


AFRICA. No. 6 (1896).



CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE RECENT



REBELLION IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

[WITH A MAP.]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.  
August 1896.*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.  |             | Date.         | SUBJECT.  | Page |
|-----|--|-------------|---------------|---|------|
| 1   | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | .. ..       | Feb. 13, 1895 | Death of Chief of Takaungu. Recognition of his son Rashid .. ..   | 1    |
| 2   | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | May 1,        | Mubarak-bin-Rashid refuses to recognize Rashid. His defiant attitude. Necessity of dealing with semi-independent Chiefs .. ..                       | 1    |
| 3   | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 23,           | Attack on Takaungu by Mubarak anticipated. Asks authority to land men from gun-boat .. ..   | 2    |
| 4   | To Mr. Hardinge .. ..                              | Telegraphic | 24,           | Answers above. To consult Senior Naval Officer and Sir L. Mathews .. ..   | 2    |
| 5   | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | Telegraphic | 30,           | Has consulted Senior Naval Officer and Sir L. Mathews. Proposed conciliatory letter to Mubarak, and resort to force if he refuses invitation .. ..  | 2    |
| 6   | To Mr. Hardinge .. ..                              | Telegraphic | 30,           | Approves proposals reported in above telegram.  | 3    |
| 7   | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | Telegraphic | June 19,      | Destruction of Mubarak's head - quarters. Takaungu to be occupied .. ..   | 3    |
| 8   | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | 2,            | Negotiations with Mubarak. Copies of letters addressed to him by Sultan and Mr. Hardinge .. ..  | 3    |
| 9   | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | 7,            | Negotiations with Mubarak. Mr. Wilson's visit to him, and further letter to him from Mr. Hardinge .. ..   | 5    |
| 10  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | July 11,      | Attack on Takaungu. Rebels have been dislodged .. ..  | 6    |
| 11  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 13,           | Recruitment of native force of 300 men .. ..  | 6    |
| 12  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 19,           | Rebels have taken refuge with Mubarak of Gazi. Mr. Hardinge in communication with latter .. ..  | 7    |
| 13  | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | June 25,      | Failure of negotiations with Mubarak-bin-Rashid. Occupation of Gonjoro and subsequent measures to assert authority over Mazrui tribe .. ..          | 7    |
| 14  | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | July 6,       | Mubarak has taken refuge with Mubarak of Gazi, who has been told to give him up .. ..   | 10   |
| 15  | To Mr. Hardinge .. ..                              | .. ..       | 26,           | Approves action reported in No. 13..  | 11   |
| 16  | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | Telegraphic | 26,           | Chief of Gazi has joined rebels. Necessity of attacking Mveli .. ..   | 11   |
| 17  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 26,           | Rebels under Chief of Gazi have sacked Wanga. Admiral Rawson recommends energetic action .. ..  | 11   |
| 18  | Commander - in - chief, Cape Station, to Admiralty | Telegraphic | 26,           | Proceedings of Her Majesty's ships. Concur in Mr. Hardinge's views as to necessity of capturing Mveli. Advises dispatch of an Indian regiment .. .. | 12   |
| 19  | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | Telegraphic | Aug. 7,       | Strain on resources consequent on spread of rebellion. Suggests that Sikhs for Juba district be used to assist local forces .. ..                   | 12   |
| 20  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 11,           | Sultan of Zanzibar has no connection with disturbances on coast .. ..   | 13   |
| 21  | Mr. Cave .. ..                                     | Telegraphic | 19,           | Capture of Mveli on 17th instant .. ..  | 13   |
| 22  | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | .. ..       | July 18,      | Account of rebel attack on Takaungu and their expulsion .. ..   | 13   |
| 23  | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | 21,           | Attempt to negotiate with Chief of Gazi. Correspondence with him. His disloyalty almost certain .. ..   | 16   |
| 24  | To Mr. Hardinge .. ..                              | .. ..       | Aug. 29,      | Rebel attack on Takaungu. Approves Mr. Hardinge's action as reported in No. 22 .. ..  | 22   |
| 25  | Mr. Hardinge .. ..                                 | .. ..       | 26,           | Chief of Gazi openly hostile. Capture of Mveli .. ..  | 22   |
| 26  | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | 26,           | Mazrui Chiefs. Memorandum on their history, &c. .. ..   | 20   |
| 27  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | Oct. 18,      | Death of Captain Lawrence .. ..   | 36   |
| 28  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | 19,           | Death of Captain Lawrence. Further particulars .. ..  | 36   |
| 29  | " " .. ..  | .. ..       | Sept. 28,     | Movements of rebels, and visit of inspection to Gazi .. ..  | 36   |
| 30  | " " .. ..  | Telegraphic | Oct. 21,      | Recovery of the body of Captain Lawrence .. ..  | 37   |
| 31  | To Mr. Hardinge .. ..                              | .. ..       | 31,           | Steps taken for pacification. Approves, as reported in No. 29 .. ..   | 37   |

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

| No. | Name.                  |             | Date.         | SUBJECT.  | Page |
|-----|------------------------|-------------|---------------|---|------|
| 32  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | Nov. 2, 1895  | Rebel attack on camel caravan and Mazera's ..   | 38   |
| 33  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | 2,            | Rebel attack on Rabai Mission station ..  | 38   |
| 34  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | 4,            | Recovery of loads and camels taken by rebels ..   | 38   |
| 35  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | Telegraphic | 4,            | Defence of caravans and stations. Asks for views as to 'situation. Can security be afforded till the Pathans arrive? ..                               | 38   |
| 36  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 7,            | Answers above. Informs of force disposable. 'Can protect main road and European stations until Indians arrive ..                                      | 38   |
| 37  | " ..                   | ..          | Oct. 24,      | Death of Captain Lawrence. Reports circumstances of ..  | 39   |
| 38  | " ..                   | ..          | Nov. 2,       | Expeditions against rebels at Sokoki and Mtwapa. Reports ..   | 40   |
| 39  | " ..                   | ..          | 8,            | Death of Captain Lawrence. Further particulars ..   | 44   |
| 40  | " ..                   | ..          | 13,           | Rebel attacks on Mazera and Rabai: Further details. Provisional arrangements made for protection of roads and stations ..                             | 47   |
| 41  | " ..                   | ..          | Dec. 2,       | Occupation of Tandia. Good results of ..  | 51   |
| 42  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | 30,           | Arrival of Indian force at Mombasa ..   | 52   |
| 43  | " ..                   | ..          | 18,           | Surrender of Giriama Chief Ngono ..   | 52   |
| 44  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | Jan. 18, 1896 | Slavery. No action should be taken on mainland with regard to until rebellion is stamped out ..   | 53   |
| 45  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | Telegraphic | 18,           | Asks report as to extent of disaffection and steps to be taken to stop it ..  | 53   |
| 46  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 19,           | Answers above. Situation would be much complicated if system of slavery were interfered with at present ..  | 53   |
| 47  | Mr. Cave ..            | Telegraphic | 21,           | Rebel attack on Frere town ..   | 54   |
| 48  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 26,           | Retreat of rebels. Difficulties of situation ..   | 54   |
| 49  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | Feb. 13,      | Rebel attack on Malindi. Urges postponement of action respecting slavery ..   | 54   |
| 50  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | 17,           | Difficulties of situation. Suppression of rebellion slow, but no cause for anxiety ..   | 55   |
| 51  | To Mr. Cave ..         | Telegraphic | 21,           | Indian regiment to be sent to Mombasa ..  | 55   |
| 52  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 26,           | Movements of rebels and Lieutenant Scott's column ..  | 55   |
| 53  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | Telegraphic | 27,           | Her Majesty's Government take serious view of situation. Increase of military force decided on ..   | 55   |
| 54  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 28,           | Situation on mainland. Answers above. Reasons for not taking too gloomy a view ..   | 56   |
| 55  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | Mar. 2,       | General Mathews agrees in considering situation troublesome rather than serious ..  | 56   |
| 56  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | Telegraphic | 4,            | Indian regiment will embark for Mombasa tomorrow ..   | 57   |
| 57  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 4,            | Good effect of recent action in Giriama ..  | 57   |
| 58  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | 15,           | Indian regiment arrived to-day ..   | 57   |
| 59  | " ..                   | ..          | Feb. 17,      | Giriama. Account of country and people ..   | 57   |
| 60  | " ..                   | ..          | 17,           | Rebel attack on Malindi and subsequent incidents ..   | 66   |
| 61  | " ..                   | ..          | 19,           | Proceedings of Captain Harrison's column. Attack on Tandia ..   | 68   |
| 62  | " ..                   | ..          | 25,           | Mr. Hardinge's visit to Kalifi and Malindi. Occupation of Roka ..   | 72   |
| 63  | " ..                   | ..          | 29,           | Major Hatch's expedition to Mwareni. Report of operations ..  | 73   |
| 64  | " ..                   | ..          | Mar. 12,      | Improved relations with natives of Giriama. Elders profess loyalty ..   | 78   |
| 65  | " ..                   | ..          | 27,           | Arrival of Indian regiment. Plan of operations. Proceedings of Lieutenant Scott and Captain Harrison ..   | 79   |
| 66  | " ..                   | Telegraphic | Apr. 22,      | Surrender of Mubarak to Germans ..  | 82   |
| 67  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | Telegraphic | 23,           | Congratulations on success of operations ..   | 83   |
| 68  | Mr. Hardinge ..        | Telegraphic | 24,           | Thanks for above message ..   | 83   |
| 69  | To Mr. Hardinge ..     | ..          | 24,           | Satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government, and appreciation of services of Mr. Hardinge, Sir L. Mathews, and officers and men engaged in operations .. | 83   |
| 70  | To Sir F. Lascelles .. | ..          | 25,           | Surrender of rebels to Germans. To thank German Government for friendly action of Major von Wissmann ..   | 83   |
| 71  | Admiralty ..           | ..          | 30,           | Proceedings of naval brigade, 4th to 24th February. Report from Lieutenant commanding Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" ..                                 | 84   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.        |    | Date.         | SUBJECT.  | Page |
|-----|--------------|----|---------------|---|------|
| 72  | Mr. Hardinge | .. | Apr. 12, 1896 | Report on origin of rebellion and measures to be taken for pacification of disturbed districts                                    | 86   |
| 73  | " "          | .. | 17,           | Mubarak and his followers have crossed into German territory. Visit of Mr. Hardinge to Major von Wissmann. Mubarak will surrender | 94   |
| 74  | " "          | .. | 22,           | Surrender of Mubarak and followers after strong language by Major von Wissmann. Arrangements as to amnesty, &c...                 | 96   |
| 75  | " "          | .. | May 2,        | Mubarak and followers sent to Dar-es-Salaam   | 100  |
| 76  | " "          | .. | 26,           | Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson on recent military operations  | 100  |
| 77  | Mr. Gosselin | .. | June 22,      | Surrender of rebels to Germans. Summary of despatch from Major von Wissmann printed in "Kolonialblatt"                            | 114  |
| 78  | Mr. Hardinge | .. | 13,           | Return of Indian regiment. Pacification of country  | 115  |

Correspondence respecting the recent Rebellion in British  
East Africa.

---

No. 1.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 11.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, February 13, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to report the death, which occurred about ten days or a fortnight ago, of Salim-bin-Hamis, Chief of Takaungu, half-way between Mombasa and Malindi. He was, like Mubarak of Gazi, between Mombasa and Wanga, a kind of semi-independent petty Prince in his own district, and imposed taxes—or what it would, perhaps, be more correct to describe as “benevolences”—upon the British-Indian traders residing there, as a condition of giving them his protection. Not long ago judgment was given against him by Mr. de Sausmarez, sitting here as Sultan’s Judge, in an action for a debt of 4,800 rupees brought by a Zanzibar Indian; but, in spite of repeated representations to Mr. Pigott, I found it impossible to get the judgment executed, as I believe Salim was resolved to resist it. Though rich in slaves, and possessing a wide influence over his dependents, he died, I am informed, a poor man, having, from extravagance and carelessness, squandered most of his real and personal property. His son Rashid has been recognized by the Wali of Malindi, with the approval of the Company, as Chief of Takaungu in his place. He is aged about 23, and is said to bear a good character, and to be well-disposed to English rule.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

---

No. 2.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received May 22.)*

(Extract.)

*Zanzibar, May 1, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learn that there is a possibility of trouble at and near Takaungu, a place situated on the coast between Mombasa and Malindi, and within the Imperial British East Africa Company’s Malindi district.

Your Lordship may remember that, in my despatch of the 13th February last, I reported the death of Salim-bin-Hamis, and the appointment by the Company of his son, Rashid-bin-Salim, as Chief of Takaungu, with the title of Wali (which Salim himself never assumed, considering it as inconsistent with the independent position claimed by him).

It appears that a cousin of the new Wali, Mubarak-bin-Rashid, declines to recognize his authority, or that of the Company, and has set up as a kind of rival Chieftain. He has seized a large stock of gunpowder, guns, and ammunition, which was stored by Salim during his lifetime, at a place called Gonjoro, inland up the River Kilifi, where he is intrenching himself behind a stockade and strengthening his position by buying additional arms from the Watoro Settlements in the neighbourhood. He is said to have 1,200 slaves prepared to fight for him, most of them having belonged to Salim-bin-Hamis, and I anticipate that, should it be found necessary to dislodge him by force, the Sultan’s troops, for the Company’s will, of course, not

undertake it—nor, under present circumstances, could they fairly be called on to do so—may meet with considerable resistance. He is supported, I understand, by Mubarak, of Gazi, the powerful Chief practically ruling the whole coast from a point not far south of Mombasa to the German frontier.

On the feast of the Lesser Bairam, or, as it is here called, the "Eid-el-Fitr," Mubarak-bin-Rashid came down with 400 armed slaves and threatened the town of Takaungu. Mr. MacDougall, the Company's Superintendent at Malindi, proceeded with a force of eighty Askaris to that place to defend it, and, on hearing that he was likely to meet with resistance, Mubarak retired to Gonjoro. But it is certain that, if he is allowed to persist in his defiant attitude, the authority of whatever Administration succeeds the present one in the Malindi district will be seriously weakened, and the entire local trade paralyzed.

I may take this opportunity of observing that one of the first difficulties which the new Administration on the mainland will have to deal with will be the position of these semi-independent Chiefs, who have practically exercised rights of sovereignty in the districts subject to their influence. Salim-bin-Hamis, for example, imposed regular taxes upon the people of Takaungu, even taking them from British Indians, and Mubarak, of Gazi, maintains a regular armed force of slaves, many of whom he lets out as mercenaries to the Company. Though it may be found prudent and expedient to utilize the feudal authority of these Chiefs for purposes of administration, it should, I think, be brought clearly home to them that the Government, and not they, are the ultimate masters in their respective districts, and that if they are allowed to exercise any power they do so under and by the Sultan's authority. But I anticipate that they may offer a good deal of opposition before they accept this position, and that we must be prepared for some possible fighting.

## No. 3.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received May 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, May 23, 1895, 11:30 A.M.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 1st instant, which is due by now in London, Mr. Pigott has informed me that there is a rumour, to which, however, he does not attach much credence, that Mubarak intends to attack Takaungu on the 4th June, and he has requested that a gun-boat may be sent to Kalifi; this will be done, but I should like to be authorized to request the Captain of the gun-boat, in the event of an attack which, in view of his presence, I regard as extremely improbable, to land men for the defence of the town, which is occupied by a considerable number of Indian traders.

## No. 4.

*The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 24, 1895.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 1st instant, and your telegram of the 23rd instant, you should consult with the Senior Naval Officer and Sir L. Mathews as to the employment of force against Mubarak if you are unable to bring him to reason by means of personal communication.

A request that the Naval Officer should be authorized, by telegraph, to act with you has been made to the Admiralty.

## No. 5.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received May 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, May 30, 1895, 12:50 P.M.*

I HAVE consulted Sir L. Mathews and the Senior Naval Officer with reference to your Lordship's telegram respecting Mubarak-bin-Rashid. Unless I receive immediate orders to the contrary from your Lordship, I propose to write a conciliatory

letter to Mubarak, inviting him to meet me at Takaungu in a fortnight's time, in order to give him an opportunity of stating his views or grievances, and informing him that, if he does so, they will receive full consideration, but that otherwise I shall consider that he has forfeited all claim to friendly treatment. The Sultan will at the same time write to him in the same sense.

I propose, if he refuses or procrastinates, to attack him at once. Sir L. Mathews thinks that the 200 men which the Senior Naval Officer can provide, will, in conjunction with the Zanzibar contingent, be sufficient. The Company could hardly object to our undertaking offensive operations, although they themselves, beyond defending Takaungu in the event of attack, would probably decline to do so.

No. 6.

*The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 30, 1895.*

YOUR action as reported in your telegram of to-day is approved.

No. 7.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tanganiko, June 19, 1895, 10:35 P.M.*

WE have destroyed Mubarak's head-quarters at Gonjoro and the surrounding villages, meeting with but trifling resistance; he and his followers fled inland. Our only loss was one sailor killed. I propose occupying Takaungu and Tanganiko, which latter place was burnt by the rebels, with a small local and Zanzibar force, in order to prevent their reassembling and making raids on the coast. There is a gun-boat stationed at Malindi for its protection.

I return to Zanzibar on the 22nd instant.

No. 8.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 21.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, June 2, 1895.*

MY telegrams of the 23rd and the 30th ultimo will have given your Lordship a general sketch of the situation created by the insubordinate attitude of Mubarak-bin-Raschid in the district of Takaungu, and of the measures which, with your permission, I propose for bringing him to reason, before he has had time to consolidate his position.

Both Sir L. Mathews and the Senior Naval Officer are of opinion that, should the use of force be necessary, the means at our disposal here are quite sufficient.

I still hope, however, that Mubarak, who has hitherto only had to deal with the Imperial British East Africa Company, and who, from experience of their conciliatory attitude towards Salim-bin-Hamis, has perhaps concluded that they would not engage in hostilities with him, but would confine themselves to a purely defensive policy, may hesitate to embark on a course of resistance both to the Sultan and Her Majesty's forces.

I have the honour to inclose translations of the letters addressed to him by myself and by His Highness respectively. These letters will be dispatched to-morrow by Her Majesty's ship "Swallow." They would have left to-day, but I am waiting for the arrival here, by the British India steamer, already overdue, of Mr. Wilson, who accompanied Her Majesty's ship "Magpie" up to Kilifi last week, and who, being well acquainted with the Takaungu district, was requested by me to report on the state of affairs there. It is possible, though I think not very likely, that the report he brings may be of a nature to suggest some modification of the course for which I have had the honour to obtain your Lordship's approval.

I propose leaving for Takaungu in about a week's time from now, after the departure of the next homeward mail.

The distance between Takaungu and Gonjoro is, I believe, about 15 miles up the Voi or Kilifi River, Mubarak's stronghold being on elevated ground about 5 miles above the junction (at a place called Tanganiko) of the two branches, which form when united its main stream.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

---

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Raschid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

NEWS has been brought to me that you are collecting and arming men at Gonjoro, and that you are talking of attacking Rashid-bin-Salim-bin-Hamis, your cousin, who has been made Ruler of Takaungu in the name of His Highness the Seyyid by the English Administrator on the coast. I am unwilling to believe that these statements are true, for to act in this way would be to resist the power established by the Seyyid; and resistance to the Seyyid would be the same as resistance to the exalted Government of England, which is in the closest friendship with His Highness, and which everywhere protects and upholds his authority. It is, however, possible that you are dissatisfied with affairs in your country or with your cousin's administration, or that you fear some danger to yourself from him. If this is so, you have only to speak openly and without fear, and if your demands are just and reasonable, and you show yourself loyal to the Government, I will discuss them with you in the most friendly manner at Takaungu. You know that it is likely that before long the present Administration of the coast will be changed, and a new Administration will be established, so if you have any requests to make concerning your tribe or your servants, or the government of your country, now is the time to make them known. For I, as the Representative of Her Majesty the Queen, and General Mathews, the Wazir of the Seyyid, your Sovereign, are coming in about fifteen days to Takaungu to inquire into affairs there, and if you will come and meet us you shall receive friendly treatment, and all you may have to say shall be listened to, and what we can grant we will grant; but if you will not come to meet the servants of the two High Governments, but despise our invitation, then we must believe that what has been said respecting you is true, and that you wish for enmity and not for friendship. But we hope that you are both too faithful and too wise for this, since you are not ignorant, and you know that those Chiefs who have given satisfaction to the two Governments, like your kinsman, Mubarak-bin-Rashid of Gazi, have been treated justly and honourably, whilst those who, like the Sultans of Witu, have been disobedient, have been destroyed. Think, therefore, well on what I have written, and follow the good advice which we have given you, and it will be well with you, as is our desire.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

---

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

*The Sultan of Zanzibar to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

June 2, 1895.

I HAVE heard that you are collecting men to fight against the Company and your cousin. Oh you! Awake yourself from sleep, and let this be known to you, that the Company and your cousin are both under our order and our flag, and whatever they do is done by our order. Your going up against them is tantamount to your going against us. I am your Sultan, and it is better for you to obey our order, since your fighting with us will amount to your fighting with the English Government, because we are under their protection, and the said Government keeps up and protects us.

And let this be known to you, that our friends, the English Consul-General on behalf of the English Government, and General Mathews on our behalf, are coming to Takaungu after ten days. If you obey our order and are willing to submit to us, and if you wish for tranquillity and peace for yourself and your tribe, we wish you to



go to Takaungu and meet them, and then you can tell them what you wish, and explain to them what is in your heart; so they can do what is good and just, so that you may live in peace. And if you go against our order, and do not go to meet them on their arrival, it will make us believe that you despise our order, and then we shall leave the matter entirely with them to deal with you in the way they wish. Do not think that you will find any place where you will be safe. You will be in danger.

No. 9.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 2)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, June 7, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 2nd instant, that Mr. Wilson, who had proceeded, as therein stated, to Kilifi on board Her Majesty's ship "Magpie," returned here on the 3rd instant. He had had an interview at Takaungu with Aziz-bin-Abdullah, Mubarak-bin-Rashid's confidential adviser, and, in response to an invitation from Mubarak himself, had paid him a visit, together with Commander Elliott, of Her Majesty's ship "Magpie," at a house belonging to him in the neighbourhood of Gonjoro, but at some little distance from the actual stronghold known by that name. Mubarak, who was attended by a guard of some 250 men, received his English visitors with every sign of friendship, and both he and Aziz disclaimed all intention on his part to disturb the peace or resist the authority of the Sultan or Company, but I understood from Mr. Wilson that they profess to feel aggrieved by a variety of incidents arising out of personal and local quarrels and rivalries, with which I need not trouble your Lordship. It is possible that this show of friendship and loyalty may have been made in order to lull our suspicions, and induce us to withdraw the gun-boat which now protects Takaungu from attack, or that Mubarak may really have been alarmed at our evident intention to interfere, and may be anxious to make peace. I have, however, thought it well for the present to appear to take the most favourable view of his attitude, and have accordingly supplemented the letter, which I wrote to him last week, by a second one, referring approvingly to the peaceful and loyal disposition evinced by him at his interview with Mr. Wilson. I have the honour to inclose a translation of this letter, which was taken to Takaungu on the 4th instant, together with my earlier one and that of His Highness the Sultan by Her Majesty's ship "Swallow."

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S. *June 8.*—Since writing this despatch I have received by the steam-ship "Juba," which arrived this morning, a letter, of which a translation is annexed, from Mubarak. A somewhat similar letter, of which I have also the honour to inclose a translation, has been received by Sir Lloyd Mathews. Both these letters are dated the 6th Zulhajjah (31st May), and were therefore written before the receipt by him of those from His Highness the Sultan and from myself.

A. H. H.

Inclosure I in No 9.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(After compliments.)

*Zanzibar, June 3, 1895.*

I HAD sent my letter dated the 7th Zulhadja on board the English man-of-war which is to go up immediately to Kilifi, taking the letter of His Highness the Sultan and mine to you before Mr. Wilson arrived here this evening, having been detained two days on the journey by an accident to his ship at Pemba. I have now seen Mr. Wilson, and was very glad to hear from him that your disposition was peaceful and loyal to the authority of government, and that you had received him in a friendly manner in your place. You may be sure that if you meet me in the same way at Takaungu you will be received by me with friendship and every wish to do you justice.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Sir L. Mathews.*

(Translation)

(After compliments.)

*Dated 6th El Haj, 1312.*

YOUR friend is quite well. I hope you to be the same.

Mr. Wilson came to us, and we saw him and discussed all our affairs, because we do not like to create any difficulty regarding the Government or our duty, but we are pleased to execute any order given to us by the Government, and we are under the authority of the Government, and you will learn more news from him.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

*Dated 6th El Haj, 1312.*

YOUR friend is quite well, and I hope you to be the same.

And what I have to inform your Honour is that Mr. Wilson came to see us, and we were very glad to see him, and now he is returning to you after having discussed all our affairs.

Let it be known to you that we are pleased to execute any order given to us by the Government. Our wish is for you to order us to do all your work, and we are under the authority of the Government, and you will learn more news from him.

No. 10.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Takaungu, July 11, 1895.*

THE transfer of the mainland was carried out by me at Lamu on the 8th and by Mr. Jenner at Kismayu on the 9th, with the same formalities as at Mombasa. The Elders of Witu met me yesterday at Lamu, and, as instructed, I appointed Omari Mahdi Sultan of Witu.

I have to-day come here with Sir L. Mathews as I heard that the rebels had attacked the town on the morning of the 8th; they entered it at night through the treachery of some of the leading townspeople and occupied a mosque, from which Captain Raikes, who was himself slightly wounded, dislodged them at daybreak. Two native officers were killed and ten men wounded, while the rebels' losses were apparently considerable. The Zanzibar troops behaved steadily and well.

I am sending to Mombasa several Elders of the town, who were arrested for complicity.

No. 11.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Takaungu, July 13, 1895.*

AS the naval forces are not available for permanent garrison or patrol duty, and as the local forces are unequal to rapidly stamping out the disturbances here, I am now recruiting a native troop of 300 men, who can subsequently be incorporated into the general forces of the new Protectorate.

No. 12.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Mombasa, July 19, 1895.

MY telegrams of the 11th and 13th.

We proceeded on the 15th instant to Sokoke, whither the rebels had retired. On our approach they fled westwards, and are reported to have taken refuge with Mubarak, Chief of Gazi. I am in friendly communication with the latter, and hope shortly to be able to secure the rebel leaders.

No. 13.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 22.)*

My Lord,

Zanzibar, June 25, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to add the following particulars to the Report sent in my telegram of the 19th instant respecting recent events in the district of Takaungu.

I arrived at Kalifi with General Sir L. Mathews and Mr. Vice-Consul Jenner on the morning of the 13th instant on board Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon," and proceeded at once to Takaungu.

After interviews with Mr. Macdougall, the Company's District Superintendent, and with the Wali, Rashid-bin-Salim, I addressed to Mubarak-bin-Rashid the letter of which I have the honour to inclose a translation. I wrote in the same sense to his younger brother Aziz, who was in command at Tanganiko, and to two Chiefs of the Watoro, or runaway slave colonies, who were said to be in alliance with Mubarak, inviting them to meet me at Takaungu. Sir L. Mathews, as representing the territorial Sovereign, addressed a similar letter to Mubarak.

On the morning of the 14th I assembled the Elders of Takaungu at a Durbar, at which the Wali, Sir L. Mathews, and Mr. Macdougall were also present. I informed them that both the Sovereign and High Protecting Governments had confirmed the choice of Rashid-bin-Salim as Wali, and I urged all loyal subjects to obey him, and put an end to the trouble and agitation now prevailing in the district. They replied that Mubarak alone was the cause of it, and, after some deliberation, proposed that a deputation should go to Gonjoro and endeavour to induce him to come down and make his submission. To this I agreed, and four Sheikhs, headed by Aziz-bin-Abdullah, who was the principal adviser of the late Chief, Salim-bin-Hamis, but who, during the present disturbance, has given loyal and wise advice, proceeded the same day to Gonjoro.

Shortly after their departure I received a letter from Mubarak full of friendly professions, but begging to be excused if he did not come to Takaungu, and asking that certain persons, including Aziz-bin-Abdullah, might be sent to arrange matters with him. Though it was clear that he was merely procrastinating, I decided to await the return of the Sheikhs before proceeding to actual hostilities.

They arrived on the afternoon of the 15th, and reported that their efforts to bring Mubarak down to Takaungu had failed; he was afraid of the force there, but would meet me, if I wished, at Kalifi. As this was an obvious excuse made in order to gain time, I resolved to wait no longer, and, after issuing the Proclamation of which a translation is inclosed herewith, arranged with the Senior Naval Officer, Captain MacGill, of Her Majesty's ship "Plœbe," to attack Gonjoro at once.

We started at dawn on the 16th from Kalifi in boats conveying 50 marines and 310 blue-jackets, 54 Nubians, and 160 Zanzibar regulars. The banks of the creek, as we ascended it, were covered with Mubarak's armed followers, but they made no hostile demonstration, and we landed within a short distance of Gonjoro without encountering the slightest resistance.

Just after our landing a messenger from Mubarak came to assure me of his master's peaceful intentions. I told him that we meant him no harm, but that he must come down and make his submission.

After giving the messenger a short delay to deliver this communication, we advanced on the village, which was, contrary to report, unfortified, and which we found completely deserted, Mubarak having fled with the bulk of his followers on the first news of the approach of the boats. We sent out messengers to reassure, and, if

possible, bring him in, and I believe that we might, perhaps, in the end have succeeded but for an untoward accident.

Shortly after our occupation, one or two of his armed retainers passed through the village. An attempt was made to stop them, and, in the struggle, a gun accidentally went off. This was interpreted as a signal for hostilities by some of his irregulars who were posted on the hillside near our camp, and they at once began firing at us. The sailors and marines replied, and in a short time an exchange of shots, more noisy than destructive, had put an end to all prospects of peaceful settlement.

The 17th was spent in burning outlying hamlets and cutting Mubarak's crops, a very necessary operation, and on the 18th we advanced on a village called Sokoko Wa Simba, in which he was reported to have sought refuge, and to have been joined by his younger and more combative brother Aziz, from Tanganiko. His followers ran away after firing a few shots at us, but a sailor belonging to Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon," who formed one of a skirmishing party, was killed by a poisoned arrow. This was our only loss. We burnt the village, and, as far as possible, destroyed the crops, returning in the afternoon to Gonjoro.

On our approach Mubarak and Aziz had fled northward into the bush, and the latter then hastened to the neighbourhood of Malindi, with a view to threatening that part of the coast.

On the 19th we proceeded in boats to Tanganiko (about 4 miles distant by road, and 8 miles by water), which we found Aziz had burnt two days before, looting the Indian and Arab traders, on the news of our occupation of Gonjoro. This being a trading centre, and superior as a military position to Gonjoro from the fact that a supply of drinking water existed close by, I recommended our holding it as an outpost, and a strong stockade was built there, behind which, in Captain MacGill's opinion, a numerically weak force could resist a very strong one. During our two days' stay there the Indian and native traders, who had dispersed after the burning of the town, began to come in again, and, reassured by the erection of the stockade, prepared to resettle and rebuild. The place is now occupied by 100 Askaris under Captain Raikes, who will be supported by a small local force under Mr. Macdougall at Takaungu, the two forces from time to time exchanging duties, as Tanganiko is said to be very feverish. On leaving it we burnt Gonjoro.

Intelligence having in the meanwhile reached me that the rebels were reassembling near Malindi, I proceeded on the 21st instant to that place, which was already protected by Her Majesty's ship "Magpie." I found that several parties of rebels had cut the telegraph line and burnt four or five coast villages, and that Aziz was at Arabuco, a small town about three hours inland from Malindi, which has long been a place of refuge for runaway slaves, debtors, and, in general, for every other kind of bad character from the coast. I convoked the chief Arabs of Malindi, and, in the presence of their Wali, and of the neighbouring Wali of Mambroi, assured them of the protection of Government to those who were loyal, and announced that the lands and slaves of those who were in arms with Mubarak would be forfeited unless they submitted within the week. I at the same time informed them that the administrative powers now vested in the Company would shortly pass to the Imperial Government, which would show itself as resolute in rewarding the obedient and faithful as in chastising those who dared to question its authority. I then dispatched Mr. Weaver, the Company's acting officer, to Jilore, 18 miles inland, to bring down, if necessary by force, the priest in charge and two Mission ladies of the Church Missionary Society's station there, who, though warned by me a week before of their danger, and advised to come to Malindi, had not yet done so, and, leaving Mr. Vice-Consul Jenner in temporary charge of the town as Civil Administrator, I returned the same night to Kaliñ, arriving on the following morning. I there settled with Captain MacGill that he should go at once with Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe" and with the Witu Soudanese to Malindi and drive out the rebels from Arabuco, and I myself proceeded with Sir L. Mathews on Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon" to Zanzibar, where the arrangements to be made in connection with the change of administration on the mainland required our immediate presence.

A telegram has since arrived here from Captain Rogers, who is in charge of the Soudanese, to say that Arabuco was to be attacked on the morning of the 24th instant, that several of the inhabitants had made overtures for peace, and that his followers were fast abandoning Mubarak, who was himself said to have fled for protection to his kinsman, Mubarak-bin-Rashid, of Gazi. The latter, as your Lordship is aware, is a powerful Chief, and his attitude during the recent disturbances has been cautious,

and, at least externally, loyal. Since yesterday the Mombasa-Malindi line has again been cut, so that we have no further news as to the proceedings of the Government forces.

The effect of the steps described above will, I trust, be to destroy once for all the independent position of the Chiefs of the Mazrui tribe in the district of Takaungu and the country to the back of it, and to bring home to its inhabitants the authority and power of the Administration. As I have had the honour to observe in previous despatches, the late Mazrui Chief, Salim-bin-Hamis, was a petty Prince, who, within his own borders, did very much as he pleased. His irregulars on one occasion threatened to shoot any soldiers or police in the Company's service who dared to come to Takaungu, and he himself levied taxes on the Indian traders as a condition of their being allowed to live in his country. This latter practice, since his son, who is the obedient servant of the Company, has succeeded him, has been publicly put a stop to by Mr. Macdougall, and it is to be hoped that the summary treatment of Mubarak, who attempted to revive Sheikh Salim's claims, and to succeed to his authority, and who, had he been allowed to gather strength, might have become a serious danger to public order and to the trade of the district, may produce a wholesome impression.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S. June 27.—Since the above despatch was written Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe" has returned here, bringing news that Arabuco was destroyed on the morning of the 24th instant, the people firing a few shots and running away. One Nubian soldier of our Witu force was killed. The rebels are said to have fled to the neighbourhood of Fuladoyo.

A. H. H.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(After compliments.)

BE it known to you that I have arrived to-day at Takaungu, with Sir Lloyd Mathews, the Wazir of your Lord the Sultan, and I now write to invite you to come here to-morrow (Friday, the 18th Zulhejjah) to meet us here after the midday prayers; we shall expect you at that hour, and we hope you will bear in mind what we have already written to you, and will not fail to come. I am sending to summon your brother Aziz and the Chiefs of the Watoro also.

Dated the 19th Zulhejjah, 1312 (13th June, 1895).

(Signed) A. H. HARDINGE,  
*Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General.*

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Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

*Proclamation.*

WHEREAS Mubarak-bin-Rashid-bin-Khamis has created trouble in the Wilayet of Takaungu, and has not appeared at Takaungu when summoned by us to answer for his proceedings, we hereby proclaim him a rebel against the authority of His Highness the Seyyid, and an outlaw. All his property of whatever kind is forfeited; any one of his slaves coming in to any one of the Walis or other authorities of the Seyyid and of the Company to ask for his freedom shall receive a freedom paper, and all persons remaining with Mubarak-bin-Rashid-bin-Khamis, or in any way assisting him, shall forfeit all their property, and shall be treated as enemies to Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of England and India and His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Dated the 21st Zulhejjah, 1312 (15th June, 1895).

(Signed) A. H. HARDINGE, *Agent and Consul-General*  
*of Her Majesty the Queen.*

LLOYD WM. MATHEWS, *Visier of His*  
*Highness the Sultan.*

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 26.)*

My Lord,

Mombasa, July 6, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch of the 25th ultimo, that Mubarak-bin-Rashid, of Takaungu, has taken refuge with his uncle, Mubarak-bin-Rashid, the Chief of Gazi. The latter, as I have had occasion to mention in previous despatches, is a kind of feudal Ruler in the district between Mombasa and the German frontier, and received from the Company a considerable subsidy.

It was believed, rightly or wrongly, in some quarters that he had encouraged Mubarak of Takaungu in his contumacious attitude, in the hope of producing disturbances, and of being invited to quell them on his own terms, which would have probably included the recovery for himself of the hereditary Chieftainship of Takaungu, and he was, I believe, a good deal disappointed that overtures of assistance, which he caused to be made to Sir Lloyd Mathews and myself on our way through Mombasa to Kalifi last month, were not accepted.

On the whole, however, his attitude has been externally loyal, and when Aziz-bin-Rashid lately burnt Tanganiko, a young son of his, named Mahommed-bin-Mubarak, who was there looking after one of his father's estates, protected and sheltered the British Indians. He himself, moreover, as soon as Mubarak of Takaungu reached Gazi, informed Mr. Pigott of the fact, and on being invited by Sir Lloyd Mathews (for whom he entertains a great personal regard, having fought and been defeated by him in the days of Seyyid Barghash) to come and meet us in the immediate neighbourhood of Mombasa, he at once obeyed the summons, arriving early yesterday at Likoni, a village close to the southern shore of Kilindini Creek.

We both thought it best that Sir Lloyd Mathews should see him first alone, and that I should only meet him on receiving an assurance that he would obey any orders I might give him.

At first he attempted to persuade Sir Lloyd to agree that Mubarak of Takaungu should remain in his custody, and that he himself should be given a free hand to stamp out the smouldering embers of the disturbances which that rebel had created, and Sir Lloyd was at one time somewhat disposed, in the interests of peace and of the revival of trade in the districts affected, to recommend my acquiescing in these suggestions.

I thought, however, that for the new Imperial Administration not to insist on the surrender of a rebel, and to allow an Arab Chief to put down for it a disturbance in its own territory, would be a confession of feebleness which would fatally damage our prestige, and that the restoration of peace and order a few weeks sooner would be too dearly purchased at such a price. I accordingly declined to meet Mubarak of Gazi unless he promised entire obedience to my directions, and it was only on his doing so that I consented to go and see him at Likoni. He endeavoured on our meeting to intercede for his nephew, and persuade me to promise him pardon, saying that afterwards, when I had got him safely down to Takaungu, I could, if I wished, arrest him; and he went on to argue that if, as I insisted on his doing, he attempted to seize him himself, the armed rebels who had followed him to Gazi would resist, and perhaps occasion serious bloodshed.

I replied that I could not forgive or make terms with a rebel, that the latter's only hope of mercy lay in unconditional submission, that to promise him pardon and then seize him when he had placed himself in my power would, in English eyes, be both weak and cowardly, that if he (Mubarak of Gazi) was not strong enough to arrest him, I would send troops to help him to do his duty, but that, in any case, I must insist on his being immediately given up to me.

He promised, with a certain amount of reluctance, compliance with my demands, and Sir Lloyd Mathews believes that he will carry out his promise; if he does not within a reasonable time we must, I think, treat him like his rebellious nephew. This will no doubt occasion a certain temporary injury to the prosperity of our coast districts, but if that prosperity is to rest on a sound basis the absolute supremacy of Government must be established beyond a doubt, and the tribal Chiefs taught to respect and implicitly obey it. Whilst, therefore, I should regret the need for any further recourse to force, and while I believe and hope that the Chief of Gazi will be wise enough to do nothing which could provoke it, I am strongly of opinion that, if necessary in order to vindicate our authority, we should not hesitate at once to employ it.

The neighbourhood of Malindi is still disturbed by small marauding parties, chiefly of armed runaway slaves who, under pretext of being partizans of Mubarak of Takaungu, from time to time attack unarmed travellers, loot villages, and cut the telegraph line. It will be some little time before the men patrolling the district from Takaungu and Tanganiko respectively can stamp out these marauders, whose operations are, so to speak, dacoity rather than guerilla warfare, but if news that Mubarak himself has been surrendered and punished should spread, it will doubtless have a salutary effect.

I may mention that the Chiefs of Makongeni, one of the principal inland Watoro settlements, to which I had written from Malindi, came into that town on the 2nd instant, and, after assuring Mr. Weaver, the District Officer, of their loyalty, asked permission, which I directed should be given to them, to proceed with their grain-planting in peace.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 15.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1895.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 25th ultimo, giving an account of the recent expedition against Mubarak, and to inform you that your proceedings, as therein reported, are approved.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 16.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, July 26, 1895.*

IT appears that the Chief of Gazi, after, probably, considerable hesitation and double dealing, has thrown in his lot with the Takaungu rebels. As we were on our way to his town he sent us a message to the effect that they had escaped, and then, on our approach, he himself fled with all his people. It is said that he has joined the rebels at Mveli, a stronghold situated 16 miles inland, and, unlike other places which have been attacked, strongly stockaded, and it is probable that a final stand will be made there. The Admiral does not consider himself justified in undertaking further operations inland without special orders from the Admiralty, and our native forces are not as yet adequate, though I trust that they may be so, next year, to attack Mveli without incurring a serious risk. Any delay in destroying this stronghold, however, will strengthen the rebels' position, impair our prestige on the mainland, and expose the whole of the coast between Mombasa and the German frontier to hostile raids; I see no alternative, therefore, except assistance from the navy of a very limited character, keeping the numbers as small as possible in view of the difficulties of transport; Sir L. Mathews, who has himself captured the place in the past, is of opinion that 200 men from Her Majesty's ships, together with our present native force, will be sufficient, and I would urge this course being sanctioned by the Admiralty.

I propose to give the Chief of Gazi two weeks in which to surrender the rebels, as I think it is just possible that he may still yield.

No. 17.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, July 26, 1895.*

THE Chief of Gazi's soldiers have sacked Wanga, our frontier town on the coast, though it is doubtful whether it was done by the Chief's direct orders. Admiral

Rawson, after a full examination of the situation, is telegraphing home to recommend energetic action. The joint rebel forces are estimated by Sir L. Mathews at about 1,500 armed men.

We have left seventy Soudanese to hold Gazi, together with a man-of-war, and the defence of Wasin has been provided for.

## No. 18.

*The Commander-in-chief, Cape of Good Hope Station, to Admiralty.—(Communicated July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Mombasa, July 26, 1895.

MR. HARDINGE has received a promise from the Gazi Chiefs that the rebel Chiefs Mubarak and Aziz shall be detained there until we arrive.

On the 22nd instant I left Mombasa, taking with me 309 men from Her Majesty's ships "St. George" and "Phoebe" under the command of Captain Egerton and 85 Soudanese troops under Captain Rogers. Mr. Hardinge and Sir L. Mathews accompanied me. I marched to Gazi and made arrangements for the "Blonde," "Barrosa," and "Phoebe" to anchor there at the same time as the landing party arrived behind the town, so that it might be surrounded and the Chiefs seized.

On the 24th instant, when we were still 9 miles distant from Gazi, it was reported by spies that the town had been abandoned. The same afternoon I marched into the place and occupied it. It was reported that the three Chiefs had retired to a place called Mwele, a stronghold belonging to them situated about 18 miles inland.

The landing party embarked to-day. Arrangements have been made by Mr. Hardinge for Gazi to be occupied by the Soudanese troops. Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe" will for the present remain there and send a landing party to support the Soudanese. Full particulars with proposals for future action have been telegraphed by Mr. Hardinge to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I concur in the view taken by the former that Mwele ought to be captured and the forces of Mbaruk broken up. My forces are quite sufficient to effect this, but I am of opinion that an Indian regiment should be immediately dispatched here for the purpose of holding the towns on the coast which it is possible may otherwise be assaulted and burnt by the enemy. I have now landed parties to protect four out of the number—the "Swallow" is at Malindi, the "Blonde" at Wasin, the "Phoebe" at Gazi, and the "Raccoon" at Kalifi, with men at Takaunga. The system at present in vogue for the Naval Brigade to make short marches into the interior and then return is ineffective as the enemy take refuge in the bush where it is impossible to get at them. I submit that it would be wiser and more expeditious and at the same time cost less to dispatch a couple of Indian regiments which might garrison the towns when captured and one Soudanese regiment who would do the marching and carry out the fighting in the bush. A force of this kind would settle the whole country in two or three months, whereas the plan which has been so far pursued would take a year, and even then peace would not be insured.

I have just learnt that Vanga was burnt by Mbaruk on the 24th instant, two native policemen being killed and one wounded. Wasin is now threatened by him. Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa" will stop at Mombasa. I am returning to Zanzibar with Mr. Hardinge and Sir Lloyd Mathews, where I propose to fill up with coal, await instructions, and, if approved, prepare expedition.

## No. 19.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Zanzibar, August 7, 1895, 2:40 P.M.

MY telegram of the 26th ultimo.

It now seems probable that the Chief of Gazi will not surrender, and that, if driven from Mwele, he will retire to Teita with the object of plundering caravans proceeding into the interior. I hope, with the assistance of Her Majesty's ships and of the Zanzibar Government, to be able to protect the road, and also the coast, and a small local force from Mombasa is being sent to Ndi, but the strain on our resources is great, and I would urge that the Sikhs for the Juba district may be sent as quickly as possible; they would be extremely useful, if diverted here provisionally until the



authority of the Government is recognized throughout the coast, and not merely, as in the Company's time, in a few ports.

Captain Hatch, who is due to leave England on the 10th instant, could possibly recommend an English officer to assist him; the latter should follow as soon as his preparations are made.

## No. 20.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, August 11, 1895.*

THE Sultan has had no connection with the disturbances on the coast; His Highness' dynasty and the rebel Chiefs are enemies of old standing.

## No. 21.

*Mr. Cave to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, August 19, 1895.*

THE following telegram has been received from Mr. Hardinge for transmission to your Lordship:—

Mweli was stormed and taken on Saturday the 17th instant, after two hours' fighting, the rebel Chiefs escaping into the adjacent bush; Zahran, the Commander of their troops was killed, and it is reported that Eyoub, the elder son of the Chief of Gazi, was also killed. Our losses were trifling.

We return via Gazi, where all is quiet.

## No. 22.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, July 18, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches addressed to myself by the Acting Administrator at Mombasa, and by Captain Raikes to Sir Lloyd Mathews, respecting the attack made by the rebels on Takaungu during the night of the 7th and early hours of the 8th instant. These reports will give your Lordship full particulars as to what occurred, and I trust that the successful stand made by Captain Raikes and Mr. MacDougall, the civil officer in charge of the district, under circumstances of considerable difficulty, will meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

Captain Raikes' wound is fortunately not a serious one, and he was able notwithstanding it to lead the attack on the mosque with an energy and spirit which gave the greatest confidence and encouragement to his men; but the two native officers killed were both capable soldiers, whose places it will not be easy to fill. As I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my above-mentioned telegram, the Zanzibar troops showed a steadiness and discipline which reflects much credit on their instructors, and justifies the hope that, in spite of the pessimistic views of some of their critics, they may, with experience and training, and under the leadership of officers whom they trust, develop genuine military qualities. They are at present full of enthusiasm, and burning for a chance of avenging the death of their two officers.

There appears to be little doubt that the leading inhabitants of Takaungu were acting in connivance with the rebels. The latter, after our destruction of Gonjoro and Arabuco, our occupation of Tanganiko, and the flight of Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Gazi, appear to have reassembled at Sokoki Kwa Simbu, a few miles to the east-north-east of Gonjoro (from which they had been temporarily driven by us), under the leadership of Aziz-bin-Rashid, the younger brother of Mubarak. This Aziz is said to be a bolder and more determined character than Mubarak; he was at first in command at Tanganiko, which he burnt, after evacuating it when we occupied Gonjoro, and I am informed that he had made a vow that no razor should touch his head till he could have it, after sacking Takaungu, in the principal mosque of the town.

