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EDITED BY

S. JI. CHITLONKAR.

POONA

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# THE POONA SARVAJAIK SABHA.

Established for representing the wants and wishes of the inhabitants of the Deccan, being appointed on a popular elective system under rules framed for the purpose.

WALEKAR'S WADA, DANE ALL

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# PROCEEDINGS OF THE SABHA

## CORRESPONDENCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE POONA MUNICIPALITY UNDER THE NEW MUNICIPAL ACT (ACT II OF 1884).

No. 45 OF 1885.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS,  
POONA, 11TH APRIL 1885.

To

JOHN NUGENT ESQUIRE

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

BOMBAY.

SIR,

With reference to Government Resolution No. 764 General Department dated the 2nd March 1885 we are directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha to submit the following representation on the subject of the constitution of the Poona Municipal Board, and to request you to place the same before His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council for his favourable consideration.

2. The Poona Municipality after having consulted the local rate-payers submitted in January last certain draft rules which contained among others some important proposals regarding the constitution of that body under the new Municipal Act of 1884. These proposals were, firstly that the Municipal Commission of Poona should consist of thirty members including the President; secondly that two thirds of the body should be elective members; thirdly that the rate-paying qualification for voters should be the payment of Rs. 3 of direct Municipal taxation; and fourthly and lastly that the body so formed should be allowed to elect its own President. The Committee of the Sabha are sorry that these moderate and reasonable proposals of the Poona Municipality have been negatived by Government in the Resolution referred to above.

3. The reasons assigned in the Resolution for negativing the proposals of the Poona Municipality are that "no sufficient cause has been shown for any deviation" from the standard District Municipal Election Rules; that the Governor in Council deems it unnecessary "to raise to 30 the number of the Commissioners," that while "at present only three-sevenths of the total number are elected," "under



the new constitution the proportion will be raised to one half;" and that as the present minimum tax-paying qualification along with other auxiliary qualifications gives a sufficiently large constituency in the proportion of 32 per mille of the population, "any reduction of the qualification appears to be unnecessary." At the end of para 2 of the Resolution it is added that the elective minimum proposed to be granted "is strictly in accordance with the pledge given by Government," and that "the Governor in Council will not exceed it at the first formation under the Act of any Municipal Board." In para 3 it is further stated that "the President will be appointed by Government," but it is not stated whether the President to be so appointed by Government will be an official or non-official gentleman. The Committee of the Sabha beg respectfully to submit that the Resolution under notice contains some evidence of by no means unimportant character showing that the Governor in Council in negating all the important proposals submitted by the Poona Municipality has over-looked several points having an important bearing upon the question, and we are directed to briefly notice them in the following observations. X

X 4. As regard the first point about the numerical strength of the new Municipal Board, we are directed to respectfully invite the attention of the Governor in Council to the Government Notification No. 580 dated the 17th February last and published at page 222 of the *Bombay Government Gazette* Part I of the 19th February last. According to that notification the new Municipal Board of the Town of Sholapoor is to consist of twenty six Members exclusive of the President; and no further reason in support of the Poona Municipality's first proposal need be assigned than the fact that when a town with a population of 59,633 souls is allowed a Municipal Board of 26 Commissioners exclusive of the President, a town with a population of 99,622 souls has a moral, if not a legal, claim to secure a proportionate or reasonable accession to the numerical strength of its Municipal Board. (It will not be here out of place to note also the circumstance that up to the end of June 1883 the Municipal Board of Poona consisted of 36 Members including the President. And the Committee of the Sabha are not aware of any cause having been shown by the District or Divisional authorities why, if for years past the Poona Municipality consisted of 36 Members, it should now consist of only 25 Members including the President. In this connection it is also worthy of remark that since the last few months the primary schools within the Municipal limits have been transferred to the management and control of the Municipality, and a School Board has been appointed to supervise them. A large portion of those, who are members of the Executive Committee, are also members of the

School Board, and thus a needlessly heavy strain is put upon almost one and the same set of men. Such a result as this is by no means desirable, and would certainly be obviated if the numerical strength of the body were increased as proposed by the local Municipality, because then there would be a larger field to choose from.

X 5. As regards the second point about the elective proportion in the constitution of the new Municipal Board of Poona, the Committee of the Sabha must first respectfully submit that it is contrary to facts to describe the existing elective proportion as "only three sevenths," and then to state that it is now proposed to raise it to "one-half." We are directed to respectfully invite the attention of the Governor in Council to Government Resolution in the Financial Department No. 3583 dated the 19th September 1882 [para 9] whereby it was proposed to reduce the number of *ex officio* members in City Municipalities from 9 to 5 and which fixed the total number of Commissioners at 18 to 24, and which laid down the elective minimum at "one-half." In this connection it has to be remembered that among those Municipalities, in which the elective franchise was introduced in the spring of 1883, there are some towns, like Pandharpur, Malegaon, Nadiad, Viramgaon and a few others, as the Governor in Council is no doubt aware, in which even now the elective minimum bears the proportion of one-half to the existing total number of Commissioners in strict accordance with the terms of the 9th para of the Resolution quoted above. And the Committee of the Sabha are not aware of any separate orders having been issued as specially applicable to the Poona Municipality and which laid down the elective proportion at three-sevenths. If the September Resolution of 1882 [para 9] be read along with the minutes of proceedings of the Poona Municipality, when the existing constitution was after considerable discussion adopted and submitted to Government for sanction, the real explanation of the existing state of things will be made perfectly clear. X It is sufficient for the purpose of the present representation to state here that the Municipal Commission of Poona, as at present constituted, consists practically of only 24 members [plus those four *ex-officio* members whom the September Resolution proposed to deprive of their seats, but who could not be dispossessed of their seats until a law should have been passed, as they held them by virtue of an Act of the Legislature], and that the elective proportion is one-half and not three-sevenths. It will be thus seen that the Government Resolution under notice sanctions only a continuance of the existing state of things, and does not sanction any new concession, as suggested therein. X

X 6. It now remains to see whether Poona along with a few other towns can reasonably claim a larger elective proportion than the minimum guaranteed by the Legislature, and whether, looking to the libe-

ral assurances and pledges vouchsafed by the Executive during the progress of the Bill through the Legislative Council, the Governor in Council is morally bound to favourably entertain such claims. One of the principal distinguishing features of the two Local Self-Government Acts of 1884, for which great credit was deservedly claimed and ungrudgingly allowed, is their elastic character; and the Committee of the Sabha are not aware of there having been any reservation, expressly or impliedly made in his speeches by the Hon'ble J. B. Peile C. S. I., which supports the view put forth towards the end of para 2 of the Resolution under notice, that at the first formation of any Municipal Board under the new Municipal Act no advantage was to be taken of the elastic character of the provisions. Further the Committee of the Sabha feel it their duty to respectfully urge that in the case of those twenty-four towns, where the elective franchise was introduced in the spring of 1883, apparently under the Act of 1873, but virtually under the new Act, whose provisions were then roughly sketched out, the first formation of the Boards took place in the spring of 1883, and that the time has arrived when it is by no means unfair to raise the question whether any of them may safely be allowed larger powers of self-government, especially so because the two years, which have now elapsed since the first formation of these Boards under the new system, have brought with them a two-fold experience, one portion being negative and the other positive.

7. The negative experience shows that the apprehensions and misgivings entertained by the Bombay Government on the subject of the introduction of the elective franchise in the Mofussil Municipalities, and which found expression firstly in the letter to the Government of India from the Bombay Government No. 3510 dated the 20th October 1881 (para 5) and secondly in the September Resolution of 1882 (paras 2 and 3) have not been in the slightest degree justified anywhere, and certainly not in Poona, where "a spirit of opposition to the Government" was in 1881-82 expected. The positive experience shows that the elections of 1883 were successful both in point of the interest taken by the newly franchised urban constituencies as manifested by the large number of those who exercised their new power, and in point of the quality of the members elected. As observed in the summary prefixed to the Administration Report of the Bombay Presidency for the year 1882-83, "the elections passed off quietly and satisfactorily, although the contest for some of the seats was keen, and won only by small majorities," and "most of the old Commissioners were elected by the people, and the new Commissioners were men of similar standing." During the last few months, however, a very important accession to this two-fold experience has been made, which must have proved an agreeable surprise to those

who did not anticipate that the rural constituencies would display so much active interest in the elections, and would return representative and influential men as their members. The Resolutions in which the Governor in Council has reviewed the election reports for the several districts bear ample testimony to the fact that, to say nothing of the other districts, even such admittedly backward districts as Kanara, Khairat, and Kaladgi have shown and proved a capability for self-government which until very recently even advanced towns, to say nothing of advanced districts, were hardly deemed capable of. And the Committee of the Sabha are, therefore, sorry to observe from the Resolution under notice that the Governor in Council has in negating the Poona Municipality's proposals acted as if no such encouraging experience, as has been referred to above, had been gained, and as if the apprehensions and misgivings entertained in 1861 and 1882 were still in full force. The principles so clearly enunciated by the Honble Mr. Peile in his speech, when he moved the first reading of the two Bills, appear to the Committee of the Sabha to have been overlooked in disposing of the Poona Municipality's proposals; for those principles declare that "it would be contrary to sound policy to retain the management of local public business in the hands of central authority a *single day* after it can be transferred to the local agencies which are most concerned that it shall be well transacted." And with the aforesaid encouraging evidence before them the Committee of the Sabha are humbly of opinion that the proposals submitted by the Poona Municipality can be "safely" sanctioned without any misgivings as regards the immediate or remote consequences of such a step. In this connection it is worthy of remark that the Poona Municipality represents a city which, in the words of our late Governor, Sir James Fergusson Bart, is "second to few in India for its educational fame," and whose political, no less than intellectual, activity has always been conspicuous.

8. As regards the nature and extent of the pledges, generously vouchsafed by Government, we are directed to quote here for the sake of easy reference the following extract from the proceedings of the Legislative Council of February 6, 1884, when the Municipal Bill was read a second time and also passed. The Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabjee said :—

I fear that many of our critics have reasoned as if the Presidency of Bombay consisted of a small compact area, peopled by one single race, and possessing exactly the same qualifications and capacity for political self-government. Nothing, however could be further from the truth. And yet some have taken the

tended that the minimum of half for elective members, as laid down in the Bill, is a dangerous leap in the dark; while others, taking the most advanced districts, have gone to the opposite extreme and have declared with equal confidence that it is a very inadequate step in the direction of popular institutions. But these arguments are based upon pure fallacies. *The Bill, while providing a general constitution for the average localities, lays down no such hard and fast rules at all. It is and it has been purposely made elastic enough for both purposes—to provide a suitable constitution for districts not yet sufficiently advanced to elect half their own members, and to confer greater electoral power upon others which may show themselves worthy of that distinction.* Now, as the Government have pledged themselves to apply these provisions in a fair and liberal spirit, I, for one, am content to accept their assurances with perfect confidence. Unhappily, however, the past history of this Presidency is not without instances where similar assurances have on previous occasions been either entirely ignored or lost sight of. And this, no doubt, is the chief reason why the Bills, even as amended by the Select Committee, have been received with less satisfaction by the people than might otherwise have been the case. \* \* \* \* \* Adopting for their general guidance the constitution as laid down in the Bill for the average localities, I trust the Government will see its way to test the capacity of the people of this Presidency for local self-government by introducing suitable variations into that constitution, according to the circumstances and peculiarities of each place, by trying in some places the effect of an equal number of elected and of nominated members, in another place giving the majority to the elected members, appointing official chairmen in some and non-official in others, while giving to some boards at least the power of electing their own presidents.

A further reference to the same proceedings will show that His Excellency the President (the Right Honble Sir James Fergusson Bart) paid a well deserved compliment to the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabji not only for the "breadth of view, independence of thought, and public spirit" of his speech, but, what is more important on the present occasion, for its "complete candour," thus showing that the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabji had in no way misunderstood or misinterpreted the pledges of Government. And the pledges of Government, so understood, require that the elastic provisions of both the Acts, but especially of the Municipal Act, should be so applied, even at the very commencement, as to suit the varying circumstances of each local area. The same view, we are further directed to state, is supported by the recorded expression of opinion of the Government

of India; for in their letter in the Home Department No. 1521 dated the 4th October 1882 (para 11) they said:— "The Government of India approve of the proposals of the Local Government (paragraphs 9 to 13) for reducing the number of *ex-officio* members on the various local Boards, and for introducing a system of election. It is expected that *in the course of a short time a less restricted system will be adopted in many places.* The new Act should be so framed as to enable the Government to adopt the details of the system of appointment and election to varying local circumstances." Again the Committee of the Sabha think it will not be fair that the advanced and larger municipal towns should be placed on a level with the backward and small municipal towns and with the equally or more backward rural tracts. The Committee of the Sabha feel persuaded that it could never have been the intention of the Legislature to lay down one hard and fast system for advanced and backward localities alike. As justly observed by the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabjee, the Acts lay down a general constitution for the average localities, the Legislature having relied upon the Executive Government to make the necessary variations to suit the varying circumstances of each locality. The Legislature might easily have followed the usual precedent and scheduled the localities, as was in fact done in Bengal; but the Legislature of this Presidency did not do so, and abdicated its functions in favour of the Executive, because it felt full confidence in the assurances and pledges of the latter, and because the former believed that the latter would do its best to exercise the powers conferred upon it in full accord with the former's declared wishes. Further the privileges, which are now claimed on behalf of Poona and other large towns, are not larger than those which the scheduled Municipal towns, of Bengal enjoy, and which they have exercised in a manner to justify the confidence, nor are they larger than those which the local Government of Madras has very recently conceded to the leading towns, about 40 in number, in that Presidency under an Act of the local Legislature which instead of scheduling the advanced localities relegated the task to the Executive Government. Now the Committee of the Sabha cannot admit that the leading towns either in Bengal or Madras are more capable of exercising these privileges than those in this Presidency. The same view as regards the advanced condition of the leading towns in this Presidency is held by the Bombay Government and also by the Government of India (Vide the Government of India's letter No. 1521 dated the 4th October 1882 para 7), and the Committee of the Sabha are accordingly the more unable to account for the hesitation and reluctance of the Bombay Government to concede to the leading towns in this Presidency those

privileges which are already being enjoyed by the leading towns in the two sister Presidencies.

✓ 9. The Committee of the Sabha understand that, though nothing has been said on the subject in the Resolution under notice, it is the intention of the Governor in Council to appoint non-official gentlemen as Presidents of the Poona Municipality and of the Municipalities of some other leading towns. If this really be the case and if, as they are inclined to assume, more than one non-official gentleman, competent to discharge the duties of the said office with credit both to Government and to themselves, are found available, the Committee of the Sabha can not understand why it is that the Governor in Council hesitates to allow in such cases the Municipalities concerned to elect their own President. These selected non-official gentlemen are sure to be elected as members by popular constituencies, and if some of them do not come in as elected members owing principally to their reluctance to offer themselves as candidates, they can surely be put in as nominated members. ✓ Under such circumstances their further selection can safely be left to the discretion of the body itself. ✓ And the Committee of the Sabha are humbly of opinion that if the non-official gentleman upon whom the Government choice is likely to fall is selected by the body itself, it is much better that he should be so selected by the body itself than that he should be nominated by Government.

✓ 10. As regards the proposal of the Poona Municipality to lower the original minimum rate-paying qualification, we are directed to state that in 1883, when the elections first took place, the aggregate strength of the constituency was nearly 4,000 voters, thus giving on an average 330 voters to each of the twelve wards. Since then some alteration has been effected in the conservancy cess with a view to equalize the incidence of that cess, the result of which will be that, should the original minimum rate-paying qualification be continued, the aggregate strength of the constituency will be nearly 1,000 less than its previous numerical strength. So that was one reason why the local Municipality proposed to lower the minimum rate-paying qualification. There is also another reason, which is supplied by the fact that while the original number of elective members was only 12, the local Municipality very justly proposed that that number should in future be raised to 20. It will be thus seen that unless the strength of the constituency is increased, there is the risk, which in the opinion of the Committee of the Sabha ought to be obviated that canvassing will be rendered too easy owing to the very small number of voters in each ward.

✓ 11. For the reasons set forth above we are directed to request

that the Governor in Council will be pleased to reconsider and grant the proposals submitted by the Poona Municipality.

We have &c,

SHIVARAM HARI SATHE.

S. H. CHIPLONKAR.

Secretaries of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

× Bella Vista, Mahableshwar.

30th May 1885.

My dear Sir,

With reference to your recent correspondence and conversation with His Excellency the Governor on the subject of the constitution of the Poona Municipality, His Excellency would be glad to know

1. Whether you think any modification necessary in respect of the qualifications of the present educated, or non-property, constituency of voters, consisting as it does of graduates, officials drawing a certain salary, Pleaders, and Sirdars of the Deccan.

2. How this non-property class of electors could be separated into a *separate* constituency returning a certain number of elected members of the corporation (for it would manifestly be out of the question to permit an elector to vote under the "educated" qualification as well as under the "property" qualification); and what the size of this "educated" constituency would be as compared with that of the "property" constituency. I remain, Yours very truly.

G. H. R. HART.

Private Secretary.

S. H. Chiplonkar Esqr.

× Poona June 5th 1885.

My dear Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 30th Ultimo<sup>x</sup> desiring to be furnished with information on the two points mentioned therein I beg to embody the same in the following observations, and shall feel obliged by your placing the same before His Excellency the Governor for his favourable consideration.

× 2. With reference to the first point mentioned in your letter under acknowledgment I beg to respectfully invite the attention of His Excellency to Act No. II of 1884 Section 12 Clause (d), which in addition to the property qualification extends the franchise, subject to certain disqualifications mentioned later on, to "every fellow and every graduate of any University, every pleader holding a Sanad from the High Court, every Juror, every Assessor and every Honorary Magistrate residing within a Municipal district," while Clause (c) of the same section empowers the Governor in Council to



further extend the franchise to such other classes as to him may seem fit. Agreeably to this last mentioned provision, the Governor in Council has already by Notification No. 115 dated 14th January last (published at page 79 of the *Bombay Government Gazette* Part I of 15th January last) extended the franchise to the classes mentioned below :—

1. Barristers-at-Law or Advocates of the High Court.
2. Persons upon whom the title of Rao Bahadur or similar other Honorary Titles are bestowed as a mark of personal distinction.
3. Sirdars.
4. Servants of Government and others whose salary is not less than Rs. 30 per mensem.
5. Persons in receipt of pension of not less than Rs. 15 per mensem.
6. Persons paying the License Tax.

The last mentioned qualification in reference to the License Tax is a property qualification, and will have to be left out in the formation of the proposed "educated" constituency. The constituency thus formed will be sufficiently numerous, and I do not think that at present at least any further modifications are necessary.

3. Before I proceed to reply to your second point I desire to make a few general observations with reference to the parenthetical remark in the last paragraph of your letter under acknowledgment. In that paragraph it is stated that "it would manifestly be out of the question to permit an elector to vote under the 'educated' qualification as well as under the 'property' qualification." I beg to respectfully invite the attention of His Excellency to the constitution of the Municipal Corporation of Bombay under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Act III of 1872. By a reference to Section 5 of that Act it will be seen that one-fourth of the whole Corporation is elected by a somewhat similar constituency, namely, the Justices of the Peace resident in the City of Bombay, while a reference to section 6 will show that when a Justice of the Peace satisfies the "property" qualification mentioned therein, he is not prevented from exercising his vote in that capacity also. Under such circumstances I respectfully submit that there is apparently no reason why the same principle, which in the case of the Corporation of Bombay has received the sanction of the Legislature, should not be extended to those Mofussil Municipalities also, where the Governor in Council may be pleased to direct the formation of such a separate constituency for the better and more effectual representation of the intelligent minority which otherwise is liable to be swamped by the vast majority of the "property" constituency. I think that a similar practice prevails in other countries also where representative institutions, local or imperial, flourish, and where it is deemed necessary to secure the proper representation

of minorities of specially qualified classes such as the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge &c. It is also worthy of note that as most of the Justices of the Peace in Bombay are tax-payers, entitled to vote under the "property" qualification, so also in the case of the proposed "educated" constituency in Poona it will be found, when the necessary inquiry is instituted, that by far the large majority of that proposed constituency would be tax-payers, entitled to vote under the "property" qualification. And what is more to the purpose, these would, I am inclined to think, be found to be the larger tax-payers. And in this connection accordingly I beg to respectfully invite the attention of His Excellency to the extract paras from John Stuart Mill's essay on Representative Government quoted at pages 46—48, of the Sarvajanic Sabha's Quarterly Journal for October 1882 (Independent Section). The two cases are completely analogous, and I am not aware of anything in Act No. II. of 1884 which prevents the Governor in Council from following the Bombay precedent in all respects in disposing of the proposal under discussion.

4. As to the manner in which the classes of electors mentioned in para 2 above, can best be separated into a special and separate constituency, I am humbly of opinion that they, like the Justice of the Peace in Bombay under the provisions of Section 5 of the Bombay Act, should be assembled together in a special general meeting under the presidency of the Chairman of the Municipality, and should then proceed to elect their representatives under rules and regulations similar to those which regulate the proceedings of the Justices of the Peace in Bombay when they assemble for a similar purpose. Having consulted several members of the Municipality and others interested in the subject, I feel persuaded that such a procedure, if finally approved of by Government, will amply meet their wishes. As to the size of the proposed constituency as compared with that of the "property" constituency, composed of those who pay Rs. 5 per annum of direct Municipal taxation and of those who pay the License Tax, the former will number between 700 and 800 people, and the latter between 3,700 and 3,800. Here I may be permitted to add that there is already a proposal before Government from the Poona Municipality, supported by the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha, that the minimum tax-paying qualification should be reduced from Rs. 5 to to Rs. 3, and if that proposal is sanctioned by Government, there will be an approximate addition of about 600 people to the "property" constituency. When to this number is added the number of those from among the "educated" constituency who would satisfy the requirements of the "property" qualification,—the number of such persons will approximately be 500 at least—the "property" constituency will number between 4,800 and 4,900.

5. Assuming, then, that the Governor in Council would be pleased to grant our prayer that the Municipal Corporation of Poona under the new Act should consist of 30 members, and that two-thirds of the number should be elective members, I would propose for the favourable consideration of the Governor in Council that 15 members should be elected by the "property" constituency, and that 5 members be elected by the "educated" constituency.

6. In conclusion I beg to state that I shall be glad to wait upon His Excellency after his arrival in Poona next week, should any further information be necessary. I remain, Your's very truly.

S. H. CHIPLONKAR.

G. H. R. HART Esq.

Private Secretary to His Excellency the Governor.

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No. 2375 of 1885.

General Department.

Bombay Castle 26th June 1885.

To,

The Secretaries Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

Poona.

Gentlemen,

In reply to your letter No. 45 dated 11th April 1885 regarding the election rules for the Municipality of Poona I am directed to forward herewith for the information of the Managing Committee of the Sabha copy of a Resolution of this Government No. 2374 of this day's date.

I have &c,

J. NUGENT.

Secretary to Government.

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*Municipal Elections: Poona.*

No. 2374.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Bombay Castle, 26th June 1885.

Letter from the Secretaries, Poona-Sarvajanic Sabha, No. 45, dated 11th April 1885—Submitting, with reference to Government Resolution No. 764, dated 2nd March 1885, the views of the Sabha on the subject of the constitution of the Poona Municipal Board; and requesting that, for the reasons stated, Government will be pleased to reconsider and grant the proposals submitted by the Poona Municipality in February last.

Memorandum for the Acting Collector of Poona, No. 322, dated 25th April 1885—Furnishing, in reply to Government memorandum No. 1393, dated 17th idem, the following information:—

- [a] Number of voters in the Poona City Municipality under a 5 rupees direct municipal taxation franchise ... 2,596  
 [b] Do. do. 3 rupees do. ... .. 3,166

Memorandum from the Commissioner, C. D., No. r.—801, dated 29th April 1885—Submitting, with his remarks and those of the Collector of Poona, a letter from the Chairman, Poona Municipality, who submits with reference to Government Resolution No. 764, dated 2nd March 1885, for the reconsideration of Government, the representations of the Municipality regarding the constitution of the Municipal Board and the appointment of a President.

Resolution—Having regard to the existence in Poona of a very large and intelligent class of educated native gentlemen, who have already shown great interest in municipal administration and in the promotion of education, the Governor in Council is willing to give a greater extension to the elective element in Poona than has been thought desirable for the present in other Municipalities. He has therefore resolved that the Municipality of Poona shall consist of 30 members, inclusive of the President, of whom 20 shall be elective and 10 nominated Commissioners; and he is also pleased to direct that the President shall be elected by the Municipality.

2. Of the 20 elected Commissioners, 4 will be elected by the following classes of voters, the election being general, and not by wards, and each person belonging to any of such classes being entitled to one vote in such election :—

- [a] Fellows of any University,
- [b] Barristers-at-Law or Advocates of the High Court,
- [c] Graduates of any University,
- [d] Pleaders holding a sanad from the High Court,
- [e] Jurors,
- [f] Honorary Magistrates,
- [g] Licentiates of Medicine, Surgery or Civil Engineering,
- [h] Persons upon whom the title of "Rao Bahadur," "Khan Bahadur," "Rao Sahab" or "Khan Sahab" has been conferred by the British Government,
- [i] Persons whose names are entered in the latest list of Sardars published under the authority of Government,
- [j] Servants of Government or of any public body or of any corporation or of any company registered under the Indian Companies Act whose salary is not less than Rs. 30 per mensem,
- [k] Persons in receipt of a pension of not less than Rs. 15 per mensem from Government or from any public body or corporation or company registered as aforesaid.

- [L] Masters of departmental and registered schools,
- [m] Conciliators.

3. The remaining 16 elected members will be elected by the following classes of voters, and the election will be by wards :—

- [n] Assessors,
- [o] Persons paying direct municipal taxes of an amount not less than Rs. 3 per annum,
- [p] Persons paying License Tax.

4. Any person belonging to any of the classes mentioned in paragraph 2, who is also qualified under paragraph 3, may vote in respect of the latter qualification under the general rules. So much of Rule 5 of the general rules as provides that "no person shall be entitled to more than one vote, although he be qualified under two or more of the tests of qualification prescribed" is to this extent modified.

5. In addition to the list to be prepared under Rule 3 of the general rules the officer therein mentioned will prepare a list of persons qualified to vote under paragraph 2 of this Resolution. Such list will be published in the manner prescribed in Rule 4, and will be subject to correction in the manner prescribed by Rule 7.

6. His Excellency in Council will watch with great interest the results of this experiment in popular self-government and he trusts that its success will at the expiration of the term of office of the Commissioners now appointed justify him in maintaining the constitution of the Poona Municipality.

7. The Collector should be requested to report what re-adjustment of wards will be necessary with a view to the election of 16 members for wards.

8. The rules for the Poona Municipality should then be provisionally published in the *Bombay Government Gazette*. The Collector should be requested to report within a month from the date of the publication of the rules on what dates he would propose that the elections under the new rules should be held in the Municipal District of Poona, and that the newly constituted body of Commissioners should commence its term of office.

JOHN NUGENT,  
Secretary to Government.

To,

The Commissioner, C. D.,  
The Collector of Poona,  
The Secretary, Poona Sarvajanic Sabha ( by letter ).

## A NOTE ON ECONOMIC REFORM.

ON a calm and comprehensive review of the economic situation in India, it is impossible to resist the conviction that, in spite of all the benevolent intentions and efforts of Government, in spite of railways and canals, and in spite, too, of growing trade and extending agriculture, the country is getting day by day poorer in material wealth, as well as weaker in productive capacity and energy. The fast-proceeding decay—we might almost say, the rapid collapse, of our varied manufacturing industry, which once sufficed to meet the requirements of a growing population, is at the root of this deplorable state of things. Its re-habilitation, therefore, would appear to be an imperative necessity, if the industrial future of the country is not to be dark and disastrous.

Looking at the question in its bearings upon the recent frequency of Famine, its causes and remedies, the Famine Commissioners also have come to the same conclusion. They think that the absence of "a variety of occupations" is the chief cause of the poverty and distress of the people, and they suggest in their Report that the state should undertake, as part of its economic policy and with a view to provide an effective remedy against famine, the establishment of manufactures in the country. Mr. Justice Cunningham of the Calcutta High Court, who was a member of the Commission, writes, in reference to this suggestion, in his "British India and its Rulers" p.236 ;—"Although protection from foreign invasion, the maintenance of order, and the diffusion of a feeling of security, are conditions precedent to all industrial progress, the accomplishment of these invaluable objects does not complete the task of the Government ; the direct, deliberate, and systematic promotion of industrial enterprise is, though a later, not a less important duty, and its thorough recognition by the State would be the most important

administrative reform of which the Indian system is at present susceptible."

Sometime ago the *Times* had the following:—  
 "The Indian Famine Commission having expressed its views as to the desirability of encouraging a diversity of occupations and the development of new branches of industry in India, the Government of Madras submitted certain proposals, which embraced the temporary appointment of a Government Reporter on arts and manufactures, and a Government mineralogist." ..... "Looking to the importance of the subject, the Secretary of State has accorded his sanction to the proposal."

The importance of this step taken by the Madras Government is clear. It shows that the responsible authorities, both in India and England, have awoke to the necessity of a radical change in their economic policy. The International Exhibition proposed to be held in Bombay in the cold weather of 1887, will forcibly draw the attention of our Local Government too, to the same necessity.

In the near future, therefore, we may expect vigorous efforts on the part of Government to promote what we so sadly want, a co-ordinate system of industries. A large development of manufacturing industry in the country will be the aim and the goal of such a policy.

✕ Under these circumstances, our duty as a nation would appear to be clearly this:—We should take our proper share in the field of new enterprise. We must not be content with a subordinate part, but should take care to be principals in the concern. Particularly, we must guard against the fatal tendency to allow ourselves to be made mere *passive* recipients of the boon. Capital and skill might be imported from abroad to any extent that may be found necessary. But we must not suffer the foreigner to monopolize and appropriate the whole field to the unjust and disastrous exclusion of the children of the

soil. X We may borrow money from him as much as we please, and pay him fair interest on it; we may employ his skill and technical training too on condition of paying fair remuneration. But any further claim on his part, to claim the whole or part of the ownership of the field, we are bound strenuously to resist. We can not, in justice to ourselves or to posterity, hand over our concerns in proprietary right to the enterprising foreigner. The undertakings—of whatever nature, and on whatever scale they may be,—must be our own; profits accruing therefrom must be ours too. There is surely nothing in the reason of things to prevent us from getting a fair start in the race, and having in course of time thriving industries of our own. We might hope to be able, by force of unremitting and persistent effort and watchful care, to do good business and repay the loans obtained from foreign capitalists, and be absolute masters of our own house. Nor does it look like catching at the moon to hope that we might one day have, within the four corners of this country itself, the needful supply of skilled labor, technical knowledge and abundant capital.

X The growth of a foreign aristocracy of wealth in the country is to be deprecated on more grounds than one. It is not only an economic evil of the first magnitude, but a source of grave political danger. A pre-occupation of the national field of profitable investment by foreign enterprise cannot fail to be highly detrimental to the interests of coming generations. Politically speaking, if we do not misread history, power must gravitate towards property and wealth, and a strong foreign mercantile interest in the country would not fail to be a very troublesome active factor in the state; it would always be disposed to use the power and influence it could command for its own selfish aims, and dominate the action of Government in its own favour.

X The growth of foreign enterprises in the country under Government auspices is, thus, in the immediate



prospect, a serious danger to be carefully and jealously guarded against, and it is of supreme importance that we, the natives of the country, should claim and have our proper share in any industrial development that might be effected. There are, however, formidable difficulties in the way of our coming to the fore-front in the field, pushing aside or pushing back the competing foreigner.

(1) There is, in the *first* place, the inveterate and deep-rooted habit with us to look up to a superior for lead and guidance. Once the ice is broken and the start given, our people will move, but *not before*, of themselves and by themselves. The energy implied in a personal, independent, and self-reliant initiative,—which is one of the most notable characteristics of European progress, is here wanting to a lamentable extent. Perhaps, as Professor Wordsworth thinks, *originative talent* has yet to be developed amongst us.

(2) *Secondly*, there is the striking absence of that spirit of co-operation and habit of corporate united action, by which alone large enterprises can be started, and success won. Our merchants and traders are literally a scattered body with no bond of union, each mindful only of his own business in the good old ways; our towns are simply so many *dissecta membra*, so many isolated units without coherency, seldom acting together, and hardly with any common sympathies, and each concerning itself with its own wants and affairs almost exclusively.

(3) *Thirdly* there is dense ignorance among them regarding the very first principles of trade and economy. They scarcely know the resources of their own country, or the requirements of its several home markets, not to speak of those of other nations. How many, for instance, can tell us in what parts of India coal or iron is found in sufficient quantities to admit of manufactures being started, or where conditions exist favourable for the establishment of the silk or woollen manufacture? Or again how few know what ma-

manufactured articles are in general demand in the markets of Bengal or Panjab? Nor do they possess any tolerable acquaintance with the cardinal truths of economical science. Hardly 1 in 100 can appreciate the significance of trade statistics, or variations in the value of the Rupee, or the rates of exchange. They do not even keep themselves informed of the quotations of prices in markets other than those with which they are in immediate contact or communication.

X (4) *Fourthly*, all over the country, technical skill and training are fast dying away. As long as our caste system rested strongly on the professional basis, and each caste and each family followed its own profession with almost religious devotion, mechanical skill was in a sense hereditary, and was handed down from father to son. This is no longer the case; times and circumstances have altered a good deal; professions do not follow caste or family descent; and there is irrecoverable loss of skill and training as the consequence. Besides, our products of manual skill and labour find but little sale in foreign markets, and but a limited one in our own, coming as they do into competition with cheaper and finer ones produced by Machine-labor; our skilled mechanics and artists are fast losing their calling, and are taking to the plough (Vide Birdwood's Indian Arts). The result is, that our labor, though we have plenty of it and cheap, is for the most part becoming *unskilled* labour, and the necessity of importing skilled labour from abroad is getting stronger in proportion.

X (5) *Fifthly*, there comes the greatest of difficulties, the want of capital. There are no large accumulations of hoarded capital in the country available for investment. This was strikingly illustrated in the evidence of Mr. Westlake who was examined as a witness before the Railway Committee in London. He pointed out, by reference to the share lists of Indian trading companies, and to the history of Government loans raised in India, that all the capital that is

invested in large enterprises in this country eventually comes from London, as also, Government borrowings ultimately revert to the London Market. The Cotton Mill industry of Bombay, which alone is in the main a *native* industry, employs not more than 5½ crores, part of which capital again is European; and the net earnings cannot exceed about 50 lakhs. We have evidently nowhere in India merchant princes in the English sense of that word. We have no Barings, and no Rothschilds amongst us. The annual income per head of the population is hardly one twenty-fifth of what it is in England, or the United States.

✕ (6) *Sixthly*, the policy of protection has been unfortunately abandoned by our British rulers. ✕ A Parliamentary resolution passed in 1878 sounded its death knell, and the recent removal of the cotton duties put the final seal to its abandonment. Our industries, therefore, however infant and undeveloped, and unorganised, cannot hope to be any longer under the protecting shadow of the state, but must be prepared to face the free and unrestricted competition of the highly perfected industrial organisations of the West. Under such circumstances, it is obvious how unequal, and on the whole losing, the contest must be for us in our own markets.

✕ (7) And, *seventhly*, what is more serious, we have already the foreigner in our midst, fighting us out of the field, with his superior resources of knowledge and skill, capital and enterprise. ✕ He has already the start of us in more branches of industry than one. He is successfully getting hold of the general carrying and shipping business of the country; the tea and coffee industries, and the jute and silk manufactures, are in his hands; his banking business is fast extending, especially in the Presidency towns; and he is slowly, if not with equal success or persistent steadiness, tapping our mining industry. Here is thus on our own ground a formidable antagonist with whom we have to wrestle; and we must never

forget that he is both able and ready to step in wherever we choose or are compelled to retire.

These are some of the difficulties we have to face and surmount at the threshold if we mean to advance, and not fall back. These are indeed great, but by no means insuperable difficulties. They can be successfully got over by boldness and the vigour of our united effort. The practical question is, how should we go about the business in view of such a situation, and in prospect of such a large manufacturing development under Government auspices, so as to be able to assert our proper claims successfully?

It may not be out of place here to submit a few suggestions of ways and means for attentive and earnest consideration.

(1.) First of all, we must have the Government thoroughly with us heart and soul. Without its help in our present economic weakness and unpreparedness, we could hope to accomplish but little in the direction of national progress. In the face of such fierce competition as we are exposed to—Government must recognise the true wants of the nation and cordially identify itself with the cause of national industries. We must, in our present state, leave it to take the initiative, which we have neither the knowledge, nor the energy to take ourselves. It should collect, by its own professional agency, and publish in the Vernaculars, the necessary information regarding the manufacturing and mineral resources of the country. On behalf of the trading community Government should undertake initial experiments in the case of industries which might bid fair to thrive in the country, with a view to test their practicability and remunerative character.

Government has already taken the first steps with reference to the Tea, Coffee, and Cinchona industries and can not have any reasonable objection to doing so in other cases. The chances rather are, that it would move of itself in this direction either from

conviction of its necessity, or under strong outside pressure. All we should have to do in that case would be to appreciate the initiative Government might take, and follow it up with vigorous and independent efforts of our own, and not to suffer, by apathy or inaction, the foreigner to come forward, and take advantage of it to our permanent detriment.

✓ (2.) In the *second* place, we must organise ourselves with a view to co-operation and associated action. In these days, without organisation there can be no vigour or sustained energy in our efforts at industrial development, nor can there be any chance of success in a field where we have to meet our foreign rivals on such unequal terms. We must have a strong central native Chamber of Commerce for each Presidency at the Capital, with corresponding branch associations in the districts, with duties and functions similar to those of the English Chambers of Commerce in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and with adequate funds at their disposal. The Central Chamber should have a monthly Vernacular magazine in which to publish its proceedings.

It would not be difficult to start such an organisation. Already we have small native trading associations in Bombay, Poona, and Sholapoor, which would form a good nucleus to start from. In other towns, too, the necessary elements exist, and to establish associations, we have only to impress on the local mercantile communities the necessity for combination, and the practical aims it is sought to attain by it. ✕/

✕ (3.) *Thirdly*, among other things, it should be the duty of such mercantile Chambers to collect, and to diffuse through the medium of the Vernaculars among traders and merchants, information on matters of trade and industry, as well as on questions of taxation and Finance as affecting these interests. ✓ Ample information of this kind is always available in English books, Periodicals and papers, and in Govern-

ment publications, and it would only be necessary to employ a staff of translators, and pay for their labour, and for the publication of translations. The cost would not exceed a few thousand rupees a year, or, cheaper still, a precis of such information might be published in the monthly magazine of the Central Chamber in each province.

With a view also to create a general taste for, and appreciative interest in, such information, a step might advantageously be taken in the education of the rising generation. A study of the elements of Political Economy, [as for example Mrs. Fawcett's little book] in a Vernacular translation, might be introduced into the curriculum of our Vernacular schools. In the large towns, these schools have, under the new Local Government scheme, now been placed under municipal management, and here the experiment may be first tried. Political Economy forms a necessary part of middle-class education in England, and, as we believe, in other countries, and with very good results. If the geography of the present standards were reduced a little, the proposed study of the rudiments of Political Economy would be no additional burden put on the scholars, and the change would rather be a welcome one, as it involves the substitution of an interesting study for a comparatively dry one.

These two steps, namely, the diffusion of information among our traders regarding trade and economy by means of translations or monthly periodicals, and the introduction of a study of Political Economy into our schools—are urgently called for in our present state of ignorance, for, without some reform in this direction, it is impossible to set on foot any bold industrial movement, or even to rouse a spirit of enterprise so as to lead to practical action. Nor is there any difficulty in adopting them. A magazine, if of sufficient interest, and conducted with ordinary skill and care, could easily pay its way; while the suggest-

ed change in our Vernacular curriculum would not be opposed by the authorities, or felt as a hardship by the learners, and could be easily made.

X (IV.) Fourthly, coming next to the want of technical training among our workmen, we must move Government to undertake it on a sufficiently large scale. X There are Industrial Schools and Colleges all over France, Germany, Belgium &c, working with eminent success, and though there are not many in England, the want has been so urgently felt that practical steps will be before long taken to supply it. The subject has been lately investigated by a Royal Commission, and its final report is before the public. It recommends the establishment in the United Kingdom of a national system of technical education, pointing out its urgent necessity. Now, if this is so in England, *a fortiori*, it must be so in India, where national industries are so completely out of joint. The cost would no doubt be heavy, but if we wish to stand on our own legs, and hold our own in the industrial world in these days of general progress and cultivation, we must be prepared to pay for it. The object is of such paramount importance to the future material safety and welfare of the country, that any present burden or sacrifice which might be needed should be ungrudgingly, and even cheerfully borne with a view to its accomplishment. Government has already a well-organised Department of public instruction, and can have no difficulty in taking up the additional duty of providing technical training.

(V.) Fifthly, we must next consider the most serious difficulty of all, namely, the want of capital. It is the greatest obstacle in the way of our material progress. To meet European competition in these days on anything like equal terms, we must have large industrial establishments, where steam and machinery can be profitably employed; factories, foundries, refineries, on an extensive scale, costly machinery must be imported and skilled mechanics must be brought out from Eu-

rope and paid at a very high rate of remuneration. For organising business on such a scale, much capital is of course required, and small profits can alone be earned for many years to come. Whence can this vast capital be had, is the practical question. We have but little in the country available for such investment; at all events we may be sure, there is not enough of it. And what little we have cannot be drawn out in adequate amounts to meet the requirements of the case, either because there is no developed system of credit amongst us, which works such wonders in Europe, or because there is extreme diffidence felt by our capitalists through ignorance regarding the thousand and one safe and profitable modes of investment. It may be that cautious people will advise us to wait till the country comes to possess the necessary amount of accumulated capital, and a proper system of credit grows up; "but unfortunately time and tide," will not wait for us, and we shall be only throwing away opportunities which may never return. Foreign competition is growing harder and harder, and we have in the field on our ground the enterprising European, ready with his resources of skill and capital to turn the situation to his own account and with immense advantage over us. If we show the slightest hesitation and retire, he has the boldness to push his way. And if we give way now, and allow our new industries to pass permanently into his hands, not only would it be a heavy present loss to us, but it would be a sad and irreparable one to our children and children's children, who will scarcely thank us, when they see the field, which ought to have been their own by hereditary right, already taken up by the foreigner.

This is a very difficult fix, and there is one, and only one way out of it, safe, sound, and sure. Theoretically it might look a little bold, but practically there is nothing risky about it. In our present circumstances, we must go to Government, and appeal to it for material help in our efforts. Nothing short



of such a step could save us now, and set us up well in our enterprise. The *modus operandi* may be thus briefly described.

(a) We should ask to be allowed to borrow in foreign markets what money we might want for the purposes of fairly starting new and untried industries, under a *state guarantee*, on conditions similar to those on which Railway Companies are permitted to raise their capital. As the material guarantee of Government has cleared and smoothed the way for the growth of railway enterprise in this country, so will it be found effectual in helping other enterprises, of an equally important character into healthy life. It is no doubt always wise and safe as far as practicable to let private effort alone, but where it runs the risk of being nipped in the bud, its growth ought to be safe-guarded by the state, and where necessary, even promoted by direct aid. With a Government guarantee, our difficulties will be at once considerably reduced. We should be able to get necessary money from foreign capitalists on fair terms. And we might safely consent to see our industrial establishments supervised and controlled by Government officers, just in the same way in which the Railway Companies reconcile themselves to a similar control.

Railway capital amounting to over one hundred crores has been invested in this country under Government guarantee; and this railway enterprise clearly differs in no way from any other national industry. The same reasons, therefore, that justify the present policy of state guarantee with respect to Railway lines, apply, with equal force, in the case of other industries of equal national importance, and justify its extension to them. Further if foreign private enterprise still requires and receives the material support of Government, with more justice can native private enterprise claim its help in new ventures. And it would seem that Government, which allows capital to be raised for such an object as Rail-

way undertakings under its guarantee, would have no objection to extending its help to native enterprise in establishing new industries,—which object is of equal, if not of more, importance to the future welfare of the country. The aim is the same in both cases,—the development of the material resources of the country, and Government cannot well refuse its aid when our prayer is limited to the extension of the policy of Government guarantees, which has done such signal service in the case of Railway construction in this country, for objects equally important.

(b) We might go further, and ask Government to subsidize such new manufactories as might be established by native enterprise and to help them by bounties in their struggling periods of birth and infancy out of its current revenues. Pecuniary subventions by the state in furtherance of industrial efforts are not an unfamiliar thing in the history of economic progress in Europe. Major (now Sir Evelyn) Baring, in one of his financial statements, concedes the desirability of such state subventions for important national objects. The cost to Government need not exceed a few lakhs a year. But such direct help from the state to native industrial enterprise, especially in its initial efforts, will be highly appreciated and will have a most beneficial effect.

(c) At times, too, and under special circumstances, Government might graciously come forward, and reward successful efforts in this field of new enterprise. It might give out of its annual revenues, what are known as *bounties* to deserving native manufacturers who might succeed, opening up promising fields of enterprise whenever their profits may fall short of the low guaranteed average. Such pecuniary rewards will not fail to produce an excellent effect in propping up new enterprises in their first stages. It is well-known how the sugar bounties in France helped to promote that branch of industry there. Similarly, bounties are given, we believe, in Germany, with no less happy results. The generous and statesmanlike

example of these countries may be usefully followed by our Government, and the cost will not be over a few thousand rupees a year.

^We are aware that this policy of bounties is generally condemned by English Political Economists. Now, where, as was the case formerly in England, one class,—be it of producers or importers, or distributors, is opposed to another, and is helped to do profitable business, and otherwise encouraged, at the cost of the rest of the community, the policy of granting subsidies and bounties is justly open to the objection of favouring a *class* and promoting only *sectional*, instead of *national*, interests. But in India the case is widely different. Here there is no such conflict of class-interests; the classes are not divided, as elsewhere, by hard lines. The duty of the State here is to help the entire community in its present helplessness,—and not this or that class,—as against other rival and foreign communities with which it has come into contact, and which are “rapidly pushing forward in the economical application of productive resources, in the systematic organisation of labour, and especially in the skilful and fertilizing employment of capital.” The comparatively resourceless native is evidently too weak economically to stand his ground in a struggle with the powerful and go-a-head foreigner. The whole community, (the consumers no less than the producers), is here interested in withstanding foreign competition with a view to *future safety*, and the state, as its representative, might be justly called upon, to spend money out of the national income for what is preeminently a *national*, as distinguished from a purely *sectional*, object. We cannot admit even for a moment, as some English Political Economists contend, that such action on the part of the state is in any way open to the charge of being “*protective*” in the restricted and objectionable sense of the word.

It must be clearly understood that this wise policy of state guarantees, state subsidies, and state boun-

ties, as suggested above, is in no sense a *protectionist* policy. It has absolutely nothing to do with the so-called wasteful protection. It does not seek to interfere in any way with Freedom of Trade. It does not tend to handicap the foreigner in the race and in the national markets, nor entail any loss on the consumer whose interests particularly free trade professes to guard. It leaves the field of private effort entirely free. It acts only as a balance wheel to rectify inequalities, to minimise friction, and to regulate the machine of commercial competition. It is intended to raise the native trader to the level of his European rival,—the state doing only what it ought to do, as representing the collective strength of the community, to equalize the conditions of the struggle.

An independent Local Legislature here would have at once adopted protection pure and simple to guard the national interests, in this respect following the successful example of Canada and Australia. But this dependency, only in name the brightest jewel in England's Crown, unfortunately does not enjoy even that measure of Legislative independence which is generously allowed to other and less important British Colonies and dependencies. The ruling principles of our internal policy and domestic legislation are laid down for us unalterably by the Imperial Parliament where, however, we have no voice; and Free Trade, therefore, which is the declared Policy of England, is also perforce the inevitable policy of India. Any departure from it, on the part of the Government of India, even under circumstances of financial urgency and pressure, will be peremptorily interdicted by the Home Government. It is, however, forgotten,—perhaps it is not seen,—how widely the economic conditions of England and India differ, and how a commercial policy, that suits the former well, is simply disastrous, when applied to the trading relations of the latter. But we see no chance of ever getting protection from our British rulers, whose professed Gospel is Free Trade,

and we reluctantly feel constrained to agree with Mr. Justice Cunningham in thinking that a policy of protection for India must be considered as altogether outside the limits of practical Indian Finance.

