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THE POONA SARVAJANIK SABHA

Established for representing the wants and wishes of the inhabitants of the Deccan, being appointed on a popular elective system under rules framed for the purpose.

WALEKAR'S WADA, DANE ALI.

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Secretary.

SITARAM HARI SATHE ESQR.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SABHA.

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE PROPOSED REPEAL OF SECTION 107 OF THE LAND REVENUE CODE OF 1879.

No 3097 of 1884.

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Bombay Castle, 16th April 1884.

To

THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND,
THE COMMISSIONER, N. D.,
THE COMMISSIONER, C. D.,
THE COMMISSIONERS, S. D.,
THE SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER,

SIR,

In paragraph 34 of Resolution No. 2619. Revenue Department dated March 26th, 1884, it is stated that for reasons therein set forth, the repeal of Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code in whole or in part will be taken into consideration.

2. I am now directed to request that you will accordingly consider the bearing of this section on the declared policy of Government and report at an early date your opinion in what way, it should be amended by a short Act so as to remove any drawback on the complete assurance which Government desire to guarantee to occupants that they will be secured in the enjoyment of profits of cultivation which are the result of improvements made at the occupant's cost.

3. All that it seems necessary to reserve to Government is the right to share in any general rise in the scale of agricultural profits due to the progress of the country, and in the special or general increase in value of land due to any great works of improvement which Government may carry out.

4. I append to this letter an extract from the journal of the debate which took place in the Legislative Council on Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN NUGENT,

Secretary to Government.

Extract from the journal of the debate which took place in the Legislative Council on Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code (corresponding with Section 188 of the Land Revenue Code Bill).

The Honourable Mr. Mandlik next moved that Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 188 should be struck out, and that the section should stand thus:—"Nothing in the last preceding section shall be held to prevent a revised assessment being fixed with reference to any improvement effected at the cost of Government." The Honourable gentleman said:—"The clauses I propose to strike out are "(b), with reference to the value of any natural advantage, when the improvement effected from private capital and resources consists only in having created the means of utilizing such advantage; or (c), with reference to any improvement which is the result only of the ordinary operations of husbandry." I submit that these clauses would place capitalists at a great disadvantage, because, if a man spent private capital and resources, he can only do so in order to utilize some natural agency, and the amount of the improvement due to each would be incommensurable. I do not know what would be the survey gauge by which the difference could be estimated, and I would prefer to see private capitalists encouraged to utilize every natural agency possible, in order that the operations of agriculture may be promoted. As to improvement arising from the ordinary operations of husbandry, it is only fair that the cultivator should reap the advantage of them; and if the Government bring about any improvement by making canals, or by some other agency, it is proper that such improvement should pay its quota to the public revenue.

The Honourable Colonel Anderson:—"The first part of the section, viz., that which Mr. Mandlik proposes to retain, refers to improvements effected solely at the cost of Government, as in the case of irrigation works, made roads, &c. Then, as an instance of improvement effected by private capital and resources only by utilizing natural advantages:—suppose a stream runs beside a field: that stream is public property; and if the ryot cultivating the field dams up the stream, and turns the water into his field by the custom of the country from all time, the improvement in the field effected by such means is subject to assessment. As to the question of improvements effected by the ordinary operations of industry, such operation will, in time—insensibly, I may say—bring about a better quality of soil, because sub-soil which would otherwise become indurated benefits by the operations which enable the surface soil to hold water. Direct improvements, caused by digging wells, &c., at the expense of the cultivator, are held free from assessment.

No 3067

dated 25th April 1884.

Forwarded to the Secretary, Poona Sarvajanic Sabha, for early opinion.

H. E. WINTER.
Acting Collector.

No. 68 of 1884.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS,

Valveker's Wada Dane Ali

POONA, 4th June 1884.

To,

THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
Revenue Department.

BOMBAY.

SIR,

In para 34 of Government Resolution No. 2619 dated 26th March last His Excellency the Governor in Council was pleased to declare that he would take into early consideration the question of the advisability of repealing Section 107 of the Revenue Code in whole or in part, and the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha now understand that Government has called upon its district officers to report in what way this proposed amendment can be carried out so as to remove any drawback upon the complete assurance which Government desire to guarantee to occupants that they will be secured in the full enjoyment of the profits of cultivation which are the result of improvements effected at the occupant's cost. The Sabha has always anxiously watched the efforts made by Government from time to time to extend this assurance, and it hails with satisfaction the announcement of the policy that it is necessary to reserve to Government only the right to share in the general rise of agricultural profits due to the progress of the country and in the special or general increase of value due to any great works of improvement which Government may carry out. The Committee of the Sabha feel assured that in many important respects the concessions now announced are in full keeping with the advanced policy of the Government of India as laid down in the last financial statement, and will go a great way to stimulate agricultural enterprise and improve the condition of the Rayat. At the same time there are important questions of detail which will have to be fully considered, and as an expression of non-official views on this question will prove serviceable at the present time we have been directed by the Committee of the Sabha to submit the following observations for the favourable consideration of Government.

2. In this connection we beg to forward herewith a copy of the April number of the Sabha's journal, in the independent section of which the whole of the policy now under consideration has been fully discussed. Without committing themselves to the support of every statement of detail the Committee are prepared to state that the article fully represents the views which the Sabha has held for many years generally on this long controverted subject. The views of the Sabha on the general subject of revision settlement were submitted to Government in their letter No. 160 of 1877 in the shape of observations suggested by the Report of the Deccan Riots Commission, the more independent members of which body freely endorsed the objections which the Sabha has all along maintained against the policy of the Survey Department in the matter of enhancement. The number of the Sabha's Journal in which that letter was printed is forwarded herewith for easy reference. It is a matter of satisfaction that many of the objections urged by the Sabha and endorsed by the Deccan Riots Commissioners have met with (though a qualified) acceptance at the hands of the Local and Supreme authorities, and that the Government of India is now prepared to sanction the proposals made by the Bombay Government in 1874, though disallowed at the time. The field of controversy has been considerably narrowed by the recent concessions made by the Local Government with the approval of the Government of India. But the most important point on which difference of opinions still prevails, relates to the question of taxing improvements which forms the subject of the present reference.

3. In our letter of 14th April 1877 we stated that though the law expressly protects the interests of the Rayats by directing that in enhancing the assessment, the improvements caused by the expenditure of capital and labour should not be taken into account, yet as a matter of fact the Survey Officers do not observe this rule and tax all improvements by raising the classification scale of lands so improved. We further stated that in the absence of a fixed rule the Survey officers do not and cannot make any allowance for the improved cultivation of lands, as it is impossible in many cases to distinguish between increase of value due to general causes and increase brought on by the labour and capital of the Rayata. This was written in 1877 before the Land Revenue Code was passed and when under the law then in force all improvement made by the Rayats were entitled to exemption. Since then section 107 of the Land Revenue Code became law and in spite of the protests of the Native Members of the Legislative Council, an attempt was made to justify the action of the settle-

ment officers by inserting proviso clauses B and C which nullified the general exemption contained in Section 106. As the result of the discussions which have since then taken place Government is now prepared to retrace its steps, and to repeal section 107 in whole or in part as may be deemed advisable. We humbly suggest that both the provisos should be repealed. The section would thus stand as the Honourable Rao Saheb Mandlik suggested at the time, namely, "nothing in the last preceding section shall be held to prevent a revised assessment being fixed with reference to any improvement effected at the cost of Government." This repeal of provisos B and C will protect the interests of the public tax-payers as represented by the Government, while it will secure to the Rayat all the benefits of the expenditure of his capital and labour in the improvement of land. The provisos B and C to section 107 were not only innovations on the old law, but were also so framed as to defeat the main intention of the law, for no improvement can be mentioned which does not directly or indirectly consist in creating means of utilising natural advantages, or does not result from the natural operation of husbandry. By taxing improvements under these two classes, the general exemption of section 106 became only nominal. These provisos must therefore be repealed.

4. Whatever theory may be accepted in regard to the rights of the state in cultivated lands, the injustice of taxing improvements under the plea that they do not create natural agents but only create the means of utilising those agencies is equally evident. We maintain on the authority of Hindu law texts and traditions affirmed by our law courts, as also on the repeated declarations made by the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State that the state is not entitled to claim ownership of cultivated lands, and that the revenue paid to it is a fixed share of the produce which is not rent but a tax on rent. This view is not accepted by the Settlement Department which claims full ownership for the state. Some members of the Government of India, however, in the discussions on the Agricultural Loans Bill maintained that the state was co-partner with the Rayat in the ownership of land, and as such entitled to share in the increase of value. Whether the state is sole landlord or co-partner or collects the land revenue as a tax or rent, it can legitimately claim only a share for improvements effected at public expense. This principle has been recognised in all recent legislation in England and Ireland where private property in land is complete, and under the tenant right clauses, the occupant is entitled to compensation for unexhausted improvement. The Government of India is trying to carry out these principles in the

Bengal Tenancy Bill against the wishes of the Zamindars. It is but just that the same principle should be recognised by the state against itself even if its interest be that of full or part owner. Proviso (a) to section 107 makes full provision for the protection of state interests, as it recognises the right of the state to levy an increased rate for Irrigation and Railway works which specially benefit lands under their command, over and above the general increase due to a rise in prices. We therefore humbly think that section 107 with proviso (a) should stand as it is, and the other provisos repealed.

5. When the amending Bill intended to give effect to these provisos is brought before the Council we think the opportunity should be taken advantage of to define the term improvements. This word has been defined in Section 4 of Act 19 of 1883 to be any work which adds to the letting value of land. We would adopt that definition with its detailed explanations, but at the same time would add two qualifications ; (1) that the increase of letting value which constitutes an improvement must be such an increase as, after making due provision for ordinary profits or interest on the capital or labour employed, leaves larger margin of rent, and (2) that due regard should be paid to the period during which the improvement will last without being exhausted. These qualifications appear to us to be essentially necessary, for mere increase in the letting value affords no criterion for judging about the real nature of the benefit conferred. If a man sinks a well in his land, its letting value is increased, but the benefit to him is not represented fully by the increase in the letting value. A deduction must be made for the ordinary rate of profits on the capital sunk, before the net benefit to him can be ascertained. In the same way if a man plants fruit trees in his land its letting value is increased, but the real benefit to him is not measured by this increase. Ordinary profits on the capital sunk must be first deducted, and there must be a further deduction because in this case the improvement will only last for a time till the trees planted cease to thrive, and the man must be recouped both his interest and his principal expenditure before that term is over. With the additions above suggested the definition of improvements in Act 19 of 1883 appears to us to be sufficiently full and explicit enough for practical purposes.

6. In the Resolution of 26th March, while expressing their readiness to exempt wells from special assessment, Government have put forth a proposal to tax all lands capable of being supplied with water whether a well actually exists or not. This suggestion is made on the authority of Sir George Wingate. We submit that by giving

effect to this suggestion Government will only defeat its own ends. It will transform the present levy upon land actually benefitted by a well into a more general levy on all lands whether they are so benefitted or not. Government assure the public that the increase will be slight and scarcely noticeable. But this assurance made by the executive authorities can have no legal status. Succeeding Governments may take another view of the matter and screw up this resource of taxation. The question, however, is one of principle and must be dealt with as such on general grounds. We deprecate the adoption of this new policy on grounds of principle: (1) In the first place we deny the right of the state to levy special taxes for inherent powers, for the land tax represents all inherent powers and advantages. (2) Secondly, the land revenue, as we maintain, is a tax and not a rent. It is a tax represented by the share of actual produce, and no advantage which does not result in increase of produce can be taken into account in fixing the tax. If lands are to be taxed whether benefitted by wells or not, this principle will be lost sight of. (3) Thirdly, the experiment now proposed was actually tried 20 years ago and condemned by the most experienced officers of the Revenue and Survey Departments and in deference to their views it was abandoned by the Government of the day. (4) Fourthly, in 1868 when the proposal was again revived Government in their Resolution pronounced it to be impolitic, if not unjust, to fix any rate on subsoil water, and at the same time stated that the right must be held to be in abeyance or dormant till water was supplied to the land. (5) Fifthly, the adoption of this proposal at the present day would unsettle all the work that has been done and disturb existing classifications and values by the introduction of an element not taken into account in the work which has been done upto this day. (6) Sixthly, it would necessitate the indefinite extension of the lease of life granted to the Survey Department which, as the Report of the Survey Commissioner shows, expects to bring its work to a close within a period of eight years at the most. The expense, delay and harassment and uncertainty represented by the working of this Department will be thus needlessly perpetuated. (7) Seventhly, by the adoption of this new principle bad soil will be proportionately taxed more heavily than deep black soils which contain water at a great depth, while barren and strong soils may have water stored in them at a smaller depth. (8) Eighthly, the loss of Revenue represented by the abandonment of special taxation on wells will be slight, and can easily be made up by other means, than this proposal of taxing all lands whether benefitted or not by wells. Even if there is a slight sacrifice Government will best consult its own and the Rayats'

interest by consenting to the sacrifice rather than unsettling men's minds all over the country. (9) Ninthly, a similar measure to levy on all lands commanded by Irrigation canals a protective rate, whether they took the water or not, was passed by the local legislature a few years ago, but it was vetoed by the Secretary of State. The present proposal is objectionable on the same grounds. All these grounds are set forth and fully discussed in the Article published in the April number, and we request a careful consideration of the same. The great point which the Government of India has in view is to make the operations of revision settlements more simple and more certain. This object will be defeated by complicating the considerations on which future enhancements are to be based. We therefore request that when the proposed Bill comes on for consideration Government may take an early opportunity to assure the public that it has no intention of nullifying the effects of the great concessions it has made in the latest announcement of its policy.

In conclusion we beg to sum up the leading suggestions contained in this letter.

(a) Provisoes B and C of section 107 should be repealed in whole and not in part.

(b) The word improvement should be defined on the lines laid down in Act 19 of 1883 with the addition in regard to the deduction of ordinary profits and a charge for reserve fund as suggested above.

(c) That Government should abandon its proposal to tax lands for supposed natural advantages such as sub-soil water &c.*

We have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most Obedient Servants

S. H. SATHE

S. H. CHIPLONKAR

Secretaries of the Poona Sarvajamik Sabha.

No 4257

From

H. E. Winter, Esquire,
Acting Collector of Poona.

To

The Secretary,
Sarvajamik Sabha Poona.

Poona, 4th June 1884.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 69 dated 4th Instant, I

* Copy of this letter was furnished to the Collector of Poona in reply to his endorsement No. 3067 dated 25th April 1884.

have the honour to send you a copy of my proposal for the amendment of Land Revenue Code.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,
H. E. WINTER,
Acting Collector.

No. 3489.

Camp Indapur, 9th May 1884.

To

The Commissioner C. D.

SIR,

In answer to your No. B 2012 dated the 23rd Ultimo, I have the honour to state that I think it would be advisable to repeal clauses (b) and (c) of Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code and to add to Section 106 the following proviso :—

“ Provided that the occupant shall enjoy the entire profit of improvements made at his own cost.”

2. The following additional clause might then be added to Section 107. (b). Or with reference to the discovery of any hidden natural advantage, but if the same be brought to light by private labour or capital, a fair profit thereon shall be reserved to the person by whose labour or capital the discovery is made.

I have the honour to be,

H. E. WINTER,
Acting Collector Poona.

“ True Copy”

(Signed) H. E. WINTER,
Acting Collector Poona

A SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL OPINIONS ON THE QUESTION OF HINDU SOCIO-RELIGIOUS REFORM.

It is now two years since the interesting controversy on the dual subject of Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood was re-opened by Mr. Malabari, and during this interval it has been very fully, though sometimes warmly, discussed by all kinds of persons. Mr. Malabari's original Notes having been officially sent by the late Viceroy to all the Provincial Governments and Administrations for the expression of their opinions, these several Governments and Administrations have recorded their views; and we propose in the following pages to give an impartial *resume* of the views so recorded, which *resume* we doubt not will prove very interesting to our readers, even though some of them may not be disposed to endorse the views so summarized.

We shall commence with the North-Western Provinces and Audh. The Government of these provinces in their reply deem it to be expedient to describe precisely the conditions and customs which prevail in those parts of India, especially in respect of the remarriage of widows. Owing to want of full and correct information to speak dogmatically on such a subject all general observations must, owing to diversity of customs, be understood to be subject to exceptions and modifications. The prohibition against the second marriage of women has, according to Mr. Mayne, no foundation either in early law or custom, and the change was due to the influence on Brahmanical opinion which looked upon marriage as an indelible sacrament. This view accords with facts according as each caste has

adopted or dissented from the later Brahmanical law, and the prohibition is found to prevail more or less extensively, though its sphere is much more circumscribed than Mr. Malabari imagines. The practice of marrying a brother's widow obtains in certain castes. It is the privilege of the younger brother to marry his elder brother's widow who may not marry a man out of the family if her brother-in-law is willing to espouse her. Where this right is not insisted on, the widow may marry a stranger. Such re-marriages are not mere concubinage. Certain ceremonies are performed which are not the same as on the occasion of the first marriage, but by long custom they are admitted by the caste and by the family as binding. The twice born classes, the Brahmins, the Rajputs, the Vaishya and the mixed Kayath caste, absolutely prohibit remarriage. The castes who do not claim to be twice born permit remarriage. Another way of stating the same thing more accurately is that castes which are governed by Panchâyats recognise remarriage, while those which have no Panchâyats prohibit it. The absence of religious ceremonies indicates the disapproval of the priestly caste, and the Panchayats have therefore taken the law into their own hands and prescribed the ceremony, and the caste councils give the sanction and validity to such unions. Of course there are individuals and families, belonging to castes in which remarriage is permitted, who, when they rise in the social scale, try to cut themselves off from their associates by adopting the customs of the people to whom they look up. This is the case with Sonars and some sub-castes of the Bania division, although the large bulk of the Bania caste still permit remarriage. It is only the Agarwallas and similar wealthy sub-castes which forbid it, while about half the Bania sub-divisions may be safely assumed to permit remarriage. No Brahmins except one clan in Sindh permit remarriage. Among the Khatries only the Jadhavs do not forbid it, while Bhats, Rajputs, and Kayaths forbid it. Out of a total

of 38 millions of population about $10\frac{1}{2}$ millions or $\frac{1}{4}$ the whole number forbid remarriage. This $\frac{1}{4}$ includes $4\frac{2}{3}$ million Brahmins, 3 millions Rajputs, $\frac{1}{2}$ million Kayaths, and 6 lacks Banias. These figures show that the restriction on widow remarriage is partial and not universal or general, and is due greatly to a strict observance of high religious doctrines, and to the conservative instincts of those wealthy, educated, and high born classes, whose social position prevents them from feeling the full inconvenience of it.

The census returns also do not show that there is any such preponderance of widows among Hindu women as is generally supposed. Taking 15 as the age of puberty the percentage of widows is 26·7 among Hindus and 25·1 among Mahomedans. Out of a total of nearly 66 lacks of Hindoo girls under 14 there are 25,574·38 widows, while out of $10\frac{1}{2}$ lacks of Musalman girls under 14, 2,612·25 are widows. Taking the girls between 9 and 14 out of a total of $18\frac{1}{4}$ lacks (Hindoo) 21,417 or 1·2 percent are widows, while out of 2,903 Mahamedan 21 or ·7 are widows. These figures raise doubts as to whether the existence of a large proportion of widows is due to any special religious or social customs of the Hindoos, for the disproportion obtains among the Mahamedans equally where no religious obstacle exists. The conditions therefore must be common to both communities. In England out of every 100 females of 20 years and upwards 26 are single, 60 married and 14 are widows. In the North-West Provinces and Audh, the single are less than 1 percent, the married $69\frac{1}{2}$ percent, and the widows $29\frac{1}{2}$; so that, taking the English figures as the standard; there are about 16 percent more widows in India than in England. As a very substantial set off and more there are a little more than 25 percent less of spinsters in India than in England. Whether as widows or as spinsters, the existence of a large body of unmarried women or, to speak more accurately, of women without

living husbands, must be detrimental to the interests of society. Looked at from this point of view the question presents a vastly different aspect, for as against 15 per cent of such women in N. W. Provinces there are 40 per cent in England ; that is, the English statistics are nearly three times more unfavourable to England than the corresponding statistics are to N. W. Provinces. But the seclusion of women in India under the Padada system aggravates the position of widows which, even without it, cannot be compared to the condition of the English spinster with her greater freedom and security and the higher considerations shown to her.

Perhaps in no stage of life is the proportion of Hindoo widows so excessive as in old age. Between 20 and 30 the proportion of widows is 6.4 ; between 30 and 40 it rises to 17 and swells to 61 and 83 in the next two decades. While the English proportion of married women between 15 and 20 is 3 per cent, it is 90 per cent in the North-West Provinces and Audh. Between 20 and 30 47½ per cent of English women are married and 92 per cent of Indian women are married. In the next decade the proportions are more equal 82 and 75 in India and in England. In the 5th and subsequent decades the English returns show a higher figure for married females. It follows from these figures that the existence of a larger number of widows in the North West Provinces and Audh is due partly to the fact that a larger proportion of the women in India get married and partly because they marry much younger. The women in India reach the marriageable age earlier and they pass it sooner than their European sisters. Women become old at 30 and are passed the age of marriage. Till some radical change takes place in the national physique, checking early development and prolonging youth and vigour, widows after 30 must remain so all their life in India as men who marry in old age do

not choose their wives from among the widows of \$0 and upwards.

Mr. Malabari's general positions are therefore on this subject not strictly applicable to the North-Western Provinces. Only among $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Hindu population is remarriage forbidden and the percentage of widows is scarcely greater among the Hindoos than among the Mahamedans. Judged by the European standard the percentage of widows is higher but that of spinsters is almost nil, and the excess of widows is in the main due to physical and social causes inseparable from ethnological and climatic conditions. The residuum of avoidable evil due to caste custom is confined to the educated and wealthy classes who are best able to help themselves without asking for state interference.

On one point only the existing law appears to fail in affording sufficient facilities to those who desire to remarry. There is no machinery by which a Hindoo widow of a caste which prohibits remarriage, or even where there is no prohibition when she fails to obtain the assent of her friends, can claim to effect a valid or legal union. This disability is not accidental but deliberate on the part of the legislature which naturally refrained from changing the native law on marriage, and having recognised the existence of the Hindoo religion as a personal law it enforced its provisions in their entirety upon all who choose to live under it. This position was clearly brought out in the discussions which took place in connection with Act 3 of 1872. The social conditions have remained the same since then, and Government will not be justified in reopening the question. A renunciation of the Hindoo marriage law or custom involves a renunciation of the Hindoo religion, and those who are prepared for such a change have the machinery provided by Act 3 of 1872 to carry out the purposes. If the popular dissent from the Brahmanical orthodoxy assumes large proportions this machinery would have

to be enlarged and improved, and Government would meet such movement half way.

As regards infant marriage it is doubtful whether state interference is desirable and still more whether it can be effectively attempted. The social customs of an entire nation cannot be altered by executive or legislative action, and the change must be effected slowly by taking advantage of, or occasionally anticipating, changes in public opinion. As regards the remedies suggested they are neither just nor practicable. They impose penalties upon the victims and not the authors of the evils. Educational disabilities are particularly inadvisable ; for as real reform must be the result of the spread of general education, such disabilities would defeat their own object. As regards the betrothal of infants the English view of individual freedom of choice is not shared in even by all western nations, and the real injury to a community is due not to early betrothal but to early consummation. Early marriage is chiefly responsible for girl widowhood, and while the evil cannot be denied it is at the same time impossible to avoid the conclusion that real reform must await the impulse of a wide-spread desire for a social change and that at present it is premature to invoke the aid of Government till the teaching and example of Native leaders had created a popular feeling adverse to the custom.

The views of the Government of the North West Provinces and Audh which we have summed up above derive special interest from the fact that that Government is presided over by Sir Alfred Lyall who stands pre-eminent among contemporary Anglo-Indian statesmen for his philosophic cast of mind, and for his deep sympathy with the historic order of things, as it has been fossilized by a long train of circumstances. Sir Alfred Lyall it would be seen does not regard these institutions as wholesome. They are evils, which are none the less to be deplored because they

are antient. State interference with them could only be justified if the movement directed against them assumed large and popular dimensions. If the current of popular feeling set in strongly against their continuance Sir Alfred Lyall would be prepared to meet the movement half way. A considerable change in the social condition of the community and material progress in the dissent from Bramhincal orthodoxies must take place before Government would be justified in reopening the question, and till such time comes, the call for state interference is premature and open to the objection that the interference of the state will be misunderstood.

We next turn to the opinion of the Government of the Panjab, presided over by Sir Charles Aitchison. In the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor of the Panjab, it is not within the province of Government to take the initiative in such matters, although Government might and ought to give every countenance and encouragement to them. Very little good will, in his opinion, result from the direct action of Government in reforms of this nature, until the way is cleared by enlightening native opinion and educating that opinion. Among the officers consulted by the Lieutenant Governor Mr. Hawkins, Deputy Commissioner Amratsir, admits that both the institutions are evils arising out of certain social opinions or prejudices, and that the question is a serious one as to how far the state can interfere in modifying social opinions by legislation or any other action. Infant marriages are not specially an Indian institution but were known in Europe during historical times, and if they have disappeared, the result is not due to any special action on the part of the state. Mr. Hawkins thinks that active interference is neither necessary nor advisable, but the state should show its disapproval of such customs by attaching celibacy as a condition of all free-scholarships. Such action would influence the rising generation which is so desirable, and

would be practical and inoffensive. In regard to the remarriage of widows, the obstacles complained of in other parts of the country are not much felt in the Panjab Provinces. While doubting the wisdom of active state interference with such matters Mr. Hawkins would encourage the organisation of societies for the discouragement of such practices and he would extend the patronage of the state to such societies.

The Hon'ble Mr. Barclay regards it as a satisfactory sign of the times that some at least of the educated natives of India have come to look upon these customs as evils for which a remedy should be sought, although he deprecates their too great readiness to despair of progress being made by educating public opinion on the subject, and their disposition to rely upon outside state pressure. In his opinion suttee and infanticide were crimes which could be punished, while infant marriages can not be declared criminal offences; and it would not be right to declare them legally null and void when it was quite certain that they would continue to be celebrated in millions of cases in possible ignorance of any change in the Law that might be made. Neither among Christians nor Parsees has the Legislature in India regulated by law the age at which the marriage may be performed, and the marriage of minors performed with the consent of guardians is recognized under certain conditions and subject to certain limitations. Before similar legislation could be proposed for Hindoos, it would be necessary to ascertain that a large number of Hindoos desired such limitations to put a stop not so much to the early celebration, as to the early consummation, of marriages. Of the several suggestions made about the mode in which the state might indirectly show its disapproval of infant marriages Mr. Barclay sees nothing objectionable in introducing these subjects into the School text books or in the officers of

Government showing sympathy with the movement in their private capacity. He disapproves of the suggestion that married students should be refused admission to University examinations, as such interference would lead to abuse and defeat the main objects. The proposal to give preference to unmarried over married candidates for public service was for the same reasons undesirable. Further students in schools, and candidates for public services were after all a very small class of the community, and any direct or indirect inducement to these classes would have very little effect for good on the general population. The proposal to secure for the benefit of the infant bride money paid by her old husband was impracticable as Government officers could not know when money was paid, and even if they knew it might not be possible to get hold of the money. Mr. Barclay is of opinion that marriages of girls to boys junior to them in age can not be restrained, for such marriages are in consonance with popular opinion in certain parts of the country, and it would be difficult to arrange suitable matches for such girls in the same caste. The process of educating public opinion in such matters need not be confined to the educated classes. In the Panjab after the annexation much was done in the way of reform by educating the masses of the people to disapprove infanticide by holding public meetings and conferences with their leaders. The educated classes could more easily reach the masses if they tried to show that they believed what they taught. In the Panjab at least these practices are much less prevalent among the illiterate classes than among the educated. As regards the remarriage of widows Mr. Barclay thinks that the state has done its part by passing Act 15 of 1856. If the law is not widely known the associations should take up that work. Those who remarry widows can not be protected against the risk of expulsion from their respective caste. The state can not find suitable husbands for widows or as-

certain without the impertinent inquiry being resented whether she has voluntarily chosen the life of perpetual seclusion. The state can not regulate the principles of caste exclusion either of the principals or of the accessory parties to the marriage. A caste is a voluntary association, and people who wish to belong to it must submit to its rules or punishments which stop short of invading a man's civil rights sufficiently guaranteed to him by Act XXI of 1850. Any attempt to declare that caste become illegal associations when they refuse to associate with remarried widows belonging to their number would put Government in a false position until the circumstances of the country are greatly changed, and when they are so changed, such a declaration would not be necessary. On the whole Mr. Barclay thinks that the state as a state can do little, and that further movement must come from outside associations, and it will be easier for the state to do what is needed when it is moved by influential associations which have prepared the public mind for further progress.

Mr. Ibbetson, Director of Public Instruction, Panjab, is of opinion that infant marriage is the exception in many districts of Panjab, while $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population freely permit widow remarriage. The evil customs are therefore not universal, but obtain chiefly among the higher castes who regard these restrictions as a mark of their superior status. Infant marriage is the rule in the Eastern Districts, and an exception in the Western portions, and where infant marriage prevailed it prevented unchastity and offences connected with woman, which were rather conspicuous by their rather wide prevalence where the custom of late marriages obtained. Mr. Ibbetson cautions the Government against political danger of sanctioning or appearing to sanction any interference with social and religious matters, as likely to lead to trouble and disaffection and impair the power

of Government to lead and influence the people. As regards the particular remedies suggested by Mr. Malabari, Mr. Ibbetson thinks that the proposal to prevent married students appearing at examinations was bad in principle and futile in practice. The proposal to prefer unmarried to married candidates for Government service would also prove futile. The proposal to improve school text books by lessons intended to teach people the evils of infant marriage was unobjectionable. The suggestion that money paid for brides to their relations shall be the brides' property and claimable by them was good, but it would prove inoperative in practice. The laws against adultery are sufficient to provide for the evils of the marriage of a woman to her husband's male relations after the husband's death, in so far as the institution common enough among savage races requires any check. Mr. Ibbetson does not see his way to approve any further interference with a view to enforce Act 15 of 1856 so as to disarm caste opposition. Moreover the suggestion that active steps should be taken by the authorities to ascertain if a woman is secluded with her consent would be a dangerous encroachment on domestic privacy and sanctity. In Panjab it is the caste or brotherhood who excommunicate, and not the priests, and measures directed against priestly power would be inoperative and mischievous. The change of sentiment must come from within, and Government cannot hasten it except by smoothing the path, and authoritative pressure would only provoke re-action. At the most interference can only take the force of permissive, and can never be mandatory, legislation.

The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces gives his opinion that nothing can be done by Government in these matters, as the questions are purely social and must be left to time and to that change of Hindu opinion which is being slowly brought about by education. The promotion of female

education would tend to secure the early accomplishment of these reforms ; for when a large number of Hindu ladies were educated, infant marriage and enforced widowhood would disappear. All the official and non-official authorities are unanimous in deprecating Government interference in these delicate matters, and the Native gentlemen consulted think that the evils have been greatly exaggerated, and are not universal, and that the influence of the spread of education has not been duly taken into account by Mr. Malabari, and that his remedies and proposals are ill considered, and likely to lead to mischief.

The Chief Commissioner of Coorg speaking for his province observes that, in not very remote times, children were not married before puberty, but of late marriages of girls of 8 years old have become common. Adult marriages still obtain, generally among the *Gaudas* of North Coorg, but the influence of Brahmins and Rajpoots is acting upon these classes. The Chief Commissioner, however, is of opinion that the State can do nothing, as its direct interference would be mischievous, and its indirect meddling, as proposed by Mr. Malabari, would be of no practical value. The educated Natives who feel the evils of early consummation will, he hopes, form themselves into associations and check its spread. The reforms proposed to remedy the evils of enforced widowhood cannot be taken up by Government, as such a task would be repugnant to British policy. They can only be enforced by the preponderating weight of influence which the leading men in the country properly associated for such a purpose can alone bring to bear upon the vast majority of the Hindu population who are either too timid or too indifferent to move.

Mr. Elliott, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, observes for his Province that the evils complained of do not prevail there to so large an extent as in the

older provinces. Remarriage is not in vogue among the Brahmins only. The other castes freely permit remarriage, and the widows do not practice the austerities exacted elsewhere. They are not compelled to fast on *Ekadashi* day, as is the custom in Bengal, and they eat and drink all kinds of food permitted to Hindus except fish and flesh. Infant marriage is almost unknown in Assam; for, except in the case of Brahmins, no girl is married before puberty, and even Brahmin girls are not disposed of in marriage before they are 10 or 12 years old. Child marriage chiefly finds favour with people who ape the manners of other Provinces, and think they rise in the social scale when they impose upon themselves the inconveniences and prohibitions of older civilization. The evils of enforced widowhood are also considerably mitigated in Assam by a custom which favours contracts of cohabitation, which contracts, though not formally recognized as marriages, have still a validity scarcely inferior to the marriage tie. On the whole the reform on these points must originate with the people themselves, and lies outside the sphere of Government activity. The exertions and good example of enlightened members of the Hindu community can alone furnish a satisfactory settlement of these questions.

The Commissioner of British Burmah, Sir Charles Bernard, states in his reply that among the Burmese, Kareens and Tailangan population infant marriages do not prevail. Young men and maidens make love and are married between 15 and 23 years, with their parents' consent, and remarriage is freely permitted and practised. The proportion of widows to the total female population in Burmah is the same as in southern Europe, and is half of what obtains in the other provinces of British India. Women occupy a higher, happier and more important and respectable position in Burmah than elsewhere in India. In Burmah 320 females out of

10,000 know to read and write, while in other Provinces the proportion is 16 or 20 out of 10,000. In Burmah only one per cent of prisoners in jail are women, whereas the proportion in other Provinces is five per cent. Infanticide and suicide of women are extremely rare offences in Burmah which cannot be said of the other Provinces. The questions raised by Mr. Malabari have therefore no scope in Burmah. As a question of Indian legislation Sir Charles is of opinion that though he sympathizes with the agitation, yet it is a delicate matter, and that it is inexpedient on the part of Government to interfere actively in such matters save at the instance of a majority, a large portion of the population concerned. The proportion of Hindu reformers is at present very small, at least of those who are prepared to side openly with Mr. Malabari, and Government interference would be resented as an encroachment on religious and personal freedom. Whatever may be the Shastra dictum on the subject, the Hindus regard these matters as intimately connected with their religion, and interference would provoke disaffection. State interference would be not only impolitic, but it would defeat the end desired. It would set people against reforms and provoke reaction, and retard progress. The only safe course is to let the forces of education and public opinion have free play. Government and its officers might show by their utterances that they were on the side of reform; and local organizations might be encouraged in these efforts. Beyond this general countenance no specific relief, such as the proposals of Mr. Malabari imply, can be given, as the proposals are opposed to common sense and would check education. Infant marriages cannot be charged with the responsibility for over population. Adult marriages are found by experience to be more fruitful in this respect than early marriages which too often prove sterile as in the case of the richer and landed classes in India. Over population is not a con-

sequence of infant marriages. On the whole, though the conclusion of non-interference was an important one, yet there are questions and occasions when it is better for Government to abstain from action than to take action that may produce evil results.

The Government of Bombay observes that the preponderance of opinion on the part of the authorities consulted leaned to the view that it would be inexpedient for Government to exercise any direct interference, at all events until there is a much stronger popular demand for interference than there is at present. The Government of Bombay think that the objection to child marriage based on its tendency to deny freedom of choice to the parties was sentimental rather than real, for in France girls have very little choice in the selection of their husbands, and yet marriages are not less happy in France than in England. Much may be said in favour of both systems, and Native public opinion would not be in favour of love matches as against selections by parents. As regards the objection that infant marriages lead to early consummation and thereby to physical deterioration, the Government of Bombay think that the evil is much exaggerated. Hindu children do not seem to be puny in size. Women become prematurely old no doubt, but legislation cannot prevent this. Consummation cannot be fixed by law later than at 14, and the present practice does not appear to countenance earlier consummation. In the absence of registration it would not be possible to enforce the law. The third objection to infant marriages is based on their tendency to produce a larger number of child widows. This objection is real, but it is not possible for Government to do more in this way than it has done by removing all disabilities by Act 15 of 1856. The state cannot go further, or restrain the force of public opinion. That opinion can only be changed as the result of time and education. Female education will tend to remove these prejudices. Till that is done the specific proposals

made by Mr. Malabari will lead to no good, if indeed they would be at all operative. Exclusion from service of married persons would not be practicable, for none get into service before 22 till which time marriage can never be postponed. Exclusion of married students from schools would check education and punish boys for the fault of their parents. Improving school text books with this view would interfere with religious neutrality. The proposals made for the protection of widows are similarly impracticable. The law is sufficient for those who seek it, and Government can not force persons to take advantage of it or entertain a number of inquisitors to pry into private affairs and encourage complaints. The suggestion made for a commission of inquiry did not commend itself to the Government of Bombay as such action in their opinion was calculated to create alarm in the public mind by giving the people concerned a notion that Government meant to interfere with their long established religious customs. Sati and Infanticide furnish no analogies, for these were offences against the law of all civilized countries. Being associated with religion, the repression of such customs by the state would strengthen their hold, and state interference would be regarded as persecution. Superstition and unnatural social traditions can never be abolished by direct attack; they become obsolete and perish when civilization outgrows them.

The Resident of Hyderabad, as representing the Government of Berars, reports that the European officers consulted deprecated legislation on the subject, and were in favour of leaving reform to the change of sentiment and opinion as the growth of education. The weight of native opinion is also on the same side, even among those who represent the advanced school of thinkers. The Resident concurs in these views. He thinks that the *Pardah* system produces more general and widely spreading evils than the prohibition of remarriage which is confined to a small section.

Government can not usefully interfere without engaging in an unequal conflict with social prejudices. The victims do not desire relief, for they regard the privation as a distinction and public opinion supports the sentiment. Wider intelligence alone can sap the evil. Betrothals at an early age is a custom well suited to the present status and character of the people taken as a whole, and especially of the agricultural classes. The obligation of the tie makes the honour of the child respected by others, and does not necessarily lead to premature consummation. When physical capacity for sexual intercourse exists at so early an age, the principle of free choice cannot be wisely advocated or safely introduced. The problem is so beset with difficulties that he would be a bold man who would say that the solution found out by the people was not the best. At least it was not a subject for prohibitive legislation.

We have thus presented a summary of the opinions of the executive rulers of the eight great divisions of the Empire on these much debated questions. We have not had access to the replies of the Bengal and Madras Governments, but it is just clear that the authorities in those Presidencies must have given the same counsels of caution and abstinence. The hopeless diversion of views between native authorities is too well-known to need any remark, and we have on that account not summarized their views on the present occasion, though we may find it necessary to do so on some future occasion. The general drift of these replies is too evident to be mistaken or misunderstood. The rulers of British India are of course in no way indisposed to welcome a voluntary change in these practices by the people themselves; but, as regards any legislative or executive action by the state, their position as alien rulers necessarily imposes a check and a caution which the warnings of the mutiny times have written in characters of blood on their hearts. Even the most

ardent reformer among us cannot blame our rulers for their, under the circumstances, natural hesitation. But those who can read between the lines can fairly see that what Government seeks is a more distinct and powerful expression of public opinion on these vexed questions than it has been possible hitherto to secure. When the ground is so prepared it will be disposed to move and not otherwise. The feeling of hesitation is shared even by native rulers, for we find that His Highness the late Regent of Kolhapoor was of opinion that State interference, whether by legislation or executive action, would give rise to much dissatisfaction. He looked chiefly to the example of moral courage, set by the leaders of reform, as alone likely to produce any good result. The Thakore Saheb of Morvi is of opinion that direct state interference would lead to no salutary results. He is favourably disposed to welcome the indirect help of the State agency, for without such help no reform he thinks is possible. The Thakore Saheb would check the evil of ill-assorted marriages at once and directly as tending to produce the social evil of early widowhood and checking widow marriage. His Highness the Thakore Saheb of Bhavanagar counsels patience as he does not deem it wise or safe to have recourse to forced measures in these religious and social matters. His Highness holds that voluntary reform, the result of the spread of education, is the only effective remedy. His Highness the Rao of Kutch is of opinion that it would be possible to effect a compromise by which marriages before certain limits of age might be forbidden. Such an arrangement would, in his opinion, surely meet with the acceptance of the orthodox. Direct state interference without such consent and cooperation in such matters is in his opinion inadvisable, though indirect support may be given with advantage. The Rao does not, however, believe in the practicability of the particular remedies suggested by Mr. Malabari, as they seem to him either unjust or impracticable, and likely to defeat the end

desired. On the subject of enforced widowhood popular feeling is, the Rao thinks, so strong that it is difficult to arrive at a speedy solution of this problem. Preaching and persuasion along with the spread of male, and especially of female, education are the only effective remedies.

This striking, but by no means unexpected, consensus of European official opinion will surprise and stagger no one but those ardent reformers who with a zeal more commendable than their judgment have set their heart from the first upon effecting the necessary reform by the aid of the Legislature. Every provincial Government and Administration, almost without a single exception, has openly asserted that the picture drawn by Mr. Malabari in his Notes on the subject is highly exaggerated and does not apply to the condition of the Hindu society living under its jurisdiction. It is to be hoped that the reformers of this class will, by careful inquiry, ascertain the real extent and nature of both the evils, and will educate public opinion to discourage these practices gradually and steadily so that, should it hereafter be deemed advisable to give legislative sanction to a change thus effected, the needful may be done with the unanimous approval or at least with the approval of a large majority of the community, chiefly if not wholly concerned.

NOTE ON THE NATIONAL DEBT OF BRITISH INDIA.

A PROPOSAL FOR REDUCING EXPENDITURE.

The annual charge on the revenues of India on account of interest on the National debt, which at present amounts to over 11 millions and a quarter, is a most serious item of our imperial liabilities, and discovering as it does a steady and alarming tendency to expansion, as now administered and managed, threatens to become, at no remote date, a source of grave embarrassment to Indian Finance. It behoves Government, therefore, to make a bold, earnest and resolute effort to lighten its pressure on the resources of this poor and otherwise over-taxed country, partly by making an effectual provision for the gradual liquidation of the debt itself, and partly by effecting from time to time such reduction in the rates of interest payable thereon by well-known methods of conversion, as the state of the money-market and the level of the national credit might render possible.

The national debt of India, which in 1884-85 stood at the high figure of 262½ millions, is made up of two parts, each standing on its own footing, namely, (1) the direct debt of Government, including both the "general" as well as that raised for Productive Public Works, and (2) guaranteed stocks of the Railway Companies :—

Description of debt.	Amount.	Charge for interest.	Remarks
	£	£	
Government direct. { "General"	24,538,971	3,027,469	(Vide Cotton's Report p. 104.
<i>P. P. Works.</i>			
Irrigation	20,766,867	803,091	} [Stanton's Report.]
State Railways.	39,967,059	1,527,300	
E. I. Railway ...	39,154,142	1,718,100	Including amunity-payment.
Guaranteed.....	67,697,168	3,277,132	At various rates ranging from 5 to 3½
			[Vide Col. Stanton's Report 83-4 p. 30.]
Total.....	262,374,297	11,329,092	

Parenthically, it may be remarked that the credit of the country is hypothecated for the whole of this debt to the fullest extent in the shape of direct obligation or guarantee, and that the ultimate responsibility of Government is *precisely* the same in respect of the one kind of debt as of the other.

Mr. Cohen, M. P. in his remarkable memorandum on Indian railway finance, contributed to the *London Times*, Sept. '84, deals with the whole railway debt, including both guaranteed and E. Indian; amounting to £ 106,851,310 and entailing an annual interest charge of nearly 5 millions sterling, and, writing with the authority of a commercial expert and sound economist, recommends a practical scheme of conversion, which, while fully and effectually protecting and conserving vested interests, promises to reduce our pecuniary liabilities on account of this debt by at least a million per annum, by revising its basis and re-casting its machinery. The commercial opinion of London is strongly in favor of this proposal to convert and consolidate the existing guaranteed stocks into a general railway debt on

Government account, and hostile critics have not yet urged against it anything beyond vague and baseless apprehensions of its 'possible' tendency to retard railway extension in India. Besides obvious financial advantages, Mr. Cohen's plan offers others of no less importance. (a) It would, among other results, break a costly and troublesome, huge monopoly which can be worked to the serious loss and inconvenience of the country in times of emergency, as shown by the conduct of the C. I. P. Railway directorate during the famine of 1876-78, and, by virtually converting these railways into state property, give the Government of the country such control as it ought to have over their financing and general management. (b) It would transfer from the hands of a private irresponsible agency to the responsible Government the initiation and prosecution of future railway extensions; and further, (c) it would substitute for the policy of guarantees, hitherto pursued with greater regard to the demands of an impatient and clamorous body of foreign capitalists and merchants than to the condition of the national finances or the legitimate requirements of the country a policy of direct obligation and responsibility in respect of railway borrowings as well as of railway construction, which would lead to more cautious procedure in future, and by preventing a reckless and extravagant addition, in comfortable sleepiness, to existing liabilities on this account, conduce to the stability of Indian Finance no less than to the improvement of the national credit. Even were little or no weight to be attached to these and similar other considerations which might be urged in its favor, a scheme which holds out the prospect of a clear saving to the amount of upwards of a million by a simple administrative change in the management and financing of these railways, and the feasibility of which can not be for a moment challenged, deserves and demands the serious and careful attention of the

Finance Committee. The scheme might, perhaps, have to be modified here and there in its details and particulars, to meet the "prejudices" or the just wishes of the investing public: but the principle on which it rests, is as un-impeachable as it is clear and intelligible. Mr. Cohen does not ask the Government of India to assume more extended responsibilities in respect of these railways than it has already incurred under the guarantee-contracts. What he proposes as a practical financier is, that it should not shrink, through timid or sentimental fears, from standing forth boldly on the Stock-Exchange *de jure* in the position which it at present holds *de facto*, and turning that position of responsible guarantor more fully to account than is possible under the existing arrangements. The credit of Government naturally stands a good deal higher than that of even the Railway Companies enjoying the advantage of its guarantee, and British investors accordingly feel greater confidence in its securities than in those which the private Companies can offer. Now if such be the feeling of the Stock-Exchange, as we are assured it is, and as is shown undoubtedly to be the case by the difficulty with which the Midland and S. Maratha Railway Companies could recently float their loans, why on earth should we not avail ourselves of the feeling of the 'change in our favour? The preference given to our Government securities over those of the guaranteed Companies will be the measure of our financial gain under the proposed scheme. The *modus operandi* of the conversion as suggested may be roughly sketched out as follows:—

The circumstance that the different guaranteed lines offer securities of different values and earn different rates of profit, must be, of course, duly taken note of in any conversion scheme; nor can it be forgotten that the stipulations regarding the division of surplus profits contained in the guarantee contracts

between Government and the Companies introduce an additional element of variation into the transaction. But it cannot be supposed that these varying factors, which determine the value of these guaranteed stocks, offer any greater obstacle to their proposed conversion into one consolidated stock than they do to their free transfer in the open market by sale and purchase. On referring to the *London Times*' "stock shares" report for April 9, 1886, we find the prices of the guaranteed Indian railway stocks quoted thus.—

Company.	Total Capital on Dec. 3, '83.	Price of 100 stock quoted.
B. B. C. India	£ 8,160,749	£ 154 $\frac{1}{4}$
G. I. P.....	24,797,889	147 $\frac{1}{4}$
Madras	10,678,531	121
Oudh & Rohilkhand	7,519,619	128
S. P. Delhi	11,423,263	122 $\frac{1}{2}$
S. India	4,422,155	127 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total.....	67,002,206	

These quotations obviously give not only the relative but the absolute value of the guaranteed stocks in the London market, inclusive of the interests created by the surplus-profit provisions. The holder of a guaranteed stock, when he sells it at the market price, parts not only with his stock but his interest as well in the surplus profits of the guaranteed lines as stipulated for in the guarantee contracts. Now,

N. B.—The E. Indian stands on a separate footing and is left-out in this calculation; and so is the E. Bengal.

in our conversion scheme, we might either leave the autonomy of each company and with it the surplus-profit stipulations entirely untouched, or do away with both. If the latter alternative be chosen, we should have to offer to the present shareholders the full market value of their guaranteed

stocks as ruling at the time on the 'change, *minus* what is due to the greater security of Government investment as compared with private, (say) about 10 per cent ; while if the former course were selected, we would be justified in making a further deduction from their market values, (say) from 5 to 10 per cent on account of the surplus profit provisions of the guarantee contracts. The first course is preferable, as calculated to secure a better prospect of success as well as better terms for the proposed conversion.

Now putting together these two conditions, and making a total deduction of from 15 to 20 percent from the market values of the guaranteed stocks on this account, as also taking the value of money to be 3 per cent as now ruling in the London market, we should have to offer the following prices for the stocks with a view to their conversion into a single consolidated stock. On the basis of these prices, thus roughly calculated, we can safely invite the present

Company.	Price of 100 stock; ruling.	Price per 100 stock, offered.	holders of railway guaranteed stocks, bearing interest at from 5 to $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, to convert them into consolidated Government railway stock at 3 percent. In lieu of a 100 guaranteed stock at 5 per cent we offer a Government stock of 128, 120, 108, 110, 108, 110, at 3 per cent respec-
B. B. C. India ...	154 $\frac{1}{4}$ at 5 p.c.	128 at 3 p.c.	
G. I. P.	147 at 5 „	120 „	
Madras.....	121 at 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ „	108 „	
Oudh and R.	128 at 5 „	110 „	
S. P. Delhi	122 at 5 „	108 „	
S. Indian.....	127 at 5 „	110 „	

tively to the holders of the different stocks, and this offer the investors may be reasonably expected to accept. The result of the proposed conversion might thus be shown in a tabular statement :—

Company.	As at present.			Under the conversion scheme.			Net gain.
	Stock capital on Dec. 31, 1883.	Rate of interest.	Price quoted exchange.	Stock converted at.	Prices offered for conversion.	Rate of interest.	In interest charge.
B. B. C. India.	£ 8,160,749	5	154	£ 10,500,000	128	3	£ 3,136,000 [= guaranteed interest.] £ 2,320,000 for the proposed consolidated stock at 3 per cent.
G. P. I	24,797,889	5	147	29,800,000	120	3	
Madras	10,678,531	4½	121	11,500,000	108	3	
Oude and R....	7,519,619	5	128	8,300,000	110	3	
S. P. Delhi ...	11,423,263	5	122	12,400,000	108	3	
S. Indian	4,422,155	5	127	4,800,000	110	3	
Total.....	67,002,206			77,300,000			

Difference £ 816,000 = gain to Government, but capital stock increased by £ 10,300,000.

Charge for guaranteed interest = £ 3,120,000.

From the above table it will be seen that the result of the proposed conversion would be:—

(1) Net interest charge on consolidated Government stock } £ 2,320,000 against
 £ 3,136,000 on guaranteed stock

Net saving = £ 816,000

(2) Capital stock, consolidated, £ 77,300,000 against £ 67,002,212 guaranteed stock

Net increase = £ 10,300,000, in the amount of capital.

The second part of the operation, namely, the addition of over 10 millions to the amount of guaranteed stock, need have no terrors for the Finance Minister who will not probably be ever called upon to pay it off, so that it can matter little or nothing to him at what figure it stands. If money becomes cheaper so as to make it worth his while to carry out a similar second conversion in future with a view to lightening

the burden on the Indian tax-payer, his hands will be free in the matter. What is, however, of immediate concern to him is the net saving in the annual interest charge which he can secure under the proposed scheme.

Moreover the gain in the interest charge is not the only advantage which it offers. As part of the conversion arrangement, the surplus profit stipulations in the existing contracts will have to be modified to the extent of defining "surplus profits" to be net profits realised over and above the new interest charge on the consolidated Government stock, and as the sum of surplus profits so defined would be larger than at present, the companies and Government will both share the benefit. The gain to Government in this respect may be thus calculated:—

(a) Net revenue of guaranteed companies *(vide Stanton's Report page 49) = £ 3,296,883
 Guaranteed interest under present arrangements£ 3,135,719

Surplus-profits available for division between companies and Government.£ 161,164
 Government share at..... $\frac{1}{2}$ =£ 80,582

(b) After conversion.
 Net Revenue.....=£ 3,296,883
 Interest charge=£ 2,320,000
 Surplus-profits£ 976,883
 Govt's share at $\frac{1}{2}$ £ 488,442
 Deduct present share.....£ 80,582

Net increase of Govt. share ...£ 407,860

Combining the saving in the annual interest charge with this gain in the share of surplus profits, we arrive at the following result:—

(a) Saving in interest£ 816,000
 (b) Increase in share of Surplus profit£ 407,860

Total.....£ 1,223,860

* N. B.—E. Bengal Railway Company left out of account

The net total gain is thus nearly a million and a quarter, against which there is only one harmless set-off, namely, the increase of amount in the Capital Stock by about 10 millions, which should, however, cause us no anxiety till the time for redeeming it comes *of our own choice*,—a very remote contingency which may be safely left out of practical calculations of immediate interest as long as the door is left open to successive conversions with a view to diminishing its pressure on the revenues of the state, in such manner as the state of the money market and of the Government credit may suggest.

Altogether, view it as we may, Mr. L. Cohen's scheme appears to be so happily conceived that, as modified above, it may be confidently commended to the careful consideration of the Finance Committee.

Passing on from this subject of the guaranteed Railway debt, we come to examine what may be described as the direct obligations of the Government of India. Mr. Cotton [in his Decennial Report, page 104] puts them down at £ 159,274,460, as they stood at the end of 1882-3, classified as under :—

In India.....	£ 90,688,766	} [N. B. the "Indian" debt is in rupee, converted into sterling at the old conventional rate of exchange (Re=2s.), while the English debt is in gold.]
In England ...	£ 68,585,694	

Adding 5 millions to each side, as roughly the amount of recent loans, we get,

India rupee debt	£ 95,688,766
English sterling debt	£ 73,585,694

Total.....£ 169,274,460

Of the rupee debt, 23½ crores bears interest at 4½, and the rest (72 crores) at 4 per cent, while of the English sterling debt £ 62,460,044 bears interest at 4, and the rest at 3½. The whole of that portion of the English debt which bears interest at 4 per cent, falls in by the end of August 1888, while the greater bulk of the rupee debt is redeemable at par on three months

notice from Government, so that Government is left free to deal with either kind of debt in any manner it may deem best for the public interest.

