the responsibility for these disturbances mainly lay. Of the 384 persons convicted in the district for offences in connection with these dacoities, 127 were Syals, 99 Jats, 51 Biloches, 62 Kamins, 9 Hindus and 36 of other castes and tribes. These figures showed that the Syals, the leading agricultural tribe in the district, were in the forefront as ringleaders, and it was a matter for great regret that a tribe with the reputation they hitherto possessed should have disgraced itself by conduct of this kind. They had behaved well in the Mutiny, and when the present war broke out attempts were made by the local officers in Jhang and other districts to encourage the Syals to enlist. That was done not so much on account of any help their recruits would be to Government as out of a desire to give them an opportunity of proving their loyalty in the same way as tribes like the Tiwanas and Ghebas with whom they claimed kinship, and of raising the *izat* of their clan. Those efforts had met with no result, and the Syals were now open to the taunt that instead of fighting the enemies of Government in the field they preferred to stay at home and loot Hindu shopkeepers. Next to the Syals came the Jats and Biloches—also great land-holding tribes—in the list of those convicted, but it was not possible to fix their relative responsibility with any great accuracy, for hundreds of persons, who deserved punishment, had escaped conviction in these offences. The main causes of the escape of the guilty in so many cases were (1) lack of satisfactory identification by complainants owing to the great number of raiders engaged, and the fact that many of the raids took place at night; (2) delay of complainants in reporting owing to fear or panic; (3) exaggeration by complainants in the

matter of identification; (4) in some few cases collusion with the accused; (5) the insufficiency of the Police at the start to deal with so sudden and widespread an outbreak; and (6) the failure of investigating officers in certain cases to do their duty. These causes had all contributed to the breakdown of the prosecution in numbers of individual cases. The fault in a great many of these cases lay neither with the complainants nor the Police. The former were confronted with the inherent difficulty of identifying their assailants among large crowds of men and also of conveying news to the police at a time when all roads were unsafe, while the latter were so over-burdened with this sudden inrush of crime that investigation work had perforce to be hurriedly done or in many cases deferred until it was too late to obtain any satisfactory proof against the offenders. Government would indeed have been glad if more criminals could have been punished by the courts. Measures for the arrest of those absconding, including some of the worst offenders, were still being taken, and His Honour trusted that they would duly be brought to justice. Apart from those judicially convicted, executive action had been and would be taken against zaildars, lambardars and safedposhes, who failed in their duty or were reasonably suspected of having connived at crime. It was merely repeating an axiom to say that in places where the leading men assisted, no serious disturbance occurred and the natural inference to be drawn was that, where disorder did arise, there was connivance or neglect of duty on their part. As regards the rank and file they had gained nothing by their misconduct. As far as could be ascertained the value of the cash and ornaments looted had been greatly exaggerated, for the complainants in most cases had warning enough to secrete their valuables. But apart from this there had been considerable losses of grain, gur, ghi, cloth, cattle, household effects, &c., while in places such as Ahmadpur an enormous amount of wanton damage had been done by setting fire to shops and houses—over 100 were thus ruined or damaged in Ahmadpur—and by burning what the dacoits could not carry away. The property carried away would probably amount to but little when distributed over the thousands who took part in the plundering, and such ill-gotten gains could bring their possessors no real benefit. They had ruined hundreds of their Hindu neighbours, they had ruined hundreds of their own houses, for in addition to the 400 convicted, there were great numbers still absconding, while their families were suffering and their lands left untilled.

II.—Present Situation.

6. The present situation was mainly distinguished by a want of confidence and strained relations between the two communities. In some places the Hindus had settled down and resumed their business, but elsewhere considerable uneasiness existed among the victims of the recent disturbances. There were also complaints that owing to the burning of account books debts were being repudiated and that rents due were not being paid.

III.—Future Arrangements.

7. His Honour emphasized the fixed determination of Government to prevent any further lawlessness and to put down any attempt to disturb the public peace with the utmost severity. (a) Extra police had been drafted into the district and troops would be immediately requisitioned should any symptoms of disorder reappear. Both troops and police would be instructed to use their firearms without hesitation against dacoits or marauders of any kind. (b) Extra gun licenses had already been granted and more would be given to respectable persons who could shew that they were in a position to purchase and use these weapons effectively. (c) Special constables would also be appointed from among the notables of the district whenever their services were required. The following measures, partly punitive and partly protective, had also been adopted :—

1. The cost of all additional police, over 100 in all, would be assessed on the villages responsible for the disturbances in proportion to their criminality, until such time as they shewed by their behaviour that any recurrence of trouble was beyond question.

2. Grants of land in the new canal colonies for which residents of the district might have been eligible, would be withheld in the case of persons residing in the affected area.

3. Any future loss accruing to persons in the affected area from crimes of violence would be made good from the inhabitants of the locality under the provisions of section 15-A of Police Act.

4. *Thikri pahra* or a system of watch and ward by villages would be put into operation.

5. A special magistrate had been appointed to tour in the disturbed tracts, to exercise general supervision and control over the staff, and to take immediate cognizance of any offences committed and any steps necessary to preserve peace and security.

6. With regard to the complaints made of loss and non-recovery of debts and rent, His Honour made it clear that while Government could not be responsible for past losses, assistance would be afforded to income-tax payers by temporary remissions and to poorer Hindus by the provision of timber at cheap concession rates in cases where Government *rakhs* were accessible and wood was available.

7. The destruction of account books was not directly remediable, but debtors must remember that suits against them could be supported by oral evidence in such cases and in the case of Muhammadan debtors he need hardly remind them of the obligation in such matters laid on them by their religion. Arrangements would, as far as possible, be made for the amicable settlement of claims for money or rent out of court through arbitrators or *Panchayats*, mainly local notables, but it was desirable that such settlements should be effected by non-official agency as official intervention

had obvious disadvantages. The best plan would probably be to establish small conciliation committees, the Muhammadan members of which would be nominated by Hindus and the Hindu members by Muhammadans. Claims for outstanding rents would similarly be settled amicably as far as possible by arbitration.

8. Government officers, whose duty it was to restore harmony, had been instructed to render every assistance, and by their advice and influence to promote the formation of suitable *panchayats*, see that the proceedings of these bodies were kept free from partiality or favour, and thus assist in the settlement of disputes and of accounts.

9. His Honour concluded by exhorting the Hindus to return to their homes and normal pursuits, assuring them that they were under the protection of Government and had nothing to fear. He looked to the leaders on both sides to use their best endeavours to restore friendly relations. On the Muhammedans rested the duty of clearing the district of the disgrace, which had been brought upon it, and with the Hindus it remained to assist in every way possible in the settlement of claims and the resumption of normal business. Each party was indispensable to the other, neither had anything to gain by keeping open the sore caused by the past lamentable events, while both would gain by an amicable settlement and the restoration of friendly relations. His Honour appealed to all men of influence and education on both sides to promote this result.

10. His Honour finally expressed the hope that on the occasion of his next visit to the district he would find peace and harmony re-established, and would not have to address them in the terms of reproach and warning which he had been compelled to use that day.

At the close of His Honour's address several gentlemen were invited to come forward and make any suggestions or remarks they considered appropriate in regard to the present situation or future arrangements.

In reply to this invitation Lala Ram Chand, of Ahmadpur, after describing the present position in that town, suggested that court-fees should be exempted on suits filed in the affected area for a fixed period, and that land should be granted to the victims of the dacoities. He also pointed out the remoteness of Ahmadpur from the courts and asked for the appointment of a special magistrate in the tract.

Pandit Kanshi Ram, of Garh Maharaj, gave the facts relating to that town, where (he said) the loss was not so great as at Ahmadpur and urged that the Muhammadans were not yet well-disposed to the Hindus and that until they were, there was ground for apprehension.

Pandit Moti Ram, Pleader, of Garh Maharaj, represented that lands intended for peasants in the new colonies should be given to the Hindu victims of the dacoities, who had suffered most, and laid stress on the importance of securing honest and impartial men as zaildars and lambardars.

Lala Hira Nand, of Jhang, referred to the pre-disposing causes of the disturbances which he ascribed to misunderstandings between Hindus and Muhammadans, and suggested the formation of special committees to remove these misunderstandings, which to some extent still existed. The Hindus should be given guarantees of amity by their Muhammadan neighbours.

Shaikh Ghulam Yasin, President, the Jhang Anjuman Islam, urged the extension of co-operative credit societies in the affected area to enable the Muhammadans to meet their obligations to the Hindus. If the Hindus would assist this movement he anticipated a prompt settlement of outstanding claims.

Fakir Gul Muhammed, Zaildar of Uch, described how he had endeavoured to protect the Hindus in Rodu Sultan and gave assurances of his future assistance in conciliation and settlement.

Sheikh Sarwar Shah, of Shorkot, admitted the correctness of His Honour's summary of the situation and said that the Muhammadans would do all in their power to restore friendly relations, and as an earnest of their desire to do so he offered to supply copies of the *Granth Sahib* in place of those that had been burned or injured. He suggested the formation of *panchayats* for the settlement of disputes and urged the necessity of co-operative credit societies as a means to economic revival. Mr. Broadway, Honorary Magistrate at Garh Maharaj, was, in his opinion, admirably fitted to act as an intermediary.

His Honour replied briefly to these representations, which, in so far as they covered fresh ground, would receive due consideration. The proceedings then closed.

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DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB.

STATEMENT BY BRIG.-GENERAL R. E. H. DYER, C.B.

3

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



225

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S 2151

From BRIG.-GENERAL R. E. H. DYER, C.B.

To THE SECRETARY,
WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.

33, Clarges Street, W.,
3rd July, 1920.

Sir,
In compliance with the permission given to me in War Office letter of 9th June, 1920, I have the honour to submit the statement which follows:—

1. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES.

I necessarily assume that the action taken against me by the various authorities concerned is based on the report of and the proceedings before the Hunter Committee with regard to the events at Amritsar on or after the 11th April, 1919.

I assume this because I know of no other matters in respect of which any adverse comment has been made upon my conduct and because the Adjutant-General in India on 22nd March, 1920, when he personally informed me of the decision that I must resign my appointment, stated that the ground of the decision was that the Hunter Committee had reported adversely to me.

My present statement will therefore be confined in substance to defending myself against the adverse criticisms of me contained in the report of the majority of the Hunter Committee, in the despatch of the Government of India, dated the 3rd May, 1920, forwarding the report to His Majesty's Government, and in the reply to that despatch by His Majesty's Government signed by the Secretary of State on the 26th May, 1920, both the latter being clearly founded upon the material supplied by the Hunter Committee.

If I go occasionally outside these official criticisms it is only because I cannot wholly ignore some unofficial criticisms (including some of those contained in the Minority report) which have appeared in public, gravely detrimental to my reputation and which in justice to myself I must ask permission to deal with. I cannot, indeed, on the information before me ignore the possibility that such extraneous matters have influenced or may influence the action taken against me.

It is clear from the official documents above referred to that the main question I have to deal with is whether my action in dealing with the assembly in the Jallianwallah Bagh on the afternoon of the 13th April was too impetuous and too drastic.

Subsidiary questions are also raised (a) as to the omission to provide medical attendance for the wounded, and (b) as to the propriety of an order issued by me some days later regarding the use by natives of the street where Miss Sherwood was assaulted.

It is to the consideration of the judgments pronounced upon me regarding each of these matters that this statement is mainly devoted.

This is the first chance I have had of dealing with these criticisms, which I did not see till the recent publication of documents after my return home from India.

I wish to satisfy the Army Council that my action in these matters was justifiable, and that the criticisms are unfounded. I will do this as shortly as possible. There is a great mass of evidence and comment in the Bluebook; but I assume that the Army Council will have read all the relevant passages, only a few of which I propose to cite as illustrations.

It will not, however, escape notice that in order to get exoneration from censure I am not called upon to go so far as to prove that at every stage I did right, nor is the Army Council called upon to take the burden upon itself of so deciding; all that is really necessary is for me to show that, situated as I was, I acted for the best and had reasonable ground for my action.

It will be seen that I am able to place before the Army Council some official material not in the Bluebooks; in particular (1), the report of my ^{brigade} Major, Captain F. C. Briggs, D.S.O., who died before he could give evidence (Appendix A.); (2) the speech of the Adjutant-General of India to the Legislative Council on 19th September, 1919 (Appendix B); (3) some results of the findings of courts held for the trial of rebels at Amritsar.

2 SUMMARY OF CHARGES IN REGARD TO FIRING IN JALLIANWALLAH BAGH.

I will discuss the main question first.

The criticisms of my action in dealing with the crowd in the Jallianwallah Bagh may be shortly summarized as follows:—

(a.) Majority Report of the Hunter Committee (paragraphs 39 and 40).

The Committee blame me first for not giving a warning to the Assembly before I ordered fire to be opened so as to give people a chance to disperse. In continuing firing so long, the Committee hold that I committed a grave error, and that I had in view not merely the dispersal of the crowd that had assembled, but the desire to produce a moral effect in the Punjab, and that this was a mistaken conception of my duty, inasmuch as continued firing upon a crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places.

(b.) The despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State (paragraphs 21 and 44).

The Government of India declare that I could and should have given warning to the crowd before opening firing, that my action in continuing to fire after the crowd had begun to disperse was indefensible, and greatly exceeded the necessity of the occasion, and that I went beyond what any reasonable man could have thought to be necessary, and that I did not act with as much humanity as the case permitted.

(c.) The reply of the Secretary of State (paragraph 3) reiterates some of these criticisms and adds others.

It is there stated in particular that I acted in violation of the principle that the military when dealing with civil disturbances must use the minimum of force necessary, that the force I actually employed was greatly in excess of requirements, that my omission to give warning before fire was opened was inexcusable, that I had no right to punish an unarmed crowd which had not committed violence or tried to oppose me, and many members of which must have been ignorant of my orders, and that my conception of my duty was fundamentally at variance with that which the Government require from an officer.

The whole of the passages referred to will be before the Army Council *in extenso* in the several documents in question and I need not set them out in greater detail here.

3. IRREGULAR AND PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.

All these adverse criticisms are admittedly founded upon the report and proceedings of the Hunter Committee.

I must therefore, at the outset, point out to the Army Council that, however suitable those proceedings and report may have been as a guide to the formation of a general political opinion about the rebellion in India, and as an investigation of historical causes or of particular events, they were not such as to constitute in my case a judicial or regular enquiry into or trial of the conduct of an individual.

The wide terms of reference ("to investigate the recent disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and the Punjab, their causes and the measures taken to cope with them") hardly suggest that the trial of individuals was intended to be the function of the Committee.

In my case the procedure of a trial was not attempted. I received no notice of any charges against me. My official superiors had indeed up till then approved my conduct on the main question. I came and gave my evidence entirely unrepresented and undefended and in no sense expecting to find myself an accused person. I was present, except for a few hours on one casual occasion, during no part of the hearing of other witnesses, and apart from sometimes seeing newspaper summaries had no knowledge of what evidence they gave, or any opportunity to ask questions or elicit information, and no kind of address or argument was addressed to the Committee on my behalf. No member of the Committee constituted himself my advocate (it would clearly have been improper for any member to have done so), while several acted as my prosecutors, cross-examined me, and sought to establish a case against me, a course which their special qualifications enabled them to pursue with special efficiency. I was furnished with no proof or transcript of my evidence, and had no opportunity to say anything by way of addition or qualification, or even to correct verbal inaccuracies. (Some of the phrases attributed to me I do not now recognise). I never indeed saw my evidence or any of the criticisms of me until the recent publication of the Bluebook.

The anomalous result has been that I saw then for the first time and all at once charges, evidence and findings.

It is clear that this procedure was not in accordance with the course of justice normally observed at the hearing of complaints or charges against an individual.

It will be equally obvious to the Army Council that the procedure was wholly irregular according to military law and custom. A military court of enquiry, which is the normal method of investigating, if detailed investigation is needed, the conduct of an individual subject to military discipline requires his attendance throughout the proceedings, with the express object of assuring that he shall have full knowledge of any case which is being established against him, and an opportunity of dealing with charges suggested or evidence adduced adverse to him.

The case of a court-martial is still clearer, as then definite charges based on definite evidence have to be formulated in advance, and a proper opportunity has to be afforded for the preparation of the defence.

I do not wish to complain against the Committee for not adopting such a procedure. The scope and nature of its enquiry may not have permitted it. But in the absence of the normal requisites of a judicial investigation of the conduct of individuals, I ask that the Army Council will not regard the proceedings of the Committee as in any way conclusive, but will form its own judgment of my conduct as a soldier, giving due regard to the submissions which follow.

The Hunter Committee was, moreover, primarily and substantially a civil Committee. What is in question now is my conduct as an officer while administering martial law during a rebellion, and that should be judged by a military tribunal.

My treatment for nearly a year after the events at Amritsar further requires consideration. I had reported those events at once. (Appendix C.) Not only was I in no way criticised for my handling of the crisis, but I received immediate official approval. I was likewise in no way suspended from my duties, pending enquiry, the normal military course in the case of an officer whose conduct is to be the subject of censure or penalty. On the contrary I was promoted and also given a command on active service in the field.

I deal below more fully with the action of the military authorities in India at the time in approving my conduct or exonerating me from blame. I mention it here, because it demonstrates that I did not come before the Committee as an accused person, and had no occasion to provide myself with expert assistance in my absence.

The great delay before the enquiry started has likewise been a disadvantage to me, as officers and civilians who could have given important testimony had in the interval become unavailable. Criticisms publicly made by Sir Michael O'Dwyer of the complete suitability of the Committee to judge the Punjab Government should not be ignored in justice to myself as an agent of that Government.

4. THE PRINCIPLE OF "MINIMUM FORCE."

The principle is laid down by the Secretary of State that an officer in suppressing civil disturbances must use the minimum amount of force necessary for the purpose. I am well acquainted with this principle, and have at all times fully accepted it. Quite apart from the ordinary experience of an officer of my seniority and length of service in the Indian Army, I had had special occasion and opportunity to study principles in this connection, as for five years I held the staff appointment of Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General for instruction in military law, and the administration of martial law during civil disturbances was necessarily a subject of study by me in that capacity. I had this principle very clearly before me during the whole time I was in Amritsar, and I never at any time failed to act up to it to the best of my judgment and capacity. I say with all sincerity that I acted upon this principle when firing upon the assembly at Amritsar on the 13th April, and according to the best of my judgment (and no one was in a better position to judge than myself) I used no more force than was required by the occasion. This contention I hope to make good in what follows.

5. STATEMENT OF SITUATION AND NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

I now wish, as shortly as I can, to make clear the situation with which I was confronted in Amritsar, and the nature of the action which I took.

I will not again set out the history of the events which is told in the Hunter Report and recapitulated in the despatch of the Government of India and will only refer to the more important and significant features of the situation.

As military commander of the whole Jullundur district of which Amritsar is but one point, I was in touch with the general situation, and during the events which followed I was kept in touch also with the general situation in the Punjab. I had very recently toured through Delhi and other districts, and had been struck with the general unrest and the inflammable nature of many elements of the population. With the Sikh population of the countryside I was particularly well acquainted. The threatening nature of the Afghan situation was also present to me, also the weakness of the internal military situation and the threat to communications. To shorten this part of the narrative, I have summarized in a later paragraph the military considerations as they occurred to me.

On my arrival at Amritsar, on the evening of the 11th April, as is generally conceded, I was confronted with a crisis of the gravest kind. On the 10th the mob had risen, killed everyone of European nationality in the city upon whom it could lay hands, burned banks and Government buildings, and had been held off the European settlement outside the city only with the greatest difficulty. The situation had already been handed over to the local commander by the civil authorities as being a military one and beyond their control.

I found a clear conviction upon the part of the local officials and abundant signs that a determined and organized movement was in progress to submerge and destroy all the Europeans on the spot and in the district and to carry the movement throughout the Punjab, and that the mob in the city and the excitable population of the villages were being organized for this purpose. In the end general looting and mob violence against the whole law-abiding Indian population as well as against the troops and authorities would have resulted.

For two days the city had been in the hands of the mob, and no Government official or European could enter it without an escort of troops. That in law and in fact I was confronted not with a riot, but with open rebellion, the Hunter Committee explicitly find (Report page 66, paragraph 3).

The very restrained firing by troops and police which had taken place on the 10th had produced no effect at all, and the situation was more menacing than ever.

There is much material in the official documents to make clear the situation.

Admittedly Amritsar was the worst place concerned in the rebellion :

"The Amritsar incidents may be regarded as the high water mark of the disorders" . . .
(*Majority Report*, Chapter XL, paragraph 4.)

Even the Minority concur :—

"Amritsar, where the disturbances first took place and were of the worst character" . . .
(*Minority*, Chapter III., page 99.)

The Secretary of State summarizes the situation very clearly :—

"In Amritsar itself violence, murder and arson of the most savage description had occurred three days previously, and the city was still practically in possession of the mob. From the surrounding countryside reports were hourly being received of violent similar outbreaks and attacks upon communications, and the deficiencies in these reports (due to the success of attacks upon communications) were supplemented by rumours which there was very little means of verifying and as little ground for disbelieving." (*Despatch*, page 24.)

I had only a small force of troops at my disposal consisting of at the outset 475 British and 710 Indian, many of them only partially trained. Amritsar is a city of 150,000 people, and the countryside is densely populated with a people of an inflammable character. The arrangement of the city and the civil lines did little to facilitate the problems of control and defence.

The signs which met me and the reports which I received left no doubt as to the existence of an organized mob with leaders, and a definite purpose of outrage and destruction.

The organization of mobs in Amritsar had been noticeable at a much earlier stage when violence was not expected.

Speaking of the organization of the initial agitation about the 6th April, Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy-Commissioner, Amritsar, gave evidence as follows :—

"Q. After the 6th, how did the situation strike you ?

"A. They were working up for some kind of mischief which I could not foresee. It struck me that the leaders of the movement were disciplining the mob with a view to some concerted form of passive disobedience to authority which would paralyse Government.

"Q. But so far as any immediate act of violence is concerned did you see anything that was being encouraged ?

"A. My idea was that they intended to avoid any collision with authority that would justify Armed intervention and to train the mob to do what they were told." (Evidence Vol. III., page 3.)

When, contrary to previous expectation, violence broke out, such organization quickly showed itself, and as Mr. Irving said later (page 11, Vol. III. Evidence) we found by experience there was sufficient organization down in the lowest stratum to go and spread with wonderful rapidity to do acts of violence. The formation of "Bludgeon Armies" (Danda Fauj) was a common matter of rebel propaganda, and the vast supplies of bludgeons which we intercepted on the railway a few days later were indications of the designs of the revolutionaries.

The events of the 12th and early part of the 13th April may be stated here in the summary afterwards given to the legislative Council by the Adjutant-General in his speech of the 19th September, 1919:—

"On the 11th and 12th he (Brigadier-General Dyer) reorganized his troops and on the 12th he marched a column round and through the city in order that a display of force might have its effect on the minds of the populace. We have it on record that the bearing of the inhabitants was most insolent, and that many spat on the ground as the troops passed. From the shouts of the mob it was clear that they were in an entirely unrepentant spirit. No military force was used on this occasion as the officer in command decided to issue proclamations as to his future intentions before employing such force. From a military point of view he would have been quite justified, I hold, in using force on that day, but the General Officer Commanding decided to pursue his policy of patience and conciliation. A proclamation was issued on the evening of the 12th, and on the morning of the 13th April the Officer Commanding marched with a body of troops through all the main streets of the city and announced by beat of drum his intentions of using force should occasion arise. The people were permitted to collect in order to hear the proclamations." (*Official Report*, 19th September, 1919, page 376.)

Reference should also be made to the report of my Brigade-Major, Captain F. C. C. Briggs, D.S.O. (Appendix A), which gives a succinct account of events at this stage.

The prohibition of assemblies in time of riot and disturbance is an elementary and well understood expedient in India, and no question is raised as to the justification for my proclamation or the announcement that any assembly gathering in defiance of it would be dispersed by force of arms. (The Hunter Committee say of a similar order issued at Ahmedabad that "the belief that all groups of more than 10 men would be fired on without warning did much to restore order.") (Report, page 14, paragraph 15.)

The method of issuing it, namely, the progress for 4½ hours of a body of troops about the city accompanied by the General himself and the Deputy-Commissioner, the summoning of the population by beat of drum, and the reading of it in two languages as they assembled, was itself an unusual and significant demonstration.

I hoped it would be sufficient to do something to quiet the situation.

But it was answered by an immediate challenge. I gradually learnt on my return to the civil lines that a counter-proclamation had been issued behind me, that the rumour had been set going that my action was mere pretence, and that I dared not fire, and that a meeting would be held in the Jallianwallah Bagh in the afternoon. Later the news came that the meeting was actually assembling.

I explain my motives and beliefs during the action which followed more fully below. Here it is sufficient to say that I know that the final crisis had come, and that the assembly was primarily of the same mobs which had murdered and looted and burnt three days previously, and showed their truculence and contempt of the troops during the intervening days, that it was a deliberate challenge to the Government forces, and that if it were not dispersed, and dispersed effectively, with sufficient impression upon the designs and arrogance of the rebels and their followers we should be overwhelmed during the night or the next day by a combination of the city gangs and of the still more formidable multitude from the villages. A crowd from the city of 30,000 had menaced the civil settlement on the 10th. Its audacity in the meantime had grown with its crimes and their immunity. The villages had been brought in, and I had to reckon upon the possibility of the irruption that night of some 30,000 Majha Sikh looters, if the whole movement were not decisively checked. As an illustration of the facts before me the following passage from Mr. Irving's evidence will be sufficient here:—

"Q. Did you form any opinion as to what the intention of the mob was with reference to Government?"

"A. The mob in the Jallianwala?"

"Q. Generally speaking the mob in Amritsar, from the 10th to the 13th April?"

"A. I believe it seriously thought it had a chance of beating the Government. One of the ringleaders, when he was talked to, said, 'well, let us have the fight out'. That was somewhere between the 10th and 13th, when he was being talked to by a friendly Indian gentleman; that is what he said, I believe.

"Q. Do you understand that to mean a fight out between the populace on the one hand and organized authority on the other?"

"A. Yes." (*Evidence*, Vol. III., page 7.)

I took the small force at my disposal, consisting of the picquetting parties and a

special party consisting of 25 rifles 1/9th Gurkhas, 25 rifles 54th Sikhs, and 59th Sikhs and 40 Gurkhas armed only with kukries, and two armoured cars, and after dropping some necessary pickets arrived about 5 p.m. in the Jallianwallah Bagh with the special party, none of them at all highly trained men. I entered it at one end by a narrow passage, through which my armoured cars could not pass.

I found a large meeting, afterwards ascertained to be from 15,000 to 20,000 in number, being addressed by a speaker engaged in violent exhortation. The speakers at this meeting were in fact most, if not all, of them later convicted of sedition in connection with the disturbances. There were no women and children in the meeting, and its appearance confirmed the reports I had received as to its character.

The position was itself an anxious one from a purely military point of view--of the other aspects I speak below--as I was liable to be assailed from behind, and the extrication of my small force from the city would have been practically impossible if after the firing the rebels had maintained an aggressive spirit.

Hesitation I felt would be dangerous and futile, and as soon as my fifty riflemen had deployed I ordered fire to be opened. The crowd began to scatter to the various exits. After some firing two groups appeared to be collecting as though to rush us, and on my Brigade-Major calling my attention to this I directed fire specially to the two points in question, and dispersed the groups. (See Capt. Briggs' report.) When 1,650 rounds or thereabouts had been fired, and roughly ten minutes from the time of opening fire, the whole crowd had dispersed, and I was able to lead the body of troops back in security, having, as it turned out, established general security in Amritsar and the neighbourhood for everyone. The spirit of the organized mobs was effectively broken, and the unrest in the countryside stopped.

I reported my action to Divisional Headquarters next day, describing briefly the events above set out, and stated that I estimated the dead casualties at between 200 and 300. (Appendix C.) I received from the Divisional Commander by aeroplane the message, "Your action correct, and Lieutenant-Governor approves." (Appendix D.)

Subsequent enquiries, according to the Hunter Committee, put the number of dead at 379, but of such enquiries I have no information.

6. CONNECTION BETWEEN AMRITSAR AND REST OF PUNJAB AND RESULTS OF FIRING.

Before discussing the above proceedings in relation to the adverse criticisms upon them, I would say a word as to the connection between the events in Amritsar and the rest of the Punjab.

It was, as will be seen, very close. First, as to the rebellious movement itself. Before I left Jullundur I was well aware of the effect of the outrages of the 10th April in Amritsar upon the districts outside.

The Hunter Committee leaves no doubt as to the fatal progress of events. Of the situation at Lahore, which clearly became nearly as threatening as that at Amritsar, the Committee says "that on the 10th the political atmosphere, already highly charged, was made acutely worse by the arrival of two pieces of news, one the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and the other the news of the horrible outbreak at Amritsar." (Report, page 35.)

A poster in the vernacular issued in Lahore exhorted imitation of Amritsar as follows. (Report, page 38.)

"When the news (i.e., of Mr. Gandhi's arrest) reached Amritsar, the Danda Fauj (Bludgeon Army) of the brave Sikhs set fire to the Bank, the Railway Station and Electric Power House. They cut the telegraph wires and removed the railway line. The Danda Fauj of Amritsar bravely killed a number of European monkeys and their Sikh regiments have revolted and deserted. O-Hindu, Muhammedan and Sikh brethren enlist at once in the Danda Army and fight with bravery against the English monkeys. God will grant you victory. . . ."

Of Patti, a town in the Lahore district, and about 28 miles from Amritsar, the Committee find that:—

"The news of the Amritsar disorders on the 10th disposed the Patti mob towards loot." (Report, page 42.)

The outbreak at Gujrianwala was clearly serious. Describing its progress, the Committee say:—

"Until the news of the happenings of the 10th at Amritsar and Lahore had time to affect the people of Gujrianwala there seems to have been no intention to hold a second hartal. After that news Europeans and authorities were alike naturally apprehensive." . . . (Report, page 43.)

and again :—

"The main object of the mob was certainly to destroy all Government buildings and there is little room for doubt that they were imitating or repeating what they heard of Amritsar on the 10th." (*Report*, page 45.)

and again :—

"At Sheikhpura on the 12th there were processions and excited speeches containing descriptions of the events at Lahore and Amritsar." . . . (*Report*, page 51.)

Next, as to the effect of my action in the Jallianwallah Bagh on the afternoon of the 13th.

The evidence as to this is copious and conclusive.

Of the effect in Amritsar itself, the evidence of Mr. Miles Irving leaves no room for doubt :—

"Q. What was the result of this firing on that mob?

"A. The whole rebellion collapsed. Not only the mob that was fired upon naturally dispersed and all trouble ceased in the city of Amritsar, but it was felt throughout the district. One of the reasons why there had been a danger was that the people not in the district thought for some reason or other that the Arm of Government was paralysed. The inaction of the police when the National Bank was burned lent some colour to that belief and there was an idea that the Government could do nothing, and this came as a disillusionment." (Page 7, Evidence, Vol. III.)

And Major-General Benyon in his report (page 322, Vol. IV., Evidence) says :—

"(iv.) The wisdom of General Dyer's action has been fully proved by the fact that there has been no further trouble of any sort in Amritsar. The news had a decidedly sobering effect on the surrounding villages when it spread to them."

With regard to the effect generally, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor, whose judgment on such a matter was necessarily the best, stated :—

"I have no hesitation in saying that General Dyer's action that day was the decisive factor in crushing the rebellion, the seriousness of which is only now being realised." . . . (*Report*, page 31.)

The evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, commanding the troops at Lahore who plainly had to face there a situation of the utmost gravity is exceptionally significant.

He told the Committee (at page 26 of Vol. IV. of the Evidence (Lahore and Kasur)) :—

"Q. Therefore I think your opinion is that these were the very things which practically maintained peace and order—these Martial Law orders?

"A. I put four things forward why peace was maintained and bloodshed avoided. First of all about 60 per cent. I put to General Dyer's action at Amritsar; the next thing I put to the institution of Martial Law, the third thing, I had a sufficient number of troops placed at my disposal here, and the fourth—and a very minor consideration—was the use that one made of that power and those troops—

15 per cent. for the number of troops.

20 per cent. for Martial Law.

60 per cent. for General Dyer.

5 per cent. for the use made of powers and men.

Now General Dyer had proclaimed his own Martial Law which he was prepared to do. Whether Martial Law was proclaimed or not is a common factor.

"Q. You mean then that when the news of what had happened on the 13th at Amritsar arrived at Lahore the situation was eased and things were looking better?

"A. Yes, there was a change in the atmosphere.

"Q. Therefore, that was due to the action of General Dyer? May I know whether there was any opportunity for such communication between Amritsar and Lahore?

"A. I should think every means of communication barring the telegraph, motor bicycles, &c., I cannot imagine there would have been difficulty in the way of communication.

"Q. If you accept this proposition that what happened on the 13th would not reach Lahore—under the circumstances that were prevailing on the 14th—will you be prepared to modify your statement?

"A. It did reach Lahore on the 13th. It was common property late that night."

And General Beynon says (at page 325, Vol. IV., Evidence) :—

"The strong measures taken by General Dyer at Amritsar had a far-reaching effect and prevented any further trouble in the Lahore Divisional area."

On page 9 of their despatch the Government of India say :—

"It is more than probable that General Dyer's action so intimidated the lawless elements in the population of Amritsar and neighbouring districts of the central Punjab as to prevent further manifestations of disorder" and

"we think that in the result his (General Dyer's) action at the time checked the spread of the disturbances to an extent which it is difficult now to estimate.

"This was the opinion of many intelligent observers in the Punjab."

I will only remark here that I cannot understand how it can be suggested that the

objects of crushing the rebellion in Amritsar or elsewhere, of diminishing the dangers in Lahore by 60 per cent., of intimidating the lawless elements in the population of Amritsar and neighbouring districts, and preventing further manifestations of disorder, and of checking the spread of disturbances were not proper objects upon which to employ a military force during a rebellion.

If they were proper objects, the Hunter Committee supply no evidence or arguments to show that I employed any more force than was necessary to secure them.

The whole gravamen of the Committee's case against me is indeed not that I used excessive force to secure these objects, but that they were not proper objects for me to endeavour to secure.

The Committee could hardly have ruled that the casualties were out of proportion to the general situation to be faced or to the actual results achieved, if once they were willing to assume that I was entitled to face the situation and to seek to achieve the results, when their own appreciation of that situation is considered :—

"In the situation as it presented itself day by day to the Punjab Government there were grounds for the gravest anxiety. Within recent years there had been two revolutionary movements, i.e., the Ghadr movement and the Silk Letter Conspiracy of 1916. It was difficult, probably unsafe for the authorities not to assume that the outbreak was the result of a definite organization. Apart from the existence of any deeply laid scheme to overthrow the British, a movement which had started in rioting and become a rebellion might have rapidly developed into a revolution."

"As a description of the occurrences to which we have called attention in our narrative of events, 'open rebellion' is, we think, apt and accurate; as a question of inference it appears to us to be the natural and the only inference. The element of rebellion as distinct from mere riot on the one hand and from political opposition to Government on the other can be traced throughout; in what sense it may be considered to lack openness we have failed to discover.

" On 10th April at Amritsar the mobs had burned Government buildings because they were Government buildings. After the first few minutes they had murdered all Europeans on whom they could lay their hands, except Miss Sherwood, whom they left for dead upon the street. They had hunted for Mrs. Easdon and the officers of the Chartered Bank; the other bank managers were sought out in their offices and killed with every circumstance of brutal rage. They were not even Government officials. But the Raj is a British Raj; they were in some sense its representative or symbols, and for this they were murdered. The railway and the telegraphs were attacked partly as Government institutions and partly to paralyze Government by preventing news, by detaching troops, and otherwise immobilizing the forces.

"The Amritsar incidents may be regarded as the high water mark of the disorders though the outbreak at Kasur on the 12th is hardly distinguishable."

We know that the Secretary of State considers that the Committee's appreciation of the danger is, if anything, below the mark. Can it be suggested that the casualties caused by my action on the 13th April were out of proportion to the result—the suppression of such a rebellion?

7. REPLY TO CHARGE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND EXPLANATION OF MOTIVES.

I will now proceed to deal briefly and directly with the Committee's criticisms and to explain, as clearly as I can, the precise motives of my action.

I say frankly at the outset that if the above described objects were not proper objects for me to seek in my action against the crowd in the Jallianwallah Bagh, then, on the major point, I may be open to criticism, and can only plead that I acted according to my best judgment under a mistaken sense of duty.

If these were right objects to pursue, I submit that, on the major point there is no case against me.

I put side by side an extract from my own report and the vital comment of the Committee.

Extract from my own Report.

"I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect from a military point of view not only on those who were present, but more especially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity."

Comment of the Committee.

"In our view, this was unfortunately a mistaken conception of his duty. If necessary, a crowd that has assembled contrary to a proclamation issued to prevent or terminate disorder may have to be fired upon; but continued firing upon that crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places. The employment of excessive measures is as likely as not to produce the opposite result to that desired."

With the last sentence of the Committee's opinion no one will quarrel. The

essential point, however, is that contained in the words, "continued firing upon that crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places." I believe the Army Council will repudiate with emphasis the principle involved in these words as being an abstract principle which cannot possibly govern the particular crisis with which I was confronted or any similar crisis.

The principle in the only sense in which it is relevant to or supports the criticism of my action comes to this—that my sole right was to secure the purely mechanical effect of causing the crowd to move off from the place where it was and go resolved into its individual elements to some other place or places. What it might do wherever it or its elements went was no concern of mine. The fact that it might go off full of derision and contempt of my force to burn and loot elsewhere, or to surround and overwhelm my troops as they moved out of the city, was not to influence my action at all. In fact, none of the possible consequences of leniency were to be considered at all.

I invite repudiation of this principle on three grounds (among others), first, that the Hunter Committee do not themselves adopt any such principle in dealing with other cases in their report; secondly, that the principle is repudiated by the Secretary of State for India, in his despatch; and thirdly, that the principle is wrong.

(a.) The recognition by the Committee itself in other cases that an officer when firing on a crowd may look beyond the needs of the movement is clear.

On page 1 of the report it is stated in regard to Delhi:—

"firing continued no longer than was necessary to achieve the legitimate object of restoring order and preventing a disastrous outbreak of violence."

On page 16 of the same report the Committee say (with reference to Niagram in the Ahmedabad district):—

"the force used against the rioters . . . was certainly not excessive. If greater force could have been applied at an early stage, the commission of an atrocious murder and much destruction of property might have been prevented."

and on page 38 (with reference to the disorders at Lahore):—

"we think that it was essential on this day to disperse this crowd, and that it would have been the end of all chance to restore order in Lahore if the police and troops had left without dispersing it."

As regards Gujrianwala, the Committee clearly consider that the accident of the recent departure of the Deputy Commissioner (Colonel O'Brien) resulted in the situation being too weakly handled; on page 45 they say:—

"in failing to order the police to fire upon and so disperse these mobs around the burning post office the acting Deputy Commissioner (at Gujrianwala) appears to us to have committed an error. If effective measures had then been taken to disperse the mob and restore order, the later incidents of the day might have been avoided."

It is, I think, a legitimate comment that officers who deal with disturbances in future are placed in a great difficulty by these different rulings. If they consider only the immediate needs of the moment, they are liable to be condemned for not looking further ahead and for ill consequences which occur elsewhere and later. If they do as I did and consider the situation as a whole and act with a view to restore order and to prevent further outbreaks, they are liable to be told that they must not look beyond the dispersal of the crowd at the moment.

(b.) The despatch of the Secretary of State gives no countenance to the view that I was required to look at events in isolation and disregard consequences in the action which I took.

"They (His Majesty's Government) think it is possible that the danger to the lives of Europeans and to the safety of British and Indian troops was greater than appears from the Committee's report . . . [Then follows the passage about the conditions in Amritsar and the neighbourhood quoted in paragraph 5 above, and the despatch continues]: "In discharging this responsibility with the small force at his disposal, Brigadier-General Dyer naturally could not dismiss from his mind conditions in the Punjab generally, and he was entitled to lay his plans with reference to those conditions." (Despatch, page 24.)

Apart from the question of principle now under discussion, which is here decided in my favour, I invite in passing special attention to the fact that in this passage the Secretary of State considers that the Hunter Committee also erred in their estimate of the magnitude and seriousness of the situation.

(c.) Thirdly, I say that the basis of criticism adopted by the Committee is on the face of it wrong and contrary to common sense. An officer dealing with riots is bound to consider consequences, and if faced with a rebellious gathering to consider what may happen both then and thereafter, both in that place and any other places affected or likely to be affected by the same movement, according as he lets the gathering alone or

disperses it, or according as he disperses it effectively or ineffectively, *e.g.*, leaving it with its defiance and designs unaffected, and its power for mischief unreduced. The measures he takes must depend on circumstances. Extreme dangers justify strong measures. He must in any case be largely judged by results.

To put an illustration: I conceive that an officer would be guilty of the greatest inhumanity, if in some district where order and security in general reigned beyond risk of disturbance, he fired upon a crowd which in a purely local and isolated disturbance required to be dispersed, and did not go to the extreme of leniency in consideration of surrounding circumstances, and of the fact that, breach of law though there might be, its consequences were not likely to be serious even if it were not checked or only very mildly checked. The converse I submit is equally true and indeed a platitude.

I submit, therefore, that the criticisms in the Hunter Report of the firing are vitiated by the false principle upon which they proceed.

The principle in question is false too in law. The rules regulating the action of the military during civil disorders, as stated in Chapter XIII. of the Manual of Military Law distinguish clearly three things (1) Unlawful Assembly; (2) Riot; (3) Insurrection.

It is conceded that I was faced not with unlawful assembly or riot, but with insurrection (open rebellion the Committee call it).

Mere dispersal is laid down as the proper course in a case of unlawful assembly only; of insurrection it is said (page 224)—

"The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection."

What the Hunter Committee have done is to apply the principles applicable to unlawful assembly in times of otherwise general peace and quiet to a vital incident of a rebellion.

The principle upon which they base their criticism of me is thus seen to be opposed both to common sense and to law.

Moreover, the comment of the Committee derives whatever plausibility it possesses from its ambiguity. The phrase "effect upon people in other places" raises the question, what people in what other places? The people I desired primarily to influence were the actual people on the spot. To my mind they were the same mob under the same leaders that had perpetrated outrages of the 10th, and were the disturbing force during the subsequent period, and constituted the danger for the future.

As to people in other places, I did not wish to influence people or places that were not affected or in danger of being affected by the rebellion, but only the people who were involved or were becoming involved in the same movement in the neighbourhood of Amritsar and in other places in the Punjab.

I submit with confidence that this was not merely a proper, but an inevitable object of any action I had to take.

The following may be taken as a fair summary of the motives and grounds of my action:—

- (a.) I had before me the general situation summarized in the despatch of the Secretary of State in the passage cited on paragraph 5 above, and all its attendant military dangers. In addition I knew of the cloud from Afghanistan, which broke three weeks later.
- (b.) I had before me in the Jallianwallah Bagh not a fortuitous gathering, which at worst had assembled negligently or even recklessly contrary to a proclamation, but a mob that was there with express intent to challenge Government authority and defy me to take any effective action against it and in particular to defy me to fire upon it.
- (c.) I knew that it was in substance the same mob that had been in course of organization for some days and had committed the hideous crimes of the 10th April, and was the power and authority which for two days had ruled the city in defiance of the Government. I had, in fact, the rebel army in front of me.
- (d.) I knew, so far as human foresight could go, that if I shirked its challenge and did not then and there crush it, it would have succeeded in the design of its leaders, contempt and derision of Government power would have been complete, and that there would infallibly follow that night or next morning a general mob movement both from inside and outside Amritsar which would have destroyed all the European population, including women and children and all my troops, and involved in its ruin the law-abiding Indian population as well.

- (e.) I knew that this result would lead to a similar result in numerous places throughout the Punjab.
- (f.) I knew that ineffective action against the mob would gravely endanger my small force on the actual spot, and make its safe withdrawal difficult, and that its destruction would infallibly produce the results indicated in the last two paragraphs.
- (g.) I knew that on the four occasions when firing took place on the 10th, in Amritsar, its effects in preventing disorder and restoring security had been quite ineffective, and that with the small body of troops at my disposal, and the large, determined and defiant assembly before me I could produce no sufficient effect except by continuous firing.

It is, of course, impossible for me to separate the effect of these various considerations, and say what I should have done if one or other had not been present, whether, *e.g.*, if Amritsar had been merely an isolated incident and not the storm centre of the Punjab, or if the danger from the countryside, our constant pre-occupation, could have been ignored, I should have acted precisely as I did. I looked at the realities of the case as a whole, as a soldier was bound to do.

But if any one dominant motive can be extracted it was the determination to avert from the European women and children and those of the law-abiding Indian community the fate which I was convinced would be theirs, if I did not meet the challenge and produce the required effect to restore order and security. I am conscious that it was this motive which gave me the strength of will to carry out my duty. Of its force in the mind of an Indian Army officer of thirty-four years' residence in India I am sure the Army Council will have no doubt. The terms of the thanks which I afterwards received from so many Indians showed what a cloud of apprehension rested upon the minds not only of Europeans but of the law-abiding Indian population as a whole regarding the fate of their children and women-folk during those fateful days.

Upon the above considerations, I submit that if my object be admitted to be a proper object, namely, the restoration of order and security, and if I was not confined to the bare mechanical operation of getting the crowd "to move on," then no evidence or ground is anywhere suggested to show that the force I used was in the least degree excessive. The Committee do not indeed anywhere attempt to show this, but base their disapproval substantially on the ground that I had no right to seek the general object of the restoration of order, but should have confined myself to the bare mechanical operation above mentioned.

Upon the assumption that I was justified in seeking the wider object, and in the absence of any ground shown for regarding my action as excessive upon that assumption, I will only allude to the adverse comments made in other parts of the Committee's report upon officer's who took insufficient action to secure the wider object of the restoration of order, and to the complete ineffectiveness of the measures taken in Amritsar on the 10th.

As regards the latter point the Adjutant-General speaking before the Legislative Council five months later, was quite clear :—

"Now he (Brig.-General Dyer) was well aware of the events of 10th April when the murders of Europeans and the attacks on property had been made, and when the firing which had been employed to suppress these disorders had been totally inadequate."

I am not here reflecting upon the authorities in charge of Amritsar before my arrival on the evening of the 11th April. At the time of the firing in question, the nature and extent of the outrages were not known to them. But the results which appeared afterwards and were present to me on my arrival showed how ineffective the action taken had in fact been.

In the same connection I may quote the Committee's own comment on the firing by the small picket near the Hall Bridge on the 10th April :—

"It angered some, and as an incitement it might well be effective with others." (*Report*, page 26.)

In point of fact, after this first firing, the crowd merely withdrew from the point assailed, and proceeded to attack and smash up the telegraph office, and attempt the murder of the telegraph master, who was rescued only at the last moment by the station picket (*Report*, page 25).

As to the grounds for regarding the crowd upon which I fired as being a rebellious mob and not an innocent political assembly, some further remarks important to my defence will be found in paragraphs 8 and 9 below, where I deal directly with the suggestion that it was largely composed of innocent people.