As a corrective, to some extent, of the evils which the Free Trade policy of Government is producing all round in this country, the above scheme of state guarantees, subventions, and bounties has been suggested. Theoretically, it is, we contend, free from any objection. It is no more than a scheme of direct pecuniary aid by the state to set the native trader well on his legs, and encourage his struggling enterprise, as a necessary provision for future economic safety, without interfering in the least with the free movements of the foreigner, or his business. The state leaves him free completely to force and fight his way as best he can, and only seeks to help the weaker children of the soil to be equal to the contest. The consumer loses nothing,—possibly he might gain eventually,—except, of course so far as he is at the same time a taxpayer. *Practically*, the action of the state on these lines would seem to be perfectly justifiable, since the cost of paying the guaranteed interest, subventions, and bounties, would be borne by the national exchequer, or in other words, by the Indian taxpayer. The maxim that what the people pay might be justly spent for their good, is as self-evident a truth as any geometrical axiom.

The scheme, as sketched above, is rather a large one, but it has nothing Utopian about it. It is perfectly sound in theory and feasible in practice. It forms actually a working part of the economic policy of several continental states, and with what a happy effect, in promoting the growth and progress of national industries, may be seen, in every page of the Report of the Royal Commission above referred to as in the trade returns of those countries; and there is no reason why it should be found impracticable in a country almost similarly situated, though of course

lagging behind at a great distance, in the race. To give practical effect to the scheme, all that seems necessary is that Government and ourselves should go about it in right earnest. Government would have to turn over a new leaf in its economic policy, and base its action more on *national* lines than on those of airy, abstract radicalism; while, on our part, we must open our eyes, and see clearly the facts of the situation, and, bestirring ourselves into activity, set ourselves to the work with a steady firmness of resolve, and a patient and zealous perseverance, which alone can ensure eventual success. As to the cost, it would be certainly considerable. To institute inquiries, to make experiments, to publish information, to found industrial schools, to help new industries by direct aid in money, all this of course will put an additional charge on the revenues of the state. But we must not grudge to pay it. On the contrary, we might assure Government of our cheerful readiness to submit even to new taxation for such a purpose. The present License Tax, for instance, might be extended to classes hitherto exempt, and when consolidated into a well-adjusted, permanent income-tax, it will fairly meet the charge of such a scheme for promoting the cause of national prosperity. Further, the growth of the industrial department is an indispensable complement of the Famine-Insurance policy since a "diversity of occupations" in the country is as necessary to relieve the pressure of hunger as well as of over population, as facilities for transport of food-supplies; and surely, the Famine Insurance Fund, which is, under present arrangements, devoted in part to railway and canal construction, might be applied also to the purpose of fostering diverse industries, with equal justice and advantage.

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## THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

It will be remembered that in the closing section of our paper entitled "Administrative Reforms in the Bombay Presidency" in this *Journal* for April 1882 we briefly sketched out some proposals for a reform of the Bombay Legislative Council both as regards its constitution and the sphere of its functions. Our urban and rural Boards having been now put on an improved and satisfactory footing, it is no wonder that popular attention has been considerably devoted to this allied subject of the reform of our Legislative Councils. The system of nomination, which now exclusively prevails in making appointments to our Legislative Councils, and their restricted functions have for some time past engaged the earnest attention of public men in almost all parts of India, but more especially of those in the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Presidencies. The scandalous abuse, in several instances, of the power of nomination, now vested in the heads of the governments of those provinces where these so-called representative institutions exist, has been the principal cause, as might be naturally expected, of this desire for a radical reform of our Legislative Councils. It was this widely felt desire for a reform that led the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabji, Barrister-at-Law and Member of the Bombay Legislative Council, to make that eloquent appeal which he made from his place in the Council, last year. On February 6, 1884, when the Bombay District Municipal Act Amendment Bill (now Act II of 1884) was read a second time, a third time, and passed, the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabji concluded his able speech in support of the second reading of the Bill by making the following eloquent appeal:—"In conclusion, I can not help expressing a fervent hope, even at the risk of being

rebuked by your Excellency, that after these Bills have been fully matured, after they have been fairly put into operation, after the people of this Presidency have shown their capacity and their aptitude for free representative institutions, in regard to which I, for one, have no misgiving whatever, that your Excellency may be able to lay the inhabitants of this Presidency under yet another, a greater, and a deeper, obligation, by pressing upon the attention of His Excellency the Viceroy the importance and the necessity of improving and enlarging, not merely the constitution, but the functions, of this Council. That would be a fitting crowning of the edifice we are raising to-day, and while it would be a lasting monument to your Excellency's Government, it could not fail to be of permanent benefit to the people of this country." This eloquent appeal from a representative and responsible Mahomedan gentleman, whose representative character Government can not for a moment question, is we believe a sufficient proof of the fact that the desire for a reform in the forementioned direction is very widely felt. The Native Press too has been for months past agitating this subject, and, as Mr. Dosabhoj Framji C. S. I., the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay, has happily expressed it in his recent able letter to the *London Times* on the subject of "Indian feeling towards England and Russia," "the voice of the Native Press of India must be accepted as the voice of the people of India," and "it is the channel through which alone the truth and the real views of the people can be ascertained." This representative and responsible press also is, as we have already remarked, singularly unanimous on this question of the urgent necessity of a reform of our Legislative Councils. And as a further proof, if one were needed, of the deep and watchful interest with which every nomination to our Legislative Councils is in these days scrutinized, we may safely refer to the fact that the recent nomination by Lord Reay



of the Hon'ble Rao Bahadur M. G. Ranade M. A., L. L. B., Judge of the Small Causes Court at Poona, to be an Additional Member of the Legislative Council, has been very favourably received not only in this Presidency but in other Presidencies also; while it is equally notorious that on the occasion of one re-nomination, and one nomination in the autumn of last year, both of them were more or less condemned by the Native Press in this Presidency at least. Precisely the same watchful criticism has scrutinized the nominations made to the Supreme, Madras, and Bengal Legislative Councils. The truth is that, whatever may have been the case before 1870, a great change has come over the people of this country generally, especially during the last ten years, the result of which is the widely felt desire for a reform of our Legislative Councils. The chief complaints urged are, firstly that the numerical strength of these Councils is not sufficiently large; secondly, that the system of nomination, under which alone members of these Councils can be appointed leads not unfrequently to great abuses, and thirdly and lastly, that their functions, unlike those of the Legislatures in other civilized countries, are too restricted to be of much practical use to the people concerned.

Like the other reforms which are badly needed in the administration of India, this particular reform also will be effected at an early date if the British Parliament orders an exhaustive and searching inquiry into the administration of India. Before the Government of India was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown, such an inquiry used to be periodically held after the lapse of every twenty years, the result of which was that, as an outcome of every such inquiry, the necessary changes used to be effected to meet the altered circumstances of the times. The last inquiry of this kind took place when, in 1853, the Charter of the East India Company was re-

newed for the last time. And it is not too much to say that to that inquiry we owe nearly every reform that has taken place during the last thirty years. To that inquiry we owe, howsoever indirectly, the enactment by Parliament of the Indian Councils Act of 1861, which Act established the Indian Legislative Councils on their present basis. And as we have said above, a fresh inquiry must be held before the constitution of our Legislative Councils can be improved, and the sphere of their duties enlarged. We believe such an inquiry will in all probability be ordered by the new Parliament which will be called into existence early next year.

In this paper we propose to present the reader with a summary of the discussions that took place in both the Houses of the British Parliament when the Indian Councils Act was passed. Such a historical summary will, it is hoped, enable us to formulate our proposals for future reform in a more intelligent manner, and with better chances of success than would otherwise be the case. As we have already observed above, the Indian Councils Act was the indirect result of the general inquiry into the condition of India ordered by Parliament before the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1853; it should be further borne in mind that when the necessary legislative measure was introduced, only two years had elapsed since the suppression of the great Mutiny of 1857. That terrible event, though it greatly partook of the character of a military revolt, necessarily dealt a rude shock to the trust and confidence reposed by the rulers in the ruled, and substituted in its stead a policy of distrust and suspicion. It was accordingly inevitable that that feeling of distrust and suspicion should have greatly weighed with those responsible for the legislation now under notice. It is also possible that if the mutiny had never taken place, the legislation in question would have been of a more liberal character than it actually was. And now that the mutual trust and confidence between the rulers and the ruled may be said to have been

completely restored and established on a firm basis,—thanks to the noble and generous spirit which pervaded the Indian administration under the Marquis of Ripon,—the time has in our opinion certainly arrived when the Indian Councils Act of 1861 should be revised in a manner to suit the legislative machinery to the altered state of things.

When the Indian Councils Act Bill was introduced into Parliament in the sessions of 1861, Lord Palmerston was Prime Minister with Sir Charles Wood (now Lord Halifax) as Secretary of State for India, and Earl De Grey and Ripon (now the Marquis of Ripon) as Under-Secretary of State for India. On June 6, 1861 Sir Charles Wood moved for leave to introduce the East India Council Bill, and in doing so made a long speech explaining at considerable length the necessity and importance of the measure, as well as its principal provisions. He said that the Bill modified to a great extent the Executive Government, and—what was of still greater importance—it altered the means and manner of legislation. He then referred to the inherent difficulties which surrounded all attempts to legislate for the benefit of a vast country like India, peopled as it was by different races with different languages, religions, manners and customs. The second element of inherent difficulty was the presence in the country of English settlers differing in almost every respect from the native population,—active, energetic, enterprising, and proud of race and conquest,—and this element of difficulty was further enhanced by the fact that, so far as the individual members composing it were concerned, this body of English settlers, who had to be subjected to the same legislation along with the native population, was not permanent but transitory, being permanent only in the sense that its perpetually renewed body represented the non-official element of foreigners. This twofold difficulty was further aggravated by the then recent Mutiny; because “the

unlimited confidence which a few years ago was felt by the European population in the Natives of India has given way to feelings of distrust." Sir Charles Wood added:—"Formerly there was at all events no feeling of antagonism between the higher portion of official persons and the great mass of the population. The latter looked up to the Government as to a protector, and if any feeling of antagonism or jealousy existed, it existed only between them and those members of the service or the English settlers who were brought into antagonistic contact with them. When I heard some time ago that the feeling of antagonism was extending itself lower among the Natives, and higher among the officers, I deeply regretted it, as the most alarming symptom of altered circumstances, which must obviously tend to increase the dangers of our position. I do not wish to dwell on this matter, but it would be folly to shut our eyes to the increasing difficulties of our position in India, and it is an additional reason why we should make the earliest endeavour to put all our institutions on the soundest possible foundations." This extract will clearly show to what extent the terrible events of 1857 must have exercised their influence on the minds of our alien rulers. It must, however, be said to their credit that, while other nations in their place would have resorted to all kinds of repressive legislation, and would probably have hesitated to grant to the natives of the country institutions which carried with them the germ of popular representation, the alien rulers of this country, true to their free instincts and noble traditions, displayed true courage and generous statesmanship in laying, even at such a time, the foundations of a policy which, if we are not much mistaken, must, in the ripeness of time, develop into the healthy form of a genuine free constitution. Sir Charles Wood, after having referred to this factor, proceeded to refer to another difficulty, which related to the absence of an inti-

mate acquaintance on the part even of the oldest Indian officers with the feelings and opinions of the native population. He quoted in proof of this statement the testimony of Sir Mark Cubbon, who had then recently died after a service in India extending over a period of two generations. Sir Mark Cubbon, who had enjoyed in a remarkable degree the love and confidence of the native population of every province in which he served, frankly stated in a letter written about that time, "that he was astonished that he had never been able to acquire a sufficient acquaintance with the opinions and feelings of the Natives with whom he was in daily communication." Sir Charles Wood then referred to the administrative mistakes committed by the Indian Government in connection with its land policy in consequence of this absence of intimate acquaintance with the feelings and opinions of the native population. Having thus, by way of preface, dwelt upon the many extraordinary and inherent difficulties of devising a system applicable to the whole of India, the right hon'ble Baronet impressed upon the House the supreme necessity of exercising the greatest caution, as a rash step might lead to most dangerous consequences. "It is easy to go forward," continued Sir Charles Wood. "It is difficult to go back, and I confess I am disposed to err on the side of caution, and to profit by the warning of one of the ablest Indian officers, Mountstuart Elphinstone, who said 'Legislation for India should be well considered, gradual, and slow.'"

Having made these prefatory observations, Sir Charles Wood briefly explained the modification which the Bill proposed to make in the Executive Government of India. This modification related to empowering Her Majesty's Government to send out to India as an additional member of the Governor-General's Council a person "thoroughly acquainted with the laws and principles of jurisprudence." This modification having been explained, Sir Charles Wood

dwelt at great length on "the main change" proposed to be effected by the Bill in the means and manner of legislation; and in doing so he briefly described the history of the legislative power in India. This history takes us as far back as 1773. By the Regulating Act of that year, the Governor-General in Council was empowered to make regulations for the Government of India. Similar power was conferred on Madras and Bombay in 1799 and 1801 respectively, while later on it was extended to the non-regulation provinces. By the Charter Act of 1833, power was taken to add to the Governor-General's Council a member whose presence was necessary for the passing of all legislative measures for the wide expanse of the territory of India then under British rule. At the same time, however, that Act withdrew from Madras and Bombay the power of making laws and regulations. Thus the whole legislative power was centralized in the Governor-General and his Council strengthened by the addition of the member referred to above. Matters stood thus till the inquiry which preceded the Charter Act of 1853 proved the necessity and desirability of adding to the Governor-General's Council, when sitting for the purpose of making laws and regulations, members from the different provinces of India. The inquiry of 1852-53 prominently brought out the fact that the Executive Council, even with the assistance of the additional legal member, was incompetent to perform the increased duties which were created by the extension of territory. Sir Charles Wood quoted the testimony of Mr. M'Leod and Mr. Hill, two eminent Indian officers who were examined by that Committee, and both of whom strongly advised the enlargement of the Legislature by the addition thereto of persons possessing local knowledge and experience of the minor Presidencies. The Charter Act of 1853 accordingly provided for adding to the Council of the Governor-General, when sitting to make

laws and regulations, members from the different provinces of India, together with the Chief Justice and another judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. We may here add that when this last provision of the Charter Act of 1853 was discussed in both the Houses of Parliament, several honourable members, but notably Lord Monteaule, urged the necessity and desirability of appointing representative native gentlemen to the Council, when sitting to make laws and regulations. It should be borne in mind that when the Charter Act of 1853 was passed in Lord Aberdeen's administration, Sir Charles Wood was President of the Board of Control. The members appointed to the Legislature to represent the different provinces, and to assist it with local knowledge and experience, were English gentlemen holding official positions under Government. But it was found in the interval between 1853 and 1861 that the Legislature so constituted was too often tempted to exceed its functions in one respect, namely, that it had a tendency to become a sort of debating society or petty Parliament contrary to the intentions of the proposer of the Charter Act of 1853, and also to those of Parliament. The Indian Legislature constituted itself a body for the redress of grievances, and engaged in discussions which led to no practical result. Lord Canning pointed out these defects in the working of the Legislative Council of India as constituted under the Act of 1853, and thus the immediate necessity arose for the introduction of the Bill which we are now noticing. Lord Canning had also consented to stay longer in the country till the Bill was passed, so that he with his great experience of the country might be able to introduce the change. The original constitution having thus failed, the question arose how the new constitution should be framed; and in discussing this question, Sir Charles Wood adverted to the two extreme notions with regard to legislation which prevailed in India. These two extreme notions were based upon

two diametrically opposite models, one purely Asiatic, and the other purely European. Sir Charles Wood described both of them at some length, and finally dismissed both of them as unsuited to the times. As regards the first notion, Sir Charles Wood said that the notion of legislation entertained by a native of India was that of a chief or sovereign who made what laws he pleased, and who had little or no idea of any distinction between the executive and legislative functions of Government. The right hon'ble Baronet then continued :—

A Native chief will assemble his nobles around him in the Durbar, where they freely and frankly express their opinions; but having informed himself by their communications, he determines by his own will what shall be done. Among the various proposals which have been made for the government of India is one that the power of legislation should rest entirely on the Executive, but that there should be a consultative body; that is, that the Governor General should assemble, from time to time, a considerable number of persons, whose opinions he should hear, but by whose opinions he should not be bound; and that he should himself consider and decide what measures should be adopted. In the last Session of Parliament, Lord Ellenborough developed a scheme approaching this in character in the House of Lords.

As might have been reasonably expected, this notion was dismissed as an obsolete one which would not suit the altered circumstances of the country. Lord Caning and his colleagues, and even the India Council of the Secretary of State for India, which, composed as it was, and has ever been, of retired officers of obsolete experience, might have been expected to favourably entertain such a notion as being eminently practical and best suited to the alleged conservative ideas of the Indian people,—all authorities in fact concurred in the opinion that it was quite impossible, under the then existing state of feeling in India, to revert to a state of things in which the Executive Government would alone legislate for the country. The other or the European notion was exactly the opposite of the former. Sir Charles Wood admitted that in the case of



Englishmen, wherever they might be settled, it was perfectly natural for them to desire that they should have a representative body to make the laws by which they were to be governed. Sir Charles Wood, however, dismissed this notion also as impracticable for the following reasons :—

I am sure, however, that every one who considers the condition of India will see that it is utterly impossible to constitute such a body in that country. You cannot possibly assemble at any one place in India persons who shall be the real representatives of the various classes of the Native population of that empire. It is quite true that when you diminish the area over which legislation is to extend, you diminish the difficulty of such a plan. In Ceylon, which is not more extensive than a large collectorate in India, you have a legislative body consisting partly of Englishmen and partly of Natives, and I do not know that that Government has worked unsuccessfully; but with the extended area with which we have to deal in India, it would be physically impossible to constitute such a body. The Natives who are resident in the towns no more represent the resident Native population than a highly educated native of London, at the present day, represents a highland chieftain or a feudal baron of half a dozen centuries ago. To talk of a Native representation is, therefore, to talk of that which is simply and utterly impossible. Then comes the question to what extent we can have a representation of the English settlers in India. No doubt, it would not be difficult to obtain a representation of their interests; but I must say that of all governing or legislative bodies, none is so dangerous or so mischievous as one which represents a dominant race ruling over an extended Native population. All experience teaches us that where a dominant race rules another, the mildest form of government is a despotism. It was so in the case of the democratic republics of Greece, and the more aristocratic or autocratic sway of Rome; and it has been so, I believe, at all times and among all nations in every part of the world. The other day I found in Mr. Mill's book upon *Representative Government* a passage which I will read—not because I go its entire length, but because it expresses in strong terms what I believe is in the main correct. Mr. Mill says—

“ Now, if there be a fact to which all experience testifies, it is that when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are, of all others, those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. They are always one of the chief difficulties of the Govern-

ment. Armed with the prestige and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power without its sense of responsibilities."

Such were the reasons which Sir Charles Wood assigned for having been unable to allow the Legislative Councils in India to be constituted on the representative principle. And he further added that the natives of India were not able to distinguish between the acts of Government and those of the persons who apparently constituted it, namely, the members of the Legislature, and that in one of his despatches Lord Canning had pointed out the mischiefs which on that account had arisen from publicity. In the case of the English settlers who, he said, were accustomed to make that distinction, the publication of the proceedings of the Legislative Council was advantageous; but if the same practice was to be continued, care would have to be taken to prevent the native population from confounding the measures eventually passed by the Legislature with the injudicious speeches that might be made in the Council during the passage of those measures. It was, therefore, found necessary, the right hon'ble Baronet added, that the hands of Government should be strengthened not only by investing it with the power of veto, thus enabling it to prevent a mischievous measure from becoming a law, but also by empowering it to prevent the introduction of any Bill calculated to excite the minds of the Native population. He then referred to the mischief which had arisen from the manner in which the Act of 1853 in this respect had been carried out owing to misconstruction or misapplication of its provisions by the Government of India; and he accordingly repeated the caution that it was necessary to so frame the measure as to prevent all likelihood either of misconstruction or misapplication. He said:—"It is easy at any future time to go further, but it is difficult to draw back from what we have once agreed to."

Sir Charles Wood then proceeded to unfold the

scheme as embodied in his Bill for the constitution of the Legislative Council of India. He said :—

I propose that when the Governor-General's Council meets for the purpose of making laws and regulations, the Governor-General should summon, in addition to the ordinary members of the Council, not less than six nor more than twelve additional members, of whom one-half at least shall not hold office under Government. These additional members may be either Europeans, persons of European extraction, or Natives. Lord Canning strongly recommends that the Council should hold its meetings in different parts of India, for the purpose of obtaining at times the assistance of those Native chiefs and noblemen whose attendance at Calcutta would be impossible, or irksome to themselves. I do not propose that the judges *ex officio* shall have seats in the Legislature; but I do not preclude the Governor-General from summoning one of their number if he chooses. They were useful members of a body meeting as a committee for the purpose of discussing and framing laws, but I think it is inexpedient and incompatible with their functions that they should belong to a body partaking in any degree of a popular character. I propose that the persons nominated should attend all meetings held within a year. If you compel their attendance for a longer period, you render it very unlikely that any Natives except those resident upon the spot will attend the meetings of the Council. This also is recommended by Lord Canning. Hon. Gentlemen will have noticed the great success which has attended the association with us of the Talookdars of Oude and of the Sirdars in the Punjab in the duties of administering the revenue, and Lord Canning has borne testimony to the admirable manner in which they have performed their duties. I believe greater advantages will result from admitting the Native chiefs to co-operate with us for legislative purposes; they will no longer feel, as they have hitherto done, that they are excluded from the management of affairs in their own country, and nothing, I am persuaded, will tend more to conciliate to our rule the minds of Natives of high rank.

Sir Charles Wood openly disavowed all intention of making the Council a debating society. He then proceeded to unfold the scheme as regards the minor local Councils. He justified the creation of the minor local Councils on two grounds specified in Lord Canning's despatches. Lord Canning contended that though, under the Act of 1853, members representing the various provinces had been introduced into the Legislature, thereby securing the advantage of local

knowledge and experience, the change had not been sufficient for two reasons; firstly, because the other Presidencies still continued to entertain a feeling that they were over-riden by the "Bengal Council" as they called the Legislature, and secondly, because the advantage of local knowledge and experience thus far secured was not sufficiently great,—at any rate as great as that which must ensue from the creation of local Councils which would in that case be wholly composed of men of local knowledge and experience. For these reasons it was found necessary to create the local Councils, whose constitution and functions Sir Charles Wood described as follows:—

And, therefore, I propose to restore, I may say, to the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay the power of passing laws and enactments on local subjects within their own territories, and that the Governor of the Presidency, in the same manner as the Governor-General, when his Council meets to make laws, shall summon a certain number of additional members, to be as before either European or Native, and one-half of whom at least shall not be office-holders. It is obviously necessary that these bodies should not be empowered to legislate on subjects which I may call of Indian, rather than of local, importance. The Indian debts, the customs of the country, the army of India, and other matters, into the details of which it is not necessary that I should enter, belong to a class of subjects which the local Legislatures will be prohibited from entering upon without the sanction of the Governor-General. I propose that Councils rather differently constituted should be established at Bengal; and, if the Governor-General thinks right, as he obviously does from his despatches, that he shall be empowered hereafter—but not without the sanction of the Secretary of State—to create a Council for the North West provinces, or the Punjab, or any other part of India which he may think desirable.

The creation of local Councils in the case of Madras and Bombay was simply an act of restoration so to speak; for both possessed this power in old times, until it was withdrawn by the Charter Act of 1833. The new plan of a central Legislative Council for the whole country, with local Councils for the different provinces, as each became ripe to have one, was considered the best for attaining a general uniformity of legislation, with a sufficient diversity for the

differences of each local unit or province, which would be ensured by this complex plan.

The Bill proposed to give power to the Governor-General in cases of emergency to pass an ordinance having the force of law for a limited period. "Questions might arise about the Arms Act," said Sir Charles Wood, "or the press, as to which it would be very injudicious that delay should occur; and we, therefore, propose to empower the Governor-General on his own authority to pass an ordinance having the force of law, to continue for a period of six months, unless disallowed by the Secretary of State or superseded by an Act of the Legislature." In conclusion, Sir Charles Wood assured the House that the Bill had been well and carefully considered both by the Government of India and the Home Government, and he expressed a hope that after it had been adopted by Parliament with such alterations as might be necessary, it would tend to the happiness of India and to the prosperity of the Indian subjects of Her Majesty the Queen. The right Hon'ble Baronet concluded by moving for leave to bring in the East India Council Bill.

The motion was followed by a very brief debate. Mr. Danby Seymour approved entirely the two principles underlying the Bill, the one for the greater localization of the Government of India, and the other for the introduction of independent Members of the Council. He expressed a hope, however, that ample time would be allowed for consideration and discussion so as to adapt its several provisions to the object intended to be secured. Colonel Sykes agreed with the previous speaker, and hoped that the proposed legislation would be such as to ensure a return on the part of the people of India to that attachment to England which existed before the rebellion. Mr. W. Ewart thought that the legislation, proposed by Lord Canning, and sought to be carried into effect by the Bill, combined the local and central managements in

a manner that deserved great praise. It was quite true, he said, "that the time must not be very remote when it would be possible to put in practice any scheme for the representative system in India," but in the meantime it was necessary to adopt means to train the people of India for local self-government. Mr. Dunlop said that there were two interests which specially required representation, the trade and the agriculture of India; and he thought that the object would be best secured by the judicious scheme prepared by Lord Canning. The credit of originating the scheme belonged in his opinion to Mr. John Bright who had suggested it many years ago. The motion was agreed to, and the Bill after presentation was read a first time.

A week later, that is, on June 13, on the order for the second reading of the East India Council Bill being read, the debate was opened by Mr. W. Vansittart, who said that in considering the Bill before the House, the first question that arose was whether India was to be hereafter governed from England, or in India itself through its local Governors, and Legislative Councils, and that if the House upheld the former principle, he maintained that the sooner the Calcutta Legislative Council was shut up, and all authority centred in the hands of the Governor-General and his Supreme Executive Council under the control of the Secretary of State for India and his Council, the better; while if the House decided in favour of the latter principle or course of action, then an Act should be passed to enlarge the numbers and powers of the then existing Legislative Council at Calcutta, and to extend similar Councils to Madras and Bombay. He contended also that, in the latter case, the Supreme Council at Calcutta, and the several Councils at the other Presidency Towns, together with a large portion of the India Council in London, were superfluous, and might with advantage in all respects be abolished; the more so because, as India

had been fully incorporated with the rest of the British dominions, he was unable to understand the object of saddling the Indian revenues with the expense caused by the maintenance of three separate and distinct Councils. One result of the Bill before the House, if it became law, would be in his opinion the multiplication of these Councils very considerably, of which there were already too many, and the revival of the old, obsolete, and exploded system of scattering local boards of administration or local Councils over the country. He then referred to the experience gained during Lord Ellenborough's administration as Governor-General of India, when owing to the inconvenience and expense caused by such local boards of administration being scattered over the country, they had to be abolished in favour of the more simple system of governing the country through responsible Commissioners and Secretaries. Independently of this, there were several other defects in the Bill according to his opinion, and these consisted in the extremely limited powers of the Councils proposed to be established by the Bill, and the curtailment of the powers of the Legislative Council at Calcutta. He said he did not also understand what was to be the nature and constitution of these proposed Councils, and he feared accordingly that the Bill had been hastily and crudely considered. In justification of this charge, he referred to three despatches from Lord Canning, laid on the table of the House, which he said materially differed from each other as to the constitution of these proposed Councils. He complained also of the fact that the Secretary of State had allowed three-fourths of the Session to pass before he introduced this Bill, along with two other equally important Bills relating to India, and looking to the other urgent work still left undisposed of, he thought it would be more prudent to withdraw the three Indian Bills until the next Session.

Mr. W. E. Forster, who followed next, desired to

be informed whether the proceedings of the principal Council at Calcutta were intended to be made public or not. Under the Act of 1853, the Governor-General was invested with the power of making regulations for the conduct of business, and these rules, as framed by Lord Dalhousie, were very like those which regulated the House of Commons in its conduct of business, and the deliberations in the former were accordingly conducted very much after the fashion of the latter. Similar power was proposed to be vested in the Governor-General by Section 19 of the Bill, but he was exceedingly anxious to know, though not in actual terms, what sort of regulations would be made. It seemed from the speech of the Mover of the Bill that he expected the regulations to be very different from the original ones under the old Act, and it seemed also from Lord Canning's despatches that he disapproved of the manner in which the proceedings of the Calcutta Council had hitherto been conducted. Mr. Forster accordingly wanted to know whether the Council was to sit in secret or public session, and whether the reports of their deliberations were to be made from day to day, or at the end of the discussion of any particular measure, or not until the end of the session. The only information which he said the House had upon this point was contained in Lord Canning's despatch of the 15th January of that year, in which, after alluding to the disadvantages which arose from the mode of publicity then followed, he said:—"For these reasons I recommend that in the Legislative Councils of the North-Western Provinces and the Panjab, as well as in that of the Governor-General, the business should be conducted as in a Committee or Commission, and not in the form of a set Parliamentary debate, and the proceedings should be reported under the control of the Governor-General." This proposal he said ensured the report of proceedings, but it did not ensure that the proceedings should be reported from day to day. He contended,



however, that that was a matter of principle involving the important question, whether or not public opinion in India was to influence the discussion of laws while they were in process of being made. Mr. Forster added that he was glad that it was proposed to appoint in these Councils as members, not only independent European, but also Native, gentlemen to some extent, so as to feel the way to giving them a share in the government; but he thought that the advantage to be derived from the admission of the non-official representatives of the European and Native communities would be very considerably minimized if no steps were taken to ensure the due and legitimate influence of public opinion upon the proceedings of the Council, which there was only one way of effectually ensuring, namely, by providing that the proceedings of the Council should be reported from day to day. With a view to practically illustrate the force of his arguments, Mr. Forster then referred to the experience gained in connection with the proposals of Mr. Wilson, the then Finance Minister of India, to levy an Income Tax and a duty on Tobacco, and to the happy results ensured in both those cases by the timely publication of proceedings; the proposal to levy an Income Tax, though at first it was objected to as harsh, was so cheerfully acquiesced in as soon as Mr. Wilson explained the necessity of the measure, and the equality with which it was to be levied, that the *London Times* indeed remarked upon the wonderful phenomenon of a community which almost liked to be taxed, while in the case of the proposed duty on Tobacco, the objections raised proved so convincing that Mr. Wilson consented to lower the rate of duty, and eventually abandoned it altogether. And Mr. Forster concluded by saying that as it was obviously intended to ensure the publication of the proceedings of the local Legislative Councils, that was another reason why the proceedings of the principal Council at Calcutta should be similarly reported; for otherwise there would

be a clashing of powers which would make the whole machine very difficult to work, owing to the fact that, though confined to a very subordinate position as compared with the general or central Council at Calcutta, these Councils would have on their side the strength and prestige which would be secured to them by having their deliberations placed before the public.

Mr. Forster was followed by Mr. A. H. Layard, who willingly admitted that the Secretary of State for India had shown a desire to deal in a large and fair way with this exceedingly difficult question of the Government of India, and had proposed changes which deserved the approbation of all who took any interest in Indian affairs. He thought that the Bill, if passed, would bring about two improvements in the state of things in India; firstly it would make the Government by Councils more effective, and secondly it would afford an opening for the employment of Natives in a position in which he much wished to see them employed. He added that the then existing Legislative Council at Calcutta was neither a consultative Council, nor a representative Council, nor a Legislative Council. It was not a consultative Council because the Governor-General was not bound to consult it, nor to follow its advice if he consulted it; it was not a representative Council because it represented no one except a few officials, it did not represent either the Natives, or the non-official British residents; and finally, it was not simply a Legislative Council because it had debates somewhat after the fashion of that House. The Council also lacked a knowledge of the wants of the country. He was of opinion that the local Councils proposed to be established under the Bill would be attended with the happiest results in India; firstly, they would be enabled to deal with matters with which they were locally acquainted; secondly, they would give the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, and eventually to the remaining provinces, an abiding interest in self-government; and thirdly, they,

when successfully developed, would lead to the division of India into distinct governments according to the plan sketched out years ago by Mr. John Bright. As regards the representation of the Natives, Mr. Layard thought that the Bill did not go far enough, and he should, therefore, be prepared to take the sense of the House when in Committee on an amendment that one half of the "Additional Members" should be Natives. They had hitherto no representation either in their own country or in England; there was scarcely a member of that House who raised his voice in their name, while the non-official British residents in India, of whom the House had heard a good deal, and who were said to be equally unrepresented, made noise enough, had the whole press in their favour, and were enabled by their money and influence to command attention to their claims. It was also alleged that the Natives would not speak in the Councils at all, but would defer to the opinions of European members. Mr. Layard said he was inclined to suspect the truth and accuracy of this allegation; but this he would say that even "if they were admitted now, in the next generation they might be expected to say a few words, and in the third they would perhaps speak as much as Europeans." Mr. Layard agreed with Lord Canning in believing that most important and valuable advice might be obtained from the Natives of India, because he could in this matter appeal to his personal experience for confirmation. He said he had recently made a short journey in India, and that the most important and the most interesting information he obtained was from Native gentlemen. He found that they took the broadest view of Indian affairs—not the European, but the Native view—which it was most important that the Government of India should know; and under such circumstances he regretted to find a tendency in England to treat India as if it were a colony, while the truth was that the condition of India widely differed from that of a

colony. The land in the country was all occupied and owned by the people, while at one time the civilization which had prevailed in the country had been far advanced, as was testified to by the magnificent remains of antiquity, and the resources of the country must have been at one time developed to an extent unknown at the present day. A country under such circumstances required in his opinion to be differently treated from a colony, pure and simple. And such a treatment he thought would be ensured by the proposals contained in the Bill, if it became law. As regards publicity, he thought it right that there should be publicity, but he agreed with Lord Canning that in that case it would be necessary that the people should not be misled as to what was passing in the Councils. As regards the powers of the Councils, he thought they were too much restricted, and he hoped that the Secretary of State would consider in Committee the advisability of allowing them greater latitude. Questions regarding the finances of India, its revenue, and its debt, might in his opinion be with advantage discussed by the proposed Councils.

Sir Edward Colebrooke, Colonel Sykes, Mr. Buxton, and Mr. Kinnaird approved the principles and the main provisions of the Bill. Sir Edward Colebrooke said he was unable to concur with Mr. Layard in the suggestion that he had made that at least half of the "Additional Members" should be Natives, because if they were admitted in such a large portion, they would be put upon a footing of equality with European British subjects, sent out from England to govern the country, which was absurd. He thought the best security they could have for the Government of India was to give a large and preponderating share in the Council to those who were connected with the Executive Government of the country. He also saw no reason why Bengal should have a Council of its own, when the principal Council at Calcutta could very well discharge those

functions. Colonel Sykes agreed with Mr. Layard in seeing no reason to suppose that the Natives would be mere ciphers, if admitted to the Councils. He said he was surprised to see no specific mention of Natives in the Bill, and that if Mr. Layard had not given notice of his amendment, he would have done so. He too thought that too many restrictions were placed on the powers of the Councils, and concluded by saying that the system which would be introduced by the Bill was "the restoration of the traditional system of the down-trodden East India Company, whose local Councils at the different presidencies had, before the Legislative Council of India was constituted, passed rules and regulations for local purposes, but which for the future would be called acts instead of rules and regulations." Mr. Buxton thought that the Bill would inaugurate a new era in the Government of India, because its policy was founded on "the basis of not treating the Natives as a conquered race, but as co-operators in the Government of that great Empire." Mr. Kinnaird thought that the provision in the Bill that the seat in the Council should be held for one year only was inexpedient, so also was the initiative power proposed to be given to the Councils. He trusted the Bill would not be hurried through Committee, when he would urge his objections to individual provisions.

Mr. A. S. Ayrton, who followed next, likened the legislative machinery proposed to be set up by the Bill to a machine made by a machanic with so many complicated wheels and cranks in it, that when he wanted to put it in motion, it would not move at all. He confessed he belonged to that school which held that if England intended to keep India, the power of governing must solely and exclusively remain in the hands of British subjects going out to India, and which further held that it was not possible to keep India if Englishmen shared the power of government with the Natives. At the same time he was of opinion that

England, while it retained the whole power of government in its own hands, was bound to exercise it with wisdom, moderation, and forbearance. Through all time, all the nations of Asia had been subject to despotic power, but that power had been exercised with an intelligence and forbearance to which the British governors had been strangers. Native Princes, howsoever despotic, made no laws without consulting in open Darbar such of their subjects as could give expression to popular wishes, while the British Governors-General of India had in their presumptuous ignorance and arrogance refused to take any such precautions, and by their disregard of the feelings of the people caused the terrible mutiny of 1857. He denounced the annexation of Oude and the seizure of Nagpore as scandalous to a degree, and the enactment by the Legislative Council of India of laws contrary to the religious feelings of the people as extremely calamitous. Mr. Ayrton here clearly seems to have referred to the Widow Marriage Act of 1856, which the Legislative Council of India, constituted as it then was, and having then no representative Hindu and other native members in its body, would have done well to abstain from enacting. We for our part do not disapprove of the principle of that legislation, nor do we deny the abstract or even the practical justice of the step then taken; but still, on the question of principle, we must express our adherence with the view expressed by Mr. Ayrton. Turning then to the question whether the power of governing India should be shared with the natives, Mr. Ayrton thought it to be an impracticable project. He believed it to be absolutely necessary for the continuance and preservation of British rule in India, that the power of governing the country should be unreservedly confided to the British subjects sent out from England, the only guarantee that was necessary to be vouchsafed being that the British authorities should not make laws without consulting the people of the country.

This guarantee he held could not be fulfilled by taking two Natives from a commercial town, and making them members of the Legislative Council. The Heads of the different local Governments should be empowered to send for a certain number of influential Native chiefs, who might be supposed to represent their people, and upon commercial questions they should invite the principal Native merchants to give their opinion; but having in this wise ascertained the views of the people, the responsibility of accepting or rejecting them should clearly rest with the Government. Mr. Ayrton accordingly thought that the constitution proposed by the Bill was better adapted to the government of a joint stock company than of a great empire like India; and that "to set up an irresponsible Council of six, elected by no body, and speaking merely their own opinions, who had undertaken no duties except to play at legislation," was equivalent to "shifting one of the most important duties belonging to the office of Governor, which ought to be discharged by him under the controlling authority of the Home Government." If, however, it was thought necessary to set up Legislative Councils, he thought it a cumbrous plan to resort to the double system of legislation contemplated by the Bill. He would in that case give complete power of legislation to the local Councils under the sanction and ratification of the Governor-General, thereby securing complete uniformity; and accordingly he thought the proposed establishment of a central Legislative Council at Calcutta, with the ancillary Councils at the different Presidency Towns, to be not only a great mistake, but one fraught with danger to the stability of British rule, in-as-much as such a central institution was calculated "to familiarize the whole of the Native population with the idea that there was but a single Government in the country." Mr. Ayrton then proceeded to further illustrate his position that the

establishment of a central Council was fraught with danger to the stability of British rule. He said:—

We had obtained our dominion in India owing to the fact that it was composed, not of a single race capable of harmonious action, but of the different races having no feelings or sympathies in common. We had conquered India and built up our empire in detail; we had succeeded whether at Bombay, at Calcutta or at Madras, because we were always acting with an intelligent mind against a divided people, or some subordinate Government which had separated itself from the original empire of India. Why should we not continue to avail ourselves of the same circumstances to maintain our rule in India? Why were we to teach the Natives what they had failed in discovering for themselves—that they would one day be a great nation? How could we hope that in time to come 40,000 or 50,000 Englishmen would maintain their rule over an united population of 200,000,000? Discontent, if it should break out in one province under a separate system of Government, would be speedily quelled by the assistance which could be rendered from other parts of India.

Having thus set forth his views as to the best means of securing the stability of British rule in India, Mr. Ayrton complained that, in the eyes of those entrusted with the Government of India, the necessity and advisability of maintaining separate Governments or, in other words, of acting upon the principle of *divide et impera*, seemed altogether of secondary importance, as compared with the details of the machinery by which that Government was to be carried out. He thought that those entrusted with the Government of India had given themselves up entirely to the political pedantry of administration at the sacrifice of those great principles of policy, the due observance of which led to the acquisition of new empires, and to the formation of new dynasties, but the neglect of which led with equal certainty to ruin and destruction. Mr. Ayrton, having thus raised his voice to warn the Ministry against the dangers of the policy intended to be pursued in regard to India, concluded by imploring the right hon'ble Baronet in charge of the Bill to strike out of it many of its more complicated provisions, with a view to render the whole measure more consonant with the simplicity of



Asiatic ideas. It was absolutely necessary, he thought, to abolish the then existing Legislative Council of India, and to transfer to the Executive Government the power of making laws and regulations. As might have been expected, Mr. Aytton's view did not commend itself to those responsible for the progressive good government of India, though of course he did not stand alone in the view he propounded. He may be justly regarded as representing the Anglo-Indian view, himself having been in his early days brought into close contact with Anglo-India on the spot, a contact from whose dangerous contagion very few, if any, escape with impunity. In the general observations with which we hope to close this historical review of the legislation on this important subject, we shall have something to say in reply to this view, which we believe to have been based upon a misappreciation of the oriental traditions, and upon a misreading of the history of the rise and progress of British power in India.

Sir James Elphinstone complained of the late period of the session at which the Bill under notice, along with two other important India Bills, was introduced, and expressed his belief that it would have been more prudent if, before the introduction of the Bill, Her Majesty's Government had devoted their attention to restore the finances of India to a satisfactory condition, in a manner to make the income balance the expenditure, especially so because he feared that the establishment of these new Councils, if they should prove anything better than mere debating societies, would lead to a great deal of additional expenditure. He said the experience of Ceylon warranted this apprehension of his, because whereas, a few years ago, the annual expenditure of Ceylon was £ 70,000 or £ 80,000, the establishment of a Legislative Council resulted in raising it to nearly five-fold of the original amount, that is, £ 350,000 per annum; and he apprehended the same result would follow in India from

the establishment of the proposed Legislative Councils. Sir James Elphinstone accordingly thought that Her Majesty's Government would have done better, had they, instead of bringing in these Bills, introduced a measure calculated to reduce the army in India in a gradual and systematic manner, and to provide a substitute for the Indian navy. Mr. Danby Seymour, on the other hand, thought that the best way to secure a sound financial condition for a country is to give it good government, and that the three India Bills were well calculated to meet that object, in-as-much as they would secure to the people of India a voice in their own affairs, would improve the administration of justice, and would ensure the admission of the Natives to a share in the Government of their country. In reply to Mr. Ayrton, Mr. Danby Seymour said :—

If we could have but one country, so much the better; and in Europe we were endeavouring to get rid of geographical differences, He desired to rule India, not by keeping the Natives in ignorance, which in these days of the free press and of public inquiry was impossible—but by elevating them and making them feel that it was their interest that our rule should continue. Our security in India was not that the Natives would not turn us out, but that they would not,—no people on the face of the earth would drive out a good Government. He believed that the people cared very little for the Government that was over them if it only governed them well. He would encourage in the Natives the wish for our civilization, and he had long advocated their admission to posts higher than those which they had hitherto held; but he would not give them too great a voice at first. He would be for a more gradual proceeding. He approved the small representation, inadequate though it was, which was to be conferred upon the people of India.

He was also glad to see that non-official Europeans too were to have a representation in the new Councils. He wished to see the independent European population of India greatly increase, and this desired result was being brought about by the extension and development of the railway system of India.

Sir Charles Wood, in replying to the debate, expressed his gratification at the manner in which the Bills had been received by all sides of the House.

In reply to Mr. Forster, on the question of the extent of publicity intended to be given to the proceedings of the Legislative Councils, he said that it was one of those details which he thought had better be left to the discretion of the Governor-General. He agreed, however, with Lord Canning in thinking that publicity ought to be the general rule, though great care would have to be taken to guard against any mischief arising from precipitate and inaccurate publicity. In reply to Mr. Layard, he said that Lord Canning was precisely of the same opinion with his hon'ble friend (Mr. Layard) regarding the importance and value of the advice of influential and representative Native gentlemen, and that it was on that very account that the Bill proposed to empower the Governor-General and the several Provincial Governors to avail themselves of their services. As to the proposal to make an express mention of Natives in the Bill, he said he objected to it on grounds of principle, namely, that we should all desire to see the obliteration of the distinction between the conquerors and the conquered in India. In pursuance of that principle, the Bills before the House provided that the Natives should be employed in the Legislative Councils as well as in the highest judicial courts, and in the most important executive offices. He maintained the perfect equality before the law of all Her Majesty's subjects, without distinction of race, birth or religion, and he was not disposed to do anything which could lead to the supposition that he doubted for a moment the existence of that principle. And he believed that a firm and loyal adherence to that principle was the best mode of consolidating and perpetuating British rule in India. He concluded by saying that that was the principle enunciated and authoritatively laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 1858, in which Her Majesty announced to the people of India the direct assumption by the Crown of the Government thereof. As regards the limitation of the time for which a

seat in the Legislative Councils was to be held, it was proposed in the Bill to limit it only to one year, because the object in view was to secure the assistance of Native Chiefs who could hardly be expected to attend for two, much less for three years. He concluded by moving the second reading of the Bill, and the motion was agreed to without a division.

A week later, that is on June 20, on the order for Committee being read, Mr. John Bright presented two petitions from India, one from Madras and the other from Bombay, numerouslly signed, in which the petitioners, both European and Native, from Madras stated that, in their opinion, the time had arrived for the introduction of the representative system with advantage to the institutions of the country. The petitioners from Bombay, wholly Native, complained of the extravagant expenditure of the Indian Government, and of the onerous nature of some of the recent taxes, and prayed that the several Presidencies be allowed sufficient power over their own local taxation, and that a legislative measure like the one proposed be passed. Sir Henry Willoughby asked the Indian Minister whether any scheme for the reduction of the salaries of the higher officers in India from the Governor-General downwards was under consideration, and expressed his opinion that some such scheme was absolutely necessary in the then existing financial condition of the country. Sir Charles Wood replied that such a scheme was under the consideration of his Council, but that, owing to the great pressure of important business, the Council had been unable to enter into the details of the scheme. Mr. Vincent Scully expressed his surprise that some Member acquainted with India had not risen to move that the Indian Bills be referred to a Select Committee, especially because the House was as ignorant as himself regarding the important subjects dealt with in those Bills. From his experience of the Irish Bills, he thought such a process would

have proved highly advantageous, and accordingly moved that the East India Council Bill be referred to a Select Committee. Mr. H. Baillie expressed his hope that if there was to be any reduction in the salaries of the higher Civil servants in India, the higher branches of the Military Service would not escape a similar revision. He denounced the salary paid to the Commander-in-Chief in India as "perfectly monstrous." After these preliminary observations, the House resolved itself into Committee, and proceeded to consider the Bill in detail. As the scope of this review is very limited, we shall notice the discussion only on those sections of the Bill which related to the constitution and functions of the Legislative Councils proposed to be established. In this same connection, it is also important to bear in mind that the debate on the two previous occasions, namely on the motion for leave to bring in the Bill, and on that for its second reading, was wholly confined to those provisions of the Bill which related to the establishment and the constitution and functions of the proposed Councils for making laws and regulations.