He went, I believe, with his brother, who was suffering at the time of his flight

there, from a bad leg, to Gazi, but afterwards returned to the bush behind Gonjoro, and was joined there by the fugitives from Arabuco. With their aid he re-formed his force, and, in collusion with the leading malcontents of Takaungu, effected an entry at about midnight on the 7th into the town. He himself however remained on its outskirts, where he conferred with some of the conspirators, and prevented any news of what was passing from reaching the Wali or the garrison, while the Arabuco contingent, led by certain disaffected Muscat Arabs, who have for a long time given trouble at Malindi, took up a strong position in the mosque.

The rebel loss in killed and wounded is estimated at from thirty to fifty, but I am inclined myself to put it somewhat higher, as from news brought us by the Wanyika the rebels left many dead, whom they could not carry away, behind them, all along their line of retreat through the bush, and we know that they were burdened with so many wounded that they had to release all the prisoners whom they had captured before their presence was known to the garrison.

In addition to the four Sheikhs imprisoned by Mr. MacDougall for complicity with the rebels, I arrested and sent to Mombasa on my arrival at Takaungu two others whose conduct had been very suspicious, and who, when examined by me, were unable to give a clear or satisfactory account of their proceedings on the night of the attack. The most important prisoner, Aziz-bin-Abdullah, who was a relative and the Chief Minister and Confidential Adviser to the late Sheikh Salim, appears to have throughout played a double game, and, whilst professing the warmest loyalty and friendship to Government, to have secretly sent his slaves to join the rebel force.

As soon as the Witu Soudanese with some fifty or sixty native Witu irregulars had arrived under Captain Rogers at Takaungu from Lamu, we moved on the morning of Sunday, the 14th, on Sokoki, whither we heard that the rebels had retreated. Captain Underwood, of Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon," was in command of the force, which consisted, in addition to the native troops mentioned above, of his own ship's company and that of Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe," Captain MacGill, the Senior Naval Officer, being in hospital with fever at Zanzibar. Proceeding from the northern shore of the Kalifi creek we camped on the evening of the 14th at Tezo, about 10 miles north-west of Kalifi and about 5 miles across thick bush from Sokoki. The village, which had been burnt on one of his patrols by Captain Raikes, was deserted, but some rebel scouts in its immediate vicinity fired, as soon as it was dark, a few shots into our camp, to which our Maxim gun replied, thus warning Aziz-bin-Rashid in his retreat 4 miles off of the presence of an European force. Next morning we moved on to Sokoki, through a very dense forest, our path being impeded by trunks of trees which the rebels had thrown across it to block our advance, and which considerably delayed its progress. On reaching the end of the forest, close to Sokoki, we found that an encampment of grass huts which the rebels had occupied there was already abandoned by them, and we learnt from stray natives that on hearing the sound of our Maxim the previous evening, Aziz-bin-Rashid had evacuated the place with all his followers, and was making with all possible speed for Gazi. This news was confirmed at Tanganiko, which we reached next day, and I accordingly resolved to return at once to Mombasa and obtain from Mubarak of Gazi, either by persuasion or force, the surrender of the two fugitive rebel leaders. I at the same time instructed Mr. Pigott to occupy Rabai with a small force of Mombasa Askaris, in order to watch Aziz's movements on his way south-west and prevent him from returning to the Malindi district, which his retreat has now cleared of the rebels, thus relieving Malindi from all danger of a sudden attack. This result is so far satisfactory that whereas before we had a long line of coast to defend against raids, with two large towns at either end, and a "Hinterland" full of troublesome elements at its back, we ought now to be able to concentrate our whole force upon the small Wanga district, where the rebels are not really at home, and where it should for many reasons with which I need not trouble your Lordship be much easier to deal with the disturbance.

Mubarak of Gazi has now written to say that he finds it difficult to bring his nephew, with the force at his back, a prisoner to Mombasa, but that he is secretly detaching his principal followers from him, and that if Sir Lloyd Mathews and I will ourselves go to Gazi he will assist us in securing him there. I have accordingly decided, after consulting Admiral Rawson, who arrived here to-day, to proceed to Gazi in a few days' time, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be completed, taking with us an adequate English and native force as a protection against possible treachery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

*Mr. Pigott to Mr. A. Hardinge.*Sir, *Mombasa, July 9, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Mr. MacDougall informed me yesterday that the town of Takaungu was attacked at about 4.30 that morning, Monday. The enemy set fire to some houses, and, under cover of the darkness and smoke, occupied a mosque, from which they were with some difficulty dislodged at about 6.30. They then went into the bush. The enemy are said to have numbered from 300 to 400 men.

I much regret to say that two native officers, and an Indian trader named Esajii, were killed, and Captain Raikes slightly, and seven Askaris more or less severely wounded.

The number of casualties among the enemy is not known.

I reported the matter to Captain Underwood, of Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon," and he proceeded to Takaungu, leaving at 1 o'clock.

The matter was also reported to the Senior Naval Officer, who is, I regret to say, in the hospital at Zanzibar, and at the same time informed him that I thought it desirable that a man-of-war should be stationed at Mombasa for the present.

Mr. MacDougall has arrested Aziz-bin-Abdullah, Rashid-bin-Mahamed Kathi, Hamis Jembi, and Ali-bin-Abdullah, who are suspected of being in complicity with the enemy.

Things continue quiet in Mombasa and the neighbourhood.

Her Majesty's ship "Magpie" is expected here this evening or to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. W. PIGOTT,  
*Acting Administrator.*

## Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

*Captain Raikes to General Sir L. Mathews.*Sir, *Takaungu, July 12, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the morning of the 8th July, at about 4.30 A.M., Takaungu was attacked by the rebels.

It is a large straggling and thickly-built native town, situated on a creek, and was garrisoned by myself and 8 native officers and 130 rank and file. At the time of attack I had three guards forming a horse-shoe shape on the creek, but the greatest part of the town was outside the line.

It appears that at about 11 or 12 on the night of the 7th the inhabitants moved out of the town, seeming to know that there was to be an attack, but, all being in league with the rebels, never informed me or Mr. MacDougall, the District Superintendent, of it.

At 4.30 A.M. the firing commenced at a distance of about 100 yards from the centre guard-house, where the rebels had occupied a mosque; the firing was then general and continuous along the whole front, but especially directed on the centre guard-house. I ordered all the troops to line the front in order to stop the rebel advance, and wherever flashes came from to fire, not being able to advance myself, as it was too dark to distinguish anything. I kept this position until about 5.45 A.M., when it was daylight, and then sent to order a general charge through the town, the left flank to move first to fire a volley into the mosque, after which the centre charged and took it, and then a general advance through the town.

The rebels then retreated as quick as they could into the bush, where a little firing took place. I then posted the troops in a cordon round the whole outskirts of the town until the evening, when they were withdrawn to occupy positions more extended, but near the old ones, as during the day forty Belooches, forty Mombasa soldiers, and Maxim gun, and a guard from Her Majesty's ship "Raccoon" had arrived.

It was not believed that the rebels would attack here, and if the inhabitants of the town had informed us of their coming, we could have perhaps prevented their

reaching the town. A good many huts on the outskirts of the town were burnt during the fighting.

It is estimated that between 300 to 400 rebels attacked. Our loss was two native officers and one private killed, and six privates wounded and myself. The enemy's loss is estimated from different reports from thirty to forty.

Mr. MacDougall did great service in looking after the left flank and attending to the wounded. I also wish to report that troops fell in immediately without any panic, and behaved in a splendid manner, being under a very heavy and well-directed fire for over an hour.

The rebels of course knew every inch of the town, so we were at a great disadvantage in the dark.

During the day four leading Arabs were arrested for supposed connivance with the rebels.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. E. RAIKES, Captain,  
Officer Commanding His Highness' Forces.

No. 23.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, July 31, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 18th instant, and with reference to my telegrams of the 26th instant, that I left Mombasa with Sir Lloyd Mathews on the 22nd instant for Gazi, in response to the invitation which had been addressed to us (as stated in that despatch) by the Chief of Gazi, Mubarak-bin-Rashid. A naval force consisting of 309 men, from Her Majesty's ships "St. George" and "Phoebe" under the command of Admiral Rawson, who, on my explaining the situation to him, readily agreed to afford us his assistance, together with 70 Soudanese, went with us, and orders were left by the Admiral that Her Majesty's ships "Blonde," "Barrosa," and "Phoebe" should appear off Gazi on the morning of the 25th, on which day we expected to enter the town. I had already, on the 18th and 19th, addressed letters to Mubarak of Gazi, copies of which I have the honour to inclose herewith, informing him of our intended arrival, and explaining that the force which would come with us was meant not to threaten, but to assist him. He replied on the 20th instant to the first of these letters agreeing to my coming with a force, and promising to hand the rebels over on our appearance. A translation of his reply is also inclosed herewith.

Leaving Likoni, on the south shore of the Kilindini Creek, on the afternoon of Monday, the 22nd, we camped that evening in the bush, about 8 miles south of Likoni, and on the following evening, at a place called Diani, situated in fertile country on the banks of a small stream, about 17 miles from our starting-point, and rather more than half-way to Gazi. As we approached Diani we noticed armed scouts, doubtless sent to bring the news of our movements to Mubarak of Gazi, moving about at a short distance from our advanced guard, and shortly after we had halted a messenger from the Wali of Mombasa (who had started that very morning from Mombasa) arrived with two letters from Mubarak himself, translations of which I have the honour to inclose herewith. Both these letters were written on the 22nd July, and had been sent from Gazi to Mombasa by a different path to that taken by ourselves, in the apparent belief that they would catch us before our departure. The first, as your Lordship will observe, suggests that we should come to Gazi in a ship. This suggestion seems at first sight a reasonable one, and I do not, without further proof, wish to imply that Mubarak was not sincere in making it. I am inclined to think, however, that if our object was the apprehension of the rebels, it was wiser to proceed by land than by sea. The anchorage at Gazi is very bad, ships have to lie a long way out, and a force from one of them advancing on the town would have to march for nearly an hour to get round the thick mangrove swamps which separate it from the beach. If, therefore, we had arrived by sea, our ships would have been seen by the rebels at least an hour or so, probably two or three hours, before any force from them, however rapidly disembarked, could have reached Gazi, and they would have had plenty of time either to fly or fight their way out of the town. Arriving by land, however, and acting in real harmony with the Chief, our presence need not have been suspected by

them till we were close enough to Gazi to surround it, for Mubarak would only have had to post scouts on all the roads from Mombasa to Gazi to stop any messengers except those actually employed by himself from reaching the latter town. The second letter shows, however, that he had not done so, for it states that, on hearing that we were coming with a force from Mombasa, the rebels at once withdrew, he does not explain whither, from Gazi.

On receipt of these letters we sent a messenger ahead early next morning to inform Mubarak of Gazi that, agreeably to his request, our force should not enter the town, but some hours before we could reach it, while we were still on our way, the messenger returned, and reported that on arriving at Gazi he had found the place deserted, the Chief and the whole of the inhabitants having fled. We pressed on, however, and after a tedious march of 9 or 10 miles over a waterless country, covered with high and thick grass, reached Gazi early in the afternoon. It appeared that Mubarak, on hearing from his outposts of our presence at Diani, had left in the utmost haste before dawn, for the lamps were still burning in his house when we entered it. A few natives who came in next day reported that he was believed to have joined the rebel leaders at Mweli, the stronghold 16 miles or so to the north-west of Gazi, to which I referred in my telegram of the 26th instant. This stronghold is situated on the summit of a high and wooded hill, and is said to be surrounded by a stout stockade and pits with stakes in them, thinly covered with light earth and grass. It is occupied by Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, the Chief of Gazi's eldest son, and in the Company's time was not allowed to be visited by any European or other Government officer, a prohibition in which the new Imperial Administration could of course not, with any regard for its own dignity or authority, acquiesce. In Seyyid Barghash's reign, when Mubarak rebelled against that Prince, it was taken after an eighteen days' siege, in which they lost many men and suffered several repulses, by the Zanzibar troops under Sir L. Mathews, and dismantled; but after Mubarak had been pardoned by the Sultan's Government he rebuilt it, and during the pacific rule of the Company no questions were ever raised on the subject.

We decided to remain forty-eight hours in Gazi, in the hope of receiving some message from Mubarak, and as none arrived embarked at noon on the 27th instant with the greater part of our force on Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa," arriving the same afternoon at Mombasa. I had in the meantime arranged with the Admiral, as it appeared now to be probable that the Chief of Gazi would throw in his lot with the rebels, that Her Majesty's ship "Blonde," which arrived on the morning of the 26th with the "Phoebe" and "Barrosa" off Gazi, should proceed to Wasin and bring off the wife and daughter of Mr. D. Wilson, the English officer in charge of the district. I at the same time instructed Mr. Wilson to build a strong "boma" round the Government House at Shimoni on the mainland opposite Wasin, and to hold it with a force which I sent him of twenty Beluchi Askaris, supported by a picket of men from the "Blonde," and a gun kindly supplied by the Admiral's permission. The "Blonde" returned to Gazi on the morning of the 27th with Mrs. and Miss Wilson on board, and reported that on the previous day the town of Vanga had been looted and burnt by the soldiers of Mubarak of Gazi, a small body of whom have since the Company's time always occupied it. It is by no means clear that Mubarak was himself responsible for this outrage; a dispute some few days before between his men and those of the Company about some goats stolen by one of the latter had created a slight disturbance, which Mr. Wilson succeeded for the time in settling, and I am inclined to think that the animosities which this dispute had engendered were still burning when the news of our occupation of Gazi and of Mubarak's flight arrived at Vanga, and that his soldiers, supposing war to have actually broken out between their Chief and the Europeans, at once attacked the handful of men in our pay. Several of the latter were killed and one severely wounded, but beyond the wrecking of their houses little damage seems to have been done to the inhabitants of Vanga, the greater part of whom, indeed, on the first rumour of trouble, had, I hear, crossed the frontier into German territory.

Before leaving Gazi I appointed Captain Rogers, who had accompanied us in charge of the Soudanese, to be Governor, till further orders, of the town, and instructed him to hold Mubarak's house, a strong stone building, easily defensible, with his men. The Admiral had ordered a Maxim to be placed on the roof, from which the surrounding country can be commanded, and a landing party of forty men from Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe," which remains off Gazi, to assist the Soudanese in holding it. This force should be amply sufficient to protect it against any attack.

On returning to Mombasa I directed Mr. Pigott to proceed with a small force of

local Askaris to Rabai, and, in concert with the Giriama Chiefs, who in that part of the country are well affected to Government, to watch the roads and passes leading from the south, and, if possible, prevent any of the rebel forces from recrossing into the now pacified Malindi and Takaungu districts. I had already, before proceeding to Gazi, myself visited Rabai with Admiral Rawson, and obtained from some of the neighbouring Giriama Chiefs, who came to meet me there, a promise of co-operation. I do not know how far these natives can be relied upon; Sir L. Mathews is of opinion that as a fighting force they are not of much value, but they may give us useful information as to the movements of the rebels, and under European leadership may even perhaps repel them. We saw some hundreds of them at Rabai dancing war-dances, and brandishing the bows and arrows which constitute their only weapons.

These preliminary steps taken, I wrote to Mubarak of Gazi, and dispatched to Mveli the letter of which I have the honour to inclose the English version herewith. Sir L. Mathews wrote in the same sense, and Admiral Rawson, since his return to Zanzibar, has sent him on his own account, after discussing the question with me, a somewhat similar warning. Should these last efforts to bring about a peaceful surrender of the rebel leaders fail, we shall advance on the 12th proximo upon Mveli, where in this case it may be taken for almost certain that the rebels will resist behind their boma, and oblige Her Majesty's forces to assault and destroy it.

It is difficult at present to form an accurate estimate of the real intentions and motives of Mubarak of Gazi. His interests would certainly prompt him to avoid a rupture with the Government. The fire of youth has, by most accounts, died out in him with advancing years; he is wise enough to know that he has nothing to gain and everything to lose by rebelling against us, and that the continuance of the subsidy of 1,900 rupees a-month, which was formerly paid to him by the Company, and of which he is very tenacious, depends on his obedience, and he has probably no desire to exchange, in his old age, his comfortable residence at Gazi, and the dignity and prestige of a petty Prince for thirty miles along the coast, for the life of a hunted animal, or, at best, of a Chief of outlaws, in the bush. On the other hand, there is, in my mind, little doubt that he has intrigued actively in support of his nephews, Aziz and Mubarak, at Takaungu, not anticipating, perhaps, when he first began to meddle in the affairs of that branch of his house, that he would have to reckon with the opposition of any more powerful factor than the Company. The circumstance that both the rebel leaders, when we first took Gonjoro, fled for refuge to Gazi, and that Aziz, after visiting his uncle there, returned to Sokoki and attacked Takaungu, and then again, when dislodged by us, went back to Gazi, seems to point, at any rate, to a conviction on their part that, however much he might dissemble his real feelings to ourselves, Mubarak of Gazi was really with them against us. Having given them so much real or apparent encouragement, it would no doubt have been a painful humiliation to him, the oldest and most powerful Chief of the whole Masrui tribe, to surrender them, or assist in bringing about their arrest, and there was perhaps also the fear present to his mind that, if they were arrested, they might make revelations as to his own share in the troubles of Takaungu, which would seriously embarrass him with our authorities. He is, moreover, surrounded by young men of his own tribe and family, who, no doubt, sympathize strongly with Aziz and Mubarak against Rashid-bin-Salim, and whose influence would be all on the side of resistance to our demands.

If these conjectures are, as I believe, well founded, it is only natural that he should, once he found he had to deal with the Government and not the Company, have tried to escape from the dilemma by temporizing, and putting forward first one proposal, or one excuse, and then another, on the chance that the development of events might help him to escape from it. Our action made the continuance of this policy impossible, and forced him to commit himself to one side or the other; but, in withdrawing, as he did, from Gazi to Mveli on our approach, I suspect him to have acted rather under the sudden impulse of fear than in accordance with any deliberate or preconceived plan.

Oriental mental processes and modes of reasoning are so different from our own that I should not venture to forecast what his next step will be, but though it is no doubt extremely inconvenient to have to attack Mveli with the small native force at present at our disposal, and to have to rely on the assistance of men from Her Majesty's ships, who are at once unsuited to the marches incidental to such warfare, and too valuable to be sacrificed in it, I shall not be sorry if, now that the Admiralty has sanctioned the use of force against him, the Chief of Gazi's power should be broken.

A conflict with him was inevitable, sooner or later, if our authority on the mainland was to be more than a name; and we may as well get it over at the outset.

I have the honour to inclose herewith an itinerary of the route from Mombasa to Gazi, which, as it is comparatively little known, may prove a useful addition to the information in your Lordship's Department as to this part of the coast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

July 18, 1895.

BE it known to you that I have arrived at Mombasa to-day with the Wazir of the Seyyid, your Lord, from Takaungu, and have learnt from Mr. Pigott the contents of your message to me, namely, that you wish us to come ourselves to Gazi and arrest the rebel Mubarak-bin-Rashid, and I shall willingly and gladly do so, only I look to you to keep the said rebel, and also the rebel Aziz-bin-Rashid, who is probably by now with you, in safety in your town till we can arrive, lest, if they should hear that we are coming, they should flee into the bush.

Also, I request you to send people as guides, and to let us know by them at what hour it would be most convenient that we should enter the town, and in what way you propose to proceed, and whether we should seize them secretly and suddenly; or openly. I propose to bring a force with me, but to halt it outside the town, and also that there should be a ship at Gazi soon after our arrival to convey the rebels back when they have been captured. This is not to threaten you or your people, but merely to make sure that the rebels shall not be able to resist or to run away; but as regards all these matters, we will be greatly guided by what you tell us, and we rely with confidence on your loyalty and friendship. We shall probably be at Gazi about Wednesday or Thursday next.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Mombasa, July 19, 1895.

I HAVE received your letter and understood its contents, and I thank you for the assurances which it contains of your readiness to serve the Government. We propose starting from here after to-morrow, thus giving you time to receive this reply, and shall probably reach Kawkabani\* on Wednesday, or, at latest, Thursday; but we think it would be best that you should send us secretly one of your confidential people to meet us either at Tiwi, or at some other place on the road which you may think best, so that he may explain fully to us how you wish us to act, and in what manner you propose that we shall seize the two rebels. I hope soon to see you in good health, and to thank you in person for your assistance.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

July 20, 1895.

YOUR letter has reached me. I learn that you have arrived at Mombasa in peace; I am very glad to hear it; our promise is the same as the one we made at Mombasa. I wrote to Mr. Pigott to inform you by a telegram that I am undoubtedly the servant of Government, and what I ask from you\* was according to custom. Formerly I was constantly engaged in war, which you, perhaps, have heard, and now I think it is not good to send an Arab to accompany you; it is better that you should come yourself with all your soldiers, and here I am myself, and it is quite sufficient, and on your appearance I will at once surrender them to you (the rebels); but if you say I must send you an Arab, it rests with you, and let me know, and the Arab will come. Also, I wish to know the day and hour at which you will come. I do not wish any one to know about this, but you shall be pleased, and I receive honour from the Government.

(Signed) MUBARAK-BIN-RASHID-BIN-SALEM.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Sir L. Mathews.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

July 22, 1895.

YOUR letter reached me on the 7th day of Moharam, and I send you this my reply to yourself and to Baloze.† What I have to say is this: it is very difficult for me to send Mubarak and Aziz to Mombasa. Whatever stratagem I make they will come to know, but my stratagem is this: I wish that you may come at once at Kawkabani‡ by a ship. I will ensnare and hand them over to you, and you will let me know the day and hour you will come. Inshallah§ it will result favourably to the Government, and I shall receive honour from the Government. But I do not want any person to know about this, and remember all that you promised me at Mtangayiko and Zanzibar,|| which has been fulfilled, and you know me well, that what I say is nothing but truth. Do not listen to malicious people, but believe me as you know me. I desire whatever will please the Government. Give my salaams to the Baloze and to Mr. Pigott. I do not want Mohamed-bin-Khalfan.¶ It is quite sufficient if you come yourself, and if you like me to send you a man to accompany you I will do it, but I do not see any good from your coming with a man of mine, as in case they (the rebels) come to know it they will be cautious, but it rests with you how to do it.

(Signed) MUBARAK-BIN-RASHID-BIN-SALEM.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Sir L. Mathews and Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

July 22, 1895.

AFTER I had written my letter news reached us that you were coming with 500 Askaris and 110 porters, so my relations became afraid to stay, and all left the town. I only remain. If you come for peace do not come with those people. Let them return and you can come, so we can do according to our promise. This is what I have to say.

(Signed) MUBARAK-BIN-RASHID-BIN-SALEM.

\* A subsidy.

† Consul-General.

‡ i.e., Gazi.

§ i.e., if God will.

|| This refers to former relations between Sir L. Mathews and himself, in Seyyid Barghash's time.

¶ A local Arab, whom we had proposed to send him as a private agent.



Inclosure 6 in No. 23.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

July 27, 1895.

YOUR letter announcing the escape of the rebels Mubarak-bin-Rashid and Aziz-bin-Rashid from your town, and asking us not to bring troops there, met us at Diani, and we immediately sent an answer saying that the troops would remain at a short distance from Gazi, but the messengers whom we sent with this letter returned to us next morning, a little beyond Ukunda, to say that both you and all your people had fled, and we afterwards heard that you had followed the aforesaid rebels to Mveli, and were there with them. Afterwards we heard that some of your soldiers had looted in Vanga, and killed several people there.

You must admit that this behaviour on your part is very extraordinary. You write that you are a servant of the Government. You asked at Likoni for powder, and I gave it to you. You asked for money, and I promised that you should receive it. You then invited me to come and seize the rebels at Gazi, as you were not strong enough to do so yourself, and promised to help. I wrote to you that I would come, and would bring a force of soldiers with me, and that a ship would also come, and at first you made no objection to this. And indeed, you could not expect that I should come alone without a guard into your town, when you told me that the rebels there had more men than yourself. How could I have arrested them unless I had brought a force to help me? I told you also that nothing was intended against you or your people, and you ought to have believed me, for if I had wanted to hurt Gazi, I had only to come in a ship of war, and appear suddenly before the town, before you could know that we had left Mombasa, and in half-an-hour, with the shells from a British man-of-war, your houses would have been a heap of ruins, for ships go twice and three times quicker than the fastest runner. But I told you beforehand all my plans, believing that you meant to keep your word, and I think that had you really wished to serve the Government, you could have prevented the rebels from hearing of them. You had only to send out spies on all the roads to prevent anybody bringing news to them, and keep them with you by friendly words till the soldiers were ready to seize them. You have not performed your promise, and I know not what to think. However, I do not wish to condemn you without certain proof, or without hearing what you have to say, so as I am going to Zanzibar to present the English Admiral to the Sultan, your Lord, I give you a fortnight from to-day to think for yourself whether you will be the friend or the enemy of the Government. If you choose the path of obedience you will publicly declare yourself the enemy of the rebels, and surrender them to me, or assist me to seize them either here or at Gazi or at Mveli; I care not where, I will come to whichever place is best. Otherwise, failing satisfactory explanations, I can only conclude that you are false to your word, and an associate and friend of the above-mentioned rebels, and enemies to the Sultan and to my high Government, and you know what that means.

I am sending you back a copy of the sacred Koran, which we found in your house at Kawkabani,\* and which I took charge of lest it should, in ignorance, be misused by the Christian soldiers. I have given orders to the Commander of the Troops, whom I have left as Governor of Gazi, not to let the soldiers do anything to your property or destroy anything so long as there is any doubt about your disloyalty.

(Signed)

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 23.

## ITINERARY.—Mombasa (Kilindini), to Gazi.

|                  |   | Miles from Likoni (rough estimate). |
|------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| Likoni .. ..     | South shore of Kilindini Creek.   |                                     |
| Cheteni .. ..    | Small native market, coconuts. High grass, studded with areca palms for the next 7 miles or so to Mehama .. ..  | 4                                   |
| Mehama .. ..     | Small stream, with fair water. Soon after leaving Mehama the country becomes fertile and cultivated, hamlets and coconut plantations abound, and at Tiwi, a large and scattered village about 3 miles on, there is a shallow pond or small lake and good camping ground .. ..                                   | 11½                                 |
| Tiwi .. ..       | Collection of hamlets .. ..   | 15                                  |
| Diani .. ..      | Scattered huts in fertile country, watered by small stream, which here is tidal; the population, both here and at Tiwi, are Mahomedan Wadigo; one or two Mombasa Arabs also own land .. ..  | 17½                                 |
| Ukunda .. ..     | Coconut plantations, one of them belonging to Mubarak of Gazi, whose influence is paramount from this point southwards. At Ukunda the fertile country traversed from a little beyond Mehama ceases, and for the next 8 or 9 miles a plain covered with high grass and without water extends to Kidogoveni .. .. | 19½                                 |
| Kidogoveni .. .. | Here a small stream, rising in the Shimba range, runs through a mangrove swamp into the sea about a mile off. A mile beyond Kidogoveni is situated Gazi .. ..   | 23½                                 |
| Gazi .. ..       | Two villages separated from the sea-beach by thick mangroves: the smaller of them is Gazi proper; the larger, neatly and regularly built, with a stone mosque and Mubarak's stone house in the centre, is known as Koukabani .. ..  | 29½                                 |

(Signed)

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Zanzibar, July 31, 1895.

## No. 24.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 29, 1895.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 18th ultimo, giving an account of the attack on Takaungu by the rebels on the night of the 7th July, and I have to express my satisfaction at the report of the conduct of Captain Raikes and Mr. MacDougall on the occasion in question.

The action taken by you to suppress the disturbances, reported in the above-mentioned despatch, is approved.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 25.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 13.).*

(Extract.)

Zanzibar, August 26, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch of the 31st ultimo, and to my telegram of the 19th instant, that I proceeded on the flag-ship to Mombasa on the 9th instant, the 10th being the day on which Admiral Rawson and myself had invited Sheikh Mubarak of Gazi to meet us at Likoni, and decide whether he would surrender or assist us in seizing the Takaungu rebel leaders at Mveli.

On arriving at Mombasa on the morning of the 10th, we found letters from Sheikh Mubarak, in which, whilst asserting his loyalty and asking permission to telegraph to England, he explained that he could not come to Likoni so long as the Government troops were in Gazi, and added that if we advanced upon Mveli he himself would retreat to Teita.

I at the same time received a despatch from Mr. Wilson, the district officer at Wasin, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose, and from which it would appear that the burning of Vanga was really ordered by Mubarak the moment our forces entered Gazi.

Admiral Rawson and I thereupon wrote letters to Sheikh Mubarak (a translation of mine is inclosed herewith), informing him of our intention to come to Mveli, and on the afternoon of the 12th instant the force under the Admiral's command set out from Mtungwe, on the south side of the Kilindini Creek. It consisted of 220 blue-jackets from Her Majesty's ships "St. George," "Phœbe," "Raccoon," and "Barrosa," of 84 marines, 60 Soudanese, and 50 Zanzibaris, forming two divisions under the respective commands of Captain Egerton (Her Majesty's ship "St. George") and Captain MacGill (Her Majesty's ship "Phœbe"), besides some 700 porters for the transport of provisions, water, and ammunition, &c., and conveyed gunpowder, four Maxims, and a supply of war rockets.

Meanwhile, Her Majesty's ships "Phœbe" and "Barrosa" remained at Mombasa to reassure the population, some of whom feared a possible attack by the rebels on the town, and Captain Raikes proceeded on the "Juba" with 100 Zanzibaris to Gazi (over which, by permission of the Admiral, I had placed Captain Festing, of Her Majesty's ship "Blonde," as Governor), with orders to march out to a short distance on the Mveli road, so as to distract the attention of the rebels by leading them to expect an attack from Gazi. Captain Marx, of Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa," was at the same time directed to form a camp near Vuga, 12 miles from Mombasa, or a little more than half way to Mveli, as a support to the main body of the force.

On the morning of the 15th we reached Vivwezi, a few miles south of Vuga, and halted there for the day, this being the spot at which Admiral Rawson had decided that Captain Marx should form his camp. During the two previous days we had marched through a fertile country, inhabited chiefly by Wadigo and Wanyika, and fairly well supplied with water. On our road a letter met me from Sheikh Mubarak, informing me that his kinsman, Mubarak of Takaungu, had left Mveli and returned to his own district. This afterwards proved to be a falsehood. I, however, on the chance that the news might be true, directed Mr. Pigott to proceed to Rabai and stop, if possible, the roads leading northwards over the Rabai hills.

Early on the 16th we left Vivwezi, and began the ascent of the Shimba range, when, just as we were passing under a hill called Ndolo, which here forms its summit, we were suddenly fired on from above by a party of the rebels, 200 in number, who had been lying in ambush for us since the previous day, and whom we afterwards ascertained to have been commanded by Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, the Chief of Gazi's eldest son, and by Aziz-bin-Rashid of Takaungu. They were speedily dislodged from their position by the Soudanese, supported by a company of Her Majesty's ship "Phœbe" and a Maxim, but one Soudanese and a porter were killed, and Sir L. Mathews and a sailor of the "Phœbe" slightly wounded.

Once driven from their vantage ground, they fled in confusion, leaving two wounded prisoners, one of whom died on the road a few hours later; but the most important result of this incident was that it left no doubts in our minds as to Sheikh Mubarak's real sentiments and intentions, and the Admiral accordingly decided to camp that evening on the hill Besua, from which Mveli is plainly visible, some 2 or 3 miles off to the west, and to attack the place without further parley next day.

Descending from Besua on the morning of the 17th, and proceeding by a circuitous route through the valley which lies between it and Mveli, we ascended the slopes of the latter hill from the north-west, and halted at mid-day for luncheon at a point near its summit, situated about 1,500 yards from the main northern stockade defending the town, or rather village of Mveli, but concealed from view by a slight intervening elevation. Leaving the carriers here, we advanced over the brow of the hill to within 1,300 yards of the northern stockade, which is surrounded on all sides by thick forest, and the Admiral then opened fire upon it with the 7-pounder and with rockets, but without eliciting any reply from the enemy.

The Soudanese then moved off to the left to attack the stockade in flank, supported by the men of Her Majesty's ship "St. George," whilst the marines, the Zanzibaris, and the men of Her Majesty's ship "Phœbe," with one of the Maxims, after advancing a few hundred yards further towards it, extended in skirmishing order, charged through the forest, and joining the Soudanese and men of the "St. George," took the stockade on the left flank. The enemy only began to open fire when our force was within close range, killing one Zanzibari Askari and severely wounding a

marine, but their resistance was of short duration; as soon as the stockade had been taken they broke up and fled, though their leader, Zahrán-bin-Rashid, the Commander of Sheikh Mubarak's troops, remained at his post at the main northern stockade to the last, and was shot through the head by a Soudanese as they rushed in. The southern or Gazi gate of Mveli was quickly captured, and at about 3 p.m., or about two hours from the time at which we began the attack, the place was in our hands. The rebel Chiefs escaped through the dense forest which surrounds the village of Mveli on all sides, leaving only an avenue through it from the north to the south gate, with an open space about half-way between for the houses. Aziz and Mubarak of Takaungu were the first, we afterwards heard, to leave, and the latter lay concealed in the forest, scarcely a mile away, till nightfall; but Sheikh Mubarak himself, who had been down to the stockades and narrowly escaped being struck by a rocket, which severely wounded one of his officers, only fled when he heard that our men were actually within the "boma." We found in his house and powder magazine about 2,000 pounds of powder, besides a considerable amount of bullets, cartridges, and slugs, all of which were either buried or blown up.

The next three days were spent in destroying the stockades, or "bomas" around the village, which proved to be forty-eight in number. Most of them had been recently erected, the strongest defences being on the Gazi road, from which Mubarak evidently anticipated that we should advance, and which, in addition to his stockades, he had obstructed with logs of wood thrown across it. The three main stockades, one on the north and the two others on the south of the town, were about 12 feet, the others about 6 feet high; all were provided with trenches and internal earthworks, and loopholed for rifles, and in several of them supplies of food for about six days were discovered, which seems to indicate that Mubarak expected to be able to hold out for some time, and perhaps oblige us, for want of water or provisions, to fall back upon the coast before we had either stormed or starved him out. Besides destroying the stockades, Admiral Rawson caused the forest to be cleared away, so as to leave a broad path open to view and attack from the northern gate into the town, or rather up to its ruins, for on the day that we left it all the houses in it were razed to the ground.

At about 5 o'clock in the evening, two hours or so after our entrance into Mveli, Sheikh Mubarak, so one of our prisoners informed us, sent a letter from his hiding-place in the bush to ask for peace; but the slave to whom it was given was either killed or else he was afraid to come near us, for the letter was never delivered. On hearing, however, of its dispatch, I wrote in courteous terms to Mubarak, explaining that it had never reached me, and expressing my willingness to listen to any communication which he might have to make. Owing to the uncertainty as to his whereabouts, and the fact that all the natives of the villages around had fled on hearing the firing, my letter, a translation of which is inclosed, could not be sent from Mveli; but I dispatched it from Mombasa by a slave of Mubarak's whom we had taken prisoner, and who was confident of being able to discover his master's hiding-place. Many rumours as to the rebel Chiefs' movements reached us, but it would have been useless to attempt to pursue them with an European force, and we accordingly returned to Mombasa on the 23rd instant, leaving Mveli on the 21st, and embarking, partly on the 22nd and partly on the 23rd, at Gazi, where all was quiet, and where the natives were gradually but surely beginning to come in.

It is too early at present to forecast the effect which the capture in two hours of Sheikh Mubarak's famous stronghold will have upon his power and prestige. Up to now he has been undoubtedly regarded by the natives of the coast district as one of the greatest of Chiefs, and as, in a sense, able to combat the Government on equal terms. I was struck with the remark which one native made in our presence to another who had complained to us that our force had destroyed his crops. "Do you," he said, "complain of injury suffered by yourself? Alas, my friend, when two elephants meet in conflict, what becomes of the grass beneath their feet?" The fact, moreover, that Mubarak was always visibly present among them, whilst the "Government" was an impersonal conception associated with a few white men in the coast ports, gave him a hold over the native imagination far greater and more terrible than ours; but it is scarcely conceivable that this hold should not be somewhat shaken when he becomes a mere fugitive and exile, dependent for food on the savage tribes whom in former times he raided and enslaved. Unless he has, which is doubtful, a secret store of powder somewhere in the hills and forests behind Mveli, his ammunition, and with it his power of attack, must be almost exhausted, whilst the fact that the crops are now harvested, and that in Duruma, Teita, and other districts on which he would fall back, and in which fear would prevent the natives from resisting him, there is a scarcity

almost amounting to a famine, will make it very difficult for him to feed his followers, who will, once reassured as to their reception by ourselves, in all likelihood begin to abandon him and steal back, first one by one, and then as confidence grows, in greater numbers, to their homes in the towns along the coast. This was what happened in Witu, and I see no reason why it should not be repeated here. At any rate, I have done my best to encourage the process by the issue and circulation of the Proclamation of which a translation is inclosed herewith, and which now that we have unmistakably shown our strength at Mveli, cannot be deemed by the natives to be a sign of weakness. I have sent instructions to Gazi and Takaungu that any person availing himself of the amnesty therein announced is, on giving up his arms, to be well received by the authorities and invited to reoccupy his dwelling, and to go and bring back any of his relatives and friends who may be hesitating or lingering in the bush. There is bound to be a certain amount of timidity at first, but once the movement really begins it will, I hope, be steady.

Mr. MacDougall, the energetic District Officer at Takaungu, reports that the people in that neighbourhood are slowly coming in, and that the townsfolk, now satisfied that we are the stronger party, are co-operating loyally with the authorities. He himself went out a few nights ago with eighty Askaris to some villages in the Tezo forest, north-west of Kilifi, where some rebels were reported to be hiding, and captured several barrels of powder, besides rifles, bows and arrows, and a considerable amount of Snider and Martini ammunition. These night attacks and surprises which Mr. MacDougall is constantly and successfully organizing cannot fail greatly to harass and demoralize the remains of the rebel forces still lingering in the district of Takaungu.

In the meanwhile, the chief danger to be guarded against is that Sheikh Mubarak's followers, or banditti and other bad characters taking advantage of these troubles to pose as his followers, may raid caravans on the road from Mombasa to Uganda, or at any rate on the section of it between the sea-coast and Ndi. I have accordingly arranged that, until order has been completely restored, up country caravans shall only go monthly with an escort as far as Ndi of forty to fifty Askaris, for whom I am sending to Lamu, and that where the caravan is taking arms up to inland stations the escort shall be under the command of an European Government officer.

Greatly indebted as is the Government of the Protectorate to Admiral Rawson, and to the officers who served under him, for the assistance so successfully rendered to it at a critical moment, it would not be becoming in me to pass any observations on the services respectively rendered by them. The Admiral will himself report them in the proper manner. But I may, I hope, be permitted to call attention to those of two officers of my own administration, Captain Rogers, who commanded the Soudanese force, and Mr. Tritton, who supervised the porters as assistant to Commander Stokes Rees, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "St. George," in charge of the transport. The Soudanese were invariably to the front, both throughout the expedition, and in the less eventful ones in the Takaungu district which preceded it, and, under the leadership of Captain Rogers, they acquitted themselves in a manner which evoked the warmest appreciation from the naval officers who here saw them for the first time.

Mr. Tritton had the management of a cumbrous caravan of nearly 700 porters and carriers, and performed the tedious and difficult task assigned to him of keeping them in line, and maintaining order and discipline among them in a highly creditable and efficient manner.

Our best thanks are also due to Sir L. W. Mathews, whose experience and intimate acquaintance with the country guided the force safely to Mveli, and who successfully managed the entire Commissariat department as well as the recruiting of the porters required for it.

Though the recent disturbances only very indirectly affected the Sultan's Government, Sir Lloyd has, during the last three months, sacrificed his work at Zanzibar, and accompanied us throughout the four distinct military expeditions which they have entailed, and has shown the greatest readiness to place his unequalled local knowledge, as well as the forces and subordinate officers of His Highness' Administration, at my disposal as Her Majesty's Representative.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

[P] 14 *Suphur*, 1313 (*August 6, 1895*).

I HAVE your letter in which you ask me to come to Likoui on Friday. Thanks very much. I cannot come, because at Kaukabani\* there is war. If you want me, have the Askaris from Kaukabani removed till I meet you. If you want them there afterwards send them. I do not want "fitenas" or war against the Government at all. I want peace myself and all my people, and my son Mubarak. If anything happens I am responsible. If you persist in fighting I am not able to stand against the Government, but I will go to Teita. If you do not want to give me peace I want permission to send a telegram to England and to wait for the reply. I will abide by any reply I receive. This is what I want from you. I want peace from the Government, and this is not a great thing for them to do, and to give me the time for a reply from England. Ala! halla! alla! halla: I want peace. I do not want war with the Government. I am not able at all to fight. I have never done this when I was in the Company's service, and now also I cannot do it. I want to be myself just like before. Do not you drive me up to make trouble with the Government. Alla! halla! alla! halla! This is what I want from you. The rest is for you. I will obey the order.

Give my salaams to General Mathews, the Admiral, and Mr. Pigott.

I want your answer whether you agree to this.

(Signed)

MUBARAK-BIN-RASHID,

*Chief of Gazi.*

## Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Shimoni, July 27, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that twenty-four Arabs and Baluchi Askaris arrived here by the steam-ship "Juba" on the afternoon of the 26th instant. The following morning I took sixteen of them off to Wanga. Captain Festing, of Her Majesty's ship "Blonde," kindly took our boat in tow, and rendered every assistance possible.

On arriving at Wanga we found that half the place was burnt entirely, scarcely any people were about, but after a short time a few came in from the shambas. It appears that on the 24th some of Sheikh Mubarak's Askaris came into Wanga. One of the Arabs, by name Hamid Mahomed, suspected that something was wrong, and he advised the Banians and Hindis to look after their property; this they did, locked up their doors, and all left for Moa. At about 4 P.M. four other Askaris came in from Gazi with a letter from Mubarak to the Akeda Ali-bin-Abdulla, saying, "Gazi occupied by Europeans, we leave for Mveli, kill the European, loot all the Indians, burn the town, and bring all the Arabs with you to Mveli."

The Akeda called the Arabs together and wished them to go to Mveli, they pretended to agree, but all managed to escape to the woods, &c. The Akeda Ali-bin-Abdulla, Backeth, the Head of Mubarak's Askaris, and another man, Mgoma, seized three of our Askaris, took away their rifles and ammunition, and then locked them up in the guard-room, after this the door of the house of the Customs Master, which was locked up, was broken down, a lot of stuff robbed, and the rest, such as rice, &c., was piled up in a heap, saturated with kerosine oil, and then set on fire, the same was done to the house of the Indian merchant, Alimjee Bhoodabhai, of Wassein. Both these houses were built of stone and were very strong indeed, and there is not the slightest doubt that Mubarak had given orders to burn down entirely the Indian houses, a strong wind was blowing at the time, and this accounts for the entire west part of the town being burnt entirely. After the houses had been set on fire, the Akeda and the others went to the guard room, took out our three Askaris and deliberately hacked them about, two men must have died almost immediately, but the

\* His part of Gazi.

third, who was left for dead, managed to crawl away to a hut where he was found next morning by one of our Askaris who had managed to escape to Jaseni during the night, the Askari brought with him to Wanga two German officials, two Nubian soldiers, and the Arab Hamid Mahomed, the latter managed to secure a small canoe and sent off the wounded man to Shimoni. Whilst at Wanga Yauna, one of the Vadeko Chiefs, came in, and he has promised to do all he can to have the weekly market at Wanga started again. He seems to be inclined to work with us, more especially as Mubarak wanted to seize by force Juma, another Vadeko Chief, and take him to Mweli; the Vadeko objected to this, and Mubarak's soldiers were obliged to leave him alone.

The two Askaris who were killed on the 24th, and left outside of the door of the guard-room, were duly buried in our presence.

All the Indians are at Moa except one Banian named Dossajee, who is missing. I am making inquiries about this man. Confidence will be established again as soon as the people see what we are doing, and I am trying to get all the Indians back. My idea is to visit Wanga regularly every two or three days; a small steam-launch would be of great assistance, as it is absolutely necessary that Alliance Fumsi, Mmoja, &c., should be looked after, as I fancy a lot of smuggling goes on, but these details I can enter into when you arrive here.

Information of the burning of Wanga reached me at 9 A.M. on the 25th. I started off at once to see for myself, but when more than half-way I met the Askari together with the wounded man, and as I saw that the latter required immediate attention I returned to Shimoni. Shortly after Her Majesty's ship "Blonde" arrived, and I went on board and asked Captain Festing to be kind enough to allow Staff-Surgeon Norman to come ashore. The wounded man was in a fearful state, and would have died, but Dr. Norman has been most kind in his attention, and there is every possibility now of the man's recovery.

In conclusion, I respectfully beg to say that there is, I hope, no fear of any attack just now, and I cannot thank Captain Festing and his officers enough for the very kind way in which they have acted, and the hard work they have undertaken in looking after the defence of this station, having pickets, night and day, and taking every necessary precaution.

At Wanga some trained soldiers are really necessary, and I do not like to give an opinion on the Arab Kiroboto, or Askaris as they are now called, but you will see for yourself.

I may mention that these men have come up without any food. They only told me this after I left for Wanga, and I had to try and arrange for something from Moa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. WILSON.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

*Mombasa, August 10, 1895 (Seffer 18, 1313).*

I HAVE received your two letters of the 7th and 14th Seffer, in the first of which you tell me I have broken my promise and that you have kept yours, and in the second of which you say that you cannot come to Likoni, but ask for peace and permission to telegraph to the High Government.

As regards the first, I never gave a promise that I would not bring troops to Gazi. I wrote to you that I would bring troops, but that they should remain outside the town, and not do anything against you and your people. I have letters written from you in which you agree to my coming with Askaris. Your proposal that I should come in a ship was only made after we had already started from Mombasa, on the day on which I said we should start, and the letter containing it met us at Diani. If you wanted us to come in a ship why did you not say so before? I asked you repeatedly how you wished us to act about seizing the rebels, and you sent no reply except to say, "Inshallah" \* we should seize them. I do not wish to argue with you, or to make many words, but I cannot allow you to accuse me of bad faith when I have been straight and open with you from the beginning, whilst you have made first one excuse and then another excuse for avoiding your duty and promise.

\* If God will.

Next, if you wish to telegraph to England, and will send a messenger with your telegram, and with money to pay for it, Mr. Pigott will have it translated into English and forwarded. Write in it whatever you wish, it shall be sent; but I do not think it will change matters, for we have told the High Government all that has happened, and are acting under its orders.

Thirdly, as to your not coming to Likori, be it as you please. I only asked you to come there because you said you wished to meet me; but really there is no need of any further shauri.\* I wrote to you last giving you fourteen days in which to show that you were the man of the Government, and to put into my hands the rebels Aziz and Mubarak; the fourteen days will be over on Monday, and if the rebels are not by then with me, I can only suppose one of two things, either you are the friend of the said rebels and therefore the enemy of the Seyyid your Lord, and of the English Government; or you are too weak to arrest them, and in that case we must put over Gazi a Sheikh who is able to govern. If you had an Akida† over any town, and if thieves or criminals or watoro‡ ran away from you to him, and you wrote and told him to seize them for you, and he answered that he could not, you would not continue to keep him and give him pay. So, if you are too weak to do the work of the Government, or to arrest and send for punishment criminals who run away to your town, it is no use for the Government to give you a subsidy.

Lastly, in reply to your request for peace, I grant it you. I have no quarrel with you, but only with the rebels Aziz and Mubarak-bin-Rashid, who I am willing to believe have forced you against your will, being stronger than you are, to receive and help them. If you wish to go to Taita, and you make it clear that you have nothing to do with the said rebels, you are free to go there or anywhere else, but if you take the rebels with you, you must be prepared to be hunted from place to place with them; for though there is peace for you so long as you do not actually rebel, there is none for the rebels; but the Government will pursue them without ceasing, and, if necessary, will bring more men from India and England until they are caught, and every day that they delay their submission will only increase their punishment.

I shall be at Mwele in a few days' time. I shall bring troops, but only against the rebels Aziz and Mubarak, not against you, therefore have no fear.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 25.

