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*Title Psychology of Socialism...*

*Price. 16/- net*

*Date of publication March 22*

*Servant of India*

# **THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM**

15 SEP 1928

THE  
PSYCHOLOGY OF  
SOCIALISM

BY  
HENRY DE MAN

*Translated from the Second German Edition by*  
EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

LONDON  
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.  
MUSEUM STREET

*The German original (Diederichs, Jena, 1926, new and revised edition 1927) is entitled "Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus." The French version, "Au delà du Marxisme" (Brussels, 1927), as amended and further revised by the author, has been a guide in the translation.*

*First published in English in 1928*

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*Printed in Great Britain by  
Unwin Brothers, Ltd., Woking*

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## AUTHOR'S FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

GERMAN is the native tongue of Marxist socialism, as it was the native tongue of Karl Marx. That is why I wrote this book in German, for it is in great measure a criticism of Marxism, and every theoretical problem discussed in its pages is at the same time a practical problem of German political life. True that since 1918 the centre of gravity of Marxism has shifted to communist Russia; nevertheless, it is in Germany that the two main trends of socialist thought (the eastern, whose essence is the idea of coercion, and the western, whose essence is the idea of self-determination) meet and struggle for supremacy.

No doubt this struggle affects the labour and socialist movement all the world over. But it does so in very different ways. In Britain, for instance, the conflict is one between the native tendencies of the labour movement—strongly influenced by the traditions of parliamentary democracy; by practical trade-union experience; and by the ideology of British liberalism and radicalism, of pacifism, of individualism, and of Christian ethics—and a left wing largely inspired by communist ideas. In the United States, the same struggle goes on, though it assumes a very different complexion. Across the Atlantic, long before communism in the modern sense of the term was heard of, Marxist socialism was an imported ideology, devoid of roots in American earth. The problem there was, and is, how to evolve a socialism no less typically American than Marxism is typically European; a socialism that will be as much a genuine growth of the soil that bore Abraham Lincoln, as Russian communism is a product of the country of the tsars, or German social democracy a product of the native land of Bismarck.

Although the problem of democratic socialism versus

Marxism is a universal one, to treat it in a way adapted to these various national aspects would have necessitated the rethinking and rewriting of this book in at least two English versions—to say nothing of other languages! Even then, perhaps, more would have been lost than gained, for the issue would thus have been transferred from the core of the problem to externals. If it be true, as I believe, that the battle which rages round Marxist theory is going to be lost or won in Germany, then it is obvious that all who are keenly interested in the upshot of the fight should watch the struggle at the centre, and should pay comparatively little heed to skirmishes on the flanks of the contending armies.

Incidentally, readers in English-speaking countries may derive advantage from the study of the intellectual currents that express mass impulses, deep though not always conspicuous, in the storm centre of continental Europe. On August 4, 1914, the fate of the world was decided by a political resolve whereby German social democracy pledged itself to the support of the imperial war policy. This determination was the final outcome of a psychological process which cannot be fully understood without a careful study of the German elements of Marxist mentality. Even to-day, the peace of the world depends in great measure on the maintenance of a democratic trend in German evolution; and this, in its turn, depends on the attitude of German labour. Now, the attitude of German labour is itself, if not determined, at least exemplified by the struggle of tendencies which the present work expounds—and in which the present work plays its part.

For all these reasons, I decided to resist a strong temptation to readapt my book to the peculiar problems of the English-speaking world. Although personally I have been quite as much influenced by British and American as by German experiences; the *Psychology of Socialism*, like the French version *Au delà du Marxisme*, will be simply a translation of *Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus*. The reader must find out



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for himself to what extent the problem it discusses is truly universal, and to what extent the principles it outlines for a non-Marxist theory of socialism are applicable under these or those specifically national conditions.

HENRY DE MAN.

*September 1, 1927.*

15 SEP 1929

## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE GERMAN ORIGINAL

Write with blood—and you will learn that  
blood is spirit.

NIETZSCHE.

ALTHOUGH this book discusses a scientific theme, it differs in many respects, as far as form is concerned, from familiar technical works upon science and philosophy. It contains very few references to literature, even fewer discussions with other writers, and no footnotes. Frequently it speaks in the first person singular, as an expression of the author's conviction that from time to time he is entitled to regard his personal experiences as sources no less important (for himself, at any rate) than are the utterances of others. In actual fact, the book is a fragment of spiritual autobiography.

The liquidation of Marxism at which it aims is a process which I had first to carry out within the recesses of my own mind. This book is the precipitate resulting from a crisis in my own mental evolution, a process which has been going on for more than twenty years, one which is the fruit of practical experience in the labour movement rather than of rummaging in libraries. Almost all the problems with which it deals have been, for me, matters of conscience.

The socialist conviction which, already in my freshman days, impelled me to take part in the labour movement, was the outcome of a purely instinctive revolt against the social environment of my home life. Thanks to my study of natural science and mathematics, I was led to seek for a scientifically precise formulation for this conviction, and soon found it in Marxism. During the years of apprenticeship and travel, spent for the most part in Germany (that promised land of Marxism!), the main purpose of my life was to strengthen

my Marxist conviction by the aid of economic, historical, and philosophical studies. During the years immediately preceding the war, when, in my Belgian homeland, I was busied in the labour movement, my chief concern was to spread Marxist doctrine. But the more closely these activities brought me into contact with organisational practice, and especially with the detail work of trade unionism, the more did I find that the corners were being rubbed off my orthodoxy. Even before the war, I was drawing nearer to those Marxist thinkers who were advocating a judicious freedom in interpretation, without proposing to dislodge any of the main pillars of the doctrine.

The war, in which I participated as a Belgian volunteer, shook my Marxist faith to its foundations. It is war-time experience which entitles me to say that my book has been written with blood, though I cannot myself be certain that I have been able to transform that blood into spirit. The conflict of motives whose upshot was that I, an ardent antimilitarist and internationalist, felt it my duty to take up arms against Germany; my disillusionment at the collapse of the International; the daily demonstration of the instinctive nature of mass impulses thanks to which even socialist members of the working class had their minds poisoned with the virus of nationalist hatred; my growing estrangement from most of my sometime Marxist associates, who went over to the bolshevik camp—thanks to all these influences conjoined, I was racked with doubts and scruples whose echoes will be heard in this book.

The war was for me a prolonged examination of conscience when face to face with death. The effect was so profoundly disturbing that, after the armistice, I quitted Europe for two years, to seek, in a nomadic and adventurous life in America, possibilities for a new spiritual anchorage. At the close of the war I formulated the problems with which I was confronted, in my book *The Remaking of a Mind* (published in 1919 by Scribner, New York, and George Allen & Unwin, London), and, more concisely, in *La leçon de la guerre* ("Le

Peuple" publishing house in Brussels). I had moved from the outlook of economic determinism, which forms the basis of Marxist socialism, to the standpoint of a philosophy wherein the main significance is allotted to the individual human being as subject to psychological reactions. After my return to Europe, I spent a further two years as a helper in the Belgian working-class educational movement. Then, in 1922, I withdrew from public life, so that, in complete spiritual independence, I could devote myself to quiet reflection. The present book is the fruit.

My primary intention was to give a strictly concrete exposition of my views on social psychology. This would have had various advantages, one of which would have been to spare me a good deal of polemical digression, such as is apt to delay the progress of thought towards its goal, and to lure the writer into the pursuit of side issues. Had I adopted this plan, I could have contented myself with letting my philosophy disclose itself in the course of my analysis of the psychological motives of the labour movement and of socialism. I should have then touched upon Marxism only as one among many historical forms of socialist conviction, forms whose psychological causes I should like to elucidate.

Instead, I decided upon a mode of exposition which brings into sharp relief the contrast between my way of thinking and that of the Marxists. Despite considerable hesitation, I adopted this course for two reasons. In the first place, I wanted to safeguard the inner veracity of my book; and, in the second place, I hoped to intensify its effect upon socialist readers by following the line of least psychological resistance.

The desire for subjective veracity was instrumental in making me adopt the present mode of treatment, for the reason that I did not reach any one of the opinions here stated until after a criticism of my own Marxist tenets, a criticism which is embodied in these pages. I have been less concerned to discuss the scientific validity of one opinion or another, than to throw light upon the mental attitude in accordance with which opinions are formed and appraised. In contrast

with my former (Marxist) attitude, my new one implies a reevaluation of all values, and the most convincing method of exposition will unquestionably be one which most faithfully reflects the change in my own outlook. The only reason why the experience of the world war shook my convictions was because it shook my conscience. Marxism failed to disclose to socialists the ways leading to the fulfilment of their moral duties towards mankind. Will was lacking because understanding was deficient. I am the less able to forget the burden of guilt which rests on Marxism in this respect, because the same burden still presses heavily on my own conscience. Thus my criticism of Marxism is transferred from the plane of knowledge to the plane of conscience. Having myself experienced a sense of spiritual release, having enjoyed a mental rebirth, I find it impossible to account for these results as the outcome of nothing more than a reinterpretation of scientific postulates.

For the same reason, I have made no attempt to avoid methods of expression which to many of my readers will seem paradoxical. I will even admit that when there has been an option between a mild word or phrase and a strong one, I have, on principle, generally preferred the strong one. This has been done, not in order to satisfy a personal need for spiritual cleansing, but on practical grounds. What the Americans call a "psychological jolt," a sudden shaking up, is an almost indispensable preliminary to such a transformation of mental outlooks as I hope to effect.

That is why, moreover, I speak frankly of the "liquidation of Marxism," instead of using some such half-hearted word as "revision," "adaptation," "reinterpretation," or the like, which might seem to imply a wish to run with the hare as well as to hunt with the hounds. What I have to say in this book concerning the relationships between socialist doctrine and the socialist movement, and in particular regarding the relative valuation of Marxism in accordance with variations in space and time, will show that I could have expressed my conclusions equally well in either of the two forms,

without any ponderable difference in substantial content. The relativation of Marxism at which I aim, betokens, in one historical significance, affirmation, in another (when Marxism is envisaged as an educative force here and now), a negation. If I insist upon the latter aspect, if I stress the negative rather than the positive, I am guided by practical considerations. From a purely theoretical outlook, the question which of the alternative formulations is more appropriate, whether it is better to affirm Marxism in its historical affiliations, or to negate it with an eye to the urgent needs of our own place and time—this question recalls the famous problem of the knife which had been again and again successively fitted with a new handle and a new blade. The problem was if, or when, it had become a new knife. Indubitably there are circumstances in which the becoming can only develop thanks to a steadily increasing awareness of its own sharp contrast to what has been.

Such a case always arises when a new generation has an active wish to differentiate itself from the older generation by adopting a new philosophy. For then the new generation does not merely *think* differently from the old in this matter or in that; if *feels* differently, is dominated by a different *mood* or *affect* towards the world at large, so that man's relationship to the environment assumes an entirely new aspect. How could it fail to be otherwise to-day, when the social environment has been utterly transformed by war and revolution, so that between the pre-war generation and the post-war generation there is a great gulf fixed? People are *thinking* differently, because they are *feeling* differently; they are *feeling* differently, because they want to *be* different. Such is the position of post-war socialism.

For the rest, let me here emphasise a point which would otherwise only become clear to the reader gradually, as he makes his way through the book. *I am not criticising Marx.* I am not doing this even when I quote from Marx's writings in order to illustrate Marxist doctrines which I am attacking. My quarrel is not with Marx, but with Marxism.

By Marxism I mean the elements of Marxist teaching which live on in the labour movement, in the form of emotional valuations, social volitions, methods of action, principles, and programs. Our concern is, not with the dead Marx, but with living socialism. This remark is for those who may fancy that they can confute my utterances by quoting Marx against me, and by showing that I am mistaken in my "interpretation" of the master. What I have to say in this book about the relationship between mass movements and the rationally conceived aims serving the participators in such movements as symbols of the will which animates them, will make it still plainer why I have no interest in textual exegesis. No doubt textual criticism is of the utmost value as an aid to biographical and historical research. With that, however, we have no concern here. It matters little or not at all how we can explain this or that utterance of Marx or Engels as an outcome of the situation at the time, or whether the utterance is consistent or inconsistent with a passage to be found in an earlier or later article or letter. What matters is: What of Marx is alive to-day? The value of the work of a man who has supplied a body of doctrine to a movement, is to be measured by the effect of the doctrine on the movement.

To say this, is not to show disrespect to Marx. The actual value of his teaching is independent of its historical value, and of our judgment of his personality. Marx was the most outstanding genius among those who have contributed to the formation of modern socialist thought. I know better than any one how much I myself owe to him; especially do I know it because I have to thank him for most of what has freed me from Marxism. Not the least among the tributes which an intelligent person can pay him is to leave his side when, in that search for truth to which he devoted his whole life, the time has come for a fresh advance.

*PART ONE*  
**CAUSES**



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE THEORY OF MOTIVES AS THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF SOCIALISM

The task of historical materialism, as Marx understood it, was to explain how human beings can transform the circumstances of which they themselves are the products.

G. PLEHANOFF.

It is not surprising that socialism is in the throes of a spiritual crisis. The world war has led to so many social and political transformations that all parties and all ideological movements have had to undergo modification in one direction or another, in order to adapt themselves to the new situation. Such changes cannot be effected without internal frictions ; they are always attended by growing pains ; they denote a doctrinal crisis.

As far as Marxist socialism is concerned, its recent history shows signs of a crisis which cannot be interpreted as anything more than transient difficulties attending the process of adaptation to new conditions. The last ten years have merely served to emphasise a trend which had existed long before, have made plain to all observers the widening cleavage between Marxist theory and the practice of those labour parties which claim to embody it.

All over the world, the trade unions, the cooperatives, and the labour parties have been driven more and more by force of circumstances into a policy of compromise, of moderation, of defensive coalition with their adversaries of a little while back. By making casuistic distinctions between means and ends, a logical bridge between the traditional doctrine and the actual tactic can always be built. But a logical bridge is not a psychological one. Logically, a policy of class collaboration can invariably be justified by a doctrine of class struggle ;

yet there may be contradiction among emotional motives when there is no contradiction among intellectual motives. Now, the motives of the masses are essentially emotional. It is sometimes difficult to make the masses understand that, after the lapse of a few years, when circumstances have changed though the end remains the same, it may be right and proper to pursue this end by other means than those adopted heretofore. When, in such a case, new means are employed, there is grave risk that the rank and file may lose confidence in the leaders—that confidence which is the moral tie requisite for all manifestations of a collective political will. The leaders, therefore, do their utmost to demonstrate the continuity of motive by reiterated avowals of faith in time-honoured doctrines. Such avowals are symbolical rather than practical. Marxism no longer really inspires political activities, for these are now dominated by circumstances very different from those in which the doctrine originated. The function of Marxism to-day is merely to supply the socialist arsenal with propaganda formulas, above all with such as are likely to fan the enthusiasm of party members nourished upon the ancient traditions, and to confute communist accusations of treason to principles. Thus, the principles acquire a conservative function differing widely from their function in old days. Marxist doctrine, therefore, has come to play a part analogous to that played by religious rites in a church which has gained temporal power. Whereas it used to be the motive force of action, it has now become nothing more than an auxiliary means of propaganda. For instance, Marxist socialists, wishing to contest the communist claim to have a monopoly of Marxist orthodoxy, are accustomed to contrapose their “pure” Marxism, their Marxism of the elect, to the “vulgar” Marxism of the communists, the Marxism of the crowd. Well now, among the social democrats, the “purer” the Marxism voiced by the leaders, the more scrupulously “orthodox,” the better fitted is it to galvanise the energy of those rank-and-filers who are still inspired by the revolutionary idealism of former days. But if Marxism

is to remain "pure," it must isolate itself more and more from practical politics and from the actual trends, from the great currents, of intellectual life. Consequently, it turns more and more to textual criticism, to disputes about interpretation, to the discussion of abstract principles. Whenever it is concerned with actual practice, it degenerates into casuistry, always trying to justify the action by the system, and never trying to vivify the system by impregnation with the living fact.

Hence arises that general impression of a lack of intellectual vigour, which is not an indication of a crisis in growth, but, rather, of senile decay. We detect a loss of logical coherency and of self-confidence, such as must inevitably arise when the guardians of a doctrine are more concerned to prove that it is still alive than to use it for the conquest of the world. Young people are particularly sensitive to such a loss of moral stamina. As every one knows, they are apt to be a little intolerant in their demand for a view of life which shall be at one and the same time a philosophy and a guide to conduct. Young people, like intellectuals, always look upon politics as the realisation of an idea, as founded both upon the moral sense and upon reason. Especially nowadays, when war-time experiences have shattered confidence in so many ideals, the thoughtful members of the younger generation are yearning for a faith whose sincerity can be proved by its realisation in the practical life of the individual. This is the inner reason why our young people and our socialist intellectuals have an instinctive prejudice against Marxism, which they consider too rigid as a mode of thought and too easy-going as a rule of conduct.

In so far as these young people become acquainted with Marxism, it seems to them not so much erroneous as superfluous. They feel, more or less clearly, that Marxism, though it may be useful as an economic theory, provides no answers to the questions which chiefly occupy their minds. For these questions are no longer concerned with the mutual relationships between various economic forms, but with the

relationship of individual human beings to economic life and to the community at large. Young people do not so much want a new economic theory or a new way of explaining history, as a new outlook on life, and indeed a new religion. Since Marxism does not offer them this, they turn away from it.

A critique of Marxism, therefore, now brings to the front questions very different from those raised by Bernstein when he set about criticising Marxism in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Bernstein wanted to "revise" certain parts of Marxist sociology, which seemed to him to conflict with the economic and social development of his days; he wanted to revise the theory of increasing misery, that of capitalist concentration, that of value and surplus value, that of economic crises, that of the intensification of the class struggle, and so on. But Bernstein's criticism of these theories was substantially inspired by the same mode of thought as the theories he was attacking. He did not want to touch the philosophical foundations of Marxism, but only to "develop" the doctrine, by applying the old way of thinking to the new phenomena of economic and social life.

If the Marxism of the social democrats is no longer to-day the living doctrine of a live movement, this is not because a few of its formulas (such as that of the increasing misery of the proletariat, that of the concentration of capital, and that of the intensification of the class struggle) stand in need of revision. Even if Bernstein's criticism of these formulas had been utterly fallacious, a much more important question would still remain to be answered. Supposing that the formulas are correct, can they serve to guide the march of socialism as Marx believed they could?

Thus, as far as the theoretical success of revisionism was concerned, it was of no moment whether Bernstein or Kautsky was right in the dispute as to the soundness of Marx's theory about the concentration of capital. The crucial question was, not whether this concentration proceeds in the way described by Marx. The question was: first, whether the concentration of capital affects the social will in the manner

predicted by Marx in his theory of social catastrophe; and, secondly and chiefly, whether the decay and disappearance of the middle class (supposing it to occur) would show that socialism was either necessary or desirable. Let me put the matter in another way. Of what use is it to prove that economic crises have assumed other forms than those foreseen by Marx? What matters to us is whether there really is, as Marx believed, a necessary connexion between economic crises and the social revolution. Again, even supposing that the theory of the increasing misery of the proletariat is true, what can this signify to one who does not consider that the socialist will of the masses is dependent upon the extremity of their poverty and distress? What, finally, can the intensification of the class struggle matter to one who does not believe that the fight on behalf of class interests will necessarily lead to socialism?

The vulnerable points disclosed in Marxism by these questionings do not relate to the question whether Marx's economic and social inferences are sound or unsound; they relate to the way in which Marx and his followers try to change their method of interpreting history into a mode of action. The plane of criticism is thus transferred from inferences to methods. Now, our historical study of Marxism and the Marxist movement will show us that the method is rooted in the philosophical theories that were dominant during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, theories which may provisionally be summarised in the catchwords determinism, causal mechanism, historicism, rationalism, and economic hedonism.

Marxism deduces the socialist objective from the laws of social evolution, which are assumed to have the inexorable necessity of the "laws of nature" formulated in physical science; to this extent, therefore, Marxism is *determinist*. The form in which these laws work is regarded as dialectical, this meaning that they conform to a type of causality in accordance with which (as we see in certain mechanical examples) a force can undergo a change of direction without undergoing

any change in nature or intensity, so that it comes to produce an effect which is the converse of its original trend ; to this extent, therefore, Marxism is *mechanistic*. It bases its knowledge of the laws of social evolution upon the history of the past, regarding the objectives of human volition as the outcome of certain environing situations ("relationships"). Man being thus reduced to the level of a mere object among the objects of his environment, and these external historical "relationships" being held to determine his volitions and to decide his objectives, we are justified in applying to the theory in question Nietzsche's catchword of *historicism*. Nevertheless, Marx tells us that social evolution, though thus proceeding in accordance with law, does not fulfil itself spontaneously ; it proceeds in virtue of the voluntary actions of human beings ; these actions are the fruit of a knowledge of the circumstances which determine them ; in the case of the fighting proletariat, moreover, they are to be the fruit of a knowledge of the Marxist laws of rational necessity ; the Marxist belief that knowledge is the mainspring of social activity entitles us to describe Marxism as *rationalistic*. Marx held, and his followers continue to hold, that the knowledge which determines the social activity of the masses is knowledge of a peculiar kind ; it is an awareness of the economic interests which arise out of the relationships of production, and especially out of the conflict of interests between the buyers and the sellers of labour power ; thus, in the last analysis, the "relationships" which determine human actions are "relationships of production," and the development of these depends in its turn upon advances in the technique of production ; the Marxist belief that social happenings are the outcome of economic causation entitles us to describe Marxism as a variety of *economic hedonism*.

The theory of motives which underlies the whole chain of reasoning, the belief that social activities are determined by an awareness of economic interests, is the basis of the most important and most original positive contributions of Marxism, namely the coordination of the proletarian class

struggle and of socialism into one and the same doctrinal system. In the days before Marx, socialism was utopian; the motive for establishing socialism was to be found in a recognition of the moral superiority of a socialist commonwealth. Marx wanted to escape the uncertainties involved in this dependence upon visions of the future, by proving that economic laws make the coming of socialism inevitable. The struggle of the working class on behalf of its own interests, as determined by the capitalist organisation of production, will (said Marx) necessarily culminate in the establishment of socialism.

It is this identification of the class struggle with socialism, this belief that there is a necessary connexion between the conflict of interests and the liberation of mankind, which has been increasingly called in question by the experiences of the last few decades. Since the day when Marx lived and wrote, it is true that the class consciousness of the workers, based on a recognition of their interests as a class, has grown ever more alert; and it is true that the class struggle has been unceasingly intensified in the industrial and political field: but the goal of a classless society seems farther away than ever. Doubts arise as to the inevitability of the transition to a new social order as the direct consequence of the proletarian struggle on behalf of the workers' interests; and these doubts grow more and more urgent. Enough to point to the way in which the working class is tending to accept bourgeois standards and to adopt a bourgeois culture; to the gradual substitution of the reformist motive for the revolutionary motive; to the increasing intimacy of the ties connecting the workers with the political and economic institutions of the existing order; to the accentuation of national differentiations in the socialist labour movement; to the formation of a bureaucratic upper stratum within the labour organisations; and so on. The problems which are thus brought into the foreground of every discussion concerning the present value of Marxism, lead directly to the central question whether the Marxist doctrine of motives, the

theory that the social activities of the masses are determined by their knowledge of their class interests, is still tenable.

Before going farther in the methodological and historical discussion of Marxist doctrine, it will be simpler to let facts speak for themselves—facts which can throw light on the real connexion between the proletarian struggle on behalf of working-class interests, on the one hand, and the socialist objective, on the other.

The first point we note is that the historical sequence of events conflicts with the rationalist theory of the adoption of a socialist objective as the outcome of an awakening to the knowledge of class interests. Socialist teachings are not a product of the awakening of class consciousness among the workers; on the contrary, they are an essential preliminary to such an awakening. Socialism existed (as an objective) before there was a labour movement, and even before there was a working class.

Socialist teachings, those of Marx and Engels not excepted, sprang from other sources than the class interest of the proletariat. They are products, not of the cultural poverty of the proletariat, but of the cultural wealth of instructed members of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. They spread from above downwards, not from below upwards. Among the great thinkers and the ardent enthusiasts who were pioneers in the field of socialist theory, hardly one proletarian can be named. Beyond dispute, socialism, though in course of time it has become the objective of the labour movement and supplies that movement with a program, is, historically considered, not so much a doctrine of the proletariat as a doctrine for the proletariat. Were we to accept the misleading terminology of Marxism, which tells us that every specific kind of social ideology is the expression of the outlook of some particular class, we should be compelled to describe socialism, including Marxism, as a bourgeois growth.

In reality, the undoubted fact that the originators of socialist doctrines have almost invariably been bourgeois intellectuals, shows that psychological motives are at work,



motives which have nothing whatever to do with class interests. The peculiarities and diversities of these doctrines only become intelligible in the light of an analysis of the spiritual motives which underlie the views of every socialist thinker, or at any rate of every socialist thinker who has a claim to originality. Of course this psychoanalytical biography cannot dispense with a consideration of the social and economic environment of the thinker. We must take into account, not only his general social background, but also his individual economic and social position—which, for instance, is “bourgeois” alike in the case of Marx, university trained and primarily designed for an academic career; in that of Owen, the factory owner; and in that of Saint-Simon, the aristocrat. If, however, leaving the field of individual biography, we pass on to attempt a psychoanalysis or to formulate a sociology of socialist thought in general, we find that socialist doctrine becomes explicable, not as an adaptive reaction of the proletariat to its class situation, but as an antagonistic reaction of cultured bourgeois and aristocrats to the circumstances of their cultural environment. Socialist creative thought, thus envisaged, is seen to take its rise in an affect, or rather in an almost infinite multiplicity of affects, derived from cultural, ethical, and aesthetic sources. These affects, and the resultant thought processes out of which the doctrines arise, are no more to be explained as the outcome of class interests and the class struggle, than the beauty of a painting by Rembrandt is to be explained in terms of a chemical analysis of the pigments and the canvas—though “in the last analysis” the picture consists of nothing more than canvas and paint. In so far as science has anything to say in the matter, the only science that is of any use here is one which ignores economic interests, and brings the intellectual and moral personality into high relief. Here we need the aid of biography, ranging from the description of the personal environment to psychoanalysis and portraiture; for thoughts are the outcome of personality, not of a parallelogram of social forces as displayed in mass movements.

Agreed that social forces, as generated and brought into clash during the class struggle, turn thoughts to account. The more accurately social processes have been reflected in the brain of a socialist thinker, the more trustworthy his perception of the longings of the masses, the sooner and the more heartily will the masses accept the teachings which embody their desires. Then, what the individual has thought, becomes the symbol of the volitions and feelings of millions upon millions. But the origin of the two elements whereof this compound of will and idea consists, is as diverse as that of the meal and the yeast out of whose union bread is made. The nature of the process of fermentation which finds expression in the socialist labour movement can only be understood by one who realises that the working masses are the dough, whereas the ideas of non-proletarian intellectuals are the yeast.

Marxism obstinately ignores this multiplicity of socialist motivation, refuses to see the complicated nature of the issues. Otherwise the Marxists would lose their faith in the necessary connexion between class interests and ways of thinking. When we study the origin of Marxism itself, we see that the position of the working class (a very different thing, by the by, from the interests of the working class) has served merely to arouse an affective predisposition for the use of ideas which, for their part, had their source in far nobler cultural motives than the desire of talented intellectuals to gain some personal advantage. We are told that the bourgeois and aristocratic pioneers in the advocacy of socialist ideals were but exceptions to the general rule that socialist doctrine is of proletarian origin—whereas the facts show clearly enough that these “bourgeois exceptions” are really the rule. To substantiate their illusion, the Marxists begin the history of socialism with Marx, repudiating the great forerunners, whose portraits would give the picture gallery a too obviously non-proletarian stamp. In doing this, Marxism does grievous wrong to itself. We gravely underestimate the value of personality, if we reduce the highest form of mental production to a non-personal process, if we

regard it as nothing more than a link in the chain of economic determinism, wherein the creative personality is but an epiphenomenon devoid of independent causal significance.

The recognition of this truth, however, must not lead us to the opposite extreme of underestimating those motive forces of the labour movement which find expression, not as individual thought processes, but as psychological mass phenomena. One such mass phenomenon is the affective reaction of the working class which makes the workers responsive to the ideas formulated by intellectuals.

Here, likewise, Marxism is incompetent to explain how this mass affect originates. The rationalist foundations of the doctrine impose an obstacle. To the Marxists it seems that the class struggle, the struggle for surplus value which expands into a struggle for socialisation, is the direct and necessary consequence of a particular mode of production, of an economic category. They regard the struggle as, in a way, an end in itself. It is not fought under the impulsion of variable motives, and to secure variable ends; from the moment when the working masses realise that their interests are fundamentally opposed to those of the possessing classes, it is directed towards an aim previously inherent and henceforward self-evident—that of the social revolution. For Marx, knowledge, awareness, was the primary determinant, the class will was the outcome of class consciousness. We are confronted with a kind of mystical revelation: a revolutionary necessity hovers in the air, as a scientifically demonstrated principle inherent in the developmental laws of the capitalist method of production; the workers, the “midwives” of the revolution, need only recognise the truth of this principle, and they will take the steps requisite to bring about the birth. They are the instruments of a dialectic which already lives as a law in a supraterrrestrial sphere before it descends to earth and enters the minds of the human beings whom knowledge will stimulate to the fulfilment of the law. Others besides the communists (the “vulgar” Marxists) are a prey to this rationalist error, as we may learn from a

characteristic passage in Kautsky's *Ethik* (p. 135), where he speaks of the "moral indignation" which impels the workers to play an active part in the class struggle as being the outcome of their class consciousness. This implies that the workers first acquire the knowledge which underlies their awareness of their class interests, and then only, having recognised it ratiocinatively, proceed to *feel* it as a matter of justice and ethics!

Can we wonder, then, that Marxism has not as yet made any serious contribution towards solving the problem as to precisely how these processes go on in the workers' minds, these processes thanks to which those who live in particular class relationships acquire particular class views? Persons who are a prey to rationalist superstitions, those who believe that knowledge precedes feeling, have no need of any such explanation; they do not recognise that there is any problem to solve. The right way of stating the problem is, of course, to ask in what way the conditions of the worker's life react on his state of feeling, and how his affects guide his social volition. Not until we have made an exhaustive study of the worker's emotive reaction to his social environment, can we understand the part played by socialist theories in this reaction, and the infinite variety of the consequent reciprocal influences. We must therefore, just as in the case of individual volitions, begin with the study of the affects, the emotional mainsprings of action, and then go on to examine the rational motives which provide theoretical aims for the volitions aroused by the affects. This division into a primary analysis of the affective sphere, and a secondary analysis of the ideational, corresponds just as much to historical reality as to a logical necessity. In the course of human evolution, thought has developed into an ever more important function of emotional and voluntary processes; so, likewise, the whole course of the inner history of the labour movement exhibits a progressive transformation of feelings into thoughts, of needs into ideals, of impulses into reasons. Throughout, there has been a clearer illumination of that which at first was but dimly craved for and darkly apprehended—illumination by an awakening

consciousness, a growing rationality. The working class fought before it knew. Class war was not born out of class consciousness. On the contrary, class consciousness was born out of the class war, and the class war itself was the outcome of a feeling of class resentment. The workers do not fight as a class because they know themselves to be exploited ; but they come to think themselves exploited when, and because, they are engaged in the fight. The theory of exploitation is the product of a struggle engendered by feeling and not by thought.

Therefore the sociology of the labour movement must always begin with a study of the affects of the individual worker, as typically produced by his normal living and working conditions. This investigation will be most enlightening if we concentrate, to begin with, upon the workers in medium-scale and large-scale industry. Of course there are various other strata in the working class (wage-earning women, agricultural labourers, office employees, the lower-grade civil servants, home workers, artisans, the workers in dwarf industries, and so on), whose conditions of life and psychological characteristics diverge in various ways from those of typical industrial operatives. But these latter constitute the most numerous section of the working class, and they display, in a peculiarly salient form, the features common to all the workers. They give out the fundamental tone of the class, and are therefore the most suitable specimens to select when we wish to study the class as a whole. Now, such a typical proletarian, an average member of this stratum, is by no means identical with the picture of him drawn by Marxist doctrinaires. As we have seen, socialist philosophy was conceived by bourgeois intellectuals. Their inclination was to idolise the proletariat ; and they did this the more enthusiastically, the less they were acquainted with actual proletarians. When a modern socialist intellectual, and above all a modern Marxist intellectual, speaks of the proletariat, it is with a reverent vibration of voice, such as might have been heard when an early Christian was talking of the Saviour, or when an 1848 democrat mentioned the People. For to the Marxist, the proletariat is the Saviour,

the Power, the Will, predestined to satisfy the longing for a better world, the longing for a "socialist hereafter." The proletariat is not a reality but a concept. This idealisation of the proletariat is a counterpart to the idealisation of the peasantry characteristic of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his followers in the days of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. In these cases, we get an ideal picture which is as far from the reality as a Watteau shepherd was from a genuine peasant of the time. Gorki puts the matter very well in his account of his impressions when, as a young workman, he attended the secret meetings of Russian socialist students and other enthusiasts. "When they began to talk about the People, I speedily realised that I did not share their sentiments in the matter. This surprised me a good deal, and made me mistrustful of myself. For them the People was the embodiment of wisdom, of spiritual beauty, of goodness of heart, an almost divine and unique being, the exemplar of all that was beautiful, just, and great. The description did not tally with 'the People' as I knew it." An analogous surprise, though in another setting, is described by H. G. Wells in *The New Machiavelli*. At Cambridge, in the nineties, his hero, then an undergraduate, comes under the influence of the thought trends initiated by the Social Democratic Federation. He regards the proletariat as a "divine being," personified in a propaganda poster by a workman, "a huge-muscled, black-haired toiler swaggering sledgehammer in hand across a revolutionary barricade." A little later, Remington comes into actual contact with the industrial workers. He goes to the Potteries, and is much distressed by the contrast between reality and fancy. "The picture of a splendid Working Man cheated out of his innate glorious possibilities . . . began to give place to a limitless spectacle of inefficiency, to a conception of millions of people not organised as they should be, not educated as they should be, not simply prevented from but incapable of nearly every sort of beauty, mostly kindly and well-meaning, mostly incompetent, mostly obstinate, and easily humbugged and

easily diverted. Even the tragic and inspiring idea of Marx, that the poor were nearing a limit of painful experience, and awakening to a sense of intolerable wrongs, began to develop into the more appalling conception that the poor were simply in a witless uncomfortable inconclusive way—‘muddling along’; that they wanted nothing very definitely nor very urgently, that mean fears enslaved them and mean satisfactions decoyed them, that they took the very gift of life itself with a spiritless lassitude, hoarding it, being rather anxious not to lose it than to use it in any way whatever.” In like manner a German, Curt Geyer, disillusioned with communism, wrote not long ago of “the alternation between vegetative wellbeing (without vision of the future) and despair, an alternation characteristic of working-class mentality.”

No doubt the bitterness of disappointment may have led these writers to paint their pictures in unduly dark colours. Still, there would have been no disillusionment had there not first been illusion. In any case, such pessimistic descriptions are no farther from the truth than were the original fancy pictures, which were not based upon experience but upon a tissue of abstractions. Among all the varieties of socialist doctrine, Marxism is most prone to create such mirages. To the Marxist, the proletariat is a pure concept, an instrument for the realisation of other concepts, one term in the algebraical formula of the social revolution. In this formula, the worker lives only for the class struggle; all his thoughts and all his actions are directed towards the one end. The Marxist intellectual identifies the proletariat (in so far as it is anything more than a purely abstract notion) with the specimens he encounters at propaganda meetings. The fallacy, of course, is twofold. First of all, at these meetings, our intellectual sees only an infinitesimal selection of the workers, which he then proceeds to identify with the “masses.” Further, he assumes that the behaviour of this select group at propaganda meetings gives a true index of what they, and the workers at large, think and do at the bench, in the home, in the normal environment of everyday life.

This psychological error underlies the fanatical idolisation of the masses which, even before the war, was characteristic of the left wing of the Marxists, and since then has been made a principle of political strategy in the forms of spartacism and communism. Mystical virtues are ascribed to the "masses." Thanks to these virtues, mass action will be a panacea for the ills which the organised and disciplined minority has not yet been able to cure! This Marxist cult of the "masses" is the expression of a tendency of certain intellectuals towards the "projection" of their own aspirations (born of their own impatience, and of a reaction against the impotence of the social stratum to which they belong) upon a great X, which at any rate has the advantage—for them—of being an unknown quantity. Experience shows, however, that the mobilisation of the masses is by no means able to infuse into the labour movement that element of heroic defiance which the theoreticians among the extremists anticipate. It is the "masses" who, after they have been temporarily set in motion by a transient ebullition of feeling, then force upon their leaders an opportunist policy, a policy in which revolutionary objectives are sacrificed for the sake of immediate material gains. The German revolution of November 1918 is not the only one which, owing to the participation of the masses, has (as German socialists are now in the habit of saying) "degenerated into a movement on behalf of better wages." What the Marxists dream of getting from the masses is really a new leadership; their cult of the masses is another form of hero worship. The unknown masses are imaginatively endowed with all the heroic lineaments which are not discoverable in the organised workers and their leaders. Nothing could be more typical of the psychological springs of this movement for the idolisation of the masses, than that its chief exponents have been women. Hero worship is a specifically feminine tendency. Three noted Marxist women have been its chief protagonists: Rosa Luxemburg, in a critical and polemic form; Clara Zetkin, as a sentimental propagandist; and Henriette Roland-Holst, symboli-



cally and poetically, for in this writer's dramatic and lyrical verses we find the most effective symbolical expression of faith in the masses as a form of hero worship.

The actual leaders of the working-class movement, born in the ranks, daily and hourly coming into contact with the masses, are far more sceptical. No doubt their attitude is partly determined by their professional position, which makes them as bureaucrats take an exaggerated view of the importance of organisational apparatus. Still, their particular kind of bureaucratic activity does certainly bring them into close touch with live proletarians; whereas the theoreticians, the writers, and the journalists who play, or would like to play, a part in the labour movement, only leave their studies or their editorial offices to enter the heady, artificial, and misleading atmosphere of party meetings. It is solely among these intellectuals that we find the originators of a Marxist cult of the masses, such as flourished during the decade before the war. I may mention four notable persons with academic titles: Dr. Rosa Luxemburg, Dr. Anton Pannekoek, Dr. Karl Liebknecht, and Dr. Hermann Gorter; also Henriette Roland-Holst, the poet, and Karl Radek, the author; three more who could write "doctor" before the name, Angelica Balabanoff, Alexander Helphand (Parvus), and Van Ravesteyn; I might add, Dr. Henry de Man to the number, were it not that I had, even before the war, laid myself open to the charge of "latitudinarianism" by a certain scepticism and moderation. So long as my socialist work remained literary and propagandist, it was not very difficult for me to retain a due measure of orthodoxy, and to preserve my enthusiasm for the poster pictures of the ideal proletarian. When, however, my activities in the workers' educational movement and in the Belgian trade-union movement brought me into contact with the problems of proletarian daily life, I found it ever more difficult to safeguard my primitive doctrinairism against the onslaughts of doubts and reservations. The halo had vanished from the proletarian head. Not that my attachment to the workers had waned, not that I had become less willing

to devote myself to their cause ; on the contrary, this feeling and this desire grow deeper and stronger as the days pass, precisely because they now relate to living individuals instead of to a generalised abstraction. I no longer look upon the proletariat simply as a mass, which exists for the sole purpose of fulfilling its historic mission to set mankind free. The workers seem to me all the more lovable, all the more in need of help, because they have ceased to be the heroes of historical drama, and have put on flesh and blood, with its biological and social heritage of virtues and vices, longings and imperfections. I find it impossible, now, to look upon my fellows as the mere instruments for the fulfilment of an idea. They are creatures driven onward by instinct, and their ideas are but tools for the satisfaction of the bodily and spiritual needs that arise in social life.

Marxists relapse into the naivety of the outworn primitive democratic adoration of the crowd, when they believe that the masses originate ideas. Besides, their own practice gives the lie to any such theory. In socialist practice, the spiritual sovereignty of the masses is treated as a fiction. There are leaders and led, the subjects and the objects of policy. The extremists of Marxism, the Russian communists, are past masters in the art of "guiding" the masses with the aid of all the means provided by modern technique for the formation of "public opinion."

Socialist conviction is, first and foremost, a complex, an emotional state, no less in the isolated thinker who launches ideas, than in the masses who accept them as symbols of their own volitions. Only, the nature of the complex differs in the respective cases. In the individual thinker, it is poetic and active ; in the masses, it is receptive and passive. Let there be no misunderstanding. I am not suggesting that mankind should be dichotomised into those who are mental leaders and those who are mentally led. Such a dichotomy is equally incompatible with extant peculiarities of character, and with the class affiliations of "thinkers" and "masses." We cannot permanently divide the socialist movement into operatives and intellectuals. All human beings have tendencies

to lead and tendencies to accept leadership as part of their spiritual make-up, tendencies which may be respectively qualified as typically masculine-active and typically feminine-passive. As temperament varies, one or other element may markedly preponderate. Yet we are not entitled to base on this individual preponderance a binary classification of social types. The only characteristic justifying such a classification is the *behaviour* with which this individual or that responds to a particular situation. Among those who manifest a leader temperament in one field of action, there are few who are not inclined to accept leadership in some other field, where different claims are made upon their capacities. For instance: many a born general can in political matters be led by the nose by wirepullers; many a great political leader is a henpecked husband; many a noted professor, who is a highly original thinker in his own chosen subject, is no more than a "man in the street" upon all other topics. Every one of us, however independent and creative his mind, is sure to be one of the crowd in the matter of some pet weakness. If, therefore, we wish to speak of "actives" and "passives," of "leaders" and "led," we must classify by the objective canons of behaviour in some special situation, rather than by temperament.

There can, then, be no question of trying to subdivide the socialist labour movement permanently into an "instinctive" proletarian mass and a "thoughtful" stratum of intellectuals. Of course the "individual thinker" may spring from the masses, and the intellectual may be one of the "led." Poietic and receptive behaviour denote different functions in relation to some definite happening which exercises a specific influence upon people's minds; they do not denote temperamental distinctions or varying class affiliations, per se. If in the following pages I frequently refer to the instinctive affects and the instinctive receptivity of the *working class*, this is only because, as far as the socialist movement is concerned, the workers at large constitute the real mass element, whose fight on behalf of working-class interests is regarded by the Marxists as the source of socialist conviction.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOCIAL INFERIORITY COMPLEX OF  
THE WORKING CLASS

No one can understand socialism . . . unless he envisages it from the outlook of the centuries and the millenniums. He who does not contemplate socialism as an age-long process, as the continuation of a long and arduous history, knows nothing of socialism.

GUSTAV LANDAUER.

LIKE every other mental attitude, the affective state which predisposes the workers to believe in socialism is the product of two factors: the first of these is *environment*, comprising the totality of the stimuli which act on human beings from without in the form of their social experiences; the second is the *disposition* whereby the reaction of the human individual to environment is determined. This disposition is not, as Marxists believe, a product of the immediate surroundings; nor is it, as the devotees of natural science are apt to hold, the expression of a "human nature" which persists unchanged throughout the ages. "Disposition" includes an instinctive element which may be considered as inherent in the nature of man, but whose modes of presentation are modifiable by habit under the influence of lasting changes in the historical environment. Thus capitalism does not produce a "capitalist disposition"; it does not simply transform human beings in such a way that they become adapted to the exigencies of the capitalist system: were this so, there would be no socialists. Capitalism is confronted with human beings whose mental and moral attributes have been already shaped, in part by hereditary disposition, and in part by the working of preexistent social forms.

The nature of these attributes may be comprehended by

thinking of them as a series of remodellings of certain primitive social impulses which are common to all mankind. As far as they are influenced by ideas, these impulses are transformed in various ways, or at any rate their manifestations are variously modified; and they consequently differ so much from individual to individual that it becomes impossible to refer them to any common social or psychological denominator. On the other hand, modifications of the instinctive disposition by habits which derive from the forms of community life can readily be recognised as social and psychological characteristics common to all (normal) members of the group. True that these habits or customs do not furnish an adequate explanation of the ideational systems which present themselves as religious or social doctrines. Nevertheless, they certainly explain the general volitional trend and the affective state of the masses, the qualities which make the masses receptive to particular ideas.

The individual human being who, as a working man or woman, reacts on the environment of contemporary industrial capitalism, is the product of a long precapitalist past. The motives which make him (or her) a socialist are not created by the present; they are rooted in that distant past. The time-honoured customs of social life have traced deep furrows in his instinctive and affective disposition, and these furrows indicate the course of the valuations and the volitions by which he reacts to present circumstances. His present life can only influence this course in so far as it creates new habits of affective valuation, and furnishes new customary directions for the will.

Properly speaking, therefore, the socialist labour movement is not a product of capitalism. We must look upon it as the product of a reaction which occurs when capitalism (a new social state) comes into contact with a human disposition which may be termed precapitalist. This disposition is characterised by a certain fixation of the sense of moral values, a fixation which can only be understood with reference to the social experiences of the days of feudalism and the craft guilds, to Christian ethics, and to the ethical principles of democracy.

To grasp the reality of these influences, we must go back to the history of the early days of the labour movement. Studying this, we find that the first struggles of the working class were purely defensive, and in a sense conservative. When factory work and home industry began, the workers felt that the new system was aggravating the hardships of their lot. Cobbett, one of the first champions of the workers to leave a legacy of literary memorials, wrote in 1807: "I wish to see the poor men of England what the poor men of England were when I was a boy." Yet it must be pointed out that at this epoch the situation of most of the industrial workers had not grown worse financially speaking. Only to a very small extent was the new class of wage earners recruited from among the independent artisans or from among the yeomen or peasants. Most of the new wage earners were already in the ranks of the dispossessed. Their ancestors had in many cases been pauperised for generations. The origin of the industrial proletariat can only be understood in the light of the laws against vagabondage and mendicity passed at the outset of the era of industrial capitalism. In England, the workhouses, where the destitute were herded, supplied "hands" to the factory owners who made the highest bids; and we read that in France during the years immediately before the great revolution there were half a million vagrants. Sometimes the offspring of peasants went to work in the new factories; if so, they were usually attracted by the prospect of earning more than could be earned by their parents who remained on the land. The only workers whose earnings were diminished by the growth of the modern industrial system were the old-time village artisans who became home workers under the new regime; and these were the very men who were least inclined to show their teeth in the early days of the fight between workers and capitalists—as, for instance, in England during the first half of the nineteenth century. What drove the workers of the new factories into a defensive struggle was, not so much a reduction in earnings, as a restriction of social independence, of pleasure in work, and of security; there was also an increasing

sense of tension because their needs grew more rapidly than their wages ; and, finally, there was a widespread feeling that the moral and legal foundations of the new system of labour conflicted with the traditions of the old order. This process has lasted on into our own time, and still produces among the workers a feeling of social injustice, a sense of resentment, which find expression in their conviction that they are exploited and oppressed, in the growth of working-class solidarity, and in a quasi-religious expectation of better days.

The resentment against the bourgeoisie which results is related, not so much to the wealth of that class, as to its power. The workers' sense of justice rises in revolt against the consequence of a position of power which is no longer accompanied by any responsibility towards the commonweal, such as devolved upon the ruling class in earlier days. This instinctive rebellion is not the outcome of the acquisitive instinct, but of the instinct of justice.

No doubt the wealthy have always been unpopular. The Christian ideal of equality and the feudal contempt for money-getting helped to create a prejudice which found expression in the folk literature of the Middle Ages. But capitalist industrialism did not simply create new wealth, it also gave wealth a new social significance. The industrial capitalist is not merely a man who has great possessions ; his ownership of the means of production gives him a social power which enables him to rule the destinies of those who work for him. In old days, the authority of the feudal lord, or the authority of the guild-master, was tempered by a corresponding responsibility ; the social system as a whole was based upon the principle that the members of the privileged classes were in duty bound to be charitable, that they were responsible for the welfare of their dependents. Under the new dispensation there was no such responsibility, and it was to the interest of the wealthy that there should be a mass of dispossessed proletarians and a reserve army of unemployed. This contrasts sharply with the moral foundation of peasant production and craft-guild produc-

tion, in which the presupposition was that every man able and willing to work should be provided with the means of labour and with the possibility of an adequate subsistence. For centuries the laws, the regulations of the guilds, the ordinances of the Church, and the customs of the people, were expressions of an endeavour to provide security for those who laboured. The revolt of the sense of social justice against the rising power of the industrial magnates was due to the fact that they were able to use their power under cover of institutions which had originally been charitable and beneficent. These institutions were made an excuse for and a means for carrying out the draconian laws against vagrancy whereby the employers were supplied with cheap labour. Nay more, in the new industrial agglomerations the masters of industry were usually the owners of the houses and the shops, and were thereby enabled to increase their gains and their power. Within the domain of their own enterprises that power was almost unrestricted, so that the only part of the feudal tradition which persisted was the part which advantaged the rich and the powerful.

Ere long the new capitalist class, entrenched in its position of political authority by the restriction of the suffrage, went farther in moulding the laws to serve its own purposes. Restrictions upon the free disposal of property were done away with. The lawcourts were in the hands of those who passed the new enactments. Armies and other instruments of power, which had hitherto served the dynastic aims of sovereign rulers, became the buttresses of capitalist class dominion. The Church, of old the guardian of the rights of the people, was transformed into a hierarchy of mercenaries inculcating the duty of submission. Universal and compulsory education, together with the rise of the daily press, were fresh means for consolidating and extending the power of the capitalist class. Finally, the new rich were able to turn their social predominance to account in the exploitation of the poor as consumers no less than as producers.

These are the facts which, from the first, gave the strikes,



the risings, and the political movements of the European workers the character of a moral revolt against a class dominion felt to be unjust. A struggle for surplus value whose motive is nothing more than the satisfaction of the acquisitive instinct, is not yet a class struggle. We can picture a capitalist method of production which would be fully accordant to the laws of the Marxist theory of surplus value, without ever leading to a class war. The struggle of the workers on behalf of their own interests does not become a class struggle, and does not culminate in a demand for socialism, until specific historical conditions arise—conditions which are not an essential part of the capitalist economic form, but are the outcome of the peculiar circumstances amid which capitalism came into being. In itself, a method of production is neither moral nor immoral. Appearances notwithstanding, the socialist criticism of capitalism bears less upon the economic form of production than upon a particular historical, social, and cultural content. In proof of this, I will give a concrete instance. Although the United States of America is a preeminently capitalist country, there is no American socialism which can be regarded as the expression of the discontent of the working masses. The reason is that a method of production similar to the European has developed in America under very different historical and social conditions. American capitalism grew out of individual colonisation and not out of pauperism; it has not had to adapt itself to the forms of social stratification which are the legacy of feudalist and monarchical conditions. On the contrary, it has been able from the first to develop in an atmosphere of political and moral equality. For these reasons, the American workers were able, in the nineteenth century, to carry on the struggle on behalf of their interests upon a juridical foundation which put them on an equal footing with all other citizens. This struggle of interests, therefore, did not become a class struggle.

Not until I had visited the United States, and, in the course of a prolonged stay in that country, had been able to contemplate European socialism from this distant viewpoint, did I become

aware that in reality it means, not so much opposition to capitalism as an economic entity, as a struggle against certain circumstances which have attended the birth of European capitalism : for instance, the pauperisation of the workers ; the legal sanctions of class subordination ; manners and customs ; the lack of political democracy ; the militarisation of the State ; and so forth. In a different historical environment, the capitalist method of production might have led to a kind of social equilibrium. What prevented this in Europe was that there the bourgeoisie, in the early days of its rise, acquired a position of outstanding social preponderance which made a balance of forces impossible. Otherwise there would doubtless have been in nineteenth-century Europe, as in nineteenth-century America, proletarians but no proletariat ; that is to say, there would have been no permanent and hereditary class of social inferiors. If laws and social customs had allowed all the capable elements in the class of social inferiors to rise out of their station, and if the less capable had all been able to enjoy so considerable a share of surplus value that the share taken by the capitalists would have seemed no more than the amount reasonably accruing to these as managers, there would still have been a conflict of interests, but there would not have been a socialist class struggle.

It is especially at the beginning of the industrial epoch that the socialist inclinations of the workers are most plainly seen to be the outcome of their recognition that they are heavily handicapped in life's race by the immoderate social influence of the new ruling class. Substantially, the same thing is true to-day. Their sense of justice is outraged, not so much because the capitalists' wealth gives such vast powers of consumption (as a matter of fact, most great industrials, great men of business, and great financiers are hard workers, absorbed in their occupations, and often ascetics), as because they wield such tremendous influence as owners of the means of production. This is the power which seems immoral because it is power without responsibility, and therefore infringes all ethical canons, whether democratic, Christian, or

feudal. The gravamen of the charge against capitalism is, not so much that the capitalists appropriate surplus value ; but that, having done so, they use it to ensure a social predominance which makes of the non-capitalists mere instruments to the capitalist will. What leads the worker to raise the banner of the class war, therefore, is not that his acquisitive instinct has become a conscious one. The motives are far more complicated and far more deeply rooted in the affective life than the simple acquisitive instinct. They spring from what in modern psychology is called a social inferiority complex.

On the next page the reader will find a table setting forth the essential causes and results of this complex in the typical industrial worker.

To avoid misunderstanding, it is well that I should say here that the division of an affective state into five components must not be regarded as having an objective validity resembling that possessed by the analysis of a chemical compound into its elements. Our conceptual analysis of the affective state is only devised to facilitate the description of the complex as a whole by contemplating it in a schematic way from a series of different aspects. Many other systematisations are possible, and perhaps one or other of them might be preferable to that selected here. In especial, the subdivision of the impulses or instincts set forth in the second column must not be regarded as anything more than a sketch of a classification. In the present state of psychological research, I consider the systematisation of the impulses or instincts and their associated affects to be impracticable. Such classifications as have hitherto been made, attempts to detect the common features in impulsive reactions and thus to reduce these reactions to terms of primary instincts, can only be regarded as provisional. We are not, as yet, entitled to say more than that every human being displays an infinite variety of impulsive inclinations, of tendencies to react towards certain stimuli in particular ways, to the accompaniment of particular affects, which find expression in particular volitional trends or conative ideals. Many of these reactions exhibit specific similarities, and they may be

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Common Psychic Disposition of the Subjects of the Reaction.	Special Part of the Instinctive Disposition reacting upon the Environment.	Affective Complex resulting from this Reaction	Compensatory Idea corresponding to the Affective Complex.
<p style="text-align: center;">FEELING OF THE PRIMITIVE EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, deriving from :</p> <p>1. <i>Christianity</i> (Equality of Individual Souls)</p> <p>2. <i>Feudalism</i> (Balance of Social Rights and Duties)</p> <p>3. <i>Democracy</i> (Inborn Equality of Rights)</p>	Acquisitive instinct, impulse to self-respect or instinct of autovaluation	Feeling of being exploited	Right to the full product of labour
	Impulse to self-respect taking effect in the working environment	Lack of pleasure in work, feeling of impaired independence	Freedom : right to economic independence (the right to work) and to self-respect (the right to happiness in work)
	Impulse to self-respect taking effect in the social environment	Feeling of inequality of social destiny	Equality of political rights and social opportunities
	Acquisitive instinct. Herd impulse	Feeling of community of interests and of community of lot	Solidarity
	Instinct of social protection	Feeling of eschatological expectation of a happier state	Conception of an ideal future society in which the above conditions will be realised

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classified accordingly. In view of our ignorance of the true essence of emotional reactions, the safest guide in the detection of these analogies, the most concrete way of recognising them, is that furnished by the functional characteristics of the various voluntary actions towards which they tend. Every systematisation of the kind may be reduced to a problem of linguistic physiognomy; current speech, and nothing else, is what enables us to distinguish between the instinctive specific functions, such as fighting, loving, playing, running away. Even the ablest among the psychologists who have tried to classify the instincts have really not been able to get beyond recognising the characterisation of them which language provides, so as to collate with each instinct (the combative, the amatory, the sportive, the fugitive) its appropriate affect (anger, love, playfulness, fear). But in this way we merely discover the outlines of linguistic physiognomy; we do not analyse an instinct into its elements. One who, along this path, seeks elementary and indivisible concepts, will discover them in the realm of philology, but not in that of psychology.

In accordance with my view that at the present juncture the description of phenomena (rather than their analysis) is the main task of social psychology, I will ask the reader not to regard my classificatory table as more than a collection of catchwords or mnemonics, of aids to memory. The "classification of the instincts" it presents is designed only to characterise, with the utmost precision now attainable, certain instinctive tendencies whose recognition is necessary to my main argument. What I wish to stress is, not the points wherein the various rubrics of my analysis differ one from another, but that which they have in common; namely, the basic idea that the emotional complex we are studying is instinctive in its origins.

The two first columns of the table present the human disposition which determines the reactions to a given social environment: the second column shows the specific instinctive disposition; while the first column shows the sources of habitual moral judgments, the common psychic disposition of

the subjects of the reaction, which disposition may itself be regarded as a historical product of the earlier reactions (ancestral reactions) of the instinctive disposition, in face of the specific social environment of earlier days.

The whole of the impulsive or instinctive life of the modern civilised human being is, at any rate as far as the form of the manifestations is concerned, the product of social experience. The so-called impulse of self-preservation may be regarded as an exception ; yet I think that the exception is more apparent than real, for (the general view to the contrary notwithstanding) this impulse plays very little part in the social behaviour of contemporary man. Even in the matter of so animal and individual a function as the provision and taking of food, it has undergone differentiation into a number of specific attributes, the most important of these being the acquisitive impulse. Of these attributes the only ones which have social and cultural importance are those which are no longer restricted to the primitively animal process of the taking of food. While it is true that many, though by no means all, of man's impulses are referable to the functional aim of self-preservation ; still, for the very reason that this subjective interpretation of the impulses has so universal a validity, we find it essential, when we are describing human behaviour, to speak of specific impulses which are nameable in accordance with the nature of the particular volitional trend to which they give expression.

But the social elements of human nature are not exclusively represented by man's instinctive trends, which are—at any rate during the brief periods with which history has to deal—almost unmodifiable. A second common characteristic of human behaviour is the peculiar way in which, at a particular stage in social evolution, the existing impulsive disposition concretes into custom, into morality ; this gives rise to a customary valuation of social conduct. It is here that we first encounter the "social" in the historical sense of that term. All community life, all society, is morality, in this meaning of the word, for custom is the cement of society. Now, social norms (in contradistinction to individual norms,

which are a product of individual minds) are merely the result of the impulsive reactions of the generations of mankind to joint destinies.

Among the transformations of the impulsive disposition that are the outcome of this historical reaction, the most important is the way in which all the primary animal impulses are raised to a higher potential by human self-respect.

When I speak of self-respect (regarded not merely as a state of mind, but as an *impulse*, the impulse or instinct of auto-valuation), I mean the disposition which leads people to seek reactions that produce a feeling of enhanced self-esteem, so that the individual acquires a sentiment of enlarged personal value vis-à-vis his environment ; and, conversely, the disposition which leads them to avoid reactions which tend to diminish their self-esteem in this regard. The disposition of which I speak must on no account be confused with "vanity" or with the "will-to-power." It forms the substratum of psychical activities of a far higher order than itself, such as the moral "censorship" exercised by the conscience. For the social psychologist, the impulse to self-respect is of the utmost importance. It is, essentially, the social instinct of civilised man, the only one of the instincts which presupposes the capacity for formulating the idea of the ego. In a sense, it subsumes all the other instincts within itself—at any rate in so far as they rest upon affective reactions which are capable of being excited by ideas rooted in the consciousness of the ego. All the social influences which enlarge the domain in which conscious ideational stimuli are at work (increase of knowledge, the promotion of self-respect by a religious or political sense of equality, the individualisation of the struggle for existence) contribute to the nourishment of the instinct of autovaluation.

In this way affective reactions which originally occurred in a comparatively simple form (without the collaboration of the idea of the conscious ego) become transformed from the sexual, the combative, the sportive instincts, from the impulse to knowledge or to activity, into the self-respecting impulse, the

instinct of autovaluation. A primitive man who fought with an animal or with one of his fellows, did so because he had no option, or under stress of the obscure promptings of his blood ; but an intellectualised contemporary will often rush into the fray (a contest with a business rival, or maybe a purely abstract discussion) solely to secure the intensification of self-feeling which the mere thought of encountering risks arouses in him. A child at play is, when quite young, playing in unconscious obedience to an inherited impulse towards activity and the gratification of curiosity ; but a little later, when the consciousness of personality has awakened, this same child will season the joys of play with those of competition, and the instinct of autovaluation will gradually awaken, until, in adult life, it inclines to prefer those forms of "play," those sports which most minister to its self-respect. In large measure, persons who are economically independent, like the entrepreneur and the man of business, find the requisite self-satisfaction in their daily occupations, which are often pursued far less in obedience to the acquisitive instinct than because they gratify the will-to-power, the delight in adventure, or some other variety of the impulse to self-respect. In man qua animal, the goal of the sexual impulse is physical gratification ; but in the intellectualised human being the instinct of autovaluation plays a contributory part in motivation, and sometimes (as in sentimentalism and romanticism, when the lover's own soul becomes his centre of interest) it may dominate the picture.

The individualism and the rationalism of our industrial civilisation, which have made an idol of the thinking ego and have magnified the struggle for the individual economic existence into a law of self-preservation, have, psychologically considered, led to a veritable unleashing of the instinct of autovaluation. The majority of the intellectual and affective disorders of this age, when mental and nervous disorders are rife, are referable to inhibitions of an exaggerated instinct of autovaluation—inhibitions caused by the social environment. Even alcoholism as a social malady is mainly the outcome of



the craving for artificial means for intensifying a self-feeling which the social rivalries of our day unleash in every one without providing adequate satisfaction. Most psychoneurotics and most alcoholics are persons who have failed in one way or another and have consequently fallen a prey to an inferiority complex.

When I use this term complex, I do so in the sense made current by Freud. A complex is a durable association of ideas charged with a particular affect, and therefore inclining to find vent in a particular volitional trend. Although this concept was first formulated in psychopathology, which it has enlightened with much knowledge and enriched with valuable curative methods, a complex is not per se morbid. Were it necessarily morbid, we should have to say that such widespread complexes as love, religious faith, patriotism, and the like are pathological, since they represent deviations from the alleged norm of rational thought.

A complex as above defined can only arise where a definite impulsive disposition predisposes to the formation of affects and gives these affects a trend. Thus the inferiority complex is the outcome of reiterated or chronic inhibition of the instinct of autovaluation, of affronts to self-respect. The affect which charges a group of ideas with energy and tends to find vent in volitions is, in this case, the issue of a reduced valuation of the ego. That does not necessarily signify a *conscious* depreciation of one's own personality. The reduced valuation may be purely emotional, never reaching the intellectual plane. But the affect, the inferiority complex, arouses resentment against the real or fancied causes of this disagreeable self-depreciation, and gives rise to conations aiming at removal of the causes and at thus relieving the subject from his negative self-feeling.

This happy result is, alas, exceptional. The existence of the complex implies that there has been some sort of inhibition, some external or internal hindrance, counteracting the gratification of an instinctive desire. (For instance, such obstacles to the gratification of instinctive desire are a normal part of the state of being in love.) As a rule, therefore, the subject

gets no farther than the formation of conative *ideas* which do not find vent in action. If normal gratification in the form of voluntary action is permanently inhibited, a repression of the complex occurs, this process being usually attended by the formation of compensatory ideas (compensation, over-compensation, accessory construction, etc.). These represent the attempt of the inhibited complex to find a discharge for the conative energy in some other field. The inferiority complex dependent upon a thwarting of the impulse to self-respect can transform the minus of self-feeling into a plus by intensified gratification in another domain. A workman who in the workshop is perpetually being "bossed" by the foreman will perhaps restore the depreciated balance of his self-esteem by hectoring his wife and children or playing the braggart among his mates over the evening beer.

We all know nowadays that the endeavour to compensate for the repression of complexes accounts for many of the most widely spread neuroses, emotional disturbances, and even mental disorders. In this book, however, we are not concerned with pathological instances, which, as deviations from the norm, are necessarily individual. Dealing with social psychology, our business is primarily with normal behaviour, that which is common to large numbers of average human beings. The effort to achieve compensation is normal to all instinctive desire when, for one reason or another, immediate gratification is denied. The hungry man strives to get food; if no food is obtainable, his hunger will luxuriate in the image of dainty dishes. The man in love, and severed from the person of the beloved, will picture her charms in his imagination, or pore over some material token, such as a photograph, a letter, or a trinket. Always the compensatory idea is a conative idea, the nature of the conative element being determined by the affect with which it is charged. Thus in the affects of the industrial workers we find that whenever the social inferiority complex is linked with the feeling that the sense of justice has been outraged, the compensatory conative idea takes the form of the thought of achieving compensation

for this injustice. The mind dwells upon an ideal state of affairs wherein justice prevails.

All the affective reactions of the industrial workers, as set forth in our diagram, are, inasmuch as they represent conscious reactions to social conditions, raised to so high a potential by the instinct of autovaluation, that the general affective state to which they bear witness may without exaggeration be termed a social inferiority complex. This complex arises because the conditions under which the industrial workers pass their lives deprive them of the gratification of many instinctive and customary needs, with the result that there is a chronic inhibition of the instinct of autovaluation.

Organisational and agitational activity in the labour movement is, first and foremost, a discharge of the impulsive tendencies which have to be repressed during work-time. Especially does this apply to the combative instinct sublimated into self-respect. In the process of selection, thanks to which certain individuals become leaders, the combative instinct rather than studiousness brings people to the front. Studiousness does not, as a rule, exert any selective value, except in subordination to the combative instinct. That, again, is why the slogans of the labour movement are apt to be couched in metaphors relating to bodily combat—war and the army, among Germans; war and sport (in accordance with a general tendency of English speech), among Anglo-Saxons. For the same reason finally, other things being equal, the labour movement is strongest among the peoples of Teutonic stock where racial disposition and the legacy of history condition the most effective survival of combative instincts which were primitively those of actual warriors. Many a man would never have joined the socialists had he not shared the inclinations of the Irishman in the story, who could not see a scrap in the street without asking eagerly: "Is this a private affair, or can I take a hand?"

Other inhibitions of the instinct of autovaluation, other mortifications of the workers' self-respect, which find expression in the labour movement, are those which concern direct aspirations

towards power and social recognition. These have much to do with bringing about promotion to leadership. Inhibitions of the creative impulse likewise play a notable part. When not conjoined with the will-to-power, the creative impulse will often drive an active worker in the labour movement into showing his mettle in the quiet field of administration and organisation, where he finds compensation for the dull routinism of the daily round of his bread-earning occupation. Thwarted creative impulse will, in exceptional instances, lead a skilled workman to practise his craft in artistic freedom out of hours. For instance, a joiner whose work at the shop is mechanised will, in the evening, make desks with secret drawers or similar useless though highly finished trifles, merely to please himself. More often such a workman's hobby has no connexion with his wage-earning occupation : a miner cultivates an allotment in leisure hours ; a potter breeds rabbits ; and so on. A clerk whose employer bullies and badgers him throughout the day, and who finds relief when work is over in the authoritative and responsible position of treasurer of a trade-union group, is yet another instance of the same psychological trend.

The popularity of sport likewise depends on the need for the compensation of thwarted instincts—in this case the instinct for play, as well as the combative instinct. The huge development of sport is especially characteristic of the era of industrialism ; and it is not by chance that England, the birthplace of industrial capitalism, should also be the birthplace of modern sport. Be it noted that when I talk of sport, I mean something very different from bodily exercise in a recreative form. Even when it does not become professional, sport, in the narrower sense of the competitive practice of some skilled physical exercise, tends more and more to pass into the hands of a small and specialised minority of young fellows. The masses, who nowadays are for the most part devotees of sport, " football fans " and what not, are merely spectators, newspaper readers, backers of their fancy, enthusiastic admirers of the heroes of the hour, and servile imitators of these. It is termed " sport " when ten thousand spectators, seeking relief from boredom,

watch a pair of boxers, two-and-twenty football players, or a couple of dozen motor-cyclists. You need merely listen to the conversation of a crowd of these "sportsmen," and you will learn that their pleasure is derived from a vicarious gratification of their heroic instincts. By means of what in Freudian terminology is called subconscious identification, they participate in the indulgence of the instinct of autovaluation, the instinct for play, and the combative instinct, without stirring from their places. Nothing could be more significant than the preponderance of braggadocio in the talk of sportsmen. Each vies with the others in the parade of his intimate acquaintance with the technique of the sport under consideration, or his knowledge of what goes on behind the scenes. The key to the mystery is the search for an imaginary exaltation of the ego with the assistance of the psychical tension inherent in struggle and adventure.

Enthusiasm for sport is preeminently the psychological complement to the monotonous and soul-deadening influence of the modern great city or the industrial village. Neither in the Middle Ages, nor subsequently before the nineteenth century, was there anything comparable to contemporary sport as a mass phenomenon, for the simple reason that in those days boredom was less general; the instincts which modern commercialised sport is able to exploit, secured a satisfying outlet in daily life. Even to-day, easy-going handicraftsmen and peasants are usually satisfied to spend their leisure hours in such mild amusements as skittles. Apart from a minority of middle-class hangers-on, the devotees of sport by proxy are mainly drawn from the ranks of factory and other industrial workers and lower-grade office employees, in search of relief after the tedium of the daily round of toil.

For like reasons the cinema has become the most popular evening recreation of the workers. This is not merely because the "pictures" are cheap. Many a good concert can be heard, many an excellent play can be seen, for no more than a workman pays at the cinema. But the latter, with its rapid changes of tension and the simplicity of its appeal to the emotions, is more

“recreative.” It furnishes in tabloid form the strong affective stimuli which enable the audience to forget the drab monotony of their daily lives. I have often had occasion to note that in regions where unskilled workers predominate (as in places where smelting is the main occupation), and where the conditions of life and labour are correspondingly bad, the cinema programmes are far more sensational than in regions where skilled workers constitute a larger proportion of the population. Similar relationships can be shown to exist, in regard to the search for the compensation of repressed instincts, between the social stratification of the working class, on the one hand, and habits in respect of drink, brawling, and gambling, on the other.

In this connexion, it does not suffice to consider only the conditions under which work is done. We must also take into account the environment as a whole, and especially housing conditions and social amenities. One who has visited a typical English mining village, for instance, will be slow to believe that the chronic discontent in such places, so apt to find expression in strikes one spring after another, can be shuffled out of the world simply by higher wages and shorter hours. On the contrary, an increase of earnings may very well lead to an increase of discontent, for, with better pay, the average worker will be even more poignantly confronted with the difficulty (in the extant conditions of working-class life) of converting money into happiness. Picture to yourself a village containing several thousand inhabitants, all of whom get their living at the same industry. The mine-owners live far away, in pleasanter surroundings. Except for a handful of managers and other officials, a small sprinkling of professional folk and men of business, and the necessary shopkeepers, all the inhabitants are miners. They live in endless rows of grimy cottages with tiny courtyards. Everything belongs to the mine. The town is a long way off, and any one who wants distraction must choose between the public-house and the cinema, where there is a new programme once a week. There is scant variety in the Sunday sermons. The shops

offer little that is attractive ; in every house the curtains are of much the same pattern ; every girl has seen the other girls' hats in the shop windows ; all the men wear caps of the same pattern. Can we be surprised that, in such circumstances, the one idea of happiness should be a radical change of surroundings, and to get away from the drabness altogether ? The question of wages is but one element of the problem, which embraces the whole organisation of social life, housing, means of communication, holidays, educational possibilities, amusement, etc.

Even when we contemplate the living and working conditions of the inhabitants of the great cities, which are not at all like those just described, we cannot fail to see that the problem of chronic discontent, the social inferiority complex of the working class, is far wider in its scope than if it were one merely of wages and surplus value. It is a cultural problem, which can only be solved by supplying the psychological requisites of happiness, by training and satisfying all the instinctive needs of human beings. When we state the problem in these terms, we realise that the essential driving force of the labour movement is the impulse to self-respect, the instinct of autovaluation. To phrase the matter less prosaically, we see that it is a question of dignity quite as much as a question of interest.

CHAPTER THREE  
EXPLOITATION, OPPRESSION, AND JOYLESS  
LABOUR

The whole wage-earning system is an abomination, not only because of the social injustice which it causes and perpetuates, but also because it separates the man who does the work from the purpose for which the work is done.

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

HOWEVER extreme the contrast between the life of the rich and the life of the poor, this does not suffice, by itself, to arouse in the minds of the poor a feeling that they are being exploited. For instance, there still exist types of civilisation in which all the more advantageous pecuniary possibilities of life are restricted to those born in some particular caste or castes—restricted by customs which have a religious sanction. No thought of envy arises in the minds of the poor whom such hallowed usages condemn to a permanent inferiority of economic status.

Similar relationships used to exist in the earlier days of European civilisation. Under the feudal system there were certainly, at times, glaring differences between the luxury of the barons and the poverty of the serfs; and yet there is no evidence that the latter regarded the system as one of unjust spoliation. The first signs of a moral revolt against it date from the period when capitalism was in its infancy, and when feudalism had begun to decay under stress of the awakening need for money. Even then, what the peasants rebelled against was not the feudal system as such, but the liquidation of this system by the lords of the soil.

The medieval journeyman could accurately gauge the amount of surplus value appropriated by his master. He



had merely to subtract the wage paid him for a particular piece of work from the price at which the master was able to sell the product of this work. Nevertheless, it would not have occurred to the journeyman to look upon himself as being exploited. The guild system as a whole was morally ordered in such a way that there was a definite relationship between the value of the journeyman's work, on the one hand, and the master's possibilities of profit-making, on the other. The mere fact that the journeyman belonged to a craft guild ensured for him a regular subsistence from his occupation, and enabled him to look forward to a more lucrative position as a master in days to come. In this case, likewise, there was no revolt until the integrity of traditional relationships was imperilled by the development of capitalism.

The sense of being exploited does not arise unless two conditions are fulfilled. First of all, work must fail to supply the labourer with adequate possibilities of satisfying the needs which he feels to be reasonable and just ; and, secondly, the fruits of his labour must pass to others, who are thereby enabled to secure the ample satisfaction of their needs. Thus the feeling in question presupposes, not only a lasting disproportion between satisfaction and need, but also a conviction that all men have equal rights to certain kinds of satisfaction. There is, consequently, more at issue than a simple conflict of interests in the economic field, such as exists between the buyer and the seller of every article or service capable of being bought and sold. The origin of the feeling of being exploited must be sought in a specific sense of justice.

This sense of justice is rooted in the views which prevailed during the whole precapitalist era. It is a legacy from a period, from a method of production, when the right to the whole product of labour was ensured, if not to each individual producer, at least to the totality of those working at some circumscribed enterprise, whether agricultural or industrial. The general feeling was that the lord of the soil or the master of the workshop (as the case might be) was entitled to a larger share of the joint product, since they had greater obligations.

The seigneur undertook the duties of administration, protection, foresight, aid, and jurisdiction; the master, besides doing skilled labour with his own hands, had to direct the enterprise, to train his journeymen and his apprentices, to provide them with food and lodging, and to tide them over the slack times.

But the factory owners of the new capitalist system recognised no such obligations. In the early days of the labour movement, the demands of the under-dogs were apt to be based on a conviction that the employer or entrepreneur ought to discharge the traditional obligation of providing for the workers in the enterprise during times of crisis as well as when trade was good. The workers, it was felt, were entitled to a minimum subsistence in any case. The capitalist failure to accept this view was the cause of the moral revolt against capitalism, which found expression, not only in the strikes and riots of the thirties and the forties of the nineteenth century, but also in the imaginative literature of the period.

If, since then, the workers' sense of grievance regarding this matter of exploitation has become intensified, the intensification is not the outcome of economic facts, is not dependent upon the extraction of more surplus value than before, with a consequent increase in the rate of exploitation. The cause is psychological. The later developments of capitalism have accentuated the disproportion between need and satisfaction, and at the same time the advance of political democracy has enhanced the traditional sentiment of equality of rights.

No doubt capitalism, in those domains where machine production prevails, has led to an enormous increase in productivity, whereby the actual no less than the possible share of the workers in the total wealth of industrial products has been substantially enlarged. It has been justly remarked that the average working man to-day has comforts and luxuries of which even a Louis XIV could not dream. The best answer to any one who maintains the theory of increasing misery in all its strictness is to point out that no modern worker could endure to live for a single week as his ancestors had to live all the year round a hundred years ago.

If, none the less, the contemporary worker is more discontented than his great grandfather was, this is because his wants have grown out of proportion to the growth in his share of joint (and enormously increased) production. In economic terminology, this is described by saying that industrialism, producing for profit and not for use, has created new wants in its search for new markets. But if these new markets are not to be restricted to the supply of luxuries to the well-to-do and to export trade to non-capitalist lands, certain psychological conditions must be fulfilled. These conditions are not strictly economic; they are the outcome of the sociological accompaniments to capitalist evolution. First and foremost, we see that industrial capitalism makes the acquisitive instinct the leading motive in production. In former days this instinct or impulse was only predominant in a comparatively small number of persons, traders for the most part, and especially those engaged in foreign commerce. During the Middle Ages, dealing in money, the pursuit of gain by this means, was regarded as immoral; it, and the banking system which was its necessary apanage, were frowned upon by the Church as usury; for centuries these avocations were mainly confined to despised persons, such as Jews and Lombards.

In due time, however, as Marx declared, the Jewish problem was solved by the Christians becoming Jews. The feudal motive of fealty, which bound the peasant to the soil and the worker to the workshop, gave place to the capitalist motive of interest. In old days, the handicraftsman worked because it was his duty as a Christian, and because he took pleasure in his occupation, although it brought him no more than a modest competence, and although his children had little hope of bettering their station. But in the new regime, moderation, contentment, and the moral ties connecting the labourer with the land and the worker with the workshop, came to be regarded as nothing more than hindrances to advancement. The aim in life was to get on in the world. The selective principle in accordance with which the upper strata were selected had become a different one. Only those

in whom the acquisitive instinct was strong rose to the top. Consequently, everything which could favour this instinct was sanctioned and encouraged under the new dispensation. The workers, too, were influenced by example and by precept (the latter even in church and school), so that they acquired a "capitalist" mentality. For now the barriers were down; in the case of all alike, and no longer only in the case of those who were privileged by birth or by a prince's favour, restrictions upon the working of the acquisitive instinct had been abrogated. They had disappeared concurrently with the disappearance of caste distinctions, of hereditary occupations, of the guild system, of prohibitions against usury, of industrial and commercial State monopolies. The Catholic ideal of contentment and asceticism (already breached by the Calvinism of the trading cities) was now regarded as morbid. It had become the characteristic of an infinitesimal minority of persons incapable of adaptation to the rising social order; or else the consolation of weaklings, of those who felt themselves condemned to everlasting poverty.

The effect of this psychological transformation upon the workers was intensified by the menace of unemployment. Vanished, now, was their ideal of a modest but assured existence for the diligent worker. Henceforward it would be necessary to earn a maximum wage when in work, in order to provide for rainy days and to safeguard the children's future. In the United States we are told that the immigrants, unskilled labourers for the most part and therefore especially liable to the vicissitudes of employment, are much more grasping than the descendants of the old settlers, skilled workers and farmers, whose occupations are comparatively stable.

In the early days of the industrial revolution, the worker was still able to compare his situation with that of the guild craftsman and with that of the peasant. At any rate, in his estimate of his own lot, he was guided by traditions surviving from the days of the feudal system. As time passed, he inclined more and more to contrast his position with that of members of the dominant class. Here, again, his tendency

was to be guided by moral and legal values which the upper classes had established as an ethical and social norm. More especially the canons of democracy became his watchword, for his own class position made him carry on the struggle for democracy initiated by the medieval craftsmen and burghers. The suppression of the privileges of birth, and the equality of all citizens before the law and the ballot-box, confirmed his impression that one man ought to have the same rights as another. The inference was that the unlimited acquisition of property and economic power ought to be open to all—potentially, at least. Such a desire was stimulated by some of the accompaniments of democracy, and above all by popular education and the Press, for these greatly enlarged the ideational world which supplies the intellectual nutriment of wants.

But whereas the quantity of goods owned by the workers, or purchasable by them, is limited by economic conditions, the increase in the wants of the masses (a purely psychological process) knows no limit except that dependent upon the time requisite for the formation of new habits. Satisfaction, therefore, is liable to lag ever more behind desire. The measure of desire is provided, not by economic forms or by the quantity of available goods, but by the sliding scale of the sense of justice. To put the matter in another way, wants tend to increase proportionally with the disappearance of the traditional psychological inhibitions which used to restrict the individual's sense that he had a just claim to share equally with others in all the possibilities of ownership and enjoyment. Out of the disproportion between what a man has and what he might have, grows a feeling of injustice, a sentiment based in the worker's mind upon a comparison of his own position with that of a member of the possessing classes. Such is the origin of the sense of being exploited, a sense which gives an affective content to the Marxist theory of surplus value, and makes of it the symbol of a proletarian protest.

Just as this feeling can be referred to the interaction of the acquisitive instinct and the sense of equality, so the workers'

feeling that they are oppressed is referable to the reaction which this same sense of equality exerts upon an inhibited instinct of autovaluation.

The individual wants to make himself valued in his work and by his work. The chief primary psychological stimulus to work is the spiritual impulse towards outward projection, towards the animation of objects. The study of primitive culture and the study of the psychology of children combine to show that a conscious estimate of the value of the result expected from work is not the primary motive to creative activity. The recognition that work is advantageous or profitable is a secondary development, a sequence to the free play of the creative impulse ; it arises at a late stage, and comes in the end to give a practical economic aim to that which was at the outset a purely artistic effort. Activity is one of the most elementary needs of the human species, and there can be no worse spiritual torture than its inhibition. That which, physiologically considered, may seem nothing more than the outcome of the switching of a surplus of vital energy into cerebral channels, really provides human beings with the first great joys of their lives, the joys of play. This happens as soon as the consciousness of the ego develops, and provides a foundation for the sentiment of autovaluation. In the child, through the voluntary activities of play, the primitive consciousness of the bodily (the passive) ego is gradually transformed into the higher consciousness of the spiritual (the actively willing) ego. Thus is the personality formed. Delight in movement, in the rhythmical alternations of tension and relaxation, in the changes which the individual is able to produce in the environment, in the recognition of new causes, in the realisation of imaginations in the world of concrete fact—all these come to spice the simpler and more elementary physiological gratifications with the higher and more conscious joys of positive self-feeling.

Not without good reason does civilised man conceive God as made after his own image, God as creator ; for the highest of all human attributes is the creative activity of the spirit.

The highest achievements of the plastic arts, of poetry, and of music, are creations which exteriorise mental states. The work of man produced beauty and joy before it produced utilities. Perhaps this is the profoundest, the most enduring significance of the ancient myth of the tree of knowledge, of the lost paradise, and of utilitarian labour as a punishment for the fall into sin. Yet even though we are thenceforward condemned to labour for practical ends, there still remains the old capacity to delight in labour in so far as what we are doing gives expression to our personality. All the social problems of history are no more than variants of the eternal, the supreme, the unique social problem—how can man find happiness, not only through work, but in work.

Never was this problem more urgent than it is to-day, when the majority of the population in the lands where an industrial type of civilisation prevails must spend their lives in work which does, indeed, produce more utilities than ever before, but brings less joy in the doing. This is the problem with which socialism is faced. Unless it can be solved, there is no future for socialism.

Marxist doctrinaires, ignorant of psychology and out of touch with the actualities of life, fail to see that the workers' prevailing discontent is due quite as much to the loss of pleasure in work as to the (problematical) loss of concrete acquisitions. It is true that a great many workers, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, do not realise the fact. This only shows that most people fail to understand the workings of their own mind, and are prone to mistake symptoms for causes. They are always ready to explain subconscious processes as the effects of conscious processes, when the true causal sequence is the other way about.

The essence of the charge brought by Marxism against capitalism is that the capitalist method of production has divorced the producers from the means of production. In actual fact, capitalism has done something much more serious ; it has divorced the producer from production, the worker from the work. In this way it has engendered a distaste for

work which is often increased rather than diminished by an improvement in the material circumstances of life, and cannot be cured by any mere change in property relationships.

The serf and the handicraftsman of precapitalist days, the entrepreneur, the intellectual, and the tenant farmer to-day, are, as regards ownership of the means of production, in very different positions one from another. Yet they all differ from the industrial worker in that, from the standpoint of technique, each and every one of them can dispose in accordance with his own liking of the means of production with which he works, can arrange his work as he pleases, and has a personal interest in the yield of his labour. Consequently his work provides opportunity for the satisfaction of psychical wants which are closely connected with the impulse of auto-valuation. The industrial worker, on the other hand, is for the most part denied this satisfaction.

Especially conspicuous is the contrast between the industrial worker of to-day and the medieval artisan who was a member of his craft guild. The handicraftsman of the Middle Ages might or might not be the owner of his house, his workshop, or his booth ; his position might be a good one, financially speaking, or the reverse. But at least he was master of his own work. He was the independent producer of articles which, when he had done with them, were finished and ready for use. He bought the raw material, owned the means of production, put what he thought a fair price on his work, and usually received this price direct from the consumer. He decided for himself how long he should work, how hard, and in what way. In so far as an external authority (that of the guild or the town) had anything to say about the hours of labour, this was only to fix a maximum ; and such regulations as there were, in the matter of technical details, were designed only to safeguard the excellence of the product. In both cases alike, the regulations (in whose drafting every master craftsman had a voice) aimed at preventing what all of them regarded as unfair competition. The manual worker saw the product being shaped by his own hands. When finished,



it belonged to him, not only because it was legally his property, but also because its specific existence was conditioned solely by his initiative, his craftsmanship, his diligence, the creative energies of his own spirit. In this sense, every handicraft was an art, and every craftsman was a creator. Be it noted in passing that the civilisation of those days was a harmonious one, based upon work done for the commonweal; and, in contrast with it, what passes by the name of civilisation to-day, based upon and dominated by money, seems but a chaos of hideous discords. The creations of medieval culture survive as tokens of a glorious age in human history, for in all the products of human labour are embodied the spirits of those who made them. The craftsman of the Middle Ages took delight in his work; he lived in his work; for him, his work was a means of self-expression.

As far as ordinary manufacturing industry is concerned, producers in this sense exist to-day solely in the form of those who have taken over from the handicraftsman of former times his functions as manager of a productive unit. They correspond to him only in a restricted sense, for the physical parts of production have been assigned to wage-workers and machinery. Besides, the technical and commercial guidance of enterprises has to so great an extent been specialised by the division and the hierarchical ordering of labour, that in many cases, even here, the motive of work for its own sake has given place to the motive of gain. Nevertheless, the directive functions in industry remain the only ones in which the spirit of work for the work's sake, a desire for the independent gratification of the creative impulse, can still find a place, even though these sentiments are apt to be alloyed with the adventurer's delight in a gamble and the captain of industry's will-to-power.

The industrial operative, on the other hand, works under technical and social conditions wherein almost all the circumstances which gave the medieval handicraftsman pleasure in his occupation have been transformed into their opposites. He has no control over the means of production, the raw

material, or the finished product. Properly speaking, he does not make a "product" at all, for he is restricted to carrying out one stage in a process whose general course he is unable to influence, or even (as a rule) to watch. His earnings are not determined by the price of the finished product, but by the state of the labour market. He does not himself settle how long he shall work, and how hard; these matters are prescribed by the discipline of the undertakings, in which he is a mere "hand", and from which he may be dismissed at very brief notice. Method and speed are determined, either by the machine at which he works, or else by the manager or the foreman. If, in these circumstances, he retains any impulse towards initiative, any desire to form resolves which might affect the result of his labours, he finds that the all-powerful mechanism is which he has become a cog tends more and more to crush both impulse and desire. What keeps him in his place is not joy in work, but simply the dread of unemployment. There, summarily stated, are the essential causes of the industrial workers' growing distaste for their work. No one can understand the contemporary labour movement unless he has an insight into the overwhelming importance of this loss of pleasure in work. There is hardly a strike whose ultimate causes are intelligible unless due allowance is made for the phenomenon we are now considering, although the strikers themselves, in many instances, are not fully conscious of their own motives, which are seldom reflected in the demands actually made.

I need not enlarge upon the fact that it must gravely influence all our civilisation when the most important branches of industrial production are carried on by persons who cannot take pleasure in their work. Yet the labour movement itself shows marvellously little understanding of the psychological bearings of the conditions now under discussion. The Marxists, in especial, consider that increasing mechanisation, and a growing substitution of unskilled (machine-minding) labour for skilled craftsmanship, are necessary stages on the

way to a consummation devoutly to be wished, when the proletariat will become numerous enough, unified enough, and discontented enough to carry through the social revolution. In Marxist doctrine, the "ideal workman" is, at any rate in respect of his position in the industrial enterprise, remarkably and suspiciously like the "ideal workman" of the ultra-capitalist Taylor system. Nor is it by chance that Soviet Russia, in the endeavour to augment communist production, has been willing to adopt many of the expedients of Taylorism. In its American homeland the exponents of this system have for the most part carried on their experimental work upon the bodies of immigrants from eastern Europe, finding that operatives of Anglo-Saxon stock were "too conservative" to abandon the traditions of craftsmanship and lend themselves to the militarisation of enterprise.

But the Marxists fail to see that this ideal workman who "has nothing to lose but his chains," and whose occupation is only a detested *corvée*, is not likely to be an efficient producer in any system of production. When a chronic distaste for labour has destroyed the capacity for working except under the lash (real or metaphorical), when the workers have become affected with a "factory complex" thanks to which the whole labour problem has for them become one of reducing the hours and the arduousness of labour, any new system of production is faced with the problem: "Now that the old motive to work has been destroyed, how is a new motive to be supplied?" The Marxists, in their rationalist simplicity, are ready to believe that the lost motive force of habit can be promptly replaced by the new motive force of social service, or by a determination to defend the revolution. This may be true enough of a handful of revolutionary leaders, of a few hundred exceptional persons, in whom reason can quickly lead to the formation of new habits. But even if all of these should abandon their work as political leaders in order to take up manual occupations in the factories, there would not be nearly enough of them to keep industry going. On the other hand, the millions upon millions who

are needed to carry on industrial enterprises, though agitation can enthuse them for political ends until they are ready to sacrifice their lives in the cause, cannot speedily acquire new habits of work under stress of such ebullitions of feeling. Only one among many thousands will, by his love for the revolution, be fired into working year in and year out at a machine when labour of the kind has become loathsome to him. Indeed, the most zealous revolutionists are prone to quit their manual tasks in order to work on behalf of their ideals in another fashion and in a different place. You can raise the political passion of the workers to the boiling-point, so that they will be ready and willing to face bullets for the sake of the revolution ; but these ardours will not be sustained when your men get back into the factories ; they will not there sweat contentedly day after day, simply in order to prove that revolutionary experiments can be performed without any falling off in production. Here the Russian communists have had unfortunate experiences by which they have not been slow to profit. They have found it necessary, in the conduct of their industrial enterprises, to have recourse to old methods of management, to revive the appeal to motives which they would fain have scrapped once and for all. In part, also, they have tried to make up for the failure of the wage-system and piecework to supply sufficient attraction, by the founding of "labour armies" under a quasi-military discipline. But they have not succeeded in providing the masses with new working motives in place of the old. Nor would the same methods have better success elsewhere, for those in whom ideals can mould habits are nowhere more than an infinitesimal minority.

If the working-class movement wishes to fit men and women for a new system of production, a system which will be able to dispense with hunger and an iron discipline as means for keeping the workers at their tasks, it will have to put its trust, not so much in the propaganda speeches and pamphlets of a revolutionary epoch, as in persistent and quiet effort (such as is now being carried on by the trade

unions) to check the trend towards doing away with skilled labour—or at least to mitigate the worst consequences of this trend. By striving to maintain a high level of craftsmanship, by the encouragement of technical education, by the extension of self-government in industry, by the democratisation of management through the establishment of workshop and factory committees, and by other measures of the kind, they are doing a great deal to promote the integrity of the last remaining ties between the worker and his work. In this respect the unions are achieving much, though few workmen and practically no employers realise the fact. Along these lines they do the worker (whether regarded as a member of extant society or as a possible member of a future commonwealth) far more good than by trying to find salvation for him through the severance of all the psychological bonds between him and his working environment.

For, happily, the "ideal worker" of the Marxists, the devotee of the class struggle fully enfranchised from all spiritual relationships with his "capitalist" environment, is but a figment of the imagination.

One who, though his lot is cast in the present, would fain uproot himself and live only on behalf of an ideal future, may by an off chance be a man of genius and an inspired leader, but it is ten thousand to one that he is nothing more than a hopeless fanatic, sterile both emotionally and intellectually. That is why we may congratulate ourselves because in the average worker of to-day there is still so much of the philistine. When I use this term I mean one who is tied to material things, to his work, to the furniture in his parlour, to his allotment, to his pipe and his beer. These substitutes for culture are pitiful enough; but at any rate his attachment to them is a sign that the last traces of joy in life have not vanished. Were it otherwise, there would be nothing in the worker's mind but a hideous vacuum, impossible to fill. It is as idle to imagine that the instinctive wants of the average man can all be sublimated so as to become motive forces in the class struggle, as to fancy that an old maid can completely

rid herself of her natural sex impulses by devoting herself to works of charity and piety.