On Clause 10 coming on for consideration—the clause that laid down the constitution of the Governor-General's Council for making laws and regulations, and which empowered him to nominate not more than twelve, and not less than six, persons as Additional Members of that Council, provided that at least one half of these were independent persons,—Mr. Layard, pursuant to his notice, moved an amendment to add the words, "And provided that not less than one fourth of such Additional Members of Council shall be Natives of India." In moving his amendment, Mr. Layard said that he agreed with Sir Charles Wood in thinking that no statutory distinction should be made between the different classes of Her Majesty's subjects having for its basis considerations of race, colour, or creed, but he denied that the acceptance of his amendment would favour

any such distinction, or imply, any slight upon the Natives, while it would have the advantage of securing the object in view. And he added that, though the Bills before the House afforded an earnest of the right hon'ble Baronet's sincerity upon this question, there was no guarantee that his successor, or the Governor-General for the time being, would be actuated by the same principles, while pressure might be brought to bear upon him by the British residents in India preventing him from fulfilling the original intentions. Colonel Sykes said that it was all very well to say that there should be no difference between a British subject born in India and one born in any other part of the world, but that unless a distinct provision like the one moved by Mr. Layard were introduced into the Bill, it would be said in India that the Natives were never intended for high office. He thought that, unless they gave fruition to the expectations they had raised among the people of India, they would eventually fall victims to the intellectual energy which they had stimulated. Colonel Sykes appears to have correctly estimated the eventual result of the educational policy of the British Government in India, unless it adapted from time to time its policy to the varying conditions of the times. If what Colonel Sykes said in 1861 were true even then, how much more true must it be in 1885! Sir Charles Wood reiterated his former objection to the proposed amendment. Mr. Bright admitted that there was great force in that objection, while he admitted also that the arguments in favour of Mr. Layard's amendment were absolutely overwhelming. He accordingly suggested an intermediate course which would be free from objection. He recommended that, when the Bill was passed, the Indian Minister should express his opinion to the Government of India as to the employment of Natives therein, and he thought if such instructions were once given, a practice would be set up, and a precedent

established, without any specific mention of Natives being made in the Act. Sir Charles Wood accepted the recommendation, adding that he had all along intended to issue such instructions. On this assurance being given Mr. Lyard withdrew his amendment.

Clause 11 related to the term of office, which it proposed to limit to one year only. Mr. Vansittart moved an amendment to the effect that the duration of the term should be for five years. He said that the result of appointing non-official members for one year only would be to render them mere dummies. A person could hardly be expected to master the business of the Council within so short a period, and he doubted whether any respectable non-official persons would consent to serve on the Council for such a brief period. Mr. Bright said that in looking over the Bill no clause surprised him more than the one under notice. The fact that these additional members were to be nominated by the Governor-General himself, and that too for one year only, most effectually removed all chance of their being able to show any independence, except what might be guaranteed by the fact that they were not to receive any salary. It appeared to Mr. Bright that this was a very clever device for making it a difficult matter to get good and efficient members, or to keep them in when once secured. He said he was not prepared to support the amendment that the term should be for five years, but he thought that three years was the shortest term that could be fixed. Lord Stanley said that the principal qualifications which were indispensable in a member of any legislative body were independence, experience, and zeal and interest in the public service, and that, under the operation of the clause as it stood, none of these qualifications would be secured. He was almost certain that no independent British resident in India would care to accept a seat in the Council under such circumstances. In his opinion, it was also worth considering whether in practice the Government might not find

it more difficult to get rid of a member of Council appointed for such a brief term than would be the case if the term were extended. Under the operation of the clause a practice would probably grow of re-appointing members of Council, and their removal, except on the ground of some obvious disqualification, would be invidious, whereas if they held the seat for a longer term, it would be understood that they had no claim to be re-appointed. Mr. Adam thought that European members should be appointed for a longer term, but that it would be inconvenient to the Native members to appoint them for a similar period; whereupon Lord Stanley observed that they might resign the seat whenever it suited them to do so. Sir Charles Wood requested the Committee to consider the course of proceeding which was likely to be followed. The Governor-General and his Executive Council would prepare the Bills and place them before the Legislative Council, when a sufficient number of them was ready. And the object in establishing the Supreme Legislative Council was to give the Governor-General the best available advice and assistance. Independent European members would have to be selected from the trading or planting classes, and he doubted whether persons so engaged in business would consent to sacrifice any very large portion of their time to the public service, as would necessarily be the case if they were appointed for a lengthened period. As regards the Native members, the Governor-General contemplated holding meetings of the Council elsewhere than in Calcutta, and it could not be expected that they would attend such meetings far away for more than a year. The object of Lord Canning was probably to hold meetings of the Council at different places in different years, and to vary some of the persons summoned according to the locality where the Council sat. He denied that the members appointed for one year would be subservient to the Governor-General, and justified this view on the ground that they



would receive no salary. Mr. Bright thought that the right hon'ble Baronet's notion of the Council was altogether different from that which was passing in the minds of the Committee. He thought that the Council should be stationed at the seat of government, and that in such a matter he was afraid the right Hon'ble Baronet was deferring too much to the view of Lord Canning. Sir Charles Wood agreed that the Council should seldom be moved from Calcutta, but he thought that it was after all better to carry out the proposal of Lord Canning on this point, as thereby alone the assistance of influential Natives could be secured. Several other members spoke in favour of the amendment, and eventually the term was extended to two years.

With reference to clause 13 which related to the business to be transacted at meetings of the Council, Mr. Bright asked whether members would have the power to move for returns, whereupon Sir Charles Wood replied that they would have that power if the motion related to business before the Council. With reference to Clause 19 empowering the Governor-General to make rules for the conduct of business, Mr. Forster said that it appeared that it was under contemplation to publish an official report of the proceedings of the Council; but it was of great importance that independent reports should be published from day to day. Sir Charles Wood said that, in Lord Canning's opinion, open debate ought to be, and would be, the rule; but that in certain cases, as when the Council met in the Punjab or Oude, where the Natives did not understand English, the reports, unless some precautions were taken, would give the arguments only on one side, in which case there would be room left for occasional misunderstandings. It was, therefore, the intention of Lord Canning to have more frequent official reports of the proceedings published. Mr. Bright said he did not think that the Governor-General was likely to appoint as

members of Council persons who could not speak English. But he thought the real question at issue was, whether the rules for the conduct of business of the Legislative Council should be made by that Council itself, or by the Governor-General in Council. In the latter case, there would be no security for free discussion; for unless Lord Canning was more liberal than he was suspected to be, the Council would enjoy no power of debate whatever, no power to do anything except with the permission of the Governor-General. He for his part was disposed to vest that power in the Council, which should of course have the right of closing its doors on special occasions, just in the same way as the House of Commons had it, though it had not exercised it for many years. Sir Charles Wood requested the Committee to bear in mind the fact that, in legislating for the Native population of India, they were dealing with edged tools, and that instances were not wanting of the minds of the Natives having been to a very great extent inflamed by incorrect and garbled reports of speeches. Under such circumstances, he thought it would be safer to leave it to the Governor-General to decide what extent of publicity should be given to the debates of his Council. Mr. Ewart here expressed his willingness to withdraw his amendment, of which he had already given notice, to the effect that the public and the press should be admitted to the meetings of the Council, but he trusted that the Governor-General would not lose sight of the advantages of publicity. Mr. Danby Seymour said that if the reports of the proceedings of the Council were to be published only after a lapse of time, they would surely ooze out, and that the interval would afford greater facilities to those who desired to circulate an incorrect account thereof. This was a much greater evil, and it could only be guarded against by securing the fullest publicity to the proceedings. As to the difficulty arising from the fact of some Native members not knowing

English, Mr. Danby Seymour suggested that the course followed in America, if adopted, would obviate it. In Canada, where two languages were spoken, each speaker expressed his opinions in his own language. Mr. Layard thought that the great object of publicity was to enable the Native population to express their opinion upon measures while they were under consideration of the Council, and that accordingly it would serve no useful purpose if the proceedings were published after the measures had become law. He accordingly suggested that authentic official reports should be published from day to day. Sir Charles Wood observed that in his opinion nobody would say that the House should, by an Act of Parliament, enact whether the proceedings should be published every day or otherwise. He had simply endeavoured to state the opinion of the Governor-General on the subject, that publicity would be the rule, but that it would be modified to a certain extent as regards the proceedings of the Council when sitting in Panjab or the N. W. Provinces, when probably there would be some Native members not understanding the English language. He did not, however, mean to convey an impression to the Committee that an authentic report of the proceedings would be published after a long delay, so as to be of little avail to those who might desire to offer criticism. Mr. Bright maintained that if Lord Canning appointed as members of Council any native gentlemen who could neither speak nor understand English, he would be departing from the objects of the Bill and the intentions of Parliament. He begged the right hon'ble Baronet to reconsider the clause, and to make it more liberal, so that when the Council met, they should not be fighting against the Governor-General, as would certainly be the case if they were men animated by feelings of independence and self-respect, whereas if they were not, it would be better to have no Council at all. Mr. Layard thought that a knowledge of

English should not be regarded as a *sine qua non* to a member of Council, as there were many very intelligent Native gentlemen who could neither speak nor understand English. He suggested as a compromise that the necessary rules for the conduct of business should be framed by the Council, and then submitted to the Governor-General for approval and confirmation. But even this compromise Sir Charles Wood declined to accept; and so the clause as it originally stood was agreed to.

With reference to Clause 30 which related to the local Councils, Mr. Vansittart urged that the term of office should be at least three, if not five years, especially so because these Councils would certainly be stationary. The term was fixed at two years. Clause 38 related to the business to be transacted by the local Councils, and when it came on for consideration Mr. Layard asked what was meant by the words at the end of the clause "affecting the public revenue of the Presidency;" whereupon Sir Charles Wood replied that they meant that no financial measure should be introduced without the previous sanction of the Governor-General. Then Mr. Bright asked if it was meant that no member should be able to propose a resolution on the question of revenue as they could in that House; and whether that privilege was to be allowed in India; to which Sir Charles Wood replied that the effect of the clause would be precisely the same as in England. The clause was agreed to. Clause 43 laid down that the local Councils were not to take into consideration, or make certain laws and regulations, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General, and when it came on for consideration, Sir Charles Wood, in reply to Mr. Forster, said that the local Councils would be competent to deal with internal improvements, or any other subjects of purely local concern, but not with questions of general policy. In reply to Mr. Danby Seymour, he further stated that if the principal Council at Calcutta proposed to

put on an income tax, the local councils would be prevented under the clause from taking that measure into consideration. Mr. Bright observed that the effect of the clause would be to circumscribe the powers of the local Councils unnecessarily so much so that if it was found that any particular tax was working more perniciously in one province than in another, the local Council of the Province would under the clause be debarred from passing any resolution about it, or from representing the grievance to the Calcutta Council without the previous sanction of the Governor-General. Lord Stanley observed that he would like to know what class of subjects would fall within the province of the local Councils, as almost every important subject would be covered by the clause. Sir Charles Wood replied that they would be competent to deal with all questions except those which must necessarily extend beyond the local limits of their jurisdiction. He instanced the Post Office, the Telegraph, the general Codes for all India, and the naval and military forces as subjects falling within the jurisdiction of the central Council.

A week later, that is, on June 27, the Bill with the several amendments was further considered, when Sir Charles Wood proposed an amendment to Clause 19 which empowered the Governor-General to make rules for the conduct of business. The amendment was to the effect that, while the Governor-General should make the rules in the first instance, the Council was empowered to amend them subsequently if necessary, the rules so amended not to take effect until confirmed by the Governor-General. The next day the House of Commons read the Bill a third time without any discussion or division.

On July 1 the House of Lords read the Bill a first time without any discussion. On July 9 Earl De Grey and Ripon moved the second reading of the Bill in a lucid speech very clearly setting forth the objects and scope of the proposed measure. We need not stop

here to particularly notice this speech as there was nothing new in it. On the motion being made, a short debate followed in which Lord Ellenborough, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Lyveden, and Lord Derby, took part. As in the House of Commons, so in the House of Lords also, the debate on this occasion was principally confined to those provisions of the Bill which related to the establishment of the Legislative Councils, their constitution, and functions. As might have been expected, Lord Ellenborough did not at all approve of those provisions of the Bill, because he was one of those who, like Mr. Arton, belonged to that school of Anglo-Indian politicians which held that India was not at all fit for representative institutions, and that the best form of legislative machinery suited to it was the Darbar, in which an Indian Prince would simply consult his subjects and ascertain their wishes, and would then act as he thought proper. His Lordship described the Legislative Council of India established by the Charter Act of 1853 as "an enlarged Cabinet," and thought that that institution would have answered its purpose most admirably if, when creating it, Parliament had not gone beyond the actual necessities of the case, as it did, by giving seats in that "enlarged Cabinet" to the Chief Justice and a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. In his opinion, the introduction of this judicial element worked all the mischief. And he further thought that, notwithstanding this blunder, the Legislative Council of India would still have answered its purpose most admirably but for two other more serious blunders, for which, however, Parliament was not actively responsible. These two blunders were, firstly, that Lord Dalhousie gave the Council an appearance of a small Parliament by framing for its conduct of business rules and regulations similar to those which regulated the proceedings of the Imperial Parliament, and secondly, that, though eminently disqualified for carrying on its discussions in public, the Council did

not carry on its business in secret session, and in confidential intercourse. He thought also that the local Legislative Councils in several Presidencies would, instead of relieving the Governor-General of any responsibility, possibly add to it; for if he refused to give his assent to a Bill passed by a local Legislative Council, he must give his reasons, and he must do the same, when he gave his assent, for the information of the Home Government, in both of which cases he must thoroughly master the subject of legislation. He further thought that the establishment of the proposed local Legislative Councils would result in an enormous increase of local taxation which would not, as it certainly had not been in former days, be prudently imposed, and that the amount of local taxation would always be made a reason for not bearing a fair share of the Imperial taxation, which the Governor-General might desire to impose. Lord Lyveden said that the difficulty which the Government had to deal with arose out of the Legislative Council having arrogated to itself powers which were not intended to be given to it, and that the greatest inconvenience of all connected therewith was the Chief Justice of Calcutta. This difficulty and inconvenience he thought could be got over by a simple declaratory Act. The alterations proposed by the Bill were in his opinion prejudicial; for thereby both representation and publicity would be done away with. There was nothing in the Bill to compel the Governor-General to take into his Council representatives of the several Presidencies; and he might, if he chose, select all his Council from one Presidency, leaving all the rest altogether unrepresented. As regards publicity, it was secure in the case of the proceedings of the local Councils, while in the case of the Supreme Council, the same precaution was not taken. As to limiting the subjects of which the local Councils could take cognizance, Lord Lyveden thought it was idle to restrict their functions in the way proposed; because as the members of these Councils would

possess the same advantages of rank and ability with those of the members of the Supreme Council, the former would break through all rules, and discuss any question of public interest they chose. He said further that he agreed with the Mover of the Bill in thinking that direct representation of the Natives in the Council was impossible, but he thought that, as regards their selection, the recommendation contained in a petition recently presented to the House of Commons to the effect that "the natives selected should be nominated by some delegation of Natives" might be deserving of consideration. Here it should be borne in mind that Lord Ripon followed this very course when he appointed the late Kristodas Pal and his successor to the Supreme Legislative Council. Lord Lyveden very strongly urged the necessity of making a specific mention of the Natives in the Bill, and of fixing the minimum number of Native members, and justified his proposal on the ground that past experience had shown that the use of general or "noble" words regarding the eligibility of the Natives to all offices equally with European British subjects had been ineffectual in securing the object in view. After the debate, the Bill was read a second time without a division.

On July 16 the Bill was considered in Committee, when on clause 10 regarding the constitution of the Governor General's Council for making laws and regulations coming on for consideration, Lord Grey moved the following amendment to that clause—an amendment which for the first time gave a distinct form and shape to the "Darbar" theory, so repeatedly referred to in the foregoing pages.

"To leave out from ('Governor General in Council') to the end of the Clause, and insert the following words, ('there shall be appointed also a Council of State to assist in the Preparation and Consideration of such Laws and Regulations. The Governor General shall have power to appoint from Time to Time such Persons as he may think fit to be Members of the Council of State, and also to remove the Persons so appointed; but all such Appointments or



Removals shall be only provisional until confirmed by the Secretary of State for India in Council.'")

"Clause (A.) It shall be lawful for the Governor General to direct the Council of State, or any Committee of that Body he may nominate for the Purpose, to inquire into any Subject on which Legislation may be required, and to prepare Drafts of Laws thereupon."

"Clause (B.) Except in Cases of Emergency the Drafts of all Laws intended to be passed by the Governor General in Council shall be submitted to the Council of State, and shall be considered by that Body at One or more Meetings to which all the Members shall be summoned. It shall be the Duty of the Council of State to report to the Governor General in Council their Opinion on the Drafts of all Laws so laid before them, and to suggest any Amendments which they may consider to be required therein."

"Clause (C.) It shall be lawful for the Council of State, with the Consent of the Governor General, to be signified by him in each Case, to take Evidence with regard to any Draft Law laid before them or any Amendment suggested therein, and likewise to hear Arguments in support of petitions for or against any proposed Law by Persons appointed for that purpose with the Approval of the Governor General.

"Clause (D.) If by reason of the Distance at which they reside any Members of the Council of State should be unable to attend conveniently at the general Place of Meeting, it shall be lawful for the Governor General to direct that such Members shall meet separately at any other Places he may appoint, to consider the Draft Laws laid before the Council of State; and the members so assembled shall be empowered to present District Reports to the Governor General in Council on the Drafts submitted to them."

Lord Grey said that some such arrangement as the one embodied in his amendment had been suggested by an experienced and noble friend of his, and also by the history of events that had occurred on the other side of the British Channel. He said that some of the greatest laws passed during the reign of the first Napoleon—and some of them were so beneficial that their enactment in some degree compensated for the harassing wars in which Napoleon kept France engaged—were mainly put into shape by the Council of State, a body which possessed no legislative powers, but was simply a consultative body. And this precedent his Lordship deemed to be quite applicable to

the circumstances of India. He thought that the Bill, as it stood, instead of tending to remedy the evils sought to be removed, would only perpetuate them, principally because the discussions of the Council were intended to be held in public session, and because, under those circumstances, the members would feel an irresistible temptation to make speeches, addressed not to the Council, but the public outside. Earl De Grey and Ripon replied that the amendment sought to establish a body of a novel character, and without precedent in any previous system pursued by England since the acquisition by it of its Indian possessions, and that accordingly the noble Earl was bound to point out how the Bill was open to the serious objection of tending to perpetuate existing evils, and also how the remedy he proposed would obviate those evils without creating others of greater extent. Earl De Grey and Ripon then proceeded to point out how the Bill would effectually remove all the existing evils, and having done so, next proceeded to criticize the amendment. The proposals contained in the Bill were objected to on the ground that the Council would be too much open to the influence of public opinion at Calcutta, and too ready to make speeches appealing to public opinion, both in India and England. And what was the remedy proposed by those who opposed the Bill, he asked. He said :—

They proposed to establish, apart from the Governor General, contrary to immemorial custom, and unconnected with his authority, a great Council of State, which was to deliberate in public, to have its proceedings reported, and was then to submit its recommendations to the Governor General. But was not an independent Council such as that suggested by the noble Earl much more likely to overpower the Governor General, and to force their opinions upon him, than a Legislative Council of the character indicated by the Government? This Council of State, according to the noble Earl, was to be composed of a large number of persons in high position, and of great weight, representing, as far as possible, the various opinions and interests existing in India, and enjoying the superadded importance of rank and standing. Were such a Council established, one of two things would

happen. Either it would have no real power, would be unable to influence the Governor General, and would find its opinions constantly disregarded—in which case men of weight and influence would decline to sit upon it, and as a deliberative body it would fall into desuetude and disgrace—or the much more probable result would ensue, that such a Council, being independent of the Governor General, having among its Members no representative of the Executive Government, and being invited to conduct its deliberations in public, would be enabled to submit its recommendations with such authority that, except in cases of great emergency, the Governor General would find it impossible to disregard their opinions. It was true that these Councillors were to have no votes; but public opinion would, under a system of open debate, give them an amount of control which was more likely to create than to avoid evils. Indeed, by their having no votes, their responsibility would be diminished. This Council was to be responsible to no one. It was to be appointed by the Governor-General simply for consultative purposes, and its Members ought, from its very nature, say whatever they thought upon every measure which was submitted to them, without the responsibility which must attach to any one who had to give a vote, and so influence the decision at which the Government was to arrive.

After a short discussion, the amendment was negatived without a division. There is nothing deserving any particular notice in the discussion on the other clauses of the Bill. Suffice it to say, that the House of Lords in Committee made no alterations in the Bill as passed by the House of Commons. So the Bill was read a third time and passed on July 22, and received the Royal Assent on August 1.

We shall now close this historical review with a few observations which suggest themselves to us on the perusal of the interesting discussions which we have summarized in the foregoing pages. At the time when the East India Council Bill was introduced, a general belief appears to have prevailed in England that it was undesirable to appoint native gentlemen as members of the proposed Councils for the simple reason that “they would never speak in the Councils at all, but would always defer to the opinions of European members.” And the most hopeful view, entertained by those who did not entertain this belief, was that “at

least, if they were admitted now, in the next generation they might be expected to say a few words, and in the third they would, perhaps, speak as much as Europeans." It is now hardly a generation yet since the Indian Councils Act was passed, and it is a very hopeful sign in the interests of India, that, to say nothing of Bengal and Madras, we in this Presidency have had several native gentlemen as members of our local Legislature who, in addition to having had the courage of their convictions, have displayed remarkable powers of debate, so remarkable indeed that in this respect they have been seldom, if ever, surpassed by any European members, whether official or non-official. It would be invidious to mention any specific names, but we feel sure that such names not only in this Presidency, but in the other two Presidencies also, will unerringly occur to the reader of these pages. And if only the authorities vested with the power of selection under the Act *always* and *invariably* made an *honest* use of that power,—and, to confine our observations for the present to this Presidency only, though the other two Presidencies have not been free from the same shortcomings, we must say that in several cases that power was simply abused by appointing as Members of Council persons whom Mr. Lal Mohan Ghose once very appropriately characterized as "Magnificent No-bodies,"—there is surely no dearth of *bona fide* representative gentlemen who can discharge the very responsible duties of Legislative Councillors intelligently, fearlessly, and with credit alike to themselves and to the people. Sir James Fergusson once said:—"It is a responsible duty to nominate members of this Council, and one which, I think, every one filling the office of Governor must exercise with thought and a sincere desire to bring to this Council true representatives of popular feeling." These are "noble words" indeed, but it would be a grievous mistake for any one to suppose that either the speaker who in words at least displayed such a beautiful appreciation of the duties which in

this respect attached to the office he held, or any of his predecessors exercised that duty *in every case* "with thought and a sincere desire to bring to the Council true representatives of popular feeling." Even Sir Richard Temple selected one or two "true representatives of popular feeling," as members of Council during his three years' administration, and so we fail to recognize any particular merit in either his predecessors or successor having done the same thing. But a practice appears to have grown up, from the very commencement, of appointing two or more non-effective members whom fiction alone can perhaps characterize as "true representatives of popular feeling." And the presence of this non-effective element, always ready and willing to support anything and everything proceeding from the source to which they owe their selection, tends to convert it to a sham that which Parliament intended to be a *bona fide* representative institution. It is the support derived from this non-effective element that alone enables the Executive Government to obtain the sanction of the Legislature to such legislative measures as the notorious Game Bill and the Mowhra Bill. And if the nominees of this class always defer to the opinions of the official European members, as they no doubt do, the responsibility for this deplorable state of things must be laid at the doors of those who deliberately select such incapable persons. ✓

As regards the Darbar theory on which Mr. Ayrton in the House of Commons, and Lord Ellenborough and Lord Grey in the House of Lords laid great stress as being the only mode best suited to the instincts and traditions of Oriental nations, it must be said that they appear to us to have attached too much importance to the form and to have utterly ignored the substance of that theory. Consultations in open Darbar by Asiatic Princes was a form, howsoever crude, of representative Government. We have not either the space or the time on the present occasion to go

the full merits of this question, but a few observations ought, we think, to be sufficient as a reply to the arguments in favour of the theory as summarized on the foregoing pages. Mr. Ayrton and Lords Ellenborough and Grey appear to have thought that, after having ascertained the views of representative men in an open Darbar, an Asiatic Prince could, if he chose, set aside the view of the majority, and act just as he pleased. A really sagacious and popular Prince would no more think of doing that than an English Sovereign would venture to refuse his assent to any measure passed by both the Houses of Parliament. In all well-regulated and settled states, this prerogative of an Asiatic Prince of affirming or vetoing the decision provisionally arrived at in a Darbar differed very little substantially, if at all, from the prerogative of an English sovereign to affirm or veto measures in respect of which the two Houses of Parliament may have expressed their opinion in unmistakable language. As Earl De Grey and Ripon very properly pointed out in his speech in reply to Lord Grey's amendment, it would have been practically impossible, in case Lord Grey's amendment had been carried, for any Governor-General to have set aside any decision arrived at by the proposed Council of State.

There remains now only one point which we are bound to notice, and it relates to the objection urged by Mr. Ayrton to the establishment of the central Legislative Council for all India, on the ground that the existence of such an institution was calculated to teach the people of the various provinces of India that they formed one nation—an idea which, if realized by the people, was calculated in Mr. Ayrton's opinion to render the continuance of British rule in India almost impossible. He added that England, having built up its Indian empire by setting up one province against another, the same procedure ought to be followed in preserving the empire by preventing the unity of the people as one nation. Mr. Ayrton

ought in the first place to have remembered that consummation, which he dreaded most as being highly prejudicial to the continuance of British rule in India, was in full course of being accomplished most effectually, though gradually and almost imperceptibly, by the extension of the railway system in India, supplemented by the rapid spread of English education, the ever-increasing influence of the Press, and the increased facilities afforded by an efficient system of the Postal Service. These four agencies have been for years past contributing much more than anything else towards the effectual demolition of all territorial or geographical barriers, and towards the effacement of all parochial distinctions. And while all these potent agencies are in full play, what can be more idle or absurd than to try to neutralize their legitimate and, we should add, inevitable result by such artificial means as the proposed refusal to establish a central institution like the Supreme Council? Moreover, it appears to us that Mr. Ayrton was wrong in thinking that the architects of the British Empire in India were greatly assisted in their work of acquisition by the active assistance of the people of one province in subjugating its neighbour. In the case of almost every acquisition made by the Company it will be found that they were enabled to establish their supremacy not so much by any external assistance as by some powerful local faction favourable to their supremacy. And it may be seriously doubted whether, if these local factions had not existed, and one of them had not made common cause with those who were then engaged in building up the British empire in India, they would have succeeded in their efforts of establishing their supremacy. The truth is that if the English people really desire to perpetuate their supremacy in India, they can do so only by means of securing the active and potential co-operation of the people in the Government of their Country.

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# PROCEEDING OF THE SABHA.

## ADDRESS TO H. E. THE GOVERNOR.

The following address of welcome was presented to H. E. the Governor Lord Reay by the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha on 22nd July 1885 in the Council Hall by the hands of a representative and influential deputation.

To,

H. E. the Right Hon'ble

LORD REAY C. I. B., LL. D.

Government of Bombay.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On behalf of the General Committee of the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha, who have appointed us to wait as a deputation upon your Excellency, we beg most respectfully to welcome your Excellency on this your first visit to the capital of the Deccan.

When the announcement of your Excellency's appointment to the charge of this Presidency as successor to the Right Hon'ble Sir James Fergusson Bart, was first made, it was hailed by us with un- mixed satisfaction as auguring the continuance of the same liberal policy which has guided the administration of this country for many years past, and secured the material and moral advance of a most favoured portion of Her Majesty's dominions in this country. Your Excellency's great linguistic and scholarly attainments, and your experience of, and connection with, many continental European countries; your labours in connection with the cause of education, the statesmanlike views you entertain upon the question of land reform and commercial freedom, the confidence reposed in your Excellency by the great statesmen and exponents of public opinion in England; all these high qualifications, the reputation of which had preceded your Excellency's arrival here, have raised high hopes, that, under your Excellency's rule, the people of this country will be blessed with a just and beneficent administration, fully alive to the wants of the times and to the appreciation of the loyal impulses which animate the Native community, and make them cherish the predominance of British rule as fraught with their highest and most permanent well being.

✕ We crave your Excellency's permission to refer in the first place to a question of local importance. In April last the Sarvajanika Sabha submitted a representation to the Bombay Government on the ques-

tion of the constitution of the Poona Municipality under Act II of 1884, respectfully soliciting a reconsideration of the orders passed in March last on the representation of the Poona Municipality on the ground that as the experimental introduction of the elective system in the spring of 1883 in the case of twenty-four city Municipalities had been attended with success, and as the introduction of the elective system in the constitution of our rural Boards had given great satisfaction both to the Government and the people in this Presidency, the time had, in its humble opinion, arrived for taking advantage of the intentions of the Legislature in making the constitution provisions of the two Local Self-Government Acts elastic in the case at least of some important towns like Poona. The Sarvajanik Sabha accordingly recommended that the Poona Municipality should consist of thirty Members, two-thirds of whom should be elective Members, and only one-third nominated by Government, and further that the body so formed should elect its own President. Moreover the Sarvjanik Sabha from the very commencement of the discussion on the Local Self-Government scheme, attached very great importance to the formation of the educated classes into a separate constituency with the right of electing a certain proportion of the elective Members, as being essential to the success of the policy. That policy, as sketched out in the two Resolutions of the Government of India was obviously and admittedly intended for utilizing the energies of these very classes, and as they had displayed greater aptitude for self-government than any other class, the Sabha strongly held that it behoved Government to recognize this fact by affording special facilities, at any rate for some time to come, to these very classes lest they might be swamped by a general rate paying constituency, if they were only incorporated with it. The Sabha accordingly recommended that a proportion of the elective Members should be elected by a limited constituency of the educated classes. And we avail ourselves of this early opportunity with the greatest pleasure to tender to your Excellency's Government our most sincere and heart-felt thanks, on behalf of the people of this ancient City, for your having been pleased to accept all these recommendations, and we further beg to assure your Excellency that we shall, with the cordial and willing co-operation of the local officers and with the generous support of your Excellency's Government, exert ourselves to the utmost to justify the confidence so generously reposed in our ability and intelligence by your Excellency's Government. We fully realize the responsibility we have thus incurred, for we know that the continuance and further extension of these very privileges to other towns will to some extent at any rate, depend upon the results we are able to show in course of time. ✓

With your Excellency's permission we beg to avail ourselves of

this opportunity to invite your attention to some of the most important questions which have become ripe for final disposal. The question of the reform of our Forest conservancy has already been pressed upon your Excellency's attention by the Presidency Association of Bombay and the Thanna Association, whose deputation waited on your Excellency at Bombay in April last. This question is not confined to the Thanna district only, but affects more or less all parts of this Presidency. The Native community generally are fully alive to the important interests, present and prospective, involved in a proper system of conservancy, and they are fully prepared to accept the main principle of conservancy regulations as essentially necessary for securing the highest prosperity of the country as a whole. Owing to a variety of causes, over which the people have had little or no control, the condition of the country from the point of view of forest conservancy has no doubt become such as to cause serious anxiety to a Government that studies the welfare of its subjects. The people accordingly fully appreciate to the utmost the extremely natural anxiety of Government to spare no effort to restore the old state of things. While fully grateful for the energetic effort Government has of late years made, the people feel that the details of Forest Association require to be very carefully watched lest the interests of the present generation may be unduly sacrificed to those of posterity, as they fear they are at present sacrificed. Perhaps the idea of making this Department a source of revenue lies also at the root of many of the existing abuses, and consequently the vested interests of many helpless classes are possibly endangered by a too stringent method of working. The best way in which the public and private interests which conflict with one another in certain matters might be reconciled would be, the appointment of a Commissioner of Europeans and Native experts both in and out of the service to go over the whole ground of the difference of views, and submit recommendation for the adoption of Government. And it has given us great pleasure to learn that your Excellency's Government has anticipated the wishes of the people by having resolved to appoint a commission of Inquiry to investigate and report upon the subject.

The attention of your Excellency's Government has already been drawn to the necessity of giving a legislative sanction to the policy of Government in regard to the reform of the land settlements, notably in respect of guaranteeing by law the exemption of private improvements from all liability to extra taxation in revision operations. A Bill intended to give effect to the intentions of Government has already been published and is about to be introduced into the Legislative Council. We submit that with a view to give effect to the wishes of Government executive action requires to be regulated by law to a

larger extent than is contemplated in the repeal of Clause (C) of Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code. The Bombay Government has, after a considerable discussion and with some alterations incidental to executive action, now committed itself definitely to the policy of accepting maximum limitations of enhancement for Taluka or village groups, as also for private holdings. It has also determined to continue the exemption of *Pota Kharab* lands exempted as such in Survey Settlements introduced after 1854. These principles of executive action should, we think, be also sanctioned by the Legislature, so as to avoid all further risk of a change of policy in the matter of the exemption of improvements from taxation. An amendment of the Revenue Code in these directions will serve to give fixity and inspire greater confidence in the classes most intimately affected by these settlements. As matters at present stand, the discretion of Settlement Officers is to a certain extent uncontrolled by fixed principles. It was with a view to regulate this discretion that the Government of India under the Marquis of Ripon issued their famous Resolution containing instructions for the guidance of the authorities in the N. W. Provinces, and recommended the same to the Bombay Government for its consideration. Some of these principles have been accepted by the Bombay Government, while others have not yet found equal acceptance. We refer especially to the limitations of the possible increase of enhancements consequent on a rise of prices, as also the rules regarding suspensions and remissions of revenues in bad seasons. This subject affects interests so large and generally so helpless, that it is too much to say that no single measure of Government is likely to promote so effectively the well-being of the community as progressive reform in this direction.

The subject of affording special credit facilities to meet the wants of the indebted agricultural classes by the constitution of Agricultural Banks will also engage your Excellency's attention. This measure of administrative relief ought to have accompanied the Legislation for the relief of rural indebtedness which has now been in operation for nearly six years. A very promising scheme of an experimental Agricultural Bank was submitted to the authorities, and received the approval of the Government of Bombay as also of the Government of India. The Secretary of State has, however, withheld his sanction pending further reference. Your Excellency's acquaintance with similar undertaking carried out successfully on the Continent of Europe inspires us with a hope that the subject will receive careful consideration at your Excellency's hands, and that the difficulties which have been raised will be satisfactorily removed.

In regard to Local Self-Government the Bombay Government has done its best to secure by law the concession of independent powers

to local bodies, and it will be your Excellency's agreeable duty during your tenure of office to give effect to the large-minded policy embodied in the measures passed last year. Both the measures contain elastic provisions which will enable Government to satisfy the demands of the more advanced localities for a larger proportion of elective Members, and the power of electing their Presidents. As both the new Boards and, in many cases, the local officers also, are new to the system sanctioned by the Legislature, they will for some time to come require the most earnest and constant supervision on the part of Government, so that the main objects of the policy underlying the legislative measure of last year may be completely fulfilled. Moreover in the adjustment of the burdens of new charges created by the Legislature great care will have to be exercised in avoiding additional taxation in the earlier years of the experiment, which would otherwise make the new policy unpopular. Your Excellency's interest in these reforms fills us with the hope that there will be nothing wanting in the liberal treatment of these and many other questions of detail which will come up before Government before the new Boards are properly constituted and set to work.

✓ In the matter of education your Excellency's predecessor by his personal interest in all educational movements and by his fostering encouragement of private enterprise did all that was possible to give the necessary start to much useful activity in all directions. There is one department of education, however, which for want of funds has not been as yet duly provided for. We refer to the comparative absence of all efforts in the direction of extending state help to technical education. We have indeed a College of Science, Agricultural and Forest Classes, a School of Arts, and small efforts in the way of schools of industry. These, however, do not suffice to meet the demands for technical instruction, the want of which is now felt to be very urgent. ✕ Government cannot in the nature of things be expected to provide technical schools all over the Presidency, it can best concentrate its efforts on a central institution in Bombay where the large number of factories and manufacturing establishments will afford the necessary help of practical instruction given in the technical institute. In the Ripon Memorial fund, which has been raised, there is already a promising nucleus of such an institute, and if this movement be duly fostered by the patronage of Government this national want will be supplied to a certain extent.

✕ Before concluding this address of welcome we crave permission to tender to your Excellency the grateful thanks of the people of Poona and of the province of which it is the capital city for the appointment of our highly esteemed townsman, Rao Bahadur Mahadeo Govind Ranade M. A. L.L. B., Judge of the Poona Small Causes Court, to be

an additional member of your Excellency's Council for the purpose of making laws and regulations. A more happy and popular selection could scarcely have been made on this occasion as is testified to by the fact that the announcement of it by your Excellency at the very commencement of your administration has been received with unanimous approval by all classes of people throughout the Presidency. The Native press of Bengal and Madras has also warmly approved of the selection in this instance. This singular unanimity will, we trust, prove extremely gratifying to your Excellency as indicating how in these days, when the national conscience has been roused after a torpor of several generations, the actions of Government are watched with the deepest interest, and how they are subjected to the closest scrutiny by the people. In this connection we shall, with your Excellency's permission, request your attention to one point of very great importance. It is now nearly a quarter of a century since an Act of Parliament created the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils, and the time has arrived when the question of the reform of these Councils both in respect of their constitution and the sphere of their duties may be expected to be raised, the more especially because the great educating agencies, which have been at work since the Act referred to above was passed, have effected very silently a great revolution in the recognition by the people of their rights and responsibilities. We may here be permitted to remark that the feeling expressed above found a responsible expression in the Bombay Session of the Legislative Council in February of last year when towards the close of his eloquent speech in support of the second reading of the Mofussil Municipalities Bill the Hon'ble Badrudin Tayabji of the Local Legislative Council appealed to your Excellency's predecessor to devote his attention to the subject. It gives us great pleasure to supplement that appeal and to commend the same to your Excellency's earnest consideration.

In conclusion we thank your Excellency for your kindness in condescending to receive this address of welcome at our hands, and we fervently hope that your Excellency's rule will be productive of lasting benefit to the people of this Presidency whom kind Providence has entrusted to your care.

We beg to remain, my Lord,  
Your most obedient servants.

K. L. NULKAR,

*Chairman.*

S. H. SATHE,

S. H. CHIPLUNKAR,

*Secretaries.*



H. E. gave the following Reply :—

GENTLEMEN,

It is to me a great pleasure to receive the welcome of your distinguished body. The patriotic terms in which it is couched enhance its value. The tribute paid by you to my distinguished predecessors who, as you say, have secured the "material and moral advance of a most favoured portion of Her Majesty's dominions in this country" increases the sense of responsibility, which must be felt by those whose duty it is to devote themselves to the welfare of Her Majesty's subjects in these parts.

You refer to the Poona Municipality. An inquiry into the condition of this City satisfied me that it would not be against its interests if the elective principle were extended, and the Government have passed the resolution which I trust will have a beneficial influence. Various localities differ so much that institutions suited to one will not prove useful to another. It is the duty of the Government carefully to watch the working of these institutions and their development, making them keep pace with the aptitude for self-government displayed by the inhabitants. Where at present the guarantees which Poona offers do not exist to the same extent, it is clear that the Government would not be justified in assimilating what is dissimilar.

You attach great importance to the specific representation of the educated classes. Your wishes in that respect have my cordial support. Though I do not wish to imply that the rate-paying constituency would not have elected members from the educated classes, still the recognition of an educated class is in accordance with your traditions and is opposed to the notion of equality which is unsound, unscientific and destructive of good government. You have discarded the "one man one vote" principle and advocated the "dual vote" principle. The fallacious simplicity of the delusive catch-words of the French Revolution has not had any attraction for you, and in following a more philosophical method I believe you have given proof of that political moderation which is the mainstay of progress. That the new Municipality may contribute to the increased prosperity of this city is my sincere wish.

The question of forest conservancy has been one to which I have given the most careful consideration ever since my arrival. You admit that forest conservancy is calculated to benefit the country. It is clear that the agricultural interest stands in need of the application of principles of agriculture, that wide tracts of country are by nature set aside for that purpose, and that the destruction of trees and the neglect in planting these areas would be foregoing unobvious means of adding to the wealth of the country. So much I think may be taken for

granted and is not in your Address denied. Future generations will have reason to be thankful for the trees planted and preserved by this generation. I am quite satisfied that forest conservancy need not in any way militate against the needs of agriculture. The agricultural interest is the first interest of India, and its rulers would show a very meagre insight into the demands on their wisdom if they ever failed to recognize the elementary truth. Besides the Land Revenue is always there to remind them of it. Wherever it can be proved that forest conservancy comes into collision with agriculture, it must give way. You are aware that at this moment forest settlements are going on. The principle which I have laid down is carefully observed by the forest settlement officers, who, as you are aware, are revenue officers and in that capacity naturally take into account how forest conservancy will affect the agricultural condition of the district. Very interesting problems arise. I shall not venture to enter the lists as to what method of tax is the most efficient. The experiments which are conducted by Mr. Ozanne will be watched eagerly and will ultimately throw light on the requirements of agriculture. When working plans are in operation we shall probably be able to allay a great amount of existing discontent. Neither the forest nor the agricultural departments are at this moment able to come to a definite agreement. You have therefore to deal with a traditional unsettled state of affairs. Our object is to arrive at a *modus vivendi*, and with that view a Commission has been appointed, which I believe to be entitled to the respect of every interest concerned. Mean-while in every settlement the Government are introducing orders to render the exigencies of forest conservancy as little vexatious as possible to the villagers, who in too many instances have wasted their aboriginal resources. The Government relies on your support in a task, which has for its sole object the increase of the productive powers of the country and as a source of revenue the forest will render taxation of a more dubious character unnecessary.

Whether you would gain much benefit from legal enactments where at present administrative elasticity gives scope to a liberal policy in the matter of land revenue I venture to doubt. The limitations of enhancement to which the Government are committed will certainly not be withdrawn, and the circumstances of every locality cannot be as it were photographed in an Act of the Legislature. The influence of the rise of prices on taxation is an economic question which cannot be disposed of summarily, and I hope you will allow me to reserve it for further consideration after I have seen more of the working of our system. This can be done all the more safely as a rise of prices is I am afraid not likely to cause us much anxiety at present, but rather the opposite phenomenon.

The question of Agricultural Banks is one certainly of very great

importance, and if the difficulties can be removed I should only be too happy to see an experiment tried especially without State interference or State aid of a financial character.

✕ On my entire sympathy with every effort to encourage technical education you may rely. ✕ To assist in the increase of manufactures, industries and arts of all kinds is the most grateful work of an Indian administrator. We cannot be too keenly alive to the importance of opening up new sources of activity for the increasing number of educated young men, who leave the rapidly increasing number of educational institutions, so that they may look forward to manifold opportunities of using their talents.

✕ The reform of the Provincial Legislative Councils is a subject for the consideration and decision of the Home Government; meanwhile I hope to make the Bombay Council as representative as possible of the various interests of the Presidency. ✕

I shall always consider it a privilege to exchange opinions with you even where, as will inevitably happen, your views may differ from mine. Every assistance given to the Government by those, who realise how difficult its task is, and I know you fully do so, can but be welcome.

### ADDRESS OF WELCOME TO H. H. THE MAHARAJA GAIKWAR OF BARODA.

His Highness the Gaiikwar of Baroda was entertained in grand style on 28th September 1885 at the Heerabag Towā Hall by the members of the Sarvajanjik Sabha, who for a few days back had been making every preparation on this account. The Hall and the way leading to it presented a very gay appearance from the numerous flags that were visible. They in every instance contained words expressing a hearty welcome to His Highness. The scenery about the Hall itself, however, was all that the brilliancy of a thousand small lights placed in fantastic positions in all the corners of the building and among flowers and flowering plants, could make it, while the effect was increased by the hundreds of little streamers, that hung in all directions. The scene was something like that told of in fairy palaces. Long before His Highness arrived, the Hall was filled with a large and influential number of native Gentlemen who were of all classes of society. There were merchants, lawyers, rich Zemindars, and Gentlemen belonging to the Judicial, Educational and Public Works Departments. On His Highness arriving he first proceeded to a small museum which is on the premises. The museum contains several fine pieces of workmanship all wrought by the Natives of Poona and the adjacent cities. His Highness appeared well pleased with the many beautiful things that were here to be seen, and after spending about half an hour in the place came to the Hall itself where everybody rose on his arrival. *Deccan Herald.*

On His Highness taking his seat on the raised dais purposeily reserved for him, the following Address was read:—

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HIGHNESS,

WE, the members of the Poona Sarvajanjik Sabha and representatives of the inhabitants of the city and camp of Poona and of the population of Maharashtra generally, beg to approach Your Highness on this most auspicious occasion of Your Highness' first visit to this part of the country, with our humble address of congratulation and thankfulness for the great honour Your Highness has done us in accepting our invitation to this great gathering of the nobility and gentry of this ancient city. Your Highness' visit, prompted as it must have been by a desire to see this land of

your ancestors, filled us with sincere gratification, and it was this feeling which prompted hundreds and thousands of the inhabitants of this city to welcome Your Highness on your first arrival at the Railway Station. The many kind visits paid by Your Highness to the educational and other Institutions of this city, and the kind interest Your Highness has shown in our public movements, will strengthen the bonds of affection and esteem which connect this ancient city with Your Highness' dominions, and will, we hope, induce Your Highness to repeat your visit to this city under more agreeable circumstances. For, in the midst of these festivities, we cannot put out of mind the recollection of the great bereavement which has taken away from Your Highness the solace and comfort of married life, a partner in your joys and sorrows, one so well endowed by nature and education to be worthy of her high position. We trust this sacred memory will be a guardian angel and be a bond of sympathy which will make Your Highness feel for the sorrows of humanity.

Many of us have been privileged to enjoy Your Highness' hospitality at Baroda on two occasions, and it affords us sincere pleasure that Your Highness has kindly consented to accept this poor return at our hands. The associations of this place have no splendour about them, save what may be derived from the historical past in which our own and Your Highness's ancestors played so great a part. As long as our annals are cherished in national memory, the valour and the daring of the great Damaji and Pilaji Gaiikwar, who conquered Gujarath, and the foresight and sagacity of your own great name-sake Sayyji Maharaj, will occupy a prominent place in our history. Such recollections crowd upon us and fill us with feelings which no time will obliterate. With the advent of a new order of things providentially guided, the Maharastra and Gujarath have entered into a new relationship which has immensely strengthened the feeling of attachment, originally subsisting between Your Highness' illustrious house and the Maharastra. And the wisdom of the selection by the British Indian Government of Your Highness to mark the commencement of this auspicious order of things has been amply vindicated by the history of the past ten years, more especially by the firmness and ability with which Your Highness has, during the last three years, wielded sovereign powers and raised Baroda to its present condition. Your

Highness' great attainments, your untiring application, your assiduous care for the welfare of your people, your love of justice, the peace and prosperity which have attended your efforts, and above all the purity of your domestic life,—all these are happy auguries of a bright and blessed career in prospect before you, and we gladly take this opportunity of testifying on a public occasion like this our sincere appreciation of all that has been done in the past, and contemplated in the future.

Your Highness is already aware that in these days, when so many liberal agencies are at work in educating the people to a more or less acute appreciation of popular rights, the duties and responsibilities of a native sovereign have naturally become more arduous and exacting. These influences have rescued India, and especially the Native States, from their isolation, and no Native Prince can afford, under existing circumstances to look upon his work in any other light than a noble trust and responsibility in which the progressive welfare and political education of his subjects are the sole justification for the exercise of power over them. Those of us who live under British protection enjoy certain advantages, but these are heavily handicapped by certain disqualifications from which the subjects of Native States are happily exempt. The identity of interests between the rulers and the ruled is more definitely realized in Native States than it can possibly be in British territory; the education of the people in the higher virtues of self-government in all directions is more easy of accomplishment; the development of national resources is less hampered by extraneous interests; the burden of taxation can easily be made to be less; heavy economy in expenditure can be ensured with greater facility in well-ordered Native States than is possible in British India. We are glad to find that all these circumstances have been steadily kept in view by Your Highness' Government; the burden of taxation has been lightened, great public works undertaken with a view to the good of the people, native talent and ambition duly encouraged, the supremacy of law maintained intact, industrial enterprise duly fostered, higher education stimulated, and liberal help afforded to every movement intended for the elevation of this country. The success that has been attained in these directions encourages us in expressing a hope that in time to come Your Highness will find it possible to carry on the same good work on a much larger scale in directions hitherto unattempted. Here we crave Your Highness'

permission to briefly notice some of the points which, in our humble opinion, deserve a careful consideration from Your Highness' Government.