The pressure of the annual debt charge on the Indian exchequer can be reduced in two ways. We might either pay off portions of our debt or secure reduction from time to time in the rates of interest payable on it as money becomes cheaper. Thus redemption and conversion are the two modes of dealing with these liabilities, and there is room for trying both in the case of our debt. Conversions, both profitable and safe, are possible in the immediate future, while some provision should be made with our present means for the gradual liquidation of the debt, on the basis of an *automatic* system of terminable annuities, such as has been adopted in respect of the English debt by the British Parliament under Sir S. Northcote's scheme of 1875, developed and enlarged under Mr. Childers' in 1883.

We shall begin with conversion schemes. A most difficult and perplexing question meets us at the very threshold, viz. Which kind of debt is preferable, *rupee* or *sterling*? High authorities are divided on this question as to the expediency of borrowing in India or England. After careful consideration, we see reason to dissent from the conclusions of Sir E. Baring and other eminent financiers, and give our preference to sterling debt over rupee. It would not be out of place to state here briefly our grounds for this preference.

The whole policy of rupee-loans under the present conditions of borrowing in India is, we hold, fundamentally wrong, as being opposed not only to the received principles of Political Economy but also to considerations of safe and sound finance. Let us go briefly into the history of our rupee loans, in order to understand their nature and effect.

Mr. Cotton gives the following details in his Report p. 104.

In India.

£

Imperial loans bearing interest	
4½ percent Transfer Loan 1870	1,831,340
4½ „ „ Indore State Railway.....	1,000,000
4½ „ „ Transfer Loan 1878.....	1,858,150
Transfer Loan 1879, 4½ p. c. portion	18,731,267
„ „ „ 7s sterling p. c. portion	24,000
4 per cent Loan 1832-33	925,024
4 „ „ „ 1835-36.....	2,495,630
4 „ „ „ 1842-43	23,453,030
4 „ „ „ 1854-55.....	5,320,840
4 „ Transfer Loan 1865.....	21,441,903
4 „ „ „ 1854.....	1,226,778
Reduced 4 p. c. Loan 1879.....	10,287,500
4p. c. Promissory Notes Mysore Family	98,041
4p. c. Railway Loan from the Scindia	1,500,000
4p. c. E. I. Railway commuted stock	10,675
3½ „ Loan 1853-4.....	57,470

Total.....£90,261,648

Imperial loans not bearing interest.....87,051

Total in India£90,348,699

Add to these recent loans to the amount of
upwards of 5 crores at 4 p. c.....5,000,000

£95,348,699*

What first strikes us in connection with these statistics is the smallness of the figure under the heading "Imperial loans not bearing interest." The amount (£ 87,051)—which is presumably the *net premium* realised on all these loan-transactions, together showing an imposing total of 95 crores,—indicates—and other evidence also points to the same fact—how onerous have been the terms on which they were conducted. Some of the loans raised before 1872, the year in which the depreciation of silver commenced, as also some of those issued during Lord Northbrook's administration, might have been floated at or ever

* Rupee debt converted into sterling at the conventional rate of one Rupee equal to two shillings,

above par ; but many of the recent ones, particularly those issued during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, were taken up much below par. The conversion of the 10 crores 5½ p. c. loan into a 4½ p. c. loan in 1878 was a failure, and the notification of the 5 crores 4½ p. c. loan in 1879, although the minimum rate was fixed at 94, resulted in only 4 crores being taken up. The losing nature of those transactions relative to the floating of rupee loans in '78-9 and '79-80 may be more clearly seen, when it is remembered that the rate of interest in England in those years was exceptionally low, never advancing beyond 3 and standing during several months at 2 per cent,— a state of things which would have enabled the Government of India to issue sterling loans in England at or above par and on such advantageous terms.

The conditions of borrowing in India, as far as Government loan operations are concerned, have undergone a remarkable change during the last 30 years. To show this clearly the figures quoted on a previous page may be re-arranged as under :—

(a) Before the mutiny		£	
4 p. c. loan 1832-33—	925,024		* The loan, Mr. Robertson tells us, was a failure, a few lacs only being subscribed [vide his evidence before P. Committee.]
4 " " 1835-36...	2,495,630		
4 " " 1842-43...	23,453,030		
4 " " 1854-55...	5,320,840		
3½ " " 1853-54...	57,470*		
4 " Tr. 1854	1,226,778		
			33,478,772
(b) After the mutiny.		£	
4 p. c. Transfer loan 1865—	21,441,903	}	23,273,243
4½ " " " 1870—	1,831,340		
4½ " " " 1878	1,858,150		
Transfer Loan-1879, 4½ p. c. a portion...	18,731,267		
			Total.....77,341,432

	Brought forward, £	77,341,432
Transfer Loan 1879, 7 s. a portion.....		24,000
Reduced 4 p. c. loan 1879		10,287,500
		<hr/>
	£	87,652,932
4½ p. c. Indore State Railway		1,000,000
4 p. c. Promissory Notes, Mysore Family.		98,041
4 p. c. Scindia loan		1,500,000
		<hr/>
	£	2,599,011*

To show to the reader at a glance the result of the above the foregoing figures may be arranged thus:—

Before the mutiny—at 4 p. c.	£33,478,772	
After	„	at 4 p. c.
	in 1865	21,441,903
	in 1879	10,287,500
		} 31,729,403
	„	„
	1870	1,831,340
	1878	1,858,150
	1879	18,731,267
		24,000
		<hr/>
		22,444,757

Total—£ 87,652,932

These figures bring out two facts, taken in conjunction with other evidence,—

(1) a continued rise in the rates of interest at which loans could be issued;

(2) an equally continued fall, as we know in the case of loans raised by Lord Lytton's Government, in the amount of cash realised.

These two facts indicate a continued movement of fall in the value of Government Rupee Securities. "The fall in Government paper," wrote the Bombay

* We leave this sum out of our calculations altogether, as it does not relate to strict market transactions.

Chamber of Commerce in their memorial to Lord Ripon's Government in Feb. '84 on Railway Extension in India, "within the last 3 years [i.e. 1881-84] is quite 10 per cent." This has been the result of the concurrent operation of many causes, among which may be prominently mentioned, (1) the depreciation of silver since 1872, though counteracted in some measure by the falling value of money in England, (2) the great and increasing absorption of capital into industrial enterprise and extended trade during recent years, and (3) the forced floating of rupee loans by Government on terms, however wasteful or onerous. "It is improbable" added the Chamber "that rupee 4½ p. c. loans issued in India could be floated at a higher rate than R 90 per cent," or in other words, as Mr. Westland puts it in his minute on Rupee loans (Feb. 1884) "India has but a small absorbing capacity for such loans" or there is very little absorbing power in India itself left now.

(1) Our loss in the principal on account of discount incurred by issuing rupee loans under these circumstances is however, though large in itself, only a trifling portion of our total loss involved in that procedure.

(2) Far more formidable is our annual loss in interest-payment. The rates of interest payable on our present loans are 4½ and 4 respectively on £ 23,444,759 and £ 71,816,861, while money can be freely obtained in England at rates vaying from 3½ to 3. The differential loss to the Indian exchequer is only a trifle less than full one per cent and may be calculated as under:—

Debt in crores. Rs	Charge for interest Rs	} Now the rupee debt of Rs 95,26,16, 200 into sterling 3 per cent at 90, at current rates of exchange 1s 9d per rupee. is
23,44,47,590 at 4½	1,05,50,130	
71,81,68,610 at 4	2,87,26,740	
<hr/>	<hr/>	
26,16,200	3,92,76,870	

equal to £ 71,000,000 sterling and the interest charge per annum, £ 2,366,000. Let us compare the two amounts for interest charge. The sterling debt would cost us per annum £2,366,000, or Rs. 3,12,13,000 (at Re.=1s 6d), while our rupee debt entails a charge of Rs. 3,92,76,870. The net difference is Rs. 80,63,870. Now upwards of 80 lakhs of rupees is rather a pretty sum for a poor country to lose year after year. But we are told, we should bear with quiet, un-murmuring equanimity so much present loss with a view to future financial safety and stability in the presence of the disquieting uncertainties of the silver market. The fall of silver, represented by the loss of these 80 lakhs a year, is from the present rate of 1s 6d to 1s-2-5d, and we thus provide for a very great drop of the rupee indeed! He must of course be a bold prophet who would venture to forecaste the future of silver, but we cannot go, practically speaking, very wrong in calculating that it will be long, very long indeed, before our rupee sinks to that level of value, and, during this interval of anxious suspense, we are asked to go on paying this heavy price for our sentimental fears of the "Silver risk" a-head! We hold that there is no sufficient justification for incurring so much loss and so needlessly in the circumstances of the present situation. We have not much faith in Bimetallism, which we look upon as a fond day-dream of *doctrinaire* enthusiasts, but we have firm and abiding faith in the operation of economic causes—which would, before long, not only arrest the fall of the rupee by diminishing the production of the American silver mines, but, adjusting demand and supply, cause perhaps an up-ward movement in its favor. At any rate, the day cannot be near when the rupee shall sink below 1s 2—5d and convert our present loss into a gain, and till it comes, if it comes at all, many things will have happened to diminish our anxieties and difficulties on the subject.

(8) But the present policy of rupee loans is yet open to another and no less formidable objection. The Bombay Chamber in their memorial of February 1884, above referred to, write:—“Each fresh issue of rupee loans in India has the effect of causing a serious advance in the value of money in the local markets, thereby bringing loss and inconvenience to all who are engaged in commercial pursuits.” Mr. Westland, the Comptroller General, in his Minute on rupee loans, practically endorses this complaint of the Chamber and holds,—though his opinion has been much controverted,—that the issues of Government loans have been “each year *crucial* operations,” “the one operation up to which the money market each year works and from which it again falls.” Now, it is clear that to the extent to which the loan-operations of Government tend to augment the rate of interest in the money market, they are liable to the condemnation pronounced upon such transactions by John Stuart Mill in his *Political Economy*, Chap. VII Ek. V. “National Debts.” In a country where there are admittedly no over-flowings of the national capital, and where new fields of profitable industry are daily opening out for which all the annual accumulations of the country are scarcely sufficient, Government can hardly borrow without seriously trenching on the funds required for private enterprise and placing itself in the position which it ought never to take up except under hard necessity, namely, that of “a competitor for capital with the ordinary channels of production investment.” The difficulty—nay, the impossibility of floating large loans in India except on ruinous terms, which seems to be admitted on all hands, is in this view a significant circumstance, adding very much to the strength of this objection. When loans reach a point at which they either fail or can only be issued at discount and at exorbitant rates of interest, this is positive proof that they seek to intercept the nation’s savings from finding employment in other and legitimate fields of private investment.

(4) But even these objections might be overlooked if our rupee loans were really all absorbed in the country itself and secured either the justly valued political advantage of giving a direct pecuniary interest in the stability and credit of Government to the higher, monied and propertied classes in the country, or the equally important financial advantage of keeping within the country itself the money payable as interest to the investors. All doubts, however, on the point are set at rest, and a flood of light is obtained when we carefully read Mr. Westland's evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on E. I. Railways. We clearly see that the present policy of rupee loans has the effect, whatever its original object, of benefiting neither the Indian Treasury nor the Indian tax-payer, but wholly the foreign investor and the local speculator, and has otherwise no justification or excuse either in the political or the financial considerations which ought, in normal circumstances, to guide and govern such action on the part of the State. When questioned by the Chairman (Mr. Baxter M. P.) on the subject of borrowing and the comparative advantages of borrowing in England and India, Mr. Westland, the Comptroller-General to the Government of India, said:—

“ I am of opinion that the operations of the Government of India have exhausted for a time the lending reserve of the Indian market.”

“ Who is it who takes up the loans at present?— First the European banks; second, the native financial firms who have capital; third the native brokers and dealers in Government paper, who have no capital, but who take up the loans on the chance of making a profit by passing them on; and fourth, the European brokers. One of the most successful men, who tendered for these loans, was a short time ago a door keeper at one of the bonded warehouses with a salary of Rs. 12 a month. He was a very large holder of Government paper, although he was entirely without means.”

“Who are the permanent investors?—A very small part is taken up permanently in India; by far the most comes to this country (England). At least half of every loan finds its way ultimately to England. Latterly this has not been the case so much, and the result has been that the last loan was not favourable. Those who tendered did so with a view to pass it on to the permanent investors, and it was found when the loan was sent over here that there were hardly any permanent investors, and it was thrown back upon them who had tendered for it.”

“So that it was absorbed in India? No, it had not been absorbed when I came away from India. It was then chiefly in the hands of the banks who had made advances upon it, and persons were paying interest to the banks for advances made to take up the loans.”

“What is the reason of the falling off in the rupee loans in the Indian Market? Partly this that rupee paper has not been very steady in price for the past two or three-years. Two years ago a 4 p. c. loan was taken up at 105, because it was believed that there would be a large demand for it in England. As a matter of fact, there was no such demand for it in England, and when the paper came back upon the Indian market, it fell at once from 105 to 99. Holders began to be frightened, and the banks who were large holders, began to want to get out of it. With things in this condition came the rupee loan of last year. That too was taken up by persons who thought they could pass it on. But it was found that holders of rupee paper were anxious to get rid of it rather than to increase their holdings, and the loan power of India was really for the time exhausted. The last loan was soon down to 95, having been issued at 98.5.”

“Can you tell us if any attempts have been made to induce the masses of the people of India to invest small amounts in Government loans? So long

ago as 1870 it was pointed out that the amount of the loans held by natives was decreasing, and at the time it was accounted for by the greater competition for the loans on the part of Europeans. Another reason was said to be the decadence of the native courts, the courtiers of which were about our best customers for the loans. Two years ago, a plan was tried of issuing stock-notes of from Rs 12½ to 100 as an experiment to test whether or not there was a demand for such investment. That experiment was not successful." After referring to other attempts, Mr. Westland added:—"The result of all this was to lead to the conclusion that it was not possible to expect that the hoardings of the people would come into the hands of the Government. Besides that very little has been taken up in this way, these schemes have been found very cumbersome to manage in every way."

"Can you tell the Committee what is the total amount of the Indian debt held in England?—The last return for 1883 shows that the total amount of the Indian debt is close upon 93 crores, and, of this only 21 are held in India, the rest being held in Europe, 22 crores in London alone."

"What rate of interest do Europeans require on rupee investments, as compared with sterling investments? In England we can get money at less than 3½ p. c. A 3 per cent loan was taken up at £94-4-2. On the other hand, the last rupee loan was issued at 4 p. c. and was *under par*."

"By Mr. J. K. Cross,—Are there no economical conditions in favor of borrowing in India? I do not know that there are, for now, whether we borrow in England or India, the capital eventually comes from England, and we have to remit interest upon it to this country."

Now, "Four per cent loans under par" or four and a half-p. c. loans slightly above par,—these terms are not, as experience shows, high enough to in-

duce the native capitalists to lend their money to Government; but, as compared with the prospects of sterling investment, are sufficiently tempting to attract capital from England, where the value of money ranges at about 3 p. c. oftener falling below, than advancing beyond, that point. "A 3. per cent loan (in gold) at £ 94-4-2" and a rupee loan "at 4 p. c." under par—give us, as the differential advantage to the investor in the case of rupee-investment, but a trifle less than one per cent. The conditions of borrowing have slightly changed since Mr. Westland gave his evidence to augment the difference: it is now full one per cent. As the result of this state of things in connection with the money market in England and in India, the evidence of Mr. Westland, above quoted in full, brings out the following points prominently:—

(a) As far as these rupee loans are concerned, the native capital stands altogether outside the sphere of Government borrowing operations. Native brokers do no doubt sometimes take up such loans, but they do so *by way of speculation* out of which to make profit, and eventually pass it on to foreign investors. All attempts hitherto made have failed to reach the hoardings of the masses of the people.

(b) The capital of Government rupee loans comes ultimately from England all the same whether it is subscribed in the first instance by English investors over the sea or temporarily resident in this country. The balance of advantage in favour of rupee investment on the terms we at present offer, measures and determines this eagerness to lend us their money; it is now represented by full one percent. It varies directly as the falling value of money in England, and inversely as the falling rupee, but these two opposite forces seem almost to equilibrate each other. There may be slight variations in accordance with the intensity of either force, one way or the other, but as long as a fair difference between the prospects of ster-

ling and rupee investment is maintained, the continuance of the present state of things may be safely depended upon. Of the 93 crores [or now 95] of our rupee loans, 72 or 75 are now held in England, and the rest in India. But with respect to this latter amount (21 crores) it should be borne in mind that it is, for the most part, in the hands of European residents in the country, who cannot fix their home here. The interest for the greater part has to be remitted to England by Government under special arrangements sanctioned as a concession to English investors in 1858 on the recommendation of the merchants and bankers of Calcutta, under which interest on rupee paper was made payable at the Bank of England through banks at Calcutta.

(c) The marginal advantage above referred to in favour of rupee investment is not only sufficiently high to act as an inducement to foreign capitalists to put their money into Indian rupee securities, but to offer a pretty fine scope for profitable business to adventurous speculators in the country. Intermediate transactions, presumably of an advantageous nature, can take place, sometimes two, sometimes three or more, before our unhappy rupee paper passes from their hands into those of permanent investors abroad. The instance, cited by the Comptroller-General to the Government of India in his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, of a door-keeper buying up large quantities of rupee paper for purposes of speculative venture is very suggestive, though amusing.

(d) The demand for our rupee loans in India is regulated by, and is in precise proportion to, the demand for them in England, and the terms on which we can hope to borrow out here are measured by the expectations of English capitalists who base their calculations on the chances of sterling investment with careful regard to fluctuations of the silver market. So, even when we seemingly borrow in India, we have to depend on the good-will of the English in-

vestors for the success of our loan operations, quite as entirely as if we borrowed in England : our loans succeed or fail in India as there is or there is not an effective demand for them in England.

Thus we see that our rupee loans floated in India, far from securing any political or financial advantage, are practically sterling loans, *minus* their advantages. By borrowing in India, we only pay a large premium on local speculation and lose the advantages of direct contact with the English Stock Exchange.

(5) Is this policy of rupee loans safe in the end ? Is it compatible, in the existing circumstances, in the long run with the continued maintenance of our national credit even at its present level ? We think, not. If the value of money rise in England, as it did three years ago after a drop in '79 and '80, unaccompanied by improvement in sterling exchange, or a further depreciation of silver, takes place without a corresponding fall in the value of money in England, and in consequence the margin of differential advantage, at present existing in favor of rupee securities, is dangerously narrowed, we must be prepared for a reaction in the feeling of the English Stock-Exchange against our rupee paper. In fact, some time ago, signs of such a re-action were visible in consequence of a sudden fall of the rupee. They are now happily past, but we cannot be sure that they may not at any time and with " but little notice " return. And the natural query is, what will then be the fate of our rupee paper ? Why, it will all come back on our own market. Referring to such a contingency, Mr. Lewis G. Hynes of H. M's Mint, Bombay, in his "*Gold for India*" page 53-says :—

" The whole of the stock, representing India's rupee debt held in England, will find its way back to this country. India will be *compelled* to receive her promissory notes in payment of her trade-debt, instead of receiving it in silver or gold. The price of the Stock in India will be greatly depreciated, the prices of her products will be raised.

the metallic currency reduced, and the credit of the Government will be injured to such an extent that it will be found practically impossible to raise future loans in India. She will be driven to seek for money in the gold-market of the world and her last state will be worse than the first." The danger of the falling rupee seems here the other way. When our rupee-paper, which we keep up for fear of increasing our gold liabilities abroad, comes back and deteriorates in value, the credit of Government will be seriously damaged and our position, encumbered with a large amount of rupee debt, will be worse than it could be without that disquieting encumbrance.

(6) The risks and difficulties surrounding the issue of rupee loans are increasing, while their advantages are steadily diminishing: and we do not see any new prospect of a change for the better in this state of things. As new lines of profitable business are opening out, the conditions of borrowing are stiffening in the country. And, in the absence of an over-flow of surplus capital, Government cannot expect, for a long time to come, to get an opportunity of carrying out any scheme of conversion with a view to securing a reduction in the interest charge annually payable.

These are some of our chief grounds for holding that the whole policy of rupee debt in the present condition of things is *ab initio* wrong. We prefer to see all our debt in sterling even in the face of adverse sterling exchange. Our argument may be summed up thus:—

(1) Rupee loans involve a considerable loss in discount,

(2) There is a still larger loss in annual interest-payment, to the extent of over 80 lacks, which loss is out of all proportion to any reasonable fears that might be entertained of the Silver-depreciation,—fears in which alone it can have any justification;

(3) Our loan operations seriously interfere with the free movements of private enterprise trenching, as they do, upon the already insufficient fund available for purposes of industrial investment and expanding trade. The loan-absorbing power of India is becoming almost *nil*, as is evidenced by the increasing difficulty of floating rupée loans even on extravagant terms,

(4) The policy benefits the foreign investor and the local speculators at the expense of the Indian tax-payer,

(5) It is further unsafe as being likely, in certain not improbable contingencies, to place in serious jeopardy the credit of the country.

Having thus cleared the preliminary ground, we proceed to propose our own scheme of conversion with respect to the whole "direct" debt of India, both sterling and rupee.

We prefer the system of stocks to that of loans as supplying a more reliable index to our position in the money-market, and also as being a more convenient and familiar form of convertible security. Stocks need involve no necessary limitations of the nation's liberty of action as regards redemption or conversion. They might be made redeemable at par on a year's notice, as is provided by the Consolidating Act of 1870 in England, and they need not be guaranteed, even for any limited length of time, unless the terms on which they are negotiated be exceptionally favourable, as in the case of the "Two-and-a-half per cents" created under Mr. Childers' Scheme adopted by Parliament in 1884, which are secured for 20 years.

Now in our scheme we contemplate the conversion of our "direct" debts, rupee and sterling, into a consolidated sterling debt in the three per cent consols at 94, this being the price of sterling stock quoted by Mr. Westland.

The English debt in gold, which amounts to about 68½ millions, leaving out recent additions, offers no difficulty. The whole of it falls in in October, 1888, and if money is cheaper now than when it was borrowed, we are perfectly free to convert it into a stock of a lower denomination. We prefer to maintain it in its present sterling shape, and do not think that its conversion into rupee debt, immediate or gradual, as advocated by Major (now Sir Evelyn) Baring in his Budget statement of March 25, 1881, para 61, can be, in our present circumstances, ever a safe or even an ultimately economical policy.

Mr. Cotton's figures for this kind of debt are as under:—

India 4 per cent Debentures...	£ 8,996,500	} £68,527,044
" " " stock....	53,463,911	
" 3½, "	4,566,633	
E. I. Railway Debenture stock	1,500,000	

But if we leave out the amount of E. I. Railway stock to which, perhaps, as being under special arrangements the scheme of conversion cannot apply, we have as the net English debt available for this operation, £ 67,027,044. Of this amount, we find

£ 62,460,411	} Bearing interest £ 2,498,416.44	} Net interest charge payable in gold
£ 4,566,633		
	£ 159,832.16	

£ 67,027,044 Total £ 2,658,248.6 Total

Converting the stock into consols at 94, we get the following result:—

capital amount	} £ 66,417,000 in place of £ 62,460,411
of stock	

£71,304,000 giving an increase, at the market price of present stock, of £ 4,279,044; Net interest charge at 3 per cent £ 2,139,120 against £ 2,658,248.6 showing a decrease of 519,128.6.

So by means of the proposed conversion of the English debt which is to fall in October 1888,

we can reduce our gold liabilities for interest-payment by upwards of half a million [£ 519,128] against which there is the set off of a net increase of our $4\frac{1}{4}$ millions in capital amount of stock. But Government further reserves to itself full powers of redemption and conversion.

Coming to the rupee [or India] portion of our national debt, we find the total amount to be Rs. 95,68,87,660, inclusive of recent loans. The whole of this debt is, as remarked before, redeemable on three months notice from Government ; and what we propose is, that Government, in the exercise of this right, which is strictly legal and indisputable, should convert it into sterling at the current market price of 3 p. c. consols at 94. The measure is one of vast importance and magnitude, but we venture to commend it to the serious consideration of the Finance Committee, as being at once economical, sound, and safe, though of course involving a wide departure from the traditions of our present financial organisation. We have already succinctly stated our grounds for objecting to the policy of rupee loans in India under the present conditions of the Indian money-market, and for thinking that a continued adherence to it is without justification or excuse either on financial or political grounds. Holding these opinions, and considering that Government has a perfect freedom of choice and action in the matter, we advocate this conversion of our present rupee debt into sterling.

The Indian debt (rupee) stands as under :—

Rs.	bearing interest at	interest-charge in Rs
23,44,47,570	$4\frac{1}{2}$...	1,05,50,141.6
71,75,94,210 4....	2,87,03,768.4
5,71,700 $3\frac{1}{2}$	20,144.
<hr/>		<hr/>
95,26,16,480	Total	Rs 3,92,74,054

[converted into sterling at the current rate of exchange]

Debt in sterling	Interest in sterling
£ 71,446,236	£ 2,945,554

Now according to the conversion scheme we propose, the debt and interest would stand as follows :—

The capital amount of stock, taken at 94 per 100 stock, would be £ 76,006,600 in place of £ 71,446,236, giving a clear increase of £ 4,560,364 or upwards of $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions. The net interest charge at 3 per cent on this amount of stock would be, £ 2,280,198 as against £ 2,945,554 which is the present amount, showing a net decrease of £ 665,356 per annum.

Thus, if converted in the manner suggested, the present interest charge on the rupee debt would be reduced by £ 665,356, against which, of course, there is the set-off of an increase of $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions and upwards in the amount of stock.

It is always a sound rule of Free Trade Political Economy that we should borrow, as we should buy, in the cheapest market; and a departure from it can only be justifiable under exceptional circumstances. In a country where accumulations of capital are going on to overflowing, where owing to increased security, keen competition, declining profits or whatever cause, the value of money is steadily falling, and where, besides, Government securities are eagerly sought for by permanent local investors, and political considerations have to be allowed to over-ride such as are purely economical, there a strong case for such departure may be made out. India is differently circumstanced in all these respects, and here the prospect of saving even a few thousand pounds in our annual charges by which-ever method, provided it be otherwise unobjectionable, should not, in our opinion, be lightly thrown away. The large saving which can, therefore, be effected under our scheme supplies, in our opinion, a strong argument in its favour.

But it may be urged that the proposed measure involves an addition to our *gold* liabilities abroad, which, being too risky, we are not justified in incurring amidst the darkening prospects of silver. The pressure of gold interest payments in England introduces into our national finances a very variable and uncertain element, depending as it does on the fluctuations of the silver market. Major Baring, in 1851, said in his financial Statement; (parra 65) "Any extension of our sterling obligations is in the nature of a speculation, which may prove successful or the reverse according to whether the value of silver in respect to gold rises or falls"; and again (in para 62) he observed, "It is essential to a sound condition of state finance that the elements of certainty and stability should prevail to as great an extent as possible. No such certainty or stability can be attained if the state owes a large sum of money in a currency other than that in which it collects its revenue."

Now we at once admit that there is very great force in the objection advanced, and that coming as it does from so high an authority, it is entitled to respectful consideration. Our reply is briefly that the silver difficulty is exaggerated, and that it is possible to purchase the advantages of financial stability and certainty at too heavy a price.

The present gain under our proposed conversion scheme in respect of the rupee debt, which amounts to £ 665,356 is calculated on the double basis of (1) the present rate of sterling exchange ($Rs = 1s\ 6d$); and (2) the differential advantage in favor of *sterling*, as against *rupee*, loans, which is at present represented by full 1 per cent. We admit that both these are variable factors of uncertain tendency in the calculation, and that our estimate of the comparative value and eventual effect of the promised present gain must depend on our estimate of the probable variations of each and their effect on our annual liabilities. If exchange becomes more adverse, or the differential

margin of advantage contracts, our present gain will be, at a certain point, turned into a fearful loss, and it is reasonable apprehensions can be entertained regarding either contingency being realised, we freely concede that it would hardly be a justifiable step to incur a vast and indefinite future risk with a view to a present gain, however tempting. But what are the chances on which we can safely calculate and take action ?

In the first place, as regards silver, we know that the rupee has fallen from 1s 11d to 1s 6d since 1872 when Germany decided on the demonetization of silver and we also see that it shows still a tendency to further fall. But we ask, can there be no limit to such fall ? Is it possible that the down-ward tendency will receive no check ? We are of course no friends of Bi-metallism which is an artificial and forced attempt, on the basis of an impossible international compact, at interference with the natural action of world-wide economic agencies, and which is, curiously enough, put forward as the sole refuge of forlorn hope on *protectionist* grounds by such staunch Free Traders and advocates of the *laissez faire* principle as Sir A. Colvin and members of the Simla Silver Association. But we confidently look for such check to the fall of the rupee to the action of three economic causes operating in its favour, viz,—

(a) increasing demand for silver with increasing population and trade in the silver-using countries of S America and Asia for purposes both of currency and ornament.

(b) increasing demand for silver even in gold-using countries for purposes of subsidiary coinage as monetary business expands in subordinate channels of industry ;

(c) diminishing production of the silver mines of N. America.

These three forces will, we think, successfully resist the tendency of the rupee to continued fall.

The depreciation may yet proceed some way further, but it will, before long, reach a point beyond which it cannot go. Our gain (of £ 665,356) estimated at the current rate of exchange [1s 6d] amply covers, and provides for, a fall of the rupee to so low a level as 1s—2½d, and we conceive that no more effective provision is required in the circumstances of the case.

But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the silver-depreciation will go on without end or limit practically unchecked, and will not save us our gain in that respect, we turn to the other factor in our calculation to see whether it does not supply us with a counterbalancing force on the other side, we refer to the differential advantage in favor of sterling, as compared with rupee, debt. This advantage depends mainly on the state of the money market in England. If money rises in England and the margin is narrowed, we shall be left practically without help and remedy, in case silver should fall still further and threaten to turn our present gain into a loss and a risk. But we know that money has been falling in value there for many years past, and as far as we can judge from the economic conditions there existent, we have no reason to expect that the movement of fall will be arrested and turned the other way. Here, then, we say we have a reserve of considerable potential strength on which to fall back in case the silver-cloud darkens and assumes a threatening aspect. If money becomes cheaper in England, as we may expect it will, we can use our legal powers of conversion and carry out effective reductions in the pressure of our gold liabilities on account of sterling debt.

We then conclude, that it is highly improbable that the silver depreciation can proceed beyond a certain point, and any further beyond 1s-2½d. for which we provide, and that even if it does go on unchecked, our gain will be saved from being converted into a loss by improvement in the condition of the money market in England.

Thus, we trust, it will appear that the measure, we propose, viz, the conversion of rupee into sterling debt, not only promises a large present gain, but is, whichever way we may look at it, absolutely free from the risk of eventual loss.

Such is the scheme of three-fold conversion we venture to submit for the consideration of the Finance Committee. The scheme, it may be observed, raises no question of *structural* change, but contemplates only *administrative* changes in the present management of the National Debt.

The net result of the scheme may be exhibited in a tabular form as under:—

As at present.		As proposed to be altered.			
£ Capital amount of stock.	£ Interest charge.	£ Capital stock.	£ Interest charge.	Increase of stock.	Saving in interest charge.
*67,002,212	3,136,000	77,300,000	2,320,000	10,300,000	816,000 †407,860
					1,223,860
†67,025,044 R	2,658,248 R	71,304,000	2,139,120	4,279,044	519,128
§95,26,16,480 = £	3,92,74,054 = £	£	£	£	£
(R=1s. 6d.) 71,446,236	2,945,554	76,006,600	2,280,198	4,560,364	665,358
Total £ 205,473,492	£ 8,739,802	£ 224,610,600	£ 6,739,318	£ 19,139,408	£ 2,408,344

Thus, this scheme, while it involves no present loss and no ultimate risk, promises us a net saving to the extent of nearly 2½ millions with the unavoidable

*Mr. Cohen's Scheme of conversion and consolidation with respect to the guaranteed Railway Debt:—The E. I. Railway debt left out as being otherwise provided for.

†Government's share of increased Surplus profit.

‡Conversion of the present Sterling debt which falls in Oct. 1883.

§Conversion of the rupee debt into Sterling.

‡ Inclusive of Government share of Surplus profit.

set off, consequent on the price of 3 p c. consols being at present quoted at 94, as also on the enormous rise in the value of the guaranteed stocks of railway companies, of an addition of nearly 20 millions to the amount of capital stock. The saving that would be thus effected, is to us of very great importance, which may be utilised for the purpose of relieving the present or coming tax-payer; while we have no fear of increase of stock with our reserved powers of conversion.

But such conversions alone, though they are calculated to secure a sensible relief to the national finance, cannot, and do not, go far enough. Our present liabilities on account of our national debt are too heavy for a poor country, and we are bound to allow due and fair consideration to the claims of posterity, even though it be at a certain present sacrifice. This duty of paying off the debt in order to lighten its future pressure must be in our opinion allowed preponderating weight over the claims of the present tax-payer to relief. Assuredly we cannot be justified in handing on undiminished to coming generations a tremendous load in incurring which they have had no voice, but which necessitates the hypothecation of such a large portion of their resources. We ought to provide, as far as our present means may permit, for a gradual redemption of those obligations.

The debt can be reduced in two ways, (1) by the application to that object of the yearly realised surpluses of revenue over expenditure, and (2) by the maintenance of a debt charge at a sum more than enough to suffice for interest payment. Of these two methods, the first, namely, the employment of surpluses, is with us out of the question, as the normal condition of our finances is one of deficits, and surplus years come to us at long, very long intervals; and even when they come, our Finance Ministers scarcely know what to do with their surpluses. They either yield to the imperious demands of the "spending" Departments bent on a career of reckless "extravagance" or

to the troublesome clamours of the tax-payer who is always knocking at the door for relief. In the course of his reply to the remarks of the Hon'ble Mr. Mandlik on the abolition of the import-duties, Sir A Colvin said on the occasion of the Income-tax debate :—" Who in the name of reason could have hoped to maintain such a surplus ? Would the Council like to know what would have happened if we had attempted to maintain it ? Expenditure, much of it unnecessary, would have increased, and would have established itself. Extravagance would have been the order of the day ; and when the day of retrenchment and reduction came,—as come it assuredly would,—the whole administration would have been thrown out of gear. If, on the other hand, so very considerable a sum as £ 1,200,000 had been maintained for the extinction of debt or for the construction of railways, how long would the tax-payer have put up with it ?" Thus, the consequence is, that our surpluses, when they come as windfalls, disappear between the " extravagance" of the Departments and concessions to the tax-payer, and are not available for the purpose of redemption. The *Famine Insurance Fund* is no doubt a good provision in this way, but it is so often liable to be gulped in the gulf now of frontier wars, now of lowering exchange, that it is leaning on a broken reed to trust to it in this important matter.

So, then, there remains open to us the second method of paying off debt, namely, by maintaining a permanent debt-charge, including a provision not only for meeting the amount of interest-liabilities but also for paying off the principal. On this subject we venture to re-commend special legislation ; for the object is so important, and obstacles in the path of its being attained are so many and formidable, that we should be sorry to see it left to the will and choice of the Executive Head of the Financial Department who often has " his hands tied behind his back" and is perfectly helpless in the matter. It is

absolutely necessary to set in motion a system for paying off the debt on a considerable scale which will work *automatically* and will lie beyond the reach of official temptation to impede its working in order to meet the wishes of the spending Departments or the noisy tax-payer. We suggest the passing of a legislative enactment fixing an annual debt-charge at a sufficiently high figure to cover the payment of both interest and part of the principal, utilizing for that purpose about two-thirds of the saving which could be effected by carrying out the conversions above suggested, or about £ 1,650,054. If the debt charge were fixed (say) at £ 8,388,422 per annum, *under statutory provision*, we should have a fair margin of £ 1,649,084, over and above what is required for payment of interest [£ 6,839,335 under the proposed scheme] and with this margin in hand available for the extinction of debt and which official caprice cannot abridge, terminable annuities might be created such as those created under Sir S. Northcote's scheme in 1875 or under Mr. Childers' in 1883. As far as we can calculate on the basis of Mr. Childers' annuities, we may say that with the amount in hand, two 20 years annuities of £ 2,674,168 and £ 683,437 respectively might be created, which working automatically would pay off upwards of 50 millions of our debt in 20 years reducing its pressure on the finances by full one million and a half.

But such and other measures of redemption and conversion which may be suggested do not go to the heart of our difficulty in this matter of the national debt. Nothing can, we firmly believe, really improve our credit and set right our position in the money market and give substantial relief to our finances so much as the advantage of the guarantee of the Imperial Government in respect to the whole of our debt obligations. It is not possible to reduce such an advantage to figures ; but roughly, we might say, it cannot be less than from one million

to one million and a half per annum. The boon is accorded to some of the British Colonies and dependencies, for at least portions of their debts, even irrespective of the consideration that they enjoy representative institutions and complete financial independence and are in consequence bound to be able to live with their own resources. As things stand here, our claims to such favor at the hands of the British Government are much stronger and juster than theirs. But the question as to the expediency of asking the Imperial Government to use its credit on behalf of the country in the way suggested is perhaps a question of "structural" change, lying outside the scope of the Finance Committee's instructions. But we feel that, while on the subject of the National Debt, we are not going out of our way if we venture to draw the attention to some of the most important aspects of it as they present themselves to us.

Now, in the first place, highly as we value the "financial independence" of the country, and cordially as we endorse all that was urged on the point by Sir J. Strachey in an impassioned speech on a memorable occasion in the Viceregal Council in 1879, we cannot feel the slightest assurance that the duties and responsibilities, which that position of financial independence imposes upon the country, can be duly discharged without adequate powers of effective financial control which we at present do not possess. We have no representative assemblies, and our councils have only nominal control, if they are not quite registering bodies, over the national finance; our foreign policy is directed and controlled from Downing street with reference to Imperial, quite as much as to purely Indian, considerations; our internal Administration, particularly on its fiscal and economic side, including taxation, P. Works, &c. is, for all practical purposes, determined and regulated by instructions from the India Office, with only seeming liberty of action left to the Viceroy in Coun-

oil; but further,—what is much more to the point under consideration,—so autocratic and practically unlimited are the powers of the Secretary of State in Council that even the simple duty of living within his means is not authoritatively enjoined upon him. On the contrary, powers to borrow in England *on the credit of the Indian revenues*,—powers sometimes of limited, sometimes of unlimited, scope have been freely bestowed upon the Secretary of State by successive Acts of Parliament on the ground stated in the preamble of each “that the exigencies of the public service in India require that the Secretary of State should be enabled to raise money in the United Kingdom on the credit of the revenues of India.” Of the pressing nature of the “exigencies of the public service in India” in each case the Secretary of State is practically left to be the sole judge, nor is he required, when he goes into the market, armed with these powers, to say for what purposes his loans are required. Already such borrowing powers, granted to the India Office under Parliamentary sanction, cover an enormous credit of £ 86,810,866, of which those, given by Acts of '74, '79, and '85 since 1874, alone cover over 41 millions. Nor are the powers, so freely given, less freely exercised by the Secretary of State. More than 73 millions have been raised on loan in England, on the strength of the forementioned powers, still leaving in his hands an unused balance, of these borrowing powers, to the extent of 13 millions. But as far as we can judge from the recent Financial Statement of Sir A. Colvin, even this reserve will probably be exhausted before the end of the current official year.

Now, with these facts before us, would it be too much to say that the motive force of our financial organisation lies not here at Simla or Calcutta, but in London; and would it be wrong to expect

(to adopt the weighty words of Mr. Gladstone, spoken in a different connection) that responsibility should lie where the means of action lie? It cannot be fair, in any view of the case, that England, acting through the Executive Head of the India Office, should have absolute powers of control over our whole administration as well as our finances, and yet should have no share of responsibility for their soundness and solvency.

These are the simple equities of the case; but practical considerations of expediency too point the same way.

If the Imperial Government consents to employ its credit in the way of guarantee on our behalf, such interposition on its part, while it would involve no risk of immediate or prospective loss and commit it to no more than moral obligations, would serve to bring the British tax-payer into closer, more intimate, more responsible contact with the financial system of this country, and give a more effective force to public opinion in England with respect to Indian affairs than seems possible under the present arrangements.

But, such help from the Imperial Government, while entailing absolutely no risk on the British tax-payer, would give a new and improved tone to our administration, and would, at the same time, secure to us a large measure of relief in the midst of our difficulties which are unfortunately, in the absence of effective control and remedy, becoming chronic. We may go further and say that such intervention on the part of the British Government in our favor, most of all, promises to effectually save the struggling vessel of our national finances from sinking and foundering in the storm of military and other exigences. Here, therefore, we place our chief reliance for help out of our silver and other difficulties rather than on the action of the United States, the Latin Union, or Germany.

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We have to apologize to our subscribers for the long delay that has occurred, owing to some unavoidable circumstances, in the issue of these two numbers of the Journal. We shall see that no such delay occurs in future.

THE POONA SARVAJANIK SABHA.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SABHA.

REPLY TO THE FINANCE COMMITTEE'S CIRCULAR.

No. 77 of 1886.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS,

Valveker's Wada Dane Ali

Poona 30th September 1886.

From

The Secretary,

Sarvajanik Sabha, Poona.

To

C. A. ELLIOTT, Esquire,

President of the Finance Committee.

Sir,

In reply to your Secretary's circular letter No. 2 of the 24th March 1886 I am directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha to forward the following representation to you with a request that you will be pleased to place the same before the Committee for their favourable consideration.

1. The necessity of effecting reductions in the expenditure of the administration has not on this occasion been entirely the result of circumstances over which the Government in India and in England had no control. That part of the Financial pressure which is due to the fall in exchange is no doubt due to causes for which the Government cannot be held responsible. By far the largest strain is, however, due to the addition made to Military forces and the expenses of the war in Burma. In respect of these two matters the Government, knowing its own resources to be inelastic and to be heavily pledged for years in anticipation, might have resisted the pressure put upon them as was done on former occasions with success. Even now the present unfavourable condition of Indian Finances would justify the Government of India in pleading its inability to carry out the full addition to the European forces just for the same reasons that have been accepted as sufficient for putting off for the time the enlistment of fresh Native levies. Without some such guarantee that economies

effected in other quarters will not be swallowed up in needless addition to the Military burden, the Government of India cannot inspire much confidence in the work which the Finance Committee has undertaken on the part of the people concerned. A resolute attitude on the part of the Government of India is the only protection which can shelter Indian interests from being subordinated to the advancement of the foreign policy of England. Such resolute attitude has in the case of the extreme difficulties for which the Government was not responsible, led the Government in England to reconsider their position of indifference, and the Committee of the Sabha feel sure that in other directions more within their control the same success will be possible if facts are properly placed before the Home authorities. Our first suggestion therefore to the Finance Committee in the way of economy is that they should recommend to the Government of India that in view of the present situation no further addition to the British or native forces should be carried out till the present difficulties are satisfactorily mastered. With the existing facilities of communication England can at any time send Military help to secure peace on the N. W. frontiers, and it is hardly necessary to increase the strength of the garrison in India permanently on this account.

3. As regards the Burmese troubles its annexation in the way it was carried out has proved a source of exhausting loss of lives and waste of money. A mediatized Prince selected by Government would have ensured tranquility and content. If such a settlement is now unfortunately not open to Government, the Government of India must on this occasion avail itself of the precedent of the last Afghan war, and, as it was a war beyond the frontiers undertaken in Imperial interests, claim that the burden shall be equitably shared between the two countries. In this way much of the immediate difficulty of the situation will be got over without any undue strain. It may be urged that the Finance Committee cannot exceed their instructions and that these matters lie beyond their province. The Committee of the Sabha, however, request that as the Government of India is the party ultimately responsible for practical action in these matters, your Committee will be good enough to communicate this expression of public opinion to those who have power to give effect to these proposals.

4. Quite apart from these accidental disturbing factors in the stability of Indian Finance the Committee of the Sabha think that as a permanent corrective the Government of India should resume its former practice of presenting its annual budget in regular form to the Supreme Legislature for discussion and approval. The practice of issuing the Budget as a Resolution of Government even in years when fresh taxation is found to be necessary has led to much relaxation of

that sense of responsibility which attaches to all acts of Government which imply a demand of popular support by inviting public criticism. The old practice was discontinued by the order of the Secretary of State, and the evils of the practice which has been since introduced having now been admitted on all hands and notably brought into prominence last year by the Income Tax Bill being discussed separately without the full information afforded by the Budget statement, the Committee of the Sabha think that the Finance Committee will see their way to recommend the Government to secure the sanction of the Secretary of State for bringing the Budget statement annually before the Legislature, whether fresh taxation is or is not imposed.

5. In making such a request the Committee of the Sabha only seek that Government should give effect to its own orders contained in para 10 of G. O. No. 3334 dated 10th December 1870. This safeguard is essential not only in the case of the Imperial Budget but also of Provincial Budgets which should also, in the view of that resolution, be similarly brought before the local legislature where such exists. This security of formal publication by an appeal to public confidence will furnish a financial check of the highest importance against reckless expenditure both by the Local and Supreme authorities.

6. After these preliminary recommendations of a general character I am directed to proceed to the examination of the ordinary receipts and disbursements of the Government of India. In this connection it is much to be regretted that one of the great heads of expenditure, the Army expenditure amounting to 20 crores a year, should have been for the most part placed beyond the practical limits of the inquiry by the circumstances of the times. The mischief of this exclusion, however, is to a considerable extent minimised by the fact that this head of inquiry has been carefully scrutinised by competent authorities and definite recommendations made to the Government of India with a view to secure economy with efficiency. If the pressure on the resources of the Empire be regarded to be as great as it undoubtedly is, the Government of India have all the materials at their hand to carry out reductions to the extent of one and a quarter crore of rupees. At the time when the Army Commission report was submitted, the Military authorities in India did not accept the recommendations, though they were made by a strictly Military Committee, and as the Government of India itself moreover did not support the recommendations in the way they deserved, most of those recommendations were disallowed by the Secretary of State. The present time, however, is more favourable for a reconsideration of the question. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was a Member of the Army Commission. The Finance Committee contains no Military

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member, and it cannot of its own authority make any suggestions likely to meet with acceptance unless they follow the lines of the old Military Commission. Much less can the non-official public be expected to make any useful suggestions in this direction. I am, therefore, to suggest that the Finance Committee will endorse the recommendations of the old Army Commission with such changes as may be deemed advisable.

7. Another head of expenditure, Home Charges, has been similarly inquired into by a competent authority, and definite recommendations made, with a view to decrease their burden. The substitution of rupee payments in place of sterling in the case of all salaries, pensions, interest payments, annuities, &c., where the money comes ultimately from India, is the chief of these recommendations which has practical value, and it is this suggestion which, I trust, the Finance Committee will strengthen by its approval. The other recommendations relate to administration and other matters and cannot be properly taken up by the Finance Committee without special instructions. Taking the recommendation made by the Simla Army Commission and the Committee that reported upon the Home Charges, there is every reason to think that Government would at least save one and a half crore of rupees out of its normal expenditure on the head.

8. By the exclusion of these two great heads of expenditure the Committee's function has been virtually confined to economies in Civil expenditure. In regard to this branch of expenditure the arrangements entered into between the Government of India and the Local authorities under the system of what are called provincial contracts will claim the largest consideration from the Finance Committee. In regard to the bases on which these contracts should be framed, much difference of opinion is possible but after the experience of the past 15 years it may be assumed that the scheme need further development in the direction of local independence under regulated control. Heads of revenue which differ in the system of levy from province to province and which represent the taxation paid by the people should be wholly provincialized. Special heads of revenue regulated by the central authority through departments common to several provinces should be wholly imperialised. Similarly the expenditure heads should be classified, each head should as far as possible be subject to one management and its proceeds received unshared by the authority that manages it. In this way real reform would be ensured and the friction of divided authority which led to the initiation of the scheme in the first instance would be avoided. Instead of the Government of India assign revenue allotments in different proportions to different provinces under different head this arrangement would ensure the largest responsibility on the part of those who understand

the management of each head in the best way. The deficit instead of being a provincial one between revenue and expenditure would be turned into an Imperial deficit but each province will make up this sum out of their surplus in fixed proportion liable to enhancement at the pleasure of the Government of India who will also have a right to share in the increases of normal revenue. As will be seen from the following extract, Sir Charles Trevelyan gave his support to such a scheme as long ago as 1870 :—

"The Supreme Government would retain its general power of acting in emergencies, as the case might require, and of directing the entire resources of the empire on any particular point. The Central Government must have the power of drawing upon the Local Administrations (in certain fixed proportions to be settled from time to time) firstly for the cost of the Public Services, the administration of which would be specially entrusted to the Supreme Government, and secondly for supplying the deficiencies of new administrations which are still in an elementary state. But as the real difficulty of accounts between the different Local Administrations arises from the distribution of the army, and there is no Administration which does not pay its civil expenses, the power of drawing under this head will be seldom or never exercised. The principle of apportionment would be that the cost of Civil administration would be a first charge upon the revenue, and that the surplus of the different Local Administrations would be drawn upon *pro rata* for the expense of the army and the other services under the immediate direction of the Supreme Government."

9. In this way the Government of India will be benefitted both in the present and in the future. It is hopeless for the central authority to enforce economy in remote parts of the country at its own instance. This work will always have to be left to the local authorities. By exacting higher tribute where circumstances permit its levy, the local authorities will have the best incentive to ensure strict economy. In the same way the tendency on the part of the Government of India to outrun its means in the extension of departments more directly under its control will also be checked by the necessity of supporting its excess demands, by adequate reasons. Any over-sided action in this respect tending to clip the resources of the local authorities would undo the work of the past 15 years and end in reviving the old irritation and want of interest.

10. Any change of system, however, would necessarily be a waste of time while the present necessities of Government are too real and pressing to wait for the discussion which must precede any change in the relations between the local and supreme authorities. It is therefore necessary that the existing receipts and expenditure under all the

Civil Departments should be examined on their present footing, and to that examination the Committee of the Sabha now propose to address themselves.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION.

11. The expenditure on account of general administration increased from £ 1,499,775 in 1873-74 to £ 1,563,832 in 1882-83. During this decade the total Imperial expenditure increased by 20 per cent; the increase in the charges on account of general administration being 10 per cent or half of the total increase. Compared with the Colonies, the expenditure under this head appears to be very excessive. In the first place the one remarkable feature of striking difference is that while in the Colonies the Governor, as a rule, combines in himself the office of the Civil and Military heads, in India they are kept distinct and separate. Combining these two offices, the head of the administration in a British Colony draws by way of salary much less than the head of the Indian administration. The contrast is no less striking if the salaries in India are compared with those drawn by officers of the same position in the United States of America or the leading countries in Europe. Thus the President of the United States, who has to manage the affairs of a land surface nearly four times as large as the British territories in India and a revenue one fourth as much more as India, gets as much only as the Governor of Madras or Bombay does. There is no parallel for such high salaries in any of the countries of the civilized world; and it may fairly be suggested that these salaries should be curtailed. In drawing the attention of your Committee to this large item of expenditure it is only intended that inquiry should be made if it would not be possible to get efficient and pains-taking gentlemen to undertake these duties on lower salaries. In the altered state of circumstances Indian Service has become the least risky, most honourable, and more a work of love, so that, in the humble opinion of the Committee of the Sabha, it ought no longer to be found difficult to induce gentlemen of high social position and standing, of admirable statesmanly virtues of self-sacrifice and love of humanity to take up the onerous duties of the Viceroyalty or of the Governorship on lower annual salaries. But besides this there is another point of view which brings this item more prominently to notice. At page 39 of the last decennial report on the moral and material progress of India occurs the following remark. "Taking the heads of administration alone, it will be seen that the cost of the Governors of Madras and Bombay is approximately double the cost of the Lieutenant Governors of Bengal, the N. W. Provinces and the Panjab and would be three-fold if the cost of the Executive Council were added. The Chief Commissioner-ships seem to be very cheaply

administered." This remark comes with very great force and at a very proper time.

12. To take up more in detail the history of the Bombay charges of general administration it will be seen that during the four years of the contract period the grant on account of general administration has increased from Rs. 12,14,300 in 1882-83 to Rs. 12,68,000 in 1885-86. This means an annual increase of nearly Rs. 14,000. The increase is noticeable principally under the Civil Secretariat and the Divisional Commissionerships. There has been a noticeable increase in the staff and household of His Excellency the Governor, and also in the four charges and Provincial establishments too. On the whole it is very likely that by the time the quinquennial period of the contract expires the expenditure on account of general administration alone would have exceeded the lump sum of the contract by about Rs. 75,000. Thus if the figures put down in the contract of 1882 be assumed as standard figures for the next five years the overgrown charges on account of general administration must be brought down to a sum smaller by about Rs. 75,000. This sum will have to be proportionately reduced still further to meet the extra calls of the Imperial Government. To ascertain where these reductions are possible the details of each head must be thoroughly sifted.

13. The expenditure on account of the staff and household of His Excellency the Governor was Rs. 85,000 in 1881-82; during the next year it rose to Rs. 88,200; by the end of 1883-84 it went up as high as Rs. 103,700; during the next year it fell down to Rs. 86,700. Thus on an average there appears to have been an annual increase of Rs. 8,000 nearly. This increase appears to have been principally on establishment and contingencies. The number on the establishment has been all at once increased from 84 to 97. It may deserve the attention of the Government to see if the allowance cannot be commuted into something like Rs. 60,000 and an addition of that much sum made to the yearly salary of £. 12,000. The Secretariat of this presidency is costlier than that of Madras. While the Civil Secretariat of Madras only cost Rs. 281,320 in 1882-83, the same charges in this Presidency amounted to Rs. 322,200. Comparing the figures of the three years after the last quinquennial contract with those for the year preceding it, it is seen that in 1881-82 the Civil Secretariat expenditure was Rs. 328,300.

in 1882-83.....	3,22,200
in 1883-84.....	3,26,800
in 1884-85.....	3,53,400

Deduct from this the charge that would have been incurred if the expenditure had been kept up to the figure of 1881-82 9,84,900

Total increase.....17,500

Or, speaking in round numbers, there has been an increase of about Rs. 6,000 every year. The increase has been bitterly complained of in the press, and the revised estimates show that the figure of Rs. 353,400 has been brought down to Rs. 346,000. This will probably be taken as the basis for the contract grant of the next five years, and it is therefore necessary to go into the details. The Secretariat consists of

- (a). Political, Secret, Judicial and Educational Departments.
- (b). Revenue, Financial and General Departments.
- (c). Separate Department.
- (d). Translators.