Bernard Shaw tells us pithily that what is wrong with the poor man is—his poverty. This means, of course, that material poverty brings spiritual poverty in its train. Equally, of course, it does not mean that possessions of any and every kind enrich the soul! The untruth of such a statement is plain on the face of it. Yet this much is true, that there are certain kinds of possession (not necessarily dependent upon a specific "right to own private property") the lack of which entails spiritual poverty. When the sense of proprietorship which binds a human being to a material object is a force which radiates from the man to the object instead of from the object to the man, it is a spiritual gain. There is moral loss only when we have to say that the object owns the man. When it is the other way about, we can "own" a great many things which we do not legally possess: for instance, a piece of land, which we rent, and which we till with our own hands; a hired house; a machine which we use to good effect, though it is the property of another; something we labour lovingly to produce, though another will sell it. The sense of ownership which radiates from a man to certain things, either because he uses them with delight or because they are the work of his hands, this sense of ownership and this claim to ownership are not the undesirable products of an immoral social order, but the essential presupposition of all social morality. The existence of individual souls determines the existence of private property in this sense of the term, and no method of production which ignored it would have any chance of success. This proprietary instinct must not for a moment be confounded with the acquisitive instinct, with the love of property for its own sake, which makes the capitalist the slave of his wealth. If the worker were devoid of the proprietary instinct, he would lack the sense that as producer he has a just claim to the ownership of the means of production and the product of his labour—a sense which makes the class

struggle something nobler than a mere fight for personal interests.

By repudiating the existence of the proprietary instinct in the worker, Marxist rationalism likewise repudiates the psychological disposition which gives content and direction to the socialist aspirations of the workers in general (Marxists not excepted). The formula "socialisation of the means of production" would be nothing more than an arid intellectual construction, lacking the breath of life which animates the affective convictions of the masses, were it not based upon the worker's passionate longing for the right to regard the means of production as in one way or another "his own". The Marxist intellectual will have to encounter a rude disillusionment if he continues to give the notion of socialised property the emotional content of a divorce of the individual worker from the ownership of the means of production. What the individual really wants is *more* property, at any rate in the sense of a more extended personal control.

I once had a very remarkable experience, which showed me how gravely the Marxist intellectual misunderstands working-class psychology. It was fifteen years ago, at a meeting of the General Council of the Belgian Labour Party, when I was taking part in a discussion concerning the insurance aspects of trade-union work. The special topic related to the Brussels Union of Woodworkers, which insured its members against the loss of their tools. Most of the workmen, in accordance with the custom of the trade, owned their tools, and took these with them when removing to a new workshop. My contention was that insurance of this kind conflicted with the principles underlying the socialist trade-union movement. I declared that the workers were assuming a responsibility which ought to be left to the employers; that the possession of a toolbox - restricting the free mobility of the worker (a free mobility essential to his activity in the class struggle) was an obstacle to technical progress, an obsolete survival from the days of the craft guilds; that to encourage in the worker this individualist attachment to his tools was a piece of

petty-bourgeois sentimentalism; that a class-conscious worker ought to sever all the ties which hindered the mechanisation and socialisation of production. I had expected that this argument would appeal to the members of the Woodworkers' Union, which was then one of the main props of the Marxist wing of the Belgian Labour Party. Great, therefore, was my astonishment to find that the woodworkers, who in political matters were ready to support me and the other Marxist leaders through thick and thin, indignantly rejected my reasoning. They could not shake my conviction; though I may plead in excuse that, as far as argument went, they were no match for me. In truth, they had practically no arguments at all. The plain fact was that they had an emotional attachment to their old toolboxes, a feeling which no theoretical considerations drawn from the doctrine of the class struggle could explain away or even influence. Not until a good many years had passed did I come to realise that they were right after all, logic or no logic. They *reasoned* wrongly, yet they *felt* rightly. They felt that the worker did not exist for the sake of the class struggle, but the class struggle for the worker's sake. The "toolbox" was a symbol of the dignity of craftsmanship, the sign of a vestige of pride and joy in labour. To deprive them of it, would have meant robbing them of something they really had in the present, for the sake of an uncertain future; would have meant losing the substance of happiness for the shadow.

I learned a lesson on this occasion. In conjunction with some similar lessons (not all of them so cheaply bought), it helped me to understand why political enthusiasts find it so much easier to talk about abstract ideas such as liberty and equality, than about the near and tangible requisites for happiness.

When we have to do with the practical problems of labour organisation, it does not suffice to ask whether this or that is one of the conditions which must be fulfilled before an ideal scheme can be realised. What we must ask is, how we can make men happier, and thus make them better and render



them more fitted to take part in the upbuilding of a better social system. In that way the endeavour to upbuild a better social system becomes in the long run an endeavour to make men better and happier, an attempt to develop the psychological forces which will make such a system possible.

The Marxist who believes that he can transform human beings into socialists by favouring all the influences which sever their traditional relationships with their work and the locality in which they live, acts on the assumption that a socialist system can be sustained by men whose minds are filled with hatred for the employing class, to the exclusion of all other thoughts and feelings. Certainly such men will be admirably fitted for the destructive work of a revolution, but they will be correspondingly unfitted for any constructive tasks. One who keeps a dog chained up, and denies the poor beast the gratification of its natural impulses, will after a time have at his disposal a snappish and quarrelsome creature. If he wants to use it for some other purpose than fighting, he will find that it has become incapable of anything else, incapable even of living on satisfactory terms with other members of its kind.

Marxists have always been inclined to condemn the work of building societies, the provision of allotments, the encouragement of the back-to-the-land movement, and so on, as concessions to petty-bourgeois tendencies. It would be just as reasonable to prescribe celibacy to the workers, because, as experience shows, a man is usually a more active trade unionist or party member, and a more zealous revolutionist, as a bachelor, than he becomes after he has married and "settled down". Carleton Parker, in his admirable study of the psychology of the members of the American organisation known as the Industrial Workers of the World, has shown that there is a close connexion between the revolutionary inclinations of these syndicalists and the enforced celibacy which is one of the accessory consequences of the nomadic life of many of the workers in the Far West. I cannot myself draw the inference that celibacy and nomadism are to be recommended

on the ground that they stimulate the class consciousness of the workers. I should hold, rather, that the extreme aggressiveness of the I.W.W.'s is an index of the unnaturalness of their mode of life. Socialism would be in a bad way if it could not be brought into being except by persons whose only reason for being socialists was that they had no opportunity of playing with their children or planting cabbages when the day's work was finished. What would be left of these "snappish dogs" socialism when socialism itself had unfastened their collars and had filled their pans with food? The socialist must, first of all, be a human being. If our socialist ideal is out of harmony with the actual human nature of the working class, this only shows that it is based upon presuppositions which do not accord with human nature.

Of course, human nature is not fixed and unchangeable. Socialism may just as well be able to establish a method of production upon work for the community instead of upon the acquisitive impulse, as capitalism was able to replace the motive of duty by the motive of gain. But we must never forget that the transition from one motive to another is a far more complicated and tedious process than the driving out of one group of concepts by another. The motives which determine the behaviour of the masses are based upon habit. Now, habits cannot be transformed in the twinkling of an eye, in obedience to the prompting of new ideas.

Under the capitalist system, although the ideational world is dominated by the idea of acquisition, working habits persist as survivals of a precapitalist time when work was a moral duty. We can thank our stars that it is so! In default, a capitalist enterprise would be even more of a hell than it is already, or else society would perish amid social struggles which would be more like the fruitless slave-revolts of antiquity than an uprising of the workers designed to instal a new civilisation. The fact that a sense of the obligation to work and some feeling of joy in work have survived the soul-destroying influences of the capitalist factory, is what will make it possible for a socialist method of production to establish

itself upon an extant basis of habits, and then stride forward and upward towards the formation of new and conscious motives for work. Were it otherwise, socialists would soon find that it is less easy to form new habits than to conceive new ideas. The machinery in the factories would have rusted away, and the courtyards would have been overgrown with grass, long before Homunculus would have jumped out of the retort.

It is worth while, in this connexion, to ask what was the chief psychological element which enabled the Russian communists to keep industrial production going after they had seized power. Were the new political formulas of the citizens of the Soviet Republic chiefly instrumental; or had the old habits of work and subordination, as a heritage of tsarist days, more to do with the matter? Why, again, do we so often hear German socialists say that the diligence of the Germans and their keen sense of duty make the conditions in Germany peculiarly favourable to the establishment of a socialist order of society? It is a well-known fact that work is second nature to the Germans, and that they are exceptionally amenable to discipline. That is why, in foreign lands, German manual workers and German clerks are so much liked by their chiefs, and so little appreciated by their colleagues. For the same reason, the German civil servant differs markedly from the bureaucrat of other lands in respect of the extremely conscientious way in which he discharges his duties. Herein we cannot fail to recognise a national psychological aptitude, of which the German socialists are not slow to boast. We must not assume it to be a racial quality, for the English (who are substantially of the same race as the Germans) do not work with the same zest. The explanation is probably to be found in recent history. Capitalism was a late development in Germany; here, the institutions and customs of a feudal past (half-peasant, half-artisan) have survived longer than elsewhere. We may reasonably expect that, in the socialist Germany of the future, advantage will be derived from such vestiges, an advantage akin to that which is now

derived by German capitalism. The possibility of establishing a socialist regime does not depend so much upon the political predominance of a labour party over its capitalist adversaries, as upon the victory of the conservative tendencies towards joy in labour over the conflicting tendencies which threaten to undermine this moral foundation of any system of production.

The conflicting, the destructive tendencies are encouraged by the very capitalists who are so fond of complaining that those who work for them show a growing distaste for labour. It is they who squander our heritage from better days, by doing their utmost to make of the worker a soulless tool, and by turning to account every advance in productivity or increase in the intensity of labour in order to bleed the producers white. There is, moreover, a pendant to this paradox. The trade-union movement, which the master class blames for encouraging a distaste for work, and which is in great measure the outcome of the discomforts experienced in work, none the less tends to maintain or to create conditions which favour delight in labour. The trade unions do this, were it merely by fighting for better wages and shorter hours. They thereby protect the worker against poverty and overwork, enabling him to look upon his occupation as something better than a hated task. They give him that sense of human self-respect, without which work is nothing more than slavery. They encourage everything which can increase skill and enhance productivity, thus giving their demands the sound foundation of a search for the general welfare. They resist the introduction or strive for the abolition of methods of work and pay which tend to exhaust the worker or to deteriorate his character. They incline more and more to replace the negative method of withholding labour (a relic from the era of sporadic strikes) by the positive method of ensuring that work shall be carried on under conditions fixed by contract between employer and employed—conditions of which industrial democracy is the supreme expression. Of course this does not abrogate the right to strike, which is indispensable in order to secure any increase in power, and therefore to secure any improvement

in the workers' condition ; but the struggle for which the strike weapon is used or held in reserve is directed towards a new aim, that of the democratic organisation of enterprise. In all countries, the trade unions are, more and more, working towards this end, in very various ways, which are symbolised under such formulas as "factory delegations", "industrial democracy", "collective bargaining", "workers' control", "workers' committees", "factory councils", "workshop committees", "workers' guilds", "Betriebsräte" in Germany "factory soviets" in Russia, and so on. The relationships between the worker and his work become more and more satisfactory, in proportion as the internal organisation of enterprise gives the worker more say in the social and technical conditions of his work.

At the moment it is difficult to foresee whether a new relationship between worker and management will suffice to bring about a new relationship between worker and work. This much is certain, that increased participation of the workers in management is an essential preliminary to the revival of delight in labour. The trade unions might work more effectively in this direction than they do, were they not hampered by scruples which are a psychological residue from the pre-contractual days of the trade-union movement. The survival of these scruples is favoured by the Marxist conception of the class struggle. Marxists believe that a steady disappearance of skilled labour is an inevitable feature of the progress of the capitalist system, and therefore an essential preliminary to the unification of the proletariat. Thus the theory of social impoverishment has as its corollary a theory of spiritual impoverishment. Marx said that over the gate of every factory might be inscribed the words written over the portal of Dante's *Inferno*, "All ye who enter here, leave hope behind!" This, till the day of the social revolution! What will happen after that? Will it be enough that on the morrow of the revolution the factory will have become State property, and that new masters will have been installed in the office, a new legend inscribed over the gate? Are we to suppose that, as

a result of these changes, the workers who enter the gate will have acquired new souls? Until then, are we to make no attempt to revive hope in the hearts of those who labour in the factories; are we to do nothing that may provide them with a modicum of happiness? In practice, the trade-union movement gives the lie to such a doctrine of despair. Much more could be done, however, if the labour movement would discard certain obsolete formulas, which hamper its activities. The most disastrous is the formula according to which the advance of the machine system must necessarily transform all skilled workers into unskilled, must reduce them to the status of mere machine-minders, thus robbing them of joy in their work. This theory no longer corresponds to the facts. Marx was led to adopt it by a study of the special conditions which prevailed at the time when he wrote. Those days were characterised by the decline of craftsmanship, and by the mushroom growth of the new mechanised industries. The British textile industry, in especial, was the one which gave Marx and Engels occasion to write so much about the replacement of skilled workers by machine-minders—women and children for the most part. Their picture of this development has become a classic, and it still falsifies the ideas of many sociologists (non-Marxists as well as Marxists) in days when the reality has become very different.

To understand and to allow for this difference, we must recognise that in practice it is psychologically impossible to deprive any kind of work of all its positive emotional elements. Complete subjugation of the worker by the machine is no more than a conceptual extreme, which is never realised in the world of fact. The human being refuses to accept so absolute a subordination. He clings to the possibility of a last remnant of joy in his work, without which he would pine away. All activity, however much brutalised by mechanisation, offers a certain scope for initiative which can satisfy after a fashion the instinct for play and the creative impulse. There is no kind of work which cannot be done well or ill. Even when the details of performance have been prescribed

with the utmost minuteness, and in accordance with the latest dictates of the Taylor system, there will be left for the worker certain loopholes, certain chances of escape from the routine, so that when actually at work he will find it possible now and again to enjoy the luxury of self-determination. He will still be able to think out for himself means of influencing the speed or the quality of his work. Even the prisoner, whose work may take the form of gumming paper bags day after day for years, will find some expedient thanks to which he can escape the most deadening effects of monotony. He will not invariably try to make his movements as automatic as possible, so that he can free his thoughts and let them roam at large. He will be ever in search of dexterous manipulations which will enable him to get better results with less effort. The pursuit of this end will bring a certain amount of satisfaction, safeguarding him against becoming utterly stupefied.

Hugo Münsterberg, the German-American psychologist, tells of a working woman who had to wrap up incandescent globes. She dealt with 13,000 a day, on the average, and in the course of her career had wrapped 50,000,000. She said that she did not find the work unduly tiresome, for it was possible to vary the movements a little from time to time. A certain amount of attention was requisite to get satisfactory results and maintain the desired output. This need for attention warded off boredom.

The despotism of the machine is never absolute. The attitude of the worker is always the outcome of a balance between two conflicting motives. One man will be mainly concerned (unconsciously, in most cases) with the attempt to find pleasure in his work. This pleasure will rehabilitate him in his own eyes, so that at least he will not have to despise himself as a mere part of the machine. Of course there are difficulties in the path. The greatest of these is psychological : every manual worker must acquire a sufficient measure of automatism, especially in the mental sphere, in order to obviate the fatigue which would result from excessively sustained attention, and to set the brain free. This need for

automatism applies, above all, to rhythmical movements. Even the medieval craftsman must have known and cultivated such phases of relaxed attention. Every artist to-day is prepared to welcome the punctuation of creative activity with spells of routinist occupation. The machine-minder will take advantage of the possibilities of automatism in order to let his mind wander to regions far distant from the factory. Other difficulties in the way of finding pleasure in work of the kind now under consideration are technical, being a result of the unvarying and dependent character of the occupation. Finally, there are social difficulties, the outcome of the worker's feeling of class hostility, for he finds it difficult to forget that he is toiling neither for himself nor for the community at large, but for dividend hunters. He knows, too, that if he is over-zealous, and turns out more than the average, he will be rewarded by a reduction in the piece-work rate, by arousing increased expectations in his employer, or by leading his mates to look askance at him as a belly-crawler eager for a foreman's job and with no regard for working-class solidarity.

In the case of the machine-minder, the tendencies making for the destruction of the delight in labour usually preponderate over those making for its encouragement. Still, they never succeed in wholly counteracting the positive trend, in completely annulling the desire to find joy in work. Every worker experiences an unceasing conflict between the two opposing forces, and the resulting balance at any moment is unstable. The worker who becomes aware of the precarious nature of the compromise between these rival psychological trends, is liable to unceasing nervous disquietude. He passes through successive phases of satisfaction, resignation, and despair. Yet, cruel as such a destiny is, it is not hopeless. From the outlook of the moral health of the social organism, the disappearance of delight in labour is undoubtedly a very grave disorder. Still, a sick man is not a corpse. Joy in work cannot be utterly destroyed. In the cases above mentioned it is only inhibited ; and it will seek new paths of realisation.



There is another reason why the Marxist theory regarding the disappearance of skilled labour is not generally applicable. In different industries, there are variations in the extent to which the conditions are favourable to mechanisation. Naturally, the first introduction of the factory system took place in those fields of production where machinery could lead to the greatest economising of labour. In the textile industry, for example, the use of machinery often increases one hundred-fold the production of the individual workman. Facts of this sort led Marx to formulate premature and unduly generalised conclusions.

In a great many other industries which have, since then, replaced the old handicrafts, or in which entirely new branches of production have come into existence, machinery has not made such advances, either because in these fields it did not render possible so great an economising of labour, or else because the machines which would have saved labour were too costly for profitable use. Besides, in the productive work of every great industry, there are plenty of operations which can only be done by hand. The number of these operations extends as large-scale enterprise grows, and as the average distance between the place of production and the place of consumption increases. In the transport industries, which are steadily developing, there are many non-mechanised occupations. The same remark applies to transport in the interior of enterprises. Division of labour brings about an increasing spatial separation between directive functions and the actual performance of work, and the consequent bureaucratisation leads to the appearance (even within the enterprises) of more and ever more non-mechanical functions. To say nothing of agriculture, commerce, women's work in the home, the civil services, etc., there are many branches of production and transport which either do not lend themselves to mechanisation, or in which (as in many repairing shops) work with machine tools alternates with work that is purely manual.

Were it otherwise, how could we explain the difference between the coefficient of economy of labour realisable by

certain machines, such as the power-loom, and the much smaller coefficient of economy of labour realised by machine production in its entirety, even in the most advanced countries ? The difference cannot be stated in exact numerical terms, partly because there are no uniform standards of comparison, and partly because the statistical problem is so extraordinarily complicated ; but every one practically acquainted with modern industry can form his own conclusions, and they will differ markedly from the speculations in which the early Marxist theoreticians used to luxuriate. The coefficient of productivity per head of population, even in the most highly industrialised lands, has not been increased by machinery to any fabulous extent—if we do not forget to include agricultural production, which has as yet been very little increased by the later developments of machinery.

For a good many years, I have been collecting statistics about various occupations from the pupils at courses of lectures, persons engaged in the most diversified undertakings. In all cases I learned that the workers who were nothing more than machine-minders formed an infinitesimal minority. The majority of unskilled workers to-day are engaged in non-mechanised occupations. It is true that the craftsman of yore has become a rarity. But, although his occupation has been mechanised, he has been replaced, not so much by a " machine-minding slave ", as by a specialised semi-skilled worker. This latter no longer exercises a craft in the former sense of the term, inasmuch as he does not fashion a complete product of any kind. He has to content himself with some partial occupation, such as that of a turner in a machine-making factory. Nevertheless, this partial occupation demands specialised knowledge and skill. Consequently he needs a course of general training, followed by a period of special adaptation, the whole often taking up quite as much time as the apprenticeship of craft-guild days.

We now come to the third main difference between the Marxist diagnosis and the reality. The phase of mechanisation, which transforms the worker into an unskilled slave of

the machine, is often followed by another, in which he is changed into a skilled overlooker, a true master of the machine. The mechanisation of production gives birth to two opposing tendencies, one which makes labour unskilled, and another which makes it skilled again. It is impossible to say in advance which of these two tendencies will predominate in a particular case. To decide this, we must consider, not only the industries as a whole, but likewise each of the particular tasks which they have to perform. The result in any instance depends upon the degree of technical perfectionment which has been realised, and upon the task which has to be executed. Circumstances differ too widely between one case and another for us to be able to generalise without doing violence to the reality. But we may say that, as a rule, the tendencies to make labour unskilled exert themselves in the early phases of mechanisation, whereas the tendencies to make it skilled again are peculiar to a more advanced stage of technical progress. The Marxist theory of the tendency to eliminate skilled labour derives from a primitive epoch of industrialisation. Since then, the tendencies to restore skill to labour have greatly advanced. They continue to grow proportionally with the progress of technique.

When the tendency to restore skill to labour becomes manifest, we may represent to ourselves the evolution which has been passed through somewhat after the following manner. To begin with, the machine is nothing but an isolated tool driven by a motive power. The craftsman, who used to work this tool with his own hands, is now replaced by an unskilled worker, and often by one who is physically a weakling, such as a woman or a child. At this stage, and henceforward for some time, the minding of the machine by means of very simple actions which can speedily be learned is the rule. By degrees, however, the machine is improved. In time, it takes over the operations which used to be performed by a number of tools, or by the skilled hand of the worker. Its management becomes more difficult and more complicated. It tends increasingly to take charge of the movements which

used to be performed by the worker in the way of feeding the raw material to the machine, and of manipulation in the process of manufacture. As a result of this, the worker becomes less and less the mere assistant of the machine, and more and more its overlooker and its master. His work has to become skilled once more, though skilled in a very different way from that of the handicraftsman. Henceforward, he needs something besides a simple professional dexterity. He must raise the general level of his intellectual faculties, must adapt himself to a special and partial task in the process of production, must familiarise himself with the general laws of technique and of mechanics ; in a word, he must assimilate himself to the type of the engineer. Such an assimilation is now going on. The degree of transformation of the technical school system from the old special type of craftsmanship to the new type of general capacity or general technical information, gives the measure of the advance of this social evolution ; but it does not enable us to grasp the whole extent of that evolution, for in most European countries the conservatism of programs at the technical schools, leads them to impart a craft training which is subsequently of no use to young folk at the machine, rather than a general training such as these youthful workers really need.

However, it does not necessarily happen that technical progress follows the course above described, namely that there is a gradual perfectionment, thanks to which we advance from the tool to the machine tool, and from the machine tool to the automatic machine which performs the most complicated operations. In many instances, the most highly developed machines perform tasks such as the craftsman never performed—tasks which have been created as new specialties in the course of the general evolution of technique. An example of the first-mentioned type of gradual development is supplied by the transformation of the old-style master printer who used a hand press, like that invented by Gutenberg, into the machinist (the “ machine master ” the Germans call him) who manages a modern rotary press. The loco-

motive engine-driver, on the other hand, represents the fruit of a non-continuous development, for obviously when a railway was built the engine-drivers would not be recruited from among the postillions who used to ply their trade along the same line of road. In the former case, a highly skilled machine-minder has taken over the task of the skilled craftsman of former days ; in the second case, a man who is more or less of an engineer performs work which in the technical respect is entirely new, although from the social outlook he has rendered superfluous a task which used to be performed by unskilled coach-drivers and wagoners.

The development of the "new" agriculture in recently settled and colonial countries is another example of the way in which a new process of production may reintroduce skilled labour. Whereas in old days all agricultural production was the work of native agriculturists (peasants, in most of the countries of Europe), the industrial lands of Europe must now satisfy a considerable part of their need for agricultural produce, and above all for cereals, with the help of the extensive agriculture of lands across the sea. Where population is thick on the ground, as in Britain, in Belgium, and in the Parisian region of France, agriculture becomes concentrated more and more upon the intensive culture of vegetables and upon dairy farming, whereas most of the grain needed comes from America. The American farmer, the man who produces this grain, has a professional type as different from that of the European peasant as the type of the machinist differs from that of the village blacksmith. The extensive system of culture dispenses with a good deal of the skilled agricultural craftsmanship and traditional knowledge, which are, so to say, the natural heritage of peasants working their little plots of land. On the other hand, the American farmer must have skilled knowledge of a different kind. He must be able to drive machines, tractors, motor-cars. Living, as a rule, far from a town, he must be able to carry out with his own hands all sorts of repairs which the European peasant would have done for him in his own or in a neighbouring village or in

the market town. He must be at one and the same time chauffeur, machinist, mason, carpenter, painter, and glazier. Furthermore, as he only sells his produce once a year, as it is of one kind, and as questions of transport and of access to a distant market are of supreme importance to him, he has to busy himself with all sorts of financial problems and of commercial correspondence, such as the European peasant, who is but a few miles from his market, need never think about. Here then we have a producer whom the progress of industrialisation and mechanisation has endowed with a skill higher in type than that of the peasant tiller of the soil.

Of course we must remember that the advances in technique which have enabled all these developments to take place, are not a final cause. In this age of marvellous technical progress, we are so much accustomed to regard the advances in the methods of production as the outcome of a sort of inherent necessity, that we fail to realise that the view now being criticised implies a lack of historic sense. Only in a capitalist regime is it possible for any one to believe in the existence of economic laws thanks to which the mechanisation of labour is, as it were, an automatic phenomenon. When he attached the idea of all human progress to the idea of technical progress, when he believed that the latter was the actual cause of the former, Marx, unconsciously following the example of the liberal political economists, raised a peculiarity of the capitalist regime to the rank of a law of nature. There is not much difficulty in proving that the evolution of methods of production is determined, alike in respect of speed and in respect of direction, by the very social and cultural circumstances which the Marxists declare to be nothing more than a reflexion of the methods of production.

To begin with, let us become perfectly clear about what we mean by "technical progress". At the present day this term is given a significance which derives from a valuation peculiar to the capitalist epoch. Mechanism is only progress in so far as it favours a quantitative increase in production. As far as concerns the quality of products, machine production

has generally meant a decline compared with the production of the old-style craftsman. If we lived in an epoch whose criterion was quality rather than quantity, we should not speak of machine production as marking progress. Why was not the steam-engine invented in the days of classical antiquity, which enriched mankind with such prodigies of the spirit, especially as regards logical wisdom and creative imagination? Why did electricity remain a toy for the ancients? Simply because the people of that age had no need either of steam-engines or of electricity. Their conception of life and civilisation was such that they had no wants which machines could have satisfied. Turning to our ancestors during the Middle Ages, we cannot regard them as any more stupid than ourselves. Chance, curiosity, the endeavour to save effort, the peculiar characteristics of certain master minds driven by the thirst for knowledge—thanks to all these, there were in the Middle Ages a number of technical discoveries which were not turned to economic account. It was not simply the indifference and conservatism of public opinion which prevented so many of the discoveries of those days from being fruitful. When the probable results of such inventions were foreseen, or when their results became obvious thanks to experiment, the men of the Middle Ages turned away from them as if they had been the work of the devil. The most advanced among medieval industries (most advanced in the capitalist sense of the term), the cloth-weavers of Flanders and northern Italy, made use in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of half-mechanised methods of which there was no trace left in the fourteenth century. They were discarded, not because they were insufficiently productive in the modern sense of the term, but because they were too productive. Even when the quality of the product was satisfactory, these machine methods were forcibly suppressed, the reason being that they were contrary to the social morality of the day. The cloth-merchants of the Flemish towns, prematurely characterised by the acquisitive instinct of capitalism, after gaining a considerable social preponderance in the thirteenth century,

were exterminated in the course of sanguinary struggles. Their exterminators were not simply the weavers and the fullers who had been proletarianised or transformed into home-workers. Every kind of craftsman, the Church, the religious orders, in a word, all the representatives of the guild system whose moral foundations were menaced, rose against the budding capitalists. In the closing years of the Middle Ages, the policy of the medieval guild system was almost exclusively directed towards hindering technical evolution. Not until later was this technical evolution regarded as progress, when the break-up of the feudal system, the growing power of the mercantile classes, and the centralisation of monarchical authority, had undermined the strength of the craft guilds.

Even under the capitalist regime of our own days, technical progress is not automatic. It depends, to an increasing extent, upon social conditions, and especially on the attitude of the working class. Machine industry, whose great development was taking place when Marx was a young man, and whose beginnings were described by him, would have had the consequences he expected, would have led to the complete abolition of skilled labour—if capitalism in the twentieth century had still had to do with an inert “human material” as submissive as were the “hands” of the British factory system of nearly a century ago.

If technique is still being perfected to such an extent that machinery has come to demand skilled labour to manage it, the cause must mainly be sought in the increasing costliness of labour, in the extension of the wants and the social power of this “human material”. Why has North America gone farther than Europe in the mechanisation of production? Because, notwithstanding the continued immigration, the supply of labour was inadequate, and the workers were able to maintain a standard of life so high that machinery, even very dear machinery, was cheaper than living labour. On the other hand, in countries where there is plenty of cheap labour, where the working day is very long, and where wages are low, we find that the technique of production is extremely



backward. At a given level of economic evolution, technical progress is not dependent upon the inventive faculty of engineers (which is much the same everywhere), but on certain social conditions. In Galicia, for instance, where social conditions are backward, technical progress will display itself by way of the introduction into a boot-making factory of machine tools which girls of fourteen can manage perfectly well. In the State of Massachusetts, on the other hand, where labour is dear, such an enterprise would be less profitable. The very same capitalist who, in Galicia, introduces a primitive factory production of boots, will find that it will pay him to have his machine tools made in Massachusetts. This will provide work for highly skilled mechanics, and for well-paid "engineers" whose business it is to drive the machine-building machines. Thus the progress of technique will produce unskilled workers in Galicia and highly skilled workers in Massachusetts. In the Galician phase, the human being is still the slave of the machine; in the Massachusetts phase, the human being has become the master of the machine, because the slave would cost too much. Thus a social state (the skill of the worker) depends upon an economic and technical state of affairs, upon the method of production; and this, in its turn, depends upon a social state, upon the standard of life and the power of the working class. In the end, we always find that it is a human element which reacts upon another human element, for the technical equipment is itself only the result of a social state which has issued from a human volition.

The social obstacles to the diffusion of Taylorism are an example of the influence of the human will. If the inherent logic of the method of production were the only influence at work, all the industries in which the technique is suitable to Taylorisation would long since have been Taylorised. Taylorism aims at applying to the human element in production the principles of division of labour and hierarchy which have already been realised in the case of machines. The worker's activity is to be reduced to a minimum of

operations whose exact nature has been determined by a series of experimental studies of elementary times and movements. Wages are to be paid ad hoc. There is to be a minimum time rate, fixed at a rather low level, with increments, or premiums, when the task is performed within the prescribed period. This tends to make the worker avoid superfluous movements, slacking, and rests. In the Taylor system, the manual worker performs none but physical and mechanical operations, and all the operations which need intelligence are entrusted to the managerial staff. The worker has only to carry out the prescribed movements automatically. Intellectual initiative, the exercise of judgment, the choice of movements and of tools, speed of execution—all these things are to be decided by a general staff of highly skilled engineers. To use F. W. Taylor's own words, the ideal is to simplify the work to such a degree that it can be done by a trained gorilla.

This is extremely logical, but it is also extremely unpsychological. No one will dispute the assertion that Taylor's ideal is in strict conformity with the tendencies inherent in the technique of capitalist production, considered as a method of production producing the greatest possible amount of surplus value with the aid of machinery which economises human labour to the utmost. Every one knows that all factory work, even in enterprises where the names of Taylor and his disciples are unknown, tends to develop in this way. But in practice, such a tendency can only be realised in so far as the employers have to do with a working class as inert as the machines to whose level the workers are to be degraded. In the United States, where Taylorism had its birth, there is not a single important enterprise in which the complete application of the Taylor system has not broken down, because it is psychologically impossible to reduce human beings to the condition of trained gorillas.

Taylorism, aiming as it does at rendering labour utterly unskilled, entails on the worker psychological consequences which are so unfavourable to productivity (even when we

take the narrow outlook of the returns in an isolated enterprise), that the loss is not compensated by the economy of labour and of wages theoretically obtainable. The objective study of elementary movements and times, which is the foundation of the Taylor theory, is a chimera. The results necessarily depend upon the mentality of those who are to furnish them. Now, the industrial manager who orders the experiments, the engineer who carries them out, the worker who has to lend himself to them, know, one and all, that these experiments are to serve as the foundation for the calculation of wages. Consequently, they are all biased from the start. Besides, the worker knows that the employer is only holding out the bait of an increase in wages in the hope of securing a still greater increase in production. Despite its scientific aspect, this way of determining wages affronts the worker's sense of justice. He wants a wage proportional to his essential needs and to the value he produces. The task-and-bonus system, on the other hand, implies the existence of a superior and so-called scientific authority which will make the curve of production rise more rapidly than the curve of wages. In practice, moreover, there are numerous elements of fluctuation and uncertainty in the fixing of the times, so that the worker is always inclined to suspect the justice of the tariff which is applied to him. Again, the monotony of work under the Taylor system depresses the worker, makes him nervous and irritable, and wears him out before his time. He knows that in a Taylorised factory or workshop, there is no place except for workers whom the bait of premiums stimulates to a supernormal activity; and he lives in dread of the dismissal which awaits a prematurely weakened worker. His gorge rises against the military discipline, and against being constantly spied upon by superiors—though both of these things are essential parts of the system. He feels degraded when his movements are timed by a stop watch. The psychological experiments of which he is the subject seem to him an intolerable moral inquisition. As a result of all these things combined, he is ill at ease; and even if there be no open or organised resistance,

this malaise is enough to rob Taylorisation of its theoretical advantages.

It is interesting to note that, in the American worker no less than in the European worker, the acquisitive instinct is far from being predominant in factory and workshop mentality. The revolt against Taylorism is much more the result of an outraged sense of justice than of economic interest. In the American factories where the workers have been asked to vote as to the desirability of continuing the Taylor system introduced by way of experiment, there has always been a larger percentage of adverse votes among the most highly paid workers. Furthermore, the introduction of Taylorism in America has been practically limited to industries which are chiefly manned by immigrants from the most backward countries of Europe. Most of the Taylorised workers are unskilled countrymen, without any previous experience of industrial life. Their needs are more primitive and more grossly material than those of born Americans, and their main thought is to make as much money as they can in a brief space of time even at the cost of exhausting labour. Almost all of them are non-unionist. During a journey of several months which I made in America as member of a commission to study the Taylor system, I did not come across a single Taylorised enterprise where the workers were trade unionists. On the other hand, wherever trade unionism has been well established, the unions have been able to prevent the introduction of the Taylor system. They were strong enough, in the year 1916, to secure the passing of a federal law prohibiting the use of Taylorist methods (stop watch and premium wages) in all enterprises working for the State. The unions were powerfully aided by the public opinion of persons not directly interested, who were anxious as to the possible social consequences of the Taylor system. Thus social forces inspired by a legal and moral sentiment have changed the direction which Taylorism wished to impose upon technical development, for most of the technical "advances" foreshadowed by the Taylor system can only be achieved in

proportion as wages and methods of management undergo a corresponding change. We see, then, that the disappearance of skilled labour in industrial work is not the expression of a law, but simply the manifestation of a tendency which can be annulled by antagonistic social tendencies, and above all by working-class resistance. The realisation of socialism does not depend upon the automatic fulfilment of an economic law. On the contrary, it depends upon the deliberate activity of the labour movement, upon an activity *working in opposition* to this alleged economic law, upon activity which aims at maintaining or restoring the worker's joy in labour.

The feeling of which this working-class resistance is the outcome does not only affect the relationships between the worker and the machine. It likewise affects the relationships between the worker and the employer. Besides, these two things are closely connected. The more labour becomes unskilled, the more does the employer find it necessary to strengthen discipline in the factory or workshop in order to replace the lost motive of joy in labour by the motive of fear of reprimand, of loss of promotion, of economic disadvantage, and of dismissal. It was in the early days of capitalist industrialism that the autocratic character of this discipline manifested the most violent contrast with the traditional conditions of the craftsman's work, and even with the working conditions of the serf. The industrial workers of those days were often compelled to sleep in the factories and to take their meals there. Fines, punishments, and various sorts of ill-treatment, were rife. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, there still existed in Belgian textile factories, pillories to which slack workers could be tied at their master's orders. To-day, the labour movement has done a good deal to put an end to the superstition that the employer is "master in his own house". Authority can no longer take such brutally despotic forms. But there is still a conflict between the general sense of justice, as expressed in political democracy, on the one hand, and the social predominance of the employer, on the other—a social predominance, which, in the last analysis,

rests upon the employer's power to deprive the worker of his means of subsistence by discharging him. This conflict has been aggravated by the fact that during recent generations the legal sense of equality has been intensified, and has made its way into the lowest strata of the working class. The resulting social inferiority complex tends to show itself less and less as slavishness of mind, and more and more as a craving for freedom. Here the word "freedom" has a very definite and positive sense. It is a corollary of the compensatory character of the ideal right, which is: the right to an assured subsistence for every one willing to work, and the right of the worker to find happiness in his labour.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY

No one is more eaten up with envy than he who considers all men to be his equals.

GOETHE.

THE concept of equality has from the earliest days been the most important stimulus to mass movements of a socialist character. At no time have any but a minority of enthusiasts regarded socialism as a rationally conceived and ideal organisation of society, or as a realisation of love of one's neighbour, or as a guarantee of individual liberty. As far as the masses are concerned, the motive which drives them towards socialism is less a desire for an ideal system of society than the instinctive and direct wish of the lower classes to diminish social inequality.

The Marxists, in so far as they trouble their heads about psychological questions at all, are satisfied to explain this equalitarian aspiration of the workers in mechanistic and rationalistic terms. According to them, it is the unification of the workers' lot which determines their mentality. Sometimes, however, they say that it is the experience of the class struggle which teaches the workers that all deviations from a social norm (for instance, too low a wage or excessive earnings from piece-work) are prejudicial to the interests of the working class.

None of these explanations is satisfactory. The declaration that the equalitarian mentality of the workers is the outcome of equality of conditions, is reduced to absurdity as soon as we realise that the workers have no desire to reduce the rest of the community to their level, but that they wish to level upwards. The desire for equality is engendered by inequality, not by equality. There is, indeed, a grain of truth in the explanation that the equalitarian sentiment of the workers depends upon

their interest in a comparative uniformity of wages. Still, this does not solve the essential problem. The equalitarian sentiment of the working class is older than working-class experience of oscillations in wages. The facts of experience, such as that it is to the interest of the workers to avoid excessive divergences in the standard of life, may influence the intellectual formulas which give expression to their equalitarian sentiment. Such experiences, however, cannot explain the origin of the sentiment. It exists prior to any kind of class organisation, and to any knowledge of class interest ; it is the outcome of a sense of justice much older and far more general than the modern trade-union movement and even than the class struggle. The socialist claim for equality is a compensatory idea, a compensation for an inferiority complex which is due to a lengthy historical development and arises out of the general conditions of working-class life.

We have already traced some of the causes of this complex to the working environment, and others to the social environment of the workers. Of course, this is no more than an arbitrary division of the subject, to facilitate its understanding. The working environment and the social environment are different concepts ; the man who passes from one environment to the other is, however, one and the same being. The repressions of instinct, which the worker suffers in the course of his occupation, serve only to increase his longing to seek outside the workshop the satisfactions that are denied him within it. There, let me say in passing, is the profound psychological cause of the persistent movement of the workers in favour of a reduction of the hours of labour. This movement is not the outcome of any knowledge of Marx's reasoning about surplus labour and surplus value ; it is due simply and solely to the desire of every human being to enjoy the maximum amount of happiness. In so far as the worker does not find happiness in his work, he will seek it elsewhere.

The longing is intensified because the worker feels that he is subjected to a treatment which outrages his traditional sense of justice. This happens both inside the workshop



and outside. The inferiority complex which results, cannot be identified with the notion of political inequality, or with that of economic exploitation. The State and the workshop are not the whole of society. From the first, the worker has felt himself socially degraded, quite apart from his lack of political rights and from the inequitable distribution of surplus value. Among such social inferiorities, which are outside the range of pure politics and pure economics, it is enough to refer to unemployment. The worker who has no resources because he has no work, feels his social dependence even more intensely than when he is working for an employer. No one can understand proletarian mentality unless he takes unemployment into account, either as an actual or as a dreaded experience. That is why so few of the non-proletarians who take a workman's job for the purposes of study, are able to understand the real state of mind of their temporary mates. It goes a very little way that they share, for the time being, the conditions of the workers' life. They are not bound to work by material necessity. If they should lose their job, this will mean for them something altogether different from what it means for true proletarians. Though his clothing may be soiled by his work, and though his hands may be calloused, the amateur will never feel the moral humiliation that results from social inferiority.

For a long time I believed that, by occupying myself as a manual worker for the purposes of study, I had morally transformed myself into a true proletarian. Especially did I think this, in view of my socialist sympathies. I did not realise my error until the day came when chance compelled me to seek manual work as a means of livelihood. During those few days, when I was wandering about with my bundle of overalls under my arm, looking for a job, I learned much more about the mentality of working folk than ten years of occupation as an amateur workman would have taught me, even if that occupation had been of the most arduous kind. The uncertainty of existence, the impossibility of making sure of a job, all the mental consequences of the chronic fear attendant

on such a situation (varying, as the unemployed's temperament varies, between dour resignation and an envious hatred of the members of the privileged classes), such are the especial characteristics of the worker's social inferiority complex. There would be no change in these respects even if the profits made by the employer were reduced to the level of a managerial salary, or if the factories should become cooperative enterprises, not working for profit.

In the last analysis, the social inferiority of the working classes is not dependent upon a political injustice or upon an economic prejudice, but simply upon a psychological state. The essential characteristic of this inferiority is the workers' belief in their own inferiority. The working class is in an inferior position because it feels itself to be so.

No doubt, objective experience is one element in the subjective sensation ; but the way in which this objective experience is reflected in consciousness depends upon a preliminary fixation of the mentality, a fixation which is not solely the outcome of the objective experience.

The workers' feeling of social inferiority presupposes three conditions at least. In the first place, the workers must believe themselves durably condemned to remain members of a lower social class. Secondly, they must believe that classes are arranged in a hierarchy of upper and lower ; that the position of the non-working classes is an enviable one ; that the class to which they themselves belong is a lower one. Finally they must believe that, after all, this hierarchy of classes is not absolutely and for ever fixed, but that the lower classes can look forward to a levelling-up of class relationships.

In the case of each of these presuppositions we have to do with a psychological condition, which may exist whatever the material conditions happen to be. For instance, in the United States, the workers of to-day are quite as much exploited, economically speaking, as their European brethren. For the great mass of them, moreover, the possibilities of rising in the social scale by becoming independent as colonisers, men of business, traders, managers, etc., as in earlier days, have now

become practically non-existent. Nevertheless, most of them still retain the belief in such possibilities, a belief reinforced by the political and social customs of the country. This prevents the formation of a class inferiority complex. The American worker rebels against being called a proletarian and a wage-slave, for he is outraged at the idea of being enrolled in a class whose name carries with it the thought of social inferiority. He would think it a humiliating avowal of incapacity to renounce the idea that one day or another he might rise in the social scale. At any rate, he believes that for his children there are unlimited possibilities of such a rise. Consequently, he thinks that all social positions are equally good—excepting only that of the non-producing and parasitic classes. The American workman and the American farmer, just like the rich American industrial, consider that those who live upon dividends without working are the social inferiors of the real producers, whether these be simple wage-workers or comparatively independent.

The majority of American workmen are opposed to the idea of introducing compulsory social insurance after the European model. European socialists are generally astonished at this attitude, but we can easily understand it as an outcome of the dislike felt by all Americans for the idea of any kind of social inferiority. The American worker says: "I want to get wages good enough to be able, like any other citizen, to take out an insurance policy in a society of my own choosing, or to employ a doctor of my own choosing." He objects to being treated as the member of a class which needs protection, tutelage, and is, therefore, in an inferior status. He would rather plank down his dollars on the table, even if this should cost him more in the end, than take his place in a queue, waiting for his turn at the little window behind which sits a bureaucrat enthroned.

On the other hand, there are certain peoples, as in some Asiatic countries where caste divisions are sanctified by religion, among whom the lower classes are wretchedly poor and villainously exploited, and yet they accept this state of affairs

as a natural one, and as the outcome of a divine ordinance. In these cases, an internal and insuperable barrier limits every one's aspirations within the class in which he has been born. Then there is inferiority without any inferiority complex, for there is no trace of the resentment which is a necessary ingredient of such a complex.

Finally, in Europe, there are plenty of poverty-stricken persons, especially among the very poor, who are perfectly aware of the wretchedness of their condition, but who nevertheless accept their lot without repining, usually with the aid of a religious belief that better times will come for them after death.

In each of the three cases we have just been examining, there is lacking one of the psychological conditions essential to the formation of the social inferiority complex which predisposes the working masses of Europe to socialism. Now, the origin of a psychological fact is always traceable to another psychological fact. A different belief entails a different social phenomenon. A different belief can even transform a sense of social inferiority in the worker into a sense of superiority. A rich man, as such, is only an enviable person to one who confounds wealth with happiness. We are reminded here of Bernard Shaw's remark (*Man and Superman*): "The man with toothache thinks every one happy whose teeth are sound. The poverty-stricken man makes the same mistake about the rich man."

The reason why Marxists caricature working-class mentality as they do, is that they fail to recognise the basic psychological fact which underlies all the rest; they fail to understand that the average manual worker looks upon the members of the possessing classes as superior beings, or as persons in a better position than his own. He will fight against them for higher wages, more agreeable working conditions, or the conquest of political rights; but he only does this in the hope of making his own position more like theirs. It is this belief in the superiority of the possessing classes which furnishes the psychological motive force of the struggle by which he wishes

to deprive them of this superiority. In the last analysis, the reason why the bourgeoisie is the upper class to-day, is that every one would like to be a bourgeois. The class which sets the example to society, dominates society. As soon as people cease to follow its example, its power is gone. No doubt, this social superiority is generally buttressed by political privileges and economic advantages; but when we probe the matter to the bottom, we find that prestige is the cause of power, not that power is the cause of prestige.

This notion conflicts so uncompromisingly with the materialist mentality of our day, that most people will need to make a great effort before they can grasp it. Here is another case where we must bestir ourselves to discover the truth that underlies appearances. History furnishes us with an abundance of cases in which classes have retained their prestige although they had lost their wealth and their political power; but we cannot find a single instance where a group of rulers, however rich or powerful, have remained in power when belief in their superiority had vanished—in a word, when they had lost their prestige. The prestige of the nobility, as a superior class, has remained almost intact down to our own days, although (in many countries) centuries have passed since the nobles lost their economic power and their political sovereignty. So true is this, that the very plebeians who had wrested power from the patricians, hastened to adopt the institutions and traditions of these nobles, from the monarchical form of State down to the manners of "good society". "Fashion," wrote Malebranche, "is a holier and more inviolable law than the laws written by God's hand on Moses' tables." What Tarde, in his *Lois de l'imitation*, calls "the magical power of suggestion" accounts for the respectful admiration which the bourgeois retain to this day for all that is "noble". Three centuries have passed since Molière wrote his comedy, *Le bourgeois gentilhomme*, and even before his day, in the Middle Ages, popular literature was continually ridiculing the bourgeois upstarts whose delight it was to imitate the nobles. Manual workers have inherited this

respectful admiration felt by the bourgeois for the noble, or they have taken it over in proportion as they themselves have adopted the forms of bourgeois society. The workers style themselves to-day "Mr." and "Mrs.", although, in past times, these titles were reserved for people of birth, for persons of "blue blood". The socialist member of parliament who stands aside with a civil bow to allow a parliamentary colleague to pass in front of him through the doorway is, without knowing it, using a polite form which first came into use many centuries ago at the courts of the kings of France, and which subsequently spread throughout all the strata of society.

When German industrial capitalism triumphed in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century, the new money power tried to win prestige by borrowing the manners and customs of the feudal magnates. As a result, in the political sphere, we note a strange welding of a prosaically bourgeois dominance of monetary interests with the romanticist forms of feudal monarchy. That is why military officers, civil servants, the students' corps, etc., imitate, more or less successfully, aristocratic traditions; and that is why there is so widespread a mania for titles and decorations. Thanks to this, the German bourgeois has become an amalgam of crude philistinism with a stiff and artificial formalism, which makes him ridiculous in the eyes of the inhabitants of other countries.

In England, the decadence of monarchical power began seven centuries ago; and it is three centuries since the bourgeoisie put an end to the exclusive economic and political dominance of the feudal aristocracy. Nevertheless, monarchical and aristocratic prestige are still so powerful that the labour government of 1924 never dreamed of trying to interfere with the custom which prescribes that ministers of State shall wear court dress on certain occasions. On the contrary, the labour ministers were careful to adapt themselves to all the traditions which symbolise the recognition of the extant social hierarchy, the prestige of the crown, of titles, and so on. For it is much easier to win a parliamentary victory, or to democratise or socialise large-scale industry, than to turn the pyramid of

social values upside-down. The British Labour Party wanted to enhance its own prestige by borrowing these traditional forms. It is easier to win an economic or political victory over capitalism, than to win a psychological victory over snobbery. Now, socialism will not be realisable as long as snobbery is supreme, a snobbery thanks to which the worker regards the bourgeois as a being worthy of envy and imitation. It does not help that the worker may hate the bourgeois, for social hatred is too often a confirmation of social envy. The manual worker—and not in Britain alone—does not regard himself as the equal of the detested bourgeois or aristocrat until he can behave exactly as his enemy behaves. The Marxist intellectual, secluded in his study, may fancy that the working class forms its ideal by the reading of *Capital*; but the unprejudiced observer knows that this ideal is nourished upon the eager scrutiny of the manners and customs of the upper ten thousand. The example of the upper ten takes effect upon the common people thanks to the actualities of urban life, thanks to novel reading, theatre going, the cinemas, the illustrated press, and, where women are concerned, thanks to the shop windows and the fashion papers.

In fact, the desire for equality and the longing for inequality, far from being mutually exclusive, condition one another. The instinct of autovaluation, individual in its nature, leads man, the man of the western world, to desire equality; but at the same time his social instincts maintain his faith in an "upper" class, which shall set an example of a desirable state of affairs, and thus give the longing for equality an objective.

It is for this psychological reason that, in view of the actual condition of human instinctive dispositions, no society is possible without an aristocracy. The aristocracy may, of course, take very different forms. European gentry, the mandarins of pre-revolutionary China, the American descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers, the Russian communist leaders, are but different aspects of one and the same psychological fact, are but different expressions of the inherent need of human beings to create a model different from themselves, a

model which they would fain resemble. If a revolution is to establish a lasting new order, it must either, like the English bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth century, continue to recognise the traditional moral predominance of the aristocracy ; or else, like the great French revolution, it must promptly create a new nobility decked out with the plunder of the old. The Russian communists would never have been able to hold power if they had not respected the popular desire for the maintenance of a social hierarchy ; if they had not replaced the symbolical sovereignty of the tsar by that of a dictator ; if they had not substituted for the reign of the old-time chinovniks the new bureaucracy of the Communist Party.

The need for an aristocracy is accompanied by the need for a monarch, in this sense, that the masses wish to have their ideal of community power and way of living incorporated in one actual person. It is in the people's parties that the moral authority of some such unique leader is most firmly established. August Bebel was the uncrowned king of the German social democracy in the days before the war. In spite of the democratic nature of the socialist movement, he was just as much the monarch of the German workers as William II was the monarch of the German bourgeoisie. Every society is animated by a special collective will, the will towards a particular configuration of destiny, towards ascent in a special direction, towards approximation to some particular way of living. The class which incorporates this way of living is the aristocracy of the society in question ; the individual who crowns the edifice (even if it be only in the form of a weathercock) is its king. As a matter of principle, it is unimportant whether this aristocracy is hereditary or not, whether it does or does not fulfil an economic function, whether it has or has not constitutional privileges. At bottom, it is not sustained so much by force as by those who want to believe in it.

The same remark applies to monarchs. The less developed their economic and political power, the easier will it be for them to maintain themselves in position, since they will have all the less difficulty in fulfilling their representative function.



The revolutionary bourgeoisie has deprived the monarchy of its real power, and has even decapitated a king here and there to encourage the others ; but after giving this little lesson it has always hastened to reestablish the monarchy as a representative institution, or else to set up a substitute for it by installing a presidency. The widespread catastrophe of 1918, only swept away those monarchs who were or wanted to be something more effective than simple ornamental weathercocks. In Britain, on the other hand, where absolute monarchy suffered its first and most sanguinary defeat, and where the king has less actual power than the president of the United States or of the French Republic, representative monarchy is so firmly established that you may go a long day's journey without coming across a republican. The United States has been a republic since the time of its first establishment, but has been all the more determined to deify Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. The Americans venerate the presidency, and have given their president more power than that possessed by any European monarch throughout the nineteenth century. The reason is that every American citizen is eligible for the presidential position, so that the masses instal their own idealised image in the seat of power. In the United States there are petroleum kings, steel kings, automobile kings, cinema kings, baseball kings. The descendants of the first colonists of New England and Virginia form an aristocracy by birth and education. Even so, Europe cannot supply a sufficient number of bankrupt nobles to satisfy the demands of the American matrimonial market. The descendants of the revolutionists of 1776, however unrepresentable, jostle one another in their eagerness to gain the entry to the receptions at the Court of St. James' ; and the great American republic shows astonishing credulity in the case of every swindler from Europe who has taken care to provide himself with a title of nobility. The snobbery of the masses, their demand that there shall be social prestige, is a stronger buttress of aristocracies and monarchies than landed property can be, or written constitutions, or bayonets. Property may be lost, written

constitutions can be changed, bayonets may grow rusty ; but the silly sheep follow the bell-wether, who represents in their eyes all that they themselves would like to be.

We learn from the American example that the desire for equality characteristic of our epoch does not prevent the existence of a differential valuation of the various social strata. The desire for social equality is more intense in the United States than anywhere else, and it is precisely for this reason that in America the desire has more need of the moral sustenance derivable from the recognition of the prestige of a superior stratum which serves as a model. It is a mistake to believe, as Europeans are so apt to believe, that the American is more inclined than the European to abase himself before the spectacle of great wealth. Precisely because wealth is so common, those who are nothing but wealthy are less the objects of envy. When an American admires a millionaire, it is not so much because the millionaire is a rich man, as because the millionaire's wealth bears witness to the man's success, and is regarded as a proof of exceptional capacity. Americans incline to admire a very different kind of social superiority. They are proud of Abraham Lincoln, because Lincoln was born in a log-hut, and rose to the presidential chair. One of the reasons why President Wilson was so greatly admired, even by many of his political adversaries, was that Wilson had at one time been nothing more than an impecunious university professor, and then rose to the highest position in the State. A trust magnate would find it just as difficult to become a president as would a negro. The American values distinctions which are less easy to secure than money ; he values birth, capacity, education.

The desire for equality and the longing for inequality are, thus, parallel phenomena. We always envy those who have what we lack. That is why we try to resemble those whom we envy because of their difference from ourselves, those whom we hate because we envy them. That, too, is why the struggle which the workers carry on against the bourgeoisie presupposes that the workers regard a bourgeois existence as desirable.

Finally, that is why the struggle in question ends by making the workers more like their adversaries in proportion as they tend to get the better of these.

This paradoxical rivalry between craving and fulfilment entails as a consequence that the goal recedes as we try to approach it. The rainbow is always in the next field. As soon as a longing for equality is on the verge of realisation, it becomes the starting point for a new feeling of inequality. Little more than a century ago, the establishment of universal suffrage seemed, in most countries of Europe, an almost utopian demand. Nowadays it has become a matter of course. But in the interim the masses have become more strongly aware of the existence of economic and social inequalities, and their exasperation on this account has grown more quickly than political equality has been realised. It is of little moment, therefore, how we solve the problem which is so acrimoniously debated by Marxists, the question whether proletarians are growing poorer ; it matters little whether, if we agree that this is so, we believe that their impoverishment is absolute or relative. The social inferiority complex may increase while differences of fortune are diminishing, and conversely. Thus, in contemporary Europe, the social hostility of the poor does not depend so much upon the actual wealth of the rich, as upon the manner in which their wealth has been acquired. Proletarians have such an intense hatred for the new rich, for war profiteers, for those who have made fortunes by speculating in the currency, and even for enriched peasants, that the old-established well-to-do are in consequence hardly regarded as enemies. Already before 1914, the resentment of the working class was increasing, at the very time when the economic position of the workers was improving ; it was increasing regardless of the question whether the capitalists' share in the total production was increasing or diminishing as compared with the wage-earners' share.

This development was going on during the very years when, thanks to the conquest of universal suffrage and to the general advance of political democracy, the political inferiority complex

had been, to a large extent, abolished. There is good reason for saying that the last decade of European history has been characterised by a transformation of the struggle for political democracy into a struggle for social democracy. The motive forces which had guided the labour movement towards the conquest of political equality, far from having been annulled by this conquest, have now been directed with an added vigour towards a new objective, the actual application of these democratic principles, the establishment of an equality of rights and of individual autonomy both in the domain of production and in that of social life in general. The most striking indication of this transference of energy is the passage of the trade-union movement from the stage of sporadic strikes to that of a permanent contractual and legal organisation of the workers' right to participate in the control of production. This phenomenon may seem inexplicable to those who regard the idea of democracy and the idea of socialism as being connected by nothing more than a superficial parallelism.

A search for the psychological roots of the socialist faith of the masses leads us towards the solution of a problem whose depths Marxism has never sounded, that of the relationship of socialism to democracy. To the Marxists, the labour movement is nothing more than a simple struggle between the interests of various classes ; and they regard political democracy as only a means which will ensure the victory of the working class because the workers outnumber the non-workers. This conception of socialism as an end, and of democracy as a means, is no less strongly rooted in Marxist thought than the associated conception that economics form the foundation upon which a political superstructure is upbuilt. The wide spread of this idea in countries where Marxist socialism is dominant has contributed a great deal to diminish the resistance of socialists (especially those whose faith is firmest) to the communist temptation of using the dictatorship as a short cut. For, if democracy is to the socialists nothing more than a means of realisation, our final appraisal of this means will depend upon the ease with which it can establish the political power

of the working class. If democracy be nothing more than a means to an end, then if some other means (a military revolt, a coup d'état, a party dictatorship) will lead more easily or more directly to the conquest of power, we shall naturally be disposed to renounce the democratic method. Were this hypothesis true, our sole reason for blaming the Russian communists would be that they want to impose, in countries where the urban workers are in a majority, a method which is peculiar to countries where the working class is in a minority.

Can we really reduce this problem to a simple question of tactics? Is democracy nothing more than an electoral or administrative policy? Must we not, rather, hold that it is a psychological condition in default of which socialism can never be realised, an essential element of the socialist ethical ideal, the very substance of the socialist idea?

The answer to this question is plain to those who look upon socialism as something more and something better than a simple recipe for the conquest of power; for those to whom socialism is a moral faith which must inspire all social relationships. We must abandon the disastrous belief that there are "means" independent of the "end"; we must apprehend the current of socialist ideas as a unity, whose significance will be disclosed by tracing them to their psychological source. Then we shall find that democracy is not a branch of the socialist tree, but one of its roots. We must contrapose to the communist fallacy of a socialism without democracy, the proud conception of a humanitarian ideal which will consciously derive its energies from centuries of equalitarian aspiration. Only then shall we be able to set up against communism a higher conception, and a conception which is in truth more radical, of the end to be achieved.

To understand the essential unity of socialism and democracy, something more is needed than discussions concerning the connexion between politics and economics, concerning the defects of extant democratic institutions, or concerning the relationship between the labour movement and the bourgeois-democratic parties. Quite apart from democracy as an administrative

technique, as a form of constitution, or as a party movement, there is a democratic sentiment, based in the last analysis upon the belief that a man's happiest lot is the one which he chooses and makes for himself. In Marxist circles it is the fashion to introduce a shade of irony whenever democracy is mentioned, the implication being that democratic institutions in the parliamentarist States of our day are a mere sham, and that the bourgeoisie (while professing democracy) has always betrayed the workers as soon as its own interests as a class have been threatened. We may challenge the communists' right to assume this tone, for they themselves have sacrificed to their class interest—or party interest—the democratic liberties in whose name the Russian socialists overthrew tsarism. Under their tutelage, the Soviet Republic has become an institution infected with all the maladies of western parliamentarism, such as the partisan spirit, an overgrowth of consultative assemblies, bureaucracy, the moulding of public opinion by the government, the promulgation of sounding slogans to mask an actual subordination to economic forces. Meanwhile, the advantages attendant upon the existence of a free, critical opposition have been ruthlessly sacrificed. Even among non-communist Marxists there has always prevailed a tendency to speak contemptuously of the achievements of contemporary democracy; although in theory they profess allegiance to democracy as the ideal form of socialist regime. None the less, they are prone to identify democratic aspirations and democratic movements with petty-bourgeois aspirations, which they regard as fundamentally insincere nowadays, and as mainly calculated to divert the attention of the workers from the realities of the class struggle.

We have no right to form our estimate of the value of democracy as one of the trends of our day upon nothing more than a study of its working in extant institutions or parties. It is, of course, the fashion to criticise the inadequacy of democracy, by which the critics usually mean the parliamentary regime, though that is no more than a particular historical

form of democracy. A good many people are inclined to infer that democracy is an obsolete notion, as the communists and the fascists agree in contending. Most of those who accept this inference are strangely unaware of their own motives. Scepticism regarding traditional democratic phrase-making (intensified as it has been by the disillusionments of the Wilsonian era), jeremiads on the crisis in parliamentarism, and the like, are proofs, not of the weakness of democratic sentiment, but of its growing strength. If existing parliamentary and democratic institutions seem ever more inadequate, this is precisely because they are not democratic enough. What inspires criticism of them is, in most cases, the democratic sentiment by which the critics are animated in their own despite and unwittingly. One who criticises parliamentarism because it does not truly represent the popular will, shows a desire for genuine democracy. The basic ideas of democracy (equality of rights for all human beings, and the right of every member of the community to share in deciding the fate of that community) are surging up more vigorously than ever in the hearts of men; and discontent with the achievements of democracy, as we know it, is striking evidence of the existence of an unsatisfied longing for the realisation of the democratic ideal. Most of the advocates of dictatorship are disappointed democrats. A naive impatience leads them to fancy that dictatorship will be the shortest road towards self-determination, and especially national self-determination. They think that the dictator will express the will of the masses better than the parliamentarians. It is a great mistake to regard as signs of decadence, phenomena which are nothing more than symptoms of the infantile disorders from which the democratic movement suffers. The cause of these disorders is that among the younger nations the democratic sentiment has run ahead of political competence, which takes generations to ripen. The desire for self-government becomes active before people are fitted for self-government. All the same, the days when power came from above are over and done with. The rest is but a question of time. Meanwhile,

democratic aspirations have never been stronger than in our own day, which is characterised by a growing discontent with the democratic realisations of the last generation.

Socialists who underestimate the importance of this motive depreciate their own socialism. In the days before the war and the emergence of the new type of communism, Marxists were already disposed to take such a line, declaring as they did that democracy is the form of government which accords with capitalism at its zenith, and therefore with bourgeois interests and ideals. Nothing could be more fallacious than such an identification of democracy with capitalism. It is the germ of the communist tendency to condemn political democracy as mere window-dressing, as a manifestation of bourgeois hypocrisy, while extolling bureaucratic despotism (itself masquerading under cover of the "soviet system"), as the truly proletarian form of government.

In reality, whatever degree of democracy the industrial States of modern Europe actually possess, is the very lifeblood of the working-class movement. Had not the workers, as soon as their thoughts began to turn in the direction of socialism, identified their own cause with that of democracy, Germany would still have been a confederation of princes, France a constitutional monarchy with a parliament elected by persons having a property qualification, and England the capitalist paradise of the days before the Reform Bill. All that has been won in Europe during the last hundred years, whether in the way of freedom of action for the labour movement or in the way of political rights for the workers—in a word, the substantial content of our democratic institutions to-day—has been the fruit of the working-class struggle, carried on by workers many of whom were inspired by the socialist ideal. Even in this empirical and historical sense, democracy and socialism are inseparable ideas.

It is true that long ere this the rising bourgeoisie had inscribed the principles of political democracy upon its banners, in the struggle against feudalism and absolute monarchy. The American Declaration of Independence and the French



Declaration of the Rights of Man are documents of bourgeois revolutions. At a much earlier date the democratic constitutions of the urban republics of the Middle Ages were established in the interest of the ascendant bourgeoisie. But there is quite as much difference between these bourgeois democracies and our extant democratic institutions, as there is between the medieval craft guilds or the tiers état (commoners) of 1789, who formed the oppressed class of producers in those days, and the capitalist class of the present time. It remained for the working class to carry the fight for universal suffrage to an end, in struggles which lasted on until yesterday.

The ethical conceptions which animated these struggles derived from a period much antecedent to the constitutional texts of 1776 and 1789. Like all democracy since the guild republicanism of the Middle Ages, they spring from the equalitarian principles of Christianity. Every democratic moral notion, and therefore every socialist notion, is at bottom founded upon the idea of equality, which is one of the basic principles of Christianity. When Bernard Shaw tells us that the democratic sentiment is a feeling of absolute respect for our fellow human beings, he is really expressing the same idea as that expressed by the Christians when they speak of the likeness of God to man and of the immortality of the soul—the implication being that every one must have self-respect, self-determination, responsibility for his own actions. Only in a society where institutions and customs have been permeated with Christian feeling for centuries, can even the lowest and the poorest of the citizens acquire a sense of dignity based upon the conviction that all human beings have a like claim to respect from the community.

The Church, notwithstanding its will-to-power, was never able to hinder the extension of this equalitarian demand from the domain of religion to that of social practice; and the demand never ceased to assert itself with elemental force. That is why, long before the great bourgeois revolutions, those who attempted to found communist societies during the Middle Ages, those who insisted upon the need for political

and social equality, democratic reformers in general, took their stand upon the fundamental principles of Christianity. For the same reason, the socialist movement to-day is confined to the lands of Christian civilisation. For this reason, finally, Christian sentiment remains one of the most bountiful sources of democratic and socialist convictions.

It is important to note that the transformation of Christian sentiment into socialist sentiment can only occur by way of democratic sentiment. Since the fundamental notions of political democracy have marked their imprint upon working-class mentality, working-class socialism has shown itself, essentially, to be a transference of the democratic principle from the political domain to the economic and social domain. Regarded from this outlook, the socialist movement becomes at one and the same time the instrument of democracy, which the bourgeoisie has deserted, and the instrument for the realisation of the Christian ideal, which the Church has betrayed.

Western Christianity has a Teutonic stamp, a stamp impressed upon it by races which passed many generations under a kind of self-government, and were ruled by elected chiefs. When these peoples form themselves into larger communities, this tendency towards democracy persists, and is, in the end, always victorious over the authoritarian desires of the rulers. The communes overthrow feudalism. In sanguinary struggles, the craft guilds defeat the attempts of the trading patriciates to govern from above. The bourgeois nationalities, formed when economy assumes a national type, free themselves from absolute monarchy. Sectaries with an inclination to early Christian communism reject popery. The primitive tribe, the peasant "mark", the artisan guild, the Hansa trading corporation, show that the desire of equal men for self-government is not displayed solely in the political field, but takes effect likewise in the formation of economic communities. It realises itself everywhere where the extent and the homogeneity of these communities is such that the administrative problem can be solved. In comparatively

recent history, the industrial revolution has destroyed these germs of self-government, and has handed over economic life to the chaos of unbridled acquisitive instincts. Of all the ancient communities, the political community alone has survived in this epoch of a worldwide economy. However, industrial and social democracy is now in course of reconstruction from beneath, under stress of an impulse originating in the working class. We can see more and more clearly how this reconstruction proceeds, after the political obstacles imposed by bourgeois class dominion have been swept away ; how it moves from below upwards, spreading from the single cell to the organism as a whole. Workers' participation in the social management of industrial enterprises, instituted by the trade unions, is a foreshadowing of the cellular structure of the industrial community of the future.

Wherever a community exists, we feel to how great an extent this tendency is based upon a unique instinct. In the family, likewise, the principle of authority is being overthrown by the principle of equality and by that of self-government, so that the relationships between wife and husband, between children and parents, are being remodelled. We see here the manifestations of a psychological impulse which is more closely akin to socialist conviction than the Marxists imagine. Let me say in passing, that Marxism does a bad turn to socialism by refusing to recognise this kinship. The Marxists consider that changes in law and in family custom are nothing more than a mechanical reflexion of economic evolution. They thus favour a trend towards the condemnation of married women's demand for the recognition of their personality, for more self-government and more leisure, as nothing better than bourgeois feminism. Nevertheless, these aspirations spring from the same source as those of men in favour of the eight-hour day. By ascribing the enslavement of women to the capitalist system, many a domestic despot, even in the working class, finds excuses for continuing a family regime which in substance is thoroughly bourgeois. But in English-speaking lands, where democratic sentiment has persisted

more effectively in institutions and customs, and where socialism is ethical rather than Marxist, the emancipation of working-class women from the tyranny of men in the home has gone farther than it has in Germany, where Marxist social democracy is supreme in the labour movement.

The longer and the more acrimonious the working-class struggle for political democracy, the more will every democratic achievement seem to the workers the outcome of their own efforts, and the more energetically will they resist any attack upon democracy. That accounts for a phenomenon which the orthodox Marxists, and especially the Russian communists, find difficult to understand. Namely, that it is the very peoples among whom democratic institutions are most fully developed which are most warmly attached to these institutions, despite their imperfections. Furthermore, among these peoples, it is the most socialist strata of the working class which are most ready to make great sacrifices for the defence and the development of democratic institutions, even though they are best able to understand the defects and the dangers of democracy. It was only socialists whom dogma had blinded to this internal psychological connexion who regarded as an incomprehensible miracle the attraction which the slogan "the defence of democracy" had for the socialists of the Entente countries during the war. I am not concerned here to ask how much sincerity there was in the minds of the rulers who first voiced this slogan, or how sound was the reasoning of the socialists who took up arms in obedience to it. All I wish, at the moment, is to point out the psychological influence of the slogan upon the masses.

If, then, we see in socialism something other, and something more, than an antithesis of modern capitalism, and if we trace its moral and intellectual roots, we shall find that these roots are identical with those of the whole of our western civilisation. Christianity, democracy, and socialism will then be regarded, even from the historical point of view, as merely three forms of one and the same idea. An inexhaustible source of spiritual energy is tapped by the socialist who becomes aware of this

unity. Then his aims acquire a significance which is derived, not only from the political economy of the nineteenth century, but also from the history of twenty centuries of the western world. Every one of the facts of this history, ranging from the Sermon on the Mount to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Communist Manifesto, from medieval communism to the modern labour movement, passing by way of humanism, the Reformation, the wars of national liberation, and the birth of the world market—all these things will thenceforward seem to him a series of stages in a vast evolution towards a great end. Every action which brings us nearer to this goal, forms a part of the united efforts of the whole of mankind.

It is not surprising that those pioneers of socialism who were very much under the spell of a consciousness of this spiritual unity, should have exercised upon their generation an influence which the Marxist finds absolutely incomprehensible. Jaurès, for instance, remained an enigma to the German social democrats who regarded *Capital* as the Old Testament and the Erfurt Program as the New. They spoke of him as the "corrupter of the party", because, for him, socialism was not the automatic fulfilment of an economic necessity, but the integral realisation of the democratic ideal. They did not take him seriously as a scientist, because, instead of talking the tongue of economics, he used that of a humanist philosopher and poet. Nevertheless, this "poet", this "muddle-headed visionary", did more on behalf of socialism than any of his European contemporaries! His influence was not restricted to his own party. Even his opponents could not escape the force of his personality and his ideas; and he had more effect upon the policy of his country than he would have had if he had only been a shrewd tactician. Are we to suppose that this widespread influence was the chance outcome of a vigorous personality? I do not think so. His personality was only the expression of his ideas; great ideas made him a great man. Jaurès could influence people who held other views than his, because he appealed to human motives which he knew existed in their minds. Marxism, on the other hand, basing its

appeal upon dogmas of the class struggle, shuts its philosophical conceptions in water-tight compartments, so that the Marxists misunderstand and despise the motives of their adversaries, and weaken their own case by regarding every political decision as a simple conflict of mechanical forces.

When thinking of Jaurès, we are tempted to paraphrase his celebrated remark on patriotism, and to say: "A little socialism takes us away from democracy; but a great deal of socialism brings us back". Here, however, I am not thinking only of democracy as a primary sentiment of equality. When fructified by the socialist idea, it seems to me a much more precise notion, that of an ideal social organisation, in which the right of self-determination is the sole foundation of community life. Thus *democracy as an idea* comes at the end of a process of the development of socialist consciousness, just as *democracy as a feeling* initiates that process. It is this democratic kernel of the socialist idea which enables us to solve the social inferiority complex of the worker, who is overwhelmed by the feeling of inequality. We can solve this complex by contraposing the moral conception of a society based upon an equality of political rights and social opportunities. Of course this does not mean that there will be an absolute equality of human destinies, but only that there will be equality in respect of the social opportunities out of which the individual's destiny is formed, so that individuals, to use Kant's phrase, become the subjects, not the objects, of social happening.

What has been said above gives no more than a summary account of the fundamental affect which is common to all democratic aspirations. In the region of intellect, these aspirations may take the most diverse forms. Here, too, the compensatory moral conception is accurately adapted to the inferiority complex which calls for solution. To each form of social environment, to each traditional moral and legal sentiment, whose combined action arouses the feeling of inequality, there corresponds a different shade of compensatory moral conception.

If, for example, a working class has regarded its exclusion from the right to vote as a peculiarly intolerable injustice, as did the British workers during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, or the Belgian workers during the last quarter of that century, its longing for equality will be mainly symbolised in political demands—all the more since the primary inferiority complex will have been intensified by the introduction of conscious motives born of the long and fierce struggle for political equality. On the other hand, after gaining the right to vote, the British working class has a much keener consciousness of the general disadvantages of its social situation, and is much more concerned with the idea of an equalisation of social possibilities, than are the workers of the Latin countries. In the Latin countries, the workers suffer more severely from the oppression of the State, which takes a more tyrannical character from bureaucratic centralisation, from militarism, and from the traditions of Roman law. In Britain and the United States, the workers are led by their longing for equality to demand *freedoms* from the State; in continental European countries, the workers clamour for *rights*. In the English-speaking lands, the demand is that the State shall not hinder the process of social change. In Latin countries, the demand is that social changes shall be regulated by law.

Within the various continental countries, moreover, this desire of the workers takes very different forms. In France, where small-scale enterprise predominates, where the economy is essentially petty-bourgeois and peasant, where the ideals of thrifty traders and of dividend receivers predominate, and where anarchist, Proudhonist, and syndicalist traditions are at one and the same time the causes and the indications of an individualist mentality—it is individuals who demand equality from the State. In Germany, on the other hand, it is the class as a collectivity which demands equality from the State. In Germany, social equality seems to the worker, not so much a task of liberation, as a task of organisation. The German workers demand rights, not for the individual, but for the

working class. The instinctive ideal of the masses (although their programs do not express it clearly) is, at bottom, a new organisation of social classes upon a quasi-feudal basis, with a working class protected and privileged by the State, so that the protections and the privileges shall form a counterpoise to its economic inferiority. For in Germany the State did not issue out of the Roman tradition, but out of the patriarchal and feudal tradition. In Germany, the transformation from the peasant and artisan State to the industrial State was achieved in a single generation. Millions of persons have passed without transition from the feudal subjection of the serf to the neo-feudal subjection of the workers in large-scale enterprise; they feel themselves to be proletarians, to be members of a class which needs protection; and this feeling has come to them before they have been able to feel themselves to be men, citizens, individuals. From the first, their inferiority complex was a class complex, because the class cleavage existed and was politically organised before the industrial revolution. The class consciousness of the German workers was, so to say, organised from above; and Bismarck may be thanked for it quite as much as Bebel. Among them, the demands of individuals are but a corollary of the demands of the class; whereas among their western neighbours, the demand of the class is nothing more than the integration of the demands of individuals.

Furthermore, the German's emphasis of the class demand is made at the cost of the wider notion of social community, and also at the cost of the more restricted notion of the individual. For decades, there was a dispute whether the Social Democratic Party was to be regarded as a people's party or as a class party. To a large extent, the dispute was purely verbal, one which words could equally well solve or present as insoluble. Really, it solved itself in practice. As soon as the socialist effectives become so numerous as to embrace the great majority of industrial proletarians, the socialist parties' will-to-power inevitably urges them to enlarge their field of recruiting. In the long run, a party which wishes to recruit



members, and especially electors, must be willing to appeal to motives which are not merely those of a class, but which have a general interest.

Marxist theoreticians, therefore, may go on voicing their denial of the existence of social ties superior to class interests, but practice marches over such theories, and makes compromises where dogma had seen only contradictions. In reality, the existence of class parties is by no means incompatible with the fundamental principles of political democracy. It would be strange were there any such incompatibility, for class parties are the historical product of democratic and parliamentary constitutionalism. The parliamentary regime presupposes the existence of parties. Under the regime of universal suffrage, a grouping of parties in accordance with class interests reveals itself as the best way of giving these parties the greatest amount of effective force and the greatest amount of responsibility towards the electors. By this method, too, the most important political aims can be most clearly formulated and can best be brought into the foreground. When we are dealing with the masses, an appeal to economic interests forms the best method of making political volitions concrete.

Thanks, however, to the nature of the tasks which the modern State imposes, in proportion as political parties draw nearer to the seats of power, the purely class motives by which these parties ensure the loyalty of their adherents must give place to other motives. Although in the lands where universal suffrage prevails, all the parties (not the socialist parties alone) have, more or less openly, become class parties, it is increasingly difficult for any party which takes power, to remain, in respect of practical politics, nothing more than a class party. I cannot think of any country at the present moment in which a ruling party is inspired solely by the principles of its own program and by the interests of the social stratum which it represents—though this still happened in the days of the two-party system, and when parliaments were elected by a restricted suffrage. Everywhere compromise

is the rule, everywhere the powers of the opposition have to be reckoned with. In all civilised lands, the realities of the State confirm Jaurès' dynamic conception that "the State is the expression of a bourgeois democracy in which the power of the proletariat is increasing"; everywhere the realities of the State invalidate the static conception of the Marxists, that "the State is the executive committee which watches over the interests of the possessing classes". That is why, in the vocabulary of political struggle, the ideology of the public good (generally travestied to-day as national interest) has almost completely supplanted the ideology of class interest. This latter only has a part to play nowadays in propaganda among the masses. Programs are means of propaganda. In actual political work, in parliament and in the ministries, persons in power seek alliances with those whose interests are momentarily identical with their own, and they make compromises with powerful opponents.

We see, then, that the stressing of the class outlook belongs to the primitive and purely propagandist phase of socialism. In early days, an appeal to class interests is the most efficacious means of awakening the political will of the masses, and of bringing about the first concentration. As soon as this concentration has been effected, as it has been in almost all civilised lands, the centre of gravity of the motives shifts towards the democratic conception. For democrats, interests and particular programs, party programs, are nothing more than elements, whose integration into a united formula is the function of the parliamentary State. Doctrinaires who fail to recognise this will, in the long run, lose all contact with reality. To quote Jaurès once more, they will "lessen the efficiency of popular and proletarian action by the paralysing contradiction between the words which they say and the things which they do".

CHAPTER FIVE

SOLIDARITY, ESCHATOLOGY, RELIGIOUS  
SYMBOLISM

We all believe that our religion is in its death-agony. In fact, it is not yet born, though the time is obviously pregnant with it.

BERNARD SHAW.

MARKISTS have tried to explain the feeling of solidarity with which the working class is animated as the outcome of the workers' community of interests against the employers. Unfortunately, they have falsified such elements of truth as this idea contains by giving it too categorical a form, and by interpreting the notion of interest in a purely economic way. They have thereby diffused among the workers mechanical and materialist conceptions, which have interfered with the ethical development of the feeling of working-class solidarity. For Marxists, the ethic of working-class solidarity, in respect both of origin and purpose, is a simple matter of class. In their view, working-class solidarity comes about more or less as follows. Capitalist industrial enterprise brings human beings together under conditions which give them a common economic interest. These human beings then come to look upon class solidarity as a necessity. As we read in a celebrated passage in the Communist Manifesto: "To begin with, the workers fight individually; then the workers in a single factory make common cause; then the workers at one trade combine throughout a whole locality. . . ." Ultimately, when the workers seize power and put an end to class exploitation, this class solidarity will enlarge into social solidarity.

The theory presupposes, first of all, that the worker, considered as an individual, is, at the outset of the process, a sort of isolated atom, a being not tied to his environment by

any social or moral instinct. It presupposes, in the second place, that the formation of his sense of solidarity is a simple affair of consciousness, is based upon the recognition of the community of certain acquisitive interests. In the third place, it presupposes that this solidarity is the apanage of a single class, and cannot become transformed into a social ethic until a new class power shall have created a new economic form.

If all this were true, socialism would be in a bad way. For, if it were true, the working class, strong in virtue of its effective solidarity, might seize power; but, presumably, would only use the power it had seized in order to dominate the other social groups, and to put new social antagonisms in the place of the old. Marxist theory does not provide for the formation of new moral motives in the working class. In the present and future action of the workers, it sees nothing more than the mechanical continuation of the impulse born out of the antagonistic form of capitalist production, an impulse which, logically speaking, ought to disappear when capitalist production disappears. To attempt to build up a new ethic upon the solidarity of proletarian interests is to march into a blind alley, for a sentiment which is only due to the awareness of an interest can have no ethical significance whatever. On the contrary, ethics presuppose a sentiment which finds expression in an inner impulse, independently of the consideration whether this impulse will or will not subserve an interest. We can even say that ethics do not begin until interest comes to an end, and that the worth of a moral volition is measured by the strength of the opposing interest which this volition is able to overcome.

In reality, working-class solidarity does not constitute a new motive. It is nothing more than a special form of that elementary instinct of social beings which psychologists speak of as the herd instinct and which moralists speak of as the altruistic instinct—an instinct which underlies all morality.

The human being whose moral activities are explained by Marxists as the outcome of a cognition of interests, is our

old friend the "economic man" of the days of the capitalist Enlightenment; he is the perfect egoist and hedonist, who knows no other impulses than those which are the expression of his interests "rightly understood". We have learned since the days when this theory was dominant, that the real human being acts in pursuance of altruistic instincts as well as egoistic instincts; and that these altruistic instincts are something very different from enlightened egoism, being, in especial, the outcome of the herd instinct and the instinct of social protection.

The worker of the primary capitalist epoch who formed the first notion of working-class solidarity, was not a clean slate in respect of habitual moral tendencies; he was already guided by ancestral community instincts which had been modelled into ethical norms by Christianity and by the social experience of past centuries. His desire for solidarity emerged out of these instincts and out of these habitual valuations; it was not the outcome of any new knowledge. If this man had really been able to act only as a result of a knowledge of his economic position, he would not have linked up his own fate with that of his comrades of the exploited class, but would, on the contrary, have tried to climb into a higher class. Had he acted only under the promptings of interest, he would have become an arrivist, instead of becoming a heroic champion of a new idea. If he chose the latter alternative, it was because he was urged towards solidarity by motives more powerful than economic interest. These motives arose out of a sublimated herd instinct which Christianity had transformed into charity, and which the tradition of the craft guilds had modified into craft fraternity. No doubt class interest plays an important part in the way in which this motive manifests itself, especially in view of the extent and the characteristics of the community to which it attaches itself. Class interest does not create the motive. On the contrary, the formation of class communities presupposes the existence of an ethical community instinct. The inadequacy of the mechanistic and rationalist conceptions of Marxism, according to which moral

motives are the outcome of nothing more than a recognition of class interest, was first brought home to me by a celebrated historian, a teacher of mine, who asked me, a good many years ago: "If the social and ethical motives of the contemporary workers arise out of their class interests, what will become of these motives as soon as this class, having attained power, will, as the Marxists tell us, abolish classes? There will no longer be any class interest to guide people. Whence are the new motives to come?"

The answer which I then tried to give, satisfied me so little that it became for me the starting-point of a lengthy examination of conscience, which ultimately led to a complete change in my outlooks. Meanwhile, innumerable practical experiences, especially in Russia, have shown me that the question has something more than a theoretical importance. Years passed, however, before I found an answer which satisfied me. Here it is: Class interests do not explain everything. Class interest cannot create ethical motives. It does nothing more than give a new form and a new direction to extant motives which are inherent in the social nature of man. When a class situation has ceased to exist, these motives will only continue in action in so far as they are in conformity with the general commandments of the human conscience. A class whose solidarity was founded solely upon interests would not, having attained power, try to do anything more than to realise under some other form the egoistic instincts which had been the motives of this interest, and it would therefore set up a new social domination. The working class will only be able to construct a society less rent asunder by antagonisms than the present one, in proportion as it succeeds in transforming the social motives which are the outcome of class interest, into an ethical rule which is the foundation of daily habits. It will succeed all the better in proportion as it emphasises more vigorously the bonds between these motives and those of general human ethics, and in proportion as its adepts become aware of this unity. A doctrine, therefore, which tries to establish the motive of

working-class solidarity upon interest, is not only indefensible from the historical and psychological outlook, but is also harmful from the practical point of view, for it breaks down the bridge which, in every one's conscience, leads from private economic interest to the general moral law.

It is because they have a more or less vague feeling that this is so, that so many Marxists try to bring in by the back door the ethical factor which they believe themselves to have eliminated by their criticism of Kant and of "bourgeois" philosophy. The way they try to do this is by raising economic interest (as far as the working class, and the working class only, is concerned) to the level of a moral ordinance. Alas, that which they thus try to introduce by the back door is not the same thing as that which they have driven out by the front door. This class interest lacks all the indications characteristic of moral duty. Instead of being intuitively felt, it is derived from a rational cognition. Instead of wishing to dominate the lower impulses of egoism, it offers itself as their servant. Instead of addressing itself to all the members of the social community, it addresses itself only to the members of one class; and the attitude which it inculcates upon them is to be assumed only towards their own class comrades, so that all other human beings are excluded from the moral law.

Thus solidarity which is the outcome of class interest ceases where that interest ceases, or, at any rate, where it is no longer recognised. Of course we see plenty of examples of the kind in actual life; but the examples in question suffice to prove that this lower form of solidarity has no ethical effectiveness. For instance, every one knows that in many workshops the young workers and the apprentices are by no means well treated by the adult workers, although all may be members of the same union, and theoretically solidarised. Every one knows, too, how readily a workman who has been appointed foreman, and becomes aware of a new "interest", will be transformed into a worse despot even than the boss. A workman, again, who will shrink from no sacrifice in order to win better working conditions, better wages, and more

freedom, for himself and his colleagues, will never give a thought to the possibility of relieving his wife of the domestic burdens by which she is overwhelmed. Until the British trade unionists came to recognise that the low wages paid to unskilled workers made their competition dangerous, the sentiment of solidarity was restricted to skilled workmen; the other were refused admission to the unions, and were not allowed to work at privileged industries. In those days the comparative prosperity of trade unionists was bought at the cost of the pauperisation of the great mass of unskilled workers. The change in technical conditions, the "new unionism" since 1885, and, subsequently, the social transformations of the war period enlarged the notion of solidarity. We see a similar situation in the United States, as concerns the attitude of the American-born white workers towards their coloured compatriots and even towards recent immigrants from Europe.

Marxists will naturally tell me that my examples signify no more than that a great many members of the working class still fail to recognise their true class interests. Thus, they say, the American worker who wants to prohibit or restrict immigration is inspired by craft interests, and not by class interests, which know nothing of racial barriers. Well, supposing that this is true, does it not prove the soundness of my contention that the sense of class interest of which the Marxist speak is not the outcome of economic experience or economic cognitions? For the American worker, his most obvious economic interest is to defend his rate of wages against the effects of mass immigration; this interest makes him join forces with his workmates and form front with them against the employers. The idea of a social community to include negroes and Asiatics as well as white Americans seems to him a good one only as a rhetorical flourish in the minister's Sunday sermon. He will never even dream of the possibility of a community of interests between himself, a "nigger", and a "Chink". A conception of class interest which would be competent to transform the American workman's antipathy for his foreign competitors into an ardent



fraternal affection, presupposes a humanitarian passion which would be as manifestly "ethical" in nature as the present policy of the American labour unions is manifestly the expression of economic interest. This gives additional proof that the frontiers of economic interest coincide with those of the knowledge of that interest. The absence of such a knowledge in the above-quoted instances shows how narrow are the limits within which class interest can produce solidarity. If, therefore, we deprive the sentiment of solidarity of all other motives than economic interest, we completely denude it of its ethical character—and thus make it "inhuman", in the generic sense of this word.

If, none the less, we are entitled to regard working-class solidarity as the germ of a new social ethic, this is because, in its socialist form, it is something very different from an awareness of interest—because it is a special manifestation of a community instinct natural to mankind, an instinct whose obliteration by the competitive economy of capitalism will be transient. Now, an instinct is not born out of knowledge. Love does not spring from a knowledge of the qualities of the beloved. What happens in such cases is that instinct awakens attention, and that an element of awareness is then introduced. A man feels solidarised with those who suffer under the injustice from which he himself also suffers. The more keenly he feels the injustice, the more plainly will he become aware of a community of fate and interest. If working-class solidarity is to acquire an ethical and cultural value, it will not be enough that, thanks to the growth of a clearer consciousness or to a widened grasp of the situation, this sense of solidarity shall be extended from the craft group or the national group of workers to the working class as a whole, considered internationally. In addition, there must arise the consciousness of something that is the outcome, not so much of a common interest, as of a common revolt of the moral sentiment against a social injustice.

Here, once more, there is an interesting parallelism between psychological affiliation and historical evolution. In the history

of the working-class movement, the notion of solidarity oscillates between the ethical and emotional pole, on the one hand, and the economic and rationalist pole, on the other. The ethical form is primary ; the economic, secondary. The theories of solidarity based upon a knowledge of interests are the product of a later epoch, and represent regressive trends in the working-class movement—trends which may make that movement degenerate in the direction of self-seeking.

The occupations in which the idea of trade-union solidarity first became active were not those in which the workers' community of interests was most conspicuous. Had the problem of solidarity been merely a problem of knowledge, the factory workers of large-scale mechanised industry would have been the first to solve it. They are brought together at work in great numbers ; there are not among them any large discrepancies in the matter of wages, and they are comparatively free from craft prejudices ; they would seem, therefore, to have been better fitted to grasp the notion of working-class solidarity than were the workers whose occupations brought them together in rather small numbers. In actual fact, however, the practice and the terminology of working-class solidarity were not originated by the workers in textile or other big factories, but by printers, engravers, cabinet-makers, builders, glovers, hatters, tailors, cigar-makers, persons engaged in all sorts of small-scale occupations. This happened although they were less completely proletarianised than the factory "hands," despite the prejudices and traditions of their crafts, notwithstanding the existence of close personal ties with their employers, and although they were widely scattered in innumerable little workshops. From my own outlook, I should say that it happened "because" of these things, and not "in spite of" them ; for, in view of their comparatively petty-bourgeois mode of life, the workers of the categories above named were from the first animated with a vigorous community sentiment, and were much more strongly influenced by the guild spirit than a good many historians have been willing to admit. It was this community spirit which, as soon

as it became tinctured with socialist ideas, created working-class solidarity. Even to-day, the solidarity of the printers (for instance) cuts far deeper, and has much more influence upon daily habits, than that of unskilled factory workers. Though these latter are "pure proletarians" in the Marxist sense of the term, for them solidarity is a political and theoretical concept, rather than a force which sways them in their daily lives. In proportion as the working-class movement expands into a mass movement, the ethical impulse is replaced by interested considerations. To-day, class solidarity only possesses, or has only regained, the significance of a socialist and non-capitalist motive, in so far as it is inspired with community traditions and the moral sentiment.

Here we reach the point at which the workers' social inferiority complex, inasmuch as it becomes resolved into a positive ethical notion capable of leading to the formation of habits, changes from a debit psychological state into a credit one. As soon as this change has occurred, there is an outburst of phenomena of mass psychology which are to so small a degree the emanations of an awareness of interests that they can only be described in a terminology drawn from the history of religions and the psychology of creeds. The chief of these phenomena is the eschatological sentiment—an affect akin to that which leads a Christian to meditate on Last Things.