Among these points the foremost in importance is that which relates the increased efficiency of the regular and irregular forces on which Your Highness's Government has, in pursuance of old traditions, to spend a considerable amount of the revenues of the State. It is very gratifying to find how on the last occasion of the national peace and prosperity being threatened by the then impending hostile demonstration on the North-west frontier of India, Native Princes and Chiefs from one end of the country to the other cordially came forward with the loyal offer to place all their resources unreservedly at the disposal of the Imperial Government. As a means of strengthening the internal national defences we humbly submit that some steps should be taken to afford regular Military instruction of the modern type to a selected number of youths from among the scions of your nobility so as to qualify them to command and efficiently administer these forces and to share the glories and honour, with the general forces of the Empire, of active service in its defence against external foes. This kind of Military instruction can be secured only in the Military schools in England. In this respect Your Highness, as the favoured child of the British Government, can take the initiative, and set an example to your brother Princes and Chiefs throughout the country.

Another point which we beg leave to notice is the ever-increasing necessity experienced throughout the country of an organized effort for establishing technical schools as a means of reviving some of the old industries which are fast dying out, and of introducing new ones so that the increasing pressure of agriculture may be considerably relieved. If we are correctly informed, this question has already engaged Your Highness's attention, and Your Highness's Government contemplates the establishment of a few scholarships enable specially selected youths to proceed to foreign countries for securing efficient instruction in the technical schools thereof.

The other points have reference to the political education of the people entrusted to the fostering care of Your Highness. The territories of the Baroda State are on all sides surrounded by British territory in which systematic efforts for the political education of the people have been made during the last thirty years and more. In respect of some of these efforts the success that had thus

far attended them led the Indian Government under the late Viceroy to make a considerable advance, and that too with much greater success than was anticipated. This experience obtained in the British territory will, we trust, be regarded as a sufficient justification for our venturing to respectfully indicate the lines of reform which with suitable variations may be tried in the Baroda State under the auspices of your Highness' Government whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself. The gradually increasing association of the people of the larger towns in the management of their own local affairs; the encouragement and revival of the old time-honoured system of Panchayat as a means of securing the co-operation of the people in the administration of civil and criminal justice; the publication of the annual budget of revenue and expenditure as a means of gradually interesting the people in the administration of the State; the responsible consultation with the leaders of the people in all legislative projects and measures of taxation;—these are some of the reforms which, we have no doubt, will commend themselves to Your Highness, and which Your Highness will, as time advances, see your way to gradually and cautiously introduce.

In conclusion we beg to assure your Highness that your visit to this ancient our condescension in coming to this representative gathering will be gratefully remembered by the people of Maharashtra, and we pray that Providence may grant you long life and prosperity for achieving victories of peace which are always more lasting and beneficent, than those of war.

We beg to subscribe ourselves your Highness' most obedient servants.

KRISHNAJI LAKSHMAN NULKAR,

*Chairman of the Sabha.*

SHIVARAM HARI SATHE,

S. H. CHIPLEKAR,

*Secretaries of the Sabha.*



H. H. the Maharaja read the following reply.

GENTLEMEN.

I am obliged to you for the cordial welcome you have given me on the occasion of my first visit to Poona. It had long been my wish to see the capital of the Deccan and the expectations I had entertained have been more than realised, whether with regard to the many useful institutions which abound in this place, or with regard to the intelligent leaders of an advanced community whom it has been my privilege to interview. I shall be pleased to think that a personal tie will now connect me with some of the gentlemen to whom I refer, while it is impossible that I can have seen your institutions without deriving benefit from them.

In your full address you have touched on many points affecting the well being of the native States of India, which are constantly in my mind. The loyalty of native Princes to the British Empire, their anxiety to co-operate in the defence of the continent in a reasonable degree and in the manner most acceptable to that Empire, the aspiration all good Princes must entertain to introduce educational and other reforms and to develop the resources of their dominions, the adoption of such liberal measures as may freely be granted under a rule which as yet must be personal rather than constitutional; these and other matters to which you refer will, I trust never cease to occupy my close attention.

I bid you all a hearty farewell, with the expression of a hope that I may return here again some day, to keep our new acquaintance alive.

## A SCHEME FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION\*.

The paths of life are varied, and varied must therefore be the Education that seeks to enable people to tread these paths with success. But this variedness has been much wanting in the educational efforts heretofore made in India. These efforts have been made but in one direction, the direction of the Humanities. The result has been that they have produced but one type of men,—those who can read and write. The best of the type achieve eminence in scholarship, become elegant writers, fluent speakers, and efficient office men; but the rest mostly degenerate into mere quill-drivers and place-seekers. The country demands a few people of this type, but the educational institutions of the country send it an unlimited supply. The country takes the few it wants, and lets the rest alone. Unfitted for anything but reading and writing, these find themselves at sea with no landmark far or near. On the other hand, other paths of life remain untrod, though they lead to most desirable goals. The scholar, the merchant, the agriculturist, and the manufacturer, each needs his own special line of education; and in that line he must be educated.

The merchant requires acquaintance with one or more foreign living languages, with geography, with accounts, with the products of different countries, with their coins, weights, and measures, with the principles, rules and usages of banking, partnership, agency &c.

The agriculturist requires practical acquaintance with the seasons, with the nature of soils, with the composition of manures, their effects upon plants, their special requirements and their adaptibilities, with drawing, surveying, watering, draining.

The manufacturer has to work on raw materials,

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\* This paper was written by Rao Bahadur V. J. Kirtane, Naib Dewan of Baroda for the information of H. H. the Maharaja, and has been published with permission, X

and to produce manufactured goods by studying the properties and affinities of matter, and the regulation and economy of force,—provinces chiefly of chemistry and mechanics.

This special training given to a special class with a special object is what is called technical education. In no sphere of life in this country is the want of technical education more felt than in that of the manufacturer. He is fast forgetting the old knowledge of his fathers; and he is acquiring no new knowledge which he can call his own. In his sphere, to use Dr. Playfair's words, "industry has been severed from science, like a tree from its roots." No wonder the tree is withering. It is here, therefore, that our first efforts must be made.

Reading and writing is as necessary for technical education as for literary education; but the student of technical education wants it not for its own sake, but as an auxiliary to his own special pursuits. A student of technical education studies words that he may understand not the laws of language, but the laws of nature. The theoretical and the practical must be blended together in his system of education. He has to observe, to follow, to assist nature. He has to use not the head alone, but the head and hands together; and it is only in this way that he can understand, follow, and assist nature. Hence he has to study the practical sciences, the sciences of Chemistry, Mechanics, Light, Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, &c. He has to study them both theoretically and practically. One who studies mere theory will only be fit to be a school master or a professor. One who studies practice only will be a mere mechanic, a mere operative without insight. One who studies both theory, and practice has alone the capacity to question nature, to imitate her workings, to establish a proper connection between means and ends, to discover, to invent. It is not every man that reads and writes that becomes an eminent scholar. Similarly it is not every man that

studies the sciences theoretically and practically that becomes an inventor or a discoverer. But just as there can be no scholarship where there is no reading and writing, there can be no discovery or invention where there is no study of the sciences.

A manufacturer, if he is not to be a mere mechanic, a mere labourer, must have theoretical and practical acquaintance with Chemistry and Mechanics. He wants at all events a good knowledge of one of these, with a passable knowledge of the other. A combined knowledge of the two is the basis of all industrial progress. This necessary connection must be thoroughly mastered by all who wish to find out a way of imparting technical education to artizans and manufacturers.

We shall therefore endeavour to emphasize this point upon the attention of our readers by one or two illustrations. In the spinning and weaving industry, for instance, we have to deal chiefly with the regulation and economy of external forces in their application to the conversion of raw material into complex and superior mechanical forms, fit for human needs. In extricating the seed from the cotton-wool, in cleaning the cotton, in making it into yarn, in weaving the yarn into fabric, we regulate, and we economize the force produced by steam by means of mechanical contrivances. The saving of time, labour, and material is the end in view. The produce of cotton weaving is grey goods, i. e., goods unbleached, that is again goods having the colors of the raw material. But we are not satisfied with the appearance of these goods. We want to drive away the dull grey color of the raw material. We want in its stead a pure white color or some bright color,—red, purple, yellow, green. We have to manufacture, therefore, goods bleached and goods dyed. Mechanical skill has produced the grey goods. There it stops. It cannot whiten them, it cannot dye them. Chemistry here comes to the re-

lief of Mechanics. One sister takes up the work of the other.

In bleaching, the object is to get rid of the natural coloring matters of the raw material. This is effected by passing grey goods through a solution of chloride of lime. What is this chloride of lime? It is a compound of chlorine and lime. Lime we all know. It can easily be got in the Bazaar. What is chlorine? How is it to be obtained? A knowledge of Chemistry here becomes important. Chlorine is a gas, and it is easily obtained from common salt. Wherever, therefore, there is sea water, there is Chlorine, for common salt is a compound of Chlorine and sodium. All that has to be done therefore is to separate the Chlorine from the sodium. In other words common salt has to be resolved into its constituents. How can this separation be effected? By a knowledge of the affinities of matter. Chlorine has combined with sodium in common salt, because to speak in popular language, there is a sort of friendship between sodium and Chlorine. We want to separate the friends. We must set out in the usual way. We must find out a greater friend of Chlorine than sodium,—one with whom Chlorine would like to keep company, even at the risk of separation from sodium. Has Chlorine then a better friend than sodium? The Chemist answers, yes. He will tell you “Seek Hydrogen, and Chlorine then will not care for sodium.” This is what is meant in Chemical language by the phrase “Chlorine has a greater affinity to Hydrogen than to sodium.” Hydrogen then has to be sought. Where can we conveniently find it? The chemist again answers; “all acids contain Hydrogen.” Find out a cheap acid from which you can extricate it. Sulphuric acid is such an acid. We therefore take sulphuric acid, that we may draw away its Hydrogen, and take it to Chlorine, and that Chlorine may leave sodium, and take to Hydrogen. Therefore we mix common salt with sulphuric acid. As might be expected, when we do this, Chlorine

leaves sodium, combines with Hydrogen, and forms Hydrochloric acid. Abandoned by Chlorine, sodium enters into friendship with the remaining elements of the sulphuric acid, and forms a new compound, sulphate of sodium.

We have now separated Chlorine from sodium. But it is still united with Hydrogen. We want to separate it from Hydrogen also. We want Chlorine, and Chlorine alone. We must have some substance therefore which will harass Chlorine, and make it leave Hydrogen. The oxide of manganese is such a substance. It is a compound of oxygen and manganese. Manganese will draw away some Chlorine from Hydrogen, and oxygen will draw Hydrogen to itself. Hydrogen and oxygen having combined to form water, Hydrogen is gone. Manganese has taken up what Chlorine it could take without surfeit to form a stable, a saturated compound, while the remaining unabsorbed portion of the Chlorine is isolated, and is thus captured in that isolated form. Bleaching wants Chlorine, and guided by the science of Chemistry, we have thus obtained Chlorine. But Chlorine is a dangerous gas. It would be difficult to keep it on any large scale in a gaseous state. We cannot keep it dissolved in water, because it would very easily take up the Hydrogen of the water, and become Hydrochloric acid again. We must, if possible, keep it hid in some solid substance. Lime would do this. Lime retains this Chlorine, and the compound is the bleaching powder used in whitening the grey goods, and is called Chloride of lime. Lime is a solid substance, and we can keep therefore this substance, chloride of lime, to any extent. Having found the substance, and having stored it for use, we must find out the way of using it. Chlorine itself is not an absorbent of colors, and yet we are told we are to use it for their removal. The real power of removing colours lies in nascent oxygen; and the use of chlorine is merely to set this oxygen free to act upon coloring matters. We have

therefore to find out a substance which contains an element friendly to chlorine combined with oxygen. Then the two friends will combine, and set oxygen free. It has been already mentioned that chlorine is a great friend of Hydrogen. We must therefore find out a substance, which is a combination of Hydrogen and Oxygen; and introduce Chlorine into it. Such a compound of Oxygen and Hydrogen is water. Introduce Chlorine into water, and introduce then the colored substance from which we have to remove the colors. Chlorine takes up the Hydrogen of the water, forms Hydrochloric acid, and sets oxygen free, which readily dissolves the coloring matter, and leaves the substance colorless. This is the theory and practice of bleaching.

Given therefore common salt, sulphuric acid, oxide of manganese, and lime, a student of chemistry will help you to make bleaching powder. A mere labourer accustomed to bleach will give you a piece of cloth thoroughly bleached, provided you give him bleaching powder. But it is only one in a thousand who knows how to produce bleaching powder, that will remove all your difficulties, and enable you to carry on bleaching on a large scale with the mechanist's assistance.

The processes of production are not difficult. The real elements of success are knowledge and skill. It is the office of technical schools to supply the required knowledge theoretically, and the required skill practically.

Still our wants are not satisfied. We want white goods in preference to grey goods. We want dyed goods in preference to white goods. Our men want white coats, but our ladies want scarlet *saris*. How is the scarlet to be obtained? We must, therefore, have recourse to the processes of dyeing. Here again we must go to the Chemist, and tell him that we want a fast bright red color. The chief process found necessary in the art of dyeing fast is that of oiling and mordanting the goods to be colored. This is a necessary process for

obtaining fast colors. Its necessity has been proved by practice, but why it is necessary has not yet been satisfactorily explained. What is a mordant? It is a substance which seizes colouring matter, and fixes it in different stuffs. The mordant for Turkey red is a liquid mixture of acetate of lead known as sugar-lead and alum. Here again a practical Chemist alone can produce these substances. Any labourer can mix them, but the Chemist alone can produce them; and if he wants to produce them on a large scale, he can only do so by the assistance of the Machanist. Acetate of lead is a compound of Acetic acid and lead. We can get lead in any quantity in the Bazaar. But what is acetic acid? How to get it? It looks a very mysterious name; go to the Chemist, and he tells you at once that it exists abundantly in all woods. Some woods will give more, some less. But there is the substance which will give you acetic acid. Put wood into a closed vessel, and heat the vessel. Under the heat so applied, the wood gives off fumes; lead the fumes by pipes immersed in water into a water tank. This water tank will be found to have received impure acetic acid, along with water, naphtha, and tar. Heat this liquid to drive away naphtha. Naphtha driven away, acetic acid will come up, and leave tar as residue at the bottom. The material for obtaining the acid is thus abundant, and everywhere available, and the process itself is not difficult. What is wanted is the knowledge of the fact that wood is the source of acetic acid, that impure acetic acid contains naphtha and tar, and that it can be freed from them by the process of heating. This knowledge the Chemist alone can supply; But the Chemist will only show how to produce acetic acid on a small scale. For commercial purposes we must go to the Machinist, who will provide you with large metal vessels or retorts, teach you how to enclose them in brick works, how to shut them up at one end, how to fix pipes to them at the other, how to adjust metal



still for heating the impure liquid, and so on. The Chemist and the Machinist must put their heads together. Having thus got acetic acid, and got lead from the market, we can easily combine them to get acetate of lead. The Chemist says "we must get lead corroded, for this corrosion is really the substance we want." We have to subject lead to the joint action of air and the vapour of acetic acid. The Machinist says "very good, we can make you an apparatus in which you can expose sheets of lead to the action of the air and vapour."

Now the other substance of the mordant is alum. Where and how to get it is the next question. In countries like Cutch and Okhaurandal, there is a certain earth in which Nature has stored sulphate of alumina. What we have to do is to water this earth, and the sulphate of alumina comes to the surface as efflorescence. This efflorescence has to be collected and treated with carbonate of Potash and sulphuric acid. Where and how to get this carbonate of Potash is the next question. The Chemist comes to your relief; he says wherever there is a forest, wherever there is any plant growth, there is carbonate of Potash. The very ashes you get by burning wood or dung contain a large quantity of carbonate of Potash. Take the ashes, mix them with water, and the carbonate of Potash will be dissolved in the water, leaving the rest of the ashes as residue. Evaporate the water by heating, and you have what you want. The carbonate of potash, and the efflorescent sulphate of Alumina combined together, produce alum. The materials for alum are abundant and the processes for obtaining it are not difficult. All you want is the knowledge and the skill of the Chemist and the Machinist. Now by mixing this acetate of lead and alum, the mordant required comes ready to hand. This mordant serves as a common friend between the fibres of cotton, and the coloring substance with which it is to be dyed. Fix the

mordant on the cloth, and dry it. The soluble mordant becomes insoluble on the fibres, and adapts them to receive and retain the coloring substance. The fibre likes the mordant, the mordant likes the color. There is a mutual understanding therefore established between all three, and they go together. The cloth is fast dyed.

The article chiefly employed as a coloring material for red colors was formerly madder, which is still exported from India to Europe. Within the last few years, however, Chemists have extracted what they call artificial alizarine, the coloring principle of madder from coal-tar. There are substances in India other than madder which contain alizarine. The Surangi of the Bazars, also called Al, which is so largely used for obtaining the dull red called Khârvâ colour, is said by some eminent Chemists to be a purer source of alizarine than even madder. The difficulty with it is that, along with alizarine, it gives up a large quantity of brown resinous matter, which it is hard to expel. It is this brown resinous substance which gives this Khârvâ red the dullness we observe in it. There is here a field for further investigation, and it is only students well-versed in practical and theoretical Chemistry that can pursue such investigations. But it is only by the assistance of the Machinist that we can make the Chemist's researches useful on a large scale.

We have given these few details, tedious though they may be, in order to bring out clearly the fact that a joint knowledge of Chemistry and Mechanics is absolutely necessary to those whom we have to equip for industrial pursuits. Such equipment is the main object of a technical school, and it must, therefore, make arrangements to instruct students in these sciences,—the instruction being both in theory and in practice. It is not expected that every student will be a proficient Chemist, as well as a proficient Machinist. As once observed before, a good knowledge of the one science, and a

passable knowledge of the other, is generally what is wanted. Men so trained will mutually assist each other, and their joint efforts will benefit the country. Men so trained will not be a burden to the state, so many and so varied will be their activities, and so large the public that will take advantage of them. A few technical institutions of this sort will bring unheard-of prosperity to the country. In a recent article published in the *Times of India* of the 22nd Instant, on the subject of technical education, the usefulness of such institutions is well illustrated in the following words :—

• “The school of Martiniere is the great technical school at Lyons. The immense good done by this school was noticed by the Commissioners on technical instruction appointed by Imperial decree in June 1863. They write :—“There are in the town of Lyons a large number of skilled artizans who have sat on the benches of the school, the principal dyers are old pupils of the school, and to them is due the increased prosperity of the trade of the town by the remarkable discoveries of new and fashionable colors.” “The Technical University at Zurich is well known throughout Europe. A writer on Technical Education has given us a glowing picture of the effect the school has had on the fortunes of the land.” “The youth of the country” he writes “have flocked with avidity to Zurich, and the young men thus trained are with equal avidity taken out into the Public Works, and manufacturing institutions of Switzerland ; and whether it arises from this cause or some other it is an astonishing fact that the Swiss—remote from the sea, that high way of merchandize, remote from coal and iron those staples of our manufacturing industry—the Swiss in their far valleys are rapidly growing a dexterous and successful manufacturing people. From us they have taken away our Coventry ribbon manufacture ; from Lyons they have appropriated a large portion of their

famous silk weaving,—in watches and clocks they have long kept the rest of the world at a distance; and their intelligent, educated and skilled men are prized all over Europe.” There is no reason why the Marathas in their far valleys should not rapidly grow a dexterous and successful manufacturing people.

We are tempted in this place to quote a telling passage from the lectures of one of the most scientific men of the age—Dr. Playfair.—Speaking to Englishmen in England, he adverted to the efforts which the continental nations of Europe were making to attain industrial progress, by opening industrial colleges, warned them that if they wanted to keep their supremacy, they must teach their youths the theory and practice of science, and that they could not always rely upon the capacity of capital to enroll foreign talent into the service of their country. Whatever the aptness of his words as applied to England, they certainly have a deep meaning when applied to India. He says :—

“ A competition in industry must, in an advanced state of civilization, be a competition of intellect. The influence of capital may purchase you for a time foreign talent. Our Manchester calico-printers may, and do, keep foreign designers in France at liberal salaries. Our glass works may, and do, buy foreign science to aid them in their management. Our Potteries may, and do, use foreign talent both in management and design. Our silver smiths and diamond setters may and do depend much upon foreign talent in design, and foreign skill in execution. But is all this not a suicidal policy which must have termination, not for the individual manufacturer, who wisely buys the talent wherever he can get it, but for the nation, which, careless of the education of her sons, sends over capital abroad as a premium to that intellectual progress which, in our present apathy is our greatest danger. This points to the necessity of establishing industrial colleges, and it implies at the same time an adaptation of juvenile

education to the wants of the age. All this impresses itself upon my mind with a conviction as strong as that the glorious sun sheds its light giving rays to this naturally dark world of ours. Do not let us by severing industry from science, like a tree from its roots, have the unhappiness of seeing our goodly stem wither and perish by a premature decay; but, as the tree itself stretches out its arms to heaven to pray for food, let us in all humility ask God also to give us that knowledge of his works which will enable us to use them in promoting the comfort and happiness of His Creatures."

We shall now endeavour to draw up a programme for the establishment of a technical school here. The object is to fit youths to pursue industrial paths in life. These youths must be divided into two classes, those who will be able in after life to act the part of leaders, and those who will be able to act the part of followers. We shall speak of the former first. For this class we must choose such youths as have acquired a certain knowledge of reading and writing, both in their vernacular language and in English. English is necessary, as there is not yet sufficient scientific literature, and there is no technical literature at all in the vernaculars. Though English literature is so full, yet Englishmen and Americans have in their technical schools provided for instruction in German, French, Italian, and other foreign languages. Progress requires that the intelligent workers of one country ought to be in communication with the intelligent workers of other countries, when their ends and aims are the same. The knowledge of these foreign languages need not be scholarly. If it makes Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen,—understand each other, it is quite enough. In India such knowledge of English would be sufficient. Boys who have passed the VIth standard of our High Schools should therefore be enrolled in the technical schools at the age of say 16 or 17. India is a poor country, and our youths must commence the battle of life at the

age of 21 or 22. Let then 16 or 17 be the age of admission, and the sixth English and Vernacular standards the tests of admission. A four or five years period will be the duration of the school course. The student will then get out at 20, or, 21 a self-reliant man. The principal instruction of the school will be in the sciences of Chemistry and Mechanics, theory and practice going hand in hand. Besides the lecture rooms, therefore, there will be wanted a workshop for practical instruction in Mechanics, and a laboratory for practical instruction in Chemistry. In the lecture rooms, there will be wanted a professor of Chemistry, and a professor of Mechanics and Mathematics, a Drawing Master (one who knows Mechanical drawing), and an English Teacher. The professor of Chemistry will carry out instruction in the laboratory; the workshop will require a practical man at its head—call him a superintendent. This teaching staff will be enough for the present. The nucleus of a workshop and the nucleus of a laboratory already exist in the state. No doubt they will require some additions; but they exist already. At present they are not doing any work; but give them the motive power, and they will go on. The professors both of Chemistry and Mechanics ought to be more than ordinary men. It is not unlikely that we may get natives fitted for one or both of these posts. But it would not be bad policy to get both these professors from England at first. There is already a suitable man in Baroda who might be selected to be the practical head of the workshop. A drawing master can be easily had from the service itself. The following will give an idea of the expenditure wanted:—

Professors of Chemistry and Mechanics each, say, from Rs. 500 to 700 a month, or say, both together	... ..	Rs. 1,200
Drawing Master	... ..	Rs. 150
English Teacher	... ..	Rs. 150
Superintendent Workshop...	... ..	Rs. 200
Contingencies, Materials, &c.	... ..	Rs. 225
Scholarships	... ..	Rs. 150

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Total Rs. 2,075

Total for one year Rs. 24,900

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The workshop will return a portion of its expenditure; but this need not be counted upon here.

The fitting up of the workshop will cost for a fair beginning about Rs. 20,000 (Rs. 10,000 have been already sanctioned.) Many Machines now lying idle may besides be utilized. The fitting up of a good laboratory will cost about the same amount; about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of this amount has already been spent. A suitable building for the school will cost about Rs. 60,000, if erected merely with an eye to business. The total of this non-recurring expenditure will come to, say, a lac of Rupees. A large portion of it may be met by funds raised by the public; the recurring annual expenditure should be defrayed by the state. An addition of Rupees 25,000, a year, to the educational Budget on this account will be necessary. A technical High School is now even a greater necessity than a literary High School; and this addition to the Budget will be amply repaid by the union it will bring about between Industry and Science.

As mentioned in the body of the memorandum, theoretical and practical training will go hand in hand. Hours in the class room will be followed by hours in the workshop and laboratory. During the first year, classes in Chemistry and Mechanics, and attendance in the laboratory and workshop will be compulsory. In the second year, students may exercise option,

and may either attend the study of both the sciences as before, or, may devote their whole attention either to Chemistry or Mechanics. In the 3rd and 4th years, in addition to general studies, the students may be called upon to work at and produce certain models of machines and chemical substances upon a moderate scale. For instance, in these years the students of Mechanics may be engaged in making, say, pumps, presses, looms, small engines, boilers &c. The students of Chemistry may be engaged in producing on a moderate scale acids or alkalies, or their combinations with metals. One or two special works, though not very large, may have to be opened at first as adjuncts to the school. These works, however, will pay for themselves. After a time, many such will spring up spontaneously in the country.

Upon the basis of this memorandum, a course of instruction extending over 4 years may easily be drawn up.

The course as indicated above will produce a superior class of people—people who will be leaders of industrial progress. But leaders want large well-trained followings. Whatever the qualifications of captains and generals, their success depends upon a well-organized and disciplined soldiery. The soldiers do not want the same qualifications as the leaders. Our soldiery will consist of skilled mechanics and operatives—men dexterous in manipulations, though not versed in the theory of the operations they perform. One aim of technical school will be to produce large numbers of this class of men. Practice will be their chief training. They ought to be enrolled in numbers.

The existing trading and manufacturing classes may here provide the best recruits. The sons of carpenters, smiths, and other workers in metals will join the workshop. The sons of oilmen, washermen, dyers, and printers, will join the laboratory. The recruiting of course need not be confined to these classes. Their course of study will extend only to



two years. They need not possess as a qualification for admission a knowledge of reading and writing. But these must be taught them as necessary subjects during their two years course. A little knowledge of English will also be valuable to them, though this need not be insisted upon. A large class of skilled workmen versed in the practice of industrial processes will be they trained, and they will spread themselves over the country. With such soldiers and their captains and generals, we may enter upon a deliberate campaign, and we may hope to invade the kingdom of nature with success.

There is one point more which we wish to advert to, before leaving the subject. The kind of education contemplated in this article may be given by either opening technical schools in this country, or by sending scholars to foreign countries, where either such schools or large industrial works exist—countries like England and America. Our belief is that the former is by far the preferable course. After all, we shall be able to send out only a very limited number of students to foreign countries. The difficulty of choosing qualified students must, for many years, to come, be very great; and as a consequence, the choice in many cases must be a haphazard one. Under these conditions, the chances of failure are many, while the probability of their attaining excellence or exhibiting any thing like genius is very small indeed. Technical schools opened in the country would on the contrary train many hands and many intellects; and the chances of discovering really right men for right work would be much greater. We are not to be understood to mean that training in countries like England and America may not be more valuable than training in India. For further training in such countries, we would choose the passed students of technical schools in India. The graduates of such schools with a year or two's foreign training would be found to be immensely superior to raw youths sent out for that period.

## THE HEREDITARY OFFICERS ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Now that two Bills have been introduced in the Bombay Legislative Council to amend Act III of 1874, it is time that a protest should be entered against some of the sweeping and arbitrary provisions of the Act which it is proposed to amend, and the perfunctory manner in which the Act has been worked by the officers charged with its administration. In the statement of objects and reasons prefixed to Bill No. 2 of 1885, the Honorable Mr. Peile, the member in charge of the Bill, stated, as representing the views of the executive Government, that the principles of the Act have been generally understood and accepted. We doubt whether such an encouraging statement can be justified by an actual appeal to public opinion. The Revenue Officers, who have an obvious interest in glorifying their own work in connection with the Act, were the only parties consulted by Government in respect of its success or failure. They have of course a right to be heard, but only in self-defence. They are not the principal parties concerned, at least their views must be checked by the opinions formed by the Vatan-dar classes themselves. The Government has to all appearances taken no pains to ascertain how far the addition in 1874 of a legislative sanction to the practically irresponsible manner of dealing with Vatan rights and Vatan property, which had till then been in vogue, has worked satisfactorily, and checked and regulated the exercise of those arbitrary powers, which too often make the Vatan-dars more wretched and helpless than the meanest Rayat in the land, and tend to convert the Vatan into a badge of slavery, and make its tenure more uncertain and burdensome than that of any other kind of property.

We are ourselves inclined to think that the principles of the Act have not been generally accepted, nor

can they ever be reasonably expected to be popular, in the true sense of the word, with those whom the Act affects. The discretionary powers exercised by the officers concerned in the enquiries held under the Act, and the severe nature of the punishments imposed over and above those sanctioned by the general Criminal law, have been chiefly the source of this great unpopularity. These complaints have hitherto found no articulate expression of discontent, because the Act directly affects only a small portion of the general population, which is moreover far removed from the centres of intelligence where their grievances could be ventilated, and discussed with effect. By ousting the Civil Courts from their jurisdiction to adjudicate upon Vatan disputes, so far as they were covered by the inquiries held under the Act, the Government has effectually gagged the mouths of all complainants. The aggrieved parties have indeed frequently attempted by ingenious devices of prayers and plaints to overleap these restraints, and to secure an adjudication of the very rights which the law prohibits the Civil Courts from taking cognizance of. These attempts, though few and far between, show pretty clearly that the inquiries under the Act held by the Revenue authorities are far from being popular, and that no confidence is reposed in the extrajudicial procedure of these Revenue Judges. And it could not well be otherwise. Our ancient traditions have all along favoured Vatan property as peculiarly sacred and inviolable. The national sentiment is still very strong on this point. The loss of a few Rupees involved in ordinary money disputes is a matter of no great consequence, compared to the value which people set upon these Vatan rights. Under Native rule, the proudest sovereign affected a peculiar regard for Vatan, and the most arbitrary tyrants did not venture to deal summarily with them. Under British rule all this has been changed. A separate judiciary, whose action is regulated by elaborate checks and laws, deals with money disputes, while Vatan properties, and

disputes regarding them, are handed over to the irresponsible discretion of Revenue and Magisterial officers. One can easily imagine the hopeless dismay of poor suitors, whose rights, perhaps, as old as the oldest village Communities, with customs of service and pedigrees as old, or older certainly than many a Royal house in India and Europe, and capable of being proved by a vast amount of every conceivable form and kind of evidence, are determined and adjudicated upon, finally and without a regular appeal, after summary enquiries, and in the shortest time possible, by judges innocent of all knowledge of the principles of Civil Law, and harassed by a multitude of conflicting duties. The Honorable Member of Council in charge of the bill must have been in our opinion, wholly unconscious of the great responsibility he has undertaken when, under the circumstances, he committed the Executive Government to an unqualified and favourable judgment on the Act and its administration.

The Act together with the amending bill, now before the Council, principally deals with three important questions :—(1) Watan properties and limitations imposed upon their enjoyment and possession. (2) Determination of hereditary rights of Watan service, both of individuals and families. (3) Penalties and forfeitures of Vatan by reason of the misconduct of Vatan-dars. We propose briefly to invite the attention of our readers to a careful consideration of each of these points in due order.

The restrictions imposed upon the alienations and inheritance of Vatan and Watan properties can only be justified on one ground, viz. that Watan properties should be always forthcoming to provide remuneration to the persons officiating in the offices, and should therefore be, as a general rule, not diverted from the family in whom the hereditary office is vested, so as to affect this liability for service. They can not be vindicated on any other grounds. These Vatan once formed an

essential feature of the old village communal system. They were not the creations of any state agency, like Jahagirs or Saranjams. Good native rulers only aided or encouraged the development of Vatan rights in ways suggested by the exigencies of the times, while the bad ones in rare cases oppressed or harassed the Vatandars. No native power however has hitherto ventured to place any legal restrictions on alienations or inheritance, or discountenanced them when effected. The free sale of Vatan, and the incorporation of strangers in the Vatan dar fraternity, were perhaps some of the most solemn acts of village communal life, and such changes have been most carefully recorded. The state did not interfere beyond recognizing the change of ownership and succession, and its functions were confined to the issue of fresh sanads, and assurances to the alienees. In the case of alienations of fractional Vatan, such sanads carefully ascertained and divided the rights, dignities, and customary dues among the original proprietors and the new purchasers. The terms of the sanads left complete liberty to the new purchasers or successors to deal with their Vatan acquisitions as they thought fit. It should always be remembered that this freedom existed in times when, according to the prevailing sentiment, ordinary property in land seldom changed hands. The fear of the disruption of mirasdar families, which it was the intention of former Governments to maintain in all their dignities and importance as so many units of political power, secured this end completely. Most of these changes were communal acts, treaties and engagements between corporate fraternities in the village system. Times have greatly altered since then, and vast changes have swept over the village autonomies. The communal organizations have ceased to exist for administrative purposes. What remains of them is shorn of most of its old significance. The individual, or each separated family of sharers in the Vatan, is now a disorganized social unit. The disintegrating

influences of foreign rule have been allowed to work unchecked so long that the village Patils and Kulkarnes, as also the Pargana Despandes and Deshmukhas, important factors of the old village and district executive, who wielded social and political power not unattended with the large responsibilities incident to that power, have now been turned either into poorly paid stipendiary servants of Government, or mere pensioners. There is nothing left to them of old dignities or powers, nothing of the importance and authority which gave them social and political status, and protected them against the representatives of the central, and too often, military, dominations. Now when the communal system has been destroyed, the Government puts forth its strength to protect the disorganized Vatanदार officiators against the consequences of their own recklessness by hedging round the Vatan properties restriction, unknown before, in the matter of free inheritance and alienation. There is no proposal to restore to them their old place as rulers in their own little spheres, representing their own small communities. We could understand this new-born anxiety if it went to the root of the evil, and the action it suggested had a wider sweep. We hold that if the state gives to any set of men responsible power, it must surround it with such commensurate dignity as it is in its nature to adapt itself to its own environment. In the systems of the Native Governments of former days, both sentimental and practical reasons combined to confer effective authority. The Patil in those days could not be useful without being clothed with the dignities and privileges associated with that useful office. But the genius of the British Government inevitably divests the Native centres of power of all the resources necessary to secure practical usefulness, and crushes out even the sentimental considerations when ranged against its own interests. The village functionaries are now reduced from their local sovereignty to a mean and slavish drudgery, dependent for the paltry annual pittance

of a few rupees upon the good will of the Revenue Officers. While other classes, whether in whole or in part, are progressing with the times, with more or less rapidity, the class of superior village and district officers have not only remained stationary, but have actually deteriorated in character. Though deprived of real power and usefulness, their hereditary instincts for the acquisition of that power are kept alive by the semblance of it. Being shut out from all the legitimate channels which they possessed under Native Governments of asserting their importance in the village communities, many among them now resort to objectionable, and even criminal, devices to attain that end. Hence intrigue and dishonesty are brought into requisition to improve their social position in the eyes of the village people, and make both ends meet. While the temptations to abuse power are thus over-whelming, Government comes down heavily upon them for the slightest neglect of duty or dereliction in the discharge of their offices. We challenge Government to publish a return of convictions of Patils and Kulkarnee officiators by Magistrates and Sessions Judges, and consequent declarations of their ineligibility to serve Government in any capacity during the last 10 or 15 years. Such a return will easily enable the reader to realize the hopeless moral depression and material poverty to which large numbers of this class have been reduced under the working of a system which kills the life out of these hereditary leaders of district and village society. As a compensation for this internal decay and loss of power, the Government now proposes to rehabilitate these classes by protecting them against their creditors and their subordinate Vatan sharers.

As long as Government cannot make up its mind to restore the old village system in its entirety, and reinstate these officers in their old places, so as to protect them from being reduced to the position of ill-paid and ill-treated sepoy or clerks appointed to collect revenue,

and render indifferent accounts of such collections, the attempt to maintain them as a compact exclusive class, with the old memories of their hereditary importance still lingering about them, is doomed to be a failure. Our suggestion under these circumstances is that it is high time to infuse new blood into these effete classes. Enlarge the sphere of families from whom selection for office has to be made. Leave the way open to strangers to enter in, and revive the energies of these classes, many of whose members have now ceased to be useful in the interests of general improvement. Of course no body desires violent change, but let no legislation seek artificially to prop up effete pretensions, and stop the way of improvement. All restrictions upon alienation of, and succession to, Vatan rights and dignities should therefore be removed. If this is done honestly, we may expect soon to see that these Vatan, in the course of a generation or two, will pass into other and more capable hands. Their retention in entirety in the old families, notwithstanding the indigence and depravity of the latter, is an impossible task. It is not expected that the transfers will be general, but by a natural process of selection, the more depraved members will be eliminated from the class, and their place supplied by fresh and healthy grafts. Such members of it as are least likely to improve their condition will die out, or be sold out, and in their place there shall be an acquisition to the fittest that survive of new blood, new talents, new aptitudes, free from all hereditary taints and depravities. Thus, and thus only, will there be legitimate fields opened out for healthy emulation, and an accession of new strength will be added to a service which it is the duty of a parental Government to improve like all its other services.

The alienation clauses of the Act of 1874 have introduced a legislative anomaly in the body of the law on the subject. The Deshmookh and Deshpande Vatan, which are no longer associated with any service, have



been included in the class whose alienations were forbidden. If there is a possible justification in the cases of Patil and Kulkarni Vatan for these restrictions on alienations, there can be none whatsoever in regard to the Deshmukh and Deshpande Vatan. Under Acts II and VII of 1863, these Vatan have been for the most part settled, and the Vatan, so included in the settlement, were declared under the authority of the Governor in Council, to be lands not held for service, and in express terms freely heritable and transferable property of the holders, their heirs, and assigns, without restrictions as to adoption, collateral succession, or transfer. There was therefore no justification for disturbing a settlement so deliberately adopted 10 years before, and introducing once more a legislative anomaly which is both unjust and impolitic, interfering as it does in many cases retrospectively with that freedom which permits every individual to deal with his property in any way he sees most beneficial to his interests. In the words of Justice West, 'service Vatan are a property, not merely remuneration, or otherwise, the right to them would cease with a discontinuance of service' The abolition of service in the case of District Vatan took away the onerous burdens of the tenure from these Vatan, but did not deprive the owners of their properties. On the faith of the Settlement sanctioned by Government, the owners of these properties had dealt with them by way of sale and mortgage, and to set aside these transactions by law appears to us to be a flagrant breach of established principles.

Not satisfied with the prohibitions on alienations of Vatan properties, the amending bill introduces for the first time a clause regarding its devolution to a limited order of heirs. The clause stands condemned alike by the law of the land, and the avowed policy of Government pursued from the commencement, and more particularly emphasized in 1857 at the close of the Mutiny. It is true that Courts

in India have introduced by their decisions novel features in the rules regarding the devolution and enjoyment of the properties of deceased Hindus. But this has been done only where the law has either been not expressed in clear terms, or was silent, or where the changes in the modes of thought and feelings of this generation have been so far-reaching as to justify such signal departures. But this can be no argument in favour of a proposition debarring daughters and sisters, and their heirs, from inheriting Vatanas. In England, there are analogous cases, such as the legislation prohibiting voluntary alienations by tenants-in-tail, but no instance seems to exist where the ordinary law regulating the devolution of property has been set aside to meet a possible administrative difficulty, or gratify a local sentiment. The change now proposed in this sidewise manner introduces into the discussion a question of principle, which all will admit is one of serious importance. The Legislative Councils, constituted as they are at present, cannot be safely allowed to tamper with the religious feelings of the nation, and sweep away by an assured majority of official votes a provision of Hindu Law by no means unreasonable, or opposed to the notions of civilized communities, because it suits the convenience of a small official class, too insignificant to outweigh national considerations, to do so. It is said that the clause has been demanded by certain Vatan-dars from the Southern Marhatta Country. Apparently those officials, who recommended and adopted this provision, have not taken into account the dismay and alarm with which, independently of the small body of interested Vatan-dars, the great mass of the people will look upon this proposed abrogation of Hindu Law. The people of India have come to realize by painful experience how bad precedents multiply in the hands of European administrators, and we strongly protest in the name of the great body of the nation who will regard the proposed change as a dangerous precedent, against this innovation to which some of the

members of the Legislative Council have thought fit to give their adhesion with such a light heart. It is high time, in the interests of all parties concerned, to disabuse the minds of the officials in power that this novel provision incorporated in the Bill cannot fail, if it becomes law, to create anxiety and distrust among the people at large. Daughters, sisters, and their sons are not such remote and stranger heirs as some appear to imagine. The daughter and her son never lose touch of the family of her father and his grand-father, both in the spiritual and temporal points of view. To a childless Hindu, the existence of a daughter or her son is a source of consolation. They represent for all religious purposes, the continuity of those spiritual duties which he owes to his ancestors. His affection for them, and their dependence on him, are as strong and legitimate as in the case of male heirs. The rights of daughters and sisters are as old as Hindu society, and any rude shock given to their claims will therefore be felt as a heavy blow dealt at one of the principal elements that enter into the composition of a nation's spiritual convictions and its temporal happiness.

It might be argued that, in some parts of the Presidency, females, such as daughters and sisters, though entitled to be heirs under the ordinary law, do not, as a matter of fact, inherit Vatan property by special custom. Such instances of special local and family custom exist undoubtedly in certain districts. The prevailing understanding in the Deccan among the families of Kulkarnees and Patils is that custom forbids transfers of Vatan into other families through female heirs. But the prevalence of such a local custom is a powerful argument not in favour of, but against, the introduction into the statute book of the prohibition in question. For the Hindu law recognises immemorial and reasonable customs, and gives them their due effect. That law declares that immemorial custom overrides the written law. Even now, those Vatan-dars who allege such a custom, can claim the benefit of its protection in en-

quiries under the Act, in the same way as customs of primogeniture and impartibility are alleged and proved in ordinary Civil suits, and provided that the judges who hold these inquiries rise to a due appreciation of their duties in connection with them, there is nothing in Hindu law to prohibit them from recognizing such a custom, and establishing the rights of distant male heirs to the exclusion of daughters and sisters. But to give that local custom the sanction of a positive and general enactment at the request of an interested minority, and to alarm the public by the creation of a retrograde precedent, at the certain risk of increasing the chances of Vatan escheating to Government for want of heirs, is opposed to all sound-legislation. When a custom grows out of the inner consciousness of the people affected by it, it is willingly and tacitly acquiesced in. But to interfere with the ordinary rules of inheritance by a positive enactment, is what we cannot understand, and such a departure cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged, unless and until such a radical change of the accepted and cherished institutions of a nation becomes imperative, not on the ground of class and local, but of national interests.

We therefore cannot accept the reasons which have been adduced as sufficient to justify the prohibitions contained in the alienation clauses of the Act, as also those that debar females and their heirs from inheriting properties in Vatan. The Government interests are in no way affected by the freedom which we advocate, for the burden of service which attaches to the Vatan will always appertain to it, whosoever succeeds to the Vatan, and it has not been shown that the liberty hitherto allowed has led to any mischievous results in prejudicing the larger interests of the people.

We come next to the consideration of the provisions relating to the determination of Vatan rights. The inquiries held by the Collectors and Assistant Collectors, whether in the original or appellate stage, with a view to the preparation of Vatan regis-

ters, are anything but consistent with the general administration of justice under the British Government. That such inquiries are judicial proceedings to all intents and purposes cannot be denied. But in the hands of a large majority of the officers authorized to hold them, they are not far removed from a mere mockery of justice. This is partly owing to the comparative ignorance of those officers of the principles and provisions of Civil Law; partly to an absence of all binding rules of procedure and evidence in the body of the Act, or of a general departmental direction to them to abide by the rules of the Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Code; and partly to their decisions being not subject to appeal or revision at the hands of the regularly constituted civil tribunals. We are fully aware that such language may appear to some of our readers to be too strong, but we are not speaking without full authority, and our remarks are based to a large extent on our own personal experience. We shall cite some representative instances of gross ignorance and apathy, and of arbitrary procedure adopted by many officers in conducting the enquiries in question.

(1) In one case, a Patil owning one-eighth of a service Vatan with a right of service, applied to have his name entered in the register. About a hundred and seventy years ago, the ancestor of the applicant had acquired the share by way of *Gohan Lahan* from the proprietor. The acquisition was confirmed by the Peishwa's Government which issued a sanad. The applicant produced the sanad to substantiate his claim. In the preamble of the sanad, the fact of the *Gahan Lahan* was mentioned. The officer who inquired into this case could not command the patience to read the sanad to the end. The shirastedar read the preamble, and when the word *Gahan Lahan* was pronounced the judge at once remarked that *Gahan* could not be recognised, and rejected the application, although the rights of the petitioner had been recognised for over 150 years, and the Act under which this judge professed to ad-

minister justice, directed him to respect alienations made prior to the Act, and much more those sanctioned by the ruling Government. We are not aware whether justice was eventually done to the applicant in appeal, but we fear he fared no better there than in the original Court.

(2.) In another case, a sanad was produced by a Patil. The sanad was a very long document. It was about two hundred years old. It bore the seal of the Peishwa's Government, and was sealed with the sign-manual of the Peishwa. The opponent alleged that the Sanad was a forgery. There was nothing in the appearance or contents of the Sanad to lead to the slightest suspicion that it was forged. The judge, instead of presuming it to be genuine under the Indian Evidence Act, and throwing the burden of proof on the party alleging it to be a forgery, presumed that it was forged, and asked the applicant to produce copies of the same from the Peishwa Daftar. The applicant incurred a large expense in procuring copies from Poona. Even after the production of these copies, the Collector in appeal did not pass a judgement in his favour, but asked the Assistant Collector whether he was willing to change his decision in applicant's favour. We have not been able to trace the after history of these proceedings.

(3.) In a third case, the appellant produced a kararnama (agreement) executed by the respondent in her favour to show that the former was all along her Gumasta or agent, and not owner of any portion of her Vatan. The kararnama was signed by the respondent's mark. The latter denied the execution of the kararnama, and said he knew how to write his signature. In support of his contention, he produced a few letters to other people bearing his signature in his hand-writing. Without taking any evidence as to the genuineness of the letters, or of the signatures, the Revenue officer, who had the charge of the inquiry, decided that the re-

spondent knew how to make his signature, and summarily pronounced the kararnama to be a forgery.

(4.) In another case, the question was whether the custom of service prevailed in the appellant's family. In the absence of other evidence, the appellant produced an order signed by a former Collector, directing the appellant's grand-father's removal from the office of Patil. The order, supposing it was admissible in evidence, proved that at one time his grand father served as a Patil. Instead of passing a decision in the appellant's favour, the Appellate Judge again sent a yadi asking the Assistant Collector whether he would change his decision in appellant's favour. We are not aware how the case was ultimately decided.

(5) These are only a few representative instances, and we might multiply them without limit. A very common irregularity occurs in many places, which will illustrate the apathy shown by the Revenue officers in the conduct of this branch of their work. When two brothers, or first cousins, or other relations equally removed from the propositus, and equally entitled to be his heirs, apply to have their names registered, each claiming the right to serve to the exclusion of the other claimants, they are told to get certificates of heirship from the District Court. The District Court, it is well-known, grants certificates of heirship to all those who are entitled to be heirs of the deceased, but that Court cannot decide which of them has the right of service, which depends either on Vadilki or custom. With a view to dispose of work anyhow, it has become almost a form that certificates are demanded, and when produced after a large sum has been spent in costs, they are found to be useless for the purposes of the inquiries under the Act.