*Mubarak-bin-Rashid to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

20 Seffer, 1313 (August 12, 1895).

I HAVE your letter, and I understand it. You say you are coming for peace. This is true. I told you before to come with Sir Lloyd Mathews to Kaukabani, in order that I may give up Mubarak. You did not follow the promise. You came with many Askaris, I then ran away. Now if you come for Mubarak, he is not here. He has gone back to his place, wishing me good-bye. I was not able to stop him, because he is stronger than I am. This is all the news of Mubarak. If you want me come with few Askaris, about ten or twenty, and if you have anything to say speak to me.

(Signed) MUBARAK-BIN-RASHID.

Inclosure 5 in No. 25.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to Mubarak-bin-Rashid.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Mwele, August 18, 1895 (Seffer 26, 1313).

SALEH-BIN-MOHAMED informs me that you sent a letter yesterday at 5 in the evening, after we had entered Mwele, to General Mathews by a slave named Musa. The letter has not reached us, nor have we seen Musa. If, however, you wish to make any communication to me, I shall be willing to listen to what you may have to say, only it is better that you should write to me direct, for though General Mathews

\* *i.e.*, discussion.

† *i.e.*, officer.

‡ *i.e.*, runaway slaves.



is your friend of many years and has always spoken in your favour, it is I who am the Representative of the Government. We came here with peaceful intentions as far as you and your people were concerned, and the troops which we brought were to be used only against the rebels, but on the way your son Eyoub and his followers fired on us, and we knew then that you had chosen enmity rather than friendship, and accordingly we took Mveli by storm. Your women, or some of them, are with us; they will be sent to the care of their relation, Mohamed-bin-Aziz, the Secretary of the Wali of Mombasa. We buried Zahran honourably yesterday, as was due to a brave man, and the prayers of Islam were recited over his body. His tomb is outside the gate of the boma which he died defending. Abdallah-bin-Mohamed is very ill, his leg is cut to pieces, but the doctor is doing his best for him.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 25.

*Proclamation.*

(Translation.)

WHEREAS Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Rashid having granted protection in his town of Mveli to Mubarak-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis and Aziz-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis, after they had been proclaimed rebels and outlaws by the Government, it became necessary to destroy Mveli, it is now announced that there is peace for all who followed Sheikh Mubarak from Gazi or Kawkaban, as well as for all who followed the aforesaid rebels from Takaungu, and who now desire to return to their homes at Gazi or Kawkaban and Takaungu, and they are hereby invited to separate from the enemies of the Government and to settle peacefully in their homes, and we will provide houses at Gazi for the people of Mveli who desire peace, their own town having been destroyed. There is leave to settle at Gazi, Kawkaban, and Takaungu, but for the present nowhere else.

Let this be understood.

(Signed), A. H. HARDINGE.  
LLOYD WM. MATHEWS.

*Mveli, 28 Seffer, 1313 (August 20, 1895).*

Inclosure 7 in No. 25.

ROUGH Estimate of the Principal Stages on the Road from Mombasa to Mveli  
via Shimba.

|  | Remarks.   | Miles. |
|--|--|--------|
| Mtongwe (south side of Kilindini Creek.) |  |        |
| Kitigi .. ..                             | Coconut plantations .. ..  | 5      |
| Ziwani .. ..                             | Ditto .. ..  | 6      |
| Bombo .. ..                              | Long grass from Ziwani to Matuga. At Bombo there are coconuts and a Wadigo village   | 7½     |
| Matuga .. ..                             | Small stream, from beyond which there is a slight rise. The Shimba range is conspicuous to the west  | 9      |
| Kigetu .. ..                             | .. ..  | 11     |
| Vuga .. ..                               | Wadigo village, surrounded by a boma. Coconuts   | 14     |
| Mwachera .. ..                           | Wadigo village. Small stream .. ..   | 15     |
| Vivwezi .. ..                            | Stream with abundant water. From here the road ascends the Shimba range  | 17     |
| Ndolo .. ..                              | Summit of Shimba hills. The road traverses a high tableland, bare of trees, but covered with long grass. Near Besua the country becomes wooded, and south of Besua hill there is a deep valley, on the opposite side of which lies Mveli | 18     |
| Besua .. ..                              | .. ..  | 25     |
| Mveli .. ..                              | .. ..  | 27½    |

No. 26.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury — (Received September 23.)*

(Extract.)

Zanzibar, August 26, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a Memorandum which I have prepared respecting the past history and present position of the Mazruis, accompanied by a Genealogical Table illustrating it, and a list of the Mazrui Princes and Chiefs who reigned at Mombasa, Gazi, and Takaungu. This Memorandum, in which I have endeavoured to trace the history of their two ruling houses down to the recent conflict at Takaungu, has been compiled by me in the main from data supplied by Mazrui informants, and, though I cannot vouch for their accuracy in every point, I believe it to be substantially correct. It has occurred to me that it might be useful to your Lordship's Office as a brief summary, for purposes of reference, of a question respecting which little has, so far as I can ascertain, been written, but which is, nevertheless, one of some interest to the new Protectorate.

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 Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

*Memorandum by Mr. A. Hardinge respecting the Mazrui Chiefs, their History, &c., up to the recent Disturbances at Takaungu.*

THE Mazruis, or, to use the correct Arabic plural, Mazarin, originally came from Muscat when the present Zanzibar dominions were wrested from the Portuguese by the Muscat Arabs under the Imam Seif-bin-Sultan-el-Yorabi at the end of the seventeenth century.

They all claim descent from a Muscat Arab named Abdullah, of the Ghafiri clan in the Oman, whose two sons, Othman and Zaher, were the respective founders of the Gazi, or elder, and Takaungu, or younger branch, between whom the Chieftainship was divided in the present century. The first Mazrui of any importance was Mahomed-bin-Othman, the grandson of Abdullah, who was Wali or Viceroy of Mombasa for the Imam of Muscat in 1730, and who in that capacity ruled the old coast from Malindi in the north to Pangani (in German East Africa) to the south, as well as the Island of Pemba, Zanzibar, which was not then, comparatively speaking, of any importance, being administered by one of the Imam's Akidas. The tie which connected Mombasa with the distant Court of Muscat was very weak; the supremacy of the Imam, as its name implied, was mainly spiritual; preoccupied by their troubles with Persia, which, under Nadir Shah, ended in the overthrow of their power, the Yorabi Princes could give little attention to their remote African dependencies, and Mahomed-bin-Othman had accordingly no difficulty in throwing off his allegiance to his Sovereign, and transforming himself from a Viceroy into an independent Sultan. His brothers, sons, and nephews succeeded him, according to the Mahomedan rule of hereditary descent, and exercised unquestioned sovereignty at Mombasa, although Seyyid Ahmed-bin-Said, the second Prince, and real founder of the Albusaidi dynasty (which, having shaken off the Persian yoke, had succeeded the Yorabis on the Throne of Oman, but which, being of the Hinawi clan, the Mazruis refused to recognize), once compelled from them, in 1785, a temporary recognition of his over-lordship. It was not, however, till after the accession, in 1806, of Seyyid Saïd-bin-Sultan, the fourth Albusaidi Imam, that the Court of Muscat conceived the design of actually reannexing its old African possessions. Taking advantage of an appeal on the part of the people of Patta for assistance, Seyyid Saïd first expelled from Patta and Pemba (in 1822) the then ruling Mazrui Chief, Abdullah-bin-Hamid (who on his accession, in 1814, had scorned to send the usual gifts to Muscat, dispatching merely, as an insolent hint, a mail shirt and a small quantity of powder), and then threatened at Mombasa itself his successor, Suleiman-bin-Ali. The latter, an aged and feeble Prince, who had been chosen in order to avert a civil conflict between two kinsmen with better hereditary claims than himself, now invoked (1823) the protection of Great Britain, and it was granted him, subject to the approval of the British Government, by Captain Vidal, of Her Majesty's ship "Barracouta," who was at that time cruising on the East African Coast, Lieutenant Reitz, R.N., being left with him as British Resident, to assist in the

government of Mombasa, with a right to retain half its revenue. The British Government, however, refused to ratify this arrangement, and withdrew its protection from Mombasa. Salim-bin-Ahmed, who had deposed Suleiman-bin-Ali in 1826, accordingly submitted to Seyyid Saïd, and agreed to surrender the fort on condition of being allowed to remain as hereditary Governor of the town, and to retain one-half of the Mombasa revenue. The peace thus concluded was, however, only a truce. Successive Mazrui insurrections against the rule of the Muscat Arabs were followed in each case by a temporary reconquest, till, in 1837, Seyyid Saïd took Mombasa for the third and last time, placed a Governor of his own over the fort, supported by a strong Muscat garrison, and sent the reigning Mazrui, Rashid-bin-Salim, whom he had persuaded to remain in the town by the most solemn oaths that his personal freedom would be respected, and had then treacherously arrested, to perish, with some twenty of his principal adherents, in the dungeons of Bunder Abbas. Three years later he himself moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, and thus secured his hold on the opposite coast.

The effect of the final capture of Mombasa was to break up the unity of the Mazrui State, which, deprived of its capital and centre, split into two divisions, the one to the south-west, and the other to the north-east of Mombasa. In the southern district Abdullah-bin-Hamis, the first cousin, and, by Sheria, rightful heir of Rashid-bin-Salim, was permitted by Seyyid Saïd to govern as a petty Chief at Gazi, whilst the Mazrui Arabs to the north of Mombasa formed a separate centre at Takaungu under the rule of Hamis-bin-Rashid, the head of the younger or Zaherite branch of the race.

It was now that Mubarak-bin-Rashid, the present Chief of Gazi, first began to appear upon the scene. The son of Rashid-bin-Salim (the last independent Ruler of Mombasa, who had died as related above in the dungeons of Seyyid Saïd), he had grown up at Gazi under the care of Abdullah-bin-Hamis, the eldest male, and therefore Chief of the branch of Othman, and of his own elder brother, Mahomed-bin-Rashid. No sooner, however, had he reached man's estate than he formed the design of wresting Takaungu from the Zaherites, and accordingly, raising a force of his own, but supported by Abdullah, he attacked and expelled its Ruler, Rashid-bin-Hamis, who had just succeeded his father, Hamis-bin-Rashid. The latter was supported by Seyyid Saïd, and the two between them drove Mubarak back to Gazi. They permitted him, however, to reside there unmolested, and on Abdullah's death he was recognized by Seyyid Majid, who had succeeded Seyyid Saïd on the Throne of Zanzibar, as Sheikh or Chief of the district around Gazi, and was granted, as had been the case with his predecessor before him, an annual subsidy from Zanzibar, in return for which he was supposed to administer his little vassal State, and furnish soldiers, if requisite, to the Sultan. He was not, however, quiet for long. Seyyid Majid having attempted to restrain his too high-handed exercise of his authority, he broke out into rebellion, and it became necessary to stop his subsidy and send a force from Mombasa to attack him. Majid, however, dying shortly afterwards, his brother and successor, Barghash, made peace with Mubarak, and restored his subsidy, until a few years later, on account of some domestic dispute (one story being that the Sultan had imprisoned one of his relations, and another that the people of Wanga had refused to send him a wife), he suddenly rebelled for the third time, and at the head of a strong force burnt and plundered Wanga. Again his pay was stopped, and an army, this time under General Mathews, sent against him from Zanzibar. Mathews drove him first from Gazi, and then after a three weeks' siege from his hill stronghold of Mveli; and though, during his temporary absence at Zanzibar, Mubarak recovered sufficient strength to sack Mombasa and other coast towns, Mathews eventually compelled him, on his return to the coast, to come to terms, and make his submission at Zanzibar to Seyyid Barghash. He was then permitted to return to Gazi, but received no pay until Barghash was succeeded by Seyyid Khalifa, who, as a gracious act on his accession, both restored Mubarak's subsidy and released several of his relations and followers who had been taken prisoners during the last rebellion. The Imperial British East Africa Company, on taking over the mainland Concession from Seyyid Khalifa in the following year, continued the subsidy, Mubarak in return supplying them with mercenaries from the ranks of his fighting slaves. Notwithstanding, perhaps in consequence of this arrangement, their relations with him were never entirely satisfactory. He despised their weakness, as he considered it, and though professing, for the sake of the subsidy, to be their servant, habitually disregarded their orders, and allowed their Resident at Wanga, of which one of his sons was Governor, no real power. It should, however, be said in his favour that he actively assisted them on two occasions, once to establish

their authority in the face of an incipient rebellion at Mombasa, and once to suppress a somewhat serious disturbance in Teita, and that promises of increased wealth and power were made to him, when they first took charge, by their agents, the non-fulfilment of which he regarded as a bitter grievance.

Meanwhile, the younger or Zaherite branch of the Mazruis were ruling somewhat more quietly over Takaungu and the adjacent district. Rashid-bin-Hamis, the Chief against whom Mubarak of Gazi had waged his first war, was succeeded by his younger brother, Salim, who, though once arrested and imprisoned for six months by Seyyid Barghash, was, on the whole, a good deal more loyal than his kinsman of Gazi to Zanzibar. Salim-bin-Hamis received no regular pay from the Sultan, but he paid an annual visit to Zanzibar till after the accession of Seyyid Khalifa, and was given on every such occasion a present in money, which practically amounted to a subsidy, and enabled him to keep up his state and dignity as Chief, and to maintain a certain force of fighting slaves. His last visit was paid on the accession of Khalifa; after that he always sent as his Representative his eldest nephew and heir-apparent, Mubarak-bin-Rashid, who received and took back the Sultan's gifts. He never would accept a salary from the Company or recognize their right to interfere in the affairs of Takaungu, nor did they seriously attempt to do so till his death in February last. They then sent there Mr. MacDougall, their District Officer at Malindi. He was at first badly received both by the Sheikhs and people, but his resolute attitude soon overcame the opposition which was simmering on his arrival, and enabled him to assert his authority.

His first duty was to see to the appointment of a successor to Sheikh Salim. Mubarak-bin-Rashid, the legal heir according to Moslem law, and his younger brother, Aziz, were both believed to be turbulent and ill-disposed towards Europeans, and the Company therefore resolved to pass them over, and to appoint Rashid-bin-Salim, the late Chief's eldest son, who was known to be of a docile disposition, and so friendly to the English that he had always been employed by his father whenever the latter required to transact any business with Mombasa. In order, however, to minimize the chances of a conflict, and secure, if possible, a semblance of popular acquiescence in his nomination, Mr. MacDougall called the Arabs and Elders together in Baraza, and asked them whom they would wish appointed. They all, including Mubarak, Aziz, and Rashid, replied that they recognized the Company's authority, and would accept whomever it selected; and on Mr. MacDougall then announcing that the choice had fallen on Rashid-bin-Salim, who would rule the district with the title (a new one for Takaungu) of Wali, Mubarak and Aziz both promised him obedience, the former offering to go to Gonjoro and administer it as his subordinate. Rashid on his side, to conciliate his cousins, made over to him all Sheikh Salim's personal property, including (so little are the Sultan's laws obeyed) his slaves, whom Mubarak at once armed and marched away with to Gonjoro. A personal dispute a few weeks later between the two cousins served as a pretext for Mubarak's permanent withdrawal from Takaungu; taking up his own quarters at Gonjoro, he placed, without reference to the Wali or the Company, his brother Aziz in charge of Tanganiko, and prepared to all appearance to attack Rashid. It was then that Mr. Pigott's application for a gun-boat at Kalifi brought about intervention from Zanzibar.

It is open, of course, to question whether the setting aside of Mubarak and Aziz in favour of a younger kinsman was an altogether politic act. It might, perhaps, have been wiser to have made Mubarak Wali on his promising compliance with certain conditions, and to have kept him at Takaungu under the supervision of an European officer, supported by a military and, if necessary, a naval force, Gonjoro and the inland districts being simultaneously intrusted to the more peaceful and loyal Rashid, who could have ruled them as his cousin's deputy. The Company, however, did not consult me as Her Majesty's Acting Commissioner (I was absent indeed at the time on the Tana), and no responsibility for the origin of the troubles can therefore be imputed to Her Majesty's Government. But whether their appointment was well or ill advised—and I am certainly not prepared to say that it was a wrong one—it was clear that, once made, it must be supported. A hereditary *claim*, respectfully submitted, might have deserved consideration; to recognize an indefeasible hereditary *right*, asserted in a tone of menace, would have been to constitute an *imperium in imperio*, which would have been fatal to the authority of Government. I accordingly recommended that if Mubarak could not be brought to reason by peaceful means, he should be coerced, and my recommendation was approved by Her Majesty's Government. The subsequent development of events, the expeditions to Gonjoro and Sokoke, the attack by Aziz on Takaungu, and the flight of the rebel Chiefs to their kinsman at Gazi were all reported

by me as they occurred. I have merely sought in this Memorandum to connect them with the earlier history of the two ruling Mazrui families, so as to present as clear a picture as possible of the true character of the Mazrui power in its relation to the other elements in the East African political situation. Your Lordship will thus have all the facts before you on which to base such instructions as you may decide to give me with respect to my eventual dealings with the three Mazrui Chiefs should they, as they probably will in the end, sue for peace, as also with respect to the future maintenance under European control, or non-maintenance, as the case may be, of a new Mazrui native Ruler at Gazi, Pongwe, or Wanga.


(Signed)

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Zanzibar, August 26, 1895.

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

GENEALOGICAL TREE and List of Chiefs.



84

NOTES.

The names of actual *Rulers* are printed in capital letters.

\* Chiefs who ruled at Mombasa over the whole coast from Malindi to Pangani.

† Chiefs who ruled at Gazi only.

‡ Chiefs who ruled only at Takaungu.

It will be seen from the Table that Mubarak and Aziz of Takaungu, though habitually spoken of by the Arabs as the "nephews" of the Chief of Gazi, are really very remote cousins. Mubarak of Gazi, however, as the representative of Othman bin Abdullah, the founder of the elder branch of the Mazruis, and in that capacity Head of the tribe, is regarded by the Arabs as the "uncle" of all the descendants of Othman's younger brother Zuber. The Swahilis habitually speak of him as "father" of Mubarak and Aziz of Takaungu.

*List of Chiefs of the Mazruis in their Chronological Order.*

| 1.—CHIEFS OF MOMBASA.                            |      | 2.—CHIEFS OF GAZI,<br>(Elder or Othman Branch.) |              | 3.—CHIEFS OF TAKAUNGU.<br>(Younger or Zuber Branch.) |          |
|--|------|---|--------------|--|----------|
| Mahomed (originally Wali for the Imam of Muscat) | 1735 | Abdullah (III)                                  | 1888         | Hamis (II)   | 1838     |
| Ali  | 1747 | Mubarak (present Chief)                         | 1860 (about) | Said   | 1845 (?) |
| Masoud   | 1762 |   |              | Rashid (II)  | 1850     |
| Abdullah (I)                                     | 1787 |   |              | Salim (II)   | 1876     |
| Ahmed  | 1789 |   |              | Rashid (III), present Chief and Wali                 | 1895     |
| Abdullah (II)                                    | 1814 |   |              |  |          |
| Suleiman   | 1823 |   |              |  |          |
| Salim (I)  | 1826 |   |              |  |          |
| Hamis (I)  | 1835 |   |              |  |          |
| Rashid (I)                                       | 1837 |   |              |  |          |

[488]

R 2

No. 27.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, October 18, 1895, 11 A.M.*

IT is with deep regret that I have to inform your Lordship of the report which has reached me that Captain Lawrence was killed in the neighbourhood of Gazi on the 16th instant. His native soldiers, it seems, ran away during a skirmish with rebels. Two men-of-war have proceeded to Gazi. The district officer at Wasin has started to recover, if possible, the body. I am awaiting further tidings.

No. 28.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, October 19, 1895, 5 P.M.*

WALI of Gazi, who was with Captain Lawrence, has sent the following particulars respecting his death.

Wali proceeded with Lawrence, accompanied by forty-seven native soldiers, to a village in the neighbourhood of Gazi to arrest one of Mubarak's chief men, Mahomed Adim. Latter fired at Captain Lawrence unsuccessfully, who pursued Mahomed on horseback, and received a second shot which killed him, after which his small following of soldiers took flight. When the Wali endeavoured to bring back the body, his men were attacked and, abandoning it in the woods, ran away.

One of the officers of the Gazi garrison, who was not, however, an eye witness, has brought a similar story here.

No. 29.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Zanzibar, September 28, 1895.*

IT would appear that Sheikh Mubarak started about the 10th or 11th instant in a northerly direction, and leaving his women and children, together with Mubarak of Takaungu, who is ill, in a village in Durumaland, arrived about the 13th instant (so far as I can calculate the dates) in the neighbourhood of the Sokoki forest. He was accompanied by his son Eyoub and by Aziz-bin-Rashid of Takaungu, and by a force of armed slaves, thinned by many desertions, but reckoned at about 500 guns. On his way he is said to have told the natives through whose villages he passed that he had no wish to continue fighting, and, as a proof of it, to have allowed certain mail-men whom he met carrying letters for the Christian missionaries in Chagga to pass unmolested; but since his arrival at Sokoki he has assumed, according to Mr. Macdougall, a more aggressive tone, describing himself as "Emir of Islam," and talking of a holy war against the infidels. This is perhaps due to the influence of Aziz, who has, on his side, sent a threatening and insulting letter to the Wali of Takaungu, and whose people have been raiding the villages and kidnapping slaves quite close to the coast. The effect of all this has been to check the movement towards submission of the disaffected in the neighbourhood of Takaungu, which was progressing with rapid strides, and to replunge the district into disquiet, and I have therefore asked the Senior Naval Officer, with the Admiral's permission, to assist Mr. Macdougall in an expedition to Sokoki to expel the rebel Chiefs from their position there, and, if possible, drive them down south. Sokoki is within easy striking distance from the sea, and an attack on it will not entail any difficulties in the way of transport; it is, moreover, most desirable that the rebels should be ousted from it, as, owing to its water supply, and to its being a good food centre—the country all round is one of the most productive on the coast—if once they are allowed to settle there their numbers will rapidly increase, and the moral effect of our victory at Mveli will be undone, or at any rate greatly diminished. If, on the other hand, we keep harassing them by midnight surprises and sudden attacks, their followers will lose heart and abandon them, as they have already begun doing, and the savage native races of the country immediately behind the coast, Waduruma and Wagirima, who now feed and help them largely from fear, and because they do not realize the Europeans' power,



will no longer afford them that assistance. That we can actually capture the Chiefs and stamp out the last remains of the rebellion with our existing forces is too much to hope; but I trust that when the Indian troops arrive we may succeed in doing so. My idea has from the first been to form a line of forts, in a sort of semicircle, from Malindi to a point south of Mombasa at short distances from one another, and to patrol the country between them; but until we have men enough to do this we must be content to exhaust the rebels by constant attacks from the coast towns, and by preventing them from ever settling in one spot.

I have the honour, in conclusion, to report that I visited Gazi on the 25th instant, placed Captain Lawrence there in charge of 100 recruits from Zanzibar, and left, as Civil Governor to assist him, and to endeavour to restore confidence among the inhabitants of the surrounding district, the Wali of Mamburi, Ali-bin-Salim, one of the ablest and most liberal-minded Arabs in this country, who will, I believe, prove of great assistance to us. The belief of the natives in our intention to hold Gazi appears to be growing. Just before my arrival Captain Raikes was visited by the powerful Chief Kubo, who lives about twenty-four hours inland, and who came with a retinue of some 300 followers to submit to him, as Representative of Her Majesty's Government, the question as to how the wives and property of his recently deceased father should be distributed amongst various rival claimants.

Leaving Gazi with Captain Raikes on the afternoon of the 25th, and proceeding overland, I reached Wasin next day at noon. The country we traversed was fairly quiet. The village of Pongwe, which had been held for some time by the rebels, was now deserted, but some of them were reported to be lingering in the adjacent bush, and in the neighbourhood of one village the crops had been cut down and carried off by a band of them, who came out, the natives told us, for this and kindred purposes every night.

One satisfactory result of our occupation of Gazi is, that a blow has been struck by it at the Slave Trade. It appears to be beyond question, from information which has reached us, that Gazi, which was never visited by men-of-war, and, is indeed, somewhat difficult of close access, was in Sheikh Mubarak's time a favourite outlet for the Traffic. Just 30 miles from the north end of Pemba, dhows and canoes could run across in a night, and could always obtain shelter and lie there unobserved if Her Majesty's ships were reported to be cruising in the neighbourhood. I do not say that the Trade was very considerable—it has greatly diminished everywhere—but such as it was, found a home of which it has now been deprived.

Captain Raikes has erected a stockade at Gazi, inclosing Sheikh Mubarak's stone house and the neighbouring buildings, as well as the mosque and its adjacent well, and the place is now strong enough to resist any native attack. Mr. Macdougall has also surrounded Takaungu with a stockade 1,400 yards in circumference, with bullet-proof bastions at intervals of about 100 yards.

No. 30.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Zanzibar, October 21, 1895, 10.50 A.M.

BODY of Captain Lawrence has been recovered. Military honours attended the burial.

No. 31.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 31, 1895.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 28th September relative to the proceedings of the Mazrui rebel Chiefs, and I approve the action taken by you, as therein reported, with a view to effecting the pacification of the country, and restoring confidence among the people of the district affected by the disturbances.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 32.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, November 2, 1895.*

REBELS have attacked Messrs. Smith, Mackenzie, and Co.'s camel caravan; jemadar killed, interpreter wounded, Mazera's station destroyed; the escort of Askaris ran away.

## No. 33.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, November 2, 1895.*

FOLLOWING *en clair* from Pigott:—  
 "Rabai Mission station attacked 4 this morning. Rebels burned ten houses; Europeans safe; two Rabai men killed, three wounded; enemy's loss unknown. They retreated southwards, followed by Rabai people. Askaris behaved admirably."

## No. 34.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, November 4, 1895.*

MOST loads and camels recovered from camel caravan. The rebels who plundered it only took twenty loads of cloth, the value of which was about 80*l.*, to sell for food of which they are short. The loss among the rebels at Rabai was considerable. Three of their commanders were killed. I am making arrangements to occupy Sokoki.

## No. 35.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 4, 1895.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 2nd instant, I have to request you to inform me fully of your views with regard to the situation on the mainland so far as the defence of caravans and stations is concerned. By employing Soudanese in the open and Askari in defensible positions, or by other means, can you afford fair security until the Pathans arrive towards the end of next month, and you are in a position to take the field actively against the raiders.

## No. 36.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, November 7, 1895.*

TELEGRAM from your Lordship, dated 4th instant.

Next week we shall have about 500 regulars to protect five coast stations, five isolated Mission stations, and about 40 miles of road; of these men 120 are trained men from Zanzibar, and 200 are new recruits of our own. There are also about 500 rebels, they are hard pressed for food, and can only get it in the neighbourhood of Sokoki which we shall occupy shortly. Any delay in their suppression encourages, no doubt, the disaffected and prevents real security outside garrisons, but we can, I think, till Indians arrive protect main road and all European Stations. Rebels only raid defenceless places or travellers, they do not fight in the open; had an Englishman been with camel escort, its robbery would not have taken place, but native guard was asleep. One man-of-war, out of the four ships on Station, is always here.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 15.)*

My Lord,

Zanzibar, October 24, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegrams of the 18th, 19th, and 21st instant respectively, copies of a despatch from Mr. D. Wilson, Acting District Officer at Wasin, and of a telegram from Captain MacGill, R.N., commanding Her Majesty's ship "Phoebe," respecting the death of Captain Lawrence at Mgobani on the 16th instant.

The account given of this sad occurrence by the Wali of Gazi to Mr. Wilson is not very clear or minute, a circumstance doubtless due to the fact that he arrived at Wasin in an agitated and exhausted condition; and I have since been informed, on the authority of Captain Raikes, though I do not know where he got his information, that the Askaris did not abandon Captain Lawrence's body on being fired at by the enemy, but being too tired after their long day's march to carry it into Wasin, concealed it in the long grass, with the intention of immediately returning accompanied by a larger party to bring it back. Whether this be so or not, it is a consolation to reflect that it received honourable burial, instead of being exposed, as is so often the case in African warfare, to indignities and mutilation at the hands of a savage enemy; and I would venture in this connection respectfully to invite your Lordship's attention to the remarks made by Captain MacGill as to the promptitude and energy displayed on this occasion by Mr. Wilson, in which I entirely concur.

The Askaris who accompanied Captain Lawrence were newly-recruited men who had never been under fire before, and who, on seeing their officer fall, lost their heads.

I have instructed the Wali of Gazi, who remains in charge of the place (which is stockaded and supplied with a Maxim gun) to abstain from any military operations outside the town on his own account. The country around is, however, evidently quite peaceful, the few rebels who were in hiding in the Pongwe district having, as Captain Gill reports, deserted.

I may mention that the horse which Captain Lawrence was riding when he was killed was captured by the rebels he was pursuing and taken to Sheikh Mubarak, who sent it to Mr. Pigott at Mombasa. I requested Mr. Pigott to send back a message thanking Mubarak, on my behalf, for this act of courtesy. I should add that he has made an overture for peace through the Rev. Mr. Jones, the native pastor of the Church Missionary Society's station at Rabai, to which I have, however, replied, through Mr. Jones, that he must communicate with me direct, and that I cannot negotiate through third parties. He is now at a place called Mwareni, about 20 miles inland of Wanga, on our side of the frontier, whence I propose to drive him as soon as the Indian troops are available. Mwareni is described to me as a forest-crowned hill somewhat resembling Mveli, but not stockaded or otherwise defended. All his women and slaves, besides Mubarak-bin-Raschid, of Takaungu, are, I believe, at Mwareni, whilst Aziz-bin-Bashid and Eyoub and Zebe, sons of Mubarak of Gazi, are said to be wandering about in the Giriama country with a force of about 150 men between Rabai and Sokoki, from which latter place they were dislodged about ten days ago by a force from Takaungu under Mr. MacDougall.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. Pigott.*

Dear Mr. Pigott.

October 16, 1895.

ALI-BIN-SALIM has just come in, 3 P.M., announces death of Lawrence, who was shot this morning. It appears Lawrence wanted to go to Mgobani, but with a small escort. Ali-bin-Salim advised him against this, and he accompanied the party, forty-seven Askaris in all. This morning Lawrence got into Mgobani, and Mahomed Adem fired at him, but missed. Lawrence then told his Askaris to remain quiet, and chased Mahomed Adem on horseback, and with his sword, into the bush. A shot was then fired and Lawrence fell. The Askaris bolted, leaving guns, &c., behind. Ali-bin-Salim, when he came up, found Lawrence dead. He tried to bring his body into

Shimoni, but was attacked; the poor Askaris running away, the body was left in the woods, and Ali-bin-Salim managed to come in here quite knocked up. I am taking two or three of his men and some Askaris to recover the body if possible. I send a telegram. Kindly add anything you want. Send a man-of-war in here or else to Gazi, and let an armed party come off here at once. Please excuse haste. I am trying to get things together so as to leave at once.

Yours, &c.  
(Signed) D. WILSON.

P.S.—Ali-bin-Salim remains here till I return.

D. W.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

*Captain MacGill to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, October 21, 1895, 7.5 p.m.*

ALL quiet to southward; have left a Lieutenant and fifteen men at Gazi. Lawrence's body was recovered by Wilson on morning of the 17th, and was buried with military honours at Wasin evening of same day, the news only reaching Mombasa about same time as burial was taking place. Lawrence was shot under right eye, bullet coming out at back of head; death must have been instantaneous; his sword, revolver, watch were all recovered. I have all his effects.

At 4 a.m. on 20th I proceeded with Wilson, Harrison, and Liwali of Gazi, and force to village of Mgobani, where Lawrence was killed, about 9 miles north-north-west from Wasin; also visited four other stockaded villages in neighbourhood; they were all deserted; destroyed them and stockades; saw no sign of enemy. Please inform Mathews should like to remove my men from Gazi as soon as possible.

As far as I can ascertain, two Askaris and three rifles are missing, but am doubtful even as to accuracy of this. Consider Wilson acted with promptitude and energy; raw Askaris unfit to act by themselves with only one white man. Harrison returns to Rabai at once.

No. 38.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 21.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, November 2, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner at Mombasa, inclosing Reports from the District Officer at Takaungu of successful expeditions organized by him against the rebels at Sokoki and Mtwapa. The latter is a small town or collection of villages on a creek 9 or 10 miles north of Mombasa, belonging to a petty Sheikh called Hamis-bin-Kombo, who is said, whether from fear of or from sympathy with Mubarak, to have given information and assistance to the rebels, and who, on being summoned by me to come to Mombasa to clear himself of these charges, declined to do so. Hamis-bin-Kombo is a very old man, he is afflicted amongst other infirmities, with elephantiasis, and is perhaps himself only an instrument in the hands of more turbulent kinsmen or dependents.

I entirely concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. MacDougall as to the necessity of garrisoning Sokoki, but our present force is hardly adequate for the purpose, and it is more than useless to send to a place of that description raw Swahili recruits such as those whom Captain Lawrence had at Gazi. I hope, however, to be able, after conferring at Mombasa, whither I proceed to-morrow, with Mr. Pigott and Captains MacGill and Harrison, to devise some temporary arrangements pending the arrival of the troops from India.

I have the honour to inclose herewith, with reference to my telegram of to-day, a copy of Mr. Pigott's telegram respecting the attack on the camel caravan and burning of Mazaras station. The statement that the escort ran away was made in a separate telegram received by Mr. Nicol (Messrs. Smith, Mackenzie, and Co.'s agent here).

I was glad, however, to be able to telegraph to your Lordship this afternoon, on Mr. Pigott's authority, that the guard in charge of Rabai have behaved admirably. I should add that Captain Harrison was not there when the Mission was attacked, having joined Captain MacGill in an expedition against a place called Bomani, near Ribe, where the rebels were said to be in force.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 38.

*Mr. Pigott to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Mombasa, October 28, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of Mr. MacDougall's Reports on the recent expeditions against Sokoki on the 10th and 24th instant, and against Mtwapa (Hamis-bin-Kombos) on the 18th and 19th instant, all of which were carried out successfully.

I would specially call your attention to the attack on Sokoki on the 24th. As Mr. MacDougall was unwell and unable to go himself, the two attacking parties were commanded by Sergeant [? Lieutenant] Mbaruk-bin-Boheti, of the Mombasa Police, who was also in charge of the Maxim, and Akida Salim, of Takaungu, respectively. These two men appear to have arranged their forces most satisfactorily, and to have routed the rebels, who were in considerable force.

You will notice that the rebels appear to have very little powder left.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. PIGOTT,  
*Sub-Commissioner.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 38.

*Mr. MacDougall to Mr. Pigott.*

Sir,

*Takaungu, October 12, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to hand you the following Report on my last visit to Sokoki.

In consequence of constant raids and murdering of slaves upon the shambas outlying the coast towns and villages of Malindi and Takaungu districts by Aziz-bin-Rashid's followers in Sokoki forest, I decided to make a combined attack in two columns on their position, which my spies had just localized.

Accordingly, on the 10th instant, at 9 P.M. a force of forty-five Askaris, with Maxim and war rockets, and forty porters from Takaungu, Akida Salim and fifty Viroboto from Tanganiko, started with a view of attacking their (enemy's) main and flank simultaneously.

Lieutenant Lockhart and four bluejackets accompanied the expedition.

We travelled by an unfrequented route to avoid observation by their spies, and, after a forced night's march through a rough and narrow path, we arrived opposite the enemy's position on a ridge some 600 yards off shortly after daylight. Their sentries evidently saw our column advancing, for they opened fire upon us. The Maxim gun and 9-pr. war rockets were very soon brought into action, whilst skirmishers were thrown out on either flanks, who fired well-directed volleys at their main position, and after a few minutes' firing, the enemy took to flight in every direction. The cries of their women and children were most hideous to listen to as they ran away.

Meanwhile the Viroboto attacked their right flank at long ranges of about 600 yards.

A rush was made upon the forest, and we followed them up for over 3 miles in the forest, killing five and wounding many.

We captured one prisoner—an Mgunia Elder—who reports Aziz gone to Nykani.

We burnt a chain of five villages, extending over an area of 3 miles, and captured and destroyed a large quantity of grain in Aziz' village.

We returned via Gonjora, and were surprised to find a strong boma with loopholed

earthworks, some 30 feet long, effectively blocking the road on the forest-clad summit of Sokoki Hill.

We charged with fixed bayonets up the hill, firing as we advanced. The occupants—about sixteen—decamped without firing a shot. The boma was made on the Takaungu pattern, which was very soon demolished, and burnt in a heap. The enemy harassed us at several points afterwards on our way back at long ranges, but our volleys very soon dislodged them.

Kibokoni was thoroughly destroyed as we passed through, and a large quantity of Indian corn belonging to Akida Bakari destroyed.

The Askaris behaved in a splendid manner, notwithstanding the fatiguing journey. We reached Takaungu at 6 p.m., after walking 36 miles in eighteen hours.

Many slaves made their escape to their respective homes in consequence of our attack.

I would strongly suggest to erect a boma in Tezo forest, whence the rebels obtain their water, and put a garrison of 100 men to hold it, and thus co-operate with Tanganiko, which will very soon drive the rebels out of it. Takaungu with its present garrison is considerably handicapped, and cannot do much in these isolated places. Trusting you will give this matter your kind consideration.

The steam-launch in Kilifi creek is absolutely necessary for a month hence, and hope you will kindly send her up. She can steam up in six hours' easy steaming in this weather.

I have, &c.

(Signed) K. MACDOUGALL,  
District Superintendent.

Inclosure 3 in No. 38.

*Mr. MacDougall to Mr. Pigott.*

Sir,

*Takaungu, October 26, 1895.*

IN compliance with your request of the 21st instant to occupy Sokoki before the rebels return from the south, I sent a party of forty-five of our best Askaris with Maxim gun and thirty-five irregulars from Takaungu and Akida Salim, with fifty Viroboto from Tanganiko. The idea was to make a simultaneous attack on the rebels. Our column started from Takaungu on Thursday evening at 4 p.m. via Mtundia, where they retired to rest until 4 a.m., when a fresh start was made. Two guns were fired by the rebels in Tezo forest at daybreak, of which no notice was taken. The column advanced steadily through the dense forest until 6 a.m., when they reached the hills above Sokoki, whence they observed Akida Salim just commencing an engagement with the rebels, so our column pushed forward, and opened fire upon them at ranges of from 400 to 600 yards, which soon scattered them.

The enemy collected in great numbers, and endeavoured to surround our troops, where a sort of a stand was made, but the Maxim and our volleys proved too much for them, as six of the enemy were killed and one taken prisoner, whilst we had one wounded slightly.

Desultory firing ensued. They harassed our column all the way back at long ranges from behind hills and trees in dense bush as usual. The column returned by Gonjora and Kibokoni, reaching Takaungu at 6 p.m. on the following day, looking none the worse after their long journey. They report that the rebels have not built any huts, nor repaired the boma I pulled down on my visit there.

I am of opinion, judging from the information I gather, that these rebels are the people of Gonjora, Sokoki, Arubuku, and Kibokoni, and have no intention of evacuating this extensive forest until we are in a position to punish their Wanyika neighbours, who supply them with food and hiding-places.

It is true we are far too short-handed, and seems evident that Sokoki or Tezo must be visited every day until we drive out the enemy. We must therefore increase our present garrison by at least 100, with provisions and ammunition, and I am perfectly confident Sokoki will be evacuated in one month.

The rebels have cut the long span over Kilifi, and pulled down and demolished several poles, and threw them into the creek, which we picked up to-day and stored in Narani Custom-house.

I beg to report that nearly in every case the powder horns captured are almost empty, and only three to six gun-caps, and the same number of bullets, in their pouches. This clearly shows that their ammunition is pretty nearly exhausted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) K. MacDOUGALL,  
*District Superintendent.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 38.

*Mr. MacDougall to Mr. Pigott.*

Sir,

*Takaungu, October 20, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to hand you the subjoined Report on my visit to Mtwapa.

In accordance with Captain MacGill's special instructions per Commander Leckie, of Her Majesty's ship "Swallow," I proceeded with a force of eighty Askaris and twenty-four porters, with Maxim gun, on Friday the 18th instant, at 6 P.M., with a view of making a forced night's march in order to arrive at Mtwapa at daylight, and so be able to co-operate with the ships from the sea and Captain Harrison from Rabai; thus I was given to understand our combined attack was to be conducted against Hamis Kombo.

We reached Mtwapa at 7 A.M. on Saturday after a long night's march, and at a quarter to 8 (as there was no sign of an attack from the sea) I decided to send a friendly message to Mahomed-bin-Hamis to come to meet me at the skirts of his town and surrender his arms, as a mark of his loyalty to the Government; but instead of complying with my request, he fired upon the Envoys, which was a signal for me to attack, so a charge was made in the usual skirmishing order, firing volleys when necessary, and with but little resistance we succeeded to rout the enemy from the first group of houses, though at the second village a halt was necessary, for very rapid firing was experienced from a stone mosque which was situated in the centre of the village, almost inclosed with huts and green bomas. The Maxim was quickly brought into action on the windows and doors, combined with a flanking bayonet charge, which had the desired effect, for its occupants endeavoured to effect their escape by jumping over its roof on to the ground, but we intercepted two in the act, who were killed outside, and on capturing the mosque four were killed inside.

Our advance was continued through the third town, which was of a straggling nature, besides overgrown with vegetation of a dense and tall description. In about one and a-half hour's fighting the town was ours. Ten of the enemy were killed, two wounded, and twelve prisoners captured, with ten guns complete. We had no casualties on our side. The town was destroyed, with a large quantity of grain, as well as a dhow's load ready for shipment to Mbaruk's followers up the creek.

I felt somewhat concerned for the safety of Takaungu, for there were only Lieutenant Lockhart with ten bluejackets and forty Askaris left in charge, and knowing that the Askaris were unable to return overland that day after their fatigue, I decided to proceed to Mombasa and procure a passage to Takaungu. Accordingly we set to work in fetching canoes from long distances in the creek until we mustered five belonging to the enemy. As we were ferrying the men across, the enemy harassed us from splendid positions in groups of fives from behind boulders of stones in the densest mangrove bushes, at ranges of about 300 yards, and notwithstanding that we dislodged them on several occasions at first, they occupied other commanding positions, so I decided to transfer the Maxim to the opposite bank and train it on the enemy's positions, covering our ferrying operations, which had the desired effect, for it soon silenced their firing.

Our expedition was ferried in two and a-half hours' time, and Mombasa was reached via Freretown, at 3 P.M., Saturday.

Commander Leckie, of the "Swallow," kindly offered to convey the party to Takaungu, and accordingly a start was made at 6 A.M. on Sunday, and reached our destination at 9:20 A.M. of the same day.

The prisoners informed me that Mohamed-bin-Hamis Kombo decamped to the bush as soon as we made a charge on the mosque.

I procured their war colours, red and white pennants bearing Koran war inscriptions.

I beg to report that the Askaris behaved remarkably well, especially while under fire, crossing the creek in the enemy's canoes without oars or boatmen, for a space of two hours.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) K. MACDOUGALL,  
District Superintendent.

Inclosure 5 in No. 38.

*Mr. Pigott to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.) Mombasa, November 2, 1895, 11 35 A.M.  
CAMEL caravan attacked last night. Gemadar reported killed. Some loads cloth stolen.

Mazeras reported burned; smoke seen in direction Rabai. Sending thirty Askaris to ascertain facts.

Have written Harrison, who will be in Ribbi to-day. Only thirty Askaris left Mombasa. Baughan Alexander leaving for Mazeras with Askaris to see after their interests.

No. 39.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 17.)*

My Lord,

Mombasa, November 8, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of reports received by me from Mr. D. Wilson, Acting District Officer at Wasein, giving full particulars as to the death of Captain Lawrence, and the position of Sheikh Mubarak at Marareni or Mwareni.

The report mentioned by Mr. Wilson that if only Mubarak were attacked at Mwareni he would surrender, has reached me from other quarters, and there is little doubt from all the accounts we receive, that both he and his people are almost starving, and that many of them are leaving him in consequence. There appears, therefore, something to be said in favour of the plan, which Captain Harrison was inclined to advocate, of attacking him there before the next crop is ripe, which will be in about six weeks' time (unless, as seems possible, the young corn is killed by the exceptional lateness of the lesser rains), but I think it preferable on the whole to discard it in favour of the occupation of Sokoki. If we attacked Mwareni we should require naval support, our advance would be known long before we were near the place, and Mubarak would probably retire to some other hiding-place a little further off, to return as soon as the expedition had regained the coast. If, on the other hand, we hold Sokoki, whence he draws his chief food supply, he may be starved out before the harvest, or, at any rate, greatly exhausted, and we can then pursue him with the Indian troops, independently of naval assistance.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

Shimoni, October 23, 1895.

I HAVE the honour most respectfully to forward you the following report in connection with the death of the late Captain Lawrence, who was killed at Mgbani, Pongwe district, on the morning of the 16th instant. It appears that Captain Lawrence left Gazi on the 15th at 8 P.M. with forty Askaries, thirty-three of his own men, and seven with the Liwali Ali-bin-Salim. Captain Lawrence wanted to go alone, and with only eighteen Askaris, but the Liwali advised him to take more men, and offered to accompany him if he wished. Captain Lawrence agreed to this, they accordingly started, marching all night. As Captain Lawrence was on horseback he



was at times considerably ahead of his men, and the Liwali and his Askaris were still further in the rear. Mgobani was reached at 7:30 A.M. Now comes the most important part of this ill-fated expedition, and I deeply regret to say that the true version is very hard to be obtained. The native officer, Muene Kombo, said that when Captain Lawrence noticed the place was a boma, a rush was made for the gate, and they got inside the boma, some shots were fired and the rebels commenced running away through the second gate. Captain Lawrence was fired at by an Arab (supposed to be Mahomed Adem), who missed him, and then ran away, the order was now given to cease firing and fall in, after which Captain Lawrence, on horseback, and with only his sword, rushed out of the gate in pursuit of this Arab. A shot was heard almost immediately, and Moosain, one of the privates, said he saw the Captain fall off his horse, and he, together with some Askaris, rushed out, stood over the body, and commenced firing into the bush. Sergeant Muktub-bin-Ali ran up and informed the officer of the sad news. Some Askaris then ran out of the boma and told the Liwali to come quickly as Captain Lawrence was killed. When the Liwali reached him he found that life was extinct, and he wanted to have the body carried away, but the men seemed to be afraid, and refused to help him. He then got a "kitanda"\* and endeavoured to lift the body on it himself, when one or two Askaris came up, and, together with his own men, they carried the body into the boma, the Liwali then set Mahomed Adem's house on fire and got out of the place under cover of the smoke. Shortly after they left a shot was heard, the rebels seeing that the European was killed and the place deserted rushed out to attack the party, the Liwali gave instructions to the officer to go ahead with the body in charge of some Askaris, and he would remain behind to repulse the attack. Some shots were fired, one just missing the Liwali, he then managed to kill the leading man, whereupon the enemy picked up his body and ran away. When the Liwali went forward expecting to meet the officer and his men, he found Captain Lawrence's body lying on the ground, and no one about. Shortly after they all came back, and when asked to carry the body into Shimoni they refused, saying they were too tired. With the aid of the Liwali's seven men and two or three others, the body was carried some little distance further and then placed in the bush. The party then came on to Shimoni to give me the news, arriving here at 3:30 P.M., the 16th. If the Liwali had not been with Captain Lawrence the body would have been left behind and in the hands of the enemy. He did everything he could, and begged of the men to carry the body into Shimoni, but they refused. The Askaris were too frightened, and commenced running away directly Captain Lawrence was killed. The Liwali picked up one rifle. I cannot say how many rounds of ammunition are lost. Up to the present three men are missing and three rifles; the others who ran away joined the main body coming here, and two ran off to Gazi.