14. The following table exhibits at a glance the amount taken in the calculation of the last contract; and the annual expenditure of the four departments of the Secretariat; the figures for the first three years are actuals and for the fourth the revised estimates.

Group:	Amount taken in the calculation of contract.	1882-83.	1883-84.	1884-85.	1885-86.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
(A)	149,0	147,0	140,7	148,9	153,0
(B)	183,0	128,8	135,8	148,5	136,0
(C)	13,0	14,5	14,6	15,5	16,0
(D)	35,0	32,2	37,7	40,7	41,0
Total.....	330,0	322,5	323,8	353,6	346,0


15. To this has to be added the cost of the Military Secretariat. It is very surprising to find that with the commencing year of the new contract the different branches of the Secretariat commenced to work at a moderate charge; but during the currency of the same there has not been a single year in which the expenditure was kept within the contract grant. The expenditure may be distributed over three general heads, salary, establishment and contingencies, and it is necessary to examine each head in order to know where the increase has taken place and where it can be reduced. The following table has been prepared

	1882-83.	1883-84.	1884-85.	1885-86.
Salary.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
A	70,4	68,9	67,8	73,0
B	52,1	56,6	66,8	57,8
C
D	14,9	16,4	15,6	16,0
Establishment.				
A	58,9	60,0	62,4	63,0
B	49,6	54,7	58,2	57,2
C	8,1	18,1	8,2	8,5
D	20,8	19,3	22,7	22,4
Contingences.				
A	11,1	11,8	14,8	15,0
B	23,1	20,0	19,4	21,0
C	6,4	6,5	7,3	7,4
D	2,5	2,0	2,2	2,6

16. The two tables give a sufficient insight into the working of the Secretariat Departments. The increase in the Revenue Department arrests attention at once. The total increase in this department over the lump sum of contract amounted to Rs. 15,500 in 1884-85; but if the increase be estimated with reference to the actual charges in the first year of the current contract, it will be seen that it amounts to Rs. 19,700 15 per cent on the former amount. In this Department there has been an increase in salaries and in the cost of establishment. Under establishment the number increased from 51 in 1882-83 to 68 in 1885-86. These are items which will be usefully inquired into. Under the Secretariat comes the Military Secretariat also in which the expenditure on establishment has very largely swollen and ought to be reduced. But the necessity of a Military Secretariat itself is open to serious question. Including the post of the Military Secretary on the personal staff of the Governor there appear to be three Military Secretaries, so that the Military element appears to be too large and ought to be cut down. If only one Military Secretary is retained the reduction would give about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the necessary reduction on this head.

17. The intermediate supervising staff of Commissioners falls under the head of general administration and ought therefore to come in here. This item of expenditure is a very heavy drain upon the revenues, and there is consequently the greatest necessity of finding out a less costly method. Anybody that has cared to watch the growth of this charge must have seen that it entails the heaviest burdens without bringing with it any compensating good. During the period of the contract the expenditure on this head was as follows:—

18. The cost on account of the Commissioners was about Rs. 224,700 in 1882-83; it rose during the next year to Rs. 236,800; the year after that it came up to Rs. 241,500; and according to the revised estimates of 1885-86 it stood at Rs. 256,000. Thus during the four years there has been an increase of over Rs. 31,000. This institution of the Commissionerships introduces an unnecessary step between the District and the head-quarters of Government, causes culpable delay in the speedy despatch of public business and is opposed to the general policy, as it makes the District Government a non-entity. At any rate the third Commissionership, created in consequence of the pressure of the famine, ought to be dispensed with without any inconvenience whatever, and the old system be reverted to with advantage.

If these suggestions are accepted the cost on account of general administration would be reduced from 12 to about 10 lacs. 

LAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION, FOREST, AND AGRICULTURE.

19. The revenue derived from land forms the bulk of the revenue of India and any expenditure incurred here, if it brings in an increase of the revenue, ought not to be complained of, but on the other hand it is also of the greatest importance that the charges incurred on account of the collection of this revenue should to be kept down at the lowest. Any saving in expenditure here incurred is a real gain to the state. It will appear from the following figures that the collection charges in Bombay, as elsewhere, have steadily gone on increasing at a very heavy rate, and this is, I am directed to state, owing to the present costly system. During the ten years 1875-1884 the land revenue of Bombay and the charges of collection were as follows:—

	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880
Bombay -----	3,701,514	3,706,121	3,355,866	3,641,887	3,689,165	3,900,729
	643,590	663,303	655,517	677,027	660,811	651,630
	1881	1882	1883	1884	Total.	
Ditto -----	3,744,845	3,845,746	3,694,768	3,959,182	37,239,823	
	646,991	665,370	652,029	675,332	6,591,500	

The figures are taken from the statistical abstract of British India, page 64. It will appear that whereas during the decade the land revenue has increased by £ 257,668 or nearly 7 per cent, the charges have increased by £ 31,642 or nearly 5 per cent. These figures do not include the large increase on account of the intermediate supervising agency. Coming to the years of the current contract it will be found that the charges on account of the salaries and travelling allowances of Revenue Officers, and the charges on account of Surveys have exceeded the contract figure by a very large amount. The number of supernumerary Revenue Officers has also been very largely increased. It appears from the Administration Report of this Presidency that the cost of collection increased by nearly 3 lacks of rupees during the three years 1881-1883. There are 12 Senior and 9 Junior Collectors with 26 Assistants. This strong staff is further strengthened by the Deputy Collectors and Mamledars so that on an average there is one Collector and two assistants for each district besides the Mamledars and Deputies. There are 45 Deputy Collectors in the Department already. And there is a Mamledar for each Talooka. These Revenue officers have in addition to their revenue duties to perform Magisterial duties as well, and this circumstance entails no small additional charge on the revenue. After the contract was fixed the Mamledars and Deputy Collectors establishments were revised, and these revised establishments have by this time been rendered sufficiently strong to conduct by the revenue affairs of the Taluka under a single District Collector's supervision. When the Revenue Department was first organized, the other Departments of the state were not formed, and the Revenue officers were the only officers to whom Government looked up to as its principal executive. Collectors, therefore, found it almost impossible to conduct their duties efficiently, and their staff had to be strengthened by the addition of Assistant Collectors, but during the last few years most of the other Departments have been fully organised,

and each Department has, in these days, its special staff of administrative and executive officers. Under these altered circumstances accordingly there exists no longer the necessity of entertaining the staff of Covenanted Assistants between the District Revenue Officer and his Taluka subordinates except so far as the necessary provision of training some few Covenanted Civilians for District work might necessitate. For this purpose one instead of two or three, the present number of Assistants, would be more than sufficient. The excess number might be turned to account by the Forest, Salt and Customs and other Departments as special Assistants in those Departments to the Collector, thus displacing a great number of unqualified Europeans who have at present monopolised these services. While the present employees might be thus provided for, future admissions might for some years be reduced in number, and thereby relieving the state of a needless and costly burden.

20. Along with this may be suggested another reform which it is expected will further reduce the cost of Revenue collections. It is the separation of the Magisterial from the Revenue duties. As against this reform it is often urged that the Revenue officers would lose their hold upon the people if they were divested of the influence which they at present possess over the Rayats as Magistrates. While the Revenue Department was in its infancy such a combination of functions may have been necessary in the hands of the Revenue officers. The revenue system has been, however, thoroughly settled since then; for in most of the districts the new system has worked for the last thirty years, and more, and all opposition to it has by this time died out so that the Revenue officers have almost ceased to feel it necessary to bring their magisterial influence to bear upon their revenue duties. Moreover, the principle of separating the Judicial from the Executive functions has been so often admitted to be essential to the due discharge of the duties of the state that the reform cannot be allowed to stand over for a long time. During the late Famine the experiment of investing Sub-Judges with Magisterial powers was successfully tried, and the Committee of the Sabha can see no reason why the experience then gained should not be utilized to the permanent relief of the finances and to place the administration of criminal justice on a more satisfactory basis than at present. It will be necessary perhaps in a few cases to detach some of the Deputy Collectors for this duty in addition to the Sub-Judges. The Committee of the Sabha feel assured that such a measure, if adopted, will secure the forementioned advantages.

21. The Land Revenue Department consists of the Collectors and the Survey and Settlement officers. This other branch of the Department has become wholly unnecessary and the shears of economy can be well applied here without in the least prejudicially affecting efficiency

of the administration. The evils of the Survey Department have been admittedly very gross, and the Government has already taken steps to bring them to a close by initiating its new land policy. In the Resolution which the Government of Bombay issued in 1884 it has expressed its intention to disestablish the Survey Department on the completion of the revision of the remaining districts. It is the intention of the Government to hand over the work of the Survey Department to the Department of Agriculture recently created, and a material saving in this branch of the Land Revenue Administration will thus be effected during the course of the next few years. It is not, therefore, any longer necessary to suggest reductions here. Looking at the Survey Department in the light of the Resolution above alluded to one cannot understand the steady increase on account of salaries in this Department. It appears that Rs. 253,800 were spent on account of salaries in 1882-83. The same increased to Rs. 274,500 in the next year. In the year after that the same went up to 3 lacs. The Bombay Government thought it probable that the revision operations would be completed in about 8 years beginning with 1883. Three years of that period have already run by, and the Bombay Government has already dispensed with the services of one party of Surveyors. It may, therefore be suggested that a lump grant of about 12½ lacs be allowed for the remaining period of 5 years, and it may be further suggested that any amount over and above this lump grant should not be allowed to be expended without the express sanction of the Government of India. There is every possibility of reducing this expenditure by about Rs. 60,000 every year.

22 Here it would perhaps be useful to draw the Committee's attention to the remarks of the Indian Famine Commission on this head. At page 102 of the second volume of their report the Commissioners give a comparative statement of the strength and cost of the Land Revenue Department for each province, and observe that Bombay is much the costliest of all the administrative divisions. This difference is more nominal than real. In other provinces various cesses, apart from the land revenue, are levied for the payment of village services which when included in the account remove all differences. As a matter of fact the newly constituted provinces are administered at a much more heavy cost than the more settled of the older provinces. Periodical Famines are the tests by which the effects of British administration in India are to be tested, and the Famine Commission which had the best opportunity and the greatest facilities of reviewing the condition of this vast Empire may rightly claim the credit of having made suggestions based upon the consideration of all circumstances and factors that combine to produce the aggregate results of the working of the administrative machinery in the different departments. The whole empire is almost as large as a Continent, and the administrative provinces are so many

composite parts and the districts the units of administration. The Famine Commission, therefore, very properly suggests that each local representative of the government should be completely acquainted with the actual condition of the people so as to watch the effects of the policy initiated by Government in the administration of the Empire. To do this he must have ample time at his command so as to be able to master the details. The Famine Commissioners had the best opportunity of finding out where the principal defect of the administrative machinery lay, and they found that it lay in the fact that the executive duties were entrusted mainly, if not wholly, to a foreign agency. They have, therefore, recommended that the chief share of carrying out the details should be allowed to the Native officials. This recommendation, if adopted, would reduce the evils of a foreign agency in the administration to a minimum by effecting economy and by making the administration more sympathetic. At page 35 of the 19th number of the moral and material progress and condition of India occurs the following remark to the effect "that the Collector is responsible for the efficiency of the administration," and in order to enable him to meet this responsibility and to keep Government constantly and properly informed of what may be going on in the district under his charge it is necessary that he must be in direct communication with the central Government that has to frame its administration to suit the requirements of the people. At present there is an interrupting wheel in the machinery, namely, the Divisional Commissioner, and the Commissioners who have very little time and very few opportunities of knowing precisely what the requirements of the people in the districts are, oftener than not mar the effect of the valuable suggestions district officers make in their reports. The Committee of the Sabha have, therefore, directed me to suggest that the unnecessary and at the same time costly machinery of the Commissioners be abolished.

23. In this connection we beg to suggest that what holds true of the Revenue Department holds equally true with regard to all the other departments of Government. The general fault of the existing system is that the number of the inspecting, controlling, and supervising officers is wholly out of all reasonable proportion to the number of real workers. Government in all its departments fixes the salaries high enough to show that it trusts the officers concerned with original work, but after showing this mark of trust it imposes check upon check as if no officer could be trusted to do his duties. This state of things was perhaps necessary in the early years of British administration when the revenue system had been in its infancy, when there was no survey or settlement of lands, when vatans and alienations were not inquired into and settled. Revenue Commissioners were then necessary to control the actions of the Collectors. But these matters having

now been settled, the Commissioners have really no independent functions but serve simply as a connecting link between the Collector and the Government. In the North West Provinces, Punjab and Bengal there are, besides the Commissioners of divisions, Revenue Boards of two or three members. This double or treble machinery serves no useful purpose beyond a nominal but often times a vexatious check. In the Judicial Department the same system of first and second appeals seems to prevail with no better advantage. The same remark holds good in the case of almost all other Departments; and accordingly the result is that this system of checks and counter-checks is, as might be expected, frightfully costly. It may be admitted that some check is necessary, but too much check defeats itself as it becomes either vexatious or nominal. The Committee of the Sabha would suggest that in place of the present checks and counter-checks the check should be more real and on the spot. If the district was regarded as a unit of administration, the Collector would be the proper President of an Executive Board, consisting of his Revenue and Survey, Police, Forest, Public Works, Medical and Educational assistants sitting together, each in charge of his own department, but taking counsel in larger matters with the heads of the other departments under the general advice of the Collector-President. To the official Board of management the Chairmen of the District and Municipal Boards may be joined as non-official representatives. The ten Members, thus sitting together and representing as many departments, would form the best check upon each individual department. With such a self-adjusting and more simple and effective check at work the present complicated and less efficient system of checks might all in time be dispensed with to the great relief of the people and of the finances, and a real working administration for each district will be provided for, whom Government might consult with advantage upon all matters. Such an arrangement would save the delay caused by the necessity of referring small matters from one department to another through all their higher and lower grades, would check mutual jealousies and one-sidedness of action, and prevent the worst evils of centralised departments.

24. Closely connected with the department of the Land Revenue are two other departments, Forest and Agriculture. The department of agriculture has been very recently formed, and it must develop itself before any thing can be said about the cost of working it. At the best it is a luxury which in hard times like this may be dispensed with. It may be suggested as regards the Forest Department, that if the work be handed over to, and placed under the charge of, the Collector with a forest Assistant the improvements would be simultaneous and the conflict between the Revenue and Forest Departments would be avoided. At present the Forest Department is controlled by three

officers, each for one division, and the operation of the Forest Act has been so different in the different provinces that there is nothing like uniformity and common growth in the Department. Agriculture has to do with lands cultivated, and the Forest Department with lands lying waste, both culturable, and unculturable. The work of afforestation is calculated to materially improve the prospects of agriculture, and it is essential that the work should be carried on under the guidance and instruction of that department which is responsible for the development of agriculture. It appears from the accounts of the income and expenditure of the Forest Department that though the Department has been bringing in more revenue every year it has been doing so at an increased cost. Any additional outlay of money that brings in proportionate additional revenue cannot be regretted, but the increase in expenditure, it appears, is not on the productive branches of it but on the non-effective part, and the Committee may therefore well examine if the revenue side of the Department cannot be further developed by reduction in the unfruitful expenditure. It appears that the expenditure on account of salaries and establishment during the year 1882-83 was Rs. 330,000, which increased to Rs. 343,000 during the next two years. The larger establishments entertained for the protection of the extended forest settlements and for the maintenance of forest accounts do not appear to have been necessary, and the re-organization of the superior staff that was carried out under the orders of the Government of India conveyed in their Resolution dated 3rd March 1884 entailed a heavier cost equally needless. It would be worth the while of the Committee to examine if the whole of the increased cost is justifiable. The three Conservators draw between themselves about Rs. 5700 besides their travelling allowances. In addition to the three Conservators there are 12 Deputy and about 8 Assistant Conservators so that each Conservator of the division has on an average about 7 high paid assistants. This department is not free from the encroachment of supernumeraries. Of these there are about 3 costing the department about 1500 Rs. a month. The sub-assistant Conservators muster as strong as the Deputies and Assistants. This is too large an establishment certainly and ought to be reduced. If, as suggested by His Excellency the Governor and by some of the newspapers, the Forest Department is localized and handed over to the District Boards, this Department can be worked more efficiently and at a reduced cost.

25. What has been observed above of Bombay holds equally true of the other provinces. The strength of the Department is in excess of the work done. In some provinces the expenditure exceeds occasionally the whole of the receipts. Even where this is not the case the expenditure absorbs 50 to 75 percent of the receipts. In fact the receipts of forest produce are only nominal. The

balance shown as profit mostly consists of the income of grass from grazing fees which can as easily be collected by the revenue officers. The charges for departmental cuttings have also been in most parts unreasonably heavy. While the higher grades of officers are overpaid and excessive in number the Department makes no use of the village agency available for the work done by its lower paid establishment. The suggestions of the Sabha in the way of economy are as follows:—

1st. The three Conservators appear to be unnecessary and one chief officer who might also combine the duty of the Director of Agriculture would be sufficient as adviser to Government, and for controlling the District staff.

2nd. Except in those parts where the revenue is considerable separate District officers are unnecessary because the assistant and sub-assistant Conservators will be quite able to superintend the work, and the post of Deputy Conservator might be dispensed with.

3rd. A separate agency for keeping forest accounts seems hardly necessary, and as it has been only recently introduced it will be possible to reduce it without any loss of efficiency.

4th. The work done by the lower paid establishment should be as far as possible handed over to the village officers who would do it for a small increase in their remuneration.

26. Customs, Salt and Excise—According to the arrangements of 1882, the local Government is allowed to share in the profits of the Excise Department only, while the other two heads have remained Imperial. It appears from the accounts and estimates of the period of the contract about to close that the Excise Department has worked at a profit while the other two have entailed a loss. The gain from the Excise Department, it is expected, would amount over Rs. 40,000,000 during the five years. The history of the administration of this Department shows that the principle of decentralization produces favorable results in the improvement of revenue; for when this Department was handed over to the Local Government with a fixed interest in 1877-78 in which year the actual charges exceeded the Imperial receipts by Rs. 28,281 the working of the Department was so approved by the time that the contract expired, that it brought the revenue to the amount of over 7 lacs. This system was further developed by giving the Local Government an equal interest, and the result is that there is an estimated profit of over 40 lacs. Customs and Salt departments show contrary results. It is estimated that by the time the period of the present contract expires the loss would amount to over 5 lacs. In connection with these departments, the Committee of the Sabha begs to suggest

that the expenditure in these departments can be greatly reduced. The abolition of import duties has relieved the department of a good deal of work but the reductions made have not been proportionate.

27. With a view to save expenditure without prejudicially affecting the efficiency, the Sabha submits, the Committee should examine if it would not be beneficial to rigidly enforce the policy of the Government of India stated in their letters to the Government of Bombay dated 30th October 1880 and 5th March 1881 bearing Nos. 3495 and 960 respectively. The main object of the policy is that the whole of the duty levied on salt should be clear profit to the state. It may not be inconsistent with this policy to leave the manufacture and production of salt to private enterprise. The Government of India has more than once declared that it is unwise that the State Department should lay out large sums of money in increasing the supply of salt on its own account. If the work is left to private enterprise, a good deal of expenditure now incurred in supervision and in capital expenditure would be saved. The economic effects of the present policy are also open to question.

28. As compared with other provinces both the Salt and Customs establishments in this Presidency are unnecessarily costly. Bengal, with a larger revenue from customs, has no Commissioner. A Collector suffices there for the works and might as well suffice here. There are port officers in Bombay, Aden, Kurrachee, Karwar &c., all highly paid without corresponding work. The Karwar port officer is virtually a sinecure and should be abolished. In Madras there are similarly port officers who appear to be relics of a past without present or future usefulness. Madras has no commerce worth mentioning, and the ports might well be handed over to the Salt Office where these exist. In Northern India although the inland customs have been abolished and the salt works owned by Government now centralized in a few places the reduction in the establishments has been quite inadequate, and Government has in fact assumed the function of salt producer and trader instead of confining to its monopoly of salt taxation. This has entailed needless expenditure without much benefit to the revenue. A proposal to abolish the independent native agency with a small commission on the salt appears to have found favour with Government. We think the restriction of private enterprise in this direction will be prejudicial to the general interest, and the sale of salt should be as far as possible left in private hands subject of course to the payment of duties. Our suggestions on this head are, 1st that the Bombay, Madras and North India establishments for the collection of salt and customs duties should be reduced and brought to an equality with the Bengal scale as far as may be possible, 2nd that Government should retire from the po-

of being producers and traders in salt and hand over this work to the licensed capitalists contenting itself with its duties, and 3rd that customs ports should as far as possible be reduced in number and the duties hitherto done by port officers in the smaller ports be handed over to the Salt Department.

O P I U M .

29. As regards the opium duties the Government of India levies the opium revenue on the Bombay side by a system of pass-duties, and on the Bengal side by making advances to the Rayats who produce opium and sell it to Government. Those systems bring in nearly the same nett revenue, about 3 crores, but while on the Bengal side Government have to advance 2 crores a year besides keeping a very strong establishment costing about 15 lacks, the pass-duty system is worked without cost. If the Rayats in Native States can grow opium without advances from the State it requires more justification than has hitherto been adduced to show why the Behar and Gazipoor Rayat cannot be similarly left to himself and the opium production left under a license system to private capitalists. The vested interest of the men in the service can alone explain the continuance of this waste of the State's resources, none of the employees in the higher grades of this department being natives of the country. On the 2/3 system if 50 percent of the employees were Natives this alone would secure a saving of 3 lacks.

R E G I S T R A T I O N .

30. This is a minor head of revenue classed usually with those which have been noticed above. The Inspector-Generalship of Registration in this Presidency appears to be more or less unnecessary. In many other provinces the duties of this post have been joined to some other office with great advantage. The Collectors are ex-officio District Registrars and can easily be trusted with this work. The Registration Department except in Bengal does not leave any large margin of profit, and as the work is of a very subordinate kind, the expensive staffs of Inspectors employed appears unnecessary. These Inspectors and Inspectors-General are supposed to examine stamps and court fees fixed to documents filed in Civil Courts. This part of the work can better be done by the District Courts deputing from time to time their clerks of the Court to examine the records. The registration machinery can never be made a source of revenue, and the fees cannot be lightened unless the establishment be reduced in the way suggested above.

S T A M P S .

31. The revenue from stamps requires little or no expenditure to realize it except what is paid to the English manufacturers of stamps.

Ac., and the commission paid to the sellers. The needless multiplicity of different stamps and the revenue and the Custom tables, and the different grades of each might with advantage be reduced to a much smaller number, and if the stamps were manufactured here on state account, as they used to be formerly, the cost now paid to a private firm would be considerably saved, and the risk of fraud would not be increased.

POST AND TELEGRAPH.

32. The receipts and expenditures under these two heads are Imperial. From the detailed reports of these two Departments it appears that the excess of expenditure over receipts is due to the excessive use of both these communications made by Government for which due credit is not allowed and to the employment on an unprecedented scale of foreign agency on very high salaries for work which Native employees would do equally well. In the case of the Telegraph Indo-European and other foreign lines have been taken up by Government on very disadvantageous terms. The charge for maintenance and working of these foreign lines is much in excess of receipts and unfavourably affects the account of the purely inland lines. As regards the post office it may fairly be questioned whether a Director General with a Deputy and two assistants and secretary, and Controller with his own Deputy and Assistant, besides Post Masters-General at the presidency towns, and in Bengal two Deputy Post Masters-General in addition, and the Superintendents for each circle, Inspectors for each district, besides Superintendents for Railway Mail service; whether all these establishments are not too excessive. Judged by the English scale, and bearing in mind that whereas the English Post Office brings in nett revenue of many crores of Rupees, the Post Office in India barely pays its way, and so it becomes a question of immediate practical importance to secure economy by the employment throughout of Natives on lower salaries in all but the highest posts. By a larger employment of Natives on the 2/3 rule in places the salaries of which exceed three hundred, a saving of at least 5 lacs can be effected in this Department. If the Telegraph superintendents were similarly trained here in a special school that service also could be manned by Natives with advantage and economy to the state.

MINT.

33. Of the two Mints working at present at Calcutta and Bombay the receipts in Bombay exceed those in Calcutta, and the excess in charges and the work turned out is also greater in Bombay than in Calcutta. Under these circumstances the suggestion made in some quarters to abolish the Calcutta mint and transfer the whole work to Bombay is worth the serious consideration of the Committee. In each of these

places highly paid Directors and Assay Masters are kept up for whom full work is not found all through the year. The Madras Mint buildings appear also not to have been yet disposed of though the mint there was closed many years ago. By the concentration of the whole work in one place much needless waste of money will be saved.

LAW AND JUSTICE.

34. The next head that calls for consideration is that of Law and Justice. In the working of this Department there is extravagance which has been the subject of loud complaint for many years, and yet by reason of the opposition of vested interests, no remedy has been found for the evil except the periodical enhancements of stamp duties, so that the question of these heavy duties has attracted the notice even of Parliament. According to the latest arrangements the Government of India claims half the revenue derived from stamps, whereas the expenditure is wholly debited to the Provincial Government. The amount of expenditure fixed for this major head was 51 lacs, and it is calculated that by the time the contract expires there will be an excess of expenditure of about 6 lacs over the quinquennial grant. There have been several causes at work in raising the expenditure under this head, but the principal one is the revision of the pay of Judicial officers carried out under orders of the Government of India in November 1883. This revision has entailed an additional annual expenditure of about 18,000 Rs. But apart from these recent additions there is something in the very system of administering this Department that is responsible for the lavish expenditure. It appears from the accounts available to the public that the Original Side of the High Court at Bombay requires for the maintenance of its establishment excluding the salary of the Judges a sum of about 250,000 Rs. annually. The Appellate Side which does the appellate work for the whole Presidency is maintained at an outlay of about 84,000 Rs. a year, on its establishment. In 1884-85 the salaries of Judges and establishment on both sides of the High Court came up to 6½ lacs. The expensiveness of the High Court is, however, not due so much to the cost of the machinery employed but to the monopoly enjoyed by Solicitors and Barristers whose fees represent the charge on litigation which is almost prohibitive. Besides this Original Side of the Bombay High Court there are other establishments which are peculiar to Bombay. There is a special coroner's court, and the clerk of the Justices of the Peace costing between them a lack of rupees. It is time that the system of the civil and criminal administration of justice in Bombay should be improved so as to render it less costly. Without going into the details we may be permitted to point out that some of the offices can be reduced and others amalgamated. At present, it appears, there is a separate Registrar and Prothonotary on the original

side of the High Court at an annual expenditure of 30,000 Rs. We believe that the establishments of the two Registrars on the original and appellate sides can be amalgamated and placed under one head with two or three subordinate officers, and the cost of 76,000 Rs. on the head reduced by about 50 per cent. The salaries of the Master and Taxing Officer can be similarly reduced. The office of the Sheriff appears to be no longer necessary so that there is a clear room for a saving of about Rs. 15,000. The Official Assignee, the Administrator-General and establishment, as also the clerk and sealer of the insolvent court may be employed on fixed salaries instead of receiving the fees which greatly exceed the amount of salaries for which qualified men can be obtained. The translation establishment is unnecessarily large and costly and might be considerably reduced, private parties being licensed to work as certified translators where necessary. At present the official translators get besides the salaries larger income from private translation. Broadly speaking, the machinery of the original side is very costly, and it is a fair subject for consideration whether the time of highly paid Barrister-Judges can not be better utilized by relieving them of much of their original work in respect of suits for money and even in respect of other suits not involving much knowledge of English Law. The number of the Judges need not be reduced, but instead of adding to that number another Judge to clear off arrears, it would be advisable to transfer the simpler sort of work to the Small Causes Court. The change of tribunal means a great deal more than appears at first sight. It is a change of system, and with the reduction of the number of suits the establishment can be effectively reduced. The arrears will be sooner disposed of. The Appellate Branch will be strengthened. The monopoly of Barristers and Solicitors will be less burdensome to poor suitors, and the costs and delay will be diminished. The Courts next in order to the High Court are the Civil and the Sessions Courts. The expenditure on account of the salaries of the Judges was Rs. 447,400 in 1881-82, while the same has gone up to Rs. 472,200 in 1884-85. The number of Judges has during that time increased by about 25 per cent (20 to 24) who between themselves dispose of about 4,000 appeals or about 200 per each Judge. From the administration reports it will appear that the District Courts have very little work to dispose of, and it seems to the Sabha a fair question for consideration if the number of the District Judges can not be reduced. This is certainly possible if the power of the Subordinate Judges in civil matters and of the Native Magistrates in criminal matters should be enlarged. The District Judges may then be empowered to perform some of the duties of the High Court.

35. The stipendiary Sub-Judges and Sub-Magistrates can also with advantage be relieved of a portion of their lighter work. Honorary Magistrates have been appointed in towns, but Benches of such Ma-

gistrates can also be constituted in Talukas with great advantage to the Government and to the satisfaction of the public. The caste and trade Panchayats can also be utilized for the purposes of settling civil disputes. There has been already a reform in the manner of disposing petty cases, and Arbitration Courts have been reorganized as cheap and efficient institutions for the administration of justice in small cases. If the same principle be extended to the Courts of Subordinate Judges, and if civil juries are associated with the Sub-Judges in the disposal of suits involving larger amounts of money, as also questions regarding rights and customs, the Committee of the Sabha believes ample relief will be afforded to the superior Courts so as to set the Judges free for the higher kind of work.

36. Our suggestions on this head are, 1st, that the establishment on the original side of the High Court should be reduced by amalgamation and abolition of superfluous offices, so as to bring this charge to the standard of the other High Courts. 2nd, That all officers paid by fees should be made stipendiary, and the fees credited to Government. 3rd, That at least eleven of these offices are at present filled by Barristers who being Europeans are necessarily paid higher than the work requires; their places can be filled by Natives with equal efficiency on smaller salaries. 4th, That a special Coroner is not needed as the duty can be performed by the Police Magistrate. 5th, That the establishment of the Clerk to the Justices of the Peace can be, like the Sheriff, abolished altogether. 6th, That by the larger creation of Honourary Magistrates and Civil Arbitrations the work now thrown on stipendiary officers can be reduced, and by a transfer of work the number of district Judges can also be reduced. 7th, Special Cantonment Magistrates and Courts are also a luxury which can be safely dispensed with in most places. In these several ways economies to the extent of 8 lacks can be carried out without any loss of efficiency.

37. Under the department of Law and Justice is included the Jail department. There is a possibility of reducing the expenditure on account of this department by about a quarter of a lack of rupees every year. The post of Inspector-General of prisons falls in the category of others which we have put down as belonging to the staff of intermediate supervision. This may be safely done away with. The Jail Department has been thoroughly organized, and, really speaking, there is no work for the Inspector General. What is wanted in the administration of Jails is local supervision, and the Committees of visitors already in existence would do the work better if their powers were a little enlarged and if their constitution were a little modified. At present they are mostly official, and a little infusion of the non-official element is all that is wanted to make the constitution efficient and effective. There is another reform too that will lead to economy in the ad-

ministration of the Jails. The Committee of the Sabha thinks that the system of looking upon District Jails as local institutions is sound in principle, and ought to be followed wherever practicable. It is only the central Jails that ought to be looked upon as institutions chargeable on the provincial revenues. Local Boards, both urban and rural, ought to be asked to largely avail themselves of convict labour and ought to contribute for the maintenance of prisoners in all local Jails. For this contribution they may be given the benefit of convict labour.

38. The total charge on account of Jail management was about 6½ lacks, and the total receipts from convict labour and Jails manufacture were about 2½ lacks. After deducting the value of materials supplied, the total charge for the maintenance of District Jails was 3½ lacks, and for the Central and Presidency Jails a lack and quarter. A reduction in the number of District Jails appears to be urgently needed in the interest of economy, and with the facilities of communications now established such reduction ought to be possible. Our suggestions on this head are:—1st That the post of Inspector General of Prisons should be abolished and the duties entrusted to either the Deputy Surgeon General or the Sanitary Commissioners. 2nd. That as far as possible District Jails should be made local charges. 3rd. That the number of such Jails should be considerably diminished. There is also considerable room for a larger infusion of the Native element among the Jail Superintendents.

POLICE DEPARTMENT.

39. Since the arrangements were made with the Local Government in 1883 the Police Department has undergone so many changes that it is almost impossible to compare the figures of expenditure during the currency of the contract with those for the years previous, but the figures for one year compared with those of the year succeeding may give us an idea as to where the increase has taken place. In 1884-85 there was an increase of 15,000 Rs. under the head of superintendence. The Government of India sanctioned from the 1st of December 1884 the creation of Inspector-Generalship of Police at an additional outlay of Rs. 24,000 every year. The Committee of the Sabha is not aware of the reasons that induced the Local Government to move the Government of India to sanction this heavy expenditure. The subject of creating the Inspector-Generalship of Police was constantly brought to the notice of the Government of India, but it was as constantly shelved off; and the public therefore expects the Committee to fully go into this subject and examine for itself if the reasons urged are sufficient to justify an outlay of a quarter of a lack of Rs. on a single appointment. The creation of this appointment is objectionable on more grounds than one, and the principal one is that the

creation of a separate police department under the guidance of a separate head deprives the Bombay system of its principal recommending feature that perfect harmony between the general administration and the administration of the Police Department was secured by making the District Police Officer subordinate to the Magistrate of the District. The Police Department has no policy to enunciate nor any to carry out, and it can therefore well remain under the guidance of the District Magistrate and his official superior. Sir Baraow Ellis was so strongly opposed to the separation of the Police duties from the general administrative duties entrusted to the divisional Commissioners, that he very strongly fought against the creation of the separate office, and it was due to his conclusive argument that the recommendation of General Brice carried no weight with the Government of India.

40. Later on when a third Revenue Commissionership was created about 10 years ago the fact that there was no separate Inspector General of Police in this Presidency, and that that duty devolved upon the Revenue Commissioners, was used as an argument for the creation of the new office. The centralized Police system has a tendency to become quasi-military for which form of organization, except perhaps in Sind there is no occasion in this Presidency. We trust accordingly that this new post costing 24,000 Rs. will be included among the probable reductions in this Department. By the arrangements entered into in 1882 in connection with the extension of Local Self-government Municipalities were relieved of their duties of contributing towards the maintenance of the Police, and the increase in expenditure is partly attributable to the transfer of charges thus rendered necessary. The Committee of the Sabha think that the Police ought to form a part of local administration, and Government ought to contribute to the local bodies funds proportionate to the share of service the Police may be required to do for the central Government, but in as much as the reopening of this question does not fall within the scope of the inquiry entrusted to the Committee we content ourselves with making such suggestions as are calculated to effect a saving in expenditure. It appears that during the past few years the staff of District Police Officers has been considerably increased, and further it has been strengthened by the entertainment of Police probationers and that these increases have taken place without any diminution in the staff of Inspectors. Each of these three items entailing an increased expenditure is open to serious objection.

41. In 1878-79 the number of District Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents was 22, in 1886-87 it stands at 30. The increase of 8 Superintendents and their Assistants has caused an increase of about a lack and a quarter. The number of Inspectors has been increased

from 33 to 47, and 13 Police probationers at an additional annual cost of Rs. 56,120 have been entertained. The Committee of the Sabha is inclined to share the popular view regarding the institution of this grade of Police probationers that the most searching scrutiny into it will fail to show any justification for its institution except providing lucrative berths to relatives and acquaintances of gentlemen occupying high posts in the administration, such persons being otherwise unqualified and ineligible probably for any other career; for a searching analysis of the list of persons already admitted to this new grade will, it is believed, satisfactorily show that they possess no other qualification than that of their race, supplemented by the fact already referred to above. No Native has been admitted as a probationer. Though called probationers they get all the allowances of men in the regular service. These items of increase call for a strict scrutiny. The Committee of the Sabha are strongly of opinion that the increase is wholly unnecessary and ought to be reduced.

42 The number of Inspectors was increased to 47 with a view to train from among them men qualified to become Assistant Superintendents, but as yet the process of substitution has not commenced. In the last Decennial Report of the moral and material progress and condition of India it has been observed that for the most part the village watchman has been neglected, and it is this neglect of the old institutions that involves the State in ruinous expenditure. If the Government of India insists on the Local Governments the necessity of reviving the institution by enlisting the sympathies and services of the people according to old Native notions and principles there is every possibility of reducing this expenditure.

43 The Presidency Police too is costly beyond measure as are most of the other institutions of the Presidency towns. The establishment there cost about 3 lacks of rupees while the salaries of three Superintendents absorb more than a tenth of the total cost on account of the establishment. We fail to see why an ordinary Superintendent of Police with two Native Inspectors ought not to be able to conduct the duties as efficiently as at the present day.

44 Our suggestions on this head therefore are, (1) that the post of the Inspector-General of Police be abolished and his duties assigned as before to the Divisional Commissioners; (2) the posts of Probationers appear to be wholly unnecessary. In no other province are there any probationers in the Police Department. The Inspectors in the higher grades ought to be promoted to be Assistant Superintendents; (3) the recent increase in the number of Police officers of all grades has been abnormal, and the scale which obtained before 1873 should be re-introduced. Considerable reduction is possible in the

Police of the Presidency town. Lastly the services of the village police should be more freely utilized, and in course of time most of the Civil Police work should be handed over to the Local Boards. In these several ways the enormous increase in Police expenditure which has taken place in recent years can be brought down to the more reasonable proportion at a saving of nearly 5 lacks of rupees.

E D U C A T I O N .

45 The total grant under the contract falls short of the expenditure actually incurred, and the total loss to the Government of Bombay under this head is about 12 lacks during the 5 years, or about 2 lacks annually. It is expected that year by year the expenditure will increase, and the Provincial Government has, under the impression that the Government of India will supply additional funds if there be any need for them, sanctioned additional grants. The Resolution of the Government of India dated 23rd October 1884 and bearing number 10-309 (para 39) does no doubt create such an impression, and the Committee of the Sabha believe that the Supreme Government will not fail to give additional funds for such a noble purpose, but it is at the same time necessary to show to the Government of India that the Department is administered with economy, and that the resources at its command are inadequate to meet the legitimate demands of the people. As at present administered, the Committee of the Sabha regret to find that greater economy is not observed. In the year 1881-82 the total expenditure of the Department was about Rs. 11,96,000, out of which the directing charges alone came to about Rs. 39,000, the charges on account of inspection were Rs. 187,000, and the rest was spent on schools and colleges, Government and aided. It may here be observed that the charges on account of direction and inspection are excessive and by judicious arrangements can be kept down. The office of the Director of Public Instruction is perhaps one which must be reserved for well qualified Europeans, but the time has certainly come when the Inspectorships should be for the most part filled by competent Native educationists. The same remark applies to a portion of the Professorships in the Government Colleges. Each college should have, if possible, half the number of its Professorships filled by qualified Natives. Under the 3rd system of pay the substitution of Native for European agency will represent some saving. It would not be out of place here to observe that there is something in the system followed in conducting the affairs of this Department that is radically defective and must be remedied. On examination of the return of schools and scholars and of the expenditure incurred on their account it becomes evident that the spread of education is not proportionate to the money spent

The recent inquiry made by the Education Commission has been thorough, and if the recommendations of the Commission are ungrudgingly given effect to, no fear need be entertained of the cost of administering the Department being enhanced.

46 The desire to make special provision for the education of European and Eurasian children, and the high scale of grants in-aid given to these schools entails no small amount of burden on Government and causes no small discontent for which the Departmental system is responsible.

47 The question of the Government Book Depot was taken up in Lord Ripon's time and the policy of Government withdrawing from the book trade was enforced upon the attention of the Local Government. Partial effect has been given to that policy in this Presidency, but there can be no doubt that real economy can only result from giving full effect to it. No large reduction can be expected or is even desirable in a Department the work of which represents the most beneficent side of the British rule; at the same time the want of a new departure in the subjects of instruction has been long and generally felt, and the Government is earnest in its desire to encourage technical education. No solid foundation can be laid in this new work without considerable expenditure. The several reductions suggested above might be of use in supplying the necessary funds to some small extent.

M E D I C A L D E P A R T M E N T .

48 The total expenditure on account of this head during the year 1881-82 was very little less than 12 lacs. During the course of the 5 years it has swollen by about a lac more, and it would be worth while the Committee's attention to find out whether the reasons urged for this increase are sufficient. A reform in the direction of economy was commenced in 1880 by separating the Civil and Military duties of the Indian Medical Department. About this time the two Deputy Surgeon Generalships, Northern and Poona divisions, were abolished to the great relief of the Exchequer. The time has, we believe, arrived when a further step can be taken in the same direction, and the Surgeon Generalship abolished, the duties being entrusted to the Sanitary Commissioner and placing the staff of Civil Surgeons under him. The Sanitary Commissioner to the Government of Bombay suggested such a reform in his report for the year 1883. In his report for the year he says, " My predecessor, Mr. Lumsdain, in his annual report for 1879, sketched out a perfect scheme. He said, indeed, to have a thoroughly effective organization, there should be one health officer, for each Collectorate, identified with its area and its people, as are the Revenue Officers. Within that area he should be conversant with its

physical geography, its communications and resources, its peculiarities of climate and rainfall, its water supply, its special and incidental diseases, its staple and other foods, its system of agriculture, its products, and general condition of its people. He could be the real Civil Surgeon, as much a part and parcel of the district as the Collector, working with and for him, and, if needs be, travelling with him." The Committee of the Sabha believes that these are the true lines to work upon, and that we should get a great deal more work done by the constant association of the Health officer of the district, with the chief Civil officer of each Collectorate, who would naturally take more interest in the representations made by one of his own officers. This is a scheme formulated and proposed by two officers of great experience and long standing in Government service. The principal recommending feature of the scheme is that it aims at a twofold reform; it proposes to get more work done by the Civil Surgeons and to provide an agency for the Sanitary Department which is very urgently wanted. The reform introduced into the working of the Civil Medical Department in the year 1880 has admitted the principle and the utility of placing the civil dispensaries under the Deputy Sanitary Commissioners for inspection, and the reform now advocated suggests the necessity of placing the Civil Hospitals and the Civil Surgeons under the Sanitary Commissioner. By the arrangements concluded in 1882 the Government of Bombay has already expressed itself in favour of placing the dispensaries under the control of the local and Municipal Boards. This has not been practically acted up to as yet, but it is hoped that it will not be long before practical effect is given to these measures. The next step will naturally be that of transferring Civil Hospitals to district Committees, and I beg leave to suggest that if the Civil Medical Department is placed under the Sanitary Commissioner who is the adviser of the local boards in sanitary matters the reform will be easily carried out when the proper time comes. At present the urban and rural Boards are held responsible for the health of the people under their care, and there is not even the slightest communication, much less cooperation, between those who have to introduce sanitary reforms, and those who have to watch their result. If the reform is carried out funds will be set free wherewith the work of village sanitation can be carried out. By the plan proposed there will be a saving of the salary of the Deputy Surgeon-General or of the Sanitary Commissioner. One officer would have the charge of hospitals, jails, and dispensaries, and of sanitation, and vaccination. At present the Deputies to the Sanitary Commissioner are for the most part costly sinecures.

49 In the same way the medical officers employed in the Presidency towns afford considerable room for reduction and economy. There

are 15 such officers in the town and island of Bombay, all very highly paid, and most of them moreover enjoy the liberty of private practice. Several of these officers enjoy a plurality of offices, each of which brings in sufficient remuneration to make it worth while for qualified men to accept the posts singly. This evil of one and the same individual filling many posts is a peculiarity of this Department which is not confined to the presidency town, but obtains also in Poona, Ahmedabad and other places. It is very suggestive of the way in which these large departments are managed not in the interest of the public, but in the interest of the services. Lastly it is worth consideration whether the Civil posts can be properly regarded as a monopoly of the Indian Medical Service. Well qualified natives in charge of Civil hospitals are always found more useful than the members of the Indian medical service, except by the class of European servants employed in the Mofussil. Honorary Assistant Surgeons ought to have a preferential claim to such posts instead of their ambition being limited to the lowest post in the Department. In all these several ways can economy to a large extent be enforced in this Department to the great benefit of the public and without any loss of efficiency.

ECCLESIASTICAL.

50 The Ecclesiastical Department was first created in the interest of the Military forces employed by the State. A further advance was made when bishops were appointed with additional chaplains for conducting the services in large centres of the European civil population. The intention was to secure the benefit of religious services for the Civil & Military servants of the State. This limited purpose has long been ignored, and the Department has increased in bulk and costliness notwithstanding the opposition repeatedly raised against it. The Sabha sees no objection to the employment of army chaplains where needed but in regard to the civil population it is differed. As a matter of fact the Presidency towns absorb a considerable number of the chaplains, and there are besides considerable grants for the additional clergy in outstations. One branch of the Christian Protestant church has a virtual monopoly of this expenditure. All these points have been repeatedly urged upon the attention of Government, and the Sabha trusts that the Committee will be able to recommend considerable reductions in that portion of the expenditure which is not devoted to the interest of the Military service.

MISCELLANEOUS.

51 The scientific and other minor departments next call for consideration. They entail a loss of about 60,000 Rs. annually. Most of the

departments coming under this head appear to be superfluous, started and worked more for the benefit of others than those who contribute to the revenues of the Empire. The Bull and Stallion Department of Government, Botanical and other public gardens, the Cotton Department, the expenditure on account of the Government architect; the Model farms and the Provincial Museums; all come under the head. The charges of the Government Architect office rose from Rs. 3,300 to Rs. 17,000 in the same period; and for the Bull and Stallion Department rose from Rs. 34,000 to Rs. 50,000 between 1881 and 1885.

52 It is often to question if the whole of this large outlay is necessary and brings in an equivalent return in some form or another. The head Miscellaneous contains a large number of items of expenditure which together amount to a total of 11 lacks of Rs. during the five years. Under this head come such items as rewards for proficiency in oriental languages, travelling allowances to covenanted and uncovenanted servants attending examinations. It may be fairly asked if these charges should not fall to the share of the individuals and not to that of the State. The sum expended on these two heads is not small and cannot be lost sight of. Another item of expenditure that can be rightly objected to is that of charges on account of European vagrants. It appears that the expenditure on this account is gradually increasing. During the last five years it has already increased by about 10 percent. In the year 1881-82 it was 80,000 Rs. while in the revised estimates for 85-86 the figure is put down at 90,000 Rs.

53 All these charges ought to be handed over to the local self-Government Boards and the existing expenditure transferred to them as a lump grant. The large excess of expenditure over the contract grant on account of the Bull and Stallion Department, as also the heavy outlay on the purchase of agricultural implements, appear to be unintelligible and have no reason to form an item of Provincial account. Railway Companies ought to be responsible for the registration of railway-borne traffic. The department of Stationery and Printing has increased beyond measure in costliness and if the present system were dispensed with, private printing presses and stationery shop-keepers would do the work at a much reduced cost. The charge for stationery being made a charge upon Government generally and not on each office separately to the full extent conceals unnecessary burden thrown upon Government by the increase of printed and written correspondence. The whole of this charge ought to be transferred in the shape of grants to the heads of offices like the contingency grant allowed to them, and the use of country made paper for all ordinary purposes encouraged by special instructions. At present there is no such inducement and no check. In regard to the Central Printing Press the same extravagance in the matter of printed forms

and statements is known largely to prevail. The monopoly of printing enjoyed by this press seriously affects the printing trade. The whole of this charge is a recent creation and might be safely dispensed with. The cadastral, geological and trigonometrical surveys, the archaeological and meteorological department are all luxuries of their kind which in hard times might be dispensed with or at least greatly circumscribed in their operation.

54 The whole of the expenditure under the head of Superannuation and Furlough Allowances comes to about $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores including the expenditure in England and India for the Civil Services and nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores for the Military Services. In all the charge comes up to 6 crores annually for which there is no present return. The whole of this charge is due to the great indulgence shown by Government in complying with the demands made from time to time by the services. The rules extended to one service were unconscientiously extended to the others till at the present time these non-effective charges represent a very large proportion of the Army and Civil expenditure. This state of things urgently calls for reform; pledges given and expectations raised must no doubt be fulfilled, but there is a limit in all these matters, and this limit of state indulgence has been exceeded. In regard to furlough rules especially they are found to be so favourable as to be abused beyond their original purpose. Twenty-five percent of the services are always absent on one or other form of leave, and their places filled up by acting appointments till all interest in the work becomes only nominal. The granting of furlough is always a matter of indulgence, and if in view of the present financial difficulties Government stopped all privilege and furlough leave except where a man chose to go without pay retaining his claim for a fixed term, this great evil would be stopped at once to the great relief of the finances. As regards the pensions no such immediate steps can be taken, but there is no reason why the fall of exchange should benefit the pensioner class. All pensions payable in sterling should be reduced by the difference between the value of silver in exchange for gold as it obtained when the pensioner first retired and its present value. It may be expected that this measure alone will relieve the finances to the extent of three quarters of a crore of rupees.

PUBLIC WORKS.

55 The only large Department that remains to be considered is that of the Public Works in all its branches,—civil buildings, roads, Railways and Irrigation (Imperial, Provincial, and Local). The total of receipts and expenditure in this Department is now represented by no less a sum than 26 crores of Rs. Next to the Army and Home charges this is the most extensive department of Government and affords the largest field for immediate economy.

56 In this Presidency the Public Works expenditure has increased from the sanctioned contract amount of 29 lacks to 47 lacks. The highly paid machinery of Executive Engineers &c. is kept up in all the Districts, though in many the total of Provincial expenditure does not exceed Rs. 3,000 and the works required by the Local Funds are of a sort the native establishment can safely undertake. The reduction in the Executive Engineers' charges appears to be urgently called for. In other Provinces, especially in the North West and Oude and also in Madras, a double set of agency, Provincial and Local, is working side by side, representing an expenditure on establishment quite out of proportion to the work done. In these places amalgamation seems to be the most economical method of reducing the cost of the establishment.

57 The gradual extension of Native agency in this Department is an object which the Government has always professed to keep in view, and yet very little effect has been given to these intentions. Even in the Public Works account and Railway Revenue branches the higher grades of all offices are all filled up by Europeans. Under the two third rule the gradual substitution of Natives for Europeans would result in an annual saving of several lacks.

58 No real economy is possible in this Department, as also in the covenanted Civil Service, so long as a fixed and excessive number of recruits are allowed to join the Department every year. The result is that more men are allowed to enter than are wanted and a block ensues in the way of promotion, and then a cry is raised for personal allowances or permissive retirement on favourable terms. This involves needless expense and unsettles all calculations.

59 Lastly there are always a number of temporary additions made from time to time to the sanctioned number of appointments without enquiry whether the persons in the service were fully employed. The serious competition of the Cooper's Hill College with the Indian Colleges threatens to extinguish these latter institutions than which nothing would be a greater calamity. The Cooper's Hill men always require two or three years apprenticeship in India before they are fit for independent charges. The same money spent here would secure a much better class of men at less expense. In these several ways economy is possible in this Department; but in the absence of detailed information it is not possible for the outside public to make specific suggestions. We can only suggest general principles for the consideration of the Committee. We trust that as the result of the labours of the Finance Committee Government will be enabled to reduce their expenditure on this Department by a considerable amount. That there is room for such reduction is evident from,

the fact that the charge of establishments is in no case less than 23 per cent and is often as high as 60 per cent.

60 The Military works branch of Public Works expenditure has been needlessly separated in some of the Provinces; the works relate mostly to the construction of barracks for which usual Public Works officers ought to be competent. The fact that this duty is performed efficiently by the ordinary Public Works officers in some of the Provinces is a convincing proof that the present division into two branches is not necessary.

61 We have thus passed in review the work done by all the Civil Departments on which Government incurs any large expenditure. The gradual substitution of Native for European agency has been repeatedly pointed out by us as a means of effecting considerable saving. The highest authorities in England and in India have long since accepted this obligation, and yet full effect has not been given to it owing to the opposition of the vested interest and the inertia of all large departments. We feel convinced that unless Government makes up its mind to insist upon the guarantee that a definite proportion, larger or smaller according to the nature of the Department, shall be reserved for duly qualified natives, no progress in this respect will be made in the future any more than in the past. It is the absence of such guarantee which has paralysed the efforts of Government. The Opium, Survey and Account Departments were so opened up without any sensible progress being made in favour of Native admission. There is no reason why in all the Civil Departments a minimum number of places should not be reserved for Natives.

C O N T I N G E N T E X P E N D I T U R E .

62 The accounts of expenditure in the different Departments show that contingent expenses have enormously swollen, and it is likely they would go on swelling if no effective remedy is applied in time. Mr. Aitkinson, the Bombay Accountant General, is reported to have brought to the notice of Government, a remedy which however has not been applied. In his report on the 2nd Provincial contract he suggested that the amounts for items of petty charges should be fixed by allotments, and the disbursing officer should not be allowed to go beyond the fixed maximum. There is a good deal of truth in the remark that the real check to such expenditure rests with the head of the Department and nowhere else; so that if the heads of the Departments are made responsible, the large grant of 289,000 Rs. for the contingent expenditure of the several Departments can be reduced by at least ten percent.

63 In conclusion the Committee of the Sabha have directed me to express their fullest confidence in the work the Committee has

undertaken, and the Sabha hopes that the labours of the Committee would end in some real and substantial good to the Empire. We have been also directed to thank the Committee for the step they have taken in consulting Native and European public opinion in that matter. The Committee would find from the several representations they may have received that there is wonderful unanimity throughout the length and breadth of the Empire on some of the leading questions involved in the inquiry. If the Committee succeed in inducing the Government of India to enlarge the powers of the Legislative Councils so as to bring the Financial administration of the Empire before them at least once a year, if they succeed in inducing the Government of India to believe that the final solution of the Financial problem lies in the complete independence of the Local Governments with the reservation that they are bound to contribute *pro rata* for the maintenance of the Supreme Government, if they in their recommendations try to simplify the administration by dispensing as far as possible with the costly checks now rendered needless and nominal, if they further confirm the recommendation of the Army Commission, if they make their own recommendations in such a manner as to enforce a really large reduction of overpaid European agency instead of contenting themselves with suggesting small economies, if they give effect to the unanimous expression of Native public opinion on the points touched in this reply, and lastly if they succeed in finding out a method by which the local and supreme Governments will give practical effect to the wishes of the Imperial Government for the extended employment of the Native agency, the Committee will have laid the Empire under permanent obligation.*

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Most Obedient Servant

SHIVARAM HARI SAPHÉ.