The instances we have given above will be enough to substantiate our remarks. We are fully prepared to give details of names and dates regarding the cases cited above, if the members of the Legislation Council desire to verify our state-

ments by a reference to the records of these cases. We yield to none in our appreciation of the intelligence of revenue authorities, and the great part they take in the government of the land. But we contend that the nature of their other duties disqualifies these officers for judicial work. Separated from their executive associations, this same service shows excellent results when they are transferred to the Judicial Department. It is not in human nature to combine efficiency as a sharp revenue officer and the patient impartiality of an independent Judge, and it is not the individuals we find fault with, but the system, which permits such an anomaly to continue, is responsible for these failures. The Revenue officers, when acting as magistrates, do good work, not because they love the work for its sake, but because it adds to their power, and because the vigilant eyes of the District and High Courts are upon them. The Vatan inquiries, though they affect the people in their dearest interests, bring no honour, and are not subject to any regulated check. This circumstance makes all the difference, and we hope that the Council, in considering the proposed amendments, will, by express legislation, provide against such failures of justice as we have referred to above, and make their further recurrence impossible. We offer therefore the following suggestions for their acceptance:

1stly That the inquiries under the Vatan Act should be expressly declared to be judicial proceedings, and power should be given to the Judges of the District Courts to receive appeals from the decisions of revenue officers, and to interfere with their general supervision in exceptional cases. This power now rests with the Government, but it is only so in name, and simply defeats itself.

2ndly The revenue officers, charged with the inquiries under this Act should be in all cases bound, and not merely permitted, to follow the rules of the



Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Code, so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act.

The third most important point to which we shall address ourselves relates to the penal provisions contained in the clauses about forfeitures and punishments. The clauses relating to penalties and forfeitures, as they have been amended by the Select Committee, are not objectionable on grounds of principle. We have only a few suggestions to make on this head. It is not the heaviness, but the certainty of punishment which acts as a deterrent to crime, and we deprecate on principle the special scale of punishments provided for in this Bill for Vatandar offenders, in excess of those provided for by the ordinary law for all classes. At the same time, if any exceptions are deemed desirable, we would add to the offences mentioned in the Schedule B those defined in Sections 193 to 195 of the Penal Code, to which village officers are more than ordinarily prone. Those who have any experience of the working of our Civil Courts will easily corroborate us when we say that giving and fabricating false evidence are two of the most frequent forms of dishonesty practised by Patils, but more particularly by Kulkarnees. Owing to this, they are a discredited class in our Civil Courts. Government themselves dare not give them larger powers than are absolutely necessary for the proper realization of Land Revenue. Like the unrecognised Muktyars, they hang about the Civil Courts, and are answerable for some of the evils with which the Civil Courts are justly charged. Their local importance in their villages easily enables them to set family against family, and class against class, to create litigation where none exists, or where there is no possibility of any dispute in the immediate future, and if necessary to assist such litigation, as a matter of course, by forgery and fabrication of evidence. Dr. Pollen, one of the most observant and able Judges in the service, complains of the conduct of this class in his last administration report.

Far more than treason or dacoity, or concealing offenders, or helping them to escape, the offences referred to above have relation to the every day performance of Vatan service, and these offences may therefore be usefully included in distinct terms among those that entail upon the offending Kulkarnees and Patils exceptional punishment of a sort which is most likely to be deterrent. This improvement in the Act will, it is hoped, if carried out, exercise a salutary check upon the behaviour of these classes in connection with the administration of Justice.

As observed above, we do not approve of the provision relating to the forfeiture of the family Vatan, for the offence of one representative Vatandar, or his deputy. Those who know how deadly is the enmity between the different sharers of a Vatan can easily imagine the probable injustice to which the clauses in question will give rise. The atmosphere which surrounds the Vatandar families precludes any of them from reposing confidence in each other. To confine the choice of a deputy therefore to the family of the Vatandar, and at the same time to call the whole body of proprietors to account for the misconduct of a single Vatandar, or of his deputy, are provisions alike unjust, and opposed to common sense. Let the choice be unrestricted, and then perhaps the forfeiture clauses, to the extent of the life interest of the officiator or deputy, may be justified. Either the one or the other of the clauses must be modified to avoid this inconsistency.

One general observation may, we think, be safely ventured in conclusion before we close this review. The dealings of Government with the village officers no doubt partake more or less of the character of executive control over its servants, but these officers are also equally the servants of the community. This latter relationship should find full recognition. As there is to be new legislation on this subject, let it be one in harmony with the progressive order of things,

and the decentralizing tendencies of the times. On these grounds we advocate an extension of the elective principle in making appointments under the Act. All sharers in a Vatan, and not merely the representative Vatandars, must be declared entitled to vote in favour of any one of their number. In the case of Guzerath, the Matadar's Bill concedes this privilege to every Matadar, and we fail to see why the same principle should not apply to the Deccan. The details may be elaborated when necessary, and should embrace all the usual safe-guards for the proper working out of the elective scheme, and for carrying out the principal objects of such appointments. We are of opinion that the free working of the elective principle will greatly relieve the burden now thrown on Government officers, and its success will ensure many other advantages. (1) It will simplify procedure, and save Government and its servants much labour and administrative inconvenience. (2) It will obviate the necessity of imposing unnecessary restrictions on the alienation and devolution of Vatan, and thus remove all cause for offence. (3) It will tend to unite families, rent asunder by feuds of long standing. (4) It will lead to an improvement in the conduct of individual aspirants to these offices. (5) It will stimulate ambition, and create a desire in such aspirants for an acquisition of intellectual and social superiority over other competitors. (6) It will revive one of the most healthy features of the old village system. (7) It will act as a safeguard against abuse of power, and help the cause of Local Self-Government.

We further urge upon the attention of the Legislative Council the necessity of exacting from Vatandars, who desire office in future, a certain amount of intellectual culture. As a rule, Vatandars, in spite of their undoubted intelligence, are hopelessly ignorant. The certainty of being called upon to discharge official duties in due course makes them indifferent to the acquisition of all knowledge that is not strictly necessary

to help them in the discharge of their duties, according to their own ideas of them. Such provisions as may be deemed capable of attaining this end may with benefit be inserted in the Act. The test at present in existence is far from sufficient. We do not say that this improvement can immediately be attained; but with this end in view, precise provisions may be embodied in the Act which, within a reasonable time, will be found very easy to carry out.

We have made the foregoing observations in the true interests of the class concerned, and the general public. It remains with the Council to take these suggestions into their serious consideration, and elaborate a law which will satisfy all just expectations. We fervently hope that the proposed legislation will not be influenced by any official or individual bias, from which much of our local legislation has not been, we regret to say, been always exempt.

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# THE POONA SARVAJANIK SABHA,

Established for representing the wants and wishes of the inhabitants of the Deccan, being appointed on a popular elective system under rules framed for the purpose.

WALEKAR'S WADA, DANE ALI.

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# PROCEEDING OF THE SABHA:

Correspondence in th Subject of the new Free studentship Rules;

—:—

No. 227 of 1885.

Sarvajanik Sabha Rooms  
Poona 29th October 1885.

To

The Secretary to Government  
Educational Department.

Bombay.

Sir,

I have the honor by direction of the General Committee of the Sarvajanik Sabha to forward herewith a printed copy of the Resolutions adopted at the meeting of the Sabha held on the 6th Instant for your favourable consideration. In the island of Bombay, the castes most forward in their desire of education are Parahus, Sonars, Simpees &c., and other sections of non-brahmanic castes. In Guzerat, except the Nagars, the Bramhin caste are less forward in their desire for securing education to their children than the Khatrees, Kayastas, and Banias castes. In Sind, the Amil class, which is non-brahmanical, is the most forward in their desire for education. Under these circumstances, quite apart from the question of principle involved in the recognition of the claims of particular castes to favor or otherwise, the new rules are obviously unsuited to the varying conditions of the population in different parts of this Presidency. I accordingly request that Government will be pleased to take such steps as it may deem necessary, and cancel or modify these rules in a way to give effect to the general principles of equal neutrality, without distinction of caste or creed, which has hitherto characterized the action of Government in all its Departments.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

S. H. SATHI,

Secretary Sarvajanik Sabha Poona.

---

A similar letter No. 226 of 1885, was sent with a copy of the Resolution to the Acting Director of Public Instruction.



A public meeting of the General Committee of the Poona Sarva-janik Sabha and the inhabitants of Poona was held on the 6th October 1885, in the Sabha's rooms, Joshi Hall. On the motion of Mr. S. H. Sathe, seconded by Rao Saheb S. R. Medadkar, Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao Hari Deshmookh was requested to take the chair. The chairman made a few introductory remarks in connection with the business before the meeting, after which the following Resolutions were adopted unanimously.

Proposed by Mr. Raghunath Daji Nagarkar, and seconded by Sirdar Vinayak Raghao Purandare.

That this meeting, consisting of the representatives of all castes and creeds, having taken into their consideration the recently published rules of the Educational Department in the matter of free studentships and reduced-fee studentships, deems it to be its duty to record the opinion that the policy of singling out Brahmins, and setting them against other classes, as representing opposite interests, is unjust, impolitic, and unfair, and is a departure from the principle of equal neutrality hitherto observed by Government, and that the only distinction which should be recognised must be made to rest, independently of all caste distinctions, upon the forwardness and backwardness of certain classes to educate their children.

That of the other castes, there are large subdivisions who are equally, or if possible more, forward in their desire of securing education for their children than many sub-divisions of the so-called Brahmin caste.

That the exemption of fees is intended only as an encouragement to poor students, and should not be turned away from this its obvious purpose by any considerations of a man's caste or nationality.

That the way in which Mr. Chatfield's rules have been worked hitherto by the head-masters has given satisfaction, and that they are not liable to the reproach suggested in the recent letter of the Acting Director of Public Instruction.

That the free studentships should be made to bear a fair proportion to the numbers of paying scholars, and that the recognition of any other principle in their allotment is highly undesirable.

That the provision of 2½ per cent. free studentships for the sons of Brahmins, Parsees, and Europeans will unjustly curtail the advantages now enjoyed by the poor students of these classes, while the margin of 2½ per cent. left for the other classes will really be of no benefit to them. The margin so secured will be too small for the legitimate wants of these classes, and will not afford any encouragement to them.

That the condition which insists upon half the number of free-  
studentships, &c., being kept vacant till the proportions of the two  
classes are fairly adjusted, is one incapable of realization, and is opposed  
to the best interests of education.

That while this meeting is thus opposed to the policy of the new  
rules in these and other matters, it is fully alive to the importance of  
fostering and encouraging the desire now felt among the classes hither-  
to backward in this connection, and that with this view it is desirable  
that, without diminishing the existing provision for the poor of every  
class, the percentage of free students for the backward classes should  
be raised to 25 per cent of the number of their paying scholars, which  
was the scale at first allowed to all classes, and that scholarships  
created out of local funds be allotted to the more deserving among  
these backward classes to enable them to complete their course of  
studies, and that these free studentships should be continued to them  
on condition of regular attendance, without exacting the profi-  
ciency test.

That copies of these Resolutions should be forwarded to all the  
district towns in which there are Government High schools, and the  
local communities be asked to co-operate with the Sabha. Copies of  
these Resolutions should also be sent to the Acting Director of Public  
Instruction, and to the Secretary to Government in the Educational  
Department.

GOPAL RAO HARI DESHMUKH,  
Chairman of the Public Meeting.

No. 4650 of 1835-86

Poona Office of the  
Director of Public Instruction  
3d November 1895.

To,  
THE SECRETARY  
POONA SARTANIK SABHA  
SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.  
228 dated October 29th informing me that your Com-  
mittee has condemned as "unjust, impolitic, and unfair" the  
recently promulgated by me for ensuring to the  
Marathas, Lingayats, and other non-Brahman Hindu  
share in the Free studentships held in Government High Sch.  
I learn from your letter that copies of your condemnation have been forwarded to all

the towns in which there are High Schools, and the local communities have been asked to "co-operate" with the Sabha. I may be permitted to hope that the appeal of an irresponsible organization for public support to secure the monopoly which they claim for their caste-men will not induce the responsible servants of the Educational Department to resist official authority, and to risk the loss of their appointments.

2. It is perfectly constitutional and natural that your Association, which specially safeguards the interests and claims of the Brahman caste, and which, I observe, is about to devote its funds to the charitable object of assisting poor Brahmans to obtain a free Education, should criticise any public orders. But it is not necessary for it to take up the cry already raised in the Brahman press that the motive of the order is to "single out the Brahmans, and set them against other classes," which is on the face of it an improbable and unreasonable supposition. It should be borne in mind by all class or caste associations in India that the Officers of Government are required to see fair play by all classes, even though the back-ward classes have neither Native press, nor associations, to represent their wants. I shall however take no further notice of what may be termed extravagant language, but shall set before the Association the facts with which I had to deal.

3 Last year there were in Government High Schools 6,565 Students, of whom 3,986 were Brahmans. Only 266 were Mahomedans, 69 were Lingayats, and 278 were cultivators. There were, including Sind, 524 High School boys receiving a free or partially free Education, of whom 318 were Brahmans. Thus, even if the free studentships were awarded in proportion to the number of the class at School, the Brahman proportion would have been exceeded. But the poverty of the Mahomedan, Lingayat, and Kunbi representation in the High Schools is itself a blot on our Educational system, and the universal answer given to inquiries made by me on the subject was that given by the Bombay Anjuman for their own community, viz, that the Mahomedan boys were too poor, and that they could not secure their proper share of free studentships. The figures, however, given above do not represent the full facts. There are parts of Bombay, like Sind, where the Brahman element is very scant. Taking the Decan districts of Poona, Sholapur, Satara, Khandesh, A. Nagar, and Nasik, with their teeming Maratha non-Brahman population, and their poor Mahomedan colonies, I found that out of 155 boys receiving a free or partially free Education in High Schools, 123 were Brahmans. Descending to the Anglo-Vernacular Schools from which candidates for the public Service are recruited, I find that, in the whole Central Division, in the 1st Grade

Schools, 58 per cent of these prizes are allotted to Brahmans, and in the 2nd Grade Schools of Poona, Sholapora, Satara, Ratnagiri, Thana, Kolaba, and the Marathi Schools of Bombay, 60 per cent are held by the same caste. In the upper primary Schools, which teach up to the standard from which the public Service is recruited, I find that in many cases the Brahman lads almost monopolise the free student-ships, although the primary Schools and the Anglo-Vernacular Schools were until lately local fund institutions, mainly attended by, and supported by, cess-payers. The Brahman population of the whole Presidency, including Sind, numbers 348,708 males. The Maratha Kunbis alone are nearly five times as numerous. The Mahomedans number 16,12,154 males. The preponderance of the non-Brahman community in the ranks of society renders it a matter for regret that they should occupy so few seats in the Government Schools of a higher sort, and that those who do enter should be discouraged by the neglect of their claims. Another aspect of the case presented itself to me. I have been assured by many of the best School-masters that the pressure of caste influence on the Head Master is such that he requires all the help which can be given to him by strict rules. The moral aspect of the unfair distribution of free student-ships has also struck me forcibly. It is not a healthy sight either for the Brahman lad, or for the Maratha Kunbi boy, that he should at the outset of his career see these prizes awarded unfairly. On a recent visit which I paid to a primary School in Nasik, I found that a poor Maratha boy was left without a free student-ship, when his far richer Brahman fellow students enjoyed them. Whilst I was examining the boys as to their circumstances, the master of the class suggested to the holder of one of the free student-ships what answer he should give me. The incident shows how under-masters have identified themselves with the system on which this patronage has hitherto been awarded. The spectacle of an unfair award is particularly demoralising for young students. The rules which I have made, and which will shortly be supplemented by others, will strengthen the hands of an honest master, and I am glad to think that there are many such in the Departments who have already felt that the rules will assist them.

4. Your Association informs me that the working of the old rules has hitherto given satisfaction. The 129 free student-ships, out of 155 available in the High Schools of the Deccan, should be held by Brahman lads, may afford them some satisfaction, but it has given rise to many complaints from the Marathas and the Mahomedans. The Anjuman-i-Islam, both in Bombay and Poona, have warmly welcomed the new order, and the Maratha community have taken their own method to express their gratitude for the measure of justice given to

them. But, even apart from these acknowledgements, I should feel that the state of affairs which I have described demanded redress, and the enforcement in act, as well as word, of the gracious principles of justice which Her Majesty's proclamation guaranteed to all her Indian subjects.

5. Your Association lays down the principle that the exemption of fees is intended as an encouragement to poor students, and that they should be allotted in proportion to the numbers of paying scholars. In fact, those who show the largest interest in education should receive for their poor the largest number of free studentships. Such a principle has been the mistaken practice, though not the theory, of the past, but it has never received the countenance of Government. The principle laid down by Government is that free studentships should either be opened to competition to those who, living at a distance from the School, have a claim to exceptional assistance, or should be reserved for classes who are exceptionally backward in respect of Education. The rules which I lately issued fall short of this, but I was anxious, in introducing a reform, to injure vested interests as little as possible. I cannot approve of your Association's suggestions, either for increasing the number of free studentships, or for reserving those which exist for the class which can show the largest number of paying students.

6. In conclusion I have to observe that I have been anxious to meet the condemnation passed by the Association on the recent rules by straightforward argument, but it appears to me that, whilst the resolution of the Poona Sabha is unsupported by any argument, its language in referring to the rules as "unjust, impolitic, and unfair" indicates a want of appreciation of the meaning of those terms.

I have the honour to be

Sir

Your Most Obedient Servant

W. LEE-WARNER

Ag. Director of Public Instruction.

No. 245 OF 1885.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS,

POONA, 25TH NOVEMBER 1885.

To

W. LEE-WARNER, ESQUIRE

ACTING DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

SIR

I am directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 4050 dated

3rd November 1885, containing an explanation of the reasons which led you to issue the new rules in regard to the percentage of free and reduced fee studentships in the High Schools of this Presidency, and somewhat severely commenting upon the Resolutions which were adopted at a Public Meeting of the inhabitants of this city under the presidency of Rao Bahadur Gopalrao Hari Deshmookh, a copy of which resolutions was communicated to you with my letter of 29th October 1885.

2. Copies of the same Resolutions were communicated to the local communities in all the larger towns of many districts of this Presidency, and it is likely that similar representations from other parts of the Presidency have been sent to Government with a view to secure a reconsideration of the justice of the policy which suggested to you the framing of these new rules. The Committee of the Sabha are unable to understand what led you to think that any officers of the Educational Department would take part in these representations, and incur the risk of the loss of their appointments with which you have been pleased to threaten them. The servants of the Educational Department have not the remotest interest in the matter. The local communities to whom the appeal has been addressed, being for the most part parents of the boys attending the High Schools, are alone interested in the action of the department. In seeking their cooperation, the Sabha expects that they will not be deterred from giving free expression to their views by the threat held out in your letter, as, fortunately for them, these communities are beyond the reach of any official pressure. The communities so addressed by the Sabha do not belong to any one caste, nor can they be properly described as trying to secure a monopoly for their caste-men in requesting Government to reconsider the rules framed by you. Such a radical misconception on your part of the constitution of these communities, and of their motives in co-operating with the Sabha, and of the power of the officials to influence them, suggests a doubt as to whether you were fully aware that you were taking up an unwarrantable position in this part of your criticism of the Sabha's proceedings.

3. In the same paragraph which concludes with the threat referred to above, you have characterised the Sabha as an irresponsible organization which seeks a monopoly for their caste-men. It is plain from this description that you are not well informed of the constitution of the Sabha. Irresponsible it cannot be, because every single member of its body has been elected by a large and mixed constituency. The members so elected belong to the different sections of the Hindu, Mahomedan and Parsi communities, and are not confined to this city or district, but are drawn from all the districts in the Central and Southern Divisions. The Managing Committee of the

Sabha, like the general body, is mixed in its character, and represents all the different sections of Native Society. The Sabha so constituted is responsible, in the only correct sense of the word, to the general and mixed community whom it represents. It is natural for officials, trained in Departmental service, to recognise responsibility as a consequence of official subordination only. Official responsibility, however, is, as you are well aware, too often nominal, and requires to be strengthened by a feeling of public duty, which is too often dissociated from official subordination. A free expression of public opinion upon all large questions in which the public feel interest is the only way to ensure this higher and more effective responsibility. It is this function which representative public organisations like the Sabha undertake to discharge, and according as they discharge it well or ill, the officials are more or less effectively controlled. The Sabha trusts that, with this explanation, you will, with your large and varied experience, realise the fact that public bodies, though they may not be responsible to official superiors, cannot with any propriety be described as being irresponsible in the discharge of their self-imposed duties.

4. In the second para of your letter, you have been pleased to state that (1) this Association specially safeguards Brahmin interests and claims, and that (2) it proposes to devote its funds to the charitable object of assisting poor Brahmins in obtaining free education. In the same para, you state that (3) the Brahmin press has raised the cry that the motive which prompted you to frame the rules was to single out the Brahmins, and set them against other classes. You also claim for the officers of Government the monopoly of a desire to see fair play by all classes, which have neither caste associations nor class press to represent their wants. None of these positions can stand the test of the least inquiry which, as the head of the Educational Department, you might have been expected to institute before you committed yourself to an official, and therefore presumably deliberate, expression of them. This Association is not a caste Association. Its work for the past 15 years is the best evidence to which it can appeal in refutation of such a charge. Its efforts in helping Government to a correct understanding of the bearings of the land settlement policy, which have been partially crowned with success, were not, and could not be, prompted by any class interest. In the times of the distress caused by the famine, its charity was distributed to all classes alike, and its services in this direction were acknowledged by the authorities. In popularising the scheme of Local Self-Government it, has furthered no class or caste interest. In taking up the subject of the rules framed by you in the matter of free studentship, it was not actuated by any class interest, as the Resolutions themselves will satisfy you on fuller consideration of the last re-

commendation made therein. No body, either in the press or outside, so far as the Committee of the Sabha are aware, has impugned your motives in the manner mentioned by you. The public are not concerned with the motives of the officials. It is the effect of the official action with which alone they are concerned, and the persistent way in which you have, during your acting term of office, given expression to your views, can alone have led to any misunderstanding on the point. The Sabha is not aware that any portion of its funds is about to be devoted to the free education of Brahmin boys. The evident haste with which, on imperfect and incorrect information, you have assumed this and other equally unfounded allegations to be true, makes us hope that, with the fuller information now placed before you, you will see cause to change your views.

Finally, I may be permitted to prominently refer you to para 12 of a letter from the Government of Bombay in the Financial Department to the Government of India in the Home Department No. 4141, dated the 27th October 1882, in which the former Government in self-defence told the latter Government that "it is within the knowledge of this Government that the Commissioner, Central Division, looked upon the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha as *being the most trustworthy and representative exponent of Native Opinion in a portion of the Deccan*, and that the Commissioner, Southern Division, who has a wide and intimate acquaintance with the leading natives, was disposed to accept almost entirely the scheme originally recommended by the Sabha." The late Governor of Bombay, and the Hon'ble Mr. Peile, gave expression to a similar opinion from their respective places in the Legislative Council on the 25th August 1883, recognizing to the fullest extent the representative and responsible character of the Sabha. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand how any subordinate official can deny the representative and responsible character of the Sabha, simply because his views on any particular question do not commend themselves to the Association.

5. These preliminary remarks will suffice to meet the force of the observations made in the first two paras of your letter. To turn next to the detailed explanation of the circumstances under which you were led to frame the rules under consideration, the Sabha most readily admits that, as a matter of fact, there are large subdivisions of people who take kindly to the secondary system of Education set up by Government, while there are many other subdivisions and races who are more or less backward in availing themselves of the facilities afforded to them by our High Schools. The point at issue between yourself and the native public does not involve a denial of this fact. The controversy wholly relates to the question whether, among the Hindoo classes, it is correct to state generally that the Brahmin class is the most



forward in availing themselves of the secondary system of education, and whether they can justly be singled out, and set against the non-Brahmin classes. The administration reports of the department will furnish the best answer to this inquiry. In certain districts there is no doubt a preponderance of Brahmin students, but this superiority is counterbalanced by their disproportionately low numbers in other districts and divisions. You have yourself admitted this state of things in your letter under reply when you state in para 3, that in Sind the Brahmin element is very scant. The fact is well known that in Sind and Gujerat, as also in the island of Bombay, the Brahmins do not by any means belong to the forward classes, and that Amils, Waiias, Parbhns, Sonars, Shimpis, Khattris, Kayastas, and other non-Brahmin classes take the lead. The rules therefore on your own principle should have been so worded as to be elastic enough to apply to all parts of the presidency. In their present form, this cannot be said to be the case. If the Mahamedans, Lingayats, and, Marhattas in the central and southern divisions compare unfavourably with the Brahmins, the disproportion is due to other causes which lie deeper below the surface of the social system, and have no relation to the provision for free-student-ships made in the High Schools. These classes show comparatively larger proportions in the primary schools, while more especially in the indigenous schools of the large towns, they preponderate to an extent which shows that it is not any manipulation of free-student-ships which can succeed in inducing these classes to avail themselves more largely of the system of secondary schools under existing social conditions. The Committee of the Sabha have no doubt that, if the necessary statistics relating to Government Primary Schools and Indigenous Schools in the city of Poona were obtained and examined, it will be found that, while in the former more than 50 percent of the students are Brahmins, in the latter more than 80 percent are non-Brahmin students, though the highest rate of fees prevalent in the latter is *twice*, and often *four times*, as large as in the former. This fact alone affords the best corroboration of the opinion expressed above, that no manipulation of free-student-ships can succeed in encouraging these classes to seek what they do not appreciate. The masters of the schools are not to blame for an allotment of free-student-ships which, under the circumstances, was almost inevitable. Accepting your figures, it is quite plain that the 266 Mahamedans, 69 ingayats, and 278 Kunbis, being together less than 10 percent of the boys attending High Schools, could only lay claim to 50 out of the 524 free student-ships. We feel sure that, taking the whole presidency, this number was actually exceeded by the free boys belonging to these communities. Under your rules, they would have a claim to

252 free studentships, that is, nearly one out of every two boys would be a free scholar. Such a proportion could under no circumstances be described as fair or just. Something might be said in defence of the new arrangement if it had been laid down that, where a choice had to be made between a Brahmin and non-Brahmin student, preference should be given to the latter, but to rule that half the places should be kept vacant, whether suitable candidates from the backward classes did or did not appear to claim the free studentships, can only end in driving the best students from Government schools, which is a result no one can regard as desirable.

6. The Committee have so far argued the question on your own ground. There is, however, a further and a higher consideration of principle involved. The Government schools are open to all classes alike under the noble policy which has hitherto been followed. This privilege implies that all the advantages of free and reduced free studentships shall be equally open to poor boys from all classes, without distinction of caste, race, or creed. This is the corner stone of the British system of Government in all its branches, and the educational department cannot take on itself to lay down any rules by which particular castes or creeds shall be favoured or discouraged. The Mahamedans, for political considerations, have been specially encouraged, and no body has complained of the special favour shown to them, because the general system was not affected by these concessions, any more than by the specially larger grants allowed to Eurasian and European aided schools, though objections might justly be urged against the latter. The rules in question for the first time threatened to commit Government to a recognition of caste distinctions, and as such their injustice and impolicy has to be protested against, not on account of the intrinsic importance of the subject matter, but because it involves an important principle, and forms a dangerous precedent.

7. While, on these several accounts, the Sabha still feels itself unable to accept the correctness of the principles which have guided you in framing these rules, it is at the same time fully alive to the necessity of special measures of encouragement to the backward classes, be they Brahmins or non-Brahmins, Hindoos or Mahamedans, without infringing the general principles of Government action. The remedy which the Sabha suggested for the redress of this evil has the countenance of no less an authority than the Bombay Committee of the Education Commission, whose report was signed by yourself along with Mr. Jacob and the Hon. Mr. Telang. At Page 133 of this report, there is a distinct admission that Government has gone as far as was possible in the matter of reducing the percentage of free studentships. The Commission recommended that, to meet the wants

of the backward classes, the five per cent provision, which at present obtains, should be raised to 15 per cent, the additional 10 per cent being reserved for the Mahomedans and other backward classes. The Sabha's suggestion in this connection therefore ought to have met with your approval, and it is a great disappointment that you have, as acting Director of Public Instruction, chosen to depart, not only from, long established practice of the Department as admitted by you, but also from your own deliberate recommendations made only two years ago. The practice of the Department is the best evidence of its understanding of the rules laid down by it, and as Government has not hitherto expressed its disapproval of this practice, sanctioned as it is, by the authority of all those officials who have been hitherto its advisers in educational matters, it must be held to have contemned that practice, though you deem it to be a mistake. X

8. We hope thus to have shown that the several Resolutions adopted at the public meeting are not open to the criticism which you have been pleased to pass on them. If anything in the language of the resolutions has given you offence, you will excuse the warmth of public feeling which has been aroused in this connection, and which found expression in the resolutions adopted at the public meeting, and not at a meeting of this Sabha as you have supposed. You have yourself, in the first two paras of your letter, committed yourself to a similar expression of unguarded and exaggerated statements, and the Sabha hopes that, in the reconsideration of this matter on the eve of your laying down office as acting Director of Public Instruction, the principles at stake, and not the warmth of the expressions used on both sides, will alone receive your best consideration.

I have the honour to be,

SIR

Your Most obedient Servant.

S. H. SATHE.

*For Joint Secretaries of the Poona*

*Sarvajanic Sabha.* ✓

No. 5069 of 1835-86

Poona, Office of the  
Director of Public Instruction

25. November 1835.

To:

THE SECRETARY

Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 245 dated this day, and to add that the representations which it contains have received my most careful consideration.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Most Obedient Servant

W. LEE-WARNER

Ag. Director of Public Instruction.

## A NOTE ON THE REORGANIZATION OF DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION.

It will be generally admitted that the existing arrangements for the executive administration of our Regulation districts, however suitable once to the exigencies of early conquest, are not adapted to the altered circumstances of the country. When this part of the country was first conquered in 1818, the Commissioner for the Deccan had under him for the larger subdivisions a single officer, called in those days Assistant Commissioner or Agent, who represented in his own person all the varied civil functions of Government, Revenue, Judicial, Police &c. He was the visible all-powerful *Sirkar* in the eyes of the people, the English edition of the old Native Subha or Commissioner. In 1827 the first differentiation took place by the separate creation of the Adalats or Civil Courts. Later on, the Police administration was detached, and transferred to a separate set of officers. The Survey and Settlement Department was similarly constituted in 1848. The Public Works Department, which before had been managed by a Board of Works, was formed after 1853. The Educational Department, with its chain of officers, was similarly constituted in 1856-57. The Forest Department, the Abkari Department, the charge of Hospitals and Jails, and Sanitation including Vaccination, the Irrigation branch of the Public Works Department, the new Agricultural Department, have been all more or less recent creations. The still more recent constitution by law of rural and urban boards has similarly encroached upon the powers and functions, which, in the embryo stage, belonged to the Collector not many years ago. The creation of these separate departments, while detracting from the undivided authority of the

Collector, have tended greatly to centralize power chiefly in the hands of general Departments, though in the case of the rural and urban boards, it has also resulted in the more distinct association of the taxpayers with the functions of local government. The local kingship of the Collector has also suffered much diminution by its subordination to the Divisional Commissioners, whose interposition necessarily destroys the old rough and ready system of district independence. Between pressure from above, represented by the centralized authority of the Secretariate, pressure sidewise, from the many district heads of coordinate authority, responsible each to its departmental chief, and pressure from below, represented by the rural and urban boards, the Collector's authority and power of initiation, of control, and of benevolent despotism, may almost be said to have been extinguished for all practical purposes, even in the single department of the collection of land revenue still left to his independent charge. The feeling of love for his district, the power to represent its wants, and to enforce attention to those wants, are things of the past, alike in matters of great or slight importance. The fiction that the Collector is still all-powerful for good or for evil is kept up in outward appearance, but his general plea of *non possumus* is so often urged to the disappointment of those who seek his help, that it is not likely such a hollow fiction will survive long without being rudely unmasked.

There are those who think that this effacement of the Collector's authority is a grave danger, and that nothing but its rehabilitation can avert the evils of this anarchical state of things. Some small attempts have been made in this direction by recent legislation, (such as the Pensions Act, the Vatandars Act, the Revenue Jurisdiction Act), which have endeavoured with indifferent success to increase the authority of Revenue officers by precluding parties from questioning their orders in

the Civil Courts. This tendency has been similarly active in strengthening the official element in the constitution of local rural and urban Boards, and in making the Collectors ex-officio Presidents of such Boards. But these attempts are at the best forlorn hopes. History cannot be unread in this way. Nor can the hands of the clock be set back without dislocating the machinery. The change that has been brought about has been a slow and a sure change. It was not forced upon Government by any outside popular pressure. The gradual centralization of functions has been the work of the officials themselves, men in full sympathy with the ideas of absolute and undivided power. Their natural predilections lay strongly the other way, and yet they have been the unconscious instruments of a radical change, which therefore must have been dictated by the sense of superior public usefulness and convenience. The influence for good, which this change of system has exercised in the free growth of the political education of the people, and in inculcating therein the first principles of orderly rule, namely, divided power, and the subordination of patriarchal discretion to regulated law, this influence for good is simply invaluable, especially for men born and bred up in the traditions of absolute rule, and constitutes the chief blessing of foreign subjection. It is therefore hopeless, and very undesirable, that any sentimental regret for the departed past should lead men so far away from the right path as to try to set up the demolished idol of the king-collector, pulled down and shattered to pieces by its own votaries. There is no doubt a considerable romance in the display of personal power, but life is not all poetry, and this romance should never disguise from our vision the ugly fact that no people under the sun can be any thing but grown-up children, while they rest under the benumbing shade of personal rule. Better far to buffet with the winds and storms of the world than to be perpetually looking up for guidance to a *ma-laa* pilot,

better to struggle and stumble, and may-be even to fall at times into the wisdom of the world, than to be perpetually condemned to the rocking cradle, and be patted on the back as dutiful boys and girls, in life-long subordination to the fatherly pedagogue. As we have said above, a return to the past is out of the question, and we have now to see what can be done in the way of reconstituting our administrative machinery so as to meet fully the wants of the present. •

In any proposals for reform that may be made, it will be also necessary to bear in mind that we cannot usefully break off altogether with the past. Proposals for reform should not err on the side of overleaping their mark, any more than that they should try to set up dead carcasses in the seats of life and power. The more transparent evils of the present arrangements are, that power is too much centralized in the heads of the different departments, and is dissociated from local knowledge and sympathy, as also from all participation of the popular voice in its decisions. The Government proper has neither eyes to see, nor ears to hear, the true state of affairs as they transpire in the recesses of village or town life. The whole work has to be done by very inferior subordinates, whose word is reached from the bottom to the top layers of the official staircase. Each department is alive to its own interests only, aims to secure its own financial solvency, and there is none on the spot to see how far the action of these several departments requires to be checked and controlled in the general interests. The Governor in Council has no doubt both the power and the will to look at these things in the interests, not of this or that department, but of the public generally, but it is too remotely stationed on the hills, or in distant capitals, and the toilers in the plains and remote villages cannot get at it. What is wanted is a lower accessible level of a subordinate authority, constituted on the model of



the central Government, though with restricted powers and a broader basis, where all interests will be fairly represented, and the barriers of the departments will not be insurmountable. Each departmental agency must be brought face to face with the representatives of the others, so that in the mutual friction of coordinate, but joint, authorities, the angularities of all might be rounded and smoothed, and moderated so as to retain the good influences, and avert all evil ones in their practical working. The unseemly conflict which leads the departmental advocates to take sides, the forest officers crying down the settlement department as the root of all mischief, and the latter in self-defence denouncing the foresters as romancing in their dreams of catching the rain-clouds, and compelling them to bless the land, the revenue officers crying down the Civil Courts as hot-beds of unjust awards, and the Civil Courts reprimanding the executive officers for their grasping greed, all this unseemly conflict is only possible because the lower agents are never brought face to face, and are never made to unlearn the routine which is cherished as a trade secret, and a protective talisman against all evils. Along with these large considerations, we must also bear in mind that the sole rationale of British rule in India, viz, its capacity and its providential purpose of fostering the political education of the country on the largest scale in civil and public activities, ought also not to be forgotten in any reform that may be proposed.

Having set forth these considerations at some length, we think it is possible, without attempting the impossible task of rehabilitating the personal rule of the patriarchal Collector, to secure for him an honourable and distinct function in the reorganization which has now become more than ever necessary.

The good point in the old arrangement, when the Collector Magistrate was the full representative of all the departments of the Government in his district, was that

the wants and interests of the people of each district were effectively backed up and insisted upon by the local executive head, who felt a pride in his charge. The weakest point of the old arrangement was that it confirmed the worst traditions of the people in regard to absolute power, and kept them in perpetual pupillage. The change that has taken place has also its lights and its shades. It is a more manly and self-confiding arrangement, but in the centralization of authority all pride in district work has been minimised, till the Collector's power has been reduced to a mere phantom, useful only for obstructive purposes, but powerless for good. Unable to withstand the pressure of the Departments, which work with the whole strength of the central power, the Collector spends his energies in creating unnecessary friction in his dealings with the popular Boards, Local and Municipal. Such a position is most anomalous. In any reform that may be proposed, we must retain the good points of both the old and the new order of things, and avoid as far as possible their weaknesses.

One scheme that has been proposed would erect each district into a quasi-independent charge under a joint administration, in which the Collector would be associated with a well-selected and experienced native colleague. The powers of this joint administration would be strengthened by a judicious curtailment of the authority at present exercised by the central despotism of the Secretariate and the specialised Departments. These latter departments would under this plan exercise their functions within any given district solely on the requisition, and subject to the authority, of the joint administration. The Central Government would also exercise its control from without, instead of from within. Its departments will serve only as an inspecting and informing agency, reporting to it how far the general principles laid down by it were applied to the special circumstances and needs of each district. Government inter-

ference would thus be confined to cases of actual complaint, or difference of opinion between the joint administrators of each district. The practical effect of the proposed arrangement will be to reconstitute the district as an administrative unit, locally independent and self-contained. This arrangement would result in great financial savings, as it would enable Government to dispense with a number of unnecessary officers, who at present serve no useful purpose. It would also associate capable native administrators in executive charge. It would check the tendency to uniformity which is not the least of the evils of centralised Government. It would create a healthy emulation between district and district. Such in brief are the details of a plan that has been proposed for the rehabilitation of the collector's power. It will no doubt be a welcome substitute for the existing condition of things, if only it can be practically carried out. This appears to us however to be the weakest point in the arrangement proposed. What is worse, past experience is directly against its success. In the early years of British rule in this Presidency, the Collector of the district was associated with a native *Dustardar* as his colleague, whose advice he was bound to seek, and whose counter-signature was necessary on all official papers. The scheme worked well enough for a few years, as long as *Dustardars* with exceptional influence and experience, such as the late *Ramrao Tadpatre* and *Kesopant Jog* were associated with comparatively young and unexperienced Collectors. When this balance of power was destroyed, the whole scheme collapsed, never to be set up again on its former footing, till one by one the district *Dustardars* ceased to be appointed. This experience condemns the scheme we have sketched above, for if it were set up again, we may be sure history will repeat itself. The Collector can never be effectively checked by association with any native subordinate as his colleague.

We are however so strongly convinced that a change in the present arrangements is inevitable sooner or later, that the direction in which that change should be made is a question well worth the serious consideration of the highest authorities. We accept that portion of the scheme sketched above which would make the district an independent administrative unit, subject to central control from without, but not from within. Instead of however associating an official native colleague with the Collector, our own plan would be to give to each district a small Consultative Council of its own, and the Collector would be ex-officio President of this Council. Our plan in brief is, to bring together the distinct fractions of authority represented by the agents of the various departments in a district Consultative Council, and of such a Council, no other functionary can more fitly be made the chief or President than the District Collector. He has the largest interest even at present in the general well-being of the District. In connection with the management of local boards, he already exercises this power, and is used to it. We would in fact reproduce in the District a sufficiently large territorial unit by itself, a responsible Government by the President and the District Council, composed as the latter would be of the Chief Executive Engineer, the Chief Medical officer, the Police Superintendent, the Inspector of schools, and the forest officer, and associate with them an equal number of non-official members, namely the President of the District Local Board, and the President of the City Municipality of the District Town, the Chief Inamdar of the District, and two representatives of the leading inhabitants, bankers, lawyers &c, nominated by Government out of the elected members of the Local or Municipal boards. A Consultative council of ten persons would not be too large for such a purpose. The official members would be entrusted as now with the discharge of routine duties belonging to their departments, but in all

matters of importance affecting a particular department, no final action would be taken without a joint consultation with the other members, under the moderating presidency of the Collector. With such a check on the spot of persons intimately conversant with their own work, the necessity which now exists of having centralized departments, and referring to them for final orders, would at once cease. The central Government would lay down the general principles, and it might retain for a time even its chief departmental advisers, such as the inspectors of Jails and of hospitals, its sanitary, and settlement, and Police and Revenue, Commissioners, and Conservators of forests, and Abkari and Salt Commissioners. But in course of time these parasite growths will fall off by their own dead weight. The Government will of course retain its power of receiving appeals from parties aggrieved by the decisions of the district Councils, and of overhauling their decisions of its own motion, or on such appeal. But its constant and ceaseless interference in all petty matters must, and will, cease, and with it half the drudgery of the despatch boxes, which now overwhelm the Secretariate, and worry and weary the patience of the President and the members of Council, would be done away with at a single stroke. The wheel within wheel of Superintending Engineers, of survey and settlement Superintendents, of Revenue Commissioners, of Abkari and Salt Commissioners, of Inspectors of Jails and Hospitals, of Police Commissioners, all this hierarchy of sinecures, who represent no original work, will be done away with without any loss of efficiency. The District work will be done on the spot instead of many hundreds of miles away, it will be done more efficiently, and with less friction, because under the open light of confidential discussion with co-ordinate officers, under an impartial chief, and sooner or later the mere financial saving this will effect will exceed many lacks of Rupees.

A due sense of responsibility will be enforced which, under the existing arrangements, when each department works by itself, is hardly known. In course of time, these powers of the District Consultative Council will so far be regulated by long practice, that authority might safely be given to the Civil Courts to check irregularities and high-handedness. The interminable correspondence, which now goes on between next door neighbours, upon matters of the most trifling importance, will be greatly curtailed, making it possible to reduce and lighten the burden of the over-worked establishments. The cumbersome machinery of double appeals, which at present ends too often in a constant reiteration of the helpless phrase "we see no cause to interfere" will be greatly curtailed. The Collector will again represent, as far as the altered circumstances permit, the Sirkar with its full responsibilities, and its regulated discretion. The whole administrative machinery will work more smoothly, swiftly, cheaply, and efficiently than before. Each district will be a self-sustaining unit for its own local administration, and the spirit of emulation, which is now stifled by a love of tame uniformity, will work wonders. The subordination to the central authority need not be diminished to any extent. It will address its orders as before to the Collector in his capacity of President of the Council. When it finds it necessary to seek advice, it will secure the consideration of its measures from a deliberative body, representing all shades of opinion. Its orders in all departments will have one channel of communication, and it will enforce punctual obedience to its wishes more effectively than is the case at present. It will have all the districts more firmly under its grasp. Altogether we see nothing but financial, economical, and political advantages in the gradual adoption of the change proposed. The sense of confidence, which the people ought to feel in the acts of Government, and which is now too often conspicuous by its

absence, will be greatly strengthened; as there will be representative native members in the District Council, acquainted with the larger measures in contemplation, and in a position to secure a hearing for their views.

The only possible objection to the scheme, as above sketched out, will be that it involves an important departure, and might lead in the distant future to a disintegration of the solidarity of interests which is so necessary, both in the interests of the rulers and the ruled. The scheme is not however so novel as it at first sight appears. It need not be, and perhaps cannot be, introduced all at once, but we firmly believe that the tendency has strongly set in the direction we have outlined above, and it is only a question of time when it will be carried out, more or less fully. The decentralization of several important items of revenue, as well as of expenditure, which has taken place already, must lead to its partial adoption, sooner or later. The Central Government cannot well expect to confine the development of the new policy in its own advantage, except temporarily. In reproducing in each large district its own miniature type of Government by local Councils with limited functions, it will only focus together all the agencies which unfortunately at present unite only in the remote Secretariate, and that to such an extent as to seriously cripple the power of the Central Government to deal with large questions of policy, for which the superior authorities, being lost in details, have no time to spare. The Collector is already President of local Boards in most places, and what is proposed is that his presidency should be extended so as to embrace other matters of local interest. The scheme will make each Presidency a confederation of states governed like the Crown colonies, and in the language of English traditions, the Collector will be the Lord Lieutenant of his country, and as such the local head of the official and non-official members of the district Council. Under the old rule, the native District officers,

Vatandar Deshmukhs and Deshpandes, discharged the function of being the advisers of the agents of the Central Government in local matters, and this function will be no less usefully discharged by the additional native members. We are aware that fresh legislation will have to be resorted to to give effect to our suggestions. But this will be equally necessary whatever scheme is proposed. The financial arrangements will also have to be revised, but there will be a distinct gain and saving in the revision. Moreover, the reconstitution of functions will be entirely on old recognized lines, as the District Council will have no power to impose taxes, or make or unmake laws, and its functions altogether need not be enlarged beyond the scope of the powers now possessed by each single and divided authority. Safeguarded by all existing checks, there is little fear of disintegrating tendencies getting the upper hand. The scheme only contemplates a direct, instead of a round-about, method of securing co-operation, and unity of counsel and action in the various functionaries of Government. At any rate, this is the direction in which things are moving, and it will be true statesmanship to anticipate the inevitable, thus securing the grace and safety of a conscious and cautious advance, in preference to careless drifting along the current of hap-hazard chance and financial pressure.



## THE NATIVE INDIAN ARMY.

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### REFORM OR INCREASE ?

THE question of Indian Native Army Reform, though it cannot be ranked as one of the most burning public questions of the day, is none the less a question of vital importance to the highest interests of the country. We take up this subject of Army Reform thus restricted in its scope, chiefly because the British Army in India stands on its own peculiar ground, and being subject to political and climatic conditions, which necessarily impose large limitations on its numerical strength and working capacity, it occupies in our opinion the position of an accessory force, though of course constituting an equally essential branch of our military system.

The question relating to the suggested or contemplated abolition of the Presidential Armies, which is at present silently agitating the official world, and causing not a slight flutter in military circles, is, we think, in principle little more than a question of administrative convenience, and, involving as it does no question of vital principle, it may be safely passed over with comparative indifference. But the far more pressing and broader question relating to our Native Army, its character and composition, its organisation and management, can never be a matter of unconcern to us, as it has an important and serious bearing on the political present and future of this country. Inattention, or what is worse, apathy with respect to a question of such grave import would be unjustifiable and inexcusable. It is true that it has not hitherto received its due measure of consideration either from the native press, or from the native associations; but recent events have necessarily forced

this subject upon general attention, and it is time, we think to invite the native public to, a calm and dispassionate discussion of it, with a view to arrive at a workable scheme of definite reform, which might be made the basis of a common and unanimous appeal to the responsible authorities.

Approaching the question on its constitutional side, we may safely lay down the position that the Indian nation has a right to ask—(1) that the native Army, which is in truth the very back-bone of its whole military system, and on whose loyalty and honest devotion to the British flag in the last resort, Government must depend as a provision against internal disturbance or foreign attack, should in its constitution be really a *national* army, an army of the Indian nations and not solely, or even principally, a mercenary one; (2) that the numbers and proportion of different branches of this army should be placed on a thoroughly sound footing with due regard to the needs and changing circumstances of the country, regarded both as an Asiatic Government, and as a loyal dependency of the British Empire; (3) that it should be maintained in a healthy state of efficiency, possessing a sufficient degree of elastic and recuperative vigour, able to withstand all danger, and equal to any exigency; and (4) that at the same time it should be administered as economically as possible, in other words, at a charge compatible with the poor condition of our national and financial resources. The nation has a right to insist that the Native Indian army shall not be organized and managed on any other lines, for in that case it will be not only a source of anxiety and embarrassment to Government under conceivable circumstances, but, what is more to the point, of positive peril at a serious conjuncture to the nation at large. If it consists chiefly of foreign levies, with doubtful loyalty to the national interests, and weak moral fibre, and notwithstanding its costliness, it is defective as a fighting

organization in one or more branches of warfare it is plain enough that it cannot safely be depended upon to stand the ordeal of a serious trial. The normal dangers of a mercenary, non-national, therefore inelastic, and unsympathetic, and in-efficient Native Army become most critical in the interests of India in the present conditions of the military situation in Asia, and it thus becomes our duty as loyal citizens of the Queen-Empress to call attention to these dangers. We have to take note on the one hand of (1) the inevitable effects of the Arms Acts in demartialising the entire population of the Peninsula, and thereby, striking at the root of all military self-reliance and internal defensive strength of the country, and (2) of the equally inevitable results of a regime of peace in inducing a general disinclination to military life, and a love of peaceful pursuits, even amongst the once famous military classes of the community; and on the other, we must note (1) the tendencies of the military situation in Asia, and (2) the rapidly-gathering clouds of trouble and difficulties on our Northwest and Eastern frontiers, consequent on closer contact with populations, divided from us by deep differences of race and creed, of thought and sentiment, and particularly with that large zone of Mahomedan fanaticism, a zone of highly excitable and explosive material, which (to quote the impressive language of Lord Salisbury's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet), is always electrically charged, out of which thunderstorms may wish but little noisies proceed." We are bound to see that our Native Army, which, next to the British Army and navy, is our chief and sole means of safety in the hour of danger,—is what it ought to be, in other words, that it is not denationalized in character, nor mercenary in spirit, nor weak as a fighting organisation, and liable to break down in times of emergency, nor overcostly in maintenance.