On being informed of this sad news I started a boat off for Mombasa to give you the news by telegram, and made arrangements to go myself with sixteen Askaris to recover the body. Guides were obtained for Pongwe, but not one of the Zanzibar Askaris would come with me to show the spot where the body was placed. One of the Liwali's Askaris then came forward, and we started at 6 P.M., travelling all night over a most frightful road. The body was found at 2 A.M., and I then made all arrangement for the different relays, each Askari in turns carrying the extra guns, &c. Mamoja was reached at 5:30 A.M., and I expected to arrive at Shimoni by 7 A.M., but the guides lost the way, or did it purposely, I cannot say which, and we were taken back into Pongwe, the extreme end of Chwaka. At this place I managed to get a Wadigo, who brought us to Shimoni, arriving here at 11:30 A.M. on the 17th. I can scarcely say how annoying this was, it is utterly useless placing any reliance whatever on the Wassein people. This is the second time I have been misled by guides. Poor Captain Lawrence was shot under the right eye, the bullet going through his brain and passing out of the back of his head. Death must have been instantaneous. I did everything I possibly could; a coffin was made, and Captain Lawrence received a soldier's funeral. All the Askaris were turned out, and at the end of the burial service three volleys were fired over his grave. The grave is being built up with stone and lime and a paling put round. I deeply regret to have had to report the death of this brave officer, who died in the execution of his duty. It will be a source of consolation to his bereaved relatives and friends to know that a Christian burial was given him, and that he was not left out in the bush, and in the hands of the enemy. I cannot speak too highly in praise of the native officer, Mahomed, and the Askaris

\* A native cot.

who accompanied me that night; they worked loyally, and I am most pleased to think that these men did their duty without murmuring, more especially as we were walking from 6 P.M. the previous evening (16th) till 11:30 A.M. the next day (17th).

A strict examination, conducted by naval and military officers, might be held over the native officer and men who were concerned in this expedition, and some truth may possibly be arrived at. I inclose you a letter written by Captain Lawrence to me the night before he died; it was found in his coat pocket.

The next day, the 18th, I left with the Liwali and all his Askaris for Gazi to see myself what Government cash was in hand, and also to take charge of Captain Lawrence's effects, and bring everything here prior to forwarding them to you. Her Majesty's ship "Phœbe" had arrived there that morning, Captain MacGill leaving Lieutenant Norfolk in charge with an armed party. Lieutenant Norfolk and myself counted the cash, and I sent what books and papers I could to Mombasa.

Next morning, the 19th, the "Phœbe's" steam-pinnace came in for me, and I left for Shimoni. I have handed over all Captain Lawrence's effects to Captain MacGill; the only thing I could not find was his signet ring, and I know he was wearing one.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. WILSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Shimoni, October 24, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour most respectfully to inform you that news was brought me from Moa that all the Pongwe people are in German territory. Four canoes left for Pongwe to take away all their goods, grain, &c., hidden in the bush. I have sent spies to find out if this is true, and, if so, I shall endeavour to catch the lot when they are leaving the creek.

Mahomed Adem, Rashid-bin-Zahrán, and Sesaro went to Mararane. Boree, the Chief of Ormuz, and Mue Hamise, of Kebega, went to Jaseni, but they returned to their shamba at Mababoni, near Wanga. Mtai Stambuli, of Ormuz, is at Kendwa, near Jaseni.

It was also reported that a Segaga killed Captain Lawrence. The news I heard was that Captain Lawrence chased Mahomed Adem, and kept calling out to his Askaris to follow him, when he was shot. During the Mgbani fight nine people were killed—four women and five men—and in the second encounter with Ali-bin-Salim two men killed.

Mbaruk has, I hear, sent Captain Lawrence's horse to Mombasa to Mr. Pigott under charge of Wasagaga, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. WILSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 39.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Shimoni, October 24, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour most respectfully to inform you that I sent word to Vanna, Wadigo Chief near Wanga, asking him if he could supply guides to show the way to Marareni. This afternoon he sent two men, and from them I can gather the following information:—

1. Starting from Wanga, reaching Mgone, the village of Vanna, three hours' journey.
2. Mgone to Mwena, three hours' journey.
3. Mwena to Mumkono, one hour's journey.

4. Mumkono to Bugee, three hours' journey.

5. Bugee to Marareni, two hours' journey.

There is a good road the whole way, and the drinking water supply abundant and good except at Marareni, where water is obtainable within an hour's walk.

Mbaruk has a number of people with him, but is hard pressed. He is obtaining supplies from the Duruma country, but at heavy prices. It is reported that Mbaruk said if an attack was made on Marareni, he would beg for peace and give himself up.

Vanna's men informed me that lately Mbaruk sent 50 dollars as a present, which, if accepted, would show that he could get help if required. Vanna returned the money, saying he could give no assistance whatever.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. WILSON.

No. 40.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 17.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, November 13, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to add the following particulars to my telegrams of the 21<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> instant respecting the recent attacks on Mazeras and Rabai.

It appears that news having reached Sheikh Mubarak that a caravan of fifty camels was about to leave Mombasa with loads for the interior, he dispatched a force of 100 men, under the command of his son Eyoub, to lie in wait for and plunder it as it came up the Mackinnon Road, and at the same time, if possible, to make an attack upon Rabai, whose inhabitants had assisted Captain Marx, R.N., in pursuing him as he passed southwards from Sokoki in the early part of last month. The force must have left Mwareni about the 31<sup>st</sup> October, and it would seem—for our information on the point is not very accurate—that Eyoub heard on the way from some natives of the Swahili village of Jomvu (between Rabai and Mombasa) that Captain Harrison (Zanzibar army), who held Rabai with 100 Askaris, had left with all his men, together with a number of the Rabai bow-and-arrow men, to join Captain MacGill in an attack upon Hamis Kombo at Bomani, some 16 miles to the north-east. The information was only partially correct, for although Captain Harrison had gone with nearly two-thirds of his force to Bomani, he had left forty men at Rabai, under a good Arab officer, and none of the Rabai natives had followed him. The rebel leaders, however, believed the story, and they accordingly, on the night of the 1<sup>st</sup> November, divided their force at a Duruma village called Bongos, a few miles south of the Mackinnon Road, one-half going to Rabai, and the other half to Mazeras, where information had reached them that the camel caravan had halted that evening.

Mazera's (or, as the natives call it, Ganjoni, Mazera being merely the name of its Headman) is a village of about 500 inhabitants close to the Mackinnon Road, about 3 miles beyond the point at which the latter takes the place of the tram-line, and about 13 or 14 miles from Mombasa. It is, therefore, usually the first stage for caravans proceeding to the interior, and is at the same time a station of the Free Methodist Mission, for which Mazera, the native Headman above referred to, acts as catechist, and which possesses there a stone church and small parsonage house.

Rabai is doubtless well-known by name to your Lordship in connection with the redemption of fugitive slaves there by Mr. Mackenzie in 1889. It is a large and scattered village, or collection of villages and hamlets, lying amidst the hills to the north-west of Mombasa, from which it is distant about 15 miles, being some 3 miles north-east of Mazeras. It contains, if all the outlying hamlets are counted, about 2,000 inhabitants, partly freed slaves of all races, partly Wanyika natives of the district, of whom about 700 are either baptized Christians or catechumens, under the supervision of two clergymen of the Church Missionary Society, one English and one native, and five English Mission ladies. Part of the settlement is owned by the Mission, which possesses in its centre a substantial stone church with a parsonage, school, and residence for the ladies, grouped together close by.

It was arranged by Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, who himself remained with a few men behind at Bongos, that the raids to be made on both these places should take place

before daylight on the 2nd, and accordingly at 2 A.M. on that day the camel caravan's camp at Mazera's was attacked. It was in charge of an escort of twenty armed men (not furnished by the Administration, but recruited on their own account by Messrs. Smith, Mackenzie, and Co.) ten of whom, including the Jemadar in command, were Beluchis, and ten Swahili porter Askaris. These appear to have been taken completely by surprise, and, although they have denied it, there seems little doubt that their sentries were asleep (a too common occurrence when there is no European to supervise them) as they were unaware of the presence of the rebels till they were actually in their midst, and were thus able to offer little resistance. Some of the Beluchis attempted to defend themselves, and fought for a few moments with a good deal of determination, but after the Jemadar had been shot, and the interpreter and another Beluchi wounded, whilst the Swahili guard fled in confusion, they were overpowered and forced to surrender. Though there were about 700 loads of stores of all kinds the marauders only carried off those containing cloth—about thirty in all—no doubt because they had not men enough to take more, and killed, I am informed, for food, two of the camels, leaving the others, of whom forty-two were afterwards recovered, to wander at large in the bush, or, according to another account since received by me, driving a few of them before them as they went south.

It seems at first sight strange that they should not have seized all the camels and used them to carry the whole of the loads to Mwareni. I can only imagine that as these animals travel slowly, especially when there are many together, and are often difficult to manage, except by their own camelmen, they feared that if they took them they might be tracked and overtaken by our troops. One Beluchi whom they made prisoner was compelled to carry some of the stolen goods, but he managed to drop behind on the way and effect his escape. The rebels set fire to the village of Mazera's, the inhabitants of which, including the Headman catechist, had fled on their approach into the high grass around it, and destroyed about sixty houses; the church and parsonage were, however, uninjured. They at the same time seized some cattle belonging to Mr. Andrew Dick, a British trader now up-country, and kept by him at a small camp which he had established at Mazera's, but which at the time was entirely undefended.

Meanwhile the second half of the rebel force was advancing on Rabai, the outskirts of which they reached at about 4 A.M. The first signal of their approach was given, I am told, by a Rabai native, who saw them from behind his hut, and not daring to run past them to warn the guard, shot an arrow from his hiding-place into their midst, thus causing one or two of them to fire their guns and arousing the garrison. The forty Askaris composing it with their officer, and the Rev. Arthur Smith, the English missionary in charge, got ready in all haste to repel the attack, and above all to defend the Mission-house occupied by the ladies; and their fire drove back the enemy and the Mission-buildings are situated. On seeing the regulars the rebels were greatly disconcerted, though they returned their fire for some time, and their leader, Akida Songoro, who was shot in the market-place of the village at the head of his men, exclaimed as he fell, that they had been deceived by the people of Jomvu.

As the enemy retreated the Rabai people, armed with spears and bows and arrows, closed on them from behind, and pursued them in great numbers for a considerable distance along the road to Mwache (15 miles to the south-west), shooting them down as they ran, and dispatching with their knives those who had already been wounded by the Askaris, and who appealed to them in vain for quarter. About thirty-five, I believe, were killed in all, including four of their leaders: Akida Songoro, who though by birth a mere slave, stood high in Sheikh Mubarak's favour, and was made Commander of his forces after Zahrán-bin-Rashid had been killed at Mweli; Rashid-bin-Salim, a nephew of Mubarak's; a leading Takaungu-Mazrui named Said-bin-Ilamis; and another Arab named Ali, respecting whom I have not yet been able to obtain any information. One prisoner was made, and sent down to Mombasa. He describes Sheikh Mubarak as being in great straits for food, says his followers are dropping off from him in consequence, and that, exclusive of those sent on the recent raid, he has not much more than 100 fighting slaves in his camp. This account was borne out by the appearance of the dead, most of whom, Mr. Smith told me, were much emaciated, and had evidently eaten little for many days. The damage done at Rabai was fortunately not great—only two or three natives were killed by the rebels, and some forty houses burned, amongst these, I regret to say, that of the Rev. Mr. Jones, the native clergyman, whose family, including himself, only just escaped with their lives. I propose to compensate those of the Rabai people who have thus been rendered

homeless by offering them land and houses at Gazi, which I have reason to believe they will gladly accept.

The day after receiving the news of the attacks on Mazera's and Rabai I left Zanzibar with Captain Raikes for Mombasa, having arranged with Sir Lloyd Mathews that fifty of the Zanzibar Askaris, who had taken part in the operations during the summer, and only lately returned to Zanzibar, should follow us immediately. With these, and by effecting a few reductions in some of the coast garrisons, I hoped to be able to make up the 100 men required for the occupation of Sokoki, which Mr. MacDougall had long been urging, and thus to cut off the rebels from their principal food supply. I placed Captain Raikes in charge of Rabai, and requested Captain Harrison, who had returned there on the 3rd instant, to accompany me to Kalifi, proceeding thence to Sokoki with the fifty fresh Askaris from Zanzibar, twenty-five Soudanese whom I withdrew from Malindi, and twenty-five men taken from Gazi and Takaungu, to build a "boma" at a convenient spot near the entrance of the forest, where the rebels usually settled on account of the food and water. I at the same time directed Mr. Wake, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul for East Africa, to join Captain Harrison at Sokoki, in order to assist him with the local knowledge which he possesses, especially as regards native troops, and take charge of the "boma" when he was about patrolling the neighbourhood. The presence of another European is of great help to an officer in command of an isolated post, especially when new to the country and troops, and Mr. Wake accepted the duty with alacrity. He arrived at Mombasa with the fifty fresh Askaris on the 9th instant, and on the 10th we all proceeded on board Her Majesty's ship "Swallow" to Kalifi, where it was decided, after an interview with Mr. MacDougall, to place the "boma," not at Sokoki proper or Sokoki Kwa Simba, but at Tezo, 3 or 4 miles further east on the opposite side of the southern end of the forest (which here ends, so to speak, in a point), its water supply being far superior.

It had been my intention to accompany Captain Harrison to Sokoki, but the doctor having forbidden me to do so, in view of a recent indisposition which living in a tent in the wet season might revive, I employed the time which I had proposed to devote to this purpose, in proceeding to Malindi, where I had not been since the change of administration, and which, as the most northerly point affected by the disturbances, I had for some time past intended to visit. I found that Mr. Weaver, the Assistant District Officer, had taken efficient measures to protect the town, which is straggling and not easy to inclose within a stockade, by establishing round it on the land side a semi-circular cordon of seventeen outposts 70 yards from one another, in each of which he had two sentries (Beluchi or Arab irregulars) always stationed. These outposts are nearly a quarter-of-a-mile from the town, and are to a great extent intended to enable the alarm to be given before any raiders can reach its outskirts; the danger at Malindi being not so much that it will be attacked in force, a very unlikely contingency so long as an English gun-boat lies off it, as that a few isolated raiders may slip in, and by setting fire, which would not be difficult, to a few of its ruinous and highly combustible houses, cause a general conflagration and destruction of property which the garrison could do little to prevent. The neighbourhood of Malindi, though occasionally troubled, like the whole of this district, by raiders, has always been tolerably quiet, and I have ordered guns to be issued to the loyal Arabs who wish to visit their farms in the surrounding country as a defence against possible attacks—a measure for which they had long been pressing, and which appears to have greatly reassured them, but which Mr. Weaver was unwilling to adopt without consulting me.

I have already in my telegram of the 7th instant, endeavoured to sum up the situation created on this coast by the disturbances still smouldering, but it may be advisable that I should in this despatch give some details as to the distribution of our forces. We have to protect five coast towns: Wasin, Gazi, Mombasa, Takaungu, and Malindi, and five Mission stations: Freretown and Rabai (Church of England), Ribe and Jomvu (Free Methodist), and Jimba (German Lutheran), besides two military posts inland, Tanganyika and Sokoki.

The following is the distribution of troops among these various places:—

| Place.                          | Force.  | Officer in command.   |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| Wasin .. ..                     | 30 Swahili Askaris (newly recruited) ..   | Mr. Wilson.   |
| " .. ..                         | 15 Beluchi irregulars ..  | Ditto.  |
| Gazi .. ..                      | 60 Askaris (newly recruited) ..   | Wali Ali-bin-Salim.<br>(Mr. Lockhart provisionally during<br>Wali's illness.) |
| Mombasa .. ..                   | 60 Askaris .. ..<br>(One ship of war.)  | Mr. Pigott and two native officers.   |
| Freretown (opposite<br>Mombasa) | 30 Askaris (chiefly old Company's men)  | A native officer.   |
| Rabai .. ..                     | 80 Askaris (new recruits) .. ..   | Captain Raikes and a native officer.  |
| Ribé .. ..                      | 40 Askaris .. ..  | A naval officer.  |
| " .. ..                         | 10 Bluejackets .. ..  | Ditto.  |
| Jomvu .. ..                     | 10 Askaris .. ..  | A native corporal.  |
| Jimba .. ..                     | 10 Askaris .. ..  | Ditto.  |
| Takaunga .. ..                  | 100 Askaris (partly trained Zanzibaris,<br>partly old Company's Askaris)  | Mr. MacDougall, assisted by a naval<br>officer.                               |
| Tanganiko .. ..                 | 80 Arab irregulars .. ..  | Akida Salim.  |
| Sokoki .. ..                    | 100 Of whom 75 Zanzibaris, and 25<br>Nubians  | Captain Harrison.   |
| Jelori .. ..                    | (Church Missionary Society's station,<br>abandoned by missionaries at my<br>direction at beginning of troubles.<br>Ten Askaris kept there till lately,<br>when necessity for their presence<br>ceased.) |   |
| Malindi .. ..                   | 120 Arab and Beluchi irregulars ..<br>(One gun-boat.)   | Mr. Weaver.   |
|                                 | 745 Total troops.   |   |

Your Lordship will observe from the above, that deducting the 200 Arab and Beluchi irregulars, whose discipline is of the most primitive description, and who are armed mainly with muzzle-loaders, and allowing for a small percentage of sick, we have a force of, roughly, 500 regulars supported, for any operations in the immediate vicinity of the coast, by four men-of-war, two of whom are always and three almost always in mainland waters. We could further, in the case of extreme emergency, bring down the fifty-five Soudanese now in Witu and at Port Durnford, but I should be unwilling, save for very pressing reasons, to withdraw what is at present, to all intents and purposes, our whole regular force in Tanaland.

I have given orders that caravans should only go up the road from Mombasa once a-month, at a date to be fixed by the Administration, and should be accompanied by an armed escort which we will furnish. In the case of the camel caravan which, shorn of eight camels, left the coast a second time on the 12th instant, together with some Presbyterian missionaries proceeding to Ukambani, I provided an escort of forty men, whom I withdrew from Rabai, leaving Captain Raikes there with the remaining forty, and arranging that during the absence of the full garrison, the Mission ladies should come down to Mombasa. I placed this escort under the command of Mr. Ewart, an English police officer, until recently employed at Zanzibar, but whose services I propose to engage for the mainland, and who, if I remember rightly, has had experience of work similar to that now intrusted to him in Burmah as a non-commissioned officer in the Army Service Corps.

I have instructed Mr. Ewart to escort the caravan as far as Taru, 40 miles or so from Mombasa, at which point the waterless desert separating the coast from Teita commences, and beyond which the operations of the marauders do not extend. On his return he will be available for the escort of the next caravan, and so on. With a properly defended camp every night and an Englishman in charge of the guard, caravans going up country should be perfectly safe from attacks by these small bands of robbers, who, as I have already had the honour to point out, only raid unarmed parties, or places which, like Rabai, they believe to be undefended.

Of course, these arrangements cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and are, indeed, only tolerable because provisional. But I trust that for the few weeks which have to elapse before the arrival of the Indian force, they may serve their purpose,

and that in so far as they accomplish this end, they may meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

## No. 41.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 23.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, December 2, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 13th ultimo, that the occupation of the Sokoke, or rather of a place called Tandia, 3 miles to the west of Sokoke forest, and village of Sokoke Kwa Simba, was effected about a fortnight ago; a substantial stockade, 60 by 45 yards, being erected there, which is held by Captain Harrison with 100 men, 25 of them being Soudanese. Tandia, Mr. MacDougall informs me, is "in a splendid commanding position, guarded by nature nearly all round like Mwel Hill, with abundance of water at the bottom," whilst the surrounding country is "very populous, and extremely rich in cultivation." It was here that Sheikh Mubarak stayed when he came to the Sokoke district for food in September last; and it would appear that he was on his way to return there at the moment of our occupation, for it is reported that he was met in the Giriama country coming northwards from Mwareni, and advised to turn back again by Aziz-bin-Rashid, who left Sokoke without any attempt at resistance the instant our force appeared. Mr. MacDougall accompanied Captain Harrison to Tandia to assist in the building of the "boma;" and he was visited there by the Wali of Takaungu, who remained three days with all his retinue. The effect of the occupation of Tandia has been to drive the rebels from the Sokoke district, and to enable the work of gradual pacification, which was interrupted by their return there in September, to be resumed. On the 22nd ultimo, one of the secondary Chiefs of the rebellion, Nasoro or Nasr-bin-Hamid, came in to Takaungu to surrender, and on the following day 150 followers of Akida Bakari, chiefly slaves and Mahagis (Wanyika converts to Mahommedanism), made their submission. I have since heard that more are coming in.

After evacuating Sokoke, Aziz-bin-Rashid, with his brother Mubarak (or according to another account, Eyoub-bin-Mubarak), sought refuge in the Giriama country, but having been refused by the Wagiriama at Mr. MacDougall's request, they are said to have retreated northwards to a Galla settlement on the River Sabaki; and Mr. Pigott anticipates that, if dislodged, as we propose they should be, from thence, they will go still further north towards the Tana. Though I hardly think myself that they will cross the foodless tract between the Sabaki and the Tana, and plunge in a region in which they are unknown and friendless, I have instructed Captain Rogers to be ready to receive them with the force at his disposal, in case they should be driven in that direction.

Sheikh Mubarak is, I believe, still at Mwareni. There are all sorts of rumours about him; some describing him as intending a fresh attack upon Rabai; whilst others say that his followers have all abandoned him, many having been killed in a recent attempted raid on Teita, and that his retreat into German territory is only a question of days. These reports are, however, all of native origin, and need to be received with great caution.

Mr. MacDougall has patrolled the country between Takaungu and Mombasa, has had several skirmishes with Hamis Kombo's people, and has taken from their villages a large quantity of grain. He has also destroyed, during a short visit he paid to Mombasa, a "boma" erected by Mwenyi Jaka, to the south of Kilindini, whence that outlaw and his people were in the habit of harassing the peaceful cultivators and traders of the district to the immediate south-west of Mombasa.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—I have just received a telegram from Mr. Pigott reporting the alleged arrival of Mubarak and his son Eyoub, with what object is unknown, at Mtongwe, on the south side of the Kilindini creek.

A. H. H.

No. 42.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, December 30, 1895.*

THE Indian force arrived yesterday at Mombasa all well.

It is Barrett's desire that a fortnight may be saved at Mombasa before they are taken on active service.

This would be in accordance with our plans.

No. 43.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 13, 1896.)*

My Lord,

*Zanzibar, December 18, 1895.*

THOUGH a series of small punitive expeditions have, since I had the honour to address to your Lordship my despatch on the 2nd instant, been carried out by the Protectorate force against parties of marauders in the Mombasa and Malindi districts, they have none of them been sufficiently important either in themselves or their results to merit any detailed report. I have, however, the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Mr. MacDougall, announcing the surrender to Captain Harrison of the powerful Giriama Chief Ngonio, or Neonyo, who, after refusing to harbour Mubarak of Takaungu, when he fled to him on our first occupation of Gonjoro, appears since to have made blood-brotherhood with him and with his brother Aziz, and to have offered a refuge at his residence near Mount Mangea, in the Giriama "Hinterland," to the rebels. Ngonio, though calling himself a M'giriama, is really of Digo origin, but he is regarded, nevertheless, as a Chief of considerable importance among the Giriama people, and his quiet obedience to Mr. MacDougall's summons is a very satisfactory symptom.

Major Hatch has visited the various garrisons near Mombasa and Takaungu, and has marched through Mweni Jaka's country, one shot only being fired at him. He has left a small garrison at Mtongwe, just south of Kilindini. The rumour of Mubarak's presence there, which I reported in my despatch of the 2nd instant, proved unfounded, but his son Eyoub appears to have passed a few days in the neighbourhood.

Though some of the coast villages between Mombasa and Kalifi have been persuaded to join Hamis Kombo, thus necessitating punitive visits by Mr. MacDougall's forces to Mtapwa and Kurwitu, the principal rebel Chiefs have apparently all left the vicinity both of Mombasa and of Takaungu, and the general opinion is that they are together at Marení, Sheikh Mubarak's place of refuge, in the Wanga district.

The Pongwe people who, upon the destruction of their villages after Captain Lawrence's death fled to Jasin and Moa, in German territory, have, so Mr. Wilson reports, been refused an asylum by the German authorities at both these frontier stations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 43.

*Mr. MacDougall to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Takaungu, December 3, 1895.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have been informed on the best authority that Baraka and Aziz, with their followers, have left this district some eight days ago; they went by a detour route, calling at Bomani forest, where they interviewed Hamis Kombo with a view to remove him to Weruni, but he declined to be removed, so they left a guard of 100 men with him for protection.

*Ngonio.*—I left orders with Captain Harrison that in the event of the Wagiriama Wazee failing to induce Ngonio to come to see me, or return the slaves which he bought from Aziz, to arrest him and send him down; so I am glad to state that he gave himself up to Captain Harrison, and came down under an escort.

I had a long conversation with him, and got him to give the slaves up. Now, it is my intention to detain him in Takaungu for a month at all events to see how affairs may turn.



I may state that he has entered into blood-brotherhood with Aziz and Baraka, and used to harbour the rebels; trusting you will approve of my action in the matter.

*Takaungu*.—There are about forty new houses built here by Wagunia and Mahaji, who have come in peace since the beginning of November.

An average of three per day comes in now-a-days.

The two Envoys (Wazee) who met the first expedition at Gonjora to say that Baraka was coming to meet the Consul-General and General Mathews in half-an-hour's time have come in on Sunday last.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) K. MacDOUGALL,  
District Officer.

## No. 44.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Zanzibar, January 18, 1896.

I THINK that until the rebellion is finally stamped out, and the leaders caught, nothing should be done with regard to slavery on the mainland, as otherwise an accession of strength may be given to the rebels from the feeling of universal hostility to interference with slaves of whom few are held there in contravention of the Treaties.

## No. 45.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 18, 1896.

WITH reference to your telegram of to-day, you should report how far you think the disaffection has spread inland; what steps you propose taking to put an end to it, and how long you consider the measures likely to take.

## No. 46.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received January 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Zanzibar, January 19, 1896, 4 P.M.

YOUR Lordship's telegram of 18th.

The disaffection amongst the coast tribes is confined to the district between the Malindi and the German frontier, and does not extend inland as much as 40 miles. There is a party at Mombasa, and in all the coast towns which is in sympathy with the rebels, as Moslems resisting Christians, and which helps them it appears, with supplies and information. But most of the leading Arabs are loyal to us, some of them actively and very usefully. They have no grievance against us except as regards the slavery question, and on that point they have been reassured by our promise, made at the change of administration, that the Moslem law and religion should be maintained; moreover they have everything to lose by joining the rebels.

If, however, we should interfere with the system of slavery, their present loyalty would be shaken, whilst its chief motive will vanish, if, being ruined by our measures, they have nothing left to lose. Many of the Arabs would probably then join Mubarak, and nearly all of them would be in a state of sullen passive opposition, instead of, as now, co-operating with us. If slaves were emancipated, moreover, their lawlessness might combine with the discontent of the entire free population to retard the restoration of order.

It is, of course, possible that the Indian troops may finish the disturbance by the capture of the rebel leaders, which they are going to attempt in a few days, and, although they may not succeed immediately, I hope that they will do so in the course of two or three months. But I would remind your Lordship that it took four years to pacify Witu and obtain the surrender of its Chiefs, although, in a smaller area, and with fewer difficulties to contend with.

I would also point out that a force under an English officer is urgently required for Kikuyu, but it could not possibly be spared if a general disaffection is to be caused in the coast provinces by anti-slavery legislation.

I have shown this telegram to the Protectorate Council at its monthly meeting held to-day, and the members concur unanimously in the views which I have here expressed.

## No. 47.

*Mr. Cave to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, January 21, 1896, 11:55 A.M.*

FRERE TOWN was attacked by the rebels this morning, but there were no casualties; the troops are in pursuit of them.

## No. 48.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, January 26, 1896.*

FRERE TOWN having been attacked by a band of 300 rebels, who had come in search of food to Bomani, 20 miles north of Mombasa, Barrett and the Indian troops moved against them on the 13th instant, but being led by treacherous guides into a tract of country where there was no water, the column narrowly escaped perishing of thirst, and was compelled to return here. I proceeded on the 23rd, accompanied by Hatch and Scott, to Bomani, the rebels retreating northwards on our approach. We placed seventy of the Indian troops in a stockade at Changoni, near Bomani, the occupation of which should clear the district to the immediate north of Mombasa, in the same way as the occupation of Tandia has cleared Sokoki. We shall probably also have to occupy Makongeni, whither a portion of the rebel force is said to be moving. Owing to the tactics adopted by the rebels of retreating everywhere on our approach to another position where they renew their depredations, it is extremely difficult to stamp them out, especially as they can move twice as rapidly as we can, as they are independent of guides and porters, and are speedily informed of our movements by the secret partisans which they have in every town on the coast.

## No. 49.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Malindi, February 13, 1896, 2 P.M.*

SEVERAL hundred rebels made an attack at dawn on Wednesday, the 12th instant, on the town of Malindi, which was simultaneously set fire to by incendiaries within it, causing considerable damage. Having heard that the greater part of the garrison had gone with the Wali to co-operate with the northern column, the rebels hoped to take the town, but they were repulsed and driven westward into the bush by the remainder of the force, consisting of fifty Indians and thirty-five Arab irregulars.

I arrived here with the Wali this morning, and intend to remain a few days in order to raise an Arab force to occupy Roka, which has joined in the rebellion. Any orders from your Lordship will be forwarded to me by ship from Mombasa.

The northern column is in West Giriama; the southern one, under Hatch, is delayed by want of water.

In spite of the harassing present warfare and the apparent lack of result, I am still hopeful that the rebellion can with patience be suppressed, but I most earnestly entreat your Lordship to postpone for the present any decision respecting slavery which could convert indispensable native co-operation into active hostility. The natives, whose help we cannot do without, will be alienated by anti-slavery legislation; we are now receiving hearty support from the loyal Arabs as well as from some of the Nyika tribes.

Please let us have the Soudanese from Egypt as soon as possible; we want more men to hold posts all over the country.

No. 50.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, February 17, 1896.*

I RETURNED from the Malindi district to-day, but am returning there immediately as the situation is somewhat critical. The burning of Malindi and the apparent smallness of our force have shaken the confidence which the Nyika tribes, 60,000 strong, had in our power, and some of them have joined the insurgents. Several Chiefs have promised, on our persuasion, to assist us in clearing the enemy out of North Giriama, but I doubt if their assurances are greatly to be trusted. With so many coast and Mission stations to be protected, we have little more than 200 men available for active operations. If an Indian regiment could be sent to garrison the coast ports for a few weeks, and thus free for work in the interior the greater part of our present forces, I think that the rising could be more quickly and cheaply crushed.

We had to postpone the occupation of Roka, as the Arab irregulars refused active service on account of the Fast of Ramadan having commenced. The mutineers have been imprisoned, and I hope in a few days' time to provide a sufficient force out of miscellaneous elements.

I trust that your Lordship will not blame me if the suppression of the troubles is somewhat slow. There is no reason for anxiety.

No. 51.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Cave.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 21, 1896.*

IT has been decided that an Indian regiment shall be sent. It will not be used for garrison work, but to take an active part in operations, which the Colonel will direct entirely. Its arrival at Mombasa may take place in little more than two weeks.

You should lose no time in arranging to receive it, and should consult General Mathews, as Mr. Hardinge is away.

No. 52.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, February 26, 1896.*

BEFORE retreating to Giriama the rebels destroyed Roka, which I have now occupied with forty Swahilis, who have been placed under an influential local Arab in a small fort. After destroying Mwarene, which they found deserted, and several other rebel villages, the southern column returned on the 24th. They were prevented from following up the rebels by want of water and supplies, but for the first time a thorough knowledge has been gained of the country, and Scott occupied Shimba as a basis of further operations on Saturday. Without showing open hostility the native tribes did their best to delay the movements of the force by passive obstruction. The supplies of the rebels are obtained from German territory. I have to thank your Lordship for sending out a regiment. Preparations are being made for its reception.

No. 53.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1896.*

IT is considered by Her Majesty's Government that the situation on the mainland is shown by your reports to be serious. Complete success has not attended the recent military operations in the interior; the rebels have become more active, disaffection is growing, and insecurity is general.

A material increase of the military element has been decided on, and an Indian regiment is to be sent out. Judicious measures of pacification may, however, have to supplement force. You and your advisers must by now be in a position to determine what were the causes of the original revolt and of the subsequent disaffection, and to form an opinion as to what remedies should be applied. I am anxious to know what result attends the deliberations of the Council, and I desire to impress on you the necessity of thoroughly thinking out the questions at issue.

## No. 54.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, February 28, 1896.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 27th instant, I fear that I have unwittingly drawn too gloomily a picture. Similar risings have often been led against the Sultans by Mubarak. He has been beaten in the field, but has worn them out by his guerilla tactics, and has thus created a belief in his invincibility among the natives, by which they are now led to assist him not so much from love as fear. He is in the present instance assisted by a strong undercurrent of Swahili and Arab sympathy with him, as a Moslem fighting against unbelievers, and by the latent but widespread popular resentment at the British policy with regard to the question of slavery, by which the natives are affected as to their religion, their incomes, and their women. This feeling is not, however, in my opinion, to any great extent spreading.

The increased activity on the part of the rebels is due to our own, and is in large part defensive, as, since Mwele, we have made no serious attacks until the Indians arrived. The struggle is now which will tire out the other, and once our inland positions can be held without their being any fear for the coast towns, the rebels will have to give in, as they did in Witu.

Personally, I have no anxiety when viewing the situation, although it is one in which patience is necessary. As I last year informed Lord Kimberley, it was bound to arise, as practically the two great Mazrui Chiefs were independent Potentates, by whom the Company was defied, and by whom the enforcement of the present slavery laws or any real Government authority would have been resisted.

## No. 55.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, March 2, 1896.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's last telegram, the rest of the Council are at Zanzibar, but General Mathews is here, and agrees with me in considering that the rising is not so much serious as troublesome. The personal insubordination of an Arab Chief was its origin, who formed a rallying point, and lent shape to a discontent which already existed. Where a once dominant Moslem race is subject to European rule some discontent must always be latent, but at present it is neither bitter nor deep here. British sentiment will not permit remedial measures on the one real grievance, interference with slavery, and the only thing to be done is to continue the present policy of suppressing the rebellion, and, as has already been done to some extent, by clemency to those who submit, detaching the rank and file. To hint at making concessions to the Chiefs would be considered as implying exhaustion, and would merely give them increased strength; once, however, they are actually crushed conciliation may be employed in dealing with their lands, which have been confiscated, and possibly, as I have already suggested, a safe post given to one of the younger children of Mubarak.

No. 56.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 4, 1896, 4 P.M.*

THE regiment will embark to-morrow, and should reach Mombasa on the 15th. There will be 12 European, 1 medical, and 16 native officers; total, of all ranks, 721.

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No. 57.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, March 4, 1896.*

A WHOLESOME effect has been produced by our march through Giriama, and the lesson which Wake has given. I was met yesterday at Tandia by some sixty of their elders, who took an oath to drive the rebels out of their country, and punish all by whom they should be harboured. A position on the Shimba range has been occupied by Scott, by whom the rebels were driven off with a loss.

I am to-day returning to Zanzibar.

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No. 58.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Zanzibar, March 15, 1896.*

THE regiment arrived to-day at Mombasa. The arrangements to receive it have all been finished. I am to-day leaving for Mombasa.

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No. 59.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, February 17, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I left Mombasa on the 2nd instant for Makongeni, with the northern division of the force now operating against the Mazrui rebels, which consisted of 100 Zanzibaris and Soudanese under the command of Captain Harrison. Dr. Hinde, medical officer for the Ukamba Province, accompanied us with the view of going on with me via the Sabaki route to Tsavo, where Mr. Bradbridge, who had left Mombasa simultaneously by the direct route, was to join and proceed with us to Machakos.

Our road lay through the heart of the country known as Giriama, and as the attitude of its people is a factor of some importance in the suppression of the present rising, I propose in this despatch to describe as briefly as possible their character and institutions, in the hope that a concise account of them may be found useful, if only for future reference.

*Geographical Limits and Features.*

Giriama is a tract of about 60 miles in length, and 30 or 40 miles in breadth, extending from the Rabai Hills, on the south, to the River Sabaki, on the north. Its eastern boundary is a line running about 12 or 15 miles, at some points less, inland from the coast; its western, the almost waterless desert, inhabited only by a few nomad Gallas or Wasania, which separates the coast region to the north of Mombasa

from Ukambani. It is, generally speaking, an undulating country, and may be said to rise from the littoral in a succession of parallel or almost parallel ridges. There are few high hills in it, the only ones deserving the name of mountains being, so far as I know, Mangepa (1,600 feet high) in the north, and Mwaiha (about 1,000 feet) in the centre of the territory.

The Rev. W. Taylor, of the Church Missionary Society, who knows it well and has composed a grammar and vocabulary of the Giriama language, divides the country into three parts, Southern, Central, and Northern Giriama, but though this division is a very convenient one and corresponds to certain natural features, the people themselves seem to prefer one into two great districts, the "Weruni," or grass country, in the south, and "Godomo" (so-called after a group of villages bearing that name) in the centre and north of the territory. These again are subdivided into a number of sub-districts, known as "malalo" (plural of "lalo") and corresponding roughly to the English parish. Mr. Taylor estimates the number of these "malalo" at seventy, but many of them, particularly in the Weruni, which was visited some years ago by a very severe famine in addition to Masai raids, are now deserted. Others include numerous villages and hamlets, ranging on an average from twenty to 100 huts.

Weruni is merely a pastoral, and Godomo an agricultural country, but both are dotted over with forests and woods, full of aloes, cactus, and euphorbia, of which the most important is perhaps the Soko forest on the eastern boundary of Godomo, extending about 30 miles from the neighbourhood of Gonjoro to Arabuco, 10 miles south-west of Malindi. Notwithstanding these forests the country presents, like all the "Nyika," or intermediate zone between the highlands of the interior and the coast, a somewhat parched and arid appearance in the dry season, and the want of water is severely felt, as there are very few streams, the only river being one running into the Kalifi Creek, which though known by different names to the various tribes through whose territories it passes, is believed to be identical with the Voi. I crossed this stream repeatedly in the course of my recent march, and found it often almost dry. Some of the minor brooks and springs (the Nzovuni for example) are salt and brackish, and it is only at comparatively rare intervals that really good water, other than rain-water, is to be found in the wells and pools.

The central and northern region is the most fertile part of Giriama, and large tracts of it are under cultivation, producing abundant harvests of millet and Indian corn. Cocoanuts are rare; I only saw three plantations, two at Dida and Rare, both in Northern Giriama, and one on the northern border of the Weruni, but the papaya tree and the pine-apple are common. Manioc and cassava are also grown.

#### *Population.*

The Giriama people are a sub-division of the Wanyika, the Bantu race inhabiting the Nyika or region between the coast from Malindi to Pangani and the interior, and resemble the other Nyika tribes (Duruma, Digo, Kauma, Chogni, &c.) in their general characteristics, considering themselves, however, and I think with justice, slightly superior to the rest in courage, intelligence, and civilization. They are a vigorous and for East Africa fairly handsome race, of a dark brown, almost black colour, and regular features and a quick intelligent expression are often met with among them. The dress of both sexes is as a rule a loin cloth, with, in some cases, a mantle thrown loosely over the shoulders, but the Elders, or "Wazee," wear a fuller sized loin cloth than the "vijana," or young men not yet admitted to full civil privileges, and are distinguished by a wooden bracelet called the "luwu," which is worn on the left arm. All are fond of brass armlets and beads.

It is difficult to estimate the population of Giriama, but Mr. MacDougall, the District Officer for Malindi, within whose bounds the most populous part of it is situated, places it at 60,000 to 70,000. I should have said it was a little more; it can certainly, I should imagine, not be less. I am told, for instance, that there are no fewer than 2,000 Elders.

#### *Government.*

The political organization of the country is very loose, but there is a kind of Constitution, Republican in its general character, and based partly on tribal divisions, partly on a system of freemasonry called "Kambi," involving, according to Mr. Taylor,

four ceremonies of initiation, in which a conspicuous part is played by payments to the Elders, and public banquets, and each of which is named after its own special ceremonial dance. Admission to these four degrees is necessary before the candidate can become a full freeman and sit in the "Moro," or General Assembly, which is convoked from time to time to discuss any question of public interest at the "Kaya," or capital of the whole Giriama people. Within the "Kambi" is an inner circle of Elders, called "Waya," who are invested with certain judicial attributes, but whose meetings, whether at the "Kaya" or in their own districts, for there is a local "Waya" in each, are mainly for the purposes of feasting. When on passing through Nzovuni I summoned the Elders for an interview with me, they had just had a meeting of the "Waya," at which they had drunk so much "tembo," that they were all lying on the ground in a state of helpless intoxication.

Within this circle of Elders is another still more exclusive body, who are known as the "Fisi" or "Hyenas," and being supposed to be the depositories of magical powers, are regarded with superstitious respect. The apex of the organization is formed by the three "Enyetsi," or "Lords of the Land," who wield the chief executive and judicial authority, and convoke at least once a year or oftener, as the necessity may arise, the meetings of the "Moro" at the "Kaya." These "Enyetsi" are supposed to represent the six tribes composing the Giriama nation, viz., Mkisa (the first tribe in rank), Milalani, Molulu, Mparwa, Maganjoni, and Mkizini, and assume office in accordance with a system of rotation something like that of the Attic Prytanies, a vacancy in their number being filled by the senior Elder (*i.e.*, member of the "Waya" and "Fisi") of the tribe next on the list to that to which the last "Lord of the Land" belonged. The three "Enyetsi" at present are Kombo and Mwazize, who reside in the south, at and near the "Kaya," or capital, and Mbaruku (to use the Swahili corruption of the Arabic name, Mubarak), who lives habitually at Bararani, in the north-west. The "Kaya" itself, generally known as "Kaya ya Fungo," after Fungo, a late Chief, who long lived there as the senior of the "Enyetsi," is situated at the extreme southern end of Giriama, about 10 miles north-west of Rabai, and except that it is the seat of the National Assemblies, and the residence of the principal Magistrates, is an insignificant village enough. It appeared when I visited it to be inhabited only by a few old men, and the country in its immediate neighbourhood looks barren and thinly peopled.

The administration of justice is very simple. All offences, even murder, can be atoned for by a fine, generally in cows, paid to the victim's family. If the offender cannot pay, he must work till he earns the amount requisite, which, in cases of theft, is double the value of the article stolen. If he denies the charge he is taken before the "Fisi," and made to undergo the ordeal of "swearing by the Hyena," it being commonly believed that a false oath made in the name of this sacred animal, will entail the death of its author, a belief which the "Fisi," I understand, keep up by first causing the secret assassination of any person suspected by them to have committed perjury in their presence, and then proclaiming the death to be due to supernatural agency.

#### *Religion.*

Mr. Taylor asserts that the Giriama people, or, at least, those among them who have passed by initiation into the Kambi, have a fairly elaborate religious and sacrificial system, in which the two principles of Good and Evil are typified by the chameleon and another lizard, called the "Mugakha," and in which worship is offered to the shades of ancestors, and as he lived long among them, and gleaned much interesting information respecting their "mysteries" from Giriama converts to Christianity, I would not venture to dispute his authority, but my own inquiries of them would have led me to infer that their only creed was what may be called "Primitive Agnosticism." They admitted vaguely the existence of a Deity, but knew nothing about him or his relations to mankind, and appeared to regard the immortality of the soul as doubtful, though they evidently believed in evil spirits, the hyena being sacred as the type of one of them, and habitually practised to propitiate them certain magical or semi-magical rites. At the "Kaya," one of the Elders who took me to see the "Moro," an open space surrounded by low seats outside a dome-shaped grass hut, informed me that the latter was the habitation of the "Muanza," apparently a kind of spirit, speaking through the medium of a sacred drum which is employed in the ceremonies of initiation to the various degrees, producing most hideous and unearthly sounds, but that they knew nothing of any places of worship, such as the mosques or

churches of the Moslems and Christians, or of invocations addressed to any divine beings. They practise circumcision, and all the children of a tribe circumcised on the same day, form a tribal subdivision, which determines the rule of seniority under which the Enyetsi qualify for office; but the ceremony is secular rather than religious, so far as it is possible in dealing with the rites of a primitive people, to separate the two ideas.

It must, however, be borne in mind that a certain reserve often exists among people such as the Giriama in replying to the questions of a stranger, especially a Government official, about their religious mysteries, and that a missionary like Mr. Taylor, living among them, and constantly conversing on such subjects, especially with the Elders, might learn much which would remain hidden from myself. He says himself that they are very unwilling to speak of their religion, closely connected as it is with their freemasonry, to any but the initiated, and that even the younger men among them are kept in ignorance respecting it, and beyond a vague general conception of a God, regarded as identical with the "sky," have no clear or definite beliefs.

#### *Tenure of Property. Slavery, and Marriage.*

The idea of permanent property in land is unknown to the Giriama people: land belongs to the occupier only so long as he remains on it and cultivates it, if he leaves it, any one is free to squat there, nor does it descend to his children unless they continue to reside on it. Houses, cattle, and slaves, and, generally speaking, all personal effects are, however, recognized as absolute property, and divided equally among the male children of their owner on his death, any disputes as to the division being referred to the Elders of the "Lalo" in which they may arise. The slaves are always natives of other tribes, the Giriama people being all free, and are bought by them either from the coast Arabs and Swahilis, or from the other native races inland, who raid for cattle and slaves on one another.

I saw some Yaos and Nyasa people in the houses of big Giriama Chiefs, but the Giriama complained that, owing to our measures against the Slave Trade, the supply was steadily decreasing, though of late they have bought a number of slaves from Mubarak of Gazi, and the other Mazrui outlaws, supplying them in exchange with food or with cloth purchased in the coast towns. The slavery is, however, very nominal, and consists chiefly in carrying water, cooking, and helping to cultivate the master's land for a few hours a-day in return for a share in his food, as the Giriama being an indolent people, with few wants, require little labour to satisfy them; in fact, as among all these East African tribes, the real "slaves" are the women, whether called free or slave, and it is by them that most of the manual work is done. I need scarcely say that as Giriama is almost everywhere beyond the Sultan's 10-mile limit, and that as, even where it is not, the possession of slaves by persons who are neither Moslems nor "People with a Book" is not sanctioned by the Sheria, this servile relation, such as it is, is not recognized as legal by our authorities.

The Giriama are unlimited polygamists, and there is no restraint on the number of wives they may possess. Ngonio, the Chief of Dida, and the richest man among them, has thirty, but his is a somewhat exceptional case. Marriage is practically a sale, the bride, who brings her husband no dowry, as female children do not inherit, being given away by her family in exchange for a number of cows proportionate to the wealth and position of the parties. Concubinage, as the Mahommedans understand it, does not exist, nor, so far as I am aware, is there any difference of status between a free and a slave wife. Some of Ngonio's "wives," for example, are Galla slaves.

#### *Military Force.*

No regular military organization can be said to exist in Giriama, but almost the whole male population are armed with bows and arrows and spears, and if any district is attacked, whether by the coast people or by other tribes, all the men in it (but not necessarily those of other districts, still less of the territory as a whole), between the ages of 18 and 40, would turn out to the sound of their drums and war horns, under the leadership of their respective "Wazee," to fight the invaders. Thus, in the country all round Jilore, where the Giriama and the other Wanyika living among them are very loyal and well-disposed, 200 of them quite recently offered to follow the Wali of Malindi against the rebels, and promised, if desired, to bring more warriors from neighbouring



districts. Nor, although they have no guns, are they an entirely despicable enemy. Some years ago Sheikh Salim-bin-Ilamis, of Takaungu, sent to attack those living near Mount Mungea, a force of several hundred men, armed with muzzle-loaders, under the command of his nephew, Mubarak, the Chief whose pretensions were the origin of the present rebellion. The Giriama drew them on into a waterless neighbourhood, where the Mazrui force suffered greatly from thirst, and then fell upon them with showers of poisoned arrows, killing several of Sheikh Salim's Arab Akidas, and over 100 of his fighting slaves, and driving the rest back to Gonjoro.