One who suffers, hopes; and one who hopes, believes. Thus in folk wisdom is enshrined the psychological truth that every unpleasant emotional state arouses the compensatory idea of a happier state. The working-class social inferiority complex, intensified to the pitch of moral indignation against extant social conditions, gives birth to a new affect, that of a longing for a better future. Man always believes in what he yearns for, and his belief grows more vivid in proportion as his present suffering is more acute. Such faith is a psychological need, and it cannot be repressed except at the cost of complete demoralisation, of upsetting the balance of the mind. Why is it that all the social aspirations of the

masses, in so far as they are based on a belief in better days to come, have a religious stamp? Because, in essence, these aspirations are eschatological, the expression of an affect, of a craving for happier times, whereof Jewish messianism, Christian chiliasm, the medieval expectation of the Kingdom of God, are no more than particular manifestations. The faith of the masses to-day in a socialist State of the future, which will put an end to social suffering and social injustice, is not the outcome of scientific cognition, but the expression of an eschatological hope. There is no human *science* of the future. There is only *faith* in the future; and among the forces which combine to bring this future into being, the faith in its coming is one of the most effective. The only way in which scientific knowledge can help this faith is by disclosing possible paths of realisation, and by transforming a vague aspiration into a conscious volition. The volition is born out of the faith, and nourishes itself upon the faith, by changing simple emotional reactions into ideational symbols which serve to guide the movement. The visions of the future we owe to prophetic sociology, what are they but symbols which set up a goal for the will? That is why socialism cannot be understood except by regarding it as a creed, except by those who realise that the essential function of socialist doctrine is to supply this creed with guiding symbols.

The kinship between the psychological foundations of socialism and those of Christianity, is shown likewise by the fact that almost all the symbolism of the socialist working-class movement is of Christian origin. There is nothing strange in that. If symbols are to touch our affects, they must be linked with our customary emotional associations. Now, the emotional symbols of Christianity are, for us westerners, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone.

We need not discuss here at any length why or how the hereditary transmission of certain emotional fixations makes particular peoples receptive to particular symbols. Perhaps it can be explained by the biological hypothesis of the inheritance of acquired characters; perhaps, by the psychological

hypothesis of a subconscious hereditary memory ; perhaps, by the sociological fact that the elements of a particular culture are handed down from parents to children. This much is certain, that Christian symbolism harmonises with the ways of thought and the ways of looking at things which are characteristic of western civilisation. Besides, it is not so much a question of explaining socialist ideas by Christian ideas, as of reducing all alike to a common psychological denominator, this implying that there is a typical western and Christian mode of thought. The hypothesis can readily be verified by facts. Thus, the peculiar dynamic character of our western civilisation, obsessed by the desire for change and haunted by the notion of the infinite, finds expression quite as much in the longing of socialists to revolutionise the social order, as in the unbounded desire for moral perfectionment which animates Christianity. Western Christianity is, preeminently, a dynamic universal religion. Alone among religions, it assumes the existence of a boundless universe and an infinite deity. It assigns to man an ideal of superhuman perfection, makes him solely responsible for the salvation of his own soul, makes the care of his immortal soul superior to every earthly consideration, and regards every moral state as nothing more than the starting point of an aspiration towards a better state. This perpetual impetus induces in the masses an eschatological state of mind, as soon as the discrepancy between social realities and social aspirations exceeds a certain measure. The characteristic of the tension which results from this discrepancy is that it does not oppose an individual reality to an individual aspiration, but culminates in the expectation of a radical transformation of the common lot. Social eschatology implies a faith in an abrupt change of the social state, this applying equally to the overthrow of the pagan empire of Rome, and to the uplifting of the poor to a position higher than that of the rich and the powerful.

This socialist eschatological affect does not appear until the basic sentiments of the social inferiority complex—the class complex, and, in especial, the sentiment of solidarity—have

already come into existence, and have founded a community sentiment extending at least to the whole class. It is the eschatological expectation of a new social order which leads from the community sentiment limited to the class, to the general ethical sentiment extending to the whole of society. The new state which is longed for is not a simple change of the individual worker's own class position, but a new social order which will transform the destinies of all. It is here that there comes into play in the affective state of the working class, the sentiment characteristic of all socialist conviction which makes the individual morally responsible for the whole human community. This is the same sentiment which Christianity symbolises in its doctrine of sin and redemption, and which Dostoeffsky's mysticism formulated in the phrase: "All are to blame for everything". All the other elementary sentiments by which we have characterised the affective state of the working class, from the sentiment of exploitation down to that of class solidarity (let the reader think of the non-socialist British trade unionism of former days), can exist without there being any question of socialism. The eschatological sentiment introduces for the first time an instinct directed to something beyond personal happiness, within whose bounds the acquisitive instinct, the instinct of autovaluation, and even the herd instinct, are still restricted. We are concerned, now, with the instinct of social protection, which is closely akin to parental love, and is deeply rooted in the sexual nature of man, leading him to regard moral participation in the destiny of all his neighbours as a moral law, and inducing him to sacrifice himself to that law. Every sentiment of right derives from this instinct, for it can only exist where an individual feels personal resentment for injustice done to another.

An eschatological sentiment, without which no socialist conviction can be explained, therefore presupposes something very different from a simple conflict of material interests. The first necessity is that a man should feel the social order which brings about these oppositions of interest to be essentially immoral or unjust. It is only upon this condition that

the new order will appear to be the realisation of a moral commandment, that which the vocabulary of the Church terms the kingdom of God, that which socialist mysticism refers to as the era of brotherhood, that which Engels means when he speaks of "the leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom". In all these cases alike, an essential characteristic is that the future system of society presents itself as an absolute, and not merely as a relative, good. The image of this system is brought into being by a complete reversal of the image of the extant system, considered as an absolute evil; the change occurring by a process analogous to the transformation of a photographic negative into a positive. The utopists construct their vision after the manner of Brother Jean des Entommeures in *Rabelais*, who drafted the rules and regulations of his ideal abbey of Thelema by turning the extant rules and regulations of Catholic monasticism upside down.

I need hardly say that this process is not scientific. No one who thinks objectively, be he never so convinced a socialist, can conceive of the social situation of the year 2000, or even of that of the year 10,000, as a perfect realisation of the ideal good. Sociologists know too well that social progress, in the best event, can only mean an approximation to an ideal which recedes as it is realised. They know, too, that progress does not consist in the suppression of all tensions and all antagonisms, but in their transference to a higher plane. They know, moreover, that we cannot possibly imagine a social life without suffering, since this would be contrary to the whole psychological organisation of man, for whom suffering and happiness are motives of action differing in their temporary forms, though immutable in their emotional essence. They know, finally, that a state of absolute perfection, supposing it to be possible, would kill desire, and would therefore entail hopeless boredom—that most subtle of all forms of torture!

Scientific thought, then, can only represent the future, in relation to our actual desires, as a "relative good". The consciousness of this need **I**not make the sage slacken his

activities on behalf of the creation of a better social system. It will not make him do so, for the notion of the "better" will suffice to stimulate and intellectualise passion. Nevertheless, it will not suffice to feed the eschatological desire of the masses. They can only be incited to action by faith in a good which is absolute because it is moral. Action on behalf of a good which is relatively good, presupposes a faculty of imagination partly independent of desire; few are capable of this amount of imagination without becoming unfitted thereby for practical action on behalf of social movements. The vigour of such movements depends upon the strength of the sentiments which animate them; and the sentiments of the masses require, like other emotional states, a belief in the possibility of absolute satisfaction. It is the trend towards the absolute which impresses upon the socialist working-class movement its eschatological and religious character.

Of course, this does not apply with the same strictness to all the phases of the movement. If we study the history of the working-class movement down to our own days, we note that the eschatological character is, generally speaking, most marked in the early phases. It gradually passes into the background when the movement becomes crystallised into organisations, and when the purely propagandist activities of the start are replaced by concrete and immediate tasks—by what the Germans call "Kleinarbeit", detail work. It must not be supposed, however, that the evolution of the movement systematically runs this course, or that the eschatological phase of socialism belongs only to the past. On reflection, we shall see that new eschatological waves may come, differing from those of the nineteenth century, but not necessarily less powerful than these.

The eschatological disposition arises everywhere when there is a great discrepancy between the aspiration of the masses towards social amelioration and the possibility of immediate realisation or realisation in a near future. The primitive Marxism of the epoch of the Communist Manifesto was the doctrine of those who regarded it as certain that this discrepancy,



and the resulting tension, would increase so as to become intolerable, thanks to the concentration of capital, leading to an intensification of class antagonisms. Since 1848 we have learned that phenomena will not necessarily take such a course even if class antagonisms become accentuated. We have to do, here, with a psychological phenomenon, which is certainly not independent of the economic environment, but which takes its rise in the variable psychological conditions of the whole of our cultural life, and more particularly in the development of the labour movement itself. Anyhow, a gradual reinforcement of the eschatological sentiment has not occurred, as the Marxists expected that it would. Still, there are indications suggesting the possibility of new eschatological tensions; either as the sequel of such events as wars, which take place in a very different plane from that of economic evolution; or else, more directly, as a sequel of modifications in the psychology of the masses, originated by an inherent mental tendency.

We may, indeed, regard the vigorous eschatological sentiment of the Russian revolution since the year 1917 as a belated wave belonging to the current which swept across western and central Europe in the nineteenth century; for in Russia we have to do with masses which had vegetated down to 1917 in gloomy resignation, and which had suddenly been awakened to a new life by the collapse of the old regime during the war. The course of events was different in other countries, and especially in the victorious countries of western Europe, in America, in the Mohammedan world, in India, etc. There, likewise, after the war, an eschatological sentiment became dominant throughout widely extended social strata. It showed itself in the expectation of a world revolution, of which Russian communism was supposed to be the forerunner. The capitalist concentration of enterprises had no more than remote relationships with this phenomenon. Its immediate causes were, obviously, the psychological changes brought about by the war. The revolutionary example of Russia was, so to say, the symbol of an act of liberation, which promised, after the

prolonged terror of the world war, an immediate cure of sufferings that had become intolerable. The movement agitated social categories which had hitherto remained passive : the previously indifferent lower strata of the working class, the liberal professions, salaried employees, civil servants, artists, etc. All kinds of social aspirations which were still unsatisfied, ranging from Asiatic and Mohammedan nationalisms down to the social discontent of the European and American intellectuals, were given a fresh mental impetus.

This aspiration of the masses was all the more strongly tinged with eschatology, because the results of the war had been so disappointing. The great struggle had exhausted the impoverished victorious European nations just as much as the conquered nations. Those Americans who had accepted Wilson's peace program at its face value, were no less discouraged by the bankruptcy of that program than were the Germans. In Britain, the outcome of the peace was widespread unemployment ; in France, there was a permanent financial crisis ; in Germany, the November revolution was a bitter disappointment to the revolutionists ; the new States carved out of what had been the Austro-Hungarian empire, were a no less bitter disappointment to the patriots who had contributed to their making ; the League of Nations was a disappointment to every one. The reaction which speedily followed the concessions made to the workers during the Wilsonian era, exasperated the working class. In a word a whole series of events, the sequel of a worldwide political catastrophe and not of an economic evolution, increased the discrepancy between desire and realisation to a point when the resulting tension gave rise to eschatological expectations. The manifestations of the mass mind are subject to very different laws, to laws far more difficult to elucidate than are the development of technique or that of the forms of enterprise ; from day to day, these manifestations are incalculable. Who, for instance, would venture to say whether the socialists of a coming generation, as a reaction against the egoistic and materialist tendencies of detail work in the political and trade-

union fields, and under stress of a spiritual need for faith in a better future, may not ere long experience some sort of "religious revival"?

Among the social factors of economic origin which decide the degree of eschatological tension, in the first place must be mentioned the insecurity of life. The worker lives from hand to mouth, far more than the member of any other class. He thinks very little about his own future. According to Bonger, the Dutch criminologist, suicides are less frequent among members of the working class than among those of other classes, despite the unfavourable economic position of the workers. Nevertheless, the worker is greatly concerned about the future of his children, being eager to provide for them that security of life which he himself lacks. Now, it is precisely in respect of stability of employment that there are such widespread differences in the working class, and it would seem that these differences are increasing.

It is far more in this domain of security than in the domain of wages that there is a difference between the two main types of industrial workers, the skilled and the unskilled. Skilled workers tend more and more to become, like the engineer, permanent employees of the factory or workshop; the unskilled tend more and more to become casual workers, Bohemians of the proletariat. Workers of the latter category will be more prone to think eschatologically, after the manner of the revolutionary extremist. It is impossible to say, at the present time, which of these types will become dominant in the future. The probability is that part of the working class will become assimilated to one type, and part to the opposite type, this cleavage being the outcome of the growing differentiation of purely mechanised functions in industry. But there are also certain indications leading us to believe in the possibility that there will arise a hierarchy of nations, subdivided into exploiting nations with a privileged working class whose well-being will be assured, and exploited nations condemned to a general pauperisation of the whole class of productive workers. It is impossible to foresee what will be the upshot of all these

developments. In any case, predictions cannot be based upon abstract laws claiming to unveil the secrets of economic evolution. The factors determining the social future are too diversified and too complicated for reduction to a common denominator. Let us be content to point out that, in the general evolution of the working-class movement, the eschatological sentiment constitutes a sort of dominant, which sounds more strongly whenever a new social group awakens to initiative, or when the circumstances of the moment increase the habitual discrepancy between the desire of the masses and the harsh world of reality.

Thus eschatological expectation forms the common foundation, the quasi-Christian foundation, of all the systems of myths and symbols which give expression to the emotional life of the socialist movement.

Ernest Renan once said that to get an idea of the early Christian communities, it would be enough to contemplate a branch of the International Workingmen's Association. The First International belongs to the past. To-day, no doubt, the Third International could be used in similar fashion for purposes of comparison. In that organisation we find strange analogies with the early Christian communities, not only in respect of psychological situations, but also in respect of artistic forms, which invariably give a peculiarly direct expression of psychical community. There is, for instance, a remarkable resemblance between the expressionist symbolism of Russian "revolutionary art" and the first attempts of Christian art to free itself from "bourgeois" Hellenism. We think, also, of the attempts of popular art at the beginning of the Middle Ages to free itself from official Byzantinism. To bring this parallelism home, illustrations would be needed; and there are plenty of other examples of the resemblance between Christian eschatology and socialist eschatology to draw upon.

Let me refer, first of all, to the myth of the revolution, which arouses such a wealth of emotions that remind us of those which were the outcome of the eschatological visions of the Apocalypse, the visions of the end of the world, the last

judgment, the kingdom of God, etc. The emotional and heroic content of the idea of revolution in itself, and what has been called revolutionary romanticism, make all the apostles of revolt accessible in the highest degree to the suggestive action of every revolutionary deed. This effect is, in some sort, independent of the aim and of the peculiar characteristics of the revolution which is taken as an example. What matters is the emotional cord which vibrates sympathetically in response to the stimulus. That explains the remark said to have been made by Trotsky about Mussolini, about the very man who is entitled to boast of having crushed communism and socialism in Italy. The words attributed to Trotsky are: "He is our ally, for he has made a revolution". Although Trotsky may never have said this, the spirit of the words is characteristic of the foreign policy of the Russian communists, who are ready to sympathise with any revolution, even if it is made or to be made on behalf of nationalist ends, and even if it raises or will raise a militarist or feudal caste to power.

A similar state of mind explains the effect which the great French revolution still has on the emotional life of European socialists, Marxists not excepted. Although in the scientific literature of Marxism, this revolution is carefully described as one which brought the detested bourgeoisie into power, the subconscious, which expresses itself in affective images, is unmoved by such critical restrictions. A direct evolution leads from jacobinism to bolshevism, passing by way of Blanquism and Marxism. Even those among the socialists whose Marxism is antagonistic to democracy, are unable, in the depths of their affective life, to escape the magical influence of the French revolution. When I was in Russia in the year 1917, my relationships with leading socialists of various trends enabled me to catch a glimpse of the individual motives which were hidden beneath the surface of the opinions expressed. I was repeatedly astonished to discover how completely they were all dominated by the idea that the Russian revolution must necessarily follow the French example in all its phases. Such beliefs are always the reflexion of a subconscious wish.

Thus, one wanted to be a girondin, another aspired to be a jacobin, a third dreamed of an Eighteenth Brumaire, and so on. I am convinced that the parallelism, often astonishing in its accuracy, between the Russian revolution and the French revolution, cannot be explained solely by a certain analogy in the psychological laws which regulate the flow of all revolutionary happenings. The conscious will of the leaders plays its part here. They are like actors who, when improvising a piece, cannot emancipate themselves from the memories of a familiar text.

If the leaders, persons endowed with a critical faculty, were influenced by such suggestions, obviously these suggestions must have acted far more strongly upon the masses who were under stress of emotional motives. The *Marseillaise*, though it is now the national anthem of a bourgeois republic, is the favourite melody of socialists in almost all the other countries of the European continent. The Phrygian cap, the fasces of the lictors, the spear, the broken chain, the crossed hands—symbols which the French revolution had itself mainly borrowed from classical models—have become an integral part of socialist symbolism. In French-speaking lands, the members of the socialist parties address one another as “citoyen”, as in the days of the great revolution; and, strangely enough, this mode of address came into use at a time when the workers still lacked the essential right of the citizen, the right to vote! The French revolutionary calendar has been imitated in a number of socialist variants, and it is only practical reasons which have prevented the adoption of these. If you look at the pictures in the dwellings of socialists all over the world, you are almost sure to find one of *Rouget de l'Isle singing the Marseillaise*, or else the *Marseillaise* of Gustave Doré. The red flag is also a universal emblem, not only to decorate the walls of the Parisian “sections”, for it has been in use in revolutionary movements since the Middle Ages, when it was chosen as a symbol thanks to a recognition of the effect of the colour red upon the heroic emotions. What, again, can be more characteristic than the adoption of the name of Spartacus

by the followers of Karl Liebknecht for their revolutionary organisation? They were urgently desirous to accentuate the proletarian class character of their program, and yet in the romanticist ecstasy of their revolutionary psychosis they did not hesitate to put themselves under the patronage of the leader of a Roman slave revolt.

If socialist eschatology has forged for itself, in the domain of revolutionary romanticism, an appropriate lay symbolism, we find, also, that there is no lack of mythical and symbolical creations which link it up closely with Christian eschatology.

Almost all the attempts to connect chronology with the hopes of the masses have a religious trend. Thanks to this principle, the various forms of Christian eschatology, from that of the early believers in Christ's second coming to the later chiliasts or millenarians, those who expected the end of the world in the year 1000, and so on, are closely connected with the chronology of the calendar. Pioneers of the socialist idea had likewise an imperious impulse to consecrate the certainty of their belief in the revolution by a quasi-mystical faith in the nearness of the socialist future. Such is the manner of prophets. We know that Marx and Engels were not free from this foible; that they fell victims to the inevitable illusion of perspective which always makes the goal seem closer than it is. All revolutionary movements believe in a new beginning, and therefore want a new calendar. They all speak of themselves as "the new age", and socialist periodicals everywhere are fond of the title. The practical need for a uniform chronology is so great to-day, when the rapidity of communications has unified the world, that an isolated group cannot possibly impose a new chronology on the world; but the aspiration is still there, hoping for the day of realisation. As recently as September 28, 1924, at the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the First International in London, Belfort Bax said: "Who can tell whether, in days to come, the year 1864 will not be reckoned the first year of a new era, which will replace the Christian notation?" Pending this development, revolutionists must content themselves by

changing the accepted calendar as much as possible. Socialist almanacs are full of the dates of revolutionary events and of sometimes trifling incidents in the history of the labour movement. I have before me a Russian block calendar for the current year, which is circulated in enormous numbers. On the obverse and the reverse of each leaf, besides astronomical, meteorological, and ecclesiastical information, there are the materials for an encyclopaedia of socialist anniversaries and propaganda texts. Of course the revolutionary feast-days are distinguished by red printing. Mostly, moreover, these are nothing but the old popular feast-days of the Church in a new dress, for the revolutionists in this respect follow the example of the early Christian Church which assimilated the calendar of pagan festivals.

In the labour world, May Day has a significance resembling that of the great feast-days for the early Christians. The history of the May Day festival gives us one of the most striking examples of the aspiration of the masses towards a symbolism which shall be connected with the periodicity of the years. When, in 1889, an international socialist congress for the first time summoned the workers throughout the world to demonstrate on May Day, this congress represented no more than an infinitesimal minority of the working class. It adopted a great many other resolutions concerning questions of practical importance, which to those present at the congress must have seemed at least as momentous as the choice of May Day for an annual demonstration. Nevertheless, the tenor of these resolutions is known to-day to only about half a dozen specialists, who have disinterred them from the musty reports. On the other hand, the idea of the May Day festival caught on, spreading as rapidly as fire in a train of gunpowder. Participation in the festival became more widespread year by year; and what was at the outset merely a manifestation for certain immediate objectives of the class struggle, became gradually transformed into a festivity having a general symbolical character. By choosing May Day, the promoters cleverly annexed the symbolical content of the ancient spring festival



of the pagan and the Christian world. That which the Teutonic and Celtic pagans had regarded as a celebration of the revival of natural energy in the spring, and that which the Catholics had looked upon as the festival of the flower-decked virgin and as the symbol of the springtime of humanity, became for socialist workers the day which bears witness to the victorious renewal of all that has grown old and has become obsolete. A great many of the traditional customs of the old popular festivals are revived on Labour Day: flower-decked processions, dances round the maypole, and the like.

The socialists have also turned to account the universal popular festivals of Easter and Christmas, which had long before been taken over by the Christians from the pagans. In Teutonic lands, above all, it is a regular custom to have Easter articles and Christmas articles in the socialist press, and sometimes special numbers are issued. Red Christmas had become a universal celebration even before communist Russia gave the festival official sanction. The tradition in virtue of which so many labour parties hold their annual congresses at Easter, is not solely the outcome of practical considerations, for some other season of the year would do just as well. In choosing the day of the resurrection (it was, besides, the first day of the year in ancient times), marking the commencement of the spiritual and ecclesiastical year, they wanted to revive its significance by a symbolical association. A similar trend finds expression in the long-standing custom of the Dutch social democrats, whose most noted leader used to give a "Christmas lecture" every year. This lecture had the significance of an apostolic message. The comrades in the country districts would read the report with an emotion resembling that with which the early Christian communities must have received one of St. Paul's epistles.

For socialism has also its apostles, its prophets, its saints, and its martyrs, all this being the outcome of a psychological disposition of the masses resembling that of Catholic believers. Human beings animated by a common ideal experience a need for that which Freudian psychology terms identification.

They project their aspirations upon an ideal personality, real or imaginary. It may even happen that in this way they create fabulous beings. Such a phenomenon occurred in the German communist movement during the phase of exaltation which followed the November revolution. The posters announcing public meetings did not mention the name of the speaker, but bore in huge letters the legend : " Spartacus will speak ". If this had happened two thousand years ago, when the means of communication were still so rudimentary that myths could easily be created by a rumour, it is likely enough that " Spartacus ", thanks simply to popular credence, would have become a person whose identity was indisputable. In any case, the emotional effect was almost as strong as if the mythopoeic faculty had been in full working order. The prestige of the orator, who often remained anonymous, was intensified by a partial and subconscious identification of his personality with that of an incorporeal and ubiquitous Messiah.

A myth of this kind characterises the beginnings of every movement which originates out of a unified impulse. As soon as the movement spreads and becomes adapted to circumstances differing in time and space, the diversity of the impulses to which it is subjected is expressed by a corresponding diversity in the beliefs as to its mythical origins. By a sort of regressive evolution, this monotheist faith becomes polytheist ; it creates a mythological hierarchy by raising a certain number of the personages of its history to the level of saints and martyrs. Marxism, materialist and scientific though it is, exemplifies this rule as soon as it becomes a mass movement. In communist Russia to-day, the prophetic figures of Marx and Lenin are quite as real in the eyes of the masses as were, in former days, those of the saints of the Church. Marxist Germany has always been the classical country of socialist fetichism. Museums could be filled with busts, illustrated postcards, chromolithographs, and all sorts of emblematic objects, ranging from Lassalle tie-pins and Bebel cigar-holders, to beer-mugs adorned with a portrait of Wilhelm Liebknecht. At every socialist congress, the busts of Marx and Bebel in

Germany, those of Marx and Lenin in Russia, that of Jaurès in France, occupy a place of honour, like that of the altar and the crucifix in a Christian church. In all the party locals, in all the houses of the militant socialists, we shall find images of martyrs to the cause: in France, a picture of the "mur des fédérés" (the wall against which so many of the Paris communards were shot in 1871); in America, an emblem of "the Chicago martyrs"; in Belgium, one of "those who have died in the fight for the vote"; among German communists, portraits of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

The cult of martyrs is an inevitable accompaniment of every movement whose adherents have to suffer for their faith as much as the socialists did in the early days. Tens of thousands were killed in revolutionary combats and during the forcible repression of strikes. Hundreds of thousands were deprived of their means of livelihood, exiled, imprisoned, outlawed. Even to-day, socialism demands continual sacrifices from a considerable proportion of those who espouse the cause. In such cases, the symbolisation of the martyrdom of the pioneers arouses among the masses a force akin to that of religious fellowship in sacrifice, which is exalted by the contemplation of the image of the crucified Saviour. Relics, even, are not lacking. Those British trade unions whose history dates back to the heroic days when the Combination Acts were still in force, regard their old membership cards, the insignia of their secret trade societies, and other souvenirs of the kind, with the utmost veneration. The same is true of the trade unions of other lands, in the matter of the first banners, and the like. When, at the age of sixteen, I joined the labour movement in Antwerp, my birthplace, a veteran solemnly showed me an object of universal admiration, a small stony mass, said to be a petrified piece of butter which had come down to us from the Commune of Paris. I remember that my heart beat violently when I contemplated this sacred relic of 1871.

When universal suffrage was established, and the first groups of socialist deputies found their way into parliament,

there was a general blossoming of wall calendars adorned with their portraits. These chromolithographs were to remind the elector day by day that great men were representing his interests in high places. At that date, when the newly acquired privilege of the vote aroused joyful expectations, he regarded these emblems with the veneration inspired in a good Catholic by pictures of the saints. Very striking, in this respect, were the honours paid in 1892 by the socialist electors to the Sicilian deputy De Felice. During the election campaign, they set up little altars, bearing his portrait, with lighted candles on either side. Robert Michels tells us that in 1893-1894, the Sicilian agricultural labourers' unions, known as *fasci*, "carried in their processions the effigies of Karl Marx, De Felice, the King of Italy, and the Blessed Virgin, as emblems of their trust in the various possibilities of social aid". A like significance may be attached to the ceremonies which attended and followed Lenin's funeral, to the monuments and icons which were consecrated to him, to the renaming of Petrograd as Leningrad, and to the scheme for building in his honour a town in the Caucasus—a town which was to be laid out in the form of the soviet star, just as the ground plan of Christian churches has the shape of the cross.

Even the lesser lights among the labour leaders unconsciously lend themselves to this aspiration of the masses towards a symbolical identification. In their dress, their postures, their style of haircutting, their ways of living and talking, they assimilate themselves to the image which to the working masses seems the personification of the ideal. A whole book, and an amusing one, could be devoted to this aspect of socialist symbolism; but it would lose point if it were not illustrated. Could there be a better exemplification of utopian socialism than the "gilet fraternel", the "brotherly waistcoat" of Saint-Simon? This garment buttoned behind instead of in front. The need for assistance in putting it on was daily to remind the wearer of the great principle of human solidarity. What could give more insight into the transformations of the socialist psyche in Germany, than a comparative study of

socialist fashions in dress, based upon observations made in the cloak-rooms at party congresses? In the earlier days, as a relic of the romanticism of 1848, wideawakes and voluminous cloaks were in vogue, suggesting a combination of the conspiratorial and the professorial type. Then, at the turn of the century, when the trade-union bureaucracy was becoming firmly installed, there was a growth of "respectability", a return to philistinism; the labour leader was a workman in Sunday best, yet still unmistakably a workman. After the revolution came a gradual approximation to a new type, that of the official in morning-coat and white linen collar. Now, once more, a rebel note is sounded, for the younger delegates appear in the garb of the "Wandervogel", the devotee of an open-air life. These changes of attire may tell us more of the currents of feeling in the labour and socialist movement, than the formal resolutions voted at the congresses.

Again, how admirably the psychological differences between the labour and socialist movements in various lands could be characterised by a portrait gallery of labour leaders! A comparative study of these types would be especially instructive if made in the early days, when the pioneers displayed a primitive picturesqueness, before their differences had been overlaid by the uniformity of petty-bourgeois officialdom. Consider the French socialist of a few decades back, not so much a working man as a Bohemian, with long hair, an artist's soft black felt hat, a luxuriant necktie; the whole get-up recalling the days of the barricades, and the conspiratorial eloquence of a south-side café. As a contrast, we have the Keir Hardie type: a burly fellow in loose tweeds, wearing a broad, red tie kept in place by a huge tie-pin, smoking a short clay pipe; a grizzled patriarch who quoted biblical texts with a rich Doric accent; a figure symbolising all that was most characteristic of British socialism in the eighties by its fusion of genuine working-class traits with the preraphaelite Bohemianism of Ruskin and William Morris. In America, there was the Eugene Debs type: a jovial-looking Yankee, the picture of an engine-driver on holiday, embodying all that was peculiar

to transatlantic socialism, with its heritage from Abraham Lincoln, the Puritans, and the Quakers, its flavour of somewhat ostentatious simplicity.

Just as the leader moulds his appearance to suit the feelings of the masses, so these, on their side, imitate the symbolism of the leaders. In pre-war Germany, Bebel's hat, Bebel's beard, and Bebel's way of talking, were quite as much the fashion among lesser leaders in militant working-class circles as William II's upturned moustache was among the loyalists. The last time I went to the People's House in Brussels, one Sunday evening, I noted that, though it was thirty years since the death of the highly respected labour leader Jan Volders, some of the older comrades were still imitating the late lamented in the cut of their moustaches, the tying of their neckties, and the shape of their hats.

The masses expect their leaders to be symbolical in mode of life no less than in political behaviour. One need not be a Freud or a Ferenczi to know that the choice of leaders is effected in accordance with a process of identification of the ego with an ego-ideal. The child, influenced by parents or educators, decomposes his conscious ego into a real but unsatisfying ego, and an ideal ego represented by another individual. In the social movement of the masses, acting under the impetus of the will-to-power, the tendency to identification will naturally be directed towards a masculine symbol. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Marxism owes a great deal to Karl Marx's beard! The hirsute countenance of the author of *Capital* gave him the aspect of a patriarch and a prophet, armed with all the authority of the father, in the most Freudian sense of that term. The cut of his hair harmonised with his literary style and with the whole tenor of his life. The general picture was one of self-confidence and aggressive certainty such as the members of every sect (in their need to take suggestion as a cat laps milk) expect from their prophet.

Obviously the symbolical significance is what really matters in the case of certain "questions of principle" which are acrimoniously discussed by the socialist parties during the

propaganda phase of socialism ; such questions as the refusal to vote certain items in the budget, participation of socialists in bourgeois governments, visits to court, the acceptance of titles and decorations, and so on. We know how difficult it has been, everywhere, to break with old traditions in accordance with the promptings of new political destinies. The difficulty is not so much the outcome of reasoned considerations (though such questions have been debated at great length, with the most elaborate marshalling of pros and cons), but of a more or less unconscious deference to the conservatism of the masses, whose faith in certain symbols is hard to shake. The fear is lest the masses should regard the abandonment of traditional demonstrations of irreconcilability as an indication that their representatives have become lukewarm. In all countries the history of the socialist parties shows that the violence of discussions has usually been in inverse ratio to the practical importance of the topic—at any rate where symbolical questions have been concerned, whether of a general type (like the problem of “visits to court”), or of a personal type (such as the numerous problems raised by the private conduct of the leaders).

There is a symbolism of adaptation as well as a symbolism of opposition, the difference being dependent upon the general characteristics of mass aspirations in particular phases of the movement. Thus, it may happen that the masses will be more inclined to have their influence recognised by the powers that be, than to maintain the attitude of an irreconcilable opposition. Whenever ministerial posts have been offered to working-class leaders of socialist origin, the “ministerialist” trend has been accentuated among the workers. They felt instinctive gratification at the thought of one of themselves becoming a minister of State ; they felt that this would be a symbolical recognition of the political ability of their class. That is why, when portfolios are being distributed, the working class sometimes gets a larger share than it would otherwise. Every social group feels flattered when one of its members wins power or is granted honours. This feeling is strong in

proportion as the members of the group in question regard the accession to power or the receipt of honours as important, and in proportion as they feel themselves to be on equal terms with the person thus distinguished. The Scottish miner, revolutionary by temperament and inclined towards fanaticism owing to the peculiarities of his religious heritage, is proud to have as leader such a man as Robert Smillie, who, despite his position as chief of a powerful organisation, continues to live in the same style as his sometime workmates, is "Bob" to them now as in the old days, and refuses ministerial posts just as he refuses invitations to dinner on the ground that he has "no time to waste". On the other hand, the London railwayman, averse from such unqualified sectarianism, trained in "urbanity" by the circumstances of his metropolitan life, adores in J. H. Thomas the very qualities which are lacking to Smillie. He appreciates Thomas' shrewdness, even though a little afraid of his leader's suppleness. On the whole, he takes personal pride in the fact that "Jimmy" has "made good", and in the fact that the man whom he calls "Jimmy" should also be on intimate terms with dukes and duchesses, and a lion in their drawing-rooms. "One man's meat is another man's poison." But in either case it is the social aspiration of the group which decides the character of the symbol.

In the early days of parliamentary activity, the socialist deputies, who were then new to their work, signalled their opposition attitude by a systematic revolt against parliamentary usages. This too had a symbolic value. The change which takes place in the parliamentary behaviour of the socialists when the party has grown so strong that its leaders become eligible for the ministry, a change which is characterised by their living on better terms with their opponents, must also be regarded as symbolic. In this case, likewise, we see in it an indication of a weakening of the eschatological sentiment of the masses.

The British and American trade unions kept up for a long time quasi-masonic practices. Some of them even continue



these practices in our own day. It is difficult to think of any reasonable motive in favour of such customs, unless it be that they have a favourable psychological influence upon the members. A suggestive ritual of the kind recalls the heroic days of the forerunners, and surrounds with a sort of religious solemnity the duty of solidarity which is incumbent upon the initiates. The same remark applies to the "compagnonnages" in France and elsewhere, which in the middle of the nineteenth century were still faithful to their masonic customs, for purely psychological reasons. In Germany, the modern trade-union movement has retained no more than trifling vestiges, in some of the crafts, of the ancient customs of the medieval guilds. The Germans, who are keen upon indicating the class character of the modern movement, and its determination to effect extreme centralisation, are careful to avoid anything that will remind the members of the unions of these guild practices. Their methods are prosaic; they do nothing which has a smack of romanticism; and perhaps this deprives German trade unionism of some of its recruiting energy and its educative influence. The British trade unions, on the other hand, which are either the offspring of the old secret associations, or else have revived the traditions of these, retain in their rules and in their customs much which gives a symbolic significance to the corporative spirit of the members. The remark applies even more strongly to the American Federation of Labor. A number of the trade unions affiliated to that body practise a semi-masonic ritual in the conduct of their meetings, where the complicated hierarchy and the outworn formalism produce a rather childish effect. The usages are maintained as symbols of the exclusiveness of trade-union organisation, and of the authority of the fully initiated leaders.

Mass demonstrations, too, have a symbolic effect. Their suggestive influence is usually much greater upon the participants than upon the outer world. Their aim is to galvanise the mass by producing a tangible impression of its own power. That is why socialist processions have always been popular in countries where the crowds are especially suggestible

through the senses (as, for instance, in Belgium, in pre-fascist Italy, and in communist Russia); either because lack of education makes them little accessible to purely intellectual influences, or else because they are traditionally inclined to demonstrative sociability. There is obviously here a parallelism with ecclesiastical traditions, which adapt themselves to the same national psychological peculiarities. Think, for instance, of the frequency of Catholic processions in Belgium and in Italy; and of the predilection of the Byzantine Church for appeals to the senses, for the effects of colour and sound. Flags, banners bearing slogans, music floral decoration, community singing, play the same part, whether it is a question of Christ the Messiah, or of Revolution the Messiah. As far as music is concerned, we have to think only of the generalised emotion aroused by community singing. The *Marseillaise*, which in France is a nationalist hymn, becomes in socialist Germany a revolutionary march; and, to the great surprise of the Germans, British socialists sing the *Red Flag* to the melody of *O Tannenbaum*, the most philistine of Yuletide songs!

At one time it was the fashion among Italian socialists to give their children symbolic names. They were not content with names derived from those of the socialist saints, such names as "Lassallo" and "Marxina". Children were actually christened "Primo Maggio" (May First). According to Robert Michels, there was even a little "Maggioranza Socialista" (socialist majority). If we are to believe Angelica Balabanoff, an enthusiast once went so far as to use the names of the executive organs of the party. He called one of his sons "Gruppo Parlamentare" (parliamentary group), and another "Comitato Centrale" (central committee). In Russia now, there are quite a number of boys called "Lenin", and of girls called "Octobrina" (after the October revolution). Similar examples can be found in other countries. Twenty years ago a girl named "Bebelina Lassallina" was registered at Frankfurt; and during the British miners' lock-out in 1926, an unfortunate Welsh boy was overwhelmed with the names "Cook Richardson Herbert Smith". We are told

that even the pieces on the chessboard have been renamed in Russia, so that the King is called "Narkom" (People's Commissary); the Queen, "Zetkina"; the Bishops, "Politkom"; and so on. *Se non è vero. . . .*

Attempts have been made to remodel such ecclesiastical ceremonies as baptism and confirmation in a socialist sense. For a time, in the Charleroi mining basin, there was quite a rage among the socialist miners, for having a "première communion rationaliste", a secular confirmation festival, the Goddess of Reason of the French revolution being resuscitated to preside over the ceremony. In this same Charleroi, one of the People's Houses is called the "Temple of Science", just as in America most of the trade-union headquarters are called "Labor Temples".

It is interesting to note how the symbolism of the early phases of the socialist movement has a definitely gnostic trend. We trace in it the growth of a rationalist mythology. The reason is, no doubt, that the workers, when first influenced by socialist teaching, are inclined to expect from their new state of knowledge a deliverance from all their sufferings, and are therefore prone to deify intellectual values. That is why the customary socialist propagandist imagery is still thoroughly allegorical, subordinating the aesthetic emotional effect to the representation of a rational idea. Among the numberless examples of propagandist socialist and communist pictures, we find very few which are comprehensible without a verbal explanation. As a rule, the allegorical figures (such as Capitalism, Imperialism, the Proletariat, Mankind, Peace) are identified by labels. It is a very remarkable fact that in the universal history of art this rationalist expressionism is, in matters of style, simultaneously decadent and primitive. Allegorical painting marks the extreme decadence of Renaissance art. But there is no necessary contradiction between a decadent style and a primitive style. The primitive art of European Christianity, from the paintings in the Roman catacombs down to the mosaics of Ravenna, also made use of decadent forms.

In Latin and Catholic countries, the adoration of Marianne

is a pendant of the cult of the Blessed Virgin. Marianne, the symbol of the revolution, worshipped in France since 1848, occupies in socialist locals, and in the houses of active members of the party, a place analogous to that occupied by images of the Virgin among Catholics. It is true that her countenance, with its expression of savage heroism, expresses a very different sentiment from that expressed by representations of the Virgin Mary. This makes all the more remarkable the likeness of the sublimated sexual motives, thanks to which, in both cases, a feminine figure takes precedence in domestic mythology. Since the Middle Ages, the central divine figure of the western Catholic world has been that of a woman, that of a virgin mother, signifying the superiority of the spiritual generative principle over the physical generative principle. A Mohammedan socialist would be as little inclined to represent the revolution by a feminine figure, as he would be to imagine the Mussulman deity as a woman. The countries where the cult of Marianne is most widely diffused among socialists, are those in which the Catholic cult of the Virgin Mary has flourished for centuries. In my own native Flanders, for instance, in the days of my youth, the most popular socialist song was a *Song of Marianne*, with a haunting melody. It began with the words: "I am Marianne, proletarians!" and ended with the refrain: "When the hour of vengeance sounds, my spouse will be the man who marches most bravely at my side!" Thereupon the choir answered: "Forward, Marianne, guide us, deliver society," etc. Here we see that there is to be a mystical marriage of the chosen person to a virgin, similar to the union with the Immaculate Virgin of which the devout Catholic dreams—the most exalted manifestation of a sublimated and spiritualised erotic sense, symbolised under an identical form in the two cases. When singing the *Song of Marianne*, I used myself to find in the idea of this mystical union with the goddess who was to set mankind free, the same purification of the erotic instincts which the monastic novice looks for when adoringly prostrating himself before the image of the Madonna.

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The spoken or written word may have the same sort of symbolic significance as the bust or the picture. Then we have a myth, in the strict sense of the term. Georges Sorel, the theoretician of French revolutionary syndicalism, when speaking of the general strike, which is the culmination of his theory of the class struggle, says frankly that it is "a myth which symbolises the catastrophe of capitalism". If "scientific" socialism would only be scientific enough to regard its own doctrine as the object of psychological analysis, it would find that such notions as that of the social revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the future society, are, from the outlook of social psychology, nothing more than myths, that is to say verbal symbols of faith.

Why is it so difficult to discover by analysis the scientific kernel of the Marxist concept of class? Simply because, in the literature and the vocabulary of Marxists, class consciousness has a mythical and mystical significance. To Marxists, class is a "substance" in the sense of the psychology of religion. The identification which, according to Freud, is the medium of mass aggregation, and gives to a certain number of individuals one and the same ideal ego, does not apply only to persons, to leaders, but also to things. In the latter case, to adopt the expression used by Lévy-Bruhl in his important work *Primitive Mentality*, we have a mystical participation. By this I mean, as C. G. Jung defines it, a particular kind of psychological tie with an object. In this mystical participation, the subject cannot clearly distinguish himself from the object, but feels himself linked with it by a direct relationship, which may be called a partial identity. The result is that, in most cases, the object exercises an influence upon the subject. Such an identification is found in the mass psychology of civilised peoples as well as in the individual psychology of primitive peoples, for in this respect the masses are often at the same level of prelogical and symbolical thought. Mystical participation through the instrumentality of substance is likewise encountered in a primary form in the vestiges of the belief in the

identifying influence of a meal taken in common. This belief still animates the Teutonic custom of brotherly drinking, that of drinking toasts, the clan repasts of the Scottish Highlands, and, above all, the Christian symbolism of the Lord's Supper. A pendant is found in the modern religion of nationalism, which substantialises the country. It is reported that the warriors of the Flemish communes, before the battle of Courtrai, kneeling down, raised to their lips a portion of the soil of their native land—that soil with which the soldiers of the Yser were, six centuries later, to fill little bags termed "Vaderlanders". The national flag, too, which must not fall into the hands of the enemy, is a symbolic "substance". When people put in place of the substance as object of the identification a corresponding concept, they do not change the nature of the emotional process in any way. All that has happened is that a verbal symbol has replaced a material symbol. It is in this way that the Marxist notion of class substitutes a substantive concept for a material substance, a concept which borrows its emotional coloration from the subjective experience of class consciousness. In the terminology of modern analytical psychology, this is called "an auxiliary intellectual construction, designed to raise the sentiment of the social level".

The socialist intellectual, whose mode of thought is so unduly influenced by exact science as to render him incapable of sympathising fully with the religious sentiments of the masses, is continually being astonished when he finds that for rank-and-file workers the "party", the "organisation", the "movement", and "solidarity", are not so much sociological ideas as the images of emotional states, and almost tangible substances. A non-socialist (and even a socialist who is not of proletarian origin, and has not, like the manual workers, learned from personal experience what the "organisation" means to such simple folk in the way of direct sacrifices and hopes) finds it almost impossible to grasp the power of these affects. The intellectual, when he observes the attachment of the manual worker to the material aspects of the

“organisation”, is prone, erroneously, to regard this attachment as the expression of a short-sighted and materialist outlook, of an inability to distinguish between means and end, and of an incapacity to understand the nature of a “pure” idea. He thus overlooks the fact that a pure idea can only act creatively when (just like the idea of God in the consecrated host) it becomes flesh and blood, or at any rate is materialised into a symbol. If the masses are able to conceive of the “movement” only as “organisation”, as something circumstantial, this is not the outcome of materialism, but of a kind of social animism. They give a soul to that which they regard as their own creation, and thus feel that their personality is uplifted to a supra-personal level. This is the expression of a religious sentiment. The vigour of such a sentiment is likewise shown by the symbolical importance which, in the inner working of the organisations, is attached to the forms of address between the members of the organisation. In French one socialist calls another “citoyen”, “camarade”, “compagnon”; in German, “Genosse”; in English, “comrade” or “brother”; in Italian, “compagno”; in Russian, “tovarishch”; in Dutch, “partijgenoot”; in Flemish, “gezel”; in Swedish, “partivänd”; and so on.

Such words derive their significance from the feeling, the affect, which is associated with them, and which makes them symbolic. It is credibly reported that in the bread riots among the Walloon workers in 1886, in one of the processions there was carried a streamer bearing the legend: “Vive la République! A bas Napoléon!” These workers, most of whom at that date were still unable to read, still used the name of the emperor as a symbol of the tyranny and the social and political oppression against which they were rising in revolt. It mattered little to them, when they were expressing their will to revolt, whether the man at the head of the government was called Napoleon or Leopold. At a later date, when the Belgian workers had learned to formulate their wishes with more precision in the demand for universal suffrage, the formula S.U. (suffrage universel) soon acquired a sort of

magical significance. During the fight for the vote, the initials S.U. became a symbolical image endowed with the same sort of psychological power that the emblem of the fish had for the early Christians, or that of the Cross for the crusaders. I have often heard the story, which seems credible enough, of something that happened in Hainault in 1893, showing to what an extent the belief in S.U. could assume a concrete character. All the social discontent of the workers was then concentrated in the fight for the suffrage. The idea of a march on Brussels was dominant in their thoughts. Strikers from the provinces flocked to the capital, expecting that there, where the king dwelt and where the laws were made, they would be able to secure the justice symbolised under the letters S.U. In one of the columns of these strikers there was one day to be seen a workman who was carrying an empty basket in addition to his store of food for the march. When he was asked what the basket was for, he answered that he was going to bring back S.U. in it. The good fellow had taken quite literally the speech of an orator who had urged his hearers to fetch S.U. back from Brussels. No one who lived through those days will deny that the orator in question, and most of his hearers (even if less simple-minded than the man with the basket), attached an eschatological significance to these famous letters S.U., regarding universal suffrage as something of far greater importance than a simple electoral reform.

The use of symbols is not restricted to festal occasions. We find it in socialist literature, theoretical as well as propagandist. As far as concerns propagandist literature intended for mass consumption, symbolism is very much in evidence. For instance, the form of the ten commandments is copied in the propaganda literature of all countries. So is the form of the catechism. There may be a practical end to gain here, for both the commandments and the catechism have a form suitable for the analysis and the memorisation of ideas. But there is no doubt that, apart from this, these forms borrowed from the Church have a suggestive influence of their own.



It derives from their habitual association with a dogmatic and imperative assertion of religious truth, and some of this hallowed influence is communicated to an entirely new content. In actual fact, it was in Catholic countries that the harvest of socialist catechisms was from the first so abundant, for it was in Catholic countries that this form had the most powerful suggestive influence. Furthermore, such catechisms and commandments are most often met with during the phases of the movement when religious and eschatological feelings are dominant.

The peculiar efficacy of the printed word is likewise explicable by the prestige of form. The mysterious character of the process which multiplies and diffuses in innumerable examples the product of a single brain, gives the printed word great prestige. Of course the prestige will be intensified, if the author is already a person of influence. Even without this, however, the printed word exercises a very powerful, and almost magical suggestion, as is proved by the credulity of newspaper readers, who give ear to all that is printed in the papers, even anonymously. During the war, many a professor of history, whose profession had accustomed him to a rigid and critical scrutiny of texts, was ready to gulp down all sorts of nonsense presented to him by his daily paper as authentic contemporary history. His mistake was, that he did not look upon this news with the eyes of a critical historian, but with the emotions of a politician; and in politics every one, even a professor of history, believes what he wants to believe.

Books have always played a preponderant part in cults. "Thus saith Holy Writ," is the phrase by which every objection is overruled, whether among Lutherans or Catholics, whether among Jews or Mohammedans. An orator at a public meeting knows very well that his auditors will be more ready to believe him if he can support his own words with the aid of some printed text, especially when he quotes from an author of weight. Lassalle used often to mount the platform carrying an imposing load of bound volumes which he ranged

on the table in front of him. It mattered little whether he did or did not quote from these books. As soon as he appeared upon the scene with them, he had already won his simple-minded and enthusiastic auditors, had gained the effect he desired. His hearers were ready to believe in advance that what he was going to say would agree with the contents of those formidable-looking volumes, which must be wise because they were so heavy. The whole of science represented by big books bound in calf was there to confirm what Lassalle said.

The significance of Marx's *Capital* as the bible of socialism depends, not so much upon the contents of the book, as upon the form in which it is written, which makes it peculiarly apt to play the part of a revelation from on high. I am not giving away any secrets when I say that in all the countries of the world the number of socialists who are ready to quote this book greatly exceeds the number of those who have really read it. This is not surprising. Though I face the risk of excommunication, I will venture to say that *Capital* is far from being the most important or the best written of Marx's works. It is very long and very difficult to understand. It is overloaded with extremely abstract considerations, and with algebraical formulae whose utility is extremely doubtful. The reader who reaches the end of the last volume is confronted with conclusions which make three-fourths of the preceding arguments seem superfluous. I am willing to admit that the foregoing is a personal opinion, is a question of taste, which therefore cannot be discussed. But this much is beyond doubt, that *Capital* owes a great part of its magical prestige to the very circumstances which discourage so many of its readers at the start: its indigestible length, its hermetic style, its ostentatious erudition, and its algebraical mysticism. The masses (and not primitive men alone!) are still ready to treat the sages whose names they venerate much as the African negro treats the wizard of his village. The more mysterious and pompous science seems, the more powerful the impression it produces on the vulgar. Every medical man knows that

the prescription "Recipe, Aquae fontis uncias decem statim bibendas" has curative virtues far greater than if he had simply ordered his patient to drink a tumblerful of water from the tap. Long before Coué was ever heard of, doctors used to cure patients by this method. It began when there were sick people who wanted to be cured and had faith in their doctors.

Reason has very little to do with all this. That is why criticism which deals only with rational values, and which regards them as absolute, runs off Marxism like water off a duck's back. *Capital* is not one of those books which can be refuted. This was shown by the very small effect which the criticism of the revisionists had, despite the great scientific value of the arguments put forward by Eduard Bernstein in 1896. The main objections with which he was met were not scientific at all. It was purely a practical psychological consideration which led Bebel, at the Hanover Congress in 1897, to accuse Bernstein of having wished "to throw confusion among the masses". Auer, the old opportunist leader, more shrewd and more detached, expressed the same thing in the words: "Eduard, you're a fool! One does these things, but one does not say them!" We can understand that, in the circumstances, "Eduard" needed exceptional courage to speak as he did. For he, too, felt that it would be wrong to introduce "confusion" into the mind of the masses. He, too, felt that it would be wrong to shake the faith of the masses in the authorities to whose prestige the party had linked its own. It seemed impossible, in those days, to disturb the blind faith in Marx without at the same time weakening the members' devotion to the party. That is why Bernstein showed so much caution and so much hesitation in his writings; that is why he was so fond of arguments based upon quotations from Marx and Engels; that was why he said again and again that he did not want to refute these authorities, but only to reinterpret them and "revise" them. What chance would a scientific criticism of Marxism have of influencing the Russian Communist Party? However careful the critic might

be to restrict himself to the theoretical problems of philosophy and economics, and to avoid any allusions to political actualities, he would have no effect whatever in a country where schoolboys are taught to pay homage to the busts of Karl Marx. Even if he were taken seriously, the attitude of the party towards him would be entirely determined by the consideration whether his arguments would have a favourable or unfavourable effect upon the progress of the revolutionary movement.

The only parts of a theory which affect the movements of the masses are symbolical representations with an emotional content, for it is these alone which give rise to the movement. That is true, above all, as regards faith in the coming of a better social order. Every socialist feels an urgent desire to construct an image of this ideal order. It is a significant fact that among the socialist books which are most widely read are the ones which, like Bebel's *Woman and Socialism*, contain descriptions of the "State of the future"; and utopist novels like William Morris' *News from Nowhere*, and Bellamy's *Looking Backward*—although even the best of these novels have no scientific value whatever; while they are, considered as novels, abominable. Never will a socialist, Marxist or otherwise, be able to construct the picture of the future, one that will satisfy his sense of justice, upon the basis of a simple logical deduction from the developmental trends of the extant economic system; for out of this he cannot fashion an image, but only a conceptual structure, purely abstract, and incapable of arousing enthusiasm, even in the most intellectualised of men. The vigour of socialist thought is derived from this, that it gives a rational form to an emotional aspiration which is as eternal and as universal as human society itself. If this emotion is to find expression in action, it must fertilise the imagination. In other words, it needs an image which can serve as a goal. The image is the product of a desire, a concrete representation of a state of affairs which satisfies a specific ethical sentiment, and renders concrete a desired moral order.

*PART TWO*

**AIMS**

CHAPTER SIX  
SOCIALIST CONCEPTION OF THE  
FUTURE SOCIETY

The mind makes the body.  
SCHILLER.

SOCIALISM as a prevision of a social order which is longed for and is regarded as just—it is in this that the two elements whose combination forms the socialist labour movement have their meeting-place ; it is here that the workers' eschatological hope in the emancipation of their class, and the scientific doctrine which justifies their hope, run together. Socialist utopism is, at one and the same time, the goal of the process which liquidates the workers' social inferiority complex, and the starting-point of the intellectual constructions of socialist theoreticians.

Marxism is no exception to the rule. Although Marxist eschatology differs greatly in form from that of the utopias which the classical utopists constructed out of the free play of their imaginations, Marxism itself is none the less' utopian, for the Marxist criticism of extant society is based upon the vision of a future society which is to be the outcome of definite legal and moral principles. True that Marxists, formulating their doctrine in scientific terminology, try to arouse a contrary impression. Their picture of the socialist future is supposed to emerge unexpectedly, as it were, in the course of a dispassionate analysis of the developmental trends of the contemporary economic system. But this is an illusion. Their conscious thought is unaware of the motives of the unconscious. *The Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England* (Condition of the Working Classes in England) and the *Communist Manifesto* were written long before *Capital*. Marx and Engels were influenced by their sympathy with the workers and by their

longing for socialism in early days, before they had begun to prophesy the inevitable collapse of capitalism. Marx's moral sentiment had made him pronounce a death sentence on capitalism, long before his study of the laws of economic evolution led him to infer that capitalism was dying. Nay more, he already, in those early days, pictured the outlines of the coming social system which was, in its leading traits, to be the precise opposite of all that he loathed in the present. Scientific thought is one variety of the activity of the imagination, and cannot escape the working of the law in accordance with which all desire creates the idea of its satisfaction. Of course this is no more than the starting-point of scientific activity.

Although Marx, in his scientific works, is sedulous to avoid pulling out the emotional stop, and takes care to give no more than an outline sketch of his vision of the future, this does not mean that he was free from emotion, nor does it prove that he was superior to utopian considerations. Far from it, the deliberate repression of emotion and imagination shows how vigorously they were at work in him. It would be an interesting and easy task for a psychoanalyst to trace the disturbances in Marx's psychic life that resulted from these repressions, from the forcible thrusting of a subconscious urge out of the field of his literary activity. Indications of so painful a distortion of spiritual volition are to be found in the excessive abstraction of Marx's thought, in the savagery of his polemic style, in the irritability and suspicion by which his personal relationships were apt to be characterised—and, by contrast, in the overflow of his love-need into the narrow circle of his private life.

Alike in the case of the isolated thinker, and in the case of the masses who are so obviously swayed by emotion rather than by thought, a vision of the future society (utopia, in a word) is born out of repressed wishes. But the nature of these wishes differs in the two cases. The motives of creative thinkers have nothing to do with their material circumstances, with their class position. True, socialists of this stamp are all intellectuals,

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persons of bourgeois or aristocratic origin. Most of them are more or less declassed, that is to say they belong to the social group of " misfits " ; and from the bourgeois standpoint many of them are " failures ". To the same stratum belong also a great many non-socialist intellectuals and artists. Though they are social misfits, we must not assume that those among them who are socialists have become socialists as the outcome of their class situation—and still less as the outcome of their class interest. Creative socialist thinkers do not, of themselves, constitute a special social group. They are lone wolves, few and far between. When we psychoanalyse their thought, we must base our analysis upon an examination of their individual destinies. It is true that intellectuals, as the outcome of their social and professional lot, have a special tendency to assimilate socialism. We shall return to this matter when discussing the socialism of intellectuals. But the disposition in question is purely passive, resembling in this respect the affective disposition we have already studied in the working class.

Some sociologists try to explain the thought of these socialist theoreticians as resulting from their personal antipathy towards bourgeois society, because they themselves are misfits in that society. Professor Sombart, in especial, illustrates this thesis by a number of examples, ranging from Cabet to Saint-Simon, and from Marx and Bakunin to Rosa Luxemburg. According to Sombart, all these were failures. He lays particular stress upon the case of Karl Marx. But are we entitled to speak of Marx as a failure, simply because he never became a university professor ? If Marx did not take up a university career, it was not for lack of capacity. If he did not become a lawyer, an instructor, a procurator, or a civil servant, it was only because he did not wish to ; or, to speak more strictly, because, when his student days were over, he wished to realise some rather unusual ambitions, which formed obstacles to a bourgeois career. No doubt in following the disinterested leanings which made of him one of the greatest geniuses of the nineteenth century, he involved



himself in a life of privations and poverty. It was natural enough that such a life should arouse in him a sentiment of hostility. But, and here is the cardinal question, did Marx's socialist convictions arise out of this hostility, or were they due to other motives, preexistent motives—due to the conflict between a particular intellectual disposition and a particular historical environment? Did Marx become a socialist because he failed to make a bourgeois career for himself; or did he sacrifice his chances of such a career because, on leaving the university, his convictions led him into conflict with those in high places who might have given him a post? The answer is obvious to any one who knows the details of Marx's life. In him, as in the other heroes of thought, what happened was, not that personal resentment created conviction, but that conviction created a situation in which feelings of resentment necessarily arose. In most people, career determines convictions. In a small minority, convictions make, or destroy, a career. Marx belonged to this minority, and so did the other socialist thinkers analysed by Professor Sombart.

Well, what is the source of such convictions? The answer is that they come from the head and from the heart, not from the stomach. They arise out of a particular disposition which, from time to time, endows a human being with a rare combination of moral and intellectual instincts. That a man may be thus equipped, he must have social leanings of such a kind that he regards the extant order as unjust; and these social leanings must be so powerful that he will be ready to sacrifice his career to his ideal. If his convictions are to give birth to a creative idea and to a doctrine, accessory conditions (likewise exceptional) are requisite. First of all, there is the matter of the thinker's own personality. He must be one of those unusual beings in whom moral passion dominates the whole of his intellectual activity. Bernard Shaw describes this temperament through the mouth of Don Juan, in the third act of *Man and Superman*: "As long as I can conceive something better than myself, I cannot be easy unless I am striving to bring it into existence or clearing the way for it. That is the

law of my life. That is the working within me of life's incessant aspiration to higher organisation, wider, deeper, intenser, self-consciousness, and clearer self-understanding." This creative imagination presupposes that such a person, urged onward by the instincts which comprise his character, has certain desires which life has not satisfied. They are the spiritual ones which the same writer describes in the preface to *Major Barbara*: "Rich men or aristocrats with a developed sense of life—men like Ruskin and William Morris and Kropotkin—have enormous social appetites and very fastidious personal ones. They are not content with handsome houses: they want handsome cities. They are not content with bediamonded wives and blooming daughters: they complain because the charwoman is badly dressed, because the laundress smells of gin, because the sempstress is anaemic, because every man they meet is not a friend and every woman not a romance. They turn up their noses at their neighbours' drains, and are made ill by the architecture of their neighbours' houses. . . . The very air is not good enough for them: there is too much factory smoke in it. They even demand abstract conditions: justice, honour, a noble moral atmosphere, a mystic nexus to replace the cash nexus."

It would be hard to give a better definition of what Karl Kautsky once spoke of contemptuously as ethico-aesthetic socialism. Artist natures resent as "ugly" what is usually spoken of as "immoral", and the outraged sense of beauty reinforces the outraged sense of good to make them demand a change in the social order.

There are plenty of other combinations of repressed social instincts which may serve as the starting-point for the formation of a socialist mentality. This will take on a special tint according to the nature of the psychical inhibition by which the individual's instincts are affected. There may be as many shades as there are combinations of the various human characters with various human destinies. Thus, among the social instincts which give rise to a socialist mentality, we shall always find a combative instinct in a more or less sublimated

form. One who is of a combative nature will, other things being equal, incline more towards socialism than towards conservatism or towards liberalism, for the elements of rebellion and aggressiveness in socialism will give more satisfaction to his fighting instinct. That is why people who are exceptionally combative can so readily pass on from socialism to fascism as soon as the latter seems to them to give more scope to their fighting instincts.

It is true that one who is mainly dominated by the fighting instinct will generally be more attracted towards practical political activity than towards theoretical and literary occupations. Marx, Bakunin, Plehanoff, Lenin in the days of his exile, and a great many others, serve, despite individual differences, as examples of a combative instinct strongly inhibited by outward circumstances, and therefore spiritualised by the guidance of intellectual activity towards criticism and polemic. Besides, the fighting instinct will not, unaided, create a socialist will; it must be combined in one way or another with some social instinct, all the more because it is of the essence of the combative instinct that it does not manifest itself unless some other instinctive desire is inhibited.

Robert Owen, on the other hand, is the most typical example of a character dominated by the instinct of social protection. This instinct (which makes people regard it as a moral duty on the part of privileged persons to come to the help of the disinherited), in alliance with other instincts or with certain types of character, displays itself in various forms. The most usual form is one in which the instinct of social protection is sublimated into charity, into love of one's neighbour, as we see in certain Christians whose religious sentiments are strongly developed. But this disposition does not lead on from simple philanthropy to the formation of a socialist conviction unless it is combined, now in one way and now in another, with the fighting instinct. Lassalle was a man in whom the intensified instinct of autovaluation fed, so to say, upon the instinct of social protection, in such a way that a chivalrous pose served to compensate for the latent sense of inferiority from which he

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suffered as an ambitious Jew. Let me say in passing that the parallelism between the socialist activity of Lassalle and the fight in which he engaged in the matter of the Hatzfeldt trial, emphasises the fact that the instinct of social protection and the instinct of sexual protection are, at bottom, interchangeable, and that a strong tendency to assume chivalrous attitudes in the social struggle is inseparable from a powerful erotisation of the spiritual nature.

When the instinct of social protection is combined with a tendency towards compassion, or, to put the matter more accurately, with an extreme receptivity towards others' emotions, the outcome is a disposition to sympathy, which does not per se suffice to bring about intellectual creations, but which forms what we may call a good conductor for the emotional content of socialist ideas. Such a disposition is essentially feminine, and is therefore much more often found in women than in men. But if it is combined with adequate intellectual powers, it is usually accompanied by a marked oratorical talent ; for one who is strongly influenced by others' emotions will be especially capable of moving others. Emile Royer, the late socialist deputy, was a typical example, all the more because his professional work as defending counsel at the Assize Court had intensified the readiness of his response to emotional vibrations. A man of this calibre is as eager to defend those who need social protection as those who need legal protection. Enrico Ferri, another specialist in the defence of those against whom criminal charges have been brought, puts a kindred disposition at the service of a healthy instinct of autovaluation and a strong fighting instinct. On the other hand, such men as Ruskin and Morris display a typical combination of the instinct of social protection with a keen aesthetic sensibility. In their eyes, the most dreadful thing in the lot of the masses is that they cannot even feel the ugliness of the world which surrounds them. Richard Wagner was a German of the same type. True that his case was a more complex one, for in him a vigorous instinct of autovaluation was strongly tinged with eroticism, and was sublimated

into a combative instinct displayed by the heroes of his dramas. But in Wagner, as in the others, we see effective manifestations of the artist's hatred for money, since to him the triumph of money seemed the triumph of ugliness.

Oscar Wilde, in turn, offers us a strange example of socialist conviction almost entirely based upon vanity and issuing from an ego-centric instinct of autovaluation. We might describe Wilde's socialism as the socialism of a dandy. To this lion of the drawing-rooms, obsessed with the determination to thrust his own personality into the limelight, socialism was a means for founding a true aristocracy of the mind, of the artistic sentiment, and of sensual refinement. In a word, an upper class of philistines was to be replaced by an upper class consisting of replicas of Oscar Wilde! This analysis must not be supposed to detract from Wilde's merits for having been one of the first to make an effective literary attack upon the crude equalitarianism of a socialism based upon the satisfaction of material interests.

A very different variety of the instinct of autovaluation inspires most of the forms of anarchising socialism. Here the personality who is seeking compensation for his inhibited instincts, identifies himself with a conceptual social whole. No doubt the thwarting of the instinct of autovaluation which leads to anarchism is due, in most cases, to some personal experience. Thus we have the disappointed author; the intellectual whose political schemes are frustrated by the despotic State; the independent artisan whose independence is threatened by the growth of industrialism; the worker who cannot adapt himself to the discipline of the workshop or the factory, and who therefore becomes a migratory labourer or a tramp; the freak who is disgusted with modern urban conditions, and prefers the "simple life". These five types practically exhaust the characterology of anarchising socialism. Perhaps one other type should be added, that of the able and genuinely creative anarchists, rare beings, of whom Prince Kropotkin was one of the most brilliant examples. In such persons, the inhibition of the instinct of autovaluation is

de-individualised, as it were, so that a profound social sympathy, a lively imagination, and, above all, a highly developed instinct of social protection, cooperate to make the inhibition of others' personalities vicariously felt. Persons of this type can hardly be said to have any purely individual experiences, for all their experiences are those of others with whom they identify themselves in imagination. To my way of thinking, that is why no one gave more direct and brilliant expression than Kropotkin to the purely ideal content of socialism ; nor do I think that there is any finer socialist book than Kropotkin's *Memoirs*.

The instinctive disposition which English and American writers on social psychology speak of as the constructive instinct, displays itself in manifold variations as a socialist motive. Per se, this instinct is a special form of the instinct for activity, being at one and the same time a cause and an effect of work ; and, to a large extent, of play. The instinct of autovaluation in the intellectualised human being, who tries to realise his ego outside himself in relationship with inanimate objects and with other human beings, may guide his constructive instinct to work upon the structure of society. This presupposes that the individual in question is able to identify himself with the social destiny ; and, since such an identification is only possible as the outcome of sympathy, the instinct of social protection presides over the application of the constructive instinct to society. In accordance with the special form of constructive instinct which is allied to the instinct of social protection, we can distinguish various special types of this socialist motivation, the most characteristic of which are the "rational scientific" type, the economic type, the nationalist type, and the eugenic type.

Scientific motivation is best defined in a phrase of Bebel's : "Socialism is science in its application to all the domains of human activity". I should mention that Bebel himself was not a characteristic example of scientific motivation. He penned the foregoing definition as an expression of the customary tendency of self-taught men to overvalue science. Be that as

it may, in our industrialised society the constructive instinct is to a large extent transformed into an instinct for scientific knowledge and scientific coordination. The whole science of our age is, in substance, nothing more than man's attempt to subjugate the universe by understanding it. Consequently, it is the most vigorous intellectual expression of man's constructive instinct. Now, knowledge can only become science by ordering itself, by organising itself, in accordance with the principle of rational causality. But the application of this principle of organisation to society does not necessarily culminate in socialism. Classical political economy, for instance, regards the capitalist method of production as synonymous with purposive organisation, seeing that the aim of classical economy is the production of the largest possible quantity of goods—unless we include among classical economists those more enlightened members of the school who are beginning to realise that capitalism does not merely create values, but destroys a good many values as well. It is only when the instinct of social protection makes social organisation aim at bringing happiness and freedom to mankind, that we can say that the rational scientific motive leads to socialist conclusions. That is why so many men of science, starting from a coordinative principle which they saw at work in their special scientific field, have been led to construct a socialist utopia. Until the days when socialism became a mass movement, and thus first acquired the emotional lure of an ethical motivation, this constructive and organisatory motive was the main motive of all the great social utopists. Their aim was, not justice, but the purposive organisation of the State; or, to put the matter more accurately, they felt that justice was only purposiveness, suitability to an end. In those days, statesmen became socialists, whereas to-day socialists become statesmen. Although the rational scientific motive is no longer supreme, it still plays a great part. The most typical living representative of this particular socialist trend is the English mathematician and logician, Bertrand Russell. In Germany, two generations ago, Rodbertus was a man of the same type.

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What economists term the economic instinct of man, the desire to create the greatest amount of value with the least possible effort, is not really an instinct, but, like the scientific motive, a special rationalised form of the constructive instinct, presupposing as it does a conscious process, the idea of the value to be created or to be economised. The British Fabians have shown in a specially effective way how the desire to avoid the waste of labour and of social values, to avoid these evils by means of a purposive organisation of society, must lead to socialism.

Among intellectuals, it is civil engineers and those whom the Americans call "efficiency experts", who are most likely to adopt socialist ways of thinking for constructive reasons. As soon as the engineer begins to apply to society at large the principles of economic and technical organisation which prevail in his own peculiar domain of production, he necessarily begins to formulate socialist ideas, although it is likely enough that he will not allow you to call him a socialist. The American apostle of scientific management, H. L. Gantt, furnishes us with a typical example of a technician who, almost to his own astonishment, has extended the idea of the rational organisation of production from the isolated enterprise to society as a whole.

A less highly rationalised variant of the constructive disposition, but one which is all the more ethico-aesthetic, derives from the application of the constructive instinct to the national community, with a subsequent enlargement of the application to the social community. We shall find the most frequent examples of this trend among the cultivated strata of peoples in whom the nationalist sentiment has recently awakened or reawakened, and in whom the feeling of oppression is accompanied by a vigorous sense of their special national culture. If this sentiment of national community is to expand into a sentiment of social community, it is necessary that the intellectual constructive instinct shall from the first have been directed more towards a cultural end than towards a purely political end. That is why the disposition we are considering is most often met with in intellectuals whose interests are



specially directed towards the historical sciences, literature, and art. Another necessary condition is that there should be a strong instinct of social protection. Then only will the intellectual perceive that the realisation of his own cultural ideal is linked with the need for changing the conditions of existence of all those who share in the national cultural unity ; and that the cultural progress of his own nation is no more than a part of a universal cultural ascent. This combination of national and social motives, modified in various ways by other influences, may be said to be normal among most cultivated intellectuals. We find it just as obviously present in Marx and Engels, as in the reformist Jaurès, and in the professorial socialist Masaryk. It is precisely because Marxist socialism would fain deny the power of the nationalist motive, that this motive is so vigorously at work in the subconscious of the Marxist intellectual. The psychoanalytical biographies of a great many Czech, Polish, Flemish, and Irish socialists, give a clear picture of the different phases of the gradual transference of the cultural constructive motive from the national objective to the social objective. The case best known to me personally is that of the Flemish socialist Auguste Vermeylen. A historian of art, he moved on from a pure study of aesthetics to a cultural nationalism, and thence to socialism, without there being any other change in his general psychical disposition than in the formula whereby he tried, in the different stages of his mental evolution, to transcend a permanent conflict between an intellectual disposition and a social environment.

If I may adduce my own case, I should like to say that I refer the origin of the motives which inclined me towards socialism as I grew up, to the peculiar position of my parental home towards national questions. My family was one of the very few among the cultured families of Belgium (most of which have adopted the French culture in preference to the Flemish) which remained faithful to the Flemish cultural tradition of the old urban patriciate. My maternal grandfather was one of the most noted Flemish poets in the days of

the Flemish revival. Inasmuch as, in the Flemish regions of Belgium, the bourgeoisie usually talks French (leaving Flemish to the "common people"), for a bourgeois to speak Flemish naturally implies a support of the aspirations of the common people. My grandfather, whose spiritual heritage became a cult in our family, was a radical and a democrat in politics. In his choice of poetical themes, he had especial fondness for folk-life, and was a keen student of folk-lore. In these circumstances, the slogan "back to the people" could not but mean something far more natural, and far more genuine, than the kindred enthusiasm of intellectuals in countries where the nationalist motive has not been similarly quickened by the social motive. Thus in childhood I learned to despise the French-speaking bourgeoisie of my country, the persons who awkwardly imitated Paris; and, although in other respects the feeling which prevailed in my home was antiproletarian, I came to feel that the common people were more closely akin to me than the French-speaking bourgeoisie, and stood higher than these in a cultural respect. Thus the transition from a national cultural to a social cultural community sense was an easy one. Even though, intellectually considered, it brought about so radical a reorientation that I at first plunged to the extreme of an unduly cosmopolitan and purely economic Marxism, this was no more than the natural reaction against the inconsequence of a romanticist nationalism, whose enthusiasm for the people had stopped short when there was a question of improving conditions of life and labour for the proletariat. Nevertheless, the primitive intertwining of the "social" and the "Flemish" threads remained so strongly operative in my subconscious that, although I have spent most of my adult life in other lands, I still find that when I think of the worker I tend to picture him concretely as one of the Flemish workmen whom I knew and loved in youth.

Another variant of the constructive instinct is what I have called the eugenic motive. This is the outcome of a concentration of the instinct of social protection and the constructive instinct, upon the objective of a healthy race. Obviously,

we shall meet this most often in medical practitioners, biologists, and hygienists, whose first intimate acquaintance with social miseries is as a cause of illness. For this reason, socialism presents itself to them mainly as a means of constructing a society of thoroughly healthy persons, which for them becomes synonymous with a healthy society. The Belgian socialist César de Paepe was an example of this type. As soon as the medical visual angle widens into the biological visual angle, the observer's wishes become directed towards an order of things which shall eliminate all the avoidable social causes of physical and mental suffering, and shall guarantee to the human race an optimum of health and longevity. One of the most noted and widely popular representatives of this type is the English novelist H. G. Wells, whose modes of thought have been strongly influenced by his biological training.

Socialist motivation shows interesting variations in the work of certain adepts of the psychology of instinct. To them, socialism presents itself above all as a means for eliminating the demoralising instinct of fear, which is all-powerful to-day as the economic motive for work and the political motive for subordination. These motives are to be replaced by constructive instincts having a loftier moral inspiration and, consequently, a higher educational value.

This motivation has much in common with that of the socialist disciples of the celebrated Viennese neurologist Alfred Adler, the leader of what is known as the school of individual psychology. Adler's basic idea is to explain the majority of neuroses as due to a "discouragement" of the community sense, and to an urge to secure compensatory "insurance" by means of an artificially intensified auto-valuation. On this interpretation it is fairly easy to build up a social outlook in accordance with which the viewpoint of individual hygiene shall coincide with the viewpoint of social morality. According to Adlerist philosophy, one who wants good nervous and mental health, should cultivate altruism. Alfred Adler's psychology is the most far-reaching attempt

that has yet been made to justify the demands of social morality from one of the outposts of biological science. But the attempts at systematisation hitherto made along these lines are too fragmentary to warrant any inference as to the possible success of so ambitious a design. It seems to me that proof is still lacking of the Adlerist thesis that morality can be substantiated in terms of hygiene alone, and without recourse to a metaphysical scale of ethical values.

On the other hand, it would perhaps be risky to assert *a priori* that socialism cannot possibly be substantiated by pure reason, that is to say in the terms of pure science. Beyond question, what Kant spoke of as the unity of reason is a powerful force making for social unification. It is certain, moreover, that at the present time a part (though a modest one) of these aspirations towards the solution of social conflicts by a reasonable criterion whose acceptance is incumbent on all sane persons, is now in course of realisation. There is obviously in progress an extension of the "neutral domain of science", of the region in which certain measures of social policy are seen to be the logical inference from the observation of certain facts, the conclusion being no less irresistible than that to be drawn from experiments in a physical laboratory. The domain is small, but it grows. For instance, enquiries regarding the social and hygienic situation of the workers, enquiries which have been systematised for a century, have unquestionably contributed to the formation of public opinion, and have led people to recognise that the demand for certain reforms is eminently reasonable. On the other hand, employers, just as much as workers, are compelled to draw practical conclusions (unfavourable to the maintenance of a very long working day) from the causal relationships which can be deduced from a study of the effect which a reduction of working hours has upon the curve of production. An appeal to reason is a necessary part of all socialist propaganda, especially when the propaganda is addressed to non-proletarian circles.

Still, it is a far cry from the recognition of these facts to the idea that the socialist order of society can be brought into

being by a simple appeal to the rational motives that will become operative in persons better informed than are most of our contemporaries as to the actualities of social life. First, indeed, it would be necessary to come to an agreement as to the meaning of the terms "reason" and "rational"! Apart from this, a victory of socialism, thanks to the effect of purely logical persuasion, presupposes other conditions, which do not arise spontaneously out of the general uniformity of the human cerebral apparatus. It is true that the ignorance of the ruling class as to the position of the working class (and especially as to the psychical position of the workers) is a formidable obstacle in the way of that awakening of the social conscience which must necessarily occur in the well-to-do before they will be prepared to take a kindlier view of socialism; but that is only part of the truth, and a lack of scientific knowledge is not the essential cause of the torpor of their consciences. Why is a cultivated man or woman in easy circumstances apt to be much better informed concerning the mental state of an eighteenth-century musical composer, that of a Japanese painter, or even that of a Fiji islander, than concerning the mental state of the workman of his own race and time who lives round the corner? The explanation is simple. In the former series of instances, knowledge is wanted; in the last instance, knowledge is shunned. If, then, the very acquirement of knowledge be determined by social position, how much more will the inferences to be drawn from known facts be determined thereby! For instance, it is generally agreed that the health of the many is unfavourably affected by the conditions in which they live and work. Yet people draw different practical conclusions from this obvious and elementary fact. To socialists it will seem reasonable that steps be taken to improve the social conditions of the persons thus affected. But among non-socialists, the only ones whose judgments and volitions will be influenced by such a conclusion, will either be those who feel themselves responsible for the well-being of their neighbours, or else those who consider that a general decline in the level of public health would entail upon them-

selves personally greater disadvantages than would be entailed by the sacrifices necessary to avert such a consummation. Thus a more precise knowledge of facts may lead to varying inferences, according as the respective thinkers vary in the moral character of their customary social valuations. Otherwise, of course, non-socialists would all be ignoramuses, and all well-informed persons would be socialists. Every one knows that this is not the case! On the contrary, there is a smaller proportion of socialists among sociological experts, than among intellectuals in general. Artists and men of letters are far more amenable to socialist sentiments than are sociological experts. A sympathetic understanding of the feelings of others, such as forms a necessary part of the artistic temperament, stimulates the social conscience more effectively, than does the frigid intellectualism of those who by taste and training are led to devote their lives to the objective study of verifiable facts.

As long as this is so, the attempted substantiation of socialism by reason can never be more than the formulation of an objective whose choice has already been determined by an affect, by a wish; the objective is a primary goal of desire, was such before reason had a word to say upon the matter. If, none the less, the pursuit of the desired end can be justified as "reasonable", this is only in so far as "reason" can no longer be regarded as merely the logical and critical faculty whereby concepts are arranged, coordinated, and associated. Every appeal made by socialism to reason, is an appeal to that practical faculty of judgment which is known as common sense. This appeal, however, presupposes that, not only certain logical laws of thought, but also certain practical laws of valuation, have become general axiomatic rules for all human beings at a given level of civilisation. Thus the justification of socialism by social hygiene, even when supported by a most formidable parade of inductions, will only seem cogent to those who prefer health to illness, and to those who would rather see their fellows well than ill. As regards the preference of health to illness in our own case, this is the outcome of a

normal instinctive valuation in one whose physiological system is in sound working order ; but the preference of health to illness in the case of others than ourselves depends upon an ethical sentiment which is outside the domain of physiology.

When we follow up this train of thought we cannot fail to see that the justification of socialism by the common reason of mankind is not valid unless we mean by " reason " a rule of judgment which implies certain ethical valuations. Now, what are these valuations which can be reduced to a common human denominator ? The question is easier to ask than to answer. A standard of value so general that it can be regarded as inherent in human nature, is, by that very fact, so emotional and so intuitive that it can never be wholly apprehended by the pure intelligence. We are obviously confronted here with an affective content such as C. G. Jung has (with good reason) declared to be insusceptible of precise verbal definition, on the ground that the faculty of intellectual comprehension is " incommensurable with the essential nature of feeling ". Where feeling comes into play, every one speaks a language of his own. Directly we begin to define and to formulate, we introduce a differentiating element, so that of the whole which we are trying to apprehend, only one aspect remains visible. Intuitively, we may feel sure that Kant's categorical imperative means exactly the same as the Christian maxim that we are to love our neighbours as ourselves and to do as we would be done by, exactly the same as the " eternal verities " of all the great religions—but it is difficult to clothe in words the higher, more perfect, more generalised truth which we feel to exist at the core of these various formulations. Experience teaches us that the symbolical imagery of the great religions, imagery which transcends logic, will often bring us nearer than logic can to the full apprehension we desire ; but many people find it impossible to follow this path, both because the old parables are apt to ask us to renounce reason instead of using it to confirm them, and because in the course of ages most of them have crystallised into formulas which are only acceptable to a fragment of mankind. A man of our own day who is

profoundly religious and at the same time enlightened with modern knowledge, has an intuitive conception of the deity, but is unable to intellectualise it to his satisfaction. He cannot identify it with the Christian Trinity, with the Old Testament Jehovah, with Allah, or Buddha, or Pan ; he wants to subsume them all, and something more as well. In theory, no doubt, the metaphysical route disclosed to us by the religious sentiment remains accessible and practicable ; but we should like a broad, new road instead of the old paths, which are numerous and narrow. Despite disillusionments and difficulties, we go on hoping that more knowledge and deeper knowledge will ultimately enable us to build such a broad, new road, which will lead us, not indeed to a final understanding of the whole meaning of life, but at any rate to the threshold of a higher understanding. The very nature of our reasoning faculties makes us strive unceasingly in this direction, though we cannot know whether our efforts will ever be crowned with success.

In the meantime, when faced by the enigma of the ultimate motive of our dynamic ethic, we must try to get somewhat nearer to its solution by the method (however inadequate) of scientific knowledge ; for at any rate a fuller knowledge of the objective manifestations of a phenomenon helps us to grasp its subjective significance. Here two chief possibilities lie open, the historical method and the psychological method.

When we use the historical method, we try to discover the common, the unifying elements that underlie all human conation—this being in sharp contrast with the particularist history of philosophy which became current during the war epoch, when the tendency was to lay all possible stress upon differentiating elements. The aim must be to formulate a neo-humanist philosophy, envisaging a synthesis, not merely of all the manifestations of some one particular civilisation, but of all the manifestations of all civilisations. The final problem will then be, how we can best come to recognise the meaning of history as the perennial endeavour of mankind to realise an aggregate of institutions which shall approximate as



closely as possible to the ideal of an immanent eudaemonistic and ethical mode of valuation.

The psychological method is directed towards the same goal, but from a different starting-point. It has as its subject-matter facts which are, strictly speaking, biological; and its approach towards ethics is from the eudaemonistic side. The Freudian psychology of the subconscious, which aims at elucidating, not merely the *How* of individual human behaviour, but also the *Why*, cannot effect the transition from the descriptive to the normative without the assumption that there is an absolute eudaemonistic scale of values, which is simultaneously an ethical scale. (The fact that Alfred Adler's individual psychology leads into a blind alley, confirms the foregoing statement.)

The existence of such a scale thus tends more and more to become the starting-point common to all theological and scientific research. From the most various outlooks, our steps converge towards the idea of an *absolute* moral order, a new synthesis of ontology and deontology, of ethical and eudaemonistic valuations, of physical being and moral duty, of happiness and virtue and wisdom—resembling that which was long ago formulated by Thomas Aquinas. Of course his medieval formulation no longer satisfies us, for its essence is out of harmony with modern methods of enquiry. But we have not yet found the new formula which is to replace it. We are only beginning to create the language competent to express it in a way accordant with our scientific habits of cognition. In these circumstances the isolated investigator, however convinced he may be that there does really exist an absolute order of moral values immanent in humanity (perhaps in the universe) and supplying a goal for human endeavour, will nevertheless do well to be cautious in the range of his formulations. It is less dangerous to say a word too little than a word too much. There are powers of faith and habit which are strong for the very reason that they are not crystallised into formulas. The unwritten constitution of Britain is a great deal stronger than are the meticulously worded constitutions

of Germany and Mexico. The mutual consent of habitual valuations, in the absence of any rationalised formula, unites and strengthens; whereas a formula, when this consent is lacking, will divide and weaken. If we say a word too little, we may prompt our hearers to continue the search for themselves; if we say a word too much, we shall probably repel them. As long as that of which we are in search looms before us as a limitary and unattainable notion, searching is more important than finding. That is why I fear I may have said too much rather than too little, when choosing from among the canons of value already formulated, the two following as truths common to all mankind and underlying all reasonable judgment:

1. *Vital values are higher than material values; and of vital values, spiritual values are the highest.* From the eudaemonistic standpoint, this may be expressed by saying that, other things being equal, the most attractive satisfactions are those which are experienced at the level of the highest consciousness of the reality of the ego and the environment.

2. *The motives of community sentiment are higher than the motives of personal power and personal acquisition.* We can express the same thought in eudaemonistic terms by saying that all men feel that they *ought* to be more pleased by the fulfilment of a duty to another than by any sort of satisfaction of an inverse kind.

Although, for the reasons explained above, such formulas are inadequate, they have their uses in guiding persons who care more about the spirit than the letter, in the search for the universally human constituents of the socialist aim.

In any case, the two formulas suffice to show that all socialist conviction (whatever its intellectual motivation may be) is the outcome of the tension between certain methods of valuation derived from community sentiment, and certain social states which conflict with the valuations secured by these methods. In so far as the methods in question can be subjected to scientific study, they are seen to derive from inborn impulses or instincts which, during the long ages of human history, have condensed into definite moral and legal canons.

The common root of all socialist convictions is, therefore, a psychological state. It is a teleological conception, the conception of a desirable end, which arises by way of compensation for the inhibitions which extant (i.e. non-socialist) society imposes upon the impulses that are born out of community feeling. It is the conception of a state of society wherein such impulses will no longer be inhibited. The forms which these impulses can assume are so diverse, that the foregoing description of various types of socialist motivation was necessarily restricted to a few salient kinds. As the nature of the inhibited motives vary (of course, they are not simple motives, but complexes of motives, and they can never be exactly alike in two different persons), so there will be variations in the teleological conception, in the mental picture of the desirable state of society wherein the impulses born out of community feeling will no longer be inhibited.

Just as there is no socialist doctrine which is not the outcome of a utopian mental picture of the socialist future ; so there is no utopia, no mental picture of the socialist future, which is not the outcome of the inhibition of certain psychological motives. In this sense, all socialism is the socialism of intellectuals. But the affective disposition will only create a socialist theory, a socialist doctrine, in those exceptional minds wherein, to the creative imagination which contraposes to the world of reality a conceptual picture of a possible world, there is superadded a critical and coordinating faculty of thought, so that desire can be retested by comparison with reality, and the will guided in its search for the possible. Every original socialist thinker is therefore both utopist and systematist.

The multiformity of socialist conceptual systems is thus dependent, not only upon varieties in the motivation which leads a thinker into socialist paths, but also upon individual varieties in intellection. The multiplicity of socialist thought is by no means an indication of weakness. Mohammed said that the diversity of opinions among the faithful was a sign of God's mercy. The very multiplicity of the intellectual forms

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in which the revolt of man's social instincts against capitalism finds expression, shows how strong is the undercurrent in the stream of human longing towards communal happiness.

Rival theorists do not as a rule look at the matter in this agreeable light, for each of them is too eager to make his particular aspect of truth prevail. Every doctrine may be said to have an inherent desire for exclusive possession of the field; or at least a wish to subordinate all competitors, all kindred doctrines. Thanks to the nineteenth-century extension of the methods of exact science into the field of history, this subordination has come to mean that the competing doctrines are to be relegated to their places in the particular thinker's system of historical interpretation. Marxism has been peculiarly successful in drafting a unified scheme of the development of socialist theory, and in putting all rival doctrines, past and present, in their appropriate pigeonholes. The entire Marxist conception is built up upon the principle that socialism is identical with proletarian class interest; and in accordance with this notion all non-Marxist socialism is classified as either pre-proletarian or non-proletarian—the latter being for the most part petty-bourgeois.

The human mind is so fashioned that we can only apprehend a plurality by searching for and finding the elements which can endow it with unity. The mere application of such a name as socialism to a vast and variegated aggregate of social and mental phenomena, presupposes the existence of a unifying principle. In the lack of a revelation from on high disclosing the final aims of historical evolution, this principle, in so far as it is to be an object of scientific study, can only be a hypothesis. The indications are that, inasmuch as the materialist hypothesis of Marxism (to the effect that class interest is the motive force of socialism) has proved invalid, the socialist doctrines of the near future, following the thought-trend of the day, will tend more and more to substitute psycho-energetic hypotheses for materialist hypotheses. Marxism itself will then appear as merely one of the phases of an evolution whose connecting link will no longer be class interest, but an affect,

a mode of feeling, common to all socialists from the first utopian writers onwards. This mode of feeling tends towards the subordination of egoistic motives to altruistic motives. Then socialism will disclose itself to be something very different from and something much more than a mere complement to capitalism. It will be seen to be a mode of feeling and of thinking as old and as widely diffused as political and ethical thought itself, a mighty perennial stream, but one which only in nineteenth-century Europe was able for the first time to become the lasting program of a mass movement.

From the outlook of exact science, this identification of socialism with an enduring spiritual creative force is obviously, too, no more than a hypothesis. Those who, like myself, can quench their thirst for understanding by the direct contemplation of an object, being content to ask this object to reveal its primary significance per se, in isolation, can dispense with such hypotheses. Those whose minds are so constituted that they cannot properly apprehend any psychical evolution except as the expression of some general law, will find that the energetic hypothesis has this great advantage over the materialist hypothesis, that it explains a psychological phenomenon in psychological and not in mechanical terms. The energetic hypothesis therefore explains much more than Marxism does—including Marxism itself. There is not one historical form of socialism which cannot be better understood as a phase of the evolution of an idea, of a self-realising psychological force, than as the outcome of a conflict of class interests. If, for instance, we accept the laws of mental evolution formulated by Ribot (*Essai sur l'imagination créatrice*, p. 258) for all the activities of the creative imagination, we shall represent the three phases in the development of socialism as follows :

1. A purely utopian phase, in which the imagination, working freely and independently, creates a mental picture of a desired social order. "There is no relationship between these creations of fancy and the actual life of contemporary societies. The world of fact and the world of fancy are utterly estranged one from the other. The true utopists were almost indifferent to

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the thought of practical applications " (Ribot, loc. cit.). This phase of socialism stretches from classical days to the close of the Renaissance, from Plato to Sir Thomas More. Throughout this period, the revolutionary movements which occurred from time to time among the oppressed, were not in any way connected one with another.

2. A phase of practical and experimental utopism. Following Ribot, we may date its beginnings from the first attempts of Locke and Rousseau to draft ideal constitutions. This phase culminated with the Owenite cooperative colonies, and declined shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century, when most of the experimental communist commonwealths had come to grief. That was when in Britain the trade-union movement, and on the Continent the agitation on behalf of universal suffrage, had come to the front.

3. A phase of practical and rationalist utopism. In this phase, socialism found expression in working-class programs. Marxism is especially characteristic of the third period. The *Communist Manifesto* supplies it with a goal at the outset; the International Workingmen's Association and the Second International present themselves as progressive realisations. The objective is still an ideal order, which the future alone can render actual, but the actualisation is to be effected thanks to the working of newly discovered laws of social evolution. Imaginative longing indues a scientific dress, that realisation may be made to seem historically inevitable. The socialist philosopher believes it to be his mission to guide the mass parties of the workers towards the objectives of "scientific socialism", and to ensure the adoption of the methods which science has disclosed.

We may picture a still closer union between theory and practice, between doctrine and movement. It is to be the work of a fourth phase, which is now beginning, when the cleavage between the theory and the practice of Marxism has shown the impracticability of the Marxist endeavour to unite utopism with science. This may be termed the practical and ethical phase. To-day, scientific psychological criticism puts

utopism in its proper place, regarding a utopia as nothing more than the symbol of a real moral conviction, and refusing to contemplate it as possessing the absolute value of an ideal state which is in course of inevitable realisation through the working of a natural law. By thus incorporating the ideal of a socialist future into the psychological motivation of living individuals, we lessen by a further step the distance between ideal and real.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE

Worth can only be the outcome of work and service.

GOETHE.

It is not a little peculiar that Marxism, although (like all socialist doctrines) it was conceived by intellectuals, should have no place for these in its description of society. Yet the class of intellectuals is a no less characteristic and important product of the industrial epoch than the proletariat. Characteristic, because the divorce of mental from manual work did not become the regular rule of production until the rise of the capitalist system. Important, because we have here to do with a class whose mentality, which gives the stamp to modern civilisation, supplies the State and the productive system with their ruling personnel, and thus actually governs the social organism.

One of the undue simplifications of Marxist sociology is the identification of the social category "bourgeoisie" with the economic category "capitalism". No doubt capital dominates the industrialised economy; but the idea of a social governing class (above all in the cultural sense assigned to this domination by Marx and Engels) signifies something very different from the economic predominance of the capitalists in production.