Secretary, Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

* Owing to unavoidable circumstances this communication was not despatched till 9th December.

To,

His Excellency the Right Honorable

DONALD JAMES BARON REAY

L. L. D., C. I. E.,

Governor and President in Council.

BOMBAY.

The humble Memorial of the
people of Poona in public meet-
ing assembled.

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH,

That your Memorialists, in common with their brethren in the Deccan and the Southern Maratha Country generally, have been painfully exercised during the last few weeks by an almost authoritative announcement that the Finance Committee has for all practical purposes recommended the abolition of the Deccan College, an institution which has been in existence now for upwards of two generations. Your Memorialists are not aware of the grounds upon which the Finance Committee may have based its recommendation in this respect, and they accordingly labour under a very heavy disadvantage of not being in a position to examine the soundness and justice of those grounds. Under these circumstances your Memorialists are constrained to content themselves with indicating as clearly as possible the manifest disadvantages of the proposed step together with the serious breach of faith involved therein, and the almost entire absence of any compensating advantages calculated to afford any appreciable financial relief to the Exchequer.

2. That before proceeding to this task your Memorialists would beg to be excused for giving here a brief history of the origin and development of the Institution which it is now proposed to abolish. Three years after the conquest of the Deccan a Pathashala or College for the encouragement of the study of Sanskrit and of ancient Hindu literature and science was established at Poona. Two years later in 1823 the Court of Directors suggested its abolition on the ground of its having proved a failure. But the kind and sympathetic intervention of the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, the then Governor of Bombay and original founder of the College, saved it from the then impending fate. In an exhaustive minute on the subject he clearly pointed out the important political object which the College was intended to serve, and the expediency and justice of setting aside for the maintenance of Brahmans, and *Brahmans especially*, such a sum as could be spared from the large sum of Rs. 5,00,000 which used to be annually distributed among them under the late Native Government, because such an assignment was expected to, and did actually, produce the desired beneficial results of a very

important political character. He strongly protested against the closing of the college, not only on these grounds of political expediency and justice, but also on the ground that it was very desirable to preserve and encourage the study of the old Hindu literature and science, and that after it had, once become a recognized resort for Brahmans, gradual improvements in its organization could be easily introduced so as to make the Institution a powerful instrument for the diffusion of knowledge and for the encouragement of the learning of the country. This strong protest, based as it was upon the writer's unrivalled knowledge "of the temper and capacity of the people of the Deccan" had the desired effect. Since then the college has been allowed to the present day to develop into greater and greater usefulness. What proportion of the net charge on account of the maintenance of the College represents this assignment from the old Dakshana Fund is not now apparent; for, under the orders of the Secretary of State contained in the Despatch No. 15, dated December 30th, 1859, the practice, upto that time prevalent of keeping a separate account of the Fund was discontinued. In 1842, however, a sum of Rs. 20,000 would seem to have been assigned from that Fund for the maintenance of the College. Though, as has been already pointed out above, the old practice of keeping a separate account of the Dakshana Fund was discontinued from 1860, this sum would appear to have received a considerable addition during 1842-65, as the other assignment from the same Fund gradually decreased. The then Director of Public Instruction, the late Mr. E. I. Howard, who had previously occupied the post of Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government, in writing about the usefulness of the Poona College said:—"The Poona College is almost entirely maintained by an assignment from the Dakshana Fund, a charitable grant of the Peshwas, and the contribution of the British Government to the Poona College is, strictly speaking, confined to Rs. 6,420 per annum, the sum allowed to the former Government English School at Poona." The Bombay Provincial Committee (i. e. Mr. H. P. Jacob, Mr. W. Lee-Warner and the Honble K. T. Telang C. I. E.) of the Education Commission of 1862 took the same view; for in its Provincial Report it wrote:—"The high schools and most of the colleges owe their existence to the State, and the State can as a rule withdraw its connection with the institution when it pleases. In Bombay and Poona, however, there are institutions which grew out of endowments or attachments of funds and to the maintenance of which the public faith is more or less pledged." In another part of the same Report the same Committee wrote as follows:—"As regards those (i. e. scholarships) in the Deccan College they were established as part of the original constitution of the Poona College out of the Dakshana Fund, and we do not think that they can now fairly be alienated from that College." And your Memorialists humbly submit that if the scholarships are declared inalienable from that College

because they represent a part of the endowment or assignment from the "attached funds," the main endowment or assignment itself must *in fairness* be held to be equally "inalienable" from the college. On a similar understanding the late Hon'ble Sir Jamsetji Jijibhoy Bart would appear to have been encouraged by the then Director of Public Instruction to offer a large sum for providing a suitable abode to the Institution; and it is surely not too much to assume that the worthy Parsi Baronet, to whose liberality and munificence many an educational institution, in this Presidency especially, is so deeply indebted, would have at least considerably hesitated before making his offer if he had not been led to believe that "the State was pledged to maintain it," and that its future was not so risky as a recent departmental interpretation of the obligations of Government in connection with this College would make it out. (Vide the Administration Report of the Department for 1884-85 p. 135).

3. During 1834-52 the College underwent several changes until at last the foundation of the present Arts College was laid, and since then upto the present time it has been allowed to develop into a very useful and highly valued institution. As regards the usefulness of the Elphinstone and Poona Colleges Mr. Howard wrote:—

"In return for these grants (amounting together in 1859-60 to Rs 23,385) the Government is supplied with the best class of Native servants, and enabled to dispense to a great extent with the costly European agency. Our superior schools are supplied with teachers which we should otherwise be compelled to import from England at a much higher rate of salary; and, finally, we are slowly building up a body of Natives with European ideas, who value education for its own sake and who would make sacrifices to give it to their children. It has been abundantly proved that *the most faithful friends of the British Government are to be found in this class*, and it should always be remembered that superior education is in all countries the *only* kind of education that is reproductive."

He then added:—

"Where would national education now be in Europe if the money spent on Oxford and Paris and Bologna had been laid out in *Danie's* schools? And even now the *real* promoters of popular education in England are not small farmers and shop-keepers, but the noble and learned, bred by our great Universities."

Sir Alexander Grant also in reviewing the position of the Elphinstone and Poona Colleges in 1867 recorded that "judging from actual results in the students educated in these institutions, there was no branch of the department that he contemplated with

reater pleasure." And further your Memorialists would respectfully request a reference to the testimony on the same subject recorded by the Bombay Provincial Committee of the Education Commission (Vide Report Chap. III Section D. pp. 144-6). To be brief, the Deccan College may fairly claim to have very fully realized the expectations formed of it by its illustrious founder, the noble Mountstuart Elphinstone, by having become, during the comparatively short period of its existence as a remodelled institution on modern basis, a powerful instrument for the diffusion of knowledge.

4. A further proof of the increasing usefulness of the College is furnished by the fact that the number of scholars attending the College in 1884-85 has, notwithstanding the establishment of other similar institutions in other parts of this Presidency, more than doubled since 1878-79, and that the receipts from fees have during the same period increased from Rs. 4,572 to Rs. 9,935 or 117 per cent, while the so-called expenditure from Government revenues or partly from Government revenues, and principally from an assignment out of the "attached funds;" very nearly stood at the same figure or showed an actual decrease, howsoever small. It may be useful here to note the fact that during the same period the fee-receipts in the Elphinstone College at Bombay rose from Rs. 13,702 to Rs. 24,964 or 82 per cent only as against the 117 per cent increase in the Deccan College; while in the case of the Poona College of Science the fee-receipts during the same period actually fell from Rs. 5,250 to Rs. 4,828 thus showing a decrease of 8 per cent. And here it is useful to bear in mind the valuable testimony borne by Mr. Oxenham, Principal of the Deccan College, that "in 1881 the fee receipts in the Elphinstone and Deccan Colleges amounted to 16 per cent of the total expenditure, while at Oxford the average fee-receipts amounted only to 13 per cent, and in the Queen's College, Cork, not even to one per cent." If the same percentage were calculated on the figures for the Deccan College alone for 1884-85, it will be found to exceed 18 (Vide Appendices to the Administration Report of the Department for 1884-85, p. cxxiii). The cost of higher education to the student has thus been so considerably increased as to make that branch of education more and more self-supporting, and to have led the Bombay Provincial Committee of the Education Commission to distinctly decline to recommend a further enhancement in the rate of fees (Vide the Committee's Report p. 148). It will not be impertinent to the subject under notice if your Memorialists humbly request your Lordship's attention to the following testimony of Mr. W. Wordsworth, Principal of the Elphinstone College, on the same point. In the Administration Report of his College for 1878-79 Mr. Wordsworth made the following pertinent observations:—"It is often said by ignorant or prejudiced persons that the State in India gives a nearly gratuitous education to pauper boys who are thus raised into positions in life for which they are wholly unfitted. The

fact is that high education is much more nearly gratuitous in England than it is in India, owing to the liberality of royal and episcopal benefactors in ancient times; and the cost of such an education as our young men receive in Indian Colleges is higher than the cost of a similar, though probably much superior, education in France and Germany at the present time. I believe that an Indian parent who maintains a boy at College and pays Rs. 120 in College fees makes a greater proportionate sacrifice than a parent in the same position in either of the two countries just named. The cost of maintenance is probably higher, but the actual fees for instruction are less. It would be easy to apply the same test to Oxford and Cambridge expenses. I have called attention to these facts because an opinion appears to prevail that the education of the middle classes of India is assisted by the State to a degree which is unknown in other countries." (Vide the Departmental Administration Report for 1878-79 p. 23).

5. Your Memorialists will now turn to acquit themselves as completely as the materials at their disposal would permit of the twofold task which they have set before themselves, and which is indicated towards the end of para 1 of this Memorial. In his letter No. 836 dated the 9th May 1885 to the Chief Secretary to Government (para 20) the Director of Public Instruction wrote :—
" Before I close this section (Section C—Collegiate Education) I venture to refer to a matter which sooner or later will demand the attention of the legislature. I have reason to believe that large sums of money bequeathed for educational purposes, but not held in trust by public officers, are misapplied. It would be a public benefit if Government were able to investigate this complaint and direct public attention to the misapplication of funds so urgently needed for educational purposes. The interference of this Department should be sought by the public and not be volunteered. But in a matter of this sort information is the first necessity, and I should be glad if I were authorized to make inquiries and submit to Government a separate report on this important matter." G. R. No. 1938 dated the 29th October 1885, which dealt with the Director's letter, an extract from which has been quoted above, is silent upon the point so urgently pressed upon the attention of Government in the said extract; and so your Memorialists are unable to say whether or not the Director was authorized to make the inquiries he thought it so important in educational interests to institute. But with all due respect your Memorialists feel extremely constrained to observe that they fail to see how the public can be reasonably expected to voluntarily seek the interference of the Education Department in the direction named above, when that Department sets an example of a very questionable propriety of repudiating its own acknowledged obligations in respect of the maintenance of a trust, which, even if it has not all the force of a legal contract, is none the less more binding on Government on account of its very important politico-moral character, and which was formally and solemnly recog-

fixed at the time of the conquest of the Deccan. And your Memorialists must respectfully decline, to assent to a proposition that, because a separate account of the trust was discontinued on the pure ground of administrative convenience in 1860, the trust has ceased to exist. The following extract from the Departmental Report for 1884-85 (para 88) would appear to have paved the way for the recommendation of the Finance Committee, suggesting the practical abolition of the Deccan College, and as your Memorialists are afraid that that paragraph led the Finance Committee to point, as if with an unerring finger, to the Deccan College as the only Institution where economy is possible, they feel constrained to prominently refer to the following extract:—

“ * * * Thirdly, the assignments withdrawn from the fund and devoted to the Poona College rest upon the same basis as the fund reserved for fellowships or annuities; that is on the general revenues, and are governed by the same declarations of principle as were applied to the latter fund. Applying these facts to the Commission's inquiry, I think that Government might take account of their expenses on the College of Science or generally on education in Poona as relieving it from any moral obligation to maintain in perpetuity the Deccan College. Even if a moral or tacit obligation rest on Government to provide for ever an expenditure of Rs 50,000 a year on education in Poona thus maintaining the allotment originally provided by Mr. Elphinstone, I find no obligation to maintain the connection of Government with any particular institution in Poona on account of the origin of the Dakshana Fund. (Vide the Departmental Report for 1884-85: 135).

G. H. No. 440 dated the 13th March 1886, in which Government reviewed the annual report being silent on this point, your Memorialists are not aware whether the nature and extent of the moral obligation of Government to maintain the Deccan College in perpetuity, as construed in the foregoing extract from the Departmental Report, is accepted by the Governor in Council; but your Memorialists are most reluctant to believe that he has done so or will ever do so.

6. With all due deference your Memorialists would humbly submit, firstly that, as can be seen from the two extracts from the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone's minute of protest (Vide the Bombay Provincial Committee's Report p. 5.) the *minimum* amount annually distributed among learned Brahmans *not only of the capital city of Poona but of the Maharashtra generally* was Rs. 500,000 and not Rs. 85,000 as inaccurately stated in the Administration Report of the Department for 1884-85 (p. 134); secondly, that the allotment originally provided by Mr. Elphinstone was not intended for education of a general character and that too in Poona only, but “ for the encouragement of the study of Sanskrit and of

antient Hindu literature and science" among the Brahmans of the Peshwas' dominions, which in course of time was expected to develop, as it has actually developed, into an institution for the encouragement of higher education among *all classes and castes* throughout the Maharashtra, as the very name of the Institution, *Deccan College*, implies; thirdly that the gradually contracting amount of that portion of the allotment of Rs. 50,000, provided by Mr. Elphinstone, which is devoted to paying an annual *Dakshana* to learned Brahmans even upto the present day, is distributed among those of the Maharashtra generally and not of Poona especially; fourthly, that an outlay on a technical institution like the College of Science, or upon primary schools, which in the Poona City as well as in the Municipal towns of the Maharashtra can not now be regarded as Government institutions in the proper sense of that term, or even upon secondary schools throughout the said province, can never be regarded in all "good conscience" as "relieving Government from all moral obligation to maintain in perpetuity the Deccan College;" and fifthly and finally, that even if it may be assumed for the sake of argument that Government is not bound to maintain its direct connection with the Deccan College, provided always that the, for all practical purposes) *bona fide* endowment of the College is preserved intact, Government is still bound to see that it does not hand over such an Institution to a missionary body (Vide the Court of Directors' Despatch No. 49 dated the 19th July 1854 para 62, and also the Bombay Provincial Committee's Report p p. 199-201).

7. That in the humble opinion of your Memorialists, as far as they are aware, there is no "local body" even in Poona, still less in the other parts of the Maharashtra, in whose favour Government can withdraw from its direct connection with the Deccan College, while Government is bound by the unequivocal instructions contained in para 62 of the Despatch of 1854 not to abandon a *single* institution to probable, still less certain, decay, even though such a *single* institution be *entirely* maintained by the State. It may possibly be urged that the Deccan Education Society, which has recently come into existence in this ancient capital will take the charge of the Deccan College as an aided institution. Your Memorialists are, however, most reluctant to believe that Government can be seriously contemplating any such measure, because the Deccan Education Society is, as your Memorialists are fully aware, deeply and painfully conscious of its inability to undertake upon its infant shoulders any such grave responsibility at the present moment or even for a long time to come, and because even if the Society were so ill-advised as to be willing to accept such a grave responsibility, such a transfer would be distinctly opposed to the unanimous recommendation of the Education Commission. The Bombay Provincial Committee (Vide its Report p. 201) wrote:—

"But the Secretary of State proposed a gradual withdrawal, and a step in that direction will have been taken if the experiment of entrusting municipal boards with elementary schools proves successful. There seems to us no advantage in forcing a change which at present would be extremely unpopular with every section of society, and would not relieve Government of any large expenditure. We have shown how moderate the establishment of Colleges and High Schools is, and their efficiency would, we believe, enable many of them under their present management to *save more under the result system than their net cost.* We see no reason why the Bombay and Poona Municipalities should not one day offer to undertake the control of their High Schools, but until they do so, we would not precipitate a transfer, which will be more acceptable, if granted in response to a demand, than if forced on the people in opposition to their wishes."

It is clear from the foregoing extract that the Bombay Provincial Committee presumably intended the Bombay and Poona Municipalities in course of time "to offer to undertake the control," first of their High Schools, and later on of their Colleges also. The Committee then proceeded to distinctly add:—

"We are unanimously of opinion that except Municipal boards there are no other private agencies which would be competent to manage the present High Schools or Colleges. * * * But until private enterprise has not only extended, but extended so widely as to create a competition between similar schools under different management, we should not be prepared to run the risk of surrendering a College or district High School to 'probable decay.' Any extension of the Government system except on the grant-in-aid principle should be arrested, as soon as each district has been provided with one High School and its ancillary institutions. But until education has taken more firm root, and well managed aided schools have proved the vitality of private enterprise, we think it premature to close or transfer any of the existing institutions of the higher order."

Your Memorialists know that the Poona Municipality can not offer to undertake the management and control even of the local High School, still less of the Deccan College; it was certainly not consulted by the Finance Committee as to its being prepared or otherwise to undertake such a responsibility. And your Memorialists need hardly add that it would be manifestly unfair to the Municipality to force such a grave responsibility upon it before it has had time to prove its capacity by its successful management and control of the primary schools transferred to it only two short years since. It would be no less unfair to the Deccan Education Society to thrust this grave responsibility upon it before it has had any time to prove its vitality, having been

brought into existence about the same time that the primary schools were transferred to the Municipality. It can not be denied that the important conditions, justly insisted on in the foregoing extract before any of the existing institutions of the higher order can be safely transferred to any local body, still remain unfulfilled; for, with the exception of the infant college (the Fergusson College) established by the Deccan Education Society since the submission by the Education Commission of its report, private enterprise in this direction is as inactive as it was before. Under such circumstances there is no wonder that the "competition between similar schools under different management" is altogether conspicuous by its absence. To be brief, your Memorialists fail to see how the considerations, which led the Bombay Provincial Committee to recommend a strict compliance with the conditions named above, can be now *entirely* ignored, even if the offer by a local body to relieve Government of the charge of the Deccan College had been *genuine* and *voluntary*.

8. Your Memorialists hear that the authorities of the Free General Assembly's Institution at Bombay have resolved to open at Poona from the commencement of the ensuing year a branch of their collegiate institution at Bombay. It may possibly be urged in certain quarters that this proposed institution will in course of time take the place of the Deccan College even if it were now abolished. To such a course there are more objections than one. In the first place it can not reasonably be assumed that the offspring, whose prospective birth has been announced, will meet with better success in life than its old parent, the latter having been already beaten in efficiency not only by its contemporaries but even by its juniors, although to all appearances it has always had as competent and strong a staff of European Professors as its more successful rivals; and secondly the reasons, which were so ably urged by the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone in his minute on the Native Education Society's report on Education in 1823 (Vide the Bombay Provincial Committee's report p. 6) against encouraging missionary enterprise in educational matters to the exclusion of the direct operations by the State in that field, hold almost as good as they did in 1823, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument,—an assumption which the experience of the past does not at all justify,—that missionary enterprise in this direction will be as efficient as the activity of the State in the same field, or even that of local native bodies working in the same field. And to transfer now such an efficient institution as the Deccan College to private enterprise, whether native or missionary, would be equivalent to deliberately allow it to deteriorate in efficiency, until at last it dies a lingering death, and would accordingly be a distinct breach of the very important condition attached to the withdrawal by the State from its direct connection with any existing institution (Vide para 62 of the Despatch of 1854).

9. But assuming for the sake of argument that such a transfer does in no way prejudicially affect the efficiency of the institution, it remains to be seen whether such a transfer will result in affording any financial relief to Government. Your Memorialists are fortunate in being able to appeal to the valuable testimony on this very point, deliberately recorded after full and mature consideration by the Bombay Provincial Committee of the Education Commission. The Committee wrote :—“ We have shown how moderate the establishment of colleges and high schools is, and their efficiency would, we believe, enable many of them under their present management to earn more under the result system than their net cost. ” That Committee observed also :—“ There seems to us no advantage in forcing a change, which at present would be extremely unpopular with every section of society, and would not relieve Government of any large expenditure. ” Your Memorialists believe they are right in thinking that the Bombay Provincial Committee must have had the Deccan College very prominently in its view when it recorded its deliberate opinion in the emphatic manner testified to by the two foregoing extracts ; and they believe they are also right in holding that no material change has taken place during the short period, that has since elapsed, which can in any way justify what was then deliberately pronounced to be absolutely unjustifiable. It need hardly be pointed out that the proposed abolition of the Deccan College would be, to use the words of the Bombay Provincial Committee “ extremely unpopular ” not only with the Brahmans of Poona, but “ with every section of society ” in the province which is largely benefitted by the Deccan College.

10. Your Memorialists are afraid that the Finance Committee must have ignored all the important points set forth above, or that if it did consider them, it must have certainly allowed financial considerations an undue preponderance over them ; on no other assumption can the action of the Finance Committee be explained. In this very connection it will not be out of place if your Memorialists request a reference to the Government of India's Resolution in the Department of Finance and Commerce No. 649 dated the 10th February 1886 (para 8), in which the Finance Committee was *inter alia* instructed not to “ propose any material modification in arrangements which have in recent years been carried out after mature deliberation under the sanction of the Secretary of State, ” and “ to pursue a similar line of inquiry so far as regards departments or branches of the administration with which the changes effected in late years have not definitely dealt, or in which the reforms hitherto effected may prove to have failed to secure the economy aimed at. ” The Government of India's Resolution in the Home Department (Education) No. 10-309 dated the 23rd October 1884 sanctioned, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, all the recommendations of the Education Commission, (necessarily including those of its Pro-

vincial Committees also) save and except those few only which were disallowed; and it is for your Lordship and the Government of India to decide, whether or not the Finance Committee exceeded its instructions in re-opening *suo motu* a question which had been after mature deliberation disposed of only two short years since.

11. While fully sympathising with the Government of India in the financial embarrassment which necessitated the appointment of the Finance Committee in February last, and while by no means unconscious that some economy is possible in the Education Department as the result of utilizing native agency more largely in higher posts now held by Europeans, (e. g. Educational Inspectorships), your Memorialists hold very strongly that the Education Department is the *only* Department which is *least* open to the charge of frittering away the resources of the State in useless and lavish expenditure, and that accordingly it should be the last to be subjected to any retrenchment operation. Your Memorialists have no sympathy whatever with the cry periodically raised, that too much is being spent on higher education in India, and that higher education in India is being given by the State as almost an act of charity. The extract quoted from Mr. Wordsworth's report (Vide supra para 4), as also the extract - from Mr. Howard's report (Vide supra para 3), gives the best and most effective answer to such a cry which is the outcome more of prejudice than of ignorance; and it will be useful in this connection to respectfully request a reference to that paragraph of the the Honorable K. T. Telang's minute, in which he supplements one of the recommendations (No. 10) of Chapter VI of the Education Commission's Report by some very pertinent observations. (Vide the Commission's Report p. 609). Your Memorialists fully and cordially agree with Mr. Telang in those observations, and would earnestly express their hope that your Lordship would do the same by giving practical effect to them. Mr. Howard wrote in 1865:—" It is objected that superior education is expensive; and calculations *not of much practical value* are made of the number of primary Government schools that might be set up at the price of one professor. " Your Memorialists feel constrained to observe with all due respect that the calculations which must have led the Finance Committee to adopt its recommendation must be held open to the same condemnation that Mr. Howard so felicitously passed upon the other narrowminded calculations, which were then and are even now the fashion among a certain class of official and non-official Anglo-Indians.

12. In connection with the remarks contained in the foregoing paragraph your Memorialists would note the fact to which in the concluding paragraph of his minute, referred to above, Mr. Telang drew the pointed attention of the Government of India, and which lies at the root of the educational

policy of the Indian Government; viz, the fact that the Indian Government has not only not increased its allotment of budget grant to the Educational Department in any fairly adequate proportion to the increase in its revenues, but has actually reduced it; for while the revenues of the Indian Government rose from Rs. 61,87,36,510 in 1878 to Rs. 71,72,74,210 in 1884; the expenditure on education from Government revenues actually fell from Rs. 76,48,917 in 1878 to Rs. 73,42,358 in 1884. The Imperial Government of the United Kingdom increased its grant to education in ten years from £ 1,940,000 to £ 4,290,000 sterling (Financial Reform Almanac 1882 p. 145). And so far as this Presidency is concerned, the Finance Committee would curtail it still further!!! Another still more remarkable fact connected with this part of the subject is that while during this period of eight years the expenditure on education from Government revenues, as pointed out above, actually fell from Rs. 76,48,917 to Rs. 73,42,358, thus showing a decrease of 4 per cent, the expenditure on education from other local sources (such as local cesses; Municipal grants, fees, subscriptions, endowments, &c.) rose during the same period from Rs. 81,28,556 to Rs. 1,43,06,825, thus showing an increase of 76 per cent (Vide Statistical Abstract, Nineteenth Number, pp. 194-5) The following tables, the first for British India generally and the second for the Bombay Presidency only, are both interesting and instructive, and your Memorialists feel that they need no apology for requesting your Lordship's attention to this subject in so emphatic a manner:—

British India.

Head of Receipts.	1878	1884	Percentage of increase.	Percentage of decrease.
Local rates	24,29,220	36,94,518	52
Municipal Funds.....	3,18,928	7,76,827	143
Fees	27,53,194	56,12,000	105
Subscriptions	10,49,044	8,36,875	20
Endowments &c.....	17,71,376	35,22,328	98
Total of local receipts.....	81,28,556	1,43,06,825	76
Government grant.....	76,48,917	73,42,358	4

Bombay Presidency.

Head of Receipts.	1878	1884	Percentage of increase.	Percentage of decrease.
Local Rates	6,83,872	8,89,699	30
Municipal Funds.....	56,110	91,617	63
Fees	2,64,534	7,16,014	170*
Subscriptions	8,299
Endowments &c.....	9,02,239	11,35,506	25
Total of local receipts.....	19,15,054	28,32,836	47
Government grant.....	11,43,925	11,89,068	3

13 It was not surely the intention of the authors of the famous Despatch of 1854 that education in India should be made *entirely* self-supporting, and that Government should be gradually reducing its own contribution towards this important object until it ceases altogether to figure in the educational budget. And a careful study of the two foregoing statements is calculated to convince even the most sceptical mind that neither the Bombay Government nor the Government of India has, during the eight years ending with 1884,—done its duty of adequately supplementing the local resources in the educational field; and that both the Governments instead of curtailing their expenditure on education must largely increase their contribution, and show *by deeds and not by words only* their due appreciation of the great sacrifice the people have hitherto very cheerfully made under the guidance of the State.

14 Your Memorialists do not feel themselves called upon on the present occasion to show in what quarters economy, or rather the curtailment of the wasteful expenditure of the State's resources is not only possible but *probable*, so that your Lordship's Government may be enabled, to do its duty adequately in this direction, and to do an act of tardy justice to the two important

* It is a remarkable fact that no other province shows so much increase under this head, except Coorg only, which shows an increase of 223 per cent.

provinces of this Presidency, viz, Gujarath and Sindh, which have already been too long neglected. They will only content themselves with expressing their firm conviction that such an economy is in their humble opinion possible in almost every other department of the State without in any way impairing its efficiency. Calculations, unlike those which Mr. Howard deservedly stigmatized as "not of much practical value," might be made of what Government might be able to accomplish in the direction of promoting higher education at the price of an Inspector General of Police with his new grade of Police probationers, or a Commissioner of division, or the personal allowances to individual members of the Covenanted Civil Service for the so-called deferred promotion,—a system which has become a serious evil and is generally regarded as extremely wasteful,—or the permanent travelling allowances, a system which the Finance Committee is believed to have condemned as wasteful, but which those, who would gladly deal a death blow to the Deccan College, are none the less understood to be straining every nerve to uphold by specious arguments, persumably because the recommendation of the Finance Committee, if carried out, would trench upon vested interests; but for the reasons already given above they have advisedly refrained from such a course.

15. In conclusion your Memorialists humbly pray that on a full consideration of the facts and arguments set forth above your Lordship will be pleased to grant their humble request and to save their dearly cherished institution from the fate which the Finance Committee, presumably in ignorance of all the bearings of the case, is believed to have marked out for it.

And for this act of kindness your Memorialists, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.

Poona 10th November 1896.

GOPALRAO HARI DESHMUKH,

Chairman of the Public Meeting.

S. H. CHIPLONKAR,

SHIVARAM HARI SATHE,

Secretaries, Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

A NOTE ON RETRENCHMENT.

In any country, and under any circumstances, economy in administration must be a desideratum and a necessity, but in none can it be more imperatively so than in India where, under the peculiar conditions of British rule, it is essential to the material and moral progress of the nation that the weight of public burdens should be as light as possible.

Among the determining features of our present financial situation, which call for rigorous economy, may be mentioned the following:—

- (a) The progress of Russia in Asia, which, involving as it does a complete change in the position of Central Asian politics, imposes upon the Government of this country the necessity for greater Military preparedness in view of possible eventualities, and consequently for larger expenditure than hitherto on our system of internal and frontier defences.
- (b) The fall of silver—which renders heavier and heavier, as it proceeds, the drain on our resources for meeting our gold obligations abroad.
- (c) A complete movement of taxation from *indirect* to *direct* carried out in this country under the fiscal measures of the last 15 years,—a movement which makes further taxation highly inexpedient: for, under it, the burden of public taxes mainly falls on the producer, who, however, can not, under the existing Free Trade conditions of the Indian Market, pass on any part of his burden to the consumer, and is, thus, in a measure, handicapped in the race with the foreigner.

Thus, though the condition of our Finances is embarrassing, there is, we submit, little in it to justify panic and the adoption of measures based upon it.

For we believe, that the crisis can be tided over with ordinary care and prudence and without resort to such drastic remedies as curtailment of "*necessary and desirable*" expenditure with the eventual result of stoppage or retardation of progress, as foreshadowed in the Government of India's Resolution of February last appointing the Finance Committee.

Economies,—in whatever directions contemplated,—must be, to be permanent and useful, compatible with both Progress and Efficiency. Retrenchments carried out under the influence of panic or actual stress of War or Famine, can, at the utmost be only provisional. Large reductions, for instance, effected in Public Works expenditure by Lord Lytton's Government in '78 and '79 to meet the pressure of the Afgan War, with a total resultant saving of a Million and a half vanished away with the stress of the crisis, and that item of Imperial expenditure rose in a year or two following almost at a bound not only to its old level but a good deal higher. We, therefore, sincerely hope that the unbecoming sentiment, which breathes through the Government of India's Resolution above referred to, and which is unjustifiable under the circumstances, will meet with no responsive echo in the country and will not influence the deliberations of the Finance Committee.

Besides, our present high level of expenditure, as compared with the demands of the public service, is due to the convenient action of a variety of causes, some of which, being only temporary in their nature, have either already ceased or are fast ceasing to have much operative force. Consequently, a good deal of such expenditure, however necessary and useful in the circumstances of a generation ago, is now a needless waste of Public Funds, just as the expenditure of to-day will possibly involve a considerable waste a generation hence. Measures of retrenchment, therefore, in respect of expenditure fixed and settled of the first years of conquest and amidst difficulties in

Imperial consolidation and administrative organization,—undertaken in view of the altered conditions of today,—far from amounting, in our opinion, to any confession of extravagance or careless waste in the past,—appear to us to be only necessary measures of revision and reform, such as every well-ordered and prudent Government is bound to carry out in the interests of economy from time to time,

The question of retrenchment, therefore, resolves itself to our thinking, into one of general administrative reform, and may be stated thus:—

Whether it is possible to revise, in the altered circumstances of the day, the existing administrative arrangements of the Empire, planned, constructed, and elaborated more than two generations since, to meet conditions and necessities which are no longer existent,—so as to secure a permanent reduction of expenditure without sacrifice of progressive efficiency, and if so, in what directions such revision can be carried out.

Apart from considerations of financial pressure or necessity, we are of opinion that the time is come for such periodical revision of public expenditure, and we hold that such revision, if loyally carried out, will give the country a saving large enough not only to enable the Government to get over the present crisis, but to afford even a substantial relief to the Indian taxpayer, particularly in respect of that monstrous impost—the Salt-Tax—which weighs so oppressively and cruelly on the half-fed,starving agricultural and labouring classes in the Empire.

The chief causes of our present high scale of expenditure which is so much in excess of our present requirements may, we think, be ranged under four heads:—

(1) Initial difficulties of administrative organization, incidental to the early years of conquest and imperial settlement,

(2) Special needs of special situations.

(3) Historic fictions—originating in historic facts and conditions long since past.

(4) Mistakes of policy, resulting in serious mistakes of plan involving a large waste of energy and funds.

A few words by way of illustration in connection with each of these heads will, it is hoped, suffice for the purposes of this Note.

(I) As due to the first of the foregoing groups of causes may be mentioned:—

(a) In the matter of revenue administration, the establishment of a double machinery of intermediate supervision, as represented by Revenue Boards and Divisional Commissionerships,—which still exist in Bengal, and the North West Provinces, though their appointed work has long since been complete, and also a stronger administrative staff for district executive work than seems now necessary;

(b) The creation and continued maintenance of special centralized departments, with a view to proper organization, in respect of branches of the Public Service, such as Forest, Abkari, Salt, Sanitation, Agriculture &c,—branches which properly appertain, and ought to be handed over, to the District Executive Administration, now that they have been thoroughly organized, and which can, after this initial stage, be in our opinion managed with greater advantage to the State and with more convenience to the people by the local authorities, than under central departmental direction.

(II) As to the next head of causes—*special exigencies*,—we might mention:—

(a) Famine relief,—to which, for instance

was due the creation of a third Divisional Commissionership in Bombay in 1875-76.

- (b) Difficulties of communication in the absence of railways and roads and canals which, in the first years of conquest, not only added enormously to the difficulties of administration, but led, for purposes of effective supervision which was in those circumstances as essential to administrative success as it was difficult, to the constitution, in almost every branch of the administration, of a supervising staff far stronger than the interests of the Public Service now appear to require in the altered and settled condition of things. In some Departments we have a double or even a triple machinery of *intermediate* supervision. Thus between the Secretariat and the Local Executive we find:—

In *Madras*,—in the Department of *Public Works ordinary* the supervising establishment is classed and graded as follows:—(1) Chief Engineers in three classes; (2) Superintending Engineers, one class in 3 grades. The Chief Engineer is assisted in the central office by a Deputy Chief Engineer;

In North India, in the *Forest Department*, while the Sub-Assistant Conservators and Forest Rangers are "the real Executive Officers" (as Mr. Cotton very appropriately observes in his Report page 203), the "Superior" or supervising staff is composed of Conservators, Deputy Conservators, and Assistant Conservators—numbering in all more than 100, exercising intermediate supervision over the work of the subordinate establishment, subject to the control of the Inspector-General who is the Departmental Chief;

In Bombay,—in *Vaccination*, while real work is done by about 380 Vaccinators, we have 10 Superintendents and 27 Assistant Superintendents over them, themselves acting under a Superintendent-General.

Such a Machinery of *intermediate* supervision can surely be curtailed and simplified in the interests of economy without any noticeable loss of efficiency, in view of the present great facilities of communication and of the thorough organization of the Services in the lower grades.

(c) Expenditure on an exorbitant scale in Public Works ordinary.—At a time when the very material apparatus of civilized and progressive administration was wanting in the country, a large annual expenditure on civil and military works was inevitable; but now after about 259 millions sterling have been spent on these during the last 40 years the necessity for continued outlay in future years, on the same or even larger scale, is justly open to question. Similarly, Public Works establishments,—both executive and supervising—organized to meet the heavy pressure of work in the first years of conquest, are now far stronger than the country requires, and cost “not less than £500,000 a year more than was necessary for the expenditure on ordinary and on productive Works which had to be carried on” (*Vide* Sir J. Strachey’s Financial Statement February 24, 1880, page 28, para 99). Reductions carried out since that declaration of the Finance Minister have been more apparent than real, for while “permanent” establishments have been slightly curtailed, “Temporary” ones exhibit a corresponding or even greater increase.

- (d) Absence—real or supposed—of trained talent in the country, necessitating a large import of foreign and costly agency in respect of such Services, particularly, Forest, Medical, Sanitation, Survey &c. As due to the same circumstance is the maintenance of the Royal Civil Engineering College at Coopers' Hill in England, for the supply of trained Engineers for the Indian service, at a cost of £20,200. Now, however, when we have strong and flourishing Civil Engineering Colleges in India, and, besides, can procure what supply of Engineers we want for our present wants from England, from among Officers of "Royal Engineers [local cadres and home corps] and Stanley Engineers," it does seem a waste of funds to support such an establishment in England,—*not in India*. Further, the supply of engineers that is coming year after year from this source, is simply embarrassing. Sir J. Strachey said in 1880:—"Our Public Works establishments are still larger than they ought to be, and the constant supply of young Engineers that flows in from Cooper's Hill, will, *if it be not speedily stopped, prove a cause of renewed embarrassment and of useless and serious expense.*" [Vide Financial Statement February 14, 1880, p. 29, para 180.] The italics are ours. At or about that time over 390 engineers were induced to retire with large gratuities—at a cost close on half a million—a fact which speaks for itself, and yet the Cooper's Hill College is still supported by Government!
- (e) Distrust of Native Agency,—a feeling to which is directly due the fact that our supervising staffs in almost all departments are composed of European officers. The

superior grades of both the Civil and Military Services are wholly manned by Europeans, and even in the *uncovenanted* civil branches of the Service, declared by successive Secretaries of State for India as reserved for native ambition, the proportion of European officers to Native is as "7 to 1" [*Vide* Parliamentary Return]. Now, is the state of things any way better in the Non-Regulation Provinces where there is no close "Civil Service?" This sentiment of distrust, however excusable in the first generation of alien rule, seems now in these days weak and unworthy and is assuredly out of date at a stage of the Country's progress at which better relations between the rulers and ruled ought to exist.

(III) Coming to the third head of causes, namely, *historic fiction*;—As due to the historic fact of the co-ordinate growth of the three Presidencies, we have:—

- (a) *Army*—The Presidential Commands, maintained at a needless charge of about a million sterling as estimated by the Army Commission. The army is, specially and practically, an Imperial service under central management and control. The Presidential armies, once resting on an independent footing, are now gone as separate local units, but the Provincial Commands still remain, a burden to the Treasury. Thus we now have the shadow without the substance, costing no less than a million sterling.
- (b) *Post*—The three Presidential Central Post Offices, each under a Post Master-General, kept up as a relic,—though a costly relic,—of a system no longer existant. The service is now an Imperial service, but the fiction remains of its once having been a Provincial

service under Provincial direction, and costs us for nothing a pretty large sum of a lac of rupees per annum.

(c) *Coinage*—This, like the two preceding Services, ought to be a strictly Imperial service. And, yet, where one Imperial mint located in the Commercial metropolis of the Empire ought to have sufficed, we had three mints in the three Presidencies down to 1869, in which year the Madras mint was closed for want of business. We have still two—one at Calcutta and one in Bombay, of which the Calcutta mint scarcely pays its way, but is admittedly kept up, though at no slight cost, in deference to the sentimental susceptibilities of the political capital of the Empire [vide Evidence before the Parliamentary Finance Committee]. The abolition of the Calcutta mint would give us a saving of about 5 lacs per year without causing any the slightest real inconvenience to the commercial public.

(IV) Our fourth and last head of causes of the present abnormal growth of expenditure is "Mistakes of Policy, resulting in Mistakes of Plan." As it is not given to any Government in the world, however enlightened (if we of course except the Papacy of Rome), least of all to a foreign Government, to be perfect and infallible, it was inevitable that mistakes of policy, and serious mistakes too, should occur, in the first years of conquest, due in a large measure to want of experience, want of local acquaintance or guidance, and to the absence of independent light from popular sources. But now, when they are pointed out by experience and by the voice of public opinion, there is no excuse for clinging to them through

conservative aversion to change. It would be enough now to refer to two such :—

(a) A wrong military policy,—founded in distrust and suspicion,—which, while it neglects to utilize the military talents of the gifted races of the Deccan and the N. W. Provinces and to enlist, in the cause of national defence, the *active* co-operation of the higher and upper classes in the country by opening out worthy careers for their ambition in the service, seeks to augment the military strength of the Empire by adding *ad infinitum* to the standing army of the country, rather than by endeavouring to increase the *expansibility* of our army organization. The increase in our army charges from 14 to close upon 21 millions sterling i. e. full 50 per cent, since the mutiny years of 1857-58, is a circumstance which shows more than any thing else the disastrous influence of this mistaken military policy, founded in distrust and mis-apprehension,—distrust of native loyalty, and mis-apprehension of the permanent demands of national defence,—upon the finances of the Empire. A blind and reckless continuance of it would, alone, neutralize the effect of economies in all other directions. A reform of policy in this most important matter of army organisation is, in our opinion, demanded in the interests of economy no less than for the sake of national security and safety.

(b) The present fiscal policy in relation to salt revenue is another instance of costly error of policy. The consumption of, the article is taxed for revenue purposes not by taxing the *sources* of supply but by controlling or

rather virtually monopolizing those sources. The normal conditions of supply and demand are thus reversed, the supply not depending upon the effective demand for the commodity, but the demand,—strange as it may appear—being *determined and limited* by the supply. The Government is the supplier, but the sources of manufacture are so contracted and concentrated for effective supervision and for preventing smuggling &c., that the supply usually *falls short of the demand*: and no better proof is needed of this state of things than the fact (Vide Cotton's Report page 163) that the price of the article at the auction sales on the margin of the Sambhar lake in North India is on an average 8 *d.* per maund or 2½ *d.* above the cost price. The frequent necessity of raising the price of salt at these Government sources of manufacture is also strong evidence of the same circumstance. Only last year, not to go further back, the supply was a good deal short of the demand at the Sambhar Lake and resulted in a considerable loss of revenue. On this point, Sir A. Colvin said in his Financial Statement of March last that "the decrease under India general and the increase in Bombay are due to the same cause, viz, the raising of the price of salt at Sambhar from 2½ annas to 8 annas a maund (i. e. three times the cost price) in order to prevent exhaustion of the stock in hand. The stock in hand was very low owing to an unfavourable season for manufacture in 1884-5. The raising of the price led to a reduction in the consumption of Sambhar salt;" and we would say, of other salt as well, and the loss of duty, due to diminished consumption caused by diminished supply, is estimated at 50 lacs. In taxing salt Govern-

ment controls its manufacture as a monopolist. It works, its sources of supply according to its own administrative convenience by concentrating and thereby contracting them according to its own measure of the demand for the article. Practically, the market is often *undersupplied*, the imports even when thus forced up not making up for deficiency of home production; and thus, the supply, acting through the "sliding scale" of prices, measures and limits the demand. The loss to the treasury owing to this reversal of the laws of Political Economy,—not to speak of the cruel hardship to the people, involved in this shortness of supply in the matter of this "prime necessary of life"—cannot of course be accurately estimated, but, looking to the almost indefinite *expansibility* of effective demand for salt, we might put it down at a million or two a year. Secondly the cost price of salt under the present system of Government monopoly, is full $5\frac{1}{2}d$, whereas it cannot exceed under careful private management 2 or $2\frac{1}{2}d$ per maund; the difference marking the wastefulness of the Government system under which the stipendiary agency employed can possibly have no motive for economy and care, the stimulus of self-interest being wholly absent. Thirdly and lastly, the charges of collection amount to over 8 p. c., whereas, under better arrangements, they cannot be more than 2 or 4 p. c.

For these and other reasons, the present salt-policy seems to us to be a costly mistake, causing,—in respect of needless expenditure as well as loss of net revenue—a total loss to the treasury to the extent of between 2 and 3 millions. Here is room for reform and retrenchment.

Such, briefly, are some of the leading causes of our present expenditure, and they are either preventable, like errors of policy, or are losing their operative force, such as difficulties of supervision. It seems, therefore, only reasonable that a revision of our expenditure in recognition of the fact, founded on the basis of administrative reforms of system and plan, should be carried out, in view of the present embarrassed condition of the national finances which demands a rigorous enforcement of economy. ✓

With this short introduction, we shall proceed to suggest, with our small and imperfect lights, in what direction such a revision of our expenditure seems practicable and safe, repeating that the question of retrenchment now before the Finance Committee is essentially a question of administrative reform with a view to economy, and not one of hard necessity or financial pressure, justifying a resort to measures of panic and haste, likely to be injurious to the best interests of the country.

We shall begin with the Executive branch of the Civil Administration, On the following page is quoted a table showing the strength of the administrative staff, as distributed according to Provinces.

[M. B. The Provinces are classed under 3 heads :—Regulation, Non-Regulation, and Scheduled Non-Regulation. But of the "Non-Regulation" provinces it should be noticed that they are now so, more in administrative nomenclature than in legal reality, because (1) since 1861 they have been brought under the general system of Indian Legislation, and (2) the union of administrative and judicial duties is being fast removed by the constitution of a separate judiciary. The "Scheduled" districts also are now "Non-Regula

Province.	Legal Status.	Area in Sq. miles.	Population (census 1881)	Revenue £.			Administrative staff.				
				Land, including cesses.	Other.	Total.	Supervising.		Executive.		
							Boards or Commissioners.	Divisional officers.	Collectors or Deputy Commissioners.	Assistants Collector and Asst. Commissioner.	Total.
Madras	Regulation.	188,800	81,170,631	5,130,004	5,978,391	10,108,295	Board.	...	21	60	117
Bombay	Regulation.	77,500	14,040,591	2,916,089	9,248,126	12,164,215*	8	13	51	92
N. W. Provinces.	Regulation.	81,700	32,720,128	5,053,468	445,174	5,498,642	Board.	7	35	110	145
Bengal	Regulation.	158,200	60,091,456	3,733,872	14,791,081	18,524,953	Board.	9	44	194	168
Punjab	Non-Reg.	105,000	12,350,327	3,303,359	1,773,437	4,075,776	Financial Commissioner.	10	32	97	129
Oude	Non-Reg.	24,000	11,387,741	1,520,068	170,017	1,607,085	4	12	35	47
Central Provinces	Non-Reg.	84,000	9,838,791	647,845	651,790	1,299,130	4	18	30	42
Assam	"Scheduled" Non-Reg.	45,800	4,881,426	883,544	874,196	757,740	1	11	21	32
Sind	"Scheduled" Non-Reg.	46,600	2,413,823	680,022	1	5	12	17

* Including Sind.

Looking first to the supervising branch of the administrative staff,—which acts as an *intermediate* agency of supervision between the Secretariat of the central Government and the local executive administration,—we find that it is differently constituted in different provinces. In Bengal, and the N. W. Provinces we have the dual machinery of Boards and Commissioners; in Panjab, there is a Financial Commission, instead of a Board, to supervise the work of Divisional officers who in turn act as Superintendents in respect of the local Executive; in Madras, we have a Board without Divisional Commissioners, while Bombay is content with only Commissioners. Now, considering that the administrative necessities of these Provinces are about the same, it appears to us that there is no justification for these inequalities of system in respect of *intermediate* supervision, and we venture to hold that the time is come for practically considering the question of re-modelling, with a view to simplicity and uniformity, this branch of the administrative machinery.

On the subject of the Boards, the Finance Commissioners observe (*Vide F. C. Report, part 2 page 101 para 3*) that “among the changes which have been made in the Indian administrative system during the last quarter of a century may be specified that of the abolition of most of the Boards which before existed,” and proceed in the same para to recommend the abolition of the Madras Board. We go in for a more thorough reform in the matter, and advocate the disestablishment of the other Boards as well. The Panjab Financial Commissionership is also, in our opinion, now a sinecure appointment and should be done away with as a costly luxury, in the interest of economy.

These Boards had their day and their usefulness. They served a most important purpose in the administrative system. In the circumstances, in which they rose, they were, for practical purposes, standing Committees of tried and trusted specialists, affiliated, on a

coordinate footing, to the Secretariat of the Central Government, whose aid was indispensable in the first years after the conquest, in the work of organising and systematising the administration, on a uniform basis, particularly in the important branch of Revenue. With a weak Secretariat, and that too burdened with other work, on the one hand, and with the local officers on the other overwhelmed with detailed executive administration, particularly in the absence of a trained, trustworthy subordinate service, the Central Government stood in especial need of the services of these Boards, possessed of local experience and technical knowledge in the elaboration of order and system on general principles and on uniform lines in respect of administrative organisation. This initial and most difficult stage, however, was in course of time passed. The administrative system was constructed, elaborated and put in working order and the work of revenue settlement was completed. The Secretariats were strengthened by a large infusion of the specialist element. The work of the local Executive Officers was simplified and facilitated; the subordinate services were properly organised, and local institutions, too, were created for the purposes of local management. The local administrative machine having been thus adjusted and effectually controlled, the work of the supervising Divisional Commissions was rendered easy and light. The special exigencies of the special situation, having been thus fully met, there was little or nothing left for these Boards to do in any special direction, and they ceased to have any special sphere of usefulness. Their *raison d'être* was thus gone and yet they have lived on. With a change, however, in the circumstances in which they had their origin there came naturally a change over their functions. They no longer served as consultative bodies to the Secretariat but sank down to the subordinate level of a subsidiary agency of local supervision side by side with the Commissioners, who were nominally subject to their authority. But this was a new function, as well

as a new position, thrust on these Boards, originally constituted for a far different purpose. In Bengal and the N. W. Provinces, they are "such in name rather than in substance," as we are told by the Famine Commission (in the para above referred to); "the two members of which they are composed" divide "the work between them," and rarely act "as consultative bodies." In Madras, the Board acts as an agency of intermediate supervision, unaided by Divisional Commissioners, and it is complained that it cannot exercise any amount of effective local supervision. Thus, practically, the work of these Boards is *nil*; for they neither serve as consultative bodies as before, nor as effective supervising bodies in their altered position. They form little more than a superfluous wheel in the machinery of administrative supervision—a useless adjunct, now that their special function is gone, to the administrative machine, clogging rather than aiding its motion and working.

We therefore submit that the time is come for abolishing these Boards as a measure of retrenchment, which can be carried out without the least sacrifice of administrative efficiency. Bombay has no such Board, and no one advocates its establishment. The Famine Commission was of opinion that Madras should be satisfied with Divisional Commissioners in lieu of the present defunct Board. Punjab too has no such Board and is content with a Financial Commission. Now if Bombay, Madras, and Panjab can very well do without Boards, we fail to see why Bengal and the N. W. Provinces should be burdened any longer with this costly but useless luxury. Surely no grounds

exist, apart from administrative necessity, which can be pleaded for keeping them up any longer.

Mr. Cotton, in his Report at page 38, gives the cost of these Boards at under :—

	£
Bengal, Board of Revenue.....	26,911
N. W. Provinces.....	21,860
Madras	28,801
	<hr/>
	Total £ 77,572

The abolition of these Boards would thus result in an annual saving of £ 77,572 to the treasury. In Madras, however, there would be a considerable set off to the saving ; for, as the Famine Commissioners suggest, it would be necessary, in that case, to create at least two Divisional Commissionerships at a total annual charge, on the Bengal scale, of £ 11,060. With this deduction, the net gain may be put down at £ 66,512.

Further, we are of opinion that Panjab should now, however reluctantly it may be, part with its Financial Commissioner who, whatever his usefulness in the first years after the conquest in the work of administrative construction in the Financial branches, appears in the present circumstances only a costly anomaly, whether we look upon this interesting personage as a special adviser attached to the Secretariat in matters financial, or as a supervising autocrat over the divisional and district officers of the Province. His work, which must now be either of an ornamental or ordinary character, should be delegated, if need

be, to a new Under-Secretary in the Finance branch of the Secretariat. The charges of the office of this Financial Commission in the Province are put down by Mr. Cotton, at £ 13,159, and if it be abolished, and an Under-Secretary be appointed to do the work at a charge, including his salary and cost of the office establishment, of (say) £ 1,500, the net saving would be £ 11,659 per annum.

This double measure of retrenchment, which involves no sacrifice of efficiency, would give the country a net annual saving of £78,169 (= £66,570 on account of the Boards and £ 11,659 on account of the Financial Commission in the Panjab), and would besides effect a most desirable change in the administrative system by simplifying the present cumbrous machinery of intermediate supervision.

These Boards disestablished and the office of the Panjab Financial Commissioner abolished, we would not advocate any further dislocation, for the present, of the existing machinery of supervision. The abolition of Divisional Commissionerships is now and then suggested in the papers, but we are strongly of opinion that the time is not yet come for so structural a change in the administrative system. As long as local supervision is essential to the success of District Administration, and unity of effective control is needed to secure uniformity of method, we think, we must retain our Commissioners, and for the reason that the Central Secretariats cannot assume, or, even if they assume, cannot effectually discharge, the functions of local supervision, besides their special one of controlling direction, and no other agency is for the present available for the purpose. Until the system of District Administration

is placed on a new footing, and the district officers are relieved entirely of the executive *detailed* work, as well as of their magisterial duties, and are thereby enabled to assume their proper position in the system, as directing heads of local Executive Administration, we fear, that the removal of these Divisional Commissionerships, as sometimes suggested, before some other agency is ready to take its place, the Secretariat being left out of account as being useless for the purpose, would confer, by doing away with the only effective agency of supervision we have now, upon the District Executive Officers a larger measure of administrative independence and controlling power of direction, than can be safely confided to them in the present condition of things, and would thereby impair the efficiency and imperil the success of local Executive Administration.

While, therefore, on these and other grounds, we strongly deprecate the suggested abolition of Divisional Commissionerships, we would, however, recommend a considerable reduction in their present number by a territorial extension of their areas, in view particularly of two facts:—(1) increased facilities of communication, rendering the task of supervision easier, and (2) changes of circumstance, such as a better organization of District Administration work, a better organization of Public Opinion, &c. which render supervision simpler as well as easier, than it was a decade or two ago. But this suggestion regarding the reduction in the present number of Divisional Commissioners opens up a far broader question of administrative change, namely, that of a general territorial re-adjustment of Divisional and District Executive

charges,—which, as bearing on the whole system of Executive Administration, has to be considered in connection with both the supervising and Executive branches of the administrative machinery.