Such is the general character of the country and people on whom the Mazrui outlaws to the north of Mombasa mainly depend for food and refuge, and who have hitherto, ever since the beginning of the disturbances last June, maintained, with a few exceptions, a neutrality if anything rather friendly to the rebels than to Government.

The principal reason for this attitude on the part of the Giriama is not, I believe, sympathy with Mubarak and Aziz, but a conviction which I found shared even by so intelligent a man as Ngonio, that their power, even though it may suffer a temporary eclipse, will, in the long run, be re-established, and that those who have befriended the Government will be made to rue it.

The prestige enjoyed by Mubarak of Gazi, which completely overshadows that of his kinsmen of Takaungu, is immense throughout the whole Nyika, and is due largely to the impolitic manner in which successive Sultans of Zanzibar, after destroying his strongholds and driving him into the bush, ended by making peace with him, and giving him back his subsidy, from sheer weariness of the guerilla tactics employed by him to harass and elude their forces. When he came back to his own again, he inflicted fearful vengeance on those who had in any way assisted his enemies.

I was told, for instance, by an Arab officer that he seized all the natives who had acted as guides to the Sultan's troops, and nailed them to trees on the various highways, where they were left to die a lingering death, or be devoured alive by vultures or wild beasts.

The ignorant Wanyika do not distinguish the English Government from that of the Sultan, which also employed European officers, or from that of the Company, which was necessarily pacific; they know of it only as the white power in the coast towns, which the Mazrui has repeatedly defied, and though they recognize that we are strong enough to take places like Mwele, whilst the rebels dare not meet us in the open, and that if they themselves actually threw in their lot with them we could punish them severely for it, they yet believe that sooner or later the fruitlessness of our efforts to crush the outlaws will weary us into making terms with them. Some even fancy that Mubarak is able by magical arts to mesmerize, so to speak, foes physically far superior to himself, and this adds to the terror which he inspires. Hence it is that while they hesitate to give us news or assist us at all actively, they harbour the rebels, many of whom it should be remembered are what are called here "Mahajis," or Wanyika who have embraced Mahomedanism, but who still keep up close relations with their pagan kinsfolk, feed them, buy the slaves whom they have kidnapped in their raids upon the coast people, and supply them with accurate information as to all our movements. They feel, naturally, no sympathy and a good deal of distrust for white strangers, and, I think, dislike our policy respecting slavery. I tried to make them see that that policy prevented their children from being stolen by the coast people and sold into bondage; but, as a matter of fact, the Arabs and Swahilis, though they might kidnap individuals here and there, seem to have felt it imprudent to make enemies of large tribes living so close to the coast, and abstained, therefore, from systematic raids on them, finding it more advantageous to trade with them in slaves brought from the far interior or over sea, whilst the Giriama themselves profited by, and some of their Chiefs grew rich on, the traffic. Their marriage being, moreover, a sale, and allowing of any number of wives, they sometimes sold their daughters as wives to the Arabs, who, of course, made them into ordinary concubines.

I endeavoured, accordingly, during the stay of ten days or so that I made in the Giriama country to impress on the natives, at all the places at which we camped, the difference between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Sultan, reminding them that, though the Nabhans in Witu had long defied the power of Seyyid Barghash, Fumo Omari was now a prisoner in our hands, and warning them that gratuitous assistance given to the enemy would bring destruction on their villages

and plantations. I said I quite admitted that, if the outlaws came in force to one of their villages, they could not with a few bows and arrows be expected to drive off men with guns, but that what we did expect was that they should send news to the nearest Government officer, and should not go out of their way to give the rebels information respecting us.

They have, moreover, harboured among them large numbers of slaves of the rebel Chiefs (who have been cultivating in small bands of three or four, disguised as Wanyika, in the shambas throughout Giriama) when the leaders were too short of food to maintain them, but who have, now that the latter have determined on fresh raids, once more rallied at their masters' call, attracted by the pleasing prospect of looting the plantations and coast villages. It was to collect these scattered slaves round his standard for his attack on Malindi that Aziz-bin-Rashid recently came to northern Giriama, and I urged the natives, should these slaves return there after being once more scattered, to dissuade them from rejoining their masters, and assure them in my name that they would receive a full pardon, and the freedom besides, if they came down to the coast and gave up their arms. I added that the Government were absolutely determined to put down the rebellion, and that they had every interest in its speedy suppression, since so long as it lasted an order that I have given at Malindi and Takaungu would remain in force, to the effect that no cloth or food which they could supply to the rebels in exchange for slaves stolen from the coast is to be sold to the Wanyika without special permission of the Walis or District Officers.

Mr. MacDougall, who is still with the northern column, is to have an interview with as many of the Chiefs as he can get together at Bararani, and try to induce them to dissociate themselves entirely from the rebels.

One Chief, Ngonio, of Dida and Rare, to whom I have already in several previous despatches referred, and whom I shall again have occasion to mention, has already shown himself thoroughly friendly. He was taken down to Takaungu some two months ago on suspicion of being in communication with the rebels, and kept for some weeks under gentle supervision in the fort, and then allowed to return to his country. I stayed at his village on my way through Giriama, and he gave us the fullest information as to the doings of the rebels, as well as provisions and guides to Makongeni, assuring me that when Mubarak of Takaungu fled for refuge to him after the taking of Gonjoro, he had told him that he could not harbour him, and that he must leave his district the same day.

Ngonio struck me as a very superior man; his house was built something in the Swahili fashion, of baked earth with a verandah supported by wooden posts, instead, as is usual in the Nyika, of straw, and his whole manner and conversation were far more civilized and intelligent than those of the other Giriama Chiefs I had met. He is the third ruler of his race, and perhaps the richest man in Giriama, his father Mavua, and his grandfather Magandi, the founders of his family's power, having accumulated much wealth by slave trading. He is looked upon in consequence with a good deal of jealousy by the other Giriama magnates, and himself assumes a somewhat independent attitude towards the "Enyetsi" and Elders at the Kaya.

It was at Ngonio's that I received, on the evening of the 7th instant, from a runner sent by Mr. Pigott, your Lordship's instructions to me to put off my journey to the interior, and I accordingly decided to return via Malindi, to which I was already somewhat nearer than to Mombasa. This plan had the advantage of not detaching any men from the northern force to escort me back through the unsettled country between Dida and Mombasa, and of enabling me to return to the coast with Captain Taubman, who, with an escort from Malindi, was to bring up our provisions for the Sabuki.

We reached Makongeni on the morning of the 9th, Captain Taubman and the Wali of Malindi joining us the same evening, and, after remaining a day to rest the men and destroy a hostile village a few miles off called Dungu's, I started for Malindi on the morning of the 11th, and arrived there two days later, being met on the way, at Jilore, by the news of the attack upon the town.

Though I am sensible of the inordinate length of this despatch, I ought, perhaps, before closing it to say a few words about affairs at Makongeni.

Makongeni (about 80 miles north-west of Mombasa) is a district or collection of villages on both banks of the Sabaki, inhabited partly by Giriama and other Nyika colonists, some of whom have crossed the river, the natural northern boundary of Giriama, but chiefly by Watoro or runaway slaves from the coast, who have established settlements resembling those of Goshu on the Juba. Each of these little communities

of runaways is practically independent of the others, but, as in Gosha, there are a few "big men" ruling large villages, whose influence, rather than formal authority, is recognized by the rest.

The most important of these is a man named Alitete, who formerly occupied a village to the north of the river, almost opposite Captain Lugard's stone "boma." His attitude towards the rebels, and, indeed, that of the Makongeni people generally, was for much the same reasons as influence the Giriama at first somewhat doubtful, but he was persuaded by Mr. Weaver, Assistant District Officer at Malindi, and by the sight of the working of a Maxim gun which he was shown and allowed to fire on Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" when visiting Malindi, and which he was casually informed could easily be transported to Makongeni, to bring a large number of his people and come himself to settle in the immediate neighbourhood of the coast, where they will be under more effective supervision and control till these troubles are over. Comparatively few inhabitants are, accordingly, left in the old "Watoro" villages, and of these, some forty men were taken by Aziz-bin-Rashid a few days before our arrival, while he was collecting his scattered slaves in northern Giriama, and compelled, I gather, rather reluctantly, to join his forces. Later on, however, it is to be hoped that Makongeni may be re-peopled, and that the population may spread along the river, for, though the climate is said to be feverish for Europeans, and even Arabs, it is not so for the negroes, and the soil, at any rate, in Makongeni proper appears fertile, producing very fine Indian corn.

The road along the river to Tzavo is said to be so overgrown with cactus and other tropical growths as to be practically blocked, though I hear a caravan of Wakamba lately came down that way, and had we gone by it we should have had to cut our way along in many places, thus incurring considerable delay. The Watoro discourage its being kept open, not caring for the visits of European, and especially of Arab or Swahili, caravans, some of which might bring up their former owners, and prefer to be encompassed on every side, even on the overland roads to Mombasa and Malindi, by miles of dense bush into which they can, if necessary, run for refuge if attacked. For the same reason, presumably, they have pulled to pieces Captain Lugard's stone "boma," which would have afforded a splendid camping position for any Arabs who might, in the days of the Company, when the practice was permitted, have come up on recapturing forays.

I have the honour, in conclusion, to inclose an itinerary of my journey through Giriama, from Mombasa to Makongeni, and thence to Malindi, together with a map showing the principal routes, and thus illustrating the movements of the northern column, on which latter I propose to report in a separate despatch.

Your Lordship will observe that, though my route was generally due north, I diverged from it slightly to the east to visit the garrisons at Tanganiko and Tandia, the latter in charge of Mr. Vice-Consul Wake, who has done excellent work in drilling the raw Swahili recruits sent him, and whom I propose to continue to detach from Mombasa for the present.

I should add that I observed with regret as we marched through the country that it was being passed over in a northerly direction by swarms of locusts, who had already done considerable damage. We came across them first in the Weruni, and they kept with us all the way to Makongeni, but their flight was evidently due north, as on branching off in an east-south-east direction towards Malindi, I noticed that they diminished in numbers, and that the plantations round the town itself were free from them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 59.

ITINERARY of Northern Division of Force operating against the Mazrui rebels, from Mombasa via Giriama to the Sabaki (Makongeni), February 2 to 10, 1896.

| Camps and Halting-places. | Miles from Point to Point. | Hours.   | Miles from Mombasa. | Remarks.  |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------|---|
| *Mombasa .. ..            | —                          | —  | —                   |   |
| *Rabai .. ..              | 12                         | 3½   | 12                  | Steam-launch up Mombasa Creek to Dandarini, 3 miles from Rabai.   |
| Jimba .. ..               | 3                          | 1½   | 15                  | German Mission Station. Thence 8 miles through scrub and brushwood. No water. Border of Giriama country and of Zanzibar dominions passed soon after leaving Jimba.  |
| *Kaya ya Fungo .. ..      | 8                          | 3½   | 23                  | Small village, with only nine inhabited houses, but political capital of whole Giriama race. Water half a mile to three-quarters of a mile from village. Thence road for two hours through park-like country, undulating and well timbered; no water in dry season. Swampy ground in depressions. One or two small hamlets.   |
| Dongoni .. ..             | 6                          | 2  | 29                  | Six cross roads meet at Dongoni. Pool of bad water. Undulating grass country continues, with views of Taita Hills and of Mbungu (German Mission Station) on left. Small villages (Viragoni, Gandzoni), with shambas and woods.  |
| Papea .. ..               | 4                          | 1½   | 33                  | Deserted Giriama villages to east of road. Coconut plantations soon after leaving Papea; then thick woods of cactus and euphorbia.  |
| Takatuni .. ..            | 2                          | 40 minutes   | 35                  | Large hamlet to east of road, whence direct roads to Rabai, Mura Moza, and Ribe. Woods continue till the road strikes the Nzovuni River.  |
| *Nzovuni .. ..            | 2½                         | 1  | 37½                 | Camping ground on high ground, dotted about with brushwood, overlooking river, to which there is a steep descent. Water brackish. Small Giriama hamlets about 1 mile off. Thence through open bush, followed by thick woods, road crossing Nzovuni stream twice.  |
| Kabanini .. ..            | 5                          | 2  | 42                  | Border of Weruni and Godomo. Dense woods, on descending from which into a fairly broad open valley the Nzovuni River is crossed near some curiously-shaped rocks at Pali-kumi.  |
| Pali-umi .. ..            | 2                          | 40 minutes   | 44                  | Road rises on west side of Nzovuni, into open undulating country, cultivated on all sides, and full of Giriama villages and plantations. Mwaiba Hill visible to east.   |
| Kazi ya Moyo .. ..        | 4                          | 1½   | 48                  | Road, which has hitherto been north, here turns east towards Mwaiba (a high spur rising out of surrounding undulating country), round whose base it runs, but shorter path across ridge to back of it, passing numerous Giriama villages (Zofa, Mizigini, &c.). Wells and pools at short intervals, but water indifferent. Indian corn and millet abundant. Red clay soil, and good Arab paths, lined with pineapple and prickly pears, throughout district.  |
| Chori, or Koeni .. ..     | 4                          | 2<br>allowing<br>for halt<br>at 20<br>for really<br>1 hr. and<br>20 min. | 52                  | Joint Swahili and Giriama village, with stone house belonging to Mahomed-bin-Khalfan, a loyal Mazrui, who is the Chief of the Swahilis of the district; the Giriama Chief being an old man named Bramba. Stream with good water both north and south of village. Small stone mosque. Mubarak stayed here in September last, and punished Mahomd-bin-Khalfan for his loyalty by stealing eighty of his slaves, representing nearly 500 <i>l</i> .<br>Route descends in an easterly direction to Tanganiko. |

| Camps and Halting-places. | Miles from Point to Point. | Hours.      | Miles from Mombasa. | Remarks.   |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------|--|
| Tanganiko .. ..           | 3                          | 1½          | 55                  | Large Swahili town, destroyed July last by Aziz-bin-Rashid, but now rising from its ashes, under protection of fort held by 100 Arab irregulars. It was formerly, owing to the water communication afforded by its position on a branch of the Kalifi Creek, the chief port of Giriama. Water in creek itself saline, but good supply from small stream quarter of a mile from town.<br>From Tanganiko the route turns northwards, following the summit of the western ridge of the valley traversed by the east branch of the Kalifi Creek (or Voi River), whence Jibana and other high hills in Mombasa district are visible. Thence it descends into the valley, crosses the river bed (dry in hot season), and, following base of eastern ridge, ascends hill of Tandia due north. |
| *Tandia .. ..             | 5½                         | 2½          | 60½                 | Fort built in November last to keep rebels from Suoke district. Giriama villages to north and west; Kauma villages (one called Tandia close to fort) to east, this being boundary between the two tribes. Commanding position, good water, but not sufficient to supply a very large force in dry season.<br>Route continues north over high undulating and cultivated country.  |
| Danija .. ..              | 3                          | 1½          | 63                  | Largest of several Giriama villages, of which the country appears full. After leaving it, cross the Voi, and passing Kwa Mango reach Rare, a group of villages, one of which, on high hill with palm trees, the residence and burial-place of Mavun, late Chief of this district.  |
| Rare .. ..                | 4                          | 1 hr. 20 m. | 67                  | Open downs, with views of Mungea and other distant hills.  |
| *Dada (Ngonio's) .. ..    | 3½                         | 1½          | 70½                 | Camp near pool to south-west of village, which is a large one, Ngonio's house being mud built, with verandah in Swahili style. Water fair. Good coconuts.  |
| Sinikumbe .. ..           | 7½                         | 3           | 77½                 | Wood to immediate north of Dida, thence grass scrub, followed by thick low forest for one hour and a-half, on emerging from which the district of Sinikumbe, at the foot of Mount Mungea, is entered. Shambas, Giriama villages, and water here.   |
| Kilimbi .. ..             | 1                          | } 1½ {      | 78½                 | Pineapple and prickly pear abundant. Wooded country, but cleared in many directions. Numerous Giriama villages. Good water at Makusidi.<br>Skirt eastern base of Mount Mungea, ascending over its eastern ridge (another and somewhat longer route for caravans is to cross summit of mountain, which is thickly wooded), and traversing at first fairly open country and plantations, then woods full of aloes and euphorbia. Soil sandy.   |
| Hulama .. ..              | 1½                         |             | 80                  |  |
| Makusidi .. ..            | 1                          |             | 81                  |  |
| *Weru Langula (Mungea)    | 7                          | 3           | 88                  | Camp on open space (grass and scrub) on emerging from forest immediately above Mungea. No water. A short time after leaving Weru Langula the forest is re-entered, and becomes denser as the road continues, ascending and descending a series of small hills, till flat, open, cultivated country is again reached, a few miles from the river. In these woods the nomad hunter tribe of Wasania are first met with, and cutting of branches and cactus has to be done in places.   |

| Camps and Halting-place. | Miles from Point to Point. | Hours.     | Miles from Mombasa. | Remarks.  |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------|---------------------|---|
| Sabaki River .. ..       | 8                          | 3½         | 96                  | The Sabaki here flows through fertile plantations of Indian corn, cultivated by Watoro (runaway slaves), whose villages lie scattered amidst clumps of trees on the slopes of the hills to its back. A little under an hour's march from the point where it is first seen is Captain Lugard's stone bonna, known for convenience as Makongeni, but called by the natives the stone fort ("bonna ya mawi"), or the European's fort "bonna ya Mzungu"). |
| *Makongeni .. ..         | 2½                         | 40 minutes | 98½                 |   |

## OBSERVATIONS.

*Length of Route.*—The route described above is 12 miles longer than that given in the Intelligence Department Hand-book to East Africa (pp. 106-107), a circumstance due to the fact that the force deviated slightly to the west, in order to visit the Giriama capital (Kaya Fungo), and again to the east-north-east to visit the garrison at Tandia.

*Food Supplies.*—These, in the shape of goats, chicken, and "mihindi" (maize), can be obtained almost everywhere, save between Makasidi and Makongeni, with a little trouble, so I have enumerated only the watering places. The Giriama people are, however, often unwilling to sell their goats, except for fancy prices, and a good deal of tedious discussion is apt to precede any transaction. Fuel is plentiful at all the camps, which are distinguished from the halting-places by being marked thus \*.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 59.

*Sketch Map illustrating Operations of Northern Column, February 2 to 16, 1896.*

[See Map facing p. 114.]

## No. 60.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received March 23.)

My Lord,

Mombasa, February 17, 1896.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows, in continuation of my last preceding despatch and of my telegram of the 13th instant, respecting the recent rebel attack on Malindi.

Having heard that an expedition under Major Hatch was proceeding to Mwareni, Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, Mubarak-bin-Rashid, Aziz-bin-Rashid, and Salim-bin-Jembea, of Arabuco, collected a force at Kurwitu, in the north-west of the Giriama country, composed partly of a compact body of 200 to 300 men, whom they had brought up with them from the south, and partly of their scattered slaves, who, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my last despatch, were living in small parties of two or three in the Wanyika villages.

They had learnt that the northern column, which was to advance on Kurwitu, was to effect, for the purpose of victualling, a junction at Makongeni with a force from Malindi under the Wali, Said-bin-Hamid, and they therefore concluded that the latter town would be left with no troops, or only a very few, to defend it, and that they might by a rapid march attack and sack it before the Wali and his force could return there. The report that an "European" (Captain Taubman) accompanied the Wali, led them, moreover, to believe that the English Assistant District Officer, Mr. Weaver, must also have left Malindi.

They accordingly started on the night of the 10th instant, while we were still at Makongeni, in three columns, 450 strong in all, under Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, Aziz-bin-Rashid, and Salim-bin-Jembea respectively, Mubarak-bin-Rashid (of Takaungu) being left behind with the women and a small force of fifty men or so at Kurwitu (which he

was to evacuate, falling further back into the bush, the moment Captain Harrison advanced on him), and marching night and day, but avoiding those Giriama districts which were known to be comparatively well affected to us, such as Dida, arrived near Watamu, about two and a-half hours from Malindi, on the evening of the 11th. There they rested for a few hours in a plantation belonging to Mubarak-bin-Rashid, having suffered terribly, so we learnt from a deserter, from want of water on the road, and, resuming their march in one column, reached Malindi about 3 on the morning of the 12th, where they again divided into three bodies. These were to enter the town from three different sides amidst the confusion caused by fires which were to be kindled at a given signal by secret emissaries already lying concealed within Malindi. These latter had most of them apparently slipped into the town on the previous evening, and as they wore the ordinary dress of the poorer class of Swahilis, and carried no weapons except a match-box and a small torch hidden under their shirts, had attracted no attention.

At 4.20 a.m., just as the Indian guard had come off patrol duty and were awaiting Mr. Weaver's further orders at the Government-house, flames were seen to burst forth suddenly and simultaneously from several quarters of the town, whilst at the same moment, under cover of the darkness, a heavy fire was opened upon the outposts (a few hundred yards from the furthest houses), which were held by some thirty to forty Arab and Baluchi irregulars. The latter at once returned it, whilst the Indian force fell in and doubled to the outposts, where, after about an hour's desultory firing, they drove the enemy off as day was beginning to break, killing, however, owing to the darkness, only a few of them, one of whom was an "akida," or standard-bearer. The Wali of Mambrui, Sef-bin-Salim, pursued them, at the head of the Arabs, for a considerable distance, outside the town, till, faithful to their habitual tactics, they broke up in all directions into small bodies, disappearing into the long grass or thick bush. Meanwhile, however, before the Indians could come up, a few parties of the rebels, led by Salim Jembea, had passed between the fire of the outposts into the outlying portion of the town, where they looted an Indian shop, killed and brutally mutilated an Arab lady, and shot an invalided Zanzibar Askari, who, on hearing the noise had rushed out into the street. All this time, too, the flames were spreading with fearful rapidity, fanned by a strong wind, and favoured by the fact that the huts of the closely-packed Swahili quarter in the outskirts of Malindi are covered with makuti thatch, peculiarly inflammable after several months of hot dry weather, and before the conflagration could be extinguished over 400 houses, inhabited chiefly by the poorer class of Swahilis, but some of them belonging to rich Arabs against whom Salim Jembea entertained special grudges, had been entirely or partially consumed.

Besides the two persons murdered as described above, some fifteen were more or less seriously burnt, two old people, who were too infirm to escape from their dwelling, being actually burnt to death in it, but the rebels failed to make any prisoners, or, except a little cloth and a few rupees seized in the Indian shop, to carry off any loot. The flames of Malindi, however, were seen far and wide throughout the surrounding country, and the rebel Chiefs were careful to spread reports among the ignorant Wanyika that they had obtained a most signal victory, and had laid the whole city in ashes.

One effect of the attack was, however, to excite the people of Malindi, who before had been, many of them, very lukewarm in the Government cause, and whom, as your Lordship may remember, I had somewhat discontented by refusing to assist or permit the recapture of slaves from Makongeni, into a state of the utmost fury with the rebels. They had believed that if the latter entered the town they would merely attack the Government troops and officers, and had never troubled, though I believe many knew of the enemy's proximity, to give warning of it to the authorities, and they now found, to their dismay, that they themselves and their property were the only sufferers. Their old apathy has now entirely forsaken them. As I passed through the plantations around the town on the morning after the attack I saw everywhere armed Arabs keeping watch, and I took the opportunity of impressing upon them, at a public meeting held shortly after my arrival, the necessity of the utmost vigilance and of energetic co-operation on the part of the townspeople with the Government.

After being driven from Malindi the rebels lay in the forest all day, and spent the night near Arabuco in a village of Wanyika, which we burnt on the 14th, taking a few prisoners and guns; then they scattered in all directions, the Chiefs returning by night marches to the neighbourhood of Kurwitu, and everywhere spreading reports amongst the credulous natives of the crushing blow which they had boasted they had

dealt us. A party of them went, I hear, to Roka and Uyombo, two small adjacent coast towns half-way between Malindi and Takaungu, where a certain portion of the population is believed to have joined them, and where they burnt the houses of the loyal Arabs. I had for some time past thought it would be desirable to occupy Roka, as it was the one coast town through which the rebels were able to receive supplies in dhows, and is besides surrounded by rich plantations, and I now determined to proceed there at once with Captain Taubman and the Wali, Saïd-bin-Hamid, and erect a boma round the mosque to be held by a force of fifty Kiriboto Arabs whom the Wali had recently engaged.

Unfortunately, as the dhows which were to convey us during the night of the 14th were being got ready, the Kiribotos practically mutinied, and believing that, in view of our necessities, they could dictate any terms they pleased to us, declared that, as Ramadan had just begun, during which they objected to active service, they would only go on receipt of a month's advance of pay. As many of them, had they received it, might have decamped on arrival there with their guns, and as such a demand would, if conceded, have been fatal to the discipline of the rest of the force, I replied that it could not be granted, but said that if they did good service at Roka I might make some of them a small present on the Bairam. They then became more insolent, and said they declined on any terms to go on active service in Ramadan—a preposterous pretension, as the Kiribotos are lax Mahommedans, and I believe very few of them really observe the fast with any strictness. I accordingly caused them to be disarmed, and on the arrival, two days later, of Her Majesty's ship "Swallow," paraded them before the Government House. I then informed them that their conduct had been most disgraceful, that if Roka was now burnt it was largely due to their mercenary and cowardly attitude, that I thought I was dealing with freemen, but found that they had the spirit of slaves, and that, therefore, instead of doing for me, as I had intended, the work of Arabs and soldiers at Roka, they should do that of slaves and sweepers in Mombasa gaol. They were then embarked on board the "Swallow," and will be kept in prison till the end of Ramadan.

This unfortunate incident has delayed the occupation of Roka, which but for it might have escaped destruction, but on reaching Kalifi on my way back to Mombasa I directed Mr. MacDougall, whom I met there, to proceed with sixty men of the northern column (thirty Swahilis and twenty-five Soudanese) and leave them in stock: de there until Captain Harrison could bring up others from Mombasa to relieve them, and by now he will doubtless have done so, and thus have closed the last port open to the rebels.

I should add that Nasr-bin-Hamid, a leading Arab, who lately abandoned the rebel cause, and made his submission, was recaptured by the rebels close to Roka and carried off by them to Mwareni. The natives tell me, however, that we need not fear for his life, as he has many fighting slaves in the rebel camp who would resent any injury to their master, and whom Mubarak would be afraid to provoke.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 61.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, February 19, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Report, furnished me verbally by Captain Harrison, who has been too hard worked to write me an official letter embodying it, respecting the operations of the northern column since I left it at Makongeni.

Captain Harrison started from Makongeni at dawn on the 11th instant, and after an eight and a-half hours' march over Mount Mangea, reached Makasidi that evening. There he learnt that the rebel force had passed eastward the same day for Malindi, but he wisely abstained from attempting to follow them, and merely sent runners to me to Jilore to acquaint me with the news. Just after these reached me we heard from others that the attack had been made that morning, and that the rebels were already in full retreat.

From Makasidi Captain Harrison marched on the 12th to Kilima (one hour), a village occupied by the rebels, who fled without attempting resistance, leaving one



killed and three prisoners. After burning this and another rebel settlement, the force camped on the evening of the 12th at Kwa Mbaya.

They were now in the district of Kurwitu, which both Captain Harrison and Mr. MacDougall, who joined the force at Tandia on its way north, describe to me as very populous, and in which our real power, being more imperfectly realized by the inhabitants than is the case with the portions of Giriama nearer the coast, the attitude of the natives became for the first time distinctly hostile.

On the 13th the force advanced to Dungús, the village of a Chief who has actively assisted Mubarak and Aziz-bin-Rashid. The entrance to it was blocked, and had to be forced, but the Chief and most of his people had fled, and only one prisoner was taken. This village and another belonging to the same people, not far off, were taken, looted, and burnt.

Captain Harrison having learnt that on hearing of his advance Mubarak-bin-Rashid, who, with his people, lived, not in any village, but in grass huts in the depths of the forest, had fled southward, and that the rebels had almost all left Kurwitu, decided to march himself in a south-easterly direction to Bararani, the residence of Mbaruku, the third of the Enyetsi of Giriama, where I had directed him to proceed as soon as he had cleared Kurwitu, for a "shauri" or conference to be held between Mr. MacDougall and the Chiefs of North-western Giriama, in order, if possible, to induce the latter to abandon their system of benevolent neutrality towards the rebels.

On his way to Bararani he camped at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 13th at Fuladoyo, three and a-half hours from Dungús. This was formerly, like Makongeni, a Watoro Settlement, but the runaway slaves have quite recently deserted it, many of them returning to the neighbourhood of the coast, and it is now only occupied by Giriamas. Here an incident occurred which, but for the coolness and judgment displayed by Captain Harrison, might have had very serious consequences, and perhaps have involved us in hostility with the whole Giriama nation. Just as he was about to resume his march, after a five hours' halt, the camping-place was surrounded by some 300 Giriamas, brandishing bows and arrows, blowing war-horns, and uttering shouts of defiance. So ignorant were these savages that they actually came within 60 yards of the Maxim gun, and shot several poisoned arrows, none of which, however, hit, at the Askaris, insulting them, and daring them to show fight. The Zanzibaris, and Soudanese were in a state of wild excitement, burning to fire, and a single shot might have been the signal for a massacre of the Giriamas. The result might have been to terrify the whole nation into submission and obedience to us. On the other hand, it might have raised them all against us, and obliged Captain Harrison's 100 men to fight their way back through a thoroughly hostile and imperfectly known country, constantly harassed at night in the bush by poisoned arrows. Captain Harrison wisely judged that it would be imprudent to run that risk before exhausting all chances of a peaceful settlement. He therefore held his men in check, and forbade them to retaliate until Mr. MacDougall had brought up the Elders of Fuladoyo, and asked them what was the meaning of this hostile demonstration, and whether the Giriama people really wished for war. The Elders, who were very much frightened, stood between the two forces, and one of them held up his hands as a signal to the warriors not to shoot, whilst the others went up to them and urged them to retire, returning presently to say that many of the young men were in an excited state from having drunk too much "tembo," and that they hoped Captain Harrison would forgive them. He replied that, although he was quite ready to retaliate should they dare to attack him, he had no wish to shoot them down if they were not responsible for their actions, but that he would not leave the spot till every one of the 300 had retired, rightly judging that if he moved off before they did they would think that they, and not he, were masters of the field. After some little persuasion by the Elders they agreed to do so, and gradually withdrew, thus enabling Captain Harrison, after another two hours' delay, to make sure that they did not return, to proceed at 4:30 p.m. on his march to Bale, one of the principal villages of the district of Bararani, which he succeeded in reaching the same evening soon after sunset.

He found Mbaruku away at the Kaya, but Ngonio met him there with about forty Elders from Kurwitu, Dida, Fuladoyo, Bararani, &c., representing in all about fourteen districts, and next day a "shauri" or series of "shauris" (no English word, except the doubtfully Anglo-Saxon term "palaver," which the West Coast Africans have learnt from the Portuguese, can adequately express what a "shauri" really means) was held between them and Mr. MacDougall. He made them a speech, in which he recapitulated the whole history of the present disturbance, pointing out how

Mubarak of Gazi, and his followers had been so defeated every time they had come in contact with us, that they no longer dared to meet us in the field, and could only burn a few houses at places where they knew or supposed we had no troops, and then run away, and how, but for the fact that they were fed and harboured by the Giriama, their rebellion would long ago have died a natural death.

He asked if the Giriama people would be so foolish as by continuing in this attitude to bring down upon them the vengeance of the Government, which had come to their country to insure them peace and security from slave-raiding and oppression, and which had shown by such examples as the taking of Mwele that it was not to be defied or disobeyed with impunity. Ngonio, who throughout was of great assistance, followed on much the same lines, assuring his countrymen that he had been down to the coast and seen the power of the Government, its ships, and Maxim guns, and that it would be madness on their part to mistake its forbearance for weakness and provoke a conflict with it.

After a good deal of discussion, the majority of the Chiefs and Elders were brought over, though one or two held out obstinately to the last, maintaining that Mubarak's power was greater than that of the Government, and recalling the vengeance he had inflicted in the past on those who had assisted his enemies.

In the end the whole Assembly were induced to take a solemn oath that they would throw in their lot with the Government and not with the rebels, and that within fifteen days they would clear them from their respective districts; and they promised to endeavour to induce the Chiefs of the other divisions of Giriama to come to the same decision.

It was evident, however, that the news, exaggerated in every way by reports spread through the country by the rebel leaders, and which neither Captain Harrison nor Mr. MacDougall were in a position absolutely to contradict, lest they should by some extraordinary chance prove true, of the utter destruction of Malindi, had produced a most disastrous impression; and even Ngonio, when he was told, in answer to a private and confidential inquiry, that the regular garrison of the town consisted only of fifty sepoys, shook his head suspiciously, and said it was absolutely essential, if only for the sake of moral effect, to have more men.

From Bale the force marched to Tandia, three hours to the south-west, and returned on the 16th instant to Kalifi for Takaungu, whence Captain Harrison returned with me to Mombasa to raise more men for Roka.

As I am writing this despatch, the news of the attack on Tandia, which I had the honour to forward to you in my telegram of to-day, arrived by special messengers.

I have the honour to transmit Mr. MacDougall's letter to me on the subject, together with the inclosures from Mr. Wake.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

*Mr. MacDougall to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Dear Mr. Hardinge,

*Takaungu, February 18, 1896.*

JUST as I was starting for Roka this morning, a letter was handed to me from Mr. Wake reporting an attack made on the stockade by a Giriama mob. They fired several arrows in the "boma." I beg to transmit copies of Mr. Wake's letters which are self-explanatory. In consequence of this occurrence I have postponed my departure to Roka; in case the rebels might join the Wagiriama on seeing our Tandia garrison weakened, and endeavour to cut their water supply, which is fully a quarter of a-mile distant from the "boma," pending your instructions.

I am of opinion that the Wazee are much too weak for the youths; if so, the Government will have to punish them forthwith by simply burning their villages and taking plunder.

I have dispatched Mohamed-bin-Abdallah to Tandia with instructions to refer the Wazee to their promises at Bararani.

I am forwarding this by a special boat, leaving at 3 P.M. The rebels are said to be in detachments throughout the Giriama.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) K. MACDOUGALL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

*Mr. Wake to Mr. MacDougall.*

Sir, *Tandia, February 16, 1896.*  
I HAVE the honour to inform you that we were this day attacked by the Giriama in considerable force.

A foraging party had brought in ten goats and sheep, and a man who owned about half of them.

I made an agreement with him for his share, paid him, and sent him away well satisfied, with a message to the other owner, or owners, that we would behave the same way to them if they would come for the money.

About an hour after this some arrows were fired into the stockade, the men were under arms, but no firing was allowed on our side. The enemy then endeavoured to force their way into the friendly village of Wakauma, who sent their women into the bush and applied to us. I went out with three sections, and having procured Wakauma guides, proceeded to drive the enemy out of the Tandia district.

In passing through the bush several arrows were fired at us, and fell in the ranks. On reaching the open, and deploying the skirmishing line opened fire, and we drove the enemy back with loss for an hour, when we returned by a different route, without any casualties.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) C. WAKE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 61.

*Mr. Wake to Mr. MacDougall.*

Dear MacDougall,

*Tandia, February 16, 1896.*

THE inclosed official will inform you of what took place to-day at Tandia. I sent out a party with orders to bring in goats, and to tell their owners that they would come and make a "shauri" with me about the price. They brought in ten goats and sheep and one of the owners. Two sons of Ngonyo came in with them, with the sick porter. The Giriama immediately assumed a most threatening attitude, and massed themselves in great numbers within 100 yards of the boma.

The alarm was immediately sounded, and the men got under arms, and went to their stations. In the meanwhile I made a "shauri" with the captured Giriama, paid him for his share of the goats, made him a present of a knife, gave him a drink, and told him that if he would send the other people in I would settle with them for the remainder, and he went away perfectly satisfied. The Giriama then tried to force their way into the Wakauma village, and reproached them with being friends of the English. The Wakauma sent their women into the bush, and came to us for assistance. I fell in three sections, sent one out as skirmishers, and followed with the other two in support, having given strict orders that no one was to fire. I entered Tandia, and procured Wakauma guides, and skirmished through the bush at the back of the village. We were fired on with arrows several times whilst getting through, about ten falling into the ranks. Two were fired into the boma before we moved out at all. I allowed no firing whilst in the bush, but on getting into the open the skirmishers opened fire, and drove back the Giriama with loss for about an hour, when we returned through their village and reached Tandia about 5:30 p.m. No casualties on our side.

I did not burn their village, as we only fought in self-defence, and I did not care to do so on my own authority. The Wakauma are delighted, they are coming in to-night to have a feed.

I have arranged for them, in case of attack, to come in here. The Giriama have been taught a severe lesson, but I begged their Wazee not to be fools, and bring destruction on their own heads, but it was the old story of the old men not being able to control the young bloods.

Believe me, &c.  
(Signed) C. WAKE.

6:30 p.m.—The Giriama Wazee have just come in. They put all the blame on the young men, are anxious for peace, and the Headman is coming to stop here to-morrow

morning in order to control them should they be fools enough to make another attack.

C. W.

No. 62.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, February 25, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 19th instant, that I returned to Malindi on the 20th instant to conclude certain arrangements which had still to be completed there, Captain Harrison accompanying me as far as Kalifi with a force of forty men whom he had recruited in Mombasa (twenty of them being Soudanese newly arrived there from the interior and from German territory) to reinforce the garrison at Takaungu and set free a corresponding number of men for the occupation of Roka.

On arriving at Kalifi we were met by the news that fresh hostile demonstrations on the part of the Giriama "Nyere," or young warriors, on the 18th and 19th instant near the stockade at Tandia had obliged Mr. Wake to reopen fire on them, and that about ten had been killed; that thirty-five of the Elders had come in to sue for peace, and that it was hoped that this lesson would prove sufficient. Unfortunately the control exercised by the Elders over the young warriors when the latter get excited is not very effective—last year, as the rains were somewhat late in coming, the youths of several districts combined, I am informed, to seize the old men and threaten that, if they did not produce rain within a certain number of days, they would burn them, and it was only after one of the most venerable of the Elders, who was kept tied to an apt-heap (a very painful ordeal in Africa), until he had exhausted all the requisite incantations, at last satisfied them that the heavens were adverse, that the remainder were contemptuously released.

From Malindi I proceeded on the 24th instant by dhow to Uyombo, the port of Roka, which lies about two hours to the south, but has no harbour of its own. The rebels had been there in force two days before, and messengers whom I had sent had therefore been unable to land; I accordingly thought it advisable to take a guard of Indians and Baluchis, who, on my learning, as I did on arrival, that Captain Harrison was already there with his men, returned overland in charge of Captain Taubman, by way of Shaka, to clear out any marauders who might still be lingering between the latter place and Malindi.

Both Uyombo and Roka had been burnt only a few days previously by Aziz-bin-Rashid, so that but for the mutinous conduct of the Arab irregulars I could still have saved them. His reason, as given us by a prisoner, for destroying them, in spite of the fact that a large body of the inhabitants had harboured and joined the rebels, was, apart from a mere love of showing his power for mischief, the circumstance that many of his slaves found such pleasant quarters there that they were reluctant to return with him into the Giriama bush so long as there were houses and cocconut plantations at Roka. The stone mosque of Roka had alone escaped destruction, and this was used by Captain Harrison, who arrived from Takaungu on the 22nd instant, to form one of the sides of a small but very strong stockade, supported by a high bastion, in which he left a force of forty Swahili Askaris, under a sergeant, and with Mahomed-bin-Saoud, a loyal Takaungu Mazrui, who owns most of the plantations and slaves in the district, as Political Officer in charge. His influence will probably induce the Roka and Uyombo people (or at any rate the loyal portion of them) to rebuild their houses and resettle there. I spoke to one or two of them who had already come in in this sense, whilst the presence of the stockade and force will clear this part of the coast of the marauders who have so long infested it. There is a good well at Uyombo, and another containing water of somewhat inferior quality, but readily drunk by the natives, at Roka. These and four others, at Mtundia, Tezo, Arabuco, and Watamu, are, so far as I know, the only watering places on the strip of coast nearly 40 miles long and 5 miles between Malindi and Kalifi.

Yesterday morning Captain Harrison and myself returned to Kalifi by way of Mtundia, which a son of Abdullah-bin-Rashid, of Takaungu, has hitherto bravely held against the rebels in a strong stockade manned by thirty of his father's armed slaves. Captain Harrison then proceeded to Takaungu, whence he was to patrol the district to the immediate south, pending the result of the "shauris" now going on as to their

future attitude towards us among the Elders of Giriama, whilst I returned to Mombasa on Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 63.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)*

My Lord,

Mombasa, February 29, 1896.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a diary (with its inclosure), by Major Hatch, of his recent expedition to Mwareni, or, as he writes it, Marení, Mubarak's stronghold in the Wanga district.

The size of the force which he took with him, and which was dictated by a prudent determination to incur no risk of a reverse or check in attacking the unknown defences of Mwareni, necessitated precautions as to water and supplies, which made it difficult for him to follow up the rebels; but the knowledge acquired of the country and of the enemy's resources will prove most valuable for the purpose of future operations, and serve as an useful supplement to the information obtained by us last August as to the routes and district between Mwele and Mombasa.

It is evident that the attitude of the Wadigo and Waduruma is very similar—and for similar reasons—to that of the people of Giriama.

My telegrams will, I hope, have reassured your Lordship as to the gravity of the general situation. In any country in which a once dominant Moslem race is subject to the rule of Christian strangers, there is bound to be a certain amount of latent discontent, which will find more or less widespread expression whenever an individual leader of Moslem faith rises, for whatever reason, against the alien Government; and in East Africa our interference with domestic slavery, affecting as it does the three points on which the majority of mankind are most sensitive, viz, their pockets, their family life, and their religious prejudices, has naturally created a certain feeling against us throughout the whole thinking population, for the lower class of slaves, whose only slaves are their own women, can scarcely be regarded as a factor in native opinion. The enforcing of Seyyid Ali's Decree, which till lately was only partial, as both at Gazi and Takaungu the Chiefs contemptuously ignored it, is very unpopular; as is also the facility now enjoyed by slaves of obtaining their freedom by escaping into the Free Zone beyond the Zanzibar boundary; but on these points we can make no concession; the utmost we can do is to rest content with the *status quo*, and not alarm the natives with new measures for depriving them of their slaves, whether here or in the islands, before we have provided some other form of labour in their place. My previous Reports will have made it clear that, besides advocating a conciliatory and cautious attitude on the slave question, I have endeavoured, not entirely without success, to detach the followers of the rebel Chiefs by systematic clemency to all those who were willing to surrender; and have even considered the question of replacing, as an earnest of our desire to deal indulgently with the Arabs, one of the younger sons of Mubarak in a position of authority, though, of course, under careful English supervision, in the Wanga district. Any measure, however, of the latter description must succeed, not precede, the suppression of the rebellion; and for some little time to come I fear force, rather than remedial measures, must be the prominent feature in our policy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

*Major Hatch to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

Mombasa, February 28, 1896.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, the following military operations carried out between the 4th and 24th February, 1896:—

[438]

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On the 4th February, 1896, the force marginally noted\* proceeded toward Shimoni, arriving there at 3:45 p.m. the same date. Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" conveyed the Naval Brigade, officers, and sixty of the Indian contingent. The disembarkation was commenced immediately on arrival, and was completed by 10 p.m. The arrangements made for the disembarkation by Mr. D. Wilson were excellent.

*February 5.*—My intention was to have marched this evening (night 5th-6th), but on making further inquiries about the route, I found it would be necessary to carry five days' supply of water. As this was impracticable, I decided to operate from Wanga, and trusted to obtaining water from the River Umba.

At about 5 p.m. this day Kubo, the Chief of the Wadigo, came in to Mr. Wilson, and his information confirmed my decision to operate on the Wanga-Moreni route. I therefore issued orders for an early embarkation on the 6th.

*February 6.*—At 5:30 a.m. the embarkation was commenced, and the majority of the dhows were under weigh by 11 a.m.

I sent a party of fifty Indians under Lieutenant T. E. Scott, with one Maxim gun under Lieutenant Watson, R.N., to attack and destroy Bormuz.† The party completed their work, and returned to Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" by 12 mid-day. At 12:30 Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" started for Wanga. I desire to bring to your notice the very hard and good work done by Mr. Bultz during the embarkation and disembarkation. At 5 p.m. the "Widgeon" anchored about 1½ miles off Wanga, and the disembarkation commenced. It should be noted that it is possible to disembark at Wanga at high water only. The disembarkation was completed by midnight (save the Naval Brigade). Wanga and the surrounding shambas are inhabited, and about twelve men came in and tendered their submission.

*February 7.*—The Naval Brigade marched into camp at 9 a.m. Kubo's guides have offered to take us by a shorter route. The first march is eight hours to Mvumbo. I started marching at 2:35 p.m. to-day for Kiniyanje, on the road to Mvumbo. After doing 7½ miles water was reached at Ma Shamba. Here I decided to halt for the night. The guide has evidently been tampered with, or has changed his mind as regards the showing of the rebels' whereabouts, for his answers are now vague, unsatisfactory, and unreliable. A new guide has been obtained, who says we should strike for the River Umba, and go up by our originally determined route.

Kubo, whose conduct has been most unsatisfactory, has been told that if he provides goats, fowls, &c., on payment, so as to enable the force to stay out longer than was intended, that his action in supplying unreliable guides will be condoned.

*February 8.*—The force marched at 2:20 p.m. to-day, and arrived at a suitable spot for a camping ground on the left bank of the Umba River at 3:35 p.m. As several days have been wasted in trying to find a route to the enemy's stronghold Moreni, I have determined to stay here till I receive fresh supplies from Mombasa, and have written to the Sub-Commissioner, Mombasa, for them, urgently. A Wadruma spy was caught in camp this evening. Mbarak's influence, or rather, the fear of him, is very great amongst the people. A panic took place in camp this evening, which might have been serious had it not been for the steadiness of the troops. The Friendlies in camp mistook a donkey's bray for one of the enemy's war horns, and tried to bolt.

*February 9.*—The force remained halted. At 2 p.m. a flag of truce was sent to Sega village. This flag of truce the people of Sega refused to allow near the village.

*February 10.*—At 9 a.m. fifty rifles of the Indian contingent, twenty Zanzibaris, one Maxim gun, and one rocket party, under my command, marched for Sega, and arrived there at 12 noon. No opposition was met with, and the villages and their defences were destroyed. The force returned to camp at 4:15 p.m.

*February 11.*—A patrol of forty rifles sent to reconnoitre the road towards Mkwec. The enemy seem to have evacuated the country. The people of the district keep coming in in small bodies, and the holding of the country seems to be producing a good effect.

*February 12.*—An escort of forty rifles proceeded this morning early to Wanga to bring up ten days' provisions for the force ordered from Mombasa. A larger quantity of rice than is required has been sent up. This necessitates a second guard to-morrow to reload the surplus rice on the dhows.

Mmkono, the Chief of the Wadruma at Mwena, is ill, but has sent in his brother, and promises to assist Government in every way.

\* Naval Brigade, under Captain E. D. HOB, R.N., 2 Maxim guns, 2 rocket troughs, 40 men; Indian contingent, under Captain Barratt and Lieutenant Scott, 110 rifles; Zanzibaris, under Captain Asmani, 55 rifles; total, 205.

† I was informed that the rebels had commenced to rebuild this.

*February 13.*—Captain Dugmore, Assistant Transport Officer, and one Sepoy (Bagga Khan), one water carrier (Ohisleti) were sent back to Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon,"\* and the spare rice was reloaded on the dhows at Wangá.

The porters supplied by Kubo (and over whom he has not the slightest control) managed to get away from camp, and are drinking "tembo" at the neighbouring shambas. Kubo's Adviser, or Minister, by name Bakari, is not to be depended on, and should never be allowed to accompany Kubo on any future expedition. This action of the porters will oblige me to make a short march to-morrow to Mkowe, instead of Mwena (or Mkonono), as the porters will have to do a double journey.

*February 14.*—The force marched at 6.30 A.M., so as to give Kubo time to get his men in, and arrived at Mkowe at 7.30 A.M. Then the porters were sent back for the supplies, and everything was got up to camp by 2 P.M. The water here (Mkowe) is obtained from a stagnant pond, or marsh, and is bad.