In our description of working-class psychology, it has hitherto been enough to apply the general term bourgeoisie to the totality of the possessing or non-proletarian classes. Now it behoves us to look at the matter more closely. In ordinary propagandist parlance, it is usual to employ the terms master class, capitalist class, bourgeoisie, ruling class, possessing class, etc., as interchangeable. This is in conformity with the



emotional trend which leads the masses to reduce all that they hate to one uniform type. On public platforms, an orator is always sure of success if, in accordance with this trend, he represents a complicated situation in such a way that the whole emotion of his audience can discharge itself upon a symbolical object, whether that be the employer regarded as an exploiter, or, in a more extended political sense, the "unique reactionary mass" of which the Lassallists used to speak.

Descriptive sociology cannot be content with so primitive a classification. The concrete phenomena which it has to investigate are far too complicated and inconstant for the concept of a single dominant class to be of any use in that science. The economic, political, and cultural functions of social life are, in this era of the division of labour, so multifarious, that organic complicated functions such as that of the State cannot be apprehended with the aid of a single pure economic category, such as capitalism. The "bourgeoisie" which we spoke of above as a ruling social class, on the ground that its prestige rendered it an object of imitation by the members of all other classes, includes a great many more persons than the industrial employers. In especial, the identification of the economic capitalist power with the State power is a fallacy; and yet the prevalence of this fallacy has made it very difficult for many of the socialist parties to adapt their political doctrines to the new realities of the post-war period.

If we wish to understand the facts, we must set out from the simple truth that the politically dominant class is the one whose members exercise the functions of political domination. This includes, above all, the functions of State administration, local government, the guidance of political parties, and the control of the press as the organ of public opinion. As soon as we accept this definition, the concept "capitalist class" regarded as the class of those who, under capitalism, organise production, is no longer applicable. In actual fact, the political functions just enumerated are not exercised by capitalists, that is to say by industrialist employers, bankers, large-scale

traders, landed proprietors, etc., but by *intellectuals*. Capitalists, generally speaking, have no time to spare for political matters. They are too fully occupied in looking after their immediate interests to give more than a passing thought to public affairs. The State and public opinion are no more their main concern than they are the main concern of the working class.

The State is, really, something very different from the simple executive committee of the ruling class. The interests of that class are in the hands of the great banks, the industrial combines, the employers' unions, the chambers of commerce, etc. It is in these institutions that "industry", "commerce", "banking", in a word, the political influence of "business men", is concentrated. The State cannot escape their influence, were it only because the influence represents a part of public opinion, and also because it controls a great many of the press organs which form public opinion. But, for the very reason that the State is subject to this alien influence, it follows that capitalist domination and the State are not identical notions, and that the State is a sociological structure with a separate existence of its own.

The State is not solely a juridical conception, and legislation is not the sole function of the State. If it were so, the will expressed by a parliamentary majority would be identical with the will of the State. Only a very simple-minded person, only one who has learned nothing since the rise of the democratic era, can imagine that the carrying out of the popular will is effected in a way so simple. In most countries, nowadays, you can find socialist ministers or ex-ministers of State who have been able to learn by practical experience how much easier it is to get laws accepted by a parliamentary majority than to ensure that these laws shall subsequently be carried into effect. The relationship between legislation and the State is not a one-sided matter, in which the majority simply imposes its will through the instrumentality of the State. Those who take part in political work succumb far too easily and far too often to the will of the State; and that which

remains of the "popular will" of the parliamentarists is not, even in the most favourable circumstances, anything more than a compromise, the resultant of a parallelogram of forces, a considerable force among which is that of the permanent officials—even if the force they exercise be only one of inertia!

The State is a distinct entity, with a will of its own; for, in the last analysis, it consists of human beings. *The State is made up of persons.* I do not mean by this to convey an abstract notion of the totality of the citizens. I mean, in a perfectly concrete way, all those whose profession it is to work for the State. When I think of the State, I visualise persons in flesh and blood: civil servants, politicians, judges, and the army of uniformed persons: soldiers, policemen, postmen, prison warders, and so on: persons who serve the State, and who, in return, have an assured subsistence, with, in addition, the enjoyment of the reflected glory of their share in the State omnipotence. Of course I know that many of my contemporaries, especially among the Germans, are not content to regard the State as simply one association among many. For them, the State is a superior entity, which man has to obey, and to which the individual must make sacrifices. For my part, I am not even prepared to admit that the most sublime functions of the State (legislative and jurisdictional) are in any way uplifted above the imperfections and the pettinesses of all human creations. Especially do I find it hard to forget that the works of the State are the works of human beings, for whom the service of the State is confounded with the realisation of their personal aims.

Furthermore, the functions of the State are not performed within the domain of the process of production, but upon the much more extended area of moral and political relationships. From the outlook of production (and this applies just as much to matters which concern the capitalist as to matters which concern the worker), the State must, in sum, be regarded as an alien power, which only intervenes in exceptional cases, and which, on the other hand, can only be influenced in exceptional cases. The will which is realised in political and administrative

life as the will of the State, differs from the capitalist's money-making will which seeks realisation in the economic sphere. The will of the State is the total direct outcome of the will of all the human beings who permanently participate in the destinies of the State ; and these persons are civil servants, members of parliament, journalists ; they are not employers or capitalists. Nor are they proletarians. The identification of the State with the rule of the proletariat as a class (whether as an aspiration in Germany or as an alleged achievement in Russia) is just as much a chimera as the identification of the State with the rule of the capitalist class in current Marxist sociology. These two conceptions of class derive their characteristics from the respective positions of the classes in the process of production. We must not transfer them to other social functions. To speak of the political dictatorship of the proletariat is unmeaning, were it only because dictatorship means government by one dictator, and not by a mythical monster with millions of heads. Under the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat is just as much an object of politics as the capitalist is in the State that the Marxists speak of as the executive committee of the capitalist class. The proletarian has no time to rule, precisely because he is a proletarian. A man cannot pass his day at the bench, and then, when his day's work is over, govern a country in the evening. Politics are not an occupation of leisure hours ; they are a specialist's job.

There are proletarians, just as there are capitalists, who occupy political posts in representative or administrative bodies. But they cannot do anything decisive in these positions unless they adopt political life as their main profession. Now, from the moment when they become members of parliament or public officials, they cease to be proletarians, however extensive the influence of the proletarian class may be upon their mentality. Thenceforward they have been enrolled in the class of persons who carry on the functions of government. They have become intellectuals ; and, in adopting their new profession, they adopt all the characteristic

insignia of their new class, from dress, bearing, and similar outward essentials, down to the modes of thought and life. When the German revolution installed a sometime saddler in the presidential chair, this was not a conquest of the saddlers over the intellectuals, but a conquest of the intellectuals over the saddlers.

I need hardly say that the term "intellectual" does not involve any higher valuation of the intelligence requisite for some particular kind of work. When we speak of an intellectual we are thinking of a kind of work which, instead of needing an expenditure of physical force, needs the practice of intellectual judgments that presuppose the acquirement of particular kinds of knowledge in the mental domain. It does not follow that the intellectual is a better-informed or a more intelligent person than the manual worker or the peasant; he is merely one who uses his intelligence in a different way, and the knowledge he needs in his occupation is directed towards a different end, and therefore has a different character.

There is no kind of regular political activity which does not need professional specialisation. All the important political operations, ranging from the carrying out of an administrative measure to the preparation of a newspaper campaign or to the adoption of a particular attitude by a parliamentary group, are the work of specialists. Even in modern democracy (nay, above all in modern democracy), it is only in an extremely indirect and theoretical sense that politics is an affair of the people, that is to say of Everyman; it is, above all, the affair of politicians. In our day, political communities are so vast, the problems with which they have to deal are so complicated, and administrative work requires so comprehensive a division of labour, that it has become quite impossible to govern after the manner of the urban republics of classical Greece, or after that of the Teutonic tribes in days gone by. Unfortunately, political life is still dominated by modes of thought and modes of speech which derive from such outworn conditions. The consequence is that a great many democrats have advocated systems whose practical results have often

frustrated the best intentions. The wish for parliamentary sovereignty has eventuated in the sovereignty of party machines; the wish to establish the power of public opinion has established the power of newspaper proprietors; instead of the authority of the legislature, that of professional executive officers has been set up; those who wanted to entrust political power to ministers responsible to parliament and subject to removal at the will of parliament, have ended by entrusting it to ministers who are, for practical purposes, in the hands of irresponsible and unremovable permanent officials. This course of development was, if not caused, at least unconsciously favoured by romanticists whose sense of reality was clouded by theory. Those who believed unhesitatingly that the State was identical with the popular will, were going the best way to prevent the realisation of the popular will in the State. The question is: How can we best organise an efficient control of the State by the popular will? The first step in this direction is that we must recognise the existence of the peculiar sociological will of the State, based upon the exercise of the directive functions of State by a class of specialists.

Owing to the nature of their work and of the knowledge necessary for that work, these specialists belong to intellectual professions. Thus the machinery of State is in the hands of intellectuals. This development began with the great French revolution, whose main significance was the conquest of the State by the intellectuals. The starting-point and the symbol of the development was the monopolisation of education by the State, a system inaugurated by the French revolution—for public education is the means whereby the stratum of intellectuals perpetuates itself as a social group. The intellectuals, more than any other social stratum, have their destinies linked with that of the State. They derive their diplomas from its universities. Lawyers, doctors, and the clergy, need its consecration before they can practise their professions. Affairs of State are the most important matters with which the journalist has to deal. The State supports the schoolmaster. Artists, men of letters, and actors, are obsessed with the idea

of the State as patron. Finally, a large and increasing number of intellectuals, whether university graduates or not, look to the State for permanent employment as civil servants.

All the movements which crystallise in the form of party organisations share, in this sense, the fate of the State, in that their guidance passes into the hands of professional specialists who have either sprung from the class of intellectuals or will become members of that class as soon as they become political leaders. Even the parties which are most faithful to the principles of democracy, the socialist parties for example, no longer embody the rule of all by all in their constitution, in the full sense of the ancient Hellenic or Teutonic democracies. The problem of "leaders and led" has, in these complicated organisations, become a sociological problem. We note, nowadays, a new social stratification, the birth of a new sociological class, the outcome of the professional specialisation of the functions of party leadership. From the outlook of professional and sociological psychology, the socialist member of parliament or the socialist journalist comes more and more to resemble his "colleagues" in other parties, and grows more and more unlike his comrades in the working class. Here, once more, the outward aspect is symptomatic. The socialist member of parliament, for instance, differs far less in appearance from his parliamentary colleagues than from the members of his audience in a working-class meeting. The manual workers do not fail to notice the fact. During the eschatological phase of the movement, it often leads them to reproach their mandatories for succumbing to the contagion, to the corruption, of the bourgeois environment, to infection with the parliamentary atmosphere. Such reproaches were common enough in the days of anarchist and syndicalist anti-parliamentarism, and they are still frequently voiced by western communists. It must be admitted, however, that, when we take a general outlook on the movement, they are somewhat foolish, and generally speaking, unjust. Persons who do not wish to have any bureaucrats, should not set up offices. If the masses want to engage in political activities,

they must have politicians. Social differentiation between the leaders and the masses is an inevitable outcome of this evolution, and it is illogical to reproach the leaders for being what they are.

However, it is no less illogical to behave as if the leaders did not lead. They are leaders ; it is their business to lead. To regard them as nothing more than representatives of the will of the members of their party or that of their electors, is pure fiction. The masses and the leaders influence one another mutually, and determine one another's actions mutually. The interests of the masses, and the emotional reactions of the masses to great events, define the limits within which the leaders (party committees, parliamentary groups, editorial committees of newspapers) can decide for one policy or another without forfeiting the approbation of the masses—for, of course, the support of the masses is essential to the influence which the leaders exercise upon their opponents. Now, these limits are elastic. Although, in the case of each new decision, they are re-determined in accordance with the general character of preceding decisions, forming a "tradition" and a "mentality", every fresh decision implies the possibility of a modification of the tradition and the mentality, however small. When the tiller is pushed, again and again, in the same direction, even though the individual movements are very small, in the long run an important change of course results. If we are to understand fully the action and reaction between the will of the leaders and the mentality of the masses, we must bear the two following facts in mind. First of all the nature of the division of functions of which we have just been speaking makes it essential that the initiative in each decision, which consists in a process of intellectual creation and not of emotional receptivity, shall be taken by the leaders. Secondly, all the relationships between leaders and masses are based upon the fact that the masses have more confidence in the judgments of the leaders than the leaders have in the judgments of the masses.

Group meetings and party congresses have long since ceased



to take any initiative. Their summoning, the fixing of the agenda, the choice of the main speakers, the preparation of resolutions—all these things presuppose decisions which can only be made satisfactorily by professional officials. It does not follow that congresses and meetings are less useful or less important than they were in the days before a party bureaucracy had been established. On the contrary, they become all the more necessary in proportion as bureaucracy develops—if the bureaucracy is to be in a position to care satisfactorily for the interests entrusted to it. But we make a great mistake if we suppose that meetings and congresses now fulfil any other function than this. It is no longer their business to take the initiative and guide activities ; they merely advise and watch those upon whom initiative and action devolve. The situation is akin to that which is encountered on a small scale in every organising committee where there are a full-time secretary and a number of unsalaried members. The secretary is then the motive power of the committee. It is he who, in so far as he is fit for his job, guides the committee instead of being guided by it. The committee does not meet in order to take the initiative ; its function is to mark certain limits (often after the event) to the secretary's initiative, and to advise and control the secretary when the work is actually being carried out. The secretary will best fulfil his tasks if he is the motive force, and the committee will best fulfil its tasks when it acts as the brake. Normally, the leader is active and the masses are passive. The leader always starts from the standpoint that it is his business to form the opinion of the masses, never from the standpoint that the masses determine his opinion. The normal relationship between a party meeting and its elected and paid representatives, is not that of a mass will that determines, and an individual will that is determined ; the attitude is that of attack and defence. The leader tries to justify himself and to maintain his position. He tests the limits within which he can affirm and realise his will without losing the support which renders his will effective. If there is from the first a coincidence between the will of the leader and

the mental state of the masses, it is all the more natural that the leader shall take the initiative by stimulating and guiding the collective will, which is an instrument of his policy, a means whereby he brings pressure to bear on his opponents.

All leadership is based upon a psychological factor : trust. This trust cannot be ensured by rules and regulations. To-day, it means something very different from what it meant in the heroic age when the leader was constantly within full view of the masses, in the glaring light of publicity. To-day, the leader is no longer a simple agitator : he must know a great many things which the masses cannot know, since to know them implies a high degree of professional specialisation ; and he must do a great many things which the masses cannot do with him, seeing that they have to be done in the routine atmosphere of offices, committees, editorial boards, and the like. It is not enough that his followers should follow him, they must also believe in him. The means whereby the masses can influence the will of the leaders are not necessarily associated with any means whereby the masses can mould the opinion of the leaders. All the data upon which opinions have to be formed are in the hands of the leaders. In their hands, too, for the most part, are the means of information (the press, etc.) by which they are able to influence the will of the masses. Every organiser knows that one of the main reasons for the intellectual homogeneity of working-class parties is that their executive committees have control of the party press, and thus dispose of the most effective means for influencing party opinion. This is much more important in relation to the great problems of national or international political life to-day than it was in the primitive epoch of local and regional democracy. Then, when the inhabitants of a village met in order to discuss such important local topics as the parish pump or the village pound, every one present at the meeting had access to the same sources of information ; every one had only to look for himself. Nowadays, millions of persons are passionately excited for or against the Versailles Treaty or the Dawes Plan, often to such a pitch of passion

that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for their opinions. How many of them have read the Versailles Treaty or the Dawes Report? For my own part, I say frankly that I have a very definite opinion upon the contents of both these documents, though I have never had the text of either under my eyes. Although I have a constitutional dislike to allowing my opinions to be formed for me by others, I am myself, in these respects, no more than one of the "mass". Every one who is prepared to entrust his interests to a political specialist must be content to be one of the masses as far as concerns political decisions in matters whose details he cannot possibly have studied as fully as the specialist has. Never, in the whole course of history, have there been so many people ready to express confident opinions concerning matters of which they know nothing except what has been told them by their leaders.

Although it is true that State officials or party officials who, according to the democratic fiction, ought to be servitors and representatives, are, in reality, leading groups—we must not therefore infer that it would be well to make an end of this fiction, and to establish the authority of the leaders by rule and regulation. It is especially when we want leadership that we should be careful to avoid making leadership statutory. Directly the position of the leader is constitutionally established, he becomes himself one of the led. He is thenceforward dependent upon the constitution, and must devote all his energies to avoiding the loss of the mass support to which he owes his power. It is only then that he really becomes a servitor—not so much in the sense of democracy as in that of demagoguery. Never has a "strong man" come simply because the people called for him. True leaders are not elected by the masses; they impose themselves on the masses. Movements which clamour for a strong man are the movements of weak persons, and weak persons are envious persons who cannot endure a strong leader; at bottom they want their leader to be a weakling. The more explicitly a constitution gives powers to a sovereign, the more difficult is it for the sovereign to exercise these powers; every new right becomes

a new chain ; where a clause in the constitution promises power, it really imposes responsibility, and this signifies dependence. By merely electing a leader, we make of him a led person ; if we really wish him to lead, we ought to elect him as a servitor. Thus, the Germany of William II passed through veritable orgies of Byzantinism. A romantically minded generation of philistines (minors, politically speaking) wanted the emperor to be in all respects different from its commonplace self. It made of him a Lohengrin, a Frederick the Great, a Tamerlane, a God of Battles ; it lived through all the ecstasy and voluptuousness of power when he spoke of his authority and rattled his sabre. If, in the end, this generation of Germans had, instead of a leader, a second-rate actor, so dependent upon the favour of his public that he fled from the scene the moment the public ceased to applaud, the Germans had only themselves to thank for it. Far-seeing democrats have said that the future of democracy depends upon its capacity to throw up a stratum of leaders really capable of ruling. Only superficial minds will regard this as a negation of democracy. Pre-democratic regimes did not perish owing to an excess of governmental authority, but because there was too little. The ruler did not rule enough ; he was no longer a chief, he had become an institution. Not until the rise of democracy was it possible to build upon the ruins of the authoritarian constitutions, a new stratum of true leaders. Every new order must begin by being an order. A new order means new leadership, and the power of this leadership is measured by its fitness for dispensing with the sanction of a constitutional text or of monarchical dignity.

It is not a chance matter that the labour movement is one whose organic constitution most definitely ignores and most vigorously forbids the rule of the leaders, at the very time when the leaders exercise the greatest possible influence and wield the utmost real power. It is precisely because democracy watches so jealously over the equality of the rights of its members, that it is able to make of this equality the best starting-point for a choice which enables the most efficient to become

leaders. Now, supreme efficiency carries with it supreme authority, based upon confidence. Although democracies will not, in their rules and regulations, recognise the authority of leaders, we must not infer that they deny the inequality of aptitudes. They are content to affirm the original equality of rights. This renders possible the most comprehensive and most purposive systematisation of the choice of leaders, and therefore, in the long run, the taking of the fullest possible advantage of the actual inequality of aptitudes. That which, at first sight, seemed nothing more than a fiction handed down from the past, is seen, on closer examination, to be a healthy and necessary safeguard for the future. Democracy gets the leaders it wants by saying: "Let us make the access to power as difficult as possible". The power of the leaders is all the more real for that. The rules and regulations do not say so, for it is not their business to guarantee the authority of the leaders. On the contrary, their aim is to restrict the authority of the leaders in such a way that the leaders can only act and maintain themselves in power thanks to a relationship of mutual confidence between themselves and the masses.

In large-scale industrial enterprises, in the working of the credit system, of commerce, and of transport, there is likewise a problem of "leaders and led", which is no less important than the problem of "wages and profits". Here, too, the necessary specialisation and bureaucracy have replaced the guiding individual will of a capitalist master by a totality of multiple wills, all executive functions being entrusted to non-capitalists who are intellectuals. We encounter here a fiction akin to that whereby the politician is regarded as the simple executant of the popular will. In the matter of the organic delegation of powers, the intellectual specialist only represents the interests and the will of a more or less anonymous capitalist authority. In reality, the progressive specialisation of intellectual directive functions leads to a progressive increase in the independence of those who exercise these functions. The capitalist, likewise, is made to realise that power lent becomes power given. From the manual worker nothing is required

but manual work ; but the work of the managing engineer or the business manager would be valueless if they were to restrict themselves to the performance of intellectual tasks prescribed for them by another. The essential function of one who exercises directive ability is to decide for himself what he has to do ; to animate, to prescribe, to organise, to command ; in a word, to manifest intellectual volition and personal creative initiative.

Very few manual workers, trade-union leaders, and socialist theoreticians, know how much this personal volition of managing intellectuals differs from the desire for profit of the capitalist who wants to make of them his instruments. Marxists are too much hypnotised by their conception of the force of the acquisitive instinct, to understand the importance of the conflict of social volitions which is the outcome of other conflicts of motive. It is true that a good many Marxists hesitate to deny the existence of functional antagonisms within what they speak of as the capitalist class, such as the conflict between the shareholder and the manager, between the managing employees and the executive employees, between the outlook of those whose primary wish is to earn dividends and the outlook of those whose primary wish is to " get on with the job ". Nevertheless, they deny that these facts have any social significance, for they are unwilling to recognise the existence of any social antagonisms other than the ones which arise out of a conflict of acquisitive interests. Now, they cannot discover any opposition of that kind in the antagonisms of which we have just been speaking, for the simple reason that there is nothing of the kind there. That is why Marxists will not recognise the existence of the class of intellectuals. They split up that class into two or three fragments which they assign, according to the respective acquisitive interests which predominate in one fragment or another, to the capitalist class, to the proletariat, or to the middle class. In this way, they sever a decisive and indubitable tie (the community of functions and of motives for work), to retain an accessory and problematic tie (the identity of acquisitive interests). Their way of looking

at the matter prevents their realising the significance of the fact that there is a social stratum differing both from that of the capitalist class and from that of the proletariat, the stratum consisting of those who exercise all the directive functions of political and economic life. This failure of understanding would be less serious than it is, did it imply nothing more than a gap in sociological terminology. In practice, however, the denial of the existence of a class of intellectuals makes it impossible to understand the fundamental data of the problem of the State. Consequently, all the discussions of this burning question in the labour movement are vitiated by the primary error according to which the State is nothing more than an instrument of class domination. Furthermore, the Marxist conception makes it impossible for the socialist labour movement to grasp the psychological characteristics of the class of intellectuals in such a way as to favour the establishment of fruitful relationships between the socialism of the workers and the socialism of the intellectuals. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the countries where Marxist social democracy is predominant the problem of the intellectuals should still be what Bebel called it, an open sore in the life of the party. In Germany, for the same reason, the influence of socialist ideas upon intellectuals is much smaller than elsewhere. The apparent exception of Russia serves only to confirm the rule, for there has never been a labour movement in Russia in the European sense of that term. The intelligentsia which the revolution installed in power did not consist of intellectuals (with or without degrees and diplomas) who had been exercising directive functions, but of a group of bohemians who had been excluded from social functions, of sometime political prisoners, or of repatriated refugees.

The contrast between the Marxist and the non-Marxist attitude towards the problem of the intellectuals is most conspicuous when we compare German conditions with British. Do not let the reader be deceived by the trade-union characteristics of the British Labour Party. The rapid advances of socialism in England since the days when the

economic and social conditions favouring the political neutrality of trade unionism came to an end, are not the result of any spontaneous change in working-class mentality. The dough would not have risen, unless the yeast had been mixed with it. The working class in Britain would never have accepted the leadership of the socialists (and at present the socialists in England are merely a vanguard of the labour movement), unless socialism had first been accepted by the most advanced members of the intelligentsia. In so far as to-day there is a socialist labour movement in England, this is quite as much the product of Fabianism as it is of proletarian trade unionism. The intellectual movement which, since the eighties of the nineteenth century, has been mainly embodied in the few hundred members of the Fabian society, and whose apostles in the ranks of the workers were subsequently constituted by the members of the Independent Labour Party, was as indispensable an antecedent of the origin of the British Labour Party as was any readiness on the part of the trade unionists to accept socialist leadership. What socialism would there have been in Britain but for such men as William Morris, Sidney Webb, Ramsay MacDonald, or even (for Mephistopheles must have a place beside Faust) Hyndman? I am thinking not so much of individuals, such as, in every country, coming from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, have devoted themselves to the service of the labour movement, as of the characteristic attitude of a certain type of socialist intellectuals, who have made a place in the socialist movement for spiritual and moral motives. In England, under MacDonald's premiership, the labour government of 1924 was able to do useful work on behalf of the peace of Europe; but as a minority government, it would never have remained in power for a day unless a decisive portion of the intelligentsia had given it fair play. This applies to the press quite as much as to the permanent officials, who, with few exceptions, served the socialist ministers of State as loyally as they had served non-socialist predecessors. Remember how the governmental policy of the German social democrats after the November revolution of 1918 was paralysed



by passive resistance, and even by active sabotage, on the part of civil servants, officers, and judges. Remember the frustration of the hopes of German socialism because of the failure of the German intellectuals to support the socialist aspects of the revolution ; most of them have since succumbed to a mood of indifference, or have gone over to nationalism and fascism. Look at the German universities, and see if you can find there signs of the fresh currents of thought which, since the war, have flowed at times even in Oxford and Cambridge. You will search vainly in Germany for a socialist literature which is anything more than party apologetic ; you will find no Germans to compare in this respect with Bernard Shaw or H. G. Wells (to name only two of the most famous), who in literature and the drama have become the leaders of a whole generation, and who have diffused more socialist ideas among the English-speaking public than any party press in the world. Ask yourself where in the German intellectual domain you can find any man of learning worthy to stand by the side of Bertrand Russell ; or any movement of ideas, free from the trammels of party bureaucracy, which has had such an influence as the guild socialist movement has had in Britain. I know well enough that the ready answer will come to the effect that the Versailles Treaty, which led to the reaction in Germany, is responsible for all her defects in this respect. But I should like such objectors to ask themselves whether, before the days of the Versailles Treaty, there were not within the thought world of German Marxist social democracy plenty of causes at work to bring about this cleavage between working-class socialism and the intelligentsia.

Disastrous indeed is the doctrine of those who teach that the only possible link between the working-class movement and the socialism of intellectuals is to be found in the acquisitive interest common to "workers by hand and brain". For there is no such common interest. The acquisitive interests of the various strata of intellectuals are too vague and too divergent to mark intellectuals off as any sort of coherent class. It is true that the intellectual usually lives, not by making

profits in the capitalist sense, but, like the manual worker, by selling his labour power ; still, we must not conclude from this that the intellectual is a proletarian. If the sale of labour power were the essential characteristic of the proletarian class status, we should have to range among proletarians all the bank managers and factory managers who live upon salaries. It is not the fact of selling labour power which determines the proletarian status, but the peculiar social conditions under which the sale is accomplished. What characterises the proletarian is the lack of property and of social protection which tends to force his wages down to a minimum subsistence ; the instability of his method of life ; the insecurity of his employment ; his dependence upon his employer ; the fact that he can find no joy in his work ; the absence of normal possibilities for higher education ; his subjective social inferiority. It is because of all these things that manual workers form a proletariat, a " lower " class. For these reasons, among the so-called mental workers, the only ones who resemble the manual workers in point of status are the less well paid among the " blackcoated brigade ", the junior clerks, the shop assistants, and the lower grade of civil servants. They are proletarians, much more proletarians than intellectuals. The sole difference between their work and that of the manual worker is that it does not require any physical strength. It is only through a misunderstanding that they are spoken of as intellectuals, through the false belief that every wage worker who does not do manual work must be a mental worker.

The fact that a man puts pen to paper does not make him a brain worker. Brain work is work whose value (even if we are thinking only in terms of pay) cannot be quantitatively measured by the hours of labour, like the work of a manual labourer or a lower-grade clerk ; it must be estimated qualitatively, for the essence of intellectual initiative and of intellectual judgment is to incorporate quality with economic values. This applies equally well to invention, creation, administration, management, supervision, organisation, the practice of medicine, education, entertainment, information, research,

and many other occupations. These various kinds of activity enable the intellectual to make such a use of his capacities as to win for himself a social status quite different from that of the proletarian, whether of the factory or of the office. The acquirement of the necessary knowledge usually presupposes that the person who acquires it comes of a fairly well-to-do family, so that at any rate he will not be obliged, like the ordinary wage earner, to make his livelihood as soon as the years of compulsory schooling are over. The social relationships characteristic of the position of the intellectual give him possibilities of protection and social advancement which are lacking to the great masses of the workers. Intellectual activity is not worth paying for unless it be accompanied by some special qualifications, by enfranchisement from pressing needs, by the possibility of persistent application to a particular task, and by a personal contact implying the existence of a certain mutual confidence between employer and employed. For this reason, the intellectual is usually engaged for long terms of work ; and even when he is paid by casual fees, his earnings are usually much higher than those of the wage earner. His social autonomy and the security of his existence are thereby greatly enhanced. Of course there are plenty of cases in which the mental worker earns less than a good many manual workers, especially when the values he creates are of a kind for which there is no steady and effective demand, such as the creations of poets and philosophers. It is probable that the working hours devoted to the production of this book would have been more remunerative if I had been working as a factory hand. But my position differs from that of the proletarian in that I was free to decide whether I should write a scientific or philosophical work, or devote myself to a more lucrative occupation. The literary, scientific, or artistic bohemian whose daily bread depends upon the public favour, can find a market even for works of an unusual type, thanks to the diversity of tastes among the paying public ; whereas the factory hand must be satisfied, under pain of death from hunger, to perform his allotted task.

The journeyman baker who, like Eulenspiegel, should knead the dough into figures to please himself, instead of making rolls or loaves of the ordinary type, would promptly be dismissed, and would not easily find another employer. But the intellectual who wants to improve his position, has at his disposal, thanks to his education and his social position, means far more efficacious than those at the disposal of the proletarian, although the latter has his trade union to back him up. In a word, what distinguishes the social position of the intellectual, even the ill-paid intellectual, from that of the worker, is that the former has an incomparably better chance of rising in the social scale, this being given him by his capacity for doing skilled intellectual work, in the absence of which no sort of leading function is possible.

We see, then, that the unity of social aim which is characteristic of a social class does not, in the case of intellectuals, derive from the acquisitive interest, but from the method of work. This presupposes a motive for work differing both from that of the capitalist and from that of the proletarian. In the two latter, the will-to-work is falsified to become the will-to-acquire, this being the outcome, in the capitalist's case of the will-to-power, and in the manual worker's case of poverty and dependence. The capitalist works for gain, and the manual worker for wages ; their mentality aspires towards quantitative values. On the other hand, the essential characteristic of the intellectual's work is that he incorporates quality with these two quantities, money and labour power. The spiritual quality is the measure of the social value of what the intellectual does. The motive for work which predominates in the intellectual is, therefore, not gain, but work for work's sake ; that is to say, from the community's point of view, work for the performance of service. The satisfaction of the acquisitive motive comes merely to liberate the intellectual powers for this qualitative performance.

All the same, it is true that intellectual work, like manual work, is in danger of losing its soul owing to the increasing division of labour. Subaltern occupations in the way of

industrial and administrative management become bureaucratized and mechanized to an increasing extent. In this respect, the intellectual worker is exposed to the same danger as the craftsman of former days. The functions which used to be performed by one single individual are broken up into functions of direction and execution, so that the executive functions are deprived as much as possible of autonomy and initiative. Still, this does not so much mean a transformation of the functions of intellectuals properly speaking, as an increasing transference of part of these functions to a lower social stratum—to the blackcoated proletarian brigade. Socialists are far too ready to confuse this proletarianisation of the subaltern functions of the intellectuals, with a proletarianisation of the intellectuals themselves. No doubt, the development we are considering forces a great many intellectuals down into the ranks of the proletariat ; but, inasmuch as they are forced down, they cease to be intellectuals. Besides, the mechanized functions of bureaucracy are less often undertaken by decayed intellectuals, than by the sons and the daughters of the proletariat, who believe that they are “ raising themselves ” in this fashion. Most workers are inclined to regard the adoption of an office career, however subordinate it may be, as an ascent in the social scale ; and they seek such a career, if not for themselves, at least for their children. A member of the blackcoated proletariat usually earns less than the skilled worker ; but his position is somewhat more secure, and he has better chances of rising. It is not quite so difficult for the clerk to become an office manager as it is for the factory hand to become a factory manager. Additional attractions are that the blackcoated proletarian enjoys a somewhat more respected social position ; that his work is generally, though wrongly, believed to demand more intelligence, and is certainly less fatiguing, less dangerous, and cleaner. The upshot is that the industrialisation of the intellectual functions does not so much proletarianise the class of intellectuals, as force upwards the line which separates the intellectuals from the blackcoated proletariat.

The increasing separation between the intellectual functions of management and the physical functions of performance, far from proletarianising intellectual labour, tends more and more to intellectualise the task of management. Here the very nature of the work imposes a limit upon the mechanisation and proletarianisation of functions—although, unfortunately, it does not maintain joy in work for the industrial worker. As far as the latter is concerned, mechanisation has been carried so far that it threatens to transform a mere loss of pleasure in work into a positive unwillingness to work, so that the theoretical gain due to mechanisation may be outbalanced by a loss from the want of good will in the worker. The employer does not fail to note this. He knows that there is a frontier which even the choicest expedients of the Taylor system will not help him to cross. On the other hand, Taylorism, which tends to deprive manual labour of its intellectual aspects, can only achieve its end by intellectualising more than ever the work of management. The more the employer tries to make the intensity and the quality of manual work independent of the worker's will, the more he himself becomes dependent upon the intellectuals who do the managerial tasks. The members of the managerial staff, however, if they are to do work of good quality, must find satisfaction in their work. They must therefore be well paid, must have assured employment, good chances of promotion, and a considerable measure of social consideration. Also, and above all, they must be protected against the most brutalising consequences of specialisation. To sum up, even in the extreme case of highly concentrated industrial enterprise, technical progress does not bring about the general proletarianisation of all those who participate in production. Its effect is to cause a more marked separation between the two classes of producers: on the one hand a completely proletarianised working class, which is only kept at work by the stimulus of the acquisitive motive; on the other, a guiding stratum of intellectuals, upon whose delight in their managerial functions the paying qualities of the concern depend. Thus these managing intellectuals are

the inheritors of the motive of production which used to animate the craftsmen of former days, the motive which alike in the capitalist and in the proletarian has been degraded into the motive of gain. This stratum of intellectuals, therefore, contains the only persons among modern productive workers whose economic function is such as to make purposive organisation the quality of production, the service of the community, their main motive for work. If this be true for large-scale industry, which seems at the first sight wholly given over to the acquisitive instinct, it is even more true for other intellectual occupations : the management of commercial undertakings, of transport services, and of credit institutions, whose effectiveness is exclusively dependent upon intellectual initiative ; the liberal professions, education, scientific research, and the like, whose essential object is to produce intellectual values ; and, finally, the State service, which approximates most closely of all to service for the community. Although a man may do intellectual work on behalf of one of these undertakings without looking upon it as community service, the work itself needs (this is the decisive point) a psychological motive wherein the essential objective is work for the work's sake, so that the worker must be a willing one. Any genuine community service would find in the members of this stratum a readiness to work which, as far as the proletariat is concerned, has already been to a great extent destroyed by modern working conditions.

Now, the intellectual's motive for work, his inclination to service, may mean something more than a simple disposition to serve. It may happen that the servitor will seek a better master, so that, while serving, he can find better and freer scope for the utilisation of his creative faculties. In proportion as an intellectual is equipped with the community sentiment, the desire to serve a better master will encourage him to look for a community more worthy of being served. That is the psychological root of the socialism of intellectuals.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE SOCIALISM OF INTELLECTUALS

. for the glory of the Creator and the relief  
of man's estate.

FRANCIS BACON.

I AM well aware that when I now go on to speak of the socialism of intellectuals (after having described intellectuals as the class which actually rules society to-day), a Marxist will consider me paradoxical to the verge of impudence. Marxists are so firmly convinced that the extant social order is equivalent to economic class domination, that they have no eyes for the forces of social transformation which cannot be explained in terms of the struggle of the proletariat on behalf of its own interests.

It becomes obvious at this stage that a derivation of the concept of class from the social function of the members of what we regard as a class, and from the consequent direction of their volitions, signifies something very different from one of those terminological innovations dear to the heart of the sociologist. When we replace the mechanical antagonism of interests by the organic concept of function and emotional volition varying with historic destiny, we are adopting an entirely new method of thought. It is only by this new way of thinking that we can grasp the ultimate significance of the capitalist social order, separating it from the idea of a domination exercised by the capitalist class in virtue of its economic power.

Capitalists (that is to say, as Marxists look at the matter, persons who live by the appropriation of the surplus value produced by wage-earners) comprise an infinitesimal minority of the population. We can imagine a capitalist social order without a ruling capitalist class, just as we can conceive of the



existence of a capitalist class in a non-capitalist society. A joint-stock company in which the shares were owned by a number of small shareholders, such as the actual workers in the undertaking, could get along without capitalists, for the possession of a few shares does not transform into a capitalist a man whose daily bread depends upon a wage earned in industry or upon the profits of petty trade. Yet such an undertaking would indisputably be capitalist, seeing that it would work in order to secure a profit on capital. What would apply to such an isolated enterprise, might apply equally well to the whole social organisation. We can conceive a cooperative form of production with a capital so widely distributed that there would no longer be any capitalist class ; and yet the society would still be a capitalist society, in so far as there were various cooperative enterprises competing one with another for profit. Conversely, if we were to organise an industry as a public service, after some such fashion as that of the Plumb plan for the tripartite administration of the American railways by the shareholders, the railwaymen, and the public, or if we were to adopt some other variant of guild socialism, we should not eliminate the capitalists from this industry. They would continue to exercise proprietary rights, to draw dividends, and to have a say in the management of the enterprise. Nevertheless, the enterprise would have ceased to be capitalist as soon as the majority of two-thirds, consisting of the working staff and the consumers, had transformed it from an enterprise aiming at the accumulation of capital into a public corporation performing a public service.

The characteristics of a social system depend far less upon the way in which political and social power are, at a given moment, distributed among different classes, than upon the motive for work, upon the juridical principle, upon the moral aim, and upon the cultural content, which determine the attitude of all classes. The rule of capitalism means something very different from the rule of the capitalist class ; it depends upon the fact that every one would like to be a capitalist, that every one feels and thinks as a capitalist. In other

words the foundation of bourgeois society is a bourgeois civilisation.

Were it otherwise, capitalism would long ago have ceased to exist, seeing that capitalists are comparatively few in number, and that universal suffrage gives power to the majority. Even in a country so conspicuously capitalist as the United States of America, the capitalist class is not only in a small minority, but it is also very far from being in a position to exercise a monopoly of political and social power, even though it has such vast possibilities of influencing public opinion through political parties and the press, by the bribery of individuals, etc. Nowhere in the United States will you find people who rail more bitterly against the State than you do among the capitalists. The real governing class is the great middle class of small men of business, small traders, small house-owners, farmers, salaried employees, civil servants, intellectuals, and even well-to-do working men—all more or less of the social type which Sinclair Lewis has described in his novel *Babbitt*. These people are not capitalists. Far from it! They generally describe themselves as hostile to Wall Street and the trusts. Nevertheless, it is the very fact of their domination which gives American society its capitalist character. For they would like to be capitalists. It is the capitalist motives for work and the capitalist desire for gain which determine their moral and social valuations, and consequently, determine the whole type of American civilisation.

Thus capitalism does not mean the rule of the capitalist so much as it means the rule of a capitalist mentality. In the particular case of intellectuals, and especially the intellectuals of industry, the capitalist class can certainly, thanks to the power of its money, dispose of the immediate means of domination and influence, and is not slow to use its advantage. This is so obvious that we need not dwell upon the matter. Less obvious, though far more important, is the fact that the capitalist mentality of the majority of intellectuals is ultimately dependent upon their willingness to serve capitalism, that is upon their willingness to adapt themselves psychologically to the demands

of the capitalist system. The mere fact that the capitalists have money at their disposal, does not enable them to wield power ; they could not do so except through the intermediation of the guiding functions exercised by intellectuals in the State and in economic life. A slight change in the social volition of the intellectuals, such as the emergence of a desire to use their functions of domination in order to grasp the totality of power, would transform the capitalist class into a more or less superfluous, and certainly powerless, appendage to production and circulation. The emergence of this will-to-power in the intellectuals would eliminate capitalism as the ordering principle of society, would replace the motive of gain by the motive of service throughout economic life, and would transform production into a social service carried on for use and not for profit. All aspiration towards this end is the socialism of intellectuals ; that is to say, it is a socialism which aims at making the motives inherent in the social function and the method of work of intellectuals, the foundation of the whole social order.

In essence, this socialism of intellectuals is no less instinctive, and no less fundamentally determined by the affective trends of the subconscious, than working-class socialism. Among working-class socialists, those whose conception is the narrowest and most vigorously instinctive would like all persons to be of the manual-worker type. Among socialist intellectuals, on the other hand, when their intellectualist socialism is of the same vigorously instinctive sort, we find a desire to transform all members of the community into intellectuals ; the captain of industry is to be a servant of the community, and the manual worker is to become an intelligent machine-minder. The plainest manifestation of this tendency is guild socialism, which is the most modern and the most carefully thought-out form of the socialism of intellectuals. Marxist communism stands at the opposite pole, as the typical contemporary form of instinctive and elementary proletarian socialism.

In both cases alike, though the doctrine is put forward as that of persons who are striving for the abolition of all class

antagonisms, the actual trend is towards the establishment of a new class domination. For, in reality, there is at work in each case an unavowed desire to suppress all other classes than one's own. The communist proletarian wants to proletarianise the whole of society, the State, civilisation. The worker's class consciousness, his fighting spirit in the class war, is to be changed into the motive of work for the State. The guild socialist, on the other hand, looks forward to a day when the acquisitive motive of the capitalist and the worker shall be replaced by a new motive, that of service to the community. For him the ideal servant of the community is an intellectual who is manager of an industrial enterprise, or an official in that enterprise, in receipt of a salary sufficient to relieve him of the need for thinking about lucre.

In this respect, guild socialism is the heir of Fabianism. The Fabians started from the sound notion that intellectuals were already the dominant class, inasmuch as they actually ruled, though (under the extant regime) as ministers to the acquisitive interests of others. If socialism was to be established, the essential thing was to win over the intellectuals to the cause. Then they would be ready and willing to make the productive machine they controlled work thenceforward for the communal advantage instead of for private profit, and they would gradually transform the State itself into a community organisation. This doctrine has been more fruitful in Britain than it may seem to have been at the first glance. It is true that the force which has made of British trade unionism a political power of the first rank, has been that of British organised labour. Still, the idea which this power incarnates is essentially Fabian, and most of its champions are intellectuals—such men as the guild socialist R. H. Tawney, who wants our "acquisitive society" to become a "functional society"—a society which exists for production and service instead of for gain. Characteristically, they say that industrial work should become a "profession".

Guild socialism, which aims at bringing about the transference to community service of that work for the work's sake

which is typical of the activity of intellectuals, differs only in outward aspect from the German variety of the socialism of intellectuals, from what may be called "civil servants' socialism"—the socialism of persons who hold that the working motive of those engaged in production should be akin to that of those who serve the State in the contemporary civil service. The motive of public service, and the motive of production for use, are but two different aspects of the impulses which underlie all mental work: the joy of creation, of management, and of responsibility; the constructive instinct of one who is active both in mind and in body; the instinct of autovaluation of those who seek and find satisfaction in instilling their spirit into their work; the craving to control things (and persons, too, in so far as these need to be guided and organised by an animating and coordinating mind).

The intellectual inclines towards socialism in proportion as he feels that the capitalist organisation of society puts hindrances in the way of the fulfilment of his desire to work after his own fashion. This occurs much oftener than most manual workers suppose. The manual worker's mind is dominated by an inferiority complex which is, in the last analysis, due to penury; and he finds it difficult to understand that a person who is well-to-do may suffer from a social inferiority complex of a very different kind, resulting from a thwarting of the desire for the exercise of function. That is why, in the working-class struggle, the manual workers so seldom take advantage of the dissensions in the enemy camp that arise from the psychological incompatibility between the "shareholder's outlook" and the "producer's outlook". The workers are, generally speaking, unaware that the managing engineers and even the business managers of an industrial enterprise, just because they are so strongly interested in it for its own sake, are apt to be resentful of the power of capital; a power which is, as a rule, anonymous, absentee, despotic, and stupid. This resentment of theirs differs in many ways from that felt by the manual workers, yet resembles it in other respects.

The brainworker in the industrial domain finds that the

satisfaction of his impulse of autovaluation is menaced by the attempts of a soulless capitalism to bureaucratise and specialise his functions. The artist, the scientific expert, the man of letters, the medical practitioner, all the brainworkers whose income depends on fees received directly from the public, will be prone, even if they are not hypersensitive, to feel that there is something rather undignified in having to sell their skill in this way—and usually to persons incapable of understanding its true worth. One who exercises directive functions, and puts his very best into them, will be apt to resent having to subordinate his own higher motives to the lower motives of others whose sole interest is acquisitive. No one likes serving a master who is felt to be unworthy of respect. The civil servant, from whom the State demands the continued over-ruling of the motive of gain by the motive of service, will not in the long run be able to do what is expected unless he can feel that in serving the State he is really serving the community. He must wish the State to become in very truth representative of, and practically identical with, the community, become an actual commonwealth, in order that his service for the State may have the worth that it can never have if done only for an “acquisitive society”. In the case of workers by brain, just as in the case of workers by hand, what makes them receptive to socialist ideas is an inferiority complex, a revolt of the social instincts against a social system which does not grant these instincts adequate satisfaction.

Of course the thwarted instincts are not exactly the same in the brainworker and the manual worker. The acquisitive instinct, which is, of course, equally powerful in both, is usually better satisfied in the brainworker than in the manual worker, and in the former it therefore plays no more than a secondary part in the formation of the inferiority complex.

The “declassed” intellectual is, however, an exception to this rule. His sense of social inferiority is closely akin to that of the manual worker, inasmuch as it arises from an economic thwarting of the instincts of autovaluation and acquisition. But it differs from the manual worker’s complex in this

respect, that the instinct of autovaluation which is thwarted in the declassed brainworker is as a rule strongly tinged with egoism. The feelings which in the manual worker are sublimated into a sense of class solidarity, are likely, in the declassed intellectual, to find expression in the irritable self-love of the "unrecognised genius," and to take the form of envy of persons who have been more successful—especially professional colleagues. In the early propagandist phase of the socialist movement, there were many such persons among the advocates of socialism. They were ambitious though briefless barristers; unpromoted or discharged civil servants; pseudo-scientists (many of them schoolmasters); unsuccessful inventors; unpublished poets; painters overburdened with originality; the ragtag and bobtail of Bohemia. These elements were more conspicuous and more important in the socialism of former days than now. At the present time communism and fascist nationalism are the refuge of the ultras, are the movements of extremists, and are therefore more congenial to the destructive nihilism of these thwarted individualists.

The growth of trade-unionism, for whose work a constructive mentality is requisite, has done much to purge the working-class movement of people of this type, who naturally feel more at home in the febrile atmosphere of purely political and parliamentary agitation. In contemporary industrial Europe, it is only in the Latin countries that they still count. Gustave Le Bon is doubtless right when he says that the reason why they continue to play an important part there is that the Latin countries are backward in the matter of industrial development, and that therefore too many aspiring young men would be glad to adopt the unproductive career of civil servant. State diplomas are apt to be the mark of an education which has been far more theoretical than practical, so that the unsuccessful or discontented civil servant will not be able to find any other employment, or at any rate any occupation which seems to him accordant with his status as an "educated man". Furthermore, the increasing difficulty of examinations (which appear to be more and more inspired with the ideals of the

mandarinate), and the economic obstacles which impede the entry into the liberal professions, thrust down a great many intellectuals into the Bohemia of the declassed, from which early socialism recruited so many of its political leaders, its public speakers, and its journalists. Such recruits, however, are not always arrivists, though the manual workers are usually inclined to regard them with suspicion, and to doubt their good faith. Enough to point out that Marx and Lenin both came into the socialist movement from this Bohemia! Still, the manual workers' suspicions are easy to understand, for the social group we are now considering has, as a whole, the psychological characteristic of being composed of persons whose mentality is individualist, ambitious, and querulous. Proudhon knew what he was talking about when, in the "Représentant du Peuple" of April 29, 1848, writing midway between the February revolution and the July revolution, he warned the Parisian workers against "a revolution instigated by lawyers, made by artists, and guided by novelists and poets".

In countries where the labour movement has reached an advanced stage of development, people of this sort have long since ceased to have the importance which they had in France from 1848 to 1890, or which they may still have in such countries as Bulgaria and Mexico. When, to-day, we contemplate the relationships between intellectuals and socialism in the great industrial countries, we are no longer struck by the existence of numbers of declassed intellectuals in the socialist movement, but with the existence of the new middle class of intellectuals; of persons who, far from being social failures, hold premier positions in industry, the State, and the educational world. Their hands are on the tiller, and, even if the ship still belongs to the capitalists, those who give orders on the bridge and those who run the machinery are interested in the course of the vessel and not in the rise and fall of shares. Though the ship were to pass into the possession of a sailors' guild or of a cooperative State, the new owners could not get on without commanding officers. This does not merely mean that the officers' function is indispensable,



but also that these officers' motive for work is the indispensable psychological foundation for all activity on behalf of the commonwealth. A socialist society could easily dispense with the ragtag and bobtail of Bohemia; but it could not continue to exist without the good will of engineers, men of science, school teachers, able civil servants, and statesmen.

It is not merely a problem of the future. We have seen that the success of socialism depends on its capacity for revolutionising both the social order and the cultural content of that order, the essence of civilisation. Substantially, we have to upbuild a new civilisation. At the present time, civilisation is the work of intellectuals. Even the anticapitalist principle of socialism, in its moral and cultural sense, is the specific product of the social and living conditions of intellectuals. The idea of socialism sprang, not so much from the physical distress of manual workers, as from the moral distress of mental workers. The manual workers, who turn the idea of socialism to account in their struggle to improve their lot, are only animated by it in proportion as they themselves become intellectuals, that is to say in proportion as there occurs within their mentality a transformation from the capitalist acquisitive motive, arising out of the material struggle for existence, to the socialist motive of service and of work for its own sake, arising out of productive good will. Seen from this loftier outlook, the realisation of socialism assumes the aspect of a change of proletarians into intellectuals. Or, looking at the matter in relation to the concrete conditions of industrial production, we may express the same conception by saying that socialism will never be realised except in proportion as it becomes possible to change the manual worker from a dull-witted servant of the machine into an intelligent master of the machine. Now, the will and the capacity for dominating the machine are characteristic of the function and the motive of brainwork. All the organisation of production for a community depends upon the generalisation of this function and upon the victory of this motive.

It is certain that from such an outlook the immense majority

of intellectuals are still as far from being ripe for socialism as are the immense majority of manual workers. Very few brainworkers are able, on their own initiative, to amplify their special motive of work for its own sake into a constructive social motive. This psychological evolution needs an above-average development of the social sentiment, that is to say an above-average capacity for understanding that the individual lot is an integral part of the lot of the community. The social horizon of the average brainworker is too often limited to the *national* community. Inasmuch as he is an "educated" person, whose tool is language, and whose lot is often closely connected with that of the State, the national community of language, civilisation, and political organisation, seem to him a far stronger tie than class. For the rest, his mentality, in contradistinction with that of the manual worker, makes him strongly inclined towards individualism. Mental work is, by its nature, as markedly individual as industrial work is cooperative. The manual worker is worth more in proportion as he is more closely linked with his workmates; the intellectual, if he is to be worth more, must distinguish himself to the utmost from his colleagues. This is why he is so difficult to organise from the trade-union point of view. Even the socialist brainworker differs from the socialist manual worker in having a more individualist mentality. For that which predisposes the manual worker to socialism is an instinctive reaction to a situation affecting workers in the mass; whereas that which predisposes the intellectual to socialism is the way in which the mental motive for work reacts to his individual lot.

Of all the forms of working-class socialism, Marxism is the one which shows the least power of understanding the social origin of the predisposition of intellectuals to socialism. According to Marxists, brainworkers, unless they wholly adopt the mentality of the working masses, are nothing more than camp followers. That is why the Marxist intellectual who serves the cause of socialism by fulfilling some function in the labour movement, can never free himself from the feeling

that his class origin puts him into a position inferior to that of his working-class comrades. The intellectuals who are least disturbed by this sense of inferiority are the ones who are financially independent, and live like bourgeois. They can then, at any rate, bask in the more or less shamefaced admiration felt by the masses for the prestige of one who lives "an upper-class life". Even the Marxist manual workers, though in theory they have the greatest contempt for everything that is bourgeois, are at bottom always a little flattered at being on familiar terms with leaders who live the life of the well-to-do.

Having been myself a voluntarily declassed university graduate serving the labour movement in a salaried employment, I have learned by personal experience how much an intellectual feels expatriated in this environment, once he has renounced the external advantages of his position by birth. To me, as to nearly all the young people who desert the bourgeoisie to join the workers, this renunciation seemed an obvious corollary of adopting the socialist faith. In the proselytising ardour of adolescence, it would have been happiness to me to live on a pittance as a vendor of socialist newspapers in some working-class village. This delight in service was accompanied by the feeling that, in order to be a true socialist, I ought to live like a proletarian. For years I tried to shake off everything which differentiated me from proletarians, for I felt any such differential characteristics to be marks of psychical inferiority in comparison with the masses whom I wished to serve. Voluntary poverty and the renunciation of all my former social relationships did not suffice to efface these stigmata. Unconsciously I tried to reduce the distance separating me from the workers in the matter of dress, gestures, and speech; though seldom, and only for brief periods, was I able to realise my ideal, which was to live like a working man, by the performance of a task as exhausting and dirty as possible, thus transforming myself into an authentic proletarian. Not until a good many years had passed did I begin to realise that a man may, after all, be

a good socialist without renouncing the advantages given to him by his education. What led me to this was a discovery which at first disappointed me very much. I came to perceive that most of my comrades, and especially the leading officials with whom in my work I had to rub shoulders day by day, were at bottom far more bourgeois in their ways of living and thinking than I was myself. They regarded with envy and admiration the very things which seemed to me most detestable in the class I had left. I should have been able to accommodate myself to savages ; but it was very painful to find that, for love of the proletariat, I was having to adapt myself to half-educated petty bourgeois.

I was still more humiliated to discover that, even for the masses, every amelioration of their material conditions took the form of a step towards the petty-bourgeois mode of life. My activity in the working-class educational movement had been dominated by the idea that the proletariat's lack of culture was the best starting-point towards a new culture, a socialist culture. Too often I found that the very few who did look upon socialism as a cultural renewal, far from being born proletarians, were deserters from the bourgeoisie. My activities became a continual struggle against the workers' aspiration towards the cheap vulgarity of a pinchbeck culture, and a vain endeavour to force upon them what I regarded as a purely proletarian socialism. It was a long time before I could find consolation in the thought that the passage of the labour movement through the petty-bourgeois stage was probably an inevitable transition. The final inference was that the inferiority complex from which I suffered as a non-proletarian in a proletarian movement was the product of autosuggestion. My mistake had been in supposing that proletarian class consciousness and socialism are one and the same thing.

There are other reasons why the intellectual finds it difficult to feel at home in a working-class socialist environment. Manual workers have, as a rule, little understanding of the peculiarities of brainwork, or of the special conditions which

the brainworker needs. When we remember that all extant social organisation has tended to set the stamp of inferiority on manual labour, we can readily understand that manual workers have reacted by showing a certain contempt for brainwork. It is a natural part of proletarian mentality that manual workers should grudge giving brainworkers conditions which imply that brainwork is worth more than manual work. Consequently, most of the cooperative societies, labour organisations, and party organisations, pay less than the market rate for mental work. The general wish among manual workers is to keep the brainworkers' salaries down to the level of their own wages. Every one knows that this false economy has brought many working-class enterprises to ruin.

These material phenomena, symptomatic though they may be, are at bottom of much less importance than the failure of manual workers to understand the distinctive psychological characteristics of brainwork, and especially their failure to understand that brainwork is impossible without a considerable measure of inward freedom. Of course it is not difficult for manual workers to justify their belief that intellectuals are unstable, by pointing to the frequency with which intellectuals are turncoats. In the history of almost all the socialist parties, among twenty cases of apostasy leading to expulsion or to resignation, we shall rarely find one in which the culprit has been a manual worker by origin. Whether this entitles us to infer that intellectuals are necessarily unworthy of trust, is a different question. Obviously the psychological roots of socialist conviction differ as between the average brainworker and the average manual worker. When a manual worker becomes a socialist, he is thereby more closely connected than before with his social environment, with his class. When an intellectual becomes a socialist, he breaks away from his social environment, and becomes an isolated being. Now, class mentality, being connected as it is with class interest, is fixed and generalised in its characteristics; whereas individual temperament is, to a degree, fortuitous and peculiar. The intellectual, therefore, who undergoes new experiences, may

well find that his convictions must be expressed in a different intellectual formula, without this implying that he is in any way a renegade, that he has ceased to act and to think in accordance with his true spiritual motives.

Manual workers should be slow to flatter themselves with the belief that nothing of this kind can happen in their case. Among them, likewise, changes in conviction are by no means rare, though such changes occur in a different way. Among intellectuals, changes of opinion occur after an individual fashion; they are intellectualised, and they are sudden. Working-class mentality, on the other hand, changes gradually, instinctively, and, so to say, in groups. The whole history of the labour movement during the last generation is a prodigious example, as regards content of ideas, of such a conversion. The manual worker remains faithful to his party, the trade-union official to his organisation, and the political leader to his program; they rarely suspect how much, in course of time, the significance of the program, the party, and the organisation has changed. A section of the International becomes a national labour party. A trade union which was formed to manage strikes, changes into the guardian of new legal rights acquired by labour. A revolutionary party becomes one of the props of the State. The trade-union official and the socialist member of parliament (manual workers by origin though now become intellectuals), seldom find it necessary to refurnish their arsenal of ideas. These ideas are the outcome of tradition, and their propagandist value seems inseparable from the existence of the working-class organisation which has served as a mounting-block. But in the minds of these leaders, beneath the surface of their outward fidelity to the letter of their faith, there has been going on, concomitantly with the change in their manner of life, a gradual change in their instinctive social valuations, and in the psychological impulses underlying all their activities. This conversion is less obvious, and causes less scandal, than the heresies of isolated intellectuals, though it has far more influence upon the destinies of the socialist movement.

Here, too, it would be a mistake, in the name of any absolute ethical demands, to pass a verdict of guilty or of not guilty. Before we judge, we should try to understand. What we chiefly have to understand is that the frequent mutual misunderstandings between workers by hand and workers by brain are socially caused.

We should make a great mistake if we were to suppose, either that the socialism of intellectuals is superior to that of manual workers, or the converse. We must be content to note the difference between the two mentalities. At most, we can search for a criterion of values in the psychological motives which influence individuals. It would be as preposterous to discuss whether the individual motive of the typical intellectual is superior to the mass motive of the typical manual worker, as it is to discuss whether brainwork is "nobler" than manual work. There is no social criterion for the judging of actions and their motives; there is only an individual criterion. The devotion to the cause shown by a manual worker who voluntarily takes part in the distribution of circulars, may have as much moral value as the devotion of an intellectual who formulates a new theory; that depends upon the motive which animates the respective persons. We can judge individuals, but not classes.

Nor must we exaggerate the importance of the fact that the organisation of the working masses seems to be more essential to the realisation of socialism than the support of a few isolated brainworkers, or than the theories of leading intellectuals. A discussion of this topic would be nothing more than a variant of the old and foolish problem whether the stomach or the brain is more essential to life. The most we can say is that the power of the organised proletarian class would appear to be the main condition requisite for overcoming the material obstacles to socialism; whereas the ideas of intellectuals are essential to ensuring that this material change shall become the means for a veritable moral and social renovation. Were it not for the influence of the motives of intellectuals, the labour movement would be nothing more than a representation of

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interests, aiming at the transformation of the proletariat into a new bourgeoisie.

We can often make detail observations which verify this generalisation. The manual worker who rises in the social scale, even if it be only in and through the socialist labour movement, can be embourgeoisied far more readily than the socialist intellectual in like circumstances. The socialist intellectual has usually acquired his socialist conviction by way of a revolt against the bourgeois cultural environment. He is, therefore, better immunised against the material seductions of the bourgeois environment, inasmuch as the individual and intellectual elements in his mentality predominate over the material elements which especially animate the labour movement. We must no more suffer ourselves to be deceived by the power of number and of organisation, than by the wording of literary manifestoes. Even in socialist working-class organisations, the socialists are in a small minority—if we mean by “socialists”, persons for whom the motive of the realisation of a new social order has become a decisive part of their moral and intellectual being. The difference between the socialism of intellectuals and that of manual workers arises, not so much out of the fact that socialist conviction is comparatively rare among brainworkers, as because among brainworkers there is no class movement which embodies socialist conviction. Whereas working-class socialism presents itself as the will-to-power of a class, among intellectuals this motive is either absent, or repressed into the unconscious.

In many respects, perhaps, it is unfortunate for socialism that this should be so. If intellectuals as a class had a will-to-power, this would not necessarily, *per se*, mean socialism—any more than the working-class movement, *per se*, means socialism. Also, in the intellectual, the sentiment of class dignity is not to the same extent as it is among the manual workers an intermediate stage indispensable on the way to the development of a full sense of human self-respect, for brainwork has never been vilified as manual work has been. Nevertheless, a little more pride of class among intellectuals



might develop their social sentiment, and consequently their predisposition to socialist conviction. This would give the socialist movement a valuable set-off to its monopolisation by the industrial workers, and therefore would tend to prevent the narrow identification of socialism with proletarian class interest. A great many socialist intellectuals who do not at present feel at home in the mental atmosphere of the labour movement, would then find an adequate field of social activity, whereas now they are condemned to an inactive and resigned isolation. For the socialist ordering of the future, it could only be a gain if the strongly organised class movement of the manual workers (animated, as they are, by the ruthless will-to-power of those who have been too long under the harrow), were counterpoised by an intelligentsia resolute enough to demand and secure respect. Whereas Lassalle used to talk of the "damnable contentment of the workers", we should rather be inclined to-day to pillory the "damnable humility of the intellectuals".

A social stratum whose work is so important as that of the intellectuals (and their work would be even more important under a socialist regime), cannot give this work its full value unless the intellectuals are permeated with an adequate sense of their own social value; that is to say, unless they are endowed with a sufficient measure of class consciousness. A certain balance between the directive producers and the manual-working producers is so essential to economic prosperity and to political order, that we are entitled to say that under a socialist regime too much proletarian power would be more dangerous than too little. The check sustained by the communist attempts at socialisation in Russia, and the failure of so many working-class cooperative enterprises, in both cases alike due to an undervaluation of the importance of giving free rein to the intellectual functions of management, furnish a sufficiently clear proof of this. It would not be necessary to utter this warning, if intellectuals had more class consciousness. No doubt they will always be less effectively organised than the manual workers, owing to the more individual character of their employment. But this need not prevent their claiming

for their socialist conviction, arising out of professional and social motives proper to their class, a dignity commensurate with that of manual workers' socialism. Neither the socialism of manual workers nor the socialism of intellectuals makes up the whole of socialism ; for socialism is an eternal aspiration of mankind, transcending the social classifications of the present capitalist order. However, the socialism of intellectuals is a useful and necessary intermediate stage on the road which leads to a socialist society—just as necessary as the socialism of manual workers arising out of class interest. Especially must this be pointed out where Marxism is concerned. The recognition of the fact may help the socialist working class to realise that socialism is something more than a class struggle on behalf of the satisfaction of the acquisitive interests of the proletariat ; and that, even if socialism implies the class struggle, the class struggle is far from implying the whole of socialism.

As soon as we come to conceive socialism as the product of a personal volition, inspired by the sentiment of good and of right, the volition will have just the same worth whether it comes from the manual worker's wish to fight against the wretchedness of his class, or from the revolt of the intellectual against the degradation of his profession. The worker must infer from this that a man can be a socialist without being a manual worker ; just as, on the other hand, a man can be an organised and class-conscious worker without, for that reason, being a socialist in spirit, in the sense of Troelstra's saying : " We must socialise ourselves ". Thus the manual worker and the intellectual worker will both learn how to banish from their minds all that ties them to the materialism of the capitalist environment : in the manual worker, the excess of class egoism ; in the intellectual, the excess of individual egoism ; in the manual worker, excessive faith in matter ; in the intellectual, excessive faith in mind. It is only by the union of these two elements on a higher plane, and not by the subordination of one to the other, that we shall be able to realise " the union of the working class and of science for the salvation of mankind " which was demanded long ago by Lassalle.

*PART THREE*

**THE MOVEMENT**

CHAPTER NINE  
PROLETARIAN CULTURE OR  
EMBOURGEOISEMENT ?

*Alas, two souls live within my breast !*

GOETHE.

HITHERTO, in order to facilitate an understanding of the relationships between socialist ideas on the one hand and the affective state of the working class on the other, I have been describing the capitalist social environment as if it were invariable in space and time. On that hypothesis, however, we cannot get beyond an understanding of the Why of the socialist movement ; the How continues to elude us. We see the movement only as caricatured by dogmatic Marxists. If there were never any changes in the psychological nature of the individual or in the social environment, the socialist labour movement, which is the product of the reaction between the two, would proceed in a straight line towards an unchanging goal, until the attainment of that goal, until the establishment of a new social system.

But in such a way we shall never reach a satisfactory understanding of a phenomenon like the socialist labour movement, lasting many generations, and extending over half the world. Obviously this movement, regarded as the outcome of the reaction between the two before-mentioned factors, will itself modify the character of at least one of the factors. It cannot fail to cause constant changes in the social environment, and thus to change itself, since it changes one of the factors of its own being. If we wished to systematise this, we should have to set out, not from the Marxist principle of causality, but from Friedrich Adler's principle of function ; thereby, however, we should involve ourselves in such a tangle of reciprocal functional dependences, that we should defeat the primary

object of our systematisation—which is to simplify. A system which obscures the matter instead of clarifying it, is one to avoid. Goethe's advice : " Don't search for anything behind phenomena ; they themselves are the doctrine you are looking for," was given with an eye to such cases. We must at any rate study and describe the actual phenomena before we try to systematise them.

The first things we notice are the phenomena which comprise the following series : the social position of the workers makes them amenable to socialist sentiments ; these sentiments become the primary motive force of attempts to improve the material and moral position of the working class ; but such improvements as are effected tend to bring the workers more and more under the cultural influence of the bourgeois and capitalist environment, and this counteracts the tendency towards the formation of a socialist mentality.

Although for the last two decades it has been the fashion, in socialist and communist circles, to talk about " proletarian culture ", this must not be taken as evidence that there is no ground for declaring that the embourgeoisement of the workers proceeds apace. Proletarian culture is not a fact ; it is only a postulate. It is a demand voiced by a small minority of intellectuals, convinced socialists one and all, who are reacting against what seems to them an alarming development—against the way in which the masses tend more and more to seek in bourgeois civilisation the satisfaction of their instinctive needs. There is no reason to be surprised that the faith in proletarian culture should be the specific product of the mentality of socialist intellectuals. The groundwork of this faith is the hostility to bourgeois culture which is so characteristic of the socialism of intellectuals.

Zealots are fond of quoting from the *Communist Manifesto* a passage which, although it did not speak of proletarian culture in set terms, created the vacuum which was later to be filled by the notion in question : " The proletarian has no property ; his relationship to wife and children is utterly different from the family relationships of bourgeois life ;

modern industrial labour, the modern enslavement by capital (the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany), has despoiled him of his national characteristics. Law, morality, and religion have become for him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which bourgeois interests lurk in ambush."

It matters to us very little whether, or to what extent, the position in 1848 corresponded to that description. Enough for us to know that the actual progress of events has made the reality the precise opposite of almost every one of the foregoing phrases.

To-day the proletarian is much less a propertiless person than he was in 1848. As one for whom the family has even more importance than for the bourgeois, his ties with his wife are closer, since she is his sole and indispensable assistant in the running of his household. The same remark applies to his children, for they contribute, or will contribute, to the family earnings. "The modern enslavement by capital" is not characterised by the disappearance of national characteristics, but by their accentuation. The differences between the social position and the mode of thought of the working class in England and in France, in America and in Germany, respectively, is much greater than it was in 1848. As concerns the veneration for law, morality, and religion, the working class is to-day perhaps the only one which does not regard this sentiment as a "bourgeois prejudice". Certainly the working class believes in these things at least as strongly as does the bourgeoisie. Most characteristic of all, it is the vanguard of the working class, the most intelligent and the most rapidly rising section of that class, which is most thoroughly assimilating the "bourgeois prejudices" of which the *Manifesto* speaks—whilst the intelligent vanguard of the bourgeoisie is being emancipated from those prejudices!

Proletarian culture may be regarded as a theoretical speculation about what will happen in the future, or as a propagandist concept; it certainly cannot be regarded as a reality. The two notions of proletariat and civilisation are mutually exclusive, if we use the word "proletariat" in its primitive and

Marxist sense. The typical position of the proletariat is that of propertiless, socially dependent, unskilled workers. Now, civilisation presupposes a minimum of property, of spiritual autonomy, of leisure, of joy in life and pleasure in work. No oppressed class has ever created a new civilisation ; it has always had, first of all, to appropriate the civilisation of the ruling classes, as the primary stage of its escape from oppression. The primitiveness of earlier stages of civilisation, such as the Romance civilisation of the early Middle Ages in Europe, was not due to the cultural primitiveness of an oppressed class. The civilisation of those days was youthful, almost childish ; all the same, it was the civilisation of the upper class. The proletarian of our industrial era is not a primitive being ; he is a propertiless person in a cultural community where civilisation is based upon the ownership of property. There can be no creation of culture without autonomy and responsibility ; but the characteristics of proletarianised labour are dependence and irresponsibility.

It is true that the Marxists, who believe in the existence of an absolutely proletarianised working class, contend that the class struggle will lead the proletariat to establish a new culture radically opposed to bourgeois civilisation. In this matter, once more, we find a typical example of the optimism of intellectuals where the masses are concerned. The intellectual, who supposes that the working-class struggle is wholly and consciously directed towards the upbuilding of a new civilisation, falsely attributes to the proletariat his own way of thinking. It is precisely because the workers' class struggle is a struggle for cultural possibilities, that their combative activity excludes cultural activity. In the best event, a cultural renewal will only be possible after the struggle has eventuated in victory, and has brought the combatants the security and the leisure necessary for the upbuilding of any civilisation.

Of course the intellectual is entitled to indulge in speculations about the future—as, for instance, about the foundations of art in a hypothetical socialist regime. If he is himself an artist, he may try to embody his hopes for the future in his

works, by a combination of personal intuition and abstract thought. However, in most attempts of this kind, intellectual theory dominates emotional intuition to an extent which gravely restricts the liberty and spontaneity essential to all creative work. Consequently, most of the literary works and most of the pictures and sculptures produced under these conditions suffer from an anaemia, thanks to which they are "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought", of which Hamlet speaks. Rarely do we find that even the most gifted artists, in such anticipations of the future, are able to produce works which do not merely express a new idea, but express that idea in a new and adequate form, such as is essential to real artistic creation. In so far as works of the kind are worthy of attention, it is interesting to find that they are produced by thinkers or artists who have steeped their minds in bourgeois culture. The value of their work is then due, not to a proletarian lack of culture, but to a bourgeois plenitude of culture. A proof of this is that in almost all such cases we see that the inspiration is drawn from some particular phase of the cultural past. Generally, the models are chosen from the primitive period of an ancient civilisation, by those who are aware that all cultural beginnings are more or less alike. This means that the models are chosen from among the origins of the cultural heritage of contemporary bourgeois civilisation.

The remarkable thing is that these rare creations of socialist cultural pioneers fall naturally into their places in the extant culture of the present day ; they are merely elements in the developmental series of artistic and intellectual forms which express the bourgeois culture of the epoch. In fact, socialist works of art, works whose creators have been animated by the conscious desire to anticipate the coming socialist civilisation, are not manifestations of proletarian culture at all ; they are simply expressions of all that is newest and most alive in bourgeois culture. Socialist artists thus share the fate of those of their bourgeois colleagues who wish to renovate art for purely individual and intuitive reasons, and without any interest in sociological theories. We cannot detach their work



from the totality of contemporary civilisation ; it is determined by that totality, and itself contributes to it. Futurism, which aims at condensing a new philosophy into a new aesthetic form, always ends by making curios for the drawing-rooms of those who are able to pay the price. Ends, I say ; yet it is often thus that futurism begins. Every poet and every musician who speaks a new language, must address himself to those who can understand that language. Here, then, is the curious fact about all good socialist art (I mean such as is not content merely to pour new wine into old bottles), that the immense majority of the persons who understand its message are to be found in the ranks of bourgeois intellectuals.

To the degree that we are justified in identifying a cultural content with those social strata whose views it expresses—with those by whom and for whom it is created—all modern culture, and especially socialist culture, is the culture of the intelligentsia. The preraphaelitism of William Morris, socialist poet and craftsman, gave a trend to the essentially bourgeois civilisation of England in his day. H. P. Berlage, the famous Dutch architect, being a good Marxist, justifies in the terms of historical materialism his return to the forms of early medieval architecture ; nevertheless, during the course of the twenty years which have elapsed since he built the headquarters of the Diamond Workers' Union in Amsterdam, he has not, so far as I know, built any more trade-union headquarters, though he has built a great many offices for insurance companies and for other bourgeois clients. Henriette Roland Holst, the Dutch poetess, who for years has been elaborating an aesthetic based on Marxism, and her ultra-Marxist colleague Herman Gorter, have, by their socialist art, established new aesthetic rules for the whole literature of their country.

My own painful experience has taught me that the working class considers all this art, not only " highbrow ", but absolutely incomprehensible, and positively ugly. The deliberate and primitive simplicity, heavy with thought, which the best pioneers of socialist art regard as the style of the days to come, is extremely distasteful to proletarians. The reasons

for this distaste are identical with those which lead bourgeois philistines to reject all non-traditional styles. The worker, like the bourgeois, does not care for primitiveness ; he luxuriates in sentimentalism. He regards as " socialist art " (in so far as he has any ideas on the subject) all kinds of tendentious botches, even if they present themselves in the guise of bourgeois works conceived in the worst possible taste. Throughout the world you will find trade-union headquarters built after a fashion which expresses the decorative mania of the petty-bourgeois upstart. The headquarters of the Unione Cooperativa in the Via Meraviglia at Milan, or those of Vooruit in the Marché du Vendredi at Ghent, are striking examples of this. Thirty years ago, when a small group of intellectuals revolted against the tastelessness of the Belgian People's Houses, they succeeded in having the building of the People's House in Brussels entrusted to the modernist architect Horta. Now the qualities of this building in respect of which it abandoned traditional rules and became one of the most noteworthy models for the renovation of architectural style in Belgium, seemed ridiculous and ugly to the manual workers ; an annex built in 1913 enabled them to take their revenge, and to show the intellectuals that other people had artistic ideas as well as they ! Similar considerations apply to literary style, to music, and to the plastic arts. Alas there can be no doubt that the taste of the proletarian masses is romanticist and sentimental. It would seem that the wave of sentimentalism which first engulfed the aristocracy towards the close of the seventeenth century, and then submerged the bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century, has now swallowed up the working class in its turn.

Perhaps all this proves nothing more than that we make a mistake when we endeavour to apply the political and social concept of class ideology to the domain of culture. The civilisation of an epoch is nothing more than the expression of a common way of feeling and thinking in determinate forms, the totality of which constitutes the style of the epoch. It is part of the essence of these forms that they must be general,

and common to all those who participate in a civilisation. They are general and common just like the language which makes of a people a cultural community, and of which the influence extends to all those who speak it. The frontiers of a community of this sort have no relationship with the limits of this or that class ; they simply depend upon the frontiers within which the common language is understood—whether we are speaking of the language of a poem, of a building, or of a musical composition. Well, a common form of expression means at bottom the same thing as a common way of feeling and thinking. Civilisation, as a totality of common ways of thinking, belongs to an epoch and not to a class. The cultivated socialist of to-day, qua civilised man, resembles more closely the bourgeois of the corresponding cultural level than he resembles Marx ; who, for his part, is more closely akin to any one of his contemporaries than to any one of ours—even, and above all, akin to those with whom he was most violently at war.

In addition to aesthetic ways of feeling, the moral, philosophical, and religious conceptions of an epoch characterise its cultural content. Science (except at most for practical sociology, which presupposes rather than determines a state of civilisation) is not subordinated to a class point of view. There is no science of proletarian physics, setting forth postulates which conflict with those of a bourgeois science of physics. As for philosophy, there are Marxists who will countersign the famous phrase of the Dutch Marxist Pannekoek, according to whom the history of philosophy down to our own days is nothing more than the history of bourgeois thought. This may be so. If it be so, we are entitled to ask with all the more insistence where we are to look for proletarian philosophy. If we are entitled to say that all philosophy, past and present, is bourgeois philosophy, surely we are no less entitled to say that all astronomy, past and present, is bourgeois astronomy ? Yet we may doubt whether Dr. Pannekoek, a professional astronomer, would agree that the mathematical formulæ which he uses day after day in his observatory have a hidden

antiproletarian significance. Why, Marxist sociology itself has borrowed from the bourgeois philosophy of its day its general philosophical hypotheses, its theory of cognition, and its dialectic.

Ethics and religion are much more closely and directly connected with social actualities than science and philosophy are. But it is above all in ethics and religion that we have least ground for speaking of a proletarian culture. No doubt many socialist savants have tried, just as their bourgeois colleagues have tried, to trace relationships between social evolution and the transformation of the forms of religious and moral sentiment. In favourable instances, and above all when they have not tried to prove too much, they have succeeded in presenting interesting and novel views as to the social determination of morality in various cultural epochs. Unfortunately for them, every one of their arguments in favour of the dependence of ethics upon social structure and upon the general civilisation of a people, is an argument against the theory which would fain make ethics dependent upon a particular class position. Besides, the science of ethics, and moral behaviour itself, are two quite distinct things. A man can write in the most brilliant and profound way upon the relationship between economic organisation and morality in the case of Polynesian tribes, or upon the economic background of the Reformation, without changing his own moral nature in the least, and even without acquiring the first elements of a new knowledge of his own moral instincts.

Kautsky's *Ethik*, for instance, which is certainly the most elaborate Marxist treatise on this subject, discusses all the controversial problems of the science of ethics, but evades the essential problem of conduct, i.e. the nature and the motivation of moral duty. We need not be surprised at that, for the problem is naturally evaded by a science which is only concerned with particular states of morality. Knowledge may at most help me to ascertain whether this action or that is in conformity with my sentiment of good or of evil ; it cannot give me this sentiment, or justify its existence. For

my part, I would never entrust my purse to one who told me that he could substantiate his morality by scientific knowledge, as, for example, by Kautsky's *Ethik*. I should be afraid lest he would find scientific reasons for keeping it. Nevertheless, I should not hesitate for a moment to show my confidence in my revered friend Kautsky in this way, and to give a great many other proofs of my trust in him, for I know better than he does himself the strength of his moral instincts, which no materialist conception of history can possibly deduce from the evolution of the method of production.

No doubt, class position exerts a great influence upon both moral theory and conduct. Furthermore, the class struggle may modify the ethical conceptions of a class; but it can never produce moral motives which did not exist before the struggle began. Human beings have within them an eternal and intangible substratum of moral dispositions, the faculty of regarding some actions as good and others as evil. No social science can provide sanctions for this, for they are antecedent to all social experience, and are essential preliminaries to all economic activity and to all social grouping. The moral nature of man must be recognised as a datum whose changes of form can be described, but whose essential nature can neither be known nor justified by science.

The moral behaviour of a social group (the manner in which it complies with an accepted rule of conduct) is quite a different thing from ethics per se (the actual rule). Ethics, or moral science, is by nature a social concept; moral behaviour is a concept relating to the attitude of an individual, and cannot be extended to a social group except by analogy. The relative stability of the moral commandments of religions, in contrast with the variability of social morality, affords the most striking proof that ethics are something very different from the product of the social conditions of the time, and that laws, morality, and religion, are something very different from bourgeois prejudices.

Above all, this is true of the working class. If the worker is not subject to anything more than a class morality sanctioned

by the common interest, what prevents him from killing his class opponent, or from forcibly retaking the property of which, according to the theory of surplus value, he has been unjustly deprived ? No doubt the consistent Marxist will reply that it is class interest " rightly understood " which tells the worker that he must not transform the class struggle into a class war—perhaps adding the reservation that this must not be done until the revolution, that is to say until the moment comes when the relationships of power have been so far modified that the dispossessed worker can regard himself as the stronger. Are we then to suppose that it is nothing but the strong arm of the law which prevents the carrying on of the class struggle by the methods of mass criminality ? Are there no internal moral restrictions ? For my part, I believe that there are. The moral ideas which prevent the socialist worker from acting on the advice that he should " steal back what has been stolen ", are what the *Communist Manifesto* calls " bourgeois prejudices ", and, still more remarkable, these very prejudices are what enlist him for the class struggle. Were it not for the moral sentiment which makes the individual submit to social regulations, there would be private theft, private vengeance, and private murder ; but there would be no common struggle, for this last presupposes a common sentiment of right. This sentiment of right, furthermore, is identical with that held by all classes, although it is not applied in the same way by all classes. Socialism is the condemnation of the dominant morality in the name of general morality ; or, if we are not to be afraid of words, it is the condemnation of capitalism in the name of Christianity.

For the rest, we must not forget that the class struggle is not the only field in which the moral consciousness of the worker can express itself. He is not simply and solely a member of a class. Above all he is a human being, a family man, a citizen, a neighbour, and a " mate ". Also (and this is what the theoreticians are apt to forget) he is a worker, that is to say a man who works, a member of a community of production, which is occupied in a great many other things than the class

struggle, and wherein there still exist other human relationships than the antagonism between exploiters and exploited. In all these relationships, the worker (though he seldom realises it consciously) is subject to a moral rule—not merely that of an abstract class community, but also and pre-eminently that of the concrete human community to which he is culturally connected by the use of a common language. As cases vary, this human community may be wider than class or narrower. In any case, it is the expression of affiliation to a general social hierarchy. In this hierarchy, even moral valuations are regulated by the prestige of the social strata which proclaim the morality. This applies equally to moral behaviour and to ethics. To the worker, as well as to others, Christian morality commands love of one's neighbour and contempt for earthly goods; whereas capitalist morality commands competition, and the acquisition of money.

The morality of every epoch, that which Marxists describe as the morality of the dominant class in the epoch, is really, for that very reason, the morality of all the classes of the epoch. The rule of a class is, in the last resort, supported only by this, that it creates the conditions which impose upon other classes the rules of its own morality. Movements of revolt against this state of affairs, such movements as socialism, are not inspired by a new moral sentiment, but by a moral sentiment of old date, handed down by the social past. No revolution has ever claimed to establish newly discovered rights of man. All revolutions appeal to the eternal rights of man. Every revolution bases itself upon the past, claiming that these rights derive from the moral nature of man, and declaring that the present outrages this nature.

That is why the morality of the subordinated classes does not so readily fly in the face of traditional morality as does that of the ruling classes; for, at bottom, the oppressed draw their hope and their courage from the sentiments of good and evil, of public interest, of human self-respect, of love of one's neighbour; in a word, from all which, in every epoch, has been regarded as the moral sentiment common to mankind.

On the other hand, in proportion as an ascendant class justifies its demands by appealing to the moral regulations of its cultural environment, it finds itself in a peculiar situation, in one full of contradictions, as regards its own customary morality. A rise in the social scale necessarily signifies increasing points of contact with the civilisation of the ruling classes. Every improvement in the material lot is reflected, in the consciousness of one who enjoys it, as a success of the acquisitive instinct. It tends, therefore, to reinforce this instinct. A strike for higher wages may have been carried on in an ethical mood of heightened solidarity, and of moral revolt against capitalism ; but when the struggle has been successful, the socialist motive of self-sacrifice recedes into the background, and the capitalist motive of holding fast to what has been gained comes to the front. It was a psychological phenomenon of this kind which characterised what the German socialists called the " degeneration " of the German revolution of 1918 into a movement on behalf of higher wages. One who has nothing to lose but his chains, is animated with revolutionary feeling ; one who has gained something, tends to become conservative, in order that he may keep what he has won.

We must note here that the way in which the gratification of a desire reacts upon the desire, depends upon the nature of this desire. The reaction will vary according as the instinct which presides over the desire is directed towards a material satisfaction or a moral one. The popular aphorisms, " appetite grows with eating " and " satisfaction kills desire ", seem to contradict one another, and yet both of them are true. The explanation of the paradox is that they apply to different cases. " Appetite grows with eating " is true in the early stage of a meal. Appetite grows with eating, because of the physiological changes which ensue upon the arrival of food in an empty stomach, these leading to an active secretion of gastric juice, and to consequent intensification of hunger. By a psychological parallelism, the same thing happens in the case of all those satisfactions which, by new sensorial impressions, reinforce



the emotional lure of the image of a desired state. But this only occurs in the early stages of satisfaction. After a time, satiety ensues ; desire declines, and finally disappears. In the end, there may be supersaturation and disgust. This only applies to satisfactions that are the outcome of the fulfilment of a material or physical desire. It is altogether different in the case of the desires which emanate from supersensual sentiments, such as the sense of the good, the beautiful, or the true. In the case of these desires, there is no such thing as satiety. On the contrary, they are intensified by every partial satisfaction.

This distinction between the two categories of desire applies with equal force to those which arise in the workers owing to their class position. In so far as these desires are based upon the acquisitive instinct, upon material envy, upon the wish for an assured wellbeing, appetite may, to begin with, be increased by satisfaction ; but, ere long, the desire is transformed through the act of satisfaction. A satiated man is a very different being from a hungry one. The skilled British workman of the classical era of trade unionism, and the conservative American trade unionist of the corresponding period across the Atlantic, show that such a saturation of the material proletarian needs is perfectly compatible with the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. An embourgeoisement of the same kind frequently occurs in the case of individual workers who have attained an assured position as officials in the trade-union movement, even though, as far as intellectual formulas are concerned, they may remain true to their Marxist conviction. How, then, can we explain that during the last hundred years there has been, in the masses, a steady widening of the gulf between desire and satisfaction ? The reason is that their desires contain elements which protect against satiety. In other words, it is because, even when they claim more material wellbeing, the masses are urged onward by a need for justice. This gives their desires an ethical tinge, thanks to which these desires belong for the most part to the category of the spiritual needs which cannot be satiated. Thus, in course of time, the respective elements in the desires of the working class undergo

a different fate. One group of elements leads to satiety and to embourgeoisement, the other to a qualitative rise in the level of cultural needs. It is only in so far as working-class claims are inspired by an ethical sentiment, that the revolutionary motive (antibourgeois, in the cultural sense) which inspired the socialist movement in its early days, is reinforced instead of being satiated by every fresh improvement in the lot of the workers.

The duality of motives in the labour movement finds expression in the increasing duality of the psychological effects of these movements. This discloses itself in the antagonisms between masses and leaders, between theory and practice ; and in many other problems of the kind which will have to be discussed in the sequel. The duality is further manifested in the stamp of actuality which it gives to the eternal conflict between the respective mentalities of fathers and sons : for whereas the socialists of the older generation become more and more interested in safeguarding the partial successes that have been won, in fights which have in great measure saturated their antibourgeois combativeness ; the younger socialists, in conformity with the psychological characteristics of youth, are dominated rather by the spiritual motive of a longing for the moral renovation of the world.

In respect of this duality of motives, the labour movement in different countries is in different phases of evolution. Communist Russia represents the primitive type, the labour movement in its initial stage. The conscious, eschatological aspiration towards a new social order still preponderates over the conservative desire to hold fast to what has been won. New Russia is still " young ", although the increasing bureaucratisation of the State and of the Communist Party are premonitory signs of the fight which the conservative trends will put up against the progressive trends. At the opposite pole stands German social democracy. Not that its policy is fundamentally more opportunist and conservative than that of most of the western labour parties, for the universal effect of the world war has been to bring these parties into closer

touch with the extant political and social order. The difference between Germany and the West, especially the Anglo-Saxon West, is that the repercussion of socialist practical politics upon the intellectual life of the party is regulated by very different conditions in the two cases. German social democracy has from the first regarded itself as the incarnation of the revolutionary and teleological doctrines of uncompromising Marxism. The younger elements, therefore, and the extremists, naturally look upon the increasing inclination towards an opportunist support of the existing State as a sign that the social democrats are gradually renouncing their traditional aims. The British Labour Party has, on the other hand, been from the first typically "practical"; the mentality of its guiding spirits is averse from apriori teleology; only under the pressure of experience has it moved on from a very moderate voicing of trade-union interests to become a socialist party. The concrete upshot of these differences is that, though in other respects the two movements are in the same evolutionary phase, German social democracy seems retrogressive in respect of its intellectual life, whilst British socialism seems progressive; German socialism seems to grow out of its ideals, whilst British socialism seems to grow "into" them. British socialists, engaged in a daily struggle on behalf of immediate demands, which are, however, justified by ethical motives, can watch the growth of their achievements while animating all their activities with a moral enthusiasm whose inspiration widens as their reformist activities prove increasingly successful. That is why the British Labour Party, though essentially opportunist, exerts a growing attraction upon persons who are mainly influenced by ethical and revolutionary motives—upon young people and intellectuals. In Germany, things work the other way about. There the inconsistency between the uncompromising verbiage of the Marxists and the actual opportunism of party policy, repels the young folk and the intellectuals. That is why, in contemporary Germany, the socialist youth is displaying a far more active spiritual revolt against the socialists of the older

generation than can be witnessed elsewhere, or than can be shown to have existed in the earlier days of German socialism.

This is only a particular manifestation of a general phenomenon, whose scope exceeds that of any political constellation of a single moment or a single country. In the long run, the objectives of the socialist movement vary because there is an increasing discrepancy in the motives which animate the working masses. The advance of their class feeling takes place in two different directions, which diverge more and more widely one from the other. Here we have a particular manifestation of the tragical dualism of all human aspirations, of the eternal warfare between instinctive habit and creative imagination. That is why the aspirations of the working class towards compensation for the social inferiority complex reach out in two different directions. The complex leads, at one and the same time, to an adaptive reaction (imitation of the upper classes), and to an opposing reaction (the eschatological longing for an anticapitalist future system of society). We have already seen that the adaptive reaction is not wholly dependent upon the acquisitive instinct ; that this instinct itself serves here only to provide the instinct of autovaluation with the means of gratification. The desired increase in earnings is to put an end to social inferiority, and to make the individual more highly esteemed by his environment. The stronger the tension between the desire for economic equality on the one hand, and actual economic inequality on the other, the more does the individual try to secure compensation for this inequality outside the purely economic domain. The working class endeavours to secure this compensation, above all, in the cultural field, following the line of least resistance.

Whereas theoreticians busy themselves in defining proletarian culture, the proletarian masses, who instinctively feel that cultural and social supremacy is a unity, are content with attempting to imitate the bourgeoisie, which they regard as a model of culture and good manners.

There are some socialist aesthetes, disgusted by the orgies of ugliness which characterise bourgeois taste, who put their

trust in a cultural renewal within the working class, regarded by them for this purpose as a clean slate. Whatever we may think, in principle, of the possibility of such a "fresh start" in cultural matters, we need merely open our eyes to the actual world in order to see that the "clean slate" of working-class culture is a chimera.

In so far as proletarian culture is not a chimera, it belongs to the past. In the early days of capitalism, when the poverty and the ignorance of the proletariat isolated it almost completely from cultural influences proceeding from above, there was not as yet any such thing as class consciousness in the socialist meaning of the term. In fact, class consciousness can only arise when the proletariat enters into touch with the civilisation of the epoch; and this is not possible until the proletariat becomes numerous, and large cities have grown up—developments associated with the inauguration of universal education and the more extensive development of material and intellectual means of communication. Before this, the proletariat certainly had no socialist culture, though it had a proletarian class culture, which, though rudimentary, displayed itself in the peculiar characteristics of working-class life, in the workers' manners and customs, their ways of feeling and of dressing.

That culture was the product of a survival of the traditions of the handicraftsmen, the peasants, and the poor of former days; traditions that were strongly influenced by the popular faith in Christianity. The material foundation of this culture was poverty, which imposed upon the workers a peculiar style of life distinct from that of the other classes. The style, however, lacked homogeneity, for the social origin of the class which it characterised was itself not homogeneous. The proletarian of a century ago, wearing a linen blouse, a cap, and wooden sabots, living in a hovel with nothing more than a little rude furniture, and with no ornaments beyond a few plaster casts of the saints and an old calendar or two, had had indeed very little "culture"; such as he had, however, was peculiar to the proletarian class. The workers, if they

could read at all, read religious works ; but their mentality was all the more original for that, being directly related with their own social stratum, as we still see among the peasants in out-of-the-way parts of the country. Such a proletarian would never dream of imitating bourgeois manners except by taking off his cap when he encountered his employer or the parson. The most typical manifestation of this class culture was found in the ways of the *compagnonnages* of which only German-speaking countries have still retained some vestiges. These vestiges recall the epoch when habits of work and of pedestrian travelling comprised a whole cultural system of social valuations, of workshop traditions, of manners, of modes of dress, and of fashions of speech, which fed a huge assemblage of legends, maxims, songs, and argot. Though all these things were only handed down by oral tradition, they were none the less very much alive. This proletarian culture has vanished like the characteristic local customs of the peasants, and with even more rapidity.