To sum up, I respectfully submit—

- (1.) That the object which I sought was a right object.
- (2.) That the force I used was not excessive for the purpose.
- (3.) That, as the result showed, it did achieve the effect desired; and
- (4.) That no less force on that occasion would have achieved that effect.

8. POINTS AS TO PUBLICITY OF PROCLAMATION AND LACK OF WARNING TO CROWD.

It will be convenient that I should deal separately with two subsidiary points which arise in connection with my action in dispersing the mob on the 13th and have been made the subject of criticism :—

- (a.) That I did not cause my proclamation in the early part of the day to be sufficiently published;
- (b.) That I failed to give a further warning to the crowd before I actually caused fire to be opened upon it.

I think that I am justified in saying that neither the Hunter Committee nor the Government of India regard either of these points as involving questions of much practical moment, and I believe their importance will be found to lie in the inference which the Secretary of State has allowed himself to draw from them, inferences which I respectfully submit will be found on further consideration to involve a substantial misunderstanding of the facts.

(a) As regards the publication of the proclamation, the Committee do not allege that the proclamation was not advertised as widely as was reasonably possible, and consider that most of those who were present at the meeting were aware of it. They say (page 30, Report)—

“the majority of the people who assembled had done so in direct defiance of a proclamation issued in the interests of peace and order, many thinking that the reference to firing was mere bluff.”

The Government of India say (at page 8 of their Despatch) that

“it cannot therefore be doubted that most of the residents of Amritsar present at the meeting were aware of the orders and collected in defiance of them.”

The Secretary of State also does not appear, in the first instance, to attach much importance to this point taken by itself as he says (at page 24 of his Despatch)—

“It would be unfair, considering the state of the city, the heat of the weather and the strain to which the troops . . . have been subjected . . . to lay too great stress upon this point” (namely, that the proclamation was published in a portion of the city only).

I trust that the account I have already given and the comments I have already made on the situation will make it clear that I, at the moment of action, entertained the belief and had proper ground for believing that substantially everyone in the crowd knew that he had assembled in defiance of orders issued, and was there with a defiant and revolutionary intent. At the risk of some repetition I will emphasize a few grounds for this belief.

The general understanding in India that in times of riot crowds are not allowed to assemble must itself not be left out of account.

Next, quite apart from my own proclamation, the orders of the authorities had been clearly indicated throughout the two preceding days when crowds had been repeatedly ordered to disperse. This happened several times during the 12th, when, as the Adjutant-General afterwards said, I should have been justified in firing, but I refrained from doing so.

Moreover my proclamation of the 13th was not the only one. A previous proclamation prohibiting assemblies and declaring that all gatherings would be fired on had been drawn up by the Deputy Commissioner and issued on the 11th April by being given to a number of citizens to be published as best they could, and on the 12th I caused another to be issued by the police.

With regard to the actual issue of my own proclamation on the 13th, the evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Miles Irving (page 7, Vol. 3 of the Evidence) shows what happened. From 9 a.m. to about 1.30 p.m. I led a column through the streets of the city, accompanied by him. The column was halted at about 18 distinct places where drums were beat in order to collect the people and where the proclamation was read after people had collected. The proclamation was read out in the official Urdu language and also explained in Punjabee language to the common people. That it was heard by and known to the riotous element in the city was shown by their immediate

issue of a counter proclamation, the effect of which was to publish my proclamation still further. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer, says (page 26, Vol. III., Evidence) that, after I had made my proclamation, three persons went round beating an empty Kerosene tin announcing that the meeting would be held in the Jallianwallah Bagh, in deliberate defiance of my order.

I need scarcely say that the mere procession of a body of troops round the city accompanied by the General himself and the Deputy Commissioner would be a demonstration of unusual significance and attracting general attention.

Lastly, while I throughout this difficult business have done my best to keep my own responsibility to the fore, I had to follow, as regards the places where the proclamation should be published, the guidance of the local official who knew the city of Amritsar, with which I personally was little acquainted.

News travels with the utmost quickness in a place like Amritsar and the surrounding neighbourhood, and speaking from my 34 years of experience, I have no hesitation in saying that the order against crowds and the threat to fire was as well known as anything could have made them by the afternoon.

(b.) With regard to the criticism that I failed to warn the crowd before firing, it is to be noticed that the Hunter Committee concede (page 30, Report) that a particular military situation (*e.g.*, the risk of a small force of soldiers being overwhelmed by a threatening mob) may justify firing without the formality of giving a notice to disperse being observed, and that the only person who can judge whether or not such an emergency has arisen is the officer in command of the troops. As I said in my report to my divisional commander (page 327, Vol. IV. Evidence), I realized that my force was small and untrained, and that to hesitate might induce attack, and if I had reasonable grounds for my view I am brought within the reservation made by the Committee. But, apart from the imminent danger it was, in my view, futile and unnecessary to address the crowd because I was satisfied that it was a rebellious gathering, and knew of the proclamations that had been issued and had assembled in defiance of them, and that no warning would induce them to disperse. The actual approach of the troops, a comparatively slow process, must obviously have been heralded to the crowd by runners, and thereby itself operated as a warning. The Committee take the view (page 30, report) that

"it is distinctly improbable . . . that the crowd . . . would have dispersed upon notice being made that they should do so, and much more likely that recourse to firing would have been necessary to secure obedience to the proclamation."

And the Government, India (at page 8 of their Despatch) say that—

". . . in view of this circumstance (the smallness of my force) and the previous successes of the forces of disorder, it is most improbable that an excited and defiant mob would have dispersed on a mere warning."

The facts already stated with regard to the publication of the proclamation and the other warnings issued against meetings, and what I myself saw of the character of the crowd with no women or children in it, were sufficient to convince me of the utter futility of any further proclamation. That it was guided and addressed by criminal revolutionaries I felt sure, and events have proved that I was right. Quite apart from the military danger to which I have alluded, the spectacle of this dense crowd under such circumstances and listening to such speakers was enough to convince anyone on the spot that further warning was not a practical requirement of the situation.

I can see now that, if I had been thinking of protecting myself from subsequent attacks, I might have given more attention to the matter, but the needs of the immediate situation and not protecting myself from subsequent criticisms were my guide.

9. CROWD NOT INNOCENT AS SUGGESTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE.

I think that the real importance to my case of the two foregoing matters lies in the indirect influence they have had upon the Secretary of State.

After referring at a later stage of his Despatch to my omission to give warning before actually ordering fire to be opened as being inexcusable, he concludes his comment:—

"But he was not entitled to select for condign punishment an unarmed crowd, which, when he inflicted that punishment, had committed no act of violence, had made no attempt to oppose him by force, and many members of which must have been unaware that they were disobeying his commands." (Despatch, page 24.)

The ground of criticism here is changed. The principle of the Hunter Committee that I was not entitled to look beyond the needs of the moment and the mere removal

of the crowd from the Bagh has (as already explained) been discarded. With the different principle embodied on the above comment I respectfully concur. To produce the impression upon a rebellious population required to restore order by deliberately firing upon an innocent gathering would have been indefensible.

Such an idea never entered into my head. What I have already said will, I trust, make clear that I was faced with no such gathering, but with a defiant, organized, and rebellious mob, with a record of at least two days of outrage and treason behind it and the above vital comment of the Secretary of State is based upon imperfect information as to the facts. The Government of India certainly do not take his view of the facts, as they speak in the extract above recited of "an excited and defiant mob."

I am inclined to think it is possible that the Minority Report has had some influence here. Their expert prosecution of me, facilitated by the absence of any expert defence, I have already mentioned. The skilful extraction of passages from my evidence to be used against me, the reference to "people of the mentality of General Dyer" and the conclusion directed both against Sir Michael O'Dwyer as well as myself that "there was no rebellion which required to be crushed" (page 115 of Minority Report) show the nature of the hostility with which, for the first time after months of official approval or exoneration, I found myself faced.

I should make this statement too long if I were to go through this Minority Report and deal with its various charges, and I have not attempted to do so. But I am compelled to mention it here, as it is possible that it is to some extent reflected in the present criticism with which I am dealing. I notice in particular the phrase "indiscriminate killing of innocent people not engaged in committing any acts of violence" (Minority Report, page 115). One of the Minority, in a question to a witness, even described the meeting as a "lecture" (Evidence, Vol. III., page 37).

I have said, I trust, enough to show the absurdity of the view that I was faced with an ordinary political assembly composed of non-criminal elements. But, in view of the apparent adoption by the Secretary of State of this "innocent" theory, I may be allowed to deal with two further points in connection with it.

The presence in the crowd of villagers from outside the city appears to be thought important, as showing that people to whom the proclamation had not been read were involved.

So far as the question of knowledge is concerned, I submit, on the facts previously stated, that there would be a general knowledge throughout Amritsar and all natives visiting it that meetings were prohibited.

So far as the question of motive is concerned, the presence of the villagers only made the matter more sinister. I was aware that the day was one of a fair and a festival. I was aware, too, of the continued efforts of the agitators beneath the surface to bring the villages into the rebellion. It was here that the worst danger really lay. Even if they came into the city with innocent motives, they would find it seething with the murderous triumphs and treasonable defiance of the two previous days. But there was only too much reason to fear that they would come with no innocent motive and Sikh looters from without would have been infinitely more dangerous than the city mob. The Deputy-Commissioner (Mr. Irving) gave significant evidence on this side of the matter:—

"Q. Then on the 13th, the situation continued critical?"

"A. It continued very critical. We were able to hold the outskirts of the city. We made no impression in the city. The city was still impenitently hostile and that was not the worst, because the great danger was from the outside. If the villagers of the Manjha had turned loose, we should have had a situation not paralleled since the Mutiny. We know them to be hot-headed men, who, if they thought that the Government was failing, would step in for anything they could get.

"Q. Can you say yourself whether any rumours were afloat as regards general looting?"

"A. I was informed that the rumour in the villages was that there was any amount of loot in Amritsar. Government was failing in the control of the situation and the sooner people came in to get their share, the better. It was brought out in evidence that in certain villages people went off to get their share.

"Q. Did you form any opinion whether there was any foundation for these rumours?"

"A. I thought them very probable. I received a circumstantial story of a large party of villagers on the 12th and 13th about 3 miles from Amritsar and I thought it extremely likely that we should have some looting." (Evidence, Vol. III., page 6.)

Reports to the above effect were constantly coming to me, and the concerted attack on railway communications were further indications of the danger from outside. We found evidence afterwards that loot from the Banks had been taken out to the villages to demonstrate that the Raj had fallen and that the villages should rise and get their share.

There could be no reasonable doubt in my mind that any villagers in the meeting

were there as sympathizers and adherents of the insurrection. I do not say that it was physically impossible for the crowd to have contained people who had not heard my own particular proclamation, and as I told the Committee (in my answer of which the Minority characteristically seize hold) there may conceivably have been many. I did not in fact believe there were, and I was, and am, convinced that substantially the whole crowd knew they were there in defiance of the authorities and in furtherance of the disorders.

The second point I wish to emphasize is the confirmation through the subsequent trials of offenders of my judgment, formed on the spot, that the meeting was engaged in listening to seditious harangues. Almost every speaker was a person who was afterwards convicted of sedition or had a warrant out against him. One was a man who is believed to have been the actual murderer of Mr. Scott. Is it possible, in view of this fact (which does not appear to have been before any of the authorities who have judged me), to doubt that my instinct and information were right, and that it was no innocent gathering, but a seditious and defiant mob?

10. EXPLANATION OF ORDER CLOSING THE STREET WHERE MISS SHERWOOD WAS ASSAULTED.

The criticisms of my order issued on the 21st April prohibiting the use of the street where Miss Sherwood was attacked involves a matter quite separate from my action on the 13th in suppressing the revolt. It has been much misrepresented, and a short statement will, I hope, make clear its true nature. The order was only in force for a short time, and affected but a comparatively few people, and would not, I think, have been made so much of, but for the agitation against me for my suppression of the rising itself. It will be enough for me to explain my reasons and to submit that they were sufficient to exonerate me from any charge of military misconduct.

The attempted murder of Miss Sherwood was probably the most dastardly outrage in the whole rebellion. The fact that it was not murder was merely because her assailants made a mistake in thinking that they had completed their work. The door of a house in the street in question to which she fled after the first assault for protection, was slammed in her face, and after being again assaulted and beaten she was left for dead by the mob.

On the 21st April I closed this street during the daytime by putting a picket at each end, and ordered that no native should pass down it except on all fours. The order was not of course meant to be in any sense a permanent order, and the picket was only there for 12 hours in the daytime. It is a complete misunderstanding to suppose that I meant this order to be an insulting mark of race inferiority. The order meant that the street should be regarded as holy ground, and that, to mark this fact, no one was to traverse it except in a manner in which a place of special sanctity might naturally in the East be traversed. My object was not merely to impress the inhabitants, but to appeal to their moral sense in a way which I knew they would understand. It is a small point, but in fact "crawling order" is a misnomer; the order was to go on all fours in an attitude well understood by natives of India in relation to holy places.

I repeat what I said to the Committee that I had no conception that anybody would in fact use the street at all and, as is conceded by the Committee, hardly any people did so. A most trivial accident has been made use of in the Minority Report to misrepresent my action. Immediately after placing the picquets on the street I had gone into the city with a party of British soldiers and had occasion while there to order the arrest of some men and send them back to the camp under escort. The non-commissioned officer with me and the British escort who took them back did not know the city and naturally went back by the way they came. When they arrived at the street the picquet strictly enforcing the order compelled the prisoners to go down it on all fours. I am of course responsible for this, but it was a pure accident and quite contrary to my intention.

It is very easy for a minor incident like this order, given in the circumstances in which it was given when the feelings of horror were strong upon everybody, to be misrepresented in quiet times by people at a great distance, and I am entitled to cite the judgment of the Adjutant-General of India five months after the event as a fair account of my motives and as containing an official view of my case which should exonerate me from censure for action taken according to the best of my judgment.

The Adjutant-General, after describing the attempted murder of Miss Sherwood

and mentioning that an important political body had misrepresented it as being a "petty assault on a woman," proceeds as follows:—

"I feel sure that the Council will agree that it is not surprising that the Officer in Command took the view that some unusual measures were necessary to bring home to the mob that such acts of violence directed against defenceless women could not be tolerated. Something was required to strike the imagination and impress on all the determination of the military authorities to protect European women. This Council can readily understand how easily the feelings of soldiers would be outraged by acts of this nature and that they might be led to uncontrolled reprisals. Incidentally it is worthy of note in this connection that we have no charge against any of our soldiers during this rebellion. It is easy, my Lord, to criticise the orders issued by the officer in command at Amritsar, but the circumstances were altogether exceptional and the punishment, though humiliating, was not such as to cause danger to life or physical hurt. Except on one occasion when a body of prisoners were brought down the street in which Miss Sherwood had been assaulted, no compulsion was brought to bear on any individual to submit to the order. The order remained in force for a period of five days and there is good reason for the belief that, except for the party of prisoners already mentioned, those who were subjected to the order came voluntarily to submit to it for the sake of notoriety or martyrdom. One man after going down the street on his hands and knees three times had to be stopped giving further exhibitions.

"My Lord, the order was of course an unusual one and not one which might have been considered necessary by other officers in like circumstances. The officer in command at Amritsar will doubtless be prepared to justify his action should be called upon to do so."

11. CHARGE OF UNDUE NEGLECT OF WOUNDED.

Another subsidiary point of criticism is that I omitted to provide help for the wounded after the dispersal of the crowd. The Hunter Committee do not make this criticism. They appear to consider (page 31, Report) that, in view of the size of my force, I acted right in withdrawing at once to the Ram Bagh, and they say that it had not been proved to them that any wounded people were in fact exposed to unnecessary suffering from want of medical treatment. The Government of India in their Despatch do not blame me for this omission, but merely express regret (page 9) that no action was taken either by the civil or military authorities to remove the dead or give aid to the wounded. But the Secretary of State (at page 24 of his Despatch) is more severe and says:—

"that Brigadier-General Dyer should have taken no steps to see that some attempt was made to give medical assistance to the dying and wounded was an omission from his obvious duty."

I cannot help thinking that this criticism is really based on the misapprehension of fact to which I have already alluded, namely, that the casualties had occurred in a comparatively innocent gathering, and, as a whole, deserved the care of the authorities in the same way as would innocent sufferers in some big accident such as a flood or an earthquake during time otherwise peaceful. To succour any such innocent sufferers I should certainly have been prepared to make the utmost exertions and to take great risks. But in the actual circumstances of the case, I respectfully submit that the Hunter Committee were right to withhold adverse comment, and that it was not possible for me to use my small and hard-worked force for this purpose and that military consideration justified my action in withdrawing it at once to my headquarters. We had no field dressings with us. No medical officer could have lived in the city for an instant without a strong escort, and in my judgment none could be then spared. There is indeed no evidence to support the Secretary of State's apparent view that no assistance was given to the wounded by anyone. The hospitals were open and the Indian medical officers were there. Help from that quarter was available if asked for, and, as the Committee find, there was no evidence that unnecessary suffering had been caused to the wounded (page 21). I submit that there is no case whatever against me of any neglect of duty in regard to the wounded, and I venture to suggest that the criticism proceeds upon the assumption that the original firing was unnecessary and inhumane, the inference being that the failure to succour the innocent sufferers was equally inhumane.

I must add, in view of rumours which have come to my notice, that it is untrue that I issued orders that none of the wounded were to be attended to in hospital.

12. SUMMARY OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Avoiding, so far as possible, repetition on what has already been narrated I summarize below the military situation as it appeared to me:—

- (a.) The whole situation in Amritsar was primarily military. The civil authorities had already resigned power to Major Macdonald before I arrived.
- (b.) The local tactical situation was hopeless unless a vigorous front was maintained and the initiative preserved throughout.

I had at the time about 407 British and 739 Indian troops, many of them only partially trained men in a city of 150,000 inflamed with criminal excesses and virtual immunity from authority, and a dense warlike population in the countryside ready to break into looting and disorder as soon as the news that the Raj had gone under went round.

The force was necessarily inadequate for anything but the bare protection of the civil lines, a few patrols, and guards at the nearest vital points. The railway as a whole, the city itself and the surrounding countryside had to be practically ignored so long as we remained on the defensive.

Had the city mob and the Manjha Sikhs joined hands, as assuredly they would soon have done, the troops and the civil lines would have been taken.

(c.) There were, among the Sikhs, some thousands of returned Ghadr revolutionaries and a vast number of demobilized soldiers; the latter would have been most formidable had their loyalty become affected in the general disappearance of Government authority.

(d.) The railway was vital. The Punjab has only one main railway line which passes over six large rivers. Communication with the North-West Frontier is entirely dependent on this line. Early in 1919, I made plans for the disposition of my troops in the event of a rising, and had taken special steps in order to keep the bridge-heads in my area clear.

There were many lesser bridges of military importance.

It was impossible during the rising to find guards for all these vital points for want of troops. The report of the Committee and the map annexed thereto provide ample material to show that the destruction of communications was carried out methodically and with concerted action.

(e.) I was alive to the situation on the frontier of Afghanistan. It is more than possible that the rising in Amritsar was precipitated by the action of the authorities in arresting the two chief agitators on the 10th. Had it been delayed four weeks it would have coincided with and paralysed the mobilization and concentration of the army for the work on the frontier.

(f.) I knew that attempts were being made to seduce my troops, and rumours came to me of similar attempts elsewhere.

(g.) The general military situation was grave. It is summarized in the passage from the evidence of Sir Michael O'Dwyer set out in the Committee's Report (page 73).

His is not a soldier's opinion, but it is plainly based on military reports and coincides with the information I had in April, 1919. The Army Council will be in possession of all the reports on these facts, and will no doubt refer to them for corroboration.

With the foregoing considerations before me and the daily reports and sights of Amritsar itself, I had no doubt that I was dealing with no mere local disturbance but a rebellion, which, whatever its origin, was aiming at something wide reaching and vastly more serious even than local riots and looting. The isolation of centres and the holding up of the movement of military reserves by destroying communications were essential features of the conspiracy.

I was conscious of a great offensive movement gathering against me, and knew that to sit still and await its complete mobilization would be fatal. When, therefore, the express challenge by this movement in the shape of the assembly in the Jallianwallah Bagh came to me, I knew that a military crisis had come, and that to view the assembly as a mere political gathering, requiring simply to be induced to go away because it was there in breach of an order, was wholly remote from the facts and the necessities of the case.

Amritsar was in fact the storm centre of a rebellion. The whole Punjab had its eyes on Amritsar, and the assembly of the crowd that afternoon was for all practical purposes a declaration of war by leaders whose hope and belief was that I should fail to take up the challenge.

13. APPROVAL AND EXONERATION BY AUTHORITIES.

I must now direct attention to the way my case was treated by my superiors, both military and civil, from the date of the occurrence in April, 1919, till 22nd March, 1920, the first date when any official disapproval or censure was conveyed to me.

I submit that according to all military rule and precedent this treatment amounts to an exoneration which it is not now open to reverse.

The normal course of dealing with an officer whose conduct in an important matter is considered questionable, is, as is well known, to hold a Court of Enquiry and in the meantime to suspend him from his duties. No such action was taken in my case; and the following synopsis of events shows clearly the opposite nature of the course that was adopted:—

- (a.) On 14th April, 1919, I reported the firing in the Bagh to Divisional Headquarters in the Report B. 21. (Appendix C.)
- (b.) On the next day, or the day following, my Divisional Commander, Major-General Beynon, conveyed to me his approval. (Appendix D.)
- (c.) The Lieutenant-Governor about the same time agreed with the Divisional Commander (*see terms of telegram*).
- (d.) On the 21st April, with the concurrence of the authorities, I went on a special mission to the Sikhs.
- (e.) On 8th May, 1919, I was sent on active service in command of my Brigade to the frontier.
- (f.) On about the 28th May, 1919, I was detailed to organize a force for the relief of Thal then invested by the Afghan Army. On this occasion I had an interview with General Sir Arthur Barrett, commanding at Peshawur. I had by then become aware that the influences which had inspired the rebellion were starting an agitation against those who had suppressed it.
Sir A. Barrett told me he wanted me to take command of the relief force. I told him that I wished, if possible, to be free from any anxiety about my action at Amritsar, which so far had been approved. He said: "That's all right, you would have heard about it long before this, if your action had not been approved." I give his precise words as nearly as I can.
- (g.) About the end of July, 1919, I saw the Commander-in-Chief. He congratulated me on the relief of Thal. He said no word to me of censure about Amritsar, but merely ordered me to write a report on it, which I did. This report is dated the 25th August, 1919 (Vol. III., Evidence, page 201).
- (h.) On 5th September, 1919, Major-General Beynon in his report on the rebellion made to Army Headquarters repeated his previous approval of my action, and added a testimony to my other services in connection with the rebellion.

"The wisdom of General Dyer's action has been fully proved by the fact that there has been no further trouble at Amritsar." (Evidence, Vol. IV., page 322.)

and later—

"The strong measures taken by General Dyer at Amritsar had a far reaching effect and prevented any further trouble in the Lahore Divisional Area. His knowledge of the Indian and his popularity with the Sikhs did much to restore confidence and loyalty in the surrounding districts." (Evidence, Vol. IV., page 325.)

- (i.) On the 19th September, 1919, the Adjutant-General of India, who must clearly have had my report of 25th August, made a speech to the Legislative Council in which he reviewed the whole of my action. I annex a copy of the relevant part of his remarks as reported in the Official Report, as I regard his utterances, taken with what had already happened and in view of his position of Chief Staff Officer for disciplinary purposes in the Indian Army, as a complete exoneration of me and as conclusive against any further steps against me in the way of censure or penalty. (Appendix B.)
- (j.) About October, 1919, I was promoted by being given permanent command of a Brigade.
- (k.) On the 30th January, 1920, I was appointed to the temporary command of the Division, though owing to my illness which had been developing for some time, I never took up the appointment.

It was not till the 22nd March, 1920, that I was first told that my action at Amritsar was not approved, and that I was required to resign my appointment. This was at an interview with the Adjutant-General at Delhi, and the ground given was merely that the Hunter Committee had reported adversely to me. My evidence before the Committee was given on 19th November, 1919, and it will be appreciated from the above recital of events that it was not as a person on his defence that I came before it.

I submit with confidence that any penalizing action or censure after all the above incidents, involving as they do a long series of acts of express or tacit exoneration, will be contrary to the most elementary principles of military justice and discipline. I fully admit the right and power of the Commander-in-Chief to remove any officer who he considers cannot usefully be further employed in a particular appointment. The exercise of a discretion in this regard need not, however, be made an occasion of censure, and in my case, I submit for the reasons stated, it cannot properly be so made.

14. PROTEST AGAINST CHARGES OF INHUMANITY AND LOSS OF NERVE AND EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER.

The Hunter Report acknowledges (and the Government of India and the Secretary of State concur) that I acted at Amritsar solely from a sense of duty and in the honest belief that I was carrying out my duty. A grave injustice is, however, done to me by the lack of any acknowledgment that I was possessed of any feelings of humanity or regard for human life. The lack of such acknowledgment, combined with the clear accusations made against me in the Minority Report of Prussian brutality and indifference to innocent suffering when in pursuit of military security has greatly prejudiced my case.

It is hardly possible that this prejudice would have arisen had I been accorded a proper warning of the case against me, and the usual facilities for defence, when evidence of my previous reputation and of surrounding circumstances could have been adduced to refute such calumnies. Some short allusion to these matters here is necessary in view of the neglect of them in the report.

My 34 years' service in India, during which I had reached the rank of Brigadier, and had received satisfactory reports throughout, should by itself be some testimony to my character in this regard.

Shortly prior to the events at Amritsar I had been called upon elsewhere in the neighbourhood on three separate occasions to deal with outbreaks and disturbances which were all in a sense forerunners of the rebellion. I referred to these occasions briefly in my official report to my military superior of the 26th August, 1919 (Evidence, Vol. III, page 201), and will not now repeat the details. While I claim no credit for my success in dealing with these minor crises after others had failed, I am entitled to insist that in the presence of mutiny and defiance of law I did not fire a single shot or use any violent or coercive method, I caused no loss of life, and I restored order by the arts of leadership and conciliation. It was from such recent successes and with such a record that I came to Amritsar on the night of 11th April.

During the 12th April I took no sort of offensive action against the city, though, as is conceded it was in a state of rebellion, hideous crimes had been perpetrated, and grave outbreaks were to be apprehended for the future. "Prussian methods" would have been easy; the city, in which admittedly Government rule had ceased and the mob was supreme, could have been bombed from aeroplanes (one was at my disposal) and bombarded by artillery, while offensive infantry action against the population could have been taken in detail with possibly advantageous results from a purely military standpoint. The Adjutant-General of India himself has referred to my policy of patience and conciliation on this day.

I claim no credit for an abstention which was my plain duty. But I am entitled to cite my conduct and record in such matters as some refutation of the charges of inhumanity levelled against me.

I can cite, for the same purpose, and indeed may be allowed to claim some credit for my pacification of the surrounding districts after the 21st April. The report itself makes plain the grave pre-occupation which the countryside and the Sikh population was to us during these critical days. I toured it with all the energy of which I was capable on the 21st April and succeeding days. I did not fire a shot or use any coercive measures against the population; I merely displayed my escort and used all the personal influence and diplomacy of which I was capable, getting hold of the leading men, appealing to them and reasoning with them, and thereby calming the spirit of unrest and insubordination that had been spreading from the city.

Of my personal success in this direction, I mention as proof, the fact that when, a fortnight or so later, the news of the Afghan attack filtered through to us, the leading men from the district came forward to me and offered me 10,000 Sikhs to fight for the Raj, and invited me to command them. I and my Brigade-Major received the unusual honour of being made Sikhs, and I was acclaimed on various occasions by native gatherings as the officer who had saved the situation. My Divisional Commander referred specially to the success of this mission in his despatch of the 5th September, 1919 (quoted in paragraph 13 above).

The Hunter Report would have provided more complete material for judging my conduct had it taken some express note of the foregoing matters.

The danger of injustice to me would have been still further diminished if some express reference had been made to what I told the Committee as to my own feelings about the firing on the crowd. I said then, and I say now, that the duty was a horrible duty, which I performed with dislike and distaste amounting to horror. I was sure of my duty as I approached the scene with my small body of troops; I was doubtful of my resolution to overcome my feelings and carry out my duty. The motives which inspired me I have already explained. I refer here to these matters of sentiment because the calumnies against my sense of humanity call for a reply in the absence of any protection afforded me by the Committee.

I am entitled further to ask that consideration should be given to all matters in my record which bear upon my character as a soldier, so far as they are relevant to this case.

My general record will be in possession of the War Office and I need not allude to it.

The incident of the relief of Thal will form a part of that record. I only mention the incident here because it occurred after the events at Amritsar, and helps to show that my faculties were alive and in good order and makes it unlikely that I am open to a charge of having lacked nerve or lost my head on the earlier occasion. For this purpose I include here the message I received from the Commander-in-Chief as showing that at that time my judgment and capacity were unimpaired :—

[Copy of a letter No. 0/1118/695, dated the 21st June, 1919, from the Brigadier-General General Staff, North-West Frontier Force, to the 16th Indian Division.]

“The following remarks by His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, with reference to the recent operations at Thal, are forwarded for communication to Brig.-General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B. :—

“The efforts made by Brig.-General Dyer from the time he arrived at Kohat were attended with full energy and competence. The manner in which he disposed of his troops, the full use he made of his artillery, the ardour he infused into his troops, denoted the hand of a Commander confident in his capacity and in his troops.

“Brig.-General Dyer in this episode has given further evidence of power of Command.

‘Signed BRUCE HAY, Lt.-Col., G.S.,
for Brig.-General, General Staff,
N.W.F. Force.’”

It is necessary for me in this connection to say that it is untrue that I caused my party in the Jallianwallah Bagh to fire all its ammunition; I did not forget elementary musketry principles, and duly took care that a reserve of rounds was preserved sufficient for the extrication of the force, and subsequent emergencies. I do not follow the observation in the Secretary of State's despatch “until his ammunition supply was at the point of exhaustion.”

The foregoing narrative and explanations sufficiently show that I neither lost my head, nor acted in any spirit of inhumanity.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS AND CONCLUSION.

I have dealt in the foregoing paragraphs as briefly as possible with the mass of evidence and comment regarding my case contained in the Bluebooks. To attempt to cite all the relevant passages from the evidence and reports would obviously have been neither convenient nor practicable in a written statement, and I have confined myself to a few citations for the purpose of illustration only. If any points are considered not to have been sufficiently dealt with or any matters of doubt are found to arise as to which the Army Council desire further explanation, I request that Counsel may be heard orally on my behalf. I am advised that the whole case is one which can be more suitably dealt with by an oral argument, and as Counsel have already, in effect, been heard against me, it is only fair that I should not be condemned until I have had a similar advantage in making my defence. The Hunter Committee failed altogether to consider many points and much evidence which, had I been on my defence with properly formulated charges and expert assistance, would have been

presented to it. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who has more knowledge than anyone else of events in the Punjab has, he informs me, kindly offered to give the Army Council any information they may require, and I trust that, if necessary, they will avail themselves of this offer.

But I contend that I have said enough to show that upon the principal points of criticism I was justified in what I did, and that the circumstances required that I should act as I did.

In any case, I contend that I have abundantly shown, what alone it was necessary for me to show, that upon the facts before me and in the circumstances in which I was placed, I acted in good faith and had reasonable ground for my action.

I contend for these reasons that I should be finally exonerated from blame, and that all action of a penalizing character against me should be cancelled. As already stated I do not question the right of the Commander-in-Chief in India not to continue an officer in an appointment, if he considers that his employment therein is likely to prove an embarrassment to the authorities civil or military. But the exercise of such right need not involve censure or blame, and for censure or blame I submit there is in my case no ground.

The consistent course of official approval or exoneration to which I have called attention, and the irregularity so contrary to military law and so prejudicial to myself, with which my case was subsequently investigated are, I submit, obstacles prohibitive of all such censure or penalizing action.

My general record for restraint, discretion, and decision during the rebellion and the actual services which I rendered in suppressing it in the most critical locality of the whole situation, and by my successful mission to the Sikhs should further be given proper weight.

The charges of inhumanity are, I submit, baseless, and I request that I may receive an explicit assurance that my character is regarded as completely free from stain on this score.

Finally, I am confident that the Army Council in judging my conduct in an emergency, as critical as it was novel, will not fail to consider the responsibility which rested upon me and the possible consequences to the whole fabric of government in the Punjab, had I failed in energy and determination, and I claim to be entitled to the full countenance and support which was promised by the Government of India, when faced with the outbreak, to all officers engaged in the onerous duty of suppressing it.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

R. E. H. DYER,

Brigadier-General, Indian Army.



APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN F. C. BRIGGS, D.S.O.

PUNJAB DISTURBANCES.

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE by Captain F. C. C. Briggs, D.S.O., "The King's Regiment," Brigade-Major 45th Infantry Brigade, who was present at Amritsar from 11th April to 8th May, 1919, as Brigade-Major to Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer, G.B.

On or about 5th April, 1919, a code message was received from 16th Divisional Headquarters, Lahore, informing us that there might possibly be some trouble over the Rowlett Act on 6th April, and to get into touch with the civil authorities. The message ended up with "special precautions Amritsar." By this message, I was not sure whether Division had given special instructions to Amritsar, or meant that we were to give them. I therefore sent a code message to Amritsar and asked if Division has issued them any special instructions. I got an answer back to say that they had received no instructions, but they were in close touch with the civil authorities and were aware of the possibility of trouble.

On the same day, a message was received from Division ordering us to send 1 Indian officer and 20 Sepoys to Amritsar as railway station piquet. This piquet was sent at once and was posted at the railway station by Captain Massey, 1st Garrison Battalion Somerset Light Infantry, who was officer commanding Amritsar.

General Dyer commanding the brigade was away at Delhi at the time, and Lieut.-Colonel Hynes, 25th London Regiment, was commanding.

At Jullundur on 6th April we were in close touch with the civil authorities, and at the request of the Commissioner (Lieut.-Colonel Burlton) posted a squadron of cavalry in the vicinity of Jullundur City and had a company of infantry "standing to" in cantonments, ready to move to Jullundur City at a moment's notice. General Dyer arrived back that day.

The 6th April passed off quietly both in Amritsar and Jullundur, and, apart from "Hartal" and speeches, nothing unusual happened.

The 7th, 8th and 9th April passed very quietly and I myself thought that the chances of any trouble had gone.

On Thursday, 10th April, at about 4 p.m., I received a code wire from Amritsar saying that trouble was expected and that some British infantry, gunners and a plane were urgently needed. Before I had finished deciphering this message, another code wire was received from Division repeating the above information and ordering us to send 100 British and 100 Mohomedan troops to Amritsar. I took these messages to the General and he gave me orders about moving the troops to Amritsar. When I got back to my bungalow I found another code wire from Amritsar saying the situation was serious, manager, National Bank killed and the bank in flames and asking us to expedite dispatch of troops. I at once took this to the General, who decided to send 200 Indian troops instead of 100. We both went down to the station to commandeer the first train to Amritsar. We found that the first train the troops could possibly catch was a passenger train leaving Jullundur about 3 a.m. We arranged with the stationmaster to commandeer this train. This was about 5.30 p.m. We then motored up to the two regiments, to whom I had sent a warning order by orderly, and gave orders for the move. Jullundur is not an important railway station and a special train could not be marshalled there.

We then went to the telegraph office to send a wire to Amritsar to tell them reinforcements were coming. On the way I said to the General "that if the situation at Amritsar was really serious the mob would have cut the telegraph wire."

On reaching the telegraph office, we found that the wires had been cut since 4 p.m. We then went back to the station and by about 8 p.m. got the message through from there *via* Ludhiana and Lahore.

At 1 a.m., 11th April, the party of 100 British (25th Londons) and 200 Indian ranks (100 of 59th Rifles F.F. and 100 of 2/151st Infantry) under the command of Major F. S. Clarke, D.S.O., London Regiment, left Jullundur, in a special train which had been sent from Lahore.

I saw the party off and gave Major Clarke a written order that he was to reach Amritsar at all costs, and that if the line was cut or damaged, he was to detrain his men and commandeer vehicles to get them to Amritsar.

This may seem pessimistic, but we had had no news of the situation at Amritsar since the message saying the situation was serious, except from officers who arrived by the Bombay mail who said that mobs were hanging round the line and shaking their fists as the train passed. The natural assumption then was that the line would be cut after dark. As a matter of fact, this was done near Manawala, but it had been repaired by the time the troop train arrived.

The party arrived at Amritsar safely at 5.15 a.m. That afternoon a message was received from Lahore saying that if the situation at Jullundur permitted it, General Dyer should proceed to Amritsar and take charge there.

General Dyer and myself immediately motored to see the Commissioner at Jullundur and, after a short discussion, the General came to the conclusion that he should go to Amritsar at once. We accordingly left Jullundur at 6 p.m. and arrived at Amritsar 9 p.m. (11th April).

We found Headquarters and the troops not on piquet duty at the railway station. The Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Miles Irving, I.C.S.) and the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Mr. Plomer) were there, and came to meet the General.

The situation was discussed. The Deputy Commissioner pointed out that the situation was beyond his control and at 12 midnight gave me a written statement to that effect (which I have now). It was agreed that the City Inspector of Police should be summoned and the names of agitators taken with a view to their arrest.

Accordingly at 12.30 p.m. the General, accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police and myself with an escort of 50 British soldiers went to the Kotwali in the city to fetch the City Superintendent back to the station. It was necessary to take an escort as complete lawlessness had prevailed in the city since 10th April. As we passed along, buildings which had been fired were still smouldering.

The General had a long interview with the City Inspector (Mohamed Ashraf Khan), many names of the leading agitators were taken down by me and arrangements discussed for their arrest.

From this interview, it was apparent that the situation was very serious indeed. Civil law had been flouted and the mobs were treating the troops, when they marched through the city, with contempt, spitting on the ground, &c. It appeared also that the villagers were gradually being drawn into the rebellion by malicious lies.

By the time we had arrived, all women and children in Amritsar had been placed in the fort, which was a great weight off one's mind, and which must have been a very serious problem to the Officer Commanding Amritsar on 10th April, with the few troops at his disposal.

Arrangements for next day's work were finished by 2 a.m. (12th). At 7 a.m. picquets were cut down to a minimum and the remainder of the troops and headquarters marched to the Rambagh and camped there.

At 10 a.m. all available troops marched to the Sultanwand Gate where an aeroplane reported a large mob.

We reached the mob who were most truculent and spat on the ground at us. "Hindi and Mussleman Ki. Jai" was being shouted and it was with the greatest trouble the mob was dispersed.

The General decided that a proclamation should be issued by him personally and, after that proclamation had been well circulated to take strong measures. After the mob had been dispersed we marched through the city and sent off detached parties from the Kotwali who effected some important arrests. On the way back a message was received from the Commissioner Lahore saying 200 armed Manjha Sikhs were intending to raid the city. The Commissioner, however, did not put much reliance on this report.

During the whole of the day, messages were pouring in from all round the district confirming the seriousness of the situation.

At 10 p.m. that evening a party of British soldiers in lorries proceeded to Ashrapore Mission Hospital to rescue two English ladies who were calling for help. In fact the situation had become a military one. We were a force cut off from Headquarters by all means of communication except by aeroplane. Supplies from the city were practically impossible to obtain.

When we arrived back from the city the General dictated his proclamation to me and I wrote and gave it to the Deputy Commissioner to have translated and proclaimed round the city. This proclamation is known as No. 1 Proclamation.

At 9 a.m. next day (13th) all available troops marched through the city again and No. 2 Proclamation was read out at all important streets and corners. The rebels sent a counter proclamation after us saying that we dare not fire on them and that we had no shoes, or some such nonsense.

On the way back to camp, a Criminal Investigation Department man came up to the Superintendent of Police and said that a meeting was going to be held at the Jallianwallah Bagh at about 4.30 p.m. that afternoon in spite of these stern proclamations.

The General Officer Commanding was told this at once but scarcely believed that the agitators would dare to meet in face of all his warnings. About 4 p.m. Mr. Rehill informed us that about 1,000 men had already collected at the Bagh and the intelligence officer gave me a letter from Mr. Lewis, Crown Cinema Manager, who had been in the city disguised as a native confirming this.

The General Officer Commanding then gave me orders for piquetting the main gates of the city and march to the Jallianwallah Bagh. With all the heavy duties and picquets, and after piquetting the main gates of the city and leaving a reserve, we found we could only muster 50 armed Sepoys and 40 Gurkhas who were only armed with Kukris. We marched about 4.15 p.m. and dropped the piquetting parties for the main gates as we marched.

The party was led to the Jallianwallah Bagh by a guide, and arrived at a small alley just about broad enough for two men walking abreast. This necessitated leaving the armoured cars behind.

The General Officer Commanding, Colonel Morgan, Mr. Rehill and myself, got out of the motor and advanced up the alley, the troops following us. Coming to the end of the alley we saw an immense crowd of men packed in a square, listening to a man on a platform who was speaking and gesticulating with his hands. It was very hard to estimate the size of the crowd. The General asked me what I thought the numbers were, and I said about 5,000 or so, but I believe it has been estimated at more like 25,000. The crowd was composed of men; no women or children were seen during the whole time we were there.

The troops deployed to the right and left of the exit of the alley and laid down.

The General Officer Commanding then ordered the men to open fire. After firing a few rounds the mob split up and two large subsidiary mobs gathered together into the two opposite corners of the Bagh. It looked for a minute as if they were meaning to rush us. The General Officer Commanding therefore gave orders to direct fire on these two crowds. The mob gradually disappeared. The party then marched back to the Rambagh. On arrival at the Rambagh the men's pouches were examined; 1,650 rounds had been fired.

Fire was directed on the crowds and not individuals. The ammunition used was the ordinary 303 Mark VI.

The men did not hesitate to fire and I saw no man firing high.

That night special precautions were taken in case of reprisals.

Next day (14th) Mr. Donald the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, informed us of the mob's intention of holding another meeting near the Golden Temple. The General Officer Commanding then sent for Sirdar Arur Singh, Manager Golden Temple and Sirdar Sindar Singh and ask them to help him and to stop this meeting.

Both these men promised to help and to deny the false rumours which were afloat about the bombing of the Golden Temple which had been invented by the agitators in order to get the sympathy of the Sikhs.

The general said to me that morning that the thing to do now was to keep the Sikhs from being disaffected.

In the evening a meeting of Heads of Communities was assembled and they promised to open their shops next day and the General promised them protection.

The shops were opened next day (15th) and no trouble ensued. Gurkhas help the police in patrolling

the city, and a large piquet of 50 Gurkhas was posted in the Kotwali, a central spot, as a reserve. Barristers and Pleaders were made into special constables, who with their knowledge of law and order, were made responsible that law and order was kept.

The city soon became normal.

The General now laid himself out to keep the Sikhs from being contaminated.

On 21st April we accompanied a movable column to Gurdespur district and on 24th April to the Bugga Atari district. On these movable columns the General held large Burbars and spoke to the inhabitants.

Sikh officers from regiments in the Punjab were sent to Amritsar to satisfy the regiments that the Golden Temple had not been bombed.

The General gathered together many retired Sikh officers whom he knew personally, and sent them round the villages to tell them not to be taken in by the agitators who wanted to use them as scapegoats.

As a result of all this, the Sikhs gradually learnt that all they had been hearing about the Government and the Rowlatt Bill were lies and all chance of the rebels getting the Sikhs on their side vanished.

On or about 29th April, the Stationmaster, Amritsar, called me up on the telephone, and said a very exceptionally large amount of sticks (lathis) were arriving and he asked for orders as to their disposal. I told him not to deliver them to consignees, but wait for orders. The General Officer Commanding and myself went down to the station that day to see them. One large storehouse was full up to the roof with them, and there were many more in trucks.

By obtaining statistics from the station books, it was found that in 1918, 12 bundles had arrived in March and April whereas March and April this year 1,056 had arrived.

These sticks were very thick and very heavy and a blow from them in a vital spot would kill a man at once.

We were very pleased at capturing what was evidently the enemy's arsenal.

On 4th May we received a code wire saying trouble with Afghanistan was anticipated and on 6th May that War had been declared with Afghanistan and that our Brigade was to mobilize being part of the Afghanistan Field Force. Accordingly, on 8th May, I left for Jullundur, the permanent Headquarters of the 45th Brigade.

Signed J. C. BRIGGS, *Captain,*
Brigade Major,
45th Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX B.

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH OF ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF INDIA, SIR HENRY HAVELOCK HUDSON BEFORE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF INDIA ON 19TH SEPTEMBER, 1919.

The Honourable Lieut.-General Sir HAVELOCK HUDSON :—“My Lord, my only reason for intervening in this debate is to clear up one or two remarks which have been made by my Honourable friend the Pandit as regards the action of certain officers and others connected with the suppression of rebellion in Amritsar. I do not think the Honourable Member has given these events in their clear perspective, or in their proper perspective. The first event to which I shall refer is the Jallianwallah Bagh, and in order to give the situation as it would appear to the Officer Commanding at Amritsar, I must ask your Lordship's permission briefly to state the situation at Amritsar on the 10th March. We have the attempts of the crowd in the Civil Lines, the troops stoned and ordered, after due warning, to fire; the attack on the Telegraph Office; the Telegraph Master rescued by an Indian officer when in the hands of the mob; the murder of a European guard at the goods station; the murders of the Manager and Assistant Manager of the National Bank; the murder of the Manager of the Alliance Bank; the attack on the Chartered Bank; firing of the Town Hall and its sub-post office; looting of other post offices; attack on the Zenana Hospital; the assault on Miss Sherwood; the burning of the Indian Christian Church, and attempt to fire the C.M.S. Girls Normal School; the murder of a sergeant of the Military Works Department; a second attempt of the mob to break into the civil lines; troops again stoned and ordered to fire, later on towards nightfall systematic destruction of all lines of rail and telegraph communication; and finally, the destruction of two small railway stations and the looting of a goods train.

“My Lord, does not this read rather like the preamble of the Indemnity Act on the Gordon riots of which the Honourable Pandit kindly made us a present? The above would be the situation as it would appear to an officer who found himself in a position such as confronted the General when he assumed command at Amritsar on the 11th April last. It will be realized, I think, that the situation was one of unexampled gravity. The Commissioner of the Division had definitely stated ‘that the situation had passed out of his control,’ that he must rely on the military authorities to restore order by the exercise of military force. The city was in the hands of an unruly mob; organized attacks had been made on Government property; banks had been burned and looted; railway and telegraph communications had been interrupted; inflammatory posters inciting to ‘die and kill’ had previously been posted on the clock tower in the heart of the city, and the lives of Europeans had been taken in circumstances which I shall not describe in detail. It would be clear to the officer in command that the rebellion was not confined to Amritsar alone. He would be aware of the riots at Delhi and Lahore, and he would have had an opportunity of gauging the temper of the people by his personal observation. He would have been aware of the danger of the spread of the rebellion into the surrounding districts. As an officer in a highly responsible position, he would know that it was his duty to take all measures necessary to restore order, and that his actions would be judged by the measure of his success in so doing. He would also know that he would be held personally responsible for any action of his which might be considered to be in excess of the reasonable requirements of the situation. You cannot conceive that any officer on whom such a responsibility had been thrown would enter on his task in any spirit of light-heartedness; nor would an officer of his seniority and experience (he had 34 years' service) set about his task with a disregard of the sanctity of human life, or with a desire to exact reprisals for the acts of rebellion which had already been committed. His first act would be to dispose his troops with a view to the protection of life and property. His second would be to warn the populace as to the result, if it became necessary, to use military force in the suppression of further disorder. These are the steps which were in fact taken by the officer in command at Amritsar.