*February 15.*—The force marched this morning at 6.30 A.M., and after two hours' actual marching reached Wwena, Mkonono. This afternoon, at 4.30 P.M., I held an open baraza, and exhorted the people to help themselves and throw off Mbarak's yoke. There is no doubt that, through his cruelties, he is much more feared than we are by the people. The Chief of the Wadruma† at Mwena states that Ali-bin-Bushari, at Mombasa, is in communication with Mbarak, but no corroborative proof is as yet forthcoming.

*February 16.*—The force was to have marched at 5 A.M., but owing to Kubo's porters again deserting, the march did not begin till 6.10 A.M. At 11 A.M. the heat was so intense I considered it advisable in the interests of health to march towards the water‡ and there rest, and not move direct on Moreni. At 11.45 the force halted at some pools in the river bed. At 3.20 the march was resumed, and Mbarak's Moreni was reached at 4.30. Five rockets were fired into the defences, and then the troops moved forward with the bayonet; the defences were torn down, and a search proved the place to be deserted. Moreni is situated on the top of a densely-wooded hill, and occupies about 600 yards of front. It is strongly defended by bomas and abattis all along its face.

The stockades, or bomas, were quite bullet-proof, and might have given some trouble in capturing if they had been stubbornly defended. As it was getting late I withdrew the troops and encamped outside Moreni.

*February 17.*—This morning I sent half the coolies with an escort to bring in water,§ and the remainder of the men were turned out to destroy the defences. This was done in the most thorough manner, and Moreni and its defences no longer exists.

Mbarak was reported to have gone to Mwele, so at 4.55 P.M. the force marched towards Mwele viâ Mdwai, and after marching for two hours bivouacked for the night. The night was cold and dark, and slight rain fell during the last hour of the march.

*February 18.*—The force marched at 6 A.M., and after about two hours' actual marching reached Mdwai. The march was resumed at 4 P.M. but a great delay took place through a small and very steep dry nullah having to be crossed. Marched actually for one hour and twenty minutes, and then I saw Mwele about 12 miles off. The Wadruma seem to be utterly unreliable; they give no assistance worth speaking of, and their sympathies are either with Mbarak or they are too frightened of him to be of any use.

Kubo's people are quite beyond his control. At night, say, 220 porters are reported as being ready to carry loads, and in the morning eighty, or about one-third, put in an appearance.

*February 19.*—Started marching for Mwele at 5.45 A.M., but owing to delays were not well under way till 6.5.

We marched with halts till 4.45 P.M., when Mwele was reached. The road was very trying, and no water available. The water supply on the south side of Mwele is bad and insufficient at this season of the year. The march was most trying, but was most cheerfully carried out by all ranks.

As far as I can ascertain, our visit to Mwele was unexpected, and had it not been that we were tired through want of water, and it was too risky to press on in a waterless country, we might have made a capture of some of Mbarak's people at the least.

\* Being too ill to accompany the advance of the column.

† Name of Chief, Cháká.

‡ This is distant from Mbarak's Moreni, three miles.

§ From the pools, three miles off.

*February 20.*—At 2 p.m. I began the ascent of Mwele and arrived on the summit in one hour. Fairly large parties of the enemy were seen on the adjoining hills, but were promptly dispersed by the Maxims and rockets. A party of about twelve men began annoying the rear-guard, but were dispersed by a volley.

One or two houses in Mwele had been rebuilt, and these, together with some supplies of Indian corn, were burnt.

At about 3:45 p.m. the descent of Mwele was begun, and water was reached (running brook of beautiful water) in about one hour. As, however, the ground near the water was commanded by several high points, I determined to march on to Mkrmjee. As the force moved off, the enemy occupied the heights referred to above and began firing. They were, however, dispersed with loss by the Maxim party under Captain Hunt, R.N.

At 7:45 p.m. Mkrmjee was reached and camp formed. The water is very good, and flows in a clear small stream.

*February 21.*—Started marching at 1 p.m., and after three and a quarter hours' actual marching arrived at Zigira, which was burnt by Lieutenant T. E. Scott. No opposition was met with.

The country is very richly cultivated with mahogo and other crops. A number of fowls and a few goats were also obtained. As I considered it undesirable to halt near the village, I marched on for about an hour, to an open space just before the Mombasa road joins the Gazi-Mwele road. Here camp was formed.

*February 22.*—Marched at 7 a.m., and after three-quarters of an hour Gazi was reached and camp was formed about twenty minutes' march beyond Gazi, near the sea-beach.

*February 23.*—I sent forty Rifles of the Indians under Lieutenant T. Scott to burn Gogoni, where some of Mbarak's people were staying, and the people of which place had refused to come in. The party returned at 11 a.m., having burnt the villages (three).

I paid all the Chiefs and men who had carried loads for me, and dismissed the several friendlies, who seemed well pleased with their remuneration.

The embarkation was begun at 11 a.m., but was not completed till past 4 p.m., so that Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon" could not start till the 24th.

Though no opposition worthy of the name has been met with, yet the country has been thoroughly explored, and it will be possible in the future to operate there easily and effectively, as the routes and water supply are well known. Moreover, severe loss has been inflicted on the enemy through the burning of his great stronghold Moreni, and Ormuz, Sega, Zigira, and Gogoni.

The general health of the troops has been excellent, though I regret to have to report the death of one Zanzibar Askari and two porters.

Before closing my Report I should like to bring to your favourable notice the names of the following officers who most materially assisted to secure the success of the expedition under my command:—

Captain Barratt, of the Indian contingent, who, as General Staff Officer, rendered me invaluable assistance.

Lieutenant Scott, of the Indian contingent, a most excellent and hardworking officer.

Captain Hunt, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon."

Lieutenant Manston, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon."

Lieutenant Watson, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "Thrush."

Surgeon Farey, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon."

These above-named officers, who were with the Naval Brigade, all worked hard in their various capacities, and rendered me great assistance.

The duties of Principal Medical Officer to the Troops were most ably carried out by Dr. MacDonald, of the Mombasa Hospital.

Mr. Matthews, employed as Acting Transport Officer, did excellent work.

Finally, I would especially draw attention to the hard and excellent work done by Mr. Bultz, both at Wassein and at Ghazi, in assisting in the disembarkation and the embarkation of the troops.

I attach a Route Report, and am having a map prepared, which will be sent in as soon as possible.\*

\* See p. 114.



## Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

## ROUTE : Wanga to Gazi, viâ Mwena, Moreni, and Mwele.

| Station.                        | Distances in Hours and Miles.   |        | Total Miles. | Description of Road.  |
|---------------------------------|---|--------|--------------|---|
|                                 | Hours.  | Miles. |              |   |
| From Wanga to Umba ..           | 3   | 7½     | 7½           | Road good. Water at camp, Umba, plentiful and very good from Umba River. Coconut groves plentiful.  |
| From Umba to Mkwewe ..          | 1   | 2½     | 10           | Road good. First through thick undergrowth, then forest, then finally open wooded country. Water in a pond or marsh, bad colour and taste. Segs 2½ miles distant.   |
| From Mkwewe to Mwena or Mankono | 2   | 5      | 15           | Immediately after passing Mkwewe the road branches off to the right for Mwena, the straight road leading to Segs. Road good. Slight forest after the first hour, and then opens out again into open wooded country. Village of Mwena is on the hill top of Mwena, above the river. A second village adjoins it at right angles. Both villages occupied by the Wadruma. Water plentiful at all seasons of the year. Country fruitful and rich. Mount Jombo is sighted just before reaching Mwena.  |
| From Mwena to Mbuji ..          | 1½  | 4      | ..           | The road from Mwena to Moreni Proper trends roughly in a north-westerly direction, through open forest country, almost resembling park land. After leaving Moreni Proper the country gets a bit closer and more undulating. The road to Moreni Proper seems to be on a plateau, from which the road descends after leaving Moreni Proper. About one hour after leaving the Wadruma villages at Moreni Proper a small road on the right leads to the Moreni water supply. This water supply is about 2 miles east of Mbaraks Moreni. Water is not always obtainable at Moreni, but depends on the rainfall. The water obtained was from pools in the dry river bed and was good. The water at Mbaraks Moreni is only obtainable in small quantities, and is brackish. The road throughout is good. |
| To Moreni (Proper) ..           | 1½  | 4      | ..           |   |
| To Moreni (Mbarak-) ..          | 1½  | 2½     | 26½          |   |
| From Moreni (Mbarak-) to Mdwai  | 3½  | 8 to 9 | 35½          | Road good and describes an S in its windings. Mount Jombo is left on the right hand about 6 miles off. The country is a little bit closer than before, but is still open woodland. Another and shorter road is reported, but not suitable for men carrying loads. Water supply at Mdwai is scanty, and bad at this season (February), the pools in the river bed being green, save one which is good and sweet. There are several dry watercourses, which after the rains would probably give good water.   |
| From Mdwai to Mwele ..          | As nearly as can be estimated 12 miles, but not more than 2 miles an hour can be calculated on; the ground hilly, and places close. |        | 47½          | The road itself is good, but the hills (about four) to be crossed make it tiring, and there is little or no water on the route. About 2½ hours from Mdwai a Wadruma village is reached, and a well is reported as being in existence. Immediately opposite the Wadruma village a road branches off on the left to Mombasa. The road to Mwele passes round the village. Mwele was entered from the south. The water issues from small springs, and after short runs of 30 yards disappears into the ground. Water could be obtained by digging in the valley in the track of the watercourse. Water insufficient for a large body of men. A bad nullah to be crossed at Mdwai.   |

| Station.                           | Distance in Hours and Miles. |        | Total Miles. | Description of Road.   |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|--------------|--|
|                                    | Hours.                       | Miles. |              |  |
| From Mwele to Mkrmjee              | 2                            | 5      | 52½          | Road is fairly good. At the foot of Mwele on the northern slope a stream of beautiful water is crossed, but, owing to the commanding nature of the surrounding country, it is impossible to camp unless protected by numerous piquets. The road is a sharp descent, so treble the time should be allowed for the ascent. At Mkrmjee a second stream of good water gives a splendid supply of water.  |
| From Mkrmjee to Gazi<br>via Zigira | 4½                           | 10     | 62½          | Road at first hilly and country close, but after the first hour country opens. After two and a-half hours' marching a cross road was met: the right hand road goes direct to Gazi, the left hand road also to Gazi, but through Zigira. Zigira is one hour from the cross roads, and another hour on an open ground, suitable for camping (but no water), is reached near the junction of the Mombasa and Gazi-Mwele roads. Water can be obtained in small quantities from the wells in Zigira. From the camping ground near the Mombasa road to Gazi is about one hour's march. |

(Signed)

G. P. HATCH, Major, Commanding Forces,  
British East Africa.W. BARRATT, Captain, Commanding Indian  
Contingent.

February 29, 1896.

No. 64.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)*

My Lord,

Zanzibar, March 12, 1896.

I HAVE the honour to report that I proceeded on the 2nd instant from Mombasa to Kalifi, and thence on the following day to Tandia, where the Chiefs and Elders of Giriama had agreed with Mr. MacDougall that they would meet him on that day, and inform him of the decision come to by them as to their future relations with the Mazrui rebels.

About fifty or sixty Elders from all parts of the country appeared, and were received by Mr. MacDougall and the Wali of Takaungu, as I had decided that I would only see them if I were assured that their intentions were loyal. It was evident that the lesson administered by Mr. Wake, following upon the march of the northern column through their country, and the arguments used at Bale by Mr. MacDougall and Ngonio, had had their effect, for they were unanimous in declaring that they would expel the rebels from their territory, and they stated that they had already sent to tell Eyoub-bin-Mubarak, who was with fifty men at Bamba on the western frontier of Central Giriama, that he must leave. Aziz-bin-Rashid, they added, had already left Kurwitu, and was hiding in the bush to the westward at a place called Gabina, which belonged to the Galla, not to the Giriama country.

On hearing of this loyal attitude on the part of the Elders I proceeded to the place where they were assembled, and delivered a brief address to them, congratulating them on the wise decision at which they had arrived, and assuring them of our desire to protect the interests of their nation, and promote the peace and prosperity of their country. They then brought me a bullock and two sheep as a peace offering, which I ordered to be killed and distributed as a feast to the assembly.

At the conclusion of the "shauri," the Elders, after being shown the working of the Maxim gun, and of a war rocket, which, it was explained to them, was fired in their honour, withdrew to a place outside Tandia fort, where they swore "by the hyæna" to adhere to the decision they had taken that day, and to punish any one of their people who should harbour or assist the rebels. The young warriors appear to be in a pacific mood, and since their repulse by Mr. Wake, to be more docile to the orders of their seniors. Those of the Arabs who know the natives of Giriama best believe that after the oath by the hyæna thus solemnly taken, they will do their best to keep their promise; but even if they do not act very energetically against the rebels, we may, I hope, rely on their abstaining in future from giving them secret help or actively thwarting our operations.

On the 4th instant the Wali of Takaungu, Captain Harrison, and Mr. MacDougall proceeded with a column of seventy men on a tour through West Giriama to drive Aziz from Gabina and Eyoub from Bamba, and I returned on Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa" to Mombasa.

Lieutenant Scott, had in the meantime occupied Shimba, and has since had several successful engagements with the scattered rebel forces in the district, whom he has driven before him with considerable loss. I have not, however, so far, received any detailed report of his proceedings.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 65.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury—(Received April 20.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, March 27, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival here on the 15th instant of the 24th Baluchistan Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson, and, on the 19th instant, of 106 Soudanese troops recruited by Captain Raikes in Egypt. These latter were immediately transhipped on to the steam-ship "Kilwa" for service in the Malindi district.

I would take this opportunity of inviting your Lordship's attention to the truly admirable manner in which Sir Lloyd Mathews carried out the duties intrusted him of preparing quarters for the Indian regiment. In ten days he had cleared a cocoa-nut plantation close to a well, by the side of the tram-line between Mombasa and Kilindini, and erected substantial wooden barracks for the men in lines; and in the centre, quarters and a mess-house for the officers, and bungalow for the Colonel—all of which were stocked with every kind of store and requirement which forethought could suggest. The Colonel and officers were loud in their praises of the accommodation which had been provided for them, and of the care with which every want had been anticipated.

I reached Mombasa on the day following the arrival of the regiment, and after fully explaining, with the assistance of Major Hatch and Mr. Pigott, the whole political and military situation to Colonel Pearson, discussed with him the plan of operations.

It was decided that a joint and, as far as possible, simultaneous attack should be made by two columns, one operating from Vanga and the Uмба, and the other from Mombasa and the Shimba range, upon Mwele, where Sheikh Mubarak and the greater part of the rebels have been living in the bush since they were dislodged by Major Hatch from Mwareni and by Captain Harrison from Giriama; that the column advancing from Vanga should attempt to cut off their retreat to Mwamandi, about 20 miles north of Mwele, where they have another forest hiding-place; that a detachment should be sent to Mbungu, on the south-west frontier of Giriama, and not far west of the Mackinnon Road, to intercept them should they try to go northwards; and another in the direction of the Teita Hills, where the natives believe that Mubarak may possibly seek refuge should he find the coast region untenable. The Vanga and Mbungu forces have already started; the others will do so within the next few days. Posts, from which the forces holding them will patrol the surrounding country, will be established both at Mkono and Mwele, and perhaps also at Jambo. The map, showing the routes through the Vanga district, prepared by Captain Barratt

after Major Hatch's expedition to Mwareni, which is referred to in the inclosure to my despatch of the 29th ultimo, will illustrate the plan of operations in the south.\*

In the meantime Lieutenant Scott has been patrolling from his position on the Shimba range the district to the immediate south of Mombasa, and has successfully repulsed (killing about twenty-four of the enemy) a night attack made on his post, while the garrison was reduced owing to the absence of one-third of it on escort duty, by a force of some 300 men under the command of Sebe-bin-Mubarak. Captain Harrison has been equally active in the north. He left Tandia with Mr. MacDougall on the morning of the 4th, when I returned to Zanzibar after my meeting with the Chiefs of Giriama, to co-operate with the latter in driving the Takaungu outlaws from their country. He was preceded by messengers who carried in all directions the news that the Hyœnas had given orders to expel the rebels, and he met with a most cordial reception in those very districts of Fuladoyo and Kirwitu which a fortnight before had displayed such hostility towards him. On the 5th he drove 400 of the enemy, under Mubarak and Aziz-bin-Rashid, with loss, from Gabina, a thickly-wooded district in the Wasania country just across the Giriama border, and burnt the villages and stores they had established there, the people of Giriama everywhere coming in thousands to welcome and congratulate him and displaying the utmost alacrity in the supply of food and guides. At the same time, as an act of politic clemency, the influential Giriama Chief Dungu, who had joined Aziz-bin-Rashid some time before, and was hiding in the bush near the Sabaki, was induced by a promise that his life would be spared, if he submitted to come in, and was allowed, to the great satisfaction of his people, to return to and rebuild his destroyed village.

Driven out of Gabina, near which a permanent post has been established by Captain Harrison, the northern rebels all fled south to Mubarak of Gazi, with the single exception of Aziz-bin-Rashid, who still lingered with about 300 men in the western outskirts of the district of Bamba, the only one where the elders appeared to hesitate, for some local reason unknown to us, to enforce the decree of the Hyœnas. It is characteristic of the difficulties and disappointments of the species of warfare that one of our detachments sent to follow them up, passed, so we afterwards learnt, within 10 yards of Mubarak of Takaungu, who was lying concealed in the long grass. Fugitives, who abandoned the rebels during their southward flight, describe them as being everywhere refused food by the villagers of Giriama and threatened with death unless they left at once, and as subsisting only upon Indian corn and fruit surreptitiously stolen from the fields. They only dared to move at all at night, and hid during the day in the jungle and forest. Meanwhile, warning messages sent by Mr. MacDougall to Bamba, and the approach of the detachment dispatched to Mbungu, about 12 or 14 miles to the south of it, forced Aziz-bin-Rashid to leave it, and march by night to seek refuge in a dense and imperfectly known forest, a few hours to the south of Takaungu, to dislodge him from which another force has just started from Changoni.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of Captain Harrison's report on his proceedings in north-west Giriama, and I desire to express my entire concurrence in the high terms in which he speaks of the services rendered by Mr. MacDougall. That officer's knowledge of the country, and its inhabitants, his mastery of the native language in which he is a fluent and most eloquent speaker, and the untiring energy which he has displayed both in assisting in the actual attacks upon the rebels, and in winning over the people of Giriama by persuasion and argument, have proved a most powerful factor in at length inducing them after months of hesitation to throw in their lot with the Government. Good service was also done by the Wali of Takaungu, who, notwithstanding the Ramadan fast, proceeded with the force to Gabina, and whose prestige, as the son and representative of Salim-bin-Hamis, helped to influence the natives in our favour. Nor ought I to omit to mention appreciatively the work of Mahomed-bin-Abdullah, a Takaungu Mazrui of good position, who has always accompanied Captain Harrison and Mr. MacDougall as an Arab political officer, and whose advice and local experience have been of considerable value.

One result of these marches through Giriama has been to reveal to us, what we did not know before, the populous and fertile character of its western portions, and from what I have heard from Mr. MacDougall, as well as seen myself, I anticipate that when peace is restored, the export of their abundant produce to the coast will greatly increase the revenue of the Malindi district. Formerly, the natives were discouraged from bringing as much grain as they could to the coast ports by the taxes imposed by Salim-bin-Hamis, who also was sometimes in the habit, when any large quantity came down to Takaungu, of forcing them to sell it cheap to himself by issuing a prohibition

\* For map, see p. 114.

of its sale to any one else, and then, after a few days, when this order had paralysed all commercial transactions, of taking large tribes from the Hindi traders to cancel it. When, however, trade with the coast is free, and receives encouragement, and the people can plant cocoa-nut and mango trees in their own uplands, without fear of their being cut down, as was formerly the case, by Masai raiders, a new era of prosperity and of agricultural development will dawn for Giriama, which ought to make it one of the richest, if not the richest, district in this province.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—Since the above was written the news has come that the force advancing from Changoni has driven Aziz-bin-Rashid down towards Mwele, recapturing twenty-three slaves whom he had stolen from a neighbouring plantation, and he is said to have joined Sheikh Mubarak at Bongo's, a village a few miles south of the Mackinnon Road, at which Eyoub-bin-Mubarak rested before attacking Rabai. This village was destroyed by a party of Indians on the night of the 25th instant, and large stores of grain and powder burnt, the outlaws, however, who were camped in surrounding bush, escaping as soon as they heard the tread of the soldiers' boots in small parties into the jungle to the south.

A. H. H.

Inclosure in No. 65.

*Captain Harrison to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Mombasa, March 22, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report that according to instructions I left Tandia boma on the 4th instant at 7 A.M. with sixty-five Soudanese, eighty porters, and a Maxim gun, arriving at Dida 10.15 A.M. Ngonio, the Mzee of the village, brought us a present of sheep, and informed us that the rebels were at Gabina still.

On the following morning we marched at 5.30 A.M., guides being provided by Ngonio, marching through thick bush for about two hours to the top of the Bararani ridge of hills, arriving at Fuladoyo about 8.30, where we halted. The Wazee of the villages near came into camp, though the younger people were very shy; the former informed us that Aziz and Baraka,\* with about 400 men and a great many women, were at Gabina, and that a party of them had passed the day before carrying loads of food from Tezo; also that they had met another party going there for the same purpose, but, on hearing of our advance, had turned back with them to Gabina.

On receiving this information, I forwarded a letter to Captain Wake at Tandia informing him of the fact, and telling him to take a party at once to find out where the grain was stored.

This he did, and from information received from the Wakauma he found and burnt large stores of grain in the forest north of Tezo.

At 2.30 P.M. of the same date we proceeded to Kirwitu, arriving at a good water place about 4.15. The water was about 100 yards by 40, and 18 inches deep; here we camped for the night. The Mzee of Qua Jefwa, a village close by, came into camp and corroborated the previous information as regards Gabina, and promised to find us guides.

On the following morning at 5.30 A.M., I paraded with forty-five men and the Maxim gun, accompanied by Mr. MacDougall and Dr. Mann, leaving the remainder of the Askaris to guard camp, and marched in north-west direction till 7.15 A.M., when shots were fired from thick bush; these continued at intervals for about two hours, and at two places a stand was made, but on the Maxim gun being brought into action the enemy retired.

In dense cactus bush and forest we found three large villages, which we burnt, containing several casks of gunpowder, marked "Mozambique," and Snider ammunition, besides quantities of food of all kinds, mats, cooking pots, &c., but could find no one near, though the people had evidently only just left. I did not allow the men to go far into the bush, which was almost impenetrable. We returned to camp 1.30 P.M., having burnt in all at least 300 houses.

\* Mubarak of Takaungu. The Swahilis corrupt this Arabic name sometimes into M'baraka, sometimes, as in the case of the Chief of Gazi, into Mbaruku.—A. H. HARDINGE.

On the 7th instant I sent out spies, who reported rebels still in the bush; also that we had killed several of the rebels the previous day.

At about 4 a.m. on the 8th instant the camp was attacked by about 200 of the enemy, who had crawled within about 150 yards of the tents, and opened fire on two sides of us, but retired about 4:30, having wounded one Soudanese in the arm, leaving two men dead themselves, and marks of others wounded. At daybreak I sent out two sections in pursuit, with the result that another large village was burnt, and the graves of six men found who were killed at one place on the 6th instant.

The following morning, 9th instant, we started to build a small boma, and decided to wait until I could get information of the direction the rebels had taken.

On the following two days the Wazee came in continually from all round, and Mr. MacDougall made arrangements with them to supply food, &c.

On the 11th instant spies we had sent out returned with news that the rebels were behind Bamba going south.

On the 13th instant, having completed the boma and built houses for the Askaris, I marched with forty men to Qua Kilumu, about 1½ hours, where we had killed a rebel on our previous visit. The Mzee of the village expressed his regret at having harboured rebels, and promised in future not to do so; we returned to camp via Kiten-geni, about two hours.

On the 14th we marched towards Bamba, and interviewed several Wazee, all of whom seemed glad to see us. Mzee Ndungu arrived in camp at 11 p.m. to ask for peace, at the same time bringing a sheep.

Having settled the post at Kirwitu, and wishing to see Major Hatch at Mombasa, I returned to Takaungu with Mr. MacDougall via Bali and Tandia, leaving Dr. Mann in charge at Kirwitu until Captain Wake could arrive from Tandia, and arrived at Takaungu on 16th instant.

On the 17th instant spies came in from Bamba reporting that Aziz was behind there in the bush with 300 or 400 men, and that Baraka and all the women had gone south; also that they were purchasing food from the Bamba people in exchange for cloth.

I returned to Mombasa in steam-ship "Kilwa" on the 20th instant.

I cannot speak too highly of the way in which Mr. MacDougall smoothed over any difficulties with the Giriamas, and the trouble he took in interviewing all the Wazee of the villages near where we passed; also the help he was to me in every way.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDGAR HARRISON, *Captain.*

P.S.—I should add that spies sent out by us to Makongeni reported that the thirty men or so taken from that place on or about the 7th or 8th of last month by Aziz-bin-Rashid had left him and returned to their homes.

E. H.

No. 66.

*Mr. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, April 22, 1896.*

MUBURAK and the other rebel Chiefs who have been excluded from pardon, with the exception of two who are still being pursued to the north of this town, yesterday surrendered to the Germans at Moa, though only after such hesitation as necessitated the employment of stern threats by Major Wissmann, and were subsequently disarmed.

To-morrow they will be sent to Tanga under military escort, and will be transferred further south later.

They were accompanied by 1,100 followers, of whom 400 had rifles, among which, however, there were only eighteen breech-loaders. However, Muburak said that within the next week more would be surrendered. In another fortnight or so I trust that the pacification of the country may be completed.

## No. 67.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 23, 1896, 11.30 p.m.*

YOUR telegram of 22nd instant.

Her Majesty's Government congratulate you, Colonel Pearson, and the other officers on the successful results of operations.

## No. 68.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mombasa, April 24, 1896.*

COLONEL and officers join me in respectful thanks to Her Majesty's Government for kind message conveyed in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

## No. 69.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. A. Hardinge.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 24, 1896.*

HER Majesty's Government received with much satisfaction the information contained in your telegram of the 22nd instant, reporting that Muburak and his followers, to the number of 1,100 men, including all but two of the rebel leaders, had been driven out of British territory into the German sphere, and had surrendered to the German authorities.

I have to repeat to you, to Colonel Pearson, and to the civil and military officers, and to the men of all forces engaged in the operations against the rebels, the expression, already conveyed by telegraph, of Her Majesty's Government's appreciation of the efforts which have led to this successful result.

I have also to request you to express to Sir Lloyd Mathews their thanks for the energetic measures taken by him at Mombasa, at short notice, for the reception of the Indian regiment and the furtherance of the military operations.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin will be instructed to request the German Government to convey to Major Wissmann the cordial thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the steps taken by him for the disposal of Muburak and his followers.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 70.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 25, 1896.*

I HAVE to state that Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in British East Africa has reported by telegraph that owing to the energetic action of Major Wissmann the rebel leaders, who had with their men taken refuge in German territory on the 21st instant, laid down their arms, and were sent to Tanga to be transferred hereafter further south.

I have to request you to express to the German Government, and to ask them to convey to Major Wissmann, the cordial thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this friendly action.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)*

Sir, *Admiralty, April 30, 1896.*  
I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a letter from the Lieutenant Commanding Her Majesty's ship "Widgeon," dated at Mombasa, the 25th February last, respecting his proceedings in connection with the expedition to inflict punishment on Mbaruk and his followers on the East Coast of Africa.

I am to request that this letter may be returned.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) R. D. AWDRY.

Inclosure in No. 71.

*Lieutenant-Commander Hunt to the Senior Officer of Her Majesty's Ships on the East Coast of Africa.*

Sir, *"Widgeon," at Mombasa, February 25, 1896.*  
I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with orders received from Commander George Leckie, of Her Majesty's ship "Swallow," after conferring with Her Majesty's Consul and Agent, and having previously embarked Major Hatch, the Commandant of the Forces on the East Coast, four officers and about sixty Indian troops, two officers and twenty-three men from Her Majesty's ship "Thrush," I left this port at 9.45 A.M. on the 4th instant, and anchored at Wasin at 4 P.M. the same day.

2. The main body of the troops, with their stores, had left Mombasa in dhows at 6.30 A.M., and immediately on their arrival at Wasin they were disembarked.

3. The naval brigade were to be landed on the following afternoon, as it was not intended to march until midnight of the 5th.

4. But on the 5th the information regarding the water supply on the route decided upon was found to be so unreliable and conflicting, that it was not considered advisable to make any move until further information was obtained.

At 6 P.M. on that day a Chief of the Wadigo tribe arrived, and, on account of the statements of his guides, it was decided that the column should start from Wanga.

5. At daylight on the 6th Lieutenant Watson, of Her Majesty's ship "Thrush," with a Maxim gun, and a party of the Indian contingent under Lieutenant Scott, proceeded in the steam-launch "Mvita" to the village Hormuz, in Pungwe, which they destroyed, no resistance being offered. They returned at 11 A.M.

6. The military stores, part of the troops, and all the porters proceeded in dhows to Wanga. The officers and 110 of the troops embarked in this ship, and at 1.45 P.M. I proceeded to that place, anchoring there at 3 P.M.

7. The disembarkation began at once, but was a matter of great difficulty on account of its being low water, and the distance from the shore at which the ship and dhows had to lie. Boats were towed in by the "Mvita" and the "Widgeon's" steam-cutter. I placed Mr. Herlihy, gunner of this ship, in charge of the disembarkation, and this duty he carried out in a most satisfactory manner. I think it was greatly due to his energy and intelligence that the troops and stores were landed as quickly as they were. The disembarkation was not, however, completed until past midnight.

8. At 7 A.M. on the 7th the Naval Brigade, myself being in command, consisting of:—

Lieutenant Marston, seventeen bluejackets and marines, with a Maxim gun and rocket tube, from "Widgeon;"

Lieutenant Watson and Mr. Jowett, gunner, twenty-three bluejackets and marines, with a Maxim gun and rocket tube, from Her Majesty's ship "Thrush;"

Surgeon Facey, of "Widgeon," in medical charge of the brigade;

were landed and joined the camp formed at Wanga.

9. The column proceeded, and there was at once a difficulty as to porters, of whom there was not a sufficient number. We marched to Ma Shamba, arriving there



after nearly three hours, the road being good, and encamped for the night. The supply of water was plentiful, and of fair quality. From information received it was decided to make for the River Umha, and follow it up for some distance before branching off for Mwena or Mmkono.

10. At 2:20 P.M. on the 8th, having been delayed from want of porters, we proceeded for the left bank of the Umha, camping about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Wanga, having arrived at 3:30 P.M. A good camping-ground with running water.

11. On account of the unexpected delays and alteration of the original plan, it was considered necessary to have an additional ten days' provisions. Those for the troops had to be obtained from Mombasa, so I sent a message to the ship ordering the "Mvita" to go there for them. She left at 9 A.M. on the 9th.

12. At 9 A.M., 10th, Major Hatch, with a rocket party under Lieutenant Marston, a Maxim gun under Lieutenant Watson, and the marines, with sixty of the Indian contingent, proceeded to Sagar, a village about four hours' march, and destroyed it without resistance. They returned at 4:15 P.M.

13. At 3 A.M. on the 12th a party of 350 porters, with an escort of forty Zanzibaris, Lieutenant Marston being in charge, marched to Wanga, and returned to the camp by 6 P.M. with stores. But a considerable number of loads had to be left behind because there were not sufficient porters. At 7 A.M., 13th, another party was sent down for the remaining stores, and also Captain Dugmore, who was acting as assistant transport officer to the column, was sent down to the ship suffering from a severe attack of fever.

14. At 6:20 A.M. on the 14th the column started for Mkowe, a march of one hour. Found a good camping-ground, but bad water. Remained for the night on account of the scarcity of porters. The difficulty having been got over at 5:15 A.M. on the 15th, the force proceeded for Mwena or Mmkono, where we arrived at 7:45 A.M., forming a camp near the village, which is near the top of a hill. The water here is good and plentiful at all seasons of the year. At 6:20 A.M., 16th, moved off for Moreni, passing through the village of Mbeiji, which was distant one hour and three-quarters, or 4 miles. The road was good. Arrived at Moreni Proper after another hour and a-half, but found Moreni of Mbaruk was another hour and a-half further on, and hearing water was close by branched off for it, but walked  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles before coming to the river, which was dry. Found only a few pools of indifferent water. Soon after 11 A.M. encamped for breakfast, and remained till 3 P.M., when we went on to Moreni of Mbaruk, arriving there shortly after 4 P.M. Four rockets were fired into the town, and then we entered, to find it completely deserted. It was defended by two strong bomas, about 100 yards apart, side bomas between them, and was a place capable of making a strong defence. The water supply close by is small, and very brackish. We camped outside, and on the morning of the 17th destroyed the bomas and burnt the huts. At 4:55 proceeded on the march, and again had great difficulties with the porters. After marching for one hour and three-quarters, encamped for the night. Proceeded at 6 A.M., 18th, and after two hours arrived at Mdwai, where there was a good supply of water. Remained till 4:30, marched for one hour and a-half, and then encamped. At 6 A.M., 19th, marched for Mwele, which is about 12 miles from Mdwai. One cannot, however, count on making more than 2 miles an hour. Encamped at 5:30 P.M. at the foot of Mwele Hill. At 2:20 P.M., 20th, started for Mwele. Arrived at 3 P.M., and found the town deserted. Saw a few parties of rebels, on whom we fired with the Maxims; but they were about 1,800 yards off. Left at 5:30 P.M., and marched till 7:30, the rear-guard being attacked by the rebels soon after leaving the bottom of Mwele Hill. No one was hit, and the Maxims kept the enemy off. We then went on to Gaze, destroying the village of Zigira on the way. Camped one hour's distance outside Gaze on the night of the 21st. Arrived there soon after 8 A.M., 22nd, when I sent Lieutenant Marston to Wanga by dhow to bring the ship, and the dhows for the troops to Gaze.

15. The ship arrived at 10:30 A.M. on the 23rd, and the dhows shortly after. The embarkation then began, but was not completed till 4 P.M., the water being very shallow for a long distance from the shore. It was too late then to proceed to Mombasa, so I remained for the night with about 150 of the troops on board, and arrived here at 10 A.M. on the 24th, when the troops disembarked.

16. The health of the Naval Brigade has been excellent, none having fallen out during the marches, which were very trying, especially during the day-time. This, I think, is due to their having been provided with sun hats, and to the kindness of Captain Barratt, commanding the Indian contingent, who lent tents for their use during the expedition.

17. On my return to the ship, Lieutenant Mansel, who was in command during my absence, informed me that, at the urgent request of Mr. Wilson, the District Officer, Wanga, six men in charge of Mr. Percy, engineer, were landed from the ship from the 11th to the 23rd February for the protection of Shimoni village, the residence of the District Officer.

18. I wish to bring to favourable notice the valuable services of Lieutenant Marston, who, in addition to his other duties, fixed the position of the various camping grounds, which, I should say, will be a great assistance in the case of any future operations. Lieutenant Marston is now on the sick list, but a plan of his work will be forwarded as soon as he is able to complete it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. D. HUNT.

No. 72.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Zanzibar, April 12, 1896.*

I PROPOSE in this despatch to explain so far as I can the origin of the present disturbances on the mainland coast, as well as the best means of terminating them by measures calculated to reconcile the native population to our rule. My explanations may I fear be somewhat tedious, but I cannot go into the subject thoroughly without a digression into the past history of the coast, which I will, however, endeavour to make as brief as possible.

When the Company took over the administration of the country from the Sultan, it may, I think, be safely said that His Highness' authority was only absolute in the full sense of the word in the three cities of Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu, where the Walis all belonged to his own tribe and clan, and were his own thoroughly loyal nominees. Elsewhere, between Vanga and Kipini, his flag flew, and his sovereignty was recognized, but it was on the tacit condition that he did not attempt to render it too real at the expense of the hereditary local Chiefs. At the time of the Company's advent his prestige, which had been great in the palmy days of Barghash, had been weakened by the humiliations which that Prince underwent at the close of his reign by the enforced recognition of Witu as an independent State, and by the practical surrender of his mainland dominions to the English and German Companies.

Taking the coast from the German frontier to Kismayu, it may be said, outside the three cities above mentioned, and a small district around each, to have been divided between three powerful Chiefs, Mubarak of Gazi, Salim of Takaungu, and Sultan Ahmed of Witu, and two petty ones, Hamis Kombo of Mtapwa, and Mzee Sef of Faza and the Bajouni mainland. Of these, the Chief of Witu was the most, and Hamis Kombo the least, powerful, but all five were regarded by their followers and dependents with a respect and loyalty far exceeding that accorded by them to the Ruler of Zanzibar.

Mubarak's authority extended along the coast from the Uмба to within a short distance of Mombasa, and his influence was paramount for some 30 to 40 miles inland over the whole of the Wadigo and Duruma tribes ranging between the German frontier and the Mackinnon Road. It was also felt, though less powerfully, throughout the Rabai and Giriama country to the north, which he had ravaged during his six years' war with Seyyid Barghash. He received a subsidy, which he affected among his own people to treat as tribute, of 1,000 rupees a-month from Seyyid Khalifa; but he regarded himself, in his capacity as Head of the oldest branch of the Mazaria, as the legitimate Sovereign of the whole coast, including Mombasa, of which his ancestors had been Rulers, and which had been wrested from them by the usurping Hinawi Seyyid Saïd. The recollection of his father's treacherous murder—for it was practically that—intensified the old feud between Ghafin and Hanawi which still burns in the Oman, and he was only too ready to complete the three rebellions which he had waged against the Seyyids by requesting, like Ahmed of Witu, the protection of Germany, whose flag he once actually flew. His method of maintaining his power amongst the timid and ignorant Waduruma and Wadigo was mainly terrorism; he raided and enslaved them on the slightest provocation,

and carried on from Gazi an extensive Slave Trade with Pemba, thus accumulating, together with his subsidy, and what he made by the sale of timber, a considerable income, which enabled him to maintain a large armed force. His own personal fighting followers were reckoned at the height of his power at about 1,000 men; but these numbers had, I believe, rather fallen off during the last year or so. He could also count upon the services of the Mahajis or Wadigo converts to Islam who inhabited all the populous villages round Gazi, and from there through the Pongwe district to the frontier, and of whom many were armed with guns, and all with bows and arrows. On the other hand, he was bound in return for the subsidy which the Company, following in Seyyid Khalifa's footsteps, paid him to furnish it with soldiers when required. The last occasion on which he was called upon to do so was in March of last year for the defence of the Missions on the Tana.

Passing Mombasa, which, as I have said, was ruled by the Sultan's Wali, the next coast Chieftain, a very small man in comparison with Mubarak, was Hamis-bin-Kombo, whose authority may be said to have extended from a point on the coast a few miles to the north of Mombasa as far as Kurwitu (*i.e.*, about 15 to 20 miles) and inland about 12 or 15 miles also, up to the Ribe and Chogai Hills. Hamis-bin-Kombo, who is a Swahili, not an Arab, represented the aboriginal Rulers of Mombasa, who had governed its "five tribes and towns" before the advent of the Muscat or even of the Portuguese invaders, and stood to the Mazrui Sheikhs in much the same relations as the old Celtic Chieftains of Ireland, the O'Neills and the O'Briens, to the Butlers and Fitzgeralds of the Pale. Before the advent of the Company he frequently resided in Mombasa, where the Swahili, as distinct from the Arab population, regarded him as their Chief, and where most of the leading Swahili, and, indeed, some of the Arab families, were connected with him by ties of blood; but when the Company took over the Government he withdrew, disliking the rule and presence of Europeans, to Mtapwa (10 miles north of Mombasa) in his own district, and as age and infirmities grew on him, never left it. He is said to be very fanatical, and was specially bitter against Freretown and the Mission in general for their harbouring and proselytism of fugitive slaves. I have been told, indeed, that in 1889, when the ferment over this question was at its height, and the German territory was in rebellion, he strongly urged all the other coast Chiefs to join hands with one another and with Bushire and to drive all the Europeans, German and English, into the sea. Mubarak of Gazi declined, however, to move. Hamis-bin-Kombo could put into the field about 300 armed slaves and retainers, and could count on the moral assistance and support of the whole population of Mombasa and of the coast as far northward as Kurwitu.

At Kurwitu began, and stretched as far as Watamu, a distance of some 30 to 40 miles, the territory of Sheikh Salim-bin-Hamis of Takaungu, the head of the younger, or Beni Zaher, branch of the Mazaria, who resided sometimes at Takaungu, his chief town, and sometimes at Gonjoro, about 15 miles to the north-east.

Salim's actual authority as Chief only extended about 18 miles inland, but his influence was supreme throughout the greater part of Giriama, which depended for its trade on his ports of Takaungu, Tanganyika, and Uyombo, not to speak of other markets at a little distance from the sea and creeks, such as Gonjoro, Roka, and Arabuco. His attitude towards the Court of Zanzibar, and his methods of government in his own sphere of influence, were more pacific and conciliatory than Mubarak's. He never openly resisted or rebelled against the Sultans, and sought to rule rather by winning popularity than by inspiring fear. His purse was always open to his Arabs, and every fugitive from other parts of the coast, found a home and the means of subsistence in his towns, so much so that at his death he was personally almost penniless. If he on one occasion attacked the Giriama, and afterwards, when they were reduced to helplessness by famine, forced them to sell him numbers of their women and children as slaves, these were exceptions to his general policy of gaining influence in their country by as far as possible cultivating friendly and intimate relations with their Chiefs. I have even heard from Arabs that, Mahomedan as he was, he at one time underwent, paying a large sum of money for the privilege, initiation into all the mysteries of Giriama freemasonry, and was actually numbered among the Hyenas.

From Watamu to the Tana, a distance of 40 miles, the two Walis of Malindi and Mambriui ruled the coast on behalf of the Sultan, but a little beyond Mambriui (*i.e.*, about 15 miles from Watamu) the country, even close to the sea, becomes poor and thinly populated, whilst the land a few miles back is inhabited

only by nomad Gallas, who spread to within a little distance from the right bank of the river.

On the left bank of the Tana the "influence," as distinct from the actual sovereignty of the so-called Sultan of Witu, began to be felt; the Witu people raided and enslaved the Wapokomo, and compelled them to pay tribute, but never actually established settlements among them.

The real frontier of Wituland was the Ozi, though even there the little ports of Kipini and Kau were held by a Zanzibar force.

Beyond the Ozi, however, right up to Kwyhoo, and as far inland as the forest was reclaimed for cultivation, the Witu Sultans were unquestioned lords of the mainland, whilst the Islands of Lamu and Patta were ruled by a Wali from Zanzibar.

Of Witu I need not speak further than to remind your Lordship that its pacification by Her Majesty's Government, by the Company, and by the Sultan of Zanzibar, took four years from the date of the massacre of the Germans by Fumo Bakari—repeated naval and military expeditions being sent against the outlaws, whose tactics, both in character and effect, were very similar to those of the present Mazrui rebels, until all their strongholds were destroyed, and their leaders surrounded and straved out.

From Kwyhoo to Port Durnford the Bajouni coast was governed by Mzee Sef, Sheikh of Faza, but the wild bush country to the back, inhabited only by nomad Waboni hunters prevented the extension of any semi-civilized rule far inland, nor was Mzee Sef's power ever formidable except to his own oppressed subjects.

Beyond Port Durnford the Somalis ranged freely over the coast as far as Cape Guardafui, the Sultan of Zanzibar merely holding the "Cinque ports," so to speak, of Kismayu, Merka, Brawa, Magadisho, and Warsheikh with a district a few miles round each.

I do not, of course, mean to imply that the Sultan had no power on the mainland. On the contrary, in what is now German East Africa, his authority was very real. Pangani, Saadani, Bagamoyo, Dar-es-Salaam, and Kilwa were all governed by Walis, who were as completely his nominees and dependents as those who ruled for him at Mombasa and Lamu, and the whole coast opposite the two islands was effectively administered by them, as well as the great trade routes from Bugamoyo to Tabora, Ujiji, and Lake Nyanza, at all the centres along which he had his officers; but the northern or as it now is British, portion of his dominions was at once poorer and more barbarous than the southern, and was, therefore, comparatively neglected and left to the local Chieftains.

The present route to Uganda, over the Taru and Teita deserts was hardly thought of, as a competitor to that through Unyamwezi; not Mombasa or Lamu, but Saadani, Bagamoyo, and Kilwa, were the great marts for the inland ivory and slaves. To take a parallel from British history the difference between the Sultan's power to the south and north of Tanga was something like that between the authority of the English Crown in the seventeenth century in the lowlands and highlands of Scotland.

In the south on the present German mainland his sovereignty was absolute; in the north his prestige was very great, but was shared, and in some cases overshadowed, in the eyes of the native tribes by that of almost independent vassal Chiefs.

Such being the condition of the coast when the Company first assumed the government it was obvious that the only course open to the Directors with their limited pecuniary and military resources, was to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the petty native potentates with whom they now found themselves face to face. Witu, then under German protection, was an avowedly foreign, as distinct from a native State; and it was not till 1890 that they made the attempt to maintain order over its outlaw population. In the case of Mubarak of Gazi, they continued his subsidy; indeed to have stopped it would have been a direct provocation, whilst Salim of Takaungu was interested in the maintenance of their rule, by the large and lucrative demands upon him for slaves to make up the caravans to Uganda and the interior, for whose hire he usually bargained for cash down before the caravans were dispatched.

Neither at Gazi nor at Takaungu were the Chiefs troubled by the presence of a resident English officer. The District Superintendents at Vanga and Malindi paid from time to time short visits to Mubarak and to Salim.

I propose now to lay before your Lordship the principal factors in the recent rising, respectfully begging you to bear in mind that the distinction between the English "Company" and the English "Government," though intelligible, is not vividly present, even to the educated native mind, and is indeed very frequently lost sight of.

First and foremost, there is the latent disaffection which will always exist in a greater or less degree wherever a Moslem community, and especially a once dominant Moslem race or class, is under the rule of a non-Moslem Government. In Thessaly and Bulgaria, where the deposed Moslem ruling class became subject to their former "rayas," the bitterness of their new position was such that they soon emigrated for good and all from their old homes. In Egypt, where the people are themselves a subject race, and where the Christian occupying Power is both tolerant and respected for its strength, the feeling is much less intense, though even there the contempt and dislike which Christianity inspires as the religion of the Syrian, Copt, and Greek, recoils on its Western professors, and requires only a very slight encouragement to find expression in outbursts of anti-European fanaticism.

In Zanzibar, both in the islands and on the mainland, Mahommedanism, in spite of the theoretical narrowness of the Ibadhi doctrine, is very tolerant, and there is no real hatred for Europeans as such. Mixing freely with the Banians, the Parsees, and and half Hindoo Shiah Khojas of Kutch, as well as with the entirely heathen tribes of the African interior, the Arabs and Swahilis are religious without being fanatical, and the idea of Christianity, which in the mind of the ordinary Turk is associated mainly with the peculiar characteristics of the Levantine, suggests here the strong and masterful Powers of Western Europe, with their war-ships and guns, and inspires therefore a certain respect. There is, moreover, no vernacular press to poison the native mind, as in Egypt and India, by falsehoods and appeals to fanaticism and race hatred. The European too, like the pure Arab in his own mind, is a "white man" in a society based mainly on negro slavery; and though the "colour prejudice" and all the ideas associated with it are infinitely less strong in an Eastern than in a Western community, it is inevitable that it should exist and to some extent counteract the different type of prejudices which arise from religious intolerance. In Poland, for example, a black Christian would *ceteris paribus* be treated with more respect than a Jew, whilst the reverse would be the case in the United States.