The proletarian of our own day has thrown aside his blouse, his cap, and his sabots, to sport a ready-made bourgeois suit, a bourgeois felt hat, and boots just like those worn by any bourgeois. Instead of the folk-songs of former days, he hums the latest music-hall air, which may come from Broadway, Montmartre, the Strand, or the Kurfurstendamm. Where there used to be the rough but simple and practical furniture inherited from forefathers, we now see a hideous "suite", which makes the workman's parlour a bourgeois chamber of horrors. The deal wardrobe grained in oak ; the upholstered armchair, rickety on its legs ; the dresser with its pillars carved in corkscrew fashion ; embroidered antimacassars ; painted vases filled with artificial flowers ; photographs of relatives in their Sunday best ; the mass of chimney ornaments and other nicknacks ; the souvenirs ; the chromolithographs and the picture postcards ; the plaster or terracotta busts ; the artificial palms in pots garnished with crinkled paper ; the rickety bamboo occasional tables ; the repp curtains ; the framed diplomas ; the paper-weights ; the albums with metal bound

corners ; the hanging lamp in imitation wrought iron with coloured glass panes—they are all there. Everything resembles the typical furnishing of a petty-bourgeois house—the only difference being that (incredible as it may seem) the things are even more hideous, more vulgar, more unpractical—for they have to be cheaper, and fashion only filters down slowly into the lower strata of society. In matters of dress, too, the changes in bourgeois fashion are reflected in the dress of the proletarians and their wives, though with considerable delay, and in a less conspicuous form. The choice of amusement in the case of the urban proletariat, and the sports indulged in by the young folk, are likewise strongly influenced by the instinct of imitation, though there are variations dependent upon the need for compensation specific to the proletariat. One who is thrust into a position of social inferiority feels a certain satisfaction in forming, as member of some athletic club or as one of the spectators at a football match or a horse race, part of a community to which authentic gentlemen and ladies, or persons supposed to be such, set the tone. The apparently trivial fact that the worker's outdoor pipe has gradually been replaced by a cigarette, is really the indication of a wish to diminish as much as possible the outward signs which differentiate his mode of life from that of his "betters".

The law of psychical compensation for inferiority complexes transposed to the social plane, may be formulated as follows : "The less one is a thing, the more one strives to seem it". The poor man envies the rich man, not so much for his comforts as for his luxuries ; not so much for his bathroom as for his motor cycle ; not so much for his fine linen as for his silk pocket-handkerchief. A German observer, Joseph Roth, aptly remarks : "Tradition teaches the workman to talk of the palaces of the rich and the hovels of the poor. He does not ask for gymnastic apparatus, tennis courts, tastefully furnished rooms. What he wants is a ridiculous palace. He is less concerned to strive for realities than for symbols." In England, Bernard Shaw writes in a similar strain in the preface to *Major Barbara* : "The poor . . . do not want the simple

life, nor the aesthetic life; . . . they want . . . costly vulgarities”.

The costs of what Dickens calls “veneering”, that is to say expenditure in order to maintain social prestige, occupy, proportionally, a smaller place in the budget of the millionaire than in that of the average worker. Their ratio to the total expenditure of the family increases as the income is smaller. Nothing could be more typical in this respect than the amount which most working-class families will squander upon a funeral. When the deceased was still alive, his relatives would think a great deal longer before changing half a sovereign in order to get necessaries for the maintenance of his health, than they think now of devoting five pounds or more to having him “respectably” buried. Few outside the ranks of the working class realise how terrible a burden is sometimes incurred for funeral expenses by a working-class family whose finances may be crippled by it for years. Just as, in the primitive days of our own civilisation, the valuable objects interred with the corpse were intended to signify his social status, so to-day the obsequies which are conducted in as bourgeois a fashion as possible are to serve the poor devil who has passed away as symbolic compensation for the miseries of his life—and do so at the cost of an aggravation of the poverty of his dependents.

This desire to secure prestige by the adoption of bourgeois formalities is not confined to externals. A wish to be “respectable” decides the attitude of mind as well. Acceptance of the moral standpoints of the privileged classes thus furnishes social compensation. The actual moral behaviour of proletarians is the product, varying from case to case, of two series of determinants. On the one hand, material conditions (poverty, the insecurity of existence, housing difficulties, promiscuity, the temptations of the great city) have a solvent effect upon the traditional ties of the family and of morality. On the other hand, the psychological factor, thanks to which there is a compensatory tendency towards the conventions of bourgeois respectability, reacts even more strongly



against these trends. The result is that the actual working class forms, from the moral and cultural outlook, a social group which is far more differentiated within itself between the two extremes of lower-middle-class respectability and slumdom that it was two or three generations back.

From among the totality of the phenomena in virtue of which the culture of the upper classes affects the lower classes, we must attend to four specially important influences : the life of great cities, the press, the cinema, and the novel. The free-and-easy character of urban life has, to some extent, lessened the distance which used to separate the environment of the rich from that of poor. The two environments are continually interacting in the whirlpool of the thousand and one impressions which derive daily from the life of the streets, from the means of transport used both by rich and by poor, from the examination of shop windows, from advertisements, public amusements, etc. Although, with good reason, the life of great cities has been described as the centre of rationalist and critical thought, we must not suppose that such thought has emancipated the urban masses from all non-rational and emotional impressions. On the contrary, the intellectual life of the great city, which enfranchises certain persons, enslaves the majority to customary impressions which they assimilate unconsciously. The average townsman talks more, and may even know more, than the countryman ; but he generally thinks less, and always thinks less on his own account. He has no time to think ; for, having received an impression (no matter whether it is due to a conversation in the tram, to the special edition of a newspaper, to something seen in the street, to an illuminated sign, or to a visit to the cinema), before he has had time to digest it he receives another impression which obliterates the first. The inhabitant of the great city is nothing more than an object upon which the intellectual action of a minority can take effect ; and this minority acts upon his subconscious, by means of sensorial impressions, all the more effectively because the multiplicity and the habitual repetition of these impressions puts his critical faculties to sleep. Even when the

impressions produce, by way of reaction, a customary attitude of distrustful scepticism, the only result, as a rule, is a sensation of false security ; for one who prides himself on being a sly fellow is the more likely to fall into a new trap which awaits him. All kinds of superstitions flourish more in great towns than in the " backward " regions. This does not apply only to such traditional wonders as magical cures and prophecies, but also to the suggestion exercised upon the masses by advertisements, and above all to the modern and far more dangerous superstition, namely, faith in the printed word.

It is upon a kindred suggestive action that the cultural level brought about by the newspapers depends. The newspaper influences the social and the political will, not so much by the frank arguments of leading articles, as by the crafty suggestions conveyed in the news items, in the serial stories, and in the headlines. In any case, few of the readers trouble to look at the leading articles. But an almost illiterate laundress who spells out the news items, and anxiously follows the tribulations and the heroic deeds of the characters in the serial story, cannot escape their influence. She thus imaginatively takes part in the doings of real or fancied beings whose life goes on in another social sphere than her own. The effect in enhancing the suggestive prestige of the upper classes is tremendous. Were it otherwise, the serial stories would not so invariably deal with the world in which Count So-and-So declares his love for a princess, and in which the rich banker marries his stenographer. Even the socialist newspapers, simply because they are newspapers, that is to say vendors of news in competition with other vendors, have to fulfil a number of functions which bring the workers who read them more closely in touch with the bourgeois cultural environment. This applies, above all, to the advertisements ; to the pages which deal with horse racing, football, and other sports, fashion, the cinema, etc. ; and to the general news items and the law and police reports, which, although to outward seeming they are politically neutral, can exercise an enormous influence in the matter of social education.

The cinema has a like effect, which is reinforced in two ways. First of all, the moving pictures stimulate the memory, and especially the affective memory of the subconscious, more vigorously than any printed words. Secondly, the spectator lacks that slight feeling of mistrust which the newspaper reader usually has regarding the political intentions of the editor of the paper ; and, in any case, the photographic character of the images suggests that they have exceptional reality. Current topics on the screen have an even stronger effect than the news items in a newspaper, for the spectator feels himself to be participating in the life of a different world, which is mainly the world of the rich.

A large part of the attraction exercised by cinematographic dramas is due to the social staging, wherein is depicted more or less accurately the life of the well-to-do. To go down with the great public, the screen drama must show luxurious interiors, costly dresses, and distinguished manners. Thousand-pound motor-cars must drive among palm trees, where ladies wearing costly furs and an abundance of jewels are walking with well-dressed gentlemen ; or similar folk must dance and flirt in brilliantly lighted halls. Then the poor devil in the cheap seats can let his fancy luxuriate as he pictures himself an inmate of this paradise. The man and the woman of the people learn at the " movies " to imitate the manners of the gentlemen and ladies of good society. Every fresh sense impression, especially when accompanied by an admiring emotional coloration, arouses an unconscious impulse towards imitation. Many a proletarian child will retain throughout life envies and social ambitions aroused by the magical images of the film.

What the masses love in the cinema, they seek and find likewise in popular novels. Literature descriptive of working-class life has very little interest for the workers themselves. If a novel is to have a widespread popular success, it must, in addition to satisfying the universal need for emotional tension, titillate the reader's instincts, and arouse a sympathetic or antipathetic identification with the characters, must appeal

to the peculiar interest of the poor in the world of the rich. Now that the tortures of hell and the joys of heaven have lost their reality for most people, the education of the social morality of the masses is largely achieved by the novel. The example of heroes and of villains suggests moral valuations ; by allusion, their moods and their doings are presented as worthy of imitation or contempt. The method is that which is customary in war-time in order to mould "heroes" with the aid of appropriate literature. No doubt such suggestions would be void of effect unless there already existed in the masses an instinctive disposition which aspires, so to say, towards its own idealisation. There is no lie which does not contain a fragment of truth : and the peculiar power of romanticism is that it satisfies a desire for reality by an illusion, and transforms true sentiments into false sentimentality. In this sense, the social romanticism of popular literature, which feeds the masses with the substitute products of bourgeois morality and bourgeois culture, satisfies a widely felt need. The orientation of the mass taste towards bourgeois standards, if not actually caused by this literature, is at any rate favoured by it.

Such an evolution is rendered possible, technically speaking, by the continued and increasing trend of industry towards the mass production of cheap goods. Consider the social consequences of the spread of the use of bicycles among the working class ; and do not forget that among the comparatively well-to-do American workers, the bicycle has already been replaced by the Ford car. Cheap ready-made clothing, boots and shoes, and hats, have rendered possible a popularisation of fashions to a degree inconceivable in days when a home-made costume lasted almost as long as its wearer lived. A hundred years ago fashion was of interest only to a trifling minority of the population ; to-day, the most retiring person among us cannot escape its empire. The fundamental principle of all modern mass production, "plenty, cheap, and bad," does not alarm the comparatively impecunious buyer. For what he wants, above all, is showiness, which will make him esteemed socially. The dreadful thing about this substitute

culture is, not that the masses desire it so keenly, but that they are content with so little. If we compare the position of the average worker to-day with that of the average worker of a century ago, we cannot fail to note, on the one hand, that there is a falling off in the quality of the objects with which he satisfies his needs, and, on the other, that there is an increase in their quantity and in their meretricious splendour. It is this change in the kind of needs which makes general conclusions so difficult when we are discussing the question of the relative impoverishment of the working class. This much is certain, that statistics of wages and of working-class budgets can never satisfy anything more than a quantitative element of the problem. There are, in fact, considerable satisfactions—and deprivations—which elude statistics owing to their immaterial character. How, for instance, can we estimate in monetary figures the significance of the fact that the workman who moves from the country into the town loses the advantages of pure air, sunlight, privacy, and quiet, which his ancestors always had for nothing? Study of the evolution of modes of life must set out from a qualitative study of needs, this involving the consideration of psychological phenomena; for the degree of a satisfaction can only be measured in terms of the need which is satisfied, and this latter is a psychological variable refractory to statistics.

We may ask whether the socialist ideals of the working-class movement do not constitute a counteracting tendency, which may in the long run get the upper hand of the trends towards the generalisation of bourgeois culture. For my own part, I do not think that in a hierarchical social system there can possibly be any other culture of the masses than that whose example comes from the upper classes. This should not prevent our trying to reinforce the socialist counteracting tendency, though we may have no hope of its immediate victory. On the contrary, if we could, even nowadays, sufficiently activate the new cultural motives of the working-class movement to induce at least an élite to strive towards their realisation, this would be an enormous gain. The élite would

then set an example opposed to the bourgeois example, provided, of course, that it was able to regulate its style of life in accordance with its own ideal. There may be little hope of transforming in this way the actual cultural reality ; but there is at least here a visible objective for the efforts of a minority, which may become a majority when social conditions are different. At any rate it is obvious that we must not expect the formation and the objectivation of this ideal to be the outcome of the spontaneous activity of the masses. A new culture can only be the work of cultivated persons. This task, therefore, is mainly incumbent to-day upon the intellectuals, who should take as their guide the words of Bertrand Russell : " The important fact of the present time is not the struggle between capitalism and socialism, but the struggle between industrial civilisation and humanity " .

The most that the working-class movement can achieve in this respect is to supply, as it were, an experimental field ; and it can do even this only within very narrow limits and under peculiarly favourable conditions. For, as G. E. Graf (the editor of one of the organs of the socialist youth in Germany) has said, the movement is primarily one of thwarted capitalists ; and it can hardly be anything else, so long as it wishes to remain a movement representing the *interests* of the masses. He only can uplift himself above the instinctive impulses of the struggle of interests, who has sufficient creative imagination and power of sublimation to make the ideal image of a different cultural state from our own the motive of all his actions. This state of mind will never be that of any but a small minority of persons who use the instinctive tendencies of the masses as an instrument for the creation of the social foundations of a new cultural state. Till then, all genuinely socialist cultural activity is essentially the affair of a leading élite. The members of this élite must continue to hold up before the masses samples of the kind of satisfactions for which the mass taste is not yet ripe ; must go on offering the examples of such satisfactions indefatigably until the moment comes (who can say when?) when the masses will be guided by these examples. What

we have to realise is that the moment will not arrive until the minority which embodies the new cultural ideal has for the masses the prestige of a new guiding aristocracy.

Let me hasten to say that it is far from being my design to discourage in any way attempts to promote working-class education. I devoted twenty years of my own life to this cause, and my zeal in its behalf has not slackened during the struggle. The only thing is that I now realise more keenly than before the natural limits which social reality imposes upon such a movement with regard to the possibility of diffusing new cultural valuations. There is no finer or more urgent task than to open for the workers an access to civilisation. But this task will only be fruitful on condition that those who undertake it clearly understand its character and its limitations. Nothing else can safeguard us from disastrous errors, and from illusions which will inevitably lead to a yet more disastrous discouragement. It behoves us to recognise that the civilisation which the working class wants to have opened to it is only bourgeois civilisation. We shall be less disillusioned by recognising this fact, now that we understand that the generic term "bourgeois civilisation" represents all sorts of things, and is extremely fluctuating in its outlines—for it means nothing else than the cultural state of the cultivated and intellectual strata of the population. Well now, the idea of a socialist civilisation is one of the most important elements of evolution and progress operative in such strata.

As far as the working masses are concerned, it is necessary to recognise clearly what must be the real starting-point of all educational and cultural activity. We must see the culture of the proletarian masses as it really is, namely a culture of substitutes for or imitations of petty-bourgeois culture. This does not merely mean that the working class is subject to the influence of this culture, but (a far more significant fact) that it does not want anything else. The desire in question is one of the most vital needs of the working class, and the labour movement helps to provide the conditions thanks to which the workers are able to realise their aspiration.

Besides, these conditions are necessary preliminaries to any kind of civilisation. The receptivity of the masses for higher cultural needs presupposes that there shall have been a minimum satisfaction of certain urgent material needs, which are far from being satiated. Such a satisfaction is not an indispensable condition for the creative process which leads certain persons to form a new cultural ideal ; but it is an indispensable condition for the adoption of this ideal by the masses, which is a receptive process. In other words, nothing will prevent an élite of socialist intellectuals and socialist manual workers from desiring, and from realising for themselves, a cultural ideal inspired by their socialist conviction ; but the psychological foundations of the extant social order are the very things which make it impossible for this cultural state to be generalised. The function of the labour movement, therefore, is, not to found a new civilisation, but to create for the masses certain material conditions which are essential preliminaries to all civilisation—the coming socialist civilisation not excepted. Since this does not yet exist, any improvement in the material condition of the workers subjugates them more effectually than before to the cultural standards of the social classes adjoining their own. Whenever trade-union or political action throws down a social barrier which has been standing in the way of the working class, the result, as regards future possibilities, may be the opening of a path which will lead from capitalism to socialism ; but from the point of view of extant realities, what has been overthrown is a barrier between the proletarian and the bourgeois.



## CHAPTER TEN

### SOCIALISM IN TIME : FROM REVOLUTIONISM TO REFORMISM

Wherever I have found life, I have found  
the will-to-power.

NIETZSCHE.

THE entry of the working class into the ambit of bourgeois culture is not due solely to the general rise of the working masses in the social scale ; it is also favoured, in a more restricted sense, by the organised activity of the working-class movement. Every fresh advance, every new recognition of the power of the labour organisations, establishes fresh points of contact between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and thus leads to a further adaptation of the workers to the cultural standards of the bourgeois environment. Every worker who is elected to parliament, to a town council, to a board of guardians, or to any other representative body, and every comrade who takes an official post in the hope of strengthening the influence of his party, is absolutely compelled (if he is to fulfil his new functions satisfactorily) to adapt his ways to those of his changed environment. As a rule, indeed, he will be eager to effect this adaptation, since it will help to free him from the stamp of inferiority which has hitherto prevented the members of his class from holding such positions. In early days, the labour members in parliament and other public bodies appear there as nothing more than a propagandist opposition ; but sooner or later the time comes when the opposition has gained so much power that it would frustrate the realisation of its own wishes if it were not prepared to share the responsibilities of office. Communists will not be able to escape this fate, any more than socialists have done.

The trade-union movement and the cooperative movement

follow the same road. Apart from the permanent bodies (Whitley councils, and the like) on which workers and bourgeois rub shoulders, every negotiation, every collective bargain, every trade dispute even (since a strike always ends in negotiation and a bargain), has a similar effect. Workmen who discuss terms with their employers, take a step out of their own class environment into an alien circle. One who, as representative of a young, growing, though still comparatively weak power, parleys with an old and tottering though still comparatively strong power, must do so upon the basis of the system which the stronger power embodies. The fact that the workers' representative goes out to meet the employer, enters the employer's office, is here symbolic. Though the workers deny the superior rights of the employers, this is irrelevant here. The decisive point is that the employer does not come to the worker, that the worker goes to the employer. Since, in the interest of the cause he represents, the workers' delegate has to go to the employer's office, he must, even as regards the petty symbolism of methods of intercourse, adapt himself to the bourgeois environment. As soon as negotiations of the sort become the normal task of a trade-union official, this bourgeois environment is his professional atmosphere. Such a trade-union leader may be as revolutionary as you please, none the less he can only do his job in daily relationships with the master class by adapting himself to the ways of that class.

The same thing happens in the cooperative movement. The ultimate aim of this movement is, on behalf of the workers' interests as consumers, to put an end to the bourgeois distributive trade, middlemen's profits, and even capitalist production. But cooperators can only draw near to their goal by competing; and, furthermore, they often have to buy from "bourgeois" sources of supply, and even to borrow from "bourgeois" lenders. If the cooperative refrains from the sale of alcoholic liquors, it leaves this branch of business in the hands of private enterprise; if it will not advertise, it allows its capitalist rivals to monopolise a great advantage.

Should working-class women, influenced by bourgeois fashions, want to wear high-heeled boots and shoes, the cooperative must deal in them or else leave this trade to the capitalists. If it buys in the capitalist market it must adapt itself to the ways of that market. If it employs travellers, they must not content themselves with criticisms of capitalism when they want to sell their wares ; for it is not their main business to spread the cooperative ideal, but to find purchasers for cooperative marmalade or cooperative boot-polish. Moreover, as a buyer in the capitalist market, or as a traveller in cooperative goods, the representative of a cooperative must make it his first task to avoid having a "proletarian" dress and "proletarian" manners, which would compromise his chances of doing business by arousing prejudice in the people with whom he has to deal.

Thus in every country where the labour movement is in an advanced stage of development there has appeared an upper stratum of officials, who adopt bourgeois standards, and set an example of bourgeois modes of life and thought which the masses are not slow to follow. The leaders are go-betweens ; they help to introduce bourgeois culture among the masses. These things are not the outcome of set purpose ; they occur in fulfilment of a natural law. That which is at first done as means to an end, tends in course of time to be done for its own sake. Often enough, conation is thereby diverted into channels which lead towards goals varying considerably from the original objects of desire.

In the last resort, this phenomenon is the expression of a psychological peculiarity akin to that which Wundt has termed *heterogeneity of purposes*. Here it shows itself in the form of a displacement of motive as a sequel of the activity initiated by the motive. Where, as happens in every mass movement, motives of divergent and even conflicting kinds exist side by side, there may ensue in course of time a shifting of the centre of gravity from one motive pole to its opposite. The process is all the easier because it is usually unconscious. It goes on mainly in the deep-seated emotional levels of the mind, so

that the subject may still be ostensibly faithful to his customary modes of thought and expression, when in his innermost personality, and especially in his habitual affective valuations, he has become a different person. Something analogous takes place in husband and wife, who may remain devotedly attached to one another on into old age, though "love" has come to have a different emotional content from what it had during the honeymoon. The experiences dependent upon the working of the original motive, which are habit-forming forces, have reacted upon the affective life in such a way that the primary motive has been insensibly transformed. The inward tragedy of such an individual destiny as that of the first Napoleon consists in a displacement of motive. The effects of his personal successes, in conjunction with his disillusionments in the matter of his intimates, metamorphosed the young revolutionary enthusiast into a despot. But the developmental process leading from one motive pole to the other was gradual and continuous, the trend having been determined by the motive in its primary form.

In the course of such a development, to the consciousness of the doer each new action seems a means to the end sought in fulfilment of the original motive ; but, inasmuch as the daily deeds are the actual causes of affect formation and affect transformation, the chain of deeds (the chain of means) soon becomes a chain of ends-in-themselves, a chain of purposes. In political parties, Churches, and public authoritative institutions, the same thing happens as in individuals. They, too, have their youth, when ideal aims predominate as motives ; their maturity, when the endeavour to reach a distant goal gradually gives place to a desire to strengthen the grasp upon what was originally nothing more than a means for attaining that goal ; and their old age, when the primary motive persists merely as an intellectual fiction, and when what had been means to an end have become the only objects of desire, the only promptings to action. A man is inspired with enthusiasm on behalf of a political or social ideal. To realise that ideal he needs power. At first power is sought only as means to

an end ; but by degrees, in the course of the struggle for power, the will-to-power grows. Now, the more power a man has, the more he will strive to retain it and to increase it. At long last, the primary aim in pursuit of which power was sought comes to have no other function than to mask from the striver (and perhaps from others) the fact that power is being sought for its own sake.

Only a sentimentalist will trouble to deplore this. We need not fear that the socialist movement will be ruined by such a hypertrophy of means till they become ends. The motive force of the movement is mainly derived from an eschatological sentiment which is nourished upon the idea of an absolute end. The leaders who cease to strive towards this end, certainly lose the eschatological grasp on the masses, in default of which no great historical movement can persist. The organisation must, therefore, continually refresh itself at the sources of enthusiasm ; or else, if it has moved too far away from these sources, it will have to make room for a new embodiment of organising and realising " means ". That is why historical evolution does not always run in a straight line, as it would if it were invariably the outcome of the pursuit of one end by one means. A great aim is achieved through a number of successive realisations. As one method of realisation is renounced another takes its place ; and so on. These serial changes do not occur by a simple process of sprouting and withering, such as goes on in vegetable life. They are attended by struggle, for the conservative trends of the aging wills must be forcibly overcome by the younger wills, by the conations of those whose energy springs from their awareness of a new task.

Every new configuration of the means will prove an advance on earlier configurations, in proportion as it is able to lessen the contrast between means and end. The ideal was formulated by Lassalle when, borrowing his style from Hegel, he wrote : " The end must already be carried out and realised in the means ". (See Lassalle's letter to Marx in Mehring's edition of the literary remains of Marx and Engels, vol. iv, p. 135.)

Translating the formula from Hegelian metaphysical jargon into concrete terminology, we get to much the same result as that expressed by J. P. Warbasse, the American writer on cooperation, in the words (*Cooperative Democracy*, p. viii): "The only great social changes that are permanent are those that are brought about by the operation of means which are similar in character to the end sought". Now, in what is this similarity to consist? It does not help us much here to follow Hegel, according to whom it consisted in that "identity of the idea" which was to be found in the realm of pure thought. For the "identity of the idea" is the very illusion to which consciousness clings in order to hide from itself the transformation of motive which has taken place in the subconscious; the same timeworn "principle" being used to justify a perpetually renewed "tactic", until the principle has disappeared and nothing but tactic remains. No, identity of means and end exists only when the same *psychological motive* finds expression in both. But identity of motives may best be proved by discovering identity in the affects out of which the motives arise.

A good instance of this is the attitude of socialists during the great war. The idea that the class interests of the workers are international did not save socialists, as a rule, from the psychosis of "national defence". Many of them (why not admit it frankly?) succumbed to all the worst promptings of the militarist spirit, including hatred of the "enemy", and love of fighting for fighting's sake. Why did this happen? Because the idea of the international solidarity of the workers was little more than an abstract idea, was the expression of a pious wish of the conscious self, rather than a fact of the unconscious life of feeling; whereas their inner personalities were still dominated by the affects of nationalist patriotism and self-assertion, and an animal combative instinct. An additional factor was the (usually unexpressed) dread that opposition to the popular war policy of the governments would imperil working-class organisations and lessen their influence; but the outcome of a successful war would, it was felt, probably

be an increase of the workers' share in national prosperity, and a more ungrudging recognition of labour organisations by the State and the employers. Superadded was the effect of the sudden inclination of the various governments to pay flattering attention to the labour parties and the great labour organisations. Those concerned were slow to believe that these "successes" were only successes for the self-esteem of a few leaders.

Socialism had not supplied the masses with any valid motive for taking a strong line against the war, seeing that doctrinaire socialists had only dwelt upon the conceptual, the intellectual relationships between the notion of war and the notion of class interest; they had done nothing to provide the anti-war motive with a firm anchorage in the realm of feeling, as the religious-minded pacifists (to whom war is per se immoral) had done. Besides, in actual fact, the idea of class interest had very little connexion with an internationalism that existed only as a mood at world congresses and the like; that was out of touch with and often in conflict with the unconscious urges of mass feeling. The sense of working-class interest was embodied in the trade union and the political party, which were national in scope, forming parts of the national community of thought and interest. In pre-war days, international socialists, influenced mainly by the German social democrats, rejected the doctrine that war was to be condemned as fundamentally immoral. They held that the policy of the various national parties must be guided by interested motives, by problems of attack and defence, the self-preservation of the "more advanced" nations, and so on. It was easy, therefore, to find intellectualist arguments for regarding participation in the war as a dictate of working-class interest. In all belligerent lands these intellectualist arguments were held to justify the "truce of parties", the "sacred union" between the labour parties and the capitalist governments. Is not this sufficient proof that the alleged identity of the idea of the international interest of the working class with the idea of opposition to the war, was only an illusion, a mask to conceal

the extensive differences between the emotional urges of those who, in actual fact, were severally dominated by nationalist sentiments ?

The effect of a policy does not depend upon the ideas stated in the program which it is supposed to carry out, but upon the affective quality of the motives which form its driving force. Means do not lead to the desired end unless they are fed from the source out of which the idea of the end has issued. Innumerable intellectual constructions, varying as the whims of logicians vary, can be formulated in the endeavour to provide an end which will justify the use of particular means ; but the psychological consequences in virtue of which some particular activity, considered as a means, transforms human beings even in respect of their most deeply felt motives—these have an indisputable and inevitable reality. A good end, the suppression of war, cannot be achieved by the use of bad means, participation in war. The reason is that warfare sets at work motives which are the driving force of war, which intensify and prolong war, and which survive war. It is equally impossible to establish liberty by despotism, to instal democracy by dictatorship, and to end the reign of force by the use of force.

That is why there has never been a violent revolution which has not proved to be a mounting-block for a despot. Revolution always signifies a step forward followed by a step backward. The extent of the retrogression depends upon the degree to which the revolutionists have thought it necessary to have recourse to violence, dictatorship, and terrorism.

When Robespierre described the revolutionary government as a despotism set up by liberty against tyranny, he was really telling his hearers how much the despotism was to remain a reality, and the promised freedom an unrealised ideal. Marxists tell us that the social revolution will raise the proletariat to power, and will abolish class differences for ever. So radical will be this revolution, they declare, that for the first time in history, a relapse into despotism will be impossible ; there can be no Restoration. They take the will for the deed !



They are sincere in their wishes, but are too simple-minded in their faith. Let us suppose that the proletarian revolution is victorious, and that, after a time, it is possible to set up legal and economic conditions which put an end to the extant class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Is it not likely that new class antagonisms will then arise to replace the old ?

To-day we see plenty of indications of social conflicts of interest besides those between employers and workers. Enough to mention a few of them. There is the antagonism of interests between agricultural producers and urban consumers ; that between all the great groups of producers, on the one hand, and the consumers, on the other, in respect of prices and conditions of work ; that between the intellectual workers and the manual workers in industry, in respect of pay, individual treatment, and workshop discipline ; that between the various categories of the working class in respect of the adaptation of conditions of pay and labour to varying degrees of skill, of the social utility of the work, of its difficulty, and of its danger ; that between the occupations which produce material goods, on the one hand, and those, like art and literature, which create intellectual values, on the other.

Although the working-class movement is not yet in a position of power which would impose upon it the responsibility of dealing with conflicts of this order, the workers have plenty of opportunity for seeing that these conflicts already exist. Very few persons, however, have sufficient imagination to perceive, in isolated happenings of their own day which may seem chance occurrences, that which will be one of the normal anxieties of the future. Let me give instances taken from German newspapers published during the week before I write these lines. Trade unionists in general have discountenanced a movement among printers to get better wages, on the ground that it is to the general interest of the working class that there shall be no interruption in the printing of its newspapers. Again, a trade-union commission, speaking in the interest of consumers, disapproves of the bakers' demand that

night-work shall be done away with in large bakeries. In a friendly society, there has been a strike of the doctors against the control of a working-class committee. Such incidents are of everyday occurrence. Even working-class cooperatives do not escape quarrels with their staff. Wherever the cooperative movement is well developed, especially in the domain of industrial production, strikes among the workers in the cooperatives have during the last few years been almost as frequent as in private industry. Not only are there ordinary strikes, like that among the employees of the Co-operative Wholesale of Great Britain in 1923; furthermore strikes attended with violence, as in the French cooperative glass works of Albi, have happened more than once. In the year 1925 there was a lock-out of employees in the British Co-operative Wholesale, which led a socialist periodical to say that the managing committee had shown less understanding of the workers' position than the average capitalist employer.

When the spur of hunger is no longer at work to make the producer perform necessary labour of a kind or intensity which no one would undertake voluntarily, the coercion to such labour will have to be maintained in one way or another by the authority of the State, of the guild, or of some other public service. Coercion, too, will have to be extended to cover the conditions of the labour contract. We should need to be excessively optimistic in order to suppose that all this can be effected without the appearance of new and bitter social conflicts. Obviously, the disappearance of the capitalist hierarchy in the field of production will concentrate an even greater power in the hands of the State or of other corporations deriving their authority from the law. Far-reaching economic and social tasks will be superadded to the functions which such bodies exercise to-day. Well, in the last analysis, these tasks will have to be carried out by individuals. Such individuals will necessarily be professional specialists; they will form bureaucracies, and will exercise power over other persons; they will incline to maintain and to consolidate this power (were it only on the plea of "saving the revolution"); and,

as an outcome of hereditary social instincts, there will be a new stratification into rulers and ruled, into conservatives and progressists, into centralists and federalists, into orthodox and heretics in the matter of the revolutionary faith.

Only a very simple-minded Marxist, only one who is content to believe that psychological motives are determined by the contemplation of a rationally conceived aim, can imagine the future under a different aspect. Marxism is responsible for a dangerous superstition, which finds expression in the traditional phraseology of the socialist parties when they speak of "political means to secure an economic end", of the difference between "tactics and principles", of the "transitional nature of the dictatorship", of "the evolution towards the disuse of force by way of the use of force", etc. Among a great many sensible things written by Proudhon may be mentioned his criticism of "this aphorism of the revolutionary party, which the doctrinaires and the absolutists will certainly not repudiate. They say that: 'The social revolution is the aim; the political revolution (that is to say the displacement of authority) is the means'. The implication is: Give us the power of life and death over your persons and your goods, and we will make you free! For more than six thousand years the kings and the priests have been repeating this patter!" Proudhon would have been the last to infer from the foregoing considerations that revolution can never be a means of social progress. The book from which I have just quoted is entitled *Confessions d'un révolutionnaire*, and it was written in prison. Nevertheless, his words are a warning, inspired by personal experience, against the chimerical fancy that an economic transformation can be brought about by political coercion.

Marxist casuistry has been far too ready to use the formula according to which important political actions can be treated as questions of tactic and not questions of principle. In this way the Marxists have often justified the tendency of working-class parties to act in ways fundamentally opposed to the principles of these parties. The result has sometimes been disastrous—especially to Marxism itself! For, unless principle

determines tactic in the sense in which all means justified by a motive correspond to this motive and reinforce it in those who make use of the means, in the long run tactics will determine principles. The upshot will then be that the theoreticians, to whom is entrusted the guardianship of the temple, will have to interpret the letter of the principle in such a way as to make the difference between principles and tactics imperceptible.

The maxim that the dictatorship is a transitory phase, fails to allow for certain fundamental facts, such as that there cannot be a dictatorship without a dictator, and that one who has become dictator will be loath to surrender his powers. It is so much pleasanter to rule without opposition, that down to this day no one has ever seen a dictator (whatever pledges he may have given before taking power) voluntarily go back into the parliamentary lion's den. Experience teaches that there is only one way of guaranteeing ourselves against a permanent dictatorship, and that is not to have a dictatorship at all. This resolve is all the more prudent seeing that the personal taste of the dictator is far from being the only reason why a dictatorship tends to become permanent. It is much easier to accustom the masses to submission than to independence. Besides, when the dictatorship has lasted a long time—as long, for instance, as the Russian communist dictators declare to be necessary to the consolidation of the new system—the men who sit in the seat of power are not those who sat there to begin with, for dictators soon get worn out. Their successors are then new men, who have grown up in a different intellectual atmosphere from the one that prevailed when the initial aim of the dictatorship was conceived. What had in very truth, for the victorious precursor, been no more than a means, has become an end in itself for his successor, who is an administrator, not a conqueror. One who is inclined to underestimate the importance of this fact, need only compare the atmosphere of the extant bureaucratic regime in the Kremlin at Moscow, with that of the period of enthusiastic effervescence which carried Lenin to power.

As for the formula recently revived and extolled by Max

Adler, concerning the "transition to the disuse of force by way of the use of force", in it only one thing is forgotten, namely that the use of force makes people inclined to go on using force, and that persons with such inclinations are not likely to establish a social order from which the use of force has been abolished. The psychological effects of the great war prove this clearly enough. The "war to end war" of which Lloyd George spoke, the "war against militarism" in which I myself at one time believed, was a *reductio ad absurdum*. War has no other aim than victory. One who counts upon the victory of force, gives force the victory, even over himself. Bertrand Russell has well said that the attempt to reach an ideal by way of war, is like trying to toast a piece of bread by exploding a ton of dynamite.

Now, it would not be fair to say that the labour movement habitually makes use of means which conflict with its aim. Nevertheless, in course of time there has been a growing divergence between some of the means employed and the primary objectives of the labour movement. As a result, there has been a displacement of motives, which may be described as a gradual replacement of the revolutionary mentality by the reformist mentality. Apart from the general psychological effects which the rise of the working masses in the social scale has had upon the masses, we can trace the causes of the development now under consideration mainly to the fact of organisation.

Every organisation, whether of a political party, a trade union, a cooperative, or a friendly society, has its own special and immediate aim, for which the organisation has been created and by which its structure is determined. In certain phases of the evolution of this organisation, to the persons who are organised the end seems identical with the integral vaster and more distant aim of social eschatology, with the aim of revolutionising the social system both legally and morally. This remark always applies to the epoch when the organisation is in process of creation and is just beginning to consolidate itself; were it only because, in that stage, it has

to overcome obstacles which are connected with the whole organisation of society, and which can only be overcome thanks to an exceptionally powerful spirit of self-sacrifice. Such sacrifices cannot be made except by enthusiasts, by persons fired with the image of a desired goal, the contemplation of which makes them forget all thought of material advantages. That was the condition of the first trade unionists, who had to break the laws against combination, to risk dismissal by their employers, and to face the derision of their own work-mates. Nor was the task of the socialist parties any easier in the early days. The socialists had to begin with the fight for universal suffrage, and for the rights of organisation and propaganda, before they could derive any advantage in the political field. This struggle for a remote end inspired them with a heroic emotional frame of mind. Their aims were a little vague, perhaps; but they were certainly such as tended to arouse enthusiasm. The establishment of every working class cooperative, every labour journal, every local branch of a socialist labour party; the fitting of the stones shaped by the pioneers into their places in the formidable edifice of social institutions which are used to-day by millions of persons as among those benefits which are taken as a matter of course—all this work needed sacrifices which can without exaggeration be described as heroic. Those who made the sacrifices were not thinking of their own interest; they were satisfying a moral demand imposed on them by their ideal.

That which one generation has created in such a spirit, the next generation, to which this early history is not a living fact but merely a tradition, will develop and utilise in a different spirit, and for different motives. The material advantages of the organisation, which to the precursors were but a means for winning over the masses to the ideal, have now become the main source of attraction. The epoch of sacrifices without gains is followed, for the masses at any rate, by an epoch of gains without sacrifices. Heroism quits the stage; propagandists and founders give place to administrators and to persons who enjoy the usufruct of what has been handed down.

At the same time, as a result of the progress of the organisation and of the consequent development of new technical tasks, the social chasm between the masses and the leaders widens. The leader becomes a professional leader, and his activity takes the form of office work. By slow degrees the motive of the organisation changes. The distant goal of the primary desires is not repudiated; were it only because the prospect of attaining this goal some day, continues to exercise a lure upon a considerable number of the rank and file. Talk of the ultimate objective is good propaganda. It serves, not only to increase the membership, but also to stimulate a self-sacrificing spirit in the average members, and to encourage them to undertake voluntary work on behalf of the organisation. Moreover, even in the case of the full-time officials, the paid leaders, the motive of work on behalf of the final aim is still operative. The faculty of being enthused on its behalf is an important element among the moral and intellectual aptitudes which determine the choice of leaders. Not a few of them would give up their posts, despite the advantages (sometimes rather problematical) entailed by being a permanent employee, were it not that from time to time they can refresh themselves in the waters of idealist enthusiasm, and console themselves for numerous vexations by remembering that their activities are on behalf of the realisation of a sublime purpose. Yet in the detail work of every day, this last motive can have little to do with ordinary activities; it is repressed by others, which crystallise in the tendency of the organisation towards self-preservation and towards becoming an end in itself.

In course of time, every religious community becomes a Church; every political party becomes that which the Americans, characteristically enough, call a "machine"; every trade union becomes a "labour trust"; every cooperative becomes a "business". All organisations exhibit a progressive trend in this direction. The rate of such developments depends upon the special aim of the organisation, upon the speed of its bureaucratisation, and upon the efficacy of

certain democratic antidotes thanks to which an excessive growth of the bureaucratic spirit may be hindered.

The trend we are considering is the main reason for the gradual change which has characterised the labour movement during the last fifty years, best described as a swing over from revolutionism to reformism. The change has been essentially psychological. The reformist is one for whom reform—that is to say, daily, direct, and tangible realisation—is the chief stimulus to action. The revolutionist is one whose actions are dominated by the eschatological notion of a radical and absolute transformation of the social system. What distinguishes the two mentalities (which can very well join forces in the theoretical domain under a common formula), is a simple difference of psychological stress. We must be careful to avoid seeing in this nothing more than the eternal effect of the diversity of individual temperaments. In the case of social volitions as in the case of music, it is the accent which makes the rhythm and the melody. The stressing of a special emotional motive in a mass movement is a far more essential phenomenon than any change in theoretical formulas, for it is the emotional motive which determines action. Revolutionism and reformism are not so much different thought systems as different affects, different types of affective reaction, different ways in which persons who act in society react to their own activities. Theoretically, these two affective states can coexist in the same individual and in one and the same theoretical system ; but in the psychological practice of mass movements they are opposites, for in practice one of the motives cannot act, cannot induce emotions and volitions, except at the cost of the other.

Every practical activity, whether effected in the political the trade-union, or any other field, is a struggle on behalf of a definite objective. This struggle always ends in a compromise, determined by the ratio between the strengths of the opposing forces. Even the force directed towards some integral aim, can realise itself only by means of a series of compromises concerning partial ends. Now, when we try to decide the value



of a final aim in accordance with an ethical valuation of good and evil, we have to do with a question of all or nothing, and we have to decide between alternatives. On the other hand, when we are discussing the practical value of some immediate accomplishment, the question at issue is not one of morals ; the decision is a compromise containing elements derived from all the conflicting wills. Well now, every compromise which we accept, represents a choice enforced upon consciousness between the final aim and the partial but immediately realisable objective. Frequently repeated choices of such a kind lead the " practical man ", one whose activity consists in the realisation of a series of partial objectives (which individually are often very slight gains indeed), to regard such activity as in itself the essential aim. He soon comes to content himself with the conquest of these partial and practical aims, and to strive for nothing more remote. Thus he is subjected to the combined influence of professional habit and of the instinct of autovaluation, which induces every one engaged in voluntary action to attribute to his own activity, in which his whole psychological being is reflected, the maximum value.

One effect of the activity of public life—a trifling effect apparently, though one weighty with consequences—is that it always implies a certain amount of personal contact with political and social opponents. The experience which is embodied in the Latin proverb : " Senatores boni viri, senatus bestia " is realised, though in the inverse order of the terms. The senate is a brute beast, but there are good fellows among the senators. Such is the universal human experience, which was expressed by Charles Lamb when he said that he could not hate a man whom he knew. It is verified nearly as often in the case of one's opponent as in that of the fellow member of one's own party ; and its result often is to make a politician round off the corners of his judgments, even in questions of opinion.

Another phenomenon favours a displacement of motive in leaders. By slow degrees, the development of the organisation results in the establishment of a new criterion for the choice of

leaders, and thus a new psychological type is brought to the front. This evolution takes place in two ways. First of all, the kind of activity reacts upon the mentality of the doer, by forming habits ; and, furthermore, a different type of activity draws into the arena men of different temperaments and of different intellectual tastes. The days are over when the working-class movement needed none but heroes to lead it. It now needs capable officials, trustworthy treasurers, shrewd negotiators, able journalists, clever public speakers. In the office of a modern trade union or cooperative, and also in parliament, the symbolism of the doings and the words of the socialist fighters of early days would arouse the impression of futile and insincere quixotism. Within the working-class movement, there is still plenty of enthusiasm inspired by the idea of the final aim ; but this enthusiasm does not act so much as a motive of leadership in the strict sense of the term, as by providing the impetus for the voluntary work which is performed by "non-commissioned officers and the rank and file": the propaganda carried on in the workshop and after the day's work is over ; work in trade-union branches and in factory and workshop committees ; the distribution of leaflets ; activity in workers' defence corps ; innumerable sacrifices of time, strength, and often family happiness, made by rank-and-file workers on behalf of the cause. It is almost twenty years since I heard Victor Adler say that the greatest danger for socialism would come from its bureaucratisation. What was then nothing more than a bold prophecy, has to-day become an actual problem of organisational technique.

Experts in labour organisation see this plainly enough when they complain that the intellectual initiative is left more and more to the bureaucracy of the organisations, what time the voluntary zeal of the subaltern militants is absorbed in the mechanical details of party "management". In the technical work of political organisation, too, mechanisation and bureaucratisation bring to the front the problem of distaste for the dull routine of specialised work. One of the most striking

symptoms of this is a tendency towards making bureaucratic functions hereditary. In more countries than one, I know a great many permanent officials of working-class organisations who are having their children trained as clerks, intending to find careers for them in the organisation. I need hardly say that the choice of officials on such lines is based upon other psychological characteristics from those which guided the choice of the parents to serve in that capacity—and in some cases the grandparents! In those early days to become an official in the labour movement it was necessary, first of all, to be a leader; and no one could then become a leader without having a temperament and a capacity fitting him for leadership. This temperament, which is rare, is still more rarely inherited. On the contrary, the education which prepares a young man for the technical tasks of trade-union officialdom is one to which only persons of an unheroic type are likely to adapt themselves. It will attract youths of mediocre ability and a subaltern spirit; the education which they will receive to fit them for their chosen career will be anything rather than one likely to develop whatever leanings they may have towards intellectual initiative and independence of character.

It is significant that the speed at which revolutionism gives place to reformism in the various branches of the labour movement depends, not so much on the special functions of the organisation, as upon the degree of bureaucratisation. True, a great many Marxists used to believe, and still believe, that the normal atmosphere of the political struggle is revolutionary; whereas the trade-union movement and the cooperative movement, they say, favour the growth of a reformist mentality. As regards certain motives, that is undeniable; for the eschatological state of mind (other things being equal, and especially the respective degrees of bureaucratisation being equal) remains active longer in the political party than in the trade union or the cooperative. The political volition is directed towards a remoter end, a more radical end, than the trade-union or the cooperative volition. Political action generally demands from those engaged in it voluntarily, greater

sacrifices on behalf of less immediate advantages. Parliamentary democracy implies continual attention to the state of mind of the masses ; and these latter, notwithstanding their concern on behalf of material interests, are greatly influenced emotionally by the contemplation of the final aim of political programs, by political phraseology, by declarations of principle. Add that the political party, differing in this from the trade union, is not solely recruited from among proletarians. Intellectuals participate in the activities and even in the guidance of the political party. Now, in the case of intellectuals, their mentality inclines them, to begin with at any rate, more towards revolutionism ; for the reason that, in them, the distant objective has usually more influence upon their actions than have immediate material cares.

It is not, of course, always so. The history of the international labour movement offers numerous examples of situations in which the industrial organisations have temporarily served as natural asylums for those who have become extremists in reaction against the reformism of political parties. Enough to remind the reader of French revolutionary syndicalism during the opening years of the present century. In that case, it was for the very reason that the political party addressed its appeals to electors of all classes, that, in a country which as yet is comparatively little proletarianised, the party was inclined to adapt its appeals in large measure to the mentality of non-proletarian electors (peasants, petty bourgeois, etc.). Consequently, to extremist intellectuals, the trade unions seemed the rampart of proletarian revolutionism. When towards the middle of the nineteenth century the tide of British Chartism ebbed rapidly, the difficulties and disappointments of political action aroused in the British workers a revolutionary trend, and this found expression in an exaggerated estimate of the revolutionary function of the trade unions and the cooperatives. A similar phenomenon may ensue when a political conjuncture brings a labour party into power. If that happens, the social discontent of the working class cannot be expected to disappear in a moment, and it is

apt to discharge itself into the trade-union movement, as representative of an economically weaker class and a class which (socially speaking) is in opposition. Such a situation occurred in Belgium in the year 1921. The working class showed itself more and more disenchanted with participation in a coalition government, a heritage from the war epoch. Under pressure of the discontent which found growing expression in the trade unions, the trade-union leaders (moderates as a rule) expressed themselves in favour of a more uncompromising policy. In Soviet Russia, during recent years, the trade unions have often given expression to the discontent of extremist manual workers with the opportunism of the reigning communist bureaucracy. In Britain, after the fall of MacDonald's government, during the period up to and including the general strike in May 1926, there was an extremist wave in the trade-union movement, showing that there, where the trade-union movement is older and more powerful and where opinions can be more freely expressed than in Russia, the oppositional tendencies of the unions are likely to manifest themselves even more strongly.

In so far as the revolutionary spirit is able to maintain itself more effectively in the political movement, the essential reason is that political parties become less rapidly bureaucratized than do trade unions and cooperatives—at any rate in so far as they do not yet conquer the whole State apparatus and transform the party bureaucracy into a governmental bureaucracy. Until that happens, the most important administrative posts which a political party has at its disposal are less secure than trade-union or cooperative posts, for they depend upon the varying political humour of the electoral masses. Furthermore, political action, whose technique is less complicated and is one requiring more voluntary activity, needs fewer employees, proportionally, than do industrial organisations. In most European countries, the trade-union movement, for instance, has been more rapidly bureaucratized in the course of the last twenty years than have the socialist parties in the course of half a century.

It results from all this that the tendency towards reformism is inherent in every kind of organisation ; but that the victory of reformism will be easier where circumstances are more favourable to the transformation of the particular aim of the organisation into an absolute aim, and where they are more favourable to the predominance of the will-to-power in the leaders and to the bureaucratisation of these leaders. Every organisation is comparatively revolutionary in its early days. This applies even to so little revolutionary a movement as cooperation. That, too, had its period of youthful enthusiasm, when it was dominated by hotheads who regarded it as a means for overthrowing the capitalist system. Owen's disciples and the Rochdale Pioneers were, unquestionably, a very different kind of persons from the actual managers of the British co-operative movement to-day. They were young, and they were filled with enthusiasm on behalf of an ideal whose realisation still belonged to the future. The present managers of the C.W.S. are cautious and easy-going elderly gentlemen, far too interested in showing a good yearly balance sheet to bother their heads about the revolutionising of society. Their program is still the same as that of the Rochdale Pioneers, and yet their chief concern is dictated by the fact that they are responsible for the most important trading enterprise in the United Kingdom. The method is still the one adopted in Rochdale, but the people in charge of the method are different. The men of 1848 created the method ; those of to-day have been formed by the method. There are just as many persons of revolutionary temperament, like those pioneer cooperators of Rochdale, in the British working class to-day ; but they will be found, not among the managers of the cooperative movement so much as among workshop delegates, socialists who take an active part in the political movement, and above all, among the communists. If the Rochdale Pioneers were to return to life to-day, the organisation of which they laid the first stones could at best offer them a job as salesmen or office-boys. They would never do for the heads of an undertaking whose turnover is more than two hundred million sterling

per annum, and which employs twenty thousand persons ; they would probably ruin the business of which they were the founders, by ill-considered experiments and rash innovations.

The displacement of motive which occurs in every organisation betwixt youth and maturity, takes place with especial rapidity in the cooperative movement because its function is to attain the goal of social transformation by purely commercial means. In principle, it aims at the suppression of profit, at the substitution of the motive of service for the motive of gain in the work of production. But competition soon forces the cooperators to revive the motive of gain. In fact, the main functions on which the upkeep and the success of the cooperative organisation depend are those of commerce and not those of propaganda. The result is that the cooperative movement, though beyond question it has a considerable effect in the realms of social reform and social education, needs a far more extensive bureaucracy than do the trade unions or the socialist parties. Thus, little by little, the characteristics which at one time differentiated cooperation from private enterprise (the absence of dividend-earning capital, the democratic division of profits, the social organisation of work, the pursuit of an educational ideal, etc.) cease to be real aims at all, or else come to play a much less important part than the founders of the movement wished. In the view of the pioneers, the direct management of the cooperatives by the consumers enrolled as members of the organisation, provided solid guarantees for the persistence of an anti-capitalist motive. But as soon as the cooperatives ceased to be dwarf enterprises, this self-government generally showed itself to be an illusion. Reference of questions of policy to the members, and decisions by vote, which have some meaning in political assemblies, become nonsensical when the matters in question relate to the management of a great trading enterprise.

In all the large working-class cooperatives with which I am acquainted, even though the managers have a strong democratic trend, the control of the business by the associated

consumers is as imaginary as is the control of most joint-stock capitalist enterprises by shareholders' meetings. The members of a cooperative concern, who have no capital invested in it, or an exceedingly small amount of capital, have not even as much interest in the success of the enterprise as an average shareholder has in the joint-stock company in which he holds a few shares. Moreover, they have no knowledge of monetary and commercial technique, and are therefore unable to study balance sheets to advantage, to grasp the meaning of reports, or to follow the course of the business in all its ramifications. That is why, in practice, the "voice of the people" is apt to be heard only as regards accessory details, or as regards personal questions—except in so far as it serves to mask by a flood of eloquence the inevitable reality of bureaucratic absolutism. The *Maison du Peuple* in Brussels is managed by a group of persons who are convinced socialists, and who do their utmost to induce the members to participate in a genuinely democratic management of the concern. Nevertheless, I remember that, when I was myself a member of that cooperative society, a commission consisting of more than thirty persons spent several hours discussing the purchase of a typewriter; whilst out of twenty thousand members less than two dozen attended a general meeting to hear the reading of a balance sheet of which most of the audience did not understand a word. Perhaps things are not as bad as that always and everywhere; but universally, in the long run, the commercial motive to which the managers tend to succumb is enabled to get its way unrestricted owing to the lack of interest among rank-and-file members who ought to be keeping watch over the democratic ideal.

In the trade unions, the hybrid character of their functions (since they are in part fighting organisations and in part insurance societies) leads to a similar conflict of motives, though it is a less violent one. The accumulation of funds which is necessary for the payment of "benefits", is needed also in acute phases of the class struggle; but the desire to safeguard the accumulations with an eye to possible struggles in the future, creates a



conflict of motives between the masses (who may be spoiling for a fight), and the responsible leaders (who wish to keep the funds intact). This antagonism already existed before the leaders had become whole-time officials ; naturally the conflict grows more acute when bureaucratisation has led the officials more and more to regard the organisation as an end in itself. Then the trade-union movement has become like Ludwig Börne, satirised by Heine. As soon as the poor devil has bought a fine tea-service in gilt porcelain, he becomes tortured by the dread of breakages should an undue revolutionary activity disturb his domestic peace. His tea-service plays the part of a chain which hinders his freedom of movement.

Political parties, likewise, have their tea-services. I shall never forget a little scene which occurred in Brussels, just before the war, at the last session of the bureau of the Second International during the end of July in the year 1914. The Austrian and Czech delegates had left their country when the mobilisation against Serbia had already begun. Naturally, they were agitated. Still, I was surprised to learn from their conversation that the main cause of their anxiety was the danger which the Austrian Social Democratic Party was running. Since they were convinced socialists, and intelligent persons, there can be no doubt that their minds must also have been occupied with thoughts of other misfortunes which the war was likely to let loose upon mankind ; but the only thing they could talk about was the risk that the party would be dissolved, that its locals would be sequestered, that its press would be muzzled, that the delivery vans used in the circulation of the party papers would be requisitioned for the use of the army. Obviously, it would be unjust to explain the political behaviour of the German social democrats on August 4, 1914, by their wish to save the "tea-service". There were other reasons at work, deeper and more ideal. Nevertheless, no one who has inside knowledge of what was going on in those days will deny that eagerness to safeguard the organisation played a decisive part in the leaders' subconscious. Soon afterwards, many of the German and Austrian social

democrats became fully aware of their own motives, and proceeded to construct a veritable ideology of tea-services, designed to justify the war because it would lead to the universal triumph of the ideal of organisation. Friedrich Adler was hardly exaggerating when in "Kampf" (July 1916) he described the idea of organisation for its own sake as the kernel of the "ideas of 1914 as to which the bureaucrats of all classes and all kinds were agreed". A German socialist theoretician, declaring that "organisation is socialism", supplied the groundwork of the conception according to which "our society was made more socialist by the war". Lensch, a deputy to the Reichstag, formulated this idea with unwitting comedy when he said that Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor, was the leader of the world revolution. It is true that, even then, a good many of the German social democrats were far from approving of such an outlook. But those among the social-patriots of that date who have good memories will, many of them, be able to recall that somewhere near the threshold of consciousness the motive of organisation as an end in itself must have been at work in their minds side by side with a longing for victory and for the economic dominance of the Central Powers.

Of course this mentality was especially marked in the trade-union officials. Nevertheless, among those who were chiefly interested in the political organisation, the bureaucratisation of the party had favoured the growth of a state of mind dominated by the desire to safeguard the party organisation, the party press, and the parliamentary representation of the party. In the political no less than in the industrial domain, the growth of organisation results in an increasing inclination to confound the cause of socialism with the cause of the party. This is an error which may become no less disastrous than, in the religious field, is the confounding of the genuine efficacy of faith with the temporal power of the Church. Experience has shown that an increase in the power of the Church has by no means signified an intensification of faith. History swarms with examples which show that religion would have

got on a great deal better if the Churches had not got on so well.

This must not be taken as an indication that I deny the indispensability of organisation as means towards an end. What I want to show is that every organised intellectual movement ultimately reaches a stage of development when the power of the organisation becomes the main obstacle to the realisation of the ideal on behalf of which the organisation was founded. Even opportunists will admit that a party is never weaker than when it seems to be at the zenith of its power. In every land where parliamentary government prevails, it is plain to all observers that a party which has a vigorous minority in parliament can exercise more influence over legislation than one which holds power in virtue of a small majority ; for when the former state of affairs prevails, the main concern of the party in power must be to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition. Since the war, the political conditions in almost all European countries (Russia excepted) have been such that the socialist labour parties, especially when in power, have had to practise a conservative policy. Meanwhile, the bourgeois parties have advocated a policy of reforms. There is scarcely a single reform demanded in socialist programs and realised in the course of these last few years, which has not been installed by anti-socialist parties. On the other hand, wherever the socialists have been in power, either alone or in coalition with non-socialist parties, they have had to concentrate all their energies upon conservative tasks, such as the maintenance of the republic and the strengthening of the State power in Germany, or the restabilisation of the capitalist economy and a struggle against inflation of the currency in countries devastated by the war. With these ends in view, and in order to avoid losing political influence, they have been compelled to eliminate from their practical programs all specifically socialist demands. This phenomenon has a significance far more extensive than that of a simple deference to the partners in a coalition, for it is even more marked when socialists govern as a majority. If the British Labour Party

should win a majority at the next general election, it will hardly be able to introduce any legislation more revolutionary than that carried by MacDonald's government in 1924, when the socialists were in office but not in power; for it would be overthrown as soon as it tried to pass some radical reform disquieting to the fluctuating elements whose barometer is the stock exchange. There would be a turnover of votes to the conservative opposition. On the other hand, these same elements would feel much less uneasy were such a reform (perhaps even more radical) carried by a conservative government, for in that case the reform would be robbed of its dangerous aspects owing to the intentions and the character of those who effected it. Besides, the labour members, being now in opposition, would have no interest in representing the proposed reform as revolutionary. On the contrary, they would endeavour, by their criticism, to show that the reform was inadequate, and in this way they would help to sustain public opinion in the view that the measure was innocuous. Finally, we have to remember that every social reform costs money. This money must either come from the banks or from the taxpayers. But the contributions of the taxpayers are, in reality, almost as voluntary as the contributions of the banks; for there is a psychological limit to the possibility of increasing taxation, and a rise in taxation cannot be effected when the ill-will aroused exceeds a certain measure. Every taxpayer is an elector whose vote can be cast against the government. Both the banks and the bourgeois taxpayers will be more likely to retain their confidence in a bourgeois government which is realising social reforms in order to assuage the discontent of the opposition, than to help a socialist government to carry out similar reforms. This is even true when the measures proposed by a socialist government are far less revolutionary; for when a socialist government is in power, the aim of the bourgeois members of parliament will always be to represent the socialist legislation as disastrous, thereby spreading panic on the stock exchange and among the electors.

We thus arrive at a paradoxical situation, which affords a clear proof of the heterogeneity of aims. Nowadays, when the political influence of the working class is so much greater than of yore, we have better reason to expect socialist reforms from bourgeois governments than from socialist governments, though, of course, the impetus towards such reforms will always be directly proportional to the power of the labour parties. There is every likelihood that in all the industrialised States there will be an unceasing swing of the political pendulum, leading to the alternate rise to power of the two extremist parties, the conservative and the socialist, either alone or supported by kindred elements. This increasing tension, which is one of the consequences of the development of socialism, acts in two different directions. Centre parties, the Liberal Party in especial, lose their importance; but the assimilation of their elements and their motives by the extremist parties tends to deprive these latter of the extremist character which is dependent upon the nature of their ultimate aims. Such an effect is intensified by the fact that the extremist parties regard every period of opposition as the preparation for a period of government, and every period of government as a precarious condition. The stronger the political tension and the more unstable the equilibrium, the more readily will there occur a sufficient swing-over of votes to cause a change of government, for this swing-over of votes occurs among the comparatively indifferent sections of the electorate, which are especially disposed towards changes of mood. In such circumstances, both the parties, and especially the party in power, become more moderate in their political practice. In our epoch of economic and international reconstruction, there is a sort of division of labour, in which the socialist parties must concentrate their forces primarily on the preservation of that which exists, while the conservative bourgeois parties must devote themselves to reforming what exists—even though the socialists and the conservatives desire the very opposite of what they are respectively doing. Labour parties must see to it that economic life and the State, which

are threatened in various ways by the destructive trends initiated by the world war, shall be kept in going order. There is no choice here, for the wellbeing of the workers depends, primarily, upon the continued and orderly conduct of production. Moreover, the working class rightly regards the democratic State as one of the main ramparts of the working-class struggle ; and the most important and urgent duty of the working class is the pacification of the world. Now, the pacification of the world can only be achieved by a close collaboration of all the main economic forces—in a word, by the stabilisation of capitalism.

The foregoing considerations do not justify the criticism of the communists, who say that the labour and socialist parties of the West have played the part of " lackeys of capitalism " in contributing to the stabilisation of capitalism after the war. By helping to reestablish capitalist production, and by maintaining the extant State system, the labour parties have been fulfilling a necessary task, one preliminary to further progress. Before we can revolutionise a method of production, we must have a method of production in working order. The experiments of the Russian communists in their own country are not likely to encourage the workers in central and western Europe to adopt the plan of climbing on to a wrecked ship in order to escape the chaos of the post-war period. It is practically impossible for the working class in any of the industrialised lands to ensure for itself a decent subsistence on the basis of extant productive forces, without first putting an end to the situation resulting from the world war ; a situation in which national antagonisms are hindering the development of these productive forces, and in which there is an ever-present risk of a relapse into the destructions of war. If this reconstruction of the world economy, and therefore the political unity of the world, be also desiderata for the capitalists, so much the better, for the workers' chances of success in their efforts to save the world are thereby enhanced. In this matter, the working class is confronted on the large scale by the very same problem with which it is confronted on the small scale when

there is a question of reducing unemployment in an industry by means of the revival of trade. The Fabian weekly, the "New Statesman", on April 25, 1925, referring to certain socialists who condemn every improvement in trade as a "bolstering up" of capitalism, remarked: "All endeavours to improve trade are ways of bolstering up capitalism, until we have established a complete Socialist Commonwealth. Under present conditions, any one who is not prepared to bolster up capitalism by providing additional work is an idiot".

The labour parties are deceiving themselves as to their own destiny if they are unable to see in the increasing cleavage between aims and realisations nothing more than the chance outcome of an abnormal post-war situation. No one knows how long this situation will last; but daily experience shows that the economic and political reconstruction that has become necessary during the post-war period is a far more tedious process than people were at first inclined to believe. One reason for the delay is that this reconstruction presupposes the liquidation of many of the important psychological consequences of the world war, consequences which prevent the formation of a sense of European solidarity. In the best event, such a liquidation can only be the work of the next generation, whose mentality will not have been moulded by the passions of the war. There are widespread indications that the coming generation will still be faced by a task very similar to that which faces us to-day. This task will not be so much a realisation of a socialist regime as a preparation for that regime. The world war has imposed the task upon the socialists; we may define it as the upbuilding of a political unity corresponding with the economic unity of the world. For it has become plain that the concentration of industrial enterprises and the capitalist monopolisation of the most important means of production, do not suffice, per se, to render possible the realisation of socialism. As long as the capitalist world economy fails to eventuate in a political world organisation, the working class will be confronted with a labour of

Sisyphus. A new war, or even the perpetuation of extant national antagonisms, will suffice to render the efforts of the workers barren. The first essential is that the universality of the capitalist mode of production shall have as its counterpart a universal political system. In the epoch of world history which is now opening, and which will be characterised by struggles on behalf of this end, socialists will have to accommodate themselves to the functional duality of socialist policy which has become conspicuous since the war. They will have to realise that it is a normal phenomenon, and likely to be such for a long time to come.

Those who can see in this parallelism which is directing both capitalist production and the labour movement towards a worldwide unity, nothing more than the slavish subserviency of socialism to capitalism, are suffering from a disastrous confusion of ideas. The fact is that capitalism is maintaining and organising the productive forces in default of which socialism can never be realised. The capitalism with which we are concerned in this matter is not capitalism as the social domination of the capitalist class or of the bourgeoisie ; it is capitalism as a method of production, a purely cosmopolitan and economic concept, which is not in itself either good or bad. The duplex signification of this concept is a reflexion of the fact that we cannot imagine working-class socialism except as being at one and the same time a fruit of capitalism and the opposite of capitalism. This apparent contradiction is really resolved in the unity of motive in accordance with which socialism still contributes, and must contribute, towards the realisation of some of the aims of *capitalism as a method of production*, while continuing to fight *capitalism as a form of social domination*.



## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### SOCIALISM IN SPACE: FROM INTERNATIONALISM TO SOCIAL-PATRIOTISM

Nothing that lives is a unity ; it is always a plurality.

GOETHE.

THE displacement of motives which occurs in time under the form of an evolution towards reformism, is closely connected with an evolution in space wherein the primary motive of socialist internationalism is replaced by that of social-patriotism. Since the days of the First International, the working-class movement has undergone an increasing national differentiation of mentalities and methods ; has displayed a growing tendency on the part of the national organisations towards intellectual autonomy ; has manifested a progressive intensification of the motives leading the workers of the respective countries to be integrated as national communities. This evolution reached a climax at the beginning of the world war. To understand it we must again examine, in turn, the transformations of the two factors whose resultant is the affective state of the working class ; these two factors being the social environment and the specific psychological disposition.

Even as regards purely economic interests, capitalism is far from having created a perfect Cosmopolis. It was natural enough that Marx should lay so much stress on the cosmopolitan trends of the capitalist economy. His economic thought drew its sustenance from the atmosphere in which the cosmopolitan optimism of the Manchester school of his day likewise flourished. The national conflicts of that period seemed to be the outcome of obsolete precapitalist and dynastic institutions and traditions. Britain was then the land where industrial development was most advanced, and it was from

that country that Marx drew the bulk of his evidence. Now, at that date, Britain was already establishing a worldwide economic empire; but, since Britain had no rivals worth considering, it was possible for British imperialism to wear the cosmopolitan and pacifist vesture of free trade. Marx, therefore, had his imagination filled with the apocalypse of the world revolution; whilst the apocalypse of the world war (much nearer than the world revolution) escaped his notice. Not until towards the close of the nineteenth century, when the British became aware that their worldwide monopoly was being threatened by Germany and the United States, did imperialism assume the forms which gave so peculiar a stamp to the great war. We know that the Marxists found it very difficult to grasp the importance of the new phenomenon of imperialism; that whenever they tried to do so, their understanding was clouded by their tendency to lay exclusive stress on the conflict between the interests of the different capitalist groups. They had no eyes for the political, cultural, and psychological effects of nationalism, especially its effects upon working-class mentality. They were blind to or refused to admit the fact that, during the epoch of imperialism, economic conflicts between the nations affected the workers in the countries concerned as well as the possessing classes.

In proportion as the working class, through political and industrial action, gains increasing influence over the conditions of life and labour, the economic interests of the workers cease to be directly opposed to those of the employers. Side by side with worldwide antagonism between employers and employed, there arises a national community of interest as between certain groups of workers and employers, or as between the working class and the employing class as a whole. Thereby some of the interests of the workers in one country are brought into antagonism with some of the interests of the workers in another.

The workers' interests are not necessarily and in all cases opposed to the interests of the employers. For instance, employers and employed alike are interested in the general

welfare of the industry concerned. This welfare often depends on the foreign policy of the State. The Lancashire cotton operatives, no less than the factory owners, will thrive when raw cotton is cheap, and when there is a brisk demand for cotton piece-goods; therefore the cotton operatives will incline to support any policy which tends to favour these things. The German miner in Upper Silesia will prefer that the frontier-line between Germany and Poland shall be so drawn as not to cut off Silesian coal from its most convenient market. There can be no doubt that manual workers in the United States have been greatly advantaged by the world war, owing to the circumstances which made the war so fabulously profitable to American industrial magnates. Had the upshot of the conflict been of the kind earnestly desired by the political and military chiefs of Germany, the German working class, on the other hand, would have benefited owing to the boom in German industry which would have followed the conquest of new harbours by the Germans, the opening up of new lines of communication, the annexation of new agricultural regions, the acquisition of new markets, the exaction of the costs of the war from the conquered enemies, the crushing of foreign competition by tariffs and military measures, and so on and so forth. The joyful excitement in the leading trade-union circles of Germany when Antwerp was taken and when the ironfields of north-eastern France were occupied by the invaders, is sufficient proof that the German manual workers were alive to these considerations. Conversely, when the war was over, the Belgian workers would not have been able to get their wages raised more than proportionally to the rise in prices (this being in happy contrast with what was going on in neighbouring lands), had not the preferential treatment of Belgium in the matter of the war indemnities made this possible—at the cost of the German workers. That is one of the reasons why the Belgian Labour Party has always been careful to avoid criticising the indemnity clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. Its main argument against the French occupation of the Ruhr was that military coercion, as contrasted with economic sanctions,

would endanger the payment of the indemnity. The difficulties of the Second International down to the year 1923, in this matter of the indemnities, cannot be understood unless we realise that the German workers wanted the payment made by Germany to be fixed at as low a figure as possible, whereas the French and the Belgian workers were interested in having the indemnity as large as possible—or, at any rate, such was their belief, which for the purposes of this argument amounts to the same thing. In the matter of the indemnities, the British workers were “above the battle”. They would not even take sides by proclaiming their conviction that the exaction of indemnities was essentially wrong-headed—though such a declaration would have been in line with the best traditions of British radicalism, and would certainly have voiced the secret convictions of the most clear-sighted among the leaders. Yet they were outspoken enough, and even passionate, in their protests against the payment of the German indemnity in the form of coal, for this drove British coal out of the continental market, lowered the price of coal in England, Wales, and Scotland, and thus reduced the wages of British miners.

Nothing but the impotence of the Second International saved it from disruption by these conflicts. It had no choice but to leave their solution to a higher power. Enough for it to do its utmost to provide directives for a conciliatory treatment of the problem of the indemnities, without expressing any opinion as to the general principle, and without trying to fix the scale of reparations. If, however, the working-class leaders who met in the conferences of the International had been empowered to come to terms about these matters as responsible representatives of the respective governments, though they would have been likely to come to terms more easily than the professional diplomatists, they too would have had to seek a compromise between the conflicting interests of the workers on either side of the national frontiers. The reader must not suppose that I am making light of the activities of the Second International during these critical years. It did

its best, and attended to whatever seemed most urgent. But what I have been saying illustrates the way in which extant national conflicts of interest tend to involve the labour movement more and more in proportion as that movement gains power and wins responsibility. Communism is no exception. Trotsky himself justified the conquest of Georgia by the Red Army on the ground that the economic interests of Russia demanded "the coordination of world production"—this meaning that the oil wells of the Caucasus must be owned by Soviet Russia.

Still, any one who should be inclined to regard national conflicts within the working-class movement as wholly and solely dependent upon the divergence of economic interests, would be as much at fault as the Marxist who, because there exists in the abstract a universal working-class interest, infers from this that there is a universal working-class political will. The growing national differentiation has other and more deep-seated causes than a simple conflict of interests. The difficulties with which the Second International has been confronted since the war will not be overcome when the working class realises that its economic interest in world unity is predominant, and resolves to devote its energies to the rebuilding of a world economy. Even then, it will be faced by the moral and political fact that international relationships are poisoned—within the ranks of the socialist workers as well as elsewhere—by the psychological consequences of the myth that all the responsibility for the war lies with one or other group of belligerents.

Hitherto the Second International has carefully refrained from lancing this abscess. Yet it is only too plain that no problem of world politics can be settled in a lasting and honest way until the masses have shaken off the illusion that the nations can be divided into guilty and innocent, goats and sheep, felons and judges. In view of the urgent problems facing the Second International, it could hardly act in any other way, seeing that it is a union of parties which was formed to work on behalf of practical ends. In fact, its first duty

after the war was, little by little, to bring the sometime adversaries together, by means of the solution of the most pressing problems of international distress—and thus to restore a minimum, at least, of mutual aid and mutual trust. A discussion of the wider problems of responsibility for the war (even though, from the point of view of individual psychology, such a discussion must be an indispensable preliminary to a universally acceptable solution of all the post-war difficulties) would have hindered the Second International in the fulfilment of its urgent practical task, would have impaired rather than favoured the reconciliation to be hoped for from the gradual return of the masses to reason under the stress of necessity. It is noteworthy that the German social democrats, forming the section of the Second International which (because of the intensity of the post-war distresses in Germany) was most directly interested in the revival of its activity, were especially eager to take that attitude. They felt that a policy of all or nothing would have sacrificed the possibility of a partial practical success to a theoretical principle, instead of preparing for the slow but sure victory of the principle, thanks to a number of practical successes. When, at the first congress of the reunited Second International, held at Hamburg in the year 1923, the American socialist Victor Berger, an ardent germanophil, mooted the question of responsibility for the war and that of paragraph 231 in the Treaty of Versailles, the German delegates were more vexed at this than any of the others. They did not wish to compromise the rehabilitation of their own people by adopting an uncompromising attitude, which would have conflicted with the tactic of following the line of least psychological resistance. Their policy was a wise one, and was certainly the only one which could have led to success in existing circumstances. Nevertheless, it was nothing more than a policy, an attitude, which was adopted primarily in order to have an immediate effect upon the masses. This does not dispense persons whose conviction is not dominated by the interests and the passions of the mass, from the duty of making the voice of conscience audible to the minority

that is ready to listen. The more that collaboration in the political problems of the day reestablishes the bonds broken by the war, the more will the international discussion of the problems of responsibility for the war become an actual condition, I mean a politically indispensable condition, of the liquidation of the heritage of the war.

Meanwhile, one who is not concerned as to the immediate effects of party policies, can claim the right of saying frankly what he believes to be true. Even the party leader will not be able to perform the tasks of the day successfully unless he contemplates them in the light of the wider and loftier problems of years and of decades. This presupposes an understanding of the true nature of the obstacles in the path of socialist internationalism. These obstacles would be much smaller than they are if they were simply due to differences in interest. The great difficulty only begins to show itself when we are concerned with the transformation of such an understanding of a supranational *interest* as may already exist, into an international political *will*. It is easy for an economist to prove that the interests of the working class are more strongly linked internationally than nationally. Such a demonstration is just as easy in the case of other classes in society, the capitalist class not excepted. What class is there whose best economic interests would not be served by the transformation of Europe into a unity like the United States of America? The difficulty is that the will of the masses—the cultivated masses no less than the uncultivated—is not determined by a rational knowledge of economic truths, but by deep-seated emotional urges, which likewise determine the way in which the various classes interpret their interests. Beyond question, from the point of view of economics, the community of interests of the proletariat is more universal than national; but human beings are not simply machines for the solution of the problems of economic arithmetic. Who, in 1914, expected the war to bring economic advantage either to the world or to any social class? Nevertheless, it was the very persons who dreamed least of deriving profits of this sort from the war, who plunged into it with the

utmost enthusiasm, and carried it on for more than four years. Especially does this apply to the manual workers. The fact is that their international solidarity of interests cannot have any result in the political field except in so far as it can engender a political will.

That is the effective reason why the centrifugal forces, those that tend to sunder the nations, are still so much stronger than the centripetal, those that make for world unity. The severing influence of political nationalism makes the internationalism of the workers' interests no more than a secondary element in the formation of their political will and their cultural disposition. Since 1914 the decisive influence in their political activities has been a sense of national community, based upon recent practical experience.

The significant point about the national sentiment of the working class during the last thirty or forty years is that this sentiment has not grown up as a survival from an epoch when the workers were not yet class-conscious. On the contrary, it is the outcome of the political and cultural ascent of the workers. Here we have another example of the heterogeneity of aims, for in very truth the sentiment of the internationalism of working-class interests and working-class tasks was one of the most influential factors of the increasing power of the working-class movement.

“Proletarians of all lands, unite!” Such was the wording of the first appeal which found an echo among the workers across national frontiers. Not long afterwards the workers of various lands came together for the first time in a mass movement under the aegis of the International Workingmen's Association. This organisation perished a few years later owing to the conflict between the doctrinaire will of its centralised leadership and the diversified aspirations of its national sections. Still, the national sections remained in existence, and by degrees became powerful parties in their respective countries. When, towards the close of the nineteenth century, a new international was formed out of these parties, they were no longer simply propaganda divisions of an international sect,



but influential national organisations formed to represent the national interests of the working class. Their will-to-power, allied with that of the trade-union movement (which had taken great strides forward in the meantime), was able to affirm itself so successfully that in most European countries the socialists had become eligible for ministerial posts even before the world war. Thanks to the conquest of universal suffrage, and thanks to the way in which class parties were able to turn it to account, socialism passed from the stage of pure propaganda to that of the gradual realisation of proletarian demands. Labour parties collaborated in legislation ; and often—for the most part in local government—in administration as well. While the political parties were thus helping in the elaboration of law, the trade unions were sharing in the customary regulation of the conditions of labour, which soon crystallised in the form of a new contractual order. Now every contract, whether we have to do with a collective wage agreement or with a law, is a tie. Since the aims of the struggle were nationally restricted, these ties assumed a national character.

Writing of the proletarians of the year 1848, the *Communist Manifesto* could say with good reason that they had no country ; in this sense, that proletarians had then, in very truth, nothing to lose but their chains. They had not the right to vote, nor the right of effective combination, nor the right of having a say in the decision of their working conditions. So few of them could read or write to any good effect, that they were almost as completely excluded from the cultural community as if they had been savages. To-day the working class is, to a considerable extent, organised in trade unions. Universal suffrage has been established everywhere ; compulsory education is the regular thing ; labour-protection laws and insurance laws have been passed in almost all countries. There is hardly a land or a town in Europe in which the organised workers do not participate in the exercise of power. Gone are the days when manual workers were the outcasts of civilisation. To-day they have a good deal to lose, much which represents for them a fragment of their fatherland. Above all, they have gained

influence over the State, because, thanks to the importance which democratic constitutions give to numbers, this conquest was in the line of least resistance. Furthermore, the consolidation of their influence over the State is becoming identified with the consolidation of the State itself. The more the classes which are dominant economically speaking lose their position of exclusive influence over the State, the more inclined are they to sabotage it. The financial dependence of the State upon credit institutions, upon the mood of the stock exchange, and upon the good will of the wealthier taxpayers; the increasing monopoly power of the great industrials; the need for money felt by newspapers and by parties; the recruiting of high officials, army officers, and judges, from among the ruling classes—all these things give the capitalists the power of establishing a State within the State but outside the realm of the constitution, give them the power of undermining the foundations of parliamentary government. In view of these facts, the working class is compelled to do its utmost to prevent the State from becoming an empty husk. To-day, in all the countries of Europe, the socialists are the true buttresses of the State. Now, the more that socialism becomes the embodiment of the idea of the State, the more does it also become the embodiment of the idea of the nation which is itself incarnated in the State.

Consider, for example, the contrast which was manifest at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 and 1924, between the attitude of the German capitalists and that of the German workers. The great industrials negotiated with the occupying power without the intermediation of the State. They tried to confront the government of the Reich with accomplished facts, for they wished to eliminate from their calculations the factor of the power which the social democracy represents in the national policy. The working class, in its resistance to these attempts, showed itself to be the real prop of national State sovereignty both in internal and in foreign relations. The German social democrats, wishing to defend the republican form of State, found it necessary (as Severing,

the Prussian socialist minister for home affairs declared in the Landtag on December 13, 1923) "to concentrate all the forces making for the preservation of the State, in order to transform the disintegrated German people into a nation". The symbol of this change of mentality has been the gradual replacement of the Red Flag by the national colours of black-red-and-gold.

The Austrian social democracy has had to link its fate with that of the national State in a very different way, but for kindred reasons, in order, in the name of the peoples' right to self-determination, to counterbalance the tutelage of the League of Nations. These anti-militarists by conviction therefore opposed the attempts of the commissary general of the League of Nations to reduce the Austrian army, which they regarded as a means for the defence of the republic against various dangers, and in especial against the danger of Hungarian aggression. Numerous examples of the same kind could be given from the recent history of other countries, and not least from that of Soviet Russia, to show that every movement, in proportion as it achieves the conquest of the national State, is compelled by its will-to-power to become a rampart of the State and of nationality. In this matter, the revolutionary working class is only reliving the experience of the independents during the English revolution in the seventeenth century and that of the jacobins during the French revolution in the eighteenth century.

When we compare the First International with the Second, this evolution assumes a symbolic form. The General Council of the International Workingmen's Association consisted mainly of political refugees, forming a sort of cosmopolitan Bohemia. Half a century later, Citizen Rappoport could scoff at the executive of the Second International, calling it the International Socialist Cabinet. Indeed, during the first years after the war, all its members were ministers, ex-ministers, or prospective ministers of State. As for the rival body, the Third International, for practical purposes it is nothing more than a propaganda section of the Russian government.

There are, however, deeper reasons why the working-class struggle tends more and more to assume a national character. Both as regards origin and as regards methods, this struggle is mainly a struggle of ideas, and especially a struggle on behalf of certain legal conceptions. This is obvious in the political domain ; yet even in the industrial struggle, the groupings of interests which oppose one another are animated, in the last analysis, by conflicting legal conceptions. These conceptions are the historical residue of a past which, in the case of all the civilised peoples, has for several centuries been a *national* past. Furthermore, the struggle of ideas is carried on in a language which is the intellectual cement of the nation. The mother tongue is something different and something more than the tongue of the mother ; it is itself the mother of the spiritual personality of the person who uses it. It is not simply a technical way of expressing some particular cultural content ; this cultural content is itself determined, and in great part created, by the mother tongue. One who learns a new language, is not merely enlarging his knowledge with a number of new words ; he is learning how to feel and to think under forms that are common to all of those who speak the same tongue, and even to those who have used it in days long past. "Every language is a temple, in which the soul of those who speak it is enshrined" (Oliver Wendell Holmes). The community of cultural heritage which a language transmits, is a bond between all those who speak it. This national cultural heritage consists of typical emotional reactions, of items of knowledge, of customs, and of modes of thought ; and in proportion as the social circle of those who have access to the heritage widens, the bond is strengthened. Even those elements (and they are considerable) of our culture which are of foreign or supranational origin, such as those derived from classical antiquity, from the Catholic Middle Ages, and from world literature, only make their way into the minds of the masses when given a national tint by transmission through the native tongue, and in virtue of assimilation into the integral cultural heritage which constitutes the patrimony of the

national civilisation. Nay more, the spiritual values which were created by so international a thinker as Karl Marx, are felt by the German worker to be a part of the German cultural complex. For the intellectual life of the German social democrat, the democratic traditions of the ancient Teutons, the Peasants' War, the Reformation, German classical literature, German philosophy, the idea of the German Reich, the fate of Germany during the world war—mean something quite different from what they mean to the average member of one of the Balkan socialist parties, even though the program of these parties be nothing more than a literal translation of the Erfurt program or of the Heidelberg program. The historical community of the destinies of the German people decides the cultural environment in which German social democracy lives, and of which German social democracy itself constitutes an important element. Every German word which the leaders of German social democracy address to the rank and file attaches them, not only to the supranational intellectual content of socialism, but also to the whole content of the national German culture. If the word "socialism" does not mean exactly the same thing to a German worker as to a French or a British worker, this is above all because in each country the meaning of the word is tinged with national associations. French socialism would be very different from what it actually is were it not for what the dates 1789, 1793, 1830, 1848, and 1871 mean to France. Belgian socialism would be very different from what it is, did it not incorporate the self-governing and federalist traditions proper to a nation whose civilisation was shaped in the days of the communes and of regional government, a nation which was formed into a State less than as a century ago. British socialism is what it is because Britain is an island and the centre of an empire; and because modern Britain enjoys the heritage of a still vigorous liberalism, the liberalism of a bourgeoisie habituated to compromise by three centuries of parliamentarism.

Inasmuch as at the present time all culture is national, the national character of the culture of the masses finds more and

more vigorous expression in proportion as these masses themselves assimilate the culture of the nation. Every one of the happenings thanks to which the working class is able to penetrate into the circle of influence of the dominant civilisation (popular education, political equality, the cheap press, the growth of means of communication, etc.), is conditioned by the national unity, bears the stamp of a peculiar national culture, and transmits this culture to the masses which participate in the evolution.

Some socialists try to invalidate these arguments by declaring that in actual fact we have already transcended the stage in which the differentiation of national cultures increases. According to them, the advance of world economy and of the means of communication creates a world culture which tends more and more to make an end of national culture. Such an assertion contains elements of truth, so we must pause for a moment to show that as a generalisation it is substantially false. It is based upon a confusion which is very natural in Marxists, between the content of a culture and the technical conditions of that culture.

There are abundant indications that some day a worldwide culture will arise. It is certain, moreover, that the rapid evolution of the means of communication and of production towards a cosmopolitan unification justifies an optimist belief in a better future of this kind. International socialism itself is a striking indication of such a trend. Nevertheless, one swallow does not make a summer! We shall risk a great many severe chills if we are ready to believe that it does, and if we therefore rashly expose ourselves to the cold winds of springtime. It seems to me that mankind will have to traverse a lengthy period in which the cultural differentiation of the masses will go on increasing, before the tendencies towards unification will get the upper hand. Means of communication and a community of interests are factors of civilisation, but they are not civilisation itself. They take a considerable time to determine civilisation. Meanwhile an increasing differentiation between national civilisations may go on for

centuries, while the material conditions of an ultimate unification are slowly being prepared. The era of capitalist civilisation offers the best example of such a secular process. Capitalism, although it only came to dominate production in the nineteenth century, began its triumphal march in the fifteenth. This development came as a sequel of an improvement in the means of communication. None the less, its first cultural effect was to destroy the unity of European civilisation in the Middle Ages, in order to build upon the ruins of that civilisation a number of separate national civilisations. The cultural phenomena which accompanied the social ascent of the bourgeoisie took the form of the establishment of national States (a process which went on from the close of the Middle Age down to the world war); of the disappearance of Latin as the vehicle of civilisation, and its replacement by the national tongues; of that progressive national differentiation of architecture and of all the arts which has been going on since the beginning of the Renaissance; and of the disintegration of the Catholic (the universal) Church which has been replaced by a plurality of national religious communities. National sentiment itself, which was practically unknown in the Middle Ages, was developed by the bourgeoisie, which appealed to the examples of classical antiquity—another epoch when the growth of new ways of communication was revolutionising economic life. It was precisely during the centuries when the universe was becoming an economic unity of production and consumption, that national sentiment became intensified into a veritable religion—a religion which has compelled even the Churches to serve its turn. One who bears this contradiction in mind will hesitate before he decides that the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture will be the immediate fruit of the discoveries of wireless and of aviation.

A universal culture presupposes, above all, a universal language. There do actually exist several auxiliary universal languages—too many, indeed. No reasonable person, however, would regard these languages as anything more than auxiliaries. They are, so to say, key languages, into which

we can, with more or less difficulty, translate what we think in our own language, and thus make it more or less comprehensible to another person who will mentally retranslate it from the key language into his own. In no sense can such a key language be a language of culture ; for languages of culture are the outcome of millions of cultural ties formed by centuries of common destiny, and not an expedient artificially constructed to solve certain material difficulties of communication in hotel life, or in a correspondence dealing with superficial matters. Theoretically it may be supposed that an auxiliary language will, in course of time, become organic enough to serve as the vehicle of cultural values ; but it is hard to imagine how it could succeed in doing this without breaking up in its turn into different national dialects, thanks to the influence exerted by the national languages which would continue to exist, with their own turns of phrase, their own idiosyncrasies, and their specific ways of pronunciation. As regards the growth of a real international language, one of the two following possibilities seems far more likely than the general acceptance of an international auxiliary language ; and they are developments which may go on side by side for a considerable time. Either one of the extant national languages will get the better of all the others, and will become the universal language ; or else the cosmopolitan elements which are taking an ever larger place in all languages, will end by producing a composite new tongue, a sort of universalised *lingua franca*. Either of these processes would be a very slow one. We may well suppose that centuries would be required before a universal language thus established would reach the degree of perfection indispensable to a universal civilisation.

Of course there are various intellectual domains which, since they do not depend upon language as a means of expression, can already form the elements of an embryonic cosmopolitan culture. This applies especially to the arts which may be termed symbolical—such as instrumental music, architecture, the plastic arts, and industrial art—which already form the germs of a universal culture. From the outlook of



the social evolution of our own day, however, it is obvious that just these elements have least influence on the real cultural state of the masses. Culture such as is requisite for the understanding of the symbolic forms of art has not as yet any vital importance (vital in the sense of seriously affecting the mode of life) except for an infinitesimal minority. Already to-day, in all countries, there are intellectuals whose culture is strongly tinged with cosmopolitanism. The number of these embryonic citizens of the world is still very small, but it is increasing. Now, a significant fact is that they cannot function as pioneers of a worldwide civilisation except in so far as their cosmopolitanism (it would be better to say their internationalism) takes the form of rendering accessible to all, the values which are, essentially, derived from a national culture. Proof of this is that the "good European" of to-day must know several national languages if he wishes to assimilate the essential national values of the great linguistic groups. In order to become international, or, in a sense, supranational, he must be national several times over.

One who becomes uprooted from the cultural soil of his own nation does not thereby become an apostle of a world culture, for he is renouncing the essential starting-point of all culture. The only cultural state which is completely independent of national culture is that of excessively rich, idle, and disillusioned persons, for whom the world is really one, since they are equally bored wherever they are; in their palaces, their sleeping cars, their staterooms, and their grand stands. They represent that decadent obverse of cosmopolitanism which the Belgian writer Edmond Picard once spoke of as "le kellnerisme" because the waiter, a polyglot and a nomad, is its most striking representative and its social pillar. Such cosmopolitanism has no cultural value, for the world to which it relates is, despite its wide topographical extent, nothing more than an infinitesimal portion of the real world, and has no bearing on any real culture.

World traffic does not suffice to create world citizenship. Yet we need citizens of the world before the world can have a

cultural and political unity. The fact that there are Germans is not the consequence of the existence of Germany, but its cause. An independent America, a unified Italy, a self-governing Poland, could not come into existence until there were Americans, Italians, and Poles who wanted it to exist. A new Europe presupposes, first of all, the existence of new Europeans. The community of world culture must be felt and understood, and must have created citizens of the world, before their subjective will can create an objective world community. A universal culture is quite a different thing from, and is something more than, an accessory ornament. It is an organic structure, cemented by the unity of style and of language, of affective valuations which have a universal currency. A thing so profoundly rooted in the soul will grow from below upwards, from within outwards. It cannot be created from above and from without.

In the political field, the only way in which we can picture the establishment of a world unity is as a contractual and juridical state of affairs, based upon a recognition of the nations' right to self-determination. In like manner, when we are thinking in terms of culture, we cannot think of a universal culture except as an organic synthesis of the various national cultures. To begin with, therefore, the masses must participate in the plurality of extant cultures. This is rendered indispensable by the fact (or, if you like to phrase it so, by the law) that oppressed classes are hindered in their access to civilisation. At the present time, the workers are even more remote from a worldwide culture, than are the educated strata of the bourgeoisie. Since even the bourgeoisie has hardly reached the climax of national differentiation as far as culture is concerned, it is surely obvious that the workers have still to pass through a long period in which their national cultures will undergo further differentiation, before the cultural tendencies towards a worldwide unity can gain the upper hand. Having recourse to a pedagogical analogy, we might say that the workers will have to learn their mother tongue before they can try to speak a universal language.

The working class is still very far from having reached that mutual understanding which is an essential preliminary to a common will. Even among the leaders of the working class, how few are really citizens of the world! An international meeting of diplomatists, financiers, or even wealthy idlers, will generally, despite all conflicts of interests, reach a mutual understanding far more speedily than will the members of an international trade-union congress, however much these latter are convinced that they have a common interest and are moving towards the same goal. The reason is that the workers are backward culturally, and that their intellectual horizon is far more restricted than the field of their economic interests. During the last twenty years I have taken part, sometimes as delegate and sometimes as interpreter, at more than two hundred international gatherings of one sort and another, mostly trade-union conferences. Only once, at these, have I encountered a French delegate able to deliver a speech in another language than his own. Among the British trade-union leaders I have met only one who is able to make himself understood in French and German. A few years ago one of the leaders of the German social democracy deplored that he and one other among these leaders were the only members of their tribe who had lived abroad long enough to acquire an international outlook. To-day both these men are over seventy, and the younger generation is not providing any who can adequately replace them in this respect—though there never was a time when it was more important for the Germans to understand the psychology of foreign nations. Outside Russia, the only countries in which a cosmopolitan élite plays a considerable part among the socialists are lesser States with very little influence upon world policy.