The present state and constitution of the Native Army are thus a most important and pressing subject

of legitimate inquiry. Its importance is not a whit diminished just now because we are ostentatiously invited to dismiss from our minds all timid fears and weak anxieties on the point, and called upon to pay the Income-tax, and trust in loyal confidence in the all-seeing and all-wise omnipotence of Government to foresee, and provide against, all possible human contingencies. Unfortunately, the people of India are not children to believe that an addition of some 30,000 men to the standing army of the country, carried out at a charge of two or three crores of Rupees raised by unpopular fresh taxation, would make for us quite an impregnable tower of strength unassailable, if not inaccessible, either on the side of the Indus or of the Iravati. The very vehemence of these most comfortable and gratifying assurances which are vouchsafed to us, defeats their end, and makes even the credulous, seldom-suspecting, seldom doubting public opinion of India rather suspicious on the point, and people are tempted to ask whether the whole thing can be so easily and charmingly managed. Is our Native Army,—we cannot but ask the question—constituted and worked at present, as efficient, as trusted, as strong, as selfsubsisting as it ought to be? Is its organization satisfactory in the permanent interests of the nation, or such as the country has a right to expect for the money spent on it? Is its present constitution such as to satisfy the requirements of the new situation? Is it above all, in a satisfactory state of efficiency, in any measure, proportionate to the increase of its responsibilities, and fit to stand any trials that may await it in no distant future? These are some of the questions which the inquiry suggests, and surely, overbold must be the man, who, after a close and conscientious examination of the subject, would venture to answer all or any of these queries in the affirmative. It is much to be regretted that the public is not in possession of full or detailed informa-

on on the subject, but the broad features of the system as it exists are clear and open to our view, and we are grievously mistaken if a close analysis of them, especially in the light of the more recent developments of the situation, does not disclose a state of things, as far as the Native Army is concerned, such as to excite the gravest misgivings even in the minds of the most credulous optimists, and to justify a demand for a through, radical, and comprehensive reform. ✓

Our Native Army stands, we suspect, at this day on all its essential elements of numbers, organization, and management, on precisely the same footing, on which it was placed after the mutinies of 1857-58. The system of military defence, adopted at a grave military crisis primarily for the restoration of peace and order, and continued, after that crisis had passed away, for facilitating the work of imperial consolidation, is maintained to the present day as a permanent system, with all the defects and shortcomings, suffered to be left intact in the heat and hurry of a troublous period, untouched. These defects did not perhaps at the time strike the official vision; blurred and dimmed as it was in the dust-storm of what was thought to be a crisis of appalling magnitude. It is none the less to be regretted, however, that the cooler and wiser judgment of the succeeding period of profound calm and peace should have left them till now unnoticed and unremedied in the light of experience, and in view of the fast-changing conditions of the situation. The main object which the military authorities had then in view was, how best to disarm the revolted soldiery, and make similar risings impossible in the future. This purpose and *raison d'être* not only do no longer exist, but on the other hand the source of danger has shifted else-where, and requires all available internal strength to be utilized and knit together to ward it off. Self-complacent official optimism is, however still swayed by the influences of an unworthy military policy of jealousy, distrust, and suspicion, adopted with some

show of justification immediately after the mutiny but for which no decent excuse can now be pleaded. It is a public misfortune that our military authorities still decline to recognize the altered facts of the situation, even when brought out in such painful relief last summer by the threatening aspect of affairs at the N. W. frontier, and they fondly seek to perpetuate all the most striking defects of the old effete system and in their advocacy even exalt them into the peculiar excellences and merits of our military organization. Official perversity, or rather aberration, could go, I can conceive, any lengths, but it is most surprising and disheartening to find that even the responsible rulers of India do not see cause to question the soundness of the existing organization, or doubt the efficiency of the native army as at present constituted. They only admit the inadequacy of its present numerical strength to meet the new requirements of frontier defence, and recommend addition to that strength, the simplest, the best, and the most obvious, solution of the problem; and Government seems resolved, though it has not yet thought fit to vouchsafe to the bewildered public those considerations of high policy which have led it to the resolution,--to carry out this recommendation of military experts, which seems to accord so well with suggestions of its own mind. It is not our present purpose to call in question the wisdom of that resolution on financial grounds, and protest on behalf of the Indian tax-payer against the contemplated increase of the armies of India, with the result of an enormously large addition to the already heavy military expenditure of the country; but we wish to show on the present occasion, by looking a little deeper into the facts of the case, how the proposed solution of the military problem, not unattractive in its simplicity, nor difficult to carry out, rests on a complete mis-conception of permanent fundamental conditions. It is our firm conviction that the whole existing military organization

the country, at least as far as the native army is concerned, is not what it ought to be, and requires a thorough over-hauling. No merely arithmetical manipulation of the standing army of the country can furnish any solid or safe basis on which to found the true solution of the military difficulty. We can have no faith in the efficacy or soundness of mathematical or mechanical modes of dealing with the complex conditions of great political policy, and we for ourselves can never subscribe to the opinion that the contemplated augmentation of our armies could go any great way to place our national defences on a satisfactory basis, though it might serve to put out of view for a time the real dangers, and the pressing evils of the existing system. All the advantages which increase of numbers can secure must be at the best only temporary; such increase can never make up for the defects of a radically vicious system. And, on this, as also on other grounds, we deem it to be our solemn duty to raise our voice, solitary though it be, in the name of common sense, against what appears to us to be only a policy of "make-shift" which, ignoring the changed and changing circumstances of the times, and putting aside the really vital problem of army reform, looks, in strange disregard of what the permanent needs of the Empire demand, and in open contempt of all considerations of financial safety, to grapple with the difficulties of the hour, by simply adding 1,000 men to our standing army, and with it, three millions of new charges to the already intolerable weight of the existing system of public burdens. Believing, as we firmly do, that the *sine qua non* of an efficient system of national defence is the soundness of its organization, and distrusting all schemes of arithmetical additions, what we ask for is a candid and honest revision and re-casting of the present arrangements, with a view to secure reform in the first place, and thereafter Increase of numbers, if imperative necessity be shown to exist.

“Reform the native army first, and increase it next if necessary”—sums up our own view of the matter.

Let us then see how the native army at present stands. We shall begin by examining first its composition. Here we find still in force the same vicious principle of state-craft “divide, and rule,” which was in such high favour with the military authorities of the mutiny period. The present policy of recruiting for the army is the same old alien and jealous policy of putting together, by way of mutual check and balance, opposing nationalities, conflicting castes, and antagonistic races, and we fear if there has been any change in this respect, it is all, as far as we can see, for the worse, certainly not for the better. The increasing difficulty of attracting recruits, due, we are told by the highest authorities, including Sir F. Roberts, to the absence of sufficient inducements and the decay of the military spirit within the country has been a source of complaint with Government for several years past. That Panjab, Oude, and the Deccan, which once used to furnish such splendid material for the army, do not now supply recruits of as good physique as before, is believed by the Commanding officers on the testimony of recruiting agents, and an impression is slowly gaining ground that these Indian fields are well-nigh exhausted and that, if the native army is not to be suffered to deteriorate in quality, they must before long be abandoned as unserviceable, in favor of other and chiefly extra-Indian, countries. Already as one of the effects of such an impression, we find that recourse is being actually had in an increasing measure, to such foreign (Vide General Hardinge’s farewell order) sources for recruiting purposes, as the Belochistan and Afganistan border tribes. Only last summer we saw how, in the anxieties of a threatening crisis of serious nature on the N. W. frontier, the Government of India, with perfect confidence, and without the least hesitation, turned to Nepaul and Sikkhim for



fresh drafts of recruits for the new battalions it wished to form. And further, we have reason to believe that if the recent returns of recruitment were published with full details, they would bring out in awful prominence the fact that this new policy of taking up recruits for our Native Army from savage and alien tribes living beyond the Indus and Terai frontiers, in apparent unconsciousness of danger arising from the introduction of such foreign, fanatical, and, purely mercenary elements into the Indian army, danger, we repeat alike to the stability of the British position in India, and to the political future of the Indian nation,—this new policy is receiving a more extended application. No attempt, it is clear, is ever made to test the validity of the testimony of recruiting agents, and wild ideas and baseless theories are taken on trust, and a fatal and disastrous turn is given to the military policy of the state. Matters are allowed to drift from year to year, and the army is being recruited from whatever sources Government recruiting agents find easy, and ready to hand. Men are picked up wherever they can be found, in the country or outside it, and from whatever class, with a single eye to breadth of chest and height of stature, and the commanding officers are satisfied if they get into their respective battalions, men of the broadest chest and the tallest stature, no matter from what field they come, from Patagonia if they will, and do not further trouble themselves, and with reason as military officers, with any political considerations of state policy. But what painfully strikes us is the political blindness of those higher authorities, who are primarily responsible for the efficiency of the national army, and for the permanent security of the country, in permitting such a recruitment of the native army. These authorities seem to be unaware or regardless of the essential conditions of national defence which must put limits to their freedom of action in this matter, and guide their line of policy. Two facts seem to force

themselves on our notice in this connection, namely (1) that there is no systematic endeavour to cultivate recruiting grounds in the country itself, and possibly none to test the supplying capacities of the existing fields, believed without sufficient warrant to be exhausted; and (2) that no inducements in the way of better pay or prospects of direct commission are held out to attract to the service fresh blood from the higher classes of the community, or even from the Yeomanry of gentle-born castes. We submit that these facts,—for facts we believe them to be,—taken *per se* seem to constitute a legitimate ground for complaint on the part of the nation, to which a good native army is of vital importance. It is hardly necessary to give detailed figures here to show how the present policy of army-recruitment is vitiating the *personnel* of our native army. The fact is too well-known and freely admitted to need further argument. We think, we are not far wrong when we say that the evil is daily, growing, and assuming more and more unsafe proportions. The danger of the present arrangement may perhaps be realised in its full gravity when we advert to the fact, to which Sir T. Madhavrao C. S. I. lately called public attention in the columns of the *Madras Times*, namely, that there is a continuous stream of Belochi, Afghau, Goorkha, and other foreign mercenaries, flowing into the country from beyond the frontiers, almost unchecked, some of them being diverted towards the Native States, some obtaining admission into the ranks of the Native police, and the Native Army, and the rest settling down to fearful occupations, and going to swell the criminal classes in the country.

Now if this is not an incorrect statement of the existing condition of things in respect to the constitution of our Native Army, the evil is real and serious, and it behoves us to lodge a respectful but solemn protest against the continuance of a method of recruit-

ment which is its parent source, and which threatens within a measurable distance of time to de-nationalise our native army, and lower its *morale*. If things are suffered to go on in this way, consciously or unconsciously, the evil will soon be past cure, and without seeking or pretending to discern the dim and distant courses of futurity, it seems within the range of possibility that troubles will arise in connection with the native army, more formidable than any with which Government has hitherto had to deal.

Here is then, one of the most crying evils of our present system, which is doing a world of harm to our native army, and Reform therefore, we respectfully submit, must begin here if any where. Our Native army must be our own national army ours in something more than a name. Its ranks, should be filled up by none other than Indian races. It should reflect in its composition and character the varied elements of the nation, its spirit, its loyalty, its aptitudes, and even, we would venture to add, its idiosyncrasies. We have therefore a right to ask that the present policy of recruitment should be at once abandoned, as fraught with grave danger, and a safer and wiser one be adopted in its place, of raising recruits within the four corners of the country itself, without relaxing in the least that necessary condition of enlistment, good physique, and preferably from the better classes of the community as far as practicable, without drawing invidious and useless distinctions of race and creed. The martial instincts of our military classes, as far as they are still alive, and have been not extinguished by the effects of the Arms Act, should be turned to account by cautious encouragement, developed with care, and utilized by prudent arrangements for the purposes of national defence, and this cannot be surely beyond the resources of military statesmanship. The existing recruiting fields which are being unaccountably neglected, need only we are strongly persuaded, the fostering and sympa-

thetic care of Government to regain their old vigour.

The second fatal fault of the existing system appears to us to be the purely mercenary basis on which our native army has come to rest. Among the chief causes which are in our judgement, contributing to this deplorable result, it may suffice here to note two, namely (1) the low pay and poor prospects of the native soldier, and (2) the refusal to confer direct commissions on native gentlemen. Men enlist to go into the army year after year in larger and larger numbers less for the love and honor of the service, than for the bread it gives. We fear, particularly looking to the new method of recruitment above referred to, men join the army less and less through promptings of noble ambition to serve the Queen Empress and their country; and share in the honors and toils of the service, and more and more, as time goes by, through the pressure of necessity and in search of bread. Low people, illiterate and ignorant, thriftless and shiftless, find here what they do not know how to find elsewhere, their means of subsistence. Foreign immigrants too, coming into the midst of a crowded population, seem to seek admission into the army from similar motives. But, on the other hand, the better classes stand aloof; all the higher prizes of the service lie beyond the reach of native ambition, and the existing system of pay and promotion for the native sepoy offer to them no sufficient inducements to enter the army. There are no honorary commissions in the army to attract into its ranks members of the military aristocracy of the country. The practical effect is that our native army is gradually deteriorating in quality from a moral, if not from a physical, point of view. While the higher and better classes do not enter the service, and stand apart, excluded from, and unattracted to, it on its present basis, it is driven to draw its strength, more and more, from the needy, hungry, and lower classes

of the population. In consequence of such a radical change in the character of its material, a distinctly lower tone is coming to be imparted to our whole military organization, in its native branch at least. The soldiers are held more and more to the national colors by what is appropriately called the "bondage of the salt," and less and less by the stronger tie of a lively sense of duty and honor. They come, for the most part, from the lower stations of society, and do not enjoy in the ranks of the army the advantage of healthy contact with the influences of higher life and higher society, because of the total absence of representatives from the upper classes. Lastly, they join the service for livelihood, and do not aspire to rise high in the ranks of the army beyond the most subordinate grades, and thus receive during the period of service no practical training in the duties of really responsible command.

It is thus, we believe, that it has come to pass that our native soldiers leave the service as they enter it, in no way improved by the discipline. Pay, in the absence of higher prizes, becomes the ruling motive from beginning to end, enlisting for money, serving for money, and leaving with the hope of money. There are no higher prospects to strike their imagination, or elevate their minds beyond considerations of paltry pay and pension. The soldiers, thus circumstanced, must be thoroughly mercenary in their loyalty. They are loyal to the salt they eat, and loyal to the Government that feeds them, but of that higher sentiment of loyalty, warm and single-minded devotion to duty, to the national cause, to the national flag, and to the Indian Government they are privileged to serve; no larger measure can, we fear, be expected in this condition from them, human nature being what it is.

The military dangers, in the hour of trial, of such a mercenary feeling getting firmly rooted in the soldier's mind, and growing deep and wide in the army, are too obvious to call for remark, and this cir-

cumstance of itself should suffice to convince sceptics of the radical unsoundness, even from a military point of view, of a system that gives rise to such apprehensions, and makes them reasonable. But the political danger of such a mercenary basis of our whole organization is more serious still. It is not too much to say that it can never be for the advantage of Government, that the higher elements of the community under its sway should thus practically stand almost wholly outside one of the chief spheres of its administration, and should not have their active sympathies and cooperation enlisted in the cause of national defence and order. This virtual exclusion of our higher classes from the ranks of the army is a feature of the existing system too serious, we submit, to be passed over without notice, and one fraught with danger to the Empire. It is a more scandalous blot on our system than even the reckless enlistment of foreign mercenaries, and as such it deserves and demands the most anxious attention of those who are responsible for the Government of the Indian Empire, and for its well-being and safety.

If the evil be once admitted and recognized, the line of reform is clear, and the remedy is obvious. A change of policy is needed, and nothing, we believe, stands in the way of such a change except a traditional adhesion to, and fondness for, the old distrustful and absolute policy of the mutiny period. Government has seen fit to adopt a more generous policy in recent times in the civil department of its general administration, and the same spirit should animate its military authorities. What is required is a levelling up of the status of the native soldier and officer. Such a levelling up would have a double effect ; (1) it would alter for the better the character and condition of the Sepoy ; (2) it would attract to the army the pick of the gentry and the yeomanry. Higher prospects and higher honours, as well as higher pay and emoluments, should be held out as prizes of ambition to draw men.

with whom money is at best only a secondary consideration. There should be a fair proportion of officers' commissions in the Army reserved for our Sardars and the younger brothers of our Chiefs, with a guaranteed right to the higher grades of the Service. In one word, every effort should be made to get for the army picked men from the higher and more intelligent and independent classes of the community: for nothing in our judgment would serve so well to elevate the whole tone and character of the Native Army than the infusion into the system of some of the best blue blood of the country. The object is so important, the interests at stake are so immense, that here, if any where, more money might be wisely and properly spent in adding to the attractions of the service.

We now pass on to a third feature of our existing military system. It raises, however, a question of principle of such serious magnitude, that we feel, we must be content here with briefly indicating our own line of view with respect to it, and we invite further discussion and examination before formulating definite conclusions at this stage of the inquiry.

Our whole military organization stands at present exclusively on the basis of a "standing" army—which forms, so to speak, the beginning, the middle, and the end of the system. It has no reserve, and no support in the country of any kind to fall back upon. Such an army organization stands alone, we believe, without example in the modern world: and surely nothing can be opposed to the whole theory and practice of modern European nations, including England herself. We may go further, and venture to add that in our former history, such a standing army never existed in India. In ancient times under Hindu rule, our Kshatriya and Rajput classes served not only to provide sufficient material for the standing army of the country, but also furnished the reserve force in the system, occupying very much the same position which the "landwehr" and the "landsturm" do in

the German system. Later on, in modern times, under Mahomedan and Mahratha rule, the Rajputs and Marathas did similar service. It should also be remembered that, throughout this period, the population was armed, and therefore was in a position to supply in an emergency a never-failing reserve of fighting material. Under the rule of the E. I. Company, Government stood in this respect on its own ground, and relied on its own local army. Its military system was organized on an independent basis, and was only distantly connected with that of Great Britain. The military-situation too was then much simpler than it is now. There were no troubles on the frontiers; there was but little contact with inflammable tribes beyond the Indus. Russia was still cooped up in her Siberian wilds and Khirgiz steppes; the Khanates of Central Asia were beyond the "sphere of her influence." The night-mare of a French invasion, backed up by a vast Mahomedan movement did, for a time, no doubt, disturb the dreams of the Company's Servants in India, but there was then nothing like the present serious reality of contact with, or unsafe proximity to, a formidable aggressive power immediately beyond the frontiers. After the Mutinies of 1857-58, however, this condition of things underwent a most momentous change. The old Army of the East India Company lost its independent footing; the English and Indian Military Services were amalgamated, and with its incorporation with the English system, our native army came to be looked upon as an appendage, and a mercenary appendage of the Army of Great Britain. The British Army, with its British reserve, and British Militia, formed the defensive system of India, (as it forms the basis of the defence of the rest of the British Empire), only assisted by local native levies. The general disarmament of the country was carried out as a necessary measure of pacification and permanent security against internal disorder and



disturbance, the old native armies of annexed states were disbanded, and the old military aristocracy of the nation was allowed, in British and native territory, quietly to pass into the general body of the peaceful population. These three measures, each of which had only a doubtful, and at best temporary, justification in the circumstances in which it was adopted—however contributed, in their total effect, to cut away from under our present native army its old and requisite *local* basis, and left it without a reserve to fall back upon. And thus our native army has come to be now in fact a mere local auxiliary force of mercenaries, kept up only in aid of the Military system of the British Isles, on which in the last resort India, like every other part of the British empire, excepting of course the favoured colonies, must for all practical purposes, lean for defence and protection.

We have no intention to exaggerate the inherent evils and inseparable dangers of such an army organization; but we must take leave to be sceptical about its theoretical soundness or practical adequacy to meet the needs of the times. We have every faith in the power of the British navy to guard the coasts of the British empire, and protect the vast British commerce on the high seas. But as far as the "dim courses" of a possibly near future can be discerned, the land, and not the sea, will, we apprehend, be the principal theatre of conflict and political supremacy, and commercial lordship will be kept in view as the prize to be won by the victor among the contending powers. It is therefore incumbent on British statesmen to inquire whether the landforces of Great, or even the Greater, Britain in their existing strength are equal to meet such a call as this, or to satisfy the requirements of such an extended empire. It may be also permitted to us with our own dim lights to doubt whether the standing army of Great Britain, with its reserve and militia in the British Isles, can supply us in India at such distance,

even with the aid of the local armies, requisite and adequate means of defence in times of a serious or prolonged struggle, and that too, across and in spite of a whole continent armed to the teeth. We cannot believe that, in a serious struggle on the N. W. or on the Eastern frontiers, with a formidable military power, we can safely count on obtaining needful supplies of drilled or seasoned men from across ten thousand miles of sea. Nor can we depend on the efficacy of timely recruitment in the country itself, conducted as recruiting is carried on at present. Recruiting is getting already difficult even in times of profound peace, at least we are told so by the highest authorities; and thus we can well imagine what an effort it must cost, and that too with the prospect of possible failure, to keep the native army, engaged in the field and employed on garrison duty, up to its normal and requisite strength. Besides, there are special circumstances connected with the present condition of India, to which we cannot afford to shut our eyes.

(1) There is first the fact which we have on the authority of Sir R. Temple, namely, that the martial spirit of several Indian races, once famous as warlike and brave, is gradually dying out. Whatever may be the true explanation of it,—whether it is due to the working of the Arms Act, or to the effects of British peace, or to the growing poverty of the people, the fact remains undisputed, and has to be reckoned with, particularly in view of prospective difficulties and struggles on the frontiers with races and powers of first class importance. (2) There is next the difficulty caused by distance from England, which would alone preclude any sanguine hope of timely help in the hour of need. As for the colonies, with the comparatively undeveloped condition and resources of the settlements in Australia and at the Cape, they themselves will require the protection of the mother country, and they can not for a century more at least be in a position to help us. (3) There is

further the possibility of complications in Ireland nearer home, and breaking out simultaneously with disturbances on the Indian frontiers. These and such other circumstances cannot be lost sight of. (4) Again, the far-seeing military policy of incorporation adopted by Russia in her Asiatic possessions, which aims at enlisting, on behalf of her hold on Asia, and also for the purposes of political expansion, the martial instincts and the military talents of her subject races, this policy requires the most watchful attention of the Government of India. A military *avalanche* might at any time, and "with but little notice" "sweep across the Indus," and overwhelm the peaceful and demartialized provinces of the Indian empire. In the face of these considerations people very naturally doubt the wisdom of the prevailing arrangements in India that neglect to provide guarantees for safety by timely measures of reform against such a possible, if not a probable, contingency, and seem to take refuge in a "make-shift" addition by which no permanent advantage can be secured, but which will only entail a serious charge on the poor resources of the country. It is quite clear that the petty arts of official subterfuge, which seek guarantees for safety and defence in the conflicting feelings and interests of race, creed, and class, will ill meet the demands of a serious military crisis on the N.W. frontier.

These considerations will bring out the true gravity of the mistakes committed in our exclusive dependence on a mercenary standing army, without a basis or support in a national reserve or militia, and acting only as an accessory branch of an imperial army located 10,000 miles away. We now ask in all seriousness the question whether the dangers of such a crisis can be adequately met by the contemplated addition to the standing army. We state it as our firm conviction that mere additions to the num-

bers, however great, which do not reform the mercenary and exclusive character of our forces, which do not secure to them a reserve in the national sympathies and strength, which do not attract and incorporate into the ranks the flower of our yeomanry, and which do not officer in part at least our army by our nobility, will fail to be of the smallest value. We may be permitted to hope that our new Commander-in-chief, Sir F. Roberts, who is both a statesman and a soldier, will not rest satisfied with such a radically defective organization of the military forces of the Indian Empire, but will courageously take up the whole problem of military reform in India, and bring his long, wide, and varied experience, and his high administrative talents, to bear on its solution.

In his speech at the Guild-hall banquet, Lord Salisbury is reported to have said:—"I ask you to remember this, that compared with other nations of the globe, you have a small territory at home, you have a weak Military force, you have a great empire, with means of sustaining it apparently far inferior to those of the great nations around you, who are constantly increasing their military forces, and who have the advantages derived from that concentration of authority, according to which all power is placed at the disposal of the central executive, and you meet these nations by this one talisman,--the unity of the people by whom these islands are inhabited" We are at a loss to see why his Lordship takes, politically speaking, such a narrow view of the moral "talisman" and basis of the British position in the world. But the language of the Conservative ex-Premier seems to us to accurately indicate the theory on which the whole military system of the British Empire professedly stands; of which the British army is the main trunk, and the local armies, only its side supports or branches. For our own part, we are not much charmed, we confess, either with the theory or

the practice of the system which rests on it; and we apprehend that, as far as this dependency is concerned, such a policy is fraught with positive danger. Mercenary armies may carve out empires; but the foreign conqueror can never keep himself in power without nationalizing his means of defence. This is the moral of our position; and it points to the only solution of our difficulties. We believe Mr. Gladstone showed a far keener and juster appreciation of the military situation as a whole; when in a most cautious and statesmanlike speech recently delivered by him in Scotland; he expressed his feelings on this subject in striking and forcible language. Referring to the threatened crisis of last summer on the N. W. Frontier, he said "I tremble to think of the position in which we should have stood if Russia had had Afghanistan for her friend; and if we had been there in the condition of persons exercising a foreign domination without cause or warrant in defiance of the sentiment of the country." The warning conveyed in these words spoken by the Liberal Premier,—whose ability, prudence, and moderation were chiefly instrumental in warding off the danger alluded to by him,—not in the hour of panic, or in the heat of excitement caused by an anticipated struggle, but six months after the crisis had passed away, and backed further with all the weight of his high authority and responsible position,—the warning, we say, thus conveyed ought to put us on our guard, and dispose us calmly to consider where and how we stand in this the most vital matter of army organisation, and receive with caution all confident schemes of re-construction advanced in reckless disregard of the real wants of the situation. When the Indian tax-payer is invited to bear cheerfully a present additional charge on account of the army, to be strengthened; he is told; by the creation of fresh battalions, he may well ask, before responding to this rather unpleasant invitation, what guarantee is vouchsafed to him, that

he will have, if he pays the new tax, his money's worth in return,—a really good system of defence. If we proceed on the lines suggested by ardent military reformers, we may be only building, we fear, a needlessly cumbrous and artificial superstructure on what will prove to be little better than a sandy basis.

The total absence of a reserve and national militia, so necessary as supports for the standing army of the country, is a very serious defect going deep down to the heart, so to say, of the national system of defence as at present constituted. A good reserve and a good militia are indispensable to our military defence, and this necessity demands, we submit, candid recognition at the hands of our responsible authorities. The truth seems to be slowly dawning on the mind of Government, and there is ground for hope that Sir F. Roberts will, before long, take up this matter with a view to serious action.

Now, as to the practical question, how to form such a reserve and militia, opinions may differ, and various schemes may be suggested. But there is one important factor which we cannot overlook in the consideration of this problem,—we mean, the condition of the national finances; and no plan could stand any chance of being seriously considered which ignored this essential element, and looked only to the military side of the question. Any feasible project that may be recommended, must satisfy the condition that it does not compel a resort to intolerable taxation. On this point our ideas are briefly these:—As far as the creation of a reserve is concerned, the end, we think, can be in a large measure attained without much additional expenditure, if a plan be devised by which the armies of our native states, as well as the English armies of "observation" stationed in native states to overawe them, can be utilized for the purpose. In the first place, the English contingent and subsidiary forces, placed near the capitals of the big native states, ap-

pear to us, chiefly in view of increased facilities for communication and movement, and the concentration of military forces,—to have no useful function, to discharge, and no important object to gain, by continuing to be where they are, and they only involve a waste of imperial military resources. These forces can be formed into reserve regiments for the purposes of imperial defence. Secondly, as to the armies of the native Princes, they stand on a somewhat different basis. They are mostly *national* armies, with *national* traditions and associations, and have a deep hold on the affections of the people, and on this, if on no other ground, they deserve to have a worthy place assigned to them in the military organisation of the Empire. The disciplined portions of these armies might be drafted into the reserves, and the undisciplined levies might safely be incorporated into the national militia.

The incorporation of these armies with the defensive system of the Empire has a political and moral value of its own, which cannot be over-estimated. But even from a military point of view, the gain would be by no means small. In point of mere physique and moral fibre, these native armies are fully equal, certainly not much inferior, to the Indian native army, and if equally well drilled and armed, there can be no shadow of doubt that they would prove equally efficient, as component parts of our Imperial army. No argument is needed to show the glaring impolicy, not to say the injustice, of the proposals for the abolition of these native armies, suggested now and then by shallow political theorists. Nor can we bring ourselves to recognise the wisdom of the present policy which throws away as unserviceable such splendid material as these armies of our native states can easily be turned into, and keeps them outside the pale of the national system of military forces, in a permanent state of enforced inaction and sullen isola-

tion, particularly at a time when our military authorities are beating every bush—both within Indian and extra-Indian territory,— for recruits, and are at their wit's end how to increase the military resources of the Empire. Thus the incorporation of both these armies (English and native), now suffered to waste their strength in a useless round of jealous watchings, with the general military system of the Empire, will be a most valuable reform in the right direction, and the moral effect of utilizing the native armies in the way suggested above would simply be invaluable, as it would confer on the whole military organisation of the Indian Empire the character it sadly lacks at present, we mean, a really *national* character.

As regards the national militia, we do not see our way very clearly towards its reconstruction, but we believe something might be achieved in this direction if the strictness of the Arm's Act were relieved, and every encouragement held out to the people to act as volunteers. Certain precautions would be of course necessary at the first start, and the progress must be slow. But the whole arrangement can be carried out we think with much ease, at little cost, and with very great gain. The armed Police, with the Native Volunteers, and the undisciplined armies of the smaller Native States, would soon develop into a healthy militia useful for garrison duties.

One or two features more of the existing native army organization require notice, though they are not so important as those referred to in the foregoing observations. Our Native Army is, as is well known, altogether wanting in one effective arm. It has no Artillery to complement the cavalry and the infantry forces. We have no wish to dwell further on this point than to say that it is a feature introduced after the mutinies of 1857-58, as a necessary measure of temporary safety, and has been since then retained



with a mistaken view of its necessity, even in the altered circumstances of the general situation of to-day. With this observation, we pass on to a more serious defect, viz. that our native army is, almost exclusively in the higher grades, officered by Europeans. The promotion and prospects of the native officer are confined to the most subordinate grades. He begins at the bottom of the ladder, and is allowed to go up only a few steps. He does not rise to independent commands. We do not in this place object to such an arrangement on political or financial grounds, but confining our view to the military aspects of the question, we cannot but consider it extremely faulty. The idea that a native officer can never safely be trusted with high responsible commands may be dismissed from consideration as a base calumny. The practical evils of the exclusion of native officers from positions of trust and responsibility may be thus briefly set forth.

(1) Sir H. Lawrence once contended that the native army "affords no outlet for the energies of active officers of superior courage and ability", and the efficiency of the army has to be maintained by the bondage of the salt. There is no inducement to exertion, no stimulus to the display of courage or talent. There is nothing to rouse ambition, and call forth noble effort. Fidelity to the salt is secured; but no higher sense of duty is inspired. The native soldier is thus kept permanently on a low moral level of military discipline.

(2) It is but natural that great disappointment is caused by this unjust treatment of native officers, as compared with their European comrades, in the minds of the more ambitious or adventurous of the native Soldiers, who are thus condemned, under the existing system, to the lower grades of the Service. It is a feeling which cannot be removed by such superficial means as attention to their "comforts" and "amusements and sports", and the continuance of this feeling must be accounted as perilous, in the

long run, to the efficiency of the army, and it cannot be safe, we submit, to ignore it or make light of it.

(3) Moreover, the present system throws the whole weight of responsibility for the maintenance of discipline and right direction on English officers, who alone are invested with independent commands, and who therefore alone know how to command and direct. The inconvenience of such an arrangement can not of course be much felt in times of peace, but will appear to be a most portentous danger at the first serious encounter with a formidable military power. In the hour of trial, a perennial supply of foreign, costly, and imported officers can not be safely counted on to meet in time the demands of a serious drain, and we may leave it to the military critics to say what would become of the efficiency of an army in the field,—however fine and disciplined, if it were not well or adequately officered. Already, judged by the German standard, which seems to be a safe standard, it would appear that the Native Army has not a sufficient supply of officers; and how can we be sure that this evil of under-officering the army may not take a very serious form in times of a protracted war, especially when we consider that, in the absence of necessary previous training, no native officer, however old, could be promoted from the rank and file of the Native Army to take command. The necessity of having a larger number of native officers in the army than there are at present should be at once recognized, and with it that of throwing open, in view of possible contingencies, the higher grades of the Service to the native gentry by direct commissions.

In whatever way we look at the subject of the reform of our native army, we thus come to the conclusion that there is no possible correction of the serious defects and consequent evils referred to above, except by elevating the status and privileges of the native sepoy and officer to a level equal to those of their European comrades.

Before we close this hurried review of the existing state and constitution of the Native Army, we would briefly touch on a question which, though not, strictly speaking, germane to the present inquiry, is closely connected with it. We refer to the question of the Volunteer movement.

The question of the extension of the privilege of Volunteer Service to the natives of the country received during the last year a large measure of public attention. That such a service is a necessary complement of the defensive organisation of a country is admitted on all hands. In countries where conscription is the law, and universal liability to serve is the rule, citizen soldiery is the basis of the military system, and Volunteer forces have of course no room. But where military organisations are more or less based on the type of a paid standing army, and there is no compulsory Service, the necessity, or at all events, the great desirability, of such forces, must be recognised. Volunteer Corps were first organized in England in 1859, and have since then come to be regarded as a necessary component of the British Army. In India too, we have had, since the mutiny years, our small Volunteer Corps. But what is peculiar to this country is that the Indian Corps are composed of Europeans or Eurasians exclusively. The privilege is thus accorded only to the members of the ruling race, and denied to the native subjects of Her Majesty. This exclusion of the native element from the Volunteer system of the country is in our judgment unfair and impolitic, and furnishes a legitimate ground of complaint on the part of the more intelligent classes of the community. It seems to cast an undeserved slur on the loyalty of the people, and creates feelings of suspicion and distrust where they ought not to exist, and gives rise to false and unfavourable impressions in foreign countries, near and remote, regarding the relations between the rulers and ruled in India. Further, the natives of the country,—

especially the educated classes, whose hearts are being linked by closer and stronger ties every day to the throne of Her Majesty the Queen Empress, and who yield to none of her subjects elsewhere in fervent loyalty to her rule, are beginning to think that they have a right,—a moral and a constitutional right—to claim the full privilege of British citizenship, and to ask to be allowed to share equally with Her Majesty's British subjects the honors and toils of citizen-service. Such are the new-born feelings and new-sprung aspirations among the higher sections of the native Community, and we need hardly point out that there is an obvious political advantage in enlisting these feelings and these aspirations in the cause of national defence, especially when the military necessities of the Empire render such enlistment highly desirable.

Such in brief outline is our view of this complicated question of native Army reform. We are fully persuaded that the existing system of army organisation is not as it ought to be, and requires a thorough re-casting. Our proposals may be summed up thus.

(1) That the Native Army should be made as *national* as possible in composition, tone, and character. The present policy of foreign re-cruitment is in many respects a grievous wrong, and must be abandoned. Recruiting in extra-Indian countries, such as Beloochistan, should be strictly prohibited, and the available fields within the country itself should be improved. Lastly, the pay and prospects, the status and privileges, of the native sepoy and officer should be raised in order to draw to the army some of the better elements of native Society.

(2) That a strong reserve and national militia be created as necessary supports of the standing army, partly by utilizing the armies of our native Princes, as well as the English armies stationed in their territories, and partly by relaxing, under suitable precautions, the rigour of the Arms Acts.

(3) That the higher grades of the military service be thrown open to native ambition, both in order to provide more officers for the Army than it has at present, and also to attract to the Service the upper classes.

(4) That the native army be made complete in all arms.

(5) That the Voluntary movement be encouraged.

These are some of our proposals on this subject. In conclusion we would most earnestly beseech the consideration of Government to the point, whether, in dealing with this most vital question of Army reform, the time has not arrived for the adoption of a more liberal policy of "trust in the people," in military matters, than has hitherto prevailed. A truly generous recognition of the loyal sentiments of the nation, and a statesmanlike appreciation of the military and political necessities of the new situation with which we are now called upon to deal, seem to us to call loudly for a change of policy. For our own part, while fully recognizing the fact that foreign rulers can not afford to forget the fact of conquest, we must express our deep and strong conviction that a comprehensive reform in the Army-organisation on lines suggested above is, in the interests of both rulers and ruled, at once both more desirable and safe than an *arithmetical addition* to the existing numbers of the standing army, and if financial considerations are allowed their due weight, such a reform is the only alternative open to Government.

For it is no use to forget that the whole question has a financial aspect, though, for obvious reasons, we have not touched upon it in the foregoing pages. Our Army-budget is already ruinously heavy, and to judge from the remarks of Sir A. Colvin in the Financial statement of March last (Para 76), these army charges might possibly

swell, in case, "apprehensions" therein fore-shadowed, "of fresh demands for further increase" in the military estimates, should be realised. This is a feature which Government cannot with safety ignore, for economy is the true key of sound finance, and must not be neglected in the military, any more than in the other branches of the Public Service. Our Army expenditure has gone up by leaps and bounds during the last 20 years of profound internal peace, from 15½ millions in 1865 to close upon 21 millions in 1885;—a charge on our "resources" already larger by no less than 6 millions per annum, than the corresponding charge on the English Exchequer for the British army. In fact it appears to be the largest military charge borne by any civilized country in the world, if we only except France: for, on comparison, we find that, while we have to pay for our Military establishments more than 21 millions a year, the German Army costs in round figures £ 18,800,000, the French Army about 22,800,000 £, the Italian Army about £ 7,300,000, the Austro-Hungarian Army about £ 14,000,000, including the cost of the local militia, the Russian Army about £ 19,000,000, while the United States army costs not more than £ 8,000,000. The cost of the English Army itself, including the Reserve and Voluntary Forces, does not go higher than 19 millions. And yet though we bear ungrudgingly and unmurmuringly a *maximum* outlay on account of the Army, as compared with the other civilized nations of the globe, we are compelled, under our present system of organisation and management, to be content with a *minimum* of effective forces. For the whole of our Army, European and Native, maintained at a cost of 21 millions, shows a total of men and officers not larger than 189,507,—a strength manifestly inadequate to the growing necessities,—internal and external,—of the Indian Empire, and one which is, besides, utterly *incapable of expansion* in the hour of need

for the purpose either of offence or defence, except by a resort to wasteful recruitment, or drafts on the English Reserve 10,000 miles away. The European nations can, in consequence of the excellence of their organisation, raise their armies at short notice to any required strength to meet the demands of national defence. For the sums above mentioned, Germany keeps an army of 4,20,000 men on the peace-footing, with an organisation capable of raising it to 1,300,000 in time of war; France, an army of 500,000 men, which may be increased in the hour of necessity to a total of 2 millions; Italy an army of about 200,000 men, without reserves, capable of being raised to about 4,50,000; Russia, an army of nearly 800,000 men in peace, and 1,200,000 more in time of war; and Austrian-Hungary an army of 270,000, capable of raising its numbers in time of war to nearly 800,000; while with our military outlay of 21 millions and more, we cannot raise our army, in the hour of need and peril, even by a single battalion of seasoned soldiers, except by importation from England. This is, in our judgement, an awful fact which we must not shirk looking fully in the face. A system of army organisation—so inexcusable and dangerously inefficient, and so ruinously and extravagantly expensive, cannot certainly be described as sound and economical, and if we wish to have an efficient and economically managed army for purposes of national defence, a reform of our present system seems imperatively called for. Any addition to our present military strength, consequent on the contemplated increase of the standing Army, if unaccompanied by improvement of the system, would be sheer waste of money and resources, against which the Indian tax payer, we submit, has a right to protest.

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- II. The Native States and their Armies.

# THE POONA SARVAJANIK SABHA.

Established for representing the wants and wishes of the inhabitants of the Deccan, being appointed on a popular elective system under rules framed for the purpose.

WALEKAR'S WADA, DANE ALI.

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*Chairman*—RAO BAHADOOR KRISHNAJI LAKSHMAN NULKAR.

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- |                                             |                                        |
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| Aderjee Dorabjee Ghaswala Esqr.             | Kashinath Rao Nilkant Kinagivale Esqr. |
| Venkatesh Govind Lale Esqr.                 | Domoder Janardhan Gokhale Esqr.        |
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| Govind Mahadeo Gadre Esqr. Pleader.         | Shivram Hari Sahu Esqr.                |
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CHINTAMANRAO VISHWANATH ALIAS BHAI SAHEB NATU ESQR.

### *Auditor.*

GOVIND MAHADEO GADRE ESQR. PLEADER.

### *Honorary Secretary.*

SITARAM HARI CHIPLONKAR ESQR.

### *Secretary.*

# PROCEEDINGS OF THE SABHA.

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE PUBLICATION  
OF DRAFT RULES UNDER THE INCOME TAX ACT.

SARVAJANIK SABHA ROOMS.  
Poona, 17th February 1886.

JOHN NUGENT Esquire  
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,  
Financial Department.

BOMBAY.

I am directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha to submit for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the necessity which the Committee of the Sabha feels in the early publication of the Draft Rules under the Income Tax Act, which His Excellency's Government may seem fit to frame, agreeably to the instructions recently conveyed to this Government by the Government of India. The Government of India have expressed in the said instructions great anxiety and solicitude with regard to the fair working of the Act, and it is their highest desire to see that the Act is worked with great caution and moderation so as to prevent inequitable assessment and discontent among the people.

The Committee of the Sabha is fully aware that the Bombay Government shares the same anxiety and solicitude that is evinced by the Government of India. It is a fact which has been admitted on all hands that the people of India are not in a position to bear the burden of any more taxation with any degree of patience, and the passing of the Income Tax Act has undoubtedly created a feeling of great unpleasantness, but the necessity for the imposition of such a taxation under the present financial condition of the state will in a great measure tend to soften the intensity of that feeling. But to further insure the sympathy of the people the Committee of the Sabha is very anxious that the detailed rules under the Act should be so framed as might be found acceptable to all the classes of the people. It has indeed hitherto been the practice of the Government to publish

a fair share of criticism, but the time that is now at the disposal of the Government is admittedly very short, and the Committee of the Sabha ventures to submit that the draft rules may at once be published with a view to invite criticism from the public and the press, and when they are thus published the Committee of the Sabha also hopes to make such suggestions, as may, in the opinion of the Sabha, be found necessary to best effectuate the intentions of the Government of India and also of the Local Government to ensure the smooth working of the Act among the people.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Most Obedient Servant

SHIVRAM HARI SATHE.

*Secretary Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.*

No. 5069 of 1885-86

Financial Department

Bombay Castle, 23rd February 1886.

To,

THE SECRETARY

Poona Sarvajanic Sabha.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 17th Instant, and in reply to inform you that the general rules under the Income Tax Act of 1886 have already been framed and published by the Government of India, but that subsidiary rules as may be framed locally by His Excellency the Governor in Council will be published provisionally before final adoption, in accordance with the standing orders.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most Obedient Servant

J. MONTEATH,

For Secretary to Government

# WAYS AND MEANS OF MEET- ING THE ADDITIONAL ARMY EXPENDITURE.

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As the increase of the Indian Army is now a *fait accompli*, the question of "ways and means" of meeting the additional military expenditure thus rendered necessary becomes a question of paramount importance.

The Secretary of State for India, in his Budget speech of 5th August 1885 in the House of Commons attempted a brief review of the present condition of the Indian finances, and drew the attention of the House to a "sudden change of position, political, and financial" consequent on the changed aspect of affairs on the N. W. frontier. In order that the House might understand what that change meant (in pounds, shillings, and pence,) Lord Randolph Churchill observed that it had "now to look to a permanent increase in the military charge, which might amount to something like £ 2,000,000, and which could hardly be reduced below £ 1,500,000. After detailing the measures called for by the requirements of the new military situation, such as the formation of new Goorkha regiments, additions to the native cavalry, increase of British troops &c., Lord Randolph Churchill proceeded to suggest "the ways and means" of meeting the additional outlay. Among others, he stated that the Government of India might have recourse—

(1) To loans:—"But that resource" said his Lordship, "ought only to be had recourse to, with great caution," as the present interest charge on debts incurred is over 11 millions.

(2) "To diversion of part of the Famine In-

insurance Fund:—but there would be considerable objections to that course:—

(3) To fresh taxation: In regard to taxation, there were three courses open:—

(a) "The License-tax might be "re-cast," "re-arranged," and "extended;" and added Lord R. Churchill, "I see no objection to that course, as the present is perhaps a favourable opportunity for its adoption."

(b) The Income-tax might be re-imposed; This course has been finally adopted, though it was admitted that it was not a course free from difficulty.

(c) The Salt-tax might be raised:—but in doing so, Lord R. Churchill imagined there would be enormous difficulties.

(4) To the abrogation, or revision, of provincial contracts.

(5) To economy in Productive P. Works expenditure, or rather a curtailment of it as also to general retrenchments.

After submitting for the consideration of the House large proposals of such serious import, all or any of which might be adopted to meet the cost of the contemplated army-increase, the Secretary of State for India, with that calm philosophy and dignified equanimity which so fitted a truly Imperial statesman, looking on the situation through the enchantment of distance across 10,000 miles of "the blue seas, went on to assure the House that there was nothing in this financial condition of India to cause alarm," and that it would be a complete error to "imagine" that the Indian Finance was not perfectly capable of adapting itself to the circumstances, and enduring even heavier charge than those indicated.

These five proposals, viewed as a whole, may be reduced to two heads; viz,

(1) Borrowing money for the purpose of defraying the additional military charges

(2) Meeting it by increase of taxation. These are very serious proposals, and as we have seen already, they have found practical embodiment in Sir A. Colvin's financial statement of March last. That statement makes it pretty clear that the settlement arrived at is only temporary, and has no elements of permanence. No thought has been given in the hurry of the moment to the question of retrenchment and the possible enhancement of the Income Tax, or further addition to the salt duties, are spoken of with ominous gravity as quite possible contingencies, while little or no hope is held out of a possible reimposition of the import duties and only a vague promise of retrenchment is made in the distant future. It thus becomes necessary to discuss the whole question from the Indian tax-payer's point of view. Accepting the addition to our Army charges as inevitable, we have now to see whether the policy of the Government of India in dealing with this crisis admits of reconsideration.