Allowing, however, for all these mitigating circumstances, there still remains a substratum of dormant religious intolerance, which is none the less real because less strong and less prominent than in countries in which the lines of cleavage are entirely those of creed. Even if it had not been embittered as it has within late years by the aggressive attacks of anti-slavery and missionary bodies, the Mahommedan spirit could not fail to be aroused by the threatened substitution of European for Arab control along the whole length of the Zanzibar coast, and once aroused there was always a danger that the merest trifle would suffice to impart to political discontent the more dangerous and contagious character of a religious movement. The spark which lit up the German rebellion was a story that the Governor of Pangani had marched, attended by his dogs, into a mosque; the real fact being that he entered the building to remove one of them who had strayed into it through the open door, and whose presence there would, he feared, offend the Arabs; but, false as it was, the tale spread throughout the land, and the rising at once became a "holy war." Mubarak has attempted in the present instance, with a good deal less success, to win support in the same way, and from the moment he really broke with us he assumed the title of "Commander of the Faithful," and made a point of always speaking of us and even of our Moslem adherents as the "Kafirs."

So far the fanatical spirit has been kept within bounds, and has only found expression in secret sympathy amongst a large class in all the coast towns for Arab and Moslem Chiefs resisting an alien and infidel Government, and in the supply to them of information and in some cases of funds; but the origin of the quarrel being one on which the Arabs were themselves divided, has not brought about, with the exception of that of Hamis-bin-Kombo, who was always a fanatic, any active adhesion to the rebel cause.

Two specific influences, since the advent of the Company, have embittered this vague and dormant Mahommedan feeling, and converted it from a mere apathetic preference for Arab over Christian rule into one of more active resentment, namely, the attacks (1) on Islam as a religious system, (2) on slavery, and I now propose to explain my meaning on both these points more fully.

### 1. *Zeal of Missionaries.*

The earlier Christian missionaries who first appeared in East Africa about the middle of the century were well received by the Sultans and Arabs, partly from the respect with which priests of all sects are regarded by Mahomedans, when their fanatical feelings are not excited, and partly because their main object, which was to preach to the heathen truths, many of them common to Christianity and to Islam, was in itself meritorious in Arab eyes, whilst it never occurred to any one at that time that their presence in the interior could seriously interfere with Arab influence or with the Slave Trade. Thus Krapf was warmly recommended by Seyyid Saïd to his representatives on the mainland as "a German holy man who wished to convert the world to God," and though Seyyid Barghash viewed the establishment of a Christian Mission in the heart of his capital with a good deal of distrust, both he and Seyyid Khalifa treated the missionaries with remarkable liberality, giving them amongst other concessions free grants of land near Mombasa for the churches and schools which they founded there. So long as the Sultan was the real ruler both at Zanzibar and at Mombasa the missionaries on their side applied their chief energies to the conversion of the heathen rather than of the Moslems, and found ample scope for them in the education of the numerous heathen captives, many of them little children, who in the days when the Slave Trade was really flourishing, and not moribund as it now is in these waters, were rescued by British cruisers from the dhows. But with the establishment of an European Administration on the coast the sphere of their activity widened, and they soon opened at Mombasa, which was at once the seat of government, and the head-quarters of the Anglican mainland Mission, a vigorous campaign against Islam.

Whilst their brethren at Zanzibar were content to hold special services for Moslems within the walls of the Cathedral, of which no one could well complain, since no one was obliged to go there or hear the arguments unless they liked, the Mombasa Mission priests conducted theirs in the public market-place, so that the ordinary native buyers and sellers or passers by would often be forced to listen to uninvited controversial attacks upon their faith. A belief seems accordingly to have grown up among the natives that their new European rulers were identified with and responsible for this propaganda, and therefore hostile to Islam as a creed. Absurd as this idea may appear to ourselves, it would not necessarily be so to an Oriental, accustomed to associate Church and State far more closely than is the case with Europeans. Though missionaries were excluded from India by the East India Company for many years after the original English conquests, so that the natives had every opportunity for appreciating our tolerance, we cannot forget that scarcely forty years ago the belief in the new greased cartridges as part of a deep-laid scheme for Christianizing the whole Bengal army was a factor of no small importance in the Indian Mutiny. Indeed, European Governments have often proselytized actively; the Portuguese, who long occupied this coast, spread the Gospel in all their Colonies with the sword; and the arguments of their missionaries were supported by the severities of the Inquisition. Be this, however, as it may, I have little doubt, from the Sultan's own language to myself, reported to your Lordship at the time, when he said that "the Company had corrupted the people," from expressions used by the Wali of Mombasa to Sir Lloyd Mathews, and from more explicit statements made to me by nearly every English layman in the place, that the zeal of some of our clergy has given offence to the Mahomedan population. I trust your Lordship will not misunderstand me, or imagine that I am in the least unfriendly to the Mission. On the contrary, I entertain, as indeed do many Arabs and Swahilis, a sincere personal regard for several of its members, and I am convinced that a Christian in whatever position will only earn the contempt of Mahomedans should he seek to conciliate them by displaying an indifference to the observances of his own creed.

### 2. *Interference with Slavery.*

Almost simultaneously with the assumption of the Government by the Company two very unpopular measures, the Decree of Seyyid Khalifa freeing all slaves who entered his dominions overland, and the Decree of Seyyid Ali abolishing the sale of

slaves altogether, were published at Zanzibar, and ordered to be enforced on the coast. Your Lordship will remember how earnestly Sir Francis de Winton protested against being forced to apply the latter measure, which remained for that matter a dead letter, and must have done so unless the Company had been able to fight the Chiefs of Takaungu and Gazi, outside Lamu, Malindi, and Mombasa. So little were its provisions ever realized in Takaungu (indeed, I do not believe it was ever officially made known there) that on Sheikh Salim's death our own candidate for the succession, Rashid-bin-Salim, sought to conciliate his cousin, Mubarak, by presenting to him, in direct violation of the clause which prohibits such a transfer, the majority of his father's fighting slaves. In the coast towns really held by the Company it was, however, systematically enforced entailing much suffering and discontent with the European Administration, which was most unfairly regarded as responsible for it. In some cases the restrictions as to the inheritance of slaves ruined not only the heirs-at-law when not sons, but the old and infirm slaves past work, who suddenly found themselves without a master to provide for them, and were thrown upon the streets to live on charity. In others, owners who could have cleared off their debts by a partial sale of slaves could now only make enough by their labour to pay the interest, since the slaves if too hard-worked found it easy on the mainland to run away, and their recovery, in itself at best uncertain, entailed expense, whilst creditors, who had previously lent money on the security of slaves, found that security rendered valueless by a subsequent retrospective enactment. To the native to whom the European objections to slavery and slave-dealing appear as fantastic and unintelligible as do the Socialistic protests against private property to the ordinary Englishman, this upsetting of all the old arrangements sanctioned for centuries by religion and native public opinion, seemed an act of gratuitous oppression, and shook the confidence which other circumstances, such as the surprising integrity and patience of our Magistrates had encouraged, in the justice of British rule. Over and over again the Arabs have been heard to say that they find much to admire in our Government; it is humane, it is uncorrupt, it deals fairly and evenly between rich and poor alike, it is clearly anxious for the good of its subjects, but on one point, the law of slavery, it is unjust, and goes against the laws of God and common sense.

I ought perhaps, before leaving this subject, to say something of the general characteristics of mainland slavery, which is in some respects very different from that of the islands, though both on the islands and on the coast pure household and harem slavery or concubinage present very similar features.

In the first place, in the coast towns, which are none of them large, and whose total trade is insignificant when compared to that of Zanzibar, there is not the same demand for the ordinary "vibarua," or day-labourers, employed in coaling, loading, and unloading, &c., so that there are much fewer slaves doing this work, whilst, on the other hand, many more obtain employment as porters up-country, and thus escape the regular supervision of their masters.

In the same way there is nothing on the coast corresponding to the clove plantations of the islands with the constant and careful work required for them, and the consequent need for supervision and checks on idleness. A few estates producing cocoa-nuts, corns, mahogo, &c., in the immediate neighbourhood of the towns, and especially of Malindi, are under more or less regular cultivation beneath the master's eye; but the Arabs and large Swahili landowners, who in the islands live as planters on their estates, on the coast are chiefly dwellers in towns, and the most common form of rural slavery resembles what in France is I believed called the "metayer" system. The greater part of the coast as far as the point at which the territories of the Wanyika, about 10 miles inland, begin, was divided after the Arab conquest among the invaders, and the properties thus created have either passed to their descendants or been transferred by them to new purchasers. Some of these lands are fertile, others are still covered by thick forest and bush, and bring little to their owners. Nearly all of them are cultivated by slaves, who live in little villages of some fifty or more inhabitants, not necessarily all the slaves of the same master, but dwelling together for the sake of protection and convenience, very much as their own pleasure and proximity to the master's land suggests. These slaves either till land already under cultivation, or make a clearing in the bush and sow new crops there, and on the food thus grown they support themselves and their families, putting aside a certain proportion of grain (so many "gizlus," or tons, a-year) for their absent master, living 30 miles away at Mombasa or Malindi, who receives his

share at certain intervals by dhow, and then usually sells it to the Indian traders at the ports. They may be said, in fact, to be small farmers who, in return for the right to cultivate the owner's land, pay a share of the harvest in rent, and their local affairs are generally managed by their own village Elders or Headmen, whom they select by a rough informal process from among the older and more prosperous slaves. The share paid to their master varies according to the productiveness or the reverse of the land, but is rarely, I believe, exorbitant, for the reason that his hold on them is too slight to make it worth his while to be grasping. If he claimed too oppressively large a share they would prefer to run away into the bush, where it would be difficult for him to track them, and would make a fresh clearing there, subsisting until the new crop was ripe on grain stolen from their former village, or else join one of the Watoro Settlements at Makongeni, where along the banks of the Sabaki there are acres upon acres of Indian corn, and whence, if threatened, as has sometimes happened, by an Arab armed force they could easily retreat till the danger was over into the jungle. The were, and still are, numerous refuges for the runaway slave, whether from slave villages such as those described above—and it is to this class that Kurwitu, Uyombo, Kijipoa, and most of the large coast villages shown on maps belong—or from the more laborious work on the coast cities. An adventurous and able-bodied slave, from a fighting tribe like the Yaos, could, moreover, always run from Mombasa to Gazi, from Malindi to Takaungu, and from Lamu or Patta to Witu. Ahmed, Salim, and Mubarak asked no awkward questions; if they fancied the fugitive had the makings of a soldier, they gave him a muzzle-loader, a powder horn, and a distinctive dress, and enlisted him among their fighting slaves. He now joined in raids for other slaves or cattle on hostile or helpless tribes, and strode about in times of quiet in his master's train, and if he showed bravery and intelligence, and thus won the Chief's favour, became perhaps one of his standard bearers, and eventually an "akida," or chief officer. Such was, I believe, the history of Akida Songoro, Akida Bakari, Hamis Mchangamwe, and many other retainers of the Mazrui or Witu rulers, who, beginning their careers as common slaves, rose by courage to authority and wealth.

There are two more points deserving notice in contrasting mainland slavery with that of the islands—firstly, the far greater ease with which the various anti-slavery Decrees could be enforced in the towns really ruled by the Company (I am not now speaking of places like Gazi or of inland districts) as compared with the difficulties to be met with in Zanzibar. The coast towns are all small, the slave-owners and the approximate number of their slaves are more easily ascertainable by the English officers; there are few planters living on inland estates who, having once smuggled slaves in, could detain them there without our knowledge, or cause them to be lost to sight amidst the teeming population of a large native capital, whilst on their side the Cadis and native officers, having no native power, such as that of the Sultan, to look to, have always been more amenable to our control. Emancipation has therefore, I think, proceeded far more rapidly and effectively in proportion to the numbers affected in the mainland towns than at Zanzibar.

The other point which has struck me as peculiar to the mainland is the almost feudal feeling, if I may so call it, which the freer slaves described above, living uncontrolled in their own villages, appear to entertain, especially in the Takaungu country, for their Arab masters. Thus the district of Kibokom, near Takaungu, inhabited almost entirely by the slaves of Nasr-bin-Hamid, an influential Takaungu Mazrui, who had joined the rebellion, was long very hostile to Government, but the moment Nasr made his submission it at once became loyal, and has remained so even now that Nasr himself is a prisoner in Mubarak's camp. "We were against the Government," said the people when they tendered their submission, "because our master was against it; now that he is your friend, we are your friends also." I could give other instances of this same feeling, which is, I think, a factor of some little importance, since it means that the loyalty or disloyalty of a single powerful Arab may affect that of the whole district under his influence.

Unpopular as an alien Government, and held responsible alike for the anti-Mussulman propaganda of the English missionaries, the anti-slavery Edicts obtained by the English Agents at Zanzibar, and the mistakes which some of its officials new to the country at first committed from a pardonable inexperience, the Company further suffered from the unpopularity which in the East always attaches to weakness. Amongst all Orientals fear or respect is the parent of love; and a Govern-



ment which fails to inspire them will almost inevitably be regarded with contempt and then dislike, whilst every effort which it makes to retrieve its popularity by concessions to public opinion, or by pursuing a liberal and conciliatory policy, will be attributed to timidity or feebleness, and as likely as not increase instead of diminishing its difficulties. The natives were not slow to see that the Company was a good deal weaker than the Seyyids in its dealings with men like Salim and Mubarak; an abortive attempt to impose a hut tax in Giriama suggested the suspicion that it lacked not the will, but the power, to be oppressive, and as first Uganda and then Witu were abandoned by it, and the energy which had characterized the earlier years of its rule gave way to a policy of "marking time" on the coast, an impression rapidly spread that its days as an Administration were numbered. During its last year or so indeed its approaching disappearance was the subject of general discussion among Europeans and natives alike, and even had it been more vigorous than it was, such a circumstance could not fail to weaken it. There can be no doubt that in British East Africa the uncertainty as to the future of the country, after the withdrawal of the Company, unsettled men's minds, revived or awoke among restless spirits ambitious hopes which might otherwise have slumbered, and generally tended throughout the territory to a state of uneasiness and political ferment from the after effects of which it is still suffering. The commoner opinion was that the Seyyid would recover his own; and though a few intelligent men understood the true character of the new Government at Zanzibar, the majority of Arabs and Swahilis did not realize that its extension to the mainland merely meant the substitution of a new set of English officials for the Directors. When in February 1895 it was known for certain that the Sultan was to resume possession, the restoration of the old Arab régime was universally anticipated: "God," said the natives, "has had mercy on us, and has heard our prayers." And when in July it appeared that the change was only to be to European control in another form, the disappointment was all the deeper for the hopes whose realization had seemed for a time so near.

During these last months of the Company's rule the disturbances which have since agitated the country were fast maturing. Mubarak became daily more and more unmanageable. So insubordinate was he that Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner at Mombasa, then Acting Administrator, had repeatedly, so he tells me, to appeal to the Directors for authority to stop his subsidy or threaten him, should it become necessary, with force; but the Directors being, as no one knew better than Mubarak himself, without the means of coercing him except by invoking the help of Government, only replied that a rupture with him would be impolitic, and that Mr. Pigott must do all he could to avoid it. As far as Gazi was concerned, therefore, the Company's officers tided over as best they could, not however without loss of prestige, the period of negotiation with Government for the transfer of territory; but at Takaungu Salim's death and the inevitable dispute over the succession forced their hands and compelled them to act. They could not permit their nominee to be deposed and Takaungu to be attacked and perhaps looted by his rival. Hence their appeal to Her Majesty's Government for the help of a man-of-war, and the intervention from Zanzibar which began the Mazrui rebellion.

Mubarak of Gazi's own connection with then events has already been discussed by me in previous despatches. I believe that had he realized at the beginning that he would have to deal with the Government, and not with the Company, he would have abstained from encouraging the disaffected elements at Takaungu. I suspect, however, that he thought that if civil war arose there he would be called upon by the Company to assist in restoring order, and would have then dictated his own terms, which would probably have included the substitution of one of his own sons for both the rival candidates for Salim's heritage, and would thus have enabled him to reunite under his rule the whole Mazrui tribe, both to the north and south of Mombasa. Our intervention upset his calculations, and when the Takaungu rebel Chiefs fled to Gazi, he was forced to choose between their friendship and that of the Government. His interest was on one side, his honour and prestige with his own people on the other. Trusting to his fortune, and influenced rather by the development of circumstances and events than by his own deliberate will, he decided for the latter; and after a few weeks of hesitation and intrigue, threw his lot in with his rebellious kinsmen, thus uniting the forces of Gazi and Takaungu in a common rising against British control.

The factors in the situation at the moment of the transfer may therefore be summed up as follows:—

1. A Mahomedan Society resting largely upon slavery and to a great extent ruled by semi-independent Chiefs.

2. An European Administration with no visible force at its back, whose establishment was followed at a short interval by premature legislation which it was not always able to enforce, but which was in itself sufficient to render it unpopular against the cherished domestic institutions of the people.

3. The failure of this alien and infidel Government to carry out with its inadequate resources, the difficult task of ruling all the turbulent elements with which it had to deal, the knowledge among the natives for the last year or so of its existence that a change was imminent, and the consequent creation of a state of political unrest very favourable to agitation and disturbance.

4. The outbreak just a month before the change of a rebellion in Takaungu, in which the fighting force at the late Chief's disposal was on the side of the rebels, and whose leaders were secretly encouraged from Gazi—and as a consequence a rising of the united Mazrui power at the precise moment of the transfer and before the new Government had had time to provide the force necessary to cope with it.

During the nine months which have elapsed since the transfer, the Government has shown, it is true, that its power is very different from that of the Company. The destruction in three hours of the stronghold of Mwele, the occupation of various inland posts, and the reverses invariably suffered by the rebels whenever they came in touch with our troops have slowly but surely weakened their prestige, but the fact that until three months ago our limited military resources and the necessity of protecting our numerous posts and Mission stations obliged us to assume a mainly defensive attitude, and after dealing a blow, such as that which we inflicted at Mwele, to return to the coast instead of following up our advantage, has destroyed half the moral effect of our successes, and enabled the rebel Chiefs to re-collect their scattered forces and appear to retaliate by sudden raids upon the coast. The contest has therefore seemed to its native spectators, many of whom sympathized on grounds of their common blood and faith with the rebels, to be not entirely unequal, and to bear a certain resemblance to the old risings of Mubarak against the dominion of Zanzibar at the close of which the honours of victory remained with the Seyyids, and its substantial fruits with the insurgent Chief. With the arrival of the Indian troops, and the effective occupation of a complete series of inland positions, the situation has now changed, and the suppression of the rebellion is now, I trust, well within sight.

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No. 73.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 15.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, April 17, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I received on the evening of the 11th instant a message from the Governor of German East Africa, through the Acting German Consul at Zanzibar, to the effect that Sheikh Mubarak was reported from Tanga to have taken refuge, with all his followers, in German territory. Major von Wissmann added that he was himself about to proceed northwards to settle the conditions of their reception there.

On the afternoon of the 13th Major von Wissmann anchored for half-an-hour on his steam-yacht the "Rovuma" in Zanzibar Harbour, and I went on board to see him, as he had not time to come ashore. He showed me a telegram from Tanga reporting that all the rebel leaders, with a following of 3,000 persons, 1,500 of whom were armed with guns, were encamped about a day's march inland from Moa, a German border town on the coast some 6 or 7 miles south of the frontier. He intended to go at once to Moa, only calling for an hour or so at Tanga, where I had proposed our meeting, but he agreed to meet me on the 15th instant at Jasin, on the frontier itself. He said he had already assured the rebel leaders that they would none of them be given up to us, but he promised me to disarm them as expeditiously as possible, and to make no arrangements with them as to the terms of their future residence in German territory till we had fully discussed the question together.

I arrived at Wasin from Zanzibar on the evening of the 14th, and proceeded next day via Vanga to Jasin, a frontier village just across the German boundary. Owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding, Major von Wissmann had anchored in the "Rovuma" off the mouth of the Umba, which is regarded as the port of Jasin, expecting me to meet

him there in our steam-launch, while I had gone by land from Vanga to Jasin village, and we thus contrived to miss one another. He sent me a message, however, explaining that he had had to return to Moa, as Mubarak was expected there immediately, and suggesting an interview next day. I thought the simplest thing would be to follow him on the steam-ship "Juba," and we met next morning on board the "Rovuma" in Moa Harbour.

The demands which I made of him were embodied in a formal note which I afterwards drafted in his cabin, and read over to him before I left, requesting him to send me, on receipt of it, an official answer, so as to record our agreement by means of an exchange of notes. He agreed generally to all that I asked, but observed that although he would do his best to disarm the rebels, he could not make absolutely certain of getting all their guns, as many of them, before the disarmament could take place, might conceal their arms in the bush, or slip back with them across the frontier. As regarded their future residence, he proposed to establish them at Tanga, where they would be under the supervision of a German District Officer. I objected to this that Tanga was too close to the frontier, from which it was only 30 miles, and asked why it should not be feasible to place them in some town more to the south, such, for instance, as Bagamoyo. To this he replied that he would be willing to do so later, but that, in dealing with a force like that which had followed Mubarak, it was necessary to proceed cautiously, and not alarm them before they were well in the grasp of the German authorities. If he were now to mention Bagamoyo as their future residence, both Mubarak and his followers would be frightened, and their suspicions would be aroused by the suggestion of so distant a banishment, and, instead of surrendering, they might break up into small robber bands, take to the bush, and disturb the peace of the German territory by depredations, which would necessitate the dispatch of an armed force to hunt them down. He would prefer to invite them to come to Tanga, where they had many native friends, and once he got them there under the guns of the fort, and could so dispose the troops there as to surround them, it would be easy to deprive them of their arms, and subsequently to intinate to them that it had been decided to settle them at some place further south. I said that I admitted the reasonableness of this contention, the peace and security of our respective frontier districts being a natural object of solicitude to us both, and that I was prepared to acquiesce in Tanga as a provisional residence, on the understanding that after the disarmament had been completed the question of their transfer further south should again form the subject of discussion.

I then sent the "Juba" to Jasin, so as not to alarm Mubarak, who, Major von Wissmann informed me, had come down at his summons to the coast, and was just outside Moa, and remained myself on board the "Rovuma," while the German Governor landed to have an interview with him, of which he promised to report the result to me.

Major von Wissmann was away about five hours. On his return he informed me that Mubarak had come down to Moa with 200 armed followers, the vast majority of whom appeared to be half-caste Arabs, and to be armed with swords and breech-loading rifles. At first Mubarak assumed a somewhat independent tone, and seemed to fancy he could make his own terms; indeed, he had actually proposed to the local German District Officer that he should unite his forces with those of the Germans and make a joint attack on British territory, and had appeared somewhat surprised at being advised not to venture to make such a suggestion to the Governor. Afterwards, however, as his true position was explained to him by Major von Wissmann, who pointed out to him that he was there not to negotiate terms, but to obey orders, and that if he disobeyed them the German forces would combine with the English to attack him, he became more submissive, and at length agreed, after a good deal of evasion and hesitation, to lay down his arms at Tanga, with as many of his followers as were willing to go with him into exile. He asked, however, for a week's grace to return to his camp inland, talk over, and collect his people, and bring as many as he could to Tanga, which was three days' march from their encampment, promising that he would come alone if they refused to accompany him, and would surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Major von Wissmann agreed to this request, but warned him that if he broke faith or tried to tamper with the Government, he would be treated as a rebel and outlaw.

In the course of the discussion, at which all Mubarak's 200 followers, as well as the chief people of Moa, were present, Major von Wissmann announced that he had seen me, and that I had told him that there would be an amnesty for all persons returning to British territory on their surrendering themselves and their arms to our authorities, only ten of the rebel leaders, whose names he read out as having been given him by me, being excepted from the general pardon. From the manner in which this announcement was

received, he was inclined to believe that many would desert Mubarak and avail themselves of my offer, and I think myself that this is specially likely to be the case sooner or later with those belonging to Takaungu and Malindi.

We parted on the most cordial terms, the German Governor promising to keep me informed from Dar-es-Salaam, whither he purposed returning at once, of any news of interest respecting the rebels, and I proceeded on his steam-launch to Jasin, and thence by the steam-ship "Juba" on the following morning to Mombasa.

I should mention that at the time of our interview Major von Wissmann had received no instructions from his Government as to the treatment of the refugees, and that his willing acceptance of my principal suggestions was his own spontaneous act.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 73.

*List of Persons excluded from the Amnesty to be granted on their Surrender and Submission to the followers of Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Rashid-el-Kahlani.*

SHEIKH Mubarak-bin-Rashid-el-Kahlani.  
 Eyoub-bin-Mubarak.  
 Sebe-bin-Mubarak.  
 Mubarak-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis.  
 Aziz-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis.  
 Hamis-bin-Kombo.  
 Mahomed-bin-Hamis Kombo.  
 Salim-bin-Haseif.  
 Akida Bakari.  
 Mwenyi Jaka.

No. 74.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 15.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, April 22, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, on receiving news from Major von Wissmann that he was concentrating troops on the frontier, as Mubarak's conduct was unsatisfactory, and that he wished to see me on the 20th instant at Moa, I proceeded there on the morning of that day on Her Majesty's ship "Philomel," being joined, shortly after my arrival, by Colonel Pearson and Captain Barratt, who had come by the steam-ship "Juba" from Vanga.

The German Governor informed me that Mubarak was procrastinating, and trying to reopen the question of the terms of his residence in German territory. He had sent to ask what pay and rank the German Government would give him if he agreed to their conditions; and it seemed probable that he was endeavouring, now he had got back among his followers in the bush, to shuffle out of his promises. He (Major von Wissmann) had accordingly written to tell him that he and his adherents were beggars, who could make no terms, but should be thankful to be allowed an asylum under any conditions; and this he followed up by a second message to the effect that, if Mubarak had not laid down his arms by sunset on the 21st he must expect to be treated as a rebel. The German forces would join with ours to attack him, and if caught on German soil he would be hanged. Major von Wissmann suggested that I should meet him on the following evening near Jasin, when he would inform me of the result of this ultimatum.

We met in Jasin roadstead yesterday at the appointed hour, and the German Governor announced to me that Mubarak had come in early that morning with eight out of the ten rebel leaders excluded from my proposed amnesty, and a following of 1,100 persons, of whom 600 were armed—400 with rifles, and 200 with bows, spears, &c.—the rest being non-combatants, women, and children. Many more would, they said, surrender within the next week or so, but some had scattered in small bands on both sides of the frontier, others had deserted altogether within the last two or three days from the camp near Moa, whilst others again were with the two leaders still at large, Mahomed-bin-Hamis Kombo and Akida Bakari, who were stated to be in the district to the north of

Mombasa, and who are now, I may mention, being hunted there by a force under Lieutenant Scott. Mubarak, who was trembling with fever, and appeared to be ill at ease in mind as well as body, asked, however, to be allowed to put off further discussion as to the number of guns still in the possession of his followers till his strength was equal to it, and this request Major von Wissmann naturally granted. The disarmament then began, each man being made to lay down his gun, sword, or other weapons, and to take off his belt, from which the cartridges were all removed by the German Governor's Soudanese askaris. The muzzle-loaders, which were in very bad condition, were broken up and burnt; the breech-loaders, of which there were only eighteen (some Sniders and some Martinis) being put aside with the ammunition to be handed over to our authorities. The refugees were then informed that they would be allowed two days' rest at Moa, and would be dispatched overland on the third morning to Tanga, where their ultimate residence would be decided upon. A guard of two companies of Soudanese was detached to escort them to Tanga, a third company remaining provisionally at Moa to keep a watch upon bands crossing the frontier.

I pressed Major von Wissmann very earnestly to intern the Chiefs at Dar-es-Selaam, and I have good hopes that he will do so, at any rate; as regards Sheikh Mubarak himself and his sons. The removal of the Takaungu Chiefs far from the frontier, though desirable, is less important, as they have no personal influence, and are indeed scarcely known in the district to the south of Mombasa.

I returned here this morning, and propose, unless anything should occur in the meantime to necessitate its postponement or modification, to publish within the next few days in Arabic and Swahili the amnesty, of which I have the honour to inclose the English version herewith, and respecting some of the provisions of which it may be desirable that I should offer a few observations.

#### 1.—As to the Persons excluded.

These comprehend Sheikh Mubarak himself and two of his sons, who were specially active in the rebellion; the two Takaungu Chiefs, Hamis-bin-Kombo and his son Mahomed; the Muscat Arab Salim-bin-Hoseif of Arabuco, better known as Salim-bin-, or wa- Jembea (*i.e.*, Salim of the dagger), who had the chief share in the burning of Malindi; and the Digo Chief Mwenyi Jaka, who, after accompanying us to Mwele last August, deserted, with no apparent provocation, to the rebels, and long terrorized the Shimba country to the immediate south of Mombasa. To these I have added, with some hesitation, the name of Akida Bakari, the principal Commander under Aziz-bin-Rashid, of the Takaungu rebel forces. I have done so because, although only a slave, Akida Bakari has been conspicuous among the leaders of the rising, for the energy and persistence with which he has prosecuted his share in it, and is accused of having committed on his own personal initiative several acts of exceptional barbarity. Even if not executed, it is desirable that in the event of his capture he should be tried, and the charges against him fully investigated.

The reward of 1,000 rupees which I have offered for each of the rebel leaders is not, I think, likely to be claimed, but will prove, I hope, useful as a deterrent should any of those excluded from the amnesty think of recrossing the frontier and hiding in our territory.

#### 2.—Reservations as to Crimes distinct from that of Rebellion.

A certain number of cold-blooded murders and outrages have been committed during the rising by individual rebels, whom it is impossible for us here to identify in such a way as to exclude them from the amnesty by name. Most of these crimes have been perpetrated by slaves, either under the orders of the Chiefs, or for the sake of robbery, and although it would have a bad effect to execute the offenders after they have come in under an amnesty, especially as the moral perceptions of the ordinary slave are those of a mere savage, and he cannot easily distinguish between what are excusable and what inexcusable acts in a state of civil war, it would be fair that the sufferers or their relatives should have an opportunity in any case where they could bring their claim home, of claiming compensation, the grant of which, on the lines of the Mahommedan Law of blood-fines, would not detract from the generally unqualified character of the pardon now being offered.

3.—*Innocent Members of Sheikh Mubarak's Family.*

I have already in previous despatches given reasons why it would be politic and would have a good effect to treat these with indulgence. It is, I think, unlikely that either Rashid or Mahomed-bin-Mubarak will return to British territory so long as their father is alive, and if they did, it would not be advisable to put them in possession of the property or allow them to reside near Gazi while the terror inspired by the old Chief's name is still felt by the surrounding tribes. They might, moreover, remit money to their father in German territory, which he would be better without. For these reasons I propose that they should only succeed on his decease.

I have every reason to hope that when the terms of the amnesty are fully known, large numbers of persons will immediately avail themselves of it, and if the people, both those who were rebels and those who were loyal, begin to cultivate within the next week or so in what were lately the disturbed districts we shall save the present half-year's harvest.

Many are coming every day into Takaungu from the district to the immediate south of it, where Mahomed-bin-Hamis Kombo and Akida Bakari still linger with small parties of rebels, to give up their guns, and obtain permission to return unmolested to their villages, and although the region between Gazi and Vanga is still full of armed bands of Wadigo, Colonel Pearson believes that they are only waiting for the news that Mubarak has abandoned the struggle, to submit. He is sending a column through the Wadigo country in the course of the next week to affect their disarmament, and he anticipates that the process will not be difficult.

With the termination of the present rebellion, which was bound sooner or later to arise, if our authority over the petty coast Chiefs was to be rendered a reality, or the slave-dealing and other malpractices at Gazi and Takaungu put a stop to, the last serious element of opposition, to the establishment and consolidation of British rule in this Protectorate may, I think, be regarded as removed. In the future we shall no doubt have to deal with disturbances among the tribes of the interior as we attempt to bring them under control, to stop their inter-tribal wars, and, above all, interfere with the local Slave Trade, to which they are all so much attached; and I think it not unlikely that the news of the Italian catastrophe in Abyssinia, which I hear is being already discussed by the Arabs in the coast towns, may produce a sufficient effervescence among the Somalis and Gallas both on the Italian and on our side of the Juba, to render the maintenance of a strong force at Kismayu advisable; but warfare in Ukamba and Jubaland, where the natives have no guns, and usually submit after one or two sharp lessons, is very different from that which we have had to carry on in Witu and in this province, with the obstinate bush-fighting Arabs and half-breeds of the coast, provided, as they are, with rifles, and supplied with stores of powder and percussion caps through the Indian traders on the seaports. None of the inland tribes, moreover, with which we are acquainted, except the Masai and the Somalis (and both of these have already been to a great extent cowed by us), are really warlike. While, however, I do not anticipate that any further extensive operations will be necessitated in any part of the territory it would, I think, be desirable that the Indian regiment should remain here if possible for a couple of months longer, till the coast has settled down again into a condition of complete tranquillity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 74.

*English version of the Amnesty.*

WHEREAS Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Rashid-el-Kahlani rebelled in the month of Seffer last against His Highness Seyyid Hamid - bin - Thwein - bin - Saïd - bin - Sultan, Sultan of Zanzibar, and against the High Protecting Power, and assisted other persons who had been publicly declared rebels and outlaws, using for this purpose against the Government the guns and money which had been given to him by it in reliance on his promises of fidelity, and assumed, in contempt of His Highness, the title of Commander of the Faithful (Emir-el-Mumenin), which in the Zanzibar dominions belongs to the Seyyid alone, and in the course of his rebellion committed many crimes against the persons and property of His Highness' subjects and others, for which reasons it became necessary for the troops of the Government to proceed against him, until, after being pursued from place to place, he and

his followers were driven to fly for refuge into the territories of the German Government, and to surrender themselves and their arms to the Imperial German authorities ;

Be it hereby known that, order being restored, there is now a free pardon to all persons who took part in the aforesaid rebellion, and who may desire to return to their homes in the Zanzibar or British territories, excepting the following leaders, who, if found in the said territories, will be immediately arrested, and will suffer the punishment of rebels, namely :—

Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Rashid-el-Kahlani.  
 Eyoub-bin-Mubarak.  
 Sebe-bin-Mubarak.  
 Mubarak-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis.  
 Aziz-bin-Rashid-bin-Hamis.  
 Hamis-bin-Kombo.  
 Mahomed-bin-Hamis Kombo.  
 Salim-bin-Hoseif.  
 Akida Bakari.  
 Mwenyi Jaka.

A reward of 1,000 rupees will be given to any one arresting, or enabling the police to arrest, any of the aforesaid persons, should they or any of them be at any time discovered in the British or Zanzibar territories.

Excepting these ten persons there is an amnesty ("aman") for all the rest on their presenting themselves and giving up their arms to the Walis or to the English District Officers of the places at or near which they wish to reside, and they will be free, subject to such guarantees as the Government may require for their future good behaviour, to reoccupy their lands and houses at Gazi, Mombasa, Takaungu, Malindi, or elsewhere, and to rebuild their houses if these have been destroyed.

Provided always that where any person so returning is afterwards accused of having, during the course of the late rebellion killed or maimed any other person not in fight, but in cold blood, he shall, if convicted of such crimes by a competent Court, be made to pay in each case to the heirs or to the injured party the "diyah" prescribed by the Mahomedan Law. Provided also that any such person shall be obliged to restore to its lawful owners any property of whatever description of which the latter can show that he is or has become during the rebellion unlawfully possessed.

Further, in consideration of former services rendered to the late Imperial British East Africa Company by Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Rashid-el-Kahlani, and of the ancient friendship between the Mazrui tribe and the Representatives of British authority on this coast, the Government desiring to deal gently and mercifully with the children of Sheikh Mubarak, and to preserve the eldest branch of the family of Othman-bin-Abdullah-el-Mazrui from dying out altogether in the Zanzibar territories, will, instead of confiscating the lands and other property of Sheikh Mubarak, hold them in trust to be divided on his death between those of his sons who took no active part in the rebellion, namely, Rashid-bin-Mubarak and Mahomed-bin-Mubarak, or their heirs, and these, should they claim the property, whether houses or shambas or other effects, will be placed in possession of it under conditions which will be made known to them, or to such agent as they may appoint to act for them at Mombasa. This, however, will not include the stone house or other houses at Kaukabani, which have already been taken by the Government for the residence of the new Wali of Gazi, and for the Askaris to be kept there. The daughters and other relatives of Sheikh Mubarak not excluded from the amnesty will also be entitled on his death to claim the shares in his estate to which they would respectively have been entitled in accordance with the rules of Mahomedan Law. With this exception all property in the British or Zanzibar dominions belonging to the ten rebel leaders excluded from the amnesty is confiscated by Government.

All slaves belonging to the ten rebel leaders mentioned above (except such as may be shown under the last preceding clause to be lawfully inherited by Rashid-bin-Mubarak and Mahomed-bin-Mubarak) will be given papers of freedom on applying for them to the Walis or English District Officers within whose jurisdiction they may wish to settle.

The prohibition of sale of cloth to the Wanyika in the coast towns will be removed, and they will be free once more to purchase it, with the permission of the local District Officer, on and after the 1st Zilhadja (14th May) next.

The Government relies on the co-operation of all classes of its subjects to assist it in healing the wounds which the rebels have inflicted on the country, and to bring back to it

the tranquillity and prosperity which the disobedience of these misguided men and its effects have interrupted for the past eight months.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 75.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Zanzibar, May 2, 1896.*

MUBARAK himself and about forty of his followers passed Zanzibar without stopping, in a German Government steamer on the 26th ultimo, on their way to Dar-es-Salaam.

The Cadi and four other Sheikhs of Takaungu, who were dispatched by me to Zanzibar for complicity in the attack on the town by Aziz-bin-Rashid last July, will be sent back there to-morrow by the steam-ship "Juba," and will be allowed to reside once more in their homes under the supervision of the local District Officer. Aziz-bin-Abdallah, the late Sheikh Salim's chief adviser, who was deported by me with them, and whose health had for some time past been failing, died at Zanzibar a few months ago, leaving an infant son, for whom the Vali of Takaungu has consented to act as guardian and trustee. The three Mombasa Sheikhs whom I banished to Ngongong Bagas, and who are now on their way there at Machakos, will also be permitted to return by the first safe opportunity to the coast.

The general amnesty, a translation of which accompanied my despatch of the 22nd ultimo, was read in Arabic and Swahili in "baraza" at Mombasa on the 27th ultimo, and has been sent for publication in both languages to the principal towns of the Seyyidieh Province.

No. 76.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 15.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, May 26, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the Report addressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson, Commanding the 24th Baluchistan Regiment, to the Adjutant-General in India, respecting the recent military operations in this province, together with a map of a more complete and accurate character than the one already sent to you to illustrate them, which in some respects is incorrect, through error of sextant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson to the Adjutant-General in India.*

Sir,

*Mombasa, May 23, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India, this my Report on the recent operations of the Mombasa field force.

In order that the Report may be the clearer and more interesting, I begin by giving a short history of the rebel Chief Mbaruk\* and the causes of the war, and a short account of all the operations that have taken place up to the present time.

*History of the Origin of the War.*

The Mazruis, or, to use the correct Arabic plural, the Mazaria, are descended from a Muscat Arab of the Ghafiri tribe named Abdulla, who came to Mombasa when

\* In this report Colonel Pearson, for convenience of distinction, spells Mubarak of Gazi's name according to the Swahili, and Mubarak of Takaungu according to the Arabic pronunciation. The name is, of course, the same, and is written in the same way in Arabic.—A. H. H.



the Iman of Muscat, Saif-bin-Sultan-el-Yorabi, conquered it from the Portuguese in the end of the seventeenth century.

Abdulla had two sons, Othman and Zaher, from whom the two Chieftains who reigned at Gazi and Takaunga respectively up to the present year are descended. The son and heir of Othman, Mahommed-bin-Othman, was made Viceroy of Mombasa by the Iman of Muscat, and was succeeded in that capacity by his sons, uncles, and nephews according to the Mahommedan law of hereditary succession up to the year 1837, when, in the middle of the eighteenth century, about 1750, the Yorabi dynasty ceased to reign in the Oman, and was succeeded by the Albusaidi dynasty, which now ruled both at Muscat and Zanzibar. The Mazrui Chiefs of Mombasa threw off their allegiance to Muscat, and declined to recognize an Iman belonging to the Hinawi tribe. The Imans of Muscat were too much occupied with their troubles with Persia to assert their authority on the East Coast of Africa, and it was not until 1804 that Seyyid Saïd, the fourth Iman of the dynasty, grandfather of the present Sultan of Zanzibar, attempted to reconquer the old African possessions of his family. He expelled the Mazruis from Patta and Pemba, both of which they held, and would have driven them from Mombasa but for the fact that in 1821 the reigning Mazrui Chief, Suliman-bin-Ali, made a Treaty with the English Senior Naval Officer on the coast, by which he placed Mombasa and the adjacent territory under an English Protectorate, the revenues to be divided between himself and a British Resident. The British Government, however, refused to ratify the Treaty, and withdrew its protection from the Mazruis, and, as a consequence, after many fights and vicissitudes, Seyyid Saïd finally took Mombasa in 1837. He induced the last Mazrui Sultan, Rashid-bin-Salim, to surrender to him, by solemn oaths on the Koran, that his liberties should be respected, and then put him in irons, and sent, with about twenty of his principal men, to Bunder Abas on the Persian Gulf, where they were starved to death in prison. This Rashid is the father of Mbaruk of Gazi, against whom the present operations are being conducted, and his treatment by Seyyid Saïd explains much of his attitude towards the English.

With the capture of Mombasa the unity of the Mazrui State was broken. A portion of the Mazrui Arabs went south to Gazi, where they founded a small semi-independent State under the rule of Abdulla-bin-Salim, the brother of Rashid. Others went north to Takaungu, and there another small State grew up under Hamis-bin-Salim, the head of the younger, or Zahir, branch of the clan. It is now that Mbaruk-bin-Rashid first appears on the scene. He grew up at Gazi under the care of his uncle Abdulla, and as soon as he reached man's estate attempted to wrest Takaungu from the Zaharite branch of the Mazruis. These, however, were assisted by Seyyid Saïd, who had moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, and Mbaruk was driven back to Gazi, where he ultimately succeeded his uncle Abdulla as head of the Othman, or elder, branch of the dynasty. In this capacity he led three successive rebellions: first against Seyyid Majid; then against Seyyid Burgash, who succeeded Seyyid Majid on the Throne of Zanzibar. Burgash sent a force against him under the command of General Mathews, who, after driving him from Gazi, attacked him at Mwele, and took it after an eighteen days' siege. Eventually Mbaruk was granted peace, but a subsidy of 1,000 rupees per month, which had been paid to him by the earlier Sultan, and in return for which he was supposed to administer Gazi for them as a vassal Chief, was discontinued, and was only restored to him on the accession of Seyyid Khalifa in 1868.

In the same year the Imperial British East Africa Company took over the Sultan of Zanzibar's mainland dominions as his tenants, and they continued the subsidy to Mbaruk, he supplying them in return with a limited number of troops. His relations with the Company were never altogether satisfactory. He despised their weakness, as he considered it, disliked their interference with the Slave Trade, and did all he could short of actual rebellion to neutralize the authority of their officers. Had their rule continued a little longer a struggle with him could hardly have been avoided. It should be said in his favour that on their taking over the country some of their agents made promises to him which they did not keep, and on one or two occasions, when his interests and theirs coincided, he rendered them useful assistance.

Meanwhile, the younger, or Zahir, branch had been reigning more quietly at Takaungu. Hamis was succeeded by Saïd, Saïd by Rashid, and Rashid by Salim-bin-Hamis, his younger brother, whose death in February 1895 was the beginning of the disturbance. Salim, who was a man of considerable ability, never received a subsidy from Zanzibar or from the Company, but he used to send his nephew,

Mubarak, not to be confused with the Chief of Gazi, every year to Zanzibar to present his homage to the Sultan, in return for which act of homage he received a handsome present, practically equivalent to a subsidy. From the Company, however, he never deigned to take anything, though he made large sums of money by hiring porters to them for their caravans, and by taxing, in defiance of all law, the British Indian merchants living in his territory. These sums he spent in keeping up a force of about 1,200 fighting slaves, Mbaruk, of Gazi, having also about the same number. These two were about the most powerful Chiefs on the coast, Mbaruk's power ranging from the German frontier to the district immediately to the south of Mombasa, and from about 30 to 40 miles inland, and Salim's from Takaunga to Malindi, and likewise for some distance into the interior. When Salim died in February 1895 the Company had to appoint a successor to him. According to strict hereditary law the best claimant was Mubarak-bin-Rashid, the late Chief's nephew, as the eldest male of the family; but as he was known to be turbulent and hostile to Europeans, the Company's choice fell on Salim's eldest son, Rashid-bin-Salim, who was docile and friendly to the English.

In order to give a semblance of regularity and popular election to this choice, Mr. MacDougall, the district officer at Takaunga, was instructed to call all the Arabs there together, and to ask them whom they would wish as their Chief. They all declared that they would accept whomever the Company might nominate, and when thereupon the appointment of Rashid was announced with the new title, which Salim had never accepted, of Wali or Governor, they all, including Mubarak, kissed his hands and promised him obedience. Mubarak then announced that he would act as his cousin's deputy at a place called Gonjora, about 15 miles up the Kalifi Creek, where Salim's armed slaves were all stationed, and on arriving there he took command of the force, and, without authority from the Company or Rashid, placed his younger brother Aziz in charge of the neighbouring large commercial town of Tanganiko. Having thus fortified himself he returned to Takaunga, got into a personal quarrel with Rashid, whose authority he ostentatiously ignored, and on being remonstrated with withdrew to Gonjora, and threatened to bring his 1,200 men down to the coast and take Takaunga by force from his cousin. Fearing civil war, and possibly the destruction of Takaunga, the Company applied to the Consul-General at Zanzibar, as representing the Imperial Government, for assistance, and a ship of war was dispatched by him to Kalifi, 3 miles from Takaunga. He at the same time recommended to Her Majesty's Government that if Mubarak could not be brought to reason by peaceable means he should be coerced, and this recommendation was approved of by Lord Kimberley.

The Consul-General accordingly wrote to Mubarak, as did also the Sultan of Zanzibar, urging him to meet him at Takaunga, when any complaint of his against the Company or Rashid would be fully inquired into, and warning him that if he declined to meet Mr. Hardinge, the Consul-General, it would be inferred that he intended to be disloyal. Last June Mr. Hardinge went with General Mathews, who represented the Sultan as territorial Sovereign, to Takaunga. Mubarak sent profuse assurances of loyalty, but declined to come down and meet them, so they accordingly went up to Gonjora with an expedition consisting partly of Zanzibari troops and partly of blue jackets from the three British ships then on the station.

On reaching Gonjora it was found that the town was actually deserted, Mubarak having retreated about 3 miles to the north; but the hills round the town were occupied in force by his armed retainers. Messengers were sent out to him to endeavour to induce him to come in, and it is just possible that the matter might have been solved peacefully but for an untoward accident. One of his fighting slaves strode in a defiant manner through the camp; the sentries challenged and tried to stop him; in the scuffle, no one knows how, a gun went off. The armed men upon the hill immediately opened fire upon the camp, the force replied, and all hope of a pacific solution was over. Two days afterwards Mubarak was pursued to Sokoke, where he had established himself; driven from there, he sought refuge with the Giriama Chief, Ngonio, and on being refused hospitality by the latter fled to his kinsman, Mbaruk, of Gazi. Meanwhile, hostilities having broken out, Aziz-bin-Rashid burnt Tanganiko, looting the Indian shops, and with a force under his command roamed about the surrounding country, plundering the villages and plantations. Tanganiko was occupied by an Arab irregular force, but too late to save the town. Shortly after these events the British East Africa Company handed over its administration of the mainland to the Imperial Government. The Consul-General at Zanzibar came up to Mombasa to take over the administration of the land on behalf of the Foreign Office.

He had written in the meanwhile to Mbaruk, of Gazi, pointing out that Mubarak, of Takaungu, had been declared a rebel, and requesting that he should be surrendered to him.