Matters may improve some day, but as far as can be seen this day is still distant. Meanwhile the socialist labour movement shares the fate of all the great intellectual movements which, initiated under stress of an internationalist ideal, are perforce trying to realise this ideal in the national environments of contemporary civilisation. The cultural interaction

between the conation and the environment generates centrifugal forces which need not promote disintegration, and yet cannot fail to bring about differentiations of type. Neither Buddhism nor Christianity has escaped this fate. Even the Roman Catholic Church, the most strongly integrated religious unity in Christendom, has only been able to maintain itself in existence by making great and ever greater concessions to the centrifugal forces we are now considering. During the world war, Catholics on the respective sides of the fighting line were offering up prayers to the one and only God—incompatible prayers for victory. In the days when the bourgeoisie was winning its way to social power, it too formulated international ideals. All the great stirrings of the new-born bourgeois mind—the Renaissance, humanism, the Reformation, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, classical political economy—had a message for mankind at large, irrespective of race, language, or nationality. One of the chief accusations brought by the burgher class against the princes has always been that these were continually involving their subjects in absurd quarrels and preposterous wars. The French revolution, which was the supreme struggle on the continent of Europe for the realisation of the political demands of the bourgeoisie, was (so thought the revolutionists) to culminate in a universal rising of the peoples against the despots, and to make the Declaration of the Rights of Man the constitution of the whole human race. The Goddess of Reason, in whose honour the revolution set up its altars, was to become the deity of all mankind.

What was the upshot? The very classes which aimed at unifying the world beneath the banner of the freedom of trade and industry, were taken prisoner by the feudal, monarchical, and militarist institutions which they had conquered, and which in turn gained the victory over them. Their fate was like that of the soldier who had taken one of the enemy prisoner, but to the order "Bring him along", could only answer: "I would if I could, but the beggar won't loose his grip on me!" This evolution eventuated in the

era of imperialism and bloated armaments, and its climax was 1914.

The reader must not suppose that I am prophesying a similar end for the international efforts of the working class. There are so many differences between the situation of the bourgeoisie in those days and that of the proletariat at the present time (differences in favour of the proletariat), that we may hope for a different issue. Above all, the interests of the working class are far more internationally homogeneous than were those of the bourgeoisie, and the objectives of the world policy of the working class are more enlightened and more practical. Nevertheless, we shall be more likely to avoid the danger of a renewal of the tragedy if we are careful not to thrust our heads ostrichlike into the sand. Militarism, for example, has a logic of its own, and this logic leads to war. Furthermore, the logic of war leads to caesarism. In Russia, communism, whose ideals were the most international that can be imagined, rose to power in virtue of its hostility to war and to nationalism. All the same, the communist rulers of Russia have needed war and nationalism to maintain their power. They have built up their government upon militarist coercion; and the moral support given them by the Russian people is largely the outcome of patriotism—a patriotism which has been stimulated by the stupidity of the enemies of Soviet Russia, by Brest-Litovsk, the invasion of Murmansk, the Baltic expeditions, the doings of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel, etc. One evil deed provokes another. The Soviet troops marched into Georgia under the Red Flag, and the defenders of Georgia were fighting under the same colours. Russian foreign policy aims at fomenting and utilising the mutual antagonisms of the other great powers, and at inflaming an aggressive nationalism among the peoples of the East. There is only one reason why Soviet Russia has not yet used the Red Army (as Edouard Berth recently advised) “to spread the working-class civil code throughout the world, and to be the instrument of proletarian imperialism, just as Bonaparte was the instrument of bourgeois imperialism”—namely, the lack of opportunity.

The lack of opportunity, that is to say the lack of responsible power in the national States, is likewise the only reason why the socialist parties in other quarters of the world are safeguarded against a similar fate. Obviously a State in which a socialist party is able to assume the reins of government, will not, simply for that reason, cease to be in opposition to other States in respect of multifarious interests. The essence of the State is the will-to-power, a will which is limited by the will-to-power of other States, and therefore tries to outgrow the rival standard. A socialist government which should to-day take charge of State affairs in any country you please, would do its utmost—by a program hostile to all policies of dynastic interest, to secret diplomacy, and to bloated armaments—to rid itself of numerous causes of conflict. We are entitled to ask how far such a socialist government will succeed in this endeavour, seeing that it will be compelled to take into account other powers, which will probably be far from friendly towards a socialist State. Besides, and above all, we must remember that a diminution of certain causes of conflict will be contraposed by an increase of other oppositions of interest. No doubt political democracy offers a guarantee against certain peculiar forms of aggressive nationalism, but it is far from being a pacifist panacea. During the world war, it was plain enough that the countries in which those who wanted to control public opinion had most difficulty in arousing militarist enthusiasm were not the ones where democracy was farthest advanced. The more the policy of government is subjected to the influence of the masses, the more this policy will be swayed by national interests of an economic kind, and the more it will be subject to the danger of waves of popular passion, such as can readily be induced by national self-love.

Even under labour governments, there will always be States in a position to supply others with raw materials, or to offer indispensable markets ; or countries which can either command or cut lines of communication. In view of the very important part which the United States is playing in the post-war epoch

as banker and purveyor of food to the rest of the world, we must not fail to note that the American workers have now powerful private interests to defend in a domain where the most dangerous possibilities of international conflicts are accumulating. I refer to immigration. The American trade unions are naturally ardent supporters of the policy of the shut door in the matter of immigration; this policy arouses intense bitterness abroad, especially in Japan. The socialist members of the trade unions are just as convinced as their non-socialist colleagues that it is necessary to maintain a policy which means high wages for American workers at the cost of increasing poverty among the workers of other lands. We see the same thing in Australia. The Australian Labour Party is probably the one which has fought most energetically and effectively against compulsory military service and the policy of armaments. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the standard of life of the Australian workers, it is obliged to enforce a policy in relation to Japan, a policy of exclusion, which is a constant menace to peace. Again, at a conference of the International Labour Office, the Australian labour delegates opposed the prohibition of the use of white lead, and did this in opposition to the demand of the European workers. What was the reason? The prohibition would throw out of work the Australians who make their livelihood in the lead mines! Once more, can a reasonable person suppose that a socialist republic of Great Britain could solve the colonial problem in any such simple fashion as by conceding the right to self-government in all the British colonies—regardless of what would happen to British property there, to British settlers, and to British cultural institutions? Would not such a republic have to ask itself whether this or that self-governing colony would be ready to carry on the relationships of transport and production which have become indispensable to the world economy; and whether the break-up of the British Empire would not expose the British workers to a disastrous crisis of unemployment and poverty? All these questions are likely to lead to violent conflicts with an ease which will be proportional to the extent to which the masses,

who will be affected by their solution, are able to exert a speedy and direct influence upon policy.

The foregoing are examples of conflicts of interest and of will in an embryonic condition, relating only to Anglo-Saxon countries, pacifist by temperament, and scarcely touched by the whirlwinds of continental problems, such as those of the indemnities, of safety, and of rectifications of frontier. How much more do such conflicts threaten on the mainland of Europe, where the ground is still drenched with blood, and where such problems are far more pressing. On the Continent, even among the working masses, we find that the passion of interests is allied to the passion of the national instinct of autovaluation, and to the sentiments of hatred, vengeance, and fear which hinder the liquidation of the effects of the war. On the Continent, the cosmopolitan horizon which is natural in a worldwide empire such as that of Britain, is obstructed every few hundred miles by frontier posts, custom-houses, passport offices, sentry-boxes, and barbed-wire fences. True, if there is a power which can bring unity and freedom here, it is that of a Socialist International. But the "if" must be emphasised; for all we can hope is, not the disappearance of national antagonisms, but at best the creation of legal guarantees which would enable every nation to defend its own interests and to affirm its own volitions without having to prepare for war. To achieve so much would already be to achieve a great thing.

Action towards this end, if it is to be effective, must be undertaken by persons who are free from illusions, both as regards the goal and as regards the starting-point. The international socialist movement is a plurality rather than a unity. National sentiment is an integral part of the emotional content of the socialism of each country. It grows in strength in proportion as the lot of the working masses of any country is more closely connected with the lot of that country itself; in proportion too as the masses have won for themselves a larger place in the community of national civilisation. At bottom, this partial absorption of socialist sentiment by national sentiment need



not surprise us. We have merely to recognise that it is the return of a sentiment to its source. Socialism itself is the product of the interaction between a given moral sentiment and a given social environment. It is not only the social environment which has a national character. The other factor, likewise, the moral sentiment, has primarily, in different peoples, a peculiar tinge, derived from a peculiar national past.

*PART FOUR*  
**DOCTRINE**

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### MARXIST RATIONALISM

Every one of our actions aims at an insertion of our will into reality. . . . The knowledge that our activity gives us concerning the working of nature, must therefore be precisely symmetrical to the interest which it takes in its own operation. . . . Every being decomposes the material world in accordance with the lines which its activity has to follow: these are the lines of *possible action* which, intersecting, trace the network of experience each of whose meshes is a fact.

HENRI BERGSON.

HITHERTO I have done little more than describe phenomena, while pointing out here and there the insufficiency of Marxist attempts to explain them. We must now pass from detailed description to general criticism, subjecting Marxism to a general examination of the relationships between the doctrine and the movement.

At the close of this general criticism, we shall encounter the following question. What conditions must a socialist doctrine satisfy if it is at one and the same time to enable us to understand the phenomena as well as possible, and to influence the phenomena as effectively as possible? In order to reach an answer to this question, we must pass by way of a critical examination of Marxism. Wishing to free myself from a tension which had become intolerable, the tension between my knowledge of reality and my social volition, I had to emancipate myself, not only from Marxist conclusions, but also from the Marxist way of thinking. I think I am entitled to discuss the problem of the solution of this tension in accordance with my personal experience, seeing that the problem in question is the destiny of a whole generation. It is the destiny

even of those who have never read Marx, for the Marxist way of thinking is only one particular form of a general mentality—the heritage of the foregoing century, which imposes its burden upon us all.

Marxism is a child of the nineteenth century. Its origins go back to the period when the regime of intellectualist knowledge inaugurated by humanism and the Reformation reached its climax in the rationalist way of thinking. This method took its watchword from the exact sciences, to which had been due the advance in the technique of production and communication. Its essence is that in it the principle of mechanical causality as manifested in technique, is transferred to psychological processes. The champions of the method look upon rational thought (which to contemporary psychology is nothing more than an ordering and inhibiting function of the psychic life) as the law of all human volition and all social happening.

This way of thinking was the foundation of the philosophical and scientific systems of the nineteenth century. How natural it was that exact science, with whose aid technique was producing such stupendous material values, should be supposed to provide the standard by which all values were to be measured! Thought, the creator of machinery and of worldwide means of communication, must surely be able to understand the social process, to solve the riddle of the universe! The natural sciences marshalled themselves to storm the citadel of ultimate realities; but were fain, towards the close of the century, to withdraw modestly from the attack, having become aware that a quantitative increase in the sum total of known facts is not equivalent to a qualitative increase in wisdom, and does not, unaided, supply a better understanding of the meaning of life or of the true nature of the forces which prompt human actions. Religious experience was dismissed as superstition, since it could not be justified in the terminology of exact science—until people came to realise, once more, that science and faith belong to different regions of the mind, and correspond to different forms of knowledge. Aesthetic

experience, not being explicable by logic, ceased to be looked upon as the direct and sincere expression of a psychic reality, and was degraded to the status of an apauage of utility, an ornament of comfort. Social science had become a mere department of economics, now that its apostles believed its only concern to be with quantitative values which could be analysed by simply taking them apart like a piece of machinery. The classical economists, from whom Marx drew his inspiration, formulated their conception of social life in terms which implied that man was a mere mechanism whose only motive force was the acquisitive instinct. Sociologists held the same view, believing that, by the rationalist demonstration of certain relationships between changes in social life and changes in ethical conceptions, they had provided mankind with the means of using reason as a sole and sufficient guide to the conduct of life.

Such outlooks ramified into two philosophical trends, rationalist materialism and rationalist idealism, which have substantially the same spiritual implications despite their apparent opposition. Both derive from the same fundamental method, in which direct experience takes a back seat, while categories (abstract general notions constructed by rational thought) are interpolated between man and the phenomena of the universe. The relationship between nineteenth-century idealism and nineteenth-century materialism is like that between sneezing and a cold in the head. Materialism was the philosophical amplification of the method of the natural sciences, which could only achieve cognition through the instrumentality of matter, since matter alone could be decomposed into its elements. The more this method culminated in the elimination of spiritual experience from the reality of things reduced to the material condition, the more did those philosophers whose main interest was in the things of the spirit seek to rebuild spirit once again—in the realm of pure reason. In doing so, they handled their topic just as natural scientists handled material objects in the laboratory, thus assimilating spiritual reality to material reality. Instead of

undertaking a direct analysis of mental experience, they set out from intellectual concepts which had been drawn, not from the immediate experience of reality, but from the mediate experience of logical constructions. Out of a world of real things and of human beings possessing a knowledge of these things which is real (i.e. not exclusively rational), they made a world of ideas and of human beings which were nothing more than the instruments of purposes inherent in these ideas. In the domain of social life, this way of thinking leads to the notion (a notion which conflicts with reality) that human actions are prompted by the knowledge of rationally conceived ends.

Marx was a materialist in this sense, that he tried to explain the history of the past with the aid of the principle of material causality which had served as the starting-point of the discoveries of natural science. At the same time, however, he took up his stand upon the mined ground of rationalist idealism, in that he regarded the future development of humanity as the realisation of an idea recognised by reason. From this twofold outlook he was a rationalist. The whole process of becoming seemed to him, alike in the determination of the idea by matter and in the dialectical reaction of the idea upon matter, the fulfilment of laws identical with those of rational thought.

We know that Marx's disciples have done everything in their power to throw light upon the points which separate his philosophy of history, on the one hand from the philosophical materialism, and on the other from the philosophical idealism of his epoch. They have tried to show that the expression "historical materialism" does not justify an inference that the man who introduced it held a materialist philosophy. They declare that we might just as well term Marx an idealist. This is true. While insisting on the material causes of historical evolution, Marx certainly recognised that these causes must create an "ideological superstructure" before they could bring new social realities into being. Furthermore, Marx regarded the continued evolution

of the "material foundation" itself as a dialectical process; that is to say, as a development by contradictories, subject to the same laws as the dialectical reason.

With just as much ground these same Marxists defended their master against the reproach of having done nothing more than transfer to sociology the idealist method of Hegel. Marx, they declared, had put Hegelianism, which was standing on its head, back again on its feet. In fact, if we ignore certain youthful follies, Marx never believed that the dialectical evolution of social forms was the realisation of "pure ideas" having a supramaterial existence, and themselves constituting both cause and effect. He said very clearly, on the contrary, that this evolution must first realise itself in matter as an evolution of the methods of production.

The correctness of these two remarks, however, shows nothing more than this, that Marx formed a sociological synthesis of the philosophical thought of his time. The synthesis was, especially in its own sociological domain, so new and so vigorous, that we cannot deny that the man who made it was an original genius. Otherwise, of course, it would not for half a century have remained a "last word". It might be touched up here and there, or reinterpreted from time to time, but could not be replaced. On the other hand, the vigour of the Marxist synthesis shows how fully accordant it was with the mode of thinking of the time. Marx borrowed both from idealist philosophy and from materialist philosophy, all that could best serve him for the explanation of social development by dialectical laws. He was in agreement with his philosophical forerunners, whether materialist or idealist, in that, ultimately, he regarded the historical process as the fulfilment of a principle of causality whose logic corresponded to that of mechanical movements. In the past, he saw this principle at work in the causal determination of thought by matter; and he believed that in the future, becoming self-conscious, the principle would work through the teleological determination of matter by thought.

We need not be surprised that Marx did not deduce the goal

of the working-class movement from the experience of that movement, for the movement did not yet exist. We can also understand why he borrowed the intellectual foundations of his system from the economic and philosophical literature of his day. Man of genius though he was (perhaps we ought to say, because he was a man of genius), Marx illustrated the maxim that the creator of intellectual values does not belong so much to a social stratum as to a historical epoch. What finds expression in Marxist doctrine is, not the movement of ideas, which did not arise until after his death out of the depth of working-class life and social practice, but the causal materialism of Darwin and the teleological idealism of Hegel. Thus every attempt to detach Marx's theory of historical materialism from its direct connexion with the philosophy of the nineteenth century can only, in the long run, succeed in throwing an ever stronger light upon its indirect connexion with the common roots of the rationalist way of thinking.

The twentieth-century way of thinking, and, above all, the thought of the post-war epoch, has a very different stamp. What Spengler termed "the century of psychology" no longer believes that human knowledge can be subsumed in logical thought. We are seeking for a conception of the world which, instead of being based upon the indirect experience of the conceptual universe, shall derive from the direct experience of the real universe of feeling and will.

Rational thought no longer appears to us as anything more than a particular form of our manifold ways of cognising and experiencing; ways among which sensorial perception, intuition (perception based upon subconscious feeling), and introjection, are the most immediate and primary. What our fathers called sovereign reason, seems to us, nowadays, nothing more than a partial function of mental life, whose mission it is to serve a volition which issues from man's instinctive disposition, which, in its turn, includes an ethical valuation.

This change of view does not imply a negation of the part which logical thought plays in the motivation of many of our actions. That role may even be a very important one. How-



ever, it is not exactly of the kind which people used to suppose, being subject to different conditions, and restricted within narrower limits.

Still less must any one infer from the foregoing considerations that we should not aim at extending the limits within which reason can determine our actions. Far from it ; the knowledge we have gained concerning the limits of our rational volition is itself the work of our reason, which is thereby seeking to enlarge its sphere of influence. Our nature as thinking beings is such, that we cannot help trying to extend the area of the decisions prompted by reason. The most obvious proof of the strength of this aspiration is the pessimism that seizes man in face of every new discovery which forces him to recognise the limits imposed upon his reason. Well now, the best way of avoiding disillusionments which may become disastrous, is to recognise from the start how much rational or logical thought can do, and what lies beyond its powers.

Rational or logical thought is that particular form of cognition whose object is, not phenomena, but words. These latter are representative images which we form by combining sensorial representations, or parts of these. Such combinations are abstractions ; and their principle is not the phenomenon in itself, but a relationship of a determinate kind among a series of phenomena. Logical thought can only be carried on by means of the words which express such a relationship. We may, then, say that logical thought, instead of being concerned with realities, is concerned with the relationships between representations which are assumed to be identical with the relationships between the represented phenomena. Rational cognition is thus the mediate and higher form of cognition, which uses language in order to express causal relationships in the form of logical relationships. In this sense, the logic of thought is nothing else than the logic of the sentence, the verbal proposition. It is significant that the ancient Greeks used the same expression to denote what we call "reason", and what we call a "word". In Hellas, both were "logos".

The non-rational forms of thought (in the general sense

of this word, which includes intuition and the free play of imagination) act on representations directly drawn from the phenomena of the outer world. Rational thought, on the other hand, brings into relationship one with another conceptual representations which rational thought has itself in large measure created. But it, too, depends upon sensorial perceptions, in this wise, that it must assign to these conceptual representations some of the qualities in virtue of which the phenomena of the outer world become sensible, and thanks to which they appear to us as realities. However abstract a concept may be, we can only imagine it under the form of a substantive, that is to say of a substance or an object. This applies also to the categories which are the essential raw material of Marxist intellectual constructions. (I am using the word "category" in its most general sense, that of a collective concept, deduced by further abstraction from particular concepts which have already been abstracted from phenomena.) A category is not a verb (movement); it is a substantive (matter). Even a verb never expresses anything but a movement, or a relationship between objects or substantival concepts; and an adjective never denotes anything but a quality which can be perceived in objects of this kind. Starting thence, the relationships which rational thought (namely thought embodied in a logical proposition) establishes between concepts or categories, are of the same nature as the relationships which we perceive between objects, and not between living beings.

The causal determination of one category by another (for instance, of the category "relationships of production" by the category "forces of production"), is for Marxism, as for all philosophy, a means of establishing causal relationships in domains which lie outside our experience. All philosophies of history have been attempts to enlarge the domain in which we can know causes, and consequently foresee effects; each one of them introduces into the past a significance drawn from a present objective or from an aspiration for the future. Phenomena are transitory; whereas categories claim eternal validity, and thus form a bridge between the past and the

future. As far as the past is concerned, we can explain facts by facts ; but if we are to be able to anticipate the future without renouncing our belief in causality, we must consider as causes, instead of facts, which we cannot yet know, categories which, by conceptual abstraction, we have derived from our examination of the facts of the past.

Per se, the use of categories for the interpretation of history is permissible. In every science we have to use abstractions. They are valuable in so far as they help us to a better understanding of phenomena. Concepts and categories are fictions representing a reality which we do not know, but which we formulate as a hypothesis ; and these fictions remain usable as long as the nature of their mutual relationships is in conformity with that of the relationships which we can detect among the phenomena from which these fictions have been abstracted. But they become sources of error as soon as we forget that they cannot be anything more than auxiliary means for the explanation of facts by other facts, and that we must not use them as substitutes enabling us to elude such an explanation. The use of categories often exposes us to the danger of what has been called "conceptual realism" ; that is to say, a forgetfulness of the fictive and hypothetical character of concepts which ought to be nothing more than a means for the examination of the reality of phenomena.

This danger is especially great in the case of Marxism. In fact, the categories with which Marxism works have been deduced from real phenomena by an abstraction which has been at least thrice repeated. Thus, in order to justify the proposition that economic evolution determines political evolution, we have to begin by abstracting from certain facts all which connects them causally with other facts which do not belong to the same causal series. In this way, we isolate economic happenings from political happenings ; and thus we already replace phenomena by partial schematic fictions, since really, in all this, we are only dealing with the same facts considered from new outlooks. Next, the concepts, thus grouped in a general category, are reconnected one with

another by special relationships of causality ; thence we form such causal series as those which Marxists name " technical evolution ", " economic evolution ", " political evolution ", " ideological evolution ", etc. Thirdly and lastly, we combine the causal series thus formed into yet another and more general causal series ; as, for example, when we say that technical evolution is the cause of economic and political evolution.

To sum up, this amounts to deducing from a particular causal series (technical evolution in the present instance) a movement, a dynamic process, which sets in motion all the other dependent causal series, determining (in the case we are now considering) the energy of the processes termed economic evolution, political evolution, ideological evolution, etc. Technical evolution thus acts like a belt which turns a shaft and thereby sets other belts in motion.

I need hardly say that this procedure differs from that of the historian. He, wishing to understand a historical fact, brings it into relationship with all the other facts which are connected with it causally, whatever the causal series to which they belong in virtue of the terminology of particular scientific disciplines. When doing this he only takes as given, the causal relationships whose reality is provable inasmuch as this reality is manifested in the conscious or unconscious motivation of human motives. Thus, in order to explain a political conflict between two States, the historian will have recourse to economic facts which he thinks competent to have acted as the causes of political volitions. He also takes into consideration : systems of government ; legal conditions ; the military situation ; social forces ; tariff policies ; diplomatic incidents ; the spiritual factors of public opinion determined by national character ; the cultural history and the political past of the peoples in question ; the character of reigning persons, etc.—in a word, all the facts, of whatever kind, which are reflected in the motives of the sum total of the human actions that comprise the historical incident. In order to facilitate understanding, he will arrange many of these under collective concepts, that

is to say under such categories as imperialism, militarism, protection, parliamentarism, monarchical Byzantinism, etc.; without, however, feeling justified in evading the description of the particular facts which, in the given circumstances, assigned to each of these categories a special and temporary content. In this case, the utilisation of categories is nothing more than an auxiliary technical means for throwing light on the causal relationships between certain facts and other facts.

Very different is it when some particular category, such as the world economy in the sense of capitalist expansion, is regarded as the cause of all the others, and therefore of all the phenomena which they embrace. That is what Marxism does. It sets out from the hypothesis that a categorical causal series, the evolution of the methods of production, is animated by a movement of its own (the "law of evolution"), which is transmitted to other causal series. Here we reach the characteristic which gives the Marxist way of thinking in categories its peculiar stamp, namely the way in which it transfers to reality the mechanical causality of rational thought. The essence of this thought is the transmission and the transformation of motion in accordance with laws which are at one and the same time the natural laws of the movement of matter and the logical laws of dialectical thought. Herein we have an attempt to accomplish for the history of mankind that which Helmholtz, at about the time when *Capital* was published, declared to be the aim of the natural sciences; namely, to reduce all phenomena to mechanical phenomena, or, in other words, to reduce all the phenomena of human life, including psychological phenomena, to the quantitatively measurable relationships within one unique substance in motion.

That is why Marxism identifies the categories with which it operates, not only with reality, but with a particular form of reality, i.e. matter. It materialises its categories, so that the relationships between them shall appear to be nothing more than the relationships between objects whose mutual





doubt it may be in respect of other departments of natural science, remains the foundation of mechanics. A cinematographic film showing the movement of two billiard balls colliding in the void upon an absolutely plain surface (that is to say under such conditions as are presupposed in the formulation of mechanical laws), could just as well be shown in the reverse order. The movement would appear equally natural to the onlooker.—The *psychological* reaction is not reversible. Such a series of happenings as that Mr. A. strikes Mr. B., who has insulted him, would become absurd if the order of the happenings were reversed. The cinematographic film which shows in reversed order some vital happening such as the growth of a plant or the actions of a man diving into the water, seems ludicrous, because it is unnatural.

4. The *mechanical* reaction is independent of time. The fundamental law of the mechanical transmission of movement is simultaneousness of cause and effect. Let us suppose that the screened representation of the billiard-ball movements already described shows these movements very much slackened or very much speeded up. No matter, they are always the same movements, subject to the same mechanical laws. But if in the representation of a human action, the cinema speeds up or slows down the movement, this movement expresses a very different psychological content, just as a melody expresses different things according as it is played slowly or quickly.—The *psychological* reaction is only conceivable as a process in time. Its essence is duration. Simultaneousness of stimulus and of psychological reaction is an absurdity, for the very notion of time as a measurable length of duration is only born in the human brain out of the sensation of a real distance between stimulus and reaction, that is to say a real duration of the process of volition. “For the artist who creates an image by drawing it from the depth of his soul, time is no longer a mere accessory. It is not an interval which can be lengthened or shortened without modifying the content. The duration of his work constitutes an integral part of the work. To shorten it or lengthen it would be to modify both



the psychological evolution which furnishes it with its content, and the invention which is its goal. The time of the invention is here identical with the invention itself. It is the progress of a thought which changes in proportion as it becomes embodied. In a word, it is a vital process, something like the ripening of an idea. . . . Time is invention, or it is nothing at all" (Henri Bergson).

5. The *mechanical* reaction is one which enables us to infer an unknown cause from a known effect. In fact, the motion in a mechanical reaction is similarly embodied in matter at the two ends of the causal series, and in every part of that causal series can be measured by the same standard.—The *psychological* reaction, on the other hand, for the reasons already explained, is one in which we can neither infer the cause from the effect nor the effect from the cause. Even if the stimulus which gives rise to a psychological reaction is a purely material fact, there is none the less interposed between the psychological term of the reaction and its material cause, an intermediate term (the subject of the reaction) whose attitude cannot be inferred from the qualities of matter. We know perfectly well, or, at any rate, we think we know, that psychological reactions are only rendered possible through the material instrumentality of the brain, the nervous system, and the whole body. But even on the hypothesis that psychological phenomena are nothing more than functions of the chemical combinations of matter, we are not provided with any means for inferring the nature of these functions from a study of the chemical nature of that matter. The difference between the matter which makes up the brain of a man of genius and the brain of an idiot, is certainly much less extensive than the difference between the respective values of the products of these two brains. A man must eat if he is to be able to produce a work of art; but we cannot deduce the value of the food from the value of the work of art, nor can we deduce the value of the work or art from the value of the food.

6. The *mechanical* reaction is fully knowable as soon as we know its cause.—The *psychological* reaction is not knowable

except in terms of the effect towards which it tends. "A psychological phenomenon can only be grasped and understood as preparation for an aim" (Alfred Adler). Again: "The creature does not merely move in a certain direction like an inner mass moulded by external force; its movements are quite incapable of being described in the language with which we describe mechanical movements; we can only describe them by saying that the creature strives persistently towards an end. For its movements do not cease when it meets with obstacles; or when it is subjected to forces which tend to deflect it: such obstacles and such opposition rather provoke still more forcible striving, and this striving only terminates upon the attainment of its natural end; which end is generally some change in its relation to surrounding objects, a change that subserves the life of the individual creature or of its species". Thus does McDougall, from whom I quote the foregoing and from whom I have also taken the substance of the three following paragraphs, characterise the "teleological" peculiarities of psychological reaction, as contrasted with the "causal" peculiarities which we attribute to a mechanical reaction.

7. The *mechanical* reaction gives rise to a movement whose kind and intensity are decided by their relationship to the cause. They have a logical consistency.—The *psychological* reaction gives rise to movements whose kind and intensity may vary in the course of the reaction. Not only, as McDougall says, may resistances increase the force of the movement, but they may also change its character. The psychical energy aroused in any reaction, and guided therein in some definite sense, may simultaneously favour volitions of an opposite sense. It often happens that one of these volitions having overcome another, the mental energy which was animating the conquered volition is transferred to the aid of the victorious volition. Common instances of this change of direction are the inverse reaction whereby a particular stimulus excites an opposed volition, and the excess of compensation in virtue of which the energy of a thwarted idea is

directed with intensified force towards a different objective which can more easily be attained. An extreme example is the case (a very common one) in which the voluntary energy consciously aroused in order to overcome an opposing volition, tends to reinforce this latter instead of weakening it, owing to the automatic and suggestive awakening of associated emotional contents. In all psychological reactions we have to do with conflicts of tendency whose resultant is, generally, altogether different from what would be the outcome of a mechanical solution by means of the parallelogram of forces. A conflict of mechanical forces can never have other outcomes than what simple logic leads us to expect. In the case of every mental conflict, the number of possible solutions is indefinite, and the logical solution is no more than an extreme possibility which is never wholly realised in practice.

8. The *mechanical* reaction transmits the movement to nothing but the matter which receives the impact.—The *psychological* reaction transmits the stimulus to the entire organism of the subject of the reaction. McDougall writes : “ In behaviour, the whole organism is involved. Every action that we recognise as an instance of behaviour, is not merely a partial reaction, such as the reflex movement of a limb, which seems to be of a mechanical or quasi-mechanical character ; rather, in every case of behaviour, the energy of the whole organism seems to be concentrated upon the task of achieving the end. All its parts and organs are subordinated to and coordinated with the organs primarily involved in the activity ”.

9. The *mechanical* reaction, being the effect of a determinate cause, is always the same, however often it is repeated.—The *psychological* reaction, when it is the outcome of a stimulus frequently repeated, differs at each repetition. Generally speaking, when the same stimulus is frequently repeated, we find that the reaction tends to occur more quickly and more easily ; so that, in the long run, there may ensue a habitual action which becomes almost automatic. But in other cases, the unduly frequent repetition of a stimulus may dull the specific

sensibility of the subject, and thus enfeeble the reaction ; or it may lead to a sudden change in the method of reaction, as when a stimulus which was at first agreeable, becomes disagreeable when frequently repeated, and thus in the end arouses repulsion.

10. The *mechanical* reaction, inasmuch as it can be repeated again and again without any change of character, gives rise to the conception of law. That is why in the natural sciences we can formulate laws based upon a series of analogous experiments. The notion that like effects will always ensue upon the repetition of like causes is the basis of the idea that the future is determined, an idea which underlies all the so-called laws of nature.—The *psychological* reaction is of a unique kind, and, on principle, its repetition is impossible. No doubt we can detect analogies in the way in which different subjects react to given stimuli, and analogies in the disposition of certain subjects who have reacted in a similar fashion to identical stimuli ; but these phenomena can only be ascertained after the event. No psychological reaction can be predicted with certainty. The probability of such a prediction is inversely proportional to the duration of the reaction and to the complexity of the phenomena which comprise it. More especially does this apply to the processes of consciousness and of intelligence. Consequently, the facts of individual human lives and the events of history seem to us unique phenomena incapable of repetition. We can, of course, detect analogies between certain historical happenings ; nevertheless, no prevision of the future based upon reasoning by analogy has as yet proved trustworthy.

11. The *mechanical* reaction consists of phenomena which can be weighed and measured. The aim of exact science is to abstract from the phenomena of matter and motion, notions that are measurable in space and time. Helmholtz's desideratum, the reduction of natural science to mechanics, meant nothing more than that all values were to be reduced to quantitative differences in a qualitatively uniform substance, this meaning that all differences of quality were to be regarded as differences of quantity.—The *psychological* reaction, at any

rate during the time which intervenes between the perception of the stimulus and the final reaction, consists wholly of phenomena which elude exact measurement. The psychological process of valuation is contrasted with the mechanical process of mensuration. The former knows only differences of quality and intensity; it has no power of apprehending differences of quantity, except as regards reaction times. Six dozen oysters are seventy-two oysters; but if I swallow the six dozen, I shall not experience six times as much pleasure as I experienced when swallowing the first dozen; indeed, it is likely enough that in the course of the operation the pleasure with which I began to eat will be transformed into disgust. If any one calls me a blackguard, or uses some other abusive term, I shall very likely grow angry; but if he addresses me in a persistent flood of Billingsgate, using, let us say, thirty abusive terms one after the other, it does not follow that I shall be thirty times as angry. It may well happen that I shall only laugh at the absurdity.

The nature of the characteristics we have just been contrasting shows that we have to do with two types which are opposed as regards pure form, though between them, in practice, there may exist an indefinite number of gradations. In applied science, there is a gradual transition between the methods of mechanics and the methods of the mental and moral sciences; the outlook of these latter begins to get the upper hand as the subject of investigation passes from the domain of the inorganic to that of the organic.

It follows that the main objection to the Marxist mode of thought is, not so much an objection to Marxist conceptual realism *per se*, as the incompatibility of the mechanical causality of this realism with the voluntarist and teleological nature of the psychological reaction of which all historical happenings are the expression.

The categorical thinking of the Marxists always moves in couples. With them, as with Hegel, we find that every category is opposed to another category, while having a causal relationship with a third category which belongs to yet another

couple. Thus the categorical couple bourgeoisie-proletariat is linked with the couple capitalism-socialism. The category bourgeoisie is causally identified with the category capitalism, just as the category proletariat is with the category socialism, in such a way that the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie is synonymous with the victory of socialism over capitalism. In these categorical couples of Marxism, as in all the others with which they are combined, we find the duality of terms characteristic of mechanical causality. The resemblance with mechanical examples is further confirmed by the fact that the tension of the antagonising categories always produces motion which leaves the conceptual content of the categories intact, but modifies the relationship between them.

Thus, for the Marxists, the social revolution (the final crisis which is to liquidate the tension between bourgeoisie and proletariat, between capitalism and socialism) very closely resembles the movement of mechanical forces, such as results from the collision of two bodies moving in opposite directions. In this way, its content is given a priori and once for all. That content is the outcome of the logical incompatibility of two opposing concepts which remain always identical until one gets the upper hand over the other and annihilates the latter's movement. The victory is not a gradual transition, but (as in the case of two bodies coming from opposite directions and acting on one another with intensifying energy) a gradual increase in the tension of the forces, until a sudden disturbance of equilibrium pushes one of the two bodies back. Until this final solution, no change occurs in the conceptual content of the two categories; and the whole "evolution" consists in their increasing tension. It was, for instance, a categorical antagonism of the kind which led Marx to formulate his doctrine of the increasing misery of the proletariat and of the continued intensification of the class struggle. To him, this doctrine was a necessary and logical deduction from the antagonism between the concepts he had postulated. Future developments of the kind seemed to him predictable with absolute certainty.

Yet the conceptual antagonism between capitalism and socialism relates only to the ideal content of these two categories, that is to say to capitalism as an ultimate concept of a social order founded upon purely capitalist motives, and to socialism as an end, that is to say, likewise, an ultimate concept. Such expressions as "capitalism" and "socialism" do not denote empirical phenomena belonging to the world of reality. They are only categories, products of conceptual abstraction.

There is no reality corresponding to the concept capitalism or to the concept socialism. Socialism, in especial, is nothing more than a hypothesis, the idea of a possible social order, or rather of certain systematic and characteristic traits of such an order, which does not yet exist and never has existed. The concept capitalism, likewise, does not correspond to anything more than an idea in our minds. It is true that we imagine the society in which we live to correspond to this idea. But here we make a mistake, were it only because we cannot use the conceptual notion except on condition that the image which corresponds to it, likewise remains identical as time passes. That is where reality conflicts with our fancy. The social relationships, the relationships of power, and the evolutionary trends which find expression in this reality, are not, at any one moment, exactly what they were a moment before; they are all subject to the perpetual transformation which is an essential part of the process of becoming. They are in a flux. How greatly, for instance, even from the purely economic point of view of the forms of enterprise, does our society differ from the one which Karl Marx knew! Yet we speak of both these social states as capitalism. We are entitled to do so, for there is a concept of capitalism which, without precisely corresponding to either of these states, nevertheless corresponds to certain essential traits common to them both. The concept in question is to-day exactly the same as it was in 1848 or in 1867. It symbolises a "pure" method of production (imaginary precisely because it is "pure") which corresponds to the laws formulated by Marx in his theory of surplus value. As long as the formula of these laws remains

unchanged, the image of "capitalism" deduced from that formula remains unchanged—precisely because it is nothing more than an intellectual and schematic construction. The image of such a complex of abstract characteristics may remain apt and useful, notwithstanding the fact that every isolated phenomenon from which it was originally derived by abstraction has become modified since those days.

What we speak of as capitalism or feudalism or socialism, signifies, therefore, certain conceptual associations of causal general relationships, associations which we build up into conceptual representations as the outcome of the resemblance of a great number of isolated happenings during some definite period in history. Nevertheless, such a representation, such an idea, can never coincide exactly with all the facts of life, for the representation is static, whereas life is dynamic and undergoes perpetual change. We cannot say that at this or that precise moment feudalism came to an end and capitalism took its place. In present-day society, the most diversified economic forms coexist; we find in it the precapitalist forms of domestic and village economy existing side by side with others which appear to be the germs of socialist production for use.

A contrast such as finds expression in the Marxist antithesis capitalism-socialism, is a state of mind and not an objectively real fact. The class struggle as a categorical conflict between a force identified with capitalism, and another force identified with socialism, is a concept whose function it is to give a directive to our feelings. The social struggles in the reality to which this concept relates, never concern capitalism or socialism, but always a particular concrete object, such as higher wages in some particular industry, or the winning of specific seats in parliament. Only in the opinion of the onlooker, or in that of one engaged in the struggle, do these isolated conflicts combine to form such a totality as we speak of as a "movement". Only in the mind of the observer or the participator is the totality given a significance (the realisation of an antagonism of categories), which does not exist, or



does not necessarily exist, in the form of a motive determining the activities of the individual combatants.

The conception of actual social happenings as a struggle between two hostile worlds, capitalism and socialism, is the crystallisation of a moral judgment which coordinates the facts of social reality in accordance with a simple polarity of good and evil. These are real psychological phenomena, since they can generate the real energies of social activity. But their reality is restricted to the mental domain ; they are not phenomena of the objective universe. Socialism as an objective reality, that is to say as a social movement, is a very different thing from socialism as an aim, that is to say as a pure category. It follows that the relationship of socialism to capitalism as a reality, that is to say as an actual social order, is different from the relationship between the two pure categories. In the world of categories, socialism is the opposite of capitalism. In the world of social reality there are no oppositions of such a kind. There, in the real world of social life, all the antagonisms show themselves in the form of struggles between opposing human wills, conflicts which are always directed towards some concrete determinate objective.

Even a struggle as vast and decisive as a revolution always proceeds in the forms appropriate to the voluntary actions of individuals and masses, never in accordance with the mathematical rhythm which characterises the rigid actions and reactions of conceptual antitheses. When we apply to the concrete fact of a social revolution, laws which are valid for the conceptual antagonisms of the categories (transposing to the objective phenomena of the impulses and the actions of the masses, the characteristics of a subjective phenomenon of moral and logical judgment), we do violence to reality. " Revolutionary " antagonisms are only real in so far as they concern moral *ends* ; that is why the essential historical meaning of every revolution is the replacement of the extant moral order by a new one.

The simple polarity of Marxist dialectical thought therefore

owes its efficaciousness, not so much to its scientific truth, as to its capacity for symbolising certain mass emotions, and, above all, the emotions deriving from the instinct of autovaluation. This instinct, whether guided or not by an ethical ideal, is the only one of all the elementary instincts of mankind which is based upon a simple polarity of feeling, to such a degree that McDougall (to whom we are indebted for the most useful extant classification of instincts) thinks that it should be split up, differing in this respect from all the other instincts, into two complementary instincts ; a positive instinct to which there corresponds an exalted sentiment of the ego, and a negative instinct which is the accompaniment of the depressed sentiment of the ego. Now the instinct of autovaluation provides a goal and a directive for all the social acts of the thinking human being ; it is, so to say, the biological foundation of moral action. The moral conscience presupposes an orientation of the instinct of autovaluation towards the social valuations of good and evil. Conscience would be a poor guide to the judgment of the doer if it were not able to put before him an alternative, and one of two terms only. Conscience must be able to say to him " you ought to do this ", or " you ought not to do that ". Conscience would not help us if it constructed a scale of three degrees, like red-green-violet ; or a scale of four degrees like sour-sweet-bitter-salt. It is this simple polarity of the moral sentiment which distinguishes it from all the other ways of human feeling, ranging from the most elementary sensations to the most complicated sentiments. Even the elementary sensations conform to a scale of values which have in no case been reducible to less than three elementary qualities.

But if the primitive simplicity of this bipolar valuation of these theses and antitheses, is a weakness in the doctrine regarded as an endeavour to attain to a scientific understanding of reality, it is a help to the Marxists towards the fulfilment of their ambition to make their doctrine the guide of a political mass movement. The simple polarity of Marxist symbolism makes Marxism well fitted to represent the volitions which

are based upon the moral sentiment. The romanticist taste of the masses is gratified by a theory of the social revolution which is founded upon the idea of a melodramatic conflict between heroes and villains, upon a simple polarity wherein the evil present and the good future are contrasted. But when dialectical thought enters into the service of the moral sentiment by providing the elementary sentiments of the masses with a symbolism of social good and social ill, it descends to a lower level of thought, that of symbolic thought. Thenceforward, it no longer leads; it is led. Then, scientific thought submits to a force more powerful than itself. The rational intelligence denies its own essence and its own loftiest destiny by abandoning the difficult paths of knowledge for the broad and easy road which is open to the primitive emotions of the masses. Do not let the reader suppose me to be advocating that reason should withdraw into an ivory tower, should isolate itself from the social aims of mankind. On the contrary, if we were to forbid people to wax enthusiastic on behalf of the ideal "categorical" vision of a coming social order, we should deprive them of the necessary basis for the formation of an actual moral judgment, and should dry up a precious source of the will-to-progress. Every political conviction presupposes the existence of categorical representations of this kind. Yet we must never forget that they are the creations of an affective state—conceptual constructions of hatred and of love.

A different affective state, a social will directed towards a different end, will decompose the conceptual image of the same real universe into different categorical elements. These will be true or false according as they express faithfully or otherwise the real essence of the volition they symbolise. The conception of the world which they embody will then be worth precisely as much as the movement which is derived from them; and the value of the conception in relation to the movement will be measured by the extent to which it helps those in that movement to understand their true motives. Thus Bertrand Russell, in a recent book entitled *The Prospects of Industrial Civilisation*, gives us a sketch of a social universe

dominated by the antagonisms "capitalism versus socialism" and "imperialism versus self-government". He regards the first alternatives as categories expressing two antagonistic forms of industrialism, and the second as expressing two antagonistic aspects of nationalism. In his system, industrialism and nationalism represent a cultural content whose replacement by a new cultural and anti-mechanistic principle seems to him the fundamental task of our epoch. A good many people will be inclined to think that Russell's categories are more akin to the reality than are the categories of Marx. On what will this judgment be based? People will give the preference to Marx or to Russell according as they feel more sympathy for Marx's objective, the victory over capitalism, or for Russell's objective, the victory over industrialism. Here, once more, it is a wish which determines the way of looking at things. One who would form an opinion concerning a categorical interpretation of reality must, therefore, always set out from the practical question whether, in the particular case under discussion, the phenomena can be better understood with the aid of the category in question or without it. Better understanding means the same thing as increased ability; for to understand is to apprehend effects in causal series of such a kind that they can become the causal series of the conscious will.

If we judge Marxism from this point of view, we need not trouble to discuss in set terms the worth of Marx's hypotheses to historians. We must frankly and cordially admit that his theories have done much to fertilise historical research. They have drawn attention to an essential factor of history, the economic factor, which, though not discovered by Marx, was gravely neglected before his days. It is evident that the main use of this hypothesis, like that of all hypotheses, is that it provides the historian with an instrument of research. This being granted, the method is only made valuable by the way in which the investigator applies it; in due time we always reach a point at which this depends upon the way in which he arrives at results which free him from the limitations of

his own hypothetical starting-point. Every historical method which sets out from the hypothesis of a general causal series of happenings, is potentially sound, whatever the category of happenings which it regards as the final cause of the series; for we invariably discover that the series is like an endless skein, which can be picked up at any point and traced back to the starting-point in either direction. In any case, the ultimate objective of any philosophy of history is to form an image of the total happenings. So, for example, the historian who tries to explain the civilisation of an epoch in terms of its economic structure may, thanks to the hypothesis of economic causation, arrive at a general outlook which will eliminate the hypothesis itself from his results. The good historian is one who writes history in such a way that the reader does not discover the hypothesis which underlies the conclusions, just as the good carpenter is one who does not leave tool-marks on the objects he fashions. The final aim of all hypothesis is to make itself superfluous, and no one can make a good use of a hypothesis unless he can free himself from the burden of his own tool. A historian will show himself to be a skilled craftsman if he understands when his consciousness of the final and real truth for which he has been seeking, enables him to put that real truth in place of the provisional and imaginary truth which formed the content of his initial hypothesis. The aim of all labour is, not the tool with which the labour is done, but the creation which is to be effected with the aid of the tool. We may say of the working hypotheses which every science has to use, that their utility is exhausted as soon as the investigators who make use of them seem to be more concerned to prove the existence of the tool by the facts, than to prove the facts by using the tool.

Of what avail is it to dispute about these matters? Marx himself would certainly protest against any one who should wish to judge his historical materialism upon an estimate of the worth which it may or may not have had in the way of facilitating an understanding of the past. He was not a

historian, and did not wish to be one. His writings are addressed to persons mainly interested in political realisations, and not to persons mainly interested in historical research. He did not wish to write history, but to make history. We should be wrong, therefore, to judge Marxism by any other standard than by answering the question how far Marxism has succeeded as a method of making history. As the English proverb runs, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating". Let us suppose that a meteorologist advises a farmer to do this or to abstain from doing that on the ground that he, the meteorologist, can give infallible forecasts of the weather. Suppose that the farmer finds that the advice has been bad, seeing that the weather forecasts have not been fulfilled. Would this farmer trouble to show the false prophet that there had been some logical error in the formulation or in the practical application of meteorological theory? Of course not! The farmer would be content to say that events had shown the weather forecasts to be wrong.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### MARXIST ECONOMIC HEDONISM

There is no class struggle-in-itself; there is only a class struggle on behalf of something.

H. SINZHEIMER.

WE have just noted that every categorical interpretation of history is the intellectual auxiliary construction of a volition which raises to the rank of final cause, the phenomena on which its primary aim is to act. If Marxism selects the economic category as the cause of social evolution, this means no more than that Marxists consider that their main task must be to set economic motives at work, in order thus to realise their vision of the future. The aim of the will decides the form of knowledge. A reputedly objective cognition of causes is only a mirage of the subjective valuation of motives.

In no other way than as an expression of this psychological consistency, can we explain the logical inconsistency of the Marxists, who simultaneously believe, on the one hand, that all happenings take place in accordance with a universal law of causality, and, on the other hand, that a unique causal series abstracted from these happenings has a specifically determining character. The determinism of natural science, the intellectual atmosphere from which Marx and his followers draw the breath of life, leads, by logical sequence, to the following conclusion: If anything had been different, everything would have been different. For a consistent determinist, everything is at one and the same time cause and effect. All that happens is the fulfilment of a titanic causal series, given once and for all; like an endless skein which has been very much tangled, but can be unravelled and traced along its whole course in either direction, starting from any point, by one who will take sufficient care. As far as principle is concerned, the

starting-point is a matter of indifference to those who regard history as nothing more than the working out of a causal series whose terms decide one another in accordance with natural laws. The series is equally significant wherever we approach it.

Still, in these matters there is a difference between theory and practice, between a mental possibility and a material reality. As the German song says : " There is a cause for everything—but one doesn't always know it ! " No more, this, than a variation upon the Kantian theme concerning the restriction of the notion of causality to the domain of experience. We may have good reason for believing that one phenomenon is *dependent* on another, but this does not justify us in asserting that the latter *determines* the former. If we say that A is the cause of B, this means much more than if we point out that there is a simple dependence, as for instance if we ascertain that any change in A is followed by a change in B—for some reciprocal relationships are of the kind which mathematicians speak of as functional mutual dependence, of such a nature that every change in B will in like manner bring about a corresponding change in A. There is but one indisputable indication that A is the cause of B ; this is when, in virtue of an assumed law of causality, we are able to argue from A known to B unknown. Then, thanks to our knowledge of A, we can *determine* B ; that is to say, we can know what B will be prior to actual experience of its reality. In the field of practical volition, this implies that, if a state A is the cause of a state B, then, if we bring about the existence of A, B will likewise come into being.

This distinction between " dependence " and " causal dependence " is important. Many persons regard themselves as Marxists because they recognise that social evolution is dependent on economic evolution, ideological superstructure on material foundation, social consciousness on social existence—to cite no more than three instances of Marxist formulations. But the recognition of these things is common form among intelligent persons. Conversely, who denies that



every economic state undergoes modifications concomitant with changes in ethical, political, and (to generalise) ideological states, so that we must also describe the economic state as dependent on the ideological? No socialist, at any rate, will deny that the ideological conditions of existence depend on the material conditions; otherwise it would be absurd to wish to change material conditions in order to attain an ideal end. It would be no less absurd, however, for a socialist to deny that material conditions depend on ideological conditions, seeing that we can only work towards a socialist objective when we believe that our conception of the socialist aim will help us to modify the material conditions of existence.

Nevertheless, the indisputable interdependence of these two orders of things will not lead any Marxist to abandon his thesis that ideological states are causally determined by material states. He will barricade himself behind the phrase, "in the last analysis". He holds that the reaction of the ideological state upon the material state is something secondary and subordinate, is a late link in a chain of causal series whose first link is the causal series known as "the evolution of the forces of production"—this meaning, more simply phrased, economic causes.

Obviously such a thinker as Marx, a skilled exponent of naturalistic determination, would have had no difficulty in discovering another chain of causes at one remove behind these economic causes. Why, for instance, did not he derive social evolution from geological or cosmological evolution? Is not such a dependence far more indisputable than the determination of ideological evolution by economic evolution? As for the "last analysis", if we are to probe thus far, there are certainly causes more deep-seated than the development of technique. Had the law of gravitation been different, had the planets been otherwise constituted, had the composition of the atmosphere been other than it is, had the average temperature of the surface of the world been considerably higher or considerably lower—then the International Workingmen's Association would never have been founded! *Capital* would never have been written

but for the geological antecedent known as the "quaternary period". Why then should Marxist analysis stop short with the demonstration of economic determinism?

The Marxist parry to this thrust resembles the answer to another series of arguments often used against Marxism, those derivable from the theory that history is geographically determined. Marxists reply that when they speak of the "last analysis" achieved by historical materialism, they mean only the ultimate *social* analysis. Cosmological, geological, geographical, and biological determinisms do not interest them, they say, seeing that the subject matter of cosmology, geology, geography, and biology forms, for practical purposes, constants in relation to the socio-historical process. Assuming, for the purposes of the present argument, that this statement is correct, are we not (to a considerable extent) entitled to say of the conditions of production the same thing that has just been said of the natural conditions, namely, that for practical purposes they form a constant in relation to the events which we can influence by our conscious will? In Marxist theory, "the evolution of the forces of production" and similar categorical causal theories are isolated from the general causal series of historical phenomena. If we are to regard such hypotheses as useful, it must be because they help us to imagine certain typically ideal forms (such as the "pure" capitalism of the Marxist theory of surplus value) as sufficiently constant to characterise the economic organisation of a given historical epoch—to form the substratum of that epoch. Nor is it difficult to bring some historical event of the capitalist epoch into relationship with the causal background of the capitalist method of production, as far as establishing a relationship of dependence between the one and the other is concerned. But such a relationship does not become significant until we are able to say: "Knowing the cause (the conditions of production in a particular epoch), we can deduce the effect (the historical event)". Should such a deduction be impossible, we have to recognise that there must be additional causes at work, which may belong to the causal series of some other

scientific discipline, or may be quite outside the field of our present scientific knowledge. These other causes are like other factors of a product, factors whose kind and whose magnitude we do not know, though they modify the product extensively in one way or another. Who would venture to assert that our knowledge of the conditions of production in contemporary capitalist Europe reveals the causes from which we may deduce the historical happenings of the capitalist epoch—even in broad outline? How could any one who knew no more about our era than the prevailing conditions of production, infer therefrom the political transformations of the period of the world war; the history of philosophy during the last hundred years; the development of physical science from Laplace to Einstein; the changes in moral ideas; the main currents of cultural and artistic evolution, from classicism and romanticism to dadaism, futurism, and the “last cry” in these matters, passing by way of naturalism, impressionism, and expressionism?

It would be about as feasible, starting from our knowledge of the size, weight, movements, and chemical composition of the planet Mars, to deduce the characteristics of the lyrical poetry written by its supposed inhabitants, seeing that, “in the last analysis,” the latter depends on the former. Marx himself, despite his marvellous knowledge of the capitalist economy (which was his specialty) was unable to foresee the main trends which the evolution of the working-class movement would follow after his death. He predicted the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat, whereas there has been an increase in the economic and social power of the manual workers; he predicted a catastrophic intensification of the workers’ attack upon the bourgeois State, whereas the bourgeois State has been a vehicle of mutual adaptation and interpenetration; he predicted revolution as the outcome of an economic cataclysm, whereas the trade-union movement has become more and more interested in the increase of productivity and in the maintenance of general prosperity. As concerns all these things, the “last analysis” does not seem

to have enabled the Marxists to see far into the millstone. After all, this analysis cannot reveal the probabilities or certainties of the future with any more accuracy than does biological determinism which (theoretically) should enable us to trace all the "causes" of human history in the structure of the amphioxus. If we want to explain the actions of human beings, we shall not learn how to do so by means of the "last analysis" of "ultimate causes", but by means of the first analysis of proximate causes.

It is a fact that the scientific indisputability of causal determination grows as the distance between the effect and the "ultimate" cause increases. Why, then, did not Marx (in the "last analysis") infer from this that biological or geological or cosmological causes or physical and chemical causes, rather than economic causes, have been the "ultimate causes" of human social evolution? For a very simple reason. In social science it does not help us in the least to explain phenomena by causes which are outside the range of our influence. No doubt the causal relationship economics/society is much less apodictic, is much less "ultimate", than the relationship gravitation/society; but we cannot change the law of gravitation, whereas we can change the laws of economics—or, at any rate, Marx thought so. To put the matter more accurately, in his view the laws of economic evolution had only to go on working themselves out, in order to realise the causal series of social evolution at whose end stood the socialist goal. Looking closer, we see that a belief in economic *causation* is, fundamentally, a belief in economic *motive*. Volition is the starting-point of the theory; at the end of the ultimate analysis we find an ultimate will, a final purpose. Not, of course, the very last which is accessible to scientific speculation, but the last which is within the range of our own will. If we regard economic causation as a first cause, this only means (despite the masquerade of objective scientific knowledge) a purely subjective profession of faith, namely that the motive of economic interest is the ultimate determinant of the will of human beings who live in a society.

In its turn this faith is symptomatic of a will which tends—in the *first* analysis, not the *last*—towards bringing about a change in the conditions of production.

When the theory of causes has been revealed as a disguised theory of purposes or motives, our criticism of historical materialism (the doctrine of economic causes) becomes a criticism of psychological hedonism (the doctrine of economic motives).

Every one knows that Marx never formulated his theory of motives. He never even explained in set terms what he meant by a social class. Death struck him down at the very time when he was approaching the discussion of the subject. Still, there can be no doubt as to the nature of the fundamental concepts from which he set out. Though they were left undefined, these implicit hypotheses disclose themselves through their unceasing application alike in Marx's scientific writings and in his practical activities. His economic theses and his political and strategical opinions rest one and all upon the supposition that the motives of human volition, whereby social progress is achieved, are primarily dictated by economic interest. Contemporary social psychology would express the same thought by saying that social behaviour is determined by the acquisitive instinct, this meaning the instinct which impels man to appropriate material values.

If Marx regarded such express formulations as needless, this was because in the economic science of his day they were taken as self-evident. Moreover, his belief in the categorical determination of ideological causal series by economic and social series enabled him to disregard the psychological process in virtue of which economic necessities become human objectives. As a disciple of Hegel, he considered that the self-realisation of the categories accounted for this transformation. As a disciple and successor of the classical economists, it seemed to him axiomatic that interest was identical with acquisitive interest or the satisfaction of the acquisitive instinct. As a rationalist, he regarded the formation of human objectives as the result of a cognitive state, a process so simple that no

other psychological explanation was requisite. If subsequent Marxists, from Kautsky to the latest exponents of social democracy and communism, declared more or less explicitly that economic hedonism underlay their notions of class, of class interest, and of the class struggle, and therefore formed the basis of all their doctrine of motives and all their political strategy, this was only the consistent application of a fundamental notion which Marx himself did not need to formulate in so many words, since it was for him the obvious starting-point of all his teachings.

Thus Marxism sets out in every case from the psychological hypothesis that the transformation of trends of social evolution into trends of human will is a process of psychological *adaptation*. Analysing the economic forms of production, the Marxist abstracts from them the laws which are, without more ado, assumed to be for man the laws of volition and of thought. This implies that every economic function will generate in the doer the directives of the will and the mental representations which are needed for the performance of the function. The social mechanism of this transference is class interest, in the sense of a determination of social will by the acquisitive instinct.

“Substantiving” categories in Hegelian fashion, Marxists are perpetually exposed to the temptation to impersonate abstractions, establishing between various “isms” causal relationships which cannot be proved to exist in the case of the objective phenomena from which the abstractions have been derived. For instance, in Marx's *Capital* (see the famous chapter on “Cooperation”), we are told that “mere social contact begets in most industries an emulation, and a stimulation of the animal spirits, that heighten the efficiency of each individual workman”. This assertion shows that Marxist psychological understanding ends, more or less, where contemporary social psychology begins. Even to-day, among Marxists, the theory is current that the cooperative mentality of the manual workers—their class solidarity, in fact—is, so to say, a reflex of the cooperative organisation of capitalist

industrial enterprise, resulting, in Marx's view, from the division of labour. Here, according to Marxist theory, we have a cardinal instance of the way in which matter influences mind. The supposition appears to be that certain characteristics of material things become transferred, by an unexplained psychological process, to the mentality of the persons who come into contact with these things. This is materialist mysticism! Bear in mind that a capitalist industrial enterprise, in so far as it is cooperative, is so only from a technical and mechanical outlook, whereas from a human and social outlook it is authoritative and hierarchical. If we trace the concrete determinants of the cooperative mentality of the workers, we shall find that this mentality depends, not so much upon the material equipment and the technical organisation of the work in a capitalist factory, as upon the antagonisms implicit in the relationships between employers and employed—that is to say upon the very thing which is not cooperative in the organisation of capitalist enterprise.

Doubtless working-class solidarity is a frame of mind which results from social experience, and collaboration in industry is one of the forms of this experience. But this by no means justifies the conclusion that there has been a direct transference from the character of the material working environment to the character of the human being who works in that environment. Every worker capable of seeing the facts with his own eyes instead of through doctrinaire spectacles, knows that the technical experience of associated labour in mechanised industry generates in the workers in large-scale industry motives which are far more apt to destroy solidarity than to induce it. The collaboration of the workers in the class struggle is something very different from a simple copy of mechanical collaboration in a factory. The mentality of which the former is the outcome does not derive in any way from technical experiences in the factory or workshop, but from a complex of social experiences which occur, for the most part, at other times than work-time. Thus solidarity is, as a rule, far more vigorous at meetings or during the dinner hour than it is when

work is actually in progress. It is more obvious when the workers are held together in a wage struggle by a common sentiment and a common acquisitive interest, than in mutual aid at the bench, or in joint willingness to keep the lavatories clean. If the theory of "transference" from the material plane to the spiritual were correct, the British or American worker ought to have a "mechanical" Marxist mentality no less clear-cut than that of the German or Russian worker whose daily occupation brings him into similar contact with similar machines. Obviously, this is not the case. The United States worker, though his occupation is mechanised to the extreme, reacts with ethical fervour against anything like a mechanical conception of social relationships. "Labour is not a commodity" is one of the watchwords of the American labour movement, whereas German trade unionists champion a theory to the effect that labour-power is a commodity and nothing more. Workshop experience acquires its significance as the outcome of a much more complicated and far-reaching group of social reactions than the mechanical "transference" theory presupposes. Furthermore, the worker's immediate reaction to workshop experience does not necessarily manifest itself simply and solely in the form of a psychological *adaptation*. The workshop environment takes effect by way of a multiplicity of reactions, part of which signify adaptation, and part of them its opposite.

Similarly with regard to the effect of housing conditions on working-class mentality. Marxist theoreticians have been fond of declaring that town life, thanks to the herding of proletarians thick upon the ground, is one of the essential pre-requisites to the formation of a socialist mentality among the masses. They consider that tenement houses, like factories and workshops, are a culture medium for the growth of habits of social solidarity and for the development of socialist instincts. Not long ago, in Germany, Marxists were opposed to any schemes for the erection of detached cottages, frowned upon building societies which would help workers to buy their houses, discountenanced "back-to-the-land" movements, and



the like. These were condemned as pandering to petty-bourgeois aspirations, and as fundamentally antisocialist. We should, of course, be foolish to deny that urban conditions of housing and intercommunication are favourable to the diffusion of a particular kind of mentality among the masses, but it is a far cry from this to the inference that massed housing necessarily creates a *socialist* mentality. In actual fact, socialism is generally more prevalent in those industrial regions where the workers are mainly housed in separate cottages, and where there is less promiscuity than in the great towns. Furthermore, when we are talking about socialist mentality, we must consider quality as well as quantity. A good many people must have noticed that, in so far as there is a qualitative difference between the socialism of workers housed in barrack-like tenement blocks, and that of workers in industrial regions where the population is not so thick upon the ground, socialist sentiment in the former case tends to have a strong admixture of unsocial or even antisocial motives. In "tenement-house socialists" we are apt to find, not merely a stronger sentiment of hostility towards the ruling classes, but also an enhanced aggressive impulse directed against fellow-men in general (fellow-socialists of other shades of opinion not excepted). Any one who has had occasion to note the difference of atmosphere at socialist meetings in Berlin, on the one hand, and in the German provincial regions, on the other, will understand what I mean. The same remark applies to other countries. In capital cities and in great towns generally, socialism tends to assume an ill-tempered and captiously revolutionary form, contrasting in this respect with the moderate but more trustworthy and deep-rooted socialism of the "provincials". Housing conditions certainly have a good deal to do with the moulding of this contrast, and with producing in large towns a socialism which often bears the imprint of a quasi-morbid antisocial complex. Enforced promiscuity of life is likely to engender, not brotherly love, but individualism, irritability, a gossiping disposition, envy, malice, and all uncharitableness.

The twofold effect of enforced promiscuity was exceptionally

plain in soldiers during the great war. To some extent, an adaptation occurred. The men grew accustomed to being massed together day after day and night after night; by degrees there ensued a customary decline in cultural needs—a decline whose effects persist to this day. Simultaneously, however, there was generated an antisocial complex, an extreme form of which was the morbid craving for solitude often noticed in prisoners of war, a psychosis which a Swiss alienist has named “barbed-wire disease”. The “comradeship of the trenches”, about which armchair philosophers waxed enthusiastic, had an obverse which was much less romantic than these rosy pictures, and far more real. For many soldiers, especially for those of refined and cultivated tastes, this unceasing promiscuity became a moral torture, deliverance from which was one of the greatest joys of leave. I have known Belgian soldiers who went on furlough to Paris supplied with cards entitling them to comfortable quarters in a “home”, but who preferred to doss on a bench on the boulevards in order to escape for a few days from being herded with the mass. The psychology of the post-war period, its intense individualism and subjectivism, will remain incomprehensible to those who fail to realise that, side by side with the formation of new habits through adaptation to life in a herd, there has been at work among ex-soldiers a reaction against such a life.

Social psychology which is to be in conformity with facts must not be content with noting the psychological reactions that are the expression of an adaptation of man to his environment; it must also note the opposite kind of reactions, which aim at the adaptation of the environment towards the fulfilment of certain human purposes. The typical adaptive reaction is the formation of habits of life on the part of the masses; the typical obverse reaction is the formation of compensatory revolutionary moral notions on the part of malcontent individual thinkers. The socialist labour movement can only be apprehended as the combined effect of these two kinds of reaction. If it were nothing more than such a realisation of class interests as depends upon the adaptation

of the workers' acquisitive instinct to the material conditions of life in the capitalist environment, it would deserve to be stigmatised as what Bernard Shaw speaks of as "working-class capitalism". The working-class movement is more than this, it is truly socialist only in so far as it is directed towards ends which derive from a *refusal* to adapt mentality to economic destiny.

Man is distinguished from the lower animals by the very fact that he is not merely an object in relation to his environment. When Herbert Spencer defined life as "an adaptation of internal relationships to external relationships", he was considering only one aspect of human life; its lower, passive, inert aspect. To the thinking creature, this part of his vital functions will seem tolerable only in so far as he can regard it as a necessary condition for the fulfilment of his higher, creative, and aspiring functions. Two types of function are here combined. In his organic functions, man is an *object*, under the sway of external causality; in the functions of his spiritual consciousness, he is a *subject*, who himself creates, in the form of volitional representations, the causes of the changes he effects in his environment. The purposiveness, the teleological essence, of our mental life is such that we modify the world in which we live. These modifications, which take the forms determined by our psychological states, comprise our civilisation and our culture. There cannot be an agriculturist unless there is land for him to till; yet it is the man who tills the land. Thereby the environment is adapted towards an end which only comes into existence in virtue of the conception of a desirable state which has become an object of desire because the preexistent state was felt to be undesirable. Discontent is spiritual non-adaptation. Non-adaptation is progress. The highest form of mental energy (which aims at *making* destiny instead of *enduring* destiny) is what we speak of as genius. If there were nothing more than adaptation of the ideological superstructure to the economic foundation, there would be no socialism. We do not give the name of "socialists" to those who adapt themselves to the demands of the capitalist

method of production, but to those who revolt against capitalism as a social system. The labour movement is partly an adaptation, and partly an antagonistic reaction. Hence the hybrid nature of its social functions, which, as we have already learned, are simultaneously manifestations of a trend towards capitalism and embourgeoisement, on the one hand, and a trend towards revolutionising the social order, on the other.

The typically psychological character of the antagonistic reaction also finds expression in the fact that this reaction occurs mainly as the sublimation of thwarted impulses by the formation of compensatory ideas. That is why its significance is predominantly cultural; for all culture presupposes the sublimation of animal impulses with the aid of compensatory ideas, which become psychological objectives. What is the significance of Christianity in relation to our western culture except as a titanic system of compensatory ideas which disclose to the impulses or instincts upon which our bellicose and acquisitive society is based, the paths towards sublimations which will aim at promoting the general welfare?

In the history of civilisation, the most significant manifestations of the spirit of an epoch or of a people, are more often compensatory ideas generated by an antagonistic reaction than by a simple psychological adaptation; they indicate, not so much what people are, as what they would like to be. The times of the greatest mystical fervour have never been those when religious faith was most vigorously inspiring the life of the masses. On the contrary, they have been those when faith had been most vigorously disturbed in the majority, and when the conflict between an ideal of life and the customs of life was most keenly felt. During the last two generations, German civilisation was dominated by the deification of power, one might even say of brute force. This was manifest in the style of architecture, literature, painting, music; in the romanticist idealisation of the "superman" by the philosophers of the will-to-power; in the political strategy and the ideology of the class struggle professed by the German social democracy; in the rodomontades of imperialist megalomania, which

provoked both amusement and alarm across the frontiers. We do not get to the bottom of things when we explain them as exclusively caused by Prussian militarism, seeing that Prussian militarism was nothing more than an incarnation of the same spirit. The power whose idea aroused so much enthusiasm, was power which the Germans did not possess, at any rate in the depths of their souls—but power which they wanted to have, and which they therefore tried to auto-suggest. Post-war France is in an analogous condition. There, power and authority are idealised as compensations for the weakness which is felt in the subconscious, for the dread of invasion which has not yet been dispelled. Conversely, during the second half of the nineteenth century, when Britain was at the climax of her economic and imperialist power, there was no cult of power in that country. The psychological complementary phenomenon of the sense of security which the unchallenged domination of Britain gave her, was a liberal, cosmopolitan, and pacifist mentality. This only began to change towards the end of the century, when British commerce was being challenged in the world market by younger competitors, and when the national self-esteem had suffered in consequence of a series of defeats in the Boer War. As soon as her real power was thus beginning to be shaken, Britain entered upon an imperialist phase, which was manifested in politics by the protectionist movement (the fear of competitors) and by the agitation on behalf of compulsory military service (the fear of enemies), and in literature by enthusiasm for the works of Kipling, and similar writings.

The difference between psychological reaction and categorical determination can be shown with especial clarity by an analysis of the psychological motives of interest, which is the fundamental notion of Marxist sociology. According to Marxists, interest arises per se out of the method of production, that is to say out of the situation of the producers in relationship to the means of production. Marx's main object in his writings was to prove that the interest of the proletarian class sprang from the conflict of interests between, on the one

hand, the sellers of labour power (the producers of surplus value), and on the other hand, the buyers of labour power (the recipients of surplus value). Marx necessarily regarded this interest as a fixed element, and, so to say, as the substratum of all economic activity. If he had not set out from the hypothesis that this interest constitutes a fixed economic motive, he would have undermined the main support of his sociological theory, that economic causes determine sociology; for, if we admit that in the course of historical evolution economic activity can be the outcome of variable subjective motives, this implies the existence of other causes of social evolution behind economic causal series.

In fact, the classical economists had already recognised that the notion of interest is not always so unambiguous as it seems to be when, for example, two traders are bargaining about the price of certain goods. They had to admit that there is hardly any economic situation in which an interested party may not have to ask himself where his true interest lies. He may make a big mistake about the matter, like the man in the fable, who killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. Obviously, the notion of interest depends, in large measure, upon the subjective way in which we understand it in each particular case. That was why the classical economists had to get out of the difficulty by formulating the notion of interest "rightly understood". This "right understanding" as a criterion of judgment reflects the rationalist mentality of those days, when the only differences in human outlooks were supposed to depend upon differences in the degree of knowledge. Such a way of looking at things, superficial enough when we are dealing with individuals, becomes utterly absurd when our aim is to explain the emotional valuations of social groupings—classes, for instance. We cannot be content to see nothing but different states of knowledge as the foundations of various subjective conceptions of interest. Behind these states of knowledge, we must look for the ways of feeling which determine their content.

Even in the comparatively simple case of the conflict of

interests between employers and employed in respect of the rate of wages, there can never be a concrete situation in which different conceptions of this interest may not exist on either side. The employer knows that he must impose certain limits upon his wish to pay the lowest possible wage, unless he wants to run the risk of losing his best workers ; or of inducing a discontented frame of mind which may lead to a strike, or to a falling off in production. In the leading circles of the employers in the United States, the watchword " high wages and low costs " has been current for a long time ; and it is enough to mention the business of Henry Ford to remind us that some industries get on very well by following this rule. The employed, on their side, cannot but take into consideration the fact that, if they force up wages too suddenly and too far, they may impair the capacity of the undertaking for competing with others of the same kind, or the capacity of the whole industry in any one nation to compete with the same industry in other nations, thus exposing themselves to a restriction of the market, to the transfer of the industry to some other place, or to the introduction of mechanical processes which will dispense as much as possible with the human element in production ; and, in one way or another, leading to the spread of unemployment.

It will perhaps be objected that special considerations of this kind do not affect the general nature of the antagonism of interests, as the outcome of which the employers are less inclined to grant an increase of wages than the employed are to ask for it. The fact is indisputable. Still, our concern here is, not to discuss the existence of the antagonism of interests, but to discover its psychological determinants. Well now, the more we pass from the examination of particular cases to the examination of the general social antagonism, the more plainly do we see that the notion of interest is determined by subjective emotional states. Simply from the outlook of the isolated employer, we know that he will find it very difficult, for instance, to decide whether it is to his interest that the working day shall be as long as possible in his own

enterprise ; he will have to consider carefully the effects of a long working day upon the output of his workers, effects which will be conditioned by psychological circumstances not expressible in purely economic terms. Every trade-union leader finds it necessary from time to time to remind the employers of their interest "rightly understood". Since this is so in the case of the isolated employer whose freedom of judgment is rather strictly determined by the position of his rivals, we must give a far more considerable scope for subjective notions of employers' interests as soon as we come to consider the general social effects of the regulation of the hours of labour. The productive capacity of the working class, the changes in the mechanical instruments of production, the technical skill of the younger generation, the general health of the masses of the population, the likelihood of international competition, and a great many other considerations, introduce problems which, even from the point of view of economic interest in the narrowest sense of the term, are open to various solutions.

This applies, likewise, to the question (apparently a simpler one) of the employers' interest in the matter of wages. Must we not suppose that such an employer as Henry Ford, who is in favour of paying high wages because he considers that this makes his workers more productive, and because he has an eye to the purchasing power of his democratic customers—many of whom are members of the working class—acts in obedience to what he believes to be his interest, just as much as Gary, the steel king, whose tactics are the very opposite ? This brings us to a more vital question. Can we explain the attitude of the majority of employers in wage conflicts, especially their attitude during the early days of the labour movement when the notions of class interest became crystallised, solely as the outcome of economic interest in the sense of the acquisitive instinct ? My own personal experience, which has enabled me to look behind the scenes again and again both in the case of the employers and in the case of the manual workers, has convinced me that what leads the employers to resist the



claims of the workers is often quite as much wounded pride and the will-to-power as pecuniary interest. In many cases a cold calculation of interest "rightly understood" in pounds, shillings, and pence, would lead the employers to recognise that it would be to their advantage to grant a demand for higher wages rather than to resist it tooth and nail. What usually leads them to resist such a demand is, above all, the determination to be "masters in their own houses", the subconscious wish to avoid admitting that hitherto their scale of wages has been too low, their social dislike of "would-be idlers who are never satisfied"—in a word, emotional valuations.

Turning to consider the workers' interest, we have already seen how much the attitude of the workers (even in respect of a struggle which appears to be purely economic, like the struggle for higher wages) is decided by valuations which derive from far more complicated reactions than those of the acquisitive instinct. If interest were only a problem of arithmetic, the non-unionist who is glad to profit by the advantages of labour organisation without paying his share of the price, the toady who "sucks up to the boss", or the blackleg, may often be said to have a more accurate knowledge of self-interest than the worker who, from a sense of solidarity, takes all the risks of participation in a strike, although he knows that the financial stresses it will entail on him may cripple his whole future. Everything depends upon what we mean by interest "rightly understood". The question is not to be decided by a rational calculus of immediate and individual advantages, seeing that, in the terms of such a calculus, we must admit that the non-unionist or the blackleg understands his own interest better than does the loyal trade unionist. In either situation, there is a knowledge and an understanding of the advantages to be derived from a particular line of conduct. What distinguishes the two cases is, not the degree of understanding, but the sentiment which directs this understanding towards a particular end. Besides, trade unionists' detestation of a blackleg is not proportional to the financial damage which

a blackleg can inflict on them. The interest which is at work here means something very different from a simple acquisitive gain ; it is a sentiment which includes moral elements incapable of expression in monetary terms.

If we continue to call this sentiment " interest ", we must use the term in its primitive and general meaning, following the example of the psychoanalysts whose vocabulary gives the same connotation to the word " interest " and the word " libido ". To be interested in something is, substantially, to want this thing. Desire, or libido, is inseparable from the interest we have in a thing. It is shown by the fixation of attention aroused by an affective state, fixation upon a real or symbolical object which is capable of satisfying a desire ; and by the transference to this object of the emotional valuations determined by the wish. The respective interests of a seller and a buyer in the price of certain goods, is only a particular case in which the valuation of an object derives from the direction of the acquisitive instinct towards determinate values—here, monetary values. Besides, even in the simplest transactions of commerce, interest guided *solely* by the acquisitive instinct is very rarely encountered. As a general rule, even economic interest of this kind contains shades of valuation which are derived from the instinct of autovaluation, the combative instinct, or the instinct of play, and even from moral valuations. This happens, for instance, when a crafty seller is delighted at " getting the better " of a customer ; or when a buyer is indignant because certain demands which he regards as inequitable have been made.

The foregoing considerations apply even more strongly to class interest. Here, in fact, we are no longer concerned with a valuation relating to some particular instance, but with the habitual direction of desire and attention towards certain objects, with a permanent interest in these objects, or with a permanent valuation of social situations. In these cases, as before, the acquisitive instinct usually gives a general direction to the totality of the affective complex ; but this complex is also strongly influenced by valuations derived

from other instincts, such as the wish for autonomy in those who feel themselves to be economically dependent, a grievance against the members of a privileged class, moral indignation aroused by an exploiting system, and so on. It is by no means unusual for the ethical motives of a class struggle to enter into conflict with the acquisitive instinct and to gain the victory over the latter. I am not theorising. This has happened countless times in the working-class movement. It happens whenever a workman on strike tries to convince or to encourage his wife, whose notion of their joint interest is dominated by her anxiety to balance the weekly budget of the household. What characterises the attitude of the workers in any combined social struggle is, above all, the ethical motive of "sacrifice for the common good". This sacrifice always presupposes a conflict with self-interest in the narrower sense, in the selfish sense of immediate gain. Thus the notion of interest is void of meaning unless we connect it with the subjective fact of need. The habitual wishes which determine the content of needs, although they tend towards satisfaction by economic means, are nowise determined by the economic position per se.

The inadequacy of the economic category for the explanation of class interest is seen with especial plainness in the Marxist theory of surplus value, according to which the interest of the proletarian class is the expression of the acquisitive interest of the sellers of "labour power". In reality, this theory does something quite different from what it professes to do; it dresses up in pseudo-scientific raiment a feeling of resentment which is the outcome of a social relationship, of a sense that the working class is unjustly exploited by the employing class. If we eliminate this ethical kernel from the theory of surplus value, if we deprive it of its central core of the feeling of exploitation, we deprive it of the meaning which connects it with the other theses of Marxist sociology. Thirty years ago, Bernstein wrote, in the book which was Englished as *Evolutionary Socialism*: "Surplus labour . . . is an empirical fact, demonstrable by experience, and needs no deductive proof. Whether the Marxist theory of surplus value is correct

or not, is quite immaterial to the proof of surplus labour. It is in this respect no demonstration, but only a means of analysis and illustration." At the same time, Bernstein admits that what the theory "illustrates" with such a wealth of argument is, after all, "a commonplace", and was this already at the outset of the capitalist period. "The journeyman employed by the guildmaster could easily see what his work cost his master, and at how much the master reckoned it to the customer." Bernstein's conclusion is that "surplus value is nothing more than a formula, based upon a hypothesis (the labour theory of value)".

Rarely, in fact, has so huge a scientific mountain given birth to so tiny a scientific mouse. More than any other part of Marx's doctrines, the theory of surplus value shows how futile is the attempt to grasp social reality with the aid of purely economic categories. What the theory proves is something which every one knew already; whereas what it really wants to prove, and what every one is ready to infer from the theory of surplus value, namely the immorality of the capitalist system, is not proved by the theory of surplus value. The theory tacitly assumes it, and the tacit assumption is the thing which has made the theory so popular. Implicit therein are the following hypotheses, with which the whole structure stands or falls: (1) the acquisitive impulse is the only motive to activity, alike in employers and in employed; (2) all labour is quantitatively measurable, and can be reduced to equal values measured by the time of the labour; (3) the only work in a capitalist enterprise which creates value is that of the manual worker; (4) the employer alone determines the rate of wages.

There is hardly a Marxist who does not believe that the theory of surplus value convicts the employing class of exploitation by its mere demonstration of the antagonism of interests between the sellers and the buyers of labour power. Do we, then, prove that there is exploitation when we simply show that the buyer gains by a transaction? Would the vendor participate in it unless he also believed himself to gain by it? It is enough to pose the question in this way to demonstrate

that what makes the wage system a regime of exploitation is the very thing which distinguishes it from ordinary commercial transactions. The exploitation derives from the fact that the relationship between the employer and the employed is quite different from the normal relationship between the buyer and the seller of goods ; it is an unequal relationship of social power, but this is a sociological and historical phenomenon, not an element of economics pure and simple.

Marx's determination to exclude from his analysis all ethical valuations unsusceptible of proof by economic categories, made it impossible for him to prove, in addition to the obvious fact of capitalist gain, that such gain is unjust. Capitalist gain cannot be successfully attacked with the aid of purely economic valuations. There is only one purely economic criterion by which a mode of production can be judged, namely economic utility, the amount of values created by the method. From the economic standpoint, the profit-making system must be approved or condemned according as it increases or diminishes productivity. That is the outlook of the apologists for capitalism, who try to justify capitalist gain as the interest on borrowed capital, as managerial salaries, as the reward for intellectual initiative, as insurance for risk, and as an incitement to the extension of the field of production and to the perfectionment of the methods of production. From a purely economic outlook, there is only one charge which can successfully be brought against capitalism, and that is the charge of *waste*. Yet this is the only charge which Marx did not bring against capitalism. He was himself too much under the spell of the classical political economy, to doubt the identity of capitalism with progress. His only interest in proving that exploitation took place, was the outcome of his wish to make this notion of exploitation the core of his doctrine of the class struggle.

The concept of exploitation is ethical, not economic. What makes Marxist manual workers regard the theory of surplus value, or what they believe to be that theory, as a successful charge brought against capitalism, is the conviction (upon which the theory is based without any attempt to prove

it) of the immorality of a system which, as Bertrand Russell says, "coins wealth out of human lives". The economic question per se, the question whether the employing class appropriates nine-tenths or one-hundredth of the surplus value created, is quite unimportant as compared with the sociological question, concerning the way in which the employing class uses the wealth and the power derived from the ownership of the means of production. As soon as we put the question in the latter way, we find that the gravamen of the charge which can be brought against capitalism is, not that the worker is deprived of part of the values which he creates, but that he is condemned to dependence and to social inferiority, to the joyless life of an economic *object* controlled by force, hunger, and fear.

Furthermore, we cannot refrain from blaming the theory of surplus value for the way in which it has helped to withdraw the attention of the workers from the deep-seated social and cultural causes of their discontent; and for the way in which it has led them to concentrate upon the sole point of the disadvantage they suffer in respect of the distribution of surplus value. The result of this way of looking at the matter is to intensify the acquisitive instinct at the cost of the higher social motives which form socialist conviction, such as the desire for individual autonomy, the longing for joy in work, the sentiment of human dignity—in a word, cultural needs. Thus is fostered a crude revolutionism, based on the acquisitive instinct, fundamentally petty bourgeois, and antagonistic to the success of the working-class movement. The mentality of those who are always thinking of "rights" which imply financial advantage, ends by affecting the whole spirit of organisation and by paralysing constructive and educational effort. Enough to think of the complaints of experienced trade-union leaders who declare that the masses of their members tend more and more to regard trade-union organisation as a mere machine for gaining advantages; that it is sometimes difficult to prevent certain members of the trade unions and the friendly societies from shirking, and from

living on the "benefits" of the organisation; that there is an increasing tendency towards social parasitism; that there are formidable psychological obstacles within the working class itself against the development of workers' control in the sense of a responsible self-government on the part of the personnel of enterprises; that the masses show less and less interest in moral and cultural claims as compared with material claims; and so on. It would, of course, be foolish to regard Marxism as solely responsible for this state of affairs; but there can be no doubt that Marxist ideology tends rather to strengthen than to weaken such tendencies, which at bottom are utterly selfish and extremely "capitalistic".

Inasmuch as class interest is based upon a subjective state of mind determined by ethical valuations, we must infer that it is impossible to deduce the notion of class from purely economic categories. If persons who occupy similar positions in the process of production are to constitute a class, there must be fulfilled a whole series of social conditions which cannot be deduced from an analysis of economic forms. More especially, the interested person must, subjectively, regard his affiliation to a particular class as a permanent state of affairs. He must also associate this state of affairs with the feeling of a determinate collective legal status. We have already seen that these are psychological requisites, which may or may not be fulfilled in a particular economic environment—whether this be so or not, being dependent upon the historical, political, and cultural conditions of the time, and even upon those of earlier generations.

Class is not an economic notion; it is a social notion, and, at bottom, a political notion. Its most trustworthy characteristic is a common direction of social will, based upon a common, emotionally tinged, way of valuing social relationships. "Class consciousness", in the sense of a rational knowledge of economic class interests, is the outcome of this emotional state, and not, as Marxists believe, its starting-point. What Marxists speak of as proletarian class consciousness, is, really, an affective condition rather than a cognitive condition.

In any case, cognition is never alone decisive. In the United States there is an increasing tendency to talk about the "race consciousness" of the coloured folk. This does not mean that they are becoming conscious of the blackness of their skins; they knew that long ago! What the phrase means is that they are beginning to associate a new sentiment with the idea of their racial characteristics, a resentment of the injustice they suffer on account of their social inferiority; and this new sentiment leads them to form a new valuation of their own race as contrasted with others, makes them voice new claims, gives a new trend to their joint social will. The theories in which this racial consciousness finds expression, are the outcome of the affective state just described, and constitute a means for its consolidation; but they are not the origin of the affective state. Theory always adapts itself to voluntary trends.

As soon as we come to consider class as a community of will arising out of a community of lot, we shall find it impossible to follow the Marxists in establishing a sociology upon the sole idea of class. For then we shall see that there are as many sociological groupings characterised by a community of will or of disposition, as there are communities of will explicable by a community of lot, that is to say by a collective experience sufficiently lasting to bring about the formation of habits. Then we shall have to introduce into the formula of the social environment to which human beings react, side by side with the notion of class, that of numerous other communities of lot, such as profession, nationality, religious grouping, and so on.

We must not deceive ourselves here: sociology has to deal with communities of lot which are not necessarily the same thing as communities of disposition. The study of these latter can only be effected by the application of the methods of psychological analysis proper to social psychology. The majority of sociological doctrines make the grave mistake of confounding the two notions. In them, the implication is that class, nation, etc., can be recognised from the start as communities of disposition, whereas primarily they are nothing



more than communities of lot, elements of environment. Of the two factors, the environment and the man, whose resultant is the social attitude of the man, sociology can deal only with the former. The study of the way in which the environment takes effect, of the way in which the general effects of the environment can bring about communities of will and disposition, is the subject-matter of social psychology. The nature of its subject-matter imposes upon it a very different method from that of descriptive sociology, and a method still more different from that of political economy. Community of sentiment and of will belongs to that kind of psychological formations of which Wundt said : " Their quality can nowise be determined by simply adding together the qualities of the elements of which they are made up ". That is why all the attempts of descriptive sociology to define, for instance, " national character " by a general and unequivocal formula, are necessarily fruitless. A national community of lot is a sociological phenomenon. The various kinds of community of disposition cannot be transformed into psychological phenomena without taking account of the peculiar psychological characteristics of groupings or individuals reacting in a different way to a common destiny. The social constitution of the tsarist empire of Russia aroused in the great masses of the people, by adaptation, a mood of habitual subordination ; whereas, in certain specially cultivated social circles, it gave rise, by an antagonistic reaction, to the ultra-individualism of the nihilists. Dollar-hunting is a community of the American lot ; but it is for this very reason that the American disposition shows itself differently in the " philosophy of success " of such a man as Carnegie, and in the ethical and antimaterialistic socialism of such a man as Eugene Debs. The anti-State mutualism of Proudhon embodies one aspect of the French national disposition, just as much as the State socialism of Louis Blanc incorporates another. Both of them arise out of the community of lot formed by the centralisation of the French State and by the French cultural heritage. The method derived from the principle of adaptation, in accordance

with which we can still in case of need deduce economic interest from the economic position, is thus quite incapable of apprehending the far more complicated psychological interrelationships by which communities of disposition can be explained. If we wish to understand the affective states which are manifest in the working-class movement, the most sagacious speculations concerning the concepts of value and surplus value will not help us in the least ; we must contemplate living beings in their actual historical environment, which varies from time to time and from place to place.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### MARXIST DETERMINISM

All other things *must* ; man is a being who *wills*.

SCHILLER.

THE knowledge of the laws of evolution in the past would have no value for Marxists unless this knowledge could help them to predict the future. Such foreknowledge is supposed to give the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle the aureole of scientific certainty, and to reinforce the confidence of the masses in Marxist guidance because it makes them believe that ultimate victory is indubitable. Marxists imagine that they have discovered the relationships of causality in accordance with which, thanks to the operation of causes known, or supposed to be known, by them, it is possible to infer necessary effects. This "fatality" is the bridge which connects the future with the past ; thus the method of cognising the past is transformed into a method of shaping the future.

No doubt the Marxists are thinking only of the future of human society. But since Marxists regard social evolution as no more than a particular case of natural causality, their faith in the determination of the social future presupposes a belief in the determinism of all that happens. Human will is not, for them, an exception. They believe that the essentials of social organisation *must* evolve in a determined direction, owing to a fatality which derives from the causal relationships among the economic categories which they have discovered. They hold that the logic inherent in the evolution of these categories determines history. According to such a view, the will of the human beings who realise this historical destiny is predetermined by the laws of economic evolution.

Thus we are confronted with the inevitable problem of the freedom of the will, the power to surmount this problem being

an infallible test of the capacity of any philosophy to avoid losing itself in the labyrinth of the abstract notions it has itself created. For a man who is not befooled by his own words, the mooted problem of free will is already the formulation of the answer, seeing that to ask the question is itself an act of the will. The mere asking of a question in the belief that it is capable of being answered in one sense or another implies a sense of freedom. To doubt this freedom by asking whether freedom is possible, is an instance of those vicious circles into which we find our way when we detach a concept from the affective elements which give it meaning. In reality, the concept of freedom, like every other abstraction, can only be cognised in proportion as we bring it into relationship with an opposed complementary concept. The dialectical nature of our abstract thought is so markedly developed, that we cannot think of freedom without instantly thinking of necessity ; and conversely. In a universe where everything was free, the notion of necessity would be unmeaning. If, on the other hand, all happenings depended upon universal necessity, the sentiment of freedom, which is one element in these happenings, would itself be a part of necessity ; consequently, freedom would itself be determined.

To get out of this blind alley, it is enough to recall that human thought has only created concepts in order to be able to act through their instrumentality. Man thinks in order to live. The concepts of freedom and necessity are void of meaning unless they are related to the subjective fact of the feeling we have in a given situation concerning what we *can* or *cannot* do. We have the feeling of freedom whenever we feel that a decision is a choice between contending voluntary ideas. On the other hand, the feeling of necessity imposes itself upon us when we feel that this choice is restricted or annulled by circumstances which are beyond the range of our will, and which we then recognise as *causes* lying outside the domain of our own ego. The essence of our feeling of necessity is, therefore, a causal relationship which we feel as coercive. We exteriorise this feeling, projecting it into the phenomena of

the external world, and, among others, into those of the historical past. Whenever we can establish a relationship of causality between a given fact and a knowable cause, we have the feeling that the relationship between the two phenomena is subject to necessity. This necessity finds its highest expression in what we term a *law*, a concept which arises out of the conviction (acquired through experience, by analogy, or in some other way) of *the regularity of certain causal series*.

We regard as free every happening, and in especial every human action, whose causes lie outside our cognition. Thus the boundary between necessity and freedom is not in the phenomena themselves, but only in our faculty of cognition. It coincides with the boundary between known causality and causality which is not known. As soon as a causal relationship becomes so complex as to be susceptible of more than one explanation, the door is opened for the notion of freedom. An algebraic equation of the first degree has but one solution; with an increase in the degree of the equation there is a concurrent increase in the number of possible solutions. Here we are dealing only with the hypothetical world of mathematical speculation. In the real world, which is the subject-matter of history, we have to do with human actions whose elements are least of all capable of being reduced to equations. Applied mathematics can at most enable us to see the probability of certain objective phenomena among the masses; but this science cannot solve any subjective problem whatever. Statistics can teach me that, according to the law of probability, I shall, being forty years old, probably live twenty years more; but statistics cannot tell me when I shall die, or guide me in any decision which may influence the duration of my life. The law of large numbers does not apply to individual instances, does not apply to the ego.