"On the 11th and 12th he reorganized his troops and on the 12th he marched a column round and through the city in order that a display of force might have its effect on the minds of the populace. We have it on record that the bearing of the inhabitants was most insolent, and that many spat on the ground as the troops passed. From the shouts of the mob it was clear that they were in an entirely unrepentant spirit. No military force was used on this occasion as the officer in command decided to issue proclamations as to his future intentions before employing such force. From a military point of view he would have been quite justified, I hold, in using force on that day, but the General Officer Commanding decided to pursue his policy of patience and conciliation. A proclamation was issued in the evening of the 12th and on the morning of the 13th April, the Officer Commanding marched with a body of troops through all the main streets of the city, and announced by beat of drum his intentions of using force should occasion arise. The people were permitted to collect in order to hear the proclamations.

"The announcement that unlawful assemblies would be dispersed by fire was received with jeers and cries indicating that the mob had no belief in the sincerity of the warning given. While the troops were still in the city, information reached the Officer Commanding at about 12 o'clock that, in spite of his proclamation, a big meeting of rebels would be held at the Jallianwallah Bagh at 4.30 that afternoon. As this place had been used before for meetings, and as large assemblies had been addressed by the heads of the agitation on the 29th and 30th March and the 2nd April, and as a dense mass meeting had assembled here on the 6th during the *hartal* and had listened to speeches intended to bring Government into hatred and contempt, it would have been clear to the officer in command that he might expect deliberate defiance of his orders. Now, he was well aware of the events of the 10th April when the murders of Europeans and the attacks on property had been made and when the firing which had been employed to suppress these disorders had been totally inadequate. The Officer Commanding at Amritsar had to decide about midday on the 13th of April how he would act if the projected meeting took place in direct defiance of his authority. After making dispositions for the safety of his command, he found that he had but a small striking force at his disposal. I believe the number was 25 men of one regiment and 25 men of two other regiments, belonging to the Indian Army, and, in addition, 40 Gurkhas armed with *kukris* only, and two armoured cars. Realising the gravity of the situation the Officer Commanding did not send, as he might have, a subaltern in charge of this small force. He realised that it was an occasion on which he, and he alone, must exercise the full responsibility. He marched this force straight to the Jallianwallah Bagh leaving the armoured cars which he had also taken with him behind, because they could not get into the Bagh. On reaching the Bagh his force was confronted by a vast assembly, some thousands strong, who were being harangued by a man who was standing on a raised platform. The Honourable Pandit would give us to believe that this was a fortuitous meeting of villagers and that they were listening to a lecture. That was not so in accordance with the facts, so far as I have been able to gather. It was clearly the duty of the Officer in Command to disperse this unlawful assembly. Realizing the danger to his small force unless he took immediate action, and being well aware of the inadequacy of the measures taken to restore order on the 10th of April, he ordered fire to be opened. The crowd was dispersed and the force was withdrawn. I have given the Council this narrative to show how the situation would be viewed by the soldier and will content myself with saying that from a military point of view the sequence of events justified the exercise of military force, and that the object of its exercise was fully attained. Also, from a purely military point of view, the Officer in Command would have been gravely at fault had he permitted the elements of disorder to continue unchecked for one moment longer."

"My Lord, my object in recounting to this Council in some detail the measures taken by the military authorities to reconstitute civil order out of the chaos produced by the state of rebellion, is to show that there is another side to the picture which is, perhaps, more apparent to the soldier than to the civilian critic. No more distasteful or responsible duty falls to the lot of the soldier than that which he is sometimes required to discharge in aid of the civil power. If his measures are too mild he fails in his duty, if they are deemed to be excessive he is liable to be attacked as a cold-blooded murderer. His position is one demanding the highest degree of sympathy from all reasonable and right-minded citizens. He is frequently called upon to act on the spur of the moment in grave situations in which he intervenes, because all the other resources of civilization have failed. His actions are liable to be judged by *ex post facto* standards, and by persons who are in complete ignorance of the realities which he had to face. His good faith is liable to be impugned by the very persons connected with the organization of the disorders which his action has foiled. There are those who will admit that a measure of force may have been necessary, but who cannot agree with the extent of the force employed. How can they be in a better position to judge of that than the officer on the spot? It must be remembered that when a rebellion has been started against the Government, it is tantamount to a declaration of war. War cannot be conducted in accordance with standards of humanity to which we are accustomed in peace. Should not officers and men, who through no choice of their own, are called upon to discharge these distasteful duties, be in all fairness accorded that support which has been promised to them?"

APPENDIX C.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GENERAL R. E. H. DYER, C.B., OF 14TH APRIL, 1919.

APPENDIX XIV.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 21.00, 14TH APRIL, 1919, TO GENSTAFF DIVISION.

I arrived here on night of the 11th April, and the same night went through the city to bring the Superintendent of Police in charge of the city to hear personally what he had to say.

After consultation with the Deputy Commissioner and police officials I determined with a view to showing the inhabitants that I had a sufficient military force to force them to law and order and also to arrest certain ringleaders. This was carried out between 12.00 hours and 15.00 hours on 12th April.

I was aware that the inhabitants had been warned that they were not to hold meetings or followings, and that if they did they would be fired on. To further enforce my wishes, a proclamation was proclaimed on morning of 13th by beat of drum in many of the main streets of the city, warning the inhabitants that unlawful acts would be punished by military force. On my way back from the city I was informed that the disaffected characters in the city had ordered a meeting in the Jallianwallah Bagh at 16.30 hours. I did not think this meeting would take place in the face of what I had done.

At 16.00 hours I received a report from the police that a gathering was beginning in the place mentioned above.

I immediately sent piquets to hold various gates of the city and marched with 25 rifles, 9th Gurkhas, and 25 rifles from detachments of 54th Sikhs F. F. and 59th Rifles F. F. making a total of 50 rifles, and also 40 Gurkhas armed with *kukris*. Two armoured cars also accompanied this party.

I entered the Jallianwallah Bagh by a very narrow lane which necessitated my leaving my armoured cars behind.

On entering, I saw a dense crowd estimated at about 5,000; a man on a raised platform addressing the audience and making gesticulations with his hands.

I realized that my force was small and to hesitate might induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the crowd.

I estimate that between 200 and 300 of the crowd were killed. My party fired 1,650 rounds.

I returned to my Headquarters about 18.00 hours.

At 22.00 hours accompanied by a force, I visited all my piquets and marched through the city in order to make sure that my orders as to inhabitants not being out of their houses after 20.00, had been obeyed.

The city was absolutely quiet and not a soul to be seen.

I returned to Headquarters at midnight. The inhabitants have asked permission to bury the dead in accordance with my orders. This I am allowing.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

R. E. DYER,

Brig.-General, Commanding 45th Brigade

APPENDIX D.

TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO FOREGOING FROM 16TH DIVISION.

APPENDIX VII.

Telegram, (by aeroplane) No. 250 S., from General Staff Division, to General Brigade, Amritsar.

Your B. 2, Your action correct and Lieutenant-Governor approves.

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COPIES of all DESPATCHES received at, or sent from, the India Office, in reference to the recent RIOTS in *Bombay*:—Of all REPORTS by the Commissioners of Police at *Bombay* relating to the said RIOTS, or subsequent Proceedings consequent thereon:—And, of the MEMORIAL from the Parsee Community at *Bombay* to the Secretary of State for India in Council, and of the REPLY thereto.

(No. 3 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

To Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in Council, London.

My Lord Marquis,

We regret that it now becomes our duty to report to your Lordship that during the last fortnight the peace of this city has been seriously disturbed by disputes that have arisen between the Mahometan and Parsee sections of its inhabitants, in which some lives have been lost, some property has been destroyed and stolen, and a Parsee place of worship has been ransacked and desecrated.

2. Disputes between these two classes have on other occasions caused much mischief here, and the feelings of mutual dislike between the races are widely spread and enduring.

3. The immediate cause of the present disturbance was the publication by a Parsee, possibly with no evil design, of a book in the Guzerathi language, in which a concubine of Mahomet was spoken of, for want of any more correct term, as a "kept mistress." For some time it remained unnoticed, until an article in a Native newspaper attracted attention to it; and immediately aroused the anger of the Mahometans.

4. The Commissioner of Police on hearing what was passing, made every effort to pacify the Mahometans and to bring about the suppression of the publication, in which last effort he was in a great degree successful. A large meeting was held at the principal mosque, about which we are not yet in possession of details, at which the leading persons present professed themselves to be satisfied with the steps that had been taken, and, ostensibly, at any rate, exhorted the multitude to abstain from any further demonstration, and undoubtedly those on whom the Commissioner of Police most relied for accurate information gave him to understand that he need be under no further apprehension of violence on the part of the Mahometans.

5. About one o'clock on that same afternoon (Friday the 13th February), however (whether with or without some further trifling provocation is a matter in dispute), a large body of the lowest orders of the Mahometan population assembled, and before the police could overcome them, ransacked and desecrated a Parsee Temple, broke into and destroyed the contents of one or more Parsee houses, and stole money and jewels to a considerable amount; while in one or two other parts of the town some damage was done to the property of Parsees.

6. The police we learn succeeded by 2 p.m. in suppressing the riot and making prisoners of a large number of the rioters, of whom some received severe injuries in the fight, and one, a Parsee, has since died in hospital.

7. The Parsees became exceedingly alarmed, and the Commissioner of Police was authorised, if he found it necessary, to apply for military assistance; which on Sunday led to small detachments of Native infantry being placed in the most disturbed quarter. No disturbance of importance occurred on Saturday

the 14th, although there were two or three isolated fights, in one of which a Mahometan was so severely injured that he has since died in hospital.

8. On the next day, Sunday the 15th, matters became worse. The funeral of a Mahometan who had been killed in a previous riot took place, and although the police had taken charge of, and made arrangements for escorting the funeral procession, a large body of Parsees gathered near the burial ground. The Mahometans allege that the latter began the attack by throwing stones, while the Parsees assert that the Mahometans came provided with bludgeons. A severe fight took place, in which again several were severely wounded and more prisoners were made by the police. Seven Parsees and 16 Mahometans were taken to hospital, of whom one of the former and four of the latter have since died.

9. It now became evident that energetic steps must be taken by the Government to maintain peace and order. The police, whose reduced numbers had been shown to be insufficient for the control of the vast population of this city under unusual pressure, had been incessantly employed for successive days and nights; and the Mahometan festival of the Mohurrum, which is always more or less a cause of anxiety, was close at hand.

10. It was therefore decided at a meeting of Council held on Monday the 16th, that the usual processions through the streets should on this occasion be prohibited. It was at first proposed that this prohibition should extend only to processions by night; but further consideration and representations entitled to respect, showed the expediency of prohibiting them altogether.

11. The processions in question partake of the character of an annual celebration of an important historical event which divided the believers in Islam into two great sections. They are more an exhibition of triumph than a ceremonial connected with religious worship, and are strongly objected to by the stricter adherents to the law of the Koran. These practices have existed for so great a number of years, and so much importance is attached to them by large numbers of the more ignorant Mahometans, that the Government could not overlook the serious character of the step it was about to take, or the dissatisfaction which would be felt by many who were possibly innocent of any participation in the riots. It was considered, however, that during the excitement that prevailed among the two hostile races, further collisions would be inevitable, if the usual processions were permitted; and to prevent further risk to life and property, it was resolved, after careful deliberation, as above stated, to put an interdict on all processions through the public streets on this occasion in the interest of the entire community.

12. To carry out this order, and to make it plain that resistance would be hopeless, a large reinforcement of troops was ordered by telegraph from Poona. In the course of the following day, the 17th, a regiment of Native infantry, half a regiment of European infantry, and some cavalry, arrived. On the 18th more cavalry arrived, and a few guns were got in readiness. On the same day, the 18th, another meeting of Council was held, at which the Advocate General and some of the principal civil and military servants were directed to attend, and which resulted in the issue of the notification, of which a copy is enclosed.

13. On the following days, the 19th and 20th, the city was quiet. But on the evening of the 21st, some Mahometan labourers, who had just landed from their daily work on board ships, and who on their way to their homes had to pass through a street thickly inhabited by Parsees, were set upon by the latter in large numbers, and, before the police could gather in force, received severe injuries. Two Parsees and six Mahometans were taken to hospital, but all are still alive.

14. On the 23rd a petition was presented by the representatives of one body of Mahometans, praying that the prohibition of the processions might be withdrawn; of which, and of the answer given after their interview with the Governor, copies are enclosed.

15. On the same day also, his Excellency had an opportunity of impressing upon some leading Parsee gentlemen the importance of their exerting themselves

selves to check the spirit of retaliation which the lower classes of the Parsees had on several occasions exhibited, and of their giving their support to the efforts at promoting a reconciliation, which had been made by Mr. Narayan Wassoodeo, a Hindoo Legislative Member of Council.

16. It was pointed out to them also by his Excellency, not only that their own position might in the future be very inconvenient to them, but also that revenge might be taken on Parsees residing in other parts of the country, where the same amount of military protection could not be at once available.

17. These representations were respectfully received, but are not proved to have influenced the bearing of the Parsees.

18. On the 24th nothing particular occurred. On the 25th, the representatives of various bodies of Mahometans waited on the Governor to present another petition for the withdrawal of the prohibition of the processions; and copies of the petition, and of the answer given after a long conference, are enclosed.

19. It may be mentioned that from time to time the military authorities had been requested [to send detachments of troops to different places, which appeared to stand in need of such precautionary measures. On the 26th all was quiet.

20. The night of Friday, the 27th, was the time at which, according to custom, the processions should have taken place, and accordingly the arrangements described in the enclosed memorandum were made by the brigadier commanding the troops, and the night passed off very quietly.

21. In conclusion, we have to state that this Despatch has been written while we are still without any official report of the commencement and progress of these disturbances. The time of the Commissioner of Police has been so fully occupied throughout, both by day and by night, that he has found it impracticable to frame a detailed report. We have, therefore, in this communication abstained from any expression of opinion; pending the receipt of the report and the inquiry we propose to make without delay, we have confined ourselves to a simple narrative of what has occurred.

We have, &c.
(signed) P. E. Wodehouse.
H. P. St. G. Tucker.
A. Rogers.

Bombay Castle, 2 March 1874.

THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Thursday, 19th February 1874.

PART I.—NOTIFICATION.

Judicial Department.—Bombay Castle, 19th February 1874.

WHEREAS it has been found necessary to station troops in different quarters of the City of Bombay, for the preservation of the public peace during the Mohurrum Festival, and it is desirable that in the event of such troops being called on to act for the suppression of a riot, a justice of the peace should accompany them, the following gentlemen have been selected for that duty, and have been requested to place themselves in communication with the proper military authorities:—

Mr. E. W. Ravenscroft.
Mr. J. B. Peile.
Mr. W. G. Pedder.
Mr. F. R. S. Wyllie.
Major A. T. Moore.

Surgeon Major J. Lumsdaine.
Mr. E. Cordeaux.
Mr. H. E. James.
Mr. W. Loudon.

By order of His Excellency the Governor in Council,—

C. Gonne,

Secretary to Government.

To Sir *Philip E. Wodehouse*, K.C.B. and G.C.S.I., Honourable Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

May it please your Excellency,

THAT your Excellency's poor petitioners beg leave most humbly to lay these few lines before your Excellency, with the full confidence and with the sanguine hopes that the same will meet your kind and favourable consideration.

We beg leave to inform you that one book was published by Rustomji Hormusji Jalbai and others, regarding the life of prophets, which contains much against the life of Mahomed; the publication of this volume came to our knowledge, which hurted very much the feelings of all Mahomedans, therefore our kazi and other influential men came to know also about the contents of this volume, from whence they thought that great disturbance and row would take place, and in order to keep the peace they thought better to bring this to the notice of Mr. Souter, the Commissioner of Police, whereupon our kazi and other influential men went and saw Mr. Edginton, and then Mr. Souter, and gave him the information regarding the publication of this book, who received them with greatest respect, and thanked them to bring this information to his knowledge, and at the same time sent immediately to Rustomji Hormusji Jalbai, who came with the police havildar sent by Mr. Souter; no sooner he came he had some kind of conversation with Mr. Souter, and shortly afterwards promised that he would bring all the copies of the above book the following day to Mr. Souter which he had in his possession (this information we had from Mr. Souter), and Mr. Souter should do whatever he thinks right with these books, and Mr. Souter promised our kazi and other influential men, that he would endeavour his utmost to destroy these books, and they should try and keep the peace. Upon this information we were quite pleased and satisfied, relying on Mr. Souter that he would do something good to us; and also we tried our best to keep the peace for about four or five days. On Thursday evening, about 8 or 9 p.m., the 12th instant, our kazi held a meeting. To this meeting few of Shiahs and Soonees attended; our kazi recommended them, and all who attended the said meeting, to forgive Rustomji Hormusji for his publishing the above book, and also to keep peace and forget bad feelings. To this all of them unanimously consented, relying on Mr. Souter that he would try and destroy these books, and do everything good for us, and to keep the peace, and then we all left the meeting. The next day being Friday, some of Mahomedans went to the Jumah Musjid for prayers as usual, and after the prayers our kazi informed them about Thursday evening's meeting, and recommended them that they should try and keep the peace, so they all left the mosque. On their way home some of the boys were saying Deen, deen, up to they came to Battlewallya Molla, or Abdool Rahim-street; your Excellency will find that from the above mosque to the Battlewallya Molla, there are a good many shops belonging to Parsees who were present at the time, but none of them were hurt or insulted, neither the Mahomedans, but one Framjee, the police constable. At that time Framjee came down from his house, where he was living, and struck the boys for calling Deen, deen, and made them quiet for his own caste people. At that time that some of our caste people who did not attend the meeting asked Framjee the cause of his striking the boys; these men he also insulted, and some of them were also struck, and at the same time some bottles and other injurious things were thrown from the windows of the said Framjee's house, in that vicinity; thereupon the present row and disturbance is going on, also some of the Mahomedans who returned from mosque, further up than Framjee's house, towards the northern side, they also perceived something coming down from the windows of the other houses belonging to Parsees, where the Parsees live at time, that some serious disturbance took place for which we are very sorry, and on the same day similar disturbances took place in other places, also the next day, and also on Saturday. On Sunday, the 15th instant, our caste were prohibited from making any disturbance; and while some Seedees and others who were burying the dead body, good many stones were thrown on them by lot of Parsees, and good many of them were hurt, and on their returning home, good many Parsees came with the sticks in their hands and struck them severely; and good many of our caste people were also struck and injured with pistols, swords, and sticks, and some of our caste people were killed and severely struck. On account of such disturbance, good many of our

RECENT RIOTS IN BOMBAY.

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our caste people are in custody, and none of the Parsees are arrested, because we are to be blamed and not the Parsees, it is to our great surprise and astonishment. And since that time we were trying our best to stop our caste people to keep peace, but on the contrary, our caste people are yet struck now and then, and here and there, and since then we perceived that good many of our caste people are suffering very much; consequently a general meeting was held on Wednesday, the 18th instant, at that meeting Honourable Narrayen Wassooden, Doctor Blaney, and Mr. Raghoonath Narrayen Khotey, and several other Mahomedans of different races were present; at that time our caste people unanimously consented to keep the peace; at that time Honourable Narrayen said that he would induce the Parsees to do the same; since that time we thought that Honourable Narrayen would stop every disturbance, and after this we were very glad that everything would be stopped, and was stopped for four days, but suddenly again on Saturday the 21st instant, it is to our great surprise that four or five Seedees, while returning from boardship from Apollo Bunder, they were severely attacked, at the Hornby-road, by the Parsees and severely injured, now they are in hospital. Under these circumstances we earnestly beg your Excellency will be graciously pleased to render us protection and assistance. On the request of Parsees asking to stop the Mohurram procession, thereupon Government, under Section 77, of Act No. 13 of 1856, passed a resolution, dated 17th February 1874 instant, stopping such procession, which is great imposition on us, as it was carried for 900 years or more, but never was stopped in any way. In conclusion, we further beg your Excellency will have the goodness as to allow us permission as to carry on the Mohurram procession as usual, and also render us military force during the holidays.

Similar disturbance took place in the year 1851, on account of some mischief done by the Parsees against us, and then Parsees asked excuse, and have guaranteed in writing us for not occurring similar thing again.

Your Excellency's Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray,

(signed) In native character,
Hajee Hafiz Abdool Khan Kadeer.
Chandlay Shutree Syrang, or
Poogla Tandul, Street House, No. 17,
 and others.

Bombay, 23 February 1874.

(No. 989 of 1874—Judicial Department.)

To *Hajee Hafiz Abdool Cadur* and others, inhabitants of the City of
 Bombay.

Gentlemen,

In reply to your petition of 23rd instant, I am directed to state that his Excellency the Governor in Council has given full consideration to your request that you may be allowed to carry on the Mohurram processions as usual, and that military aid may be rendered to you during the holidays, and much regrets that he considers it to be his duty to decline to withdraw the prohibition of processions of any kind in the city of Bombay during the Mohurram Festival of the present year.

2. Government do not doubt that many of the persons who have signed this petition are desirous of doing all in their power to allay the prevailing agitation, and to prevent further breaches of the peace; but their ability to do so under present circumstances, if the processions be allowed at all, is extremely questionable.

3. A casual insult offered to a procession by some reckless individual would inevitably lead to dangerous riots, for the suppression of which the troops would be put in action and a loss of life of persons of, perhaps, all classes would ensue, for which the Government must feel they would be to blame.

4. Government would not for any light cause interfere with the established customs of any class of the community. Their first duty is to protect life and property, and they are satisfied that on the present occasion this can best be

done by prohibiting the processions in Bombay. In such a course they hold themselves entitled to the earnest support of all the respectable inhabitants of the city.

5. The other circumstances mentioned in your petition will receive due consideration at the proper time.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. Nugent*,
Acting Under Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle, 24 February 1874.

To His Excellency The Right Honourable Sir *P. E. Wodehouse*, K.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

The humble Petition of the Mahomedan Inhabitants of Bombay,

Sheweth,

THE disturbances which have recently taken place between the Parsee and Mahomedan community are in no way connected with their religious processions. A few only of the disorderly classes of both communities have been assaulting each other. The respectable portion of the Mahomedan community have in no way been connected with the disturbances or assaults.

Your Excellency's order, prohibiting the usual Taboot procession, is felt by the whole of the Mahomedan community to be an extreme invasion of their religious privileges.

That your Memorialists submit that the religious customs of erecting Taboots, &c., and of the procession thereof respectively, have been in existence in India for several centuries, during which it was on no occasions stopped by any of the Government, whether native or foreign, not even during the disturbances of 1851, nor during the disastrous Mutiny in 1858.

Your Memorialists are quite willing to carry the Taboots in procession only through streets inhabited by the Mahomedan community; your Memorialists also submit that if proper and necessary guards are placed near the approaches to the Parsee quarters, all possibility of any disturbances will be avoided. Moreover, your Memorialists submit that in the year 1851, under a similar state of disturbances, the processions were not prohibited, and your Memorialists submit that the present state of feeling between the two communities is not of so bitter and hostile a character as to require, by the prohibition of the procession, such an invasion of the religious privileges of the Mahomedan community.

Your Memorialists point confidently to the fact that the leading members of the Mahomedan community have shown a most conciliatory disposition towards the Parsees, and that they are supported in showing that conciliatory tone by nearly the whole of the Mahomedan community.

Under these circumstances it would be extremely unfair to deprive the Mahomedan community of the exercise of one of their most valued religious rights, on account of the improper conduct of a very small portion of their community; and your Memorialists hope that your Excellency would be pleased to allow the procession of their Taboots through such streets and in such a manner that no cause of disturbance could arise.

Your Memorialists further submit that if arrangements are made by which the processions can be carried out, all possibility of any ill-feeling being entertained by any portion of the Mahomedan community, on the ground that their religious rites have been interfered with through the agency of the Parsees, will be removed, and friendly feelings between the two races will certainly be more speedily re-established.

Your Memorialists, therefore, most earnestly hope that your Excellency will graciously take the case into your kind consideration, and will not allow the long prevailing and uninterrupted religious customs and usages of your Memorialists'

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rialists' community to be violated, and which said customs and usages have nothing to do with the present ill-feeling between the lower orders of the Parsee and Mahomedan communities.

And your Memorialists, as in duty bound, shall ever pray,

(signed) *Md. H. Chorghay and others.*

Bombay, 25 February 1874.

(No. 1063 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

From *John Nugent, Esq.*, Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay to Mr. *Md. H. Chorghay and others*, Mahomedan inhabitants of Bombay, dated 26 February 1874.

Sirs,

IN reply to your Petition, dated the 25th instant, I am directed to inform you that it was not without full consideration or much regret that his Excellency the Governor in Council arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary, on the occasion of the present Mohurrum, to prohibit, in the city of Bombay, the processions which for so long a series of years certain classes of the Mahomedan community have been accustomed to conduct through the public streets. The desire of the Government was to prevent, above all, loss of life, and secondarily the unlawful destruction of property. They believed that, for the attainment of those objects, the prohibition of the processions was indispensable, and they felt that the antiquity of the custom could not be accepted as a justification for endangering the lives of the community.

2. His Excellency in Council fully sympathizes with the respectable members of the Mahomedan persuasion, who are in no-way implicated in the disturbances that have taken place, but who are, nevertheless, of necessity subjected to an unwelcome interference with customs to which they attach much value. He would also gladly promote the restoration of good feeling between the Mahomedans and Parsees to which allusion is made in the Petition, and without which it is to be feared that both classes will suffer inconvenience in the future. But, unfortunately, up to the present moment there is no substantial indication of a change in that direction, nor, in the opinion of his Excellency, is there anything to warrant the withdrawal of the orders given for the preservation of life and property.

3. On these grounds his Excellency regrets that he must decline to sanction the conveyance of the Taboots through the streets of the city.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Nugent,*
Acting Under Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle,
26 February 1874.

EXTRACT from DISTRICT ORDERS by Brigadier General *Gill* commanding the District.

Bombay, 27 February 1874.

THE Byculla station posts to be abandoned (leaving one sowar to bring telegraphic messages), and to take post at Bhendy Bazaar, Abdool Raymon's stables, at 5 p.m.

The permanent garrison will consist of two guns detachment R.A. Captain Owen's detachment Poona horse from Nowrojee's stables when relieved by Major La Touche.

1. Company British Infantry 68th regiment, L. I.

305.

B

2. Companies

PAPERS RELATING TO THE

2. Companies Native Infantry 20th Regiment, N. I., and will furnish the following detached posts,—

Erskine Road. One native officer, 25 rank and file.

Khetwady. One native officer, 50 rank and file.

Obelisk Road. Two tanks, one havildar, and 14 rank and file.

Major La Touche leaving 20 sowars in his camp, will occupy Nowrojee's, stables, support Captain Owen's party, and look after the Khetwaddy and Obelisk road posts.

The Pydhounce picquet will be permanently occupied by two Companies of Native Infantry, 8th Regiment, N. I. 50 sowars 1st Light Cavalry, and will be reinforced at night by one Company of British Infantry, 68th Regiment, L. I., and will furnish the following posts,—

Abdool Raymoon-street, two Naiques, and six privates.

Donjee Dongre-street, Parsee Wada; two Naiques, and six privates.

The Dhobie Talao picquet will be doubled as to Native Infantry (8th Regiment N.I.) from 5 p.m. this evening, doubling the detached posts, and will be reinforced at night by 25 rank and file.

British Infantry (1/2nd Queen's) and one officer.

The British Infantry 2nd Queen's from Colaba will be brought in to join the camp on the Esplanade, handing over charge of their barracks to the Royal Artillery as a temporary measure.

The Grant-road station post is to be increased to,—

Two guns detachment R.A.

One Company N.I., 21st Regiment N. I.

Ten sowars, 1st Light Cavalry,

The usual detachment British Infantry 2nd Queen's will proceed to Grant-road direct this evening, and march to camp Esplanade in the morning, and to-morrow evening will march from the camp at 5 p.m.

The officer in command of this post will cause all the roads leading to Cumballa Hill, to be watched by videttes placed at the railway bridges and cross roads, not forgetting Chowpatty level crossing.

If the Bhendy Bazaar post, Abdool Raymon's stables, requires support, it is to be furnished from the Grant-road post.

Infantry are to be furnished with 40 rounds per man, and a further supply of forty rounds per man to be placed at the Bhendy Bazaar, Pydhouse, Dhobie Talas, and Grant-road posts.

The officer commanding 8th Regiment N. I. will detail a party of 25 rank and file to mount immediately at the Boree Bunder under the command of a native officer, to remain at the post until Sunday morning.

This party will act under the orders of the inspector of water police.

Officers in command of the Bhendy Bazaar post will inform civil officers of change of distribution.

The brigadier-general will pass the night at the Pydhouse picquet, and all reports are to be sent to him there.

True copies,
(signed) *G. Miles.*
Assistant Secretary to Government.

To his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, *Bombay.*

(Judicial, No. 5.)

Sir,

India Office, London, 23 April 1874.

1. THE despatch of your Excellency in Council, dated 2nd March, No. 3, of 1874, reporting serious riots arising from some disputes between the Mahomedan and Parsee sections of the population in the city of Bombay, has been considered by me in Council.

2. I much regret these occurrences, but I will refrain from remarking upon them

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them until I am placed in possession of the official report on the commencement and progress of these disturbances, alluded to in the last paragraph of the Despatch under reply.

I have, &c.,
signed) *Salisbury.*

(No. 10 of 1874.)

Government of India—Home Department—Judicial—Police.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of *Salisbury*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for *India*.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 10 April 1874.

THE judicial Despatch to your Lordship from the Government of Bombay, No. 3, dated the 2nd ultimo, contained a preliminary account of the riots in the town of Bombay in February last. We now transmit for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter* which we have since received from the Government of Bombay, containing, among other papers, a report regarding these disturbances, drawn up by the Commissioner of Bombay, together with a copy of our letter† to the Government of Bombay on the subject.

* No. 1458, dated 16th March 1874

† No. 108, dated 2nd April 1874.

We have, &c.,
(signed) *Northbrook.*
B. H. Ellis.
H. W. Norman
A. Hobhouse,
E. C. Bayley.

From *W. Wedderburn*, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Judicial Department, to *A. C. Lyall*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India (No. 1458); dated Bombay Castle, the 16th March 1874.

WITH reference to the Despatch from this Government to the address of the Secretary of State, No. 3, of 2nd instant, of which a copy was forwarded to you with Mr. Acting Under Secretary Nugent's Letter, No. 1187, of 4th idem, I am directed to transmit for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Police Commissioner of Bombay, No. 464, dated the 28th ultimo, and of its enclosures, reporting on the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay, on Friday the 13th February 1874, and on the subsequent occurrences up to the date of the Report. Copy of a resolution passed by this Government on Mr. Souter's letter is also appended.

2. I am desired also to forward copy of a letter from the Quartermaster General of the Army, No. 79 B., dated 6th instant, and to state that his Excellency in Council has ordered the reduction of the force now in Bombay to the extent suggested by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, as this Government is of opinion that the measure may be safely carried out.

From *F. H. Souter*, Esq., c.s.i., Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to *C. Gunne*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Judicial Department (No. 464); dated Bombay, the 28th February 1874.

I HAVE the honour to submit a report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on Friday, the 13th instant, and of the subsequent occurrences up to the present time.

2. It was my anxious desire to have furnished this report at an earlier date, but I have necessarily been so much in the saddle night and day, and have had so many other pressing duties to attend to, that I have found it impossible to devote to it the time required.

3. I will now endeavour to lay before Government as brief and correct a narrative as possible of the unfortunate disturbances which have taken place, and which originated solely with

with Soonee Mahomedans, and also to show what were the apparent causes which led to them.

4. Ill-feeling arose amongst the Mahomedans against the Parsees in consequence of a book, styled "The Renowned Prophets and Nations," having been written and published by a Parsee named Rustumjee Hormusjee Jalbhoy. The book is in the Goozerathi language, and in it a passage appears, the interpretation of which is to the effect that Mahomed had a son named Ibrahim born to him by a kept prostitute; a phrase which implies that the prophet was the protector of a public woman. The Mahomedans look upon the above expression as an insult to themselves and defamatory of their Prophet.

5. The book in question was, it seems, published some 10 months ago, but was circulated principally amongst the Parsees, and was only brought to the notice of the Mahomedans very recently, when a deputation of them, headed by their Kazeer Abdool Luteef, waited upon me to represent their grievances.

6. Under ordinary circumstances I should probably have taken little notice of the matter, but seeing that the Mohurrum was so close at hand, and well knowing the excitement which prevails during this festival amongst all classes of the Mahomedan community, I deemed it advisable to exercise my influence in checking, as far as possible, a spread of ill-feeling between the Mahomedans and Parsees.

7. With this view I sent privately for the author of the book, who stated that he had not written regarding Mahomed with any idea or intention of insulting or wounding the feelings of his followers, and at my recommendation he willingly agreed to deposit in my office all the printed copies of his book which at that time remained in his possession. He also furnished me with the names of the subscribers to his work, each of whom I addressed by letter (copy of this letter is appended and marked A.), urging the advisability of their temporarily entrusting to my care any copies in their possession, and explaining to them my reasons for recommending this step.

8. I will here mention that the day the Kazeer Abdool Lateef waited on me with his deputation to represent their grievance was the 9th of February, or four days previous to the outbreak of the disturbance. The Kazeer then stated that he would get together and represent to those few of his community who had become aware of the publication of the book the steps I had promised to take, and he gave me every reason to believe that he would bring about a reconciliation and that no further trouble would arise; at the same time he promised to communicate with me at once in the event of any dissatisfaction being evinced among his people.

9. After the Kazeer's deputation left my office, I at once, in consultation with my deputy, Mr. Edginton, called up our chief detectives and gave them strict orders to watch the Kazeer's proceedings, and also to adopt immediate measures to keep themselves and me informed of the feelings and proceedings of the Mahomedans in connection with this matter.

10. Nothing particular transpired on the 10th. On the 11th Mr. Jalbhoy sent 85 copies of his work to the office, and called himself at night to see Mr. Edginton, to whom he expressed fears that a Mussulman neighbour named Sooliman, who he believed had brought about the agitation regarding his book, would probably annoy him during the approaching Mohurrum, and asked that police protection might be accorded to him at that time. The detectives reported that all was quiet this day, and that no excitement of any kind was observable.

11. On Thursday, the 12th, one of the leading members of the deputation who waited on me on the 9th, again called and informed me that a meeting of certain Mahomedans was to be held that evening with the object of discussing all particulars connected with the book, and the measures taken to remove the insult to their religious feelings, and he assured me that the matter would now be peaceably and satisfactorily settled. I directed the chief officers of my detective force to attend this meeting, which they accordingly did and reported to me the following morning (Friday) that the proceedings were in every respect conciliatory and calculated to allay any feelings of irritation which might exist in the minds of the people. This report was corroborated by a member of the deputation who had waited on me on the 9th, and who called again at my office on Friday morning.

12. From all the information I had gathered there certainly appeared no reason whatever to apprehend any disturbance on the 13th; and though I considered that under the circumstances any unusual display of police would only create unnecessary alarm and anxiety, I ordered Inspector Khan Bahadour Abdool Ali of the detective force with some of his agents to be present in the Jumma Musjeed during the time of prayer, and it was arranged that an experienced European inspector and constable (the statements of these men are appended and marked B. C. D.) should also be at the mosque in plain clothing. I took this precaution not because I in any way anticipated disturbance on the 13th, as the Mohurrum festival (during which, if at all, popular commotion would naturally occur) had not begun, but in order that the police might ascertain and make known to me the feelings of the people and report at once if anything extraordinary should occur.

13. About a quarter to one o'clock the European inspector at the mosque sent a report to his superintendent, Mr. Smith, to the effect that there was rather a large gathering, but that all was perfectly quiet; the superintendent of the division to whom this report was made

made happened to be with me in the police office at Mazagon at the time it was received. I therefore ordered him to proceed to the mosque at once and to let me know without delay if anything unusual was going on.

14. Mr. Smith had not been out of office many minutes when a report was brought by a sepoy that some Mahomedans had attacked Parsee shops and houses in Bhendy Bazaar and in Syed Abdool Rohimon-street.

15. Not a moment was lost in getting the few available policemen of the reserve force together, and, with the six mounted policemen then in the lines, my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and I started with all possible haste for the scene of disturbance.

16. Passing through Bhendy Bazaar we found considerable agitation in the streets, and learnt that a Parsee fire temple had been entered, the sacred fire put out, and all property in it mischievously destroyed. A few prisoners were here taken, and such precautionary measures as men and time would admit of having been put in force to prevent a fresh outbreak and keep up the communication, we went on at a gallop to Syed Abdool Rohimon-street, where it was reported that further mischief was being done.

17. On entering the above-named street we observed an immense mob of Mahomedans, composed chiefly of Arabs and Seedees, armed with bludgeons and sticks, in possession of the place, the main body seemed to be approaching us, and others were seen actively engaged in the work of destruction; some of them rushing out of houses with property in hand.

18. Nothing could have excelled the conduct of the small party of police, particularly of the Europeans, at this moment; they dashed into the midst of the mob and at once scattered them, and many of the offenders were immediately ironed or otherwise secured. From one house alone, that of Jeejeebhoy Dhunjeebhoy in which of all others most destruction was committed, about 40 of the rioters, principally Seedees and Arabs, were taken. Of these several made most desperate efforts to escape by rushing through the police; but they were mostly knocked down and made prisoners. In about half-an-hour from the time the police arrived at the scene, the whole disturbance was quelled and order restored. Sixty-four rioters in all were apprehended in this street, and but for the paucity of the police and the formidable men they had to deal with, many more prisoners would have been arrested.

19. It has been affirmed that the neighbourhood of Syed Abdool Rohimon-street was in the possession of an excited mob for some hours. Fortunately I am able to state exactly the time which elapsed from the outbreak of the riot to its suppression. The report of the European Inspector that all was quiet was brought to me at about a quarter to one o'clock; at about ten minutes past one by the office clock the news that an attack on Parsee houses was being made arrived at the Mazagon Office, and according to the statement* of a gentleman who arrived on the scene immediately after the disturbance, the riot was entirely suppressed, and the last of the rioters in custody by a few minutes before two o'clock. This corresponds with my own and Mr. Edginton's recollections of the matter.

* Further corroborated by letter marked E, and appended.

20. When order was restored I, in consultation with my deputy, made such prompt arrangements as seemed to us best calculated to prevent any further disturbance; European and Native police were massed in and about the localities inhabited by Parsees, and the few mounted police available patrolled the streets throughout the night. I also at once took measures to ascertain the amount of injury done to persons and property during the riot; and from the inquiries made regarding this and all subsequent disturbances have made out returns marked F. and G. respectively, which show plainly the number of fire temples and houses, &c., entered by Mahomedan rioters, with alleged value of property destroyed or stolen, and also the total number of persons of different sects injured. On this day five Parsees and eight Mahomedans were injured, of whom one Parsee has since died.

21. On Saturday morning, the 14th, my deputy, Mr. Edginton and Superintendent Mills personally placed all the prisoners, numbering 91, apprehended the previous day, before the senior magistrate, by whom they were remanded till the 4th March, and lodged in jail. There was a slight disturbance on this day, which from the evidence would seem to have originated by some Mahomedans of the weaver caste throwing stones at a Parsee house in Falkland-road. One stone, which is said to have been hurled at a policeman while endeavouring to restore order, accidentally struck one of the Mahomedan aggressors and caused fracture of the skull; the man was taken to hospital, but died the following day. Beyond a few panes of glass being broken, no other harm was done. I was on the spot with a party of police soon after the disturbance and succeeded in making 29 prisoners, the ringleaders being amongst them.

22. It appears that on Saturday, the 14th, a Mahomedan funeral party proceeding to the cemetery at Sonapore had been in some way annoyed or interfered with by Parsees who reside in that neighbourhood. This circumstance probably excited the resentment or the fears of the Mahomedans, as on Sunday morning, the 15th, three funerals, one that of a Seedee, which started from different parts of the town, met on the way to Sonapore and were attended by more than the usual number of persons. About 10 a.m. Mr. Superintendent Mills receiving information that these funerals were on their way, collected immediately a body of 30 native constables and one sowar and overtook them in Bholeshwur-

* See Mr. Mills' deposition on oath, marked L.

road. On the way the number of attendants was augmented by men dropping in by ones and twos. Mr. Mills states,* that the members of the procession at this time did not appear to be armed in any way, though some of them may have had sticks under their clothes, while others probably armed themselves subsequently with clubs and bludgeons from a wood depôt against the grave-yard wall, and by taking bamboos from sheds and fences inside. When nearing Sonapore, the procession, now numbering about 300 persons, escorted by the police passed through a locality occupied by Parsees, a great number of whom were standing on both sides of the road, but Mr. Mills exhorted them to be quiet and they did not in any way interfere. At the cemetery Mr. Mills was joined by Inspectors Austin and Brewin and 10 sepoy. The processions passed quietly into the burial ground and the ceremonies commenced.

23. In consequence of the number of people assembled, Mr. Mills sent off orders to the officers at the nearest police station to bring up to his assistance with all haste as many policemen as were available, and also despatched a sepoy in a buggy to call the Commissioner and his deputy to his aid with further help. Before the conclusion of the funeral ceremonies about 300 or 400 Parsees armed with sticks and bludgeons came up a back lane from the direction of the Dhobee Talao and commenced throwing stones into the graveyard. This excited the indignation of the Mahomedans, several of whom having armed themselves with sticks and stones thereupon rushed to the wall and retaliated upon the Parsees. Some of the Mahomedans assisted the police to restore order, but 40 or 50 Seedees jumped over the wall, rushed at the Parsees and put them to flight. The police however succeeded in getting most of them back again into the cemetery, and the tumult was for the time quelled; but in consequence of this disturbance, and fearing further outbreak, Mr. Mills despatched Inspector Austin to call out the military, who had after the disturbance on Friday been warned by me that their services might be required at any moment, and by order of the Brigadier General commanding the district were in readiness in case of need. The ceremonies being over, the processions were reformed, and started on their homeward journey in charge of the police.

24. It appears that a Seedee who did not return to the burial-ground was discovered down a bye-lane by the flying Parsees, who set upon him and left him for dead. Mr. Mills endeavoured to send off the injured man to the hospital before this deed was found out by the Mahomedans, but in this did not entirely succeed, and the Seedees were impressed with the belief that one of their party had been killed. Shortly afterwards a body of Parsees were seen drawn up in the Breach Candy-road, armed with bludgeons, which they brandished in a threatening manner. Two European police officers in succession went up and called upon them to disperse, which they refused to do. In the meantime the procession arrived at the place and the two bodies came into collision, the police being unable to restrain them. The Parsees eventually fled and the Seedees thereupon commenced an attack upon the Parsee houses in the locality. The police did their utmost to keep them in check until the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Edginton, who with a small party of European and Native police, reached the scene of the affray just before me, led his men into the midst of the mob in a manner entitling him and his small party to all praise; the mob was immediately dispersed, and but for the timely arrival of the additional police the Parsees would doubtless have suffered very severely. Thirty-six of the Mahomedan rioters were arrested, and in this disturbance 13 Mahomedans and seven Parsees were injured, of whom four Mahomedans and one Parsee have since died. The reason why all the prisoners here taken were Mahomedans is, that by the time the police were reinforced the Parsees had been beaten off and the Mahomedans were then attacking their houses. The Mahomedans, therefore, appeared at the time to be the aggressors, and the party guilty of a breach of the peace. Shortly after the disturbance was quelled the military arrived on the scene, but their services were not required.

25. I am sorry to say that after the Mahomedans had been routed by the police as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, some of the Parsees seem to have pursued and attacked the stragglers with unjustifiable ferocity; one old man of about 80, in particular, who could have had little or nothing to do with the riot, was hunted down, brutally beaten, and left for dead. He was removed to the hospital where he died the following day.

26. On the same morning between 11 and 12 o'clock some Mahomedans were without provocation attacked by Parsees in two different places in and near the fort, and three were seriously wounded. A crowd of Parsees also assembled in front of their fire temple, and upon Inspector O'Connor going to assist a police sepoy who was being hustled by the Parsees, he received a very severe blow on the head from a stick which but for his helmet would have probably killed him. The Municipal Commissioner, Mr. Pedder, and Mr. James, Under Secretary to Government, arrived on the spot immediately after this occurred, and nothing further happened. The Parsee who struck the inspector escaped into the fire temple, and has not as yet been identified.

27. In consequence of the disturbances which had ensued I deemed it necessary, in order to reassure the people, to apply for military to be posted in the town and for cavalry pickets to patrol at night. These arrangements were at once carried out under the orders of the Brigadier General Commanding the District, and have been in force ever since.

28. On

28. On Monday, the 16th, one of the Mahomedans who had been severely injured in the affray on Sunday died, and it was reported to me that his funeral passing through the town would probably excite the sympathy of his caste and rouse them to some act of revenge. I therefore, after taking certain police precautions, immediately proceeded in person to the military authorities and obtained the aid of two companies of the Marine Battalion, with whom I escorted the funeral about 2 p.m. to the Mahomedan burial-ground, and all passed off quietly. Nothing else particular transpired between Sunday the 15th and Saturday the 21st to disturb the peace of the town. The Parsees however during this time evinced much agitation and seemed to be troubled with all manner of misgivings.

29. On the evening of the 21st about half-past seven o'clock some 20 Seedees and other Mahomedans were returning quietly to their homes from on board ship where they had been working. They took the direct route to the native town, and had thus unfortunately to pass Hornby Row, a locality almost entirely inhabited by Parsees. From my inquiries it has been shown beyond doubt that when these men reached the above neighbourhood, a sudden alarm was raised by some Parsees who in a large body made a murderous attack upon them. One Seedee had his leg and arm broken; several others were more or less seriously injured; and but for the timely arrival of a few policemen, it is impossible to say what would have been the fate of these unhappy people. As the onslaught was made in the dark it has unfortunately been impossible for the police to find out the principal offenders. It is true that one Parsee was stabbed in this disgraceful attack; but I have been informed by the medical officer of the Jamssetjee Jeejeebhoy Hospital under whose treatment this man has been that the wounds from their nature must have been inflicted by some person while on the ground. It is evident therefore that they were given in self-defence, and it must be noticed that all labourers on board ship wear their sailor knives to enable them to do their work.

30. My reputation as a police officer having been loudly assailed in the public prints for not having taken such precautions as the events previous to Friday, the 13th, are said to have called for, I would ask for a careful perusal of paragraphs 4 to 13 of this Report, and also beg to attach original letters received from the Mahomedan gentlemen noted in the margin who were present at the important meeting held the evening previous to the outbreak. It will be seen that these gentlemen, two of whom are justices of the peace and the most influential men of their community, fully believed the ill-feeling regarding the publishing of the book had entirely subsided, and that they had no apprehension whatever of any disturbance arising. One of the gentlemen, Mahomed Ali Rogay, it will be seen, was himself at prayer in the Jumma Musjeed on Friday, the 13th, and observed no indication of excitement amongst his people, or any signs of disturbance. The testimony of this gentleman is unimpeachable. He has incurred great unpopularity among the Mahomedans, as they think he has taken the side of the Parsees, and has in consequence temporarily left Bombay.