Reverting to our table on page 14 of this Note, we find the whole administrative staff distributed according to Provinces as under:—

Province.	Divisional Commissioners.	District Executive officers.	Assistant Collectors &c.	Remarks.
Madras	21	96	We leave out of consideration the two "Scheduled" Non-Regulation districts of Assam and Sind, as being subject to exceptional administrative treatment in their present backward condition. The "Non-Regulation" provinces, (Panjab, Oude, Central Provinces) being so now only in name, are grouped with the Regulation Provinces, as practically belonging to that category.
Bombay	3	18	74	
N. W. Provinces.	7	35	110	
Bengal	9	44	124	
Panjab.....	10	32	97	
Oude	4	12	35	
Central Provinces.	4	18	30	
Total.....	37	180	566	

Thus of the total superior staff of Executive Administration, numbering 783 strong, we have 37 Officers, composing the supervising branch, and 746, the Executive of which latter, 180 are the local Executive heads of District Administration.

The distribution of this staff according to Provinces is shown in the following tables which give the average area, population, and revenue per each class of Officer in each:—

(A) As per Commissioner.

No. of Commissioners.	Province.	Area.	Population.	Revenue (£)			Remarks.
				Land.	Other.	Total.	
	Madras (...)	No Commissioners, but a Board.
3	Bombay (—Sind).	25,853	4,680,197	972,029	2,312,031	3,041,054*	* Including Sind, and the average is taken by dividing the figure by 4—being the number of Commissioners in the Presidency, inclusive of Sind.
7	N. W. Provinces.	11,671	4,674,304	721,937	63,596	785,520	
9	Bengal.....	17,577	7,410,163	414,863	1,643,453	2,058,217	
10	Panjab.....	10,500	1,885,043	230,235	177,343	407,577	
4	Oude	6,000	2,846,935	380,017	42,502	402,264	
4	Central Provinces.	21,000	2,459,655	161,836	162,697	324,785	

(B) As per *District Officer*—Collector or Deputy Commissioner.

N o. of Districts.	Province.	Area.	Population.	Revenue (£)			Remarks.
				Land.	Other.	Total.	
21	Madras	8,609	1,484,315	243,381	285,652	481,318	* Same as in the preceding table.
18	Bombay (—Sind).	4,311	780,035	162,605	402,092	528,898*	
35	N. W. Provinces.	2,334	934,860	144,385	12,719	157,107	
44	Bengal.....	3,600	1,515,715	84,560	335,160	421,021	
32	Panjab.....	3,281	588,451	71,954	55,420	127,368	
12	Oude	2,000	948,980	126,672	14,168	134,088	
18	Central Provinces.	4,111	546,556	37,630	36,210	72,060	

A NOTE ON PATR ENCHMENT.

(C) As per *Sub-District officer* (—Assistant Collector &c.).

No. of sub-district officers.	Province.	Area.	Population.	Land Revenue £.	Remarks.
98	Madras	1,445	324,694	53,437	The other heads of Revenue are left out because these sub-district officers have but little to do with them. Land Revenue alone is particularly under their management.
74	Bombay (—Sind)	1,048	189,373	39,041	
110	N. W. Provinces.	743	287,456	45,940	
124	Bengal	1,276	537,834	30,112	
97	Panjab.....	1,083	194,330	23,839	
35	Oude	698	323,364	43,430	
30	Central Provinces	2,800	327,957	21,578	

These three Tables [A. B. C.] show how unequally the administrative staff is distributed among the different Provinces. The fact of this unequal distribution may be brought out more vividly if we re-arrange the figures as under :—

1st Area.

No. of Commissioners.	Province.	Per Commissioner.	Rank.	Remarks.
3	Bombay (—Sind)	25,853	1	Of the Provinces that have Divisional Commissioners, Bombay heads the list, with the largest average area per Commissioner: Oude comes last, in which the average <i>Divisional</i> Commissioner-ship is smaller than the average <i>District</i> Collectorate of Madras. The average <i>Divisional</i> area in Panjab is only slightly larger than that of the Bombay District of Khaundeish.
4	Central Provinces	21,000	2	
9	Bengal	17,577	3	
7	N. W. Province.	11,671	4	
10	Panjab	10,500	5	
4	Oude	6,000	6	
.....	Madras	

No. of District Officers.	Province.	Per District Officer.	Rank.	Remarks.
21	Madras	6,609	1	In respect of District Executive charges, Madras has the largest area, and Oude, the smallest. The average district area in the N. W. Provinces is considerably smaller than that of the sub-district charge in the Central Provinces.
18	Bombay (Sind)... ..	4,311	2	
18	Central Provinces ...	4,111	3	
44	Bengal	3,600	4	
32	Panjaub	3,281	5	
35	N. W. Provinces ...	2,334	6	
12	Oude... ..	2,000	7	
No. of Sub-district Officers.	Province.	Per Sub-District Officer.	Rank.	Remarks.
30	Central Provinces ...	2,800	1	With regard to the Sub-district Officer's charges, the Central Provinces stand first, Oude comes last. The areas the in N.W. Provinces are only a trifle larger than in Oude.
98	Madras	1,445	2	
124	Bengal	1,276	3	
97	Panjaub	1,083	4	
74	Bombay (—Sind) ...	1,048	5	
110	N. W. Provinces ...	743	6	
35	Oude... ..	698	7	

In point of magnitude of Area, the Provinces rank as follows:—

Province.	Commissionerships.	District charges.	Sub-District charges.	Remarks.
	Rank	Rank	Rank	
Bombay (—Sind).	1	2	5	Thus, <i>Bombay</i> has fewer Commissioners than any other Province; <i>Madras</i> fewer District officers, and <i>Central Provinces</i> , fewer Sub-District officers. <i>Oude</i> has the largest number of Commissioners, District officers and Sub-District officers; <i>Punjab</i> comes next to it or, rather, the <i>N. W. Provinces</i> .
Central Provinces.	2	3	1	
Bengal.....	3	4	3	
N. W. Provinces...	4	6	6	
Punjab.....	5	5	4	
Oude.....	6	7	7	
Madras.....	7	1	2	

2ndly In respect of Population:—

No. of Commissioners.	Province.	Per Commissioner.	Rank.	Remarks.
...	Madras has no Commissioners.	Of the Provinces having Commissionerships <i>Bengal</i> gives to the Commissioners the largest population to look after; <i>Panjab</i> the smallest; the latter averaging only slightly larger than the average population for a District Officer in Bengal, or being about equal to that of the two <i>Bombay</i> districts of <i>Khandeish</i> and <i>Nasik</i> .
9	Bengal	7,410,163	1	
3	Bombay	4,680,197	2	
7	N. W. Provinces ...	4,674,304	3	
4	Oude... ..	2,846,935	4	
4	Central Provinces ...	2,459,685	5	
10	Panjab	1,885,043	6	

No. of District Officers.	Province.	Per District Officer.	Rank.	Remark.
44	Bengal	1,515,715	1	In respect of District charges Bengal again heads the list; the Central Provinces come last, Panjaub being only a shade better; the average District charge in Panjab shows a population only a little larger than that of the average sub-district in Bengal.
21	Madras	1,484,815	2	
12	Oude... ..	948,950	3	
35	N. W. Provinces ...	937,860	4	
18	Bombay (—Sind) ...	780,035	5	
32	Panjaub	588,451	6	
18	Central Provinces ...	546,556	7	
No. of Sub-District Officers.	Province.	Per Sub-District Officer.	Rank.	Remarks.
124	Bengal	597,834	1	Coming last to the Sub-district charges, we find Bengal at the top as in (a) and (b), Bombay falling at the bottom: Panjaub is only slightly better than Bombay.
30	Central Provinces...	327,957	2	
35	Oudh... ..	325,364	3	
98	Madras	324,694	4	
110	N. W. Provinces ...	287,456	5	
97	Panjaub	194,330	6	
74	Bombay	189,373	7	

In point of *Population* therefore the Provinces rank as under :—

Province.	Rank.			Remarks.
	Commis- sioners.	Collec- tors.	Asst. Colts.	
Bengal.....	1	1	1	<i>Bengal</i> has the largest Commissioner, District officer, and sub-District Officer charges. <i>Panjab</i> , about the largest number. <i>The O. Provinces</i> , only slightly better. <i>Oude</i> ,—middling.
Bombay	2	2	2	
N. W. Provinces.	3	3	3	
Oude	4	4	4	
Central Provinces.	5	5	5	
Panjab	6	6	6	
Madras	7	7	7	

3rdly—Revenue—*Land* (as being the most important.)

No. of Com- missioners.	Province.	Per Commis- sioner.	Rank.	Remarks.
3	Bombay (—Sind)	972,029	1	<i>Bombay</i> shows the largest land revenue per Commissioner; the Central Provinces the smallest.
7	N. W. Province.	721,927	2	
9	Bengal	414,863	3	
4	Oude	380,017	4	
10	Punjab	230,235	5	
4	Central Provinces	161,836	6	

No. of District Officer.	Provincia.	Per District officer.	Rank.	Remarks.
21	Madras	240,338	1	<i>Madras</i> in respect of district charges heads the list with the largest revenues for District officer: The <i>Central Provinces</i> come last.
18	Bombay	162,605	2	
35	N. W. Provinces ...	144,385	3	
12	Oude.	126,672	4	
44	Bengal	84,560	5	
32	Panjab	71,954	6	
18	Central Provinces...	37,630	7	

No. of Sub-District officer.	Provinces.	Per Sub-District Officers.	Rank.	Remarks.
98	Madras	53,439	1	<i>Madras</i> , again, comes at the top in regard to <i>Sub-District</i> charges while the <i>Central Provinces</i> fall to the bottom.
110	N. W. Provinces ...	45,940	2	
85	Oude	43,430	3	
74	Bombay	39,041	4	
124	Bengal	30,112	5	
97	Panjab	23,837	6	
90	Central Province ...	21,578	7	

In respect of *Revenue (Land)*, these Provinces rank as below :—

Province.	Rank.			Remarks.
	Commissioners.	Collectors.	Assistant Collectors.	
Madras	1	1	1	As compared with the proportion of the <i>land-revenue</i> , <i>Bombay</i> has the <i>fewest</i> Commissioners, the <i>Central Provinces</i> , the <i>largest</i> number,—its thinly scattered population fully accounting for it. <i>Madras</i> stands first in respect of District Administration, having the <i>fewest</i> officers, the <i>Central Provinces</i> coming last in the list; the circumstance is worth noting in <i>Madras</i> particularly as there are no Commissionerships; the District Officers, subject to the Board and the Secretariat, are more independent than in any other Province.
Bombay (—Sind).....	2	2	4	
N. W. Provinces	3	3	2	
Bengal.....	4	5	5	
Oude	5	4	3	
Panjab.....	6	6	6	
Central Provinces.....	7	7	7	

ling together these results, as relating to Area, Population, and Revenue interests,—
 be chief factors which go to determine the strength of the administrative staff, we
 the provinces ranking as below :—

Province.	RANK ACCORDING TO									Average rank on the principle of compensation balance,	Remarks.
	Area per			Population per.			Revenue (Land)				
	Commissioners.	District Officer.	Sub-District Officer.	Commissioners.	District Officers.	Sub-District Officers.	Commissioners.	District Officers.	Sub-District Officers.		
Bombay	1	2	5	2	5	7	1	3	4	2	<p>The last column gives the rank of the Province in respect of Divisional and District charges in relation to Area, Population and Revenues, allowing an equal mutually balancing influence to those three factors. Bengal comes first, as being perhaps the oldest of the British Provinces, in order of conquest, and shows, a pretty normal state of things. Panjab, on the other hand, comes last as being the latest acquisition: Oude stands above it, as being earlier in date of virtual connection.</p> <p>In respect of District Administration.</p>
Central Provinces.	2	3	1	5	7	2	6	7	7	4	
Bengal.....	3	4	3	1	1	1	3	5	5	1	
N. W. Provinces.	4	6	6	3	4	5	2	3	2	3	
Panjab.....	5	5	4	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	
Oude	6	7	7	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	
Madras	1	2	...	2	4	...	1	1	1	

The distribution of the administrative staff, as indicated by the *average rank* of the Provinces, bears evident traces of historical origin, and had relation clearly to the exigencies of Administrative organisation in the first years of conquest and imperial consolidation, a circumstance which explains its inequalities as per margin.

1 Bengal	As an historical accident, therefore, it is that Bengal is, on the whole, more cheaply governed
2 Bombay.....	
3 N. W. Provinces.	
4 C. Provinces.....	
5 Oude	
6 Panjab.....	
1 Madras	

than any other Province in the Empire, Madras excepted; while Panjab has a more expensive administration.

These inequalities in the distribution of the Administrative staff are great and glaring, and, however justifiable in the circumstances of early conquest, seem to us to be indefensible in the altered conditions of to-day and add largely but needlessly to the cost of Administration in some Provinces as compared with others. They, therefore, call in our opinion for a re-adjustment with a view to greater symmetry and uniformity, in the interests both of administrative reform and economy.

On this subject, however, the Famine Commissioners in their report, part 2, pages 101-2 para 5, write:—"We have thought it desirable to examine whether there is any considerable inequality in the proportion borne by the number of officers in the various Provinces to the work that has to be done, as indicated by the area, population, and revenue; whether there is apparent reason for thinking that a re-adjustment is desirable to secure economy or efficiency. The figures, which we have brought together in the accompanying table" (which are duly given) "*do not justify such a view.*" (The italics are ours). After further remarks, intended to explain the self

balance of the supposed inequalities, the Famine Commissioners put aside the whole subject, observing that there is no "probable practical utility of pushing such inquiries further."

We beg respectfully to dissent from this view of the Famine Commissioners regarding the important question of a territorial re-adjustment of Executive charges, and submit that these inequalities in the distribution of the Administrative machinery are not only not defensible at the present day as features of the administrative system, but are costly *anomalies* involving a large waste of administrative energy and Public Funds. A territorial reconstruction, therefore, of the Executive Administration, with a view to the removal of these inequalities, appears to us not only a most desirable measure of administrative reform, but a necessary measure as well of retrenchment.

The existing strength of the Administrative staff in both the Supervising and Executive branches, as well as its unequal distribution, had perhaps full justification in the condition of things in which they were originally settled.

1st. As regards the executive side,—At the critical stage of administrative organization in the first years of the inauguration of foreign rule, the heads of the District Administration had very onerous duties and responsibilities imposed upon them. The very fabric of Administration had to be constructed; the administrative work was neither specialized nor systematized; there existed no special Departments for special administrative purposes; and there were no settled principles and no definite procedure for the guidance of the District Officer. And yet he was responsible for almost everything relating to, and happening in, his District. He was responsible for the peace, order, and good administration, of his territorial charge; he had to look to the management of Revenue in its various branches; he had to supervise the movements of Police and the maintenance of order;

he had to look after jails and hospitals, Schools and P. Works,—Sanitation and Vaccination, too, were not excluded from the purview of his duties. He was, furthermore, a Magistrate and had a heavy amount of magisterial work to go through. He was, thus, more an Executive Officer in his District, charged with heavy detailed work, than its supervising head. To add to the difficulties of his work, he had, in those years, no trained or tried subordinate Native Servants under him, and no trained native subordinate magistracy; nor were there local institutions, urban or rural, to relieve him of part of his local Executive work. No organs of Public Opinion existed, though Public Opinion itself existed, and possibly in great strength too, and had to be carefully ascertained and respected. The absence of means of communication was a great disadvantage.

Under such circumstances, it was essential to the success of the new *regime* that the territorial charges of these Local Executive officers should be small and conveniently manageable, or, in other words, that the strength of the Executive staff should be proportionately great, in proportion to the difficulty and complexity of the work thrown upon it.

Consideration, too, of administrative necessity or convenience, in special reference to peculiarities of *Area*, of Population,—and of Revenue interests to be guarded,—must have gone a great way towards determining both the strength of the Administrative staff and its existing unequal distribution. Regard had necessarily to be paid, in the first years of conquest and Imperial settlement, in regulating the division of Executive charges for Administrative purposes, among other things, to the following:—

(1) In respect of *Area*—(a) configuration and physical features of the area to be managed, as bearing on the facilities of communication and work of supervision; the difficulty of administration evidently varying according as it w

tract or scattered, level or hilly, intersected by rivers or traversed by mountain ranges.

(b) Intermixture of British, with Feudatory, territory as, for instance, in Bombay :—

(c) Proximity to the territory of Feudatory states, large and important (as in Madras, the Central Provinces &c.), of quasi-independent states (as in Assam) or of independent states (as in Panjab.)

(2) In respect of *Population* :—

(a) *Composition* of the population to be looked after—whether it was homogeneous or mixed, and if mixed, in what proportions the different component sections were mixed, what were their mutual relations &c., the admixture, for instance, of a large Mahomedan element in Panjab or in the eastern parts of Bengal, the concentration of hostile elements in great numerical strength in the chief centres of religious, political, or commercial activity, as in the N. W. Provinces, the traditional, inveterate antipathies of race among the different sections of the community as in Panjab,—these and such other circumstances were all important factors in the administrative problem of organisation :—

(b) *Character* of the populations, also, as having a bearing on the difficulty or otherwise of administrative work. The work was more or less difficult according as they were disaffected or loyal, lawless or peaceful, backward or advancing :—

(c) *Contact* of these populations with others, not directly or indirectly under British management.

(3) In respect of *Revenue* :—

(a) The complexity and importance of Revenue interests to be protected :—

(b) The difficulty and intricacy of management.

These two sets of circumstances, (1) initial difficulties of administrative organisation and (2) peculiarities of Area, Population, and Revenue management, go a long way to account for the existing territorial distribution of executive District administrative charges in the different Provinces and its inequalities.

Similar considerations must, in the same way, have determined the double or triple system of supervision that at present exists in the various Provinces of the Empire, and regulated, besides the constitution of special Boards, the number of Divisional Commissionerships.

At a stage of Administrative progress, at which the system of local executive Administration was but imperfectly elaborated, and the District officers were overwhelmed with the multifarious details of executive administration and were in no way controlling heads in their respective districts, and when, therefore, local, personal, and constant supervision was indispensable for administrative efficiency and yet was beset with more than ordinary difficulties in the absence of means of communication; where, further there were no independent, outside checks yet developed within the country to control the work of the District officers,—in these circumstances it must be admitted that the necessity was almost imperative for narrowing the areas of Divisional Commissionerships within convenient limits, for creating a strong staff of Divisional supervising officers, both to ensure effective local supervision and to secure thorough enforcement of general and uniform principles in respect of local executive administration. The exigencies of Famine relief were, at a later date, an additional element in the situation, and Bombay was burdened with a third Commissionership only on the occasion of the last famine in S. India. Further considerations, such as those above referred to, relate to Area Population and Revenue, as bearing strength and inequality of the executive

account for the very unequal number of Divisional Commissionerships in the different Provinces.

But the situation, in reference to the requirements of which the Administrative staff—both executive and supervising—was determined and distributed a generation or more ago, is assuredly not the situation of to-day with which we have to deal. During the last 25 years and more of uninterrupted peace and administrative progress, things have vastly changed and in recognition of that change, a revision of our existing arrangements seems desirable to bring them into harmony with the wants of the present day. The main features of the change are briefly these:—

(1) The Non-Regulation provinces have been levelled up virtually, if not in administrative nomenclature, to the status of the Regulation ones, in point of system and mode of administration.

(2) The administrative machine has been developed and perfected to a high degree of excellence in a three-fold way thus:—

(a) The work of Executive Administration has been regularized under a perfect and uniform code of rules and procedure, and most of its branches, under a well-constructed differentiation of functions, have been *specialized* through the professional agency of special Departments under skilled direction.

(b) A strong system of supervision,—rather too strong for the purpose,—has been organized in various branches; and to ensure, further, a unity of directive control the Central Secretariats have been strengthened by the introduction of the specialist element on a large scale.

(c) A system of Local Self-Government has been set on foot more or less in the elective principle in most of the Provinces under recent legislation, intended as much for the purpose of relieving the Executive Administration of a large

part of purely local work, as for that of promoting the political education of the people.

(3) A vast improvement has taken place since 1853 in the means of communication (railways, roads, telegraph &c.)—by which the work not only of Executive Administration but also of administrative supervision is greatly facilitated.

(4) Side by side with these changes, there has been also, during the period, a parallel movement, outside the bureaucratic sphere of administrative cognisance, of Native Public Opinion in the country as a political force, or third estate, or "*tiers etat*." New organs have come into existence for a "constitutional expression" of the voice of the people; a pretty large number of Native Newspapers, both English and Vernacular, have been established under independent native management; and many public associations, more or less representative in their constitution, have been formed all over the country. The progress of Education in both its "higher and primary" branches, the activity of a free press and of political associations are some of the forces that have been working throughout the period to rouse and educate the political thought of the nation. In this growing power of Public Opinion, particularly native, we have a new controlling force, which as it increases in intensity and momentum, renders the work of administrative supervision on the part of the Central Government in respect of local Executive Administration, lighter and simpler and yet more effective and successful.

These four circumstances constitute, in our opinion, an important change in the conditions of executive administration. Their effect in lightening and simplifying the actual work of the administrative staff may be briefly described as follows:—

(A) In respect of *District Executive administration*:—The District Officer's work, so heavy and complicated at the initial stage of administrative progress

has been lightened and simplified a good deal. It is lightened :—

(1) With regard to *Revenue* management

(a) Relating to *Land*—by the separate action of the Survey and Settlement Department.

(b) Relating to *other branches* of Revenue, such as Excise, by the creation of Separate Special Departments.

(2) With regard to *Executive administration* :—

(a) By the withdrawal, from under his direct control of several and important items, e. g. the *jails* under the Inspector-General of Prisons, the schools under the Education Department, *Police* under its own Department recently created.

(b) By the constitution of District and Taluka Boards, to whose management, most of the work, that is of a purely local character, has been handed and on which he has now to exercise general superintendance "from outside".

(c) By the organisation, under him, of a strong trained subordinate native service.

(3) With regard to *Magisterial* work

(a) By the formation of a strong subordinate native magistracy.

(b) By the facility, therefore, with which such work can be delegated to others. In Bombay, at least, the District Head Officers do very little of magisterial work, as shown in his pamphlet on "Criminal Statistics" by the Honourable Rao Bahadur M. G. Ranade.

And the District Officer's work has been *simplified* by a thorough organisation of the administrative system in its three features of division of functions, graded supervision, and definite procedure.

Thus, it will appear, that the District Officer of the present day is not the District Officer of 1850 or 1860. He is now more a Supervising Officer in his District, than an Executive Officer overwhelmed with detailed executive work,—a change in his position and

function, which deserves to be recognized in administrative arrangements, and which clearly points to the desirability of extending the territorial limits of his executive charge—which had necessarily to be narrowed in area in days gone by.

(B) In respect of *Administrative Supervision* :— The necessity and difficulty of effective supervision to be exercised by a Divisional Commissioner are alike diminished :— (1) because the District Officers are now more of Supervising than Executive Officers, and are in a position to do a large part of the work of supervision hitherto done by the Boards and Divisional Commissioners.

(2) Because, several important items of District Administration, both revenue and executive, are already under special direction of Departmental chiefs, exercising co-ordinate authority.

(3) Because there now exist independent popular checks, which materially aid the work of supervision.

(4) Because of increased facilities of communication which render possible effective supervision over more extended areas.

Thus the present staff of divisional, supervising Commissioners appears now stronger than need be for purposes of effective control

Further more, in respect of both these branches of the Administrative staff, it may be remarked that the considerations also relating to Area, Population and Revenue, glanced at on a former page have now lost much of their former force.

(A) *Area*—(1) The interlacing of British, with Feudatory, territory is no longer what it once was a source of difficulty to the Executive Administration and for two reasons :—

(a) That most of the Feudatory states whose territories are interspersed with British have passed during the last 30 years through the crucible of direct British management; and also

that some of those large Feudatory States, such as Mysore, Hyderabad, Baroda &c., having territories contiguous to British, have also experienced a similar stage:—

(b) That the system of administration in these Native States is being rapidly assimilated to that obtaining in British territory by the adoption of British Law and procedure.

(2) In the second place, the administrative difficulty, due to proximity to independent States, is now almost minimized (a) by a vastly improved condition of diplomatic relations, and (b) by increased strength of frontier defences.

(B) Population.—

(1) The composition of the populations in the different Provinces of the Empire must have still remained very much the same that it was 30 or 40 years ago. Within each Province, some change may have taken place in rural and urban society in this respect, in consequence of a steady movement of population from the country to the towns owing to increasing business and commercial activity in the latter.

(2) But their character cannot but have been deeply modified by the action of powerful material and moral influences, to which they have been subjected during the period. The relations, too of the different component sections of the populations have greatly improved; the old feelings of antipathy of race and creed and color are fast dying away before the solvent action of education, free thought, free discussion and healthy contact with a superior civilization. A new national coalescence is taking place, a new life is being infused, new sentiments, new aspirations are springing up all round. This growth of national solidarity and national self-consciousness is a most important feature of our present progress,—which has a national bearing on the system of administrative arrangements. The concentration, as for instance in the N. W. Provinces or Panjab, of large mixed populations in small

areas—urban or rural which was once a source of serious embarrassment to the Executive Administration owing to the mutual hatreds and discords—is now being transferred into a positive advantage conducive to facility of administrative work and thereby to economy of administrative energy.

(C) *Revenue*:—The importance and complexity of revenue interests have no doubt greatly increased during the last 30 years, but the difficulty of management has been proportionately reduced by better arrangements and improved agencies for both executive work and directive supervision. The *Land Revenue*—which is the most important item of our Imperial revenues, and which was once the hardest head of revenue for the District Officer to deal with, now offers little, or no difficulties. In those parts where it is permanently settled, as in Bengal and a large part of Madras, there is little executive work in connection with it, excepting the regulation of relations between the Zamindars and their tenants which, however, is not strictly revenue work. In other Provinces, such as the N. W. Provinces and Panjaub, where there is the village system and large rent-paying communities have to be dealt with, the work is large in amount, but simple in its character. Elsewhere, the difficulty of managing this revenue under the Ryotwari system is now practically much reduced, partly because the survey is now approaching completion in most provinces and with it the registry of peasant rights, and partly because of the clear definite rules that have been laid down by Lord Ripon's Government in 1882 for the regulation of settlement operations,—rules which are such as to preclude the necessity for minute interference and vexatious periodical proceedings in respect of revision of assessments. As regards the other heads of revenue the management is now thoroughly systematized and thereby rendered easy and simple.

These and such other circumstances indicated in

the foregoing observations, when taken together, amount in our opinion to a large and important change in the conditions of Executive Administration, which deserves to be duly recognized. In view of this change, we are of opinion that the existing strength of the Administrative staff, both Executive and supervising, regulated in relation to a situation and to conditions which are no longer existent, is much in excess of the present demands of the Public Service, and that the existing inequalities in its distribution, as between the different Provinces, however necessary in the early years of conquest, have no longer a sufficient justification in their present administrative requirements, and that, in consequence, both are now an objectless and therefore needlessly costly feature of our administrative system. With due deference, therefore, to the authority of the Famine Commissioners, who take a different view of the subject and see no cause for a re-consideration of the existing arrangements, we venture to maintain that a territorial re-construction of Executive Administration charges with a view to reduction in the present strength of the Administrative staff and to its more equable distribution is a desirable and necessary measure of administrative reform and economy.

We do not, however, intend on the present occasion to suggest any sweeping or comprehensive scheme of administrative re-construction, but earnestly urge that a first step may be taken in that direction, at least in the interests of economy.

We would confine our present proposals to a re-adjustment of Divisional and District Executive charges, leaving undisturbed the existing arrange-

ments regarding sub-district administration. We would recommend an extension of these Executive areas, or, in other words, a reduction in the number of Divisional Commissioners and District Officers, as a measure which can be safely carried out without loss of efficiency. To begin with the Commissionerships:—

(A) The present number of these Divisional Commissionerships in the different Provinces is 39, maintained at a charge to the treasury of £204,594 or, excluding Assam and Sind as scheduled non-Regulation districts, 37 costing £ 195,371, distributed as marginally shown in a table:—

Province.	No. of Commissioners.	Charge £	Remarks.
Bengal.....	9	50,262	(The figures are taken from Mr. Cotton's Report for 1882-83 page 38).
Assam.....	1	5,333	
N. W. Provinces 7 ...	11	54,463	
Oude 4			
Panjab	10	52,618	
Central Province	4	18,975	
Bombay (—Sind)	4	23,053	
Madras.....		
Total.....	39	204,594	

Or, exclusive of Assam and Sind, 37 at a charge of about £ 195,371.

So that, we have under the present arrangements:—
As per Commissioner (Vide table on page 22).

No. of Com- missioners.	Provinces.	Area in square mils.	Population.	Land Reve- nue £.
9	Bengal	17,577	7,410,163	414,863
7	N. W. Province	11,671	4,674,304	721,921
	Oude	6,000	2,846,935	380,017
10	Panjab.....	10,500	1,885,043	230,235
4	Central Provinces ...	21,000	2,459,685	161,836
3	Bombay (—Siad).....	25,853	4,680,197	97,029

In our recommendations, we shall begin with our own Presidency. *Bombay*, excluding Siad, had only 2 Commissioners before the Famine of 1876-8, and we would suggest that she should revert to the old arrangement, the strength of the District Executive staff being fully adequate to the exigencies of Famine relief, as was shown in the conduct of the relief operations of the said Famine. The *N. W. Provinces*, the most compact of our Provinces, possessing the greatest advantages of communication, and the best manageable, being free from most of the administrative difficulties connected with Area, Population, and Revenue to be met with in other Provinces, should be content, in our opinion, with 3 Commissioners, instead of the present 7. *Oude* too, which has been amalgamated with these Provinces for administrative purposes, should consent to cut down the number of her divisional Commissionerships from 4 to 2, possessing as she does similar advantages. *Panjab*, in no way inferior to the *N. W. Provinces* in compactness of territory and facilities of communication and, possessing a much smaller popula-

tion, should have 5 Commissioners instead of 10 as now,—still two more than the N. W. Provinces, because (1) of the more mixed composition of its population,* and (2) of its being a frontier Province in direct contact with the “excitable” zone of Mahomedan states in Central Asia. We would leave undisturbed for the present the *status quo* in Bengal and the *Central Provinces*; in Bengal, because she shows on the whole, a normal condition of things as regards the administrative arrangements, and in the *Central Provinces*, because of the sparseness and backwardness of the population as well as of the imperfectly developed state of communications. Moreover we would give Madras, as said before, 2 Commissioners in place of her present Board of Revenue.

Thus, we would have a staff of Commissioner 27 strong, instead of 37 as at present, distributed as follows:—

Bombay.....	2	in place of	3
N. W. Provinces	3	„	7
Oude	2	„	4
Panjab	5	„	10
Central Province	4	} as now	4
Bengal	9		9
Madras.....	2	(new)	9

Total.....2737

Province.	Population	Percentages (relative) of the constituent elements.				Remarks.
		Hindus.	Mahomedans.	Others.	Sicks.	
N. W. Province ...	32,720,128	85.91	13.72	.36	.01	(Census 1881 vide statistical tables for British India)
Panjab	18,550,437	37.83	55.83	.34	5.95	

The territorial re-distribution of Divisional charges, involved in this reduction of the number of Commissioners may be shown tabularly as follows:—

Province a.	Area.	Population.	Revenue (Land) £.	Suggested number of Commissions.	Existing number of Commissions.
Madras	138,800	31,110,530	5,130,004	2	...
Bombay and Sind ...	77,500	14,040,591	2,916,089	2	3
N. W. Provinces ...	81,700	32,720,128	5,053,468	3	7
Oude... ..	24,000	11,337,741	1,520,068	2	4
Panjab	105,000	18,850,437	2,302,359	5	10
Central Province ...	84,000	9,838,791	647,345	4	4
Bengal	158,200	66,691,456	3,733,872	9	9
Total	27	37

This gives, per Commissioner, Area, Population and Land Revenue under the proposed scheme as under:—

Province.	Area.	Population.	Land Revenue £.
Madras	69,400	15,585,315	2,565,002.
Bombay (Sind)	38,750	7,020,295	1,458,045
N. W. Provinces	27,233	10,906,709	1,648,489
Oude	12,000	5,893,870	760,034
Panjab	21,000	3,770,087	460,471
Central Province	21,000	2,459,655	161,886
Bengal... ..	17,577	7,410,163	414,863

The saving to the treasury, in consequence of the territorial re-adjustment of Divisional charges would be £ 61,777, the charges for the proposed two Commissionerships in Madras being met from the saving effected by the abolition of the Board of Revenue (Vide page 18 *supra*).

Province.	As at present.		As proposed.		Reduction in No. of Com.	Savin
	No of Commis-sioners.	Chaaages £	No. of Commis-sioners.	Charges £		
Bengal	9	50,262	9	50,262
Central Province ...	4	18,975	4	18,975
Bombay—(Sind) ...	3	17,283	2	11,522	1	5,761
Panjab	10	52,618	5	26,309	5	26,309
N. W. Province and Oude	11 { 7 4	54,463	5 { 3 2	24,756	6	29,707
Total.....	37	193,601	25	131,824	12	61,777

Madras would have two new Commissionerships at a charge of (say) £ 11,060 to be met from the saving to the amount of £28,801 consequent on the abolition of its Board of Revenue and leaving a net saving of £ 17,741 included in the total saving for the Boards generally.

The abolition of the Boards and the reduction of the number of Divisional Commissioners, as suggested above, would thus give the country a net saving of £ 128,289, while, at the same time, effecting a most desirable and needed administrative reform in the direction of symmetry and simplification as under:—

Boards.....	£ 66,512
Commissioners.....	61,777

Total £ 128,289

(b) Let us now pass on to the subject of District Administrative charges. The present staff of District officers (Collectors and Deputy Commissioners) in the different provinces is 180 strong (excluding Assam and Sind) distributed as under:—

Madras	21	Bengal	44	} 180
Bombay	18	Penjab	32	
N. W. Province.....	35	Central Province	18	
Oude	12		—	
	—		94	
	86			

This gives, as shown before, *per Head District Officer Area, Population, and Land Revenue* under the present arrangements, as follows:—

[Vide page 23 of the note]

No. of District Officers	Province.	Area.	Population.	Land Revenue £.
21	Madras	6,609	1,484,315	243,331
18	Bombay (—Sind)	4,311	780,035	162,605
35	N. W. Provinces	2,334	934,860	144,385
44	Bengal	3,600	1,515,715	84,560
32	Panjab	3,281	588,451	71,954
12	Oude	2,000	948,980	126,672
18	Central Provinces	4,111	546,556	87,630

As in considering the subject of Commissionerships, so here, we shall begin with our Presidency. Bombay, exclusive of Sind, should be satisfied, we think, with 15 Collectorates instead of 18 as at present. Some of the districts in the N. and S. Divisions, being too small in area, might be advantageously amalgamated, there being no special administrative difficulties in the way, connected with area or population. The importance of Revenue interests involved, if concentrated in small areas, should be utilised for purposes of administrative economy rather than otherwise. Thus Broach and Surat, Thanna and Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Canara should be formed into 3 good, manageable Collectorates. The resulting re-arrangement might be shown thus:—

Province.	Area.	Population.	Land Revenue (lacks)
Broach } Surat }	2,946	9,57,409	R 45.1
Thanna } Kolaba }	5,634	11,97,829	23.7
Ratnagiri... .. } Canara }	8,024	14,17,640	19.5

(2) In the North W. Provinces, we would propose that the number of Collectorates be reduced from 35 to 19 the reduction being effected by the amalga-

tion of District Areas in several Divisions, the greater density of population, as compared with that in other Provinces being an administrative advantage, conducive to administrative economy as well as the concentration of Revenue interests in comparative narrow areas.

The present Divisions are as below :—

Provinces.	Area.	Population. Lacks.	Land Revenue, Lacks. Rs.	Number of Dis- tricts.
Meerat	11,285	49.7	79.9	6
Rohilkhand	11,813	54.9	73.3	6
Agra	10,156	50.4	81.2	6
Jhansi... ..	5,058	9.3	14.2	3
Kumaon	11,500	7.4	9.4	2
Allahabad... ..	13,625	54.6	93.2	6
Benares	18,330	81.7	80.4	6
Total...	35

Of these 7 Divisional Commissionerships Jhansi is exactly equal to Poona,— a Bombay District, for which the figures are Area 5,099, Population 907,235, and Land Revenue 14.8 lacks—and is yet divided for Administrative purposes into 3 Collectorates. So again Kumaon is only a little larger than the Bombay District of Khandesh in area, has a smaller population and 1-10 of the Revenue (the figures for Khandesh being, Area 10,162, Popula-

tion 10,28,642 and Land Revenue 34.4 Lacks) and yet is divided into 2 Collectorates. We think, the requirements of administration can be fully met by having 19 Executive District charges instead of 35 as now ;

Division.	No. of District.	
Meerat	3	instead of 6
Rohilkhand	3	" " 6
Agra	3	" " 6
Jhansi... ..	1	" " 3
Kumaon	1	" " 2
Allahabad	4	" " 6
Benares... ..	4	" " 6
Total... ..	19	35

(3) In Oude, we would have a staff of 6 District officers, instead of 12 as at present. There is here the double administrative advantage of (1) great density of population and (2) concentration of revenue interests in small areas :—

The composition of population * being about the same as in Bombay and the N. W. Provinces.

Province.	Population.	Percentage of constituent sections.		
		Hindu.	Mahomedan.	Others.
Oude... ..	11,337,741	87.31	12.59	.1
N. W. Provinces ...	32,720,128	85.91	13.72	.57
Bombay	11,040,591	85.49	8.08	6.63

Amalgamation of District Areas can, we think, be safely carried out in the Divisions of Lacknow, Fyzalad, and Rai Barelli.

(4) In Panjab, we have, under the existing arrangements, 32 Executive Districts grouped in 10 Divisions. Looking (1) to the more mixed character of its population as compared with that of other Provinces and (2) to its being a frontier province, we would suggest the reduction of the number only to 24, thus giving it comparatively small District Areas in relation to the real difficulties of administration. Amalgamation is possible, without administrative inconvenience in such Divisions as Delhi, Umbala, Amritsur, Jalandhar.

(5) In Madras, Bengal and the Central Provinces, we would retain the present arrangements as calling for little alteration in this direction. In Madras, perhaps, some might suggest a slight increase in the number of Collectorates, say, from 21 to 24, and the suggestion would be in accordance with the views of the Famine Commissioners who state (Vide Report part 2, page 101 para 4) that "the efficiency of the administration in the Madras Presidency suffers also from the large area of some of its districts, which are more than double the size of the districts in other Provinces." We would accept this increase in the number of Executive districts here. Vizagapatam, Bellary and such other Districts might be broken up and rearranged more manageable Executive charges.

Thus, then, we would have a staff of District officers, 150 strong in place of 180 as at present, distributed as follows :—

INDEPENDENT SECTION.

Province.	No. of Districts	
Bombay	15	instead of 18
N. W. Provinces ...	19	„ „ 35
Oude	6	„ „ 12
Panjaub	24	„ „ 32
Central Provinces ...	18	as now 18
Bengal	44	as now 44
Madras	24	in place of 21
Total	150	instead 180

The territorial redistribution of executive District charges, involved here, might be exhibited as under:—

Per District Officer under the proposed scheme.

Province.	Area.	Population.	Land Revenue £.
Bombay	5,166	9,36,040	194,406
N. W. Province	4,300	17,22,112	264,212
Oude	4,000	18,97,957	253,344
Panjaub	4,575	7,86,268	95,932
Central Province	4,111	546,556	37,630
Bengal	3,600	15,15,715	84,560
Madras	5,783	12,98,753	213,750

The saving to the country, in consequence of such a territorial redistribution of District Executive charges, would be about £ 72,009, assuming, for the

sake of estimate, the charge of each head District officer to be £. 2,488 per annum, including the cost of his establishment. The strenght of the staff would be reduced by 30.

The total saving, which can thus be effected, without sacrifice of administrative efficiency, by these three measures regarding the Boards, the Commissionerships, and District Executive officers, would be, thus, £ 200,289 per annum, no small relief, certainly, to an embarrassed treasury, to be obtained with a positive advantage in point of administrative reform.

	£s.	}	£s.
Boards	66,512		=200,289.
Commissioners	62,777		
District Officers	72,000		

As closely connected with the subject, we would draw the attention of the Finance Department to the system of recruitment for the Covenanted Civil Service to which the superior grades of Executive appointments, dealt with in the preceding pages, belong by law as a special privilege.

The Covenanted Civil Service is a costly and privileged service, and the way in which it is recruited from year to year must be closely watched in the interests of economy. The recruitment does not always seem to follow definite rules, and sometimes, it is clear, indents for Civil Servants are sent from India to England, without due regard to the requirements of the Public Service. Over-recruitment necessarily follows with the eventual result of putting a considerable permanent needless charge on the Public Treasury. "Prior to 1861 there was a large under-recruitment, followed in the years 1862-64 by a correspondingly large over-recruitment". The gap caused in the ranks of the service during the period of the Mutiny having been filled up, it was attempted to stop the over-flow by an under-recruitment in 1869. There has since been more or less of over-recruitment again. It may suffice to refer to the state of things in

the Madras Presidency. In "Standing Information regarding Administration in Madras" page 24 we read :—

" There are altogether rather less than 100 appointments ordinarily available to the service, and the service is kept at such a strength, that allowing for absentees, a Junior Civilian will get his first acting appointment in the lowest grade at about the close of his fourth year after arrival in the country. The ordinary annual recruitment calculated so as to ensure these results is about 7, giving an average of 28 Junior Civilians who will be at any one time not yet provided with an appointment."

Here thus, in Madras, we have always 28 Civil Servants *without any appointment even "in the lowest grade,"* drawing, under statutory provision, salaries ranging between £ 600 and £ 800 per annum; and learning their business as extra Assistant Collectors or supernumerary Assistants in the practical school of District Administration. The object is, no doubt, a worthy object—namely to fit them for a due discharge of the responsible duties of their high executive posts,—and the 4 years' period of such royal practical training in the work of Administration must be peculiarly agreeable, too, to the young officers. But the country has to pay, in the Madras Presidency alone, for this interesting educational luxury an annual sum of between £-16,800 and £ 22,400 in the shape of salaries to these men undergoing the so-called probation. Besides in this Province, the yearly recruitment is at the rate of 7 new men,—a number which seems to have been arbitrarily fixed without reference to the number of annually retiring officers or to the needs of the service. The case is not much better in other Provinces, but exact figures are not available.

The consequence of this over-recruitment for the Covenanted Civil Service, which now appears to be the rule rather than the exception, is three fold :—

(a) The Executive branches of the Service are needlessly over-crowded thus:—

In *Madras*, the appointments "reserved" by law for Covenanted Civilians are 91 in number, and yet the actual strength of the said service, including members present and absent on leave, is about 155. Looking to the Leave Code, which allows these Civilians two years furlough after 8 years, and thereafter one year after 4 years service, it is allowable to assume that the number of annual absentees on furlough,—that has to be considered in regulating the standing strength of the service,—cannot exceed 20 or 25, and so it would appear that the "normal" strength need not be more than 111 or 116. The difference between this figure and 155, the actual number (=44 or 39) represents the excess strength of the service, needlessly maintained at a permanent charge of, say, £. 35,200 or £. 31,200, assuming the cost of each such officer to be £. 800 per annum.

In *Bombay*, similarly the number of sanctioned appointments "reserved" under statute to the same Service is about 84, of which 27 are judicial and 57 revenue and general, excluding supernumeraries and extra Assistants below the rank of 2nd Assistant Collectors, and yet the number of Civilian Officers was (in 1884-85) 159. Allowing for the possible number of annual absentees on furlough under special privileges of Leave, say 20, we have still 54 more Civilian Officers in our service than we want, costing the state £ 43,200 a year at the rate of £ 800 per Officer.

So also, in the N. W. Provinces, the Executive Administrative staff is proportionately stronger in the number of sub District officers (Extra and supernumerary Assistant Collectors) than in any other province, excepting *Oude* which is, however, administratively speaking a part of it. In the

N. W. Provinces we have 110 Civilian Officers engaged in sub-District Administration, besides 35 Collectors, while Oude has 35 such officers in addition to 12 Collectors.

(b) The regular order of promotion is disturbed. There is sometimes a block to the serious disadvantage of the Junior members, and there is often great inequality in promotion as far as it occurs. The service is then kept in a habitually "abnormal" condition, as regards pay and prospects. But what is of more immediate concern to the Finance Minister is, that promotion in the case of these Civil servants—whether blocked or retarded is a serious matter to the state rather than to them, for the rule of granting compensation for "deferred promotion," which was, we believe, first adopted in the N. W. Provinces, where the over-crowding of the service was greater than elsewhere, was extended in 1877 during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton to the other Provinces, and consequently the charge on this account is now almost become a permanent recurring charge. This annual charge, which in Bombay is nearly one Lack (£ 10,000), represents a portion of the price which the country has to pay for the original mistake of *over-recruitment* of the service.

(c) In cases where there is no sufficient work for the new men as they come year after year, even after 4 years of sinecure service, spent in learning their duties some of these men are drafted into other branches of the service than those reserved for Covenanted Civilians. The incidental result is that the area of native employment in these, *i. e.*, uncovenanted branches which are specially intended for *native* ambition, is needlessly contracted, and that a costly element is introduced, where it should not be, and where a cheaper Native agency is available.

In view of these results consequent on the over-recruitment of the Civil Service which is going on more or less under the present arrangements we would

recommend that clear and definite rules may be laid down, for regulating annual indents for Civil Service recruits for this country, with due regard to the wants of the Public Service, and that power may be reserved to the Provincial Government to suspend the recruitment for a shorter or longer period if necessary, to remove the existing block or equalize the supply to the demand. This appears to us necessary both in the interests of economy and in the interests of the present members of the service.

Let us now turn to some of the other Departments of the Civil Administration. We shall first take the Public Works Department. Railways (productive, protective, or ordinary) and irrigation works stand on their own footing, and the general policy of the state in regard to them, being governed by considerations other and weightier, by far than purely financial or administrative, cannot offer a fit subject of inquiry in this connection. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves, in the following observations, to only one branch of it, that of P. Works ordinary. It is a sub-head of this class of expenditure, which, whatever its necessity and extent of demand in the early years of administrative progress, admits of considerable reduction in view of the altered state of things at the present day.

Public Works ordinary, coming under the management of this Department, are classed as:—

I Military and Civil, according to their nature.

II Imperial, Provincial and Local according to source of funds.

Under class I the Military branch are included works connected with the Army, such as Fortifications, Barracks, Commissariat and Ordnance Buildings, Military rest-houses and cantonment roads; while the Civil comprises all buildings in connection with the various Civil Departments of state—Judicial, Police, Jails, Revenue, Educational, Medical &c.—Communications, Miscellaneous Public Improvement, Harbour works, Light-houses &c.

Works carried out from Imperial funds are (1) Military works, (2) Civil Buildings, in connection with such Imperial services as Post, Telegraph, Marine, salt &c, and (3) Miscellaneous. The Provincial Governments have to pay out of their own Provincial funds for civil buildings for the use of their various departments and services, Communications and Public Improvements. Works paid for out of Local Funds are classed as Local, and include, buildings, roads, improvements.

“Down to the time of Lord Dalhousie” writes Mr. Cotton in his Report page 242 “the state concerned itself only with the making of a few main roads and with the construction of the buildings necessary for Military and civil purposes. The general superintendence was entrusted to a Military Board for each of three Presidencies.” In 1855, a special Department of P. Works in the Government of India with subordinate Departments for Bombay and Madras, was constituted, and “no Department of the Indian Government,” justly observes Mr. Cotton, “has grown at so rapid a rate as that of P. Works.”

Taking the year 1840 as the starting-point, the following figures are brought together, giving the total expenditure up to date on this class of P. Works, *i. e.* Ordinary :—

Year.	Million £.	Remarks.
1840	·21	Thus, before the advent of Lord Dalhousie to office (1848) this item of expenditure was well within a third of a million per annum. But when large schemes of administrative improvement engaged the attention of the new Governor-General, large P. Works ordinary were undertaken, and the result was that the expenditure rose from ·36 in 1848 to close, on a million (·90) in 1854 in 7 years. If the total for the last seven years (1848-54) be compared with the first eight years, it will be found that while in 1840-47 the total expenditure amounted to £ 2·51 million, in 1848-54 it rose to £ 3·30.
1841	·27	
1842	·24	
1843	·19	
1844	·28	
1845	·26	
1846	·30	
1847	·26	
1848	·36	
1849	·40	
1850	·35	
1851	·46	
1852	·61	
1853	·55	
1854	·90	
Total...	5·64	

The year 1855, which witnessed the constitution of this new Department in the Government of India, also marked a turning point in the history of British India. The work of conquest completed, the attention of the new rulers naturally turned to plans of internal improvement as well as to measures of administrative organization and imperial consolidation. This new policy of internal progress took a strong economic bent, and the principal object, aimed at, was the development, by means of material, almost to the exclusion of indirect and moral, influences, of the "unbounded" resources of the country. No Department, therefore, could have been started under better auspices or with a wider or freer scope for activity. The young Depart-

ment of P. Works rose equal to the occasion. Expenditure on "reproductive" P. Works commenced on a high scale at the very start, and has been steadily rising higher and higher. Side by side with it, under the wing of the energetic new Department, another item of expenditure established itself and at a high point, too, and that was on account of P. Works ordinary. Such were the demands of administrative improvement, particularly at the initial stage of organisation, that it was deemed necessary that the state should construct, by its own agency, within the shortest period possible, an adequate material apparatus of administration in the shape of buildings and roads &c. Accordingly, the expenditure on this class of P. Works which was 1.94 Millions in 1855, the year in which the Department was created, rose in the 3rd year, 1857, to 4.34 Millions. And, now, after the lapse of about 28 years; during which 137 Millions have been spent on such works, we find that it stands at a still higher level than that of 1857; though it is not easy to conceive how the Departmental demand for new additions year after year to the material apparatus of administration could have attained to such a stout and vigorous growth as to necessitate the maintenance of such a charge,—which could only be purely *temporary* in its nature,—as a *permanent* recurring charge on the public treasury at a figure even a good deal higher than that of 30 years ago, in the altered conditions of today. The figures are these:—

As stated before, the total expenditure from 1840 to 1854 was 5.64 Millions on P. W. ordinary. Since that year it has been as under :—

Year.	Millions £.
1855	1.94
1856	2.40
1857	4.34
1858	3.05
Total ...	11.73

From 1855 to '58=11.73 Millions.

1859	4.29
1860	5.17
1861	5.37
1862	6.37
1863	5.97
1864	7.05
1865	6.72
1866	5.13
1867	6.13
Total ...	52.20*

From 1859 to '67=52.20 Millions. [This total includes Guaranteed Railway-interest-payments which amount to 10.8 Millions. So deducting this amount we have 41.4 Millions as net expenditure on P. W. ordinary.]

1868	6.29
1869	5.06
1870	4.01
1871	3.96
1872	3.60
1873	3.16
1874	3.47
1875	3.63
1876	3.51
1877	3.67
1878	5.17
Total ...	45.53

From 1868 to 78=50.53 Millions.

Add 5 Millions spent from Local Funds, not shown in Imperial accounts.	
Total ...	50.68

Grand Total from 1840 to 78=103.66 Millions.

This total (103.66 millions) includes the expenditure from all sources, Imperial, Provincial and Local,

and both classes of P. works ordinary, military and civil. The works executed by the Municipalities out of their own Municipal funds are left out.

In 1878-9 the two classes of works were separated, Military from Civil, and the Military works grant per annum was fixed, on the average expenditure of previous years; at one Million Sterling. The expenditure since is shown below:—

Year.	Civil Works.	Military.	Remarks.
1879	2.95.	1	
1880	3.36	1	
1881	3.97	1	Total from 1879 to
1882	4.36	1	86=38.85 Millions
1883	4.79	1	
1884	4.03	1	
1885	3.10	1	
1886	4.29	1	
Total...	30.85	8.	

<i>Summary</i> —1840—54.....	5.64	Before the constitution of the Department, the expenditure was 5.64 it has been 142.51 Millions since i. e. during the last 30 years at the average rate of 4.73 Millions.
1855—58.....	11.73	
1859—67.....	41.40	
1868—78.....	50.53	
1878—86.....	38.85	
Grand Total.....	148.15	

Opinions differ as to the value of the net outcome of so much expenditure, which is equal to 3 times the net annual income of the Empire. But in a memorandum submitted to the Parliamentary Committee, Sir J. Strachey very vigorously defends the action of the Public Works Department in this, as in all other

branches, and explains the effects of this expenditure. We quote the following from Justice Cunningham's "British India and its Rulers" pages 115-6.

"It is not too much to say, (writes Sir J. Strachey) that there was then (i. e. 30 or 40 years ago), comparatively speaking, little in India of what we now think the first necessities of a civilized administration. When I went from Calcutta to my first station in the N. W. Provinces I was carried about a thousand miles in a box on men's shoulders; there was no other means of travelling through the richest and most advanced and most important parts of India. Speaking broadly, roads and bridges had but begun to appear; there were no canals to save the people from destruction by famine, or those that existed were on a very small scale; there were few barracks in which English soldiers could live with tolerable health and comfort; there were few jails, in which a sentence of imprisonment did not carry with it a serious probability that it would prove a sentence of death. The country at that time was entering on a phase of rapid change. The firm establishment of order was followed by improvements in all directions."

"Ten thousand things were demanded, which India had not got, but which it was felt must be provided. The country must be covered with railways and telegraphs and roads and bridges. Canals must be made to preserve the people from starvation. Barracks must be built, and every sort of sanitary arrangement be carried out."

"This was not only true in regard to matters of Imperial concern. Demands for improvement, similar to those which fell upon the central Government, cropped up in every city and in every district of this country."

After instancing the wants of Calcutta and Rangoon Sir J. Strachey proceeds:—

"When I say that, to a great extent, the requirements of civilized life and modern administration

have had to be provided for in India for the first time, within the space of a few years, I do not speak only of material objects, of roads and railways and canals and barracks and city improvements and so forth. The demand for improved administration has been so strong that it is not too much to say that the whole of the public Services have been re-organised."