Every subjective decision is accompanied by the feeling of freedom, in so far as we cannot refer the motives of this decision to causes. Of course that does not prevent us from supposing, if we choose, that causes exist. Our feeling of freedom is

unaffected by such a supposition, for the consciousness of a general and hypothetical causality will not modify any real element in our voluntary decision. The consciousness in question applies to all the knowable motives which collaborate in giving rise to our voluntary actions. If the same character of necessity attaches to the various motives which comprise the pros and the cons of every decision, the relative strength of pro and con will not thereby be modified. When all the terms of a given equation are multiplied by the same coefficient, the solution is unaffected. In a word, a sense of general determinism does not affect particular decisions. On the other hand, a sense of freedom is inseparable from conscious volition. Such is the demand of the instinct of autovaluation which is the basis of our conscious ego, the standard of our moral valuations, and the main driving force of our social actions. "An act is freer in proportion as the decision of which it is the outcome is more personal" (Keyserling).

The limitations and uncertainties of our cognitive faculties show us, therefore, that the causal relationships we deduce from the laws of necessity are born within our own brain. They are nothing more than relationships among the ideas constructed by ourselves in order that we may more effectively influence phenomena. "Philosophy is well aware that whatever there is of the visible and tangible in things, represents our possible action upon them" (Bergson). It is our own thought which, exteriorising what goes on in our own minds in the act of conscious volition, introduces relationships of causality into the world of phenomena—this process being the reverse of what is commonly supposed to occur. Until we reflect upon them, phenomena are nothing more than a chaos. If some of them present themselves to our consciousness as links in causal chains, this is only because we have abstracted from them certain conceptual images.

Thus the power of thought which enables us to apprehend causal relationships, is subject to numerous limitations, which do not derive so much from the phenomena themselves as from our own ways of thinking. First of all, our faculty of

conception, as given to us through the organisation of our senses and our memory, is restricted ; what we are able to perceive of the universe is obviously no more than an infinitesimal part of all that exists. Secondly, of the phenomena perceived, part only enter into the framework of the abstract conceptual images between which we construct causal relationships that can be formulated as laws. Thirdly, all these phenomena belong to the past ; the data of experience from which we deduce laws do not constitute a completed whole, for they are constantly being modified by new experiences ; and that is why the laws we deduce from them are always provisional. Fourthly and lastly, the judgments by means of which we pass from the phenomenon to the image, from the image to the concept, and from the concept to causal relationships, are subjective ; they are more and more intimately connected with our valuations and our wishes, in proportion as the phenomena under consideration are themselves nearer to the domain of our activity.

When we believe that we are able to formulate causal relationships in the form of laws, the goal towards which we strive is not knowledge in itself. This knowledge enables us to apply the same laws to other causal series resembling the one from which the laws were deduced. We are thus always inclined to extend the laws derived from an infinitesimal fraction of the universal process, to that part of the process concerning which we know nothing. Obviously, this part of which we know nothing will include the future, for the future effect of our actions interests us more keenly than anything else. Inasmuch as we conceive certain knowable relationships of causality as laws, we infer that necessary laws will also be at work in regions where the limitations of our cognitive faculties prevent verification in the phenomenal world. Anticipations of the future seem self-evident to the active human being, for such is the necessary condition of all activity directed towards an end, that is to say towards that which does not yet exist in the real world.

The bearing of the necessary laws which we can know,

depends upon the practical capacity of particular scientific methods. It differs from science to science in accordance with the object of that science. Here we find differences akin to those which we have noted in the classification of the sciences in respect of the degree to which mechanical hypotheses are applicable. The causal relationship being the outcome of a conceptual abstraction, necessary laws are above all applicable in the sciences which deal with abstract quantities, and which, consequently, are comparatively little dependent upon concrete phenomena. Higher mathematics is preeminent in this respect, since that science deals with purely abstract quantities. In higher mathematics, therefore, we can use what may be called a purely apriorist method, since the laws of cause and effect deduced therein claim no validity outside the domain of conceptual quantities.

At the other end of the ladder of the sciences, we find the psychological and moral sciences, and, in especial, history. Here nothing matters but the phenomenon. In these sciences, moreover, we have to do with a kind of phenomena whose causal interpretation is peculiarly subject to the sources of error of which we have just been speaking: restricted field of observation, complicated causal relationships, variable mass of experience, influence of the subjective purpose.

An interpretation of history independent of the historian's social objective is inconceivable. Such history would be unmeaning. We are only interested in history because we are interested in the present, that is to say in our own purposes here and now. Had we no present interest whatever, all that we know of the past would seem equally significant—and this amounts to saying that it would appear equally insignificant and devoid of meaning.

The only causal relationships we can imagine as operative in the past, are akin to those which form part of our present experience. That is why there are as many historical laws as there are philosophies of history, and as many philosophies of history as there are historical objectives. The law of evolution which is designed to justify an objective, really



presupposes that objective. It only postulates a necessity which we *want*, and this pretended necessity is nothing more than an illusion of the will as to the bearing of its own capacity for realising its own desires. History, therefore, is a typical instance of the kind of science in which apriorist methods are forbidden, and one which can only draw conclusions from known facts to knowable causes; its domain is limited to the past.

In view of the impossibility of basing foreknowledge on any historical method, Marxism gets out of the difficulty with the aid of determination by economic categories. Thus the future which the Marxists believe themselves able to predict does not appear to them, as the past appears to the historian, in the form of the integration of a multiplicity of events in causal or evolutionary series; but, conversely, as the disintegration of predetermined categorical causal series, their disintegration into events. According to the Marxists, everything already exists in the mystical entity of the law before coming into being on earth; everything is already necessary before it becomes real. This faith reminds us of the quizzical remark which Anatole France puts in the mouth of the nominalist monk in his *Révolte des anges*: "Before feet and behinds had been created, the concept of a kick in the behind lay slumbering from all eternity in the womb of the Almighty".

It is expedient to point out here that Marx should not be regarded (as he is so often regarded) as a fatalist in the sense that he denied the influence of human will upon the historical process; nevertheless it is true that he regarded the will as itself determined. The distinction must not be overlooked by those who want to understand the psychological function of the Marxist faith in economic laws. Marxism, determinist though it is, does not look upon the fulfilment of socialism as an automatic and direct realisation of the category "economic evolution" by its transformation into the category "social evolution". If Marx had believed in the possibility of a political evolution without political volition, his belief in the determination of all historical causal series by the causal series

of technical evolution would have led him to infer that the only way of expediting the advent of socialism would be for all socialists to become engineers and inventors ; for if the technical substratum determined everything else without the intermediation of human will, why should propagandists, politicians, and educationists take so much pains to tinker at an ideological superstructure which must in any case spontaneously change, and can only change, concomitantly with changes in the method of production ? Marx's pupils have been right in defending their master against the charge of a fatalism of this kind. Thereby they have shown all the more clearly that their master was a prey to another kind of fatalism, that which takes the form of a belief in inevitable categorical ends. In the Marxist view, social evolution is regulated by laws ; this evolution is achieved by means of the class struggle ; the struggle is itself the inevitable result of the economic evolution which creates a conflict of interests ; its essence and its conclusion are determined by a specific objective, which is nothing else than a knowledge of the laws of social evolution, as acquired by Marxist socialists.

Thus, in order to determine the future, the laws of social evolution need merely emerge into consciousness. In this way Marxist socialism, which leads the proletariat to be aware of its own historic mission, becomes itself a link in the chain of the causal series whereby human destiny is fulfilled. It is enough that we should know the law, and the law will then work itself out to its own conclusion. The aim which this fulfilment assigns to the socialist labour movement is itself predetermined and inevitable, seeing that it derives from objective causes already given. In becoming aware of this end, Marxist socialism realises an action determined by the natural laws of social evolution. The foreknowledge of Marxist socialism, and the realisation of this foreknowledge by way of the social revolution, are two different manifestations of the same law of the determination of the future by the past.

The most vulnerable point of this doctrine is that it is linked

with the hypothesis that all our social actions are determined by the knowledge of certain ends inherent in social evolution. It is evident that these ends will only be inevitable laws in proportion as our knowledge of the causal series which lead to them is itself inevitable. On this showing we can consider our ends as necessary, solely in proportion as we can conceive them as nothing more than the effect of given and known causes. But from the moment when we become aware of an end, this awareness already belongs to the past, and so do its "causes". When we recognise that human objectives depend upon historical situations acting as causes, we are admitting that new historical situations will have the effect of providing us with new objectives. We thus come to the conclusion, which is also the dictate of common sense, that we cannot consider our actual ends as permanent, or the adoption of new ends as inevitable, except in so far as we can foresee historical happenings. This is precisely what we are unable to do; and that is why the necessity which we believe ourselves able to see at work in the past, cannot determine the future. Historical experience itself reduces to absurdity the claim made for the Marxist objectives that they are inevitable; experience does this in a far more convincing way than any logical arguments could. In fact, if the Marxist objectives were to be inevitable, they would have to be permanent; but the whole history of the socialist movement since the days of Marx has been nothing else than the history of the transformation of these objectives, thanks to the influence of historical happenings which Marx himself did not foresee, and which no one could possibly foresee.

Are we to infer from the foregoing that it is futile to attempt to forecast, in the light of our actual knowledge of history, certain events, or certain evolutionary trends? By no means. No conscious social action is possible without a modicum of prevision, for every action of the kind presupposes an aim, and the mental representation of this aim implies an anticipation of the future. It is just here that the conception of history as the fulfilment of inevitable laws proves useless.

The foreknowledge we are in search of does not relate to what must come to pass whatever we do, but to what ought to ensue or might possibly ensue as the outcome of an action which we believe ourselves able to perform or to refrain from performing. This reminds us of what Samuel Butler wrote in *Erewhon*. The Erewhonians "say that there was a race of men tried upon the earth once who knew the future better than the past, but that they died in a twelvemonth from the misery which their knowledge caused them; and if any were to be born too prescient now, he would be culled out by natural selection before he had time to transmit so peace-destroying a faculty to his descendants". The only forecasts we need are those which relate to the conditions and the effects of our own actions, or at least of the events in whose making we ourselves participate: the choice of the aim of our life, and the daily performance of the concrete tasks which the pursuit of this end imposes upon us; not because our actions constitute the effect of given causes, but so that our actions may be the causes of effects which do not yet exist. To assign an aim to our lives, we do not need to know any other laws than the moral law. The alleged natural laws of history will not help us. History, and the perspectives of the future which it opens to us, only aid us in so far as they can throw light upon the conditions which impose certain limits on the social efficacy of our actions. There are no inevitable laws which *determine* (that is to say cause) our actions; there are only probable facts which *condition* them (that is to say limit them). To bring about an effect, the cause is sufficient, the condition is merely desirable. A piano is a condition of piano-playing, but not its cause.

Marxism, in its causal interpretation of history, confounds *causes* and *conditions* in the same way in which Darwinism has confounded them in biology. Darwin showed that there is a relationship of dependence between the evolution of animal species and their adaptation to environment by natural selection, just as Marx showed the dependence of the social order upon the economic order. Darwin's discovery led Darwinists to

believe that the Darwinian theory had explained why animal species undergo transformation. Since Darwin's days further researches have shown that it is not the environment which creates new types. On the contrary, animal species transform themselves thanks to a will of their own, and in a way which seems fortuitous, is often sudden, and is incomprehensible to us. The influence of the environment only makes itself felt as a cause in so far as those new types alone survive which are sufficiently well adapted to their environment to escape being eliminated by natural selection. The environment, therefore, is not a factor of creation ; it is only a passive and conditioning element, inasmuch as it imposes certain limits upon the perpetuation of new creatures.

Similar considerations apply to human society. Man wills, and it is his will which transforms society ; however, the only willed modifications which can succeed and maintain themselves are those which are compatible with the material conditions that form the environment. These conditions derive, in part from human nature, and in part from the social situation of the moment. Movements whose aim comprises within itself economic changes, can only be carried through in so far as this aim is compatible with the dominant economic motives. For instance, a movement which aimed at a return to a method of production without machinery would be foredoomed to failure, because the masses have now acquired needs and modes of life and of work which render necessary the continuance of economic evolution along the extant lines of technical progress. I deliberately avoid saying that " the social demand must lie along the line of economic evolution ", for this economic evolution is not an ultimate cause. What makes the slogan " back to the Middle Ages " an impracticable one is, not that machines and factories could not be destroyed, but that human beings (of course with the help of machines) have acquired needs which can no longer be satisfied without the aid of machinery.

Nevertheless, because an economic situation conditions a movement, it does not follow that it determines that movement.

The workman who has at his disposal certain raw materials and certain tools, can only make use of them in order to manufacture objects whose nature is in conformity with these means of production. A man who has only wood and a carpenter's tools cannot make a pair of boots or a motor-car. As to whether he will make a wardrobe or a chair, and as to whether he will do his work well or ill, this no longer depends upon the raw materials or the tools ; the determining cause of these events is the will which guides his hands. We recall what Goethe said about playing-cards, that the hand of cards is dealt to the player, who cannot choose them at his own will. Still, with a given hand, the player can play in various ways.

No doubt, causes can be found for our own will, causes which do not lie within us. People often speak of the influence of heredity, education, and environment, upon the social destiny of us all. If we are to regard these effects as the carrying out of inevitable natural laws, we must have a knowledge which will enable us to explain fully, not only human actions, but also all our wishes, as the effects of known causes. Yet who would venture to say, even as regards the most trivial moment of his life, that he knows all the causes of the volitional ideas at work within him ? We shall, therefore, only be in a position to prolong into the future those causal series whose concrete beginnings are already known to us.

The degree of probability attainable by a forecast of this kind depends upon our scientific or intuitive knowledge of the facts, rather than upon our knowledge of general laws. That is why theoreticians obsessed by their belief in abstract laws are apt to prove far less successful as prophets than do men of action, or such intuitive thinkers as poets and artists. Marx is an example of this. Like most learned men who have been interested in the philosophy of history, he predicted a good many things with great accuracy, whereas concerning many other things he was mistaken. Where, thanks to the wide extent of his knowledge, he was able to recognise the real evolutionary tendencies which were already in course of fulfilment in his own days, he was able, by simply prolonging

the extant lines of evolution, to foresee numerous phenomena which the future has confirmed because his predictions were in line with the "general trend of evolution". For example, capitalist concentration of enterprise, growth of the proletariat, increase of class consciousness among the workers, their increasing political power, and so on. On the other hand, when he trusted to reasoning deduced from categorical laws, he was mistaken. For instance, his belief in a categorical law determining the evolution of economic forms led him to predict that agricultural production would advance along lines of development similar to those which had been followed by industrial production; here the course of events has proved him wrong. Another economic category made him prophesy a steadily increasing impoverishment of the proletariat, whereas experience has shown that the economic and social influence of the workers has steadily increased. Furthermore, it was impossible for all the economic categories in the world to enable Marx to predict evolutionary tendencies which had not yet begun in his days, or such as, for one reason or another, eluded his observation. Thus, he did not know that the class struggle would lead to increasing national differentiation and to a growing solidarity between the workers and the State. Just as little was he able to foresee the part which the trade unions play nowadays in the working-class movement, and the changes in the character and the trends of this movement which have resulted therefrom. Nevertheless, these last instances are those of an evolution due to such general and deep-seated causes that a contemporary Marx would certainly regard them as inevitable laws. What he did not know was not for him necessary; he only needed necessary laws in order to give the support of self-confidence to certain trends which he knew and also wished to favour.

That is the explanation of faith in social determinism. Its psychological function is to reinforce the will by suggesting confidence. Belief in inevitable laws characterises the mentality of all psychological movements which are too young or too weak to be able to dispense with the idea of a compensation

which will reduce the contrast between the extent of their aims and the slightness of the power. It is an index of primitiveness, a symptom of a lack of internal equilibrium, the auxiliary intellectual construction of an aggressive instinct arising out of an inferiority complex.

The determinist act of faith means that the believer is appealing to a supernatural power in order to arouse fear in his opponents and to instil confidence into his own supporters. The "natural laws" of social evolution formulated by Marx are nothing more than a symbolical reconstruction, adapted to an atheistic age, of the law dominating human destinies to which earlier generations gave the name of God. It is a harsh, violent, and cruel god, whose characteristics obviously resemble those of the Jehovah of the Old Testament and those of the God of the Calvinists (the predestined pioneers of capitalist civilisation). He demands of his creatures that they shall sacrifice to an end regarded as inevitable, shall sacrifice everything, even their own sentiment of free will. In return, he promises his servants, when in revolutionary tribunals they carry out his verdicts, that they shall be freed from the pangs of conscience which derive from free will. The law which apparently replaces the individual will by complete submission to a superhuman will, is itself nothing more than a magnified and metaphysical form of the individual will. Marxist determinism creates a magical illusion that actions performed in conformity with a determinate direction of will and parallel to the direction of the law acquire a superior historical efficacy. There ensues a sort of mystical super-valuation of such actions, which raises them above all common moral law, and gives them a higher value than that which they derive from their immediate effects. Prophets of this kind remind us of the story told by Multatuli of an oriental date vendor named Hassan, who, when crying his wares in the streets, used to say: "Hassan's dates are larger than they are!"

The confident sense of security which determinist faith instils into youthful movements during their missionary phase



is, unfortunately, bought at the cost of psychological effects whose disastrous character becomes conspicuous in more advanced phases of the movement. The belief in "must" gives rise to a feeling which weakens belief in "ought". The sentiment has amoralised Marxism, and has thwarted the activity of ethical motives in the movements under Marxist dominance.

This observation is not controverted by the arguments of Marx's disciples, trying to defend their master from the reproach of having preached a fatalist doctrine destructive to the powers of the will. They waste their pains, when, in order to prove this thesis, they draw subtle distinctions between determination in the first analysis and determination in the last analysis. Obviously, Marx never preached the sort of fatalism which would tell the proletariat to remain passive while awaiting the economic catastrophe of capitalism, undermined by its own crises and internal contradictions. In teaching that this catastrophe was inevitable, Marx's aim was to encourage the socialist movement to become the "midwife" of the new society, by a revolutionary intervention of the most active kind. The remarkable energy of the political initiatives of the Russian communists gives a practical demonstration that faith in Marxist determinism does not paralyse the will. It is true that, in other circumstances (a crucial example is supplied by the behaviour of the German social democrats from 1914 to 1919), Marxists have readily found pretexts for shirking the responsibilities of initiative. To this question I shall return. Meanwhile, I am not evading it when I point out that the essential characteristic of the psychological effects of Marxist determinism is not so much that, in certain circumstances, it may paralyse certain wills, as that it encourages the development of a particular kind of motives. We ought not to reproach Marxism with denying human volition; but there is all the more ground for declaring that Marxism tends, in that volition, to discourage ethical motives in favour of other motives, especially those of economic interest. No matter whether, or to what extent, such a development is in conformity

with Marx's own intentions ; the essential point is that the trend exists. A belief is good or bad according as it makes men better or worse. A doctrine which declares that social happenings are invariably the outcome of economic laws, favours among its adherents an inclination to discount the motives which are not sanctioned by these laws.

In actual fact, even the most orthodox Marxist finds it necessary to bow before the power of ethical motives ; all the more since he is confusedly aware that Marx's work and the mentality of the socialist masses contain more ethical feeling than is obvious in the formulas of the doctrine. That is why Marxists are continually trying, with the aid of historical materialism, to show that ethical objectives are the " necessary " outcome of economic causes, and notably of class interests. We have already seen what must be thought of a socialist ethic which is based exclusively on the class interests of the proletariat. Of course we can explain changes in certain ethical states by modifications in the social environment ; but because there is a science of ethics, we are not justified in inferring the existence of a scientific ethic competent to deduce the moral motives of human beings from a logical cognition of the scientific laws of necessity. A being endowed with a moral sense does not act because of a knowledge of necessity ; he acts in virtue of a sense of freedom.

Every attempt to found ethical valuations and ethical objectives upon social necessity ends by presenting us with a human being who would settle all problems of conscience by asking : " What is the trend of social evolution ? " Here we have the professorial superstition of the " century of the Enlightenment ", resuscitated in a new form. According to this theory, all human actions depend upon a knowledge of the direction of historical evolution, which is regarded as necessary and as progressive simply because it exists. But what will happen if we are mistaken as to the trend of evolution ? How easily an error may slip into so complicated a calculation ! Enough that we, by mistake, write a plus for a minus, or a minus for a plus, before one of the factors of a product, and the whole

result will be vitiated. Does the transformation of all the moral motives of human beings into their opposites really mean nothing more than the transformation of an intellectual plus into an intellectual minus? Will the discovery of an error in my historical judgment lead me to hate everything that I have hitherto loved, and to love everything that I have hitherto hated? Is it not, rather, true to say that love and hatred guide my historical judgments in a way which does not depend upon the possibilities of a chance error in calculation? Where is the higher power in whose name our cognition of historical necessities is to be equipped with the formidable responsibility of deciding betwixt good and evil? And what am I to do if, when verifying or improving my historical knowledge, I am led to the inference that an evolutionary process now actually going on is not—in my eyes—progress towards a desirable end, but the reverse?

For the social determinist, all social happenings are necessary, and this necessity points out to him his duty as the servitor of progress. But can we not recognise the existence of "necessities" of which we do not approve, and which we do not wish to endorse? For my own part, I can see everywhere, even in the working-class movement, developments ("embourgeoisement" is one of them) conditioned by social causes, and in this sense inevitable, which appear to me opposed to cultural or moral progress. Why, then, should I be enthusiastic about them? In the sense in which the working-class movement is necessary, the resistance offered by the opponents of the movement is likewise necessary. Is the part which I myself shall play in the conflict to be decided by a knowledge which of the two necessities will overcome the other in the end? Can I not be a socialist, and do everything in my power on behalf of the movement, even though I do not know that socialism will, in the end, necessarily triumph? Why should I regard economic evolution as a necessity of a superior kind, to which all other objectives must be subordinated? Are we, then, so sure that the actual trend of economic forms is synonymous with progress? Why should my socialist conviction

depend, for example, upon the fact that there is a continuous process of industrial concentration, when we see again and again that this concentration may mean nothing more than an increase in social power, without any increase in productivity ? Why should I believe that the moral superiority of my socialist objective over the objective of my opponents only consists in this, that I see more plainly than they do whither " evolution " is tending ? Is socialism only good because it is " opportune " ? Why, in that case, should I feel (as I do feel) a sense of fellowship with the socialists of two thousand years ago ; and what am I to think of the contemporary opponents of socialism who, perhaps, are only defending doctrines which will be " opportune " two thousand years hence ?

Marx really knew better. He only represented socialism as necessary because, at bottom, he had a tacit moral conviction that it was desirable. The efficacy of a moral judgment is greatest in situations where this judgment can dispense with the support of reasoned certainty. A mother in childbed, who bears the pangs of labour with fortitude, has no rational certainty that her baby will be beautiful ; one who fights for the protection of the weak does not need to be animated by the certainty of victory ; and a person who risks his life in order to save that of another, does not ask himself whether he is quite sure of himself escaping death.

As long as socialism was the faith of a handful of enthusiasts faced by a world of enemies and by the indifference of the working class, the element of certainty which was promised by Marxist doctrine endowed socialists with an energy which was not purchased at the cost of a weakening of ethical motives. Despite the determinist formulation, the motives actually were ethical. Very different is the state of affairs in more advanced phases of the movement. To-day, the socialist movement is, mainly, an effort of organisation for the defence of certain working-class interests in the political and industrial fields. Ethical motives have not been eliminated, but they have been forced into the background. In such circumstances, the doctrine which was originally a support becomes

a hindrance. Wherever the internal development of the working-class movement leads to the enfeeblement of ethical motives (as has happened in all advanced countries), the determinist doctrine, traditionalised and fossilised, is a refuge for those of little faith, and a hindrance to the most precious creative impulses. The conservatism of the leaders, the pusillanimity of the worshippers of the God Organisation, the narrowness of mind of those who are immersed in the petty tasks of every day, the bureaucrats' dread of responsibility, the selfishness of those who are too readily satisfied—these combine to make what was a vigorous revolutionary doctrine little better than a soporific. As an excuse for inaction, people say: "The hour is unfavourable!"; "The masses are not yet ripe!"; "The system is at fault!"; "We cannot work against evolution!"

The most terrible instance of this degeneration was supplied by the German social democrats during the years between the outbreak of the great war and the November revolution of 1918. When the war began, some of the German socialists blamed "the system", while most of the others rallied to support an "evolution" which seemed to them inevitable. Afterwards, when the revolution of November 1918 came (and came against the will of the majority of Marxist leaders), the German social democrats resigned themselves to what they ought to have longed for in accordance with their own program, as people resign themselves to the inevitable. Subsequently, they were ashamed rather than proud of the responsibilities they were compelled to accept in view of the accomplished fact. Numerous political trials in Germany during recent years, the aftermath of the events of this epoch, have shown the men who in 1918 seemed to be the leaders of the revolution adopting the attitude of delinquents who plead extenuating circumstances, declaring that they rallied to the movement as a choice of evils, and in order to prevent its going too far. Even of the late Hugo Haase, Von Groener, the democratic general, could say: "My impression was that he was everything that could be wished—except a leader of the revolution".

The "involuntary revolution"—what a satire upon the decadence of determinism, which Marx, a true revolutionist, had conceived to be the essential psychological factor of revolutionary activity! For a long time, now, the determinist doctrine has been used by the leaders to justify their opposition to all kinds of innovating trends, which have been able, none the less, to force a way: the special organisation of women, the youth movement, the temperance movement, the cooperative movement, efforts to secure workshop control, etc. In all these matters, determinist dogmatism has supported bureaucratic conservatism. We need not be surprised, therefore, that socialist Germany has suffered the effects of this Marxist petrification in the form of a falling-off in the individual quality of its leaders. Those who subordinate the ethical motives which are the source of personal conviction to the collective motive of class interest, will not breed personalities. An *organisation* can get along very well with leaders who are devoted, zealous, honest, and imbued with a sense of responsibility, such men as exist in great numbers at the head of the Social Democratic Party and the German trade unions; but *socialism* cannot get along unless it has better protagonists than this. Socialism, even from the immediate outlook of practical politics, needs leaders who symbolise the aims of the masses in that they tower above the masses and are distinguished from the masses. For unless the movement is directed towards a distant objective, internal progress ceases; if its aims are not embodied in living personalities in whom these aims create a new human reality, its ideal of the future will not be worth the paper on which its programs are printed. A theory which considers that personality is determined by collective factors, and which, as soon as this personality transcends the average, regards such transcendence as nothing more than a chance happening and an inconvenient one, has in practice a levelling influence tending to promote general mediocrity. No doubt, it would be an exaggeration were we to make Marxism wholly responsible for the poverty of German socialism in respect of strong personalities. No

doubt, the characteristics of German Marxism and the absence of effective leaders in Germany are the joint outcome of a national psychology formed by the autocratic State and by the lack of democratic and individualist traditions. Still, we must not fail to recognise that Marxism has itself favoured a lack of personal convictions and a growth of a subaltern mentality, by making a virtue of necessity, and by a philosophy of the subordination of the individual ruled by conscience to masses ruled by need.

Economic determinism shows at one and the same time the immense significance of Marxism as the expression of a primitive phase of the working-class movement, and the limits of its own effectiveness in the present situation.

It would be absurd to underrate the historical importance of Marxism as a contribution to the doctrine of the working-class movement and to the social sciences. Marx was the first to combine into a closely reasoned system the outlook of political economy and the outlook of historical evolution; and he thus effected for the social sciences a step forward analogous to that which Darwin effected for the biological sciences. In addition, he showed the nineteenth-century working class that its economic conditions of existence rendered necessary a struggle from which the workers could only emerge victoriously through the passing of the capitalist social order into a cooperative commonwealth. The socialism of the days when he began to write was utopist in the sense that it was a socialism of vague and impracticable wishes. Marx showed, by deeds even more than by words, that socialism could only be realised in so far as the workers emancipated themselves economically by their own efforts. This transformation would have been impossible unless, in the sociological domain, Marx had been able to bring about a transference of stress towards economic factors. The consequent social determinism, although we know now that it was an untenable hypothesis, was none the less of enormous use.

But a new age brings new tasks, and the new tasks need new

working hypotheses, which, in their turn, find support in the perfectionment of the methods of scientific research. Since Marx's death, and above all since the world war, social science has adapted itself to historical experience, especially as manifested in the working-class movement and in the results of that movement. As the outcome of such experience, there has been a fresh displacement of stress, thanks to which we now pay far more attention to the psychological factors of the social process. "Far more *attention*", that is the important point; for, in the end, it is only attention (guided by affective valuations) which, beneath the surface of logical systems, guides scientific effort towards new objectives. Fresh social experiences give rise to new affective valuations; new valuations bring about new trends of attention; and it is these last which incite us to fresh researches and lead to new outlooks.

If the twentieth century is to be the century of psychology, as the nineteenth century was the century of natural science, this is not only because we have to-day more knowledge of psychology. It also means that we *wish*, above all, to have more psychological knowledge, while making a better use of the old knowledge, because our social experience leads us to attach more importance to psychological motives. Perhaps history will one day see in this phenomenon the dawn of a new understanding (forced upon our intelligence by the world war, communism, and fascism), namely, that the psychological evolution of man from the instinctive animal to the state of reason, is much slower than the evolution of thought and of technique. Bitter experience has shown us that reason, creating technique, becomes the slave of its own instruments; that it is thereby subjected to the rule of lower instincts such as the acquisitive instinct and the will-to-power, whose uncontrolled activities negate all reasonable ends. However this may be, we grow more and more aware, especially in our judgment of social conditions, that there is a dangerous conflict between our rational objectives and the possibilities of our instinctive dispositions.



It follows that our incoercible instinct of intellectual auto-valuation, which drives us to attempt to dominate our social destiny by reason, leads us to pay more attention to the non-rational character of our social instincts. The close connexion between attention and affective valuation thus involves us in the paradox that our aspiration towards reason at first takes the form of a higher valuation of non-rational motives—antirationalist pessimism and the deification of instinct. This finds expression, alike in the tendencies of contemporary art and literature; in the relativist mentality of the modern philosophy of cognition; in the interest which history, geography, ethnography, and even the fashionable aesthetic, take in everything which is primitive; and, finally, in the pessimist mood of the philosophy of history, according to which, nowadays, no rational or moral significance can be discovered in historical evolution. The whole thought of our epoch, socialist thought included, is characterised by this painful tension between desire and knowledge, so that our faith in the rational meaning of the Future is imperilled by the pressure of a Now which seems unmeaning. Our reason endeavours to rid itself of this tension by taking cognisance of its nature. This accounts for our trend towards psychology, for our efforts to attain new clarity concerning the relationships between thought and emotion, concerning the nature of our instinctive disposition and the possibilities of transforming it.

In our day, it is by no means easy to distinguish, in this matter, between the symptoms of the disease and the signs of an approaching cure. All that we know for certain is that, in this malady as in so many others, cure cannot come unless we diagnose the disease, and that we cannot relieve ourselves of the tension from which we are suffering except through attaining a deeper knowledge of its causes. Consequently we must accept as working hypotheses the valuations of the psychology of instinct, even when they seem to impose obstacles in the way of our reestablishment of our faith in reason—in the hope that these hypotheses will resolve themselves and

destroy themselves in a subsequent state of consciousness. The scepticism of our day in regard to reason is a better starting-point for the return to reason than was the rationalism of the nineteenth century, which, idolising logical thought, transformed our civilisation into a chaos of unrestrained passions. Our search for knowledge is instigated by the same wish as that which has driven men of all epochs to attempt a better understanding of their destinies in the hope of learning how to guide them better. Precisely because we are less convinced of the omnipotence of reason than our grandparents were, we are urged forward in the attempt to reconquer what we have nearly lost, a faith in the rational meaning of historical evolution. After all, we ourselves are so much under the spell of rationalist thought, that we can see no way of attaining this end except by intellectual cognition ; but we set out from a different starting-point from that of the nineteenth century. Our science aims at being a knowledge of the *psychological* conditions of historical progress, whereas the knowledge of the nineteenth century was concentrated on the *technical and economic* conditions of that progress.

That is what we mean when we speak of a lower valuation of economic motives and of a higher valuation of psychological motives. We are concerned, not so much with a displacement upon the same plane, as with a plunge into greater depths. What Marx said about the importance of the economic causes of social evolution remains true on the plane where he gained this knowledge. If we were compelled to stay upon that plane, we should still have to admit the accuracy of his valuations, which were those of all the scientific thought of his epoch. If we refuse to do this, if to-day we regard his mode of thought as a hindrance, as a regressive evolution from the meaning to the unmeaning, from good to ill, it is because we have become able to see other truths, not by the side of the truth which he saw, but behind it. We see other truths because we *want* to see them, because we need new knowledge in order to prevent our reason from abdicating in face of the tension between our old knowledge and our new will.

We may frankly admit that Marx was right in his recognition of all the facts which led him to formulate his doctrine of the economic causation of social evolution ; and, further, we can agree that the deductions whereby he moved on from the knowledge of isolated phenomena to his general system were almost always perfectly logical. None the less, to-day, we reject his doctrine because it no longer explains to us what we wish to understand, and what we must understand if our actions are to have a meaning in our own eyes.

We can, therefore, accept for what it is worth the whole intellectual construction by which Marx derived the " ideological superstructure " from the " economic foundation ", " social thought " from " social existence ", etc. It has not been refuted ; but it has suffered a worse fate than that, for it has ceased to interest us. It no longer interests us for the very reason that we now wish to emancipate ourselves from this dependence of man upon the technical and economic conditions of existence. We want to start from the postulate that technique and economics depend upon man, for only on that condition can we believe that technique and economics have a meaning.

Above all, we need a science of the labour movement and of socialism which shall rest upon the great foundation of social experience itself. Marx could not establish such a science, for the requisite foundation of experience had not yet been laid in his time. Contemporary labour parties, the trade-union movement, social legislation, industrial democracy—all these, in Marx's days, existed only in the germ. If, to him, it seemed that the industrial struggles of the workers were merely a fight for the reallotment of the shares of surplus value, this was because, when Marx wrote, the conquest of a physical minimum of existence was still the indispensable preliminary condition which must be satisfied before any cultural claims could be made. If he regarded the State as nothing more than a mechanism of class oppression, and was unable to foresee the epoch when it would fulfil an organic function in the realisation of a moral social order, this was

because the State as he knew it, the State based upon a restricted suffrage, was all that he described.

He could not derive his mental picture of socialism from an actual socialist labour movement, because this movement, as a form of mass action, did not yet exist. Furthermore, Marx was of a bookish temperament, what we sometimes call a bookworm, who passed his days in an atmosphere remote from practical life, and above all from working-class life. Speaking of *Capital*, Bernard Shaw writes aptly, though rather pun- gently : " every reference . . . made to workers and capitalists showed that Marx had never breathed industrial air, and had dug his case out of blue-books in the British Museum ; . . . there was not a fact in *Das Kapital* that had not been taken out of a book, nor a discussion that had not been opened by somebody else's pamphlet".

To-day, we have access to a source for the study of socialism which had not been tapped when Marx wrote : the history of the socialist movement, of which Marxism itself is no more than a part. If we wish to emancipate ourselves from the trammels of dogmatic hypotheses, and thus enter the path which will lead us to this source, we need not repudiate the whole of Marxist thought after the manner in which a true dogma may be opposed to a false one. In order to open a trail that will lead to new truths, it will be enough to make due allowance for the conditions of time and place which made Marxism possible, and thus to throw light on the historical relativity of the value of the doctrine. Marxism is only erroneous because it has become so. If we wish to escape its errors, we must not retrace our steps, but go forward. What we have to transcend in Marxism is its claim to be for all time the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, about socialism and the social sciences.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### THE MARXISM OF THE ELECT AND THE MARXISM OF THE CROWD

No one ever has had, and no one ever will have, a true idea ; but there is a true way of having any idea you like to name, and that is to see the things through.

ALAIN : *Le citoyen contre les pouvoirs.*

I HOPE I have been able to make the reader understand why my judgment of Marxism is not based either upon the historical criticism of texts or upon the abstract discussion of " absolute truths ". A sociological doctrine which aims at being the program of a mass movement, gains thereby a meaning which does not wholly depend upon the will and the opinion of its initiator. In so far as it becomes the mode of consciousness of a movement, that is to say a complex of voluntary trends, it has an existence of its own. From the very fact that it lives, it is continually evolving. Its contents change in accordance with changes that ensue in course of time in the trend of the volitions which make up the movement. We have, therefore, to form a judgment, not only concerning the intentions of the creator of the doctrine, but also concerning the actions which are the outcome of the reciprocal reaction between his intentions and the intentions of others. We have to refer the original impulse to the original environment, but we must judge contemporary motives in the light of the tasks of to-day. Thus, the criticism of the doctrine ceases to be a criticism of various items of knowledge, and becomes a criticism of motives. We have not so much to compare one doctrine with another as to compare each doctrine with the tasks it has to fulfil in a given historical situation.

When I speak of liquidating Marxism, I do not so much think of liquidating a state of knowledge, as of liquidating

an impulse, in order to open the path to a new impulse for which an outlet has become necessary, and of providing for it as free a scope as possible. No doubt, this new impulse is not independent of the old one. On the contrary, it presupposes the existence of the old one. I doubt whether my own conception of socialism can be fully understood except by those who reach it through Marxism. Every new state in a movement is a synthesis of all the impulses which have, at a given moment, contributed to its formation. That is why Marxist impulses will always be more or less present in every subsequent form of the socialist movement. Yet every Marxist, as a good Hegelian, will understand me when I say that the synthesis is only possible to those who pass by way of the antithesis. If I am to be able to say "*after Marx*", I must first say "*against Marx*". If the new impulse is to be as efficacious as possible, the new elements in it must be made as clearly visible as possible; and, consequently, it must be formulated in the sharpest possible contrast with the old impulse. That is why (and not simply because I myself have only reached a new understanding by way of a criticism of Marxist doctrine) I put the main stress upon the points where I differ from Marx. If, some day, this is to lead to a new synthesis, that synthesis will be all the more fruitful in proportion as the antithesis has been thoroughly alive, conscious of its own will and of its own peculiar essence.

Only those among my readers who can thoroughly grasp this fact will be able to understand why, in contradistinction to all previous critics of Marx, I set out from the principle that what has to be criticised is, not Marx, but Marxism. If, none the less, I discuss Marx himself, the reason is simple. Marx belongs to Marxism because he gave the first impulse to the doctrine. But Marx is not the whole of Marxism, for Marxism has survived Marx. As regards the task of our own day, our sole concern is with the Marxism of to-day. Marx himself can only be of interest to us in so far as his original impulse is still living in the doctrine. That is why I claim the right of discussing, not only what Marx actually

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said, but also the fate of his opinions as embodied in the mass movement. In the sum total we call "Marxism", the decadent phenomena which have been spoken of as the "Marxism of the crowd" or "vulgar Marxism", are a no less essential part than are the scientific opinions included in the doctrine—the "Marxism of the elect", or "pure Marxism".

Vulgar Marxism is a doctrine in which the scientific elements have, by a regressive evolution, been transformed into symbols of the affects of the masses. For the thinker who creates a doctrine, the ideas it contains are concepts whose meaning derives from their logical relationships with other concepts, and remains unchanged only so long as these logical relationships are intact. It is true that the concepts are born out of a definite affective condition, but for the man who has conceived them their existence and their validity are independent of the continuance of this affective condition. Thus Marx would never have formulated the concept of exploitation in the course of the capitalist production of surplus value, had he not been led to do so by his affects (hostility towards the employing class, sympathy with the oppressed, moral revolt against the motive of gain in production). Once formulated, the concept, born as the end of a chain of scientific proofs, acquires a life of its own whose duration exceeds that of the affective complex—which the formulation of the complex has "resolved". The creative thinker thus transforms a feeling into an idea. He frees himself from a conflict between his own emotional way of valuing and his impressions of the external social world; he does so by transferring this conflict from the subconscious plane to the conscious, where the feelings can be attached to conscious ideas. By thus harmonising emotional conflicts through their transformation into conceptual antagonisms, the thinker, so to say, sets himself free. He must reason in the way he does in order to rid himself of a painful feeling, of an affective complex which burdens him.

The masses, on the other hand, when predisposed by a similar affect, grasp the idea in order to incorporate it into

an existing emotional complex. They apprehend the idea in the form of a word or a phrase. These words are charged with affect; they are charged with an emotional state which corresponds to a trend of will already existing or in course of formation. Thus the idea becomes the symbol of this volition. It strengthens kindred volitions, and in that way favours action as a sequel to the emotions which it arouses. Thenceforward, the meaning and the power of the symbol depend upon the direction and the power of the volition which makes use of it. The effect of a symbol depends entirely upon the affective state which predisposes to its acceptance. In practice, its value can only be measured by its affective efficiency, quite independently of any understanding of the logical procedure whereby its inventor was led to formulate it, and of any acceptance of that procedure. When the affective state which has led to the adoption of a given symbol changes, the affective content, and therewith the subjective significance of the symbol, change in the same direction.

For instance, the concept of exploitation, which Marx based upon scientific argument, acquires a symbolical significance of this kind in the minds of the masses. Millions of workers believe that Marx proved that the employers unjustly appropriate part of the value which they, the workers, create—namely surplus value. Among these millions, you will hardly find a few hundred who are capable of understanding Marx's arguments. The immense majority never attempt to get acquainted with them. Besides, the arguments have no bearing upon the symbolical use of the concepts "surplus value" and "exploitation". The symbolical use is entirely based upon the feeling the worker has, born out of experience, that he is being exploited. The notions of exploitation and surplus value accord with the feeling that he is underpaid. He therefore accepts them as symbols of the voluntary trend which they characterise, and is fortified by the assurance that Marx proved the reality of the concepts in question in a marvellously learned work. Thus the worker does what Marx himself did, and what we all do when we think; he transforms



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his subjective sentiment into an object. In Marx, this objectivation meant that he created ideas ; in the Marxist disciple it means that he conceives these ideas as objective facts, which for him become symbols of his affects and his volitions.

It is thus that a word or a phrase which expresses an idea becomes a catchword, a slogan, a shibboleth. The finer shades of difference which Marx introduces into his argument, the differences between value and price, between the value of labour power and wages, between surplus value and profit, or between the coefficient of surplus value and the coefficient of exploitation, are of no importance in the eyes of the masses, and are ignored by them. On the other hand, the masses regard as fundamental that which Marx intentionally left in the shade, or tacitly assumed to be already proved, namely the moral stigma which attaches to the employing class for an unjust appropriation of surplus value. In fact, whereas the creator of the idea tried to render the logic of his deductions more striking by the elimination of all emotional judgments, those who adopt the idea in order to make of it a symbol of their aspirations care only for its emotional coloration and for its power of stimulating affect.

That is why a movement which makes use of certain doctrines as symbols, as does every Church and every party, tends in the long run to move towards goals which have nothing in common with the original significance of the symbolised ideas, although the symbols have remained unchanged. In fact, the significance of these symbols for the movement, and their practical efficiency, is nowise the logical outcome of the intellectual process which was needed to set them up. The meaning and the use of the symbols depends solely upon their power of symbolising an affective state aroused by the conditions under which the masses live. The modification of these conditions of life brings about a change in the affective condition ; thereupon, the symbol will either decay, or (and this is what usually happens) will acquire a new meaning. Once launched among the masses, the symbol gains a life of its own,

and is cut adrift from the intentions of the man who, intellectually speaking, was its creator; it has become nothing more than the vehicle of an emotional content dependent upon the affective state of the masses who use it. That is why, in all socialist doctrines, the only element of practical importance is the phraseology which lends itself to a transformation into emotional symbols, to the formation of watch-words or war-cries. Whatever the importance of the rest of these doctrines in relation to the biographies of socialist thinkers or in relation to the history of science, the history of socialist reality is only concerned with affective phraseology. Marxism, therefore, is that which the labour movement, regarded as a totality of trends of emotion and will, has made of the theoretical system of Marx. Nothing else is alive in Marxism, for nothing else is able to create life, new social life.

What matters, then, is, not that we should know what can be proved as deductions from Marx's doctrines, but what part of these doctrines has proved itself in the form of practical irradiations. This means that we are concerned, not with the teachings of Marx, but with Marxism. Marx only formulated doctrines in order to act by their means. The efficacy of his teaching is the criterion of his value to men who live and act to-day. Those of his teachings which are not discoverable in Marxism have not acted, and consequently, as far as we are concerned, they are negligible. The only thing of interest to us is what has acted, and what is still alive to-day. You may call that "vulgar Marxism", you may call it "Marxism of the crowd", if you please. But all Marxism is to-day "vulgar Marxism", save only that which takes the form of biographical researches and the criticism of texts—activities alien to our epoch and devoid of influence upon our destinies. It may seem very alluring to attempt the annihilation of vulgar Marxism, wherever this differs from the Marxism of the master, with the aid of quotations from the master's text; but the attempt is futile, for texts in which the masses have no faith (because they have been useless in daily life) cannot sap the faith of the masses in the symbolical phraseology which has

become the instrument of the mass will. You might just as well try to induce the Catholic Church to dissolve by drawing attention to some passage in the scriptures which had hitherto escaped attention or had been misinterpreted! The Marx who lives in the faith of the masses cannot be refuted by a Marx who exists only on the book-shelves of dryasdust investigators. Living truth and living error are both of them stronger than dead truth; the proof of their strength is found in the very fact that they are alive. It is futile to regret that the truths enunciated by a prophet have not all of them proved viable. The viability of truths depends upon the mentality of those who listen to them. In one respect, at least, every thinker is condemned to be misunderstood. His ideas resemble seeds, some of which are carried away by the wind, while some of those which germinate will produce fruits of a different taste from that wished by the sower. However, it is written: "By their fruits ye shall know them". The inevitability of such misunderstandings is, in great part, the tragedy of history, where the tragical destiny is not solely that of the individual who is misunderstood, but also that of the masses who misunderstand.

Perhaps my readers will now grasp why, when I say that Marxism must be superseded, I am thinking, not only of the "vulgar" Marxism which lives mainly in the phraseological faith of the communist masses, but also of the "pure" Marxism of the socialist theoreticians who would fain graft the old apple tree and make it bear oranges. Vain is their hope! While they are at work with their grafting knives, they are being pelted with the apples (some fresh and some rotten) which they themselves helped to garner.

That is why I say we must liquidate vulgar Marxism, because it derives its strength from error; and must liquidate pure Marxism because, outside the domain of this error, it no longer has any force. Vulgar Marxism is a living error; pure Marxism is a dead truth. Spengler has good reason for saying that one no longer troubles to refute it, and is content to say that it is tedious. The pure Marxism of the savants

has long since ceased to vivify socialist practice. As arsenal of a traditional propagandist phraseology, it serves only to facilitate a demagogic competition with communism, a propaganda whose spirit has for many years been out of harmony with the real aspirations of the non-communist labour movement. The communists, in fact, who preach the Marxism of the crowd, are the true inheritors of Marxism: not, perhaps, in the sense that they understand Marx better in relation to his epoch; but certainly in the sense that they use Marx more efficiently in relation to the tasks of their own epoch for the realisation of their own objectives. Kautsky's picture of Marx probably resembles the real Marx more closely than does the picture which Lenin has popularised among his disciples; but Kautsky makes comments upon a policy which he does not influence, whereas the watchwords Lenin has drawn from Marx are practical politics after Lenin's death, and go on creating political realities.

The communist movement is the only mass movement in which Marxism survives as a vigorous faith. The communists have drawn all the energy that can be drawn from the emotional impetus of Marxist phraseology. In their hands has fructified the living seed which Marx sowed in the minds of the masses. They have made of Marxism a religion, and this was the only way to make of Marxism a living force, for science does not become a concern of the masses until it establishes a faith. Even in the days when Marxism was still the official doctrine of a unified socialist movement, it was never anything other than a faith, though theory came, in the end, to harmonise less and less with practice. As regards the non-communist working-class movement, this retains nothing more of the faith than ritual formulas. The sap of the Marxist trunk has all flowed into the communist branch. The "pure" Marxists, the socialists who repudiate modern communism, make books; the communists, the "vulgar" Marxists, guide parties. The ruminant Marxism of the socialists is powerless against the carnivorous Marxism of the communists. As soon as Marxism becomes a faith of the masses, every one of its

doctrines (difficult though their popularisation may seem) acquires an emotional tint which transforms it into a war-cry of the Marxism of the crowd.

Every one of the intellectual formulas of Marxism which has become a vital symbol, has been transformed in this way among the masses. As soon as the masses learn, more or less indirectly, about the Marxist theory of surplus value, they draw from it the inference that the only productive work is that of proletarians, and this reinforces their conviction that the members of all the other classes, headed by the capitalists, lead an idle parasitic life, and may therefore justly be regarded with contempt. If, in a working-class meeting, the speaker shows that most of the captains of industry are extremely active persons, and that their work has an exceptionally high social value, the audience is greatly troubled. What is said does not in the least affect the accuracy of socialist conclusions, but it conflicts with an affect which is symbolised by the conventional catchwords of the movement. When the masses speak of "surplus value", they attach to it a sense of moral blame for which there is no warrant in Marx's original formulation.

The formula about the "expropriation of the expropriators" relates in Marx's writings to the supposed dialectical inevitability in accordance with which the means of production, after an economic catastrophe, will pass back into the hands of the producers, who thenceforward will comprise the whole of society. This formula serves to nourish a longing for vengeance in the minds of the masses who feel that they have been robbed, and look forward to getting back stolen goods. Among the German communists there was for a time current a slogan "Steal the stolen goods!" which was regarded as a justification for expropriations during periods of civil war. Thus a dialectical law of determinism has been changed into an imperative which presupposes and encourages among the anticapitalists the very motives of gain for which the capitalists are blamed.

The formula "scientific socialism" has been seized upon

by an affect, thanks to which a subjective social concept now lays claim to the aureole of objective and absolute truth. Marx himself aimed at showing the relativity of social science (a relativity shared with all the other ideologies, since every one of them moves towards objectives which vary from class to class and from age to age); but the masses were charmed by the label "scientific", for they had breathed in with the atmosphere of their century a faith in the sovereignty and infallibility of scientific thought. In consequence, there has grown up a scientific superstition of which science itself has been the first victim, leading in practical politics to fanaticism, intolerance, and terrorism, such as have invariably characterised superstition.

The concept of the class struggle has undergone a kindred evolution. The notion of a conflict of interests and of wills has given place to an affective state, and this has sympathetically annexed all the passions which, in the course of historical evolution, have linked social manifestations with the fighting instinct. As a result, the masses often go so far as to connect with the idea of the class war a denial of the right of the members of the opposing class to exist, in so far as their extinction is regarded as essential to the interests of the proletariat. Following Marx's example, the class struggle is identified with class interest, and the passions arising out of this interest are supposed to be entirely exempt from moral obligations, inasmuch as the idea of class is conceived to be the only valid social bond. Thus the ethic of the class war comes to resemble that of ordinary warfare, in which necessity knows no law. In countries where, and in times when, mass psychology is profoundly influenced by militarist traditions and warlike experiences, the catchword of the class war is raised to the rank of a strategical principle.

The same emotional coloration explains the numerous and interesting transformations undergone by the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat", although Marx himself had no intention to make of this a war-cry. Originally, it was nothing more than a political hypothesis, an accessory sketch of a

political theory. It has become an article of faith for the millions upon millions of communists, the reason being that they regard it as a means for the discharge of a long-accumulated passion for revenge. As regards Marx's own use of the term, a reference to the originals shows that all he wished to imply was that the working class, after winning its way to political power, would have, first of all, to govern as a ruling class, until, by means of this political power, it would be able to put an end to all the causes of class differentiation. As far as I know, the phrase is only used by Marx in two of his letters; and the context shows that, when envisaging this temporary class dominion, he was not thinking of dictatorial methods at all, but of democratic methods. What, however, is left of such shades of thought as soon as the passion of the masses runs away with a phrase of this kind? Textual criticism is impotent against a word which promises to justify the lust for vengeance upon sometime oppressors, and to provide opportunity for its gratification. That is the only thing which counts. The trappings of the doctrine are mere book wisdom.

Long before the communists had discovered the "dictatorship of the proletariat", Marxist socialists had made a similar use of the idea of the revolution. In Marx's writings, this primarily means "revolution" in a Hegelian sense, that is to say the sudden reversal of a particular state of affairs as the outcome of the victory of an antithetical dialectical principle; it applies equally well to political revolutions and to purely conceptual revolutions, like those in the method of production. But the masses had already come to infuse into the notion of revolution, an emotional content derived from the historical experience of the British revolution, the French revolution, etc.—an emotional content connected with the use of armed force in order to achieve the conquest of political power. Nor did Marx himself intend to exclude the use of force. Still, the affective coloration which the notion acquired in the popular mind necessarily restricted its original dialectical significance. The dialectical meaning became romanticist. In the Latin countries, this led to an intermingling (quite

contrary to Marx's own intentions) of Marxist revolutionism with Blanquism and conspiratorial traditions ; and in Russia, with a nihilist tradition of individual acts of terrorism and of theories of direct expropriation. Marx was a peaceful man of letters, and, in his quiet workroom, the revolution did not mean very much more than the chemical formula of an explosive ; but in a mass movement, under stress of mass passion, it means the explosion itself—the explosion of psychological forces which, during and after the explosion, pass out of the control of those who penned the original formula. Such is the fate of persons who invent war-cries. They call up spirits which they believe they will be able to control, but the spirits control the magicians, for they are spirits of passion which compel the spirits of reason to serve them.

Thus, in the development of the theory of every social movement, there always comes a time when the intellectual impulses, the creative forces, instilled by the initiator, lose their independent vitality, and become, in practice, subject to impulses which derive from the masses—easily stirred by affects, through sluggish thinkers. Ideas become mass objectives, following the line of least resistance. Even after the new impulse they have transmitted has begun to die away, they remain useful to the masses as warrant for an attitude which is conservative in its intellectual essence. As soon as such a dying away of the impulse has begun, a further spiritual development of the movement cannot be effected without a negative criticism of its doctrine ; for dead branches must always be sawed off a little nearer the trunk than the place where they have begun to perish.

This brings us to an extremely characteristic fact. The elements of Marxism which I regard as the most vulnerable, precisely because they are associated with an outworn materialistic mentality, are the very ones which, at the present time, are most alive in the faith of the masses—in this sense, that their phraseology is most easily popularised, and is most persistent. The expressions, "determinism", "rationalism", and "hedonism", which I have used to denote the three



pillars of Marxist thought that have been most effectively undermined by contemporary science, characterise the very elements that have most conspicuously enabled Marxism to become popular among the masses of the workers. Wherever Marxism is or has been the dominant form of working-class socialism (as it was in Germany when the Lassallist period was over), we must unhesitatingly admit that there is a conformity between Marxist ways of thinking and the mentality of the masses as brought about by the special circumstances of their social and political destiny.

The valuations whereby such a socialist mentality secures expression are, ultimately, emotional and customary valuations of motives. The theory of motives which underlies Marxism corresponds in certain essential points with the valuation of motives which is realised in the daily environment of proletarian life, in so far as this derives from the experience of a hierarchical and feudal capitalist system.

To the economic hedonism of Marxism, there corresponds in this environment a tendency to give an especially high valuation to the economic motive, that is to say to all the actions inspired by the acquisitive instinct which capitalism has unchained. This valuation corresponds to a social destiny which condemns the manual worker to economic dependence, subordinates all his life to care for daily bread, and makes it impossible for him to better his lot in any other way than by the stimulation of his own acquisitive instinct in opposition to that of the employer and the middleman. The worker living in an environment which seems to him entirely dominated by the motive of gain, introduces a high valuation of this motive into his general conception of society, and of the whole social past. That is why he is so ready to accept the materialist conception of history, in which an excessive valuation of the economic motive has become the basis of a sociology.

Similarly with regard to the acceptance of the motives of social coercion and rational utility, which are the bases of Marxist determinism and rationalism. In all the countries where, and in all the periods when, Marxist socialism has

flourished, social conditions have been of such a kind that the worker was naturally inclined to regard society as a coercive mechanism deciding his own volitions. His work is essentially a carrying out of the orders of those who plan and guide it. His choice of a dwelling depends upon the chances of his employment, in the selection of which he has had very little say. As a rule, the only way in which he can improve his individual lot is therefore by way of a collective improvement in the lot of his workmates or classmates, and consequently he has to subordinate his individual will to a collective will. Furthermore, within the conditions of time and place we are now considering, he is treated as an inferior being by the social and political hierarchy, and his whole position in relation to all the social powers (especially the powers of State) implies a permanent submission to a will stronger than his own. That is why he considers the coercive motive of necessity so supremely important as a determinant. Since, for him, all social reality signifies coercion, he is naturally inclined to believe in a doctrine which explains the whole history of the past, and even the order of the universe, as the outcome of necessity, as due to the working of iron laws.

The most obvious and immediate necessities in his experience are the earning of his daily bread, and the carrying out of the work that is ordered. In his relationships with the employer who pays him his wages, just as in his relationships with his daily task of production, he sees a condition of affairs dominated by the rational knowledge of utility. He regards the employer as one whose sole concern is with gain, one whose actions are exclusively inspired by the acquisitive instinct consciously exercised. The worker does not work because he takes pleasure in what he is doing, but because he has a utilitarian need for daily bread. His work is the permanent application of rational, causal, and mechanical thought, directing mechanical tasks aiming at the achievement of utility. His personal social experience leads him to believe that nothing happens except as the outcome of an interest recognised as utilitarian. The only social behaviour which seems to him

sincere and noteworthy is, therefore, that which is susceptible of explanation in terms of interest. He distrusts all conceptions which do not present themselves as the defence of some interest or other ; and he is shy of ideas which cannot be represented as the logical application of a mechanical law. This mentality largely explains the mistrust of religious traditions which is so characteristic of the modern industrial worker, as contrasted with the peasant, whose working and living environment is dominated by the laws of organic growth. As Bertrand Russell aptly remarks, we can easily understand that a peasant should believe in a god who makes the weather ; but it is difficult to imagine the British Miners' Federation arranging that prayers should be offered up for the refilling of worked-out coal seams with coal ! To the industrial operatives, and in general to townsmen, it naturally seems that all the forces which preside over their lot must be knowable by human reason and explicable in terms of the action of mechanical causality. Such a system of thought as Marxism, in which hedonist and rationalist motives become the supreme law of social existence, is appropriate to this experience and this mentality.

That is why Marxism, notwithstanding the asseverations of the Marxists that their doctrine claims only to be a sociology and not a universal philosophy, has in practice, among the proletarian strata which have been subject to its influence, founded a rudimentary philosophy, practically a religion.

There is much truth in Guyau's remark : " Religion is a universal sociomorphism ; the religious sentiment is a feeling of the dependence of will-forces which man projects into the universe ". This much is certain, that every sense of social relationship tends to expand into a sense of cosmical relationship, in this way, that the motives which are seen to be at work in social destiny are introduced into the interpretation of all the happenings in the universe. Such a contention is confirmed by the fact that in all countries where the workers have accepted Marxist socialism (in contrast with English-speaking lands), a rejection of traditional religious beliefs has become a matter of course.

We are, therefore, entitled to say that Marxism, despite the claim that it is nothing more than a sociology, has really become a rudimentary philosophy, or a rudimentary religion—a sort of substitute religion. This has happened, not in spite of the sociological character of the doctrine, but because of it. For the very reason that Marxism is in conformity with the desire of the masses to construct an image of the universe based upon their image of society, within two or three generations (among the working masses of central and eastern Europe) it has been able to acquire the formidable influence which nothing but a religion can exercise. The influence of the different varieties of the Christian faith has been overthrown, because they claimed their authority from an emotional or rational revelation which, instead of resulting from the transference of empirical social valuations to the image of the universe, conflicted with these valuations. Marxist workmen regard such religions as hypocritical because they preach a morality which does not conform to the actual morality seen at work in industrial daily life, and because they construct an image of the universe which conflicts with the social experience of the industrial worker and with the ways of thinking which derive from his experience. Thus the religious beliefs enshrined in the hearts of millions of persons by the traditions of centuries have, within the space of a few decades, been replaced by a Marxist faith whose attraction is derived from the fact that it deduces the conception of the world from social experience, whereas the Churches have vainly attempted to do the opposite.

That is why Marxism, in its effect upon those sections of the working class whose outlooks on life it forms, returns to the philosophy out of which it was born in the minds of Marx and Engels. Their sociology was only the projection of a philosophical picture of the universe (issuing from their rationalist atheism) upon a fragment of that universe—the social fragment. The masses which have accepted this sociology, have retransformed it into a philosophy, by projecting (in the inverse direction) the silhouette of the

fragmentary social image upon the cosmical screen. The same outlook on the world is found at the beginning and at the end of the development.

It is important to note here that such a world outlook, such a world feeling, has no essentially socialist elements in it. True that it corresponds to a proletarian experience ; but that experience has no meaning except in so far as proletarian mentality implies an "adaptation" to the capitalist environment without the "contrary reaction" against the environment which is the essence of socialist conviction. Such a world feeling is an index of the cultural and spiritual poverty of the proletariat, and not of its creative capacity. We see here the reflex of the phenomenon in accordance with which Marxism is preeminently the doctrine of a proletariat which is beginning to awaken to the consciousness of its condition as a mere object ; rather than the doctrine of a working class which has already, thanks to its own struggle, attained to a certain measure of social dignity and to an active participation in the determination of its own social lot. In a profounder sense than Sombart's, we can apply here what Sombart said of Marx, who "set out, like Columbus, to discover socialism, and found capitalism on his way—much as Columbus set out to discover India and found America on his way". The sketch I have just been drawing of the rationalist, determinist, and hedonist foundations of the Marxist proletarian mentality, is concerned only with the phenomena which comprise the capitalist environment ; it has no bearing on the psychological objectives which are rooted in a precapitalist or generally human ethic, and in the world of socialist ideas. When we seek for the causes which have made of Marxism the masked religion of proletarian cynicism and materialism, we find the causes which have made it, in the psychological domain as well, culminate in a capitalism of the obverse sign. The ideological elements in question, which are based upon the adaptation to a particular environment, make it easy for this environment to achieve a psychological reconquest of the ideology.

This contention is confirmed by the characteristic way in

which Marxism, born east of the Rhine, has, after a period of ostensibly universal dominion, again become the peculiar form of socialism in central and eastern Europe. In doing so, it has remained what it was in its origins, a typical form of proletarian socialism in countries without democracy, or at any rate without a democratic tradition. This seems obvious as far as Russian communism is concerned. But it may be as well to give a demonstration of the fact as regards pre-war Germany, where Marxism received its classical configuration, and whence it spread to the labour movement all over the world. If we ask why precommunist Marxism could only establish and maintain itself in Germany, in German-speaking lands, and in the regions of central and northern Europe intellectually influenced by Germany, we shall find the reason in the remarkable conformity of Marxist mentality with the German national character as displayed in the reign of William II. To understand this character, we must refer it to the cultural effects of a rapid though belated evolution towards large-scale industry in an authoritarian and militarist State devoid of democratic traditions. That is to say, we must realise that it was the outcome of conditions thanks to which Germany, politically speaking (current Marxist theory notwithstanding), appears rather as a young and backward country than as an advanced country.

A concentration of the labour movement upon the struggle for political power, and the State-socialist coloration of the Marxist picture of the future, correspond to the condition of affairs in a country where the crushing power of the State, the popular faith in the patriarchal duty of the State to help the weak, and the lack of political freedom, have led the workers to concentrate their attention primarily on the State. That is why the trade unions and the cooperatives were slow to develop in Germany, whereas in the more western countries of Europe they formed the basis of a movement which speedily endeavoured to attain its ends without recourse to the State.

The Marxist conception of the class struggle as a simple problem of power—a problem which, after a period of

increasing mutual tension, will be solved in a quasi-mechanical fashion by the sudden transition of the working class from a state of oppression to a state of rule—is the social reflex of the militarist State of pre-war Germany. Rigid Marxist and Hegelian dialectic, according to which every political minority must be content with the endeavour to increase its power by agitation, until this power at length becomes great enough to effect the catastrophic overthrow of its adversaries, is a mode of thought which to the French and to the English workers (who have a better grasp of the shades of political possibility) seems a crude political strategy worthy of the sergeants' mess. Nevertheless, there was hardly any other possibility open to social democracy in the Prussianised Germany of pre-war days. The militarist character of the monarchy, the impotence of the parliaments, the brutal authoritarianism of the ruling Junkers, the lack of political culture in the bourgeoisie, combined to bring about the crude oppression of an opposition party, until the time when growing discontents became powerful enough to enable the opposition at one and the same time to crush its parliamentary adversaries and to overthrow the whole system of government. On the other hand, the socialist parties of the West were able (owing rather to democratic traditions, and to the custom of parliamentary compromise, than to any constitutional texts) to exercise upon the State and the administration a positive influence, increasing as their membership grew, and thus progressing in a gradual and experimental fashion.

Marxist doctrine turns upon the idea of a class struggle which will lead to victory, after the fashion of ordinary warfare, thanks to a progressive increase in the number of the ultimately successful combatants, an improvement in their discipline, and an intensification in their fighting spirit. It was natural that such an ideology should find a favourable soil in Germany. I do not mean to imply that the Germans are constitutionally bellicose, as some of their enemies believe (and not a few of the Germans themselves). Long ago, no doubt, prior to the days of medieval civilisation, the Teutons were a fighting race.

But a warlike past is common to most of the Aryan races at a corresponding level of social evolution, and there is hardly one of the European nations which has the right to reproach any of the others in this respect. Besides, there is no evidence as to the hereditary transmission of racial characteristics which warrants the belief that warlike instincts of two thousand years back can be responsible for militarism in the nineteenth century. Twenty centuries of agricultural and industrial civilisation must have been long enough to enable a fighting instinct to be sublimated into customary motives directed towards other objectives than militarism and war. The English offer a good example of this. Their Anglo-Saxon and Norman origins link them with a past which is certainly quite as bellicose as that of the Germans. Nevertheless, down to the outbreak of the world war, they were so unmilitarised a people that they were inclined to regard the wearing of a military uniform as carrying with it a stamp of social inferiority. Their inborn combative instincts had been so completely metamorphosed by education as to find adequate satisfaction in the ordinary tasks of a trading, manufacturing, seafaring, and colonising people. Or, if any margin remained, the surplus of the fighting instinct was fully satisfied in sport and politics. The French, on the other hand, although they are only in part of Teutonic origin, have been a military nation much longer and far more markedly than the Germans. Even before the experience (so unwholesome for them) of victory in the world war, they were already, of all the inhabitants of Europe, those who were most inclined to wax enthusiastic on behalf of military glory and military power. But the Germans, at the time when the national characteristics of the European peoples were taking a fixed shape after the formation of the national States and the development of the great national languages (that is say from the early Middle Ages down to the close of the eighteenth century), were among the least bellicose folk in Europe. When the wars of conquest waged by the kings of France were making a cult of military glory an integral part of the French national



character, the Germans were no more than the passive victims of the wars which devastated their country, and in which, being greatly impoverished, they were content to serve as mercenaries. Above all, they were spared the unfortunate psychological consequences of the historical association between the revolutionary ideal and compulsory military service, such as in France was strengthened by the wars of the revolution and to some extent by the Napoleonic wars. It is obvious that the brief period of liberal reforms which concided with the German wars of liberation after 1813 could not possibly establish a democratic bellicose popular tradition in the same way as did the wars of the French people in defence of the revolution. Even the French civil wars of the nineteenth century, down to the Paris Commune in 1871, helped to link up the delight in military display and in the use of military force with the deepest cravings of the popular and democratic mind.

In contrast with all this, German militarism of the nineteenth century seems not so much the expression of racial predisposition as the new product of a comparatively recent historical evolution. This evolution, which to begin with was restricted to Prussia, and was instigated by the French example, did not really begin until the reign of Frederick the Great, only involved the whole German nation after the battle of Jena, and did not exercise decisive influence upon the German national character until the nineteenth century was well advanced. Indeed, as far as the masses of the German people were concerned, the influence did not show itself so much as warlike enthusiasm and as a passion for glory after the French model, as in the formation of the habits of organisation, subordination, and discipline, which gave so characteristic a stamp to the activities of the German army and the German nation during the world war. Such habits were readily formed thanks to the peculiar social situation of the country, a situation which (partly owing to political disintegration and to cultural backwardness) enabled the social order of the feudal age to remain in being right on into the beginnings of the modern era of large-scale capitalism.

To sum up, the social function of German militarism in the nineteenth century was to maintain and to perfect the psychological ties of the hierarchical precapitalist order, in such a way as to enable them to give solid support to the new hierarchy and to industrial capitalism. The man who has been disciplined to obey a sergeant's order, will likewise be ready to do what he is told by a rough-tongued foreman.

This readiness for subordination which has become a national trait of the Germans was also manifest (continues to manifest itself almost as strongly as before, notwithstanding the suppression of compulsory military service) in the political relationships between rulers and ruled, in the everyday relationships between the public and the officialdom, the apprentice and the craftsman, the employed and the employer, the schoolboy and the schoolmaster, the servant and the master, children and parents, the members of a party and the executive committee—in a word, between the lower and the higher orders in all hierarchies of whatever kind. The German labour movement could not escape this influence, since it was made up of human beings. An extremely characteristic fact in this connexion has been the remarkable and unexpected success of the republican organisation known as the Reichsbanner, which in the course of a few weeks secured millions of members, most of them socialist working men. This success cannot be explained as solely due to political motives, which might have equally well benefited the ordinary party organisations. It was mainly dependent upon psychological causes of a far more general order. Certainly the idea of depriving the nationalist reactionaries of their monopoly in war games (which made them so dangerously alluring to young folk), was a stroke of genius. Since the suppression of compulsory military service, millions of Germans, ex-soldiers, or younger sons born too late for the harvest of glory, have been suffering—unconsciously for the most part—from a repression of deep-seated instincts inherited from the old regime; fighting instincts, and habits of command and subordination. The Reichsbanner gave then an opportunity of satisfying these instincts while fighting against the

attempt to restore the old order. Furthermore, its main attraction was, not so much any promise it held out of giving opportunities for the use of physical force, as the traditional delight in soldierly exercises, participation in the activities of a drilled body of men—pleasure in wearing uniform, marching in the ranks, giving and obeying orders.

A good many years ago now, in his book *Political Parties*, Robert Michels showed to how great an extent German socialist literature had borrowed its terminology, and, above all, its emotional slogans, from the vocabulary of militarism. This is hardly less true to-day, and the resemblances between the phraseology of military life and of the working-class movement indicate a close kinship between certain typical affective processes in the one and the other. A people which reacts so vigorously to the stimulating watchwords of the militarist and bellicose frame of mind, is naturally receptive to a doctrine which gives to aggressiveness in social struggles a profound ethical significance. The fact that Marxism has enabled the communist revolution to profit by the habits of subordination and by the psychosis of war and of violence which formed part of the heritage of the world war, gives further proof of the intimate psychological connexion between Marxism and militarism.

German Marxist socialism is one element of a national political mentality, in this respect, that, like the militarist regime, it has always regarded the individual as nothing more than a means for the realisation of a collective aim incarnated in the State. The Englishman, on the other hand, whether conservative or socialist, is of a typically contrasted type. He regards political and legal organisation as a means for the realisation of the aims of the individual and for the safeguarding of individual rights. We must not forget that, down to the days of the Weimar constitution, Germans knew of the State only as a will imposed from above. It therefore appeared perfectly natural to a German that the State should instruct him; should be his moral guide; should take care of him when he was poor, ill, or old; should lead him by the hand

along the pathways of life, meticulously inform him as to what was forbidden or recommended by the authorities, and, in general, play the part of a mentor whom the pupil cannot always love but must necessarily regard with respect and must perforce obey. If we wish to realise how repugnant such an idea is to the English, we need only remind ourselves of how the English detested the increase in the powers of the State which were rendered necessary by the war between 1914 and 1919; how eager they were to rid themselves of all these new developments as soon as the war was over—beginning with compulsory military service. In Britain, a deep-seated traditional repugnance had to be overcome before people would agree to the State education of children. The Englishman's attitude towards a policeman differs fundamentally from the German's; for whereas to the German the policeman is the armed representative of a superior authority, to the Englishman he is simply a courteous public servant, whose business it is to see to the discharge of certain necessary tasks of communal life. The German is proud of the police force because he regards it as the symbol of State authority; the Englishman only tolerates the police amiably because he knows that seven centuries of the Great Charter and two-and-a-half centuries of the Habeas Corpus Act safeguard him against the danger that the policeman's truncheon will become the symbol of an authoritarian State.

On the continent of Europe, there is a similar contrast between the countries on either side of the Rhine. In France, Marxism has always been an imported product. The political trends accordant with the French national character have found expression in various active socialist doctrines, such as Proudhonism, anarchism, federalism, revolutionary syndicalism, etc., which are always strongly tinged with individualism and autonomism. Even to such a man as Jaurès, who by disposition was strongly inclined towards mass synthesis, democracy appeared essentially as a claim made by individuals on the State. To Bebel, on the other hand, it seemed that democracy was a claim made by the State on individuals.

Bebel's ideal of the "people's State" always smacked of barrack life; at bottom, it was nothing more than a depersonalised form of the monarchy of Frederick II placed at the service of an ideal of economic equality. That accounts for the phenomenon (which is so characteristic of German and Marxist mentality) of the identification of the State with society. It implies an identification of political ethics with social ethics, of duty towards the State with duty towards society.

It is characteristic that, when indulging in thoughts of Utopia, the German socialist speaks of the "Zukunftsstaat" (the State of the future); that the Frenchman speaks of the "cité future" or the "société future"; while the Englishman speaks of the "cooperative commonwealth" or of the "socialist society". In Germany, it was the State which established machinery for the direct representation of the workers in the management of industry, whereas the initiative in this respect has been taken by the trade unions in western lands. The German factory councils, moreover, have fulfilled the intentions of the legislature by guiding the momentary products of the revolutionary ferment of 1918 and 1919 (products formed on the Russian model) into the channels safely banked in by a new official hierarchy. In Germany, the factory councils have served very little to give expression to the idea of workers' control or to the idea of industrial democracy. As soon as the political excitement of the revolutionary epoch had subsided, they became, in practice, a mere regulatory apparatus to decide rates of wages under the paternal supervision of new "authorities". Speaking generally, the revolution of 1918 has left the State and the officialdom intact. Indeed, it has, on the whole, reinforced their authority. This is not surprising in view of the existence of a socialist mentality which regards the State, not as an institution to be itself transformed, but as a mere means for bringing about the social changes desired by socialists.

Within the labour movement, the relationship between the individual and the State is reflected in the relationship between the individual and the working-class organisation, Strict

party discipline is foreign to the British mentality. The Englishman is proud of the fact that his political parties, like his trade unions, are organised upon autonomist and federalist principles, though to a German this seems a disastrous lack of centralisation. The Englishman does not understand how the German worker can derive from the idea of the class struggle a mystical exaltation of his personal value. When an Englishman defends class interests, he does so for his own advantage ; when he wishes to conquer a better future for the working class, he does not feel that he is fulfilling a class mission, but that he is acting in obedience to an individual ethical imperative. Long since, he has freed his mind from the coercive notion of the hierarchical State, which in Germany has survived on into the epoch of large-scale industry, making of German proletarian class consciousness a notion enforced from above, and of German Marxism a doctrine of the historical mission of the working class.

The amazing rapidity with which, during the last third of the nineteenth century, Germany became transformed from a State of peasants and petty bourgeois into a great industrial power, without any adaptation to this tempo on the part of the political and cultural evolution of the country, accounts for many of the other traits of German national character in recent days thanks to which the German workers have been predisposed towards Marxism. One might almost say that in Germany a capitalist class sprouted out of the ground within a single generation. A mushroom growth, it had no time (like the corresponding class in Britain) to accustom itself, by social and political experience slowly acquired, to the chivalrous traditions of sport and to the mentality of compromise. We must remember that in pre-war Germany all able-bodied men of the ruling class, having served in the conscript army, held commissions in the reserve. This, in conjunction with the example of the authoritarian State, and the persistence of traditions of obedience among the people, helped to make of them a superior caste, and to accentuate the effect of an unduly rapid selection of the ruling class in

industry. This selection has brought to the top of the new social hierarchy, not the most stable elements or those most polished by a long-standing culture, but those whose minds are most crudely dominated by a frenzied desire for wealth and power. The brutality displayed by a new ruling class of this kind in the exercise of its power naturally arouses a corresponding embitterment in the ruled. Among these, likewise, the acquisitive instinct comes to the front ; and resistance to aggression tends to be regarded as a kind of militarisation of the struggle of interests, a struggle whose outcome will be wholly decided by brute force and by the submission of the combatants to an iron discipline. Even better can we understand how it is that, under conditions in which all social relationships have been thus revolutionised by industrial progress, the economic element has acquired in the eyes of the workers the significance of an omnipotent fate. It is natural, then, that the coercive idea of economic necessity should be regarded by the workers as the basis of a social philosophy.

In pre-war Germany, the effect of these conditions was to transform the temperament of the working class in line with the general evolution of Germany. What used to be a "kindly" land, petty bourgeois, sentimental, romanticist, and idealist, has become the Germany of the captains of industry, of armed condottieri, a land with a morose and cynical philosophy, where the only realities seem to be the brazen facts of authority and wealth. The intellectual symbol of the metamorphosis was the victory of Hegel over Kant, of the philosophy of natural necessity over the philosophy of moral obligation. At the same time, this symbolised that infection of the spirit by materialism and rationalism from which German socialist theory suffered when Marxism made an end of Lassallism—an infection which persists to this day. Only in the light of that phenomenon can we understand the contrast which used to strike visitors to the country a few years ago, between the formidable effort of theoretical education on the part of German social democracy, and the hopeless mediocrity of the movement in the sphere of ethics and aesthetics.

During this epoch, of which the youth movement resulting from the war is only the beginning of the end, all the intellectual activities of German socialism were concentrated on what was called science. Here, again, we note a striking parallelism between the characteristics of German Marxism and those of German science in general. At the risk of being charged with penning a caricature instead of a characterisation, I will venture to say that in Germany science is as severe as the climate, as conscientious as the civil servants, as authoritarian as the military caste, as fanatical for order as the police, as systematic as economic organisation, as profound as the judgments of the law-courts, as indigestible as sauerkraut, as slow and sure as the railways, as stiff as parade-ground drill, and as infallible as the State. It is fully accordant with a traditional educational ideal which (in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon ideal whose watchwords are "good form" and "good breeding", that is to say the formation of character and judgment by habit) is mainly directed towards the memorisation of facts, and their systematisation in accordance with judgments prescribed by the "authorities". In Germany, the exact sciences are given so marked a precedence over moral disciplines that, until very recently, the former were able to impose their methods even upon the psychological sciences. German psychology remained longest, and, in this limited field, most fruitfully, a physiology and a mechanics of the mind; and descriptive social psychology is more backward in Germany than anywhere else. The militarisation of the methods of social combination and the backwardness of the country in respect of the democratisation of political life, made it possible for a long time, both in social practice and in social science, to dispense with the intuitive quality of tact. German science, almost exclusively directed towards typical and collective notions, proved much more fertile in the domain of classification than in that of understanding individual shades of difference. All these characteristics are found quite as markedly in the science of Marxism as in the psychology of individual Marxists. These latter remind us of the portrait of the German



general, Von Pfuel, sketched by Tolstoy in *War and Peace* : " He was one of those men endowed with an imperturbable and fanatical self-confidence such as can be found only in Germany, because the Germans alone have confidence in themselves thanks to an abstract idea, science, that is to say pretended knowledge of absolute truth " .

The faith of the Germans in the " absolute truth " of Marxism has been greatly shaken during the last few years by the fact that, in the International, Marxism no longer holds uncontested sway. Marxism has split into two schools, that of the " pure " Marxists, represented by the German social democrats, and that of the " vulgar " Marxists, represented by the Russian communists ; and, westward of the Rhine, socialist thought has turned away more and more from Marx. It would seem that Marxist dogma can only animate politically powerful mass passions in the communist form ; but there are very few central and western Europeans who (whatever they may think of communist realisations in Russia) regard this theoretical evolution as anything other than a regression, favoured by post-war barbarism, towards primitive methods of thought and action which belong—at any rate in central and western Europe—to a phase which the working-class movement has long outgrown. On the other hand, the consequences of the war have transferred the centre of gravity of economics and world policy to English-speaking lands. Now, in English-speaking lands, the working-class movement was born and grew up in a mental atmosphere which has never been much tinged by Marxism. More especially, the British labour movement, which, thanks to its enhanced political influence, has since the war become the pivot of socialist world policy, incarnates a non-Marxist mentality, and in large measure a definitely anti-Marxist mentality.

Nevertheless, the socialist parties of central Europe, in the days of their greatest need, have had to lift up their eyes towards British socialism as towards the power to which they must mainly look for safety. Before the war, German Marxism was able to regard itself as the only true and advanced form of

socialism, and to consider the non-Marxist socialism of other lands as peculiar national evolutionary products kept backward by special circumstances. Nowadays, such a belief conflicts too grossly with almost universal facts to retain its force. By slow degrees, people are beginning to realise that Marxism itself is only one of the manifold forms wherein the increasing diversity of national socialist ideologies finds expression.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN  
THEORY AND PRACTICE

In seeking a political theory which is to be useful at a given moment, what is wanted is not the invention of a utopia, but the discovery of the best direction of movement.

BERTRAND RUSSELL : *Why Men Fight*.

THE history of Marxism shows the limits imposed upon the possibility of transforming a theory of sociological cognition into a theory of social action. The frontier which Marxism has not been able to cross, and which science in general seems unable to cross, is traced by the fact that necessary laws derived from the causal interpretation of the past do not suffice to arouse voluntary actions. Within the conditions already explained, the Marxist method of the interpretation of history is useful to explain the phenomena of the past ; but it cannot help us to establish aims. We may try to recognise that the past has been the cause of the present ; but our knowledge of the present can never be the cause of what the future should be. Duty is determined, not by causes, but by aims. Sociological knowledge, in conformity with the causal nature of its method, can do nothing more than disclose to the actions whereby our will tries to insert itself into the future, the probable limits of their efficacy. In the best event, historical materialism can only serve the human being who acts, as the theory of the conditions and the limits of his action ; it cannot function as the theory of his impetus for action. It can provide sketches, very vague outline sketches ; but it cannot fill in the outlines with colour. The best conceivable map of a field of operations is not yet a plan of battle. The empire of Marxism, like that of all science which is based upon a knowledge of history and economics, is the empire of

necessity, not that of freedom. Marxism is a science of capitalism and not a science of socialism, in this sense, that it can disclose the conditions arising out of the capitalist environment which are essential to all socialist realisation ; but it cannot establish the socialist will itself, for the scope of the socialist will transcends the framework of capitalism and the class struggle which capitalism engenders. Political economy and history show what *can* be ; to show what *should* be is a matter for ethics. Now, ethics is not a science ; it is a disposition inherent in human nature, and can at most be subjected to a psychological scientific description of its workings.

The inference from the foregoing arguments is that scientific socialism, in the Marxist sense of a socialism irrefutably grounded upon a knowledge of the past and a foreknowledge of necessary happenings, is impossible. "Scientific socialism" is as absurd as "scientific love". Socialism is not a product of science. It can, however, be an object of scientific study ; and we can employ the data of the scientific study of socialism as an aid to the realisation of socialism.

The science of socialism must, therefore, accept a division of its task into two parts. On the one hand, it has to interpret objective reality (the past and the present, "phenomena", "relationships", "data"—including the objectives we have already envisaged), to explain this reality causally ; on the other hand, it has to disclose, in the case of the objectives that have still to be formulated, the conditions, that is to say the frontiers, of their realisation. But the *motivation* of these objectives is outside the field of exact science, for it cannot be deduced from a knowable causal necessity.

In every socialist theory, therefore, a place must be found, side by side with the causal science of the movement, for the teleology of socialism, that is to say for the theory of the objectives which must be envisaged in virtue of an ethical imperative. To understand the enormous importance of this latter task, it will suffice to note that the contemporary socialist movement, despite the vast increase in its knowledge, is less confident than of yore concerning its precise goal, less able to transform

its knowledge of what is into a volition towards what ought to be. Formerly, socialists had aims, but lacked means; now, they have means, but are not so sure about their aims. Or, at any rate, they have less faith in the realisation of these aims; and this is tantamount to saying that they have less strength for their realisation. There have been so many realisations which proved very different from the aims of those who set out to realise them!

If there is to be an escape from this blind alley, we must first of all see to it that socialists shall free their own minds from the belief that the objective of socialism is a deduction from capitalist reality—an error whose outcome is that socialists who set out towards a socialist goal, only succeed in reaching a capitalist one.

Why is it that the Marxist bulls of excommunication launched against reformism and social-patriotism (the two chief embodiments of the reconquest of the socialist movement by the bourgeois environment) have been void of effect? The deep-lying reason is that Marxist ideology is based upon a causal motivation restricted to the capitalist environment. The Marxist way of thinking is, in fact, rooted in the very same soil as the obverse way, the capitalist way, of thinking; the two differ only in respect of intellectual sign. Hence the paradox that the Marxist way of fighting reformism and social-patriotism ends by reinforcing both these trends.

To the Marxists it seemed, at first, that the displacement of motives which occurred in the labour movement, the displacement which was a manifestation of the general trend towards reformism, could only be accounted for as an error of judgment, or as a perversion of normal class consciousness in the leaders and in isolated thinkers. But it soon became plain that the causes of reformism lay deeper than the mistakes of a few heretics, and that reformist theories were the expression of preexistent trends in the mass movement. The Marxists had to find for the new collective phenomenon an economic explanation, an explanation in conformity with historical materialism. The theory now is that economic peculiarities,

such as the privileged position of the skilled workers in certain countries, the imperialist exploitation of foreign lands, a disproportionate rise in the standard of life among the officials in the labour organisations, and similar phenomena, account for reformism. The most important cause is supposed to be a backwardness of economic evolution. The last explanation was especially acceptable in Germany, because South Germany, where large-scale industry was comparatively undeveloped, was the region where the political reformist movement had first struck root. This, however, made it all the easier for the main body of the socialist movement (in the regions where industrial development was to the fore) to experience a like replacement of the revolutionary motive of conviction by the reformist motive of interest. For a time the change was masked by a retention of revolutionary phraseology; but in the end it became obvious that it was precisely in the countries where the greatest strides had been made in the direction of large-scale industrial development and bourgeois culture, that Marxist revolutionism found least support among the masses. A study of the map of the world shows that the countries where Marxism has the greatest vogue are the ones in which large-scale industry is in its infancy. On the other hand, the most fully industrialised countries—the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, etc.—are strongholds of reformism. The only exception to this generalisation seems to be Germany. But pre-war Germany was a land where the development of political and cultural conditions had failed to keep pace with an over-hasty industrial advance, and was therefore one of those historical anomalies which the Marxists were fond of referring to in proof of their thesis that reformism was only a survival from a backward phase of culture. Could there be a more convincing demonstration than that German Marxism of the days before the war remained alive only as a theory of the political struggle, and that since then (thanks to the democratisation of the State) it has lost all effective influence even upon parliamentary practice?

Apart from a scientific concern for an adequate knowledge

of reality, the practical interest of the labour movement in intellectual unity and fertility demands a doctrine which shall promote in that movement a better understanding of its own aims, and invigorate the pursuit of partial objectives by relating them to some great common end. I am thinking now, above all, of getting rid of two present obstacles to this : the weakening of the socialist spirit in the trade-union and the cooperative movements, and the moral difficulties in the way of the reconstruction of the International.

Trade-union and cooperative activity to-day, above all in countries where Marxism prevails, is carried on in a mental atmosphere which has no more than a superficial kinship with the professed ideology of the socialist political parties. The attitude of the German trade-union movement is especially characteristic. Its leaders are extremely sceptical as regards Marxist doctrine, and their scepticism has extended to socialist theory in general. Marxism is itself largely responsible for this state of affairs. From the first it was preeminently a theory of political or parliamentary action. In France, Marxist Guesdism, with its insistence that trade-union activity must be wholly subordinated to political ends, interfered for a long time with the development of a unified and autonomous trade-union movement. This naturally fostered the growth of revolutionary syndicalism ; which, in its turn, only became influential in so far as it abandoned Marxism, or gave Marxist doctrines a twist peculiar to itself. In Britain, the trade-union movement, which was in the end to raise the socialists of the Labour Party to the seats of government, was for a long time censured by the Marxists as a futile and vaguely reactionary enterprise. In Russia, Marxism has culminated in modern communism, whose ideology (dominated by the determination to achieve the conquest of the State) is a reflexion of the fact that Russia, where industrial development is so little advanced, has never known anything more than the germ of a trade-union movement in the sense of a direct and autonomous movement of the workers. In Germany, the social democrats have from the

outset regarded the trade-union movement as nothing more than a recruiting ground for the party. Every step taken by the trade-union movement in that country to adapt its organisation to its own peculiar tastes—the declaration that the General Council was politically neutral and was independent of the Social Democratic Party; insistence that the trade unions must take an independent line in matters of collective bargaining, in the policy of the general strike, and so on—has been criticised by the Marxists. This has confirmed the trade-union leaders in their opinion that Marxist doctrinairism is a hindrance to trade-union progress, though they find it expedient to ignore Marxism instead of openly opposing it.

The Marxists, therefore, whose criticism of reformism in the trade unions was intended to check the trend of the trade-union movement towards degeneration into a mere fight on behalf of narrow opportunist aims, have actually promoted this trend, have favoured this degeneration. It has become increasingly plain that there is only one way in which the trade-union movement can be lifted to a higher plane, can be given loftier objectives than those of a fight for better material working conditions. This way is that of industrial democracy, the establishment of workers' control in industry, beginning with a right of supervision, and advancing in due time to the establishment of self-governing productive units managed by associated producers. But the desire for responsible self-government in industry, essentially democratic, is fundamentally alien to Marxist ideology. The Marxist faith in the determination of social will by economic interest, and in the realisation of that will through a gradual and more or less automatic increase in the organised power of the workers, has tended to encourage a working-class mentality in which the trade-union struggle seems nothing more than a fight for surplus value.

If trade-union ideology is to advance, if it is to gain strength, the trade-union movement must cease to seek its sole inspiration in the principle of self-interest, and must derive its impetus from the principle of right. This does not mean an



abandonment of the idea that one of the main purposes of the trade unions is to increase the power of the workers by means of organisation, and through the fight to promote working-class interests ; it means only that the struggle must be given a new teleological impetus. But Marxism is based upon an economic theory which centres in the belief that there is an essential conflict of interests between employers and employed in the matter of wages and working hours.

That theory was useful as a means of propaganda in the days when it was still necessary to convince the workers that they must put up a fight. It becomes nonsensical when the power of the workers has been so effectively organised that they have a voice in the fixing of their conditions of work. Once this has been achieved, the question of the general causes of the class struggle passes into the background, and the question of its particular objectives comes to the front. One point will be enough to show the inadequacy of Marxist theory as a motive for trade-union activity. What trade-union representative, negotiating with the employers in order to secure better working conditions, would be so foolish as to appeal to a theory which would fain persuade the employers that it is against their interest to grant better conditions? The workers' representative, when going to discuss matters with the employer's representative, takes with him, not the *Communist Manifesto* or *Capital*, but a copy of relevant acts of parliament, the minutes of previous meetings and the text of earlier collective bargains. Why? Because his aim is to show his adversaries, not why they must fight, but why they must come to terms—and how. The aim of every industrial struggle is an agreement, and there cannot be an agreement until the contending parties believe that there is something on which they can and should agree. The main business of the workers' representative must, therefore, be : first to put the employers in the wrong ; and secondly to show them that it is to their interest to grant the workers' demands. Now, the employers can only be put in the wrong by an appeal to certain moral or legal principles which are assumed to be held in common by

the two contending parties, and indeed by the community at large—at any rate as a profession of faith. This appeal will probably win allies in the enemy's camp, giving some of the employers an uneasy conscience, or making them have a wary eye to public opinion. These may be imponderable entities ; but they are, as a rule, the main factors of success. Other things being equal, success is decided by the famous last quarter of an hour, when the stronger will gains the victory ; and (once more, other things being equal) the stronger will is the will of the combatant who has the easier conscience. In such a case as the one we are now considering, a good conscience will be the outcome of a harmony between the motives of the struggle and the dictates of a general ethical mentality, based upon respect for undertakings, honesty of statement, business uprightness, regard for the general welfare, the common interest of employers and employed in the success of the enterprise in which they are engaged, their joint desire to avoid the disastrous results of a protracted struggle—in a word, and in more meanings than one, "common sense". Were it otherwise, the workers would never have won an industrial dispute, the preponderance of material power being always on the side of the employers.