Mahomed Ali Rogay, Esquire, Justice of the Peace. Cumroodin Tyebji, Esquire, Justice of the Peace. Mirza Ali Akbar Khan Bahadur. Mirza Hoossein Khan, Esquire.

31. From my searching inquiries and all that has transpired I am decidedly of opinion that if the disturbance was premeditated as generally affirmed, the plot must have been confined to a very few of the Mahomedan roughs of Bombay, and its secrecy thus secured.

32. I would further submit in support of this opinion that had any fear whatever of a disturbance being likely to take place existed in the minds of the public, the Parsee community in particular, against whom the attack was certain to be directed, would have shown their anxiety, and some member of that large body would assuredly have come forward in the interests of their people and for their own safety have given notice to the police and applied for protection. The only Parsees who expressed any alarm to me were a few who live near the house of Jalbhoy, the author of the obnoxious book, and they only stated that during the Mohurram they were apprehensive of being molested in consequence. The Municipal Commissioner also, who is in daily intercourse with many Parsees, tells me that he never had a hint of danger from any of them till after the riot of Friday, the 13th. These facts show that the stories of the Parsees, that they were aware previous to the 13th that an attack would be made on them on that day, are inaccurate.

33. It has been my endeavour in this report to describe minutely every case of riot and all severe attacks upon individuals which have been brought to the notice of the police. Other petty assaults have occurred in connection with the present disturbances, but I have not considered it necessary to mention them at length, or to comment on the numerous absurd or exaggerated rumours which have prevailed, all of which have however been immediately inquired into.

34. I must here explain how it was that at the commencement of the riots a sufficient police force could not be brought to the scene of the disturbance sooner, and the riot quelled even more promptly. The Bombay police force, in consequence of their having no barracks or lines, are scattered about the city wherever they are able to hut themselves; thus the bulk of the men do not reside in the division or section to which they are attached for duty, and on an emergency arising the only policemen that can be quickly got together are those actually on their posts. At the Mazagon Police Office the 13 native mounted police have lines, and here also a few of the reserve force happen to reside. It is therefore

the only place where a small body of police can be quickly assembled if suddenly required.

35. The want of proper quarters for the Europeans and lines for the native police in central and suitable localities impairs most seriously the efficiency and satisfactory working of the police force. This fact has repeatedly been brought by me to the notice of Government and the municipality, and will form the subject of further report.

36. Most severe criticisms have been published on my own conduct and that of the police generally in reference to these unfortunate disturbances.

37. As regards myself I willingly and confidently leave it in the hands of Government, without attempting a defence to decide, whether I am deserving of the strictures passed upon me, merely asking for careful consideration of all the facts stated at the commencement of this report.

38. But with respect to and in defence of the force which I have the honour to command, I beg most respectfully to urge in justice to them that their conduct throughout these disturbances has been such as to merit commendation, and in substantiation of this I would beg to adduce the following facts:

Even on the first day, unprepared as we were, the riot was completely suppressed within an hour, and upwards of 60 prisoners captured in the act of riot and plunder.

Since 2 p.m. on Friday, the 13th, notwithstanding the violent excitement of both parties, and the intense hostility which existed between them, not a single house has been plundered, nor fire temple defiled.

During the excitement which has prevailed it has been impossible to foresee at what particular point a disturbance might arise, but in every instance of riot the police alone have promptly met and effectually suppressed it, notwithstanding the demands upon them in all quarters of the city.

I would beg to point out also that this has been done by a police force considerably reduced below the strength fixed by Colonel Bruce in 1864 as requisite for the efficient performance of the police duties of this city.

The police force recommended by Colonel Bruce, then Inspector General of Police for all India, and which received the sanction of Government and was entertained in 1865, was of the strength shown below:—

46 European police of all grades, and
1,411 Native police of all grades.

Colonel Bruce in fixing the above force remarked, to use his own words, "And I am unable to perceive that the work can possibly be done with fewer hands." But in spite of the opinion of so experienced a police officer, the Bombay police force was reduced in 1868, 1871, and 1872 by—

6 European police of all ranks, and
108 Native police of all ranks.

39. Government will thus fully understand how severe the strain has been upon the police, notwithstanding which all the Europeans have been most steady and cheerfully performed their harassing duties, and have at all times displayed courage, promptitude, and discretion, entitling them to the highest praise; the Native police have also behaved extremely well, and have been steady and energetic in the performance of their duties. From the 13th up to the present time the police, European and Native, may be said to have been on perpetual duty night and day, for they have scarcely ever left their posts.

40. To say that Native constables are not as intelligent, energetic, and self-reliant as would be desirable is merely to say that they are Natives; but they have behaved extremely well and followed their European leaders with considerable courage, and have been most steady and obedient. The assertion that the majority of Native constables are Mahomedans is erroneous—the proportion to Hindus and other castes being about 25 per cent., and I should regret to see it reduced, as Mahomedans make in some respects the best policemen.

41. With reference to the accusation that not only have the Bombay police behaved badly in these disturbances, but that their general efficiency has fallen off of late years, I would in refutation respectfully point to the annual returns which will show that for several years past there has been a marked diminution in the number of crimes committed, and the amount of property stolen, while the proportion of convictions and of recoveries of stolen property has vastly increased. These results have received repeated commendation from Government and from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, and have been acquired notwithstanding the large decrease in the strength of the force.

42. Throughout these disturbances which have so severely taxed all hands of the police force, I have received most invaluable aid from my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and from Superintendents Mills, Bailey, and Moffat, and Deputy Superintendents Smith, Crumney, and Brown, who have all by their praiseworthy zeal and devotion to their duties shown an admirable example to the more subordinate members of the force.

43. As regards the allegation brought by the public papers against the detective force, that they not only failed in their duty, but that they deceived me, I would here remark that I believe these accusations to be as undeserved as they are unjust. The detective officers selected to watch the actions and to ascertain the feelings of the people in this matter;—Khan Bahadoor Meer Akbar Ali and Khan Bahadoor Meer Abdool Ali,—are both tried and faithful servants of Government in whom I repose every confidence, and believe that they would keep no information from me which it was their duty to acquaint me with. The last-named officer has very recently had the title of Khan Bahadoor conferred upon him by the Viceroy, at the recommendation of this Government, in acknowledgment of the excellent service from time to time rendered by him. This officer was by my orders present at the Jumma Musjeed during prayer on Friday, the 13th, and his report of what occurred on that occasion is appended in original and marked (B). It will be seen from the statement of this intelligent officer, corroborated as it is by the appended statements of the European inspector and constable, that at the mosque prayers were said as usual, and that there were no signs whatever of excitement or agitation amongst the congregation. I would submit that it was impossible on this occasion for the police to foresee the sudden and unpremeditated outbreak of a fanatical mob.

44. The presence of the troops has been most valuable in restoring confidence among the timid and to overawe the rioters, but in no case have they been called on to act. They have not only not fired a shot, but have never come into collision with the people. Their presence was required, not because there was any prospect of the mob overpowering the police, but because the police was not sufficiently numerous to guard effectually the whole city at a season of disturbance, and it was physically impossible for them without assistance to endure the fatigue of this anxious fortnight.

45. Before closing this report I would wish to acknowledge the ready and prompt assistance I have at all times received from Brigadier General Gell whenever it has been necessary to call upon him for military aid, and also the consideration he has always shown to my suggestions in stationing military posts and guards in such localities of the city as circumstances have rendered necessary.

46. I would also mention that since the outbreak on the 13th, I have been in constant communication with the Municipal Commissioner, Mr. Pedder, and that in many of the precautionary measures I have from time to time put in force for the preservation of peace and restoration of order, I have acted in consultation with that officer, whose cordial and valuable co-operation I desire to acknowledge.

(A.)

Police Commissioner's Office, Bombay,
13 February 1874.

My dear Sir Cowasjee,
A BOOK has lately been published by Mr. Rustomjee Hormusjee, styled "The Renowned Prophets and Nations, &c., &c.," and I understand that you subscribed for and received several copies of the work. It seems that the Mahomedans have taken great offence at some of the passages which they consider to defame their Prophet Mahomed; and as there is some excitement about the matter, I write in the interests of peace to ask if you would kindly allow the copies which you have in your possession to be sent to me for safe custody for the present, or till such time as the excitement may have blown over.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

To Sir Cowasjee Jehangeer, K.C.S.I.

A similar letter was sent to the undermentioned gentlemen:—
Framjee Nasserwanjee Patell, Justice of the Peace; Ardaseer Hormusjee Wadia, Justice of the Peace; Dinshaw Manockjee Petit, Justice of the Peace; Muncherjee Hormusjee Cama, Justice of the Peace; Nasserwanjee Manockjee Petit, Justice of the Peace; and Byramjee Jeejeebhoy, Justice of the Peace.

(B.)

From Khan Bahadoor Meer Abdool Ali, Inspector of Police, Bombay, to F. H. Souter, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner of Police, Bombay; dated Bombay, the 27th February 1874.

I beg to report that, in obedience to your order, I attended the Mahomedan meeting held at Dada Mukba's bungalow, at Byculla, on the 12th instant.

2. The meeting was composed of more than 100 members of the different sects of the Mahomedan community, and most of them were persons of weight and respectability. The subject of Mr. Jalbhoy's book, and the steps taken by you regarding it, were fully and calmly

calmly discussed; your action was unanimously approved, and the excitement occasioned by the publication of the book seemed to be peacefully and perfectly set at rest.

3. The proceedings of the meeting were of so thorough and peaceful a character that I could not reasonably suppose that any riot or disturbance would at any time afterwards break out in connection with the question which the meeting had apparently disposed of.

4. In accordance, however, with your further instructions, I, with three detectives, went to the Jumma Musjeed at noon on the following Mahomedan Sabbath, Friday, the 13th idem, to watch the proceedings, &c., of the congregation. I remained in the principal hall of the mosque on the ground floor. I did not see Kazeer Abdool Luteef, but was informed that he was then in the mosque. The usual prayers were recited; the congregation did not appear to be excited or agitated in any way, and nothing whatever occurred to lead me to suspect that any riotous outbreak was at all contemplated or likely to take place.

5. On conclusion of the prayers I stationed myself at the main gate of the mosque, and the members of the congregation came out and went away quietly in different directions. I did not see any of them armed with sticks or other weapons either inside or outside the mosque. By about 1 o'clock p.m. all the congregation had quietly quitted the mosque and its immediate neighbourhood, and I and the other policemen in plain clothing who had been sent on duty there, left the place.

6. When I arrived at the junction of Syud Abdool Rohimon and Shaikh Ally Junjerkur streets, I saw a crowd of people near the small police chowkee in Syud Abdool Rohimon-street, and on going there I saw a number of men and boys throwing stones at the windows of the houses of the Parsees. I sent information to the police office at once, and I and the policemen with me did our best to disperse the mob.

7. While we were so engaged a large number of Seedees and Arabs poured into the street from the direction of the chuckla, and commenced to throw stones at the windows, tear down the sunshades of the shops, break down the railings, and break into the Parsee houses on each side of the street.

8. Some of them ran towards Mirza Oil-maker-street. I and other policemen drew up across the road and prevented them from entering it, and consequently no damage was done by the mob in that street.

9. About this time Inspector Raymond met me, and he and I went together towards Alibaugh. On our way we saw a wounded Parsee lying in Dhunjee Dongria Cross lane, and removed him into Dhunjee Dongria-street, and made him over to some Parsees there.

10. Soon after this a large number of rioters entered this street from its northern end. They were all armed with sticks, &c. We repulsed them. We were both struck with sticks and stones, but were not much hurt.

11. At about 2 o'clock p.m. a few policemen came into the street from Syud Abdool Rohimon-street, where soon afterwards I found that the large and furious mob I had previously seen had been dispersed, and that many of the rioters had been captured by the police. I saw you, sir, the Deputy Commissioner, and other members of the force there at that time.

(C.)

From Inspector *R. Raymond*, of the Bombay Police, to *F. H. Souter*, Esq., c.s.i., Commissioner of Police, Bombay; dated Bombay, the 28th February 1874.

I beg to report, for your information, that on the evening of the 12th instant I received orders from Deputy Superintendent Smith to attend the neighbourhood of the Jumma Musjeed in plain clothing during the Mahomedan hours of prayer, from 10 o'clock to 1 o'clock, on the following day. I accordingly attended, accompanied by Constable Gough, who was also in plain clothes, and we waited about in the street near the entrance of the Musjeed. The worshippers commenced to assemble about 10 o'clock a.m., and by noon a large congregation had assembled, and I sent a report of the circumstance to Mr. Deputy Superintendent Smith. Their behaviour, however, was quiet and orderly. None of them carried sticks or were otherwise armed, and no circumstance arose to give me any reason to suppose that any disturbance was likely to take place. The prayers were concluded about 1 o'clock p.m., and the congregation poured out of the building in my presence, and dispersed quietly in different directions. The crowd having left the vicinity of the mosque, I ordered Constable Gough to walk through the Mahomedan quarter towards the chuckla and see that all was quiet. He went away, and after about a quarter of an hour returned and reported all quiet. Ten or fifteen minutes after this I again sent Mr. Gough to take another look round. While he was away a native constable came and reported that he had been sent by Mr. Gough to state that a row was going on in Syud Abdool Rohimon-street. I went there immediately, and saw crowds of Mahomedans pouring into that street from the direction of the chuckla through the bye-lanes. They were throwing stones at the houses

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houses of some of the Parsee residents in that street, and breaking the windows and railings, &c. I tried to stop them, but could not do so. I sent to the Commissioner's office and elsewhere, for help. Within less than a hour afterwards I saw the Deputy Commissioner, and other members of the office establishment, &c., &c., in Dhunjee Dongria-street, behind Syud Abdool Rohimon-street. I immediately afterwards went into Syud Abdool Rohimon-street, and found that the mob I had there previously seen had been dispersed by the police, and that a number of rioters were in custody. I went into Dhunjee Dongria Cross-lane, because I saw a Parsee lying on the ground. I found he was wounded, and picked him up and removed him into Dhunjee Dongria-street, and engaged myself in trying to disperse the mob there; shortly after which the reinforcement of police from office, &c., came, as I have before stated. There was no tumultuous meeting of Mahomedans near the mosque on that morning, and neither at the going in nor coming out of the congregation were there any sticks or other weapons in their hands.

(D.)

From Constable *Hugh Gough*, of the Bombay Police, to *F. H. Souter*, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner of Police, Bombay; dated Bombay, the 28th February 1874.

I HAVE seen the report of Inspector Raymond regarding the riot which broke out in Syud Abdool Rohimon-street on the 13th instant, and confirm the statements made therein up to the point at which Mr. Raymond directed me to pass the second time through the Mahomedan streets in the neighbourhood of the Jumma Musjeed. On receiving this order, I went and stood at the junction of Syud Abdool Rohimon and Shaikh Ally Junjerker streets. While standing there I saw two or three Mahomedan boys running towards Alibaugh and shouting "Deen Deen." I heard some Mahomedan men who were passing along tell these boys to hold their tongue. I went in the direction in which the boys had run, and when I got near the first of the Parsee houses in that street, I saw a crowd of Mahomedans run into Syud Abdool Rohimon-street from Bajee Palla-street. Some of them began to throw stones at the windows of the Parsees; others tore down the blinds of the shops, and armed themselves with the bamboo rollers, &c., of these blinds. I tried to quell the disturbance, and was told by some of the rioters not to interfere, by others to go away. I sent at once to Inspector Raymond, to Deputy Superintendent Smith, and to the Commissioner's office, for assistance; this was a few minutes after 1 o'clock. The street became almost instantly crammed with rioters, who seemed to come in from all directions. I went through the crowd to the Parsee fire temple (Alibaugh), and saw a mob of Seedees and Arabs had broken into it and into some of the houses on the opposite side of the street, and were wrecking and plundering them. In about 10 minutes from this time, as near as I can remember, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner came with help from office. Immediately after they came, we (the police) charged into the mob and dispersed it, and captured a large number of the rioters. Nothing in the hearing of the people at the mosque led me to anticipate any breach of the peace. I did not see any of the congregation at any time armed with sticks.

(E.)

My dear James,

Marine Lines, Bombay, 2 March 1874.

I SHALL be only too glad if my evidence as to the duration of the riot on Friday will be of any service in correcting the mis-statements on the subject.

I left this house as nearly as possible at 12.30, and must have been in the centre of the Native town, at the top of the Copper Bazaar, at about 12.45. I reached the Elphinstone College at 1 o'clock, and left punctually at 2, as near as I can calculate. I must have passed through the centre of the town at 2.15, or possibly 2.20. When passing through first, there was no sign of a row, and I noticed nothing unusual. On my return I saw crowds moving about, but no fighting. At the top of the Copper Bazaar I saw a number of European policemen standing round their drag. I stopped my horse and asked what was the matter; and one of the constables told me that there had been a row, but that it was over. His words, as far as I can remember, being, "We have had a tough job."

I am perfectly willing that my name should be used, if required. I am sorry I was out when your note arrived, but hasten to send an answer now.

Believe me, &c.

(signed) *E. Giles.*

(F.)

RETURN OF FIRE TEMPLES and HOUSES, &c., entered by MAHOMEDAN RIOTERS on 13 February 1874 with alleged Value of Property Destroyed and Stolen.

Numbers.	Name of Owner or Tenant.	Locality.	Description of Building.	Alleged Value of Property.		REMARKS.
				Destroyed.	Stolen.	
1	Alibaugh property -	Synd Abdool Rohimon-street.	Fire Temple and Jumatkhana.	Rs. 5,000 -	a. p. -	Doors and windows broken. sacred fire extinguished. Cont of Temple stolen or destroyed.
2	Dorabjee Fardonjee -	- ditto -	Dwelling-house -	92 -	-	Doors and windows broken.
3	Pestonjee Cooverjee -	- ditto -	Liquor-shop -	1,500 -	3,000 -	Shop broken open. A cash box containing 3,000 rupees said to have been stolen. Pestonjee said to have been assaulted by one Nuboo Khan, and is in custody. Case postponed until 6th March.
4	Manockjee Cussetjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	50 -	-	Bottles and other things in shop destroyed.
5	Jamsetjee Nowrojee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	100 -	-	Ditto - ditto - ditto
6	Auderjee Framjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	100 -	-	Bottles of spirits destroyed or stolen.
7	Jeewanjee Hormusjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	650 -	-	
8	Cursetjee Hormusjee -	Nagdavie-street	Liquor-shop	900 -	-	
9	Cooverjee Hormusjee -	1st Coombarwada	- ditto -	350 -	-	Bottles, &c., broken and liquor spilled or stolen.
10	Nowrojee Manajee -	New Memonwada	- ditto -	400 -	-	Liquor spilled or stolen.
11	Cowasjee Jevanje -	- ditto -	- ditto -	300 -	-	
12	Jeejeebhoy Dhunjeebhoy -	Synd Abdool Rohimon-street	Dwelling-house	5,000 -	5,000 -	House wrecked; money, jewellery, clothes destroyed and stolen.
13	Pestonjee Munchorjee -	- ditto -	Dispensary -	2,300 -	200 -	House adjoining foregoing partly wrecked.
14	Dhunbai (woman) -	- ditto -	Liquor-shop -	700 -	-	Contents destroyed.
15	Bomanjee Ardaseer -	- ditto -	Sherbet-shop -	200 -	400 -	Shop wrecked and pillaged.
16	Jairbai Dhunjeebhoy -	- ditto -	Dwelling-house -	200 -	-	
17	Gopal Nana -	Dhunjee Don-street-	- ditto -	NH -	350 -	Shop entered by mob; gold and all ornaments stolen.
18	Heerjeebhoy Byramjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	13 -	40 -	Fifteen rupees and cooking utensils &c., stolen.
19	Bomanjee Pestonjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	43 -	50 -	Wearing apparel stolen and rail broken down.
20	Bomanjee Merwanjee -	Bhendy Bazaar	Fire Temple	2,784 -	726 -	Temple wrecked; sacred fire put out.
21	Jamsetjee Cowasjee -	Falkland-road -	Liquor-shop -	75 -	339 -	
22	Bhiceesjee Burjorjee -	Phull Gully -	- ditto -	195 -	587 -	The truth of this complaint is very doubtful.
23	Eduljee Rustomjee -	Erskine-road -	Dwelling-house -	-	40 -	
24	Pestonjee Dorabjee -	- ditto -	- ditto -	-	20 -	Door broken.
25	Dinshaw Jamsetjee -	Parell-road -	Stable -	7 -	13 -	
TOTAL - Rs.				20,959 -	10,785 -	

N.B.—Slight damage was also done to 79 other dwelling-houses, stables, &c., in different localities on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant, by wind glasses being broken, or benches, doors, railing, &c., &c., being destroyed or injured. The collective amount of the alleged damages is estimated at about 1,983 rupees.

Bombay, 28 February 1874.

(signed) F. H. Souter, Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

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(G.)

LIST of Cases brought to Hospital on the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 21st February 1874, during the Mussulman Riot

No.	NAMES.	Caste.	When admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Nature of Injuries.	Remaining in Hospital, 28th February 1874.
1	Dadabhy Rustomjee	Parsee	13 Feb. 1874	-	14 Feb. 1874	Contused wound of head; fracture of skull.	} Remaining.
2	Syud Ameen	Mussulman	13 " "	-	-	Laceration of tongue; contused wounds.	
3	Sherid	Parsee	13 " "	-	-	Suspected fracture of skull	} "
4	Dorabjee Byramjee	"	13 " "	19 Feb. 1874	-	Contused wound of face.	
5	Cassum Yacoub	Mussulman	13 " "	-	-	Fracture of left leg; contused wound.	} Treated and sent away.
6	Hosain Mohideen	"	13 " "	22 Feb. 1874	-	Fracture of lower jaw	
7	Shahodeen Doola	"	13 " "	13 " "	-	Contused wound of head	
8	Hakoom Subjada	"	13 " "	13 " "	-	- Ditto - ditto	
9	Allae Omir	"	13 " "	13 " "	-	Lacerated wound	
10	Nusserwanjee Sorabjee	Parsee	13 " "	13 " "	-	Contused wound of head	
11	Hussain Allee	Mussulman	13 " "	13 " "	-	- Ditto - ditto	
12	Towar Dhondoo	"	13 " "	13 " "	-	- Ditto - ditto	
13	Cowajjee Hormusjee	Parsee	13 " "	13 " "	-	Bite on side of abdomen	
14	Ismail Khan	Mussulman	14 " "	14 " "	-	Contused wound	
15	Assad Nayar Ally	"	14 " "	14 " "	-	Contused wound of head	
16	Manockjee Byramjee	Parsee	14 " "	14 " "	-	Suspected fracture of skull; contused wounds.	
17	Shak Ahmed	Mussulman	14 " "	18 " "	-	Three lacerated scalp wounds.	} Remaining.
18	Hyadeen Ahmed	"	14 " "	-	15 Feb. 1874	Fracture of skull; contused wounds.	
19	Franjee Merwanjee	Parsee	14 " "	-	-	Contused wound of scalp	
20	Nezamoolen Curambur	Mussulman	14 " "	-	-	Contusion and injury to spine	
21	Sides Jumrah	"	15 " "	-	-	Gun shot wound (right elbow)	
22	Jamsetjee Dorabjee	Parsee	15 " "	-	27 Feb. 1874	Fracture of frontal bone.	
23	Awadan Nusserwanjee	"	15 " "	-	-	Fracture vault of skull	
24	Nusserwanjee Bamoon	Mussulman	15 " "	-	-	Wound of scalp	
25	Unknown	Mussulman	15 " "	-	15 Feb. 1874	Fracture vault of skull.	
26	Khan Mahomed	"	15 " "	18 Feb. 1874	-	- Ditto - ditto.	
27	Oosman Khan	"	16 " "	25 " "	-	Wound of scalp.	
28	Sambakoo Sullimon	"	15 " "	24 " "	-	- Ditto.	
29	Unknown, Seede	"	15 " "	-	16 Feb. 1874	Wound of scalp; fracture of skull; laceration of brain.	
30	Casseo Sungoo	"	15 " "	-	-	Wound of scalp	} "
31	Hajee Ahmed	"	15 " "	-	15 Feb. 1874	Fracture of lower jaw.	
32	Caloo Sorab	Parsee	15 " "	-	-	Wound of scalp	} "
33	Shak Sab	Mussulman	15 " "	16 Feb. 1874	-	- Ditto.	
34	Ramjan Malomed	"	15 " "	22 " "	-	Wound of scalp; fracture of forearm.	
35	Succoa Jeera	"	15 " "	-	16 Feb. 1874	Concussion wound of scalp.	} "
36	Mucktoom Ahmed	"	15 " "	-	-	Fracture of forearm; scalp wound.	
37	Ditto	"	15 " "	-	-	Wound of scalp	} "
38	Burjorjee Nanabhoy	Parsee	15 " "	19 Feb. 1874	-	- Ditto.	
39	Cursetjee Janajee	"	15 " "	-	-	- Ditto	} "
40	Sadalla Mabrook	Mussulman	15 " "	-	-	Gun shot wound (buttock)	
41	Bairam Ardassar	Parsee	15 " "	23 Feb. 1874	-	Wound of scalp.	} "
42	Hajee Malim	Mussulman	15 " "	-	-	- Ditto.	
43	Imugoo Atia	"	15 " "	25 Feb. 1874	-	- Ditto.	} Treated and sent away.
44	Shak Ally	"	16 " "	16 " "	-	Contused wound of scalp	
45	Shapoorjee Pestonjee	Parsee	16 " "	16 " "	-	Contused wound of face	} "
46	Rustomjee Sorabjee	"	17 " "	17 " "	-	- Ditto - scalp	
47	Ardasar Jamsetjee	"	21 " "	-	-	Punctured wound	} Remaining.
48	Syud Jeewor	Mussulman	21 " "	-	-	Scalp wounds; fracture of skull.	
49	Bomonjee Merwanjee	Parsee	21 " "	-	-	Contused wounds	} "
50	Mahomed Singoo	Mussulman	21 " "	-	-	Scalp wound	
51	Barrack Mursook	"	21 " "	-	-	Contused scalp wounds; fracture of left tibia and fibula.	} Treated and sent away.
52	Yawah Mahabood	"	21 " "	-	-	Contused wounds of scalp	
53	Philan Abdoos	"	21 " "	-	-	Contused wound of head	} "
54	Salim	"	21 " "	21 Feb. 1874	-	- Ditto - of face	
55	Rustomjee Dhunjeebhoy	Parsee	22 " "	22 " "	-	- Ditto - of ear	

Byculla, 26 February 1874.

(signed) J. Anderson, House Surgeon, Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy Hospital.

P.S.—In addition to the list of casualties mentioned above, one European Inspector and six Native police were admitted into hospital seriously injured; several others also received slight wounds, which, however, did not prevent them from continuing their duty.

(signed) F. H. Souter, Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

(H.)

My dear Mr. Souter,

Callian, 25 February 1874.

ACCORDING to your wish expressed in Mr. Edginton's letter to me of this day's date, I beg to furnish you with the following statement of my opinion on the subject therein referred to.

Kazee Abdool Luteef Lenday having called in a meeting on the 12th instant, at the house of Dada Mukba at Byculla, I was present on an invitation. The action taken by you with regard to the suppression of the publication of Mr. Jalbhoy's book was explained by the said Kazee to the people present, and they all seemed to have been satisfied, as they expressed their entire approval of what had been done by you. After the meeting was declared dissolved, and coffee, &c., was served out, I left before others, and I believe I was the first person who left the premises. I left the assembly with a firm belief that the misunderstanding caused by the publication of the book was amicably and thoroughly settled. At the ordinary prayer meeting at the Jumma Musjeed, on the following day, at which I was present, everything, as far as it came under my observation, passed off in a quiet and orderly manner, and I had no ground whatever for suspecting that any disturbance of the peace was likely to take place.

The "Times of India" of the 14th instant, in reporting the disturbance, says:—"It appears that a meeting of the Mahomedans was held at the Jumma Musjeed yesterday morning, at about 10 o'clock. The feeling of those who were present, principally the men who afterwards created the disturbance, was much against the Parsees. Instead, therefore, of a peaceable meeting, the bad feeling showed itself in cries of 'Deen, Deen,' notwithstanding the praiseworthy efforts of Mr. Mahomed Ally Rogay to quiet the feelings of the crowd. He explained to them that as the book had been withdrawn from circulation, no harm had been done, and that by assaulting the Parsees they would only get themselves into trouble."

I should take this opportunity of stating that no meeting was called at all to my knowledge, but that the people had collected to say their prayers on Friday as usual, and that what is given by the "Times of India," as above quoted, is quite unfounded, since I, having had no reason whatever to suspect an outbreak, could not and did not say anything to the people to the effect that they should not make any disturbance. During the time I was present at the prayers not a word was said there regarding the last day's meeting, or the publication of the book. As a rule I leave the Musjeed as soon as the principal portions of the prayers are said, and I did the same on this occasion. About half an hour after I reached home I heard that something like a riot was taking place at Shaikh Abdool Rohimon-street. You will thus observe that, until the riot actually took place, I had no ground whatever for suspecting that any disturbance of the peace was likely to take place.

Yours, &c.

To F. H. Souter, Esq., c.s.i.,
Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

(signed) *Mahomed Ally Rogay.*

(I.)

My dear Mr. Souter,

Bombay, 24 February 1874.

I HAD no apprehensions whatever of a riotous outbreak after the meeting at Dada Mukba's bungalow on the 12th instant.

The remarks I made at that meeting were thoroughly acquiesced in by all present, and we all felt contented, and indeed thankful, that a speedy and peaceful solution of a very nasty question had been brought about by your timely interference.

I certainly left the meeting under the belief that the question was peaceably and finally settled.

Yours, &c.

(signed) *C. Tyabjee.*

(J.)

My dear Sir,

Bombay, 27 February 1874.

I UNDERSTAND from Mr. Edginton, your deputy, that you wish to have from me a concise information of what took place at the Mahomedan meeting convened at Dada Mukba's bungalow on the 12th instant. With much pleasure I will tell you here as nearly as possible what took place at that time.

I was present when Kazee Abdool Luteef spoke to the following effect: that he and others whom he named had called upon you and showed the book which Mr. Jalbhoy had published, and in which some disrespectful words were used against our prophet. The Kazee further said that you received him with kindness and grace, and heard what he had to say with patience, and you offered to do what you could in allaying the bad feeling which was likely to excite among the Mahomedans by such publication. You at once sent for Mr.

Jalbhoy

RECENT RIOTS IN BOMBAY.

23

Jalbhoy and took him aside and said something to him, when he at once offered to give up the books then in his possession, and to stop their further publication.

The Kazee then, after this explanation, told the assembly that they ought to be satisfied. Mr. Cammoroden and myself also spoke upon the matter.

The whole assembly seemed to have been perfectly satisfied, and there was not the slightest indication of any bad feeling among them. I was then of opinion that the matter had been satisfactorily and conclusively settled, and there was not the remotest idea or suspicion in my mind that there would be any disturbance on the following day.

To F. H. Souter, Esq., c.s.i.,
Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

I remain, &c.
(signed) *Meerza Ali Akbar.*

(K.)

Dear Sir,

27 February 1874.

In acknowledging the receipt of Mr. Edington's letter, dated yesterday, I have to inform you that I was present at the meeting (by invitation) at Dada Muckba's house on the 12th instant, when the question of Mr. Jalbhoy's book, and your actions in trying to prevent its circulation, were fully and calmly discussed.

I, on my part, assure you that I did not entertain any fears whatever that any disturbance would take place, and the general belief of the leading and respectable members of the Mahomedan section of the community was that the question of Mr. Jalbhoy's book had been definitely and satisfactorily settled.

In conclusion, I had no reason whatever to think that a disturbance or riot would take place on the following day, or at any subsequent period.

To F. H. Souter, Esq., c.s.i.,
Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *Mirza Hoosein Khan,*
Solicitor, High Court, Bombay.

(L.)

FORT POLICE COURT.

The Information and Deposition of *Thomas Mills*, inhabitant of Bombay, taken upon oath before me, *Nava Morjee*, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace, and a Magistrate of Police for the Town and Island of Bombay, on Wednesday, the 18th day of February 1874, in the presence and hearing of the prisoners named in the annexed list (A) charged before me, the said Justice, with committing riot and mischief, being members of an unlawful assembly, and rioting with deadly weapons, which said deponent, on his oath aforesaid, saith—

I am superintendent of police in charge of C division. On Sunday last, the 15th instant, at about 10 o'clock a.m., I saw two Mahomedan burial processions, accompanied by about four or five hundred persons, passing from Bhoiwada towards Bhooleshwar-road, and proceeding on to Portuguese Church-street. I, with about 20 Native policemen and one mounted sowar, accompanied them. They proceeded through the Agiary-lane and old Sonapoor-lane to the Mahomedan burial-ground. At Sonapoor-lane I was met by Inspector Austin, constable Brewin, and 10 or 15 Native policemen. The procession passed into the grave-yard, Inspector Austin and several Native policemen going with the procession into the grave-yard; I with the other policemen remained at the gate of the burying ground. Shortly afterwards an alarm was given that stones were thrown into the grave-yard. Mr. Austin, who had been standing near the wall inside, called out and told me that stones had passed over his head. The Mahomedans, some of whom were in the mosque and others in the yard, all rushed to the wall of the grave-yard in an excited state. I was mounted on a horse, and I galloped to the lower corner of the grave-yard outside, from which direction the stones were stated to have been thrown. There I saw, in the Sonapoor-lane, between two and three hundred Parsees, the greater portion armed with sticks and bludgeons. They were throwing stones at the Mahomedans in the grave-yard, and the Mahomedans were throwing stones from the grave-yard at them. I, with the other policemen who were there, went between both the parties, and while we were trying to press each party back, two or three of the police were struck and injured. The Mahomedans rushed out over the wall, through the police and among the Parsees. The Parsees turned and fled. When the Mahomedans first rushed upon the Parsees, a couple of men from each side were injured. After the Parsees had cleared away, the police drove the Mahomedans into the grave-yard, and they were kept there until things got a little quiet. I had, before any disturbance had taken place, sent Mr. McDowell, a municipal inspector, to the Null Bazaar Chowkey for some more reinforcement of the police. I had at the same time dispatched a sepoy in a buggy to call the commissioner and deputy commissioner of police with all the aid they could get.

I sent Mr. Austin in a buggy after the first disturbance, but before the arrival of the police reinforcement, to the commander of the troops to order out the aid of the military. The Mahomedans who had been driven back into the grave-yard as aforesaid, formed themselves into a procession to go home. They were in an excited state, and the greater portion of them were armed with sticks. Before they left the grave-yard I had information that a large number of Parsees had collected together at the end of the Sonapoor-lane, by which end the procession had to pass. I sent a European police officer and some sepoy with directions to disperse the crowd and send them away. The police brought back information that the Parsees refused to go away. Before allowing the Mahomedans to leave the graveyard, I, myself, rode to the end of the lane, and there, on the Breach Candy-road, saw hundreds of Parsees, a great number of them armed with sticks and bludgeons; one of them, whom I know as a clerk in the Municipal Commissioner's Office, was in the front of the crowd. I remonstrated with him and the others, pointing out that their conduct might lead to a serious disturbance. He and others who were very much excited, said, "The police won't protect us, we must protect ourselves." I insisted upon their clearing the road, and moved them back. The Mahomedan procession then came down the Sonapoor-lane, and turned to the left on the Breach Candy-road, which was their way home. I had the police drawn up on the right of the Sonapoor-lane. As the latter part of the procession passed out of the lane into the Breach Candy-road, the crowd of the Parsees rushed up, shouting and brandishing sticks. The police at this time were between both parties. The Mahomedan procession stopped, turned round, made a dash through the police, and amongst the Parsees. They got mixed amongst the Parsees, and both parties struck each other with sticks. The greater portion of the Parsees then fled, some into the houses and verandahs, and others towards the Dhobee Talao. Those Mahomedans who were scattered about, and those who were following the Parsees, were driven back by the police towards the Breach Candy-road. The Mahomedans then threw stones at the windows of the Parsee houses, and rushed on the verandahs to get in. The police drove them back, and prevented others from doing so. At this stage the commissioner and deputy commissioner of police arrived with a reinforcement. The police charged into the crowd, which turned and fled, some men through Funnuswaree, and some through the Agiary-lane, and other lanes and bye-lanes. All the men now present, except three, were arrested by the police while they were running away. A number of them was arrested in a gully alongside the Agiary. In consequence of the riot aforesaid on the Breach Candy-road, six or eight persons, some Parsees and some Mahomedans were injured. Out of them, three or four have since died in the hospital from the result of the injuries. I cannot identify particularly any single individual as having done some particular act, but they were all present at the riot, and refused to be dispersed when desired to do so. The troops arrived quickly, but before they had arrived the mob had been dispersed.

Prisoners decline cross-examination.

T. Mills.

Taken upon oath the day and year herein above written.

Before me,
Nana Morojee,
Justice of the Peace, Bombay.

BOMBAY FORT POLICE COURT.

Tuesday, the 24th February 1874.

(1) Nusserwanjee Bazonjee, (2) Dorabjee Nusserwanjee, (3) Manockjee Eduljee, (4) Sorabjee Temooljee, (5) Dinshaw Manockjee, (6) Byramjee Aspaniarjee, (7) Pallonjee Rustomjee, and (8) Rustomjee Aspaniarjee, are placed at the bar by Mr. Superintendent Mills.

Dr. Dallas appears for Nusserwanjee Bazonjee, Dorabjee Nussetwanjee, and Pallonjee Aspaniarjee.

Mr. Phirozshaw Merwanjee Mehta appears for Manockjee Eduljee, Sorabjee Temooljee, Dinshaw Manockjee, Byramjee Aspaniarjee and Rustomjee Aspaniarjee.

Mr. Thomas Mills re-appears, is re-sworn, and the foregoing information and deposition having been read over to him in the presence and hearing of the above-named eight prisoners, and explained to the prisoners, he further states as follows: Burjorjee Framjee, I have now ascertained, is the name of the Parsee I have alluded to in my foregoing information as the one who is employed in the Municipal Department. I pray for a warrant for his arrest. I also charge the eight men who are now in court with taking part in the aforesaid riot. Their names are (No. 1) Nusserwanjee Bazonjee, (No. 2) Dorabjee Nusserwanjee, (No. 3) Manockjee Eduljee, (No. 4) Sorabjee Temooljee, (No. 5) Dinshaw Manockjee, (No. 6) Byramjee Aspaniarjee, (No. 7) Pallonjee Rustomjee, and (No. 8) Rustomjee Aspaniarjee.

Cross-examination reserved.

T. Mills.

Taken upon oath the day, month, and year herein above written.

Before me,
Nana Morojee,
Justice of the Peace, Bombay.

(A.)

NAMES OF PRISONERS.

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Rasid Fareed. | 20. Billal Essub. - |
| 2. Ahmed Houssein. | 21. Furoz Goodo. |
| 3. Silleman Ahmed. | 22. Shoos Panchjamat. |
| 4. Khumis Syud. | 23. Ebram Bookar. |
| 5. Matoola Sungoor. | 24. Ismal Almas. |
| 6. Salmin Nussib. | 25. Hajee Ambar. |
| 7. Nussib Sarur. | 26. Abdoola Ebtam. |
| 8. Aurid Khamis. | 27. Sillamon Abdoola. |
| 9. Abdoola Houssein. | 28. Moobrack Farad. |
| 10. Ruba Nassur. | 29. Antone Dalman. |
| 11. Ismail Yaeud. | 30. Kyratee Houssein. |
| 12. Singoor Auladee. | 31. Shabadeen Mootazee. |
| 13. Feroz Ambar. | 32. Mahomed Goolam Mahomed. |
| 14. Pran Aman. | 33. Syud Acbar Allee. |
| 15. Moota Sillamon. | 34. Jahan Kooshal. |
| 16. Syud Moobrack. | 35. Syud Fazul Shlan. |
| 17. Syud Moosa. | 36. Syud Sally Mahomed. |
| 18. Jowaree Amber. | 37. Allee Bin Oomer. |
| 19. Amber Essao. | |

EXTRACT from the Proceeding of the Government of Bombay in the Judicial Department, No. 1375; dated Bombay Castle, the 12th March 1874.

READ—

Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, No. 464, dated 28th February 1874, submitting a report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on Friday, the 13th February 1874, and of the subsequent occurrences up to the date of his report.

RESOLUTION.—His Excellency in Council is glad to be in possession of this narrative by the Commissioner of Police of the action of the police force under his command during the recent disturbances in Bombay.

2. It would appear from this report that the police acted with praiseworthy energy and determination in the suppression of each outbreak as it occurred, but it is not satisfactorily established whether the original outrages which were committed on Friday, the 13th of February, were the result of a preconcerted design, or an accidental ebullition of class malevolence.

3. His Excellency in Council desires that the Commissioner of Police should make a more thorough inquiry on this point; and will await this further report, and the disclosures which are likely to take place on the trial of the principal rioters in the High Court, before pronouncing any definite opinion on the general character of the occurrences and on the conduct of the police in connection with them.

(True Extract.)

W. Wedderburn,
Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Judicial Department.

From the Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Military Department (No. 79—B.); dated the 6th March 1874.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to solicit the orders of Government as to the time when the troops which are summoned from Poona to Bombay in aid of the civil power during the late riots may return to their station.

2. It has occurred to his Excellency that Government might be able to dispense with the European troops at an early date, and that if it should be considered necessary to detain Native troops extra to the ordinary Bombay garrison, a detachment of 150 sowars and a wing of Native Infantry might remain for the present.

(Home Department—Police.—No. 108.)

From *A. C. Lyall*, Secretary to the Government of India, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Sir,

Fort William, 2 April 1874.

* No. 1468.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of a copy of the Despatch sent by the Government of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the disturbances in the town of Bombay in February last. Your letter of the 16th March* has also been received, forwarding, with other enclosures, copy of a report on these disturbances submitted to your Government by the Commissioner of Police at Bombay.

2. His Excellency the Governor General in Council regrets much that some of the Parsee community in Bombay should have been subjected to violent aggression that was originally altogether unprovoked, and that retaliation should in some instances have been made upon innocent persons in a manner that is entirely indefensible. His Excellency trusts that the leading representatives of the Parsees and of the Mahomedans in Bombay will succeed in their praiseworthy exertions to restore the good feeling between the two communities which has been interrupted by these unfortunate collisions.

3. His Excellency in Council considers that the authorities acted rightly in supporting the police by military force; indeed, the opinion of the Government of India, upon the information now before them, is that this necessary and proper step should have been taken earlier. The action of the local government in prohibiting public processions during the late Mohurram is also approved. This prohibition was not intended as a penalty, but as a temporary and exceptional precaution considered necessary to secure the peace of the city.

4. The Commissioner of Police reports at length upon the conduct of the Bombay Police during these riots, especially upon the point whether the first outbreak ought to have been foreseen, and might thus have been prevented. He lays much stress upon the disadvantage at which the police are said to be placed by their having no barracks or lines; so that for want of proper quarters they live scattered about the town, and thus upon sudden emergencies the reserve force cannot be speedily collected. Into these important questions of internal administration I am to say that his Excellency in Council will not enter, since they are now undergoing full inquiry and consideration in the hands of the Government of Bombay.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. C. Lyall*,
Secretary to the Government of India.

(No. 6 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

To Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in Council, London.

My Lord Marquis,

WE beg leave to transmit a memorial addressed to your Lordship in Council by the Parsee inhabitants of Bombay, having reference to the riots which, as reported in our Despatch No. 3 of the 2nd March last, took place in that city in February last, and of which the importance has been so excessively exaggerated.

2. The memorial concludes by preferring seven requests, based, as it would seem, on three alleged grounds of complaint, viz. :—

1.—That the police did not make proper use of the information furnished them, and took no precautions to prevent, by a display of force, any riotous or disorderly proceedings.

2.—That recourse ought to have been had to the employment of military force at an earlier stage of the transactions.

3.—That

3.—That the Governor has shown an animus against the Parsees; that the Government has lost no chance of defaming their character; and that they have been compelled to ask for “the justice which, until enlightened by the experience of the last few weeks, they believed it was impossible that they could ever have to ask for in vain from any representative of Her Most Gracious Majesty holding the high office of Governor of Bombay.”

3. We shall make it our business, therefore, to reply to these allegations, though of necessity at the risk of repeating in part the substance of our Despatch of the 2nd March.

4. In regard to the first allegation the memorial states, that “the fact of premeditation on the part of the rioters is proved,” and that “had the police done their duty, there would have been no serious rioting at all,” and further, paragraph 3, that “the action of the Commissioner of Police in suppressing the book was illegitimate and ill-advised.”

5. In answer to these assertions we wish to inform your Lordship, that we have been unable to obtain the slightest evidence to prove that the riot on the 13th February was premeditated; and in the trials before the High Court, the Parsees have not been able in any way to support such a contention. Minor disturbances did take place on the same day, but we attribute them to disorderly excitement, and not to any pre-arrangement. That excitement had been caused by the translation of the life of Mahomed; and that during the Mohurrum, between the 20th and 28th February, more than the ordinary precautions to prevent any dangerous outburst of fanatical feeling would be necessary, was well known to the police. The Commissioner of Police did not, however, neglect to guard himself against surprise, and it will be seen, by reference to paragraphs 9 and 11, and subsequent paragraphs of the report of the Commissioner of Police, No. 464, February 28th, 1874 (received after our Despatch of the 2nd March was written and now enclosed), that he adopted measures to keep himself informed of what was going on; and on the particular day on which the riot commenced, February 13th, he ordered not only his native inspector of the detective force, but Inspector Raymond and Constable Gough to attend at the mosque and report to him immediately if they noticed any sign of disturbance.

6. It is contended by the memorialists that these precautions were not sufficient, and that “had the police done their duty, there would have been no serious rioting at all.” It is easy to judge events after they have transpired; but in deciding upon this question it is necessary to recall to your Lordship’s mind the state of affairs before one o’clock on Friday the 13th. The Commissioner of Police had, as he believed, ascertained that no outburst would occur on that particular day. Public apprehensions all pointed to the Mohurrum, and if Mr. Souter participated in that belief, this Government, whilst regretting the mistake would be unwilling to hold him answerable for not anticipating what it believes to have been a very sudden and unpremeditated outbreak. That the police acted with praiseworthy energy and determination in the suppression of each outbreak as it occurred, has already been recorded by his Excellency in Council in Government Resolution No. 1375, March 12th, 1874, and has since been fully shown and noticed by the High Court in the course of the trials.

7. With reference to the alleged “illegal and ill-advised action of the Commissioner of Police in suppressing Jallbhoj’s book,” it must be observed that the Commissioner of Police did nothing more than advise the author (paragraph 7 of Mr. Souter’s report) to deposit with him the unsold copies of his book, and recommend the possessors of the copies sold to leave their copies for a time in his possession, until after the Mohurrum. The Commissioner was the best judge of whether he was right to take upon himself this responsibility, which he did without any instructions from Government to that effect; but we would observe that Mr. Jallbhoj himself and the purchasers of the work voluntarily accepted his advice, and that the translation of the word “concubine,” as pointed out in paragraph 3 of our Despatch No. 3, March 2nd, was more offensive than the original, or than the memorialists seem to admit.