Sir J. Strachey's estimate in regard to the action of the P. Works Department generally will carry weight, and we may say with him, in special reference to expenditure on P. works ordinary, that large works of Public improvement have been executed, without which administrative progress on "modern" lines would have been impossible.

But it may be allowable to observe that the formidable total of Expenditure on this class of works given above (*i. e.* 148.18 Millions since 1840 or 142.54 since 1855) represents certainly a course of what may be called a *high pressure* improvement. The average rate of outlay under this head, during the last 30 years has been 4.73 Millions per annum;—surely a heavy item of annual charge for a poor country like India.

Now, however, that after so much money has been spent in this direction, "the requirements of civilized life and modern administration" have been fairly met, and "the first necessities of a civilized administration" have been more or less provided for, and the material apparatus in the shape of buildings, roads, bridges &c. is already complete or is approaching completion, it would not be unreasonable to propose in the interests of economy that the high pressure at which the machine has been hitherto working in this branch of P. Works should be lowered, and the speed moderated, so that this item of expenditure on account of Administrative convenience, more than for the nation's progress, may not exceed the just wants of the country as well as its ability to

In the *Military* branch of this class, it is calculated that, since the mutiny year of 1857, about 14 Millions have been spent on barracks alone for the use of European troops. The small item of Barrack furniture alone in 8 years from 1873 to 1880, amounted to no less than £. 554,633 or nearly 7 lacks a year. The total expenditure on military works during the decade of 1873 to 1883 was £ 11.16 Millions, i. e. above a Million, per annum. The Civil works (buildings and roads) during the same decade cost 34.9 millions or at the rate of 3.46 Millions a year;—certainly too heavy a rate of progress in the constitution of the Civil apparatus of “a civilized administration.”

The apparatus, both *Military* and *Civil*, composed of those works of public improvement and administrative convenience, constructed at such cost in the course of the last 30 years, must now be sufficient for practical purposes, and as the claims of economy are ever paramount, it is necessary to see that expenditure on additions to it, whether useful or ornamental, should not go beyond the limits of urgent necessity. On the *Military* side, the requirements of the services should be closely looked into. After an expenditure of upwards of 14 crores on the comfortable housing of European troops, the country can not, surely, continue to spend year after year, on new barracks and repairs to the old, at the rate of $\frac{1}{4}$ ths of a million, nor is it opulent enough to afford to pay at the rate of 6 or 7 lacks per annum for additions to the already splendid furniture of these Barracks. Similarly, on the *Civil* side, as regards *Civil buildings*, the intense love for works more ornamental than useful—which is shown by some of our aesthetically minded Provincial Governments, should be effectually restrained; Madras, for instance, must not, we think, be allowed, in these hard times, to claim from year to year increasing grants to be spent on political offices, and *kacheries* for her

Collectors and Tahasildars; nor should Bombay be encouraged to expect the state to spend lacks upon lacks any more on her civil buildings, as in Sind, which is well-known for the beauty and and splendour of her official buildings. As regards *communications*, the necessity no doubt exists for large expenditure, but here too, a limit might usefully be imposed. Already the major part of Local Funds (*i. e.* 1.5 Millions) is devoted mainly to that object, conjointly with that of local improvements, and we are of opinion that the Provincial grants for the purpose should be a good deal curtailed. The "forcing" process does not always do much good; possibly the machinery runs the risk of wearing away and in the end breaking down. The country has long, long years before it, and can afford to go at a much slower rate—a rate most consistent with the safety of its other and more vital interests.

For our specific recommendations on the subject, we shall take the figures for 1882-3 (which do not much differ in their aggregate total from those for the current year) as given by Mr. Cotton in his Report in Sect. XVII; *Public Works*, pages 297 and 299. Later figures are not available. Let us begin with Military P. Works.

New buildings	£361,752	} This includes the entire outlay on Barracks officers' Quarters, Hospitals, Fortifications, Commissariat and Ordnance Buildings &c. against which is the set off of receipts to the amount of £ 44,306, leaving a net expenditure of £ 931,802 for the year.
Repairs	£345,044	
Barrack furniture ...	£ 68,000	
Establishment	£201,312	
<hr/>		
Total £. 976, 108		

Now we would propose that the annual grant for these works which is at present fixed at the

high figure of a million should be cut down to £625,000 giving the country a net saving of £ 375,000. The reductions might be distributed thus:—

New buildings ...	£ 300,000	} In the first three items the reductions proposed are not very large; as barrack furniture, being only a matter of convenience and comfort rather than of necessity, can well be less splendid than before.
Repairs ...	£ 200,000	
Barrack furniture...	£ 25,000	
Establishment...	£ 100,000	
Total ...		£ 625,000

Reduction in the cost of the Establishment requires a word of explanation. We borrow this suggestion from the *Englishman* newspaper. It proposes (in its issue of June 1, 1886) the abolition of the Military Works Department as a separate branch of the administration. The Military works should be made over to the Provincial Governments, and one-half of the office establishments of the Executive Engineers of the M. W. Department should be placed under Provincial control and to assist the Provincial Engineers. The paper says "the account work will be distributed among the existing Provincial account offices, and the whole of the expenditure on the Military W. accounts will be saved. The control of the local Government and of the Public Works Department of the Government of India will be sufficient, and no substitute for the Inspector-General and his expensive office will be required. Our estimate of the reduction which can be effected by the abolition of the Military Works Department is accordingly as follows:—

Inspector-General and his office ...	Rs. 100,000
Examiner of Military Accounts ...	Rs. 100,000
6 Superintending Engineers at an average of Rs. 1,600 a month, including Military pay ...	Rs. 115,000

vice and thereby putting a limit to expenditure, certain and well-defined, which has been adopted in the case of Military Public Works, is, we hold, a very sound and wholesome principle, and we would advocate its extension to the civil side of our P. W. ordinary expenditure which is at present allowed to be always uncertain and variable at the discretion of the executive authorities.

Out of the total Expenditure of £. 4,352,091, the sum put down under head "Imperial" is £. 584,929 distributed as below:—

India general	£. 249,469	} Now (1) with regard to the last item of £. 253,224 spent in Bengal, N. W. P., Panjab &c., under Provincial supervision for the use of "Imperial services," such as Post, telegraph, marine, salt, opium &c, our proposal is that it should be transferred to the Provincial Funds, and that the Imperial Government should stop this yearly grant of a quarter of a Million out of its Funds to the Provincial Governments for works which, though theoretically Imperial, are really Provincial and Local. In the second place, we would recommend that Expenditure in England should be cut down. The details of this item are:—
Expenditure in England	£. 82,238	
" " in the Provinces for Imperial services	253,224	
Total	£. 584,929	

The details of this item are:—

Royal Indian Engineering College	£. 20,219
Salary and expenses of students in England	£. 6,605
Examination of candidates &c.	£. 1,513
Stores, Absentee allowances, Furlough pay &c.	£. 53,901
Total	£. ... 82,238.

The first three constitute an item of expenditure (= £. 28,337) maintained for the purpose of securing a steady, requisite supply of trained talent from England. At a time when there was no trained

agency procurable in the country; nor was there a prospect of attracting a sufficient number of men for the Indian Engineering service by open competition, and when the stress of work was heavy, special arrangements were necessary for getting a regular supply of recruits year after year for the P. W. Department. A special college had to be maintained for the training of youths in England, and to attract men to the college, that is, to the Service, even the salaries and expenses of students in the college had to be paid out of the Indian Exchequer. But it has now outlived its usefulness, as did the Company's college at Haileybury in 1853. The Public Works Department is at present more than sufficiently manned according to Sir J. Strachey (Vide his F. S. 1880). The amount and pressure of work are both diminishing. Engineering colleges in India are in a prosperous condition and are turning out every year plenty of trained men. Further, the attractions of the Indian service in general are now stronger in England than ever. Under these circumstances, the Cooper's Hill College no longer has any purpose to serve and therefore any reason to continue to exist. As the Haileybury College, maintained for the special purpose of recruiting the civil service, ceased to be necessary and had to be dispensed with, the service being thrown open to public competition; so we propose, that this Royal Engineering College in England should now be similarly dealt with. The College should be abolished, and appointments in the superior grades of the P. W. Department should be open to public competition. Already the supply of trained men that is pouring in into the country from this institution is becoming a source of serious embarrassment to Government, as Sir J. Strachey declared from his place in Council in his Budget speech of 1880: and it is a notorious fact that, when recent reductions were carried out in the Department, about 300 Engineers had to be induced to retire with large gratu-

ties. It is therefore only reasonable to suggest that the time is come for putting a stop to this special supply by abolishing the source. The net saving would not be very large, for while the gross charges of the College amount to £ 20,219; the net expenditure is £ 5,779, and the expenses of Engineer students are about £ 6,605; together making a total of £ 12,384—which would therefore be the extent of saving. But though the saving is only £ 12,384, the object to be secured is important; for, as Sir J. Strachey says, “our P. W. Establishments are still larger than they ought to be, and the constant supply of young engineers that pours in from Cooper’s Hill will, if it be not speedily stopped, prove a cause of renewed embarrasment, and of useless and serious expense.” (F. Statement 1880)

This measure would bring down the amount of expenditure in England from £ 82,238 to £ 55,414. The item of £ 249,469 under “India general” is necessary for the wants of territories under the direct management of the Supreme Government; and we would not propose any reduction in it.

Thus the *Imperial Head* of Expenditure on P. W. Ordinary is reduced to £ 304,883 at which figure we would propose to fix it in future years.

India general	£ 249,469
Expenditure in England	£ 55,414

Total £ 304,883

Coming next to Provincial expenditure on the works, we find the amount to be £ 2,304,798. The works are civil buildings, roads and Public Improvements. We think that each of these charges can conveniently bear reduction; especially as the greater part of Local Funds is applied to the same class of P. Works Ordinary. We would fix future expenditure under this provincial Head on these works at £ 1,500,000; less than the present grant by £ 804,798; and add on to it £ 250,000 for “Imperial Works”

in the Provinces to be transferred to Provincial control. Thus the net expenditure on P. W. Ordinary out of Provincial Funds would be, under our proposals, £ 1,750,000 in place of £ 2,304,798 as at present. The reduction to the amount of £ 804,798 above proposed in Provincial Expenditure might be distributed over all the four items of it in various proportions suited to the circumstances of each Province. Civil buildings, and communications and Public Improvements should surely require, now; less expenditure than formerly; for (1) repairs and small additions to the existing *civil buildings* are alone now necessary, and needless expenditure on those works, as in Madras and Sind, must of course be stopped; (2) the necessity for outlay on communications is real, but if a larger sum than heretofore from Local Funds were devoted to the construction of roads, the want, we think, would be fully met consistently with a considerable reduction in Provincial expenditure on them; and (3) so, also, we would propose, Public Improvements should in future have a smaller allotment than hitherto. The Provincial Governments can cut down their expenditure on the establishment also; and we would recommend that the cost of the superior branches of the Engineer-Department should be retrenched by abolishing, on the ground of diminished necessity and difficulty of supervision, the staff of Superintending Engineers, in the various Provinces, who supervise the work of Executive Engineers, and are themselves subject to the control of Chief Engineers. The number of such Superintending Engineers whose work is connected only with P. W. Ordinary [the staff of railway and irrigation officers is separate] is 14 in Bombay, Madras and Bengal, and so, in these three provinces alone, the saving due to the proposed removal of this body of intermediary officers would be £ 26,880 at the average of £ 1,920 per officer per annum.

We would not propose to disturb the existing

arrangements regarding expenditure on P. Works ordinary out of Local Funds.

Our recommendations may be summarised as follow :—

A. *Military P. Works*—The annual grant should be cut down from £ 1,000,000 to £ 625,000.

B. *Civil P. Works*—The total expenditure, which is now a variable and uncertain amount averaging above 4-35 Millions per annum, be reduced to £ 3,515,470, being the total amount to be spent out of all kinds of Funds. Of this amount, Imperial and Provincial Expenditure should be strictly limited to fixed annual grants, which must not be exceeded, except in "extraordinary" circumstances, in which, however, the outlay, that should be necessary, should be met from special grants extraordinary. We propose,

(1) Imperial Expenditure be fixed at £ 304,883 per annum; in England £ 55,414 instead of £82,238 as now, Cooper's Hill to be abolished.

In India.....£ 249,469

total £ 304,883

and

(a) Provincial Expenditure be fixed at £ 1,750,000 in place of 2 Millions and more as now:

Provincial proper.....	£ 1,500,000	} 1,750,000
Imperial provincialized	£ 250,000	

The net saving to the country, under these proposals, would be £ 1,209,842 as under :—

Military P. Works £ 375,000

Civil P. Works

(a) Imperial	£ 280,040	} £ 834,842
(b) Provincial... ..	£ 554,796	
(c) Local... ..	Nil	

Total £ 1,209,842

This is, then, the net amount which, in our

opinion, can be saved in this branch of Indian Expenditure by means of the proposed measures of retrenchment, without sacrifice of efficiency, administrative convenience, or progressive improvement. Further, the adoption of the principle of assigning fixed grants for *Imperial* and *Provincial Civil Works*, as is already done in respect of *Military P. Works*, would we think introduce what is at present wanting but is most desirable, in regard to this class of expenditure, an element of certainty into *Imperial* and *Provincial Finances*.

Medical Relief, Sanitation, and Vaccination.—

These three are cognate branches of one and the same service—viz, Public health; and we think they should be treated as such in administrative arrangements.

Until 1875-6, in some Provinces, vaccination was a branch of the Medical Department under its own chief; sanitation, similarly, stood alone in some provinces, while in others, it was joined on to the Medical Department for purposes of administrative direction. In that year changes were made in several provinces. In Bombay, for instance, sanitation and vaccination were put together under the care of the Sanitary Commissioner, who was himself subordinate to the Surgeon-General, and thus, through him, these three branches of sanitation, vaccination, and medical relief were brought together under one departmental chief. In Madras sanitation and vaccination were placed under the Sanitary Commissioner, who had no connection with the Medical Department, and thus we had here two separate Departments under two chiefs. Similar arrangements were, we believe, adopted in Bengal and the N. W. Provinces; while recently within the last four months the Bombay arrangements have been assimilated to those in other provinces, and the Bombay Sanitary Commissioner is no longer subordinate to the head of the Medical Department with the rank of Deputy Surgeon-General.

We prefer the older arrangements regarding the union of the three branches under one chief, as being the best in point of economy and administrative convenience; and we would therefore suggest a return to them in all the provinces on a uniform basis. The head of the medical department should have directive control over the three branches of Medical relief, vaccination and sanitation equally.

Besides the constitution of a single Department for these three branches of the service, we propose further changes in respect of each as follows:—

1st. Staff of the Medical department (civil side):—we have usually on the Staff in most provinces a number of surgeons-major, surgeons, hon. surgeons, assistant surgeons,—all officers of high professional attainments in charge of civil hospitals, assisted by a large body of Hospital assistants, medical agents, apothecaries &c. doing the whole *executive* work of the service; over them are placed Deputy Surgeons-General about 5 or 6 in number in each province, and the whole department is under the direction of one Surgeon-General, who communicates with Government. Now the *executive* portion of the staff will not of course bear reduction, which must be adequate for the work it has to do; the operations of Medical relief are every year extending, and increase, rather than decrease, in the staff must be necessary in future years. But we would suggest a reduction in the supervising machinery. However necessary in the first years of organisation of the service, we are of opinion, that the staff of Deputy Surgeons-General is no longer needed. For unity of control in matters of Finance and organisation, we have a Surgeon-General at the head of the Department, and the nature of the executive work does not require that he should have under him a staff of intermediate superintending Deputy Surgeons-General; in fact the work is such as to preclude the necessity of such intermediate supervision, especially when the

executive staff of District Surgeons is of so superior a grade, as well as even the possibility, in many respects, of any such supervision being usefully or effectively exercised. We, therefore, propose that this staff of Deputy Surgeons General (civil side) in the Medical Department be abolished in all the provinces of the empire. The saving, according to our estimate, would be about 6 lacks a year. In Bombay, Madras, and Bengal, the saving would be about 3½ lacks. The measure can be carried out, we think, in the interests of economy without in any way impairing the efficiency of the service.

(2nd), *Sanitation* —(a) The sanitary officer in charge of the service is only a consulting officer: his work is strictly limited to collection of sanitary statistics, review, report, and advice. The practical carrying out of his recommendations on the subject of sanitary improvement, rests entirely with the local Executive. As at present arranged, the Sanitary Commissioner is usually a Medical officer of the first rank, and draws between 2,000 to 2,500 rupees a month. We do not think that such a highly-paid functionary is required in the interests of the Public Service. When *Sanitation* is handed over to the supervision of the Surgeon-General, head of the Medical Department, we are of opinion that an officer of a lower grade in the medical service on a monthly salary of, say, Rs. 1200, to serve as sanitary Assistant to the Surgeon-General would be sufficient. The total saving by this substitution of sanitary Assistants for the present Sanitary Commissioners in the different provinces would be about 75,000 rupees a year. (b). Further the executive work of this Sanitary Department, which is at present done by the inspecting staff of the vaccination branch, is confined to gathering information, inspecting on the spot sanitary arrangements, and reporting on them. It might advantageously, in our opinion, be delegated to the Civil and Military Surgeons in charge of District and Cantonment Hospitals,

who will do it infinitely better than the Vaccination Inspectors. These Surgeons have already (on the civil side) to superintend the branch dispensaries in their respective Districts and therefore make annual tours of inspection in them. To their duties of medical superintendence, the work of sanitary inspection and report and advice can not make any very large addition, especially as these officers are usually men of high professional training and experience and have also the additional advantage of intimate acquaintance with local sanitary conditions. They are already medical superintendents in respect of District Dispensaries and might as well be, without inconvenient addition to their work, inspecting visitors in respect of District sanitation under the direction of the Surgeon-General in both capacities. Our proposal, therefore, is that the work of local sanitary inspection and report should be transferred as a measure of administrative economy, intended to ensure increased efficiency, from the half-qualified inspectors of the Vaccination Department to the District Surgeons of the Medical.

(3rd) *Vaccination*—In respect of this branch of the service, we are for a thorough recasting of the existing arrangements. These at present differ in different provinces, as briefly summarized below:—

Bengal—The system is a dual one in respect of both work and superintendence.

The work is done partly by the dispensaries and partly by

(a) Paid vaccinators in the employ of the state, and

(b) Licensed Vaccinators and Ex-in-oculators, who practise vaccination on their own account under Government control.

Supervision is entrusted (1) to the District Civil Surgeons and (2) to a special staff consisting of circle Deputy Superintendents and Vacci-

nation Inspectors acting under the Superintendent Général.

Operations—The total for 1879-80 was 17,42,995. The greater part of the work was done by licensed Vaccinators and Ex-in-oculators; the number of persons vaccinated by them being 10,21,432 *i. e.* more than $\frac{1}{2}$ the total. In noticing a similar feature in the work of the Department in a previous year, the Bengal Government wrote (vide Administration Report for 1877-78 page 416) as follows:—"From the readiness of the people to accept Vaccination from licensed Ex-inoculators it appears probable that before long it will be possible to withdraw paid Vaccinators from several districts, and leave the work to licensed Vaccinators under efficient control and supervision."

Cost—In consequence of this system of self-supporting vaccination being organised in this Province on a large scale, and also owing to the employment of the services of the District Civil Surgeons in the work of supervision alongside of a special staff, we find the annual cost of the Department averaging about a lack and a quarter (Rs. 1,25,000 or one anna and two pies, for each operation, to the state.

Central Provinces:—

The work is done by a paid staff of Vaccinators under paid supervision; no private agency is recognised or is admitted to any share. The number of vaccinators is 170.

Supervision—There is a paid staff. In the Administration Report for 1878-9 page 139 we find, "The Sanitary Commissioner is Superintendent-General, and a moiety of his pay is charged to this Department. In 17 Districts the superintendents are the Civil Surgeons, who are each assisted by a Native superintendent. In the other District (Nagpore) there is a Deputy Superintendent."

Operations.—The number of vaccinated persons in 1879-80 was 297,569.

Cost—The total for the year was Rs. 35,809 so that the cost to the state per operation was less than 2 annas (1 anna and 11 pies)

It is a noticeable feature of the Department in the Province that the work of supervision is so largely—rather almost wholly—entrusted to the District civil surgeons assisted by Native superintendents.

N. W. Provinces :—

The work is wholly done by a paid staff under paid supervision. There is no dispensary vaccination carried out in the Province—a striking instance of the neglect to utilize the service of a state-supported professional establishment, though available. There is of course no private agency recognised.

Supervision—The Sanitary Commissioner is the Superintendent-General with 3 circle Deputy Superintendents under him, assisted by a large body of Inspectors.

Operations—The number for 1878-9 was 759,467.

Cost—The total cost in 1878 was Rs 117,862 or 2 annas 6 pies per operation.

*Bombay :—*The work is done partly by the dispensaries and partly and chiefly by a paid staff of vaccinators, over 400 strong.

Supervision—Under the Sanitary Commissioner, who is Superintendent General as in other provinces, the staff consists of Deputy Superintendents, Circle Superintendents, Assistant Superintendents and Inspectors.

*Operations :—*The number vaccinated in 1878-9 was 561,968.

Cost—The total cost was 233,704 Rs. or about 4 annas per operation.

Madras :—Work—The agency is mixed as in Bengal, but the paid staff of vaccinators does the bulk of the work, Vaccinators practising on private account and the dispensaries doing but little.

Supervision :—The supervising staff consists of an Inspector, and 1st and 2nd class Deputy-Inspectors, under the direction of the Sanitary Commissioner.

Operations :—The number of persons vaccinated was about 521,760 in 1878-9. Private Vaccinators performed only 160 operations, and the Civil Dispensaries 397, while the rest fell to the share of the paid staff.

Cost—No information is available.

Briefly, the arrangements connected with this branch of the Service may be tabularly shown as under :—

Province.	Work.	Supervision.	Cost per operation.
Bengal	Dispensaries ...	Civil Surgeons ... } Paid special staff }	As. Ps. 1 2
	Paid Vaccinators } Licensed " " }		
Central Provinces	Paid Vaccinators ...	Civil Surgeons... } aided by Native } Superintendents } and one Deputy } Superintendent }	1 11
N. W. Provinces ...	Paid Vaccinators...	Paid special staff...	2 6
Bombay	Dispensaries ...	Paid special staff...	4 0
	Paid Vaccinators }		
Madras	Dispensaries ...	Paid staff
	Paid Vaccinators } Private Do. }		

Thus it seems, that on the whole the Bengal system is the most economical, the cost to the state per vaccination operation being the lowest, 1 anna 2 pies; while the Bombay system is the most wasteful, the charge to the state per operation being no less than 4 annas, or more than 3 times as much as in Bengal.

Firstly, in respect of *executive agency*, the Bengal plan appears to us the best; under it, Vaccination is rapidly becoming self-supporting; a large body of licensed vaccinators and ex-inoculators is being develop-

ed to do the work under Government supervision. In course of time, therefore, as the Bengal Government hopes, the state may be in a position to withdraw its paid agency altogether from the field, when the only charge upon the Treasury on account of this service will be one of supervision only. It is the adoption of this system, therefore, in respect of executive work in the Vaccination Department in all the Provinces, that we would advocate in the interests of economy. A gradual introduction of self-supporting vaccination by means of a private agency working under Government control would have further the advantage of enlisting in the cause of medical relief reform private interest than which no more powerful incentive to energetic work can be conceived.

Secondly, in respect of supervision, we prefer the arrangement existing in the Central Provinces. The work is here entrusted to the Civil Surgeons aided by Native Superintendents, and is consequently more cheaply and, yet, more efficiently done than in other Provinces. We would, therefore, recommend the extension of this system to the other Provinces.

The adoption of this mixed system in regard to this service (vaccination) founded on a combination of the Bengal arrangements in respect of work and of the Central Provinces system for supervision would leave little or no work for a separate staff of either vaccinators or vaccinating superintendents, and would make vaccination, what, in our opinion, it ought to be, a branch of the Medical Department in point of administration. The Vaccination Department thus virtually disestablished, all that would be necessary would be to give the Head of the Medical Department a vaccinating assistant, say, on a salary of 800 Rs. per mensem, and to pay some remuneration to the Civil Surgeons in addition to the regular pay as Medical officers for additional work, thrown on them in respect of supervision in the branch of sanitation and vaccination. Both these charges (salary of a vaccinating

assistant and remuneration to the Civil Surgeons) would not amount to more than a third of the present cost of the Vaccination Departments in the various Provinces. The net saving, therefore, to the Treasury would be $\frac{2}{3}$ rds of this cost—say 6 lacs per annum.

Summary of our proposals :—(1) there should be one Department for the 3 branches of Medical relief, sanitation and vaccination, under one head.

(2) The supervising staff of the Medical Department should be reduced by the abolition of Deputy Surgeons-General.

(3) A sanitary assistant should be appointed in place of the Sanitary Commissioner, on a salary of Rs. 1800 per month, to assist the Surgeon-General.

(4) The Vaccination Department should be abolished as a separate branch of the service. The executive work should be gradually transferred to a private agency, and supervision delegated to the officers of the Medical Department at a fair remuneration. A Vaccinating Assistant should be appointed to assist the Surgeon-General.

The net saving, estimated, is as below :—

	Rs.
(a) Abolition of Deputy Surgeons-General ..	6,00,000
(b) Appointment of the sanitary assistants to the Surgeons-General in place of the present Sanitary Commissioners.....	75,000
(c) Abolition of the Vaccination Department as a separate service, the work being transferred to the Medical Department.....	6,00,000
Total Rs.	12,75,000

This saving can be effected, in our opinion, under the arrangements recommended, with increase of efficiency rather than otherwise.

THE FOREST DEPARTMENT.

I. *Character of the Service* :—As at present arranged, Forest conservancy is, in a fiscal point of

view, a semi-Provincial, semi-Imperial service. For administrative purposes, however, it is Imperial and is placed under central direction. The Forest Department, though organized according to Provinces, is under the control of an officer of the Supreme Government, who is styled Inspector-General of Forests. He has a special staff attached to his office, comprising "a Superintendent of Forest Surveys and a Superintendent of Working Plans," a forest survey and a working plan being the two main divisions of the professional work of the Department. The Forest Surveys are in full working order, and the system of working plans is in course of development. "A working plan comprises an estimate of the stock in a forest at any given date, of its annual increase, of the amount that may be removed yearly, and of the measures required for keeping up the supply; and it is the duty of the Superintendent of Forest Plans to prepare such estimate himself or to approve those submitted by local officers, and to watch over their due execution." The survey work is eventually temporary, and so is, therefore, the survey establishment. But the staff of executive Forest officers under the Superintendent of Forest Plans is a permanent establishment, charged with the administration of the service which is thus thoroughly centralized under the control of the Inspector-General at Calcutta.

II. *Constitution of the Service* :—"For local purposes, the Forest Department is classified into Circles, Divisions, and Ranges, which vary in area according to the proportion of forest that exists in different parts of the country. A Forest Circle, the highest unit, is the charge of a Conservator, and is usually co-extensive with the area of a Province, though some Provinces contain more than one circle. A Forest Division is the charge of a Deputy Conservator and is usually coextensive with the District, though in not a few cases, when forests are few and unimportant, it includes several Districts. A Forest Range, the

lowest unit, consists of a part of a District and is placed under an Assistant Conservator or a Ranger according to circumstances" (Vide Cotton's Report page 203).

The staff of the Department is divided into *superior* and *subordinate*. The superior staff consists of Conservators, Deputy Conservators, and Assistant Conservators. They are all "Europeans originally nominated in England by the Secretary of State, subject to an entrance examination and a course of professional study." Including Madras and Bombay, they number 140 of whom 15 are Conservators, and the rest Deputy Conservators and Assistant Conservators; 100 are posted in North India, 21 in Bombay and 19 in Madras. They constitute the staff of forest supervision and direction.

Under these officers of the superior staff, there is a large subordinate staff of Sub-Assistant Conservators, Forest Rangers (or Overseers) and foresters, who are all natives specially trained for the service. They do the whole executive work of the Department.

Thus the Forest Department of India is, like the Post and the Telegraph, an Imperial Department under the direction of an Imperial officer, with a triple machinery of intermediate supervision working under him. The work, being essentially local, is entrusted to the local establishments on its executive side; but all directive control is exercised from a single Imperial centre through Provincial media.

Such an organization of a service, which is peculiarly local in its character and requirements, can not be, in our opinion, either good or economical as a permanent organization. In cases of this kind when the general interests of the empire demand that there should be, in the management of the service, unity of plan and purpose, and of basis and method, central direction is highly useful and necessary at the initial stage in departmental construction. But after this stage is passed, and the service is placed on sound and uniform

basis, with definite rules of procedure, centralization, we submit, obviously loses its *raison d'être* and therefore should cease. Directive supervision, exercised from a single Imperial bureau over the local executive operations of a Department, embracing in its range of management an area even larger than that of the whole of Western Europe, cannot possibly be effective, however energetic, and must be *papey supervision* and perhaps worse. The action of the Central Office of direction, wherever it should choose to interfere, is likely to be oftener than not, in wrong places and in wrong ways in respect of local matters, and, besides leading to friction and irritating controversies, to have the effect of weakening motives for economy and care on the part of the local executive officers of the Department.

We would therefore advocate, in the first place, a change in the character of the service. The selection of Forest areas for special conservation and Government management is, we think, the most difficult and at the same time the most responsible part of the whole work of the Forest Department. The work is of Imperial importance and should be guided by Imperial (*and not Provincial*) considerations, such as those relating to the climatic and physical conditions of the country as a whole, to protection of various exposed tracts of territory from drought, to the securing of an equable rainfall, and the guarding of the sources of important rivers, the clothing of the hill and mountain sides &c. It should not, in our opinion, be left to the discretion of the Provincial Governments, which, in their irrepressible zeal for false progress in big figure totals might often forget the real objects of State Forest conservancy and permit their Forest officers to make year after year increasing additions, whether useful and necessary or not, to their Provincial "reserved" and "protected" forest areas, as it is at present being done in the Southern Circle of the Bombay Presidency, regardless

alike of the real climatic wants of the country, or even of their respective Provinces, or whether the operations needlessly trenched upon the vested rights and interests of the cultivating peasants or private proprietors. The work of Forest surveys, with a view to such selection of Forest areas, should be conducted, as it is at present, under central direction by means of a central agency and completed once for all, throughout the country like the cadastral survey from which it does not much differ.

But the Forest survey over, and the lines of a general Forest policy laid down, the work, we think, of the Supreme Government in the matter of Forest conservancy is done. When Forest areas are chosen and demarcated, the work of Forest executive administration in connection with "Forest Plans" should be provincialized, a general plan and general principles being alone prescribed by the Central Government for the guidance of the Provincial Governments as in the management of Provincial Finance. Forest conservancy, look at it how you may, is in every sense a *local* service and can be managed best only *locally*, and should therefore, in our opinion, be treated as such in any administrative scheme. The Local Governments alone have the requisite machinery for effectually controlling its Finance and organisation.

Passing on from the *character* to the constitution of the service, we would propose that "Forest survey" should be detached altogether from the work of "Forest Plans," the two branches being entirely distinct, just as the cadastral survey has nothing to do with the administration of the Land Revenue. The work should be made over to the Department of Revenue Survey, and the agency of that scientific service should be utilized for the purpose. So far as the Bombay Presidency is concerned, we know that in the early days of the Forest Department the demarkation or survey work was done by the Revenue Survey Department; and as the Land Revenue and

Forest Departments are closely allied, there is a fitness of things in entrusting the work of Forest Survey and demarkation to the Revenue Survey Department. One great advantage of such an arrangement is that it will ensure due regard being paid to the agricultural interests which is not now done. The officers of that Department should, in the matter of Forest Survey, be under the direction of the Inspector General, the Chief of the Forest Department, whose duty it should be to lay down general rules for the conduct of operations and check the results, if necessary, by personal tours or with the aid of the officers of the P. W. Department whose labours lie in the same field, and whose advice he should be officially entitled to claim. With the transfer of Forest Survey to the Revenue Survey Department, the necessity for maintaining a special Superintendent of Forest Survey on the staff of the Inspector-General, with a numerous army of Field Surveyors under him, will disappear, and the whole establishment, can, in our opinion, be conveniently abolished. A large saving can be thus effected without loss of efficiency or convenience. Further, as the survey operations advance, in the various Provinces, under the Revenue Survey parties, the Inspector-General should proceed, on the data so obtained and verified, to determine, in consultation with the local executive Forest officers, the selection of Forest areas Province by Province, and to formulate his recommendations in a report on each year's work to the Supreme Government, which before arriving at a final decision may, if it thinks necessary, give the Provincial Governments an opportunity of expressing their views on the subject. After such

survey and such selection of Forest areas are complete, the Supreme Government should, in our opinion, leave nothing to itself to do in this matter beyond exercising general control "from outside." The services of the Inspector-General should then be dispensed with, and the administration of Forest conservancy should be made over to the Provincial Governments.

The service provincialized for administrative purposes as we propose, the Superintendent of "Working Plans," attached to the office of the Inspector General, will have no work to do, and should be abolished, and the constitution of the Forest Department remodelled in accordance with the requirements and convenience of the various Provinces. A double change seems to us necessary, especially in the interests of economical management.

(1) The existing Imperial distribution of Forest executive charges into Circles, Divisions, and Ranges, which are not in most cases conterminous with the civil divisions of different Provinces, should be done away with as no longer necessary or convenient, and both made to coincide with each other.

(2) In each Province, Forest conservancy should be, as once it was, an integral part of the civil District administration in something more than a name. When the Survey is over, and with it, the selection and demarkation of Forest areas, half the professional work of the Department is done, and in respect of the other half, that of the local forest management, the head civil District officer should have, we think, more than a consultative voice, and should not be

merely a mechanical and useless channel of communication between the District Forest officer and the Circle Conservator, as, at present, he virtually is.

We would, after this double change, recommend the reconstitution of the Forest Department on some such lines as the following:—

Each Province should have a Conservator at the head of its Forest Department, who should communicate with Government, and should be its consulting officer in respect of Forest conservancy generally. He should have, as now, controlling authority over the Finance, organisation and discipline of his department, but in all matters of local forest management, his functions should be, as at present nominally they are, those of advice. Eight Conservators would be sufficient, one for each of the Provinces,—India general, Bengal, Assam, N. W. Provinces and Oude, Panjab, Central Provinces, Bombay and Madras,—and the present staff, which consists of 15 Circle Conservators, might be cut down by 7.

Next, the staff of intermediate supervisors, acting between the head of the Forest Department and the local body of Forest Rangers (or Overseers) also admits of considerable reduction. It at present consists of Deputy Conservators and Assistant Conservators (numbering 125 in all) assisted by Sub-Assistant Conservators. Assuredly such a triple machinery of intermediate supervision in connection with such a service as Forest Conservancy, in which the work being more or less concentrated over particular areas or blocks, is simple

and easy for purposes of control, cannot be deemed absolutely necessary for the effective protection of the public interests; particularly after the system of "working Forest Plans" is properly developed and put into order. The ordinary administrative district staff should be, in a more active and real manner than at present, associated with the work of Forest supervision, and further, we recommend that the Local Boards and Committees, wherever practicable, may be given a large share and a direct interest also (in the shape, say, of commission or good service rewards) in local forest supervision. The services of village headmen and local Inamdars should also, in our opinion, be utilized for the purpose. With such *outside* agencies available for control, we think, the Provincial Governments should reduce a good deal the regular supervising staff of the Forest Department. It is, as at present constituted, 125 strong, taking only the Deputy and Assistant Conservators. We would give each Commissioner or Divisional officer one Deputy or Assistant Conservator to be his adviser or Assistant in Forest matters, according as local Forest work is more or less important. There are at present 37 Divisional Commissionerships in all India, and therefore 37 or say 40 of these 125 Forest officers would be sufficient for the real requirements of the service. Here, therefore, there is much room for retrenchment without loss of departmental efficiency, and we would content ourselves with drawing the attention of the Finance Department to the fact that the state at this day maintains at an enormous cost to the treasury a body of about 80 officers whose services, however useful in other days will not for some years.

to come be permanently required, under the changes above suggested, which can be carried out without loss of efficiency for the public good.

Finally as regards the District Forest Administration, after the removal of Deputy and Assistant Conservators to a higher sphere of duty with the Divisional Commissioners, we would suggest that each District should have as its Forest officer a Sub-Assistant Conservator of Forests assisted by Forest Rangers in the management of Talooka work.

Such a reconstitution of the service would, in our opinion, not only give us a large saving, but result in increased departmental efficiency in respect of Forest Conservancy. The estimated saving is about 6 lacs per annum. Our proposals may be thus summarised:—

(1) That there should be no centralized administration of Forest Conservancy; Forest Survey should be carried out under central direction by the agency of the Revenue Survey Department. The office of the Superintendent of "Forest Surveys" with his special staff should be abolished. The survey over, the Inspector General should determine the selection of Forest areas to be conserved, with the aid of the local officer of the P. W. Department, and lay down a general plan and a general system in respect of Forest administration for the guidance of local Forest officers. This done, there should be no Forest Department in the Government of India. The services should be provincialized.

(2) That the Forest Department should be reconstituted in each Province thus:—One Conservator at the head of the Department and one Deputy or Assistant Conservator with each Divisional Commissioner; One Sub-Assistant Conservator as head District Forest officer, aided by the Forest Rangers. The rest of the supervising staff should be abolished.

For purposes of local supervision, the District administrative staff and the Local Boards and committees, as well as village headmen and Talooka Inamdars, should be utilized wherever available. The services of 7 Conservators and 80 Deputy and Assistant Conservators might be dispensed with under these changes

MINOR RETRENCHMENTS.

Post :—The General Post Offices of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta cost the Treasury about £. 12,000 per annum. These three offices, located in the capitals of the three Presidencies, representing the machinery of Provincial control, which is, however, now a thing of the past, in respect of this Imperial service, which is thoroughly under central direction, serve no purpose and have in fact outlived their usefulness. Owing their origin to a system of things long since gone, they are now only a useless historical relic, and for this reason and others briefly stated in the Introductory section of this Note, we would propose that they be abolished. The net saving would be £. 12,000 a year. The centralized organisation of the service leaves nothing to be desired in the direction of supervision.

Mints :—Of the Bombay and Calcutta Mints it is notorious that the Calcutta mint does not always pay its way. It costs on an average £. 70,000 per annum. We suggest that it may be closed, the staff of the Bombay mint being strengthened and the machinery, made adequate to the demands of additional work that would be thrown upon it. The cost of increase in the Bombay Mint establishment need not exceed 2 lacs a year, and thus the net saving to the state by this measure of retrenchment would be about £. 50,000.

Until 1869 there were three mints in India, working in the three Presidential capitals. But in that year, the Madras mint was closed for want of sufficient work and we have now only two. The comparative work of these in the 10 years from 1871 to 1880 is shown in a table below :—

Coinage in 10 years.

Year.	Calcutta.				Bombay.			
	Gold £	Silver £	Copper £	Total £	Gold £	Silver £	Copper £	Total £
1871	3,994	474,712	6,121	484,827	...	1,243,685	1,243,685
1872	15,412	1,080,009	25,049	1,120,470	149	610,385	610,534
1873	31,795	1,045,953	11,012	1,088,760	...	2,934,961	2,934,961
1874	15,498	790,909	14,461	820,868	...	1,579,097	1,579,097
1875	14,034	1,771,462	105,786	1,891,282	...	3,125,422	5,238	3,130,660
1876	17,150	818,346	84,416	916,912	...	1,751,872	24,244	1,756,116
1877	2,079,285	107,385	2,185,670	...	4,191,831	16,044	4,207,551
1878	15,636	5,151,821	133,220	5,800,677	...	11,028,505	15,371	11,043,876
1879	2,324,473	66,648	2,391,143	85	4,886,275	4,886,360
1880	14,604	2,135,416	67,300	2,217,320	126	8,121,551	8,121,677
Total..	£ 128,123	£17,672,408	£618,398	£18,418,929	360	39,453,370	60,897	39,514,667

A NOTE ON REFRENCHEMENT.

The total coinage of Gold, Silver and Copper for all India in these 10 years amounted to £. 57,933,576, thus distributed :—

Gold	£.	128,483
Silver	£.	57,125,798
Copper... ..	£.	679,295

The work of the Calcutta Mint is represented by a total coinage of £. 18,418,929, while that of the the Bombay mint amounted to a total of £. 39,514,647, or, in round number, out of the total coinage of about 58 Millions the Bombay share was 39·5, that of Calcutta 18·4. Thus in these 10 years, the Calcutta Mint, which costs almost quite as much as the Bombay one, did not do even half as much work.

Gold coinage is now almost stopped and copper is a subsidiary coin. Therefore, the bulk of coining operations is connected with Silver : and the work of the Government mints at Calcutta and Bombay is chiefly dependent upon the annual imports of Silver into the country. In normal years it is wholly so, and it is only in exceptional years of famine or distress, that a portion of the silver supply for coinage is drawn from the ornaments and hoardings of the people.

Here then, in the annual importations, of Silver, we have an accurate measure by which to form an approximate estimate of the future prospects of work at the two mints. The following table gives the imports of Silver for Bengal and Bombay for 30 years from 1854-5 to 1883-4 :—

Imports of Silver.

Year.	Bengal.	Bombay.	Total for British India.
	£.	£.	£.
1854-55	326,520	983,920	1,145,137
1855-56	4,356,630	3,719,244	8,792,793
1856-57	5,502,627	5,825,987	12,237,695
1857-58	6,228,114	5,946,565	12,935,332
1858-59	3,343,052	4,443,742	8,379,662
Annual Average.....	3,951,389	4,123,892

Year.	Bengal.	Bombay.	Total for British India.
	£.	£.	£.
1859-60	6,666,410	4,664,085	12,068,626
1860-61	2,271,818	3,467,993	6,434,716
1861-62	2,445,241	6,636,464	9,728,809
1862-63	2,874,636	9,957,925	13,627,491
1863-64	2,306,816	10,825,136	14,037,109
Annual Average	3,317,044	7,110,921
1864-65	4,016,894	6,327,836	11,488,320
1865-66	6,687,652	12,182,878	20,184,407
1866-67	4,672,524	3,481,840	8,655,433
1867-68	2,778,206	3,869,054	6,999,450
1868-69	2,817,548	6,667,519	9,978,973
Annual Average	4,194,565	6,505,360
1869-70	3,143,463	4,804,846	8,264,107
1870-71	630,036	1,791,243	2,662,249
1871-72	2,834,626	4,884,283	8,000,035
1872-73	251,709	1,444,779	1,934,214
1873-74	1,472,158	2,379,824	4,143,726
Annual Average	1,666,399	3,000,936
1874-75	2,236,188	3,445,862	6,051,810
1875-76	515,016	2,633,530	3,464,331
1876-77	2,421,590	7,252,081	9,994,408
1877-78	4,520,780	11,076,166	15,776,532
1878-79	1,367,152	3,995,368	5,593,699
Annual Average	2,212,145	5,630,602
1879-80	2,441,114	6,902,462	9,605,002
1880-81	945,224	4,166,057	5,316,156
1881-82	922,729	5,429,131	6,466,389
1882-83	1,307,065	6,888,463	8,358,022
1883-84	1,125,938	6,023,591	7,408,506
Annual Average.....	1,343,496	5,881,940
Total.....	83,450,040	161,668,555	259,790,454

Thus the quinquennial averages are:—

Year.	Bengal.	Bombay.
1854-55—1858-59	3,951,389	4,123,892
1859-60—1863-64	3,317,044	7,110,921
1864-55—1868-69	4,194,565	6,505,360
1869-70—1873-74	1,666,399	3,000,996
1874-75—1878-79	2,212,145	5,680,592
1879-80—1883-84	1,348,496	5,881,940

Thus, of the total imports of Silver during the 30 years from 1854-5 to 1883-4, which amounted to nearly 260 Millions, Bombay and Bengal had between them 245, leaving only 15 Millions for the other Provinces. Of these two, again, Bombay imported 161.6 and Bengal 83.4 Millions, so that the imports into the latter Province average only one half of those of the former. The proportionate work of each of the two mints closely corresponds to this relative ratio of imports of silver into the two Presidencies.

Looking, however, to the quinquennial averages for each of the Provinces and to the annual imports, we find that the tendency in Bengal is to a fall-off. Ever since 1866-7, the imports of silver into that Province had been more or less on the decline till in 1883-4 out of the total imports amounting to £. 7,408,506 for all India, the Bengal share was only £. 1,125,988 while the Bombay figure was £. 6,023,591. Later figures are not available, but comparing the quinquennial averages for 1879-80—1883-4 with those for 1854-5—1858-9, we notice a striking difference. The Bengal average fell from £. 3,951,389 to £. 1,348,496, while that of Bombay rose from £. 4,123,892 to £. 5,881,940. We may, therefore, say that most of our imported silver,—as much as 6/7 of the whole,—now comes to Bombay, barely 1/6 going to Calcutta, and that the current has set in in this direction ever since 1866 7.

Such is the course of trade in respect of silver

imports, and if the work of our Government Mints is, as Mr. Cotton observes, entirely dependent on that course in normal years, it is not unreasonable to assume that *coinage* will, in future years, increase at the Bombay mint, and decrease at the Calcutta one. Already, as shown before, the Bombay Mint does more than twice as much work as the Calcutta one, the exact ratio being 2·4 to 1, and as the tendency of Silver imports to centre more and more in Bombay develops itself, the Calcutta mint will have before long little or no work except in respect of copper coinage. The nearest Mint to the post of arrival would also be the most convenient for coining purposes to the importing merchant. Therefore we may say that neither the convenience, of the merchants nor the interests of commerce, would seem to require that, besides a Mint in Bombay, which can serve the needs of the situation for all practical purposes as the bulk of the Silver supply comes there, there should be another at Calcutta and that, too, maintained generally at a loss to the Public Treasury. Further the concentration of coinage work at one central Mint, would conduce to economy in management, unity of control, and cheapness of work.

The service, of course, must be, as it is at present, strictly Imperial and under Imperial direction. But if one central Mint, located in the commercial capital of the Empire, suffices for the convenience and interests of commerce, there is no reason, apparently, why another should be kept up in the political Metropolis of India, except it be for satisfying the sentimental susceptibilities of Calcutta.

We, therefore, recommend that the Calcutta Mint be closed, the staff and machinery of the Bombay one being strengthened to meet the pressing increased work. The net saving would, according to our estimate, be no less than five lacs per annum.

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[No. 4]

APRIL 1937

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EDITED BY

S. H. DIPLOMKAR.

POONA

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THE POONA SARVAJANIK SABHA.

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WALEKAR'S WADA, DANE ALL

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SABHA.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FINANCE COMMITTEE REGARDING THE PROPOSED ABOLITION OF THE DECCAN COLLEGE.

No. 123 of 1886.

From,

S. H. CHIPLONKAR

Secretary of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

To,

C. A. ELLIOTT Esq.,

President of the Finance Committee,

Calcutta.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS.

Poona, 18th November 1886.

Sir,

Agreeably to the Resolutions passed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of Poona on Wednesday the 10th Instant under the presidentship of the Hon'ble Sardar Rao Bahadur Gopalrao Hari Deshmukh I am directed by the Committee of the Sarvajanic Sabha to forward herewith to you for your information and for that of your colleagues on the Finance Committee a copy of the Memorial unanimously adopted at that meeting, protesting against the recommendation which your Committee is almost authoritatively announced to have made regarding the practical abolition of the Deccan College at Poona.

2 Under a separate cover I beg to send also eight more copies of the Memorial for distribution among your colleagues on the Committee.

3 I am to add that the Committee of the Sabha fully endorse the views expressed in the accompanying Memorial, and that they hope that your Committee will see good cause to review its decision on the subject if it be not too late to do so.

4 In conclusion I am to request your special attention to paragraph 10 of the Memorial

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

S. H. CHIPLONKAR,

Secretary, Sarvajanic Sabha.

No. 601.

Office of the Secretary to the Finance Committee,
Calcutta, the 29th November 1886.

From,

STEPHEN JACOB, Esq., C. S.,
Secretary, Finance Committee,

To,

The Secretary
Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

Sir,

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 123 dated 18 November 1886 forwarding copies of a memorial from certain inhabitants of Poona to the Government of Bombay regarding certain proposals attributed to the Finance Committee, and to say that the Committee's proposals have been submitted to the Government of India and that the orders of the Government regarding them have not been issued.

2. I am to observe that the Finance Committee consulted the Sarvajanic Sabha as representatives of the public in those parts and asked for any suggestions they could give regarding reduction of expenditure and have up to date received no reply. When at Poona the President requested the Hon'ble Mr. Ranade to make known to them that if they had any suggestions to make, which it would be useful to discuss, the Committee would be glad to meet the Sabha in conference. To this communication also no answer was returned.

3. The Finance Committee considers that by thus refusing to give any opinion on the subject of economy when courteously requested to do so, the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha have abdicated any right to criticise their proposals in the character of representatives of the Native Community.

4. In conclusion I am to remark that the language used in certain parts of the memorial regarding the Finance Committee is unusual in tone and bears an appearance of discourtesy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most Obedient Servant,

WILLIAM H. DOBBIE,

For Secretary Finance Committee.

No. 154 of 1886.

From,

S. H. CHIPLONKAR Esq.,

Secretary Poona Sarvajanik Sabha

Poona.

To,

The Secretary

Finance Committee

Calcutta.

Sarvajanik Sabha Rooms,

Poona, 10th Dec. 1886.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 601 dated the 29th Ultimo, and to say in reply that the Committee of the Sabha exceedingly regret that owing to unavoidable circumstances they were unable up to yesterday to respond to the very courteous invitation of the Finance Committee for an expression of the views of the Sabha on the very important subject referred to them for inquiry by the Government of India. The Committee of the Sabha are aware that the expression of their views, submitted at so late a date, may not prove of any practical service, but rather than leave your courteous invitation altogether unanswered the Committee of the Sabha have deemed it their duty to submit their views even at this late date. The Committee of the Sabha fully appreciate the honor done to them by your Committee, and this circumstance only enhances their regret at their having been unable to respond in due time to your Committee's invitation for an expression of their views on the subject of economical administration of this Empire.

2. But while so deeply conscious of their own involuntary failure, which they frankly confess has justly laid them open to the complaint of your Committee, the Committee of the Sabha beg leave to observe with all due respect that they fail to perceive the logic of the argument on which, to judge from the language of para 3 of your letter under acknowledgment, your Committee evidently appear to have laid much stress. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Committee of the Sabha deliberately and intentionally "refused to give any opinion on the subject of economy when courteously requested to do so," it is difficult to perceive how even such failure to respond to your Committee's invitation can be fairly and reasonably construed into an "abdication" or estoppel of their right to criticise any specific proposal of your Committee as might seem to

them objectionable on various grounds. The Committee of the Sabha further beg leave to observe that, even assuming that they in response to your Committee's invitation had timely expressed their opinion on the subject of economy generally, they do not see how it could have prevented your Committee from submitting to the Government of India the particular recommendation regarding the Deccan College which the Finance Committee are confidently reported to have submitted, any more than the timely expression of opinion on the subject of economy generally by the Bombay Presidency Association did.

3. I am further directed to point out that even if it is to be assumed that the involuntary failure of the Sabha to timely respond to your Committee's invitation amounts to a practical abdication of their right to criticise any of the proposals of your Committee as may seem to them objectionable, it is not easy to see how the general public of Poona in common with the people of other districts, affected by the particular proposal of your Committee under consideration, could be said to have forfeited their right of criticizing the same. The Memorial to the Bombay Government a copy of which, agreeably to the Resolution passed, was forwarded to your Committee with my letter No. 123 dated 18th Ultimo, was adopted by the people of Poona in public meeting assembled.

4. In conclusion I am directed to assure the Finance Committee with reference to the concluding paragraph of your letter under reply that nothing would have induced the Sabha to be the medium of communicating to them a document knowing that it contained discourteous expressions towards the Committee. The Sabha is quite unconscious of the use of such language in the Memorial, and feels certain that the Memorialists would readily express their sincere regret should any expressions, bearing an appearance of discourtesy towards such high authority as the Finance Committee, have unguardedly crept into their Memorial.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

S. H. CHIPLONKAR,

Secretary, Sarvajanic Sabha.

REPLY OF THE FINANCE COMMITTEE TO THE
GENERAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE
SABHA ON THE SUBJECT OF ECO-
NOMY IN ADMINISTRATION.

No. 21.

Office of the Secretary to the Finance Commissioner
Calcutta, the 14th January 1887.

From,

STEPHEN JACOB, Esq., C. S.,

*Secretary, to the Finance Commissioner with the
Government of India.*

To,

The Secretary,

Poona Sarvajank Sabha,

Sir,

By the direction of the Finance Commissioner with the Govern-
ment of India, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter
No. 77 dated the 9th December 1886, communicating to the President
of the Finance Committee, for the consideration of that Committee,
the views of the Poona Sarvajank Sabha on the possibility of
effecting economies in the Public expenditure, and to inform you
that your letter arrived only a week before the Finance Committee
dissolved, and that there was not time to circulate it among the
Members of the Finance Committee, or to pass any resolution on it.

2. I am directed, however, at the same time to express the
thanks of the Finance Commissioner to the Sabha for the communica-
tion which is full and valuable and to add that if it had reached
the Committee before they arrived in the Bombay Presidency, in the
course of their tour, its figures would have been carefully examined,
and probably it would have been found to be of considerable
assistance.

3. Extracts from your letter will be printed among the
appendices to the report of the Finance Committee.

I have the honor to be

Sir,

Your most Obedient Servant,

STEPHEN JACOB,

Secretary to the Finance Commissioner

with the Government of India.

INFANT MARRIAGE AND ENFORCED WIDOWHOOD IN INDIA.

I. NON-HINDU EVIDENCE.

In our number for July 1886 we were enabled, through the kindness of a friend, to give a brief summary of the opinions submitted to the Government of India by the local Governments of eight * provinces on the subject of Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood in India. At the same time we were enabled to give a brief summary of the opinions on the same subject by a few European officers in the Panjab, and by a few Native Princes in the Bombay Presidency. We had not then the opinions of the Madras and Bengal Governments before us, nor those of the representative Hindu gentlemen in the various provinces of the British Indian Empire. In the discussion of a subject of such paramount importance to the Hindus themselves we do naturally attach the greatest importance to the deliberate and dispassionate views recorded by representative Hindu gentlemen, as indicating in an unmistakable manner the growth of responsible public opinion on the subject of Hindu social reform generally. We accordingly welcome the publication by the Government of India of an interesting and instructive volume as a selection from its records, containing all the papers submitted to the Government of India on the subject under notice, and we have also to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of a copy of this compilation.