Mbaruk's answer to this letter was to come in person for an interview with the Consul-General at Likoni, on the mainland opposite Kilindini. There he made all sorts of excuses for not giving up his kinsmen, but eventually promised to do his best if only he was granted time. This interview took place about the 7th or 8th July, 1895, and a week afterwards Aziz-bin-Rashid attacked Takaungu and got into the town, a large part of which he burnt through the treachery of some of the leading inhabitants. The rebels were repulsed with loss by the native garrison under the command of Lieutenant Raikes, and fell back upon Sokoce, whence a second naval expedition soon afterwards dislodged them, Aziz flying, like his brother, to Mbaruk, of Gazi.

While the Consul-General was returning from the second expedition letters were received from Mbaruk, of Gazi, saying that it was difficult for him to bring the rebels to Mombasa, but that if the Consul-General would come to Gazi, they would be handed over there. This proposal was accepted; but to guard against a trap he was told that the Consul-General would come with a considerable armed force, and he (Mbaruk) acquiesced to this arrangement. Just at that time Admiral Rawson arrived with the flag-ship, and took command of the projected expedition to Gazi. The expedition started from Mombasa overland during the last days of July 1895, and was met half-way by the news that the rebels who were to be apprehended had received notice of the approach of the expedition, and had left Gazi for Mwele, where they had been received by Eyoub-bin-Mbaruk, the Chief of Gazi's eldest son. The expedition pushed on to Gazi, and found it absolutely deserted, Mbaruk having thrown in his lot with the rebels, and followed them to Mwele. Two days afterwards the town of Wanga was burnt by Mbaruk's order, the Indian shops looted, and the two or three Government soldiers massacred.

Upon this the Consul-General wrote to Mbaruk, informing him that his conduct was inexplicable, but that he would be given a fortnight in which to submit and place the rebel Chiefs in the hands of the Government.

Admiral Rawson wrote in the same strain, but all that was received in reply were empty professions of loyalty.

The fortnight having expired, the expedition moved upon Mwele. On its way over the Shimba hills the column was attacked by a force under Mbaruk, of Gazi's eldest son, Eyoub. This decided Admiral Rawson to attack Mwele without further parley, and the place, which was strongly stockaded, was taken after two hours' hard fighting.

Unfortunately, there was not at that time a sufficient local force to follow up the advantage thus gained. Mbaruk rallied his scattered forces, and kept up all through the months from September to December a species of guerilla warfare throughout the whole region from the German frontier to Malindi, robbing caravans, stealing slaves, and generally plundering the peaceable population.

About October 1895 he received a certain accession of strength from the adhesion of Hamis Kombo, the Chief of Mtwapa, to the immediate north of Mombasa. Hamis Kombo is not an Arab, but a Swahili, and represents the old native reigning family which governed Mombasa and its neighbourhood before the Portuguese and Arab conquests. He is an old, infirm man, over 80 years of age, but very fanatical and hostile to Europeans of all sorts; and though he was in no way connected with the Mazrui quarrel, he secretly assisted the rebels through mere hatred of the Christian Government. He was accordingly summoned to Mombasa to answer for his conduct, and this was a signal for his joining Mbaruk. The whole of the country in which his influence is paramount, which may be said to extend from Mombasa to Takaungu, from being secretly became avowedly hostile.

On the 30th December, 1895, the Indian contingent, under Captain W. Barratt and Lieutenant F. E. Scott, landed at Mombasa, and on the 13th January, 1896, a column of 200 rifles advanced against the rebels, who were collecting near Bomani, Changoni, and Mtwapa, and were thus threatening the Mission stations of Ribe, Rabai, and Kisaoni or Frere Town. The force disembarked at Mtwapa, and the rebels, who were there assembled in force, stubbornly opposed the landing, and kept up a brisk fire on the boats. The skirmishing lasted about three hours, during which two men of the contingent were wounded (one severely), and two men hit through their accoutrements. The enemy's losses were about eighteen killed and wounded.

The advance was continued the next day towards Bomani, where the rebels

were in force, but which the column failed to reach through the treachery of its guides, who purposely misled the column through a waterless country towards Kariwitu, where the wells had been filled in. The column was without water for about twenty-two hours, marching the whole day under a tropical sun, and with the greatest difficulty managed to retrace its steps and regain a cocoa-nut plantation, where the milk of the cocoa-nut assuaged the men's thirst, and, thus refreshed, enabled them to search for and find water. The guides were tried, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to penal servitude for life, with 100 lashes each. The rebels who had retired on the advance of the above expedition again began collecting secretly in the Mtwapa district, and by a forced march managed to deliver an attack on the Mission station of Frere Town on the 21st January at about 3:45 A.M. However, the Frere Town guards were on the alert, and the enemy was kept in check. The Indian contingent under Captain Barratt and a company of Soudanese under Captain Harrison crossed rapidly over to the mainland, and followed up the enemy for about 4 miles.

A second expedition was then organized against Bomani, and advanced by the Ribe route. No opposition was met with, and a post of sixty-five rifles of the Indian contingent was established at Changoni under Subadar-Major Zaman Ali. This native officer and the post under his command have done excellent work, and by vigorous patrolling have cleared the district of all rebels within an 8-mile radius, and, further, by burning these villages and stores, have crippled their power and prestige in the district. The enemy's losses in the attack on Frere Town and in the several small encounters with the Changoni post patrols may be estimated at about thirty killed; our own losses were *nil*.

It was now decided to operate in two columns against the rebels. The first, or northern column, consisting of about 120 Soudanese and Zanzibari troops, with one Maxim gun, being detailed to operate in the Giriama country, with a view to giving confidence to the Wa Giriama and of driving the enemy southwards. This column had several small encounters with the enemy in the Roka and the northern Kurwitu districts, and inflicted some losses, their own casualties being two men wounded. Whilst operating against the rebels in the district the enemy made a detour, and by a forced march effected an attack on Malindi. This attack was beaten off by the Indian Contingent Post under Jemadar Burhan Ali, with a loss to ourselves of one Zanzibari sepoy killed, and the enemy of about ten killed. The rebels, however, succeeded in setting fire to one or two of the houses on the outskirts of the town; the fire, owing to the nature of the huts (built principally of palm branches and grass), spread rapidly, and the rebels, though beaten, spread the report that they had successfully attacked and burnt Malindi. The glare of the burning huts had been seen for miles in the darkness, and thus gave a semblance of truth to the story, and the Giriama, a powerful tribe of about 50,000 people, began to waver in their loyalty, and actually proceeded so far as to make a demonstration against Tandia.

The situation now was most serious, as the Protectorate troops, split up as they were in small detachments to guard the various coast towns and Mission stations, could not have been concentrated, and the balance of troops available were insufficient to cope successfully with the rebels, reinforced by the whole Giriama tribe. Mr. A. H. Hardinge, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, proceeded northwards to interview the Elders of the Wa Giriama. This interview was most successful, and in the end the Giriama swore on the sacred hyena ("piga fiséd") to withhold assistance of all kind from the rebels, which promise they have very fairly faithfully maintained.

The second, or southern, column, consisting of 120 rifles Indian contingent, sixty Zanzibaris, and two Rocket and two Maxim gun parties from Her Majesty's ships "Widgeon" and "Thrush," moved towards Wanga by sea on the 4th February, 1896, and on the 16th February burnt Mwareni, Mbaruk's stronghold, which was found deserted. The villages of Hormuz, Zigira, Gogoni, and Segwa were also destroyed, and Mbaruk followed up to Mwele, where he had retired, and from whence he fled westwards.

Whilst retiring to Gazi the rebels attempted to harass the baggage and rear-guard, but the Maxim gun coming into action, they were compelled to retire with a loss of about six killed and wounded.

On the return of the column to Mombasa, a party of sixty-five rifles of the Indian contingent, under Lieutenant Scott, immediately advanced on Shimba, with a view to there establishing a post. This party had sharp skirmishing with the rebels on the 2nd and 6th March whilst driving them from the Shimba range.

On the 8th March, just about daybreak, the rebels under Sebe, one of Mbaruk's sons, made a determined attack on the post. Sebi had been told by Mbaruk that he need not return to Mwele unless he succeeded in driving the English from the post. Lieutenant Scott on the morning of the attack had only twenty-five rifles effective, as a party had gone to Jimbo to escort up a Maxim gun; but the garrison behaved splendidly, and their rifle fire was so good that the enemy lost twenty-four in killed alone, and on Lieutenant Scott and ten men charging out of the stockade when an attempt was made by the enemy to surround the post, the rebels gave in and fled towards Mwele.

The casualties on our side in the fights of the 2nd and 6th and 8th were four wounded (two severely). The enemy's losses in all, about forty killed. The wounded not estimated.

In February Mr. Hardinge, seeing that the cheapest and quickest way of bringing the hostilities to a close would be by bringing more troops to bear on the enemy, applied for the services of a regiment from India, and, agreeably to this request, orders were received by me on the 29th February, 1896, for the 24th Beluchistan regiment to proceed to Mombasa for service there. On the 5th March the regiment sailed in the Royal Imperial Majesty's ship "Warren Hastings," and disembarked at Mombasa on the 15th March. The positions of the troops on my arrival were as follows:—

#### INDIAN Contingent.

|                  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |     |
|------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Mombasa          | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 67  |
| Rabai            | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20  |
| Ribe (signalers) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2   |
| Changoni         | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 95  |
| Malindi          | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50  |
| Shimba           | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 65  |
| Total            | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 299 |

#### ZANZIBARI and Soudani Troops.

|  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |     |
|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Mombasa and surrounding posts            | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 149 |
| Rabai                                    | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 76  |
| Ribe                                     | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 30  |
| Changoni                                 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10  |
| Malindi                                  | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20  |
| Wasini                                   | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 62  |
| Takaunga, Tandia, and northern garrisons | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 321 |
| Total                                    | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 668 |

Mbaruk's columns were operating both to the north and south of Mombasa, and the Protectorate troops had to be so disposed as to meet attacks at all points, the available balance operating with a view to driving him (Mbaruk) into German territory, as an agreement had been made with the German Governor, Major von Wissmann, that, in the event of Mbaruk taking refuge in German East Africa, he should be disarmed and deported to the south. Taking the above agreement and the present disposition of the troops into consideration, I determined to cut off the northern part of the country from the southern by means of a chain of posts along the Uganda road, and to surround him by a second line of posts along the Uмба River, and then to operate in the inclosed area with flying columns supplied from the advanced depôts of Mmkono and Mwele, with the hope on the off-chance of capturing the leaders, or of pressing them so hard as to compel them to take refuge in German territory. The country is so densely covered with forest and under-growth, that it is an easy matter for a column to pass within a few hundred yards of the enemy's main body without being aware of their proximity. The above plan promised the best results, as a waterless desert on the westward prevented Mbaruk's escape in that direction; and even in the event of his being able to cross the desert, the Wa Teita at Kisigau were known to be hostile to him. On the 19th March, 1896, the advance of the troops on the several positions began. Captain Mellis, with 100 rifles of the 24th Beluchistan regiment, proceeded to Mbungu, and after establishing a post there moved southwards to the Uganda road to establish a temporary post from which patrolling could be efficiently carried out in the directions of Mazeras and Samburu, both of which places were held, the latter by Captain Harrison and the Soudanese, who marched

thitherwards on the 31st March, and the former by Zanzibari troops under a native officer. The posts of Rabai and Changoni completed the northern chain.

Whilst the Uganda road posts were marching to their positions, the southern posts were also being thrown out. Captain Tighe's D.S.O. flying column, together with the garrisons of Mmkono and Wanga, sailed in Her Majesty's ship "Barosa" on the 22nd March, for the latter place. The village of Mpongwe was destroyed by this party *en route* to Wanga, but owing to the difficulties encountered in the passage up the Mpongwe creek, the column did not arrive at its objective till 7 A.M. instead of 3 A.M., as intended; the rebels therefore escaped owing to the failure of the surprise through the natural difficulties met with on the road. The village was however destroyed, as also a quantity of stores, Indian corn, &c. The party then on its return transhipped to Her Majesty's ship "Thrush," and proceeded to Wanga, and the posts at Mmkono and Wanga were successfully established. Captain Tighe then advanced in a north-westerly direction towards Mveli from Mmkono.

While the northern and southern lines were being taken up, every effort was made to fill up Shimba post with a large quantity of supplies on an advanced base, so as to enable the big depôt at Mveli to be readily rationed. Two small columns were also sent out from Mombasa to distract the enemy's attention from these movements; the first, under Major Tulloch, consisting of fifty rifles 24th Beluchistan and fifty rifles Indian contingent, who proceeded on the 23rd March towards Mikundini forest, in the Changoni district. They got into contact with the enemy, and released twenty-three men and women who had been raided from the Takaunga district, and were being led into slavery by the rebel leader, Aziz. The second column, consisting of fifty rifles 24th Beluchistan regiment under Lieutenant Parker, advanced to Quabungo via Rabai, and, having burnt the village and supplies, returned to Mombasa with the Headman's son, who was captured in the rush on the village.

By the 31st March everything was ready for the operations to begin, the line of posts were taken up, and Shimba and Mmkono fully stocked, so the main column, consisting of 112 rifles 24th Beluchistan and forty rifles Indian contingent, advanced in two parties to Shimba via Jimbo on the 1st and 2nd April, and immediately continued its advance so as to deliver the main attack on the 4th April on the Kamari forest, near Mveli, where Mbaruk was reported to be with all his forces. On the 3rd April at 9 A.M. the force marched in two columns from Shimba to Maluavamba, about 10 miles from Shimba, and there halted for the night. At 2 A.M. on the 4th April the advance was continued again in two columns, the first moving on to Mweny, Jaka's village, in the Kamari forest, which was taken with a rush, only to find it deserted, save by one woman, a cripple, who said that Mbaruk had retired westward the previous evening; the second column moving direct on Mveli with all the baggage. A rebel, captured on Mveli hill by Lieutenant Turner on the afternoon of the 4th, said that Mbaruk was in hiding about 3 miles from our camp, and offered to guide the column to the place. I therefore determined to search the southern portion of the Kamari forest before moving in pursuit. At daybreak on the 5th April a very large deserted village, about 300 houses, was found, and these, together with large supplies of Indian corn, likewise bullets of baked clay, iron, and lead, were destroyed. I now determined to act on the woman's information, so, on the 6th April, detached Major Tulloch, with a flying column of thirty-seven rifles Indian contingent and thirty-seven rifles Beluchistan regiment in the direction of Momandi, with orders to try and pick up Mbaruk's trail and press him closely. At the same time I tried to get into communication with Captain Tighe's column, which, as I afterwards ascertained, had been misled through the treachery of the guide, one of the Headmen of Mdwai, who has since thrown in his lot with the rebels.

On the 10th April Major Tulloch returned to camp with a small escort, and reported that he had succeeded in picking up Mbaruk's trail, and by rapidly following him up had obtained possession of his office box (which led to the realization of about 5,000 rupees lodged in Mombasa with a native banker), a gold-hilted dagger and forty-eight kerosine oil tins filled with gunpowder, which was promptly blown up (about half-a-ton of powder in all). Major Tulloch was given rations for ten more days, together with a reinforcement of seventy-five rifles 24th regiment, and returned at once to take up the pursuit. I also ordered Captain Tighe, whom I found had returned to Mmkono, being unable to discover my whereabouts through the disloyalty of his guide, to advance through Mwareni and attack on the 15th April Adda, towards which I heard Mbaruk was retiring. This movement was being carried out when information was received from Captain Tighe that Mbaruk was making his way towards German territory. This information was confirmed by a telegram from the

Consul-General, stating that a telegram received from Major von Wissmann, the German Governor, mentioned that Mbaruk was attempting to pass into German territory.

On receiving this information I immediately marched towards Mmkono, with fifty rifles whom I had ordered up from Mombasa, when I reinforced Major Tulloch's column, and I ordered Major Tulloch and Captain Tighe to concentrate at Mmkono also. This concentration was successfully accomplished on the 16th April, and on the 17th April I ordered the following movements: Captain Tighe's column to Segá; Major Tulloch's original column of seventy-five rifles to Camp Umba, and head-quarters to Wanga; thus a line watching the German frontier was established. This line was, however, not taken up immediately, as a telegram was received to the effect that Mbaruk and all his following had surrendered in German territory; a later telegram being received that Mbaruk's conduct was unsatisfactory, the troops at once took up the positions assigned, and, in order to extend the cordon still further westwards, eighty rifles, under Lieutenant Parker, moved on to Moreni, and prolonged the line from Segá to beyond Moreni.

On the 18th April I went to Wanga and embarked on the steam-ship "Juba," and sailed on the 19th for Wasin, in the hope of there meeting the Consul-General, and arranging further operations with him. On the morning of the 20th April Mr. Hardinge passed Wasin, on board Her Majesty's ship "Philomel," on his way to Moa to meet Major von Wissmann. I, therefore, followed in the steam-ship "Juba," and at a Conference held at Moa with the German Governor, it was decided that Mbaruk should be given up to the evening of the 21st to come in and disarm, and, in the event of his not doing so, the German Governor would meet Mr. Hardinge and myself at Jassin, and there arrange the line of military operations to be adopted against the common enemy.

Mr. Hardinge then returned to Wasin in the "Philomel," and I to Jassin, to await the expiration of the period of grace allowed.

At about 4 p.m. on the 21st April, Major von Wissmann and Mr. Hardinge arrived off Jassin in their steam launches from Moa and Wasin respectively, and it was then known that Mbaruk had come in unconditionally and disarmed.

As far as I can gather from the Headmen of the country about Mweli and Mmkono, the following are Mbaruk's movements from the commencement of my operations. On first hearing of the southern line of posts which threatened one of his two lines of retreat (the second being to the north), he attempted to move north via Samburn. This place he found occupied, as also Maji-ya-Chumvi and Mazeeras; he therefore returned to the Kamari forest, Mweli, only to find the main column advancing on him, and Captain Tighe's column threatening his rear. He then retired westwards on Momandi, a village he had before used as a place of refuge, but was obliged to retreat before the flying column detached in pursuit of him. His intention then was to retire on the forests, about Mwareni by Adda, but hearing of the occupation of Mwareni, and the advance of Captain Tighe's column on Adda from the south, he made a detour, and passing Mwareni on the west made for Segá, on the Umba River. Here he found that the Mmkono post, reinforced from Wanga, was patrolling in his immediate vicinity; he therefore reluctantly crossed over into German territory.

I consider that the rapid and varied movements of the columns, the long distances covered by them by day and night marches, caused him to receive several reports of the movements of any one column, and as, in addition to the columns, the posts were patrolling to long distances from their stations, he most probably thought he was attacked by overwhelming numbers, and was further unwilling to face the rifle fire of Indian troops, after the losses he had sustained in the several engagements on the Shemba hills under Lieutenant Scott, and in the Changoni district under Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan.

Leaving the outpost line to watch the German frontier, I returned to Mombasa to confer with Mr. Hardinge as to the desirability of taking action on the following points:—

- (a.) The disarmament of the country.
- (b.) The opening up of the country by the making of direct roads between the principal places, and the surveying of the country.
- (c.) The reorganization of the Protectorate troops.

As regards the first of these, there is no doubt that though a very large proportion of Mbaruk's followers accompanied him into German territory, yet there are a certain number of small bands still in the bush, and these, through the terror Mbaruk's name inspired, would be able to take supplies from the villagers and keep

the spark of rebellion glowing until an opportunity arrived to fan it into flame; and I also know that before Mbaruk effected his escape, he left a large number of guns with the villagers to be retained for him until such time as they should be again required for use against the Government. I, therefore, with Mr. Hardinge's permission, ordered an immediate disarmament of the disaffected districts, which has been quietly and smoothly carried out, and up to the present about 400 guns in all have been brought in.

With reference to the second point, I considered that the inhabitants should be compelled to assist in the making of roads between the several principal places, and the country should be properly surveyed, so as to facilitate not only the movements of troops, but the general opening-up of the country. One of the hardest things I had to contend with was the want of information as regards the routes and water. The few maps that are available are so inaccurate, and on such small scales, that they are useless, and no record of routes exist, so that in the advance and the movements of the flying columns, information had to be obtained daily as to the distance of the next water supply, and this information was generally incorrect and vague. I, therefore, with Mr. Hardinge's approval, am having roads cut, and the country surveyed under the supervision of the outpost Commanders.

As to the reorganization of the Protectorate troops, I considered that this should be proceeded with at once, as their clothing and equipment both need looking to, as the men, being insufficient for the work, had been on constant outpost or expedition duty, and no opportunity had been available to equip them, or to perfect them in the use of their weapons. My reason for saying this is, that it has been elicited that up to the arrival of the Indian contingent, rifle fire has not been dreaded in any way by the rebels, and it generally required the Maxim gun to come into action to dislodge them from the bush, and I think that it is largely due to their recent heavy losses from rifle fire, considering the numbers engaged, that they decided on retiring into German East Africa, and thus avoid facing the fire of trained riflemen. To enable the Protectorate troops to be concentrated and their organization proceeded with, I returned to Wanga on the 28th April in the steam-ship "Juba," and sent back all available troops to Mombasa with a view to their taking over the northern posts, thus relieving the garrisons. The reorganization is now being proceeded with. From Wanga I returned to Mombasa, touring through the country via Mmkono, Mwareni, Wadyambh, Adda, Mdwai, Mveli, Gazi, Ukunda, and Tiwi. I called the Elders of the people to meet me at various places, and ordered them to bring in all the arms in their districts, and issued instructions on the points mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b). When it was known positively that Mbaruk had surrendered I ordered Captain Harrison, with a company of Soudanese and a Maxim gun, to Ukumbani, where the attitude of tribes had compelled the district officer to apply for troops to overawe them.

Two of the proscribed leaders are still at large, viz., Mohammed-bin-Hamis (Hamis Kombo's son) and Akida Bakari. Parties under Captain Mellis and Lieutenants Scott and Turner have been out after them, but without success, and I think that Mohammed-bin-Hamis has most likely effected his escape into German territory, and that Bakari has fled northwards, and is in hiding in the Makongeni forest. As they have only two or three guns and a very small following of about six to twelve men, they need not be taken into further calculation.

#### *Geographical Notes.*

The physical difficulties offered by the country to the movement of troops are far beyond any that have been recorded of expeditions in India. The blistering force of the sun, the stifling heat of the jungles, and the scarcity of water, render operations in the lowlands near the coast extremely arduous and trying, and the want of water formed the greatest difficulty that had to be contended with. From the Sabaki River in the north to the Umba River in the south, a distance of over 80 miles, there are only two streams, one of which disappears in the ground after a course of a few miles only. In the hills small springs of delicious water are occasionally found; elsewhere water is only to be found in small pools in the otherwise dry river bed and in holes in rock, and it can easily be imagined that the water stagnating under a fierce sun was quite unwholesome and unpalatable. The jungle in many places is so dense that all movements through it were impossible, and had to be confined to narrow country paths in single file formation.

The intelligence obtainable from the inhabitants was for a long time *nil*. The



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enemy's knowledge of the country was perfect, and had it not been for the fact that they were utterly bewildered by the numerous reports they received of the presence of troops in all parts of the country, and that their confidence had been broken by the losses sustained, they would have been able to wage an obstinate guerilla war for some time. The country, save the Mveli-Shimba range and a few isolated hills like Jombo, Mrima, Kisigan, and Kilibas, is flat, and devoid of marked features. The general drainage of the south sets towards Mpongwe creek, which is separated from the Umba drainage by the watershed which runs parallel to and within a few miles of the Umba River.

The Ramisi River, the second largest river, cannot always be depended upon, as its water only flows in stream after rains, and ten to fifteen days is sufficient after the rainfall for the water towards Adda to become salt and undrinkable.

#### *Signalling.*

Owing to heavy forest land, signalling communication is impossible save by intermediate stations on the isolated hills, and as water is not always obtainable near the hills (as at Jombo), these points cannot always be utilized. Signalling communication was, however, successfully established between Mombasa and Shimba, and Mombasa, Rabai, Robi, and Changoni.

#### *Transport.*

The transport for the expedition consisted entirely of porters, carrying a maximum load of 65 lbs. The men were all collected under the orders of Her Majesty's Consul-General, and numbered in all about 1,500. They were chiefly drawn from Lamu, Malindi, Zanzibar, Rabai, and Mombasa, and in the Mmkono and Mveli districts were supplemented by Wadigo and Waduruma carriers. They were engaged at an uniform rate of 10 rupees per month, and worked very satisfactorily, often carrying loads for over 20 miles. On an emergency, for operations in the interior, some 3,000 porters in all could be obtained from the tribes on the coast and Zanzibar. No other description of transport is obtainable in the country, though the leading mercantile firm in Mombasa is now experimenting with but small success with transport bullocks and camels. No description of transport animal appears to thrive in the country. Apart from the tsetse fly, all animals are attacked by what hitherto appear to be unknown diseases, and I would take this opportunity for urging the necessity of their causes being investigated in the general interests of the country quite as much as for military purposes.

The porters employed on this expedition were supplied with nothing save their pay, rations, and cooking pots. The rations consisted of 1½ lbs. of rice daily and some dried fish, and is the ordinary ration issued to porters in this country. During the rains the porters suffered much from exposure, and some of them died. Their only clothing is a cotton loin cloth, and I would strongly recommend the issue of a light blanket to all those who may be employed in future operations.

#### *Supply.*

All rations for the troops from India which took part in the expedition had to be imported from India. East Africa at present grows some Indian corn, as also a certain quantity of excellent rice, but this quantity is not sufficient to meet local demands, owing to want of labour. Dhall and ghi are almost unknown in the country, and no fresh vegetables are grown on the mainland. Sheep and goats can be obtained in small numbers on the coast, but I believe the supply inland is unlimited. The main products are mohogo and Indian corn; they are harvested simultaneously in July and December. Mohogo is a nutritious though somewhat tasteless root, in appearance like a yam or sweet potato. The Africans eat it raw or baked in the embers. Indian troops do not take to it kindly. The Indian corn, being grown for the most part on the most fertile soil in the world, is excellent, and far above the average of any grown in India. The inhabitants pound it in wooden mortars, and boil it for food. Should Indian troops be again employed in East Africa, all their rations would have to be imported; and as regards their packing, I would offer the following remarks: all atta should be packed in bags, with an inner cloth bag. The

soil for the most part is very light, the wear and tear in transit extraordinary, and after a very few days' marching the atta becomes impregnated with sand, and unfit for food.

It would be preferable to send ghi in tins containing 50 lbs. each net weight. Goor should also be packed in tins; the strength of the sun, coupled with the extreme moisture of the air, is so great that any article like goor packed in the ordinary way deteriorates at once.

I need hardly remark that no package sent to Africa should exceed 65 lbs. gross weight. Double coolie loads are not a success. Ammunition which deteriorates rapidly has to have its box weight readjusted by taking 200 rounds out of each box, thus leaving 400 rounds per box.

I have submitted this Report thus early, as I consider that military operations have virtually ceased, and that the present movements are merely with a view to carrying out the work stated under the headings (a), (b), and (c).

Those Reports that are enumerated in paragraph 14, Appendix (F), Field Service Manual, India, and that are applicable, will be forwarded later, and I beg they may be taken as supplementing this Report.

I find that owing to the great pressure of work no report has yet been made of certain operations of the Indian contingent before my arrival, and as I think his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India would be pleased to hear of them, I forward them herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. A. PEARSON, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*

*Commanding Mombasa Field Force and 24th Beluchistan Regiment.*

The following telegram was received on the 24th April, 1896, from Lord Salisbury by Mr. A. H. Hardinge, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General:—

"Her Majesty's Government congratulate you, Colonel Pearson and the other officers, on the successful results of the operations."

(Signed) A. A. PEARSON, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*

*Commanding Mombasa Field Force and 24th Beluchistan Regiment.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

*Captain Barratt to Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson.*

Sir,

*Mombasa, May 21, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to submit this my Report on the engagements fought by detachments of the contingent under my command against the allies and followers of the rebel Chief, Mbaruk-bin-Rashid.

On the 24th January, 1896, a post was established at Changoni, 17 miles north of Mombasa, under the command of Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan, Indian contingent. Large numbers of rebels had been living in the vicinity of Chengoni, and had collected quantities of grain and stores of food. After the establishment of the post, this native officer, with his garrison of sixty-five rifles Indian contingent and nine rifles of the Mombasa Askaris, by a system of vigorous patrolling completely cleared the district of rebels to a radius of 8 miles. During his term of command there he attacked and burned four rebel villages, and destroyed some 2,000 maunds of grain which was concealed in these villages and in the forest in their vicinity.

To revenge themselves for this the rebels made two attacks on the boma which had been built for the protection of the garrison, but on each occasion were routed and driven off. The first attack took place on the 25th February, 1896, but was not pushed home with much vigour, and the enemy were easily driven off by a section sent out to make a counter-attack on them.

In retaliation for this, the rebel leader Aziz, with a strong force, made an attack on the boma on the 26th February, 1896. The rebels attacked on the eastern and southern faces, creeping up in the jungle to positions 100 to 200 yards from the walls. Here they halted, and delivered a very heavy fire. Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan, taking with him twenty-six rifles, doubled out of the post by the northern gate, and by a well-planned manœuvre came down on the right flank of the rebels. When the

latter saw that their flank was turned by this successful counter-attack, they lost heart and retired.

The native officer pursued them for about 2 miles and completely routed them.

The casualties on both sides were: Indian contingent, *nil*; rebels, thirteen killed.

In making the above well-timed counter-attack, Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan gave the rebels no chance of being able to find their range and shoot the men at their posts on the walls.

On the 28th February, 1896, the post was reinforced by a party of twenty-five rifles Indian contingent, under Jemadar Allal-dad-Khan. On the 4th March, 1896, this native officer, with a party of fifty rifles, when patrolling the country 5 miles north-east of Changoni, came in contact with a strong body of the rebels, who fired on him from the jungle. He promptly attacked them, and after a very sharp encounter routed them completely. The style of country where this engagement took place lent itself greatly to the assistance of the rebels, but Jemadar Allal-dad-Khan handled his men with such coolness and skill that they were unable to inflict any loss on him.

The casualties were: Indian contingent, *nil*; rebels, ten killed.

On the 24th March, 1896, Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan, with fifty rifles, proceeded as part of a column, under the command of Major Tulloch, 24th Beluchistan regiment, to operate against a body of rebels who were occupying the forest close to the village of Mikinduni, 10 miles north-east of Changoni. This column came in contact with the rebels, and after a sharp encounter at Mikinduni routed them, and released a party of men and women whom the rebels had seized in a village near Takaungu, and whom they were taking away to sell as slaves.

On the 12th February, 1896, Jemadar Barhan Ali Khan, with fifty rifles, forming the garrison of the town of Malindi, repulsed an attack made by a strong body of rebels, under the leaders, Aziz and Mbaraka. The attack, which was a most determined one, took place at 4 A.M. on the above date, and the rebels were assisted by allies in the town. The latter is a large and straggling one, and is protected by sentries posted at intervals of some 50 yards all round. These sentries are furnished by local levies, and on the first shot being fired they all ran away, leaving every path open for the enemy, who availed themselves of two, on which they advanced in the dark to the attack. Assisted by their friends in the town they succeeded in setting fire to a few native huts, and in looting some Baniaks' shops before there was time to stop them. At once on the alarm being raised the Indian contingent portion of the garrison, which was located near the district officer's house, turned out and drove the rebels out of the town and back into the jungle, when they altogether broke up and fled. Owing to the dark and confusion among the inhabitants it was very difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and Jemadar Barhan Ali Khan had by no means an easy task in doing so. By his coolness he not only utterly defeated the attacking force, but also saved the lives of the inhabitants, whom it was so easy to mistake for rebels in the dark.

The casualties were: Indian contingent, *nil*; rebels, ten killed.

On the 1st March, 1896, a post was established on the site of the old Mission station at Shimba by Lieutenant T. E. Scott, with a force of two native officers and sixty-five rifles.

On the 2nd March, 1896, this officer, with forty rifles, attacked the rebel leader, Mijjaka, who occupied the village of Mwamchara, 3 miles east of Shimba. The attack took place at 4.45 A.M., and the detached portion of the village in which the rebel leader was reported to live was rushed with the bayonet, but as the rebels fired at once on the attacking troops, the leader was alarmed and effected his escape. The enemy fired on the line as it charged, remaining in position behind houses and small hillocks, from which they fired at about 30 yards' range, but owing to the darkness their fire had no effect. On clearing this portion of the village a position was occupied on its further side to wait for daylight. As soon as the day broke the village was found to be formed of detached groups of houses along a ridge about a mile in length, which stretched away to the right of where Lieutenant Scott took up his position. With daylight the rebels appeared in force at the furthest end of the village, and began advancing towards the contingent. At once on seeing them the latter advanced to attack them, and drive them from the top of a low ridge which they were occupying, and where they halted when they saw the advance begin. The enemy opened fire at long ranges, which was not replied to at first. A steady advance was kept up, but as the jungle was very thick, and none of it could be left unexamined, this was necessarily slow. When effective range was reached Lieutenant Scott opened

fire, and, having driven the rebels from their position, ordered section commanders to charge any small parties they might meet. This order was well carried out, and after two and a-half hours very sharp skirmishing the rebels were completely routed and driven off the range (on which the village stood), and from the three bomas in the village. The latter was then completely destroyed.

Casualties: Indian contingent, one sepoy wounded; rebels, thirteen killed.

On the 6th March, 1896, Lieutenant Scott, with thirty-five rifles, attacked a party of rebels who (it was afterwards learned) were going to attack a porter convoy returning empty from Shimba to Mombasa. This party was routed completely after half-an-hour's skirmishing.

Casualties: Indian contingent, one sepoy severely wounded; rebels, nine killed.

On the 8th March, 1896, the boma at Shimba under command of Lieutenant Scott was attacked.

A full report of this was submitted by the above officer, and I beg to forward it herewith.

On the 19th April, 1896, Lieutenant T. E. Scott was sent to Changoni with orders to clear the district from Mtwapa to Takaungu of rebels, and, if possible, catch two of the leaders who were supposed to be still at large there.

This officer first proceeded to Mtwapa and cleared all the coast-line there, burning two villages, with some stores of grain. Returning to Changoni for more supplies, he proceeded to Bomani.

On arriving there, a party of rebels fired on the advanced guard from the jungle. A section was sent in pursuit of them, and they were driven off with a loss of two killed. A camp was formed, from which Lieutenant Scott went out daily with parties in search of rebels' stores. The large village of Jauri on the coast with large quantities of stores were burned.

Having cleared this part of the district of rebels and stores he proceeded to Mikinduni, to which place it was reported the rebels had returned. Arriving there before daylight, a party of rebels was driven from the forest in the vicinity of the village, and large supplies of grain were burned. When the remaining scattered bands of men found their stores destroyed and their houses burned they collected at Mtwapa, and about 140 gave themselves up to the Sub-Commissioner, Mombasa.

In the several skirmishes which this column had the enemy lost four men killed, and the Indian contingent none.

In the district round Changoni, Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan inflicted a total loss on the rebels of thirty to thirty-five killed in the several engagements he had with them, and the excellent relations he established with the loyal inhabitants enabled him to get guides and information whenever required. His guides and spies were of the greatest assistance to Lieutenant Scott when operating against the rebels round Mtwapa and Bomani, &c.

Subadar-Major Zaman Ali Khan, in dispersing the rebels round his post, drove out of that district the band under Aziz which had attacked the Mission station at Frere Town, and thereby insured the safety of the outskirts of the latter place from marauding bands.

The words "very sharp" have been used in describing the above encounters, and though we lost no men, this was simply due to the protection given by the undergrowth, which was in places almost impenetrable. The enemy's fire was sufficiently heavy in all attacks to have killed a large percentage of the men engaged, but invariably got very wild under the rifle fire of the troops.

In both Shimba and Changoni the men suffered very severely from fever and dysentery, no one escaping in either post. As far as possible the weakly ones were brought in to Mombasa. One N.C.O. died at Changoni.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. BARRATT, *Captain,*  
*Commanding Indian Contingent.*

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Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

*Lieutenant Scott to Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson.*

Sir,

*Shimba, March 8, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, that an attack was made on the boma here shortly after 5 o'clock this morning by a force of rebels 150 to 200 in

strength, under the leadership of one of Mbaruk's sons. The circumstances are as follows :—

I was aroused at the above hour by hearing a shot, followed immediately by heavy firing, and, at once turning out, I proceeded to the west face of the boma where the firing was going on. Here I found that a deliberate attack made by the enemy, who had got to within 60 to 100 yards of the walls in the dark, was checked by the steady fire of the men of the garrison, who had rapidly fallen in on their posts. I went up into the bastion on the north-west corner, but could see nothing except the line of flashes from the enemy's fire.

I then inspected all the boma, and found every man in his appointed place.

On my return to the west face I ordered the firing to cease and the men to lie down, in hopes that by so doing I would be able to get the attacking force to advance, and that we should be able to shoot them down in the dim light which was now beginning to break, and also that I should be enabled to estimate their strength. This was not successful, as only a few appeared, the remainder keeping under cover and delivering a heavy fire. On these few men appearing my men shot some of them down.

I concluded that the object of the attacking force was to get us to waste our ammunition, and, as they were beginning to work round the south face of the boma, that a bold counter-attack was necessary to drive them back if possible, or, in any case, to prevent their being able to pick off my men as the daylight broke.

As I had only thirty-nine rifles in the boma, of whom eight were on the sick list, I did not like to withdraw too many men, so, having ordered Jemadar Ghulam Muhammed to take command of the defence, I withdrew a Havaldar and nine men from the walls with the intention of doubling out of the north gate, and, if possible, getting round to charge the enemy's left flank.

I ordered the party to fix bayonets, and as it was now almost daylight I doubled out of the gate, promptly followed by the men. On getting outside, I saw that my idea of turning their flank was not possible without exposing the men too long, so I charged straight on the enemy at once.

The men charged most gallantly, and the enemy firing retired before we got within 50 yards of them. We followed them hard for some 2 miles, but, as they broke up and ran here and there in the jungle, it was impossible to inflict much loss on them.

I did not consider it was wise to leave the boma for too long with such a small garrison, so returned, having completely routed the attackers.

Our casualties were: No. 125 Sepoy Ahmed Din and No. 158 Sepoy Habib Khan (both of B Company) wounded, the latter severely. The enemy's losses I have since ascertained to have been twenty-four killed and missing, of whom three were taken prisoners. In addition to the prisoners, five guns, some ammunition, and a standard of Mbaruk's were captured.

It is difficult for me to praise sufficiently the conduct of the native officer and men who were my comrades in the above defence, but I can truly say that they behaved in a manner worthy of the Empire whose name they upheld, and I respectfully beg to bring to your notice, and recommend for your most favourable consideration, the following non-commissioned officer and men for the gallant way they charged a force of unknown strength, who were firing heavily on the boma. I consider it is altogether owing to their gallantry that the attacking force was driven off with such a slight loss to us :—

- No. 100 Havaldar Azad Khan, B Company.
- „ 95 Bugler Manga Khan, A Company.
- „ 205 Sepoy Hayat Khan, C Company.
- „ 25 „ Shah Nawaz, A Company.
- „ 131 „ Amir Khan, B Company.
- „ 133 „ Hakim Khan, B Company.
- „ 134 „ Jahan Khan, B Company.
- „ 135 „ Ghans Muhammed, B Company.
- „ 138 „ Muhammed Yar, B Company.
- „ 275 „ Ali Bakhsh, C Company.

All the sick men, except one, who had been severely wounded, and my own servant, took part in the defence.

That the men were ready to at once check the attack is due to the facts that—

1. The patrol which daily goes out for one hour just as daylight is breaking (and before the return of which no one is allowed to leave the boma) was just getting under arms when the attack commenced; and

2. In accordance with my orders, one man per tent or group of five sleep accoutred.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) T. E. SCOTT, *Lieutenant,*  
*Second in Command, Indian Contingent.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

*Map illustrating the Military Operations in the Province of Mombasa.*

No. 77.

*Mr. Gosselin to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 29.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 22, 1896.*

THE last number of the "Kolonialblatt" publishes a despatch from Major von Wissmann, Governor of German East Africa, dated the 30th April, reporting the disarming of Mbaruk-bin-Raschid at Moa.

The Governor relates at length the circumstances attending the arrival of Mbaruk, which have already been reported to your Lordship by Mr. Hardinge. He made the rebel Chieftain clearly understand that he and his men would not be allowed to remain armed on German territory, whence they could, when opportunity offered, renew the campaign against the British authorities across the frontier, but he could guarantee him life and freedom provided he delivered up within five days all arms, and would obey orders as to the future residence of himself and his followers.

Mbaruk seemed at first to have hesitated as to accepting these terms; he asked what salary he would be granted, and what position he would occupy, having received from the British authorities a monthly wage of 2,000 rupees as Vali of Gazi; he had some 1,500 armed followers. "I had further learned from Mr. Hardinge that he must be in possession of 136 modern breechloaders, which he had received from the English Government as Vali of Gazi."

Major von Wissmann, under the circumstances, thought it necessary to send for more reinforcements from Dar-es-Salam and Kilwa, so that on the 20th April the German force at Moa was 500 strong; he dispatched a detachment of forty men to Buiti, in north-east Usambara, and made arrangements with Mr. Hardinge for a joint campaign of the German and British forces, who were holding the line of the Umba, in case Mbaruk should prove recalcitrant.

On the 20th April Mbaruk and 1,100 followers arrived at Moa, 400 armed with guns, 200 with spears, bows and arrows, and laid down their arms. On the following day 300 more arrived, besides various small detachments, who were disarmed at Tanga, so that Major von Wissmann estimates that in all 1,600 made their submission.

"Two of the leaders, Akida Bakari and Mohamed-bin-Hamis by name, said to be in possession of many breechloaders, returned, according to Mbaruk, to British territory."

Major von Wissmann, at the date of his despatch, had been informed that 700 more of Mbaruk's people were trying to escape to German territory, but were kept back by the English, who hoped to make prisoners the two above-named Chiefs.

The Governor accordingly decided to leave a company at Moa to disarm these people should they arrive there, and sent Mbaruk and the chief part of his followers to Tanga on the 22nd April under the charge of two companies.

Mbaruk himself has since been sent to Dar-es-Salam, and Major von Wissmann proposes eventually to settle the greater part of the fugitives in the thinly populated but fruitful south Usambara district, leaving a small number at Tanga.

"I hope I have succeeded in settling this matter to our advantage, and I am

firmly convinced that our Colony will derive benefit and profit from this increase in the population, which is in many ways desirable."

In a further article in the same number of the "Kolonialblatt," it is stated that Mr. Hardinge has expressed his grateful thanks for the assistance rendered to him in the matter of the disarming of Mbaruk and his followers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MARTIN GOSSELIN.

No. 78.

*Mr. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury. — (Received July 13.)*

My Lord,

*Mombasa, June 13, 1896.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have made arrangements with Colonel Pearson and Major Hatch, by which the 24th Beluchistan regiment will be ready on the 17th instant to embark at Mombasa for India by way of Zanzibar whenever the transport arrives for it, and will be replaced in the out-stations hitherto held by it by the local forces of the Protectorate.

As I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my telegram of the 25th ultimo, the pacification of the recently disturbed districts is complete, and tranquillity prevails throughout the province. Taking advantage of the amnesty, many persons who were implicated in the late rising, and took refuge in German territory, have given up their arms and returned to their old homes, whilst the disarmament of the Wadigo and Waduruma, and of those followers of Hamis-bin-Kombo who infested the bush to the north of Mombasa, has been peacefully effected. The two proscribed Chiefs who did not follow Sheikh Mubarak across the frontier, Akida Bakari and Mahomed-bin-Hamis, are still said to be in hiding, and as they have been abandoned by all their followers it is very difficult, especially in the district between Mombasa and Takaungu, where the dense jungle is in some places 8 or 9 feet high, to discover their retreat. My impression is that they will work their way by unfrequented paths, crawling through the bush at night, and lying concealed in it during the day, to the German frontier, and will ultimately succeed in rejoining the other refugees at Dar-es-Salaam.


The people of Vanga, including the Indian traders, are returning, and beginning, under the supervision of Mr. Wilson, the local District Officer, to rebuild their town. The Wali, Ali-bin-Salim, of Gazi, also reports that the former inhabitants of that place, including several Mazrui Arabs who followed Mubarak, are coming back in increasing numbers, and similar intelligence reaches me from Roka, Uyombo, and other places in the Malindi district, which were destroyed or partially destroyed during the rising. The telegraph line between Mombasa and Malindi, which was destroyed at numerous points by the rebels, the wire being used for the manufacture of bullets, is being rapidly rebuilt, and is now in working order from Malindi to Takaungu.

I have authorized Mr. Ainsworth to send down by the first opportunity the three Mombasa Sheikhs whom I banished in February to Machakos. As I anticipated, they have felt their exile keenly, and it will prove, I hope, a salutary lesson. I notice a satisfactory change in the demeanour of the general body of Sheikhs here. Formerly disposed to be sullen and apathetic when invited by me to co-operate with the Government in suppressing the revolt, they now respond willingly and with every appearance of loyalty to my suggestions, and some of the leading men among them spontaneously volunteered about a month ago to proceed to Mtwapa and bring in, for disarmament, a body of Hamis Kombo's slaves and followers, who were still hesitating as to whether they should surrender. Their mission was successful, and, as its result, 140 rebels submitted and gave up their arms. The fact is that now that the contest has been decided, and that there is no doubt about the issue, the population, even that portion of it which sympathized with the rebels, is beginning to experience a feeling of relief at being able to return, without danger or disquiet, to its ordinary avocations. Everywhere cultivation is being actively resumed, and except in some districts, such as that of Rabai and some of the western parts of Duruma and Giriama, where the eggs left by the locust flight of last February are now being hatched, I have every confidence that we shall be able to save this summer's harvest. Trade is also feeling the beneficial effect of the restoration of peace, and from what Mr. Marsden tells me of the Customs Returns of the last two months, his recent anticipations of an increased revenue for this year are likely to be abundantly justified.



MAP  
to illustrate the operations in  
**EAST AFRICA**  
February, 1896.

Scale 506880 or 1 Inch = 8 Miles



Routes taken by the Columns.....  
Dates in February on which the Columns reached the points specified..... 21

Authorities

- Admiralty Charts.
- Survey of the Mombasa Victoria Lake Railway LD.W.O. 957<sup>o</sup>.
- Anglo-German Boundary Commission LD.W.O. 976<sup>o</sup>.
- Two sketches furnished by the Consul-General, Zanzibar.



The Wanyika are all greatly relieved at the termination of hostilities, but it was some time before they really could be brought to believe that the Mazrui power, which had overshadowed them so long, had been really broken. Some Elders of Giriama even sent me a message advising me to warn the Germans to be very careful, and to make "very strong magic" before getting into touch with Sheikh Mubarak, as there was every chance that when they did he would, by one of the spells of which he was a master, so paralyze the German forces that he would himself disarm, instead of being disarmed by them, and would return to our territory with their guns. I mention this little incident, not on account of its intrinsic absurdity, but because it serves to illustrate the difficulties which we have had in the past in inducing these people to take any action against the rebels, as well as the advantage to the Administration of having got rid once for all of an agency, always liable to be hostile, whose influence over the native tribes was so strong.

Captain Rogers being very unwilling at present to leave his province, where the development of the Tana River and Port Durnford districts is now engaging his attention, I propose intrusting to Mr. Hall the work of rebuilding Mwele, and establishing there a commercial and administrative centre for the Southern Waduruma. There is, I think, every likelihood, if such a centre is created, that one or two Indian merchants will settle there.

Sheikh Mubarak's son, Rashid, is here at present in connection with the property which will be inherited on his father's death, under the terms of the amnesty, by himself and his younger brother, Mahomed-bin-Mubarak. He is desirous of settling in our territory, but I have told him that whilst I am far from wishing to condemn him to perpetual or even lengthy exile, I think it best that for the present, and certainly until my return from Europe, both he and the other members of his family not excluded from the amnesty should remain at Dar-es Salaam.

I fear there is little prospect that the transport will arrive here in time for the proposed review of the 24th Beluchistan regiment before the Sultan, to take place before I start next week for England; but I propose asking Colonel Pearson and two or three of the senior officers to accompany me to Zanzibar for a few days' stay, so as to present them myself to His Highness when I take leave of him on the eve of my departure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

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