8. We are glad that the complaint as to the tardy employment of the troops has been brought into the memorial, as it enables us to submit distinctly to your Lordship in Council the principles by which we were guided on this point, in

respect of which some doubts have also been expressed by the Government of India in a letter (copy of which is enclosed) lately received from them.

9. We therefore avow it to be our opinion that military force should not be brought into active operation against rioters unless or until it is known or has been shown that the civil force at the disposal of the authorities is unable to overcome them; and we assert without fear of contradiction, that in no single instance in these riots was it found that the police could not master the rioters as soon as they acted in a body against them. The active assistance of a soldier was not once required. No troops were brought into the native town until the want of them was represented by the Commissioner of Police, and he did not then contemplate their active employment. He felt that the strain upon his men, who had been for two or three days and nights almost incessantly on duty, was wearing them out, and, with the immediate prospect of the Mohurrum before him, he was anxious to give them some relief. Small detachments were therefore posted in the most suspected localities.

10. Subsequently, when, as will presently be shown, the Mohurrum processions were prohibited, the Government filled the city with troops, not expecting to use them for putting down a riot, but to convince the discontented that any attempt at disturbance must be perfectly hopeless in the face of the support which was at hand to assist the police if needed. And this arrangement was entirely successful. Not the slightest attempt was made by the Mahometans to violate the orders of Government. But if riots had begun, it would have been the duty of the police, and not, in the first instance, of the large military force to suppress them. We feel that the principle here involved is one of much importance, and we shall be grateful for a clear expression of your Lordship's views on the subject.

11. In answer to the 3rd allegation, it is necessary for us, even at the cost of some repetition, to review the course of events.

12. The first riot, the prompt suppression of which we have fully noticed, took place on Friday the 13th February. A large number of the rioters were made prisoners. Those who had not been conspicuous were summarily punished by the Magistrates; and 62, all Mahometans, were committed for trial. One of them was released on account of illness. Fifty-seven received the severe sentence of five years' hard labour, and the remaining four one year's hard labour. On the following day, Saturday the 14th, no disturbance of any importance took place, nor did anything occur to warrant a belief that military aid was required. But in the evening, the Parsee gentlemen named in the Memorial, waited on the Governor. They undoubtedly told him that the Parsees were, as described in the Memorial, "panic-stricken;" but they as undoubtedly did not make the slightest allusion to the expected Mahometan funeral, which, it is alleged in the Memorial, was already causing great alarm. We feel certain that on that evening they knew nothing whatever of the approaching funeral, and we submit that it was but reasonable for the Governor, in the conversation which took place, to urge the heads of a large section of the community, which had been actively protected by the police, but which was "panic-stricken," to make some effort for its own protection.

13. On the following morning, Sunday the 15th, the funeral took place. The Mahometan burial-ground is in a part of the town thickly inhabited by Parsees, and a severe fight took place. It was stopped by the police, and some of those engaged in it on both sides have been tried by the High Court. The judge, in passing sentence on the Parsees said, "I consider that the evidence of the occurrences at the corner of the grave-yard, and in the Breach Candy-road, proves it to have been the intention of the Parsees to attack the Mahometans, and that had it not been for the Parsees, the Mahometans would have peaceably returned, and that no disturbance would have taken place." And he sentenced the Parsees to imprisonment with hard labour for six months. Of the 19 Mahometans brought to trial, four were found guilty of exceeding the legitimate limits of self-defence, and were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for two months. The other 15 were acquitted.

14. This last occurrence, however, satisfied the Government that the hostility of the two races was still in active operation, and that decided measures of precaution must be adopted in connection with the annual Mahometan festival of the

the Mohurrum, which was close at hand, and which is always more or less the cause of anxiety. It was therefore on Monday the 16th February resolved, after full deliberation, that the Mahometan processions, usual at that season, should be prohibited altogether on this occasion. The gravity of this step was in no degree under-rated, either by the Government, or by the community in general. The processions in question, though not strictly religious, have great attractions for a large section of the Mahometans; they have lasted for very many years without interruption, and it was felt that their entire prohibition, though a necessary precaution, would be a severe punishment. The Government, however, bearing in mind that the dangerous state of public feeling had been first created by the Mahometans, held to its determination; and, as above shown, made a proper exhibition of military force. On the 18th February, the leader of the present demonstration, Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, forwarded to the Governor a petition from the principal Parsees, which had been framed on the 16th, and he admitted in his letter that their suggestions had been in a great measure anticipated by the Government, and that they felt thankful. Indeed, no better proof than the prohibition of the processions could have been given by the Government of its determination to preserve order, and, as a consequence, to protect the Parsees. From that day, no insult of any kind has been offered to any Parsee place of worship, nor, so far as we are aware, has any private house been attacked; and the Memorial says—"When the military had once been called out, no further serious disturbances occurred. The Parsees were satisfied that the Government would not suffer them to be again molested." Efforts were perseveringly made by leading members of society, European and Native, to restore harmony. The press, however, published incessantly letters and articles of the most irritating nature, all in the interest of the Parsees, not confined to Bombay alone, and thus, as far as in it lay, contributed to disappoint those who hoped that the excitement might die out.

15. On the 21st, a considerable body of Parsees "made the mistake," as they term it, of committing an assault on a few Mahometan labourers returning to their homes from the work of the day. It was after this that, says the Memorial, "the Government of Bombay, anxious as it would appear to have an excuse for its own lamentable weakness, has lost no chance of defaming the character of the Parsees." The account of the defamation follows. Two days after the cowardly attack just alluded to, the Governor, having received from one of the most trusted public servants, a representation of the evils which must result from such acts, requested an interview with some of the leading Parsee gentlemen, and pressed upon them the propriety of their endeavouring to allay the irritation to the best of their ability. He pointed out that in other large towns of the Presidency, to which troops could not be so easily sent, the few Parsee inhabitants might for a time be exposed to much danger from exasperation caused by acts done in Bombay, and that even in Bombay itself, they could not expect the large garrison to be permanently maintained. The conversation took place in private, and the defamation, if "defamation" it be, has been made public by themselves.

16. The Memorial untruly charges the Governor with expressing the same feeling to a large deputation of Mahometan gentlemen. That deputation had on the same day presented and earnestly supported a petition praying that the processions might be allowed, and had offered to become bound for the good behaviour of their co-religionists; and they were told that it would be impossible for them to prevent conflicts arising out of sudden affronts offered to the processions while passing through narrow and crowded streets. A copy of the written answer given to the petition is herewith forwarded.

17. In short, the Mahometans, with whom the riots began, have felt the full weight of the action of the Government, both in the prohibition of the processions and in the severe punishment of the rioters. The Parsees sustained losses at first, for which that punishment has been inflicted. From that time they have suffered nothing. They were satisfied, when the troops were called out, that the Government would not suffer them to be again molested, and they have not been. They felt thankful for what had then been done. They have since had literally nothing to ask for. They have not asked for anything. The "justice" for which they appeal to your Lordship, has not been withheld from them.

18. We have, in conclusion, to notice the requests made at the close of the Memorial, that your Lordship will order inquiries to be made into the cause of the riots, into the efficacy of the steps taken to arrest them, as to the conduct of the Governor and the Commissioner of Police, and as to the measures that should be adopted with a view to the future.

19. We now transmit copies of the Reports received from the Commissioner of Police, which, with the remarks we have made, will, we hope, be considered sufficient explanation of the past. We altogether disbelieve that these riots originated in any premeditated plan, or that they were promoted by respectable members of the Mahometan community. It would have required very little organisation to render them far more destructive. Not a particle of evidence has been received in support of such a theory; and we cannot too strongly deprecate the institution of fresh inquiries on these points. We believe that they will tend to keep alive ill-feeling; that they will afford opportunities for the fabrication of false charges and evidence; and arouse suspicions which will rest on no substantial foundation, but which may work much mischief.

20. As regards the future, it will be seen that this Government is fully sensible of its obligations. It recognises the necessity for providing quarters for the police in suitable localities, and has already applied to the Government of India for authority to grant sites. It has called the attention of the Commissioner to the necessity for rendering the detective force more reliable; and it desires to see an augmentation of the European and mounted portions of the force. But in respect of these measures the Government is placed in a very delicate and embarrassing position. The strength of the police of Bombay, in all its details, is regulated at the pleasure of the local government, but the funds required for its support are provided out of the municipal rates. No contribution whatever is made from Imperial or provincial funds. We are fully sensible that this is unfair, and that, as the taxation of the country is now arranged, the municipality have every right to demand a reasonable contribution, such as is paid in Calcutta and elsewhere. But we cannot afford it. The allotment from the Imperial revenues which we receive under the decentralisation scheme is so scanty that we cannot meet this charge. We have long since represented to the Government of India the necessity for a modification of that scheme, and have ventured to suggest the direction that such modification might take. Our last representation has unfortunately just been positively negatived.

We have, &c.
(signed) *P. E. Wodehouse.*
Augustus Spencer.
H. P. St. G. Tucker.
A. Rogers.

8 May 1874.

(No. 464 of 1874.)

From *Frank Henry Souter, Esq., c.s.i.*, Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to the Secretary to Government, Judicial Department, Bombay.

Sir,

Bombay, 28 February 1874.

I HAVE the honour to submit a Report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on Friday the 13th instant, and of the subsequent occurrences up to the present time.

2. It was my anxious desire to have furnished this Report at an earlier date, but I have necessarily been so much in the saddle night and day, and have had so many other pressing duties to attend to, that I have found it impossible to devote to it the time required.

3. I will now endeavour to lay before Government as brief and correct a narrative as possible of the unfortunate disturbances which have taken place and which originated solely with the Soonee Mahomedans, and also to show what were the apparent causes which led to them.

4. Ill-feeling

4. Ill-feeling arose among the Mahomedans against the Parsees in consequence of a book styled "The Renowned Prophets and Nations" having been written and published by a Parsee named Rustomjee Hormusjee Jalbhoy. The book is in the Guzerathi language, and in it a passage appears the interpretation of which is to the effect that Mahomed had a son named Ibrahim born to him by a kept prostitute, a phrase which implies that the Prophet was the protector of a public woman. The Mahomedans look upon the above expression as an insult to themselves and defamatory of their Prophet.

5. The book in question was, it seems, published some ten months ago, but was circulated principally amongst the Parsees and was only brought to the notice of the Mahomedans very recently, when a deputation of them, headed by their Kazeer, Abdool Lateef, waited upon me to represent their grievance.

6. Under ordinary circumstances I should probably have taken little notice of the matter, but seeing that the Mohurrum was so close at hand, and well knowing the excitement which prevails during this festival amongst all classes of the Mahomedan community, I deemed it advisable to exercise my influence in checking, as far as possible, a spread of ill-feeling between the Mahomedans and Parsees.

7. With this view I sent privately for the author of the book, who stated that he had not written regarding Mahomed with any idea or intention of insulting or wounding the feelings of his followers, and at my recommendation he willingly agreed to deposit in my office all the printed copies of his book which at that time remained in his possession; he also furnished me with the names of the subscribers to his work, each of whom I addressed by letter (copy of this letter is appended and marked A), urging the advisability of their temporarily entrusting to my care any copies in their possession, and explaining to them my reasons for recommending this step.

8. I will here mention that the day the Kazeer, Abdool Lateef, waited on me with his deputation to represent their grievance, was the 9th of February or four days previous to the outbreak of the disturbance. The Kazeer then stated that he would get together and represent to those few of his community who had become aware of the publication of the book, the steps I had promised to take, and he gave me every reason to believe that he would bring about a reconciliation, and that no further trouble would arise. At the same time he promised to communicate with me at once in the event of any dissatisfaction being evinced amongst his people.

9. After the Kazeer's deputation left my office, I at once, in consultation with my deputy Mr. Edginton, called up our chief detectives and gave them strict orders to watch the Kazeer's proceedings, and also to adopt immediate measures to keep themselves and me informed of the feelings and proceedings of the Mahomedans in connection with this matter.

10. Nothing particular transpired on the 10th. On the 11th, Mr. Jalbhoy sent 85 copies of his work to the office and called himself at night to see Mr. Edginton, to whom he expressed fears that a Mussulman neighbour named Sooliman, who he believed had brought about the agitation regarding his book, would probably annoy him during the approaching Mohurrum, and asked that police protection might be accorded to him at that time. The detectives reported that all was quiet this day, and that no excitement of any kind was observable.

11. On Thursday the 12th, one of the leading members of the deputation who waited on me on the 9th, again called and informed me that a meeting of certain Mahomedans was to be held that evening with the object of discussing all particulars connected with the book and the measures taken to remove the insult to their religious feelings, and he assured me that the matter would now be peaceably and satisfactorily settled. I directed the chief officers of my detective force to attend this meeting, which they accordingly did, and reported to me the following morning (Friday) that the proceedings were in every respect conciliatory, and calculated to allay any feelings of irritation which might exist in the minds of the people. This report was corroborated by a member of the deputation who had waited on me on the 9th, and who called again at my office on Friday morning.

12. From all the information I had gathered, there certainly appeared no reason whatever to apprehend any disturbance on the 13th, and though I considered that, under the circumstances, any unusual display of police would only create unnecessary alarm and anxiety, I ordered inspector Khan Bahadoor Abdool Ali of the detective force, with some of his agents, to be present in the Jumma Musjid during the time of prayer, and it was arranged that an experienced European inspector and constable (the statements of these men are appended and marked B., C., D.) should also be at the Mosque in plain clothing. I took this precaution not because I in any way anticipated a disturbance on the 13th as the Mohurram festival (during which, if at all, popular commotion would naturally occur) had not begun, but in order that the police might ascertain and make known to me the feelings of the people and report at once if anything extraordinary should occur.

13. About quarter to one o'clock the European inspector at the Mosque sent a report to his superintendent, Mr. Smith, to the effect that there was rather a large gathering, but that all was perfectly quiet. The superintendent of the division, to whom this report was made, happened to be with me in the Police Office at Mazagon, at the time it was received. I therefore ordered him to proceed to the Mosque at once and to let me know, without delay, if anything unusual was going on.

14. Mr. Smith had not been out of office many minutes when a report was brought by a sepoy that some Mahomedans had attacked Parsee shops and houses in Bhendy Bazaar, and in Syed Abdool Rahimon-street.

15. Not a moment was lost in getting the few available policemen of the Reserve Force together, and with the six mounted policemen then in the lines, my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and I started with all possible haste for the scene of disturbance.

16. Passing through Bhendy Bazaar we found considerable agitation in the streets, and learnt that a Parsee Fire Temple had been entered, the sacred fire put out, and all property in it mischievously destroyed. A few prisoners were here taken, and such precautionary measures as men and time would admit of having been put in force to prevent a fresh outbreak and keep up the communication, we went on at a gallop to Syed Abdool Rahimon-street, where it was reported that further mischief was being done.

17. On entering the above-named street we observed an immense mob of Mahomedans, composed chiefly of Arabs and Seedeas, armed with bludgeons and sticks, in possession of the place; the main body seemed to be approaching us, and others were seen actively engaged in the work of destruction; some of them rushing out of houses with property in hand.

18. Nothing could have excelled the conduct of the small party of police, particularly of the Europeans, at this moment; they dashed into the midst of the mob and at once scattered them, and many of the offenders were immediately ironed or otherwise secured. From one house alone, that of Jeejibhoy Dhunjibhoy, in which of all others most destruction was committed, about 40 of the rioters, principally Seedeas and Arabs, were taken. Of these several made most desperate efforts to escape by rushing through the police, but they were mostly knocked down and made prisoners. In about half-an-hour from the time the police arrived at the scene, the whole disturbance was quelled and order restored; 64 rioters in all were apprehended in this street, and but for the paucity of the police and the formidable men they had to deal with, many more prisoners would have been arrested.

19. It has been affirmed that the neighbourhood of Syed Abdool Rahimon-street was in the possession of an excited mob for some hours. Fortunately I am able to state exactly the time which elapsed from the outbreak of the riot to its suppression. The report of the European inspector that all was quiet, was brought to me at about a quarter to one o'clock; at about 10 minutes past one by the office clock, the news that an attack on Parsee houses was being made, arrived at the Mazagon Office, and according to the statement* of a gentleman who arrived on the scene immediately after the disturbance, the riot was entirely suppressed and the last of the rioters in custody by a few minutes before two o'clock,

* Further corroborated by letter marked E and appended.

o'clock. This corresponds with my own and Mr. Edginton's recollections of the matter.

20. When order was restored, I, in consultation with my deputy, made such prompt arrangements as seemed to us best calculated to prevent any further disturbance. European and Native police were massed in and about the localities inhabited by Parsees, and the few mounted police available, patrolled the streets throughout the night. I also at once took measures to ascertain the amount of injury done to persons and property during the riot, and from the inquiries made regarding this and all subsequent disturbances, have made out returns marked F. and G. respectively, which show plainly the number of fire temples and houses, &c., entered by Mahomedan rioters, with alleged value of property destroyed or stolen, and also the total number of persons of different sects injured. On this day five Parsees and eight Mahomedans were injured, of whom one Parsee has since died.

21. On Saturday morning the 14th, my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and Superintendent Mills personally placed all the prisoners, numbering 91, apprehended the previous day, before the senior magistrate, by whom they were remanded till the 4th March and lodged in jail. There was a slight disturbance on this day which, from the evidence, would seem to have originated by some Mahomedans of the Weaver caste throwing stones at a Parsee house in Falkland-road. One stone, which is said to have been hurled at a policeman while endeavouring to restore order, accidentally struck one of the Mahomedan aggressors and caused fracture of the skull: the man was taken to hospital but died the following day; beyond a few panes of glass being broken, no other harm was done. I was on the spot with a party of police soon after the disturbance, and succeeded in making 29 prisoners, the ringleaders being amongst them.

22. It appears that on Saturday the 14th, a Mahomedan funeral party proceeding to their cemetery at Sonapoor, had been in some way annoyed or interfered with by Parsees who reside in that neighbourhood. This circumstance probably excited the resentment or the fears of the Mahomedans; as on Sunday morning, the 15th, three funerals, one that of a Seedee, which started from different parts of the town, met on the way to Sonapoor and were attended by more than the usual number of persons. About 10 a.m. Mr. Superintendent Mills, receiving information that these funerals were on their way, collected immediately a body of 20 Native constables and one sowar, and overtook them in Bholeshwer-road. On the way the number of attendants was augmented by men dropping in by ones and twos. Mr. Mills states* that the members of the procession at this time did not appear to be armed in any way, though some of them may have had sticks under their clothes, while others probably armed themselves subsequently with clubs and bludgeons from a wood depôt against the graveyard wall, and by taking bamboos from sheds and fences inside. When nearing Sonapoor the procession, now numbering about 300 persons, escorted by the police, passed through a locality occupied by Parsees, a great number of whom were standing on both sides of the road, but Mr. Mills exhorted them to be quiet, and they did not in any way interfere. At the cemetery Mr. Mills was joined by Inspectors Austin and Brewen and 10 sepoy. The processions passed quietly into the burial-ground, and the ceremonies commenced.

* See Mr. Mills deposition on oat marked L.

23. In consequence of the number of people assembled, Mr. Mills sent off orders to the officers at the nearest police station to bring up to his assistance, with all haste, as many policemen as were available, and also despatched a sepoy in a buggy to call the Commissioner and his deputy to his aid with further help. Before the conclusion of the funeral ceremonies about 300 or 400 Parsees, armed with sticks and bludgeons, came up a back lane from the direction of the Dhobee Talao, and commenced throwing stones into the graveyard. This excited the indignation of the Mahomedans, several of whom, having armed themselves with sticks and stones, thereupon rushed to the wall and retaliated upon the Parsees; some of the Mahomedans assisted the police to restore order, but 40 or 50 Seedees jumped over the wall, rushed at the Parsees and put them to flight. The police, however, succeeded in getting most of them back again into the cemetery, and the tumult was for the time quelled, but in consequence of this disturbance, and tearing further outbreak, Mr. Mills despatched Inspector Austin to call out the military, who had, after the disturbance on Friday, been warned by me that

their services might be required at any moment, and by order of the Brigadier General commanding the district, were in readiness in case of need. The ceremonies being over, the processions were re-formed and started on their homeward journey in charge of the police.

24. It appears that a Seede, who did not return to the burial-ground, was discovered down a by-lane by the flying Parsees, who set upon him and left him for dead. Mr. Mills endeavoured to send off the injured man to the hospital before this deed was found out by the Mahomedans, but in this did not entirely succeed, and the Seedees were impressed with the belief that one of their party had been killed; shortly afterwards a body of Parsees were seen drawn up in the Breach Candy road armed with bludgeons which they brandished in a threatening manner. Two European police officers in succession went up and called upon them to disperse, which they refused to do. In the meantime the procession arrived at the place and the two bodies came into collision, the police being unable to restrain them. The Parsees eventually fled and the Seedees thereupon commenced an attack upon the Parsee houses in the locality. The police did their utmost to keep them in check until the deputy commissioner, Mr. Edginton, who, with a small party of European and native police, reached the scene of the affray just before me, led his men into the midst of the mob in a manner entitling him and his small party to all praise. The mob was immediately dispersed, and but for the timely arrival of the additional police, the Parsees would doubtless have suffered very severely: 36 of the Mahomedan rioters were arrested, and in this disturbance 13 Mahomedans and seven Parsees were injured, of whom four Mahomedans and one Parsee have since died. The reason why all the prisoners here taken were Mahomedans is, that by the time the police were reinforced the Parsees had been beaten off, and the Mahomedans were then attacking their houses. The Mahomedans therefore appeared at the time to be the aggressors and the party guilty of a breach of the peace. Shortly after the disturbance was quelled the military arrived on the scene, but their services were not required.

25. I am sorry to say that after the Mahomedans had been routed by the police as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, some of the Parsees seem to have pursued and attacked the stragglers with unjustifiable ferocity. One old man of about 80, in particular, who could have had little or nothing to do with the riot, was hunted down, brutally beaten and left for dead. He was removed to the hospital, where he died the following day.

26. On the same morning between 11 and 12 o'clock, some Mahomedans were without provocation attacked by Parsees in two different places in and near the fort, and three were seriously wounded. A crowd of Parsees also assembled in front of their Fire Temple, and upon inspector O'Connor going to assist a police sepoy who was being hustled by the Parsees, he received a very severe blow on the head from a stick, which but for his helmet would have probably killed him. The municipal commissioner, Mr. Pedder, and Mr. James, Under Secretary to Government, arrived on the spot immediately after this occurred, and nothing further happened. The Parsee who struck the inspector escaped into the Fire Temple and has not yet been identified.

27. In consequence of the disturbances which had ensued, I deemed it necessary, in order to re-assure the people, to apply for military to be posted in the town, and for cavalry picquets to patrol at night. These arrangements were at once carried out under the orders of the brigadier general commanding the district, and have been in force ever since.

28. On Monday 16th, one of the Mahomedans, who had been severely injured in the affray on Sunday, died, and it was reported to me that his funeral passing through the town would probably excite the sympathy of his caste and rouse them to some act of revenge. I therefore, after taking certain police precautions, immediately proceeded in person to the military authorities and obtained the aid of two companies of the marine battalion with whom I escorted the funeral about 2 p.m. to the Mahomedan burial-ground, and all passed off quietly. Nothing else particularly transpired between Sunday the 15th and Saturday the 21st to disturb the peace of the town. The Parsees, however, during this time evinced much agitation and seemed to be troubled with all manner of misgivings.

29. On

29. On the evening of the 21st about half-past 7 o'clock, some 20. Seedees and other Mahomedans, were returning quietly to their homes from on board ship, where they had been working; they took the direct route to the native town and had thus unfortunately to pass Hornby-row, a locality almost entirely inhabited by Parsees. From my inquiries it has been shown beyond doubt, that when these men reached the above neighbourhood, a sudden alarm was raised by some Parsees, who, in a large body, made a murderous attack upon them. One Seedee had his leg and arm broken; several others were more or less seriously injured, and but for the timely arrival of a few policemen, it is impossible to say what would have been the fate of these unhappy people. As the onslaught was made in the dark, it has unfortunately been impossible for the police to find out the principal offenders. It is true that one Parsee was stabbed in this disgraceful attack, but I have been informed by the medical officer of the J. J. Hospital under whose treatment this man has been, that the wounds from their nature must have been inflicted by some person while on the ground; it is evident therefore that they were given in self-defence, and it must be noticed that all labourers on board ship wear their sailors' knives to enable them to do their work.

30. My reputation as a police officer having been loudly assailed, in the public prints for not having taken such precautions as the events previous to Friday the 13th are said to have called for, I would ask for a careful perusal of paragraphs 4 to 13 of this Report, and also beg to attach original letters received from the Mahomedan gentlemen noted in the margin, who were present at

the important meeting held the evening previous to the outbreak: Mahomed Ali Rogay, Esq., J.P.
 It will be seen that these gentlemen, two of whom are justices of the peace, and the most influential men of their community, fully believed the ill-feeling regarding the publishing of the book had entirely subsided, and that they had no apprehension whatever of any disturbance arising. One of the gentlemen, Mahomed Ali Rogay, it will be seen, was himself at prayer in the Jumma Musjid on Friday the 13th, and observed no indication of excitement amongst his people, or any signs of disturbance. The testimony of this gentleman is unimpeachable. He has incurred great unpopularity among the Mahomedans, as they think he has taken the side of the Parsees, and has in consequence temporarily left Bombay.

31. From my searching inquiries and all that has transpired; I am decidedly of opinion, that if the disturbance was premeditated as generally affirmed, the plot must have been confined to a very few of the Mahomedan roughs of Bombay, and its secrecy thus secured.

32. I would further submit in support of this opinion, that had any fear whatever of a disturbance, being likely to take place, existed in the minds of the public, the Parsee community, in particular, against whom the attack was certain to be directed, would have shown their anxiety, and some members of that large body would assuredly have come forward in the interests of their people, and for their own safety have given notice to the police and applied for protection. The only Parsees who expressed any alarm to me were a few who live near the house of Jalbhoy, the author of the obnoxious book, and they only stated that during the Mohorrum they were apprehensive of being molested in consequence. The municipal commissioner, also, who is in daily intercourse with many Parsees, tells me that he never had a hint of danger from any of them till after the riot of Friday the 13th. These facts show that the stories of the Parsees, that they were aware, previous to the 13th, that an attack would be made on them on that day, are inaccurate.

33. It has been my endeavour in this report to describe minutely every case of riot, and all severe attacks upon individuals which have been brought to the notice of the police. Other petty assaults have occurred in connexion with the present disturbances, but I have not considered it necessary to mention them at length, or to comment on the numerous absurd or exaggerated rumours which have prevailed, all of which, have, however, been immediately inquired into.

34. I must here explain how it was that at the commencement of the riots, a sufficient police force could not be brought to the scene of disturbance sooner,

and the riot quelled even more promptly. The Bombay police force in consequence of their having no barracks or lines, are scattered about the city wherever they are able to hut themselves; thus the bulk of the men do not reside in the division or section to which they are attached for duty, and on an emergency arising, the only policemen that can be quickly got together are those actually on their posts. At the Mazagon police office, the 13 native mounted police have lines, and here also a few of the reserve force happen to reside; it is therefore the only place where a small body of police can be quickly assembled if suddenly required.

35. The want of proper quarters for the Europeans and lines for the native police in central and suitable localities impairs most seriously the efficiency and satisfactory working of the police force. This fact has repeatedly been brought by me to the notice of Government and the municipality, and will form the subject of further report.

36. Most severe criticisms have been published on my own conduct and that of the police generally in reference to these unfortunate disturbances.

*Vide Mr. Souter's
note appended.*

37. As regards myself, I willingly and confidently leave it in the hands of Government, without attempting a defence, to decide whether I am deserving of the strictures passed upon me, merely asking for careful consideration of all the facts stated at the commencement of this report.

38. But with respect to, and in defence of, the force which I have the honour to command, I beg most respectfully to urge in justice to them that their conduct throughout these disturbances has been such as to merit commendation, and in substantiation of this I would beg to adduce the following facts:—

Even on the first day, unprepared as we were, the riot was completely suppressed within an hour, and upwards of 60 prisoners captured in the act of riot and plunder.

Since 2 p.m., on Friday the 13th, notwithstanding the violent excitement of both parties, and the intense hostility which existed between them, not a single house has been plundered, nor fire temple defiled.

During the excitement which has prevailed it has been impossible to foresee at what particular point a disturbance might arise, but in every instance of riot the police alone have promptly met and effectually suppressed it, notwithstanding the demands upon them in all quarters of the city.

I would beg to point out also that this has been done by a police force considerably reduced below the strength fixed by Colonel Bruce in 1864 as requisite for the efficient performance of the police duties of this city.

The police force recommended by Colonel Bruce, then Inspector General of police for all India, and which received the sanction of Government, and was entertained in 1865, was of the strength shown below:—

46 European police of all grades.

1,411 Native police of all grades.

Colonel Bruce, in fixing the above force, remarked, to use his own words, "And I am unable to perceive that the work can possibly be done with fewer hands." But in spite of the opinion of so experienced a police officer, the Bombay police force was reduced in 1868, 1871, and 1872 by

6 European police of all ranks.

108 Native police of all ranks.

39. Government will thus fully understand how severe the strain has been upon the police; notwithstanding which all the Europeans have been most steady, and cheerfully performed their harassing duties, and have at all times displayed courage, promptitude, and discretion, entitling them to the highest praise. The native police have also behaved extremely well, and have been steady and energetic in the performance of their duties. From the 13th up to the present time the police, European and native, may be said to have been on perpetual duty night and day, for they have scarcely ever left their posts.

40. To say that native constables are not as intelligent, energetic, and self-reliant, as would be desirable, is merely to say that they are natives, but they have

- have behaved extremely well, and followed their European leaders with considerable courage, and have been most steady and obedient. The assertion that the majority of native constables are Mahomedans is erroneous, the proportion to Hindoos and other castes being about $\frac{2}{10}$, and I should regret to see it reduced, as Mahomedans make in some respects the best policemen.

41. With reference to the accusation that not only have the Bombay police behaved badly in these disturbances, but that their general efficiency has fallen off of late years, I would in refutation respectfully point to the annual returns which will show that for several years past there has been a marked diminution in the number of crimes committed and the amount of property stolen, while the proportion of convictions and of recoveries of stolen property has vastly increased. These results have received repeated commendation from Government and from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, and have been acquired notwithstanding the large decrease in the strength of the force.

42. Throughout these disturbances, which have so severely taxed all hands of the police force, I have received most invaluable aid from my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and from superintendents Mills, Bailey, and Moffat, and deputy superintendents Smith, Crummey, and Brown, who have all, by their praiseworthy zeal and devotion to their duties, shown an admirable example to the more subordinate members of the force.

43. As regards the allegations brought by the public papers against the detective force, that they not only failed in their duty, but that they deceived me, I would here remark that I believe these accusations to be as undeserved as they are unjust. The detective officers selected to watch the actions and to ascertain the feelings of the people in this matter, Khan Bahadoor Meer Akbar Ali and Khan Bahadoor Meer Abdool Ali, are both tried and faithful servants of Government, in whom I repose every confidence, and believe that they would keep no information from me which it was their duty to acquaint me with. The last-named officer has very recently had the title of Khan Bahadoor conferred upon him by the Viceroy at the recommendation of this Government, in acknowledgment of the excellent service from time to time rendered by him. This officer was by my orders present at the Jumma Musjid during prayer on Friday, the 13th, and his report of what occurred on that occasion is appended in original, and marked B. It will be seen from the statement of this intelligent officer, corroborated as it is by the appended statements of the European inspector and constable, that at the mosque prayers were said as usual, and that there were no signs whatever of excitement or agitation amongst the congregation. I would submit that it was impossible on this occasion for the police to foresee the sudden and unpremeditated outbreak of a fanatical mob.

44. The presence of the troops has been most valuable in restoring confidence among the timid, and to overawe the rioters, but in no case have they been called on to act; they have not only not fired a shot, but have never come into collision with the people. Their presence was required, not because there was any prospect of the mob overpowering the police, but because the police was not sufficiently numerous to guard effectually the whole city at a season of disturbance, and it was physically impossible for them, without assistance, to endure the fatigue of this anxious fortnight.

45. Before closing this report, I would wish to acknowledge the ready and prompt assistance I have at all times received from Brigadier General Gell whenever it has been necessary to call upon him for military aid, and also the consideration he has always shown to my suggestions in stationing military posts and guards in such localities of the city as circumstances have rendered necessary.

46. I would also mention that since the outbreak on the 13th I have been in constant communication with the municipal commissioner, Mr. Pedder, and that in many of the precautionary measures I have from time to time put in force for the preservation of peace and restoration of order, I have acted in consultation with that officer, whose cordial and valuable co-operation I desire to acknowledge.

(signed) *F. H. Souter,*
Commissioner of Police.

and the riot quelled even more promptly. The Bombay police force in consequence of their having no barracks or lines, are scattered about the city wherever they are able to hut themselves; thus the bulk of the men do not reside in the division or section to which they are attached for duty, and on an emergency arising, the only policemen that can be quickly got together are those actually on their posts. At the Mazagon police office, the 13 native mounted police have lines, and here also a few of the reserve force happen to reside; it is therefore the only place where a small body of police can be quickly assembled if suddenly required.

35. The want of proper quarters for the Europeans and lines for the native police in central and suitable localities impairs most seriously the efficiency and satisfactory working of the police force. This fact has repeatedly been brought by me to the notice of Government and the municipality, and will form the subject of further report.

36. Most severe criticisms have been published on my own conduct and that of the police generally in reference to these unfortunate disturbances.

*Vide Mr. Souter's
note appended.*

37. As regards myself, I willingly and confidently leave it in the hands of Government, without attempting a defence, to decide whether I am deserving of the strictures passed upon me, merely asking for careful consideration of all the facts stated at the commencement of this report.

38. But with respect to, and in defence of, the force which I have the honour to command, I beg most respectfully to urge in justice to them that their conduct throughout these disturbances has been such as to merit commendation, and in substantiation of this I would beg to adduce the following facts:—

Even on the first day, unprepared as we were, the riot was completely suppressed within an hour, and upwards of 60 prisoners captured in the act of riot and plunder.

Since 2 p.m., on Friday the 13th, notwithstanding the violent excitement of both parties, and the intense hostility which existed between them, not a single house has been plundered, nor fire temple defiled.

During the excitement which has prevailed it has been impossible to foresee at what particular point a disturbance might arise, but in every instance of riot the police alone have promptly met and effectually suppressed it, notwithstanding the demands upon them in all quarters of the city.

I would beg to point out also that this has been done by a police force considerably reduced below the strength fixed by Colonel Bruce in 1864 as requisite for the efficient performance of the police duties of this city.

The police force recommended by Colonel Bruce, then Inspector General of police for all India, and which received the sanction of Government, and was entertained in 1865, was of the strength shown below:—

46 European police of all grades.

1,411 Native police of all grades.

Colonel Bruce, in fixing the above force, remarked, to use his own words, "And I am unable to perceive that the work can possibly be done with fewer hands." But in spite of the opinion of so experienced a police officer, the Bombay police force was reduced in 1868, 1871, and 1872 by

6 European police of all ranks.

108 Native police of all ranks.

39. Government will thus fully understand how severe the strain has been upon the police; notwithstanding which all the Europeans have been most steady, and cheerfully performed their harassing duties, and have at all times displayed courage, promptitude, and discretion, entitling them to the highest praise. The native police have also behaved extremely well, and have been steady and energetic in the performance of their duties. From the 13th up to the present time the police, European and native, may be said to have been on perpetual duty night and day, for they have scarcely ever left their posts.

40. To say that native constables are not as intelligent, energetic, and self-reliant, as would be desirable, is merely to say that they are natives, but they have

• have behaved extremely well, and followed their European leaders with considerable courage, and have been most steady and obedient. The assertion that the majority of native constables are Mahomedans is erroneous, the proportion to Hindoos and other castes being about $\frac{2}{15}$, and I should regret to see it reduced, as Mahomedans make in some respects the best policemen.

41. With reference to the accusation that not only have the Bombay police behaved badly in these disturbances, but that their general efficiency has fallen off of late years, I would in refutation respectfully point to the annual returns which will show that for several years past there has been a marked diminution in the number of crimes committed and the amount of property stolen, while the proportion of convictions and of recoveries of stolen property has vastly increased. These results have received repeated commendation from Government and from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, and have been acquired notwithstanding the large decrease in the strength of the force.

42. Throughout these disturbances, which have so severely taxed all hands of the police force, I have received most invaluable aid from my deputy, Mr. Edginton, and from superintendents Mills, Bailey, and Moffat, and deputy superintendents Smith, Crummey, and Brown, who have all, by their praiseworthy zeal and devotion to their duties, shown an admirable example to the more subordinate members of the force.

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46. I would also mention that since the outbreak on the 13th I have been in constant communication with the municipal commissioner, Mr. Pedder, and that in many of the precautionary measures I have from time to time put in force for the preservation of peace and restoration of order, I have acted in consultation with that officer, whose cordial and valuable co-operation I desire to acknowledge.

(signed) *F. H. Souter,*
Commissioner of Police.

(A.)

Police Commissioner's Office, Bombay,
18 February 1874.

My dear Sir, Cowasjee,
A book has lately been published by Mr. Rustomjee Hormusjee, styled "The Renowned Prophets and Nations, &c., &c.," and I understand that you subscribed for and received several copies of the work. It seems that the Mahomedans have taken great offence at some of the passages, which they consider to defame their prophet Mahomed, and as there is some excitement about the matter, I write in the interests of peace to ask if you would kindly allow the copies which you have in your possession to be sent to me for safe custody for the present, or till such time as the excitement may have blown over.

Yours, &c.,
(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police

Sir Cowasjee Jeehangeer, K. C. S. I.

A similar letter was sent to the undermentioned gentlemen :

Framjee Nasserwanjee Patell, J. P.
Ardaseer Hormusjee Wadia, J. P.
Dinshaw Manockjee Petit, J. P.
Muncherjee Hormusjee Cama, J. P.
Nasserwanjee Manockjee Petit, J. P.
Byramjee Jeejeebhoy, J. P.

(True copy.)

(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police.

(B.)

To Frank Henry Souter, Esq., C. S. I., Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Sir,

I beg to report that, in obedience to your orders, I attended the Mahomedan meeting held at Dada Mukba's Bungalow, at Byculla, on the 12th instant.

2. The meeting was composed of more than a hundred members of the different sects of the Mahomedan community, and most of them were persons of weight and respectability. The subject of Mr. Jalbhoy's book, and the steps taken by you regarding it, were fully and calmly discussed. Your action was unanimously approved, and the excitement occasioned by the publication of the book seemed to be peacefully and perfectly set at rest.

3. The proceedings of the meeting were of so thorough and peaceful a character that I could not reasonably suppose that any riot or disturbance would at any time afterwards break out in connection with the question, which the meeting had apparently disposed of.

4. In accordance, however, with your further instructions, I, with three detectives, went to the Jumma Musjid, at noon, on the following Mahomedan sabbath, Friday the 13th idem, to watch the proceedings, &c. of the congregation. I remained in the principal hall of the mosque, on the ground floor. I did not see Kazee Abool Luteef, but was informed that he was then in the mosque. The usual prayers were recited; the congregation did not appear to be excited or agitated in any way, and nothing whatever occurred to lead me to suspect that any riotous outbreak was at all contemplated, or likely to take place.

5. On conclusion of the prayers I stationed myself at the main gate of the mosque, and the members of the congregation came out and went away quietly in different directions. I did not see any of them armed with sticks or other weapons, either inside or outside the mosque. By about one o'clock, p.m., all the congregation had quietly quitted the mosque and its immediate neighbourhood, and I and the other policemen in plain clothing, who had been sent on duty there, left the place.

6. When I arrived at the junction of Syed Abdool Rahimon and Shaikh Ally Junjerkur streets, I saw a crowd of people near the small police chowkie in Syed Abdool Rahimon street; and on going there I saw a number of men and boys throwing stones at the windows of the houses of the Parsees. I sent information to the police office at once, and I and the policemen with me did our best to disperse the mob.

7. While we were so engaged, a large number of Seedees and Arabs poured into the street

RECENT RIOTS IN BOMBAY.

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street from the direction of the Chuckla, and commenced to throw stones at the windows, tear down the sun-shades of the shops, break down the railings, and break into the Parsee houses on each side of the street.

8. Some of them ran towards Mirza Oil-maker-street. I and other policemen drew up across the road, and prevented them from entering it, and consequently no damage was done by the mob in that street.

9. About this time Inspector Raymond met me, and he and I went together towards Alibaugh. On our way we saw a wounded Parsee lying in Dhunjee Dongeria Cross-lane, and removed him into Dhunjee Dongeria-street, and made him over to some Parsees there.

10. Soon after this a large number of rioters entered this street from its northern end. They were all armed with sticks, &c. We repulsed them. We were both struck with sticks and stones, but were not much hurt.

11. At about 2 o'clock, p.m., a few policemen came into the street from Syed Abdool Rahimon-street, where, soon afterwards, I found that the large and furious mob I had previously seen had been dispersed, and that many of the rioters had been captured by the police. I saw you, Sir, the Deputy Commissioner, and other members of the force, there at that time.

Bombay, 27 February 1874.

I beg to remain, &c.
(signed) M. Abdul Ali,
Inspector of Police.

(C.)

To the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Sir,

I beg to report for your information, that on the evening of the 12th instant I received orders from Deputy Superintendent Smith to attend the neighbourhood of the Jooma Musjid, in plain clothing, during the Mahomedan hours of prayer, from 10 o'clock to 1 o'clock on the following day. I accordingly attended, accompanied by constable Gough, who was also in plain clothes, and we waited about in the street near the entrance of the Musjid. The worshippers commenced to assemble about 10 o'clock, a.m., and by noon a large congregation had assembled, and I sent a report of the circumstance to Mr. Deputy Superintendent Smith. Their behaviour, however, was quiet and orderly. None of them carried sticks, or were otherwise armed, and no circumstance arose to give me any reason to suppose that any disturbance was likely to take place. The prayers were concluded about 1 o'clock, p.m., and the congregation poured out of the building in my presence and dispersed quietly in different directions. The crowd having left the vicinity of the mosque, I ordered constable Gough to walk through the Mahomedan quarter towards the Chuckla and see that all was quiet. He went away, and after about a quarter of an hour returned and reported all quiet. Ten or 15 minutes after this I again sent Mr. Gough to take another look round. While he was away a native constable came and reported that he had been sent by Mr. Gough to state that a row was going on in Syed Abdool Rahimon-street. I went there immediately, and saw crowds of Mahomedans pouring into that street from the direction of the Chuckla through the bye-lanes. They were throwing stones at the houses of some of the Parsee residents in that street, and breaking the windows and railings, &c.; I tried to stop them, but could not do so. I sent to the Commissioner's office and elsewhere for help. Within less than an hour afterwards I saw the Deputy Commissioner and other members of the office establishment, &c., &c., in Dhunjee Doongria-street behind Syed Abdool Rahimon-street. I immediately afterwards went into Syed Abdool Rahimon-street, and found that the mob I had there previously seen had been dispersed by the police, and that a number of rioters were in custody. I went into Dhunjee Doongria cross-lane, because I saw a Parsee lying on the ground. I found he was wounded, and picked him up, and removed him into Dhunjee Doongria-street, and engaged myself in trying to disperse the mob there, shortly after which the reinforcement of police from office, &c., came as I have before stated. There was no tumultuous meeting of Mahomedans near the mosque on that morning, and neither at the going in nor coming out of the congregation were there any sticks or other weapons in their hands.

28 February 1874.

I am, &c.
(signed) Richard Raymond,
Inspector of Police.

(D.)

To the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Sir,

I HAVE seen the report of Inspector Raymond regarding the riot which broke out in Syed Abdool Rahimon-street on the 13th instant, and confirm the statements made therein up to the point at which Mr. Raymond directed me to pass the second time through the Mahomedan streets in the neighbourhood of the Jooma Musjid. On receiving this order, I went and stood at the junction of Syed Abdool Rahimon and Shaik Alli Jinjeerker-streets. While standing there I saw two or three Mahomedan boys running towards Alibaugh, and shouting "Deen! Deen!" I heard some Mahomedan men who were passing along tell these boys to hold their tongue. I went in the direction in which the boys had run, and when I got near the first of the Parsee houses in that street, I saw a crowd of Mahomedans run into Syed Abdool Rahimon-street from Bhajee Palla-street. Some of them began to throw stones at the windows of the Parsees; others tore down the blinds of the shops, and armed themselves with the bamboo rollers, &c., of these blinds. I tried to quell the disturbance, and was told by some of the rioters not to interfere, by others to go away. I sent at once to Inspector Raymond, to Deputy Superintendent Smith, and to the Commissioner's Office for assistance; this was a few minutes after 1 o'clock. The street became almost instantly crammed with rioters, who seemed to come in from all directions. I went through the crowd to the Parsee Fire Temple (Alibaugh) and saw a mob of Seedees and Arabs had broken into it, and into some of the houses on the opposite side of the street, and were wrecking and plundering them. In about 10 minutes from this time, as near as I can remember, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner came with help from office. Immediately after they came, we (the police) charged into the mob and dispersed it, and captured a large number of the rioters. Nothing in the bearing of the people at the mosque led me to anticipate any breach of the peace. I did not see any of the congregation at any time armed with sticks.

28 February 1874.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Hugh Gough*, Constable.

(E.)

My dear James,

Marine Lines, 2 March 1874.

I SHALL be only too glad if my evidence as to the duration of the riot on Friday will be of any service in correcting the mis-statements on the subject.

I left this house as nearly as possible at 12.30, and must have been in the centre of the native town at the top of the Copper bazaar at about 12.45. I reached the Elphinstone College at 1 o'clock, and left punctually at 2. As near as I can calculate, I must have passed through the centre of the town at 2.15, or possibly 2.20.

When passing through first, there was no sign of a row, and I noticed nothing unusual.

On my return I saw crowds moving about, but no fighting; at the top of the Copper bazaar I saw a number of European policemen standing round their drag. I stopped my horse, and asked what was the matter; and one of the constables told me that there had been a row but that it was over; his words, as far as I can remember, being "We have had a tough job."

I am perfectly willing that my name should be used, if required. I am sorry I was out when your note arrived, but hasten to send an answer now.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *F. Giles*.

RECENT RIOTS IN BOMBAY.

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(F.)

RETURN of Fire Temples and Houses, &c., entered by Mahomedan Rioters on the 13th February 1874, with alleged Value of Property Destroyed and Stolen.