In the following pages we propose to give a brief summary of the opinions of the Madras and Bengal

* These eight provinces are:—Bombay, North-West Provinces with Oude, Panjab, British Burmah, Assam, Central Provinces, Berars and Coorg.

Governments, including those of the Divisional Commissioners in the Lower Provinces, and having done this, we propose to briefly notice the responsible evidence of representative Hindu experts. Before proceeding to this interesting task we can not help drawing the attention of the reader to one unfortunate circumstance, viz, the entire absence or rather non-publication of any papers by representative Hindu gentlemen from five out of the ten provinces or administrations to whom the Government of India forwarded Mr. Malabari's original Notes for ascertaining the official views as well as those of representative Hindu gentlemen,—more especially the latter. In the compilation before us we have no responsible Hindu opinions from the following five provinces—North-West Provinces with Oude, Central Provinces, British Burmah, Assam, and Coorg. We regret this omission more especially in the case of the North-West Provinces and the Central Provinces. As regards the the remaining three provinces the omission is not of much consequence, for the simple reason that the practices complained of do not exist there as a system to any appreciable extent, although if some local representative and responsible opinions had been published in the compilation from the said three provinces, they would have proved interesting and instructive. In the case of Assam and Coorg this omission is to be regretted all the more, because we are told by the Chief Commissioners * of both the Provinces that the

* The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam writes :—
 “ In the chapter on conjugal condition, in the Assam Census Report of 1881, Assam is described (para 82) as a young country, comparatively free from the yoke of conventionalities and from the artificial systems of child marriage and perpetual widowhood ; the statistics alluded to in paragraphs 85 and 89, 91 and 92, do indeed go to prove that even in Assam a dislike to the remarriage of widows prevails with some degree of force, and that child marriage is by no means unknown ; still, on the whole, there is certainly a preponderance of custom in favour of adult marriages, and, to the best of Mr. Elliott's belief, *child marriage finds favour mainly among persons who are the*

practice of Infant Marriage has recently been finding increasing favour in the eyes of the strictly local population, whose past traditions, however, favoured the system of adult marriages only, in consequence of some real or fancied superiority of the new system over its old rival. It would have been both interesting and instructive if we had some direct evidence from representative local gentlemen of the classes chiefly concerned, tending to show how they regarded this new departure in their traditional custom, and whether any appreciable inconvenience or discomfort resulted from its adoption. We think the Government of India would do well to supply this omission by issuing a supplementary volume, which will, we have no doubt, be regarded as an interesting and instructive addition to the volume before us and now under notice.

As regards the other five provinces, the official compilation before us contains 68 papers by Hindu gentlemen from Bombay, 17 papers by Hindu gentle-

ustoms of other provinces, and think they raise themselves in the social scale by adopting the inconveniences to which the older civilizations of Hindustan have subjected themselves. With regard to the remarriage of widows, the additional observation may be made that the customs of the country lend themselves easily to contracts of cohabitation which, though not formally recognized as marriage, are of a validity scarcely inferior to the legal ties.

The Chief Commissioner of Coorg writes:—"I find it stated in a small Manual entitled 'Coorg Civil Law,' published in 1871 that while in former days among the Coorgs no girl was given in marriage till she had attained the age of puberty, this rule or custom had in recent years become relaxed, and occasionally marriages of girls of 8 years of age, but not less, have been allowed. This statement is confirmed by the Commissioner of Coorg, who has reported that, while adult marriages prevail generally among the Coorgs and the Goudas of North Coorg, this practice of infant marriage 'has come into vogue within the last 40 years, chiefly to secure a certain provision for daughters, and there is the further reason that the Coorgs have not been superior to the temptation of following the example set by the Brahmins, Rajputs and other caste races who have come to settle among them in increasing numbers."

men and 15 by public bodies from Bengal, 9 papers by Hindu gentlemen from Madras, 3 papers by Hindu gentlemen from the Panjab, and 12 by Hindu gentlemen from the Berars. It will be thus seen that the largest collection is from the Bombay Presidency, and it would have been better if the other Provinces had followed the example set by Bombay. In the case of these five provinces there is another feature about this compilation which deserves more than a passing notice. The Bombay and Madras Governments alone appear to have scrupulously abstained from inviting an expression of opinion on Mr. Malabari's original Notes from others than Hindu gentlemen, whether official or non-official; while the remaining three Provincial Administrations, notably the Bengal Government, appear to have circulated the said Notes among Hindus and non-Hindus alike. In the Bengal portion of the compilation we find 11 papers by European officers and, by the Central Mahomedan Association of Calcutta; similarly in the Panjab portion we find 3 papers by European officers and 1 by a Mahomedan gentleman, and in the Berar portion we find one paper by a European officer. In Bengal, moreover, all the district officers appear to have reported upon the subject, though their reports are not published, having probably been taken into consideration by the Divisional Commissioners when submitting their reports. We wish both the Bombay and Madras Governments had requested some select European officers to report their views on the two Notes; for, as far our Presidency is concerned, we should certainly have liked to read the opinions of officers like Messers Erskine, Sheppard, Crawford, Propert and Baines, who either by their fairly intimate acquaintance with the manners and customs of the Native community, or by their special qualifications as the result of their special opportunities for studying such interesting problems by the light of comparative statistics, were competent to give intelligent opinions on the questions raised.

The Government of Madras in their reply premise at the outset that the subjects discussed in Mr. Malabari's Notes, had "long before the receipt of Mr. Malabari's Notes, attracted much attention in this Presidency," and then add that "the backwardness of its most prominent men* to favour Government with their opinions on this occasion is in a measure due to ignorance as to Mr. Malabari's qualifications and claims to lead reform in this direction." As to the various remedies suggested in the Notes the Madras Government say that they can not view with approval any interference of the kind suggested by Mr. Malabari; for it would be "a clear and unwarrantable violation of Her Majesty's proclamation to bring official influence to bear upon the religious beliefs and practices of the people, and particularly upon the institution of marriage, which is one of, if not the most sacred sacrament of any creed or church." They further think that the remedies suggested are not practicable, and, even if practicable, are not advisable; for the orthodox element, which would be opposed to such interference, "represents 99 per cent of the Native community." In noticing the argument of the reformers that the existing practices in both the directions "are not sanctioned by Hindu law as it was in the beginning," the Government of Sir M. E. Grant Duff say in reply that they consider this argument "to be of no avail;" firstly because "the Government have to deal with socio-religious laws and customs *as they are* and *not as they were hundreds of years ago,*" and, secondly, because "for the law courts

* It appears that the Madras Government requested 22 Hindu gentlemen to favour them with their views on the Notes, of whom only 7 responded to the invitation, the remaining two papers in the Madras portion of the official compilation having been volunteered by their respective writers. There is one more paper similarly volunteered by H. H. the Maharaja of Travancore, but we have excluded it from our summary, as it contains no opinion whatever, beyond a vague expression of good-will towards the cause of social reform.

to hold at this present time that consummation and not the marriage ceremony made a marriage would be for the law to sanction retrogression." In the opinion of the Madras Government, however, "civilization tends the other way." They also hold that "the fact that Act XV. of 1856 is a dead letter, is a reason for viewing with distrust the measures suggested for improving the condition of the widow." The Madras Government further add that "there is a great danger in assuming that the Rajahmundry Widow Remarriage Association and other societies of the like kind are evidences of a public opinion which they are in fact endeavouring to call into being;" and also that although reformers always affect to forget it, the truth is that "infant marriage is the exception, not the rule," and that "in practice its most objectionable features are much modified," and that "the proportion of widows to the total population of adult women is habitually grossly exaggerated." In conclusion the Madras Government add that they prefer improvement from within to interference from without, and that the true remedy for the existing evils will be found in the progress of civilization in general, and in the promotion of female education in particular, and *not* in the establishment of national associations for social reform, and in interference with the religious customs of any portion of the population.

The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in his reply says that "more evil than good would be likely to result at the present time from any interference by Government in the socio-religious questions" raised in Mr. Malabari's Notes. Sir Rivers Thompson thinks that legislative interference for the prevention of child marriage in India is undesirable, while he holds that no case has been made out for extending the provisions of Act XV of 1856 in the direction of improving the position of Hindu widows; and it is probable that an attempt of this character, if one were made, "would be resented and resisted by most

Hindus of influence and authority," while it "would certainly be much in advance of popular sentiment upon this subject in the Lower Provinces of Bengal." On similar grounds he thinks that action by Government in its executive capacity would be equally impracticable, and that even if such action were practicable, so far as the two proposals for excluding married students from the University examinations and for giving preference to unmarried candidates over married ones for employment in the public service are concerned, it would at the best "touch only a small fraction of the middle classes of society." In conclusion Sir Rivers Thompson, like all other Provincial Governments, thinks that "the reforms in question must be left to the gradual operation of the mental and moral development of the people by education."

Among the European officers consulted by the Bengal Government and whose reports are published in the compilation were Mr. C. H. Tawney, the officiating Director of Public Instruction, and nine Divisional Commissioners, who in their turn consulted their subordinates, both Native and European, and also some non official gentlemen and public bodies. Mr. Tawney, who in his report has quoted a few extracts from the reports of three native educational officers,* says that the disabilities proposed to be put upon married students "would be in the highest degree impolitic and unjust," and that it is very doubtful if the Senate of the University, the only competent authority which could do so, would take such a step. We are told that Babu Bireswar Chakravati, Assistant Inspector of Schools, Chota Nagpore Division, proposes the following "heroic remedies"

* The three Native officers are:—Pandit Mahesh Chandra Nyayaratna, Principal of the Sanskrit Colloge, Babu Radhika Prasanna Mukarji, Inspector of Schools, Presidency Circle, and Babu Bireswar Chakravati, Assistant Inspector of Schools, Chota Nagpore Division. All the three are opposed to state action in its legislative capacity, while the last named only favours some executive action.

for discouraging early marriages:—(a) That married boys in Government schools (not colleges) should be charged higher fees than unmarried ones; (b) That the Universities be moved to levy higher fees at the Entrance Examination, from married than from unmarried candidates; and (c) That no married boy be allowed to hold a Government junior, middle or primary scholarship. The author of this three-fold remedy claims for it, (a) that it will not interfere with education, (b) that it will increase the fee-income of Government schools, while at the worst it will make aided and unaided schools prosper at the expense of the Government schools,—a result by no means to be regretted as it will lead the people to support their own schools more liberally,—and (c) that it will increase the number of marriageable young men, educated and otherwise qualified and will so make the marriage of daughters less expensive. The proposal is no doubt an ingenious and original idea, and the twofold object an excellent one, but one may well agree with Mr. Tawney in doubting whether the object in view will be attained by such a method. Mr. Tawney and his subordinates bear their testimony to the good that has been already done thus far in the required direction by the spread of education and enlightenment, and these agencies will in their opinion soon effect the desired reform among the educated classes.

On the subject of Enforced Widowhood Mr. Tawney premises at the outset that Mr. Malabari's picture of the sufferings of Hindu widows is, according to the general consensus of native opinion, "highly coloured," and that in Bengal there is a strong feeling among all classes of the Hindu community against widow-marriage in any form. And he rightly holds that it is this strong feeling which has resulted in Act XV of 1856 remaining a dead letter to the present day; whereas Mr. Malabari, as pointed out by Mr. Tawney, wrongly holds that that result is due to

causes which Government, if it chose, could successfully deal with ; for, as Mr. Tawney justly observes, "the fact of Act XV of 1856 remaining a dead letter is due to causes with which no alien Government, and indeed no Government at all, can deal successfully." Mr. Tawney then observes that in Bengal there is a small but energetic party working in favour of the remarriage of widows, and that there are no signs of reaction. "Indeed, I should myself entertain no fear," says Mr. Tawney, "that the ground gained by the spontaneous action of the people themselves will ever be lost. Such a calamity is rather to be feared when progress is forced on an unwilling people by the 'friendly moral pressure' of an alien Government. I have no wish to under-rate the value of the influence of 'distinguished members of the ruling race,' but I think that the days when such pressure could produce a magic effect are for ever gone by in this part of the country, and for my part I do not much regret them. Besides official pressure is utterly incapable of dealing with a sentiment based on religion and long-established custom, and allied with the best instincts of feminine delicacy."

Mr. C. T. Metcalfe, the Commissioner of the Orissa Division, says in his report that in Orissa the evil in connection with the Infant Marriage system is less than in Bengal proper, for in this province young children are only betrothed, and a second ceremony takes place when the wife is old enough to cohabit with her husband. Among the Kandaets and Kurrans of Orissa Infant Marriage is not practised at all, and girls and boys attain the age of 16 and 20 before they think of marriage. In some places such as Jeypore whole communities are to be found who do not marry till the girls are 16 and boys 20 years old. The Balasore National Society also agree with Mr. Metcalfe in the views contained in his report.

Mr. A. Smith, the Commissioner of the Presidency Division, says that there is a consensus of opini-

on as to the limit of marriageable age having been raised with the progress of education and the widening influence of a healthier public opinion. He adds:— " Infant marriages are now less frequent than before, and there is every reason to believe that a marked improvement has set in, which only requires time to make it permanent, and far-reaching."

Mr. G. N. Barlow, the Commissioner of the Bha-
galpore Division, reports:— " Some of the leading gentlemen belonging to the orthodox party make a distinction between the two cases, and suggest that the proposals of Mr. B. M. Malabari involving direct interference by the State with Infant Marriages, which are not inculcated by the Shastras, might be attempted ; but they decline to approve of any thing being done to assist the remarriage of widows, as they view the prevailing system upon this head as supported by the sanction of religion." It is, however, added that they expect this contemplated action to follow, and not to precede, any movement that may be made by the leaders of society in that direction. Mr. Barlow expresses his concurrence in these views.

Lord H. Ulick Browne, the Commissioner of the Rajshahye Division, recommends that Section 2 of Act xv of 1856, which enacts that a Hindu widow shall on remarriage forfeit all claim to any property inherited from her deceased husband, should be repealed, unless there is strong consensus of opinion against the proposal. He considers the existing law to be an anomaly which Government in his opinion " are almost bound to remove, and will at all events have a strong case for doing so." In his opinion nothing more can be done; for " I do not think," says he, " any substantial advance can be made in these matters, by Government especially, until education has spread much more than it has at present, and that very little can be effected till then either by Government or by enlightened Natives, or by both combined."

There is nothing particular in the reports of other Divisional Commissioners which calls for special notice, unless it be a shrewd and pertinent remark by Mr. Nolan, the Collector of Shahabad, reproduced in his report by the Commissioner of the Patna Division. With reference to Mr. Malabari's suggestions that married students should be excluded from the University examinations, and that in the employment for the public service preference should be given to unmarried over married candidates, Mr. Nolan writes:— "If we exclude Hindus from the professions and public services for marrying too soon, we may also exclude Europeans for not marrying at all, Mahomedans for marrying too often, Buddhists for marrying without exclusive possession, and men of all creeds for marrying rashly, and failing to keep their matrimonial engagement."

Before proceeding further we shall briefly notice the remaining three non-Hindu opinions on this subject to be found in the compilation. The first that claims our notice is a report by Colonel H. C. A. Szczepanski, Deputy Commissioner of Wun district in the Berars, who states at the outset that all those whom he consulted agree with him in holding that the subjects discussed in Mr. Malabari's Notes "are matters which do not call for Government interference, far less legislation." As regards the system of Infant Marriage he says it may be open to objections, but it has also its peculiar advantages. He denies that the various races which follow that system are deteriorating. As to the advantages of the system he points out that every woman is to a certain extent provided for, although in consequence there are many virgin widows; and he then adds that "on the other hand, if it were not for these infant marriages, there would be many unmarried females, and the result from the moral point of view would probably be worse." He tells us that there is already a tendency to increase the age at which these marriages take place. "The

limit, I understand, used to be 8 years, and is now 11." As to widowhood he says it is enforced only among Brahmins and the higher castes, the general opinion, however, being that the system "should be so far relaxed as to allow the remarriage of virgin widows."

The second opinion that calls for some notice is by the Central National Mahomedan Association of Calcutta. It is stated at the outset that "the evils described by Mr. Malabari do not exist among the Mahomedan community, as infant marriage is almost *unknown among that community, and the remarriage of widows is allowed under Mahomedan law and is practised in many parts of British India." Looking at the subject from the Hindu point of view, the Association is of opinion that "in these subjects of socio-religious reforms it would be better for the Government and its officials to abstain as much from direct or indirect interference or encouragement as possible, and to leave the solution of these problems to the growth and development of the national public opinion." The third non-Hindu opinion is by Nawab Nawaziah Ali Khan of the Panjab who apparently recommends Government to adopt indirect means,

* If the Mahomedan Association had taken care to ascertain the real facts, it would have surely abstained from making the inaccurate statement; for we find from Mr. Bourdillon's Census Report (1881) for Bengal that while of the Hindu boys of the age period (5-9) 10.60 percent and of the girls for the same period 28.26 were married, including those widowed, the corresponding percentages for the same age-period among Mahomedans were 2.32 and 16.73 respectively. This shows how the Mahomedan Association's allegation is unfounded. As to widowhood the Mahomedan law, no doubt, allows the remarriage of widows, but the practical question is whether the proportion of Mahomedan widows is on that account less than that of Hindu widows to any appreciable extent. The last census does not show this to be the case. Mr. White O. S., the late Deputy Superintendent of Census for the North-West Provinces, says in his Census report:—"It is remarkable that the proportion of widows among the Hindus, should be so little greater than among the Mahomedans, 25.7 percent to 25.1 percent." Why is this?

having for their basis its moral support and encouragement for gradually weaning the Native community from the evil practices.

The non-Hindu opinion has thus far been analysed, and so also that of Native Princes and chiefs, who are in no way directly affected by any legislative or executive action that may be taken by the British Indian Government. We have, however, seen that almost the whole of this evidence is strongly opposed to any action being taken by the British Indian Government in its legislative or executive capacity, both on the ground of principle and on the ground of such action, even if it were unobjectionable in principle, being in practice calculated to prove not only ineffectual but even harmful in so far as it may, as it surely will, strengthen the conservative forces, now passively opposed even to the present silent, gradual, and voluntary progress in the desired direction, and compel them to assume an attitude of active hostility to the cause of social reform. The evidence is quite unanimous in desiring to leave the full consummation of the social reform to time, education, and other new born civilizing influences, which thus far have not altogether been barren of good results. Let us now see what the Hindu evidence, as collected in this compilation, tends to prove.

II HINDU EVIDENCE.

We now proceed to deal with the Hindu evidence, province by province, in the order in which it is published in the compilation before us. As we have already stated above, we have this kind of evidence rendered available only from five out of the ten provinces under the Government of India. These five provinces are;—Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Panjab and Berars.

To begin with Madras. Of the nine gentlemen who favoured Government with their views on the subjects, four are in favour of some action—legislative,

or executive, or both—being taken by the state in reference to either or both of them ; while the remaining five object to such interference by the state. The names of those who would welcome the interference of the state in these social matters are :—

- 1 Mr. C. Ramchandra Aiyar, Sub-Judge of Madura.
- 2 Mr. C. Subharaya Aiyar B. A., B. L., Third Judge, Appellate Court, Ernacollum.
- 3 Mr. M. Tillainayagam Pillai, Deputy Collector, Madras.
- 4 Dewan Dewan Bahadur R. Raghunath Rao, Deputy Collector, Madras, (now Prime Minister at Indore).

Mr. Ramchandra Aiyar, with his 23 years' experience of several districts in the Southern Presidency, assures Government that, inspite of all the civilizing influences to the contrary, Infant Marriage "has become more numerous than ever," and that it "has become the mania of the people at large." He maintains also that "nothing can be done and will be done by the Hindus, if they be left to themselves, even for a century to come." And in support of his contention he requests Government to ascertain "if there is today any graduate or educated man who, as father of infant girls, has not got them married while they were infants ; or if there is any graduate or educated man who has had the moral courage of keeping his daughter unmarried till she had attained her puberty and then getting her married." Evidently Mr. Ramchandra Aiyar regards all marriages of girls before their puberty as "infant marriages." There are in his opinion three causes which lead to this practice ; firstly the unfounded notion that a girl attaining puberty before betrothal loses caste, secondly the "cursed" astrology in which "the uneducated women and the educated men alike confide," and thirdly the decisive or judge-made law which declares that "an infant girl on losing her !

trothed husband becomes entitled to suitable maintenance from the boy's ancestral property, if the boy be an undivided member, and to inheritance if he dies a divided member." It is the last or third cause which in his opinion constitutes the "strongest" inducement to infant marriages. He then goes on to point out that the judge-made law is not in conformity with the antient Hindu law which in his opinion does not recognize unconsummated marriages. He contends strongly and with great confidence that the British courts of justice in the early days of British rule in India committed the grand mistake of recognizing unconsummated marriages, and of recognizing in an infant girl who had lost her betrothed husband the full status of a widow under the Hindu law, without having first taken the trouble to ascertain the real spirit of that law. He accordingly recommends that "such an inquiry should now be made, and that if his contention should be found to be correct, as he confidently hopes it will be, a prospective law to that effect be forthwith passed. His first recommendation accordingly is:—

"That a simple prospective legislation be passed providing that a betrothed infant girl losing her husband before consummation of the marriage or nuptials shall not be considered a widow, and shall not be entitled to claim the rights of a widow under the Hindu law, but shall be treated as maiden of her parents having all the rights as such under the Hindu law."

Such a legislative declaration will, he confidently believes, lead the Hindu people to marry their girls after puberty—a result which he is so sanguine as to anticipate in the course of a decade or two!

His next recommendation under this head is that the old Hindu law now obsolete, should be revived, which declared that a boy shall not marry till after the completion of his education. Apprehending, however, that the Legislature will probably be unwilling to revive it, he recommends that the object in view

should be attained, not by shutting the doors of the University against married students, but "by restricting the admission generally to unmarried boys only under 16 in all the Government and aided schools."

On the subject of Enforced Widowhood Mr. Ramchandra Aiyar says that "even now there are young widows who have inherited their husband's property quite willing and anxious to marry, provided that *such remarriage would not interfere with the right which they would otherwise have of holding their deceased husband's property throughout life.* He does not, however, suggest the repeal of the provision in Act XV of 1856 but, strangely enough, insists upon the Legislature putting a remarried widow and an unchaste widow on the same footing, or, in other words, that adultery on the part of the widow be declared "a positive disqualification to hold property inherited from her husband." He recommends further an amendment of the criminal law of the country, which should declare "open(?) excommunication" by priests and others of the remarried pair and their relations a penal offence. He would also secure to such remarried pairs and their relatives the right of entry to public temples, and of access to public tanks and rivers, both of which, we are told, are at present denied to them.

Mr. C. Subharaya Aiyar also, like the preceding gentleman, advocates precisely the same measures with the exception of one only, which relates to restricting admission to Government and aided schools to unmarried boys under 16. He is, however, at the same time of opinion that "reform in the marriage laws of the Hindus must be initiated by the Hindus themselves," and that "no amount of extraneous pressure can have the effect of disabusing the minds of the orthodox of the inveterate prejudices and religious sentiments with which they are saturated."

Mr. M. Tillainayagam Pillai, although he holds that the best course for effecting the reform is "to create a sufficiently strong public opinion in fav-

of it," and that female education is "the most effective of all the measures that can be adopted for the remedy of the evils under notice," recommends that Government may advise the Universities and heads of schools to decline to admit married men for University examinations and in the schools three or four years hence." He feels assured that such a course will be attended with greater success than any other. He recommends also the enactment of a law prohibiting the priests from excommunicating a widow who may choose to remarry, and her husband and others who may sympathize or associate with them.

Dewan Bahadur R. Raghunath Rao maintains that Infant Marriages and Enforced Widowhood are not sanctioned by the Hindu Shāstras, nor were they in use in India a few hundred years ago, and that "as they have been found to encourage immorality and crime," Government are bound to prohibit Infant Marriages as they have already abolished enforced widowhood. He recommends that marriages of girls of less than 10 years old should be prohibited. In the letter under review he does not recommend any other action. As regards the power of the priest to excommunicate he says he has come to the conclusion, after much thought and deliberation, that the priest's excommunication "is nothing more than the exercise of his private undoubted right" to interfere with which "would be illegal;" and that the best remedy against it is "to show contempt openly, and neglect it." He adds:—"If men of common sense and education would do this, there would be an end to the priest's tyranny."

The five gentlemen who object to all state action in social reform are:—

- 1 Mr. A. Sankariah B. A., President of the Hindu Sabha, Madras.
- 2 Mr. K. Krishnaswami Rao, Chief Justice, Travancore.
- 3

- 3 The Hon'ble S Subramania Aiyar, Pleader,
High Court, Madras.
- 4 Mr. P. Chentsal Rao, Superintendent of
Stationery, Madras.
- 5 Mr. T. Pattabhiram, Head Shirestedar,
Trichinopoly Collectorate.

Mr. Sankariah points out that "it will be a clear and unwarrantable violation of Her Most Gracious Majesty's Proclamation to bring official influence to bear upon the religious beliefs and practices of the people, and particularly upon the institution of marriage which is one of, if not the most sacred sacrament of any creed or church." He adds also that those who agitate against Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood "are not just and even honest in interfering with those who do not religiously or socially approve of that freedom (*i. e.* freedom to marry girls and widows at any age)," and that although he himself belongs to "the agitator class," he should "be ashamed to call it *persecution* if those who do not believe and act with me disown me as their relative or casteman."

Mr. Chentsal Rao, who is very well-known for his zeal in the cause of social reform generally, and of the remarriage of widows especially, distinctly says:—"I do not see my way to advising the Government to interfere in the matter directly or indirectly." He moreover adds:—"While any such interference can be productive of no beneficial results, it is sure to shake the confidence of the people in the neutrality of Government in religious matters and create a reaction in favour of the very evil which it is our wish to repress." He then points out briefly the objections to the various suggestions in Mr. Malabari's Notes. He and Mr. Krishnaswami Rao, however, would advocate the enactment of a law for prohibiting the marriage of old men to infant girls, though it is admitted that "such cases are so very few that interference of Government is hardly called for," v

The latter recommends, and the former would be glad if it could be done, that Government should assign periodical donations to the Widow Marriage Fund upon such conditions as would not encourage idleness." The reason assigned for this recommendation is that what the Widow Marriage Association of Rajahmundry complains of is not that the laws are defective, but that "they can not command necessary funds to pay the expenses of marriage and to maintain such of the married pairs as are unable to support themselves."

It is worthy of note that none of the Madras gentlemen has thought it worth his while to notice the exaggerations in Mr. Malabari's two Notes, although, if the last Census Returns are to be believed, the Madras Presidency is one of those provinces where Infant Marriage prevails to a very small extent. Madras and Panjab are the only two Indian provinces which show the smallest percentage of boys and girls married under 10; in Madras the percentage of boys under 10 married—including those widowed—to the total male population of that age-period is 0·89, and for girls 4·50, while in the Panjab the respective percentages are 1·20 and 3·50.

* It would be interesting to authoritatively know how many of the marriages celebrated under the auspices of the Rajahmundry Association fall under this category. We are informed by a friend that 10 out of the 12 marriages celebrated by the Association fall under this class? It is at the best a very questionable policy to endeavour to bolster up any cause by such means. If we remember rightly, we are not aware of any such marriages having taken place in the Bombay Presidency. And we think the Rajahmundry Association would do well to abstain from encouraging those, who are hardly able to maintain themselves, to incur the additional responsibility of maintaining a wife and the issues of such marriage. As it is, we have enough and to spare of this kind of evil,—the evil of imprudent marriages, imprudent on the ground of economic considerations,—to any addition to it. It scarcely requires a prophet to predict that Charles Elliott's Finance Committee would have without much difficulty wiped out such grants from the provincial budgets if any were found in existence.

Second in order comes the Bombay Presidency, and, thanks to the Government of Sir James Fergusson, we have a really large mass of evidence from all kinds of representative gentlemen, scarcely leaving anything to be desired. It is understood that the Bombay Government circulated Mr. Malabari's Notes very widely for a responsible expression of opinion, but all those to whom they were sent did not respond to the invitation. 68 gentlemen, however, favoured Government with their views, and we find from the compilation before us that of these 68 gentlemen only 21 or less than one third are in favour of some action by the state, while 47 are opposed to it. These 21 gentlemen are :--

1. Mr. Mahipatram Rupram C. I. E., Principal, Training College, Ahmedabad.
2. Mr. Jotirao Govindrao Phule of Poona.
3. Mr. Gurshidappa Virbassappa, Deputy Collector, Belgaum.
4. Mr. Narayan Bhicaji Joglekar of Poona.
5. Mr. Gopalrao Hari Deshmukh of Poona.
6. Mr. Khauderao Chimanrao Bedarkar of Poona.
7. Mr. Tirmalrao Venkatesh, Inamdar of Dharwar.
8. Mr. Harichand Sadashivji Hate A. M. I. C. E. of Bombay.
9. Rao Sahab Ranchodlal K. Desai, Sub-Judge, Umreth.
10. Mr. Premchand Raichand of Bombay.
11. Dewan Bahadur Manibhai Jashbai, Dewan of Kutch.
12. The Honourable M. G. Ranade C. I. E. of Poona.
13. Mr. Venkat Rango Katti of Dharwar.
14. Mr. Ranchodlal Chotalal, President of the Municipality, Ahmedabad.
15. Dr. Sakharām Arjun of Bombay (deceased)

16. Mr. Lakhmidas Khimji of Bombay.
17. Mr. Lalshankar Umayashankar, Sub-Judge of Ahmednagar.
18. Mr. Govind Babaji Joshi of Bassein, State Preacher at Baroda.
19. Pandit Narayan Keshava Vaidya of Bombay.
20. Mr. Gokuldas Kandas Parekh of Bombay.
21. Mr. Shantaram Narayan of Bombay.

Mr. Mahipatram Rupram of Ahmedabad thinks the harm done by the custom of Infant Marriage to be "really great," and suggests legislative action on the following lines as a remedy against the evils:—

(1) Compulsory registration of all births by Municipalities in Municipal districts and by Taluka Boards in non-Municipal districts.

(2) The said two classes of Boards to grant certificates of births to each party containing the names of the child and parents.

(3) No marriage to be allowed to take place without a license from the Municipal or Taluka Board, as the case may be, a certificate of marriage being given by the Board.

(4) The Boards to be empowered to fix the minimum marriageable age for boys and girls respectively, and also to have the power of raising it from time to time as they may think proper.

(5) The Boards to be empowered, subject to the sanction of Government previously obtained, to make rules for depositing the dowries in safe custody in the case of the marriage of old men with young girls, and thus to prevent the sale of girls in the holy name of matrimony.

Mr. Mahipatram after having sketched out the outlines of his scheme proceeds to add that if it be accepted, it will have the advantage "of rousing the attention of the whole country to the subject." He holds that the question will then be discussed by every man and woman, and the sympathising officers of Go-

vernment will be able to influence the masses in such an important question through the members of these Boards, and to put the weight of their influence, which is by no means inconsiderable, in the scale of a wholesome reform without any vexatious interference.

On the subject of Enforced Widowhood he does not clearly see "what Government can properly do in their legislative and executive capacities directly or indirectly."

Mr. Jotirao Govindrao Phule of Poona suggests the enactment of a law laying down that boys under 19 and girls under 11 should not be allowed to be married; and in case the provisions of such a law are infringed, a reasonable tax should be levied from the parents, the proceeds of such taxation being spent upon the education of the middle and lower classes. As regards the second subject he does not apparently see his way to suggest any legislative action except that "no barbers should be allowed to shave the unfortunate Brahmin widows"

Mr. Gurshidappa Virbasappa, with his experience of the Kanarese Division of this Presidency, tells us that "Infant Marriages are of rare occurrence now a days," and that "child marriages too are becoming scarce, as people have begun to understand that such marriages end in unhappiness." He does not see his way to recommend any legislative or executive action in this direction, but thinks that some legislative action is necessary in the case of Enforced Widowhood. He does not, however, seem to have any clear idea as to the form such action should take.

Mr. Narayan Bhicaji Joglekar thinks that the Hindu marriage system does require a little reform, and he would be glad to see legislative action taken by the state. He proposes:—

(1) That no boy under 16, and no girl under 11, be betrothed on pain of a fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 recoverable with distress and sale of the offender's property.

(2) That no person above 40 marry a girl under 12, and then too without her written consent recorded before Panch to be appointed for the purpose.

On the second subject he "strongly" recommends that a law be passed that no widow under 35 be shaved by a barber without the written permission of a Panch given by them after noting down the voluntary desire of the woman concerned.

Rao Bahadur Gopalrao Hari Deshmukh would amend Act XV of 1856 so far as to declare any public proceeding adopted by caste or others to excommunicate and molest any remarried couple or their friends to be illegal and penal under the Penal Code.

Mr. Khanderao C. Bedarkar would pass a law enacting that "no marriage of a girl under 13 or of a boy under 17 shall be legal in any part of British India in any caste or community." He thinks that "if India has to wait till public opinion is sufficiently educated as to be able to effect radical changes, it may have to wait till Doomsday." He does not see his way to recommend any action as regards the other subject, beyond an addition to the Penal Code to the effect that "no Hindu Widow under the age of 25 should be deemed to have given her consent to shave unless it be in writing signed or marked by her before a Magistrate and attested by the latter." He thinks that the prevention of this cruel practice is rightly regarded "as a substantial step in advancing the cause of widow marriage."

Mr. Tirmalrao Venkatesh of Dharwar thinks that "nothing short of stringent legislative enactments can stop Infant Marriages and all the attendant evils;" and he accordingly proposes a scheme consisting of the following provisions:—

(1) That "no boy, until he is 20, and no girl, until she is 12 years old shall marry or be married."

(2) That "no man shall, during the life time of his first wife, marry another woman, unless the first wife has not borne any children upto 10, or has

borne only girls upto 12, or all of her children have died upto 15, years from the time of her commencing to live with her husband, or it is proved that she has committed adultery. Even then he is to make full provision for the maintenance of the first wife, such provision not interfering with, or extinguishing, her personal rights, as well as those on her husband's family and property either before or after his death."

(3) That "no man who may have one or more sons and whose wife has just died, and who has passed the age of 45 years, shall marry a virgin girl, unless he leaves a written permission, permitting, in case of his death, his new wife to remarry some other person, if she be minded to do so, provided that he may remarry a widow of any age, for in case of his death she will be at liberty to marry again if she be minded to do so."

He advocates legislative action in connection with the widow-marriage question also, but does not indicate clearly the lines of that action.

Mr. Harichand Sadashivaji Hate advocates that the minimum marriageable age be fixed by law at 12 and 17 for girls and boys respectively, and that the custom of shaving widows be put down by law, at least in the case of widows under 30.

Rao Saheb Ranchodlal K. Desai recommends that the marriage of a minor girl with an old man of 40 and upwards be declared a penal offence, and also that adultery by, and with, a widow be declared to be criminally punishable. The adoption of both these suggestions will in his opinion give considerable encouragement to the cause of widow-marriage. It may be added that he approves generally of most of the remedies suggested in Mr. Malabari's Notes.

Mr. Premchand Raichand would lay down the minimum marriageable age at 13 and 16 for girls and boys respectively and would repeal section 2 of Act XV of 1856 thus enabling a widow on remarriage to retain her interest in the property of her deceased

husband. He also generally supports most of Mr. Malabari's proposals for executive action.

Dewan Bahadur Manibhai Jashbai recommends the enactment of a Hindu Marriage Law prescribing the minimum marriageable age, but would make it an enabling law like the old Municipal Act of 1850, extending it gradually to each local area in response to an application for the same from the inhabitants thereof. With the view of inducing even the most orthodox to readily join the movement he would have three classes of minimum age limits:—(a) That in which the minimum age limit will be 10 years for children of both sexes, (b) That in which the limits for girls and boys will be 11 and 14 years respectively, and (c) That in which the said limits will be 12 and 16 for girls and boys respectively. As regards the second subject he thinks that all that the Legislature can do has been already done, and that "facilities in the shape of remission of court fees, gratuitous services of counsel &c may be advantageously offered to the widow for enabling her to obtain legal protection."

The Hon'ble M. G. Ranade C. I. E., who is one of the leaders of this movement on this side of India, does of course strongly and enthusiastically advocate state action both in its legislative and executive capacities. Mr. Ranade says that if the Hindu society had a self-regulating power in any of its relations, there would possibly have been less cause for the interference of the state; but that, as it is, in the absence of such a self-regulating power, the only way to secure the emancipation of the Hindu community from "this bondage to past ideas" is "to withdraw, one by one, these fetters of so-called religious injunctions, and turn them into civil restraints, which are more amenable to change and adaptation." He contends that what is sought to ensure by the cooperation of the state "is not in fact putting on new chains, but removing old ones, or rather substituting flexible for

inflexible bonds" He accordingly proposes state action on the following lines :—

(a) That minimum marriageable age-limits both for boys and girls be fixed by law, not compulsory in the sense of annulling marriages contracted before attaining the said limits, but only permissive in the sense of leaving the parties concerned freedom to question the binding character of the marriage so contracted. He thinks the age limits should be 16 to 18 for boys, and 10 to 12 for girls, subject to exceptions in particular castes and localities.

(b) That Municipal and Local Boards be empowered to certify to the age-qualifications by requiring that licenses be obtained from these Boards, as the case may be, before solemnizing a marriage. Mr. Ranade would not trust the Boards with the power of regulating the age-limits, but would have them fixed by law.

(c) That the Universities should, after a reasonable notice, confine their honours and distinctions to those who, in addition to their other qualifications, submit to the condition of remaining single during their college or school course.

(d) That the Penal Code be amended so far as to declare sexual intercourse with a girl under 14 to be rape.

(e) That men of 45 and upwards should be prohibited by law from marrying young virgins; so also the marriage of young men with girls older than themselves should be prohibited as being unnatural and mischievous.

(f) That the old Shastraic restraints, imposing certain permanent restrictions which a person must needs satisfy before marrying again during the life time of his first wife, should be revived and legalized.

As regards the second subject Mr. Ranade seems to think that "the interposition of independent non-official gentlemen as intermediaries to ascertain whe-

ther the young widow understands the full misery of her situation, will go a great way to alleviate" the lot of infant widows, whose condition, he adds, is "the most pitiable," and whose desperate misery is "a scandal and a wrong which is a disgrace to any well-regulated society." It would seem that to this extent only he would seek the interference of the state.

Mr. Venkat Rango Katti, with his experience of 40 years, bears testimony to the fact that the marriageable age limit in the case of boys and girls has been slowly but steadily advancing.* He does not see his way to recommend any state action whatever as regards the question of Infant Marriage, beyond this that at the Entrance and other examinations double fees may be levied from the married candidates, the authorities concerned thus affording a sufficient indication of the contempt with which they regard the system of early marriage. Similarly as regards the other subject also he does not see his way to recommend any state action beyond this that he would

* Mr. Venkat Rango Katti in support of his statement writes:—
 "I and my brother were joined at the age of 12 by our father, who was a Shastri, to girls who had yet to complete their 7th year. This was the type of marriages in those days. A girl was scarcely allowed to complete her 8th year without being married. An unmarried Brahmin girl of 10 was then looked on as a shame to her parents, who always tried to conceal her age. *This state of things no longer exists.* In most of the present marriages the age of the bride is from 8 to 10, and that of the bridegroom from 13 to 15. Educated fathers go still forward, and it is no novelty to see girls of 11 and 12 passing in procession through the streets with their youthful husbands. I have a son who will complete his 16th year in September next; he is yet to be married, and I have selected for him a girl of 12 (the daughter of a Shastri) with his approval. My friend Mr. Bhujangrao, Principal of the Training College, married his two sons at the age of 17 to girls who came of age within six months after marriage. *Both these girls belong to respectable families in which English education has yet found no way.*" He quotes some other instances also, which conclusively show that the progress in this respect is satisfactory, even among those who have received no English education.

prohibit by law the shaving of widows by declaring it to be a criminal offence. He says that no trace of this "inhuman" custom can be found before Buddhism in which it first originated, and which required the shaving of its religious persons of both sexes. He says he is at a loss to understand how this "inhuman" custom escaped the attention of Government and its officers—this "heart-rending" custom of seeing "a beautiful young face deprived of the ornament which nature has bountifully bestowed upon it"—when they have already declared such customs as swinging by hooks before idols, self-torture to extort money, &c. to be penal offences. He also considers that the cause of widow-marriage will be considerably advanced by the step he so warmly advocates.

Mr. Ranchodlal Chotalal does not see his way to recommend any state action in respect of the question of Enforced Widowhood, nor in fixing the minimum marriageable age of girls, but thinks that as regards the minimum marriageable age of boys "some pressure from Government might be exercised with some success and without much objection." He would fix the same at 15 or 16, but would not prevent their betrothal under that limit. He advises that the people of all castes should be invited to show cause why the suggested step should not be taken, and feels almost confident that no serious objection would be urged against the reform.

Dr. Sakharan Arjun, the step-father of the defendant in the now famous Hindu "Restitution of Conjugal Rights" case, says that we have to deal with "early marriages," and not so much with "infant marriages," as happily the latter "are now on the wane," and "hardly any town or city of importance witnesses them in these days." He adds:—"Taking human nature as it is, bearing in mind the climatic influences on the Native physique, and the enervating effect of social customs, recognizing the fact that the mental culture—the basis of self-restraint—of our

community, particularly the female part of it, is at best only partially developed and must continue to be so for years to come—all these facts considered, I am fully persuaded that *our system of marriage is most wholesome under present circumstances, whatever our English friends may think of it, and is eminently adapted to prevent those dread contingencies to which late marriages are exposed.*" He then says that the great aim of our reformers should be directed to induce our people to regard marriage and consummation "as two essentially distinct ceremonies and to make them defer the latter till the married couple arrives to maturer years." He thinks that if the efforts of our reformers were directed towards accomplishing this object, they would be crowned with *speedy success* ; "for," says he, "the baneful effects of early consummation are so patent and far-reaching, that men who would not budge an inch of their orthodoxy in other matters, *now willingly defer the consummation of marriage in the case of their children to a pretty long period.*" This testimony, coming as it does from one who enjoyed a very extensive practice in Bombay and whose observation used to be very keen, is very valuable as tending to completely refute the contention of those who are never tired of maintaining that no real and substantial advance in the cause of social reform need be expected from the conscious and voluntary efforts of the community,—even of the educated portion of it, still less of the orthodox portion thereof. As regards the question of Enforced Widowhood Dr. Sakham Arjun says that though it is an institution of a pretty long standing among the Brahmanical classes, it has been comparatively of a recent origin among the other castes who have voluntarily aped the Brahmin manners and customs in this respect. He says :—"In our own days, the eagerness for *indiscriminate* adoption of the *foibles*, nay even the *follies*, of our English rulers, which many of our countrymen display, is an illustration in point of this passion for

imitating our superiors." He advocates legislative action in respect of both the subjects, but does not clearly indicate the lines that such action should take, beyond stating that the Hindu law should be dissociated from the Hindu religion. The least that the Government should in his opinion do is "to fix the age of discretion of a girl and make the marriage of minors liable to be disputed in a court of law unless it is ratified by consummation which can only be legal when the parties arrive at years of discretion." We feel sure that many would be inclined to class the adoption of this suggestion among those cases of "indiscriminate adoption of the foibles, nay even the follies, of our English rulers" of which Dr. Sakharām Arjun so bitterly complains.

Mr. Lakhmidas Khinjī advocates that the minimum marriageable age be fixed by law at 16 and 12 for boys and girls respectively; that the minimum difference between the ages of the bride and the bridegroom as regards the minors should be 4 years, and that as regards a minor bride and a grown-up bridegroom such difference should not be more than 15 years. He would also declare it to be an offence for the caste or any of its members to excommunicate or join in excommunicating any person marrying a widow or taking part in the widow marriage ceremonies, or having intercourse with parties contracting such marriages.

Mr. Lalshankar Umayashankar would fix the minimum marriageable age of *boys only* at 18. He says:—"The idea of getting a girl married before puberty is so strong, and the difficulty of finding a suitable husband is so great, that *it would at the present be revolutionary to fix the age of the bride.* The real evil is in marrying a boy in infancy. With the increase in boys' age the improvement as to girls' age, I believe, will follow." But even as regards boys, he would provide for exceptional cases. He apprehends, however, that when the minimum marriageable age of

boys is fixed at 18, the result will be that as big boys will have to be married to infant girls, the evil of early consummation of marriage will increase. Having regard to all these circumstances he proposes the following provisions :—

(a) No guardian, whether appointed by the Court or not, shall, without written permission of the Civil Court, celebrate the marriage of a male minor before he has completed his 18th year.

(b) On the application of a guardian or friend of a male minor, the Court, under special circumstances, after recording its reasons, may permit the marriage before the age prescribed.

He would prescribe some penalty for breach of the provisions of such mandatory legislation.

(c) That the age limit mentioned in Sec. 375 of the Penal Code be raised to 12; in other words, that sexual intercourse with a girl of 12 and under be considered rape within the meaning of that section.

(d) That the practice of receiving money for giving a bride be declared penal. Such a provision will, he thinks, to some extent prevent a young girl being given in marriage to a very old man.

As regards the other subject he does not see his way to recommend any legislative action, but he recommends the following executive action :—

(a) Government should strictly warn the Police and Magisterial officers to take all precautionary measures to assist and protect the remarriage party in all possible manners.

The reason why Mr. Lalshankar suggests this measure is that "sometimes when Police and Magisterial officers are themselves orthodox, or seek popularity by favouring the orthodox party, or neglect their duty, the persecution of the remarriage party becomes more," and that "one such case has the practical effect of deterring many who would otherwise have remarried." We may add that Mr. Lalshankar has not cited any specific examples in support of his contention.

(b) As long as persecution of the remarriage party is very active, Government officers should give preference to remarried candidates in filling up places for which they may be qualified.

(c) The Social Reform Associations proposed to be formed should be registered by law, and some penalty should be prescribed for one who, after joining the Association in a specified manner, breaks the rules thereof.

There is nothing worthy of note in Mr. Govind Babaji Joshi's paper beyond this that he approves of the suggestions in Mr. Malabari's Notes, and hopes that Government will be pleased to assist the Hindu community in the way recommended.

Pandit Narayan Keshav Vaidya advocates state action both in its legislative and executive capacities. He would fix the minimum marriageable age at 16 and 11 for boys and girls respectively in the sense of annulling marriages contracted before those minima limits; he would abolish the practice of demanding money by the parents of the bride and the bridegroom, and would also declare marriages so contracted illegal; he would abolish the practice of shaving the widows; would define the rights of a remarrying widow, and would treat excommunication by the caste of any person or persons who conform with the above rules as a penal offence. He would also exclude married students from the Entrance Examination. But the most unique suggestion that Mr. Vaidya makes is that at such social gatherings as "At Home" or "Garden Parties" the subject of widow marriage "should be alluded to, and the services of the Oriental Translator to Government utilized, in explaining the benefits arising from the measure to persons who may not be knowing the English language, thus creating a strong public opinion in its favour." The Governor in Council and other high officers ought to feel grateful that the Pandit does not suggest the failure of

these high dignitaries to do the needful to be declared a penal offence.

Mr. Gokuldas K. Parekh, who advocates state action in its legislative capacity in respect of both the subjects, thinks that if the Legislature prevents the caste from excommunicating a man "marrying the girl of a person belonging to another caste or subdivision of the same caste with whom the members of his caste mix at food," and also the parents of the bride so married by him, the evil practice of Infant Marriage would be put down. He holds also that the Legislature should declare the excommunication by the caste of a remarried pair and their relatives a penal offence. He would also have a legislative provision "compelling every widow of those castes in which remarriages are not permitted, who is in the family way to her condition being registered," and he would have a strict inquiry made into the causes when such a widow dies in that condition, or miscarries, or when her child dies within some specified time from her delivery. Finally he would make the failure of such a widow to get herself registered a penal offence.

Mr. Shantaram Narayan advocates legislative action for prescribing the minimum marriageable age both for boys and girls, but does not say what that age should be. He would also repeal Section 2 of the Widow Marriage Act and would thus enable a widow on her remarriage to continue to inherit the property vested in her on the death of her first husband.

Such are the proposals of the 21 gentlemen from the Bombay Presidency who advocate state action in its legislative, or executive, or both capacities with reference to either or both the subjects discussed. We shall now give the names of the 47 gentlemen who are opposed to such action :—

- 1 Mr. Nandshankar Tuljashankar, Assistant Joint Administrator, Rajpipla.
- 2 Mr. Lalubhai Naudlal, Native, Assistant to

INDEPENDENT SECTION:

- the Commissioner N. D.
- 3 Mr. Vinayak Wasuddeo, late Oriental Translator.
 - 4 Dr. Bhicaji Amrit Chobe G. G. M. C., Assistant-Surgeon, Poona.
 - 5 Desai Hariprasad Santukram of Bhowanagar.
 - 6 Mr. Mahadeo M. Kunte B. A. Head Master, High School, Poona.
 - 7 Desai Kalianrai Hukmatrai of Broach.
 - 8 Mr. Bhaskar B. Pitale of Bombay.
 - 9 Mr. Nana Moroba of Bombay.
 - 10 Mr. Bhau Mansaram of Poona.
 - 11 Mr. Virchand Dipchand of Bombay.
 - 12 The Hon'ble Mahadeorao Wasudeo Barve C. I. E.
 - 13 Mr. Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar B. A., LL. B. of the *Indu Prakash*.
 - 14 Mr. Karsandas Vallabhadas of Bombay.
 - 15 The Hon'ble Nanabhai Haridas of the Bombay High Court.
 - 16 Mr. Varjivandas Madhavdas of Bombay.
 - 17 Mr. Motilal Lalbhai, Sub-Judge of Ahmedabad.
 - 18 Mr. Bholanath Sarabhai of Ahmedabad.
 - 19 Mr. Jagjivandas Khushaldas, President of the Municipality, Surat.
 - 20 Mr. S. H. Chiplonkar of the Sarvajanik Sabha, Poona.
 - 21 Mr. Narmadashankar Lalshankar Bombay.
 - 22 The Hon'ble Kashinath T. Telang C. I. E. of Bombay.
 - 23 Mr. Ganpatram Shastri, Deputy Educational Inspector, Broach.
 - 24 Mr. Raghunath Narayan Khote C. I. E. of Bombay.
 - 25 Dr. Vishram Rauji Ghollay, Assistant-Surgeon, Poona.
 - 26 Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar M. A., P. H. D. of the Deccan College, Poona.

- 27 Mr. Gowrishankar Udayashankar, late Joint Administrator of Bhowdnagar.
28. Mr. Hindumal Balmukund of Poona.
- 29 Mr. Nagindas Tulsidas of Bombay.
- 30 Mr. Pandurang Balibhadra of Bombay.
- 31 Desai Haridas Viharidas of Nadiad (Karbhari of Junagad).
- 32 Sardar Rangarao V. Purandare of Poona.
- 33 Mr. Chaturbhuj Murarji.
- 34 Maha-Mahopadhyaya Ram Shastri Dixit, Apte of Poona.
- 35 Dr. Atmaram Pandurang G. G. M. C. Bombay.
- 36 Mr. Uttamram Mehta.
- 37 Mr. Hari Raoji Chiplonkar of Poona.
- 38 Mr. Ambalal Sakharlal Desai M. A., LL. B., Judge, Baroda territory.
- 39 Mr. Manmohandas Dayaldas, Editor of *Vartoka Sadbodha Rasraj*.
- 40 Mr. Gangadhar Shastri Datar of Poona.
- 41 Pandit Gattulal of Bombay.
- 42 The Hon'ble. Rao Saheb Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik C. S. I. of Bombay.
- 43 H. H. The Rao of Kutch.
- 44 H. H. The Thakore of Bhowdnagar, Kattiawad.
- 45 H. H. The Thakore of Morvi, Kattiawad.
- 46 H. H. The late Regent of Kolhapore.
- 47 H. H. The Thakore of Limdi, Kattiawad.

It is unnecessary to deal with the papers of these 47 gentlemen in the same way as we have dealt with those of the 21 gentlemen. The reader will, however, be surprised to find that such gentlemen, as the late Bholanath Sarabhai, Dr. Ramkrishna G. Bhandarkar, Dr. Atmaram Pandurang, Mr. Mahadeo M. Kunte, Mr. Ambalal Sakharlal Desai, and Mr. N. G. Chandavarkar, the genuineness of whose active sympathy and interest in the cause of social and religious reform can not be for a moment questioned, are opposed to state action, principally because they

hold—and rightly as we think—that, so long as the popular sentiment on the subject remains unchanged, state action, whether legislative or executive, is not only impotent to secure the object in view, but that such action is not unlikely to prove harmful to the cause of real reform by provoking those hostile forces which are now inactive and dormant. It is, however, worthy of note that most of these 47 gentlemen—not even excepting some of those whose names we have specially noted above—have more or less severely animadverted on the mischievous exaggerations indulged in by Mr. Malabari in his Notes.

We turn next in order to the Bengal portion of the compilation in which, as we have already stated above, there are 32 papers of which 7 are in favour of state action and 25 against. The first 7 papers in favour of state action are by:—

- 1 Babu Sitakanta Mukarji, Deputy Magistrate, Dinagpore District.
- 2 Babu Jadu Nandan Sen, Dewan of Maharani Surat Sundari Devi of Portea.
- 3 Babu Kali Kamal Mitra of Rajshahye district.
- 4 Babu Shyam Mohan Chakravati, Pleader, Rangapore district.
- 5 Babu Hari Mohan Chandra, Personal Assistant to the Commissioner, Rajshahye Division.
- 6 The Orissa People's Association.
- 7 Babu Munihal Chattarji, Sub-Judge of Beerbhoom.

Babu Sitakanta Mukarji would fix by law the minimum marriageable for boys and girls at 20 and 14 respectively, and would have every marriage compulsorily registered by the priest of each family. As regards the other subject he recommends the constitution of a standing Central Committee of learned Pandits and religious men, and highly respected high caste laymen, who should assemble every five

or six years, and decide every question represented by delegates from similarly constituted Provincial Committees, their decision having the force of law.