Lord R. Churchill's first proposal, that of loans standing by itself seems to be perfectly unintelligible, unless it is taken in conjunction with his other proposals regarding the Famine Fund, and curtailment of the P. W. Budget Grant. The three proposals, taken together as parts of one measure, seem to us to formulate what some will regard as a complete financial scheme for meeting the new charge of two millions, or possibly more. It was suggested by the Secretary of State that the P. W. expenditure, for which Government is allowed to raise between 2 and 3 millions a year by loans in England or India, might be cut down to safe and more convenient proportions: In other words the proposal is that the sanctioned amount of money to be spent annually on Productive Public Works, chiefly railways or irrigation works, should be borrowed year after year, and part of the loans, so raised for such a purpose, appropriated for army-services, so that there might be no need of a resort



to new borrowings on account of the military charges; and the annual interest-payment should be made out of the proceeds of the old License and the new Income tax which have imposed as makeweights to equalize the burden on traders and professional or official classes of state taxes hitherto too exclusively raised from the agricultural classes. The Secretary of State apparently thinks, that the famine Insurance Fund and the P. W. Grant cannot be better utilized than in paying part of the cost of the machinery of national protection from war which is as serious a danger as famine.

Now this proposal of defraying part of the annual recurring expenditure of the country by means of loans, and going on adding year after year to the indebtedness of the country professedly for pure administrative purposes is certainly a most extraordinary financial proposal, and were it not for the fact that it has been put forward by a responsible minister of the Crown in an official financial statement, it would scarcely have been worthy of serious consideration. While statesmen of high authority like Mr. Gladstone, and economists of high eminence like Mr. John Stuart Mill, advocate the policy of defraying even *extra-ordinary* charges, such as war-charges, out of current revenue, as a just and wise financial policy, here we have an Indian Secretary in his place in Parliament, submitting for adoption this proposal that a portion of the *ordinary* expenses of the general administration should be paid out of borrowed money, for which interest alone was to be charged against current revenues. It is certainly wonderful that such a dreamy proposal, coming from a responsible minister of state, who prides himself on his practicality and foresight, and upon his being far removed from the lulling influences of the languor of this land of the lotus, should have provoked not a single word of adverse comment or criticism in the House, while a side party attack on Lord Ripon led

to a most lively debate. It is a fact which speaks volumes as to the way in which questions of grave importance, affecting the welfare of the millions of this dependency, are discussed and disposed of in the British imperial Parliament.

Whatever may be said of its insidious character, there is no doubt that this proposal has the advantage of possessing simplicity and facile opportunism. (1) It obviates the inconvenient necessity of resorting to additional taxation of an "exasperating" nature, and shunts off to a distant shore all idea of a readjustment of existing taxes for meeting this increase of military charges, and has further the advantage of reducing the recurring *permanently* additional charge to a perceptible amount, for the increasing interest on this new debt will be met by means of an Augmenting License and Income-tax. (2) As no new tax would be necessary, the proposed arrangement will be also free from the difficulty of requiring public assent to fresh taxation measures. Parliament has already sanctioned the annual borrowing on account of unproductive P. Works expenditure, and the proposal only involves a new appropriation of the monies so raised; Such a diversion being justified on the ground that the end to be kept in view in either kind of expenditure was the same, viz the protection of the nation from war or famine.

The objections to such a scheme both on grounds of honesty and justice are however so obvious that we shall content ourselves with only stating here a few of them;—

(1) First, it is impolitic and unfair to pay ordinary charges of current expenditure out of borrowed money, and throw an increasingly heavy charge on future generations. That current expenditure should be met from current income is one of the first principles of sound finance; and no scheme is worthy of serious consideration that goes counter to it.

(2) The proposal, if accepted, would lay down a most dangerous precedent. It would leave no motive for enforcing *present* economy with due regard to prospective safety, and by lightening the present pressure of public burdens, would induce a blindness to the real facts of the situation, and lull the public mind to sloth and slumber over prospective dangers, to receive only "a rude awakening when it was too late to mend."

(3) The present debt of India is already close on 260 millions, including guaranteed railway debt; and the interest charge is over 11 millions and a half annually. The cost of remittance,—or which is the same thing, loss by exchange on the remittance account—is already a million and a half. Thus the present indebtedness of the country is such that the annual charge of interest and exchange on the guaranteed railways is no less than 13 millions, taking the guaranteed railways as really Government railways under a different name. The impolicy, therefore, of increasing without limit, and at a regular and progressive rate, to the general debt year after year, and that not for the purpose of developing the productive resources, and thereby the tax-paying powers of the country, but solely for Army Services—is obvious; and therefore any proposals tending in this direction of increasing the country's foreign liabilities for interest must be viewed with extreme "caution" particularly in view of a threatened further fall in Exchange owing to the probable action of the U. S. Government, in the matter of the repeal of the Bland Act.

(4) The proposal contemplates a diversion of the Famine Insurance Fund from its original purpose, for interest payment on account of the military charges, which would be a breach of faith on the part of the Financial administration of the country, and would "exasperate" public opinion which reconciled itself with great difficulty, and under protest, to

the imposition of the License-tax on the faith of the most solemn assurances and bridling promises voluntarily given by the Government of Lord Lytton when it was first imposed.

The whole proposal of meeting the cost of the contemplated increase of the army by means of new loans is such that the nation has only to understand it in order to see its absurdity and impolicy, as well as its unscientific and unfair nature. And with this remark, we take our leave here of what we might call the *borrowing* proposals of Lord Randolph Churchill. We feel sure that the judgment of the impartial public, both in India and in England, has already condemned this plan without reprieve. We pass on to the *taxing* proposals of his Lordship which appear to be of a more serious and practical importance. We will begin with his 4th proposal viz—the abrogation, or revision, of the provincial contracts.

Lord R. Churchill proposed, if we correctly understand his language, to revise the existing provincial contracts, and on revision, to abolish, in part at least, the present scheme of periodically settled provincial allotments. In Lord R. Churchill's opinion, assignments for provincial expenditure, out of imperial revenues, should be regulated year by year with strict regard to the changing necessities of the Empire as a whole, and he sees obvious and great risk in tying up the hands of the Central Government, by entering into such contracts for long or short periods with the Local Governments. This proposal opens up the whole question of the de-centralisation policy inaugurated by Lord Mayo's Government, and developed on existing lines by Lord Ripon; a question of vast importance, with which, however, it is not our object to deal with on this occasion. Practically for our present purposes, we might regard the new proposals as leading to a curtailment for the advantage of the imperial expenditure of the existing provincial

### 3. WAYS AND MEANS OF MEETING THE ADDITIONAL

grants, and thereby leaving the Provincial Administrations to recoup themselves by additions to their provincial resources. The advantage of it lies in the fact that the imperial wants might be thus met by the existing resources without the necessity of having recourse to additional taxation of a more or less "irritating" character for imperial purposes, and the odium of fresh taxation for Provincial needs might be shifted to the local Governments. The theory is that Provincial expenditure should be met out of strictly provincial income, and imperial charges defrayed out of nonprovincial and general receipts. So that any extension of imperial taxation proper might be avoided. All future additions to taxation would be purely *provincial*, instead of being *imperial*. Questions of additional taxation being provincialized would be at once removed from the arena of Indian Imperial Finance as such, and becoming local will lose all point and interest as imperial questions for national consideration. Lastly, when this arrangement was carried out, new taxation proposals would take such form as might be best suited to the habits and circumstances of the Provincial populations.

This is a bold and dangerous proposal, and aims at abrogating the provincial needs as they grow. It seems to us to be however open to two very serious objections, besides the one above indicated. (1) It would necessitate year after year, as the requirements of the Empire increase, increasingly large additions to our Provincial rates, which fall under the present arrangements *exclusively* on our trading and agricultural classes, and have the effect of (to use Sir S. Northcote's language) "overloading" the very "springs of our national trade and industry". These classes, besides, it should be borne in mind, contribute the major portion of the existing imperial taxation, and are entitled to relief, if relief can in any circumstances be given, from

provincial burdens. The proposal under consideration shuts off all chances of such relief. (2) In the second place, under the scheme of provincial taxation for imperial purposes,—which in fact it is,—the flourishing foreign interests in the country will go untaxed. Already the whole system of imperial taxation is so ingeniously constructed that these foreign industries pay absolutely nothing beyond a mere trifle, and it is perfectly evident that no provincial extension of taxation could be so planned as to reach the opulent foreign merchants. The proposal would leave them undisturbed in their present enjoyment of almost perfect immunity from taxation.

On these and other grounds, therefore we are strongly against the contemplated interference with the provincial contracts, and with the decentralisation policy on which they are based, as involving almost certain extensions of provincial rates, and a form of imperial taxation of a most dangerous and objectionable character.

We now proceed to the consideration of the third proposal of the Secretary of State. It covers the whole ground of the increase of imperial taxation of a direct nature, and relates to the License-tax, the Income-tax, and the Salt-tax. We will take up the last part of the suggestion first, namely that which contemplates an increase of the Salt-tax.

This proposal to meet the additional outlay on account of the Army increase by an enhancement of the Salt tax is a most tempting proposal, and it is on that very account we feel that we are

bound to protest against it in the strongest terms. There is a fatal disposition in some quarters to regard it as a "financial reserve." Even Lord Ripon spoke of it directly in that sense. It is looked at in much the same light as the Income-tax in England, as a very convenient engine in the hands of the financier. In times of emergency, pressure might be put on it to cover a financial deficit, or to meet an additional charge, without noise or trouble. Official opinion has been always taught to look upon the Salt-tax as a sound and safe resource in India. It is often urged by the official defenders of the tax that it is the only national tax that can reach all classes of the community. No other tax, of equal and general incidence, it is significantly added, no other form of taxation can be devised so ready and convenient to hand in the special circumstances of India, that can really touch the vast mass of the population. This is, to say the least, certainly a very weak line of argument for our Stracheys and Colvins to take. In the first place, it is difficult to understand—and the texts of Political Economy do not help us here,—why there should be one or more such a national reserve as the Salt tax. Is it not enough that the total taxation of the state—whatever it is, whether high or low, is so adjusted as to distribute the total public burdens on all classes of the community in a fair and equitable manner? And can it be really a task beyond the skill of our financiers to devise a scheme of taxes which will embrace within its scope and reach the different sections of the people each in its own way, measure, and degree? Sound Political Economy surely cannot countenance a resort

to such a hateful impost as this Salt-tax for the sake of fiscal symmetry and abstract comprehensiveness. Let us look a little deeper, and try to understand the real nature of this impost, and also the working of the prevailing finance policy in connection with it.

Salt is a necessary of life : it is an article of food both for man and beasts ; it is an article of manure ; and on its supply depends the whole fish-salting industry. It is also an important national industry itself, in which the whole coast population, as well as a large part of the inland population, is more or less deeply and directly interested.

The Salt tax is thus not only a tax on a prime necessary of life, but also an industrial impost, and under this double aspect, it appears to us to be a far worse than even a poll tax of the corresponding amount. For a poll tax pure and simple—whatever odium might attach to it as such, is a poll-tax, and nothing more or beyond. When we pay it, we are free from any further disturbance on its account. Not so with the Salt-tax. It taxes our food, it starves our land and cattle, and also affects our means of livelihood as a nation.

Historically speaking, such a tax, as Mr. Cotton remarks in his Decennial Report of the material and moral Progress of India ( page 159, part I ) had no large place in the fiscal system of the country under native Governments, and that “ the prominence given to Salt as a source of revenue is due in Bengal, as in other parts of India, to British fiscal policy.”

The tax is professedly a tax on a necessary



of life, and truly partakes of the nature of a poll-tax on every man, woman, and child in the country, and as such offends against one of the fundamental principles of fair taxation. It is a tax of an indirect kind, levied from the dealer or producer, and the fact that while it brings into the treasury 4-s. a maund, the price paid by the general public for the commodity is 6-s. 6-d. points to an evil of no small magnitude. The tax besides is unequal, because of its equality, and therefore unfair in its incidence. The merchant prince and the cultivating peasant pay nearly the same amount, and neither the Bengal Zemindar, nor the European merchant of Bombay, pays more of the tax than the toiling Ryot of the Konkan. The equality in the amount paid is a false equality, it does not imply true equality—namely, the “equality of sacrifice.” And it is obvious that the poorer the man, the burden falls more heavily upon him. The poor agriculturist who has cattle to feed, and fields to manure, who looks upon salted fish as his only dainty,—does he not pay more than his fair share of this tax? The Bhandaries of the Konkan, the Koonbees of the Deccan districts, the Kolis, and Bheels of Berar—can they be said to come in only for an equitable share of this burden! Do the richer classes feel the pressure of the impost as much as the poorer! If not, the difference marks the measure of the inequality of the burden as it falls on different classes. And in all financial discussions, the one question for the practical financier is not, whether the total burden of taxation is heavy or light on the general population,—which is a point of practical politics,—but whether, taking the whole

body of public burdens, it is equally and equitably distributed; not whether taxation as a whole is heavy or not as compared with the means of the country to pay, but whether as it is, the weight of it falls on all classes in just and equitable proportion to their ability to pay. And looked at from this and no other point, the inequality involved in the incidence of this tax would furnish strong considerations against the proposed enhancement.

In connection with the incidence of this tax, we may note that the increase or decrease of consumption, following variations in the duty levied, has a meaning which must not be mistaken. Certainly it is not the upper classes that are expected to decrease their consumption of salt or increase it because of the raising or lowering of the duty on it. And when we are told (vide Strachey's Statement 1879-80) that general consumption has increased in Bengal owing to the reduction of the duty, or that "the rate of consumption for the whole Bombay Presidency was 9.9 lbs per head in 1879, and had increased to 11.7 lbs in 1882-83 (Cotton's Report, 161st page) we must look for the cause of the increase in the consumption of other than the richer and well-to-do classes. It is the poorer classes—the cultivating peasant, the agricultural laborer, the poor fisherman,—people who cannot get even a full day's meal for a full day's work, the millions who, according to Dr. Hunter and Mr. Elliott live on one meal a day, these are the greatest sufferers by such an impost. And when these poor, starving, and suffering people eat more salt when it becomes cheap, and less when it is dear, in other words increase or diminish their daily consump-

tion of an article of food, which, in India at least, is, next to air and water, a prime necessary of life, as the duty on it is less or more, it can be easily conceived how hard must be the struggle for life with such classes. What a terrible privation must an increase of such a hateful and barbarous impost mean to these humble classes? Lord Randolph Churchill in England, and Sir A. Colvin out here, may propose with a light heart, and without counting the poor people's suffering an increase of the tax, for the operation is so simple that the change in the duty can be effected by a stroke of the pen, or a message by the wire, but surely no such step can be taken without inflicting positive injustice, and additional suffering on the poorer classes.

Nor is this all. There is another aspect of this question of the Salt-tax which has not received the attention it deserves, but which must not be overlooked; particularly as it affects our economic growth in an essential and vital particular. This tax, as remarked before, is an industrial impost of a most serious nature; and let us inquire for a moment, and see what has been the effect of the present Salt-tax policy on one of our industries, which once furnished means of subsistence to a large part of the coast and inland population. A few facts and figures bearing on this important point demand anxious study.

Mr. Cotton's Report states that the gross Salt Revenue was 6.18 crores in 1882-83, having risen three hundred per cent from 2.6 crores, which was the figure for 1842-43, in 40 years. The net revenue, after deducting collection and other charges, was  $5\frac{1}{2}$  crores, or nearly 7 d per-head of the population under British administration.

Year.	Revenue.
42-43	2.69 millions.
52-53	3.17 "
62-63	4.56 "
72-73	5.16 "
82-83	6.18 "

Great changes have taken place in the rate of the

Year.	Bom- bay.	Ma- dras.	Bengal	Punjab	N. In- dia.
	S.	S.	S.	S.	S.
18 43	1-6	3	3	4	3
18 60	3	...	...	5	6
18 78	5	5-4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5-6	5-6	5-6
18 82	4	4-4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	4	4

duty since 1843, and these changes are shown in a marginal table. The duty was different in different provinces in 1843, and continued to be so down to the mutiny-period. In 1860-61, it underwent a change, and was increased all round.

Another re-construction took place in 1877-78, and a rough equalisation was effected by raising the duty in Madras and Bombay, and lowering it elsewhere. Lastly, in 1882-83 the equalisation was almost complete, and a general levelling of it to 4-s. was carried out. Sir John Strachey was the first minister to attempt this equalisation, and Major Baring completed it, but not by raising the duty. Sir J. Strachey, in reply to a representation on the subject made by the President of the Salt Chamber of Commerce of Cheshire and Worcestershire, said ( p. 94, F. Statement 1780 ) 'it is an essential part of our policy to equalise the duties'

This equalisation of the Salt duties in the different provinces had the effect of putting on the same footing native and foreign salt. Imported salt was rather a gainer than loser by the changes made. Coming as ballast in merchant vessels, and paying only nominal freight, it could easily beat out of the market salt of native manufacture. As long as Bombay and Madras salt was under-taxed, it retained its footing in the markets of Northern India, and could compete with Cheshire and other imported Salt, but the equali-

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sation had the effect of a bounty or bonus so to speak, to the importers and confined the native sale to the provincial areas of its manufacture. The following table will be found interesting in this connection.

Revenue.	India general.	Bengal.	Br. Burmah.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.	Remarks.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	
Sales of Government Salt.....	205,636	...	...	1,342,853	37,375	1,585,864	Sale proceeds.
Duty on inland customs line ...	1,274,832	...	...	2	1,357	1,276,211	Local manufacture.
Excise on local manufacture ...	34,154	72,953	3,481	42,179	1,315,750	1,468,317	Imported.
Duty on English imports .....	...	1,444,465	12,940	124	176	1,457,725	Imported.
„ other imports.	...	802,796	...	3,160	1,156	307,112	
Miscellaneous.....	...	...	...	...	...	82,552	
	1,369,496	1,836,514	16,421	1,390,853	1,364,495	6,177,781	

It will be necessary to note a few details before the proper significance of these figures can be understood. The details of Salt-revenue supply an index to the sources of Salt-supply. In Northern India, the duty is levied on the Inland customs line, and is really an excise duty on Salt manufactured at works belonging to Government. In Bengal, the greater part of the revenue is obtained by a customs duty on imports by sea; in Madras from sales of Salt manufactured under Government monopoly, and in Bombay by an excise duty on local manufacture.

The above table deserves careful study, as throwing light upon the present state of our great Salt industry. The sources of Salt supply are now (1) Government monopoly, (2) importation by sea, and (3) local manufacture. Of the 6.18 of Rupees crores raised from the tax on Salt required for our annual consumption, Government supplies represent 2.9 crores of revenue, the foreign importer contributes 1.8 crores, and local manufacture 1.5 crores, or in other words, Government produces for us by its own direct agency nearly half the quantity, the foreigner brings into the country for our use nearly a third, and the local manufacturer has to be content with producing only one quarter of the annual supply. Thus before the combined monopoly of Government and the foreign importer, the native producer is being driven out of the field. Let us see how this disastrous change in the national industry has been brought about, and in what direction it is tending.

In Bombay, and Bombay alone, local manufacture holds its own; it has died out elsewhere. The Bombay Salt Department was constituted in its present form in 1873, and was further developed on the same lines in 1882. It is under the charge of a Collector of Salt Revenue, with Deputies and Assistant Collectors, and with a numerous supervising and preventive staff, numbering 5,926 men in all. The sole aim of all recent changes has steadily been to

bring under complete control the manufacture, storing, and sale of Salt. Small and isolated works have been suppressed : the depots of supply have been limited, and areas of manufacture contracted. Thus is our local manufacture trammelled and controlled in the only province where it still maintains its foothold : and the tendency of the present arrangements is to establish virtually a Government monopoly under the name of a controlling agency.

The Salt Department of Northern India directs and controls the Government monopoly of manufacture in the Panjaub, N. W. Provinces, Oude, Central Provinces, Berar, Rajputana, Central India, and Behar. It is under a Commissioner with a staff of 190 officers and 4,939 men ; and these have the charge of the manufacture of seven millions of maunds *i. e.* half the quantity required for the annual consumption of the whole population. The local manufacturer has no place in the system, and all native industry in salt may be said to have died out throughout this vast area.

In Madras, there is again the Government monopoly established as long ago as 1805. The system remains for the most part unchanged, except in the rigour with which the monopoly is enforced. Some private rights of manufacture and sale of Salt which existed before were recognised, and compensation was given to the proprietors for abolishing them. The whole manufacture is now in the hands of a Government agency, under Government control. Down to 1877, the manufacture of Salt, except on Government account, was strictly prohibited in the Presidency. But since that year, an excise system has been introduced to encourage local manufacture. There has been however no improvement in the situation worth mention. The manufacture still remains a close Government monopoly.

In British Burmah, the supply is obtained both from local manufacture and foreign importation. But

Mr. Cotton observes that the native industry is everywhere on the decline, *owing to the consumption of imported Salt.*

But it is in Bengal, above all, that we are brought face to face with a most disastrous change, which gives us a timely indication of the serious and dangerous tendency of the present fiscal policy in relation to salt. The importation of salt dates only from 1818, nor did it acquire large proportions until 1835. In 1780, Warren Hastings introduced a system of Government monopoly, somewhat similar to that which now prevails in Madras. With certain modifications, the monopoly system continued till 1862; when it was gradually abolished, leaving the supply of Salt, whether by importation

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or excise manufacture, to private enterprise. Excise manufacture was first tried in 1835, and authorised in 1847. It is still carried on to a considerable extent in each of the districts of Orissa, and to a small extent in the District of the Twenty-four Parganas on the Gangetic sea-board; but the industry does not thrive, and the quantity manufactured has steadily decreased of late years. In 1883, the manufacture ceased entirely in the Twenty-four Parganas. The quantity of locally manufactured Salt in Bengal in 1882-83 was only 287,846 maunds". Thus in Bengal the supply comes from abroad almost wholly. The history of the collapse of the native industry in this unfortunate province is marked by three striking stages:—

(1) Local manufacture of Salt in Bengal was stamped out by the Government monopoly of production between 1780 and 1835. Government stopped local independent production, and undertook to supply salt manufactured by its own agency, while it freely permitted importations by sea.

(2) Having produced its full mischief, this policy was changed, too late between 1847-62, when



the local industry had been long since dead, and imported Salt had taken a firm hold of the local market. Local manufacture, subjected to excise-duty, was invited to compete with importing enterprise. Under such circumstances, the conditions of the competition were unequal, and local industry was at a disadvantage, and having to work its way against heavy odds, has not revived.

3 On failure of local enterprise, without chance of recovery, the importers became masters of the field, and imported salt got a monopoly of the market.

The Government has not lost a whit by any of these changes, and is as sure as ever of recovering the whole of its Salt Revenues from the Province. It may even be said that it has gained considerably. It has no longer a cumbersome monopoly to manage for fiscal purposes; and the full revenue comes without the inconvenience attaching to the older system. The importer of Cheshire and Liverpool salt pays the tax, and the full amount of it. Again the consumer has not lost much; his salt comes, as come it must, as surely as before, the source of supply alone being changed. He gets it now not from the native manufacturer, but from the foreign importer, and gets it equally cheap, if not cheaper. The sufferer and the only sufferer has been the native manufacturer. It is he who has lost his calling by this change, and has probably been driven to the plough.

This decadence of the salt Industry in this Province brings out in painful and prominent relief the full effect and tendency of the present fiscal policy of Government in the matter of the salt tax. The total decline of the industry in Bengal marks a *transfer*, by skilful fiscal manipulation, of it to foreign hands.

If such has been the fate of our salt industry in Bengal, can we be sure that it does not stand in similar danger in other parts of the country too! In "Northern India" *i. e.*, all the Northern Provinces,

except Bengal, the Government monopoly is strictly maintained. Local manufacture is crushed, and importation freely allowed. In Madras, however, a relaxation of the monopoly has commenced since 1877, in much the same manner in which it was attempted in Bengal 30 years ago, ostensibly in favour of local production. But when the local industry has been so long in a state of paralysis and suspense, and imported salt is permitted slowly to fight its way into the field, we cannot help asking the question, whether the Bengal tragedy is to be played out again! Coming nearer home, we find in Bombay that local industry is no doubt permitted still to live, and though there is yet no monopoly of production in the strict sense of the word but only most grasping control, still when we find that large local salt-pans, such as those in Ratnagiri, have been closed for purposes of effective control, a strong preventive agency is maintained, areas of manufactures are dangerously contracted, and depots of local supply are limited in number, it is almost impossible to believe that the fatal Bengal policy is not here too being pursued, though in a disguised form, without the intermediate stage of monopoly.

If this repressive policy continues to work, the danger of a complete transfer of the whole salt industry to foreign hands is not too remote, and we only do our duty in calling public attention to it. The results of the salt-tax policy as at present developed may be thus summarised:—

1 One of our first national industries is almost destroyed. In Bombay it is dying a lingering death while in the other parts of the country it is dead.

2 Government has secured a complete command of salt manufacture for fiscal purposes, having ousted the people by prohibitive and preventive regulations from the field. The sources of supply, the seaboard, the lakes, the salt mines &c., are entirely under its control. The revenue of the state is strongly and effectively protected and secured, and the only incon-

venience of the arrangement is that a vast administrative machinery has to be maintained for the purpose of managing such a cumbrous monopoly. Government would indeed be glad if any way could be pointed out to get rid of the troublesome business without of course endangering the revenue. The removal of the prohibition upon local manufacture in the Madras Presidency in 1877 is one proof among others of such a wish and such a feeling. The revenue secured, and the wants of the consumers supplied by an unlimited supply of the commodity, Government would not trouble itself with the inquiry who produces and supplies salt and makes money by it.

(3) The worst has come to pass in Bengal. The industry has changed hands, passing from native manufacturers to foreign importers. The Bengal collapse shows that Government is not by any means disposed to keep in its hands the monopoly of a vast industry which it has thought fit to wrest from the people for revenue purposes, but is willing to admit the foreigners to a share of this monopoly.

As far as the action of the duty as an industrial impost is concerned, these results are so disastrous that they compel attention.

The fiscal policy of Government in this matter, viz, of appropriating a whole industry of the nation for no other than revenue purposes, is a most extraordinary policy; without precedent or example. We have a magnificent sea-board, large salt lakes, and salt mines, which afford great advantages for salt manufacture. We have wealth at our very door, but we are not permitted to utilize it. We have by the grace of God splendid resources within our reach, but we are not suffered to turn them to account; and why? For enabling the state to derive a large and secure revenue. May we ask, without meaning to distract the official conscience, what moral or political right has Government to prevent us, its native subjects, from freely producing this necessary of life for our

own daily wants? The equity and expediency of the case apart, we are bound to say that a Government that is spending millions upon millions—with the laudable object of developing the material resources of the country, is simply taking up a most inconsistent position in thus adhering to the policy of debarring its subjects by a prohibitory code of regulations, from turning to use one of these very resources of material wealth. Is it free trade or good finance to oust the people from a vast and remunerative industry? Is it not better, nobler, and safer to leave the industry in the hands of the people themselves, and tax only their profits? Indian finance is said to be in-elastic, but we might ask, where lies the cause of its in-elasticity, if not in the badness and unsoundness of the existing fiscal system, which, while securing nearly the whole in-come of the state from the poorer, starving and struggling classes, leaves un-touched the profits of the wealthy merchants, whether native or foreign, the earnings of vast European enterprises in the country, and the luxuries of the rich and well-to-do consumers, and hesitates, even in times of pressure, out of fear of interested clamour, or of the criticism of a powerful press, to devise forms of taxation which will reach the pockets of these classes? If the expenses of the administration are heavy and growing, Government can tax the nations profits, the nation's income, the nation's expenditure, but it is surely against all ideas of justice or prudence to drive away the people from one of their largest fields of industry.

We maintain that the fiscal system is perfectly capable of reconstruction so as to give our revenues any necessary amount of elasticity. New taxes can be devised which, while fully meeting the requirements of the financial situation, will render unnecessary any further continuance of the salt duty, which operates not simply as a tax on a necessary of life, but also as a hateful industrial impost, and is thus worse than a poll tax. It is on these accounts that we con-

demn not only the Secretary of States' proposal to raise the salt tax, but also the existing salt duty, and its policy as fraught with serious danger.

We have dwelt on this subject longer than we had intended, for much misapprehension seems to prevail as to the nature and working of this tax, and Sir A Colvin has hinted in clear terms that it may become necessary to raise it in order to meet the additional outlay on army services. The tax is unnecessary, unfair, unequal, and disastrous in its working, and therefore we protest against its being maintained as a part of the permanent taxation of the country.

It is unnecessary to discuss the question of the joint License and Income Tax which has been recently imposed by Lord Dufferins Government to make both ends meet.

As another taxing proposal, we would advocate the imposition for revenue purposes of a uniform duty of 1 or 2 per cent. *ad valorem* on imports by sea. Such a customs duty as a fiscal resource is, in our judgment, free from all objection, and might be incorporated into the permanent fiscal system of the country. (1) In the first place it cannot be objected to as a protective duty. It would not work as such, because such a small duty could not have any appreciable effect on the position of the foreign imports in our markets, so as to "bonus" or protect home grown articles. The articles of foreign merchandise imported into our country have already secured a hold upon our market, that they cannot be affected in any way by a light impost, nor can it improve the position in the local markets of the Indian manufactures as competing with foreign articles, undeveloped as the former are at present. (2) In the second place, such a small duty as the one we propose would throw no inconvenient, or hard burden on the consumer. The general body of our present imports does not consist of food supplies, or

supplies of raw material, which it would be unjust or impolitic to tax even for revenue purposes, but is made up of articles of luxury or convenience, and are for the most part manufactured articles. So that even if the price of these imported articles be slightly raised by the action of the proposed duty, the consumer being for the most part well-able to buy them, cannot in justice complain of the burden which he can well bear, but which if he so chooses he can well avoid by a little sacrifice of enjoyment. As far as the present state of demand for foreign imports in the country is concerned, we are not far wrong in saying that it touches only the upper fringe of society, and does not yet reach the main bulk of the population. The proposed duty will, therefore, fall where it should and conveniently fall on those classes that can afford to pay it, and not, like the present salt-tax, on classes least able to bear it. (3) Thirdly, the duty though so light as one or one and half per cent, would bring in a large revenue in the shape of customs. As a fiscal measure, it is equitable in its incidence, putting the burden where it can well be borne. But further it has very strong recommendation in its favour. Such a duty as a permanent part of the revenue system might serve as a financial reserve, which could be utilised in times of pressing emergency without difficulty or inconvenience.

While thus suggesting such a general customs duty on imports, we are not prepared to support the proposal of the Madras Chamber of Commerce for the re-imposition of the cotton duties; for such a impost—however disguised, assumes the character of special class imposts, devised and maintained for special purposes. It would be felt as a grievance, and rouses the hostility of large and powerful class interests that would be aggrieved, and it would be utterly impossible to maintain it as a part of the general system of taxation. For this reason, if no other existed, we would not join in

a recommendation for the revival of the cotton duties, which would reopen the irritating controversies of three years ago, though, at the time, the repeal, was carried out we protested against the step as a needless and unwise surrender in the then circumstances of the Financial situation.

Our present proposal rests on an entirely different basis. It is a general customs duty, not a particular tax. It is a customs duty on all imports alike, and not a particular tax on a particular class of imported commodities. It is fairly a revenue duty; and not in any correct sense a fiscal measure of a protectional tendency. And to such a proposal we see no objection of any practical validity or force, except perhaps on theoretical grounds of abstract Free Trade.

We can here but cursorily mention that a succession duty, sugar duties, tobacco tax, a tax on marriages have been suggested by great financial authorities, and they will have to be examined on their own grounds in a separate article. Thus far we have confined our attention to the various ways of raising additional taxation. But it is clear that this is by no means the only way available to us. The end can be as effectually attained by economy and retrenchment. Large measures of economy are quite possible in the various branches of the Indian administration; reduction in the Home charges is by no means difficult or impossible, provided there is the 'will' to carry it out. And we will here content ourselves with suggesting one measure of retrenchment which has not received any large measure of public attention. We refer to the reduction of the present interest charge on our Indian debt.

The following figures show how matters stood down to 1882-83.

(Mr. Cotton's Report, pages 279, 103, 281-299.)

Kind of debt.	Amount.	Charge.	Rate.
Government of India debt	£	£	per cent.
" General " .....	97,050,806	3,997,469	4.1
Irrigation debt.....	20,750,856	809,091	3.9
State Railways .....	36,002,952	1,226,702	3.5
Eastern India Railway.....	34,824,452	1,703,398	4.8
Total.....	188,639,066	7,737,660	average. 4.2
Guaranteed debt.....	73,785,230	3,317,873	4.5
Total.....	262,424,296	11,055,533	

Thus the whole debt of India, inclusive of Guaranteed Railways, is nearly 262½ millions, and the total of interest charged on its account is 11 millions. This is a very heavy charge, and any scheme that might be suggested for its reduction is worthy of the most attentive consideration.

The table above given brings out the fact that the rate of interest on the guaranteed debt is considerably higher than that on Government debt. While we pay for the latter kind of obligation at 4.2 per cent, or excluding the East India Railway debt, less than 4 per cent, the charge for the former ranges above 4.5, the difference being nearly ½ per cent or even more, and yet we know that both these kinds of debt rest essentially on the same basis, viz the credit of the Indian Government. The cause of the difference is to be found in the mode of borrowing adopted in the two cases. The Government debt, whether general or productive Public Works, is raised



directly by the Secretary of State on Government account on the security of the Indian revenues, while the different Railway companies are allowed to borrow on their own separate account, helped to float it by the Government Guarantee. The security is felt by the investing public to be greater in the former than in the latter case, and consequently the terms on which loans can be raised by the one or the other agency differ considerably. The money market is more free for Government purposes than for the transactions of the guaranteed companies, and yet we know that the responsibility of the Indian Treasury is not one whit the less, whether the capital is sought by the Secretary of State, or by the Directors of a Company.

Here then there is room for reform. Though the interest for the Guaranteed debt is paid out of the earnings of the guaranteed railways, we are vitally interested in the question of interest, in as much as Government is responsible for the whole interest in case of failure, and also is entitled to a share of the net profits. The question arises of what possible advantage can it be to the various companies, or to the state, that the subscription of the public should be invited by the respective boards of such companies, instead of by the Secretary of State? The question thus raised suggests its own solution. (1) The state should borrow for the purposes of the different Railway Companies on the same principle as it borrows for all other purposes, and should cease to allow the different companies to raise the capital on the credit of the state. (2) The new general Railway debt should be administered by the Bank of England; and (3) facilities should be given for conversion into the new general Railway debt the guaranteed stocks of existing companies.—These three propositions sum up Mr. Cohen's scheme for reducing the interest charge on account of guaranteed debt by over  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, and we heartily support it, and hope that it

will receive from Government the attentive consideration it deserves.

We would, for our own part, go further than Mr. Cohen, and suggest that the whole debt of India, including guaranteed, should be placed under the guarantee of the British Government. As things stand at present, the Indian Government can borrow in the money market only at 4 per cent, and its whole debt stands at this rate and a trifle over, having been contracted at different periods, and under different circumstances, while we find that the imperial debt of Great Britain and Ireland pays not more than 3, or at the highest,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. This gives the difference between the two rates of over  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Why this difference? It is due to the inferior credit of the Indian Government in the money market, as compared with that of the Imperial Government. Under the present arrangement, the Indian Government goes into the market for borrowing on its own account, in its own name, and on the security of its own revenues, and as its credit is not so good as that of Great Britain and Ireland it finds it necessary to raise its loans on less advantageous terms than those on which the English Government can borrow. And yet it is true that the Indian Government appears as a borrower, only in a subordinate capacity as a branch of the English Government, for the ultimate responsibility for the whole financial position rests with the Imperial Government in England. It may well be asked why it is that the Indian Government is not permitted to go into the market professedly on that basis with the British guarantee. A nominal change of basis and of security is all that is necessary to put matters right in this respect. The British Government should give us the benefit of its direct guarantee for our national debt obligation. The advantages of such a system would be very great. The market will be much more free than it is for the

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borrowing transactions of the Indian Government, and the net interest charged might be reduced by  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent and even more, thus giving us a clear saving on Government debt alone of nearly a million per annum. This would be a direct money advantage; but the political advantage would be still more valuable. Our finances will be, in that case brought under the real effective control of the Imperial Parliament, and our financial administration will be a responsible one in reality, instead of being as at present only nominally so. Further, Parliament would come, through the natural operation of such financial relations, to feel a more direct, immediate and living interest in questions affecting the welfare of this Dependency over which it at present allows itself to "sleep and slumber."

# THE NATIVE STATES AND THEIR ARMIES.

## THE MAHOMEDAN STATES.

( *Continued.* )

Next after the Maratha States, the Mahomedan Native States of India come in for their share of attention at the hands of the correspondent of the *London Times* whose opinions about the armies of the Native States we are reviewing. There are twenty-two Mahomedan States within the limits of British India; but of these not more than three or five can claim political importance. The *Times* correspondent dwells at some length on the armies and affairs of only three of them—Hyderabad, Bhopal and Bhawalpore. We think Tonk in Rajastan, Rampore in Rohilkhand and Junagad in Katiyawad may well have claimed individual descriptions at his hands; for their prestige, resources and military retainers are not very far behind at least those of Bhopal or Bhawalpore.

This writer has not the same high opinion of the military strength and capacity of the Mahomedan principalities of India that he has of the Maratha States, though we must confess, in the present state of the country, we think him greatly mistaken in his estimate. Hyderabad alone has an army which does considerably out-number the armies of the three military Maratha chiefs taken together. Then we must remember the fact that part at least of the Nizam's forces are recruited from independent Mahomedan tribes beyond the limits of India proper, like the Arabs and Pathans—who, as warriors, wherever they have been found in considerable numbers, have always given a good account of themselves.

It is true the Maratha chiefs have behind them a comparatively compact nation which, taken all in all, has shewn itself to be one of the most capable of the nations of this vast country. But in the present circumstances of the country and the all but total isolation in which the Native States—particularly the Hindu ones—have been placed—no importance, we fear, could be assigned to the fact above alluded to; while the community of religious ideas and fanaticism which bind together the Mahomedan nations of the world becomes, *at times* a very real source of power which though it has only the elements in it of being able to work efficiently by fits and starts, has, for the time being, brought about great combinations and sometimes great results. The existence of powerful independent Mahomedan kingdoms; beyond the bounds of the British Indian Empire, both in Asia and Europe, is a circumstance which cannot be *entirely* ignored, even in their present tottering condition, in any estimation of the military strength of the Indian Mahomedan States. In the last century at Panipat, they were able—for a short time though it be—to shew such a united front. The history of the Hyderabad State furnishes instances of foreign Mahomedan kings trying to find allies there for their projected invasions of India. It is on record that Zuman Shah, the Amir of Cabul, made two abortive attempts to induce the Nizam to join him in his plans against the Marathas which, indeed, never came to a head. The mutiny too of 1857-58 is not without its lessons in this connection. It must, however, be said in justice to the Nizams of Hyderabad, and their responsible ministers, that they have never sympathised with, or made common cause with, the barbarous and savage Mahomedans beyond the confines of India. Not only this. We presume it would be difficult to mention any more faithful allies of the English Government of India than the Nizams of Hyderabad. Yet this writer in the London *Times* has little, as the sequel

will shew, good to say of them, whom we think and look upon, by the best of all rights—that of long alliance—as one of the best friends of our Government.

The greater portion of the communication which this writer has devoted to the Mahomedan Native States of India is taken up with a description of the Hyderabad State, a perverted narrative of its relations with the English Government, its army, and that useful body of troops known as the "Hyderabad Contingent;" the character of its Government and the alleged tastes and inclinations of its nobles. This portion of the writer's performance is typical of the sort of writings that constantly find their way in public prints of the lowest sort, and, we must confess, we are at a loss to comprehend how an influential, and usually dignified paper like the *London Times* could have stooped to ventilate such views as are here disclosed, and that from the pen of one who, though he purports to write to the "Thunderer" as a correspondent, is, in fact, a member of its editorial staff. As humour is discovered in every sentence in some of Oliver Goldsmith's writings, so ill-will, a total disregard for truth, and an extreme prejudice towards the very existence of the Native States, are to be found in every line of this communication as far as it refers to the Hyderabad State. Were we, therefore, to attempt a systematic refutation of the various opinions expressed in this portion, the task would be unusually tedious, and, perhaps, as useless as tedious. We will, therefore, try to give from well known sources as meagre a sketch of the history of the relations of this state with the paramount power as possible—for the greater part merely contenting ourselves with specifying the dates of such events as seem necessary for our argument and then simply giving extracts from the correspondent's own writings in the *London Times*. This will serve a double purpose, in as much as the extracts, besides carrying their own refutation, will conduce to justify

what we have been hitherto compelled to say as characterising the correspondent's writings.

The Nizam's of Hyderabad have no pretensions to antiquity, the Subhedari of the Deccan having been raised over the ruins of the proud kingdoms of Bijapore and Gowalkonda about the year 1710 A.C. Ten years later, Asof Jah, the first Nizam, threw off his allegiance to the Emperor at Delhi, and though the Nizams have ever since been in the possession of extensive territories, the comparative barrenness of their achievements is conspicuous and does not lend itself easily to the lofty pretensions of the family. The Nizams of Hyderabad have come in possession of extensive territories which they had never laboured to conquer, and consequently they have always been forced to lean on foreign support for the maintenance of their authority. Asof Jah was only able to hold what he had usurped, against the Delhi Emperors on the one hand, and the Maratas on the other, by a secret understanding with the latter whose attacks he often skillfully diverted towards the plains of Hindoostan and Delhi.

Hyderabad may be said to have entered on its long friendly career with the English power in India even from this early period of its history, since Asof Jah, at the request of the English, sent an expedition to Madras to take it from the French and restore it to the English. In this enterprise, however, his officers were not successful. Asof Jah died in 1748 A. C. The immediate descendants of Asof Jah were his sons Gaziuddin, Nasir Jung, Salabat Jung, Nizam Alli ( the youngest, in whom the dynasty was finally established ) and Muzaffer Jung, a grandson of Asof's favourite daughter. On the death of Asof Jah, Nasir proclaimed himself Subhedar of the Deccan, giving out at the same time, that Gaziuddin had renounced his right to the Musnad. But his pretensions were at once opposed by Muzaffer who pretended that a testamentary arrangement had been

made in his favour by the last Nizam. Both these rivals being, each in his town, supported and deserted by their respective French and English allies, perished ignominiously in some petty actions. Salabat Jung now assumed power, but his claims were disputed by Gazioodin, aided by the Marathas. Gazioodin, before he had progressed far in his enterprise, fell a victim to poison. Thus ended the second contest for the Nizamate between the sons of Asof Jah. But the struggle for power between their English and French allies was destined to a more prolonged duration. Salabat Jung now became Nizam, but having been obliged to engage in some distant enterprises from his capital, his younger brother, Nizam Alli, engrossed to himself all the power of the state and in 1761. A.C. deposed him. Nizam Alli reigned long enough to contract most of the important treaties and stipulations which have regulated the relations of our English Government with the Hyderabad State. In 1765. A.C. he came into collision with the British power by a ferocious invasion of the Carnatic, the Nawab of which was then in alliance with the English.

Except on this single occasion, the soldiers of Hyderabad have never placed themselves in actual opposition to the troops of our Government. The Nizam, indeed, was making preparations for a renewed attack on the Carnatic, but the English sent General Cailland to Hyderabad to make peace, whereby they agreed to pay an annual tribute or Pesh Kash of 5 lacs of Rupees to the Nizam, in return for some territory ceded to them, and the contracting parties further stipulated to assist each other with troops when required.

It seemed after this as if the Nizam were about to break this engagement and make common cause with Hyder Alli. But he soon saw his error and the negotiations between the Darbars of Hyderabad and Mysore fell through. There-upon on the 1st of Septem-



ber 1798, a new treaty was concluded by which it was stipulated that the Subsidiary force should be made permanent and increased to Six (before it was two) battalions of Infantry with a proportion of Artillery, at an annual charge to the Nizam of 24, 17, 100 Rs. The French corps which was in the Service of the Nizam was to be immediately disbanded and their officers made over to the English to be transported to Europe as prisoners of war. The importance and utility of this stipulation to the English Company will be evident when it will be remembered that, besides the big territorial cession it brought, it enabled them in the war with Mysore which soon followed, instead of leaving at Hyderabad a disciplined body of 15,000 troops, accustomed to war and officered by foes, to distract their movements, to avail themselves of large supports from the Nizam's own army. The Contingent itself mustered 6,500 men who were placed at the Company's disposal, with an equal number of the Nizam's infantry and a large body of irregulars. After the death and defeat of Tippu, the districts of Guttu and Goorum-Cunda were included in the portion of Tippu's territories made over to the Nizam as his spoil in the war. On the 12th of October 1800 by a subsidiary treaty made with the Nizam, the British Government further engaged "that no state or power what-so-ever should, with impunity, commit an unprovoked hostility or aggression upon the territories of the Nizam. To enable the Company to fulfil efficiently this engagement, two battalions of Sepoys and a regiment of Native Cavalry were permanently added to the Subsidiary force to be maintained by the Hyderabad State; and to secure the regular payment of his augmented force the Nizam ceded in perpetuity to the Company all the territories which he had acquired by the treaties of Shrirangapatana and Mysore in 1792 and 1799 respectively. †

In August 1823 Nizam Ali Khan died and was succeeded by Secundar Jah. We have now reached

a point in our narrative when Chandulal was virtually at the head of the Hyderabad administration. The treatment the state was subjected to for some time hence in connection with the appointment of its responsible minister, shows how impossible it is for the high officers or Karbharris of Native States to pull on for any length of time unless they are totally subservient to the political officers of the paramount power accredited to their courts and how difficult it is for them to initiate an original, or a comprehensive policy, however beneficial it may be to their states if sanction be withheld from it, even from private and questionable motives, by those officers.

In 1823 owing to the heavy debts with which the Hyderabad state was encumbered, our Government induced it to relinquish the "peshuns" paid to it by the Company in perpetuity in exchange for the sum of 1, 15, 66, 66, 6 Rs.

Sekunder Jah died in 1829 and was succeeded by his eldest illegitimate son Nasir—oodowla. This was thought a fit opportunity to revise the style of correspondence with Hyderabad hitherto followed. The imperial phrase "Mabu Dowlah" (royal self,) used by the Nizam, and the term of inferiority "Najar mud" used by the Governor General, were discontinued, and the correspondence has since been conducted in terms of perfect equality.

The payment for the contingent became at this time irregular, and the English Government, who had an eye to the acquisition of territory advanced the Nizam sums of money for the payment of that body. This had the effect in time of greatly embarrassing the state in financial difficulties. At last these difficulties became so great that the Governor General thought a fitting opportunity had arrived for fixing a definitive period within which the debt due by H. H. must be paid in full. The Resident thereon was instructed to demand that the whole debt should be discharged by the thirty first of

December 1850. On the fourth of January 1851 the time for the payment having expired, the Nizam was required to pay the large debt. But at his request the time was prolonged to 31st October ensuing. By the 15th of August, the Hyderabad State had paid so much of the debt that only 32, 96, 702 Rs. remained to be paid. The English Government at this time again thought it necessary to advance large sums of money to the Nizam and, in about three months time, the Nizam's debt had again risen to upwards of forty-five lacs of Rs. In April 1853, therefore, the Resident was directed to submit to the Nizam a proposal for a new treaty on the basis of ceding *in perpetuity* to the British Government a territory to the value of about thirty-six lacs per annum. In return he was to be relieved from his present debt and from all future payments to the Contingent.

As the Nizam's repugnance for a perpetual cession of territory was great, it was concluded, by treaty, that in lieu of the present Contingent, the Honorable Company should maintain an auxiliary force of five thousand infantry 2,000, Cavalry and four field batteries of artillery to be styled "the Hyderabad Contingent"; for the regular payment of which the Nizam agreed to assign (not cede permanently), districts, yielding an annual gross revenue of 50 lacs of Rs, to the exclusive management of the British Resident, who was to account to the Nizam's government for the revenues he received and to pay over any surplus after the legitimate disbursements had been met with. We will here only draw the attention of our readers to the hitherto total cost of this Contingent to the Hyderabad State as compared to the trifling cost to our Government with which it may be possible now to secure the active services of the proposed supplementary contingents from the armies of the native states.

Six days after the conclusion of the business

above alluded to, Suraj-ool-Moolk, the Nizam's Dewan died, and his nephew Salar Jaug was appointed to that office.