Name of Owner or Tenant.	Locality.	Description of Building.	Alleged Value of Property.		REMARKS.
			Destroyed.	Stolen.	
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	
Albough property	Syed Abdool Rahimon-street.	Fire Temple and Jumut Khana.	5,000 - -	- - -	Doors and windows broken. The sacred-extinguished. Contents of Temple st or destroyed.
Dorabjee Furdoonjee	- ditto - ditto	Dwelling-house	92 - -	- - -	Doors and windows broken.
Pestonjee Cooverjee	- ditto - ditto	Liquor shop -	1,500 - -	3,000 - -	Shop broken open; a cash-box, contain 3,000 Rupees, said to have been stol Pestonjee said to have been assaulted one Nubookhan, now in custody. (postponed until 6th March.
Manockjee Cursetjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	50 - -	- - -	Bottles and other things in shop destroyed
Jamsetjee Nowrojee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	100 - -	- - -	- ditto - ditto - ditto.
Auderjee Framjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	100 - -	- - -	Bottles of spirits destroyed or stolen.
Jeevanjee Hormusjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	650 - -	- - -	
Cursetjee Hormusjee	Nagdavia-street	- ditto	900 - -	- - -	
Cooverjee Hormusjee	1st Coombarwada	- ditto	350 - -	- - -	Bottles, &c. broken, and liquor spilt or st
Nowrojee Manajjee	New Memonwada	- ditto	400 - -	- - -	Liquor spilled or stolen.
Cawasjee Jeevanjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	300 - -	- - -	
Jeejeebhoy Dhunjeebhoy	Syed Abdool Rahimon-street.	Dwelling-house	5,000 - -	5,000 - -	House wrecked; money, jewelry, and clo destroyed and stolen.
Pestonjee Muncherjee	- ditto - ditto	Dispensary	2,800 - -	200 - -	House adjoining foregoing partly wrecked
Dhumbai (woman)	- ditto - ditto	Liquor shop	700 - -	- - -	Contents destroyed.
Bomanjee Ardaseer	- ditto - ditto	Sherbat shop	200 - -	400 - -	Shop wrecked and pillaged.
Jairbai Dhunjeebhoy	- ditto - ditto	Dwelling-house	200 - -	- - -	
Gopall Nana	Dhunjee Dongeria-street.	- ditto	nil - -	350 - -	Shop entered by mob; gold and silver o ments stolen.
Hoorjeebhoy Byramjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	13 - -	40 - -	Fifteen Rupees and cooking utensils, stolen.
Bomanjee Pestonjee	- ditto - ditto	- ditto	43 - -	50 - -	Wearing apparel stolen, and railings br down.
Bomanjee Merwanjee	Bhendy Bazaar	Fire Temple	2,784 - -	725 - -	Temple wrecked. Sacred fire put out.
Jamsetjee Cawasjee	Falkland-road	Liquor shop	75 - -	389 - -	
Bhickajee Burjorjee	Phall Gully	- ditto	195 - -	587 - -	The truth of this complaint is very doubt
Edujee Rustomjee	Erakine-road	Dwelling-house	- - -	40 - -	
Pestonjee Dorabjee	- ditto	- ditto	- - -	20 - -	Door broken.
Dinahaw Jamsetjee	Parrell-road	Stable	7 - -	13 - -	
TOTAL - <i>Rs.</i>			20,939 - -	10,765 - -	

N.B.—Slight damage was also done to 72 other dwelling-houses, stables, &c., in different localities, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant, by window glasses being broken, or benches, doors, railings, &c., &c., being destroyed or injured. The collective amount of the alleged damages is estimated at about 1,968 rupees.

Bombay, 28 February 1874.

(signed) *F. H. Souter,*
Commissioner of Police.

(G.)

List of Cases brought to Hospital on the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 21st February 1874, during the Mussulman Riot

No.	Names.	Caste.	When Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Nature of Injuries.	Remaining in Hospital 28th February 1874.
1	Dadabhoj Rustomjee	Parsee	13 Feb. 1874	- - -	14 Feb. 1874	Contused wound of head; fracture of skull.	-
2	Syed Ameen	Mussulman	13 "	- - -	- - -	Laceration of tongue. Contused wounds.	Remaining.
3	Sheriad	Parsee	13 "	- - -	- - -	Suspected fracture of skull	ditto.
4	Dorabjee Byramjee	ditto	13 "	19 Feb. 1874	- - -	Contused wound of face	-
5	Cassim Yacoub	Mussulman	13 "	- - -	- - -	Fracture of left leg. Contused wounds.	Remaining.
6	Hoosain Mohideen	ditto	13 "	22 "	- - -	Fracture of lower jaw	-
7	Shaboodeen Doola	ditto	13 "	13 "	- - -	Contused wound of head	-
8	Hakoom Subjada	ditto	13 "	13 "	- - -	ditto - ditto	-
9	Allee Oomir	ditto	13 "	13 "	- - -	Lacerated wound	-
10	Nusserwanjee Sorabjee	Parsee	13 "	13 "	- - -	Contused wound of head	-
11	Hussain Alee	Mussulman	13 "	13 "	- - -	ditto - ditto	-
12	Towar Dhondoo	ditto	13 "	13 "	- - -	ditto - ditto	-
13	Cowasjee Hormasjee	Parsee	13 "	13 "	- - -	Bite on side of abdomen	Treated and away.
14	Ismel Khan	Mussulman	14 "	14 "	- - -	Contused wound	-
15	Assad Nayar Aili	ditto	14 "	14 "	- - -	Contused wound of head	-
16	Manockjee Byramjee	Parsee	14 "	14 "	- - -	Suspected fracture of skull. Contused wounds.	-
17	Shaik Ahmed	Mussulman	14 "	18 "	- - -	Three lacerated scalp wounds	-
18	Hyadeen Ahmed	ditto	14 "	- - -	16 Feb. 1874	Fracture of skull. Contused wounds.	-
19	Framjee Merwanjee	Parsee	14 "	- - -	- - -	Contused wound of scalp	Remaining.
20	Nezamoodeen Cureembux	Mussulman	14 "	- - -	- - -	Contusion and injuries to spine	ditto.
21	Sides Jansah	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Gun-shot wound (right elbow)	ditto.
22	Jamsetjee Dorabjee	Parsee	15 "	- - -	27 Feb. 1874	Fracture of frontal bone	-
23	Awadan Nusserwanjee	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Fracture vault of skull	Remaining.
24	Nusserwanjee Bamon	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Wound scalp	ditto.
25	Unknown	Mussulman	16 "	- - -	16 Feb. 1874	Fracture vault of skull	-
26	Khan Mahomed	ditto	15 "	18 Feb. 1874	- - -	ditto - ditto	-
27	Oosman Khan	ditto	15 "	25 "	- - -	Wound of scalp	-
28	Sumbakoo Sullimon	ditto	15 "	24 "	- - -	ditto	-
29	Unknown "Seedee"	ditto	15 "	- - -	16 Feb. 1874	Wound of scalp; fracture of skull; laceration of brain.	-
30	Casee Sungoo	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Wound of scalp	Remaining.
31	Hajee Ahmed	ditto	15 "	- - -	15 Feb. 1874	Fracture of lower jaw	-
32	Caloo Sorab	Parsee	15 "	- - -	- - -	Wound of scalp	Remaining.
33	Shaik Sab	Mussulman	15 "	16 Feb. 1874	- - -	ditto	-
34	Ramjan Mahomed	ditto	15 "	22 "	- - -	Wound of scalp; fracture of forearm.	-
35	Succoo Jeera	ditto	15 "	- - -	16 Feb. 1874	Concussion wound of scalp	-
36	Mucktoom Ahmed	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Fracture of forearm; scalp wound	Remaining.
37	Mucktoom Ahmed	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	Wound of scalp	ditto.
38	Burjorjee Nanabhoj	Parsee	15 "	19 Feb. 1874	- - -	ditto	-
39	Cursetjee Jamajee	ditto	15 "	- - -	- - -	ditto	Remaining.
40	Sadalla Mabrook	Mussulman	15 "	- - -	- - -	Gun-shot wound (buttock)	ditto.
41	Bairam Ardaseer	Parsee	15 "	23 Feb. 1874	- - -	Wound of scalp	-
42	Hajee Malim	Mussulman	15 "	- - -	- - -	ditto	Remaining.
43	Jungoo Afa	ditto	15 "	25 Feb. 1874	- - -	ditto	-
44	Shaik Ally	ditto	15 "	16 "	- - -	Contused wound of scalp	-
45	Shaporjee Pestonjee	Parsee	16 "	16 "	- - -	Contused wound of face	Treated and away.
46	Rustomjee Sorabjee	ditto	17 "	17 "	- - -	Contused wound of scalp	-
47	Ardaseer Jamsetjee	ditto	21 "	- - -	- - -	Punctured wound	Remaining.
48	Syed Jeewar	Mussulman	21 "	- - -	- - -	Scalp wounds; fracture of skull	ditto.
49	Bomanjee Merwanjee	Parsee	21 "	- - -	- - -	Contused wounds	ditto.
50	Mahomed Singoo	Mussulman	21 "	- - -	- - -	Scalp wound	ditto.
51	Barrack Marzook	ditto	21 "	- - -	- - -	Contused scalp wounds. Fracture of left tibia and fibula.	ditto.
52	Yamah Mahabood	ditto	21 "	- - -	- - -	Contused wound of scalp	ditto.
53	Philan Abdoola	ditto	21 "	- - -	- - -	Contused wound of head	ditto.
54	Salim	ditto	21 "	21 Feb. 1874	- - -	Contused wound of face	Treated and away.
55	Rustomjee Dhunjeebhoj	Parsee	22 "	22 "	- - -	Contused wound of ear	away.

Byculla, 28 February 1874.

(signed) J. Anderson, House Surgeon,
J. J. Hospital.

(True Copy.)

(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police.

P.S.—In addition to the list of casualties mentioned above, one European inspector and six native police were admitted into hospital seriously injured several others also received slight wounds, which, however, did not prevent them from continuing their duty.

(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police.

(H.)

My dear Mr. Souter, Calcutta, 25 February 1874.
 ACCORDING to your wish, expressed in Mr. Edginton's letter to me of this day's date, I beg to furnish you with the following statement of my opinion on the subject therein referred to.

Kazi Abdul Lutf Lenday having called in a meeting on the 12th instant, at the house of Dada Mukba at Bycolla, I was present on an invitation. The action taken by you, with regard to the suppression of the publication of Mr. Jalbhoy's book, was explained by the said Kazi to the people present; and they all seemed to have been satisfied, as they expressed their entire approval of what had been done by you. After the meeting was declared dissolved, and the coffee, &c. was served out, I left before others; and, I believe, I was the first person who left the premises. I left the assembly with a firm belief that the misunderstanding caused by the publication of the book was amicably and thoroughly settled. At the ordinary prayer meeting at the Juma Musjid, on the following day, at which I was present, everything, as far as it came under my observation, passed off in a quiet and orderly manner, and I had no ground whatever for suspecting that any disturbance of the peace was likely to take place.

The "Times of India" of the 14th instant, in reporting the disturbance, says:—"It appears that a meeting of the Mahomedans was held at the Juma Musjid yesterday morning at about 10 o'clock. The feeling of those who were present, principally the men who afterwards created the disturbance, was much against the Parsees. Instead, therefore, of a peaceable meeting, the bad feeling showed itself in cries of Deen! Deen! notwithstanding the praiseworthy efforts of Mr. Mahomed Ally Rogay to quiet the feelings of the crowd. He explained to them that, as the book had been withdrawn from circulation, no harm had been done; and that, by assaulting the Parsees, they would only get themselves into trouble."

I should take this opportunity of stating that no meeting was called at all, to my knowledge, but that the people had collected to say their prayers on Friday as usual, and that what is given by the "Times of India," as above quoted, is quite unfounded, since I, having had no reason whatever to suspect an outbreak, could not, and did not, say anything to the people to the effect that they should not make any disturbance. During the time I was present at the prayers, not a word was said there regarding the last day's meeting, or the publication of the book. As a rule, I leave the Musjid as soon as the principal portions of the prayers are said, and I did the same on this occasion. About half an hour after I reached home, I heard that something like a riot was taking place at Shaik Abdool Rahimon-street. You will thus observe that, until the riot actually took place, I had no ground whatever for suspecting that any disturbance of the peace was likely to take place.

Yours, &c.
 (signed) *Mahomed Ally Rogay.*

(I.)

My dear Mr. Souter, Bombay, 24 February 1874.
 I HAD no apprehension whatever of a riotous outbreak after the meeting at Dada Mukba's bungalow on the 12th instant.

The remarks I made at that meeting were thoroughly acquiesced in by all present, and we all felt contented and indeed thankful that a speedy and peaceful solution of a very nasty question had been brought about by your timely interference.

I certainly left the meeting under the belief that the question was peaceably and finally settled.

Yours, &c.
 (signed) *C. Tyabjee.*

(J.)

To *F. H. Souter, Esq., c.s.i., Commissioner of Bombay Police.*

My dear Sir, Bombay, 27 February 1874.
 I UNDERSTAND from Mr. Edginton, your deputy, that you wish to have from me a concise information of what took place at the Mahomedan meeting convened at Dada Mukba's bungalow on the 12th instant. With much pleasure I will tell you here as nearly as possible what took place at that time.

I was present when the Kasee, Abdool Lattif, spoke to the following effect: That he and others whom he named had called upon you and showed the book which Mr. Jalbhoy had published, and in which some disrespectful words were used against our Prophet. The Kasee further said that you received him with kindness and grace, and heard what he had to say with patience, and you offered to do what you could in allaying the bad feeling which

was likely to excite among the Mahomedans by such publication; you at once sent for Mr. Jalbhoy and took him aside, and said something to him, when he at once offered to give up the book then in his possession, and to stop their further publication.

The Kazeer then, after this explanation, told the assembly that they ought to be satisfied. Mr. Cummorodeen and myself also spoke upon the matter. The whole assembly seemed to have been perfectly satisfied, and there was not the slightest indication of any bad feeling among them. I was then of opinion that the matter had been satisfactorily and conclusively settled, and there was not the remotest idea or suspicion in my mind that there would be any disturbance on the following day.

I remain, &c.
(signed) *Mirzee Ali Akbar.*

(K.)

To *F. H. Souter*, Esq., c.s.i., the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Dear Sir,

27 February 1874.

IN acknowledging the receipt of Mr. Edginton's letter, dated yesterday, I have to inform you that I was present at the meeting (by invitation) at Dada Muckba's house on the 12th instant, when the question of Mr. Jalbhoy's book, and your actions in trying to prevent its circulation were fully and calmly discussed.

I, on my part, assure you that I did not entertain any fears whatever that any disturbance would take place, and the general belief of the leading and respectable members of the Mahomedan section of the community was that the question of Mr. Jalbhoy's book had been definitely and satisfactorily settled.

In conclusion, I had no reason whatever to think that a disturbance or riot would take place on the following day, or at any subsequent period.

Yours, &c.
Mirza Hoossein Khan,
Solicitor, High Court, Bombay.

(L.)

FORT POLICE COURT.

THE information and deposition of Thomas Mills, inhabitant of Bombay, taken upon oath before me, Nana Marojee, Esquire, one of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace, and a Magistrate of Police for the Town and Island of Bombay, on Wednesday, the 18th day of February 1874, in the presence and hearing of the prisoners named in the annexed list (A.), charged before me, the said Justice, with committing riot and mischief, being members of an unlawful assembly, and rioting with deadly weapons.

Which said Deponent, on his oath aforesaid, saith:—

I am Superintendent of Police, in charge C Division. On Sunday last, the 15th instant, at about 10 o'clock a.m., I saw two Mahomedan burial processions, accompanied by about four or five hundred persons, passing from Bhoiwada towards Bhooleshwar-road, and proceeding on to Portuguese Church-street. I, with about 20 native policemen and one mounted sowar, accompanied them. They proceeded through the Agiary-lane and Old Sonapoor-lane to the Mahomedan burial-ground. At Sonapoor-lane, I was met by Inspector Austin, Constable Brewin, and 10 or 15 native policemen. The procession passed into the grave-yard. Inspector Austin and several native policemen going with the procession into the grave-yard. I, with the other policemen, remained at the gate of the burying-ground. Shortly afterwards an alarm was given that stones were thrown into the grave-yard. Mr. Austin, who had been standing near the wall inside, called out and told me that stones had passed over his head. The Mahomedans—some of whom were in the Mosque, and others in the yard—all rushed to the wall of the grave-yard in an excited state. I was mounted on a horse, and I galloped to the lower corner of the grave-yard, outside, from which direction the stones were stated to have been thrown. There I saw, in the Sonapoor-lane, between two and three hundred Parsees, the greater portion armed with sticks and bludgeons. They were throwing stones at the Mahomedans in the grave-yard, and the Mahomedans were throwing stones from the grave-yard at them. I, with the other policemen who were there, went between both the parties, and while we were trying to press each party back, two or three of the police were struck and injured. The Mahomedans rushed out over the wall through the police and amongst the Parsees. The Parsees turned and fled. When the Mahomedans first rushed upon the Parsees, a couple of men from each side were injured. After the Parsees had cleared away, the police drove the Mahomedans into the grave-yard, and they were kept there until things got a little quiet. I had, before any disturbance had taken place, sent Mr. McDowell, a Municipal Inspector, to the Null Bazaar Chowkey for some more reinforcement of the police. I had at the same time dispatched a sepoy in a buggy to call the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police, with all the aid they could get. I sent Mr. Austin in a buggy, after the first disturbances but before the arrival of the police reinforcement, to the Commander of the troops to order out the aid of the military. The Mahomedans, who had been driven back into the grave-yard as aforesaid, formed themselves into a procession to go home. They were in an excited state and,

and the greater portion of them were armed with sticks. Before they left the graveyard, I had information that a large number of Parsees had collected together at the end of the Sonapoor-lane, by which end the procession had to pass. I sent a European police officer and some reploys with directions to disperse the crowd and send them away. The police brought back information that the Parsees refused to go away. Before allowing the Mahomedans to leave the graveyard, I myself rode to the end of the lane, and there, on the Breach Candy-road, saw hundreds of Parsees, a great number of them armed with sticks and bludgeons; one of them, whom I know as a clerk in the Municipal Commissioner's office, was in the front of the crowd. I remonstrated with him and the others, pointing out that their conduct might lead to a serious disturbance. He and others, who were very much excited, said: "The police won't protect us; we must protect ourselves." I insisted upon their clearing the road, and moved them back. The Mahomedan procession then came down the Sonapoor-lane, and turned to the left on the Breach Candy-road, which was their way home. I had the police drawn up on the right of the Sonapoor-lane. As the latter part of the procession passed out of the lane into the Breach Candy-road, the crowd of the Parsees rushed up, shouting and brandishing sticks. The police at this time were between both parties. The Mahomedan procession stopped, turned round, made a dash through the police and amongst the Parsees. They got mixed amongst the Parsees, and both parties struck each other with sticks. The greater portion of the Parsees then fled, some into the houses and verandas, and others towards the Dhobie Talao. Those Mahomedans who were scattered about, and those who were following the Parsees, were driven back by the police towards the Breach Candy-road. The Mahomedans then threw stones at the windows of the Parsee houses, and rushed on the verandas to get in. The police drove them back, and prevented others from doing so. At this stage the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police arrived with a reinforcement. The police charged into the crowd, which turned and fled—some men through Funuswaree, and some through the Agiary-lane and other lanes and by-lanes. All the men now present, except three, were arrested by the police while they were running away. A number of them was arrested in a gully alongside the Agiary. In consequence of the riot aforesaid, on the Breach Candy-road, six or eight persons—some Parsees and some Mahomedans—were injured. Out of them three or four have since died in the hospital from the result of their injuries. I cannot identify particularly any single individual as having done some particular act; but they were all present at the riot, and refused to be dispersed when desired to do so. The troops arrived quickly, but before they arrived the mob had been dispersed.

Prisoners decline cross-examination.

(signed) *T. Mills.*

Taken upon oath the day, month, and year herein above written, before me.

(signed) *Nana Morojee, Justice of the Peace.*

Bombay, Fort Police Court,

Tuesday, 24 February 1874.

1 Nasserwanjee Bazonjee, 2 Dorabjee Nasserwanjee, 3 Manockjee Eduljee, 4 Sorabjee Temooljee, 5 Dinshaw Manockjee, 6 Byramjee Aspaniarjee, 7 Pallonjee Rustomjee, and 8 Rustomjee Aspaniarjee, are placed at the bar by Mr. Superintendent Mills. Dr. Dallas appears for Nasserwanjee Bazonjee, Dorabjee Nasserwanjee, and Pallonjee Rustomjee.

Mr. Pherozshaw Merwanjee Mehta appears for Manockjee Eduljee, Sorabjee Temooljee, Dinshaw Manockjee, Byramjee Aspaniarjee, and Rustomjee Aspaniarjee.

Mr. Thomas Mills re-appears, is re-sworn, and the foregoing information and deposition having been read over to him in the presence and hearing of the above-named eight prisoners, and explained to the prisoners, he further states as follows:—Burjorjee Framjee I have now ascertained is the name of the Parsee I have alluded to in my foregoing information as the one who is employed in the Municipal Department. I pray for a warrant for his arrest. I also charge the eight men who are now in court with taking part in the aforesaid riot. Their names are—No. 1 Nasserwanjee Bazonjee, No. 2 Dorabjee Nasserwanjee, No. 3 Manockjee Eduljee, No. 4 Sorabjee Temooljee, No. 5 Dinshaw Manockjee, No. 6 Byramjee Aspaniarjee, No. 7. Pallonjee Rustomjee, and No. 8 Rustomjee Aspaniarjee.

Cross-examination reserved.

(signed) *T. Mills.*

Taken upon oath the day, month, and year herein above written before me.

(signed) *Nana Morojee, Justice of the Peace.*

(True Copy.)

Nana Morojee, Acting Third Magistrate of Police.

(No. 1375 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

Bombay Castle, 12 March 1874

LETTER from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, No. 464, dated 28th February 1874.
—Submits a report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on Friday the 13th February 1874, and of the subsequent occurrences, up to the date of his report.

RESOLUTION.—His Excellency in Council is glad to be in possession of this narrative by the commissioner of police of the action of the police force under his command during the recent disturbances in Bombay.

2. It would appear from this report that the police acted with praiseworthy energy and determination in the suppression of each outbreak as it occurred, but it is not satisfactorily established whether the original outrages which were committed on Friday the 13th of February were the result of a preconcerted design, or an accidental ebullition of class malevolence.

3. His Excellency in Council desires that the commissioner of police should make a more thorough inquiry on this point, and will await this further report, and the disclosures which are likely to take place on the trial of the principal rioters in the High Court, before pronouncing any definite opinion on the general character of the occurrences, and on the conduct of the police in connection with them.

Acting Secretary to Government.

To the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

To Sir *Phillip E. Wodehouse*, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., Honourable Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

May it please your Excellency,

THAT your Excellency's poor petitioners beg leave most humbly to lay these few lines before your Excellency, with the full confidence and with the sanguine hopes that the same will meet with your kind and favourable consideration.

We beg leave to inform you that one book was published by Rustomjee Hormusjee Jalbai and others regarding the life of Prophets which contains much against the life of Mahomed. The publication of this volume came to our knowledge which hurt very much the feelings of all Mahomedans thereupon. Our Cazee and other influential men came to know also about the contents of this volume from whence they thought that great disturbance and row would take place, and in order to keep the peace they thought better to bring this to the notice of Mr. Souter, the Commissioner of Police, whereupon our Cazee and other influential men went and saw Mr. Edginton and then Mr. Souter, and gave him the information regarding the publication of this book, who received them with the greatest respect and thanked them to bring this information to his knowledge, and at the same time sent immediately to Rustomjee Hormusjee Jalbai, who came with Police Havildar sent by Mr. Souter. No sooner he came he had some kind of conversation with Mr. Souter, and shortly afterwards promised that he would bring all the copies of the above book the following day to Mr. Souter which he had in his possession (this information we had from Mr. Souter), and Mr. Souter should do whatever he thinks right with these books; and Mr. Souter promised our Cazee and other influential men that he would endeavour his utmost to destroy these books, and they should try and keep the peace. Upon this information we were quite pleased and satisfied, relying on Mr. Souter, that he would do something good to us, and also we tried our best to keep the peace for about four or five days. On Thursday evening about 8 or 9 p.m. the 12th instant, our Cazee held a meeting. To this meeting few of Shiah and Soonees attended. Our Cazee recommended them and all who attended the said meeting to forgive Rustomjee Hormusjee for his publishing the above book and also to keep peace and forget bad feelings. To this all of them unanimously consented, relying on Mr. Souter, that he would try and destroy these books and do everything good for us and to keep the peace, and then we all left the meeting. The next day being Friday, some of Mahomedans went to the Jumah Musjid for prayers as usual, and after the prayers our Cazee informed them about Thursday evening's meeting, and recommended them that they should try and keep the peace; so they all left the Mosque. On their way home some of the boys were saying,
"Deen

"Deen Deen;" up to they came to Battlewalla Molla or Abdool Rahimon-street. Your Excellency will find that the above mosque to the Battlewalla Molla there are good many shops belonging to Parsees who were present at the time, but none of them were hurt or insulted, neither the Mahomedans, but one Framjee the police-constable. At that time Framjee came down from his house he was living, and struck the boys for calling "Deen Deen;" and made them quiet for his own caste people. At that time some of our caste people, who did not attend the meeting, asked Framjee the cause of his striking the boys. To these men he also insulted, and some of them were also struck, and at the same time some bottles and other injurious things were thrown from the windows of the said Framjee's house in that vicinity; thereupon the present row and disturbance is going on; also some of the Mahomedans who returned from mosque further up than Framjee's house, towards the northern side, they also perceived something coming down from the windows of the other houses belonging to Parsees where the Parsees live. At that time some serious disturbance took place for which we are very sorry, and on the same day similar disturbance took place in other places; also the next day and also on Saturday. On Sunday, the 15th instant, our caste were prohibited from making any disturbance, and while some Seedeas and others who were burying the dead body good many stones were thrown on them by lot of Parsees and good many of them were hurt, and on their returning home good many Parsees came with the sticks in their hands and struck them severely, and good many of our caste people were also struck and injured with pistols, swords and sticks, and some of our caste people were killed and severely struck. On account of such disturbance good many of our caste people are in custody, and none of the Parsees are arrested because we are to be blamed and not the Parsees. It is to our great surprise and astonishment; and since that time we were trying our best to stop our caste people to keep peace, but on the contrary our caste people are yet struck now and then and here and there, and since then we perceived that good many our caste people are suffering very much. Consequently a general meeting was held on Wednesday, the 18th instant. At that meeting Honourable Narayen Wassoodew, Doctor Blaney, and Mr. Ragoonath Narayen Khotay and several other Mahomedans of different races were present. At that time our caste people unananimously consented to keep the peace. At that time Honourable Narayen said that he would intrude the Parsees to do the same. Since that time we thought that Honourable Narayen would stop every disturbance, and after this we were very glad that everything would be stopped, and was stopped for four days, but suddenly again, on Saturday the 21st instant, it is to our great surprise that four of five Seedeas while returning from board ship from Appollo Bunder, they were severely attacked at the Homby-road by the Parsees and severely injured; now they are in hospital. Under these circumstances we earnestly beg your Excellency will be graciously pleased to render us protection and assistance. On the request of Parsees asking to stop the Mohrum procession, thereupon Government, under Section 77 of Act No. 13 of 1856, passed a Resolution dated 17th February 1874 instant, stopping such Procession, which is great imposition on us, as it was carried for 900 years or more but never was stopped in any way. In conclusion, we further beg your Excellency will have the goodness as to allow us permission as to carry on the Mohrum's procession as usual, and also render us military force during the holidays.

Similar disturbance took place in the year 1851 on account of some mischief done by the Parsees against us, and then Parsees asked excuse and have guaranteed in writing for not occurring similar thing again.

Your Excellency's Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray,

Haji Hafiz Abdool Cadir,

Chandlay Shatree Syrang or Poogla,
Tandel-street house No. 17.

Bombay, 23 February 1874.

(No. 989 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

To *Hajee Hafiz Abdool Cadur* and others, Inhabitants of the City of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

IN reply to your petition of 23rd instant, I am directed to state that his Excellency the Governor in Council has given full consideration to your request, that you may be allowed to carry on the Mohurrum processions as usual, and that military aid may be rendered to you during the holidays, and much regrets that he considers it to be his duty to decline to withdraw the prohibition of processions of any kind in the city of Bombay during the Mohurrum festival of the present year.

2. Government do not doubt that many of the persons who have signed this petition are desirous of doing all in their power to allay the prevailing agitation and to prevent further breaches of the peace, but their ability to do so under present circumstances, if the procession be allowed at all, is extremely questionable.

3. A casual insult offered to a procession by some reckless individual would inevitably lead to dangerous riots, for the suppression of which the troops would be put in action, and a loss of life of persons of perhaps all classes would ensue, for which the Government must feel they would be to blame.

4. Government would not for any light cause interfere with the established customs of any class of the community. Their first duty is to protect life and property; and they are satisfied that on the present occasion this can best be done by prohibiting the processions in Bombay. In such a course they hold themselves entitled to the earnest support of all the respectable inhabitants of the city.

5. The other circumstances mentioned in your petition will receive due consideration at the proper time.

I have, &c.

(signed) *J. Nugent,*

Acting Under Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle, 24 February 1874.

(No. 760 of 1874.)

From *Frank H. Souter, Esq., c. s. i.*, Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to the Secretary to Government, Judicial Department, Bombay.

Sir,

Bombay, 7 April 1874.

REFERRING to my letter, No. 464, dated 28th February, submitting a detailed report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on the 13th idem, and on subsequent dates, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Resolution of Government passed thereon, No. 1375, dated 12th ultimo, directing me to make a more thorough inquiry, and to report whether the original outrages were the result of a preconcerted design, or an accidental ebullition of class malevolence.

2. In obedience to these instructions, I beg to state that I have been constantly engaged in further searching investigations on this point, and that no effort or expense has been spared to elicit the required information.

3. Previous to adducing any further evidence which I have been able to obtain on this head, I would beg to draw the attention of Government to paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 of my Report, No. 464, in which I endeavoured to set forth my reasons for believing that the riot of the 13th February was unpremeditated, as far as the mass of the Mahomedan population was concerned.

4. I need

4. I need scarcely assure Government that, immediately after the first disturbance was quelled, I made it my special duty to set on foot searching inquiries with the object of ascertaining all particulars connected with the outbreak; and although I felt every confidence in my own detective force, I employed other reliable persons to obtain any information possible; and from the inquiries made, the opinions were unanimous that the riot of the 13th was *not* premeditated.

5. The evidence which has since been given at the trial of the 62 prisoners charged with the original outrage, on which they have been convicted and sentenced, goes in every way to corroborate the above expressed opinion.

6. The witnesses, in their evidence before the High Court, have stated that all was perfectly quiet at the Jumma Musjid on Friday, the 13th February; that there was no indication whatever of a disturbance; and that the men who attended the mosque were not armed: and this has been proved from the fact, that when the attack took place, the Seedees, Arabs, and other offenders, armed themselves with pieces of firewood, railings, iron bars, rods, or whatever such like they could lay hold of. Had the riot been premeditated, there can be little doubt that the rioters would have come to the mosque prepared.

7. In addition to all other inquiries, I wrote to the four gentlemen named in the margin, asking whether, from any information they might have obtained, their opinions were that the outbreak was pre-concerted or otherwise; and their replies, which are attached to this Report, and marked A, B, C, D, all tend to show that the disturbance was *not* premeditated. These gentlemen are well qualified to give an opinion. The Honourable Narayen Wassodeo has from the first strenuously exerted himself to bring about a reconciliation between the Mahomedans and Parsees, and was therefore likely to hear all the incidents connected with the riots. Dr. Blaney, in his medical capacity, is constantly moving amongst the Mahomedan population of the city, and also assisted the Honourable Narayen Wassodeo in his endeavours to re-establish good feeling between the two communities. The Turkish Consul, from the position he holds, and from the circumstance of his being in the habit of regularly attending one of the mosques, was likely to know the state of feeling of his coreligionists towards the Parsees. And, lastly, Mr. Abdul Rahman is a most respectable Arab gentleman, who would probably have received information regarding the causes which induced several of his sect to take part in the disturbance; and as he is much respected by the European residents in Bombay, I think his opinion may be relied on.

1. The Honourable Narayen Wassodeo, Member Legislative Council, Bombay.
2. Dr. Blaney.
3. The Turkish Consul.
4. Mr. Abdool Rahman.

8. With the object of leaving no stone unturned in carrying out my inquiries, I personally visited in the gaol the 62 prisoners taken up on the 13th February, and both before their trial and after their conviction, questioned each of them separately as to whether they had been instigated in any way by other persons to take part in the disturbance. I also explained that, in the event of any of them making a confession which would lead to the apprehension and conviction of the real ringleaders, if any, I would use my best endeavours with Government to obtain for them a pardon or remission of their sentence. One and all, however, declared that in what had happened there had been no premeditation, neither had they been in any way influenced by others.

9. It is true that on Friday, the 13th February, there was an unusually large gathering at the Jumma Musjid; but this has been satisfactorily accounted for, from the fact that it had become generally understood that it was the intention of the Kazeer on that day to explain to those assembled the course taken by him and the leading members of the Mahomedan community regarding the book the publishing of which had so offended their religious feelings.

10. The information, therefore, which I have been enabled to gather from the many measures put in force to fathom this important point, all goes to prove beyond doubt that the riot of the 13th February was not premeditated. As stated in paragraph 31 of my Report, No. 464, it is quite possible that a few of the Mahomedan roughs of Bombay may have determined on creating a disturbance wherever and whenever they might find an opportunity; but even this has

(No. 989 of 1874.—Judicial Department.)

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5. The other circumstances mentioned in your petition will receive due consideration at the proper time.

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(signed) *J. Nugent,*

Acting Under Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle, 24 February 1874.

(No. 760 of 1874.)

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REFERRING to my letter, No. 464, dated 28th February, submitting a detailed report of the disturbances which took place in the town of Bombay on the 13th idem, and on subsequent dates, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Resolution of Government passed thereon, No. 1375, dated 12th ultimo, directing me to make a more thorough inquiry, and to report whether the original outrages were the result of a preconcerted design, or an accidental ebullition of class malevolence.

2. In obedience to these instructions, I beg to state that I have been constantly engaged in further searching investigations on this point, and that no effort or expense has been spared to elicit the required information.

3. Previous to adducing any further evidence which I have been able to obtain on this head, I would beg to draw the attention of Government to paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 of my Report, No. 464, in which I endeavoured to set forth my reasons for believing that the riot of the 13th February was unpremeditated, as far as the mass of the Mahomedan population was concerned.

4. I need

4. I need scarcely assure Government that, immediately after the first disturbance was quelled, I made it my special duty to set on foot searching inquiries with the object of ascertaining all particulars connected with the outbreak; and although I felt every confidence in my own detective force, I employed other reliable persons to obtain any information possible; and from the inquiries made, the opinions were unanimous that the riot of the 13th was *not* premeditated.

5. The evidence which has since been given at the trial of the 62 prisoners charged with the original outrage, on which they have been convicted and sentenced, goes in every way to corroborate the above expressed opinion.

6. The witnesses, in their evidence before the High Court, have stated that all was perfectly quiet at the Jumma Musjid on Friday, the 13th February; that there was no indication whatever of a disturbance; and that the men who attended the mosque were not armed: and this has been proved from the fact, that when the attack took place, the Seeders, Arabs, and other offenders, armed themselves with pieces of firewood, railings, iron bars, rods, or whatever such like they could lay hold of. Had the riot been premeditated, there can be little doubt that the rioters would have come to the mosque prepared.

7. In addition to all other inquiries, I wrote to the four gentlemen named in the margin, asking whether, from any information they might have obtained, their opinions were that the outbreak was preconcerted or otherwise; and their replies, which are attached to this Report, and marked A, B, C, D, all tend to show that the disturbance was *not* premeditated. These gentlemen are well qualified to give an opinion. The Honourable Narayen Wassoodeo has from the first strenuously exerted himself to bring about a reconciliation between the Mahomedans and Parsees, and was therefore likely to hear all the incidents connected with the riots. Dr. Blaney, in his medical capacity, is constantly moving amongst the Mahomedan population of the city, and also assisted the Honourable Narayen Wassoodeo in his endeavours to re-establish good feeling between the two communities. The Turkish Consul, from the position he holds, and from the circumstance of his being in the habit of regularly attending one of the mosques, was likely to know the state of feeling of his coreligionists towards the Parsees. And, lastly, Mr. Abdul Rahman is a most respectable Arab gentleman, who would probably have received information regarding the causes which induced several of his sect to take part in the disturbance; and as he is much respected by the European residents in Bombay, I think his opinion may be relied on.

1. The Honourable Narayen Wassoodeo, Member Legislative Council, Bombay.
2. Dr. Blaney.
3. The Turkish Consul.
4. Mr. Abdool Rahman.

8. With the object of leaving no stone unturned in carrying out my inquiries, I personally visited in the gaol the 62 prisoners taken up on the 13th February, and both before their trial and after their conviction, questioned each of them separately as to whether they had been instigated in any way by other persons to take part in the disturbance. I also explained that, in the event of any of them making a confession which would lead to the apprehension and conviction of the real ringleaders, if any, I would use my best endeavours with Government to obtain for them a pardon or remission of their sentence. One and all, however, declared that in what had happened there had been no premeditation, neither had they been in any way influenced by others.

9. It is true that on Friday, the 13th February, there was an unusually large gathering at the Jumma Musjid; but this has been satisfactorily accounted for, from the fact that it had become generally understood that it was the intention of the Kazeem on that day to explain to those assembled the course taken by him and the leading members of the Mahomedan community regarding the book the publishing of which had so offended their religious feelings.

10. The information, therefore, which I have been enabled to gather from the many measures put in force to fathom this important point, all goes to prove beyond doubt that the riot of the 13th February was not premeditated. As stated in paragraph 31 of my Report, No. 464, it is quite possible that a few of the Mahomedan roughs of Bombay may have determined on creating a disturbance wherever and whenever they might find an opportunity; but even this has

PAPERS RELATING TO THE

been in no way established; and I submit that when a few men bent on mischief keep their own counsel, it is unreasonable to suppose that the police must necessarily be cognizant of the fact.

I have, &c.
(signed) *F. H. Souter*,
Commissioner of Police.

(A.)

My dear Mr. Souter,

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, asking me to inform you whether, from all the circumstances which came under my notice consequent on the endeavours made to effect a reconciliation between the Mahomedan and Parsee communities, I am of opinion that the attack by a portion of the former on some of the latter on the 13th February was premeditated, or whether it was merely a sudden outburst of malevolent feeling.

In reply, I beg to inform you that a couple of days before that event I had heard, in common with others, that some excitement, arising out of the publication of a book by a Parsee, did exist among the Mahomedans, but that it had been allayed at a meeting which had been subsequently held. I was, therefore, amazed to learn that such was not the case, by the outbreak which ensued on Friday, the 13th February.

You are aware that, in endeavouring to restore amity and goodwill between the Parsee and Mahomedan communities, I succeeded in convening two meetings of the latter; viz., one on the 18th, the other on the 26th February. In arranging for these meetings, I was necessarily brought into close contact with large numbers of Mahomedans generally, and had, therefore many opportunities of forming an opinion as to the state of feeling which existed among them, and I am thereby enabled to say that I have no reason whatever to believe that the attack on the 13th was the result of a preconcerted plot.

On a reflection of the circumstances attending the event, I think it will be admitted that this view is corroborated by the simple fact that the rioters were, at the outset, altogether unarmed, and that it was not until the mischief, from some unaccountable cause, had been set a going, that they armed themselves with whatever came within their reach. Had it been otherwise, I think there is no reason to doubt that they would have prepared themselves in a way which would have been more disastrous in its results.

Malabar Hill, 2 April 1874.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *Narayan Vasudev*.

(B.)

To *Frank H. Souter, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner of Police.*

Dear Sir,

Byculla, 31 March 1874.

WHILE fully realising the importance of the question asked of me in your letter of yesterday regarding the origin of the late riots in Bombay, I am not in a position to say more than that the first manifestation of a riotous spirit on the part of some of the Mahomedan population took me quite by surprise. For a long time previous to the outbreak I was engaged in daily professional work in the Mahomedan quarter of the town, and had not so much as heard the subject of Mr. Jalbhoy's book alluded to in any of the houses, nor did I hear of any premeditated riot; hence my inability to say, as a matter of fact, whether the riot of the 13th of February last was the result of a deliberate plan to attack the Parsees, or whether it arose from suddenly excited religious or fanatical passion.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Thomas Blaney*.

(C.)

Dear Sir,

Bombay, 1 April 1874.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your lines of yesterday's date. You were correctly informed that I had attended one of the mosques on Friday, the 13th February.

It is my habit to attend the mosque on every Friday; it is chiefly the Ismael Habib Musjid I select, and thither I had gone on that particular day.

At the prayer meeting I observed no extraordinary signs or excitement, but found the attendance as usual; and only by driving from the Musjid to the Agra Bank I observed that Shaik Abdool Rahman Street was filled by a mob of Arabs and Seedis, which obliged my carriage to turn and to take the Kalbadavie Road.

In my opinion, and as far as I can judge from my own observance afterwards, the attack upon

upon the Parsees was not premeditated, but was the spontaneous desire of vengeance of the alleged ill-treatment of the Mahomedan boys by a Parsee, prompted by the already existing ill-feeling towards that community entertained by the low caste and fanatic Seedees and Arabs, who saw in the disturbances an opportunity to plunder.

As I never attend any meeting of the Mahomedan community except private parties, and the consulate being situated in the Mazagon district, far from the centre of the Mahomedan population, I have not much opportunity of acquainting myself more with their feelings than anyone else, as you may be led to suppose.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) Hussein,
Consul General of Turkey.

(D.)

To F. H. Souter, Commissioner of Police.

Dear Sir,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 31st ultimo, and, in reply, to observe that when I stated to you, on the occasion you refer to, that I did not consider the attack of the Mahomedans on the Parsees on the first day of the riot was an act of premeditation, I said so from my belief that none of the respectable portion of the Mahomedan community, of whatever section, would attempt to instigate rioting on such a matter as the publication of a book.

I have since had much conversation with many respectable persons of the different classes of the Mahomedan religion who attended the mosque on the day the rioting commenced, and I have not met with one person who had the remotest idea of any intention on the part of any class of Mahomedans to create a disturbance, and it is my belief that the rioting entirely arose from some unexplained circumstances which arose amongst the lowest and most disreputable persons of the different sections of our community.

Bombay, 2 April 1874. I am, &c.
(signed) Abdool Rahmon Bin Minee.

(No. 1025, of 1874.)

From F. H. Souter, Esq., c.s.i., Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to the Secretary to Government, Judicial Department, Bombay.

Sir,

Bombay, 29 April 1874.

HAVING received and perused a copy of the memorial addressed by certain members of the Parsee inhabitants to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in connection with the recent riots, and finding it to contain certain statements wholly, or partially incorrect, I have the honour to draw attention below to the inaccurate passages, and to place in juxta-position my remarks thereon.

Memorial.

Para. 2. That the records of the proceedings in the police and high courts, during the trial of the rioters, and the other documents annexed to this memorial, establish beyond dispute, in your memorialists' belief, the following propositions: (1), that on the 13th day of February last, mobs of Mahomedan rioters, carrying out a preconcerted design, issued from their mosques, and made almost simultaneous attacks * * * * (3), that had the police done its duty there would have been no serious rioting at all.

Para. 3. The fact of the premeditation on the part of the rioters is proved * * * Your memorialists would also call attention to

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Remarks.

The proceedings in the police and high courts go to show that there was no preconcerted design, and there is not an iota of evidence to prove that there was a pre-determined plot: on the other hand, all the circumstances reported in paras. 30, 31, and 32 of my letter No. 464, of the 28th February, and the facts adduced in my subsequent report, No. 760, dated 7th April 1874, establish, as far as it is possible, that the riot of the 13th February was not premeditated.

There is nothing either to prove that the rioters issued from their mosques.

It has nowhere been shown that the police failed or were unequal to their duty; the results have proved the contrary.

There is no evidence whatever to prove that there was any premeditation.

The statement of this fruit seller, Dorabjee

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Memorial.

to the important, because precise, statement of a Parsee fruit seller, named Dorabjee Pestonjee,* who declares that on the 12th of February he was warned by a Mussulman friend and partner in business that it was probable there would be a disturbance the following day.

Para 4. That though the action of the Commissioner of Police in suppressing the book was illegitimate, and in your memorialists' opinion ill-advised * * * * Mr. Edginton had told Mr. Jalbhoy, in Mr. Souter's presence, that the Mahomedans were all ignorant and turbulent people * * * * not only did Mr. Jalbhoy himself go to Mr. Edginton and tell him that in the early part of the 11th February men were openly addressing crowds of Mahomedans from the steps of several of the mosques regarding the supposed insult to their religion, and giving it out as lawful that Mr. Jalbhoy's life should be taken for the offence, and that his caste-fellows should also be punished; information which Mr. Edginton must have put faith in, or he would not have recommended Mr. Jalbhoy to leave Bombay, and go to Poona or Surat, but a deputation of Parsees from Dhobie Talao and Sonapore also went to the police office on the 11th, and implored protection, declaring that they had positive information that Mussulmans were going to fall upon them and commit a dreadful havoc among them. In reply to this deputation the Deputy Commissioner of Police said that leading members of the Mahomedan community had promised to meet the next day (Thursday, the 12th February) and arrange about the prevention of any disturbance. He further said, that in case of their acting otherwise the police would soon bring them to their senses. * *

Remarks.

jee Pestonjee,* is in no way substantiated. If correct it is to be regretted that he made no mention of what he states was told him to the police, though it would have been impossible for the police to have taken action upon the reports of every alarmed Parsee. No foundation has been given for the statement made by the Mussulman to his friend Dorabjee Pestonjee.

The action taken by me, and the reasons for adopting the measures I did, have been fully explained in my report on the riots, and I maintain that, under the circumstances, the course I followed was the one of all others best calculated to avert a disturbance.

Mr. Edginton assures me that Jalbhoy's allegations as to his statement to him about the denunciations from the steps of the mosques, and as to his statement to him with reference to the threats of the Mahomedans to set fire to the houses of the Parsees, &c. (*vide* Appendix C. of the Memorial), are utterly untrue.

On the night of the 11th (or 12th) of February, Jalbhoy came and told Mr. Edginton that he suspected one Mr. Sooliman, a Mahomedan neighbour, with whom he was on bad terms, of having brought his book to the notice of the Mahomedan community, and as it was likely Sooliman and other Mahomedans might injure or annoy him *during the Mohurram*, then close at hand, he wanted police protection; he also said that he had some thought of quitting Bombay until the Mohurram was over, and hoped, if he did so, the police would keep an eye on his house, &c. during his absence. Mr. Edginton told him that he should have the protection he asked for; at the same time he told him he thought his idea of quitting Bombay a prudent one, and would take care his house, &c., was looked after if he went away.

In the forenoon of the 11th or 12th of February, Rustomjee Eduljee, Jewajee Burjorjee, †Dorabjee Nusserwanjee Polishwalia, ‡Rustomjee Manockjee Pouchkhanawalla, and other residents of Dhobie Talao came to Mr. Edginton, and said that, as they lived near Jalbhoy's house and feared he might be an object of Mahomedan resentment during the coming Mohurram, and they, from living in his neighbourhood, might also suffer, they hoped that precautions would be taken to prevent any disturbance. Mr. Edginton told them Jalbhoy had suspended the publication of his book to appease the Mahomedans, that
a meeting

* Dorabjee Pestonjee gave evidence in support of an *alibi* put forward on behalf of one of the Parsee prisoners, Pallonjee Rustomjee, in the Sonapore Riot case. Pallonjee was, however, convicted, and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment.