Babu Jadu Nandan Sen would fix the minimum marriageable age at 20 and 13 for boys and girls respectively, and would make marriages contracted before that period voidable. He would also restrict Government scholarships to bachelor students only. As regards Enforced Widowhood, although he is in favour of the remarriage of virgin widows only, he does not clearly indicate what action the state should take to bring about the result.

Babu Kali Kamal Mitra would have a legislative enactment not only to put down the practice of Infant Marriages, but also "to enforce the intermarriage between the Radhri and Barendro Brahmins if the bride or bridegroom, or their parents choose to do so, as well as the abolition of Kulinism." As regards Enforced Widowhood he suggests that widows of 20 and under should be allowed to remarry, but that "a widow being the mother of children of either sex should not be allowed to marry again in spite of her hearty desire to do so." It does seem that he would deprive widows, having children of either sex, of those Hindu castes among whom widow-marriage has been customary long before the Act of 1856,—that he would deprive such widows of the right to remarry even when they heartily desired to do so!!! This is surely a very retrograde reform.

Babu Shyam Mohan Chakravati advocates legislative action to put down Infant Marriages, because he thinks that if the spread of education alone were trusted to effect the desired end, it would "take centuries to make the people conscious of the injurious effects of Infant Marriage and to finally put a stop to them." He does not, however, suggest any state action in respect of Enforced Widowhood, as he thinks that "the progress of education will in course of time do much in removing the obstacles now thrown in

the way of widow-marriage." The palpable inconsistency of the writer will not fail to strike the reader.

Babu Hari Mohan Chandra, like Dewan Bahadur Manibhai Jasbhai of Kuch, * advocates the enactment of a graduated and elastic law with reference to the first question. As regards the second subject he would have an enactment for the protection of the remarried pair and their friends and relatives from petty annoyance and persecution of the caste, probably by making excommunication a penal offence. He would also grant "licenses to priests for celebration and optional registration of widow remarriages, and remuneration of the priest-registrars by fees, say, from Rs 2 to Rs. 100 to be paid by the parties for the celebration and optional registration of each marriage." And he would also modify Sec. 2 of the Widow Marriage Act to the extent of giving "a right to the widow who remarries to some share in the property of her deceased husband for her own maintenance."

The Orissa People's Association "cordially approve of the suggestions of Mr. Malabari" in respect of both the subjects.

Babu Munilal Chattarji thinks that "a Hindu Marriage Act would, like the Suttee Act of Lord William Bentinck, be productive of incalculable boon to the country, which will be treasured up in the memory of all the children of the soil as precious monuments of the benign rule of Her Gracious Majesty the Empress of India and Queen of Great Britain," and accordingly proposes to fix the minimum marriageable age at 24 and 12 for boys and girls respectively. He would further enact that "a contract of marriage by guardians would be null and void unless it benefits infants personally." He would also introduce the practice of marriage-settlements, in writing. He adds:—"These settlements, as also the valuable

* *Vide Supra p. 25.*

gifts by the parents of the bride or bride-groom, might be executed on the night of marriage on plain paper before a Sub-Registrar or one of his subordinates, who may take an inventory of the articles of gift, so that the minors or their children might, on arriving at majority, know what property has on her marriage brought, and call up their guardian to render an account."

As regards the other subject he thinks that a simplification of the Law of Wills with a view to make it more intelligible to the people generally, and to women especially, and reasonable facilities to get adequate redress from Courts of Justice at a moderate cost will afford a direct encouragement to the cause of widow marriage. What earthly connection there is between the two passes our comprehension.

The twenty-five papers from the Bengal Presidency which are opposed to state action are by the following gentlemen and Associations:—

- 1 Pandit Mahesh Chandra Nyayaratna, Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta.
- 2 Babu Radhika Prasanna Mukarji, Inspector of Schools, Presidency Circle.
- 3 Babu Bireswar Chakravati, * Assistant Inspector of Schools, Chota Nagpore Division.
- 4 Babu Kedareshwar Roy, Judge of Small Cause Court, Dacca.
- 5 Babu Kailash Chandra Bhattacharji, Head Master, Noakhally.
- 6 Babu Peary Mohan Sarcar of Bhagalpore.
- 7 Babu Uma Charan Banarji, Deputy Magistrate, Dinagpore District.
- 8 Babu Kasbi Kinkar Sen, Deputy Magistrate, Rajshahye District.
- 9 Babu Gopal Chandra Mukarji, Deputy

* *Vide Supra* p. 8. He advocates some action by the Education Department only.

- Magistrate, Rajshahye District.
- 10 Babu Mahima Ranjan Roy, a Zamindar, Rangapore District.
 - 11 The British Indian Association, Calcutta.
 - 12 The Indian Association, Calcutta.
 - 13 The Jessore Indian Association.
 - 14 The Murshidabad Association.
 - 15 The Bardwan Association.
 - 16 The Uttarparah People's Association.
 - 17 The Rajshahye Association.
 - 18 The Bagra People's Association.
 - 19 The East Bengal Land-holders' Association
 - 20 The Mymensingh Association.
 - 21 The Burisal People's Association.
 - 22 The Chittagong Association.
 - 23 The Tipperah People's Association.
 - 24 The Balasore National Society.
 - 25 Kumar Pramatha Bhushan Deva Roy of Naldanga in Jessore.

Most of these 25 papers also complain of the highly sensational and exaggerated character of Mr. Malabari's Notes.

We next turn to the Panjab portion of the compilation, and find that of the three Hindu gentlemen who favoured Government with their views, two are in favour of some state action, and one is opposed to it. The names of the two former are :—

1 Dewan Ram Nath, District Judge of Hosharpur.

2 Kanvar Bikram Singh Bahadur C. S. I.

And the gentleman who is opposed to state action is Rai Mulraj M. A., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gurdaspur.

Dewan Ram Nath thinks that in advanced provinces like Bengal and Bombay the learned classes of several castes and under-castes may be induced to ask the Government to pass an Act, similar to the Parsi Marriage Act, and that in such an Act a provision might be made for illegality of minor mar-

riages. He thinks that if such an attempt were made in those provinces, it would gradually encourage learned natives of the sister provinces to follow their example. As regards the other subject, he would declare excommunication by the caste of the remarried pair to be an offence under the Penal Code. He, however, adds that "if any enlightened Hindu Raja were to undertake to perform the duty first in his own territory by aid of Brahmins, I think it would have an easier way for our British Government to assure the ignorant classes of the public that the legislation, if made, is purely made for public interests, and no infringement of caste and religion is intended."

Kanwar Bikram Singh would make registration of marriage compulsory, and would fix the minimum marriageable age for boys and girls at 14 and 12 respectively, registration of marriages of boys and girls below the said age-limits being refused as unlawful. As regards the other subject he does not see his way to recommend any state action beyond this that Government should publish in a pamphlet form and circulate widely and gratis all the injunctions that can be found in the Shastras in favour of widow marriage, and thus create a strong public opinion in favour of the reform.

Last of all we come to the Berar portion of the compilation. Of the 13 Hindu papers in this portion 3 are in favour of, and 9 opposed to, state action. The three papers are by :—

- 1 Mr. Bapuji Hari, Head Clerk to the Deputy Commissioner, Buldhana.
- 2 Mr. Lakshman G. Rishi, Deputy Educational Inspector, Basim District.
- 3 Mr. Gabu Singh, Special Magistrate, Akot.

Mr. Bapuji Hari would put down Infant Marriages by law by declaring them penal; but what he would call an Infant Marriage he does not say. Similarly he says that the law "should stretch its hand to avenge

the wrong inflicted on a widow, and protect her from the persecution of her tormentors."

Mr. Lakshman G. Rishi would fix the minimum marriageable age at 18 and 12 for boys and girls respectively; and with a view to prevent marriages before the prescribed period he would enact that parents desirous of marrying their daughter before she has completed her 12th year shall "deposit in the Government Treasury a certain sum in her name and for her exclusive use that would pay an interest sufficient for her maintenance in after-life in case she becomes a widow." Such a provision will in his opinion have a deterrent effect. He would have a similar provision enforced on the parents of a girl whom they may wish to give in marriage to an old man or to one who is decidedly far advanced in age.

As regards the other subject he does not recommend any state action, but would trust to time and the spread of education.

Mr. Gabu Singh would fix the minimum marriageable age at 18 and 11 for boys and girls respectively, and would enforce registration of marriages. As to marriages of young girls with old men above 40 he would require "the production of health-certificate from licensed medical officers, in addition to the deposition of at least 2,000 Rs. worth of estate in favour of the bride, distinctly apart from any claims of her relations during her life-time."

As regards the second subject he thinks that Government should "rule that girls under the age of 18 or 20, and without a male issue, should not be kept in widowhood for more than two years, except on special reasons and so on." He would clearly, by legislative interference, enforce the marriage of such widows!

The nine Hindu gentlemen from the Berars who oppose state action are:—

1. Mr. Narayan Prabhakar Parajpe, Head

- Master, Anglo-Vernacular School, Raj Dulgam.
- 2 Mr. Vishnu Moreshwar Mahajani M. A., Head Master, High School, Akola.
 - 3 Mr. Shrikrishna Narhar Khaparde, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ellichpoor.
 - 4 Mr. Bajaba Ramchandra Pradhan, Educational Inspector.
 - 5 Mr. Shriram Bhicaji Jathar B. A., Director of Public Instruction.
 - 6 Mr. Hari Moreshwar Shevade, Head Master, Anglo-Vernacular School, Malkapoor.
 - 7 Mr. Waman Narayan Bapat, Tahsildar of the Chandur Taluka.
 - 8 Mr. Raghunath Balkrishna Talvalkar B. A., Head Master, High School, Umraoti.
 - 9 Mr. Keshava Rao, Clerk of the Court to the Commissioner H. A. D.

Some of these nine gentlemen also complain of the exaggerations in Mr. Malabari's Notes, and object to state action in these social matters on the same grounds that have been urged by their brethren in other parts of the country.

III. FINAL DECISION.

We have thus presented to the reader a brief summary of the opinions embodied in the interesting compilation under review. It only remains for us to reproduce that portion of the Resolution of the Government of India on these papers in which its decision is embodied.

4 In dealing with such subjects as those raised in Mr. Malabari's Notes, the British Government in India has usually been guided by certain general principles. For instance, when caste or custom enjoins a practice which involves a breach of the ordinary criminal law, the State will enforce the law. When caste or custom lays down a rule which is of its nature enforceable in the Civil Courts, but is clearly opposed to morality or public policy, the State will decline to

enforce it. When caste or custom lays down a rule which deals with such matters as are usually left to the option of citizens, and which does not need the aid of Civil or Criminal Courts for its enforcement State interference is not considered either desirable or expedient.

In the application of such general principles to particular cases, there is doubtless room for differences of opinion; but there is one common-sense test which may often be applied with advantage in considering whether the State should or should not interfere in its legislative or executive capacity with social or religious questions of the kind now under notice. The test is, "Can the State give effect to its commands by the ordinary machinery at its disposal? If not, it is desirable that the State should abstain from making a rule which it cannot enforce without a departure from its usual practice or procedure.

If this test be applied in the present case, the reasons will be apparent why His Excellency in Council considers that interference by the State is undesirable, and that the reforms advocated by Mr. Malabari, which affect the social customs of many races with probably as many points of difference as of agreement, must be left to the improving influences of time, and to the gradual operation of the mental and moral development of the people by the spread of education.

It is true that the British Government in India has by its legislation set up a standard of morality independent of, and in some material respects differing from, the standard set up by caste; and it may be that the former standard has had some beneficial effect in influencing native customs, practices, and modes of thought. But legislation, though it may be didactic in its effect, should not be undertaken for merely didactic purposes; and in the competition of influence between legislation on the one hand, and caste or custom on the other, the condition of success on the part of the former is that the Legislature should keep within its natural boundaries, and should not, by overstepping those boundaries, place itself in direct antagonism to social opinion.

5. Of the suggestions made in the course of the voluminous correspondence quoted in the preamble, the only two which do not seem to the Government of India to be open to serious objection on ground of principle are (1) the amendment of section 2 of Act XV of 1856 as to the forfeiture of property of a widow on remarriage; and (2) the supply of machinery by which a Hindu widow, who fails to obtain the consent of her caste fellows to her remarriage, may nevertheless marry without renouncing her religion.

But although there is much to be said in favour of each of these suggestions, the Governor General in Council, as at present advised

would prefer not to interfere, even to the limited extent proposed, by legislative action until sufficient proof is forthcoming that legislation is required to meet a serious practical evil, and that that legislation has been asked for by a section, important in influence or number of the Hindu community itself.

Such a decision was a foregone conclusion, and need not surprise any one. We doubt very much if even a Hindu Government could have arrived at a different conclusion.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOREGOING REVIEW.

Having briefly reviewed the interesting and instructive compilation it will not be out of place if we avail ourselves of the present opportunity to criticise the Government of India's Resolution, and to offer a few observations on the proposals made by those who have advocated state action in reference to some one or other point connected with the vast subject of Hindu social reform. It is gratifying to observe that legislative action by the state in response to a healthy and decisive growth of responsible popular sentiment has not been opposed by any one simply on the sentimental ground that the Indian Legislature, being mainly foreign in its constitution and composition, shall not interfere with the purely socio-religious economy of the Hindu community. The main objection to legislative action in the direction principally desired by those who agree with Mr. Malabari wholly or partially, is that such action is much in advance of popular sentiment, and that, if undertaken, it must defeat its own ends. The Government of India in its Resolution says that "when caste or custom enjoins a practice which involves a breach of the ordinary criminal law, the state will enforce the law," and that "when caste or custom lays down a rule which is of its nature enforceable in the Civil Courts, but is clearly opposed to morality or public policy, the state will decline to enforce it." This is no doubt a safe policy to pursue, but when under special circumstances in deference to the local or sectarian sentiment the state finds it inadvisable and inexpedient to enforce the law even when any caste enjoins a practice involving a breach of the ordinary criminal law, or when the state through its

Civil Courts finds it expedient to recognize and enforce a custom which any caste enjoins, but which is clearly opposed to morality or public policy—the custom being opposed to the morality or public policy of the state, but not opposed to the morality of the caste—it will be clear why any interference by the state in its legislative capacity in social matters, much in advance of the popular sentiment, is in no way desirable. As an illustration of the truth of our foregoing observations we request the attention of the reader to the following extract from Mr. T. Drysdale's Report of the Census of the Central Provinces in 1881 (p.39). It refers to a sect known as *Satnamis* and purports to describe the marriage customs of that sect. This sect numbers some 399,409 souls in that Province.

Churi.—On the death of a woman's first husband, she is claimed in 'churi' by his brother or cousin as it is considered a point of honour that a woman who was once married in a family may not go out of it; and it is to this feeling that we sometimes find a girl of sixteen or seventeen linked to a boy of seven or eight. Very often she runs away with somebody else, and the elopement is followed sometimes by a prosecution for adultery, and at others compounded at home by the co-respondent paying the marriage expenses of the former husband. In this form of marriage, a pair of 'churies' (glass bracelets, whence the name,) and a 'lugra' are given to the bride, in addition to a 'bonus' to her parents, if she be yet a virgin. This form of marriage being quite inexpensive, the poorer sort always prefer it to the 'shadi,' and widowers of a certain age prefer it, as the bride is, as a rule, a grown-up one.

Paithoo.—Suppose a married woman becomes intimate with a person other than her husband. The connection is discovered, and her home naturally becomes too hot for her. She goes away to the house of her seducer and begins to live with him as his wife, and obtains the privilege and rights of one. Her new husband satisfies the old one by paying compensation, which is generally measured by the marriage expenses.

"It is worthy of note that the children of both the latter class of marriages succeed equally with those of the married wife, and *such succession is often recognized by our Courts. It may also be observed that if the Penal Code were strictly administered in Chhattisgarh, almost every tenth Chumar might be made amenable to one or other of the sections relating to marriage, and a good many women would go to jail for bigamy. But laws which are above the working level of society can scarcely be effectively administered, and the law is almost a dead letter in the face of facts, which are held to be quite consistent with good sense and Chhattisgarh morality.*"

This extract is both interesting and instructive, and we would commend it—more especially that portion which we have italicized—to the consideration of all those who advocate state action in advance of popular sentiment. With these general observations we shall proceed to notice the two suggestions contained in para 5 of the Government of India's Resolution.

It seems to us that too much has been made of the forfeiture of-property clause in the Widow Marriage Act of 1856. The object of the Legislature in enacting the law of 1856 was not to introduce into the Hindu law any new principle altogether unknown to that law, but simply to clear up a doubtful point in that law, and to render valid for civil purposes widow-marriages contracted by persons who honestly believed that such marriages were permitted by the Hindu-law even to those Brahmanic castes of the Hindu community among whom they were and are generally held to have been prohibited; in short, the Legislature may not inaptly be regarded as having put itself into the position of a chief umpire or *Sir Panch*, and as having given its verdict in favour of Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and his followers, who contended that the Hindu law sanctioned such marriages, as against those who maintained the contrary. The chief *raison d'être* of the party headed by Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar was

that they did not want the Supreme Legislature to do anything which was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Hindu Law, both of which they urged sanctioned the remarriage of widows. Such being the case, the Supreme Legislature of India could not with decency omit to specifically enact and re-affirm the forfeiture-of-property clause, which is an essential feature of the Hindu law; for even if it had been omitted altogether from the Act, as it was from the draft Bill, there would have been no material change in the position of a remarrying widow as regards her power to continue to inherit the property of her deceased husband, so long as the specific clause in the Hindu law was not specifically repealed. In his article on "The Hindu Child-Widow" in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for October 1886 Sir William Hunter tells us that the clause in question "found entrance into the Hindu Widow-Remarriage Act of 1856, *only at a late stage of the Bill*, and, so far as the records show, *without any very full discussion.*" The foregoing observations will, it is expected, show to the writer why no full discussion, if any at all, was needed, and that, even if no such clause had found its way into the Act, the omission would not have been *ipso facto* of any consequence whatever. It is of course well-known that the Act of 1856 did and does in no way affect the non-Brahmanic castes which form the large majority of the Hindu community, for the simple reason that widow-marriage has been prevalent among them both before and since that enactment; and it is equally well-known that a widow of those castes on remarriage forfeits under the Hindu law—not under the Act of 1856—the property inherited by her from her former husband. And, so far as we are aware, no complaint whatever has yet been heard from those castes, of any grievance as resulting from the forfeiture-of-property clause. When there is the real desire to remarry, and a fairly eligible bride-groom presents himself, a

widow of those castes is not deterred from marrying him simply by the forfeiture of property clause in the Hindu law.*

The position of those who advocate widow marriage among the Brahmanic castes is still the same which was taken up by Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar more than thirty years since,—viz, their validity under the Hindu law. They base their advocacy and agitation upon that sanction. Such being the case, it is a matter for no small surprise that they or at any rate a considerable number of them; should be agitating for an amendment of Section 2 of the Act of 1856, knowing full well that that clause possesses in a far larger degree the sanction of the old Hindu law than the clause enabling a widow of the Brahmanic castes to remarry. Would they like to place widows of the Brahmanic castes in a more enviable position than those of the non-Brahmanic castes of the Hindu community? The Act of 1856 placed both classes of widows on a footing of equality. And what more can the Legislature be expected to do without seriously interfering with the Hindu law, or without basing its new legislation upon non-Hindu lines—a mode of action which the reformers are the loudest in repudiating. The proposal to amend the clause with a view to enable a widow on remarriage to continue to inherit the property of her deceased husband, or to allow her a life-interest therein at the expense of the rights of reversioners who belong to her deceased husband's family, while she ceases to be a member of that family on remarriage, seems to us to be as absurd as, if not more absurd than, the proposal that the State should endow Widow Marriage Associations from the public revenues. †

* The case of the mother of Rakhmabai, the defendant in the "Restitution of Conjugal Rights" case is an illustration in point. By her re-marriage she forfeited a property worth Rs. 25,000 and more.

† Vide *Supra* p. 19.

In the article to which we have already referred Sir William Hunter makes the following proposal:—

In 1856, the Legislature was probably in the right to assume that if a Hindu husband did not give his widow express liberty to remarry in his Will, he left his property to her on the understanding that she would not re-marry. But it is a question whether the time has not now come to make the legal presumption run the other way. This could be effected by enacting that, unless a Hindu husband left his property to his widow on the express condition of her perpetual celibacy, she should not, by re-marriage, forfeit the interest conveyed to her by the Will. The measure should apply only to Wills made after the law was fully known to the Hindu community, and the rights of reversioners would have to be considered. In any case the Act could only deal with the class of interest conveyed to the widow by the Will, and subject to the limitations placed by the Will on that interest.

It is probable that the Government of India, when they penned para 5 of the Resolution quoted above, had this or a similar proposal in view; and assuming that such a proposal received the sanction of the Indian Legislature, and assuming further that such a provision is very widely known to the community concerned, we venture to say that its only result will be that Hindu husbands will, by specific testamentary dispositions, leave matters in *status quo ante*. Human nature generally, and Hindu nature more especially, being what it is, and the Hindu notions on the subject being what they are, you will scarcely find one Hindu husband in 10,000 who will not attach the condition of celibacy to his wife after his death continuing to inherit his property, unless there be very special reasons to the contrary. It may, therefore, be safely and without any hesitation assumed that such a provision will remain practically a dead letter.

But it is said that while the judge-made law, and not the Hindu law, allows a widow to continue to inherit the property of her deceased husband even when she has become unchaste, a widow is divested of that

property on remarriage; and it is considered that this is an anomaly. In the compilation, which we have reviewed, we have frequently been referred to the decision in what is popularly known as the great unchastity case, *Moniram Kolita versus Keri Kolitani*, in which a full bench of the Calcutta High Court, as well as the Privy Council, held that a widow, after the property of her deceased husband had once been vested in her, could not be, according to the Hindu law, divested of that property by any subsequent act of unchastity. A woman is held to be incapable of inheriting the property of her deceased husband if at the time of his death she has been unchaste; she also forfeits that property on remarriage, even when it is once vested in her; and she also forfeits her right to maintenance if, after such maintenance has been once granted to her, she becomes unchaste. But she does not forfeit the property, when once vested in her, by any subsequent act of unchastity. *Prima facie* such a state of things does no doubt look like an anomaly, but we are inclined to think that if the decision of the full bench* of the Calcutta High Court in the case cited above, and also of the Privy Council in † in the same case, be carefully and dispassionately studied, the conviction must become irresistible that that decision, so far from being open to the reproach involved in its being characterized as "judge-made law," is fully in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. That decision is based upon the following cardinal principles:—(a) A circumstance which, if found to exist in a Hindu heir at the time the inheritance in the natural course of things devolves upon him or her, would disqualify him or her to succeed as heir, does not constitute the ground of forfeiture if he or she, after having once succeeded as an heir, is found to have become the victim of the said circumstance, unless there is a specific provision to that effect. Thus

* The Weekly Reporter (Calcutta) Vol. XLX pp. 367-412.

† The Indian Law Reports, Calcutta Series, Vol. V. pp. 776-792.

a son, who at the time of the death of his father is insane, would be passed over as an heir; but he does not forfeit his inheritance if, after the property has once descended to him, he becomes insane. And (b) the Hindu law, though it clearly states that a widow shall forfeit such property on remarriage, and also that she shall forfeit her right to maintenance by her subsequent unchastity, is silent as to whether she shall forfeit property once vested in her by subsequent unchastity; the presumption accordingly is that it was not intended that she should. If the subsequent act of incontinence on the part of the widow be, however, accompanied by "loss of caste, unexpiated by penance and unredeemed by atonement," the widow would, under the Hindu law, forfeit her property, even though once vested in her; for by such degradation she becomes as one dead. But a Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court (Westropp and Warden JJ.) held in 1867 in deciding the special appeal in the case *Parvati kom Dhandiram versus Bhiku kom Dhondiram*,* that Act XVI of 1850, by which converts from one religion to another have been enabled on the principle of religious toleration to continue to inherit their property, would come to the rescue of such a "degraded" widow, and would prevent her being divested of the property vested in her. As to this point, however, there is no decision of the Privy Council upon it. It does not also appear to have been fully argued, and it may reasonably be doubted

* Bombay High Court Reports Vol IV A. C. J. pp. 25-32.

† The Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court in 1867 held that "deprivation of caste, whether it be for change of religion, or for unexpiated incontinence, or any other cause, can no longer be recognized as either working a forfeiture of any right or property already vested in interest, or as impairing or affecting any right of inheritance." The point was not argued before the Court for the simple reason that it was not contended that the plaintiff in the case, *Bhiku kom Dhondiram*, was degraded from caste for unchastity (an assertion by the defendant which was not proved), and it is not a little surprising that the Court departed from its usual practice of not

whether the Privy Council will, after such full argument, uphold the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above.

pronouncing any opinion on a point not raised in the suit. On the other hand we find that in the order of reference to the Full Bench the Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Dwarkanath Mitter and Bayley JJ.) expressed their opinion as follows on this very point :—

“ Supposing, however, that the preceding conclusion is correct as far as it goes, the next question we have to determine is whether this case falls under the purview of Act XXI of 1850:

“ We are of opinion that this question ought to be answered in the negative. This Act was passed for extending the principle of Section 9 Regulation VII of 1832 of the Bengal Code throughout the territories subject to the East India Company, and its preamble is as follows :—

“ Whereas it is enacted by Section 9 Regulation VII of 1832 of the Bengal Code, that ‘ whenever in any civil suit the parties to such suit may be of different religious persuasions, when one party shall be of the Hindoo, and the other of the Mahomedan persuasion, or where one or more of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Mahomedan or Hindoo persuasions, the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which, but for the operation of such laws, they would have been entitled.’ And, whereas it will be beneficial to extend the principle of that enactment throughout the territories subject to the Government of the East India Company.”

“ These words seem to prove conclusively that the one object which the Legislature had in view in passing the Act was to extend the principle of religious toleration, and the inference is, therefore, almost irresistible that it could not have been intended to govern a case like the present. The violation of conjugal duty is an offence against universal morality, and it is upon this ground that contracts based upon adulterous considerations are declared by Courts of Justice to be absolutely null and void. To hold that an unchaste woman is entitled to claim the same privilege as a person who has conscientiously changed his religion would be manifestly opposed to public policy, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the construction of the Act ought to be limited to the furtherance of the great principle enunciated in its preamble, and not extended to a case of positive immorality like the one before us. It has been often remarked that the preamble of an Act is the key to its interpretation,

Now we have already said that it is neither possible nor expedient, even if it were possible, to enable a widow on remarriage to continue to inherit the property of her deceased husband. Mr. Justice Jackson, who formed one of the majority of the Full Bench, in his judgment separately recorded, wrote as follows:—"It may be argued that a widow who leads an immoral life ought not to be placed in a better position than one who honestly takes the benefit of Act XV of 1856, and in so doing renounces all rights in her deceased husband's property. But the Legisla-

and we do not see any reason whatever why we should extend the operation of the Act in question beyond the limits proposed by its framers, and that at the risk, as Mr. Sconce puts it in his judgment in the case of *Rajkoomaree Dossee v. Golabee Dossee*, 'of relaxing the bonds which tend to secure and elevate the relations of married life.'"

In that case also it was not contended that the defendant, Keri Kolutani, a woman of the black-smith caste in Assam, was degraded from caste for her unchastity. Mr. Justice Glover, who formed one of the minority and held that a widow forfeits her property by a subsequent act of unchastity, wrote as follows on this point:—

"The second question does not arise, there being no contention that the widow has been excluded from caste, but if it did, I should be strongly of opinion that Act XXI of 1850 did not bar the forfeiture. That Act was meant for the relief of those who, from conscientious motives, found it necessary to abandon the faith of their ancestors, and not for cases like the present. If a Hindoo widow can become unchaste, and still under cover of this law retain her estate, she makes (setting moral considerations aside) a very good thing of her incontinence. The Hindoo religion forbids her offering oblations or performing religious ceremonies for her husband, and consequently she has to expend no part of her property on these observances, but keeps it all for herself. It can hardly be supposed that the Act had this in view, or intended to hold out a premium to immorality."

The Privy Council in affirming the decision of the majority added that under the Hindu law the defendant would have been divested of the property if she had been degraded from caste for her unchastity. There being, however, no contention that the defendant was degraded from caste, the Privy Council abstained from "determining what would have been the effect of Act XXI of 1850, if she had been degraded or deprived of her caste in consequence of her unchastity."

ture as to this last provision was simply in accord with native custom, as shown by Steele at p. 176 of the book already cited; and *it would certainly be a severe shock to native opinion that a widow by remarriage should be able to carry away her first husband's property into a strange family, neither his nor her own, and besides by remarriage she acquires certain rights or probable rights in the estate of her second husband.*" It will thus be clearly seen that the objection to allow a widow to continue to inherit the property of her deceased husband on her remarriage into a strange family, where by such remarriage she acquires new rights, is based on justice and good reason. In the same way it will be conceded, we should think, on a calm consideration of all the conditions of the problem that it is certainly not expedient in the interests of public policy to declare by law that a widow shall forfeit property once vested in her by any subsequent act of unchastity. While the advantages of such a legislative provision in the interests of morality generally, and in the interests of the cause of widow marriage particularly, will be at the best of an extremely problematecal character, the disadvantages will be real and may in the long end lead to disastrous results, which will far outweigh all the advantages that may accrue. "If, therefore, it be recognized as a rule of law by this tribunal," wrote Mr. Justice Jackson in his judgment referred to above, "that a Hindu widow forfeits by unchastity the estate which she has taken as the heir of her husband, then I apprehend not only will a fruitful cause of domestic discord be largely extended, but a motive will be afforded, to say the least of it, for publishing and bringing into Court the most deplorable scandals. That such a ruling will tend in any great degree to purity of life and manners I do not believe, but it is likely enough to furnish a stimulus to perjury, or to collusive proceedings, equally nefarious." As an illustration of the truth of these observations we

may refer to the moral indicated by the Bombay case cited above. The defendant, Parvati kom Dhondiram, a junior co-widow with the plaintiff, and occupying a distinctly inferior position to the latter, because having been previously a widow she was married to the deceased Dhondiram by *Pat* ceremony, sought to deprive the plaintiff of her share in the property by alleging that she had become unchaste, and also that she had remarried,—assertions which she was unable to fully substantiate, while she herself by her own admission was leading openly a life of regular prostitution! While fully agreeing with what Mr. Justice Jackson said, the Privy Council pointed out other evil consequences also as calculated to result from such a rule of law. We shall here refer only to one of them. They wrote:—

If the widow's estate ceases upon her committing an act of unchastity, the period of succession will be accelerated, and the title of the heirs of her husband must accrue at that period. Suppose a husband dies leaving no male issue and no daughter, mother, or father, but leaving a chaste wife, a brother, & nephew, the son of the surviving brother, and other nephews, sons of deceased brothers. The wife succeeds to the estate, and the surviving brother is her protector. (See Dayabhaga, Chap. XI, Sec. I, v. 57.) If he survives the widow, he, according to the Bengal school, will take the whole estate, as sole heir to his deceased brother, and the nephews will take no interest therein, for brothers' sons are totally excluded by the existence of a brother (Dayabhaga, Chap. XI, Sec. I, v. 5; *id.*, Chap. XI, Sec. VI, vv. 1 and 2). The surviving brother may be advanced in years; the widow may be young. The probability may be that she will survive him. If her estate were to cease by reason of her unchastity, the benefit which he would derive from her fall would give him an interest in direct conflict with his moral duty of shielding her from temptation. But, further, the widow has a right to sell or mortgage her own interest in the estate, or in case of necessity to sell or mortgage the whole interest in it. (Dayabhaga, Chap. XI, Sec. I, v. 52) If her estate ceases by an act of unchastity, the purchaser or mortgagee might be deprived of his

estate if the surviving brother of the husband should prove that the widow's estate had ceased in consequence of an act of unchastity committed by her prior to the sale or mortgage.

The reader will, we fancy, be inclined to agree both with Mr. Justice Jackson and the Privy Council in the view they have taken; and it is for these reasons that we consider it inexpedient in the interests of public policy to declare by law that a widow shall forfeit by unchastity the property of her deceased husband once vested in her, and thus to place a widow who becomes unchaste on a footing of equality with one who remarries. We are bound to admit that such legislation would be theoretically most perfect, but that it will lead to very undesirable consequences altogether disproportionate to the good it may be expected to achieve, can scarcely be denied.

As regards the second suggestion noticed in the Government of India's Resolution we confess we do not see how any machinery that human ingenuity can devise is to enable a Hindu widow, "who fails to obtain the consent of her caste fellows to her remarriage," to marry "without renouncing her religion." A Hindu widow, save and except those of the Brahmin castes among whom widow marriage is not customary, does not, on her remarriage, renounce her religion, nor does she lose her caste, although she is considered disqualified to take part in certain religious ceremonies. A Brahmanic widow, if she remarries, does not renounce her religion, but she loses her caste. She and her new husband cease to be Brahmins, but none the less remain Hindus. We accordingly fail to see what can be done by the State in this direction, although we should be only too glad if the remarried pair can be helped out of this difficulty, but we feel fully persuaded that the State is simply powerless to grant this relief.

There are only two proposals in the interesting compilation which we have briefly reviewed, that

seem to us to be free from all objection on the ground of principle. The two suggestions are :—

(a) The suggestion made by Mr. Tirmalrao Venkatesh, Inamdar of Dharwar, * and the Hon'ble M. G. Ranade C. I. E. † to the effect that the old Shastric disabilities, laid down in the Hindu law, and which a living wife must fulfil before her husband can marry again during her life-time, should be revived and legalized.

(b) The suggestion made by Babu Sitakanta Mukarji, ‡ Deputy Magistrate, Dinagpore district, that "a respectably constituted standing Central Committee of learned pandits and religious men, and highly respected high caste laymen should be formed," and that this Central Committee "should assemble every five or six years, and decide every such question represented by delegates from similarly constituted provincial Committees, such decision having the force of law."

We are inclined to think that at the present time these two suggestions, and only these two, are worth serious consideration; because it is possible, that both of them may commend themselves to the enlightened and responsible Hindu public opinion in the country. We do not propose on the present occasion to go into any detailed consideration of the several arguments that may reasonably be urged in favour of both these suggestions. We shall content ourselves with only a very brief statement of the reasons why we consider them to be worth serious consideration.

It is a mistake to suppose, as Englishmen generally do, that the Hindu marriage system is not a monogamous system, § simply, because under certain

* *Vide Supra* pp. 24. † *Vide Supra* p. 26. ‡ *Vide Supra* pp. 36-7.

§ Mr. Ibbetson in his Census Report for the Panjab (p. 362) writes :—"By law and custom alike a Musalman may marry four, and a Hindu two wives. But as a fact the privilege is very rarely taken advantage of by Hindus, and not often by Musalmans except the more wealthy section of the community, unless the first wife proves barren

particular circumstances that system, or, to speak more accurately, the principles and religious obligations on which that system is wholly based, allow a Hindu to marry again during the life-time of his first wife. It can not be denied that in some isolated instances the injunctions laid down in the Shastras, are disregarded with impunity, because there is no spiritual authority having the necessary vitality to strictly enforce obedience to the said injunctions, while the temporal authority is quite indifferent to the subject for more reasons than one, and for no fault of its own. The Hindu public sentiment, however, is apt to be scandalized whenever any individual member of that community takes to himself another wife during the life-time of his first wife and without also adequate reasons for such a step. And we are inclined to think that responsible opinion, both orthodox and heterodox, will cordially support a movement for reviving and legalizing the old restraints* in this direction, even though the evil is ne-

or bears daughters only. The unanimity of district officers on this point is very general, the usual remark being that *the people are too poor to afford a second wife.*"

Mr. Lewis Melver in his Census Report for the Madras Presidency (p. 73) writes:—"In every district there are of course more wives than husbands, but the excess is so slight as to support the belief that *polygamy, although allowed to Hindus and Musalmans by their laws, is rejected by their common sense.*"

Similar inferences can be drawn from the statistics for civil condition in the other provinces, and even official testimony cited in support of such inferences. But it is hardly necessary to do so: for the testimony we have cited from one northern and one southern province is enough for the purpose.

* Manu, the celebrated Hindu Law-giver in his Institutes, Chap IX verses 80-82, lays down the restraints. We give below a free English translation of the said verses:—

"A man may, at all times, marry a second ~~one~~ ^{one} if his first wife is an habitual drunkard, or is faithless to her husband (misconducts herself), or is ill-disposed, diseased, pugnacious or extravagant (is managing the household)." —80.

cessarily very restricted in its extent, owing to the operation of several causes.

Such a legislation will fully answer the purpose in all parts of India, except those isolated tracts where polygamy in the strict sense of the term and polyandry* prevail. The compilation which we have reviewed in the foregoing pages furnishes us with no evidence whatever as regards the present attitude of the leaders of those classes among whom the said practices are prevalent; but although we strongly condemn those practices, and would gladly see them die out altogether, we are not at all prepared to recommend any legislative action being taken to put a violent stop to them, against the deliberate wishes of the classes concerned. The said practices must accordingly be left untouched if, as we assume, the classes affected by them are not prepared to abandon them. The motive power must come from within, and no useful purpose can be served by forcing a reform, however beneficial, upon an unwilling people. The work must be left to time and the growing consciousness of the evil on the part of the classes concerned. Otherwise, as has been already pointed out at the outset of these "Observations," the same result must follow which has followed in the case of the *Satnamis* of the Central Provinces.

In the same way the Nayer community, on the

"A man should wait for 8 years if his wife is barren, for 10 years if she is delivered of still-born children, and for 12 years if she gives birth to girls only; before he marries a second wife."—81.

"Again if a woman is diseased but well-disposed (towards her husband) and well-behaved, her husband may marry a second wife with her knowledge, and at times should pay due regard to her wishes."—82.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that even when the living wife satisfies any of the conditions mentioned in the first two verses, except that relating to absolute misconduct, the husband is, in many cases, prevented from making advantage of the privilege conferred on him through his sheer inability to support two wives.

* The Panjab Census (1881) Report, pp.365-66.

Malabar coast, among whom marriage is unknown, and if it does take place it does not entitle a Nayer to the exclusive possession of his so-called wife,* must also be left to follow their present practice, until an influential and respectable majority of them desire to stop the practice by legislative action. We understand that not long ago an advanced band of this community sought legislative interference to put a stop to the practice, but the Government of India very properly refused to comply with the request so preferred because on inquiry they found that the community was not prepared for the change.

Babu Sitakanta Mukarji makes his proposal with reference to the subject of Enforced Widowhood only; but without committing ourselves to all the details thereof we think the idea to be an excellent one and such as may be expected with the necessary alterations to commend itself to the Hindu public with reference to the whole subject of socio-religious reform. The discussion of such subjects by a responsible body like the one proposed above,—and that too in a constitutional manner—will prove of great use in adapting from time to time the Hindu law to the varying requirements of the situation. Such a constituted board will also provide a recognized channel by which alone the Legislature, which is foreign in its character, can keep itself in touch with responsible popular opinion on the subject. In the absence of such a recognized institution all efforts at reform are apt to be spasmodic in their character, as they have hitherto been, and calculated to do in the long end more harm than good. Until the Indian Legislature becomes *thoroughly* representative in its character, there will always be legitimate ground for distrust of every attempt made by it to interfere with the autonomy of any Indian community, and with the autonomy of the Hindu community more especially,—a community the intellectual defenders.

* Bombay Gazetteer. Kanara. Vol. XV. Part 1 p. 196.

and custodians of whose antient traditions "have a hereditary instinct for self-preservation" in a far larger degree than that possessed by any other community. This undeniable fact affords another reason, if any were at all needed, why the Indian Legislative Councils must be enlarged on a really representative basis. And if our English friends sincerely wish to improve the status of Indian women, very little reflection ought to show to them that the only way, in which the desired reform can be secured, is the reconstitution of our Legislative Councils ; for then and then only such changes as may be found necessary—and far be it from us to say that no change is necessary or will be found to be necessary hereafter—will be made in due course without any suspicion and distrust of legislative action by the state. Modern forces, if they are to be fully utilized in the interests of progressive advance in social reform, must be utilized in a manner most approved by modern polity. We freely admit that the full consummation of even this political reform is a work of time. But it is a sheer illusion for any man, be he who he may, to contend that this reform must follow and not precede social reform generally, and the improvement in the social and civil status of Indian women particularly, whereas the history of almost every civilized country proves almost to demonstration that the best way to secure social reform is to secure cautious political reform in the first instance. If in the intermediate interval, however, a responsible body, like the one suggested by Babu Sitakanta Mukarji, could be formed, it would very probably prove of great use in ensuring a steady and progressive advance of the community concerned, and in preventing new abuses from creeping in into the social system of the Hindu community. We are inclined to think that this is the only method by which, if at all possible, the object in view can be attained. Dr. Trailokya Nath Mitra in his Tagore lectures for 1879 having

observed that very few marriages had taken place under Act XV of 1856 because the Hindu community generally had refused to accept Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar's interpretation as correct, proceeded to add :—"The movement would have succeeded better if, instead of an appeal to the Legislature, which is alien in its constitution, a grand congress of the Hindus learned in the Shastras throughout the country, and representing all possible shades of opinion, had been held under the presidency of one of its respected teachers, and the orthodox nature of the measure had been established by the decision of such an assembly. Such a decision would have been among the Hindus what the decree of an oecumenical council is among Roman Catholics, and would have been accepted by the mass of Hindus as genuine Shashtra, and the social reform would have been carried out most successfully." The view propounded in the foregoing extract is precisely the view which underlies the proposal we have briefly noticed above. No immediate result need of course be expected from the adoption of this or any other proposal, but if a responsible body could constitutionally discuss such important questions at periodical intervals, the desired object might in the long end be secured.

Before concluding these observations we should like to notice one point which struck us remarkably, and which will not fail to strike the reader of the foregoing review of the compilation. This point relates to the practice of shaving widows. It is rather a remarkable fact that no Hindu expert from any of the five provinces, from which representative Hindu opinion on the subject of social reform has been made available in the compilation, with the exception of Bombay has deemed it worth his while to express an opinion on this practice. Whether this absence of an expression of any opinion on the question is due to the fact that it was not noticed in Mr. Malabari's Notes, and accordingly no expert whose opinion

was solicited on those Notes thought it proper to travel beyond those Notes, or whether that absence is due to the fact that the practice is more prevalent in Bombay than in any other part of India, and that accordingly the righteous feeling of indignation against the practice found a naturally forcible expression in Bombay, we can not undertake to say definitely. It would seem, however, that in no part of India is the practice in question more prevalent than in the Madras Presidency, and if this impression is well-founded, it is in no small degree surprising that we have not been favoured with an indignant protest against it by any of the nine Hindu gentlemen from that Presidency whose opinions have been published in the "Selection," not even by Dewan Bahadur R. Raghunath Rao himself. Be that as it may, it may be observed that, so far as the Bombay Presidency is concerned, this practice is confined to Brahmins and semi-Brahmin castes only, the latter having, it is alleged, only recently subjected themselves to it. Even among the Brahmins the custom is most rigidly observed only among the Kokanaath Brahmins of the Maharashtra irrespective of the age of the widow, provided only she has attained puberty, and is not in family way, and has not a child dependent on her for nourishment, while, among other sub-divisions of the Maratha Brahmins at any rate, young widows are spared the infliction, until they themselves choose to submit to it when advanced in age. In Gujarath also the practice, we are told, is not rigorously enforced except perhaps among the Nagar Brahmins. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Venkat Rango Katti in holding that the practice in question is not Hindu, but evidently Buddhistic in its origin.* Be that however as it may, we believe its days are numbered, and that at no very distant date the growing consciousness of its revolting

* *Vide Supra p. 28.*

character on the part of the classes concerned will lead them to discountenance it effectually, though perhaps not in an ostentatious manner which finds so much favour with the typical modern Hindu reformer. Our own belief founded upon personal knowledge and observation is that even in quarters least suspected of entertaining such heretic views the feeling of righteous indignation against the practice, as it now prevails among certain Brahmin classes, is gradually gaining strength, and if no untoward circumstances in the interval retard its progressive growth, the feeling may assuredly be expected to assert itself at no very distant date. Mr. Narayan Bhicaji Joglekar, late District Deputy Collector at Sholapoor, and now a pensioner and First Class Honorary Magistrate at Poona, is nothing if not orthodox; and he would perhaps decline with thanks the compliment of being classed as a reformer with the Hon'ble Mr. Ranade. But what even Mr. Ranade * has in his paper on Mr. Malabari's Notes evidently shrunk from recommending, Mr. Joglekar † has boldly come forward to recommend and support. Mr. Joglekar's strong susceptibilities, roused by personal observation, have led him to openly revolt against the approved orthodox notions on the subject, and to strongly recommend the enactment of a law practically putting a stop to the practice, at least in the case of widows under 35. Mr. Joglekar does not of course stand quite alone in holding such views. There are others who share the same views with him, though they at present form a small minority; but, as we have already expressed our confident belief, this minority is bound to become a majority at no very distant date, if we are not much mistaken in reading the signs of the times and in basing our forecaste of the future of this practice on such observation of the present attitude which, though

* *Vide Supra* pp. 25-27. † *Vide Supra* p. 23.

outwardly it has all the appearance of perfect indifference, is none the less distinctly unfavourable to its long continuance. And the gradual spread of female education, which has a brilliant future before it if only duly and skilfully fostered, will undoubtedly accelerate the forementioned consummation, and will moreover prove of immense use to the progress of healthy social reform all along the line.

The other point which we would notice is the advisability and practicability or otherwise of the Legislature doing anything calculated to give a direct or indirect blow to the system of Infant or Early Marriages prevalent among the Hindu community. The Hindu community is simply not prepared to tolerate any legislative action in this respect. And the non-Hindu reader of these pages will not be surprised at this attitude of the Hindu community, if he carefully weighs the moral of the incident we shall refer to in the sequel.

Certain decisions of constituted judicial tribunals in respect of the succession to property of a Parsi dying intestate, and in respect of the jurisdiction of civil courts to *entertain a suit by a Parsi for restitution of conjugal rights* introduced such an anomaly about the legal status of the Parsis that on the representation of the Parsi Law Association established in Bombay in 1855 the Bombay Government appointed in December 1861 a special Commission, consisting of two European, and two Parsi, members,* "to make a preliminary inquiry into the usages recognized as laws by the Parsi community of India, and the necessity of special legislation in connection

* The two European members were Sir J. Arnould and Mr. H. Newton, while the two Parsi members were Mr. Framji Nasarwanji Patel, President of the Parsi Law Association, and Mr. Rustamji Kharsetje Modi Suratwala, a member of the Association, and a representative of that family the head of which for the time being hereditarily held for centuries the office of Davar or spiritual Judge of the Parsees in the Surat District.

with them." This Commission received evidence and submitted drafts of two Bills, one dealing with the subject of marriage and divorce, and the other with succession. The original drafts would appear to have been prepared by the Parsi Law Association; and the original draft on the first subject not only recognized "the validity of Infant Marriages and betrothals," but provided for imposing "*criminal penalties* in respect of the violation of duties and obligations supposed to arise out of such marriages and betrothals." And the following extract from the Commission's report will be read with great interest:—

VIII. *Can the Indian Legislature be rightly asked to sanction by direct legislation the validity of Infant Marriages and betrothals amongst Parsees or to award Civil redress, or impose criminal penalties in respect of the violation of duties and obligations supposed to arise out of such Marriages and betrothals?*

The European Members of the Commission, regarding the practice of infant marriages and betrothals (a practice plainly derived from the Hindoos and not in any way sanctioned by Zoroastrian Scripture or ancient Zoroastrian usage) as very hostile to the progress of the Parsee Community in civilisation and morality, cannot recommend the enactment by the Indian Legislature of any laws that have a tendency, directly or indirectly to sanction this practice. The Members of the Parsee Community who have prepared, or who support, this Draft Code, are pressing its enactment on the Indian Legislature, as a concession due to their admittedly rapid progress in civilisation and intelligence. They can make no case for asking from the Indian Legislature any encouragement to practices which are alike opposed to the principles of those who are invited to legislate, and to the true interests of those on whose behalf Legislation is solicited. A Member of their own body, Mr. Maneckjee Cursetjee, in one of the pamphlets that he laid before the Commission* expresses himself thus on the subject

* Letter to the Honorable C. J. Erakine (31st March 1861) paragraphs 31 and 32.

of Infant Marriages and Betrothals. "This is one of the many barbarous and cruel rites and customs which the Parsees have borrowed and adopted from the Hindoos and which

is productive of incalculable mischief among them. The extent of the domestic discord and family derangement caused by infant marriage and betrothals among the natives of India, few if any foreigners can have any adequate conception of. Little babes and children are *quasi* sold and bartered but by another name miscalled marriage which not only saps the foundation of their domestic comforts, ruins and destroys their health, and obstructs the development of their mental faculties, *but also defeat all attempts at those moral and social reforms the introduction of which is so greatly needed among the Parsees more than any other class of the native Community.*"

To the European members of the Commission this representation of the evils of infant marriages and betrothals appears substantially just, and they, therefore, are of opinion that the provisions of the supplemental Draft Code which sanction such contracts by defining them; which treat them as valid by giving civil redress in damages, nay even by imposing criminal penalties for their violation, cannot be recommended for legislative sanction. These provisions are more especially Sections 1-2-3 part of 11 and Section 19 of the supplemental Draft Code.

The European Commissioners do not feel themselves in a position to suggest any explicit legislative prohibition of such marriages, they merely recommend that the above provisions be omitted. This would still leave it competent for the Panchayat to deal with questions arising out of such contracts *in fore domestico* while it would preclude any awards of the Panchayat in respect thereof from obtaining recognition or sanction in any British tribunal within Her Majesty's Indian dominions. The European members of the Commission have good reason to believe that the change they propose in this respect in the supplemental Draft Code, will be favourably received by a large and highly respectable minority among the Parsees of Bombay.*

Notwithstanding this strong protest from the European members of the Commission, the Parsi community appears to have carried the day; for in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 1865 we search in vain for a statutory age of consent enabling

* Mr. Sorabji S. Bengali's compilation pp. 183-184. The Italics in the extract are not ours.

a Parsi boy or girl, married before the said period, to repudiate the same on attaining the said age of consent if he or she were disposed to do so. On the contrary we find the validity of Infant Marriages practically recognized by Sections 3 and 37 of the Act, the latter section only providing that no suit for enforcing such Infant Marriage shall be entertained "if, at date of the institution of the suit, the husband shall not have completed the age of sixteen years, or the wife shall not have completed the age of fourteen years." Section 37, it will be seen, does not prescribe the statutory age of consent, but *the statutory age of consummation*. It may further be pointed out that under such a law also a case like *Dadaji vs. Rakhmabai* is by no means impossible; * for Section 36 of the Act provides a penalty in the form of imprisonment or fine or both if the order to return to cohabitation is wilfully disobeyed.

Now if a community which has always shown a remarkable aptitude for adapting its manners and customs to the varying requirements of the situation, found it absolutely impossible in 1865—*only a little more than twenty years since—to abandon at the bidding of a few of its own leading members, supported by foreigners, a practice which was not in any way sanctioned by its own sacred books or antient usage, but which was evidently borrowed from others,* and accordingly insisted upon the Legislature recognizing the same to the fullest extent, notwithstanding the mature opinion of one of its respected leaders that the absolute abandonment of the said practice was essentially necessary in the interests of "those moral and social reforms" which the said community "more than any other class of the Native community" needed most urgently;—if such a community, we repeat, so late as 1865 strenuously and successfully resisted the attempt then made to prohibit Infant

* And such a case *did* occur. *Vide* Bombay High Court Reports Vol. IX pp. 290-304.

Marriages by law, or even to render them voidable, is it really so very surprising after all that a community like the Hindus should *even in 1887* stoutly resist the attempt to coerce them into abandoning a practice *fully sanctioned by their own scriptures and antient usage*? There is no precedent on record, so far as we are aware, justifying such a wanton and gratuitous interference by any Legislature, whether native or foreign, with the deeply-cherished marriage laws and customs of any nationality or community, even when the said customs, as in the case of the Parsi community, happen to be borrowed from others, still less when they, as in the case of the Hindu community, are admittedly indigenous. The writer of these "Observations" is not so deeply enamoured of the Hindu marriage customs as to contend that they are all perfection and require no reform; on the contrary he would gladly see his Hindu brethren gradually repudiate the objectionable parts of the said marriage customs in the first place, and resort to legislation afterwards, if necessary, for rendering a return to the old state of things impossible.

When it will be found expedient and practicable to legislate on this subject, it will be much better to absolutely prohibit by law marriages under a certain age-limit, whatever that limit may be, than to prescribe by law the age of consent and to make marriages taking place before that period voidable at the discretion of the parties when they shall have attained the said age of consent. A proposal falling under the latter category was made by Mr. Justice Raymond West, suggesting 14 and 12 to be the age of consent for Hindu boys and girls respectively. Sir W. Hunter in his paper on "The Hindu Child-Widow" has, however, very properly rejected the proposal as impracticable; and the reasons assigned by Sir W. Hunter for rejecting the proposal can not but commend themselves to every thinking mind. Sir William says:—"To the third scheme (*i. e.* prescribing the

age of consent) there is the additional objection, that the adoption or renunciation of marriage, by a girl of 12 or a boy of 14, *would either be a meaningless formality or a defiance of parental authority by children too young to judge wisely for themselves.*" The same objection holds good even if the age of consent were raised to 20 and 15 for boys and girls respectively, as recently recommended in a proposal which the *London Times* without probably knowing what it meant certified as "a modest and reasonable request," even though the age-limits are obviously higher than those obtaining in England. The great importance attached by all Oriental communities to parental guidance and control in such matters may be inferred from the fact that even a consensual marriage by a Parsi boy of 20 with a girl of 15 *without the consent of parents or guardians on both sides* is under Section 3 of the Parsi Act invalid, even though such marriage between an English boy and an English girl would admittedly be valid under the English law. It will be thus seen that the standpoint from which Oriental communities regard the marriage question differs in all material respects from that from which Englishmen view it; and foreign critics of the Hindu system would do well not to forget the fact that so long as the aforesaid standpoint retains all its vitality, no radical reform—and to prescribe the age of consent by law is a radical reform—is possible.