In 1857 the Nizam Nasir-oo-Dowla died and was succeeded by his endest son Afzul-oo-Dowlah. This was a little before the mutiny. During the mutiny the Nizam and his illustrious minister remained faithful to our Government. Nor was this faithfulness of the Hyderabad State through all the occurrences of 1857 and 1858 so much a matter of course as some would seem to believe. It was subject to severe trials. Rumours of disasters in the North-West of English arms often gained credence and the prevalent feeling seemed to be one of shame that while the "faithful" in the North-West had dared the chances of an open war with the Caffir English, the City of Hyderabad was at peace. It is but an act of bare justice to the Nizam to say that his personal fidelity to his alliance with our Government was beyond doubt. The services also of the troops he lent were brilliant and deserve to be noticed in view of what the correspondent of the *English Times*, under review, says about them by way of disparagement.

Instead of joining in any conspiracy against the British Government, or opposing the wishes and inclination of the Nizam, the gallant soldiers of the Hyderabad Contingent marched for fifteen months, and after the termination of a glorious campaign returned to the Nizam's country. The far famed "Nizam's horse" gave the first blow to the rebellion in Central India, by the capture of the stores, guns and ammunition carried away from Mahitapore by the mutinous contingent there, and the garrison of Dhar that had escaped. This together with the famous engagement at Rawal saved the Neemuch garrison from the fate that befel the British garrison at Cawnpore. So satisfied was Colonel Durand with the work performed by the Hyderabad Cavalry, that he took

upon himself the responsibility of authorising the payment of an extra five Rs. per month to each horseman. These services were rendered with "the first Malwa column." Those rendered with the second column were equally notable. Great assistance was rendered by the Hyderabad troops in the capture of Zanshi and in the victorious battles before Koonch, Kalpee and Gwalior. For these services rendered by the Nizam, his nobles and troops, in the July of 1860, the Governor General requested the Nizam's acceptance of presents of English manufacture, valued at one lac of Rupees and also made over to H. H. in full sovereignty the lapsed petty State of, Sholapore and cancelled a debt of 50 lacs of Rs. with interest and restored to H. H.'s Government the districts of Raichore and Dharases which had been assigned for the maintenance of the Contingent together with the Berars, which are still in the management of our Government. Besides these rewards to H. H. khillats of the value of 30,000 Rs. each were awarded to the Nizam's uncle Shumsh-ool-oomrha and H. H.'s Dewan Mookhtar-ool-moolkh Salar Jang Bahadur.

We presume every one of the readers of this Journal is well aware of the glorious results of the late Sir Salar Jang's administration and the efforts he made for the restoration of the Berars to the Hyderabad State—offering at one time to capitalize the expenses of the Contingent. We are sure every body has read some thing about the manner in which he was treated by some of the officers of the Government of India for making these exertions in favour of the Hyderabad State whose servants he and his ancestors have been for many generations past. But here we feel we shall have to treat on live embers, and we will therefore let the veil drop over the narrative.

As observed before we will merely now give extracts from the correspondent of the London Times

to show what his sentiments are about the State owned by our faithful ally the Nizam, his people and the Hyderabad Contingent whose brilliant achievements in the cause of our Government in the critical times of the mutiny we have tried very briefly to enumerate above. Comments on these extracts, we presume, after the very brief outline we have given of the history of the state will be superfluous.

Here is what our writer says about the Hyderabad state:—"Hyderabad has long been a hot-bed of intrigue and self-seeking machinations both among natives and *non-official Europeans*. It is the one place in India where corrupt Englishmen (only *non-officials* we suppose) have been found. The snares of the Nizam's court have availed to tarnish the spotless reputation in pecuniary matters which the men of this country have gained in every other state of India."

"There are several peculiarities in connection with the Nizam's dominion. Nowhere else is the dominant caste more obtrusive and nowhere else has it less real hold on the soil. The rulers and the *officials are Mahomedans*; but the people are Hindus. *The latter have no share in the administration whatever*; the former do not possess the sympathy or attachment of the subjects by whose thrift and labour they enjoy the pleasures of the town\*\*\*or the mild excitement of plotting against each other, varied by the discussion of the still more attractive theme of what they will do when the hour of those English has passed away. He (the Musalman of Hyderabad) must be a soldier, and administrator, or one of those idle politicians of native capitals who rearrange the map of India to their fancy and speculate on the consequences of Russia's advance in Central Asia and of England's embarrassment in Egypt."\*\*\*The Nizam's authority is maintained as the most intensely fanatical and self-seeking Muhamedan administration

in the Peninsula over 10,000,000 Hindu subjects in the upland of the Deccan".

Here is the opinion of our writer about the Hyderabad Contingent :—

"The Hyderabad Contingent is a survival of a state of things that has long passed away, and it should be re-organised or abolished, and its duties transferred to the Madras or Bombay armies. In Hyderabad, we have lavishness of expenditure side by side with inefficiency in the results typified in a more striking form than anywhere else in India, and this criticism applies with equal force to the Nizam's army and that antiquated organization termed the Hyderabad Contingent." \* \* \* "The force called the Hyderabad Contingent, numbering 8,000 men, occupies the Cantonment of Secunderabad and eight other places in the province. But there would not be much ground for surprise if the very generally accepted view as to the doubtful fidelity of this force, if turned against the Nizam, were to prove the correct one; for the Hyderabad Contingent is nominally an army of the Nizam paid out of the revenue of the English-governed province of Berar, and notwithstanding that it is officered by Englishmen."

"If the Nizam ever could have the courage to unfurl the green flag of the Prophet, which I admit is doubtful, there would be small thought of opposing his decision among the Contingent at Secunderabad. In this particular the Nizam enjoys a superiority over his neighbours, the Maratha Chiefs, and possesses a mark of independence which they have not retained; for the garrisons of Mahow and Morar are composed of the regular Anglo-Indian army, with a large proportion of Englishmen and an exclusively European artillery."

Here is what our writer proposes should be done with such a state :—

"Few will be so sanguine as to suppose that the Court of Hyderabad can be purified by

any process short of abolishing it; but the main points will be attained by a reduction of the Nizam's army, the removal of the 16,000 mercenaries; and the substitution of an Anglo-Indian garrison for the Hyderabad Contingent".

Here are extracts which show how easily this has been attempted before and how it could be done now:—

"Notwithstanding treaties recognising 'the sovereignty' and 'the independence' of the Nizam, English officers were employed shortly before Nasir's accession in settling the amount of revenue to be raised in different districts, while it was by means of troops led by English officers that some degree of security was restored to the high roads of his state." "Although the Nizam has been allowed by official consent not only the premier place among the Indian Feudatories, but even a position of quasi-independence, there is no state in India wherein our interference has been more often rendered necessary by internal discord and carried into effect in complete disregard of the Nizam's sovereignty. *The Nizam's sovereignty is a mere fiction, a hollow pretence that, but for us, should never have possessed any meaning.*"

Below we quote the concluding para of our writer's communication regarding the Mahamedan native states of India:—"Our interference in Hyderabad, despite the flattering fiction of independence, has been more marked and more inquisitorial than any where else; but the results have been spasmodic and irregular, because we have left the duty of carrying out our suggestions and requirements of experience and knowledge to the Nizam's own Agents. *No certain amelioration will be effected until we apply the Berar system to the rest of Hyderabad, and succeeded in inducing the Nizam to diminish his army, to banish his mercenaries and to acquiesce in the*



*substitution of Madras regiments for the Hyderabad Contingent."*

"Practically" says our writer, "the question of our relations with the Mahamedan states of India resolves itself into the difficult problem of our relations with the Nizam."

The italics in the above extracts are our own; and we invite the particular attention of the reader to the same, as illustrative of the propriety and justice of the general observations we have deemed it our duty to make regarding the character of these contributions. We presume after the perusal of these extracts, our readers will come over to our opinion and think that a writer or a publicist who should needlessly cause irritation, dissatisfaction, or alarm in the hearts of the feudatories of this vast British Indian Empire, their subjects and well-wishers should be considered as the greatest sinner against propriety as those who should needlessly bring about such results in connection with our enlightened English Government of India itself.

The second Mahamedan State of which the correspondent of the London *Times* has given an individual account is Bhopal. It is fortunate our writer, as in the case of Patiala, has nothing provoking or unkind to say about this native state. "The name ( Bhopal ) suggests," says he "so many memories of loyalty and devotion, that the reader will be prepared to find criticism-dis-armed and the strictures passed on more famous and powerful principalities absent from my review of this native territory." Notwithstanding these sentiments the writer insists on the reduction of the small army this state maintains.

Like Hyderabad, Bhopal too has no pretensions to antiquity, the principality having been founded by Dost Mahomed, a fellow-soldier with Asaf Jah. Dost Mahomed's successors, for the whole of the 18th Century, were weaklings. Bhopal at the beginning of the present century, found a ruler of energy and

capacity in Vazir Mahomed. He died in 1816 and was succeeded by Nuz-zur Mahomed, who accepted the protection of the English Government of India. The Pindbaris, who had made Bhopal their home, were soon expelled from it; but Nuz-zur was accidentally killed by his brother. The widow of Nuzura Mahomed, the Khodsia Begum, became regent and set aside her husband's successor, Mooner. Another successor was chosen. His death which took place in 1844, however, brought the old Begam and her daughter, Sikandar Begam who had views of her own, again to the front. The latter in 1859, as a reward for her conspicuous loyalty to our Government in the Mutiny, was recognised as ruler of Bhopal in her own right. She was also rewarded with the gift of certain districts, one of which belonged to Dhar and ought properly to have been restored to that principality. The Begam was also granted the honours that would have been her due if she had belonged to the stronger sex.

In Bhopal the subjects are less taxed than in British India, the taxation per head being only 3s. 6d. "This should be the case" says our writer, in all Native States. But it seems he would not care what the taxation in the native states was "if they were obliged to take a larger share" in the imperial obligations." We have already shewn in a former portion of this paper that the Native States very fully bear their share of all responsibility in this matter and could not, in justice, be called upon to contribute anything more unless they chose to do so of their own accord for new favours and privileges.

The Bhopal army, according to the correspondent of the *London Times*, contains 2,200 infantry, 700 cavalry and nearly 60 guns, and the state pays two lacs of Rupees a year in support of the Bhopal Battalion, which is under the control of English officers and which represents the old contingent. Our

writer seems to assert that *this* arrangement, which he would see followed in the case of Hyderabad, has enabled three successive Begams to work wonders in the administration of their territories. How come then the present troubles in Bhopal, one might naturally ask. We fear only the establishment of some thing like a constitutional rule, in place of the entirely personal rule of the chief, and the Political Agents that obtains now, can put the administrations of the native states on firm foundations which will not be shaken or affected by personal caprices and personal defects. The countries of Europe have long achieved this end and are prospering, and the Native States of India will never fare well otherwise than by following in the foot steps of their more enlightened brethren of the West. Such being our faith, we cannot sufficiently condemn the measures which are often not only tolerated but encouraged and even forced upon the Native states, and which are totally at variance with the aims which our wise government follows with such exemplary strictness in its own administration. How wide-awake, for instance, is our Government in the choice of their own servants, and how rigidly it sticks to the limit of age in their case. That regulation has two objects to accomplish; not to clog promotion and to secure the efficiency of the service. In most native states there is only one place in the disposal of which the officers of our Government have no inconsiderable hand. This is the post of the Minister or Karbhari in the native states. It is curious to see how our Political officers exercise this patronage. Go from one end of the country to the other if you please; you will find this moral patronage mostly abused by our officials where ever they had a finger the matter. You will find their choice has mostly fallen on mere boys or old effete pensioned off men who were though unfit for British service any longer. We know, Mr. Gladstone is a very grand old man, and that William Pitt was a very

grand young man, and that both of them had been Prime Ministers of England. But, we presume, as a rule, few men can be grand at the ages when those remarkable men became so. This is an instance of a measure which is condemned in one administration but thought to be quite good enough for another. We are reminded of it in connection with Bhopal as the state seems to be suffering at this time by a similar shortcoming which is to be laid at the doors of our officials. Readers of English history must be aware what precautions are deemed necessary to be taken when there happens to be a queen on the throne of England and when it is thought desirable she should marry. The queen and the woman are scrupulously viewed apart. But in the case of Bhopal a different "bandobasta" was thought to be the most correct thing. Some years ago the present Begam lost her consort, and whenever our Political officers happened to have seen Her Highness in this bereaved condition, they were struck with commiseration at her loneliness. She appeared to them as amorous Kalidas would describe a female in a similar condition of destitution. "Like the budding Malati willow, without her blossoming supporter the majestic Amra tree," the Begam Saheba seemed a desolate object to them, and they, like Dr. Primrose, the Vicar of Wakefield, began to preach matrimony to her. If Her Highness would take a new consort; they told the Begam, he would be of immense help to her in relieving her of much of the burden of her administration. The new consort did this thoroughly and effectively. He enforced the rights of the Mahomedan husband against his royal lady and put her behind a Parda. In fact he made her invisible. Disorder is soon said to have become rampant in the state, and our Government is at present engaged in endeavours to mend matters in Bhopal; in other words, undoing that which they were so anxious to do but a few short years ago. Here once more

we beg leave to observe that it is not the individual men, but the system, that we find fault with.

As there is at present at the head of the Central India Agency such an accomplished and unprejudiced a statesman as Sir Lepel Griffin we are led to hope that Bhopal, one of our best allies, will pass safely through the crisis that has come over it.

The third Mahomedan state described at some length by the correspondent of the *London Times* is Bhâwalpore, which lies to the south of, but immediately contiguous to, the Panjâb, with only the Sutlaj between. It is a state which once owned allegiance to the Durani monarchy of Afganistan; but which has survived the Sikh revival. The population of the state numbers 5,000,000 and the revenue is 2,000,000 Rs. It maintains an army of 360 cavalry, 2,500 infantry and "not fewer than 80 guns." This force, as that of a frontier state, does not seem excessive to our writer who further says it should be only made more efficient and allotted a place in the defence of our North West frontier. For once we are here in complete accord with our writer, and here we beg to remain for the present.

The next group of Native states to which the correspondent of the *London Times* directs his unfriendly attentions are what he calls "The Hindu States" from which, as observed before, he has in a malicious manner, marked off the three Marâthâ states. The writer, however, is only a degree less hostilely inclined towards the majority of these states than he is towards those of the Marâthâs, in as much as he does not propose to do with them exactly what, in the plenitude of his power and wisdom, he proposed to do with the great Marâthâ Feudatory states—their total effacement from off the face of Native India. It seems our writer, for the present at least, would be satisfied to allow these Hindu states to exist if they were only rendered harmless by the abolition of their armies. This comparative indulgence, however,

He is anxious to show he has not extended to these states without carefully considered reasons; for he says of their chiefs that they are the *the natural rulers of their states and are at one in sympathies of race, religion and caste with the people they govern.* This preference claimed for the rulers of these states is, as we have before pointed out, misleading, and has perhaps been advanced by the writer to cast a sort of slur on the Marathas. We must confess, that though high caste Hindus ourselves, we have still to learn that the people of Mysore or Rajputana are free from the fourfold system of caste that obtains in India everywhere, and that they are all, or profess to be all, either of the race and caste of the Shalivahans of old or Rajputs, and that they all interdine and intermarry, which they must, if they be members of the same race, religion and caste. No one, we fear, would more strongly renounce, if not resent, the honour and distinction thus attempted to be thrust on them by the writer in the *English Times* than the chiefs and the people themselves of the principalities in question. Indeed, we firmly believe, they would sooner fly to arms than submit to be dubbed with the honours which this ignorant correspondent of the *London Times* would seem to confer on them with such exemplary fairness and generosity. Sir John Malcolm somewhere in his *Memoirs of Central India* says that the bulk of the inhabitants and cultivators of Central India, Malwa and Hindustan—especially the Jats and the Sikhs—greatly sympathised with the Maratha leaders and invaders, and secretly invited and assisted them to come into their country and helped them in many other ways, because they looked upon the Marathas as their Kith and Kin, as people who occupied the same position with themselves in society. The writer in the *London Times*, living as he does on the banks of the Thames, may well be ignorant of the fact that the Bhats or lords of the Jats and the Sikhs on the banks of the

Jamanah, and the Sutlaj are never tired of singing of the heroic deeds of the "Arre Raws and Bhale Raws" of the Deccan, mounted on their fleet mares, and chargers that had been reared on the historically famous pastures in the country, irrigated by the Bhima and the Neera—in their contests against the hated tyranny of the infidel Moslems. So popular is the theme with the people, that often times the only stock of folklore and popular song possessed by these "Northern Bards" is the song in honour of the fearless deeds of the fearless old Maratha horsemen. We cannot and must not, however, dwell any longer on this and similar topics—even for fear of seeming to catch the bait so cunningly thrown out to us by the hostile and foreign writer in the *English Times*. It is obvious now, even to the most superficial observers, that sectional and caste prejudice (if they ever were very strong *politically* in this country) are now dying rather fast, and that now they would scarcely offer any safe handle for the evil-disposed with which to work upon the feelings and prejudices of the people of India—one against the other, and by such sort of management to find reason or excuse for the shortcomings of any administration. Every day now the people of India, like the American peoples, are fast training themselves, under the benign British rule, to look upon themselves as Brother Indians—more than anything else. Apart from these considerations, however, the interested lucubrations of the correspondent of the *Times* under examination, at this time, do not deserve any very detailed refutation. We were prevented, owing to the limited space at our disposal being until now otherwise required for the elucidation of other matters of a more pressing, though temporary, character, from continuing our criticism of the *Times*' correspondent's absurd utterances about the Native states and their armies. We are now gratified to find that the march of events in the interval has

helped to render our task comparatively easy. Not only have the *Times*' Correspondent's thousand and one faults,—both of omission and commission—his false and baseless alarmist conclusions that he has drawn from his perverted facts and figures—not only have all these been amply exposed by men of greater authority and ability than ourselves, but some of the views which this journal has ever been at the pains of expounding and bringing prominently to the notice of Government, have been confirmed by men whose knowledge and authority to speak decisively on the subject can not, by any means, be lightly estimated. It would, indeed, be difficult to point to any recent writings that have been more authoritatively refuted and condemned all round than “these communications” of this correspondent of the *London Times*. And yet a noted firm of publishers has thought these communications deserving of a permanent place in English literature, and has given them to the world in the form of a handsomely printed volume!!!

Sir Lepel Griffin from his higher post in Central India has hurled his powerful literary bolts unmercifully against the writer in the *Times* and almost demolished him. But calamities they say seldom come singly. Scarcely had the unhappy writer time to hide his diminished head than that irrepressible veteran writer on Indian topics—that inexhaustible repository of varied official knowledge and experience concerning subjects Indian—the famous author of the one pound ration theory, and the redoubtable champion of our notorious system of forestry—we mean in short Sir Richard Temple—took this writer in hand and thrashed him thread-bare. Such was the logic of facts and such the extremity to which our prolific writer in the *Times* was reduced that he was glad to withdraw the calumnies that he had recklessly launched against the Native States and their so-called armies. He had literally, so to speak, to eat his own words. He had with one stroke, as it were, of



his mighty pen called into existence several hundreds of thousands of well drilled and well equipped warriors and several hundreds of batteries of mighty artillery. It has been proved now by persons who know the Native States well, that there is not a single serviceable battery of artillery in the whole of Native India. The several lakhs of formidable infantry and cavalry have dwindled down to a few thousand sorry battalions. In fact every position that was advanced by the correspondent of the *English Times* under notice, has been proved false and utterly untenable, if not extremely mischievous and untimely also. Sir Lepel Griffin, if we remember right, has gone so far as to say that the armaments of the Native Chiefs, far from being too numerous, actually fall short of the numbers they have contracted to maintain with the Paramount Power. We must confess we were not prepared to hear this sort of contention just now, unimpeachable though it is. Sir Richard Temple has followed the attack on nearly the same lines; and many more, less known to fame, have done the same. But we think the unkindest cut of all has come from that forlorn hope of unscrupulous Anglo-Indianism—Mr. J. M. Maclean, formerly Editor and now the London Correspondent of the *Bombay Gazette*. He has with rare ingeniousness and frankness denied that the writer in the *English Times* did not know or did not understand the subject well that he had undertaken to enlighten the English public upon. He has denied that the writer was unconscious of the untruthfulness of the facts and figures he had based his apparently ignoble argument upon. Mr. Maclean maintains that the writer in the *London Times*, being actuated with high motives of patriotism and philanthropy, only wanted to terrify the Native chiefs and the people of India, like children, by wrongly representing their toy military establishments as really very formidable and fearful ones, and then urging their total abolition, to threaten the Native

Chiefs into making those loyal offers of service and aid that they have lately made with scarcely a single exception. In other words Mr. Maclean admits that the whole affair, from beginning to end, has been a cooked affair, and that it has succeeded very well and completely answered the expectations formed of it by the alien writer. No condemnation of the correspondent of the *London Times*, under examination, could be more complete. This is ignoring, however, Lord Ripon altogether. A fly seating itself on the top of a carriage, says the fable, once boasted how its presence there created all the speed, the noise and the dust! The poor creature, of course, altogether ignored the horses and the vigorous coachman. After such a defence as that set up by Mr Maclean, or the condemnation of the whole thing, it is scarcely necessary at this hour to enter into any lengthy refutation of the sophistries so studiously strung together in the *London Times* by its correspondent. It would be only slaying the slain over again. If therefore in what follows, we notice at all his arguments against the Native states and their armies, it is only to preserve the line of argument we had previously chalked out for ourselves, and thus in some measure to enable us to bring into bold relief the lines of policy and the measures of National defence we wish to advocate, and which we very strongly recommend, in the loyal spirit of loving subjects, for the adoption of our Government.

This group of Native states styled "the Hindu States" comprises by far the large portion of what is understood by the expression "Native India;" for out of a total population of 50,000,000 people that own the sway of the feudatories of the British Indian Empire, it contains no less than 21,000,000 inhabitants. The chiefs of these states, with a few insignificant exceptions, are mostly either Rajputs or Sikhs—two of the most warlike races of this country. The Rajput Chiefs and their followers were the very incarnation of courage

and truthfulness not many centuries ago. Being trusted by the Mogul Emperors, they were one of the staunchest defenders of the Empire. Some of their leaders conquered and held for the Delhi Emperors some of the districts and countries beyond the natural confines of India. Yet the *Times*' writer can only see the necessity of entirely demartializing these noble races by the abolition of their military forces, which he thinks is the only way in which they can conduce to the stability and security of the British Indian Empire!

One of the states comprised in this group has merited the entire approval of our writer. That state is Mysore. Of all the Native States under the British Empire, Mysore is after the Correspondent's own heart. There are reasons for this preference. Mysore was a strong military power only in the latter part of the last century—next only, if at all, to the Marathas. Under Hyder Alli in 1780 A. C. Mysore had waged a war with the English, the issues of which were sufficiently doubtful to justify the hope that, had his life been prolonged, Mysore would have made a very protracted resistance to the whole of the available power of the Company and exacted equal terms from them. This military power of the state is now annihilated, and the people completely disarmed and demartialized,—a state of things which writers of the stamp of this correspondent of the *London Times* think the best for the feudatories, if not the people, of their greatest dependency, which is figuratively not inaptly often styled "the brightest gem in her Majesty's diadem." This state of utter helplessness these writers wish to see established every where in this country. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army may complain that in a country where Hyder was able to raise valiant troops by the thousands and tens of thousands, Government now find it difficult to get indifferent recruits for the small numbers of their native battalions from the disarmed country

around ; but what are such considerations to such self sufficient people like the writer under review ? It has been well remarked that peace has its insidious dangers far more tempting to the pride of a dominant and aggressive people than even the stern realities of war. The almost unbroken internal peace of some thing like the period of a generation now in India, has inspired some of the more thoughtless Anglo-Indians with the pride that they can undertake the defence of the Empire, against any enemy whatsoever, without the aid of the more warlike of the Native races. We have only to say to these arrogant writers that we very much doubt their ability to be able to do so—not that we undervalue the valour or the mere physical powers of endurance of the British people, but we must frankly tell them that our scepticism is excited by our well-grounded belief that our Government could not possibly find the money that would be necessary for the maintenance of the very large European army that would be necessary. They could no more defend this Empire against a really powerful foe than they were able to conquer or acquire it without the aid and active sympathy of its people. It seems our tall-takers of the stamp of this English writer are entirely oblivious of the significance of this great fact. As, however, we shall have to dwell on this aspect of the case later on at some length, we will not enlarge upon it here.

The other reason of our writer's preference for Mysore is the fact that in his opinion it affords " the best precedent of intervention and of the assertion of our official authority." After the death of Purina, the misgovernment of Mysore by the restored Hindu Ruler was so great that it provoked a mutiny amongst his own troops and subjects, and our Government thereupon assumed the practical control of the Government of the country in 1831, A.C., and this it retained till 1851, when the state was handed over

to the present young Maharaja. The population of Mysore, according to our writer, exceeds 5 millions, and the revenue does not exceed £ 1,250,000. So the taxation per head of the population is not more than what it is in British India. This lenient taxation we are told we entirely owe to that "assertion" of the powers of interference of the British officers of our Government in the management of the affairs of that Native State. We fear the people of Mysore owe some thing more to these officers than our writer, in his moderation we suppose, has been disposed to disclose. This assertion of the birth right of British Indian Officers has also enabled to impose upon the Mysore State an increase of several lakhs of Rupees to its annual tribute to the Paramount Power, and the people of Mysore now may congratulate themselves for possessing exactly the same diminished ability to pay their taxes as the subjects of the British Indian Government. The Hindu administration of Mysore are at their wits ends to make the two ends meet and to pay the enhanced tribute to our government even in ordinary years. How they are to pay this tribute and to carry on efficiently the administration or help their subjects to tide over the calamity in years of scarcity or famine (to which Mysore unhappily is but too often subject) is more than what we can undertake to say. Perhaps the subjects of the state may then have the happiness of further strengthening their dependence upon our Government by again practically becoming their subjects. Here no doubt is a glorious result of the "assertion" of the powers of our English Officials. At present the Native administration pinch themselves and their subjects, and our Government, which is absolved from all trouble and responsibility of governing the Mysorians, reaps the advantage of those economical measures. This is certainly out-Russianing the Russians themselves. It is this state of things which the philanthropic correspondent of the *London Times*

wishes to see enforced in every Native state that he would suffer to exist. That it is the one wish nearest his heart is glaringly apparent throughout his tediously long tirades against the Native states and their armies. The Mahomedan chiefs and their retainers, being a "foreign domination" in the opinion of our alien writer, ought to be summarily pensioned off their kingdoms and principalities and the revenues of them applied to the "assertion" of the purely benevolent and philanthropic work of the English Official class, and the defence of the country, through them alone, against foreign invasion. In fairness, however, to the little regard for fair play and for the legitimate rights of the Native Princes, which still claims and finds a place in the heart of the London *Times* correspondent, we must say that at times his object is only to be got at by reading correctly between the lines of his communications. *i. e.* his heart is not as yet sufficiently hardened to be able to face the odium of his disreputable opinions quite openly by eschewing all ambiguity of language. We have been at the pains of dwelling longer on our writer's strictures and remarks about Mysore than we should have otherwise cared to do, had not the sort of treatment which Mysore has received at the hands of the officers of the Paramount Power recommended itself to several Anglo-Indian writers as the one which our Government ought to adopt in the case of all the Native states—so to increase their tribute as to leave them scarcely anything beyond the bare necessities of an administration maintained as it were on half pay and to appropriate the remainder for imperial purposes—all the solemn Treaties and Engagements in the world notwithstanding. This is the way they assert Russia is reigning and prospering in Central Asia, and this is the way in which this British Indian Empire, with its numerous feudatories, ought to be managed and held by England. Whatever might be the other favourable or compensating conditions of Russian rule in Central

Asia that might go to sustain the white Czar's rule there in this fashion, it is clear that the Empire in this country could never be maintained on the above conditions. England's moral superiority over Russia, on all points, must be strictly maintained here, and on no one point more than on that of strict and honourable observance of the solemn pledges she has entered into with the Native states. So deep is the love of the people of India to their remaining Native states that it cannot be too often repeated that the healthy preservation of the Native states is the *sine qua non* of the stability of the British rule in India. We have therefore instanced the case of Mysore as one which our Government must not follow under any circumstances in respect of any other state.

It will be observed that in the case of most of the "Hindu states" the rate of taxation per head is lower than what it actually is even in the British Indian territories. It has also been pointed out by Sir Lepel Griffin that the expense the Native states incur on their so-called armies, so far from being wasted, is the only practicable means, under the existing circumstances of the country, by which so many of the inhabitants of the country are placed above want and in a condition of moderate usefulness. In many of these states, notably so in Jeypore and Patialá, the arts of peace are greatly encouraged and developed, and education is making rapid strides; and one would have thought that in these "Hindu states" at least, which constitute the majority of the Native states, the reasons advanced by the correspondent of the *London Times* for the disbandment of the Native state armies fall to the ground altogether, and that the writer would not have been audacious enough to advance them. But our readers have seen that it is otherwise.

There is one state, however, which the correspondent of the *London Times* has mentioned in connection with the "Hindu states," where the cou-

dition of things seems to call for attention. Our attention has been drawn to the affairs of this petty Central Indian state by the very numerous letters that have from time to time appeared in most of the Vernacular papers of this presidency for the last three or four years, complaining of the management or rather extraordinary mismanagement of the state by an officer who apparently, it seems, has been forced upon the petty state by the officers of the Indore Agency. The writer of the letters in the Vernacular papers affects a style so mysterious and so full of allegorical allusions to local matters that an outsider, like ourself, may be easily pardoned if he fails to grasp the real significance of the situation. This little state, called by the writer "the Rajput principality of Dewās" is a petty Marāthā state in Central India. Of this state the correspondent of the London *Times* says that it has a population of 25,000 inhabitants and a revenue of £ 42,500 i. e. more than 80s. a head of the population, and that it has its 750 so-called soldiers. If this description be true, it would not be difficult to realise the misery of the subjects of the state who seem further (if the reiterated allegations in the Vernacular papers be true) to have been handed over by the officers of the Indore Agency to the tender mercies of an old and effete administrator whose pay alone is stated to be Rs. 1400 a month besides numerous other perquisites, allowances and Nemanukas to members of his family! This officer we are told is above 80 years of age or thereabouts and is thoroughly incapacitated for carrying on the administration of the state. This officer, it is alleged in the Vernacular papers, has arbitrarily increased the taxes and so mismanaged the revenues that the horses and elephants of the little state have sometimes to be starved of the usual allowance of gram and fodder! Many are the complaints that are said to have been preferred to the Agency, but as their own creature is the subject of those complaints, the Agency officers,



it is said, with what truth we know not, lend a deaf ear to the complaints of the unhappy Rayats and others who, therefore, suffer hopelessly from the laxity and corruption which is the inevitable result of such an administration. Such is the picture that is given in the Vernacular papers of the administration of this principality, and the description is such as would correspond in many points to the one given in a former portion of this paper of the sort of work that is not infrequently carried on by the creatures of the Agency, under sanction, implied or express, of its officers. We, however, are slow to give credence to the allegations contained in the Vernacular papers against the officer at the head of the Dewasa administration, as we feel sure that were the affairs of the state as above described, they would not have escaped the notice of the Agent to the Governor General, Sir Lepel Griffin, whose ability and probity are well known. The ambiguous, if not mysterious, language employed in this instance by this correspondent of the Vernacular papers, is in itself suggestive either of exaggeration of facts or of despair to get redress by any other method. In either case, we think, it would not be amiss for the Agency authorities to look after the doings of its nominee with a view to mend matters. We have been at the pains of looking into the administration reports of Central India for an explanation of the seemingly absurd and ambiguous statements in the Vernacular Press for several years past, but we regret to say, scarcely any mention is to be found in them of this small *Maráthá* principality. That such a petty state in Central India should have attracted the attention of the correspondent of the *London Times* shows how diligent and industrious he has been in finding out materials for his perverted argument.

We believe it must be evident to our readers from what we have said above in connection with the important Hindu Principality of Mysore that

the writer in the *London Times* holds forth for the adoption of our Government the system which, if Professor Vambray has described accurately and truthfully, Russia is following in the countries and principalities of Central Asia that she has lately subjugated. In Khiva, in Bokhara and other countries, we are told, the Russians take a pretty large portion of their revenues to themselves and leave the chiefs in other matters very much to themselves to shift as they please. Professor Vambray seems to think well of this method of acquiring territory and influence, as he mentions this circumstance in Russia's Central Asian policy among the causes that have conduced to its very rapid progress in that part of the world. We presume it is not necessary to point out that totally dissimilar conditions prevail and hold good in the two cases of the countries or nations of Central Asia and the Native states of India, which socially and geographically are parts and parcels of the adjoining British territories and are inhabited by the same peoples. Naturally enough, therefore, the people of British India resent any ill or illiberal treatment which may be intended to be meted out to their brethren beyond the artificial frontier as strongly as they would resent similar conduct towards themselves. In the policy that our Government may pursue towards the princes and people of the Native states, the people are apt naturally to look for and find the real motives by which the English Rulers of the country are affected towards the people of India as a whole. Such being the case, we once more beg to remark that the sort of treatment lately given to Mysore, by which the tribute of that state has been increased, is one which the British Government must scrupulously avoid at any cost. It cannot be seriously said or maintained that the Treaties and Engagements which our Government has entered into with the Native states were or are more favourable to the Native states than they

were or are to the Paramount English Power who, after defeating and humbling the native potentates, dictated to them as conquerors. Whatever may have been the advantages once gained, the people of India wish our Government to remain satisfied with them and not to make new encroachments on the remaining rights, privileges and territories of their weaker brethren in the Native states, the advantages of which they share with them. They also wish that the policy of our Government towards the Native States should be such that while it will conserve and protect the rights and dignity of the Native States, it will also bring about in them a humane and enlightened administration. Such a task, it must be confessed, affords little scope for clever "diplomacy," as it is commonly understood, or for political surprises, and that to execute it with credit and profit to all the parties concerned, one must possess qualities of the head and heart of no mean order. The people of the Native States judge of the success or otherwise of the careers of the Political Agents or Residents of our Government by this one standard of excellence alone. This no doubt is a high measure of excellence to be expected of any people, but we make bold to assert that no other will suit the exigencies of the British Empire so well, or be in harmony with the free and liberal instincts of the English people into whose hands a far-seeing Providence has confided the destinies of the teeming millions of India. It is cheering to think that our present accomplished and experienced Viceroy seems to have grasped clearly the conditions of the problem before him, and that he will be able to initiate a policy regulating the relations of our Paramount Government with its feudatory Native States which will conduce to the stability of the British Indian Empire and the welfare of the Native States in subordinate alliance with it. The Viceroy's speech at Gwalior, on the occasion of restoring

the Gwalior fort to the Maharajah Scindia is an important declaration of his Lordship's policy towards the feudatory states. It is a policy which, by marking a necessary departure from the hap-hazard policy hitherto pursued, comes very near the policy which we would advocate and which must be no doubt gratifying to all real well-wishers of British and Native India.

We have observed before that the Correspondent of the *London Times* under review is not so hostilely inclined towards those states which he is pleased to call the Hindu states as he is towards the Maratha and Mahomedan states. The first, in his omnipotence and supreme wisdom, he would totally abolish the face of the Earth; the chiefs of the second he would allow to exist as so many Government pensioners like the titular Nawabs of Moresheadabad and Arcot. Of the "Hindu States," though the writer includes under the designation some of the Sikh States of the Punjab, those that are ruled over by Rajput chiefs, as being under their national leaders, he would suffer to exist much as they are at present but with their armies greatly reduced, if not abolished altogether. There is a class of chiefs included in this group who have the rare good fortune to be altogether in the good graces of this Correspondent of the *English Times*. These are the Sikh states of the Panjab. With these states and their armies, says our writer, "an exception might be made with justice and on political grounds also." Though the total of the armies this group of petty states maintains comes up to the respectable figure of 18,370 men and 200 guns, our writer is bold enough to assert that these armies do not detract to any appreciable extent from the material resources of the states. There are diverse other reasons advanced by the writer not only for the retention of these armies but for the increase of their efficiency which must go to prove him to be no mean adept in the art of special pleading. One might

think whatever was good food for the goose might be so for the gander too. But this is evidently not the doctrine of the writer in the *English Times* we are dealing with. We do not deny that in the case of at least one of these Panjab states, there is a special reason why it should be specially trusted; and that is the state of Patiala. This state, says the *London Times* Correspondent, "served us well in the war with Nepal in 1814-15, attached itself to our cause in both the struggles in the Panjab, and stood by our side in the most valiant and noble minded manner in the darkest hours of 1857." It is something to be able to read such good words about any Native State from writers of the stamp of the one under reply as it shows that they are not entirely incapable of gratitude. Owing to the geographical position of this state it was enabled to be of such signal services to our Government. The virus of the mutiny of 1857 was not able to penetrate that latest acquisition of the British Indian Empire—the Panjab. It was, therefore, easier for the chiefs in the Panjab to help our Government in its hour of dire difficulty. Of course we do not under-value the aid that was so ungrudgingly rendered, but what we contend is that the assistance rendered to our Government by other Native States at, if possible, a greater sacrifice to themselves should not be lost sight of as is done by this our partizan writer. We have before this shown, by extracts from the writings of well known English authors, how admirable and loyal in this respect was the conduct of Maharajah Scindia and his illustrious Dewan. The Maharaja Gaikwad too rendered excellent services notwithstanding that some of the more active leaders in the mutiny had penetrated to territories near his own, and when the turbulent tribes of Waghers and others in his own state were not in the best of moods with his Government. Holkar too in his way, as Sir Lepel Griffin has lately point-

ed out, was of service to the Government. It is, however, no secret that H. H. affects, and not quite unjustly it is thought by persons competent to give an opinion in the matter, to have a grievance in connection with the treatment that he has received at the hands of the Government after the mutiny. What was given as reward for their services to their Highnesses the Maharajas Scindia and the Gaikwar with the one hand was attempted to be taken away by the other. But Patialâ has received a quite different treatment at the hands of our Government. That principality covers 5,419 square miles of territory. Much of it is the direct grant of the English Government in acknowledgment of faithful services. The revenues of the state fall short of half a million sterling. In fact the state of Patialâ might be well considered to be a *Jahâgir* or *saranjam* granted to its chief by the British Government, and as such, it is no wonder that the active loyalty of its chiefs should be conspicuous. As we have mentioned the case of Mysore as the one which our Government ought not under any circumstances to follow; we cite the instance of Patiala as one which the Government will always do well to make the basis of their policy, towards the subordinate and feudatory Native states of the Empire. Without the *reciprocity* of service and reward no system of paramount sovereignty is, in our humble opinion, long possible. Nor shall the establishment of such a policy cost the government any sacrifice worth mention. Most of the Native States are by this time, in one way or another, beholden to the English Paramount Power. At all events the chiefs individually have had an accession of despotic power and they are now convinced that they can, under present circumstances of the country, only hope to rise or be useful through their subordinate co-operation with the English Government. Therefore their co-operation can be effectively secured by a little more fair play

than they can at present hope to obtain and by a little more regard for the real interests of their states and subjects. Such a policy Lord Dufferin seems to have lately inaugurated at Gwalior ; a little more extension of it, and strict adherence to it always, is all that is necessary to make the Indian Feudatories of the British Empire its Arkane Dawalat in a military point of view as they are so from the political point of view.

As it is, there are clear signs that our Government will change their present policy of repression and distrust for one of enlightenment and confidence, and admit the subordinate Native States of India, that have been so long in alliance with it, to an honourable fraternity of arms with itself for the necessary military purposes of the vast British Indian Empire by devising a plan of action which, while it will encourage and confirm into the hearts of the chiefs and people a proper sense of the security and integrity of the subordinate Native States and of the rights and privileges guaranteed to them by solemn treaties and engagements, will at the same time create and sustain in them a spirit of emulation to do their best on the field of battle for and on behalf of the Paramount British Power. As we have ventilated our opinions about the utility and the necessity, for many purposes of usefulness, of the armies of the Native States and have in a former number of this Journal attempted to shew that from their existence, even as they are at present, no sort of danger was to be apprehended to our Government, we shall content ourselves here only by referring our readers to that number of our Journal and at once proceed to formulate a scheme by which the efficient subordinate co-operation of the Native States Armies may be secured for the imperial purposes of National defence and just commercial development.

It is evident that a comprehensive and abiding system of co-operate action, which necessarily will require considerable sacrifice from the contracting par-

ties and which may be fraught with important results and new responsibilities, should be based on the only firm ground of reciprocal advantages and made to revolve on those two powerful hinges on which all government and management rest—an inexorably and immutably just code of rewards and punishments. The British Government, as we have shewn before—notably in the States of Patialā, Hyderābād, Bhopal and even Gwalior—has followed this natural course whenever there was an opportunity of so doing.

The relations of our Government with the Native States having been regulated and settled by Treaties, and the rewards and penalties by which they were enforced having been long meted out and become accomplished facts, it is only just that new responsibilities and liabilities must be made to rest on new rights and new privileges, and that these chiefly must in the present instance come from the stronger and the more capable of the two parties concerned; in other words, from our Government. We are, however, to use mercantile language, bound to see that we strike the bargain at a comparatively reasonable price, and that the same should be so clearly defined and worded and drawn out in black and white that it should in the future lead to no sort of disputes or untoward complications. This, we know, is no very easy task. Towards its accomplishment our Government must labour hard and exercise a conscientious control over the baser and the more selfish instincts and propensities of itself and its officers.

The want of good faith and feelings in our dealings with our feudatory Native Chiefs has been sufficiently well marked a feature of our policy to make the Native States rightly hesitate a little in undertaking to put their military forces under any sort of control of the officers of the British Government. This hesitating attitude of the Native Princes, to enter into any systematic plan of military co-operation by which their own armies shall be



permanently subjected to the interference of the officers of any Government other than their own, is not to be confounded with any want of loyalty or any unwillingness to help our Government to the best of their humble powers whenever our Government may require it. Nothing could perhaps be more loyal and genuine than the offers which the different Native chiefs have from time to time made to our Government to place all the military resources of their states at its disposal on certain crises as they arose. Nor is there the least reason to doubt that the chiefs would always act in the same spirit of loyalty and helpfulness. The question that should now interest us more than any other is how to utilize effectively these offers in view of the possibly prolonged Russian and other troubles that loom on the Northern and Eastern frontiers of the British Indian Empire without weakening the integrity and true friendship of the Native States and the people of India generally.

However brave or of a martial spirit the soldiers of the Native States armies may supposed to be, they could not, out of sheer humanity, be placed in the field against a well armed and disciplined enemy. The discipline, the drilling, the arms and accoutrements of these armies shall have to be improved a great deal before their assistance can be really effective, and this shall have to be done without any obtrusive interference from the officers of our Government—likely to weaken the hold of the princes on the armies of their states. If due precautions are not taken in time, by one excuse or another, it is feared the Native Chiefs would become strangers to their own armies, while their states would be saddled with the expense of not only maintaining them—but maintaining them in a high state of efficiency. It is this very natural fear that has prevented many a Native thinker from formulating a plan for the utilization of the armies of the Native states for imperial purposes

This is especially the case with the princes and their ministers. In their minds the fates of the contingent troops they maintained in the service of the British Government must be ever present. The moral, too, of one of the fables of Æsop in which the wolf and other inferior beasts of the forest leagued themselves in some subordinate alliance as it were with the lion, the paramount lord of the forest, to hunt in common for their more easy subsistence, may suggest itself to their imaginations. Under these circumstances, a scheme free from the faults above hinted must come from our Government and it must be in time submitted to a thorough discussion in the public press of the country. We propose in the scheme we formulate below to set the ball a rolling as far as that can be done by an independent writer in a native journal. We are aware our plan is not complete in all its details and we therefore only advance it as a tentative one with a view to the subject matter of it being thoroughly and freely discussed.

( I ) No state, whose administration of its territories is not decently well, or whose administration of its public affairs is marred by extortion, extravagance, injustice or oppression, should be honoured by an admission into a fraternity of arms with our British Government, whose zeal for the proper administration of the country and the progressive welfare of their subjects are so conspicuous. Petty oppressors and small contemptible despots, we humbly think, would be unnatural companions of such a power.

( II ). New rifles, after the pattern of those which are supplied to the Native Regiments of our Government, should be granted by it to the infantry portion of what is called in the Native States their " Regular Army." The Native States should return as many of the old Muskets into British arsenals as may have been thus replaced by the new rifles.

( III ) The Native States themselves should furnish the regular portions of their Cavalry with their own arms.

( IV ) Half a battery of modern artillery should be supplied by our Government to the Native States to one thousand troops of their " reformed regular army " We mean this should be the proportion of their ordnance to their troops. The Native States to return into the Government Arsenals as many of their first class canon as may be thus replaced. For the draft, cattle or horses may be employed as the Native Chiefs thought proper or convenient.

( V ) The portions of the " regular army " thus reformed should pass the drilling season in the nearest British Cantonment where they must be drilled and paraded along with the Native Regiments of our Government.

All prizes and matches, open to the members of the Native British Army, should be thrown open to these " Reformed Native States armies."

The Native States themselves should defray all the necessary expenses of their forces in connection with this drilling—except the pay of the officers of our Government that may be employed in the work—unless the services of these officers should be required by the Native Chiefs at some distance in their territories beyond the time for the season.

( VI ) These reformed armies of the Native States should be considered in the light of a kind of " Second Reserve."

And whenever called out to serve in the imperial interests of the country, they should get their rations from our Government after they have once crossed the frontiers of their own states until the time they return within them.

These armies should be allowed to participate, along with the Native British army in all the customary loot and prize money of any war or battle in which they might be employed.

They may also receive the customary medals.

The widows and orphans of those who may fall in the active service of our Government should receive the same pensions and other allowances from our Government that their own troops may receive in accordance with the regulations that may be in force for the time being.

Pensions for good service and rewards to be paid to the men and officers of the Reformed Native States armies through their respective Durbars who must account to our Government for the sums they may thus receive for disbursement.

(VII.) While on active service, all expenses incurred beyond the usual pay of the officers and men of these armies should be borne by our Government, who must also, for special services reward the Native States with grants of land or money or any other suitable marks of Imperial favour as has been hitherto done.

(VIII.) Except as herein set forth, in matters connected with the armies of the Native States the provisions of the treaties and engagements entered into by the British Government with them to remain in force as before.

We may generally remark here that the "Reformed armies" of the States should be regarded by our Government very much in the light of Volunteer Corps and should be regulated, as far as possible, by their analogy and the way in which the old Mogal Emperors of Delhi utilized the armies of the Rajput Principalities in subordinate alliance with the Empire.

We have now reviewed the opinions of the Correspondent of the *London Times* regarding the Maratha, Mahomedan, and Hindu States of India and their so-called armies and indicated our points of difference with him. We have also formulated a tentative draft of a scheme of subordinate military co-operation by the Native States with the Paramount British Power in India. This scheme, we presume, will meet all

the nice exigencies of the case and will be found just their subjects sufficiently liberal to compensate the Native Chiefs and for the new responsibilities they thereby undoubtedly incur and the sacrifices they may have to undergo. We have, for want of space, left the Chapter which our writer has devoted to the armies and affairs of the Frontier Native States unreviewed, as, at present, our knowledge of their armies and their politics is so scanty that we do not feel ourselves warranted to deal justly with them. The matter of our relations with the Native States beyond the ordinary boundaries of the British Indian Empire, and some of our independent neighbours, is such an important subject that their conduct will soon form the subject of another article in this journal. Attention may be then turned to the part now left unnoticed.

We scarcely need, we trust, say that we have been actuated all along in what we have hitherto written with a sense of gratitude to wards the English Nation and the British Government under which we live and which has done so much for our country and which is destined, in the goodness of Providence, still more to raise us in the scale of nations and civilization. There is a school of Anglo-Indian writers whose opinions are calculated, we humbly yet firmly believe, to disturb the harmony that should and does exist, in spite of the mischief such writers tempt to do with a persistence worthy of a better and nobler cause, between the rulers and the ruled of this vast Empire. Under these circumstances, we ask our enlightened British Rulers and the Great English Nation to be righteous and to fear not. As pointed out by a high official of the Government of India in connection with the ovation our late beloved Viceroy received at the hands of the millions of this grateful country, the only policy which the British Government of India should persistently follow should be one of progressive improvement. So help them, God, thou who art the Ruler and disposer of Nations!