† This man has since been convicted and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment for rioting, &c., at Singapore, on the 15th February.

‡ This man is now charged with abetment of perjury in connection with the defence of one of the Parsee rioters, who has been sentenced as above.

Memorial.

a meeting of influential Mahomedans was about to be held, and that he had reason to believe that the matter would then be effectually and peacefully settled; and he promised the police should, as requested, keep careful watch over Dhubie Talao during the Mohurrum.

Remarks.

Para. 5. On Friday morning there were numerous signs of what was about to happen * * * * * But it appears from the evidence given in the High Court that, although the gathering of the Mahomedans at the Jumma Musjid was so unusually numerous, and of such a character as to excite alarm among the Hindoos, as well as Parsees, only one European constable was on duty near the Mosque when the prayers were over. *

The memorialists will not discuss the question how long a time the rioters had to work their will in, before the police came to the rescue (at Abdool Rahimon-street on the 13th February), as the evidence is conflicting on this point. * * *

Para. 6. That notwithstanding the well-known tendency of disorders in India, when they have not been checked at the outset, to spread like wild-fire and become quite unmanageable, there would probably have been no fresh disturbances after the riots of Friday had been suppressed, if the Government had called out the military in aid of the police. * * * * * The excited Parsees, who were also armed with sticks, gathered in crowds near the graveyard. Stones were thrown, Inspector Austin states, by some Parsees first of all (though the Parsees deny that they were the aggressors), and then a free fight ensued, resulting in loss of life and serious injuries to a large number of Seedees and Parsees, and it became necessary to call out the troops to quell the disturbance. * * * * * What else could the police have expected? If they had desired to provoke a fresh riot, what more could they have done than deliberately to march a procession composed, not of peaceful Mahomedan citizens, but of ignorant and savage adventurers frequenting the port of Bombay (for such is the character of the Seedees and Arabs who were engaged in the affray) into the heart of that division of the town of Bombay which is most thickly inhabited by Parsees?

The evidence given in the High Court at the trial of the rioters proves the very contrary.

2 Inspectors, 3 Constables, and 10 or 15 Native policemen were on the spot when the riot commenced.—See evidence given on trial, and statements attached to my report on the riots, No. 464, dated 28th February 1874.

There is no conflict of *reliable* testimony on this point. It has been clearly proved in Her Majesty's High Court and otherwise that the riot broke out about 1 o'clock p.m.; that I was on the spot with a party of police by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 1, and that the mob was dispersed and more than 60 of the rioters taken into custody by 2 o'clock.

The disorder was promptly and effectually checked at the outset, and there would have been no fresh disturbances after the first riot had been suppressed on Friday, the 13th February, but for the Parsees menacing the Mahomedans while burying their dead on the 15th February. The presiding Judge, when passing sentence on the Parsee prisoners charged with being members of an unlawful assembly on that day, remarked as follows: "I consider that the evidence given regarding the occurrences at the corner of the graveyard clearly showed that these occurrences originated with you. I further consider that the Mahomedans would have returned peaceably had it not been for the Parsees molesting them."

The principal Mahomedan burial-ground is at Sonapore, and the police have no power or authority either to prohibit the Mahomedans from burying their dead there, or to interfere as to the numbers attending funerals.

At any time such undue interference would be productive of serious results.

Regarding the military being called out to quell the disturbance, they were never once called upon to act, and every disturbance was met and suppressed by the police alone. The Advocate General in his speech, replying to the defence of the Sonapore rioters, remarked:—

"He mentioned this because it showed that the police were perfectly well able to escort the procession from Bholeshwar to the graveyard without in any way endangering the public peace. He thought the jury would agree with him that a great deal of undeserving abuse had been heaped upon the police in this trial, and that if there was a portion of the community who

ought to thank the police, it was that very portion whose counsel in this case had attempted to heap obloquy upon them. He thought they had acted on that day (the 15th) with prudence, courage, and with success. Supposing the police had not been able to hold the Seedees in check in the Sonapore lane, supposing they had not been able to drive them back on the Breach Candy-road, what would have become of the Parsees in their localities? He thought the police had not only shown themselves willing and competent to protect the Parsees, but had done so successfully."

The Judge in summing up in the same case said:—

"The evidence of these three police constables, he thought, if the jury believed it, established that there was a *bond fide* funeral of two biers, and that it proceeded in a peaceable manner from where it was joined by Mr. Mills till it arrived at the burial-ground, and also that it was the Parsees who were here the assailants and aggressors in the first instance, and that they were similarly the assailants at the corner of the Sonapore lane. However, it had been alleged on behalf of the defence that this was a police case, and that the police had given their evidence unfavourably to the Parsees. Now, he must say he thought this was not a charge that could be made against the police. If the police erred at all, it was in taking too much the side of the Parsees. That the police conducted themselves most admirably on that day there could be no doubt, from the manner in which, in the first place, they endeavoured to prevent the disturbance, and then put it down. But it was shown on the evidence of the police themselves, supposing the jury believed it to be true, that the Parsees were, in both cases, the aggressors: and in the other part of the evidence, to which he had not yet alluded, that the Seedees had been beaten by the Parsees. He apprehended that though the Seedees might be poor, and might be sneered at, they were equally entitled to the protection of the law as the wealthiest inhabitant of Bombay. Therefore, on that occasion, it was the duty of the police not only to have done as they did, and arrest the Seedees whom they found fighting, but at the same time they ought not to have stayed their hand, but ought to have arrested the various Parsees who, they now alleged, were engaged in the disturbance."

Much stress has been laid in the memorial that troops were not ordered out into the town sooner; but as the riot of the 13th was promptly and effectually suppressed by the police and order restored, there was no apparent necessity for military aid, nor would there have been but for the Parsees molesting the Mahomedans while engaged in burying their dead on the 15th at Sonapore. The Parsees had been regarded as a peaceable people, and it was never contemplated that they would act as they did, and even if military had been ordered into the town sooner, they would have been posted as usual in the centre of the town, in the Mahomedan locality, at a considerable distance from Dhobie Talao and Sonapore, and therefore the disturbance of the 15th would not have been averted.

During former riots, and at the time of the annual Mohurrum festival, when troops have been ordered into the town, they have never taken up posts at Dhobie Talao, for the reason that very few Mahomedans live in that locality, and because the military lines, those of the marine battalion, adjoin Dhobie Talao, and are within about 500 yards of where the disturbance took place at Sonapore, on the 15th of February.

I have, &c.
(signed) F. H. Souter,
Commissioner of Police.

(True copy.)

F. H. Souter, Commissioner of Police.

RECENT RIOTS IN BOMBAY.

55

(Home Department.—Police.—No. 108.)

From *A. C. Lyall*, Secretary to the Government of India, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

SIR,

Fort William, 1 April 1874.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of a copy of the despatch sent by the Government of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the disturbances in the town of Bombay in February last. Your letter of the 16th March* has also been received, forwarding, with other enclosures, copy of a report on these disturbances submitted to your Government by the Commissioner of Police at Bombay.

* No. 1458.

2. His Excellency the Governor General in Council regrets much that some of the Parsee community in Bombay should have been subjected to violent aggression that was originally altogether unprovoked, and that retaliation should in some instances have been made upon innocent persons in a manner that is entirely indefensible. His Excellency trusts that the leading representatives of the Parsees and of the Mahomedans in Bombay will succeed in their praiseworthy exertions to restore the good feeling between the two communities which has been interrupted by these unfortunate collisions.

3. His Excellency in Council considers that the authorities acted rightly in supporting the police by military force; indeed, the opinion of the Government of India, upon the information now before them, is that this necessary and proper step should have been taken earlier. The action of the Local Government in prohibiting public processions during the late Mohurrum is also approved. This prohibition was not intended as a penalty, but as a temporary and exceptional precaution considered necessary to secure the peace of the city.

4. The Commissioner of Police reports at length upon the conduct of the Bombay Police during these riots, especially upon the point whether the first outbreak ought to have been foreseen, and might thus have been prevented. He lays much stress upon the disadvantage at which the Police are said to be placed by their having no barracks or lines; so that for want of proper quarters they live scattered about the town, and thus upon sudden emergencies the reserve force cannot be speedily collected. Into these important questions of internal administration I am to say that his Excellency in Council will not enter, since they are now undergoing full inquiry and consideration in the hands of the Government of Bombay.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. C. Lyall*,

Secretary to the Government of India.

To the Most Noble the Marquis of *Salisbury*, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in Council, London.

The MEMORIAL of the Parsee Inhabitants of the City of Bombay, in the East Indies,

Sheweth,

1. THAT your Memorialists have felt themselves constrained to adopt the unusual course of addressing a direct appeal to your Lordship in Council, both in order to obtain redress for cruel wrongs suffered by the Parsees of Bombay during the recent Mahomedan riots and security against the recurrence of such outrages, and also to vindicate the Parsee community before Her Majesty's Government and the people of England from unjust reproaches cast upon them by the Government of Bombay.

2: That the records of the proceedings in the police and high courts during the trial of the rioters, and the other documents annexed to this Memorial, establish beyond dispute, in your Memorialists' belief, the following propositions:

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(1) That

(1) That on the 13th day of February last, mobs of Mahomedan rioters, carrying out a preconcerted design, issued from their mosques, and made almost simultaneous attacks in different localities on Parsee fire-temples and dwelling-houses, defiling sacred things, destroying or plundering property, and maltreating individual Parsees; (2) that the Parsee community had done nothing whatever to provoke this outbreak; (3) that, had the police done its duty, there would have been no serious rioting at all; (4) that the continuance of the agitation in the town after the 13th, and especially the renewal of the rioting on the forenoon of Sunday the 15th February, must be ascribed to the weakness of the Government in failing to realise the actual state of affairs in Bombay, and to provide a force sufficient to restore confidence and maintain order.

3. That the fact of premeditation on the part of the rioters is proved, not merely by rumours current in the town for some days before the 13th that an organized onslaught would be made on the Parsees, but by the evidence given in the police and high courts* that the riots began on the 13th of February in the same manner, and, as far as can be ascertained, nearly at the same hour; and that the principal object of the mobs in Shaik Abdool Rehman-street, the Bhendy Bazaar, and Khetwaddy, was to offer the worst of insults to the Parsees, by profaning and polluting their fire-temples. The suggestion that the chief riot, that in Shaik Abdool Rehman-street, arose accidentally out of a casual dispute between a Parsee police constable and some mischievous Mussulman boys, is shown to be quite baseless by the evidence of police constable Gough, the European policeman, who was on duty at the Jumma Musjid, whence the rioters rushed out on the 13th, and who saw how the riot began; † and Serjeant Atkinson, the counsel who defended the Mussulman rioters, admitted that this part of the defence had completely broken down, and that the Parsee constable had entirely cleared himself of the charge of having in any way provoked a disturbance. ‡ Your Memorialists would also call attention to the important, because precise, statement of a Parsee fruit-seller, named Dorabjee Pestonjee, who declares that on the 12th of February he was warned by a Mussulman friend and partner in business, that it was probable there would be a disturbance on the following day, and who in consequence removed his wife from his house in the native town to the house of a relative on Cumballa Hill. The warning was repeated on the morning of the 13th, when Dorabjee went as usual on business to the Crawford Markets, and he retired to his house, which was one of those afterwards attacked by the rioters, though they did not succeed in forcing an entrance. A similar warning was given to the schoolmasters of the girls' school of the Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Benevolent Institution in the neighbourhood, and of another school in Bhendy Bazaar, and the pupils were in consequence removed, and the schools closed at about half-past eleven and eleven o'clock respectively on Friday.

4. That the Parsee community was perfectly innocent of having given any cause of offence to the Mahomedans is clear from an examination of the pretext alleged for the ill-feeling of the Mahomedans against the Parsees. On the 15th of June 1873 a Parsee named Rustomjee Hormusjee Jalbhoy had published in Bombay a Guzerati book containing, among the biographies of other renowned prophets, a *Life of Mahomet*, compiled from Ockley's *History of the Saracens*, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and Washington Irving's *Life of Mahomet*. In narrating the family history of the Mussulman prophet, Mr. Jalbhoy had spoken of the mother of Mahomet's only son as a "concubine" or "kept woman," using the Guzerati term રૂઝેલ રૂઝ, which is the very same expression, without the adjective રૂઝેલ (kept), employed with the same object in a *Life of Mahomet*, published by the Christian missionaries belonging to the Bombay Tract and Book Society in 1853. No notice was taken of Mr. Jalbhoy's book by the Mussulmans for eight months, till in the beginning of February 1874, and just on the eve of the Mohurram (a festival which almost invariably gives

Dorabjee Pestonjee's statement—
See Appendix A.

See statement of
Framjee Cursetjee
—Appendix B.

* See reports attached to this Memorial of proceedings in the High Court in connection with the Shaik Abdool Rehman Street and Bhendy Bazaar riot cases, and in the police court in connection with the Khetwaddy and Bhendy Bazaar cases.

† See Constable Gough's evidence in the High Court in the Shaik Abdool Rehman Street riot case.

‡ See evidence of Constable Framjee Bhicajee in the High Court at the trial of the Shaik Abdool Rehman Street rioters, and Serjeant Atkinson's speech in the same case.

gives occasion for some disturbances among Indian Mussulmans), a number of respectable Mahomedan citizens of Bombay waited upon Mr. Souter, the Commissioner of Police, to inform him that their co-religionists were dreadfully excited, because a Parsee had published a book in which Marian, their prophet's favourite, had been described as "a prostitute." The Guzerati word for prostitute is quite different from that used by Mr. Jalbhoy; but at the urgent request of Mr. Souter and Mr. Edginton (the Deputy Commissioner of Police), who called upon him for an explanation of his conduct in publishing a work that the Mahomedans could find fault with, Mr. Jalbhoy delivered up to the police all the unsold copies of his book, and tried as far as he could to withdraw the book from circulation. This concession might fairly have been expected to put an end to the Mussulman ill-feeling against a man who had never meant to say a word to offend them; and, as regards the Parsee community, it was not alleged, nor is there the slightest shadow of a pretence for saying, that they were responsible for what was printed in Mr. Jalbhoy's book.

5. That although the action of the Commissioner of Police in suppressing the book was illegitimate and, in your Memorialists' opinion, ill-advised, because inconsistent with the principle of religious toleration and the right of free discussion, and because it had the effect of creating a precedent of which, as is shown by the recent attempt to suppress a Christian tract at Kurrachee, the Mahomedans have not been slow to take advantage against other sects than that of the Parsees, still the course taken by Mr. Souter in this instance might be in some degree excused by the consideration that the fatal riots of 1851 had had their origin in the publication by a Parsee editor of a sketch of the life of Mahomet, which the Mahomedans chose to regard as offensive. But, if the parallel held good as to the pretexts, it was likely also to hold good as to the consequences of the state of excitement into which the Mahomedans had worked themselves. In 1851 a Mussulman mob had rushed out of the Jumma Musjid on a Friday, crying "Deen, Deen," and had assailed the Parsees; and it was probable that there would be an exact reproduction of this scene in 1874. Mr. Souter can hardly have persuaded himself that the extraordinary concession he had made to Mussulman bigotry would satisfy ignorant fanatics, whose unreasonable expectations as to what he ought to have done were expressed in the following words by the editor of a Mahomedan paper, the *Kashful Akhbar*, on the 19th of February:—"After the Commissioner Sahib (Mr. Souter) first received information about the book, if he had destroyed all the copies previous to the Friday following, in a manner that would have enabled many people to witness the destruction, then it is quite certain that the riots would not have occurred. But, in consequence of the copies of the book not having been destroyed by Friday, the mass of the people must have felt some doubt in the matter." What precautions, however, did the Commissioner of Police take to prevent such an outbreak? Mr. Edginton had told Mr. Jalbhoy, in Mr. Souter's presence, that "the Mahomedans were an ignorant and turbulent people;" and the police were distinctly warned, two days before the riots began, that the people were still dissatisfied and meditating revenge. Not only did Mr. Jalbhoy himself go to Mr. Edginton and tell him that "in the early part of the 11th of February men were openly addressing crowds of Mahomedans from the steps of several of the Mosques, regarding the supposed insult to their religion, and giving it out as lawful that Mr. Jalbhoy's life should be taken for the offence, and that his caste-fellows should also be punished"—information which Mr. Edginton must have put faith in, or he would not have recommended Mr. Jalbhoy to leave Bombay and go to Poona or Surat; but a deputation of Parsees from Dhobi Talao and Sonapore also went to the Police Office on the 11th and implored protection, declaring they had "positive information that Mussulmans were going to fall upon them, and commit a dreadful havoc among them." In reply to this deputation, the Deputy Commissioner of Police said "that leading members of the Mahomedan community had promised to meet together next day (Thursday, the 12th February), and arrange about the prevention of any disturbance." He further said "that, in case of their acting otherwise, the police would bring them to their right senses." The Mahomedan meeting was held on the 12th, and many soothing speeches were made; and with this result Mr. Souter seems to have been entirely satisfied, for he took no precautions on the Friday (the day on which Mussulmans assemble in their

See Jalbhoy's statement—Appendix C.

See letter of Naorojee Beiramee Suntook and others—Appendix D.

See Appendix F.

Mosques) to prevent by a display of force any riotous or disorderly proceedings on the part of "an ignorant and turbulent people." On Friday morning there were numerous signs of what was about to happen. Mr. Ruttonjee Manockjee Rutnagur* was warned by a friendly Mussulman from entering the streets near the Jumma Musjid at about 11 o'clock, and at that time he saw a number of Arabs and Seedees, some of them armed with bludgeons, hurrying towards the Mosque. Other Parsees, whose statements are appended, testify that they were assailed with stones between the hours of 11 and 12 by Mussulmans ranged on the terrace of the Mosque. But it appears from the evidence given in the High Court † that, although the gathering of Mahomedans at the Jumma Musjid was so unusually numerous and of such a character as to excite alarm among Hindus, ‡ as well as Parsees, only one European constable was on duty near the Mosque when the prayers were over; and, when the mob of Seedees and Arabs, armed with sticks and stones, invaded Abdool Rehman-street, all that this constable could do was helplessly to follow the crowd, while he sent a sepoy in a buggy to give warning to Mr. Souter at the Mazagon Police Office, a mile and a half away, that the rioting had begun. Your memorialists will not discuss the question how long a time the rioters had to work their will in, before the police came to the rescue, as the evidence is conflicting on this point. It seems only necessary to remark that they had ample leisure to effectually defile two fire-temples, plunder several houses, and beat a number of Parsees, one of whom afterwards died of his wounds; and that in Khetwaddy they were foiled rather by the energetic attitude assumed by the residents than by the early interference of the police. The mobs were quickly dispersed wherever the police showed themselves: and what your memorialists would respectfully insist upon is, that had Mr. Souter done his duty by stationing strong police guards near the mosques on the Friday morning, no mischief would have been attempted. Instead, however, of securing public tranquillity by so using his detectives, at the head of whom are Mahomedans who have often been praised and rewarded for their vigilant loyalty, as to unravel and expose the plot, or, when a breach of the peace seemed inevitable, by employing the force at his command to control "an ignorant and turbulent people," the Commissioner of Police chose to place implicit confidence in the goodwill and power of respectable Mahomedans to keep their caste-fellows in order; and the result was that the lives and properties of Parsees were left at the mercy of crowds of riotous fanatics.

See statement of
Mr. J. M. Maclean
—Appendix H.

6. That, notwithstanding the well-known tendency of disorders in India, when they have not been checked at the outset, to spread like wildfire and become quite unmanageable, there would probably have been no fresh disturbances after the riots of Friday had been suppressed, if the Government had called out the military in aid of the police. Orders were indeed given that a company of Europeans and two companies of native infantry should remain under arms in their quarters in readiness to be called out; but the salutary effect which the presence of troops in the localities that had been the scenes of the riots would have had on the ill-disposed was lost, because His Excellency the Governor, as he himself acknowledged in his Convocation speech of the 17th of February, could not bring himself to believe that the state of the town on Friday evening, Saturday, and Sunday morning was so critical as to justify him in having recourse to the extreme measure of employing soldiers to keep the peace. Although, therefore, the Mahomedans remained in a flushed and angry mood, while the panic-stricken Parsees dreaded that still worse things might befall them than they had already suffered, and although it is no exaggeration to say that the native town was everywhere seething with agitation, the troops were not made use of, and a police force, which Mr. Souter himself confessed to be quite inadequate for its work, was broken up into petty detachments and scattered about the town in the vain hope of preventing a renewal of the riots. The excitement among the Parsees on Saturday became every hour more intense, as they found that the Government left their fire-temples unguarded, and as rumours went

* See statement of Ruttonjee Manockjee Rutnagur—Appendix E.

† See evidence of Constable Gough in the Shaik Abdool Rehman-street riot case.

‡ See statement of Hindoo grain-sellers, who closed their shops at half-past twelve in consequence of the accounts they had received of the threatening aspect of the large crowd gathered outside the Jumma Musjid—Appendix G.

went about that two attacks had been made on the Parsee residents in Khetwaddy, and another on the London Hotel in Grant-road, and that numerous assaults had been committed on stray Parsees in streets chiefly inhabited by Mahomedans. Their alarm found expression in the afternoon in a letter,* addressed by Mr. Byramjee Jeejeebhoy to the Commissioner of Police, in which it was pointed out that "the mobs which had collected in Khetwaddy had not been attacked and dispersed by the police, but had been simply turned back to collect again at some point that seemed more defenceless." Mr. Byramjee stated that the European policemen themselves owned they were too exhausted to fulfil their duty, and he urged that a military force should be stationed in the disturbed districts to restore confidence among the Parsees, and prevent a repetition of the scenes of Friday. Mr. W. H. Payne, a solicitor of the High Court, who accompanied Mr. Byramjee Jeejeebhoy, has furnished to your Memorialists valuable testimony in support of the allegations of the last-named gentleman. Mr. Payne's statement is attached to this Memorial. Mr. Edginton, in reply to Mr. Byramjee's letter, admitted that the excitement had not subsided, but doubted the existence of the threatening mobs described by Mr. Byramjee, or the inability of the police to maintain order. He added, however, that the Commissioner had been in communication with the Government, and that "further measures for the security of the city" (besides keeping the troops under arms) were "under consideration." In the evening, by which time a distinct report prevailed among the Parsees of Sonapore and Dhobi Talao that the Mussulmans intended to come in large numbers to the graveyard at Sonapore on the pretence of attending a funeral, and to sack the Parsee houses and violate the chief fire temple (Atush-Behram) in that quarter, a deputation of Parsee gentlemen, consisting of the Honourable Sir Jamssetjee Jejeebhoy, Bart.; Dinshaw Manockjee Petit, Esq.; Byramjee Jeejeebhoy, Esq.; Chmsetjee Furdoonjee, Esq.; and Merwanjee Framjee Panday, Esq., waited upon H. E. Sir Philip Wodehouse to acquaint him with the apprehensions still entertained by the Parsee community, and to ask that the military should be called out without further delay. His Excellency in reply said, "I cannot call the military into the town until I hear that the police are quite unable to cope with the rioters and suppress the riot The members of your community ought to learn the lesson of defending themselves from the rioters, and not to depend wholly on Government, but form themselves into what they call in England special constables." His Excellency asked more than once, "Are you Parsees quite unable to defend themselves?" Extraordinary as such language may seem, coming from the mouth of the representative of the Government, which has, as a matter of deliberate policy, disarmed the whole population of India and taken upon itself the sole duty of keeping the peace instead of encouraging the various races and sects to "defend themselves" against one another, the Governor of Bombay would appear, from the following passage in his Convocation speech, to be really of opinion that the Parsees would have done a right and proper thing in forming themselves into bands of special constables, to fight the Mussulman rioters and spare the English Government the disagreeable necessity of calling upon the military to help the police:—"I find," said His Excellency, "that there is apparently a general disinclination to take an active part in the operations of the established police of this city—that there is a disposition to leave them to cope as they best can with all the disturbances. Disturbances breaking out first in one quarter and then in another! Yet, wherever they may be, the police are expected to do all the work!" Though the conduct of the Parsee residents of Sonapore, who on Saturday night armed themselves with sticks and stones to defend their houses and fire-temples, after having applied uselessly for a larger number of police to be stationed in the neighbourhood, cannot be said to have been a direct consequence of the Governor's scornful advice to the Parsees to defend themselves, yet the words used by His Excellency and the admitted helplessness of the police may fairly be pleaded in their justification. The opportunity for self-defence came only too soon. On Sunday morning, about 10 o'clock,† two Mahomedan burial processions, composed of about 400 or 500 persons, a great number

Statement of Mr.
W. H. Payne—
See Appendix J.

* Letter of Mr. Byramjee Jeejeebhoy, late Member of the Legislative Council of Bombay, to Mr. Souter, with the reply of Mr. Edginton to the same—See Appendix I.


† See evidence of Superintendent Mills in the police court and in the High Court in the Sonapore riot case.

See Map attached
to this Memorial.

number of whom were, it was afterwards discovered, armed with bludgeons, entered the Parsee quarter. On their way to the graveyard at Sonapore through the native town, they showed their real character by attempting to assault two Parsees they happened to meet.* According to the evidence there were with the procession, after it had reached Bholeshwur, one European policeman, Superintendent Mills, and about 20 native policemen, and two other European constables joined them at the burial-ground. The excited Parsees, who were also armed with sticks, gathered in crowds near the graveyard. Stones were thrown, Inspector Austin states, by some Parsees first of all (though the Parsees deny that they were the aggressors), and then a free fight ensued, resulting in loss of life and in serious injuries to a large number of Seedees and Parsees; and it became necessary to call out the troops to quell the disturbance. It appears to your Memorialists to be of little consequence who began the stone throwing. A conflict was inevitable when two bodies of men, one of them excited by the indulgence given for two whole days to their turbulent spirit, and the other thrown into anxiety and alarm by the prevalent rumours about fresh outrages in contemplation, deprived of all confidence in the efficiency of the police, and hurt by the indifference and inaction displayed by the Government—had been brought within fighting distance of one another. What else could the police have expected; if they had desired to provoke a fresh riot, what more could they have done than deliberately to march a procession composed, not of peaceful Mahomedan citizens, but of ignorant and savage adventurers frequenting the port of Bombay (for such is the character of the Seedees and Arabs who were engaged in the affray) into the heart of that division of the town of Bombay which is most thickly inhabited by Parsees; if troops had been sent to escort the procession all would have passed off quietly, as was shown on the following day when a still more numerous funeral procession was escorted to Sonapore. But the 20 native policemen could do nothing against a crowd of able-bodied men intent on violence. Mr. Mills, in his evidence, mentions that the Mahomedans more than once "rushed through the police," who could not restrain them, and he bears witness to the general feeling of the Parsees when he reports the remark of one Parsee in the crowd who said to him, when remonstrated with for breaking the law, "The police won't protect us; we must protect ourselves."† When the military had once been called out, no further serious disturbances occurred. The Parsees were satisfied that the Government would not suffer them to be again molested, and the only occasion on which they made a fresh attempt at "self-defence" was when a sepoy, on Saturday the 21st February, raised an alarm that a party of Seedees going through the Fort had hostile intentions. The Parsees, many of whom had fled to the Fort from the native town for safety, certainly on that occasion made the mistake of assaulting the Seedees, but this again was not an organized attack on the Mahomedan community; it was only an onslaught on men supposed to be rioters, begun in the belief that these men had invaded a part of the city previously considered to be perfectly secure. If the police themselves were not of the same opinion originally as to the object the Seedees had in view in entering the Fort, how does it happen that they only arrested Seedees and did not take any Parsees prisoners? Your Memorialists, however, regard the encounters which took place after the 15th of February as of no great importance; what they contend is that the anarchy of the Sunday forenoon might have been averted, and the loss of life and other serious injuries caused on that day to both the Parsees and the Mahomedans would not have occurred if the Government had been roused to action in time; and that the proper use of the ordinary garrison of Bombay on the evening of Friday the 13th of February would have rendered unnecessary the great display of vigour made too late by the Government on Tuesday the 17th, when it invoked the aid of formidable reinforcements of cavalry, infantry, and artillery from Poona to enable it to keep the peace in Bombay during the Mohurram.

7. That your Memorialists having now, as they conceive, demonstrated all the propositions set forth in the second paragraph of this Memorial, wish to address themselves

* See letter from the Mahraj (Head Priest) and other Hindoos, to the address of Mr. Souter—App. K.
† Evidence of Superintendent Mills in the police court and in the High Court in the Sonapore riot case.



MAP
of a
PORTION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY
showing the locality
of the
M&MOMMEDAN RIOTS OF 1874.
and the route taken by the
PUNERAL PROCESSION
to the
SONAPORE BURIAL GROUND.

N O T E.

The Arrows show the direction of the Mahommedan Funeral Procession to Sonapore on the forenoon of 15th February 1874. The Bhoolaswer Hindoo Temple denotes the spot referred to in the petition of the Makraj Jeevan Laljee & other Hindoos, where attempt was made to attack Parsee travellers by men belonging to the funeral party on its way to Sonapore. The Alushbehram or chief Fire Temples threatened by the Mussulmans, are denoted as the Chundanwddy Fire Temple and Dady-Shett Fire Temple.

SCALE OF 400 FEET TO AN INCH.

See Map attached
to this Memorial.

number of whom were, it was afterwards discovered, armed with bludgeons, entered the Parsee quarter. On their way to the graveyard at Sonapore through the native town, they showed their real character by attempting to assault two Parsees they happened to meet.* According to the evidence there were with the procession, after it had reached Bholeshwur, one European policeman, Superintendent Mills, and about 20 native policemen, and two other European constables joined them at the burial-ground. The excited Parsees, who were also armed with sticks, gathered in crowds near the graveyard. Stones were thrown, Inspector Austin states, by some Parsees first of all (though the Parsees deny that they were the aggressors), and then a free fight ensued, resulting in loss of life and in serious injuries to a large number of Seedees and Parsees; and it became necessary to call out the troops to quell the disturbance. It appears to your Memorialists to be of little consequence who began the stone throwing. A conflict was inevitable when two bodies of men, one of them excited by the indulgence given for two whole days to their turbulent spirit, and the other thrown into anxiety and alarm by the prevalent rumours about fresh outrages in contemplation, deprived of all confidence in the efficiency of the police, and hurt by the indifference and inaction displayed by the Government—had been brought within fighting distance of one another. What else could the police have expected; if they had desired to provoke a fresh riot, what more could they have done than deliberately to march a procession composed, not of peaceful Mahomedan citizens, but of ignorant and savage adventurers frequenting the port of Bombay (for such is the character of the Seedees and Arabs who were engaged in the affray) into the heart of that division of the town of Bombay which is most thickly inhabited by Parsees; if troops had been sent to escort the procession all would have passed off quietly, as was shown on the following day when a still more numerous funeral procession was escorted to Sonapore. But the 20 native policemen could do nothing against a crowd of able-bodied men intent on violence. Mr. Mills, in his evidence, mentions that the Mahomedans more than once “rushed through the police,” who could not restrain them, and he bears witness to the general feeling of the Parsees when he reports the remark of one Parsee in the crowd who said to him, when remonstrated with for breaking the law, “The police won’t protect us; we must protect ourselves.”† When the military had once been called out, no further serious disturbances occurred. The Parsees were satisfied that the Government would not suffer them to be again molested, and the only occasion on which they made a fresh attempt at “self-defence” was when a sepoy, on Saturday the 21st February, raised an alarm that a party of Seedees going through the Fort had hostile intentions. The Parsees, many of whom had fled to the Fort from the native town for safety, certainly on that occasion made the mistake of assaulting the Seedees, but this again was not an organized attack on the Mahomedan community; it was only an onslaught on men supposed to be rioters, begun in the belief that these men had invaded a part of the city previously considered to be perfectly secure. If the police themselves were not of the same opinion originally as to the object the Seedees had in view in entering the Fort, how does it happen that they only arrested Seedees and did not take any Parsees prisoners? Your Memorialists, however, regard the encounters which took place after the 15th of February as of no great importance; what they contend is that the anarchy of the Sunday forenoon might have been averted, and the loss of life and other serious injuries caused on that day to both the Parsees and the Mahomedans would not have occurred if the Government had been roused to action in time; and that the proper use of the ordinary garrison of Bombay on the evening of Friday the 13th of February would have rendered unnecessary the great display of vigour made too late by the Government on Tuesday the 17th, when it invoked the aid of formidable reinforcements of cavalry, infantry, and artillery from Poona to enable it to keep the peace in Bombay during the Mohurrum.

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† Evidence of Superintendent Mills in the police court and in the High Court in the Sonapore riot case.

themselves to the still more serious and delicate task of answering accusations brought against the whole Parsee community by the Governor of Bombay. These accusations seem to have had their origin in a report made to his Excellency by Mr. Souter, the Commissioner of Police, as to the cause of the Sonapore riot. In a narrative of his own experience of the state of Bombay on the 15th of February, Mr. Maclean, the Editor of the "Bombay Gazette," says Mr. Souter told him he was just going off to Parell to let the Governor know that the Parsees had created the whole disturbance, and on the same morning Mr. Souter charged the Parsees generally with having provoked the row, and said in his anger he would "like to see all the Parsees killed." Your Memorialists are not specially anxious to have Mr. Souter personally called to account for these hasty and intemperate words, which he no doubt sincerely regrets having used, and which may be pardoned to a man called suddenly to suppress a riot of which he had not seen the beginning, and which broke out after he had persuaded himself and the Government that the town was perfectly quiet. Your Memorialists only refer to this incident to show how his Excellency the Governor became biased against the Parsees to such a degree that he seems now actually to hold them at least equally worthy of blame with the Mahomedans for the disturbances that occurred after the 13th of February. On the evening of the 14th the language of Sir Philip Wodehouse in the interview he gave the Parsee deputation was not very friendly in tone; but on Sunday evening, after Mr. Souter had made his report on the riot of that day, his Excellency, without inquiring whether the conduct of the Commissioner of Police himself might not be deserving of censure on account of the extraordinary carelessness which alone, as your Memorialists contend, made the affray of Sunday morning possible, at once took up a distinctly hostile position against the Parsees, adopting the view of Mr. Souter that they had wantonly assailed a funeral procession of innocent Mahomedans in spite of the presence of "a strong police force." Your Memorialists have already given the true history of the Sonapore riot without seeking to extenuate the conduct of the Parsees, and they now invite the attention of your Lordship in Council to the following account of the same affair written by Mr. Lee-Warner, the Governor's Private Secretary:—

My dear Sir Jamsetjee, Parell, Sunday, 15 February.
 As I write, the military assistance for which you asked is in the town of Bombay, and the Government will be prepared to take such further action as may be necessary. H. E. told you last night, that from the latest accounts received he was of opinion that the Mussulmans were quieted by the arrest of the late rioters, and it is therefore his earnest hope that the leading gentlemen of the Parsee community will repress by every means in their power any sign of retaliation on the part of the Parsees, or any exhibition of vindictive feeling, which, if it does not provoke a fresh breach of the peace, will keep old sores open. H. E. is exceedingly sorry to learn that, despite the presence of a strong police force, some Parsees to-day threw stones at some Mussulmans during a funeral service, and brought on a fight which caused injury to several people. There has also been a smaller row in Fort Bora Bazaar-street, where one European inspector has been badly hit by a Parsee. Of course such things cannot be altogether avoided, but, with the influence which you and the gentlemen who called last night possess over the Parsee community, H. E. must look to you, as he is sure he can with full confidence, to advise all Parsees to remain at home as much as possible until some greater degree of quiet is restored.

Yours, &c.
 (signed) W. Lee-Warner,
 Private Secretary.

The "smaller row" referred to in this letter, had evidently been reported to his Excellency in the same one-sided way of which your Memorialists think they have reason to complain as regards Mr. Souter's version of the "greater row," no mention being made of the fact that the assault complained of was occasioned by the violent and unjustifiable conduct of the inspector himself in having beaten in the first instance an aged and inoffensive Parsee priest.

Again, on the 19th February, in answer to a memorial from Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and others, praying that the strong hand of Government might be used to avert further outrages on the Parsees, Mr. Nugent, Under Secretary to Government, was instructed to say that "the disorders subsequent to that of Friday afternoon have been in some degree attributable to acts of retaliation on the part of the Parsees." Your Memorialists would respectfully submit that

See extract from
 the "Times of
 India" of 18th
 Feb.—Ap-
 pendix L.

the very thought of attempting "retaliation" never even entered the minds of the Parsees. Where are the proofs the Government has to offer of the "retaliation" of which it complains? What mosques have the Parsees defiled? What dwelling-houses or shops have they plundered? What quarter of the town have they invaded for the purpose of killing or injuring peaceful Mahomedan citizens? In the fort there is one small Mussulman mosque, near which very few Mussulmans live, but which is surrounded by Parsee houses. Here was an opportunity for safe retaliation if the Parsees had desired it; yet this mosque was left untouched. While the riots were going on, the Mahomedan inhabitants of Bombay, knowing they had nothing to dread, remained at home, or went about their usual avocations as they had been accustomed to do in ordinary times; they knew that no mob of Parsee rioters would attack them or their families. So great, on the other hand, was the justifiable terror of the Parsees, after the events of the 13th February, lest they might become the victims of fresh attacks, that more than 150 Parsee families residing in the native town left their houses, and at considerable expense removed with their families into the fort for better protection. A much larger number of families had to employ, at their own expense, as guards over their houses, English sailors and other Europeans, Poortheas from the North West Provinces, and others, amounting in all to about 1,000 men. This broad distinction must, in fact, be drawn between the acts of the two communities. The Mussulmans, without having received any provocation, assailed with the utmost fury the whole Parsee race in Bombay; while the Parsees in no instance became the aggressors, but remained always on the defensive, and only attacked such Mahomedans as they supposed to have come amongst them with evil designs. Some reprehensible acts of violence were no doubt committed by individual Parsees, but may not these be forgiven to men who, after having been exposed to the most shameful outrages, were taunted by a Government, which should have calmed their fears, with their inability to defend themselves? Was not the mad act of the police in letting the funeral processions enter the Sonapore district while the Parsee quarter was guarded only by a few police sepoy, on the Sunday morning, sufficient in itself to drive the Parsees to desperation? Yet the Government of Bombay, anxious as it would appear to have an excuse for its own lamentable weakness, has lost no chance of defaming the character of the Parsees. On Monday the 23rd February, after the brawl in the fort, his Excellency the Governor sent for Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and other leading Parsee gentlemen, and lectured them on the ill-feeling which continued to show itself on the part of the Parsees towards the Mussulmans. His Excellency wished, he said, "to be perfectly frank with them, and, speaking generally of the whole community which they represented, he could not but consider the conduct of the Parsees as injudicious and unconciliatory. They must remember that Government could only put a stop to open breaches of the peace, the sore of revenge and ill-feeling between sect and sect the Parsees themselves must cure. The present bad spirit could not be allowed to last for ever, nor could the troops always be kept in Bombay, and the Parsees must seriously consider the effect their present attitude would have upon themselves when the troops were withdrawn." His Excellency expressed the same feeling when he received on Wednesday the 25th of February a large deputation of Mahomedan gentlemen who came to ask him that the Taboot processions of the Mohurrum might be allowed. With marvellous indiscretion his Excellency the Governor told the deputation that, although they might "give security for the good behaviour of their own people, such a guarantee was one-sided, and would not affect the behaviour of the Parsees, or any one else who wished to create a disturbance." In other words, the Governor tried to relieve himself of the responsibility of having prohibited the Mohurrum processions, by telling the Mahomedans that they must thank the Parsees for this act of the Government, as the police and military could not protect the processions against the violence of that turbulent people! And yet his Excellency gravely exhorts the Parsees to beware of perpetuating ill-feeling between sect and sect. Your Memorialists cannot say what may be the feeling of the Mahomedans, but they confidently affirm that the Parsees are an industrious, peaceful, orderly people, whose sole desire is to live on terms of amity with all men, and to obtain that protection for their own lives, property, and religion, which they would gladly see all other classes and races enjoy. It is, they assert, a pure delusion on the part of his Excellency Sir Philip Wodehouse to suppose that the Parsees have any special enmity against the

See list—Appendix M.

the Mahomedans as a class or any desire to violate the law and create disturbances in Bombay. No class has so strong an interest in keeping the peace as the Parsees, for they are few in number, prosperous, and unaccustomed to any other than commercial pursuits. Not once or twice only, but frequently, have Mahomedan publishers reprinted works in which vile and offensive language is used in speaking of the Prophet Zoroaster and his followers, but the Parsees have uniformly let such attacks pass unnoticed. Your Memorialists may perhaps venture to call witnesses to character in opposition to Sir Philip Wodehouse by reminding your Lordship in Council what has been thought and said of the Parsee community by distinguished English and Anglo-Indian Statesmen of our own day and of former times. The Parsees, who had settled on the western coast of India in the beginning of the eighth century, made Bombay their chief place of residence as soon as the island came into the possession of the English; and for the last two centuries they have been amongst the most loyal, the most industrious, and the most enterprising subjects of the British Crown. They now number 44,000 in Bombay alone. Sir John Malcolm said of the Parsees half a century ago: "There is no body of natives in India so remarkable for their intelligence and enterprise as the Parsees;" and since the introduction of English education into India, they have more than maintained their former character by the eagerness with which they have, as a people, availed themselves of the opportunities of improvement offered them by the foundation of schools and colleges in Bombay. Sir Henry Anderson, now one of the Secretaries to the Council of India, remarked when he was proposing to the Legislature of Calcutta to pass a special law relating to this people: "The Parsees will day by day prove themselves more efficient as an agency by which the civilisation of the West will be able to influence the destiny of this magnificent country. From the time when the Davur of Surat afforded aid to our first factory, to the time when Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy called on his countrymen to stand by the British Government with their fortunes, as they would, if need were, with their lives, the Parsees have ever been faithful and loyal to our rule;" and on the same occasion Mr. Harrington, another member of the Legislative Council, said he "most entirely concurred in all that Sir Henry Anderson had said as to the intelligence, the advanced civilisation, the loyalty, and general good conduct of the Parsee community. In a Resolution dated 16th October 1863, on the report of the Parsee Law Commission, the Government of Bombay described the Parsees as "an enterprising and sagacious community," and said moreover, "that Her Majesty possesses no subjects, who, for loyalty, intelligence, capacity for public duties, liberality, sympathy with suffering, and honest admiration for British justice, have a better claim to a full and intelligent consideration of their needs, than the Parsee community of Bombay and the Mofussil." And it would be easy for your Memorialists to quote much more testimony to a like effect, but they believe that your Lordship in Council must be familiar with the reputation of the Parsees, and able to judge between them and the present Government of Bombay.

See extracts in Appendix N.

Your Memorialists are confident that your Lordship in Council will grant them the justice which, until enlightened by the experience of the last few weeks, they believed it was impossible that they could ever have to ask for in vain from any representative of Her Most Gracious Majesty holding the high office of Governor of Bombay; and having regard to the matters stated in the foregoing Memorial, they pray that your Lordship in Council may be pleased to adopt such measures as may seem meet for the purpose of ascertaining,—

- (a.) What was the real cause, and who were originators of the late riots;
- (b.) The extent and duration of the said riots;
- (c.) What precautions, if any, had been taken against the occurrence of the said riots before their outbreak, and if no precautions had been taken, the reason for such inaction;
- (d.) The measures taken after the outbreak of the said riots for their suppression and the efficiency of such measures, whether there was any delay in the taking of any such measures, and, if so, the reason for such delay;
- (e.) The measures necessary to prevent the recurrence of such riots in the future;

(f.) The efficiency and integrity of the police and defective force of Bombay;

(g.) And generally the action taken by his Excellency the Governor and the Commissioner of Police with regard to the late riots, and all the circumstances connected therewith.

And your Memorialists, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

Bombay, 13 April 1874.

Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy.
Ardaseer Hormarjee Wadia.
Framjee Nasserwanjee.
Byramjee Jeejeebhoy.
Heerjeebhoy Hormusjee Settna.
Dinshaw Manockjee Petit.
Cursetjee Furdoonjee.
Merwanjee Framjee Panday.
Muncherjee Hormusjee Cama.
Nowrojee Manockjee Wadia.
Sorabjee Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy.
Dustoor Peshutun Behramjee.
Jamasjee Dustoor Minochehrjee.
 And 8,438 other Parsees.

APPENDIX (A).

STATEMENT by *Dorabjee Pestonjee*, Vendor of Fruit in the Crawford Markets.

I AM a vendor of fruit in the Crawford Markets. I am also a contractor. I remember the 13th of February last, the day when the Mahomedan riots broke out. It was a Friday. On the day previous, that is on Thursday, the 12th February, I had a conversation in the morning with Mehmon Geega Nuthoo, a partner in my business, when he informed me in a friendly way of his apprehensions that a disturbance of the Mahomedans would take place on the following day. In consequence of this warning, I removed my wife from my house, in Dhanjee Doongaria-street, to the house of a relative near Cumballa Hill. I also warned several of my friends of the intended outbreak, and recommended them not to leave their houses on the Friday in question. On the day when the disturbance broke out, I had attended the Crawford Markets at an early hour, when my said Mehmon friend, Geega Nuthoo, informed me of his fears of the riots to take place in course of the day. He said that respectable Mahomedans would remain quiet, but that nothing had been done to pacify the lower classes. In consequence of the persuasions of the said Geega Nuthoo, I returned to my house before 11 o'clock a.m., contrary to my usual habit.

In about two hours and a quarter, after my return home, the disturbances broke out. An attack was made upon my house, but the rioters did not succeed in entering it. It is within my knowledge that the Parsee girls' school belonging to the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Benevolent Institution, which is situated in the neighbourhood of Dhanjee Doongaria-street, was closed, and the children removed at about half-past eleven o'clock on the day of the riot breaking out, in consequence of warnings received by the schoolmasters.

Dated at Bombay, this 27th day of March 1874.

Signed by Dorabjee Pestonjee,
 in the presence of
D. D. Cama.
D. E. Khambata.

Dorabjee Pestonjee.

(True Copy.)

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

Ardersir Framjee,
 Solicitor, High Court.

Appendix (B.)

STATEMENT made by Mr. *Franjee Kursedjee* on the 16th day of March 1874.

I AM a Parsee priest and tutor in the Parsee Girls' School at Kandawala-street, in Bombay. On the 13th of February last I went the usual round to collect the pupils of the said school, when their parents, alluding to the rumoured outbreak to take place on that day, on the part of the Mahomedans, requested me earnestly not to open the school that day, or at all events to dismiss the school earlier than usual. I had also similar apprehensions, and accordingly dismissed the school at 11 o'clock in the forenoon of that day. At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, the same day, a person of the Bohra caste came shouting into the street, warning the Parsee inhabitants thereof that a mob of Mahomedans were at that moment issuing out of the neighbouring mosque, called the Nabob's Musjid, and were coming to attack the Parsees. The Parsee inhabitants, in consternation and alarm, closed their doors and windows precipitately, when a mob of about 200 Mahomedans rushed into the said street, armed with bludgeons, and shouting "Deen, Deen." They commenced to batter the doors and windows by means of stones which they hurled against them. After thus rioting in the street for half an hour, they withdrew from the street at the intercession of certain Mussulman neighbours well affected towards the Parsees.

Mobed Franjee Curssetjee, Teacher,

Taken before me,
Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor.

Kandawala-street.

(True Copy.)

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Appendix (C.)