The aim of an industrial dispute is never a fight for fighting's sake, but always the attainment of an equipoise which seems in conformity with certain conceptions of right common to both the contending parties, and in conformity with the respective views of interest derivable from these conceptions. Doubtless this peace is very different from the idyllic peace hymned by the champions of social harmony. It does not signify the disappearance of all antagonisms, but only their temporary contractual stabilisation on terms which permit the avoidance of persistent open warfare, with its frank attempt to break the adversary's will by driving him to the verge of ruin. "Peace" means here the organisation of antagonisms upon the foundation of joint submission to conditions determined by collective bargaining. This does not exclude a subsequent revision of these conditions to fit them to a new balance of the

opposing forces. The normal state of affairs to-day in all the industries where collective bargaining prevails is one of armistice, punctuated by episodes of warfare during the transition from one contractual phase to the next. What matters is that we should realise how the temporary equilibrium of forces largely depends upon the psychological question, to what extent the objectives of these forces correspond to the collective moral valuations of the social commonwealth which includes employers and employed.

The Marxist conflict of interests as regards the distribution of surplus value is thus a starting-point but not a goal. The aim must be to secure enfranchisement from the starting-point by means of voluntary actions directed towards a new goal. In actual trade-union practice, it is impossible for a causal economic doctrine to supply an adequate teleology for the working-class struggle. Were it only as a matter of mood, a gulf yawns here between Marxist theory and trade-union practice. Trade-unionist voluntarism is optimistic, like all voluntarism; Marxist determinism is pessimistic, like all determinism. The Marxist theory of wages, according to which there can be no real improvement in the position of the working class without a catastrophic transformation of property relationships, is haunted (notwithstanding all differences in respect of certain formulations) by the shades of Malthus and Ricardo, of the iron law of wages, of the dogma of supply and demand—in a word, by the theory that the laws of economic evolution are the expression of a determination by natural (i.e. physical) laws. The trade-union movement, on the other hand, has no meaning at all, unless we believe that the working of economic laws can be modified by human will striving towards an ideal goal.

In passing, I may say that this undermines, not only the Marxist interpretation of the working-class movement, but also the Marxist interpretation of political economy. The method which searches behind the motives of economic interest for the deeper psychological causes of the motivation, nullifies the dogma of the necessary conflict of interests between

employers and employed as the respective buyers and sellers of the "commodity labour power". Behind this concept "labour power", it seeks the content "will-to-labour"; behind the concept "quantity of production", it seeks the content "purpose of production". Thus it undermines the foundations of Marxist economy in the very citadel of Marxism, the theory of profit and of wages. What remains of the natural laws discovered by the Marxist analysis of economics, when the chief hypothesis of Marxism, the employers' interest in a long working day and in low wages, is nullified by voluntary activities? This nullification is effected, not only by the will of the workers, but also by that of those employers who adopt the "golden rule of wages" of American business economy, thus proving that the employers' interest in the increase of purchasing power by higher wages and shorter hours is just as "natural" a principle as any other. Can it be doubted that the trade unions are interested in favouring such a transformation of employers' mentality? Still, it would be a very strange sight if the trade unions of the United States, a preeminently capitalist country, were to adopt an economic doctrine more reactionary than that of the employers, a doctrine in accordance with which the employers' inclination to improve the working conditions of the employed would be represented as the outcome of ignorance of economics and as an infringement of the "natural" laws discovered by Marx! For practical purposes, however, that is what the European trade unions would do were they to deny the possibility, henceforward, of working conditions acceptable or unacceptable, just or unjust, bad or good; and, consequently, the possibility of there being "good" and "bad" employers. It is advantageous that there should be as many good employers as possible; not only with a view to the immediate interest of production and to the happiness of the producers; but also because the transition to a less autocratic organisation of industry will become easier in proportion as there is less hindrance from the managerial side (such a hindrance as is being imposed by "bad" tradition and "bad" managers).

In all these matters, trade-union practice to-day conflicts with every one of the " must be so " principles of Marxist economy, opposes them by an efficacious " we will it otherwise ".

It is not surprising that the Marxists, headed by Marx himself, tolerated rather than desired the growth of the trade unions. The trade-union movement is the child of a different mentality from that which fostered Marxism. Its idea derives, temporally considered, from the pre-capitalist guild system, which is a closed book for Marxism as well as for classical political economy; and, spatially considered, from that trade-union Britain which for all Marxists, from Marx himself to Trotsky, has remained a monstrous anomaly and an insoluble psychological problem.

At bottom, and despite the reverence for pure form which is sometimes displayed out of respect to Marxist traditions, the guiding notion of every trade-union movement, in Germany as well as elsewhere, is the old trade-unionist maxim which was so much derided by Marx and Engels: " A fair day's wage for a fair day's work ". This is a principle of equity, not an economic principle; but when we eliminate from trade-union motivation the idea of equity, as does the Marxist theory of the " commodity value of labour power ", we deprive the whole trade-union movement of its soul; and above all we unfit it for the moral transformations which are the essence of its socialist task.

A socialist doctrine of the trade-union movement must, unless it is to remain a lifeless dogma, possess a psychological foundation, and must motivate even its economic theories with voluntarism. Such a doctrine—which considers man as the subject (whose actions are guided by a moral sentiment) of a variable reaction to a variable social environment—is the necessary condition for the revitalisation of every labour movement by bringing it back to an ethical motivation and to a task of moral and cultural transformation. In default of such a doctrine, we cannot do justice to the activity on behalf of the creation of convictions, legal rights, and customs, which is incumbent upon the trade unions, the cooperatives, and,

in general, all the self-governing organisations of the working class. Just as the economic category of the method of production was the pivot of the old doctrine, so man himself, as a spiritual individuality, will be found at the centre of the new doctrine. The centre of gravity of the theoretician's tasks will be transferred from the analysis of surplus value to the study of the actualities of life in the workshop, the study of the institutions which the working class has created, of the transformations of the social environment which the working class has achieved, of the changes in moral and legal ideas which are being brought about in the course of the working-class struggle and by means of the working-class struggle; and this new science will endeavour to solve the question of the moral and legal order of the future by studying it in process of formation in the affective life of the men of to-day. It will discover the first elements of this study in the history of wage struggles, in collective bargaining, in arbitral decisions, in the minutes of workshop committees, in factory regulations, and in kindred documents of industrial life. Thus it will be able to form an image of what is growing organically, will do so by abstracting the characteristics of that which exists and that which is actually in process of formation.

No doubt such a doctrine will not be able to dominate the labour movement in the sense in which Marxism has always tried to dominate it. The days are over and done with when theoretical reason (which, in the end, is only the reason of individual theoreticians) could claim, in virtue of a dogma outside which there was no salvation, to prescribe the activities of the labour movement by means of dictatorial theses, bulls of excommunication, and the intrigues of cliques. Since those days, the labour movement has become a world-embracing aggregate of the efforts of millions of persons, moved by the most diversified aspirations; a chorus of manifold nations and tongues; a medley of objectives and institutions—all kept in a state of constant fermentation and ebullition by the febrile temperature of this apocalyptic age. Our most suitable attitude when faced by a phenomenon of this kind is to study

its meaning, instead of trying to impose upon it some arbitrarily imagined form. One who pursues knowledge faithfully will not endeavour to dominate, but to understand and to serve ; then he will guide without seeking to do so. Science, likewise, must serve in this way ; its frontiers are assigned to it by the phenomena under investigation ; it can do nothing more than help the human aspirations which determine the phenomena to become conscious of their nature and their origin. Socialist sociology (which is quite a different thing from the socialist moral imperative) can only become once more a doctrine *for* the working-class movement if it becomes a doctrine *of* the working-class movement. It can no longer draw its data from the dusty volumes on the shelves of the British Museum Reading Room, the volumes where Marx found the materials for his indictment of the capitalist method of production. The hearing of the case was finished a long time ago. The accusers have done their work so well that the accused no longer has any peace of conscience. Our business henceforward is, not to accuse the past, but to build the future. The foundations of the socialist doctrine of to-day are provided by the socialist movement of to-day. The investigator must devote himself to his task with a love which will lead to intellectual understanding because it springs from human sympathy. Of course, science will not help us to solve the problems of individual duty ; but it will help us to get a clearer view of the conditions which make collective action efficient.

If it will aid the reader's understanding that I should describe the basic principle of this socialist science in the terms that have been popularised by modern philosophy, I should call it pragmatic, voluntarist, pluralist, and institutionalist. It is institutionalist in this sense, that in the institutions which the socialist movement has created we can best trace the decisive characteristics of the cultural changes effected by the socialist movement. This implies a conception which, to define it once more by a label, leads back to Proudhon. In his conception of the revolution, Proudhon, whom Marx (with good

reason, from some points of view) spoke of contemptuously as a petty bourgeois, was far more proletarian than were Marx and his disciples. For the Marxists, the proletarian class struggle is, in the last analysis, nothing more than the realisation of an idea recognised by intellectuals and given a priori. For Proudhon and his followers, the movement is itself the source of a constant creation of a posteriori ideas. Proudhon did not regard the revolution as a simple displacement of political power, which was to put the proletariat in the position of being able to turn the social order upside down ; he regarded it simply as the final result of the daily evolution of social institutions, which the workers were creating, for the most part, outside the domain of political power. The revolution, which to the Marxists is simply a question of *power*, was for the Proudhonists a question of *capacity*—the capacity of ruling, as an outcome of the capacity for producing and administering. The pivot of this revolution was to be found in the domain of economic and social activity, where the "direct action" of the workers secured immediate expression in their own creations and their own activities, issuing out of the experience of work and the working environment. It is true that this action is likewise subject to the disaggregating influences which derive, just as in the political sphere, from the fact that the action has perforce to be carried out indirectly, through the instrumentality of elected representatives and paid officials—a point which the theoreticians of French revolutionary syndicalism have failed to take into account, as was natural in view of the backward state of organising technique in their country. Nevertheless, the institutions created in this field are, in essence, a more direct expression of the workers' efforts to transform the structure of society than can be any kind of legislative reform. They are this, in the first place, thanks to their psychological origin. Their motive springs, without the operation of any kind of literary formula, from the daily life of the workers, in the regions where personal experience creates conviction. They are this, secondly and above all, thanks to their psychological effect ; for law and adminis-



trative practice incorporate (in the most favourable circumstances) rights which have already been willed, whereas an institution established by autonomous initiative incorporates and educates the moral will itself. Thirdly and lastly, it is in the realisation of working-class institutions that there is elaborated, in the widest possible sense of the term, that political capacity of the working class which is an indispensable preliminary before any political power conquered by the workers can be utilised for more decisive ends than the mere maintenance of this power for its own sake.

Theory, therefore, must abstain from trying to subject the working-class movement as a whole to objectives which are really no more than the objectives of one particular conception of the political struggle, tinged moreover by peculiar national conditions. It is right that every form of activity should be related to the end which properly derives from its institutional character. We shall ensure the existence of a vivifying interconnexion between these particular ends by relating them, not to one particular form of activity, but to the general sense of all the forms. This sense will disclose itself the more readily in proportion as we bear in mind that it is always the same human beings who react in the most varied fields to a joint social experience. Only on this condition can theory faithfully reflect the fact (long since realised in practice) of the equality and the organisational autonomy of the various branches of the working-class movement.

By replacing the rigid dogmatism of rationalised objectives by a conception of mobile, pragmatic, and pluralist evolution, the socialism of psychological motivation can, furthermore, sweep away the chief intellectual obstacles in the way of the practice of internationalism. These obstacles were not created by the world war. They already existed; and it was owing to their existence that in 1914 the Second International proved morally bankrupt, in the sense that it was unable to fulfil its pledges. I call these obstacles by their names: intolerance and lack of sincerity.

The lack of sincerity consisted in this, that the leaders of the

International, in respect of every manifestation of opinion or of will, had set out from the principle that there is an absolute solidarity of interests in the proletarian class—an international solidarity of interests which did not then exist and does not yet exist to-day. The national ties which restricted international class solidarity were tacitly ignored, though they were already sufficiently powerful before 1914 to become supreme as soon as the war broke out. No matter how far the error was due to subjective self-deception, to a laudable determination to recognise no ties but those of international solidarity, in the hope that their recognition would consolidate them. The fact is that the national ties disclosed their existence and their strength with such overwhelming clearness that to-day any one who wished to ignore them (even in a rhetorical outburst at an international congress) would have to be possessed of an extraordinary faculty for self-deception. Every socialist must be eager to overlook nothing which can possibly reinforce internationalism; but for that very reason every socialist must begin by recognising the reality of the conditions and the limitations which derive from the power of national sentiment. A socialist party which should act in any other way in its relationships with the socialist parties of other lands, would be as dishonest as a man of business who, when entering into a contract with another, should conceal the fact that he is already bound to a third party by a contract which restricts his power of entering into fresh obligations. Any who should act in this way would inflict a mortal moral wound on internationalism, reducing it to the level of a phrase representing no more than an illusion which will take wings to itself and fly away when the transient enthusiasm of congresses and demonstrations has evaporated.

There is no more urgent task for the working-class movement of to-day than the reconstruction of an International which will give the utmost capacity for effective action to whatever really exists in the way of a common international will. Every one knows that, despite the most praiseworthy efforts, we are still a long way from the fulfilment of this

task. It is not one of those tasks which can be done in a hand's turn, as we shall recognise all the more clearly when we bear in mind that most of those who have to undertake it are still persons whose souls are scarred by the experiences of the war. Nevertheless, until the task has been achieved, the labour movement in all countries will suffer from moral weakness, for it will never attain its maximum influence (even in the limited field of the daily political struggle) unless the brother parties on either side of the national frontiers can consciously direct their activities towards a common goal. When I speak of this common goal, I am not thinking of a facile exchange of mutual assurances of fraternal sentiment ; but of agreements, elaborated down to the last detail, concerning the concrete problems of policy, such as have presented themselves for solution day after day, since the close of the war—problems concerning war indemnities, safeguards, disarmament, and international law.

For years and decades to come, such questions as these will dominate policy. It is almost a commonplace to say that to-day all politics are foreign politics. It is really true that to-day no question of home policy can be detached from the complex of international relationships. The labour parties realise this better than any one else, for their influence increases or diminishes *everywhere* when socialism advances or retreats *anywhere*. The curve of unemployment in Britain may rise or fall according as the elections to the German Reichstag tend this way or that. Under the influence of socialism in France, the fate of the German workers may mend or grow worse. The economic position of every American industrial worker and every American farmer may be affected by the success or failure of the pacifist aspirations of European socialists. We may say of socialism that it has now only one political task, since this one task is the indispensable preliminary to the fulfilment of all the others ; namely, to avoid a new war, which can only be done by organising Europe and the world into a supernational legal unity. I may say in passing that, for practical purposes, this is the main contrast between the

aims of the Second International and those of the Third. Could this contrast be done away with, we should not need to trouble ourselves any longer about other conflicts of doctrine and personality, which would gradually cease to count could the two bodies combine for a common work of pacification.

What was formerly nothing more than a policy of doctrines, a policy which came to grief in 1914 for the very reason that its only means for fighting a real danger were purely theoretical and doctrinal, has now become a policy of realities, and we might even say the only policy of realities. This policy, therefore, can only be pursued by realist means, by the gradual wearing away of obstacles through the opportunist pursuit of limited objectives, by the patient advance from each partial success towards the next, by the conscientious recognition of the material and psychological facts which simultaneously supply and restrict every possibility of success. In view of all these considerations, the International must be built upon a foundation very different from that of the days before the war. The national autonomy of all the affiliated parties must be expressly recognised ; and yet there must be contractual ties, based upon an agreement concerning particular concrete questions. We must not be content, as we were formerly content, with an international unity of a purely external and demonstrative kind, or with theoretical resolutions having as little connexion as possible with the sphere of concrete facts. The new International will not have to suffer the experience of a new 1914 if it can make up its mind to pay less attention to the rhetorical performances of great international congresses, but more attention to the practical work of lesser conferences ; and if its resolutions are less extensive but more intensive. Of course, this does not imply any renunciation of great propaganda demonstrations, were it only because these have a marked educative influence upon the masses. But we must not forget, even here (seeing that the post-war humour of the masses is somewhat sceptical), that such manifestations only attain their end if they are directed towards a concrete objective, and if they underline the decision of some definite action,

however modest, rather than devoting themselves to the production of outbursts of hot air, transient by their very nature.

Furthermore, internationalism will remain an empty word if the practical recognition of national peculiarities and national autonomy is restricted to the field of administrative organisation, instead of being extended likewise to the spiritual valuation of the socialist parties in other lands.

A preliminary technical condition, one which would put an end to all national narrowness in respect of judging other people's opinions, would be the renunciation, once for all, of any attempt to impose doctrinal tests as a qualification for affiliation to the International. If we want an International of action, we must judge the affiliated parties by their acts alone. This means that the only question we need ask them is whether they are willing to make use of working-class power in order to prevent war and in order to unify the world. Under the influence of Marxism, the Second International in the days before the war had taken over from the First International a doctrinaire stipulation which made affiliation impossible unless the party desiring to affiliate accepted certain "principles" (the recognition of the class struggle, the need for the conquest of political power, socialisation through State action, etc.). At bottom, the mere wording of the formulas shows that they were a criterion for a hierarchy of conceptions, at the top of which came Marxism as the highest and purest form of "true international socialism". This was obviously absurd in the case of an international federation which could not, under pain of impotence, dispense with the support of the English and American working masses, whose lack of enthusiasm for Marxist doctrine was already a matter of common knowledge. The mere translation of the "principles" into English shows how impossible it is to give a faithful rendering of the German original. For instance, year after year there were disputes as to whether the term "Klassenkampf" could best be translated as "class struggle" or "class war". This comedy of errors might be regarded as merely amusing had it not helped to

strengthen the impression in the minds of the British and American workers that the Second International was the product of a continental European mentality, a mentality essentially different from that of the English-speaking peoples. These philological details are symbolical of the incommensurability of spiritual values, which are national values, were it only because they are rooted in national tongues which, in their turn, embody distinctive cultural atmospheres. There is only one way of remedying this state of affairs, and that is, once for all, to renounce the attempt to build the tower of Babel upon words, and to say simply : " In the beginning was the deed". This will simultaneously dispel the claim to superiority on the part of the elect peoples, who cherish the pure doctrine, and the inferiority complex imposed upon the others, who are tolerated while, by degrees, they are approaching the higher levels of insight. It is time we should give up regarding divergent national ways of thinking and speaking as representing different levels of insight ; we must learn to look upon them as manifestations which are all of equal value, since they are all equally alive, but the expression of different cultural entities. Then the pedantry which puffs up the master with pride and humiliates the pupil, will give place to the tolerance of those who, from an understanding of their own way of thinking and acting, are inspired with respect for that of another.

Little by little, Marxism, which half a century ago was the intellectual tool of internationalism, has become a hindrance to internationalism. Although among socialist doctrines it was distinguished by the universality of its objective, it soon showed itself tainted by psychological peculiarities which conflicted with the demands for sincerity and intellectual tolerance. The concentration of attention upon a theoretical totality, accompanied by an under-valuation of concrete immediate tasks (thanks to which German Marxism became a fig-leaf for social-democratic opportunism), fortified the tendency of the Second International to ignore the extant national differences of opinion under cover of rhetorical and doctrinal

demonstrations. Marxism, mainly represented by German social democrats and by Russian refugees, made light of nationality as an element in the cultural diversity of the labour and socialist movement. The nation was considered to be something which only concerned and divided the ruling classes ; it was, said the Marxists, nothing more than a community of language inherited from a defunct past, without essential vitality and without influence upon working-class mentality. Starting from this, Marxists cultivated the fiction of an International united *apriori notwithstanding plurality* ; whereas the facts have shown that the International can only be united *aposteriori by means of plurality*, and only on those terms can become viable. By thus doing violence to the unifying tendency, there were brought about precocious centralisation and bureaucratisation of the International, processes which were purely fictitious. In reality, the Second International existed mainly as a bureau for the storing of card-files and the organisation of demonstrations, until the hurricane of 1914 blew down the cardhouse and scattered the cards to the four winds of heaven.

But the gravest accusation which can here be brought against Marxism is that it helped the Second International to evade, under cover of doctrinal preoccupation, what should have been already its main practical task, namely the struggle against militarism, the opposition to war. Agreed, we have no right to say that the International ought to have been able to prevent the war. No one knows anything about this hypothetical possibility. Still, having myself been for several years intimately connected with the work of the organisation, I feel entitled to say that the International would have been able to make more effective efforts in this direction had not the German and Austrian Marxists stood in the way.

During the ten years before the war, socialists (especially those of Britain and France) made strenuous efforts to induce the International to concretise its opposition to war. The most notable attempt of the kind was embodied in the resolution in favour of a general strike against mobilisation, a resolution championed by Keir Hardie and Vaillant. The question

had been raised at Stuttgart in 1907, and at Copenhagen in 1910. The resolution was on the agenda of the Vienna Congress of the International, whose meeting was prevented by the outbreak of the world war in August 1914. From the first, however, the proposal had encountered stubborn resistance, of which the German Marxists formed the vanguard and the centre. They refused to fight against militarism except by a platonic vote against the army estimates, by parliamentary criticism of the foreign policy of their government, and by protests against such minor abuses as the bad treatment of soldiers. Notwithstanding the pressure of a handful of convinced antimilitarists led by Karl Liebknecht, they would not commit themselves to any step which might sap the foundations of militarism by undermining the masses' spirit of subordination or by questioning the moral obligation of the workers to submit as soldiers to the will of the State. They said they would not even discuss the idea of the general strike or of refusal of military service in case of war—an idea which even so "moderate" a body as the Amsterdam Trade Union International has actually adopted since the experience of the world war. The political opportunism which was the expression of an internal adaptation to the spirit of the militarist State, and of an unwillingness to oppose that spirit at any risk to working-class political parties and industrial organisations, secured a useful ally in Marxist doctrinairism. What was really political weakness was given a semblance of theoretical strength, of fidelity to principle. Historical materialism could be appealed to in support of the contention that it would be futile to attack militarism directly, and that the proper line of attack was to continue the class struggle against capitalism—of which militarism was the fruit. These sapient logicians ignored the fact that there had been armies and wars before the days of capitalism; that capitalist production is perfectly conceivable without warfare; that the struggle against war and militarism is one of the first requisites of the fight for socialism. Thus an erroneous doctrinaire fatalism came to back up a commonplace bureaucratic pusillanimity, by



representing inaction as the outcome of superior insight. The case is unaffected by the argument that even if it had taken a bolder line, the International would probably have been broken up by the coming of the world war. One who has will but lacks power, must yield to superior force, but yields with honour. Had the International perished honourably in 1914, its spirit would have survived, and that spirit would have more speedily found a new body.

Furthermore, Marxism must be blamed because its intolerance stood in the way of the establishment of genuine internationalism. Here, again, I speak from personal experience when I declare that before the war Marxism was instrumental in favouring the aspirations of the German social democrats to dominate the Second International intellectually, and to control it administratively. I do not wish to impute bad faith to the German Marxists; to imply that their action was determined by anything more than a subjective, but sincere, belief that their line of action was one which would promote the general welfare. If I were to blame them, I should have to blame myself also, for at that time I too believed that the predominance of German Marxist influence was essential to the wellbeing of the International. Indeed, I was almost inclined to think that the main function of the organisation was, gradually, to arouse in the socialist labour parties throughout the world that higher degree of socialist consciousness which—for me—was embodied in German Marxism and in the principles and methods of German social democracy. Since I thus frankly avow my own innermost thoughts of those days, it will perhaps not be taken amiss when I express the conviction that such an aim was part of the German social democrats' interest in the International. The same observation applies to the Marxists in general. If we look behind the scenes, and take subconscious motives into account, we cannot fail to recognise that Marx's activities on behalf of the International Workingmen's Association were stimulated by an inward conviction that the Germans were the chosen people, and by the wish to help the Germans to play a leading part.

Although, for obvious reasons, the conviction and the wish were not openly expressed, it is easy to read them between the lines in Marx's correspondence. When, later, the German social democracy became the chief paymaster of the International, there was once more at work the desire—largely unconscious, no doubt—to become the mentor of the International. (As the English proverb pithily says: "Who pays the piper, calls the tune!") It is part of the Marxist faith that all non-Marxist opinions are the outcome of economic or cultural backwardness. Thus the utmost tolerance of which a Marxist is capable is to concede that there may be extenuating circumstances for heresy, and that a heretic may be granted a little time before entering the way of grace. In every international trade-union federation, the Marxists have tried to play the schoolmaster. If, to-day, the communists declare that all the socialists outside the Moscow International are nothing better than lackeys of the bourgeoisie, they are only (under the sign of a return to a more primitive cultural atmosphere) caricaturing by their own behaviour the impeccability, the fanatical self-confidence, of an earlier generation of Marxists.

Without mutual trust, no fruitful international understanding is possible; and the first step towards the establishment of mutual confidence must be a liquidation of the vestiges of this doctrinal self-sufficiency, a relativisation of all theoretical formulas. But that will not alone suffice to enable the International to take effective action against new wars. The International is not the whole of pacifism, any more than the working-class political parties and trade unions are the whole of socialism. All mass organisations, as such, have to defend interests (especially those of maintaining and extending their own organised strength) which, though the pursuit of these interests is an indispensable preliminary to the attainment of their ideal aims, are distinct from, and fall short of, those ideal aims. Within the organisations there must be persons who retain a spiritual independence of the immediate material aims; persons inspired by moral convictions having a far

wider scope than that of any organisational programs. In the fight for the realisation of the material conditions requisite for the unification of the world and for the maintenance of peace, I welcome as ally any one whose will marches with mine in this direction, were it only for a short stretch. If we are agreed as to the goal, I care not whether my travelling companion, like certain Marxists, only wants world peace as a prelude to the world revolution ; or, like many sincere Christians, wishes to carry out the commands of the Church ; or, like not a few business men in the United States and elsewhere, is merely animated by the conviction that " war does not pay ".

All we can hope from the adaptive and imitative instincts of the masses is that these will lead to actions which will break a trail for the realisations of vanguard minorities whose motives are the fruit of personal moral convictions. Every policy must be opportunist to this extent, that it is futile to expect from others anything beyond the actions which conform to the trend of the extant collective volitions. But socialism is more than a policy ; it is a moral faith. Among the claims which this faith makes on those who profess it, is an admission that the practical and opportunist activities which associate them with certain mass aspirations are no more than special aspects of a more comprehensive duty ; also that, even to satisfy the lesser demand, the socialist must recognise the moral imperative of duties which are peculiarly his own. He must be opportunist in his expectations of others, but he cannot be opportunist in respect of the moral demands he makes of himself. For instance, my personal experience of the war has produced a conviction that I must henceforward abstain from any sort of action which will involve me in war-making or in the preparation for war ; and must repudiate the claim of any State or other collectivity that it has the right to dispose of my life—or, through me, of the life of another. As regards socialism, too, I can see in the long run only one possible way of escaping the disastrous consequences of the ever-increasing cleavage between national motives and international tasks.

This is to declare war tabu, to permeate all the live forces of the working-class movement with the moral conviction that the use of force to settle differences between States is wicked, and with the logical conviction that resort to arms and the rights of the nations are incompatibles. This permeation can extend to the motives which tend to reinforce national sentiment. Even for the man who loves his country on lofty moral and cultural grounds, there can be no more splendid ideal than that of transforming, amplifying, and ennobling this notion of "country", so that, instead of "patriotism" implying qualities which will arouse fear and hatred in the advocates of a rival brand, it may inspire confidence and foster peace. That was Jaurès' interpretation of "love of country". However, the admission that in our pacifist mission we must begin with purifying the love of country, and that the working class must traverse a phase of national culture before it will be ripe for a worldwide culture, is only the practical man's concession to the imperfections and inadequacies of the environment in which he has to work, a concession to the will of others. If the concession is not to become a cowardly and enervating form of renunciation, those who already style themselves citizens of the world must not be content with this high-sounding name, but must exact from themselves services which no others can undertake.

Even if the appeal will only be heard by the few who already understand the tongue of world citizenship, it behoves them, few as they are, to scatter the seed which will fructify in due time in the form of mass actions. Those who to-day style themselves citizens of the world are the first citizens of the universal commonwealth of to-morrow, leaders who really lead instead of following. But they do not live so wholly in the future as to make it impossible to set them to-day to a task which seems to me both practical and urgent, as a preliminary to any effective internationalism. I mean, the liquidation of the universal psychosis that one side was exclusively responsible for the outbreak of the world war. Only a socialist who is truly internationalist in feeling—as must be

any one who really *feels* as a Christian—can bring to men thirsting for peace the mutual trust which will fortify their will-to-peace, by convincing them that “all are to blame for everything”, and that every nation must be left to settle accounts with its own conscience.

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

### CREDO

And Jesus answered them and said, Verily, verily I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled.

Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life. . . .

ST. JOHN, vi, 26-27.

SOME readers, wishing to facilitate their judgment by pigeon-holing the author, would like to know in which "wing" he can be placed, or with what "ism" he can be labelled. I fear I cannot present them with a chapter of "conclusions" which will facilitate such a classification. I set out to show the need for a judgment of values based upon a criterion different from that in use either in the right wing or the left wing of to-day. In my picture of socialist reality, there are no statical points, but only movements. That picture does not contain any straight line separating a deeply shaded surface from an illuminated one; it consists of an infinite number of moving images which, from moment to moment, assume different aspects under the lights and shades cast by the observer's judgment.

I therefore find it impossible to judge the phenomena I have described under the captions "reformism" and "social-patriotism" in accordance with a scale of values which knows only approval and disapproval. I think my readers cannot have failed to perceive that the phenomena in question are in many respects antipathetic to me. It is true that in practice I incline rather towards realism than towards extremist phraseology, and that I attach more value to the building of a new sewer in a working-class quarter or to the placing of a

plot of flowers in front of a working-class tenement, than I do to a new theory of the class struggle. But, on the other hand, I have made no secret of the fact that, when I became aware how impossible it is for the working masses to attain more prosperity without becoming embourgeoised, I suffered one of the most grievous disappointments of my life. I see very plainly that a lack of patriotism may be a deficiency from the outlook of cultural wealth; but I detest the misuse of this patriotism by the State's will-to-power, and regard such a misuse as a most abominable crime; while the narrowness of national vanity seems to me the worst of stupidities. I think that it is quite possible to describe a phenomenon as real, important, and natural, without being open to the charge that one who pays attention to a phenomenon must necessarily take unqualified pleasure in what he is studying.

I am aware that the foregoing remarks imply that I recognise the existence of a tension between the demand that an observer shall be objective, on the one hand, and, on the other, the subjective desire to pass judgments of value—a desire which animates every one as soon as he takes a side in social struggles. I know, too, that the logic of a scientific system appears far more trustworthy when there is no sign in it of such a tension. That is why most systematisers are so careful to hide their emotional valuations behind the apparent objectivity of an expressly chosen terminology. Such a game of hide-and-seek is distasteful to me, and I think it forms an obstacle to a really profound scientific knowledge. As soon as we wish to grasp phenomena which include psychological elements and acts of volition, we are concerned with two different domains: that of the world which is, and that of the world which ought to be—the world of realities and the world of values. The example of Marxism shows how impossible it is to establish between these two domains a relation which shall be logical in the sense of a syllogism in which one term decides another. The only rational systematisation possible in such cases is one that introduces the notion of tension—which is not logical, but psychological. This tension results from a contrast

between the affective tendencies of the man who is seeking, on the one hand, to recognise that which is, and, on the other, to recognise what new realities he must try to create under the impulsion of his moral nature. All that scientific systematisation can do here is to lift the tension from the subconscious to the conscious plane. This does not make an end of the tension, but it makes it less distressing and more fruitful, for on the conscious plane it is enabled to realise the energy which all conflicts of forces contain in a potential form. Tension implies a certain suffering; in the case we are considering, the suffering of the man who wants perfection, but who knows that he will never be able to attain perfection. It demands a certain resignation; the resignation of the man who makes the search for absolute good his rule of life, but who knows that he will never be able to serve this good, in the struggles of daily life, except in so far as he is willing to work on behalf of the lesser of two evils. Nevertheless, if we wish to make the most of the endeavour to do what we feel to be our duty, we must accommodate ourselves to this suffering and to this resignation. They are the toll imposed upon the intellectual being governed by a social conscience, for the reason that his will is directed towards a supra-personal future, and because, owing to the power of thought, such a being lives at one and the same time in the present and in the future. Were it not for the suffering which arises out of the tension between the absolute character of the vision of the future and the relative character of the action of the present, this tension would be incapable of awakening an aspiration towards a distant goal—the aspiration thanks to which our present actions are able to create future values. But for the fact that the combatant in the social struggle resigns himself to the persistence of this tension, he would not have sufficient energy to escape being discouraged by the inadequacy of the partial results he can secure from day to day.

The rational thought which enables us to incorporate into an orderly picture of reality, the tension which we are now considering, does us better service than we might expect from



a simple prescription of psychological hygiene. The picture of the real world thus secured is, in very truth, the least imperfect state of knowledge attainable by the faculties at our disposal. If we believe the supreme purpose of our rational faculties to be that they shall disclose to our moral will the most useful end, that they shall provide that will with the requisite energy, and that they shall furnish it with the most adequate means, we certainly have no reason for taking too gloomy a view of the insufficiency of our science and of our prescience. The Faustian temperament characteristic of the western mind makes us look for ends external to ourselves and our time. We are not content with *dreaming of* these ends, for we want to *think* them also. The final aim of all thought is, and remains, harmony; the quiet balance of causes and effects which Hellenic civilisation already achieved in the syllogism and in the perfect work of plastic art. But, for our part, we can no longer content ourselves with the joys of pure logic and pure aesthetic. A disquiet, whose ultimate motives are to be found in the community sentiment of our race, and which secures its supreme symbolical expression in the longing for perfection which derives from our Christian morality, urges us onwards towards ends whose realisation we can only imagine as a harmony, but towards which we can only move by way of disharmony, and which we know we shall never fully reach.

The collective energies of social volition appear to us in tensions and antagonisms. In so far as we can form an orderly image of them, we do not reach the unique sound of a harmonious concord; but at least, as Keyserling aptly puts it, we arrive at the moving images of a symphony—counterpointed, full of discords, and developing by way of contrasts—in which only our imagination can compose the finale which resolves all the tensions. When becoming conscious of the nature of these tensions, we simultaneously become aware of the volitional energy to which they give birth; and we realise that in the world symphony we shall better play the instrument allotted to us by our innate dispositions and by our education when we recognise that we should not attempt to dominate

the others as soloists, but that we should subordinate ourselves to the rhythm and to the melodic development of the whole.

When we restrict social science to its natural domain by demanding that it shall serve the purposes of ethical volition, we enable it to give its maximum yield. A sociology can never serve our social acts except by helping us to understand the conditions of these acts. Now, to understand means to vivify and to dominate. To quote Keyserling once more, he who grasps a meaning realises it. The only spiritual forces which can conquer us are those which we do not understand. Take Marxism, for instance. It was overcome by reformism and social-patriotism simply because it failed to understand these two phenomena. A theory of the working-class movement which is only able to understand some of the motives which animate that movement, will inevitably reinforce those motives at the cost of the others, the motives which it does not understand. We cannot assign any meaning to the totality except when we try to understand the unity and the continuity of phenomena and the unity and the continuity of a fundamental motive. A theory which descries the fundamental motive of socialism in the moral judgment inspired by the community sentiment, *understands* more than a theory which can see no deeper than the struggle of interests on the surface of things ; and the former theory is more *vivifying* than the latter.

The " direction of movement " of an action, in accordance with which Bertrand Russell rightly wishes to guide the judgment of all political phenomena, is given by the direction of the motive which inspires this action. No judgment of value passed upon a social movement can be deduced from the final aim which it pursues. It is the present motive and not the future aim which is decisive. That does not imply any denial of the importance of the final aim ; for this, in so far as it has a value, is one of the causal elements of the present motive. Consequently, its worth can only be that of the actions to which it gives rise. I am a socialist, not because I

believe in the realisation of a socialist vision of the future more than I believe in any other ideal you like to mention, but because I am convinced that the socialist motive makes human beings happier and better here and now. The idolisation of the ideal which is characteristic of sentimentalists and romanticists is repugnant to me. Those who promise collective happiness in some remote future seem to me naive when they are honest and detestable when they are humbugs. It is so easy to love the good in the cloudy regions of the remote future. As Dostoeffsky says : " In the abstract love of mankind, what we love is almost always nothing but ourselves ". Those who draw bills of exchange which will only fall due at a very distant date are likely to be bad payers. In my view, the primary aim of all socialist education must be the transformation of socialist *ideals* into socialist *motives*.

I think that our will indulges in a false perspective when we withdraw socialism from the actions of the present-day movement in order to establish socialism as a " goal " of the future. Such aims are only imaginary points on the horizon of the future, on to which we project the goals of our desire. They become real only when they become motives of present actions. If we rely on " evolution ", and trust to the future to bring what we desire, we are vanquished by time at the very start. The future is something which we have to create, and those will create the future most effectively who can most certainly establish harmonic relationship between the remoteness of their aims and the scope of their own capacity for realisation. They will not squander their energies as do the timid opportunists who do not venture enough, or the sterile visionaries who aim at too distant a goal. The best safeguard against a lack of concordance between the distance of the aim and the scope of the action is that we shall adapt the distance of the aim to the scope of the action. By thus reducing the distance between ourselves and our goal, we shall intensify the creative force enabling us to advance towards it. Aims live only in our present actions ; their future existence is illusion, whereas their present existence is reality.

One who has made the effort necessary to grasp the meaning of all this, will suddenly discover that the socialist movement appears to him in a new light. He will then see the end of that movement in its actual existence, in its present actions and demands, and not in an imaginary future. If socialism as a movement has any meaning, it is that it can make the persons who participate in the movement happier. The happiness of future generations is nothing more than a phenomenon of the intellectual imagination, and it has no real value except in so far as faith in it is necessary to enable us to fulfil our present tasks. All that we can know of socialism is what it is at the present time. That is the *movement*; that is the vast sum of individual actions, which are to-day creating new social relationships between human beings, new psychological states, new rules of life, new habits, and new institutions. The essential part of socialism is the struggle for socialism.

What we need, first of all, is the concrete realisation, if not of immediate happiness, at least of certain material conditions preliminary to happiness. Neither the "self-interest rightly understood" of which the economists speak, nor yet the moralisings of the Churches, have prevented those who dominate our present industrial system and enjoy its fruits from condemning the masses of the workers to an existence which, were it only through the payment of low wages and the enforcement of unduly long hours of work, has hindered their aspirations towards higher things. Not until the workers joined forces in self-defence under the banner of socialism were they able to secure the minimum material conditions essential to an existence worthy of human beings. The feeling of class antagonism, the feeling of envy and hatred, which this struggle engendered, may seem a moral defect if we measure it in accordance with the ideal demands of Christian and socialist morality; but its emergence is an indisputable gain as compared with the state of hopeless submission and utter demoralisation which was, in practice, the only possible alternative to active resentment. Furthermore, the struggle animated by this affect proved the only efficient way of educating

in the ruling class a modicum of practical social morality; for those who formed this class were actually unable to realise their own best interests except under pressure on the part of the growing strength of the working class. The defenders of a system which nothing but the revolt of the oppressed saved from condemning the majority of the producers to the most horrible physical and mental wretchedness, have really no right to complain because Marxists preached a socialism of hatred. Before sermonising the workers, they would do well to ensure that 'their friends, the masters of industry, should themselves practise neighbourly love. It was at the fires of this hatred that was forged the solidarity which is to-day for the masses the essential and effective form of neighbourly love; that which is most compatible with the necessities of the struggle for existence, or at any rate the only possible starting-point towards a collective education in this sense. Above all, we must not forget that the feeling of class hostility has been an indispensable means of procuring for millions of human beings better and healthier conditions of life and (especially by the reduction of working hours) new cultural possibilities. If there was any other way of realising these advantages, the members of the ruling class and their advisers certainly failed to acquaint us with it.

I am only too well aware that these cultural possibilities have not always been used in the way which seems most desirable to a convinced socialist. I have myself known hours of black despair when contemplating the embourgeoisement of the working class. But in such moods, I have often been able to console myself by recalling a memory of my youth. The Belgian town where I passed my student days was a centre of large-scale textile industry. Every morning before six o'clock I was awakened by the clacking of innumerable sabots on the pavement. Workmen, workwomen, and children, a weary multitude, were hurrying along towards the prison-like gates of the factories, to disappear within, and not to emerge until eight o'clock in the evening, even more tired and paler than they had been in the morning. That is not yet twenty-five

years ago. Recalling the shame and anger with which I was then filled because I lived an easy life while all around me were human beings who condemned other human beings to such a slavery, I would say to myself: "You are nothing more than a dilettante of the class struggle, narrow-minded and narrow-hearted, if you vex yourself because these good folk, now that they need work only eight hours instead of twelve, do not please you by living in a way which satisfies your aesthetic and cultural ideal. Thanks to the sacrifices they have made in their organised struggle, they can lead a somewhat better life, and you are disgruntled because they spend their few extra francs of wages and their free time—being ignorant of the higher joys—in the stupid pleasures of an existence which apes the petty bourgeois. For that reason (admit it!) you have less sympathy with them than before. But do you suppose that they live only to figure on the stage of your aesthetic revolutionary romanticism? Are they to live for their own ends, or for yours? Wellbeing is always less picturesque than poverty—for the onlooker, but not for the poor—and you complain of them because, for the most part, they have become philistines. Do you not know that philistines form the immense majority of the members of every social stratum? Perhaps this is just as well. If there were none but bohemians and geniuses, the world would be a chaos. After all, is not the first essential that these people shall be freed from the most pressing cares of daily misery—from the pangs of an empty stomach, the aching of weary limbs, the heaviness caused by insufficient sleep—before they, or their descendants, can attain the freedom of mind essential to a more beautiful life?"

In fact, it does not become the intellectual who dreams of the revolutionary mission of the proletariat to despise proletarians because, above all and before all, they do not wish to remain poor. One who has money enough to buy happiness, or one who knows ideal satisfactions of a different kind (and satisfactions so intense that he forgets material cares), such a one finds it easy to condemn the masses for their faith in money.

But if he wishes to do something that will help in the realisation of his ideal, his business is to help the masses to create the conditions which will enable them, likewise, to emancipate themselves from faith in money.

If we wish to educate the masses in such a way that their wants will be directed towards higher things, we must, first of all, free them from the actual tension between need and satisfaction. There are only two possible ways of doing this. Either we must accommodate the need to the satisfaction, or else we must accommodate the satisfaction to the need. A reduction of the need for money to the level of the mediocre satisfaction actually available to the masses (as, for instance, by the generalisation of the Franciscan ascetic ideal), presupposes a psychological transformation, conjoined to a temperament so exceptional that we can hardly regard it as within the range of possibilities for the masses, at any rate as far as contemporary western civilisation is concerned. The opposite alternative is, to increase the productivity of labour and the share of the masses in the produce of labour, thus making good the extant deficit in the means of satisfaction, and attaining a certain level of general prosperity and well-being. Then the aspiration of the workers towards a rise in the cultural scale may be directed towards different ends, towards the imitation of loftier modes of life, especially those whose essence is moral and intellectual. Experience shows clearly enough that the latter path is the only possible one for the masses of our own day. *Voluntary* poverty is a virtue of which few are capable. *Enforced* poverty makes it impossible for the majority to acquire the loftier virtues. Ordinary mortals must have enough money before they can learn to despise it; or at least they must have enough to free themselves from obsession with money. The masses must attain a modicum of wellbeing before they can cease to believe that wealth and happiness are synonymous. As far as the masses are concerned, the road to socialism sets out from proletarian poverty, and passes by way of petty-bourgeois mediocrity. The true task of socialism does not begin until then. The

average manual worker of to-day is neither a sublime hero nor a disagreeable upstart. He is simply and solely a human being who desires more happiness, and who cannot secure this unless he has more worldly goods. The socialist movement, which helps him to secure these worldly goods, can put this down as a notable item on the credit side of the account.

In this way the socialist movement does something more than satisfy the hunger of the stomach, for it also satisfies the thirst for justice. Besides fighting against poverty, the working-class movement puts an end to the injustice of too marked a contrast between the social power of the members of the possessing classes and that of the members of the non-possessing classes. Thereby it lessens the disastrous psychological effects of this injustice—effects which occur alike in those who believe themselves to profit by it and in those who have to put up with it.

Even if all this were nothing more than an illusion, there would still remain as an undeniable gain for socialism the fact that, simply by its effort in this direction, it has rendered the existence of those who have made the effort happier, fuller, and worthier, giving them the feeling which comes only to those who, not content to submit to destiny, make their own lot. The most profound significance of socialism is that (to put the matter in the dry verbiage of social psychology) by forming compensatory and guiding ideas, it helps millions of persons to overcome a social inferiority complex. For the masses, the only practicable alternative to socialism is a demoralising social parasitism and a generalised criminology. The socialist demands of the workers are the sublimated form of a natural resentment which, but for this safety-valve, would lead to an intensified individual aggressiveness, and to a destructive nihilist fury. To put the matter in the phraseology of religious ethics, we may say that socialism is a faith which makes men better because it raises them above themselves and guides them towards supra-individual ends. In any case it gives them hope which incites them to action. No one can foresee what this hope will make of the world in



centuries yet to come. Our knowledge leaves us in the lurch here. Consequently, we cannot decide, in terms of such a forecast, whether socialism is good or bad. If we want to know whether socialism is good or bad, we must decide by the canons of the only knowledge which is attainable. But this we do know, that socialism, here and now, makes human beings better and happier, because it saves them from the atrophy of their noblest social impulses.

Though I thus endorse the claim for happiness, I must protest against being supposed for that reason to accept the materialist hedonism which inspired Bentham when he spoke of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". I regard every quantitative theory of happiness as psychologically unmeaning. The essence of the feeling of happiness is a subjective and qualitative valuation. Such valuations cannot be compared one with another objectively and quantitatively.

Happiness and unhappiness are psychological affective states which cannot be compared with one another except in relation to a definite situation. They are the poles of a state of tension which, but for these poles, would be devoid of meaning. There are no happy or unhappy "conditions". There are only happy or unhappy human beings. In any situation, the feeling of unhappiness derives from two factors: the situation itself; and the method of valuation of the person who is in the situation. This individual mode of valuation, for its part, is not invariable. It is guided by experience—not, of course, isolated experiences, but a mass of experiences in each phase of life in which certain kinds of experience are habitual. Many things, which, for my neighbour, denote supreme happiness, arouse in me nothing but repulsion and disgust; and, on the other hand, that which makes me happy, may leave him quite unconcerned. Again, a state which I had looked forward to as happiness, may fail to bring happiness when I have attained it. Perhaps it will prove different from what I expected; or it may be that directly I have attained it I want something else. In every new situation, provided that it lasts for a measurable time, there ensues a new objectivation

of the relationship of polarity between happiness and unhappiness which is indispensable to the orientation of the will; the tension is always there, but it takes a new direction because the polarity is new.

If there were only a quantitative measure for happiness and unhappiness, we should have to infer that in every durable phase of their lives all men would feel, thanks to their habitual social experiences, exactly the same amount of happiness and unhappiness. The line of division would then always be at an equal distance between the two poles, for it would be an equator, the expression of an equal division between extant emotional states. The paradoxical contention that in the long run happiness and unhappiness are always equally divided for the individual would, in such circumstances, be as obvious and trite as the contention that the intelligence of the half of mankind is below average, since the average is decided by the fact that half is above and half below. It is true that this cannot apply to an isolated moment in human life, but only to a minimum duration extending to what I have called a phase, which may be equal to the total duration of the life. We must understand by such a phase a durable state in which the valuation of happiness (a habitual affective criterion which, like every habit, needs a certain time for its consolidation) gradually adapts itself to the median line which divides the real mass of experiences during that phase. Unhappiness (in the sense of a lasting predominance of feelings of unhappiness over feelings of happiness) is, if we consider it from a purely quantitative point of view, the outcome of a failure of adaptation of the habitual method of valuation to the habitual lot; and the remedy, then, is a qualitative modification of the method of valuation. The normal experience of the combatants in the world war gives an example of this on the large scale. At the front, the only men who were really unhappy were those who did not succeed in adapting their method of valuation to the new conditions. The majority were able, in a surprisingly short time, to accommodate themselves to their new mode of life so effectively that hours of

suffering and hours of "joy" practically balanced one another. Those who did not succeed in doing this fell a prey to neurosis, or else (and this was very rare) became transformed into different beings, who found a new psychological pivot in a new compensatory idea of future happiness.

Imagine a man who passes his whole life in conditions which remain substantially unchanged (because, for instance, the same brief series of conditions is perpetually recurring). Imagine, further, that—thanks to his heredity and his education—this man from the outset approaches life with a method of valuation which is the outcome of the adaptation of earlier generations to like conditions. Then, in the course of his life, this man will experience equal "quantities" of happiness and unhappiness, for his average valuation will correspond perfectly with his average experience. Of course no such case will ever be realised to the full measure of theoretical possibility; but it provides a standard to which the actual experience of a great many persons closely approximates. Primitives untouched by "civilisation" and countryfolk living in isolation (belonging as they do to social groups whose existence is homogeneous and almost unchanging, so that their behaviour is regulated by traditional rules in strict conformity with their mode of life) are almost typical of such a standard. They are, therefore, "neutral" and "inert" in the matter of cultural progress. There is so perfect a balance between wants and satisfactions, that there is no tension which could engender longings for happiness of a different kind, that is to say aspirations towards a different kind of life. The contemplation of such cases has given rise to the maxim: "Happy the peoples which have no history". But they are not happy in the sense that they do not know the feeling of unhappiness. The phrase means no more than that the subjective polarity of their feelings of pleasure and pain, of happiness and unhappiness, is, generally speaking, adapted to the objective mean of their experience. For them, unhappiness and happiness are distributed harmoniously and stably, so that there is no tension to call up a wish for innovation.

We must now remind ourselves that the paragraph opening the present discussion began with the words : “ *If* there were only a quantitative measure for happiness and unhappiness ”. The more we probe the question the more plainly do we see that in this field a quantitative criterion can explain very little. Were there no other criterion, cultural evolution would merely tend to bring about a stable equilibrium between valuation of happiness, on the one hand, and experience on the other—to establish a condition characteristic of the “ happy people who have no history ”, of the “ fellaheen ” of Spengler’s decadent pessimism, of Adam and Eve in the Garden before the Fall. But man has lost the equipoise of this terrestrial paradise, the balance proper to his animal heritage—not because he wanted *more* happiness, but because he wanted a *different* happiness. Let me repeat that if there were but one *quality* of happiness and of unhappiness, there would always have to be the same *quantity*—from the outlook of a generation of human beings adapted to its mode of life. An Eskimo in Northern Greenland feels heat and cold as we do, but his estimate of “ heat ” begins at a point which we call “ cold ”.

On the other hand, the qualitative problem of happiness is far more complicated, were it only because several systems of polarity come into conflict here. Happiness and unhappiness are not the same thing as the feelings of pleasure and pain which, in the psycho-physics of sensorial perception, are used for the linear measurement of the gradations of elementary sensation, simultaneously with the measurement of the gradations of tension and discharge, stimulation and tranquillisation.

Why do we not give the name of “ happiness ” to every pleasurable sensation ? First of all, because it is our custom to value pleasurable sensations, even when they are physically and psychologically incommensurable, in accordance with a hierarchy of a different kind. It is an ethical or aesthetic hierarchy. We do not directly measure our pleasurable sensations one against the other, but we compare them indirectly, in their relationship to the motives which make us

seek them and to the actions towards which they aim. I cannot measure the agreeable sensation of a sweet taste in terms comparable with those of the pleasure given me by a chord of C-major ; but I can range such sensations in accordance with a scale of values, saying : " If I go to listen to a good concert, this is a more *elevated* enjoyment, a greater *happiness*, than if I am enjoying the taste of a chocolate cream". As concerns the latter, I should not call eating it " happiness " at all, but only " pleasure " or " enjoyment ", reserving the expression " happiness " for " loftier " satisfactions.

The existence of such an ethical and aesthetic scale of values is most conspicuous in the cases, so common in our experience, when there is a conflict between a motive dictated by our moral consciousness and the wish for a gratification of the senses. Suppose that, in such a case, the ethical motive gets the better of the sensual motive, can we say that the sensation of pleasure derived from the gratification of our conscience was simply " greater " than the sensation of pleasure the sensual gratification would have given us ? If so, what is the scale by which we measure the two ? Perhaps a physiologist might deem it possible to answer this question with the aid of measurements of the activities of the heart and lungs, of local vasomotor manifestations, internal glandular secretions, etc. Well and good, but can we believe that all the measuring apparatus in the world will enable us to detect a keener sensation of pleasure in a martyr who is enjoying a sense of mystical ecstasy than in a debauchee who is giving himself up to the pleasures of the flesh ? Can we find any standard of measurement which will enable us to compare the one with the other ? Of course there is no such standard. Here, we do not *measure*, but *value* ; and we value in terms of ethical and aesthetic canons (of course, variable within certain limits) which have nothing to do with the quantitative intensity of physiological and psychological feelings. No matter whether we call the highest point of this scale of values—the absolute value—" Tao ", " Brahma ", " the Good and the Beautiful ", or " bonum divinum ". Even though this last appellation may seem more significant to most

of us, it is probable that all of them are but partial expressions for a wider general understanding. In any case, we are concerned with varying manifestations of a psychological disposition whose essence is unique, one which leads us to believe in the existence of a supreme value directing us towards happiness—unless we prefer to speak of it as “salvation”. Thus those who dream of a state of perfect happiness for the mankind of days to come, are only thinking of a situation which would be happiness in accordance with the normal valuations of the extant social state. They are craving for that which would render them happy in accordance with their present valuation, and not that which might appear as happiness to the people of a future day. In fact, we delude ourselves in a way which is hardly less simple-minded than the faith a Mahommedan has in a material paradise, where the true believer will be surfeited with enjoyments which seem to him happiness in accordance with his earthly judgment. Who is there that would really like to spend eternity in eating meringues or in listening to perpetual allegros? Perfection has no meaning except in relation to imperfection upon the same plane of reality.

That is the weak point which psychological criticism discovers in all the utopist pictures of a eudaemonist future; for close examination shows that they are the outcome of purely subjective criteria of value, and that there is no possibility whatever of their objective realisation. The earthly paradise of the utopists (the Marxists not excepted), who picture the general happiness on “the day after the revolution” as a general wellbeing, belong to the same order of guiding fictions as the “happy hunting grounds” of the Red Indians, who, since their worst misfortune is a lack of game, naturally regard heaven as a place which is teeming with deer and buffalo. The Eskimos, in like manner, dream of heaven as a sea where fish abound. The illusion in all these cases is the natural illusion of perspective to which Müller-Lyer gave the name of “nynoscopy”, this meaning the tendency to look at the future and the past through the spectacles of the present. A

generalised craving of the present is thus projected into the future state of which we dream, regardless of the modification in the general direction of our wishes which will be a necessary part of that future. When we study Marxism, or any other form of utopism, we see that this tendency is universal, being the outcome of the working of psychological laws. Moreover, it applies to the past as well as to the future. The Marxist belief, a pseudo-scientific belief, in the universality of primitive communism, as a variant of a universal myth of the Golden Age, has led the "scientific socialists" into numerous false generalisations concerning the history of primitive man. It is the expression of the same tendency to identify happiness with possession that leads the Marxists to believe in a future society built in accordance with their hearts' desire. Such fancies are the expression of a psychological need for symmetry, as a justification of the faith that men are better than their institutions—an error to which all utopists and all revolutionists are prone, the classical instance being Jean Jacques Rousseau.

From the psychological outlook such an illusion is perfectly natural, and there is every reason to believe that it is inevitable, if not indispensable. My only object in referring to the matter here is to show that from the specific form of the utopia we can infer the nature of the wish that creates it. It would seem, then, that Marxism is utopist and psychologically absurd because it believes in an increase in the quantity of future happiness by means of an institutional guarantee of the satisfaction of wants whose nature corresponds to an extant institutional reality. This is nonsensical, for two reasons: first of all, because the quantity of happiness is a social constant; and, secondly, because an improvement in the quality of happiness, which is the only thing that matters, cannot be effected by a mere transformation of institutions, but solely by a transmutation of motives—which institutions can only favour or hinder indirectly. That is why the idea that every conceivable kind of social organisation can ensure anything in the least like "general happiness", is utterly absurd. Institutions can

only introduce or remove obstacles to certain modifications of the quality of happiness.

The tension which is important for the promotion of cultural evolution is, therefore, not so much the elementary and static tension between happiness and unhappiness, as the complicated and dynamic cultural tension between one kind of happiness and another. If, when we speak of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" we only mean a larger or more intense sum of agreeable sensations, we are hunting a chimera, for every increase in our faculty for enjoyment brings with it a corresponding increase in our faculty for suffering. We might as well long for a universe where we should see more light and less shade. Directly we had found it, the equator of our luminous sensations would be transferred to midway between the extremes of our habitual sensations. The problem of increasing the quantity of happiness is insoluble, and only in the philistine and platitudinous philosophy of a Bentham could it ever have been posed. Of these shopkeeper philosophies we may say, paraphrasing Schopenhauer: "They talk of 'happiness', but they mean 'money'". Here, once more, Marxism suffers from the heritage of its philosophic ancestry: it speaks of more happiness, and means more wellbeing. The demand for more wellbeing is certainly justified in view of the conditions of the industrial era; but in the form in which the Marxists make it, it cannot become associated with the ultimate, most general, and eternally valid objectives of mankind, and thus merit the consecration of the ethical.

Wellbeing only assumes the aspect of happiness when wellbeing is absent. As soon as it is realised for the "greatest number", happiness is suddenly recognised to be something altogether different. Already in the United States the problem of progress is seen in such an entirely new light by all far-sighted critics of American civilisation, that they are actually beginning to complain of the degree of wellbeing attained by "the greatest number", for the very reason that it does not signify "the greatest happiness". Are we, then, to infer



that it is useless to aim at the greatest wellbeing of the greatest number? By no means. We must aim at it, and must attain it, so that the greatest number may learn to seek for a different and loftier happiness.

Here is what the whole problem turns on in practice. Progress does not mean an unattainable increase in the quantity of happiness, but a displacement of the ideal of happiness. This displacement can be effected, and is constantly occurring. The displacement is synonymous with the abolition of a polar system of valuations of a low ethical quality, in order to adopt a polar system of valuations of a high ethical quality. We must not try to put an end to the tension between happiness and unhappiness, but to turn it to account (by searching for sublimated compensations) so that it can act on a higher and ever higher plane.

To dream of satisfying all the wants of every one is as stupid as it is vulgar. Such an idea can only arise in the minds of persons who are suffering from the delirium of a social fever caused by the inhibition of higher needs as a sequel to the non-satisfaction of lower needs. It is the vision of starving and weary folk who are dreaming of the Land of Plenty. The dreamers are persons crushed by a sense of social inferiority. They believe because they wish to believe in the levelling down of all the social causes of suffering—as if it were possible for us to rid ourselves of extant social conflicts except by lifting them to a higher level, that is to say by replacing these conflicts by others of a different kind, and less gross. The most tragical feature about the destiny of the working masses is not, I repeat, material poverty in itself; it is that this poverty of the flesh condemns them to poverty of the spirit: continual anxieties about a job, social dependence, the inhibition of the best constructive instincts by joyless and undignified labour, social inferiority, etc. These are the things that I think of when I speak of the inhibition of higher wants owing to the non-satisfaction of lower wants. Still, though we can sometimes explain a dream by a real cause (such as an empty stomach), it does not follow that the image in the dream is itself real.

Let us tell the masses the truth: we can only realise more happiness by raising the level of ethical and aesthetic wants. Such is the deeper meaning of the contrast between the paradisaic ideal and the heroic ideal; and the same consideration explains why I always speak in one and the same breath of men as becoming "happier and better"; they can only become happier by becoming better, and cannot become better without becoming happier.

When we envisage things from that angle, we discern a new aspect of the duality of motives, which is displayed in the socialist labour movement by the contrast between the "capitalist spirit" (a product of adaptation) and the "socialist spirit" (a product of the obverse reaction). The movement aims at two things: first of all, at the satisfaction of the extant wants of the masses; secondly, at raising the level of these wants. The former task is fulfilled by the struggle of interests; the latter by cultural activity. The latter is the only one which is essentially socialist, in the sense of a real concordance between the means and the end. Were it otherwise, how could we understand that Lassalle, more than half a century ago, should have been able to arouse the enthusiasm of a working-class audience by speaking of "the workers' accursed lack of wants"? This latter objective, without which socialist aspiration would lack an ethical character, and indeed the religious character of being directed towards an absolute end, is not one of *more* happiness, but one of *loftier* happiness.

But in so far as there is a difference in principle between the two claims, it is only in respect of the theory of those who confound direction towards *more* with direction towards *higher* things. There is no contradiction between the two methods in the practical work of the movement. In practical work, the reality of the instinctive aspirations resolves the antagonism into a unity which needs only to be recognised by theory in order to extend itself to conscious motivations. That which, according to theory, might appear to be a relationship wherein one is opposed to the other is, in the practical work of the movement by which the masses educate themselves, a relation-

ship wherein one follows the other. The struggle of interests is the preparatory phase towards a cultural ascent. The lower wants of the masses must find at least a modicum of satisfaction before the higher needs (which are insatiable) can be felt with sufficient general intensity to raise the level of mass wants. We think of Schiller's parable: "Cover nudity, and dignity will come of itself".

This conception of our cultural task throws light on the essential contrast between socialist practice based on the Christian and democratic idea of self-determination, on the one hand, and fascism and bolshevism on the other. The fascists and the bolshevists, too, want "the happiness of the masses": but in pursuit of this end they follow a simple policy of power which, in accordance with the Napoleonic example, exploits the lower motives of the masses whose desires are frustrated; and, above all, exploits their social and national inferiority complexes, their need for subordination, and their fear. All this sets out from the tacit assumption that the motives in question are to be regarded as the permanent and invariable "raw material" of the institutional creations of parties or dictators. The assumption leads in its turn to the practical result that the institutions created in this way depend for their working upon such motives, and therefore can never lead to an improvement in the ethical quality of the motives of the masses and to a corresponding improvement in the mass valuation of happiness. As a general rule, indeed, there is actually a deterioration of motives, in that the will-to-power is apt to change moral indignation into a mere longing for revenge. Socialism, which in my view is the conscious aspiration of the democratic peoples towards the self-government of all their social life, is based upon a very different psychological hypothesis. It sets out from the belief that human motives are transformable with regard to their ethical quality, and are educable through the sublimation of the instincts. Thanks to this transmutability of motives, every step forward towards the satisfaction of extant wants becomes, through conscious orientation towards an ethical aim, a step

towards the raising of the level of wants. This effect (which, in the last analysis, is nothing more than the transformation of political and social activity into educational activity) will be all the more certain in proportion as we recognise more clearly the fictive and purely subjective character of eudaemonist visions of the future. The search for "more" happiness is a chase after one's own shadow, so long as the search is for a realisation in an eschatological future. It can only lead to a result for those who seek the realisation of happiness in the actual and lasting sublimation of the valuations of happiness.

In this sense I say that socialism means the present happiness of actually living persons, or it means nothing at all. The growth of that thought in my mind was the last step on the road which led me away from Marxism. It had upon me the effect of a discovery. I felt that, after long wanderings, I had at length made my way to a hilltop whence I could once more see the surrounding country. Above all, I felt that henceforward I was in possession of a means for escaping from the painful dilemma arising out of the contrast between present action and faith in the future. For, in this new conception of socialism, faith in the future becomes nothing more than one of the psychological elements of present action.

This brings us very near to the limits of the knowledge which any scientific theory of socialism can give us to-day. The object of a doctrine of socialism must always be something which actually exists. Social science can never do anything more than show us the place where we must apply the lever of our will in order to get the best effect; it cannot arouse this will to action, or give it reasons for action. On the contrary, our study of Marxism has shown us that any doctrine which tries to arrange the phenomena in a system of causes and effects can do nothing else than embody in these causes the motives which the creators of the doctrine regard as of the highest value.

I am therefore no more inclined to give the scientific judgments which I have been trying to establish the significance of absolute and definitive truths, than I will give that signifi-

cance to the Marxist ideas which I have been trying to refute. I am well aware that every doctrine which gives more than a simple description of facts is nothing but the expression of a faith in rational symbols. Every sociological belief is capable of rational symbolisation, that is to say of logical motivation. Nevertheless, it does not derive its value from the logical consistency of its intellectual presentation, but from the moral substance of the motive which tries to secure expression in it. The subjective measure of this motive is the feeling that it gives to our personal life the highest sense which that life can have, and its objective measure is the effect which the actions it inspires have upon human happiness.

That is why I can only present my final conclusions in the form of a credo. I am no longer a Marxist, not because this or that Marxist affirmation seems false to me, but because, since I emancipated myself from the Marxist way of thinking, I *feel* myself nearer to the understanding of socialism as a manifestation (variable from age to age) of an eternal aspiration towards a social order in conformity with our moral sense.

Nor am I willing to be labelled a sceptic because I have had to pass by the road of doubt in order to rid myself of many "ideals". Above all, I defend myself from such an appellation because I should be most unwilling that any one should learn from me nothing more than scepticism. The only sort of scepticism I plead guilty to, is the kind which derives from an excessive need for belief, and is a means for attaining to a higher level of understanding.

No doubt the strongest charge that will be brought against me will be that I despise reason and science because I venture to say "I believe". But if I merited this reproach, should I have tried to express my faith in a scientific form, and should I have addressed myself to the reason of my readers? It is true that I have endeavoured to show that scientific reasoning does not, in regard to human activity, and above all in regard to mass activity, play the preponderant role which our fathers assigned to it. But this is the very thing which makes me esteem reason more highly and to recognise that the

extension of the domain in which it can exert its influence is the surest possible sign of human progress. From the psychological outlook, civilisation is a process of sublimation : that is to say it is a transformation (effected with the aid of reason) of animal-physical vital phenomena into psychological-spiritual vital phenomena ; a process which replaces non-intellectual motives by intellectual motives issuing from the sphere of concepts. The more plainly we become aware of the defects of knowledge, the more strongly do we feel urged to amplify our knowledge. No doubt among our contemporaries there will be found those who, having discovered the feebleness of our reason, will lapse into an idolatry of all that is irrational and even bestially instinctive in man ; but such persons are, at bottom, nothing more than disillusioned worshippers of the Goddess of Reason. They do not understand that they are only turning away from their idol because they are weaklings who expected from that idol more strength than it could give them. They would not behave as they do unless their faith had been a superstition. If I fight against a superstitious faith in reason, it is precisely because I want a reasonable faith in reason. I value science so highly that I regard a psychological science of science as essential. If, when making science a means for knowing the nature of science, we make of it at the same time a means for recognising its own limitations, the only inference we need draw from this is that the conviction of the limited character of our knowledge is itself a scientific knowledge of a higher grade. Awareness of the inadequacy of our cognition is the least inadequate of our possible cognitions.

The men of the nineteenth century, unwilling to hear a word about the possible limits of scientific knowledge, did a great deal to shake the faith of the twentieth century in scientific knowledge. They were far too much inclined to find salvation in technical progress and in the increase of knowledge which subserved this progress—as if these things alone would suffice to give us more understanding, more wisdom, and more happiness. Whether they went to church or not, they no

longer had any religion, no longer had any kind of faith which could say to them : " You ought ". They tried to replace their lost faith by science ; to make of science, instead of a servant, a master. This idolatry transformed men into the barbarians who revealed themselves in the world war. There is only one science which can claim to guide us on the path to duty ; it is the science of good and evil ; in a word, conscience. The highest aim of scientific socialism is to become a social science in the service of the social conscience. In the domain of social science there are no truths but those which can enable us to fulfil our moral trends as members of a social community. The eternal task which this fulfilment imposes on us—socialism, that is to say—manifests itself in every age under a different form, in accordance with the possibilities of knowledge and of fulfilment peculiar to that age. That is why the sociological truth of to-day differs from that of yesterday, and will be different again to-morrow.

What I have said concerning the necessity of achieving the liquidation of Marxism, will apply just as much, in a nearer or more distant future, to that which seems to me truth to-day. What is true to-day, likewise, will be false in time to come, and will then have to be combated.

Does the admission seem inconsistent ? What gives me courage for the attempt to overthrow an old truth by a new one, at the very time when I admit that both of them are conditioned by the epochs to which they respectively belong ?

I have the courage to do this, not *in spite of* my conviction of the relativity of social science, but *because of* that conviction. It is because I believe in this relativity that I say that Marxism was conditioned by the circumstances of the epoch which gave it birth. These circumstances have changed, and the conviction that Marxism thereupon ceased to be true has become one element of the truth of our own day. Does this mean that there is no progress in psychological ideas ; that there are nothing but errors, succeeding one another in unending relays, without hope of attaining truth, and only regarded as true until refuted by a new error ? Not at all ! None but a

superficial thinker can believe that one who regards all scientific truth as relative is thereby proclaiming truth as error. Nothing could be more fallacious than such a view. For, first, where there is no absolute truth there can be no absolute error. When we show that a truth is relative, we do not transform it thereby into an error, but merely show that it is a historical fact ; it ceases to be a law of knowledge in order to become an object of knowledge. Secondly, and above all, when pointing out the relativity of scientific knowledge, we are not destroying the notion of truth in itself. Man draws truth from various sources, and exact science is only one of these. Above all, we regard as true what we see, feel, believe. Men knew truths for a long time before they began to use microscopes, telescopes, and retorts. Few of the truths which the students of exact science believe to-day can be justified by these sciences ; and the sciences are only possible because they assume certain truths which we believe without being able to prove them. All mathematical science starts from axioms taken as self-evident ; all metaphysical science sets out from the belief in apriorist forms of thought ; all experimental science is founded upon the hypothesis that there are natural laws presiding over the repetition of effects ; all historical science starts by assuming that there is a meaning in human destiny ; all sociology believes in an actual objective ; all knowledge, to whatever type of faith it belongs, believes in the identity between certain ideas and the corresponding phenomena. We only seek knowledge because we believe knowledge to be useful, or because we feel in duty bound to seek it. Why, then, because our scientific knowledge is limited, should we deny the possibility of knowing truths, when the faith in this possibility is the starting-point of all scientific effort ?

Having faith in this possibility, believing that we can know truth, it is natural that we should continually try to replace all temporary scientific truth by new scientific truth. That is what we mean by progress—or at any rate by evolution, the movement without which progress is impossible. This movement becomes progress when a temporary truth is replaced



by another temporary truth of a higher order. Marxism was this in relation to truths recognised before its day, such as the truths of utopist socialism. It made them invalid by demonstrating their relativity, by disclosing the way in which they were historically conditioned, and by making of this demonstration the basis of a new conception. There was no place for Marxism in utopism, but there is a place for utopism in Marxism. Marxism was a truth of a higher order than that to which the earlier truths belonged, for it *comprehended* them—just as a geometrical figure which circumscribes another is necessarily larger than that other.

In like manner I hold that my own conception of socialism is an advance upon Marxism, because it shows the relativity of Marxism and circumscribes Marxism ; and because it does this by setting out from the knowledge of our own time, from the knowledge of phenomena of recent date, among which must be numbered Marxism itself and the working-class movement which has been subjected to Marxist influence. But it seems to me that this new conception, precisely because of its relativism, denotes an advance in a different and even deeper sense. Marxism disclosed the relativity of all social ideologies—Marxism alone excepted. My way of thinking recognises its own relativity ; it does not introduce any new sociological dogma, for its aim is to show the invalidity of all sociological dogmas.

I am prepared to be asked whether a conviction of the relativity of sociological truth will not be likely to result in a weakening of social activity, seeing that the sense of uncertainty will inevitably react upon volition. As far as this is likely, I admit it gladly—for I shall rejoice if people become so keenly aware of the relativity of their knowledge that they will no longer try to dispose of others' fates and others' lives in the name of any knowledge whatever. My gorge rises against the claim that the human understanding can justify the use of force in the regulation of other persons' lives. That is why I am horrified at the proposals of certain eugenists, who, under the sanction of a theory of heredity, would like to

“regulate” procreation by law. Similarly, I am strongly opposed to capital punishment, which subjects a human being to an irreparable fate on the warrant of a judgment which may be mistaken. I detest the puritan morality which would expand an individual obligation into a general constraint. Its usual upshot is to set up a double standard, according to which the moralist expects more of others than he is willing to exact of himself, since it is much easier and pleasanter to rule others than to rule oneself. I would fain see established a double standard of the inverse kind, a standard characterised by freedom and toleration. Its golden rule would be: “Make yourself better, others happier”. This means: “Impose an educational aim on yourself, but don’t try to enforce it on others; be content, rather, to free their path from the obstacles which stand between them and their happiness”. That is why I regard socialism as, above all, a claim which each individual makes on himself—it should be a claim upon society only in so far as it attempts to persuade others, to inspire them with socialist feeling, to secure their reasoned assent. If, then, besides having these desirable consequences, the conviction of the relativity of knowledge should lead people to be less sure of their duty, less confident in the claims they make upon themselves, we must be content to take the rough with the smooth, having no option. We can do nothing else than submit ourselves to the guidance of thought; and, when thought discloses to us the limits to its own powers, we must make the best of the situation, just as we have to make the best of it when the growing knowledge of mechanics leads to a discovery in technique whose consequences are disagreeable to us. Since it is our fate to be thinking creatures, we must think out our thoughts to the end. Our thoughts will think themselves out, whether we like it or not!

Happily this applies also to the idea of relativity, which may be said to annul itself when we think it out to the end. A little relativism shakes the confidence of the will, but more relativism restores confidence. For the very reason that we understand our scientific knowledge to be conditional, we are better

enabled to appraise this knowledge by the concrete standard of its fitness to serve as a guide to moral volition. Thus, as soon as we have got the better of the pangs caused by the dispelling of a cherished illusion, we return with the vigour of convalescence to the deeper sources of the living will, which flow out of the moral subsoil.

If we are confident that what we are doing is good, why do we need, over and above, to be sustained by the belief that the victory of this good is scientifically assured? Only in mechanics, only in the science of material things, is such foreknowledge possible—and only there is it needed. The man who makes a machine must be able beforehand to deduce from scientific laws how the machine will work. But the science whose subject matter consists in the social activities of mankind cannot possess such foreknowledge absolute; for we do not need to *know* anything more than the bearing of the immediate action. It is enough that socialism should have *faith* in its own future. Socialism is a *passion*, not a *cognition*—that is what we learn from psychology. One who is fighting for the establishment of a better social system does not need scientific proof that the coming of this system is inevitable. It suffices that his conscience should tell him to work for its coming.

The masses, whose social aspirations are determined rather by interests and by passions than by scientific knowledge, are not discouraged by the conviction that there are limits to knowledge. This conviction practically does not affect them at all. Their impulses seem to them self-justified. On the other hand, one who separates himself from the mass because he acts in virtue of a reasoned personal conviction, will probably find an adequate reason for self-confidence in the knowledge of the ethical origin of his volition. Such a one, if troubled by doubts as to the utility of his efforts, may, in case of need, recall the proud maxim of William the Silent: "There is no need of hope in order to undertake, nor of success in order to persevere". All great things are the work of individuals who act in obedience to a moral commandment, and no one

can do great things unless, in supreme moments, he is able (like Luther at the Diet of Worms) to say, "I can no otherwise !"

If, therefore, I am asked whether I believe in the realisation of socialism in the future, I answer : I believe in it as a moral obligation, but not as a natural necessity. The actions inspired by this faith are directed towards a future which is realising itself from day to day in proportion as these actions make us different beings. Socialism is not a panacea to be applied once for all ; it is a process which begins with the first action consciously inspired by socialism, and will not end when the last of these actions has been performed. No doubt, there will never be any social state which exactly corresponds to the ideal image which animates all such actions, for the ideal is only a limiting notion, a guiding plan, a line stretching out towards infinity.

What do we know of the morrow ? It seems probable that the European socialist working-class movement will, one day, lead to the control of political power by the workers, because their interests are the interests of the great majority, and also because of the energy which socialism derives from the harmony between its ends and the noblest social instincts of spiritual beings. Still, that does not tell us what will be the outcome of the political victory. There are possibilities of a new kind of class domination, of a new type of social parasitism. There may be a destructive revolution, resulting in a universal relapse into the vegetative civilisation of the fellaheen, or in a transition to caesarism. It may result in a suicide of the world through universal war. It may hand over a Europe exhausted by bloodshed to the expansive instinct of American capitalism. It may lead to so complete a destruction of the forces of industrial production that there will result a social hegemony of the agricultural producers. But what is the use of chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of a foreknowledge which we do not need in order to guide our actions. For my part, I do not believe that so gloomy a future awaits us ; but an individual faith of this nature exercises no constraint over universal history. As far

as the historical process is concerned, every belief weighs no more and no less than the weight of the actions which are animated by this belief. Our sole concern, therefore, should be to devote all our strength to the service of our aspirations. Then, what we do will be a permanent acquisition. Our task is not that propounded by the pessimism of Spengler, "the inevitable or nothing", for we cannot know what is inevitable. Our task is to realise as much as possible of the best which we can aspire to. What we realise of socialism in ourselves and through ourselves cannot perish. Thereby we shall change the world to the full extent to which we are capable of changing it. Nothing that is done can be undone.

In a word, then, if I am asked whether the sceptical tinge of my own faith in the future of mankind (as contrasted with Marxist infallibility) does not undermine the energy of action, I can only answer that, as far as I am concerned, it does not do anything of the kind. No doubt I have lost many illusions, but in losing them I have only felt that I have been freed from needless burdens. For the very reason that I have come to doubt the absolutist character of many intellectual valuations, I have come to esteem more highly the real values of the life of action. I do not think that I can be charged with having given too rosy a picture of working-class psychology or of the socialist movement. Nevertheless, despite all the moderation of my rational judgment, I feel to-day, as regards every concrete decision, more closely attached than ever to the working-class cause—were it only by the instinctive sense of duty which imposes upon those in a privileged social position the obligation to devote themselves to the cause of the disinherited. I am the last to expect socialist miracles from a struggle for political power; and yet, should I be called upon to do so, I should fight for the working class in an electoral struggle however obscure and out-of-the-way (provided only that I was not myself the parliamentary candidate) with just as much energy as in the days when every parliamentary socialist seemed to me the apostle of a new humanitarian religion. Certainly, I no longer expect the Golden Age or universal peace from the

conquest of political power by the labour parties ; and yet the slightest increase of socialist influence, when thrown into the scales which oscillate between war and peace, seems to me so weighty a factor on behalf of a reasonable world policy that even this modest advance is, to my mind, worth any personal sacrifice.

Do I believe in the revolution ? My answer is that the older I grow the more revolutionary do I feel, and the less do I believe in the revolution. I am a revolutionist : this means that the transition from a capitalist system to a socialist system is for me a spiritual motive which can only enter my mind as the conception of an antagonism between two incompatible moral principles. The detestation of social injustice, of the degradation of human dignity, of bourgeois selfishness, of philistine greed, of conventional hypocrisy, and of the degeneration of taste, which led me in early youth to revolt against the outlooks of my social environment, has become intensified as the years have passed. I find the cultural atmosphere of contemporary bourgeois society irrespirable. I cannot go on living unless I withdraw from it at intervals in a more direct way than by mere activities on behalf of socialism—either by refreshing myself through contact with unsophisticated nature, or else by delighting in the beauties handed down to us from earlier ages. Nevertheless, in proportion as my revolutionary sentiment grows stronger, I find myself more and more aloof from the shallow and romanticist idea of a revolution that aims at bringing about, by crude and sudden violence, a growth which (like all growth) will need time and freedom. I want to work at something far profounder and more essential than would be any revolution in methods of *government*. What matters beyond everything is the way of *living*. It is far more difficult to change customs than to change laws. For socialism, a change in the laws has no meaning except in so far as the laws are obstacles to the consolidation of new customs. The psychological transformation necessary for this latter cannot be favoured by force, which does not only give rise to an antagonistic reaction in the person to whom force is applied, but also demoralises the one who makes use of it.

I am not so much aloof from the things of this world as to imagine that the further rise of the working class towards the attainment of social power will be accompanied with less use of force than hitherto. Far from it—were it but because the narrow-mindedness of the members of the owning class will probably lead them, in the determination to defend their position, to use all the means of constraint which are still at their disposal. But for me the decisive feature in the situation is, that an increase of working-class power can only signify a realisation of socialism in so far as the change can be achieved without the use of force. That is why socialists must wittingly simplify their objective, changing it from an objective of class vengeance to an objective of the cause of mankind. They must not be content to say that they will not use force unless they are forcibly opposed. They must not leave the responsibility to the other side. They must themselves do everything in their power to prevent the use of force by either side, on any pretence whatever. Socialists must not, on their own side, stimulate any motive which may become a motive for the use of force. One who trusts to the use of force, delivers himself over to force. The experiences of 1914 showed how easy it is for a socialist revolutionary motive to degenerate into a destructive bellicose motive.

The strongest weapon against force is the refusal to use force. I know that this method presupposes a strength of the moral consciousness which exists to-day only in exceptionally gifted persons. No doubt many days must pass before we can expect of the masses who are moved by instinct, the capacity for following such examples—even though the working class, whose social position predisposes them to use non-forcible means of struggle like the strike and oral or written propaganda, seem predestined to grasp, in due time, the fertility of this idea. But for practical purposes to-day, the decisive consideration is that everything which leads the working-class movement away from the use of force and towards a sublimation of the instincts of social combativity, will increase instead of weakening the power of the working class, and

will, above all, increase its capacity for using this power in a socialist way.

In the light of this consideration, the traditional Marxist formula "we do not want to use force, and we shall only use it to defend ourselves against force used by our opponents", seems to me no better than an attempt to hide the true educational task of socialism. A German communist, a lawyer, recently said in a law court: "We are not preparing an armed rising, but we are preparing ourselves for an armed rising". This may have been said in good faith; but in the actual state of our knowledge of the nature of mass motives, and of the influence of psychological symbols upon the masses, it assumes the aspect of an insincere dialectical artifice. It belongs to the same order of sophisms as the one so often used by States in defence of armaments: "Si vis pacem para bellum". States justify the way in which they heap up armaments by saying that it is necessary for them to be ready to defend themselves; but experience shows that the heaping up of armaments tends to create warlike motives, and, at last, to make war inevitable. It matters not how Marxists find it possible to justify intellectually their idea of revolution. The actual fact is that the idea of revolution tends to strengthen motives for the use of force, since the use of force is implicit in the conception. The idea of revolution, for those who make it a corner-stone of their political mentality, signifies primarily a desire to secure compensation for a feeling of oppression. The masses would never dream of revolution as a means of vengeance were it not that the prophets of the masses have always spoken of the revolution as the "sublime tribunal". So strongly does this statement apply to Marx himself, that his notion of the revolution may be said to begin and end with the seizure of power. For him the revolution is a fulfilment rather than a beginning. It puts an end to the class struggle thanks to which, according to Marxist doctrine, historical progress is effected; and the end of this struggle seems rather to take the form of the defeat of the adversary than of the accomplishment of a constructive task. The German revolution of



November 1918, which put into the hands of the working class a power they lost because they did not know how to use it, was a practical caricature of the Marxist notion of revolution. I agree that the whole blame for this must not be attached to the theory. But the theory must bear a part of the blame, in that it had contributed to reinforce among the masses motives which were directed rather towards conquest for its own sake than towards constructive tasks.

I recognise frankly that my deepest reasons for opposing this conception of the revolution are affective. They are not so much the product of what I have thought as of what I have lived. I lived them for three years in the trenches, where I learned to shudder at the "sublime tribunal" of unchained mass passions. My experience in this respect was like that of De Stogumber, in Shaw's *Saint Joan*, who is represented in later years as explaining his mental and moral collapse at the burning of the Maid of Orleans (for whose condemnation he had been partly responsible) by saying: "If you only saw what you think about, you would think quite differently about it. . . . I did a very cruel thing once, because I did not know what cruelty was like. I had not seen it, you know. That is the great thing: you must see it. And then you are redeemed and saved." Some critics will dismiss this as sentimentality; but to that I could only agree if any one could convince me that the detestable use of force in the world war, in order to promote the realisation of fine ideals, was essential or even helpful for the realisation of these ideals. Nevertheless, the horror I felt did not arise so much from the contemplation of the vastness of the human sacrifice in the war as from the contemplation of the vastness of the lack of meaning and the lack of purpose in this sacrifice. What I cannot forgive in the war—and in myself—is the tragical madness of a destiny which condemned men to expiate the weakness of their judgment by the transmutation of their best motives into their worst deeds; which compelled them to kill their fellows under stress of humanitarian passion; to become, when inspired with enthusiasm for a universal idea, accomplices in the

destruction of that idea. To this end, one did not merely sacrifice oneself. One sacrificed others to an end which, owing to the nature of the means employed to reach it, was transformed into its opposite. I am myself too strongly animated with the fighting instinct to be able, through a simple repugnance to the use of force, to rally to any kind of pacifism except that which is itself a fight of a loftier and more ardent kind. If my inference from my war experiences has been that all war is an evil, it is because I can no longer believe in the possibility of attaining a good end by these evil means. Well, now, force in the service of a revolution would not act in any different way from force in the service of a war. It would lead away from the goal we wish to reach.

War has become as absurd as it is immoral. In our day of worldwide economy and of democratic States, every war becomes a war of the peoples, which destroys the economic foundations of national prosperity in the victors as well as in the vanquished. The same thing happens as regards the revolution, in so far as it is an armed rebellion. Revolution has been the historical form of revolt against a tyranny which was maintained only by force of arms. But capitalism (at any rate in the era of political democracy) is based upon the psychological power of the social prestige which money gives. A governmental regime can be overthrown by force, but a social order cannot. The apparent exception of Russia confirms the rule. The Russian revolution overthrew senile tsarism, but it was only able to overthrow youthful capitalism in so far as capitalism was not yet rooted in the national psychology.

Thus the practical consideration of utility takes its stand by the side of outraged sentiment to justify our faith in the superior strength of passive resistance. I no longer believe in the revolution as a sort of Last Judgment. But I believe all the more firmly in a revolution which will change ourselves. This idea conforms equally well with the demands of political opportunism, and with those of the moral law. The militarist conception of the revolution as a simple fight between

contending powers is unpractical romanticism of the worst kind. Bernard Shaw is right when, in *The Perfect Wagnerite*, he illustrates the practical absurdity of such an outlook with the aid of the symbolism of the Wagnerian Ring dramas. Siegfried, fighting against three allies, Alberich (Capitalism), Wotan (the government), and Loki (the intellectual who is their servant), is overthrown; for, though he can conquer them as a hero, he cannot make his victory effective in practice. "Alberich's work like Wotan's work and Loki's work, is necessary work; and therefore Alberich can never be superseded by a warrior, but only by a capable man of business, who is prepared to continue his work without a day's intermission." This is but another version of the Proudhonist idea of the revolution as a rise of the working class to "political capacity".

The same conviction, that ethical motivation is not merely the best policy, but is the only realist policy, is my guide when I insist upon the need for a renovation of socialist conviction by means of the moral and religious consciousness. We must not let ourselves be deceived by the fact that all political happenings in the world seem to be nothing more than a game of chess played between the interests. We fail to see the wood for the trees when we forget that no interests can in the long run maintain themselves or secure their end unless they can in one way or another be justified before the tribunal of the general moral consciousness. The fact that to-day there is no belief which cannot be misused in order to mask some private interest, is itself a proof how great, after all, is the power of faith.

That is the conclusion to which all the science of man comes, provided only that it digs deep enough. There is no science whose starting-point and methods are more prosaic and more sceptical than those of Freudian psychoanalysis. It dissects the soul with such cruel delight in every new discovery of the animal instincts in man, that among many of its amateurs it is only a pretext for a sort of intellectualised sadism, for a scarcely veiled hunt for the obscene. But serious psychoanalysts like Freud himself are always in search of the ultimate

dynamic motives of the human mind, and this search leads them to a discovery of a very different kind. Beyond all the manifestations of animalism, Freud discovers a force which he is unable either to decompose or to derive from any other force, one which seems to dwell in a peculiarly inaccessible and intangible region of the mind. Psychoanalysts do not always agree in the name they give to this force. Freud has called it the "censor". Alfred Adler speaks of it as the "community sentiment". Hypnotisers refer to it as "personal inhibition", which prevents hypnotised subjects from carrying out during hypnotic sleep orders to perform certain actions which, in the waking state, the subject regards as immoral. All these are but manifestations of what in common parlance is termed "conscience". Is it not touching, is it not sublime, that when we delve deeply enough into the human mind, even if we are only on the look-out for traces of man's animal heritage, we should always find these elements of the divine? In truth, we did not need to wait for psychoanalysis to disclose the power of the faith in good and evil. But how brilliant a confirmation it is of the intuitive knowledge of former days; and at the same time how precious a testimony to the profundity of the psychoanalytical method, that psychoanalysis, after all, finds itself unable to say what Lalande once said of God, "I have no need of this hypothesis!"—but must say, on the contrary, "There is nothing more real in man than the divine power of the moral law".

In social life, too, the moral forces of belief always prove the strongest. A policy which is based upon them is the only realist policy, the only opportunism which can win lasting successes. Why is the socialist labour movement continually gaining strength? Not because the class interests which it represents are, per se, becoming more powerful! The reason is that people come to see more and more plainly that the aspirations of the working-class movement are in conformity with a moral demand, whose essential justice even the ruling classes do not venture to deny. The weakness of the opponents of socialism is that they are growing more and more aware of the

uneasiness of their own conscience. Conversely, the recruiting energy of the socialist idea is temporarily weakened whenever the working-class parties incline to pursue a crafty policy of interests, which, though it may occasionally achieve material results, purchases these at the cost of an increasing scepticism among the masses. Why did the German socialists give way to bellicose passion in 1914? Simply because, when patriotism made its moral claim, based upon regard for the welfare of the community, the socialists had no moral arguments to oppose to this claim. All that they had to set up against patriotism was interest. Every one, during the first weeks of the war, felt the stimulus of an epoch of splendid and sublime passion, for people believed that they were helping in the victory of the motives of a community ethic over the selfishness of everyday life. This enthusiasm galvanised all the peoples, rendering them capable of a collective effort unprecedented in history—until it became apparent that this idealism had served only to unchain the most material and most bestial of the lower passions.

If the mentality of the working masses, in the post-war epoch, is stamped with scepticism and cynicism, we must in part blame socialism for this, inasmuch as socialists during the war were too much inclined to pursue a policy of interest. The mentality of which I speak is proof of disillusionment, this meaning proof of an unsatisfied need for faith. Communism would hardly have acquired outside Russia the remarkable prestige which it had shortly after the war if it had not manifested itself as a new faith. If, notwithstanding the intellectual primitiveness of its eschatology, it nevertheless made so deep an impression upon some of the most intelligent members of the working class, and even upon the stratum of intellectuals, this gives yet another proof that the masses have an unsatisfied need for a belief in a new eschatology. I fancy that the day is not far distant when even opportunists will discover that they are throwing away their best trump when they fail to take into account the masses' need for faith. Those who think themselves too clever to take the risk of showing faith, often prove the most stupid after all.

In view of what I have said of the instinctive character of mass movements, I do not suppose any one will imagine that I expect a change of this sort in mass sentiment as the outcome of the diffusion of a new doctrine such as I have been sketching in this book. The masses only react directly to those doctrines which supply them with new watchwords for their struggles of the moment. They do not draw their philosophy from books, and certainly not from books of the present kind. That is why I only address myself to the small number of persons among whom are to be found the possible leaders of the coming generation, those whom a new understanding can inspire to a new way of living. If they succeed in changing themselves until they become shining examples to others, they will, whether they wish it or not, become the leaders of these others. He who knows how to guide himself, can guide others; and no one who has this capacity can help using it. No doubt, a great deal of water will run under the bridges before a spiritual metamorphosis, forming a new group of leaders, can give the impulse to a mass movement. Will this ever happen? If so, when and how? Will a new spirit descend upon mankind, as has happened from time to time in the course of history? This is a secret of the future, whose veil we are unable to lift. All we can say is that a new spirit of this kind has never acted until after a small group of persons has first been animated with it.

The psychical rebirth of socialism, which at first can only be the experience of an élite, will then perhaps become, and more quickly maybe than we now dare to hope, a mass phenomenon. For my own part, I firmly believe that there will soon be a swing of the pendulum, and that the masses will return from the materialist cynicism which now prevails to the religious fervour which animated socialism in its early days. Meanwhile, the fundamental task is to show, to those who already aspire to give a new direction to their social activities, how they can do this without bidding farewell to the understanding of realities. Here, again, we shall at one and the same time obey a moral commandment and act in

accordance with an intelligent calculus of political realities (bearing in mind all the possibilities of influencing the masses by the suggestion of example), when we set to work at the task of educating ourselves without troubling to enquire how many will imitate us. The best way of getting ready for the problematic duties of to-morrow, is to fulfil as well as possible the concrete duties of to-day. In this we shall find so much satisfaction that when we have once tasted it we shall want to go on with the work. What makes life beautiful is, not beautiful dreams, but beautiful actions. When Socrates was asked whether his perfect State really existed, he answered : " It exists only in heaven ; but men can learn, in the light of this divine image, to realise in their world States a beauty which is not very different from that of the perfect State ".



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