STATEMENT of Mr. *Rustumjee Hormusjee Jalbhoy*, taken this day before Messrs. *Sorabjee Shapoorjee Bengallee* and *Jehangir Mervunjee*.

Bombay, 15 March 1874.

ABOUT the 8th or 9th day of February last, I was sent for by Mr. Edginton, the deputy commissioner of police. I waited on him accordingly the same day at about half-past 10 a.m. Mr. Edginton asked me whether I was the author of a certain book called "Renowned Prophets, &c." On my stating I was, he told me that I had written a certain passage in the book in which I had stated that Mahomed had a son by a prostitute, adding that the word "prostitute" had given great offence to the Mahomedans. I disclaimed that I had any intention of offending the religious feelings of the Mahomedans; and that in the said book I had translated the English words "concubine" as "𑂔𑂗𑂏𑂱 𑂔𑂏𑂱," whereas the Guzerati word for "prostitute" was "𑂔𑂗𑂏𑂱𑂱", which I had not at all used. Mr. Edginton said that a deputation of Mahomedan gentlemen was then present in Mr. Souter's room, and that there was a translator whom they had brought with them, who was of opinion that the words used by me in the book meant a prostitute. I repeated that the words used did not bear out the translator's interpretation. I told Mr. Edginton, moreover, that the life of Mahomet, which I had written, was compiled from the works of Ockley, Washington Irving, and Gibbon, and that I was so very careful to avoid giving offence or hurt the religious feelings of any one in my book, that I had, in my compilation of the life of Mahomed, purposely omitted every passage from the books of the above authors which were in the most remote degree likely to injure the religious feelings of the Mahomedans. Mr. Edginton happened to have, at the moment, Ockley's work in his office, and he himself told me that he had read the passage in that book which related to Mahomed's concubine Marian, and that he thought that passage was very severe on the character of the Prophet. Thereupon I pointed out at once to Mr. Edginton that I had omitted the said passage and other passages of a like nature from my book, which proved what my intentions were, viz., that I had not the remotest intention of writing anything to hurt the feelings of the Mahomedans. After this Mr. Edginton brought Mr. Souter, the chief police commissioner, to where we were sitting. Mr. Edginton, in Mr. Souter's presence, told me that the Mahomedans were an ignorant and turbulent people, and put me in mind regarding what had taken place in Bombay many years ago, when a Parsee had published a portrait of Mahomed, and also told me that the deputation of Mahomedans who were in Mr. Souter's room had informed him that their co-religionists were so excited that they would burn down the houses of the Parsees, would maltreat them, and do other injuries to them. Mr. Souter was present all the while this was said. He put in a question why I had published the book, to which I replied that my object was the diffusion of the knowledge on these subjects amongst those who did not read English.

Mr. Edginton ultimately persuaded me to part with all the unsold copies of my book, which he promised to return after the Mohurrum, stating that his object was to pacify the Mahomedans and preserve the public peace. He also asked me for a list of the subscribers to my book.

On the 11th of February, I sent him 85 copies of my book, for which he sent me a receipt. I did not give him any list of the subscribers, but I have subsequently learnt that he wrote to several of them, and in some instances obtained possession of my books which they had subscribed and paid for. The names of the subscribers Mr. Souter probably obtained from the preface of my book, in which I had thanked several of the subscribers of my book by name.

Shortly after I had handed over the books in my possession, I learnt that there was a great commotion amongst the Mahomedan community, and that in the early part of the 11th of February men were actually addressing crowds of Mahomedans from the steps of several of the mosques regarding the supposed insult to their religion, and giving it out as lawful that my life should be taken for the offence, and that my caste fellows should also be punished. I was also informed that on the same day some Mahomedans had called at Dhobie Talao, where I lived, and ascertained the place of my residence. Upon this I became much alarmed, and sent word to Mr. Edginton, on the following morning, that I wished to see him after dark. I accordingly saw Mr. Edginton at his house in Mazagon at about 7.30 p.m. I spoke to him about my fears, and told him that I intended to leave Bombay. Mr. Edginton approved of the course proposed, and said, moreover, that it would be better if I were away until the Mohurrum was over. He said that I might go to Poona or Surat. I left Bombay on the morning of the 13th, and heard the next day that the threatened riots had taken place on the day I left.

Rustomjee Hormusjee Jalbhoy.

Witness,
Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, Bombay.

(True Copy.)

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

APPENDIX (D.)

To Messrs. *Sorabjee Shapoorjee Bengallee, Jehangir Merwanjee, and Phirozeshaw Merwanjee Mehta*, Members of the Sub-Committee appointed to prepare a Memorial in connection with the present Mahomedan Riots.

Gentlemen,

Bombay, 14 March 1874.

WE, the undersigned Parsee residents of Dhobie Talao, Sonapore Beach-road, hereby declare, that on the 11th of February 1874, two days before the present Mahomedan riots in Bombay broke out, we had proceeded in a body to the Mazagon police office to wait upon the Chief Commissioner of Police, Mr. F. Souter, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, to give him warning regarding the intended outbreak. As we went in we met Mr. Alfred Edginton, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, who took us aside, and the following is the substance of the conversation which took place between him and ourselves on the occasion.

We stated that we had positive information, which we believed to be true, that the Mahomedans were to fall upon the Parsees residing at Dhobie Talao, Mr. Jalbhoy, the author of the book containing the life of Mahomed, being a resident of that locality, and to commit a dreadful havoc among them. Mr. Edginton told us that we need not be afraid of anything going wrong, that the police had communicated with the leading members of the Mahomedan community, who had promised to meet together next day (that is Thursday, 12th February), and arrange about the prevention of any disturbance of the peace. He further said that we should not let the Mahomedans know from our movements that we were under any apprehension whatsoever, and that in case of their acting otherwise, which may God forbid, the police would bring them to their right senses. After being thus assured, we expressed our thanks to him and returned home.

We are, &c.

(signed) *Naorojee Beiramjee Suntook.*
Jansetjee Rutnagar.
Rustomjee Eduljee Birdy.
Javajee Burjorjee Ponchhhanawalla.
Rustomjee Manochjee Ponchhhanawalla.
Cooerjee Dhunjeebhoy Mistry.
Cowajee Eduljee.
Dorajee Nusserwanjee Polishwala.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

APPENDIX (E.)

STATEMENT made by Mr. Ruttonjee Manekjee Rutnagur on the 21st day of March 1874.

I AM a sharebroker and reside at Dhobie Talao. At about 11 o'clock a.m. on Friday the 13th of February last, I went to certain cutlers' shops near the Jumma Musjid. While I was making sundry purchases a Parsee named Nanabhoy Bbaroocha, who was standing at a corner of the same, came up to me and warned me not to stay in that place, as he was informed that a serious attack on the Parsees was intended that day by the Mahomedans. I did not take much heed of what he said, and proceeded to a neighbouring shop on business. At this time I noticed a number of Mahomedans, Seedeas, and Arabs, some of whom armed with bludgeons, hurrying in an excited manner towards the entrance of the said Jumma Musjid. A respectable looking Mussulman about this time came up to me and advised me forthwith to quit the locality if I valued my life; I thereupon became alarmed and left the place. About an hour after my arrival in the Fort, I heard that the threatened attack had been made. The said Nanabhoy Baroocha subsequently informed me that on the day when he warned me as aforesaid, he, having been forewarned, had purposely taken his stand near the said Musjid with a view to warn off Parsee wayfarers from that locality, and that he had actually done so with respect to a number of Parsees.

(signed) *Ruttonjee Manekjee Rutnagur.*

Taken before me,

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court, Bombay.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

APPENDIX (F.)

WE, the undersigned Parsees, hereby declare that we were passing along the road called Shaik Memon-street, near the Jumma Musjid, on Friday the 13th day of February 1874, between the hours of 11 and 12 a.m., when stones were thrown upon us by several Mahomedans from the terrace of the said mosque, who were bawling out "Deen, Deen," and also abused us.

(signed) *Rustomjee Eduljee Kakalia.
Dhunjibhoy Hormusjee Khan.
Burjorjee Ookerjee Mistry.*

13 March 1874.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

WE, the undersigned Parsees, hereby declare that we were passing along the road close to the Jumma Musjid, on Friday the 13th February 1874, between the hour of half-past eleven a.m. and 12 noon, when stones were thrown upon us by several Mussulmans from the terrace of the said mosque, who also abused us.

(signed) *Nusserwanjee Ruttonjee.
Shapoorjee Muncherjee.*

Bombay, 14 March 1874.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

APPENDIX (G.)

TRANSLATION of a Statement written in the Guzerati Language by *Withul Motee* and others, on the 6th day of April 1874.

WE, the undersigned Hindu merchants and grain shopkeepers, hereby state that on Friday the 13th February 1874, on which day the Mussulman riot in Bombay took place,
305. I 2 we

we had heard in the morning rumours regarding the same, and we had also observed a larger number of Mussulmans than usual going towards the Jumma Musjid, passing by our shops which are situated in the Shaik Abdool Rehman-street. In consequence of this we despatched two persons for inquiries, who returned with the news that a large crowd of Mussulmans had gathered outside the Musjid, and that the police were not seen there. After receiving this information, and apprehending a disturbance, we closed our shops. This was at about half-past 12 o'clock. In about half an hour afterwards the riot commenced.

Bombay, dated 6th April 1874, Monday, the 5th Vud of the month of Chaitra of the year of Sumvat 1930.

(signed) *Vithul Motee.*
Lalchund Goverdhun.
Lakhu Nagur.
Maneckchund Ghirdhur.
Jogee Dewchund.
Soorjee Dewchund.

Witness, *Wassoodew Babajee Nowrungal,*
Agent for the Patent Plumbago Crucible
Company of London.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 8 April 1874.

APPENDIX (H).

STATEMENT OF *J. M. Maclean,* Esq.

(From the "Bombay Gazette," 16 February 1874.)

BETWEEN half-past ten and eleven yesterday morning, I saw some Parsees running down the marine lines evidently in a state of extreme agitation, and immediately afterwards a European constable drove up to Colonel Scott's bungalow, the brigadier being at church, and asked him in Mr. Souter's name to send out the company of the 20th N.I., which had been held in readiness for two days, to assist the civil power. Just afterwards, Rowjee, the Mussulman manager of Jaffer Sulliman's shop in the fort, called to see me on business; and without thinking that there might be some risk in going out with such a companion, I said he might take me with him in his shigram to see what was going on. We drove past the Framjee Cowasjee Institute on the Girgaum-road, and as soon as we reached the Parsee quarter beginning at the Money School, we observed that the road was crowded with Parsees, who were all armed with long and heavy bludgeons, and were shouting and gesticulating with the utmost energy. As we went on the crowd grew thicker, and close to the Parsee fire-temple, about a hundred of them, some I noticed, disguised as Mahomedans, came round the gharry with sticks raised, threatening to assault us. The sticks were very formidable shillelaghs, and things began to look very uncomfortable. Some respectable Parsees, however, recognised me and tried to keep the roughs quiet, crying out, "Don't be afraid, Mr. Maclean, no one wants to hurt you." I called to the coachman to stop, and was getting out to remonstrate with the club-wielders, when Rowjee, with more sense, shouted to the man to drive on as fast as he could. The Parsees, in fact, had the gharry stopped, were quite in the mood to beat my Mussulman companion to death. The horse went off at a gallop amidst the yells of the Parsees, and for several minutes, along two or three hundred yards of the Girgaum-road, in the middle of the day, with only two police constables to be seen for that whole distance, the open shigram we were in was exposed to a perfect hail of clubs hurled with right good will by Parsees lining the road on either side. Fortunately the tramway is not being laid down this road, so that there were no loose stones at hand for our friends to throw at us, or we should possibly have been seriously injured. As it was, the long clubs, though savagely thrown, were warded off by the sides and the roof of the gharry, and we escaped without hurt. At Jaffer Sulliman's place in Girgaum, I got another conveyance, and a Mahratta coachman, and drove back with another European gentleman and a Parsee to have a talk with the Parsees. I had the presumption to think that as there appeared to be no government in Bombay, I might perhaps do something by my own personal influence to induce men, who are generally peaceful and well-disposed, to give up taking the law into their own hands. As soon as I re-entered the Parsee quarter, the people came thronging round the carriage, and offered the most profuse apologies for what had occurred. They assured me that they had the greatest respect for me, and that their only object had been to demolish Jaffer Sulliman's man. I suggested that it had been rather an awkward mistake for me, and then went on to urge that nothing could justify them in thrashing even a Mussulman who had given them no cause of offence, and was quite helpless to resist them. They all with one voice exclaimed that the police would not protect their homes and temples, and what were they to do? Were they to sit still and be murdered

murdered by their enemies? They entreated me to come and see the men wounded by Mussulman rioters that very morning, and to observe that even up to that moment there was no guard set upon their fire-temple. As the carriage went slowly along, the crowd of excited Parsees, all talking together, always gathering force, Mr. Souter, accompanied by superintendent Mills and half a dozen sowars, turned out of a side street leading from the Mahomedan burial-ground and cantered along the road. He reined in his horse when he saw me, and I got out and said to him, that surely this sort of thing ought not to be allowed to go on. He said "Well, what am I to do? I am working night and day to keep the peace, but we have no police force. The Bench of Justices choose to cut down the strength of the European mounted police, half-a-dozen of whom would be of more use to me now than a hundred natives." I suggested, "But you surely might call out the military and issue a proclamation commanding the people not to assemble in disorderly crowds, with sticks in their hands, but to keep in their houses?" He replied, "The military have been called out" (there were none at the time in the neighbourhood); "and it is the Parsees who are to blame for the whole row. There were some Mussulmans peacefully burying a corpse in the Sonapore graveyard, and the Parsees began the riot by throwing stones and sticks at them from the adjoining houses. I am going to tell the Governor now that it is all the Parsees' own fault." I told Mr. Souter I had had personal experience that there were Parsees as well as Mussulman roughs, and added, that it seemed to me the Government ought to keep the peace, no matter who was originally to blame. Mr. Souter then rode off, and I went into a big Parsee house next door to the fire-temple, in which I saw three seriously wounded Parsees who were having their hurts dressed by Dr. Furdoonjee Servai of the Grant Medical College. The doctor showed me on the head of one of these men two deep cuts which had evidently been made by some sharp instrument; and it is believed that the Seedee vagabonds who form the chief fighting strength of the Mussulman mob carry small hatchets concealed about them, as well as clubs and stones. I spoke warmly to the Parsees present, many of them well-known men, about the impropriety of the conduct of their people in opposing force to force, and they all said, "We shall be perfectly satisfied to remain quietly at home, if the Government will only give us a corporal's guard to protect our fire-temple." I noticed that some policemen had come up by this time, but the Parsees will not trust the police, the force being composed principally of Mussulmans who, they say, sympathise with the rioters.

I then tried to get the Parsee account of how the row began, and this, in substance, is their story. They assert that the Mahomedans, to the number of about 400, marched down to the Sonapore burial ground armed with sticks, and that on their way from Bioleshwur these men attacked two Parsees who with difficulty found shelter in a Hindoo house. A Bunniah, Narotum Hurrilall by name, can, I was informed, be produced as a witness to prove this fact. Arrived at the burial ground, which is overlooked by some lofty Parsee houses, the Mussulmans, according to the statements of the Parsees, began the riot by throwing stones at the windows, and afterwards sallied out into the streets and maltreated every Parsee they met. On this occasion the Parsees were prepared to defend themselves, and the result was that one man on each side was killed and many were severely injured. The statement of the police, on the other hand, is that it was the Parsees who first threw missiles from their windows into the graveyard, and that the Mahomedans would have gone home without doing any mischief if they had not been first attacked. Mr. Souter himself maintains this side of the story with the utmost vehemence, but the Parsees unanimously declared that the chief commissioner of police is bitterly prejudiced against them. I should hesitate to say anything further on this subject; for nothing can be more distasteful to me personally, than to have to say a word against a man for whom I have always had a sincere liking and respect, but it appears to me that I am bound to publish a statement, which was made and signed in my presence yesterday at the house of Mr. Byramjee Dadabhoy, Registrar of Bombay, by several well-known Parsees who are quite ready to come forward, along with Mr. Byramjee himself, to testify to the truth of the statement. These gentlemen affirm then, that as Mr. Souter was riding past Mr. Byramjee's house in one of the side streets leading from the Churney-road to the Girgaum-road, all the inhabitants being out in their verandahs and talking of course their hardest, he called out: "Damn you Parsees, you have provoked this row. The Mussulmans were quite orderly, but you provoked the row." Mr. Byramjee Dadabhoy: "But, sir, one of our Parsees is killed." Mr. Souter: "I am very glad of it, and I should like to see all the Parsees killed, and I will tell the Governor not to help the Parsees, and I will remove all the police force." Mr. N. R. Ranina: "Sir, it's a great slur upon the Parsees." Mr. Souter: "Damn you, who are you? Sowar, take him up"; and then Mr. Souter with his stick raised rode up the steps and was going to beat the man, but he changed his mind and rode away. Of course Mr. Souter did not mean what he said; he only spoke in his haste, when he was irritated beyond measure by what had occurred at the burial-ground; but it is a serious thing when the chief of the police cannot refrain from making injudicious speeches of this kind instead of keeping his judgment cool to deal fairly with rioters of all creeds.

The object of this narrative is simply to state my experience and leave the public to form their own opinion on the subject. I have tried to speak impartially of Mussulman and Parsees, and to describe as accurately as I could the state of confusion into which the city of Bombay has been allowed to drift.

Bombay, 16 February 1874.

(signed) *J. M. Maclean.*

APPENDIX (I).

LETTER from *Byramjee Jeejeebhoy*, Esq., late Member of the Legislative Council of Bombay, to *F. H. Souter*, Esq., Commissioner of Police.

Sir,

Bombay, 14 February 1874.

I beg to call your attention to the state of the city, especially in the neighbourhood of Khetwaddy, Dhunjee Dhongaria Street, Abdool Rahiman, and other streets adjacent. In these quarters mobs of Mahomedans have, on two or three occasions this morning, collected in a threatening manner, to the alarm and terror of the inhabitants, and these mobs have not been attacked and dispersed by the police, but have been simply turned back only to collect again at some other point that seems more defenceless.

On inquiring at Khetwaddy main road, I was informed by the European constables there that they were quite exhausted, having been on duty since one o'clock yesterday afternoon, that they had no proper communication with the different sections of police, and consequently were unable to assemble in sufficient strength to attack and disperse the rioters. Under these circumstances, I beg, on behalf of my countrymen of the neighbourhood in question, that you will obtain further assistance, as it is evident that the police force, in its present condition, is unable to cope with the rioters, who, if by any chance they obtain an opportunity, will renew the dreadful outrages of yesterday. I have been requested by several deputations of my countrymen to make this communication to you.

I submit to you that what has occurred to-day tends to show that all necessary precautions have not been taken, and I take the liberty of suggesting that the stationing of the military in these districts will alone scare the evil doers, and restore confidence to the Parsee community.

It is much safer to err on the side of peace and order, and to put beyond all possible doubt the chance of the repetition of what occurred yesterday.

H. F. Souter, Esq., C.S.I.,
Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Byramjee Jeejeebhoy*.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

ANSWER to the above Letter.

My dear Sir,

MR. SOUTER is at this moment patrolling the city with a large party of police. I will give him your letter when he comes. I have myself visited the places you mention, some of them several times during to-day, and have not seen nor heard anything of the threatening mobs you write of. There are two companies of Native Infantry and one of European Infantry under arms, and in readiness to turn out instantly. The parties of police stationed at the different posts you mentioned will be relieved every 24 hours. They are in communication with each other by means of mounted patrols. There are altogether about 600 men now doing duty in the B. and C. Divisions.

There has up to this time been no rioting since yesterday. Only two or three men, so far as I at present know, have been guilty of disorderly behaviour to-day, and I most sincerely hope that the present excitement will speedily subside. The Commissioner has been in communication to-day with his Excellency the Governor, and further measures for the security of the city are under consideration. Your suggestion will I know receive Mr. Souter's prompt and careful attention.

The Honourable Byramjee Jeejeebhoy,
&c. &c. &c.
14 February 1874.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *A. Edgington*.

(True Copy.)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

APPENDIX (J.)

STATEMENT of *H. W. Payne, Esq.*, of Messrs Jefferson & Payne, Solicitors, High Court, Bombay.

ON the 14th February 1874, at about 2 p.m., I accompanied Mr. Byramjee Jeejeebhoy and Mr. Nanabhoy Byramjee Jeejeebhoy and another gentleman to the Khetwaddy main road; there we were informed by the European constables that a mob of Mahomedans, armed with sticks, had on two occasions on that morning collected at the point. That the police were unable to attack them, as they had only about 20 police sepoy, and these were barely sufficient to enable them to maintain their post. That they had formed their sepoy across the road when the mob came up on both occasions, but no attack was made on either side, and the mob had turned back. One of these police constables also said that they were exhausted, and had been on duty since one o'clock the afternoon previous; that they had no sowars to communicate with other police posts, and were consequently unable to assemble in sufficient force to enable them to disperse the rioters. He also said that it was to be regretted that the military were not called out to assist the police, as they feared that in their exhausted state they were not sufficiently strong to cope with the rioters, if they made an attack in large numbers. He also informed us that some Parsees had assisted the Police in turning the rioters back on the two occasions referred to. I may add that the Parsee women and children at the windows of the houses in the neighbourhood appeared to be in a state of great terror and anxiety.

(signed) *Henry W. Payne.*

14 March 1874.

(True Copy.)

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor, High Court.

APPENDIX (K.)

(From the "Akhbar-i-Soodagur," a Guzerati Daily Newspaper, of 26th February 1874.)

TRANSLATION of a Letter, signed by Jeevunlaljee Maharaj, through his Mehta Nagindas Permanandas, and 400 other Hindus, and addressed to *F. Souter, Esq.*, Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

Sir,

WE, the undersigned residents of the Bhooleshwur locality, beg to inform you that this day morning (Sunday, 15th February 1874) about 300 Mussulmans, with sticks, were going with a funeral along the Bhooleshwur Road, who, upon seeing a Parsee there, rushed at him, and the Parsee upon receiving some blows ran into the Bhooleshwur Temple for his safety. The Mussulmans began to rush into the temple in order to catch hold of him, but as the day was the Shivratri Holiday, and as there was a large collection of Hindus in the temple, they immediately shut the temple doors, and thus prevented the Mussulmans from going into the temple. We hereby inform you that as Bhoiwada and Bhooleshwur-streets are the chief streets from which the dead bodies of Mahomedans are taken to their burial ground, and as upon these streets are situated the chief temples of our Hindus, and the shops for the sale of their ornaments; and as, on the other hand, the Parsees also frequent these streets in pursuance of their callings, we entertain great apprehensions of riot breaking out in this direction. Therefore, we request you to make some "bundobust," or arrangement for the preservation of peace in the Bhooleshwur locality, or to stop Mahomedau funeral processions from going through Bhoiwada-street along the Bhooleshwur Road.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Jeevunlaljee Maharaj*,
By his Mehta Nagindass Permanandas,
and 400 other Hindus.

(True Translation.)

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

Ardesir Framjee,
Solicitor, High Court.

APPENDIX (L.)

THE Assault on the Inspector in the Fort.

(From the "Times of India," 16th February 1874.)

THE statement in his Excellency the Governor's letter to Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, that a European inspector was assaulted and injured in the fort by some Parsees, whom he endeavoured to prevent assaulting a Mussulman, has much troubled the Parsee community. We have received from a Parsee eye-witness the following account of the affair, and as his Excellency the Governor thought proper to found his imputation on the Parsees from what the inspector said, it is as well "to hear the other side," even after the judgment has been passed upon them. Here is the Parsee version:—"I was present when the so-called assault was committed on the European inspector. At about 11:30 a.m. on Sunday, a report being circulated in the fort that the Arabs and Seedees, instigated by the Mahomedans, were coming to plunder the shops and fight with the Parsees, they immediately shut their shops. Most of the respectable shopkeepers, including my father, took peaceably to their homes, although they were insulted by the more excited of the population for the adoption of such a course—that of concealing themselves in their houses; and the rest of them, including a respectable element of the Parsee community, provided themselves with clubs to defend their wives and properties. My youthful disposition did not admit of adopting the course pursued by my father, and so I repaired to the Manekjee Sett's Agiary, and sat there, but without carrying anything resembling a stick even with me. At this time there was not a single sepoy to be seen, and still less a European constable. The Parsees at this time were in a most excited state of fury. Now I come to the point. When the general excitement had a little abated, a European constable (perhaps the inspector) with about six sepoys, came rushing on, actually like a maniac, just gave a box to one, a kick to another, a slap to a third, without, I most positively say, the slightest provocation. But this is not all, being more emboldened, he gave a flat slap to a poor old Parsee priest on his chest, who fell heavily on the ground, and received considerable injury. But the constable's stupidity does not end here: he told the sepoys to carry the poor priest to the chowkey! Some of the Parsees remonstrated with the constable on his unjustifiable conduct. He rushed against the Parsees who remonstrated with him. In the scuffle that ensued between the Parsees and the constable with his myrionids he received a stroke from a bludgeon. Who gave him the wound I did not see in the confusion; whether he received the wound from a Parsee or a sepoy just going to pound the head of a Parsee . . ."

Another Parsee writes:—"The inspector came up quite excited, and seeing the Parsees at Agiary, without any cause of provocation, gave a sound blow on the head to a poor mobed (priest) who was standing there, and on receiving which the poor mobed fell insensible on the ground. The Parsees rushed in to rescue the poor mobed (Parsee priest), and in the general affray the inspector received a blow from the hand of a Parsee. Now, sir, it is for you now to think who was the aggressive party." When a bishop, who was nearly as august a personage as his Excellency the Governor, complained that a dog had bitten the calf of his leg, the Rev. Sydney Smith shrewdly said that it would be desirable to have the dog's version of the affray. In this instance we have, fortunately, got the Parsee's version of the assault committed on his Excellency's inspector.

APPENDIX (M.)

LIST containing the Names of Parsee Families who had come to Reside in the Fort for Better Protection since the breaking out of the Riots on the 13th February 1874.

From Kandawalla Mohulla.

Nowrojee Hormusjee Mowrawalla.
Pestonjee Rustonjee Fitter.
Hormusjee Bhicajee Gadiali.
Jamsetjee Franjee Kolabawalla.
Rustonjee Sumacharwalla.
Motabhai Hormusjee Daroowalla.
Cawasjee Nowrojee Ponchkanawalla.
Ardesir Sorabjee Bharoocha.
Maneckjee Cursetjee Manintana.
Sorabjee Pestonjee Batliwalla.

Nowrojee Sheriadjee Broacha.
Merwanjee Usrajee Broacha.
Cawasjee Usrajee Broacha.
Nowrojee Shereardjee Daroowalla.
Jamsetjee Manekjee Daroowalla.
Edujee Dhunjeebhoy Kirurd.
Furdoonjee Dadabhoy Patel.
Hormusjee Dadabhoy Printer.
Pestonjee Dorabjee Daroowalla.

From

From Dhunjee Doongaria-street, Shaik Abdool Rehmon-street, Meerzu-street, Agiary-street, and Hanooman-lane.

Dinshaw Bomanjee Keranwalla.
Cawasjee Framjee Petiwalla.
Byranjee Jamsetjee Bhugwagar.
Dadabhoy Dinshaw Kartuck.
Nanabhoy Cawasjee Guzdar.
Sorabjee Eduljee Kootar.
Dadabhoy Ruttonjee Thoothi.
Bhikajee Sorabjee Kootar.
Eduljee Cawasjee Bhatena.
Pestonjee Eduljee Dhala.
Ruttonjee Rustomjee Valsaria.
Nowrozjee Pallonjee Keranwalla.
Jamsetjee Bezonjee Choksee.
Nusserwanjee Jamsetjee.
Sorabjee Dadabhoy Kapudia.
Hormusjee Pallonjee Mistry.
Cawasjee Rustomjee Manjra.
Pestonjee Muncherjee Doctor.
Muncherjee Hormuzjee Bhabha.

Nusserwanjee Dhunjeebboy Daroowalla.
Framjee Ruttonjee Coachman.
Pestonjee Cawasjee Solicitor.
Framjee Cawasjee Powri.
Pallonjee Pestonjee Razhee.
Rustomjee Maneckjee Engineer.
Jamsetjee Hormuzjee Baria.
Rustomjee Framjee Powri.
Shapoorjee Hormuzjee Kartuck.
Rustomjee Nowrozjee Vurgara.
Hormusjee Cursetjee Ghaswalla.
Cursetjee-Eduljee Mistry.
Hormusjee Cawasjee Daji Ghandhina.
Dossabhoy Manockjee Kootar.
Cawasjee Fakirjee Parelwalla.
Nusserwanjee Nowrozjee Muccadam.
Manockjee Pestonjee Arjain.
Muncherjee Cawasjee Munguldasna.

From Bhendi Bazaar.

Furdoonjee Bhorucha.
Sorabjee Pestonjee Coachman.
Rustomjee Nowrozjee Billard - Table -
wala.
Fackirjee Sorabjee Bhorucha.
Shapoorjee Nusserwanjee Sooj.
Shapoorjee Cooverjee Mistry.
Eduljee Dhunjeebboy Daroowalla.

Pallonjee Jeevunjee Mistry.
Framjee Pestonjee Lackdawalla.
Pestonjee Jamsetjee.
Dhunjeebboy Pestonjee.
Cursetjee Byramjee Bhorucha.
Dadabhoy Hormusjee Engineer.
Adirjee Bezonjee Patetawalla.
Muncherjee Fackirjee Tabelwalla.

From Null Bazaar.

Pestonjee Cawasjee Sodawaterwalla.

From Nagpada.

Jeevunjee Jamsetjee Shapur Teylen.
Dadabhai Jamsetjee Shapur Taylen.

Jeevunjee Jamsetjee Bhatena.

From Dhole Taluo.

Sorabjee Hormusjee Lackdawalla.
Dorabjee Maneckjee Shroff.
Ardesir Pallonjee Mistry.
Muncherjee Eduljee Colabawalla.
Nanabhoy Eduljee Colabawalla.
Bomanjee Dhunjeebboy Talati.
Hormusjee Framjee Pagdiwalla.
Jeevunjee Framjee Chapakhanawala.
Bhickibai, sister of Dosabhai Mistry.
Nanabhoy Nusserwanjee Kharegat.
Cursetjee Jamsetjee Rozadaraona.

Manockjee Heerjeebboy Mistry.
Burjorjee Jamsetjee Bankwalla.
Marwanjee Heerjeebboy Bottlewalla.
Daughter-in-law of Palonjee Bottlewalla.
Nowrozjee Pestonjee Kapadia.
Dossabai Bagana.
Temooljee Manockjee Vaid.
Manockjee Framjee Writer.
Dorabjee Maneckjee Daroowalla.
Nanabhai Framjee Spencer.
Muncherjee Pestonjee Kurunjia.

From Chundanwadi.

Bomanjee Rustomjee Bomon Byramna.
Dorabjee Hormusjee Valsaria.
Bajonjee Nanabhoy Valsaria.

Rutanjee Marwanjee Khuragat.
Framjee Eduljee Mistry.
Jeejeebboy Cursetjee Master.

From Sonapore-lane.

Framjee Jamsetjee Dubash.
Merwanjee Jamsetjee Aduryanwalla.

Jamsetjee Nowrozjee Colabawalla.

From Dady Shett Ateshbehram Street.

Jamsetjee Framjee Khory.
Peroshaw Muncherjee.
Nowrojee Cowasjee Kyas.

Hormusjee Jamsetjee Francees.
Muncherjee Nowrojee Lakdawalla.

From Kerawadi.

Hormusjee Nowrojee Saklatwala.

Sorabjee Ruttonjee Doctor.

From Girgaum.

Ruttonjee Eduljee Battlewala.
Aduljee Bomanjee Mistry.
Dosabhoy Dhunjeebhoy Dhunnapatelna.
Shapurjee Cursetjee Divicha.
Cursetjee Nowrojee Wadia.

Nowrojee Cowasjee Darookhanawala.
Cowasjee Nowrojee Mistry.
Nowrojee Cowasjee Mistry.
Fakirjee Pallonjee Etchaporla.

From Khetwadi.

Nanabhoy, Servant of Motibai.
Jamsetjee Hormusjee Dharooowala.
Pullonjee Cursetjee Cama.
Framjee Muncherjee Harda.
Sapoorjee Sorabjee Setna.
Dinshah Sapoorjee Dallasna.
Dinshah Eduljee Law.
Eduljee Dorabjee Saklatwala.
Dhunjeebhoy Dorabjee Malagamwala.
Nowrojee Nussorwanjee Khedwar.
Aspendiarjee Jamsetjee Vulsaria.

Sapoorjee Dorabjee Saklatwara.
Framjee Dhunjeebhoy Cama.
Dadabhoy Cowasjee Bugli.
Jehungirjee Eduljee Jijoriwala.
Kaikashroo Nowrojee Kabrajee.
Framjee Eduljee Oograniwala.
Nowrojee Kaikobad Mody.
Byramjee Muncherjee Mistry.
Rustomjee Jamsetjee Colabawala.
Eduljee Sorabjee Madun.

From Two Tank Road.

Sapoorjee Sorabjee Mistry.
Dadabbhai Jamsetjee Darooowala.

Shapoorjee Sorabjee Bhatiwala.

From Grant Road.

Rustomjee Pallonjee Kapadia.
Eduljee Framjee Mistry.
Merwanjee Bejonjee Doobash.
Dhunjeebhai Pallonjee Botliwala.
Jamsetjee Dhunjeebhoy Mistry.

Nanabhoy Burjorjee Shaklatwala.
Shapoorjee Nussorwanjee Dundash.
Dinshahjee Framjee Daver.
Burjorjee Jeevanjee Mowjee.
Dhunjeebhoy Pestonjee Mehta.

From Old Jail Road.

Sorabjee Burjorjee Tadiwala.

From Omerkady.

Bomanjee Sorabjee Master.

(True Copy.)

(signed)

Ardesir Framjee, Solicitor,
High Court.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

APPENDIX (N.)

EXTRACTS from "Tarikh-us-Salatin-ul-Ajam," published in Bombay, by Aga Mahommed Sâdick Sâhib, 1277 Hijra, corresponding with the Christian Year 1861.

(Translation.)

A MAGI named Zardusht appeared in his (King Gushtasp's) reign. He was a disciple of one of the disciples of Armia (Prophet Jeremiah): may God bless him! During the time that Zardusht attended on this prophet, he greedily devoured some of his doctrines; and

and he produced them (the doctrines) in a terse style. Conscious of his weakness, he delivered himself up to the care of *Shaitan* (Satan); pretended to have received some divine inspiration, and harboured many vague conceits in the hollow of his brain. Meanwhile he was reported to have committed some ignominious crime, for which he was constrained to make his escape with treble speed under cover of the darkness of the night.

(Translation.)

And they set down the trifles and *bagatelles* of that vile and abandoned person on those leaves (parchments) which deserved to be consigned to fire.

(Translation.)

The consequence thereof was that during the reign of this king (Gushtasp) people became proselytized to the creed of the Magi, surrendered to his mandates, and sank into the whirlpool of infidelity, and into the abyss of error. They regarded it as lawful and enjoined by God to cohabit with their mothers and sisters.

(Translation.)

The following few opinions are the offspring of the sullen and turbid mind of that damned accursed person (Zoroaster). "The Almighty God lived by himself for a long time. As his period of solitude continued longer, grief sat on him, and he felt a prey to biting cares and uneasiness. In this languor, *Iblis* (Satan) took his birth. As the *Iblis* was of a very ugly and repulsive countenance, God turned away from him with disgust, and wished to conquer him, when *Iblis* becoming helpless, ran away from his sight, and has continued execrable ever since."

EXTRACT FROM "Shams-ul-Loghat," published in Bombay by Kazi Ibrahim bin Kazi Noor Mahommed, of Porebunder, and Nuroodin bin Jiva Khan, revised by Moulwi Nurul Huda and Talib Ali, 1277 Hijra, corresponding with the Christian Year 1861.

(Translation.)

Zaratusht, the name of a philosopher, who promulgated the religion of the worship of fire. May the curse of God be upon him!

(Translation.)

Zand, the name of a book, composed by Ibrahim Zartusht, founded on the false religion of the worship of fire.

(True Translation.)

(signed) *Bahmanji Dosabhai*, Munshi.

Bombay, 31 March 1874.

(No. 18 of 1874.)

Government of India.—Home Department.—Judicial.—Police.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of *Salisbury*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis,

Fort William, 2 June 1874.

We have received from the Government of Bombay a letter of the 20th instant, transmitting copy of the Despatch addressed to your Lordship on the 8th May; No. 6, on the subject of a memorial from the Parsee inhabitants of Bombay with respect to the recent riots in that city.

2. We do not feel called upon to enter upon the subject of the Memorial, as it was addressed to Her Majesty's Government and not to the Government of India; but we desire to submit, for the consideration of your Lordship, some

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K 2

observations

observations with regard to two references to the action and opinion of this Government which are contained in the Despatch.

3. The first will be found in the 8th, 9th, and 10th paragraphs of the Despatch. In those paragraphs the Government of Bombay express their opinion "that military force should not be brought into active operation against rioters unless or until it is known, or has been shown, that the civil force at the disposal of the authorities is unable to overcome them," and they contend that the assistance of the military force was not earlier required at Bombay, because "in no single instance in the riots was it known that the police could not master the rioters as soon as they acted in a body against them." The Government of Bombay rightly consider that the principle which they lay down is one of much importance, and request the expression of your Lordship's views upon the subject.

4. In our letter to the Government of Bombay of the 2nd April, No. 108, a copy of which was furnished to your Lordship with our Despatch of the 10th idem, No. 10, we indicated our opinion (purposely in guarded terms, in order to avoid as far as possible any appearance of disagreement with the Government of Bombay) that the aid of military force might with advantage have been earlier used upon the occasion of the late riots. As the general question is now raised, we consider it to be our duty to state to your Lordship that we differ altogether from the opinion expressed by the Government of Bombay, that it is right to wait until it has been shown that the police are unable to check a riot, or in other words, to allow the rioters for a time to remain unchecked, before calling in the assistance of the military force; on the contrary, we conceive that in India, on the first apprehension of any serious riot, the right course is to assemble such a military force as will show those who are disposed to break the peace that any attempt of the kind must be ineffectual, and to make use of that force promptly if occasion should require it. Hesitation and delay under such circumstances appear to us to involve great danger, especially when the character of the population which composes many of our Indian cities is taken into consideration, and regard is had to the political danger of any appearance of inability on the part of the executive Government to put down a disturbance.

5. It is in our opinion the more necessary to express our views clearly to your Lordship upon this subject, because we observed that in a speech addressed to the members of the Bombay University, his Excellency the Governor of Bombay expressed a reluctance to call upon the military force for aid in time of riot, along with some doubts as to the sufficiency of the powers placed by law in the hands of Government. We are unable to agree with his Excellency on either of these points.

6. The other reference to the Government of India upon which we desire to remark, is contained in the concluding lines of the 20th paragraph. We have to observe that when the provincial service system was commenced in the year 1870, a sum of 10,000 *l.* per annum was included in the allotment to the Presidency of Bombay as a contribution in aid of the police of the city of Bombay. In the exercise of the discretion committed to Local Governments under the system of provincial services, the Government of Bombay has itself withdrawn this sum for its original purpose, and it cannot therefore be said that the Government of India has made no provision from imperial funds to meet the expense of police in the city of Bombay.

7. The Government of Bombay allude to the representations which have been made to the Government of India on the subject of modifying the provincial service system. Those representations, along with the recommendations which we have received from other local Governments, are under our consideration.

8. The last representation made to us by the Government of Bombay was that we should sanction the introduction of a Bill into the provincial legislature for the purpose of levying a provincial income tax in the Bombay Presidency in order to carry on a high rate of expenditure upon public works, mainly consisting of civil buildings. We declined to comply with this request, and pointed out

out to the Government of Bombay that it would be necessary to reduce their expenditure so as to come within the ways and means at their disposal.

We have, &c.
 (signed) *Northbrook.*
Napier of Magdala.
B. H. Ellis.
A. Hobhouse.
E. C. Bayley.
J. F. D. Inglis.

(Judicial, No. 31.)

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

India Office, London, 9 July 1874.

Para. 1. THE Despatch of your Excellency in Council, dated 10th April, No. 10 of 1874, on the subject of the riots in Bombay, on the 13th and 15th of February last, has been considered by me in Council.

2. I have since received a memorial from the Parsee community at Bombay, complaining of the conduct of the Government of that Presidency in connexion with the riots, together with a Despatch from the Governor in Council of Bombay of the 8th of May, commenting on the statements in the memorial; and your Excellency's Despatch of the 2nd June, commenting upon the Despatch of the Government of Bombay.

3. The cause of the outbreak on the part of the Mussulmans was an ill-advised expression in a notice of the Life of Mahomet, published by a Parsee. The words employed were in themselves indefensible, and their use was the more to be condemned that a more harmless biography of Mahomet had, in 1851, led to a very serious riot in Bombay. But this provocation did not afford the slightest excuse for the Mahometan riot of the 13th of February, in which some houses of the Parsees were sacked, two fire temples were desecrated, several wounds inflicted, and one life lost.

4. Before that day, the Commissioner of Police was informed of the existence of an angry feeling among the Mussulmans, and he tried to calm it by procuring the suppression of the book. In neglecting at the same time to take suitable precautions against disorder, Mr. Souter committed an error of judgment. If the feelings of the Mahometans were not likely to be dangerously excited, there was no need to interfere with the circulation of the book; if they were, that measure would not by itself avail to ensure the maintenance of order. Unaccompanied by any preparations for repression, it may have been interpreted as a proof of weakness, and have increased, rather than allayed, the prevailing excitement.

5. When, however, the disturbance broke out, and the houses of some respectable Parsees had been plundered and two temples defiled by Arab and Seedee rioters, Mr. Souter behaved with the conspicuous gallantry which he has always evinced throughout his official career. Ably supported by those under his command, he soon quelled the disturbance, and took 64 prisoners. Whatever error of judgment may be laid to Mr. Souter's charge before the actual outbreak, he amply redeemed his character, as a vigorous and resolute officer, when the time for action had arrived.

6. On Saturday, the 14th February, the town continued in a state of feverish excitement, and great apprehensions were entertained with respect to some Mahometan funerals which had been appointed for the next day. On the evening of Saturday, the 14th, Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, and four other leading members of the Parsee community, waited on his Excellency the Governor. They represented that their countrymen were panic-stricken, and implored him to call out the troops for their protection, and for the preservation of order. His Excellency declined to comply with their request. At the same time, he

explained in forcible language to the deputation the view which he entertained of the duties of a Government, in case of public disturbance, and which has been more formally enunciated in their Despatch of 8th May by the Government of Bombay.

7. On the next day, Sunday, the 15th, a large funeral procession of Mussulmans took place, and a still more formidable riot occurred, in which many men were wounded, and five men were killed. The police again exhibited remarkable efficiency in the restoration of order. The learned judge who subsequently tried the rioters was of opinion that the Parsees were in this riot the aggressors. But it should be remembered, to the credit of the Parsees, that they injured no mosque, and destroyed no property of their opponents.

8. After the serious outbreak of Sunday, the 15th, the troops were called out, and no further disturbance worthy of the name occurred. The processions on the occasion of the Mohurrum were prohibited, and a large number of the perpetrators of the outrage of Friday, the 13th February, were tried before the High Court, found guilty, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

9. The memorial of the Parsees, signed by many gentlemen of high consideration, prays for the institution of an inquiry into the origin of the riots, and the measures taken for their suppression. I am of opinion that such an inquiry would add nothing material to the information we possess, and would serve no useful object. The anxiety of the Parsees to clear the reputation of their community seems to me superfluous. The original indiscretion, however grave, of one of their number, cannot leave any slur upon their well-known loyalty and public spirit. There is not, on the other hand, anything in the conduct of the Commissioner of Police which calls for inquiry. He under-rated the danger to which public order was exposed, but when it came, he met it with vigour and capacity.

10. It remains for me to notice the conduct of the Government of Bombay. I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the recourse to a military force ought not to have been delayed so long. But the error of the Government of Bombay in this respect did not arise from negligence, but from the adoption of a mistaken principle. If they are to be judged according to the views of the duty of a Government which they themselves entertain, no exception can be taken to the course which they pursued. In their Despatch of 8th May, they say, "We therefore avow it to be our opinion that military force should not be brought into active operation against rioters unless or until it is known, or has been shown, that the civil force at the disposal of the authorities is unable to overcome them, and we assert, without fear of contradiction, that in no single instance in these riots was it found that the police could not master the rioters as soon as they acted in a body against them. The active assistance of a soldier was not once required."

11. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, in his answer to the Parsee deputation on the 14th February, expressed himself in the same sense. His Excellency, if he has been accurately reported, said, "I cannot call the military into the town until I hear that the police are quite unable to cope with the rioters and suppress the riot. The members of your community ought to learn the lesson of defending yourselves from the rioters, and not to depend wholly on Government, but form themselves into what they call in England 'special constables.'" His Excellency asked more than once, "Are you Parsees quite unable to defend yourselves?"

12. I must express the distinct dissent of Her Majesty's Government from the view thus taken of their duty by the Government of Bombay. In England, military force is only used for the repression of civil disturbances in the last resort. This usage has its origin and its justification in political circumstances peculiar to England. It is wholly inapplicable to India. There is nothing distasteful to Indian feelings in the employment of troops for the maintenance of order. The nature of Indian institutions, the excitable character of the people, and the many causes of conflict which are supplied to them by diversities of race and creed, impose upon every Indian Government a special obligation to repress
with

with an unflinching hand the first beginnings of disorder. Compared to the primary importance of this duty, the question whether it should be performed by civil or military agency must take a secondary rank. Nothing is gained by withholding military support until the insufficiency of the police has been ascertained by experiment, but during the time which elapses while the proof is being worked out, extensive loss of life and property may take place, and passions may be excited from which serious calamities may flow. On the other hand, the early display of a sufficient force will tend to save life, by depriving the disorderly of all hope of impunity.

13. Some observations attributed to the Governor of Bombay, in a speech made shortly after these riots, appear to indicate a doubt in his mind whether his legal powers are adequate to enable him to act with promptitude in the suppression of disorder. These doubts, if he entertains them, will be set at rest for the future by the recent extension to the Presidency towns of Sections 480 to 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of which the provisions are in harmony with the principles I have laid down.

14. An impression appears to have prevailed in the minds of some of the Parsee community that the Governor of Bombay was animated by a spirit of hostility to them. I am unable to find any trace of such a feeling in his language or his measures. He did not in any respect depart from the careful impartiality which is required by his high position.

15. A copy of this Despatch has been forwarded to the Government of Bombay.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Salisbury.*

NOTE.

THE proceedings of meetings of Parsees held in Bombay in connection with the riots, and reports of the proceedings of the police courts and High Courts, will be presented hereafter.

16 July 1874.

H. L. Anderson, Secretary,
Judicial Department.

EAST INDIA (BOMBAY RIOTS).

COPIES of all DESPATCHES received at, or from, the India Office in reference to the Riots in *Bombay*; of all Reports by the Commissioners of Police at *Bombay* relating to said Riots, or subsequent Proceedings consequent thereon; &c.

(*Mr. Dunbar.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed
17 July 1874.

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Under 8

